§ The order of the day for the consideration of the Prince Regent's Message on this subject being moved, the Message was read by the clerk, after which.
448The Marquss Wellesleyrose, for the purpose of moving an Address to his Royal Highness on the occasion. It was one, he observed, on which he naturally expected that under the circumstances of the case, the general concurrence of their lordships, would be signified. The facts and circumstances to which the message referred, were of indisputable notoriety, and the policy and wisdom of the measure to be proposed rested upon principles of public faith, and incontrovertible grounds of public wisdom. On these grounds, in the present stage of the discussion, it would be the lessnecessary to enter into the reasons upon which his Royal Highness founded his expectations of receiving the general concurrence and support of their lordships. They all knew and should feel, that the present moment was the very crisis of the fortunes of our magnanimous ally; she was in the very zenith of her exertions, co-operating with us against the common enemy; and surely it was impossible to think that an idea or a desire could be entertained of checking or suspending the successful progress of our common exertions. The exertions made by Portugal, independent of the aid she received from this country, were of themselves considerable; but how much more efficacious these may be rendered with due assistance from this country, may be inferred from what was now well known to their lordships to have resulted from the aid already afforded by us to Portugal. She had been stimulated thereby to a degree of exertion before unknown in the annals of the country, and these efforts, when assisted by and combined with those made by Britain, had produced a tide of success unparalleled in the history of any country in Europe. Her present formidable military force has risen from a lower scale of establishment and discipline than could be paralleled in any country of Europe; but it had proceeded progressively under the inspirating auspices of excellentand skilful British officers to its present state of perfection. To prove the value and efficiency of the Portuguese troops, he need only add, that during the campaign which had just passed, they had been sharers in all the toils endured, and partners in all the glories achieved, by the British soldiery. But this was not all; the system to which his Royal Highness in his gracious message referred, had proved a pregnant and perennial source of other important advantages. It tended 449 to exalt the Portuguese militia to a degree of vigour and activity worthy of a powerful regular army; and further, it was the means of bringing forward an armed peasantry, who may well be styled the great defensive mass of the country. The more the line of policy which had been pursued was considered, the more its advantages would appear. An organized militia was established, which could act in co-operation with a regular and powerful army stationed in a central situation, and opposed to the main body of the enemy's force. The advantages derivable from such a military system of defence or annoyance were reciprocal. Such different descriptions of force operated in favour of each other, and thus a two-fold advantage was obtained over the enemy. A question, indeed, might be started, or rather a point to be considered, was, what had been the result? To this he had to answer, that it was undeniable that the country had been hitherto successfully maintained against the military power of the enemy. Under all these circumstances, a doubt could never have been entertained as to the general policy of defending Portugal. She had made every effort on her part; and on every principle of national honour and sound policy, she should have the aid of our utmost efforts. To look further at this part of the question, he observed he had never heard any person deny that the defence of Portugal was at the same time also a main instrument for the defence of the whole Peninsula; neither could it be denied that from such a quarter we could act with the greatest advantage in case of any great or favourable event occurring ill Spain. The only remaining question to be considered, then, was, whether the proposed aid towards the defence of Portugal should be continued, or whether—he would not use a stronger term—we should with an untimely hand, after rousing the slumbering energies of this people, damp the spirit which had been thus created, instead of feeding it, and renewing its vigour?—whether we should not stimulate the exertions, encourage the hopes and furnish aid to the patriotic efforts of a country nobly struggling for her independence?—whether we should not lend her additional assistance to strengthen and invigorate those powers which already exist, and are in a train of success, to improve those great and incalculable advantages, which such a 450 train of circumstances and such a state of things naturally and obviously present? There undoubtedly would be many occasions for regularly and fully discussing the whole of this important subject, and for such discussions no man could be more anxious than himself. But in addition to the various other reasons for the adoption of the measure in question, he must advert to that unanswerable consideration, that it had stood the test of experience, and proved its merits. We were bound therefore, equally in interest and in honour, to continue our assistance. There remained now only one other point upon which he would trouble their lordships. It was to be recollected that his Royal Highness had, through his commissioners, expressed his desire to hand over to his Royal Father on his happy restoration, which he trusted in God might speedily take place, every part of the system of government, every branch of national policy, and every description of public affairs, unimpaired, and in the same state in which he had received them, unaltered and undiminished. On every ground, therefore, whether referring to the glory, the honour, or the interest of the country, their lordships, he trusted, would feel it incumbent on them to concur with him in the address he should have the honour to propose. The Noble Marquis then moved an Address to the Prince Regent, corresponding with his Royal Highness's message, and assuring him of the concurrence of the House in enabling his Royal Highness to continue the assistance afforded last year to Portugal, and for affording such further aid as circumstances may require.
§ Lord Grenvillesaid, that the situation in which their lordships at present stood was peculiar and unexampled, a situation which would by no means justify any relaxation in the discharge of their duty to the country, but which imposed on them embarrassments and doubts as to the manner in which that duty ought to be discharged. It was notorious that, on account of the calamity which had befallen them, the constitutional relation between the crown and its ministers and Parliament was completely suspended. He had no idea, however, that the functions of Parliament were also suspended. He had no idea that they were not to adopt what measures might appear best for the interest of the country—that they were not to adopt what would place the country in 451 the most favourable situation when his Majesty should have happily to resume the government—but that they were to put the country into the same situation in which it was at the commencement of his Majesty's malady—that they were to endeavour to arrest the progress of time—that they were to pay no regard to the happiness and prosperity of the millions with whose rights they were entrusted, but merely to consider what was the precise situation of the country, and what was the exact state of its relations on the 25th of October, and to preserve it critically in that situation. On that 25th of October, after all the glories and all the triumphs which this country had obtained, its situation was in no small degree disastrous and calamitous; but, however disastrous and calamitous that situation might then have been, it would be happy for his Majesty, and happy for his subjects, that the country should be delivered over to him as it then was. But ministers have not arrested the wheel of the revolution that was going on; they had not arrested the progress of the calamity which has desolated Europe. By their notion of preserving the country in the same state, both as to internal policy and external relations, as at the commencement of his Majesty's malady, ministers meant nothing more than the accession of every measure which could be advantageous to the public interest, and this from some supposed desire of the Prince Regent, not arising from a concern for the advantage of the people, but with that cold and narrow view of merely placing the country in the exact situation in which he received it. He was convinced that the Prince Regent never held such sentiments. But whatever were his sentiments, it was their part to consider what was their duty—not what was the situation of the country at any one period—but how they might, in the existing crisis, with their counsels, best produce the happiness, the prosperity, and the glory of its people. He must, therefore, he said, take the liberty to dismiss from the present discussion what may have been the situation in former periods; because, in his opinion, it was the view of its actual situation only which their lordships were called on to entertain.
In the little that had been said upon the real question before them, there was one thing he should particularly remark on, as possibly in that House the only opportu- 452 nity they would have of considering it, the close of the Session being near. The whole question was agitated as if the assistance to be continued were to be only of the same amount as that voted last year.—If he could banish from his mind all that had taken place during a former discussion, he should imagine that they were merely called on at present for a renewal of their vote; and as they then decided to give one million to the Portuguese, that all that was now proposed was, to keep up the same force. Would it be conceivable by any man who heard the speech of the noble marquis, that they were now called on for double that sum? It was spoken of as a thing of course. It was said they were asked to do nothing more than not to withdraw their assistance. The question, however, for their consideration was very different. It was not whether they were to continue their assistance, but whether, in the situation of this country, it was safe or politic to grant two millions for the support of an additional body of Portuguese troops?—Of this addition they were told nothing. Last year they were told distinctly what was to be the application of the sum voted—there was something like the semblance of an estimate—they were told that it would be expended on a certain army of Portuguese troops—but now they were not even told that an additional million was wanted, still less were they told how that million was to be disposed of, whether the pay was to be increased, or whether the forces were to be increased, or what was the controul under which the disbursement of that expenditure was to be placed?—Of all these circumstances they were told nothing—they were left in utter darkness, and the conclusion was conceived to be irresistible, that because one million was granted last year, it became necessary this year to grant two millions. This system, so long as it was persisted in, was hastening the country with accumulating rapidity, to that ruin which seemed almost inevitable.
It was not his object to give opposition to this or to that particular grant; he did not mean to oppose the application of this or of any other particular sum, but he gave his decided opposition to the whole system. The situation of the continent, he contended, was such, that without great assistance from the natives it was impossible, with any military efforts of our's on the continent, to resist that power which has all Europe at command. When he 453 stated this, it was necessary to guard against misrepresentation. It was undoubtedly roost desirable to this country to witness and to aid in the emancipation of Europe. It was most desirable to keep this consideration constantly in view, that the moment may arrive when this country shall again successfully resist, and may finally overthrow, the common enemy of Europe. But the struggle could never be carried on by this country on the continent single-handed. In conformity to the practice of our ancestors, this country, whose chief strength lies in her navy, cannot successfully contend out of her own element, without powerful military cooperation on the continent of Europe. When that subject was first discussed, he had told their lordships, that many modes of acting were open, without compromising or committing their army in vain; and that the line of conduct pursued required greater efforts than they were able to continue. Undoubtedly, if the question was, whether it was desirable that Spain and Portugal should be relieved from the yoke, millions of treasure, and the lives of thousands, could not be better employed than in so noble a cause. Every emotion of the heart would prompt us to join in so glorious a cause; every freeman would rejoice that so iniquitous a plan of subjugation should be frustrated. Would to God that such a prospect existed! no individual would more seriously rejoice at it than he should. He would not only consent that assistance should be given, but he should wish that every sacrifice should be made for such an object. With regard to Portugal, they had, in addition to that common feeling, the long-continuance of treaties and the strong sense of united interests to influence them. But in the consideration of the political interests of a great country, it was not merely what was desirable, that ought to be adopted: their lordships were bound to consider and determine, in the first instance, whether any probability existed, that any efforts, which it was possible to make, could be successful; or whether, by mistrusting those efforts, which under a more seasonable application of them might succeed, they would not only make them frustrate the immediate object in view, but also contribute to produce the very reverse of that which they were intended to accomplish. It was not because he entertained an opinion that the country should abstain from generous, if only useful and possible, ef- 454 forts; it was not because he entertained the doctrine that they were not interested in the fate of Europe; it was, because he saw no hope of salvation to the country so long as Europe remained under subjection to France, that he wished her at present carefully to husband her resources. It was not from selfish motives that he wished their lordships to act; it was not merely from considerations of their own advantage; but from the most generous of all motives, that they might at last be able to act with effect, and in the great cause of all nations to employ their whole energies with success. They had been told that night, that it was proper still to continue their efforts; and they were told this as if up to that moment these efforts had been successful. "Look back" (said his lords ship) "to Spain—look to the sacrifices, to the losses which have been there sustained, in wild and impracticable projects, and see the situation in which Spain is at this moment—look to the immediate object of this motion, Portugal. What had been the fruits of the operations there? What is now the state of Spain? What the situation of Portugal? What return has been made to this country, what benefit has she reaped from the immense exertions, the enormous sums that have already been expended in aid of that cause? All that we have been told in answer to this question is, that the enemy has not yet been able to achieve the conquest and subjugation of Portugal; that the British army is still there.—Yes, the British army is still there; but does it possess more of the country than the ground which it actually occupies? This is all that is held out to your lordships respecting the present state of affairs in that country. As to the future, not one word has been uttered to encourage our hopes, to cheer our prospects, to afford the slightest consolation for all the efforts and sacrifices which have already been fruitlessly made in pursuit of the same unattainable objects. We are not even told that all this enormous expence will tend to defend and ultimately secure Portugal. The only reason and encouragement with which we are favoured in justification of it is, that it is hoped we may long continue to maintain that narrow spot of ground which our army now occupies. Thus, in hazarding our best means, we do not essentially contribute to help or save Portugal, while we vainly drain our own resources, and risk our own safety—those resources which, if prudently managed, 455 and providently laid up for a more propitious moment, would not only secure, but might also be effectually employed in the support and defence of other countries. Not that in making these observations I would be understood by your lordships as not taking the most lively interest in the cause of the peninsula, and as not being as willing as any man to make every effort and sacrifice in support of that cause, if in making such efforts and sacrifices there were any fair prospect of their not being made in vain. Upon this point I have been grossly and shamefully misrepresented. Never have I said, never was it in my intention to say, that the British empire was not directly and deeply interested in the fate of the peninsula—on the contrary, it was because I had the cause of Spain and Portugal sincerely and Warmly at heart, that I felt anxious, that your lordships should pause in this wild and mad career of thoughtless prodigality—that we should look our own situation in the face, and learn from the contemplation of it the necessity of economising our national resources, not with sordid or selfish views, but that we may be able at a period more favourable than the present, to lend to the cause of the nations of the peninsula, or to that of any other country similarly situated, that support and those exertions which, when made under all the circumstances of our present situation, must be found not only wholly unavailing to our allies, but highly injurious to ourselves."
He should be the last person, he observed, whether by speech or insinuation to detract from the merits of brave men armed and fighting in their country's cause. God forbid that he should ever harbour such sentiments. He was willing to admit that irregular and regular troops, acting in concert, were the best means of defending a country, and that without the application of both these species of force, they could not avail themselves of all the resources of war. But the question went higher than this. It was necessary before this, in any circumstances, and much more in our present circumstances, to inquire whether there was any rational prospect that these two millions, added to the enormous profusion which had already taken place, would produce any adequate advantage to compensate such a burden. They were bound to ask this question tinder any circumstances, and even under the most prosperous circumstances; but surely they were much more bound to ask 456 this question now, when they were aware of the condition in which the finances of this country were actually placed. He had no wish to aggravate the final issue of the present difficulties; but when he considered what these difficulties were, he could not but think the present measure was exceedingly impolitic and ill-timed. It was not usual for this country, he knew not indeed if there was a single exception, even in the most prosperous times, to subsidize foreign troops before first examining the estimates of our own expenditure, and the situation of our own country. This was a good and salutary course. It enabled the members of both Houses to know that they had discharged their duty, and that they had not lavished the money of the public before they were apprised of what were the demands on it, and what the sacrifices required. How then should they take upon them to grant these two millions, before they had ascertained what sacrifices were demanded, what resources they had to supply these demands, what were the exigencies of the navy, and what protection could be afforded to the commerce of the country, if any commerce remained? They were told in the speech of the King's ministers, not that the revenues of this country had fallen off, but that there existed some financial difficulties in Ireland. When in former times extraordinary demands were made on this country, it was known whence these demands could be supplied, by the prosperous and growing commerce of the country, This enabled them to stand against a host of enemies; and that commerce has yet enabled them to maintain a proud front of defiance to the enemy. But look to the present agriculture and commerce of the country. With respect to its agriculture, in what situation were they when called upon to relinquish the main system of that agriculture? and, with respect to commerce, did they not know, that there was adding to the mass of paper at this moment in existence, the sum of 6,000,000l. as if there was not paper enough already in the country, in order to protect their commerce and manufactures from destruction? As to the fruits that would result from this measure, he should express himself more fully in a future discussion, and he even here merely considered it as one feature of the waste of those resources to which they were to look in their financial difficulties. A measure something similar took place at a 457 former period, the propriety of which he very much doubted at the time; but then the evil merely arose from want of confidence in those resources which existed, which had only to be called out; whereas at this time the evil lay in the stagnation of commerce itself. But he would not dwell on the discussion of this topic, he wished merely to point to the singular period they had fallen on, to vote such enormous sums. They were told that they were not only bound in policy, but that their good faith was pledged to continue their assistance. As to good faith or policy, he could not see that either called for this addition, though aware that the union of interests long subsisting between the two countries might on ordinary occasions have its force; but they had to recollect, that there was another country with which they were yet more closely and vitally connected by every tie, namely, Ireland. He did not speak of Ireland with regard to the general policy adopted there, nor to show the conduct that reason and common sense would have there adopted, but merely with regard to its financial situation; and he thought that before they were called on to pay Portugal for the maintenance of her own soldiers, they ought to consider what means they could adopt to fill up the deficiency in the revenue of Ireland. He called upon them to weigh the ways and means that remained for this, as he should be glad to know what these ways and means were. If the revenue of that country was deficient between one and one and a half millions below the ordinary expences, it might be prudent to advert to it before supplying the deficiency of Portugal. On the whole, therefore, he should give his decided negative to the motion, because he disapproved of the whole system; because three campaigns had more and more shewn its impolicy; because every circumstance was at present adverse to the prolongation of the contest; because he saw that system hastening the country fast into a gulph of inevitable ruin; and because, although at no time justifiable, it was brought forward at a time perfectly irregular and unparliamentaiy, before parliament had any information as to the actual state of resources of the nation, or their adequacy to so large an additional expenditure.
The Earl of Liverpoolwas surprised the noble lord should complain that no intimation had been given of the amount of the 458 aid now proposed to be afforded Portugal. Was not the amount of that grant most explicitly staled in the address which had just been moved? Did it not appear from the votes of the other House of Parliament, now on their lordship's table? Had he not himself declared it explicitly on a former night, when the question respecting the amount of the intended subsidy was put to him by a noble lord? So much for the deficiency of information in that respect, of which the noble lord so loudly complained. He would now say, that there existed at present important grounds in addition to those which induced their lordships last session to agree to the grant of money to Portugal; and these additional grounds fully justified, in his opinion, the addition that was now proposed to that subsidy. He had only to recal to the recollection of their lordships the circumstances which passed when the first subsidy was proposed. With respect to the propriety of the assistance, the noble lord last session opposed it on the ground that the opportunity for acting was past, and that no man could hope for the creation of a Portuguese force of the description proposed.
§ Lord Grenvillesaid, that had he misrepresented his sentiments that night, he should have waited to the end of his speech; but as he was misrepresenting his sentiments on a former occasion, it was proper to expose the misrepresentation immediately.
The Earl of Liverpoolcontinued to ob serve, that such had been at the time, not only the view of the noble lord, but it wag widely entertained by many who were most anxious to give every assistance to Portugal, and who differed totally from the noble lord in sentiment. They had in this instance proposed the measure submitted by the motion of his noble friend, upon no speculative ground, but founded on an experience of exertions on the part of the Portuguese, which had exceeded the expectations even of the most sanguine; and far surpassed any calculations in which he himself' had ventured to indulge. As to the general policy of subsidies granted to foreign powers, he had frequently before discussed that subject with the noble baron He knew that it was the opinion of many, that they generally tended rather to 459 cramp the energies than to call forth the resources of those states. He was aware that it was a common argument to say-that we did not get the value of our money. But the present was an occasion which could not be tried by any such principle; it was made evident that, in return for the expenditure of the sum voted last year, we had succeeded in gaining greater advantages than were anticipated by any person in the country. The Portuguese bad not only a large efficient regular force, but a numerous militia, making, exclusive of the Ordinanza, an army of between 80 and 90,000 men; an army which had already on numerous occasions contributed essentially to the safety of their country. There were persons now in London, by communication with whom it was easy to ascertain the important fact, that at the battle of Busaco the Portuguese troops acted in a manner deserving of the highest encomiums. From these circumstances, and from a reference to what had actually been done, their lordships had the satisfaction of seeing that what to some had appeared impossible, to others extremely doubtful, had now been fully realised. The noble baron had asked, how was the sun, which parliament was now called on to gram, to be applied? He wished to answer distinctly, to military purposes only; and he felt the highest satisfaction in informing the House, that four fifths of the whole revenue of Portugal itself, had been appropriated to the same purposes. There was, nevertheless, a deficiency still under the original estimate, arising in a great measure from the increased prices of the necessary supplies. The ground, however, on which he particularly recommended the vote, was the degree and amount of the exertions that had been made in Portugal towards raising an efficient force.
There were some other topics of the noble lord's speech, on which he felt desirous of making a few observations. Although unquestionably he felt all the warmth and enthusiasm which the situation of the nations on the Peninsula kindled in every British mind, yet he must declare that the government of this country had not conducted their measures by any views or principles of a romantic character. On the contrary, they had acted on a firm persuasion, that in aiding Spain and Portugal they were effectually supporting the cause of Great Britain. He appealed to the policy of our ancestors, 460 which had always regarded Holland and the Peninsula as those parts of Europe with which it was essential to our best interests to maintain a close connection. In pursuit of this object, thus deemed of such importance, the best blood of our country was lavished a century ago. That House had at one period come to a solemn resolution, that this country never could make peace with safety, so long as the crowns of France and Spain were united in one family. How different, and how much more menacing were the circumstances of the present time, and how much more formidable were the projects of the present emperor of France! It certainly was desirable that all parts of the continent should be delivered from the domination now exercised over them; but there might be a period when it would be useless and imprudent to lend them any assistance, when it was at the same time an object of the wisest policy to persevere in every effort for the preservation of the independence of the nations on the Peninsula.
He now came to the question of practicability. He admitted its importance, but considered experience as its best test. If the House looked back to the commencement of the contest in 1793, he believed it would be impossible to name a conjuncture that presented a fairer prospect. The campaign of 1805 was over in three months; in as short a period the Russian, war was terminated; and in a still shorter the Prussian monarchy was overthrown. If they looked to the duration of the war in Spain and Portugal, they found themselves in the third year of an unremitted struggle. In 1809, the House was told that it was perfectly vain to contend against the power of France; in 1810, this prediction was repealed; and now, in 1811, they still heard the same assertions. He was, however, happy to say, that there was not a single province In Spain in which the enemy had yet succeeded in establishing an unresisted authority. The contest, compared to any other, which the French had had to sustain, had been great, had been gigantic; and he was convinced that the mind of the Spanish people was yet unconquered, and he believed unconquerable. It would be a new fact in history, if a nation rising as Spain had risen, could be overcome. As to what had been said by the noble baron, of the British army possessing no more of Portugal than the circumscribed space 461 within its entrenchments, he would beg leave to remind him that there were four provinces in that kingdom which not a French soldier had hitherto entered. The situation of the army was that, which had been chosen by its commander as one which enabled him to oppose the enemy with the greatest advantage and effect. And here he would ask, had not the character of French wars and French armies been somewhat changed by the events of the last three years? Whether the tone of that government was what it used to be, when the French ruler proclaimed his march to be irresistible, and announced with such presuming confidence his intentions of driving us into the sea?
The noble lord had objected to the time and form of the vote proposed, which he considered as unusual and unparliamentary. He could, however, produce many instances in which similar votes had been passed, immediately after the army estimates had been laid before the House. As to its amount, and the means of the country as connected with it, he must again express his decided opinion, that so long as there was a fair prospect of success, it was the policy of this country to avert the battle from its own shores. He believed that nine-tenths of the country would rather continue to sustain the burdens or privations it might impose, than abandon the struggle in the Peninsula. The noble baron had dwelt on the interests of Ireland: but how must her danger be increased, if the western coasts of Spain and Portugal should be in the possession of the enemy. So powerfully did this consideration operate on his mind, that he must conceive Ireland more, if possible, than any other part of the empire interested in the present crisis of the campaign. Should all the exertions that had been made ultimately fail, and the conflict be at length transferred to our own shores, we should still reap this important advantage from the present measures, that we should have an experienced army to depend on. When the fate of Russia and Prussia so clearly shewed that it was not to regular forces that the safety of nations could be always securely confided, if those forces were without experience, it must be gratifying and consolatory to know, that in the last extremity there would be a British army who had acquired a practical skill in the arts of war, who would be then entrusted with the defence of their native land.
The Earl of Grosvenorobserved, that 462 when he recollected the sanguine hopes which had been expressed concerning the probable results of our expeditions to the Peninsula, he could not help feeling considerable disappointment. He was willing' yet to indulge an expectation that something might be done, though it must depend on many contingencies, and particularly on the conduct of his Majesty's ministers, who were acting under a most heavy responsibility. It appeared, however, that we must no longer look for the voluntary exertions of the natives in the Peninsula, who were henceforth to be dependent on our subsidies. After several further observations, the noble earl said, that he could not entirely acquiesce in the sentiments of his noble friend (lord Grenville), and should therefore assent to the motion.
§ The original question was then put and carried.