The Duke of Gloucesterpresented a Petition from the University of Cambridge, against the Catholic Claims, and stated that he did so, having the honour 112 to hold the office of Chancellor of that University, but that he was anxious to be understood as giving no opinion on one side or the other relative to the subject of the Petition.
§ The Earl of Hardwickeobserved, that due notice had not been given to the nonresident members of the University of the intention to set on foot such a Petition; to the consideration of which, he contended, the attention of the non-resident members ought to have been fairly called, it not being a question of religion, but of political expediency. To shew that the danger to be apprehended from the interference of the Pope was merely ideal, the noble earl observed, with reference to some late proceedings of the Catholic Prelates of Ireland, that the Pope was not to be found, nor could any communication be had with him.
§ The Petition was ordered to lie on the table.
§ Lord Grenvillesaid that he had a similar Petition to present from the University of Oxford. The mere act of presenting a Petition at variance with his own opinions, was a thing so common in parliamentary usage, that he should not have thought it necessary to notice the circumstance. But both the illustrious personage who had preceded him, and himself, stood in a peculiar situation with respect to these Petitions. They come, my lords, from corporate bodies at the head of which we have the honour to be placed; and they purport to be the Petitions of the chancellors as well as of the other members of our two Universities. The illustrious personage has, therefore, thought it necessary to disclaim all participation in the prayer of the Petition which his Royal Highness has presented, and to remind the House that he has always hitherto (and from motives which all who know them must applaud) abstained from giving any opinion on this great question. For myself, however, I must go much further. My opinions upon it have been long publicly avowed. So far from concurring in this Petition, I am convinced that no other expedient could now be devised so certain and so effectual for bringing upon this country the very evils of which the petitioners are apprehensive, as the adoption of that very policy which they so earnestly recommend. Thus much I stated to your lordships on a similar occasion last year, and my opinion remains unaltered. But I have now a still more painful duty to discharge 113 To the declaration of my unqualified dissent from the prayer of this Petition, I must add, that of my strong disapprobation of the terms in which it is expressed. It appears to me, by obvious and necessary construction, to convey a most injurious, unwarranted and groundless aspersion on the motives and principles of some of the best and wisest men both living and dead, who have ever adorned the councils or the senate of this country. It appears to me to extend this reflection even to the proceedings of the legislature itself. Such being, as I think, the import of the words according to their plain sense and meaning, it was matter of grave and serious deliberation in my mind whether I could be justified by any consideration in suffering my name to be affixed, even for form's sake, to such a paper. Nor am I yet sure that I have rightly decided. But if I have erred, it is on that side on which, if I err at all, I should wish my error to be found. I have erred from the desire of facilitating the exercise of the right of petitioning—from the wish to promote free discussion on this momentous question, and to give full scope and due weight to whatever either of argument or of authority can be adduced against those opinions, the success of which has always been best proved by full and unreserved examination.—I was also greatly influenced by my firm persuasion that the words which convey to my mind this highly objectionable sense were nevertheless not so intended by the framers of this Petition. They are men, I am confident, of juster and better regulated minds than to be capable of such a purpose. They know, I am certain, that nothing could be more unbecoming of their own peculiar stations—that nothing could less befit a grave, and reverend, and religious body, than the attempt to judge the consciences of others, and to fix an injurious calumny on the motives of those from whose opinions they may chance to differ. They are also, I must believe, men far too wise, and of judgments infinitely too enlightened, not to be sensible that if disgrace should attach any where, it must fall on the authors of the calumny, and not on those to whom it is applied. For them, therefore, as well as for myself, I publicly disavow any such interpretation of their Petition; and it is in this persuasion only that I could think myself authorised to present it to your lordships, and to move that it may lie on your table.
§ The Petition was ordered to lie on the table.