The Earl of Liverpoolstated, that the only material alteration was giving a discretionary power to Courts Martial, either to inflict corporal punishment, or to sentence to imprisonment.—The House then resolved itself into a Committee on the Bill.
The Earl of Radnorsuggested an alteration in a part of the Articles of War, which, however, he did not mean to press at the present moment. By one of the Articles, the Judge Advocate (in cases where there was no private prosecutor) was directed to prosecute at Courts Martial in the name of his Majesty. The Judge Advocate was also the adviser of the court. It happened in one instance within his knowledge, that there was an argument on a point at a Court Martial, between the Judge Advocate, who was the prosecutor, and the counsel for the prisoner, and the court being about to deliberate upon the point, strangers were ordered to withdraw, and the counsel for the prisoner was, of course, obliged to retire, whilst the Judge Advocate remained. He thought in such 368 cases it was scarcely possible for the Judge Advocate to do his duty. His object, therefore, was to propose that every warrant constituting a Court Martial, where there was no private prosecutor, should also appoint a prosecutor, distinct from the Judge Advocate.
The Earl of Liverpoolobserved, that the practice generally was to appoint a prosecutor, if there was no private prosecutor, and that at all events the Judge Advocate had no right to vote at the court. He would, however, make inquiry, and consider the noble earl's suggestion.
The Earl of Radnorthen suggested the expediency of altering the clause respecting the period of bringing offences before Courts Martial. At present it stood that no Court Martial could be held respecting any offence which appeared to have been committed more than three years before. This time, he thought, was, in some instances, too long, and in others too short. He proposed to reduce it to a year, with respect to Courts Martial summoned by subordinate authorities; that it should be three years with reference to Courts Martial directed by his Majesty, giving a larger period, extending to five years, in distant parts.
The Earl of Liverpoolpromised to make inquiry, and to consider the suggestion by the next stage of the Bill.
The Earl of Rosslynthought the period of a year would be in many cases too short, as evidence could not probably be obtained, particularly respecting matters of account, within the time.
§ Earl Stanhoperose to propose a separate clause to the Bill, of the justice, policy, and propriety of which, he was confident that every noble lord must be sensible. The clause which he should have the honour of moving would go to rescue a very numerous class of men from the most despotic tyranny, the most desperate oppression which was ever attempted to be exercised over human beings. Their lordships must be aware of certain circumstances which, from their recent occurrence, it was unnecessary for him to state, which made the adoption of the clause he had in view, not only expedient, but absolutely necessary. Their lordships must bear in mind, that nearly the half of the British navy and army was composed of dissenters from the established church, that those dissenters amounted in number to four or five millions of persons, if not more; and that the House must be sensi- 369 ble of the serious consequences that might ensue from any severe and unjust measure that should affect so large a class of the community. He would not now repeat the expressions and distinctions made use of in discussions of this topic by the Noble Secretary of State. It was his wish and intention to keep clear of every thing irritating and exasperating. It should, in his humble opinion, also be the wish and study of ministers to abstain from all measures of an irritating and exasperating nature, and it was with a view to afford them an opportunity of manifesting such a disposition that he should move the clause he had prepared. Could their lordships perceive any thing more cruelly tyrannical, more insultingly oppressive, than that a large class of men, the Roman Catholics, for instance, or any other description of dissenters, should be compelled to adopt a mode of worship of which they did not approve, or be prevented from pursuing that which their conscience represented to them as the best; yet such practices had prevailed. And here he could not but refer to that admirable letter of lord Harrington on this subject, which shewed that noble earl to be as honest as he was an honourable man; and which so justly discountenanced such a practice. What would their lordships, who were Protestants, say, feel, and think, of a regulation, by which they were compelled to go to mass, and join in a worship which they were taught to consider as idolatrous? If their thoughts and feelings would justly be indignant at the idea of such a compulsion, must they not confess that the minds of the Catholics, under similar circumstances; would, with equal justice, revolt at the idea of such an attempt at oppression? They would no doubt recollect, that the essence of justice was to do as we wished to be dealt by, and they would act on the principle of that fair recollection. He did not see upon what just grounds any noble lord could object to his clause; but if it were objected to, he should take the sense of the Committee upon it. The noble Earl concluded with moving a clause to the following effect:—That no Roman Catholic or other dissenter, be compelled to attend a mode of worship of which he did not approve, or to be prevented or hindered from following that of which he did approve.
The Earl of Liverpooldid not see the necessity of the clause, or the propriety of the mode in which the noble earl would 370 have it introduced in the Bill. Previous to the letter to which the noble earl had alluded, and as far back as 1802, the strictest orders had been issued by the authority of the illustrious person, then Commander in Chief of the Forces, that no compulsion of the nature condemned by the noble earl, should in any case he resorted to, and such, since that period, had been the uniform practice in the army. To insert a clause, therefore, of the nature of that proposed by the noble earl, would be to call in doubt the sincerity with which such orders had been issued, and give countenance to an insinuation that such orders had not been duly attended to, Than such an insinuation, nothing could be more unfounded. Government had, ever since the issuing of these orders, been vigilantly observant of their due and uniform execution, and the circumstances, at least one of them, alluded to by the noble earl, had no reference to the present case, and was not occasioned by a wish or attempt to enjoin any particular place or mode of worship, but was the punishment usually inflicted upon a man who, on the march from the parade, should be found out of the ranks. Such was the case and the punishment referred to by the noble earl; and it must be obvious to their lordships that it was not in point.
The Marquis of Lansdowneacknowledged such to be the disposition and the practice of government both here and in Ireland, but still he did not see the fairness of the noble Secretary's argument, that, by admitting the proposed clause, that disposition would be called into doubt. Such he could not conceive to be the nature of a legislative declaration such as that proposed by his noble friend. On the contrary, the object of such declarations was not to give rise to, but to remove doubts, if any such happened to exist. He felt how very important was the point now under discussion. Their lordships would not forget that the part of the United Kingdom to which it chiefly referred had long been most productive for the recruiting service, and promised to be still more, and the demands for that service were more likely to increase than diminish. Of what importance, therefore, was it that no impediment or discouragement should exist in a part of the United Kingdom so resourceful, in this respect, to the success of our military means. If any doubt should exist in so delicate a point as that of conscience as to modes of faith and wor- 371 ship should not every care and attention be used to remove them? And how could they be more effectually removed than by enabling the recruiting serjeant to refer to the present Bill, and point out the particular clause in it which guaranteed to every man the free exercise of that faith and worship to which his judgment and conscience gave the preference? In this view of the question, he thought the clause moved by his noble friend, was just, expedient, and politic; and it should therefore have his hearty concurrence.
§ Earl Spencercould not but consider the clause as unnecessary. He happened to have been in a situation which enabled him to know that the orders issued at that time by the commander in chief had been strictly attended to; and that they had since been executed with equal strictness and attention. As long therefore as they were punctually executed, he was not aware of the necessity of any legislative measure in this respect; but as he approved of the principle of the clause, so would he be ready to support it any time when he should see a fair necessity for its adoption.
§ Earl Stanhopebriefly replied. He said he exulted in having brought forward a clause, the principle of which no noble lord had been hardy enough to question, and to have gained this point was to him matter of great triumph, and would be felt as such by all honest, impartial, and reflecting men. That consideration alone was fully sufficient to induce him to persevere in his motion.
§ The Committee then divided on earl-Stanhope's amendment:
| Contents | 11 |
| Non-contents | 22 |
| Majority against the amendment | —11 |
§ The remaining clauses of the Bill were then agreed to.