HL Deb 21 April 1812 vol 22 cc542-8

It is a principle of evangelical moral that we all ought to obey immediately the prince's commands, whenever the sovereign makes use of his rights, and that the object of his precepts is not contrary to the divine law; for then the Apostle says 'obedire magis oportet Deo quam hominibus.' St. Peter in his first Epistle, cap. ii. says, "Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake; whether it be to the king as supreme, or unto governors as unto them that are sent by him." And afterwards, "Servants, be subject to your masters with all fear, not only to the good and gentle, but also to the froward; for this is thank-worthy, if a man for conscience toward God, endure grief, suffering wrongfully." Thus taught St. Peter obedience to the faithful, without opposition to their lawful princes, although of the keys of the Church: neither can their subjects be freed from fealty and obedience.

they may be as unjust and perverse as Nero, in whose life-time the Apostle wrote. St. Paul, a disciple of the same school, gives a similar instruction to the Romans, in his Epistle, chap. xiii. "Whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God, and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation, wherefore he must needs be subject, not only for wrath, but also for conscience sake."

2. The ancient fathers of the church instructed in this doctrine of Christ and of his Apostles, taught every where that when the sovereign exercises his rights and powers, although unjustly, we must implicitly obey his commands, save when they order a violation of the law of God, or the natural law. Thus Tertullian and St. Augustin express themselves upon the same subject.—What command could be more unjust than to order any one into exile on account of the Christian faith! And yet St. Cyprian, in his Epistle the 13th to Rogatian, affirms, that should a Christian, banished by a Gentile Emperor or proconsul, return to his country in opposition to such an order, he ought then to be punished, not for being a Christian, but on the score of disobedience to his so-vereign.—Theodoret, lib. iv. cap. 14, in writing of St. Eusebius, bishop of Samosata, who was banished by the emperor Valens, which his people wanted to prevent, states, that he only obeyed the laws of the Apostles, which commanded strict obedience to princes and magistrates; and that he therefore immediately embarked for the place of his exile. The same Theodoret, lib. ii. cap. 27, farther relates of the two bishops, Eleusius of Cizyco, and Silvanus of Tarsus, that when they were threatened by the emperor Constantine with banishment, on account of their defence of the true faith against the Arians, they replied, that the emperor had the power to punish them, but they had the liberty to choose between pious and impious tenets.—St. Athanasius, in his Apology to Constantius, num. 20, explicitly declares that he will not return to Alexandria, from whence he was exiled, until the emperor's humanity should allow him to be recalled. Before this he had likewise stated, that he should even have obeyed the questor of that city, since he was a minister of the emperor.—

In canon law it stands, that kings acknowledge no superiors in temporals, and that appeals concerning temporals should

All these holy bishops knew very well that these commands of the emperor were unjust, iniquitous, and tyrannical: but as on the one hand they could not perceive that the object of these orders were to affect any personal disobedience on their part to the law of God, and on the other they felt that the emperor exercised his lights in so acting, they obeyed without opposition, and declared their readiness to submit to these unjust commands; following implicitly the instructions laid down by Christ and "his Apostles to all those who professed Christianity.

3. Since Athanasius, Melecius, Cyrillus, and Eusebius, obeyed Constantius and Julianus, who abused their authority, and thought, and declared, that they ought so to do; who can discharge the bishops of Portugal from their duty of executing punctually so justifiable a command as the present order issued by our pious and prudent sovereign, prohibiting all his subjects from appeals or any communication with Rome?—This ordinance has in its favour not merely the innate and manifest piety of the king our lord, which so transcendently shines as an hereditary virtue in all his actions, but claims it likewise as the practice of all Catholic kings, who by such prohibitions avenge the wrongs offered to their sovereignty without condemning the true religion. On the other hand, it does not appertain to the subject to investigate or dispute the justice or injustice of such royal proceedings; nor is the sovereign obliged to communicate to his subjects the motives that have induced him thus to act; because it is an established maxim, that when the object of the command does not exceed the limits of the regal power, but is contained within them, the presumption of justice is always in favour of the king. Besides it is equally certain that the object or intent of the present decree, which forbids to all Portuguese any communication with Rome, belongs to the authority of the sovereign, who has the exclusive right to determine, whether his subjects should or should not be permitted to go out of his kingdom, or to communicate with any foreign sovereigns or courts. Therefore should even the justice of his Majesty not be so evident as it is by the repealed manifestoes which our court has published, still upon the principle of charity

not be brought to the pope's tribunal. Philip the Fourth of France, in a dispute

towards our fellow creatures, and upon that of religious submission towards our sovereign, we ought all to presume that this royal decree is justifiable.

4. But let any one presume (which I do not even suppose) that the present decree is unjust; surely it is not more so than that decree of Constantius or Valens, which ordered Athanasius and Eusebius from Alexandria and Samosata, where God wished them to reside as bishops over their flocks; and yet they did both quit those cities, declaring that it was their duty so to do, in obedience to the emperor's commands. This decree is not more unjustifiable than another which the same emperor Constantius issued against nearly 600 bishops, who composed the general synod of the west, detaining them for several months at Rimini, during the severest part of the winter, under very great corporal sufferings, and to the most serious spiritual evil of as many dioceses. And yet the whole synod, though legal, (for Catholic it always was) petitioned the emperor to return to their provinces, declaring that without such permission they could not separate.—It is not more unjust than the decree of Mauritius, by which he prohibited his soldiers from becoming monks; when St. Gregory obeyed the emperor's commands by promulgating the law, thus confessing, that as a subject he ought so to do, although not in conformity with God's ordinance.—Finally, it is not more unjust than that decree of which Innocent 3, treats in his letter to a bishop of England, thus establishing the same doctrine. From this letter is taken the cap. Pastoralis, lib. 1, tit. 29. De Officio et potestate Judicis delegati.

5. Finally, let the nature or quality of this royal decree be what it may, certain it is, that by it all communication with Rome is prohibited de facto. It is also certain that in virtue thereof, all Portuguese are prohibited de facto from having re course to the See of Rome, under heavy penalties. It is likewise clear that neither the bishops nor the subjects can remove these obstacles to the appeals to Rome, nor impede the decree. We are therefore in a situation in which we may with truth say, that we cannot have recourse to Rome or to the Apostolic See without its being the fault of those who wish to have recourse to those appeals from which they

with Pope Boniface the Eighth, in 1303, addresses him in the following words:

are prevented. The bishops ought therefore to act as if the said communication was impeded by war, pestilence, or any such cause, as a long schism, when it is not known who is the true Pope; without examining or enquiring whether the war is just or not, or whether the neutrality which the sovereign orders to be observed in his kingdom, by not obeying in such a doubtful case either the one or the other of the pontiffs, is prudent or not. Thus have the bishops of France and Spain acted in times of schisms and wars, and thus ought the bishops of Portugal now to act in the present rupture, remembering the excellent advice of St. Augustin in his book 22, against Faustus.

In Gallia, Belgio, et Sicilia Pontificii Legati ne minimam partem jurisdictions exercent. Antequam autem in Galliam admittantur, indigent permissione Regis; bulla Legationis Parlamento Parisiensi exhibetur, in qua si quid inveniatur libertatibus ecclesiæ adversum, illud modificatur; sic verificatæ, approbatæ, et modificatæ facultates Nuntii registrantur, in omnibus Regiis curiis (Parlements) ad quarum districtus eadem facultates extenduntur; denique jurat Nuntius, se non aliter, quam ita, et quandiu Regi placitum fuerit, his approbatis facultatibus usurum. [Hericourt, Loix Ecclesiastiques, part I, chap. 7, §. 6. seqq. Apud Justinus Febronius de Statu Ecclesiæ, cap. 2, §. 10.]

In Germania Nuntii Apostolici ampliore adhuc utuntur potestate, quam in aliis regnis; cognoscunt nempe ilia, et decidunt causas in secunda et ulteriore instantia; non tamen id peraeque in omnibus Germaniæ partibus: Moguntini e. g. nuntio ad tractum Rheni nihil jurisdictionis in sua Archidiæcesi permittunt. Illæ variationes, tam temporum, quam locorum, sufficiunt ad probandum, omnia hæc, quantum cum essentialibus juribus Primatus necessariam non habent connexionem, mutationibus esse obnoxia, neque aliud fere habere fundamentum quam in origine falsas decretales, in conservatione majorem vel respective minorem potentiam, vigilantiam, et genuinorum jurium notitiam; quae omnia in sacris non faciunt jus. [Justinus Febronius, de Statu Ecclesiæ, cap. 2. §. 10 de Primatu.]

Quod multi in Papa Jurisdictionem vocant, nos Authoritatem dicimus. Quis

"We should have your Madness to know that we acknowledge no superior in ternporals

rectius loquatur, judicent peritiores. Forte de re convenimus, sic que inutiles esset de voce concertatio. Saltern nos cum Tri-dentino loquimur, quod quoties de prima-riis Apostolicæ sedis in Ecclesia juribus agit, semper authoritatis, nunquam jurisdic-tionis vocabulo utitur. Yid. Sess. 7, in fine Præf. de Reform, et sess. 25, cap. 21. [Justin. Febr. ib. cap. 2, § 11.]

At the Council of Constance the two ambassadors of king John 1, of Portugal, protested against the Pope's interference in temporals, either directly or indirectly; as appears by the sess. 22, of the said council, which concludes in these words:

"That no order either of the Pope or of the council should be carried into execution, or in any way obeyed in the king's dominions, kingdoms or lands, without the king our lord's previous information there of; and a notification of his consent, will, and pleasure signified thereon, conform-ably to the protest."

The same regulation was observed in the reign of John 2; for the reason stated by the learned Van Espen in his Treatise De Placito Regio, part 11, can. 111, §.2.

Justinus Febronius relates the same of Portugal, De Statu Ecclesiæ, cap. 9, §. 8; and to this day it is observed with respect to the Pope's Nuncio, as is to be found in Scabra's Deducçao Chrouologica, part 2, prov. 14, §. 139.

"When the Apostolic Nuncio arrives at Lisbon, he calls on the secretary of state for foreign affairs, and delivers to him the original brief of his commission: your majesty orders it to be examined by the state judges and your privy council, in whom you confide for their virtue, learning, and prudence, in order that you may learn their opinion and advice upon matters of such high importance, and be enabled to take your determination on the subject. This royal resolution is communicated by the secretary of state to the Nuncio: intimating to him in the most explicit terms those points, which are incompatible with the sovereignty of your majesty, the public peace of your subjects, or the laws and customs of your kingdom; and thus prohibiting him from exercising any of his powers which do not accord with your determination; at the same time the Nuncio is informed that his original

but God alone." Charles the Sixth of France, who reprobated as much as the

brief will remain at the secretary of state's office, until he acknowledges the communication made by the minister, and accompanies it with an assurance of conforming to the restrictions intimated to him. Upon the receipt of the Nuncio's reply the secretary of state returns him the original brief of his commission; and immediately communicates his answer. 1st. To the lord chief justice (Regedor das Justicas) in order that he may redress every grievvance, upon an appeal of any of your subjects, in consequence of an attempt set up by the Nuncio in his jurisdiction contrary to the tenor or the spirit of the said restrictions: 2d. To the governor of the court of justice at Oporto, for the same purpose: 3dly. To the tribunal of the Palace (Desembargo do Paço) on account of the provisions there granted in cases of appeal: and, 4thly, To the prelates and superiors of all regular orders, to the intent that they may govern their inferiors without any foreign influence."

As to the election of bishops in Portugal, it has always been exercised by the king, as is positively asserted by the Portuguese Jurisconsult, Paschal Josephus Mellii, in his Institutionum Juris civilis Luzitani, Lib. 1. tit. v. §.111, in these words: "In primis itaque Reges nostri ab antiquissimis inde temporibus ad particulars imperii sui ecclesias regendas, Episcopos nominarunt, et hanc nimirum facultatem ab ipsius regni primordiis execuerunt, quæ hodie nobilior quidem juris patronatus Regii pars habetur."

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