RELIEF TO THE INHABITANTS OF PORTUGAL.

HL Deb 09 April 1811 vol 19 cc746-8

The order of the day having been read for taking into consideration the Prince Regent's message, and the said message having been read by the clerk at the table.

Marquis Wellesley

rose, he said, for the purpose of moving an humble address to his royal highness the Prince Regent, in answer to his most gracious communication made yesterday to their lordships, concerning the propriety of affording aid to the people of Portugal. The noble marquis called to the consideration of the House the effects that had been produced in Portugal by the spirit of the people and the troops that had been raised and taken into British pay. A sentiment had been there by created of admiration of the magnanimity, the perseverance, the zealous and ardent constancy, which the exertions of our ancient and faithful ally had, with British assistance, so strikingly manifested. He called to mind the great and costly sacrifices they had made: first in the preparations for an effectual resistance to their invaders; and secondly, in bearing up with fortitude against what had since taken place, and, in the endurance of their spirit under the wanton cruelty and savage barbarity which had been exercised upon them in the retreat of the French army. He did not think it necessary to urge this subject by entering into details of what had been inflicted and what endured. What he was about to propose was justifiable, not only on motives of generosity to a people in alliance with us, but was due on the sound policy upon which he conceived every one must see that the proposition stood. But he should take the liberty of making a few observations on its general principles. There could scarely exist a doubt, that in such a contest as that in which this nation was now engaged, a fair and full view of its circumstances would justify us in raising a resistance in any part of the continent of Europe against the enemy, when there appeared any prospect of such resistance being efficacious and successful. But there had been much doubt, and experience had-confirmed the opinion, that whatever general principles of policy might justify we ought to know the sentiment of the nation which we were about to assist and encourage: we ought to know that she felt as sincerely and deeply as ourselves-the nature of her situation; and that she felt that spirit and energy to resist her oppressor which could alone lead to a steady, regular, determined opposition, which could only be expected to be successful by the full view, on the part of the struggling nation, of the dangers and difficulties against which it had to contend. Under these circumstances, he begged their lordships to look at the great exertions of the Portuguese, and to consider that for the purpose of such a defensive war, the first and main-spring of resistance must be found in the spirit of the people themselves. Great exertions were made in the first instance; but there was one great matter still required; there was wanted not only the spirit to prepare, but the spirit to endure. See what were the efforts which had been made by the nation. It was not only the exertions of the Ordenanza, nor the numerous and great individual efforts, but it was the persevering and vast sacrifices which had been sustained by the public spirit, which, under the exertions and directions of that great commander—for so he must call him, though so nearly related to him by blood—had been rendered so essential to the general defence. Every man must agree, that by the whole system, all the attempts of the enemy had been frustrated; the whole of this great combination of measures for defence had tended to exalt our military character in the highest degree, in every sober, stedfast, regular consideration of such a subject. It had manifested the wisdom of the commander, and had defeated the enemy in all his efforts. As we had felt ourselves fully justified in sustaining the military efforts of the Portuguese government, so now that we had gained that main spring of defence, the will and spirit of the Portuguese people, were we equally justified in rendering our assistance to them. When we saw that distress which they had borne with firmness and perseverance, should we not agree to give our aid for relieving them from the pressure? Indeed, we should be laying the foundation for the erection of new military undertakings, by supporting and animating a spirit, not originally created by us, but hitherto fostered by us so successfully, and which after its sufferings and privations came back to us for farther sustenance and 'encouragement. On this great military diversion, founded in public spirit and fortitude, depended the hope of any favourable alteration in Europe, and, in no small degree, our own particular safety. The consequences of the example of Portugal might prove as beneficial to other nations of Europe as they bud hitherto been for her own defence. This measure, therefore, he would repeat' stood upon the ground of the solid, substantial policy, of encouraging what had proved so advantageous, and not simply an old attachment, friendship, and alliance. It stood on the ground of the only hope of achieving any thing in the shape of security for any part of Europe. It combined principles, in which ancient alliance and particular and general safety, were equally concerned. He was satisfied that their lordships would not repudiate those grounds of action—that they would not repudiate such old and admitted principles of national conduct, which were in such perfect consonance to every dictate of morals and of religion. The principles of our measures in Portugal were not to be characterised as sentimental, chivalrous, and, romantic: they were connected with; every sentiment that was dear to British hearts. Hitherto we had given our aid liberally, and there were the best reasons for our continuing to do so. It was fresh in the recollection of their lordships, that they had acted on a broad, fair, and liberal scale. He hoped he had not lived to see the day, though he had sometimes been surprised by hearing something like it, when it should be said, that ancient faith, long-tried attachments, and close connections with our allies, were circumstances to be discarded from our consideration; and that they should be sacrificed and abandoned to the mere suggestions and calculations of a cold policy. Connected and combined as every great view of such a subject was in this measure, he should not further encroach upon their lordships' attention except to mention, that the sum he proposed for the relief of the suffering subjects of our ally in Portugal, was 100,000l. The noble marquis then read the Address to the Prince Regent, which was conformably to his Royal Highness's message: and moved that the Address be agreed to.

Earl Grosvenor

felt considerable difficulty in acceding to this motion, particularly when he considered how much had been done already for Portugal. Lately two millions of money had been granted to that country; and the reason then assigning for proposing it was, that the French were in possession of great part of Portugal, and therefore the revenues could not be received from the distant provinces of the country. Now the same reason did not hold, for the French were in possession of only a small part of Portugal; and he would ask, were their lordships really prepared to take the whole burden upon themselves, and exempt the Portuguese altogether from the burden of relieving their own people? It was a principle as applicable to public as to private affairs, that you should be just to your own people before you were generons to other nations. He knew it would be generally thought, that this was a magnificent and high sounding proposal, and that to some minds it might recommend itself on that very account, particularly as displaying a marked contrast with the barbarity and atrocities of which the French had been guilty towards the Portuguese. These were, indeed, shewy principles; but he doubted whether they were sound in the present circumstances of the country. He was not for deserting an ancient ally; but sometimes too great liberality had the effect of discouraging the efforts of those who were the objects of it. He begged, however, to remind the House, under whom these exertions of the Portuguese had been made; they were made under the direction of British officers: and hence he concluded, that if any thing was to be expected from the Spaniards in the common cause, it must be from their being led on by British officers.

The Earl of Harrowby

observed, that his recollection did not furnish him with the reason assigned by the noble lord for the former grant, namely, that a large-proportion of Portugal was in the hands of the enemy. That was a grant founded on reasons of its own, and furnished no argument whatever against the present. It should be recollected, that the war in Portugal was not an ordinary war, nor conducted by the French on the principles usual in former times, when, though a hostile army traversed a country, yet still something was left for the subsistence of the inhabitants; but Europe had never witnessed such barbarities as had been perpetrated by the French; and the country through which they passed had been plundered and exhausted to such a degree, that British humanity alone could afford it the common and necessary means of existence; and if the aid was not speedily granted, it might come too late to effect his object. Highly as he thought of the talents of the British officers who were at the head of the allied army, he did not believe that even their talents would have produced their effect without the exertions of the Portuguese population. The pea- santry and the militia had uniformly displayed the greatest ardour, and their army had fought side by side with the British soldiers. Let their lordships look also at the accounts which had been received of their inferior officers, and it would be found that they had always their full share in the danger and the glory of every action. The liberties of Portugal had been saved, at least for a time, at the expence of much blood and treasure, and if farther distresses were inflicted on the people by the atrocities of their enemies, which it might not be in the power of this country to prevent, the present measure would at least display the generous policy on which we had acted.

The Marquis of Lansdowne

, in consequence of what had fallen from his noble friend (earl Grosvenor) felt himself called upon to state shortly his reasons for voting for the present motion; agreeing in the justice of the remarks made by his noble friend, he still could not consider them as a ground for resisting the motion. As applied to economy in our expeditions, and the taking care that more expence was not incurred than was commensurate with the object to be attained, he perfectly concurred; but whatever might have been his opinion regarding the policy of our military exertions in Portugal, no doubt now existed in his mind, that the efforts made by the people of Portugal eminently deserved at our hands the aid now asked, to relieve that distress into which they had been plunged by the barbarity of the enemy. Of that state of distress there could be no doubt; it was confirmed by all the accounts received from Portugal, which stated the privations endured by the inhabitants to be extreme. Whatever, therefore, might have been his opinion of any part of our policy in Portugal, or even, if he believed that lord Wellington would be again compelled to retreat, still he would vote for the present motion, convinced that by affording this timely assistance to the distressed inhabitants of Portugal, we should manifest a conduct so oppositely contrasted with that of the enemy that it could not fail to make an impression in Europe highly favourable to the British character, and tend to place that contrasted conduct in the strongest point of view. In Portugal itself it could not fail eminently to raise the British character in the estimation of the people. In thus raising the estimation of the British character in Europe, by displaying its beneficence, its generosity and its humanity, as contrasted with the savage barbarity of the enemy, the most beneficial consequences must result with a view to the great contest we were maintaining against that enemy. In extending to the people of Portugal that generosity for which they might look through Europe and the world in vain, we placed our national character upon a pinnacle of greatness which nothing could destroy. It was through these acts that Europe would see the excellencies of our character, and its eminent superiority to that of the enemy. Even if our army was compelled to evacuate Portugal, and we should be unable to withstand there the progress of the enemy, still this act would be productive of the most beneficial consequences, the posterity of the inhabitants of Portugal would remember with gratitude the aid afforded to their ancestors in the hour of their distress, and would hail the British character with a corresponding admiration, For these reasons, the Address should have his hearty concurrence.

The Address was then agreed to.