Lords Sitting of 26 January 1810

BATTLE OF TALAVERA.—VOTE OF THANKS TO LORD WELLINGTON.
The order of the day being read.
The Earl of Liverpoolrose, and addressed the House, to the following purport:—My Lords; In pursuance of the notice I gave, I now rise for the purpose of moving, That the Thanks of this House be given to lord viscount Wellington, the officers and the army under his command, for the skill and ability, the valour and bravery by which they obtained a victory over the enemy at Talavera. When, my lords, I first proposed to bring this question under your consideration, I fully expected that it would have met with unanimous approbation; but since I have been led to believe, from what has fallen from noble lords opposite, that this motion of thanks will encounter some degree of opposition, I never, in the whole course of my life, felt more interested in any question both on private and on public grounds. I have in framing my motion on this occasion pursued the usual course, and with a view to conciliation, have separated the conduct of the army, and the officer commanding, from every other subject connected with the general management of the campaign. It has been my care to propose the vote of your lordships thanks in that shape which, if possible, could have no disputable point of objection, and therefore it is that it is confined simply to the battle of Talavera. Whatever opinion may be entertained respecting the measures which led to the battle itself, or the consequences that ensued, there can be, lam persuaded, but one sentiment as to the skill of the general and the valour of the army that fought and defeated the French at Talavera. I believe that on any former occasions, it was never deemed necessary to blend the other circumstances of any campaign with the consideration of the valour of the troops displayed in a particular action.—The instance alluded to last night by my noble friend (Harrowby) when your lordships were called upon to confer a vote of thanks upon sir John Stuart and the army under his command, for the glorious victory gained at Maida, must be well remembered. It must be in your lordships' recollection, that when a noble baron, in this house, and another of his Majesty's ministers, in another place, moved a similar tribute of approbation of their conduct, whatever difference of sentiment might exist, as to the measures which led to that event, such was the brilliancy of the act itself, such was the glory gained by British intrepidity and valour on the occasion, that without investigating other measures
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connected with it, not only did his Majesty's present servants, but the whole House, agree to the motion, unanimously.—My lords; different sentiments might be entertained on the propriety and policy of that descent upon Calabria. On that occasion it was deemed expedient, by those who directed the operations of the campaign, to make that attempt, for the purpose of accomplishing two objects—one as a diversion against the enemy, and to assist the Calabrians then in a state of insurrection; the other, to relieve the Mole di Gaeta, a fortress on the coast, at the time besieged by the French. Although that army failed in the latter object, and succeeded but partially in the first, yet no one suggested that the general had not done his duty, no one denied that the whole, both the general and the army, were entitled to the gratitude of their country, and the thanks of Parliament. Still, in that case, it might have been said, whatever may be your lordship's opinion of the present, that the consequences which ensued were not beneficial to the country, and that the measures which preceded it were not founded in any principle of sound policy. The Thanks of both houses were nevertheless given to sir John Stuart, and the army, for the eminent skill and valour displayed in that battle, and the splendid victory obtained. I come now my lords, to the merit of that action which terminated in the glorious victory of Talavera, and I most readily admit, if your lordships were called upon to decide upon all the circumstances of that campaign, that it might materially alter the question; but I wish to direct your attention solely to the conduct of the officer, and the army under his command, on the 27th and 28th of July. We ought to consider the state of the army before and at the time of the engagement; for if every measure was pursued on that occasion, which could reflect honour on the prudence and valour of the general, not any events which afterwards occurred should derogate from his merit in that memorable engagement. The march of lord Wellington into the interior of Spain, was not, as some may term it, a rash undertaking; on the contrary, it was well considered, wisely planned, and deliberately executed. No greater prudence could be manifested than the choice of the admirable position at Talavera, as it was afterwards described by the French generals. Need I remind your lordships

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of all the circumstances by which this victory was attended: It had been determined on the part of the enemy to make a concentrated attack upon the combined armies. The British force afterwards engaged, did not altogether amount to move than 20,000 men; and although the Spanish army was present, and partially took a part in the battle, yet it was evident, not only from lord Wellington's dispatches, but from the accounts of the enemy, that the brunt of the attack was principally, if not wholly, borne by the English. Thus, my lords, the French army, amounting to almost 50,000 men, commenced their desperate attack upon the British line, and were repulsed. They renewed it, and were repulsed again; and though they frequently renewed and repeated their attempts, they were defeated—signally defeated in every instance. Although, as I have said, the Spanish army was present, the French directed all their efforts against our troops. This was peculiarly evident in their attack upon the strongest part of our position where major-general Hill commanded, against which they directed the great bulk of their force, and where all their attempts were eventually but gloriously frustrated by the irresistible valour of British troops. In a similar manner an attack was directed against other parts of the line, and universally failed; the enemy were routed with the loss of nearly 10,000 men, and obliged to retire from the scene of action and seek security in flight. Could any action be more decisive? Could any be more glorious to the British arms, when you take into consideration the inequality of numbers? This victory, my lords, was attended with unerring proofs of its brilliant and decisive nature. Twenty pieces of artillery and four standards were the trophies of the triumph of the British general and army. In whatever light it can be viewed this action must be considered eminently intitled to the thanks of your lordships, and the gratitude of the nation. It arrested the progress of the enemy; it was remarkable for the military skill displayed in it throughout; it was maintained in a manner no less conspicuous for tactical arrangement, than for the characteristic energy of the general and the pre-eminent valour of the troops; and being achieved against such an immense disparity of numbers, shed a new lustre upon the long established reputation of British soldiers. Though the army was afterwards, by the
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same policy that led to its advance directed to retreat, that retreat was not owing to any want of skill or foresight. When the French army was reinforced by another body of 36,000 men, who, from other quarters, had been marched to their aid, it was prudent, on the part of lord Wellington, to retreat, and reserve his strength for a more favourable opportunity of making a successful struggle in the cause of Spanish liberty. For, certainly, my lords, a brilliant success may be gained over an enemy, and motives of military prudence may afterwards direct a retreat, if that enemy be strongly reinforced. It cannot with any fairness be for a moment contended, that when in a contest between two bodies of men or two individuals, a great and splendid triumph has been gained on the one side, the arrival of a fresh force on the other is to be considered as destroying the merit or rendering doubtful the victory which had been previously acquired. I am ready to allow, that a proposal of this nature is one of the greatest importance; but when such a motion is submitted to the consideration of Parliament, it ought to be considered on the other hand that any light objection to it may be attended with serious results.—My lords; I would impress upon your minds, that it is of the last importance that such victories as that of Talavera should be rewarded by every tribute of honour and praise this House can bestow. If we refuse to reward the valiant deeds of our army, by every approbation we can bestow, we take from them every incitement to valour; we deprive them of those laurels which constitute the soldier's honour and his fame; which he thirsts after, not only for himself, but, because he knows they will be handed down with derivative value to his descendants. It is for this that he devotes his life to his country's good; and if you refuse such a tribute to the transcendent merits of the survivors and the glorious memory of the slain, you will act unjustly to the army, and disrespectfully to the devotion of those who are dead. In the existing state of the continent of Europe, it becomes us more especially to consider the interest, to animate the courage, and to reward the services, of our army. France was, under the old government, a great military power; but we see her a still more formidable one in the present day. Under the monarchy, not only the military, but every other

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profession, was eminently encouraged; but the revolution, which has changed other establishments, has altered the whole system of old France, and sacrificed every thing to the interest of the army. The profession of the law has been destroyed; that of the church has been overturned; commerce and trade are little attended to; and nothing is countenanced with honour or respect, except the profession of arms. No stronger inducement than the consideration of the effects of such a system can influence your lordships to unanimity. When the enemy endeavours to traduce our national character in every other instance, this is the theme of his ostensible invective, and his real praise. We know he has pronounced us a nation of shopkeepers. It has been the good fortune of Great Britain to unite a military spirit with our commercial pursuits, and every encouragement is due still further to promote this spirit. No achievement was ever more entitled to praise than the victory at Talavera. It was so considered by the government of Spain—as a victory of the last importance to the safety of their country—and they conferred the highest honours on lord Wellington; honours so great, that they will be found to have been but seldom bestowed for any services. How, I will ask, did his Majesty, in his General Orders, denominate the battle of Talavera?—[His lordship here read the General Orders, wherein it was stated that the French were completely defeated]—His Majesty, in those General Orders, which might be certainly considered as proceeding from the advice of his ministers—
Earl Greyrose to order. He considered any mention of his Majesty's sentiments, in the course of a debate, as irregular, and inconsistent with the privileges of the House.
The Earl of Liverpoolcontinued—My lords, I did not mention the opinion of his Majesty, in any manner, but as the advised opinion of his ministers for which they are responsible; and in that I conceive I am justified, according to the usage of this House I will again ask your lordships, how the victory of Talavera was estimated by our allies? Why, universally, they considered it one of the greatest magnitude in itself and of the most advantageous nature in its consequences. It filled the breasts of the people of Spain with general admiration. It will never do, my lords, to judge of mili-
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tary prowess, by all the rules of special pleading. I wish to press upon your attention the importance of an unanimous vote, as it will inspire your armies with a love of glory, and secure the strength of the country. The noble earl concluded by moving "That this House do return their Thanks to general lord vise. Wellington for the skill and ability displayed by him in the battles on the 27th and 28th of July 1809, at Talavera."
The Earl of Suffolksaid, as a professional man, that it was with pain to his feelings he rose to state those objections which irresistibly impelled him to express his opposition to the motion of thanks to lord Wellington. On all occasions, he was sure that the British army would discharge their duty, and, in every emergency, exhibit proofs of unquestionable valour; but he could not, as a military man, allow that the noble general had acted prudently, in having brought himself into such a situation, as that in which the battle was fought, without his having the power to decline it. The noble earl had alluded to the battle of Maida—but that brilliant action was not to be compared with the contest at Talavera. It was decisive in its issue, and did not come under their lordships consideration, in a questionable shape, like the victory of Talavera. He could not denominate that a victory, where a retreat immediately followed, and the wounded and the prisoners fell into the hands of the enemy. The noble earl had dwelt, with much stress, upon the artillery taken on the spot—but the capture of artillery was not to be considered at all times as a signal of victory. It might have been convenient for the enemy to leave them on the field. As to the reinforcement of 30,000 men, which was advancing to support the French, why did not lord Wellington know of their situation, and the probability of their approach? It was the duty of every general to have such information. He thought, when considering the amount of the British force in the Peninsula, and that only so small a portion of it was brought into action at Talavera, there was ground for reprehension; and this conduct appeared perfectly conformable to the manner whereby the same general brought only half of his forces to act against the enemy at the battle of Vimeira. He had listened with attention to the observations of the noble earl, respecting the situation of the country, and he would only ask, how came it that we were so si-

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tuated? Why, the chief cause was the same with that which produced the disastrous consequences of our expeditions to Spain. It might be recollected that he had given his opinion, in a former session, that the most judicious disposal of our military force, in aid of Spain, would be to send them by ten or twenty thousand together, on board our fleets, for the purpose of being landed at any point where they might best conduce to the assistance of Spain and our Allies. It was his decided opinion that by such a mode of warfare, we might have relieved Gerona, which had withstood so long and glorious a siege. In addressing these observations to their lordships, he had explained his reasons for not acquiescing in the motion as to the noble general; but, as to the army, it should meet with his entire approbation.
Earl Grosvenorwas induced from considerations of duty, to rise on this occasion, and with whatever regret to state those reasons which led him to oppose this motion of thanks to lord Wellington. In the first, place, he was apprehensive that if the House were to be called upon to vote thanks for every instance of the display of valour, the proceeding would draw after it injurious results. The consequence would be, that if a single division exhibited proofs of determined bravery, their lordships would be called upon to vote away thanks, which was the highest honour they could bestow. Nay, the principle might be extended, and then the bravery of a single detachment, or an individual act of valour, would expect this high tribute of commendation. Whenever consequences no way beneficial, still more injurious, resulted to the country, from any operation of an army, whatever admiration might attach itself to the conduct of that army during such operation, he did not perceive the propriety of their being publicly thanked by the Parliament. The battle of Corunna, and the vote of thanks on that occasion, had been quoted as justifying a similar proceeding respecting Talavera: but, in his opinion, the former was not, on account of its consequences, entitled to that distinction, though certainly preferable to one under consideration. He wished to know from ministers whether or not, supposing the lamented sir John Moore had returned to this country after the battle of Corunna, they would have proposed a similar vote of thanks, passing over the, on his part, unblamable failure of success that occasioned that battle to be fought
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there? He had in a general view an objection to the grant of peerages, as the reward of naval or military successes, and therefore, felt disposed to take this opportunity of commenting upon the other honours, which, in so conspicuous a manner, had been conferred upon the noble general. He supposed this vote of thanks would be followed, by another proceeding for granting a pecuniary remuneration. Their lordships would reflect upon the impolicy of granting titles of nobility to men whose fortunes were not adequate to suppport the dignity. It was of importance to the country that the peerage should not be so bestowed, because though no bad consequence may follow while the titled individual lived, the defect of fortune was likely to render his successors dependents on the crown. Perhaps it would better promote the ends of military fame and reputation, if an institution were established, from whence might be granted different orders of military merit. It would excite the same spirit of valour, without producing any of those inconveniences to the constitution, which resulted from the conferring of titles of nobility. Having adverted to this subject, as connected with the constitution, he was ready to allow that such heroes as the great Marlborough and Nelson, were entitled to the highest honours and estates, which had been granted to them and their successors. The battle of Talavera was one which, in all its circumstances did not appear to him entitled to such rewards; and therefore he considered it proper to address these sentiments to the House, as an explanation why he could not concur in the motion now submitted to their consideration.
Viscount Mountjoyexpressed his wish to offer a few remarks upon the question proposed for their lordships decision. He was not possessed of those talents, and that experience, which belonged to the noble lord opposite (earl Grey) who appeared to be attending to every thing he might urge, and was preparing to answer every argument. Still, however inferior he might consider himself to the noble earl, in other respects, he could not reconcile it to his feelings or his duty not to communicate his sentiments on this occasion to the House. Looking at the conduct of the noble general, in his march from Portugal to the battle of Talavera; looking to the decided victory obtained there; and then contemplating the circumstances of his able retreat, he felt

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bound to say, that, in his opinion no general ever deserved more honour or reward.—What would the noble lords opposite have said, if he had remained inactive in Portugal, and not marched into the interior of Spain? What would have been their outcry, if such had been his conduct? Why, then it would have been said, there was no necessity for his remaining in Portugal; we were in possession of Portugal. What benefit could result to the Spanish cause, if he had remained inactive on the frontiers of Spain?—But lord Wellington had done all which prudence could suggest, and valour carry into execution. He took a position at Talavera which reflected lustre on his talents; and, though his army was harassed, fatigued, and had undergone the utmost privations, it was in that state they were opposed to the French army, luxuriously supplied with every comfort which French commissariats could furnish, and one of the most splendid victories which was ever recorded, was gained by the skill and ability of the general and the steady discipline and determined valour of the British army almost unassisted. For this they were entitled to the gratitude, applause and affection of their country, and the unanimous thanks of that House. It was a victory so redundant with glory, that if any errors were in the way, they ought to be overshadowed by the laurels which had been acquired there. He wished to say a few words on the retreat of lord Wellington, which was only resorted to for the purpose of refreshing his troops. The sick and wounded, about whom so much had been alledged, were left; but how were they left? Sir Arthur Wellesley left in the care of the Spanish army those sick and disabled soldiers, whose wounds and mutilated bodies were so many bleeding mementoes of their glorious struggles for the triumph of the Spanish cause, over their perfidious invaders; he left them with general Cuesta, who occupied a position sufficiently strong to be maintained against the enemy and to afford the British army another opportunity of signalizing their valour, and assisting the Spaniards in the redemption of their liberty. While the wounds of our soldiers were still bleeding in the cause of Spain, after the glorious struggle they had made against the enemy, the conduct of general Cuesta prevented the noble lord from taking the advantage of his situation. No general was better skilled in war, none more enlightened, none more valiant than
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lord viscount Wellington. The victory of Talavera was as brilliant and glorious as any upon record, and consequently intitled to the unanimous approbation of their lordships and the eternal gratitude of Spain and of this country.
Earl Greyhaving been so particularly alluded to by the noble lord, who had just sat down, begged leave to trouble their lordships with a few observations upon the question then under their consideration. The noble lord had alluded to what he had said on a former evening; namely, that it was doubtful, whether the battle of Talavera was a victory or not; he must again repeat that doubt, for he had yet to learn that it was a victory; still more, that it was a splendid and decisive victory as described by the noble lord. He could not discover any circumstances in its nature or results, which entitled it to the character of a victory, much less to that of a splendid and decisive victory; and under this impression, however painful the duty, and however much he might regret it, still he felt it to be his duly to resist the conferring of that high reward, the thanks of that House, which it was now sought to bestow. The noble earl (Liverpool) had indulged in a vein of declamation, upon the propriety and the expediency of conferring rewards upon military merit. He was, certainly, ready to agree with the noble earl in the propriety of bestowing rewards, where rewards were deserved, and of conferring the high honour of the thanks of that House upon transcendant merit; but he could not agree that the battle of Talavera was an event that ought to be characterized in such a way or remunerated by that superior distinction. Before, however, he should go into the discussion of the subject immediately before the House, he would beg leave to say a few words relative to the instance of the victory of Maida, for which the noble earl had stated, that the thanks of that House had been given, although the objects of the expedition of Sir John Stuart, had completely failed. He (lord Grey) was not aware that the objects of that expedition had completely failed, as slated by the noble earl. If they did fail, the failure was remote. It would be recollected that a French force was at that period assembled on the Neapolitan coast for the purpose of making a descent on Sicily. To destroy this force was the object of the expedition of sir John Stuart, and in that object he

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completely succeeded in the battle of Maida, and the consequences that resulted from it. The enemy did not after that action retire in regular order, nor take up a position within sight of the field of battle, but were completely dispersed and annihilated as an army. Here then was a clear ground for the thanks of the House, a decisive victory having been gained, and the object sought in fighting the battle having been by that victory most fully attained. But when noble lords talked of a decisive victory having been gained at Talavera, it was incumbent upon them to shew that some of those results by which the character of a victory was distinguished, had taken place. To prove that a victory had been obtained, it was surely necessary to shew, either, that the object contended for had been gained, that the enemy's army had been dispersed, that prisoners had been taken, or that some decisive advantage, with a view to the general object of the campaign, had been achieved. The noble earl (Liverpool) had stated the taking of artillery to be a Mire criterion of victory, but this was at best a doubtful point. How these twenty pieces of artillery were taken, did not by any means clearly appear, but surely the taking of prisoners would have been a much more decisive criterion of victory; but instead of our taking prisoners it appeared that prisoners were taken by the enemy. So far from the battle of Talavera, therefore having the character of a victory, it had neither succeeded in attaining the general object of the campaign, nor the immediate object, namely, that of dispersing the enemy's army.—The general object of the advance of lord Wellington into Spain, he took to be that of driving before him the enemy's troops, and obtaining possession of the capital of Madrid. The French troops in Spain at that time occupied a defensive line of positions from Toledo to Salamanca. On the advance of lord Wellington into Spain, the enemy left their positions, for the purpose of concentrating their troops, and preventing him from advancing. Lord Wellington having marched to Talavera, and being there destitute of the means of transport and of provisions, was obliged to stop, the battle was fought, and the enemy were for the moment repulsed; but the general object of the advance into Spain was lost, the enemy retained possession of the capital, and the British troops were obliged to retreat. The im-
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mediate object of the battle was not gained; for what was the result?—The enemy retired in good order, and took up a position in sight of the field of battle, where our army did not venture to attack them. In two days afterwards the British army was obliged to retreat, leaving to the care of the enemy their sick and wounded. The noble earl had said, that this was in consequence of the advance of another part of the French troops, which threatened the flank and rear of our army. That Lord Wellington had no intelligence of the advance of this body of French troops, until the 31st of July, did not speak much in behalf of his conduct as a general. Not only, however, the battle of Talavera could not be considered as a victory, but its results were absolutely disastrous. By his retreat, lord Wellington left uncovered the Spanish army, under Vanegas, which was in consequence afterwards defeated by the French: he left Sir Robert Wilson, exposed also at Escalona, and his troops were, in consequence, totally defeated by the French. Sir Rt. Wilson, whom lord Wellington, in a subsequent dispatch, praised as an "active partizan," had certainly shewn great ability and extensive military talents, in collecting and organizing a force out of materials not the best adapted for the purpose. If then, it was proved, that by the battle of Talavera the enemy were merely for the moment repulsed, but not defeated, and that the most disastrous consequences resulted from that battle to our ally, as well as with respect to the general object of the campaign, surely it could not be pretended that a victory was gained, or that the high honour of the thanks of that House ought to be conferred for merely repulsing an enemy.—It had been said, that lord Wellington had displayed great skill in the dispositions he made during the battle. He confessed he could not agree in that opinion. He thought that the position on the left had not been sufficiently secured, or taken advantage of; and he doubted much whether the charge of cavalry was judicious, it having been attended with great loss, without producing any adequate advantage. He could not help thinking, that there was much also to blame in the conduct of lord Wellington with respect to the Spanish troops, though certainly the dispatch of the Spanish general gave a very different account of the conduct of those troops to that given in the dispatch of lord Wellington. But if

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lord Wellington believed the Spanish troops to be of such a description that they could not be trusted to meet the enemy, why did he place the British army in a situation of such imminent peril at Talavera? If lord Wellington held such an opinion of the Spanish troops, nothing could justify him in giving the Spanish General the option either of defending the passes against the advance of the French army under the duke of Dalmatia, which threatened the flank and rear of the British, or of taking care of our sick and wounded at Talavera. If he thought the Spaniards incapable of effectually combating the enemy, nothing could justify him in giving such an option, by which, if the Spanish general had accepted the former part of the alternative, the British army might have been placed in a situation of most imminent peril. Why also had not lord Wellington better information with respect to the state of the defence of the passes? Why did he trust to the intelligence he received from the Spaniards, neglecting even the ordinary precaution of sending an officer of his own, to ascertain whether the passes were properly defended?—Unfortunately the disasters to which he had alluded, and which immediately followed the battle of Talavera, were not all that resulted from that measure. The British army was compelled to retreat into Portugal, where he was afraid, it was now in a very critical situation, and where, from the unhealthiness of the position it occupied, disease had made such alarming progress amongst the troops, that he believed their number did not now exceed 9,000 effective men.—The noble lord had very eloquently and truly depicted the Suffering state of our army at the time they fought the battle of Talavera. It certainly demanded a very serious inquiry how it happened that the British troops were destitute of almost every comfort, and almost without provisions, whilst the French army was amply supplied.—It was a most singular thing that we, in a friendly country, which we went to defend, should be so ill supplied—should be almost starved in fact: while the French, the enemies and invaders of that country, should be well supplied and well fed. It had been said by a great authority, that the least merit of a great general consisted in fighting a battle. In judicious marches, in combined and well-timed movements, in coming to action
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only when all circumstances were most favourable for him, lay the perfection of a general's skill. If we looked to Austerlitz and other great battles, we should find that the French armies seized their enemies magazines, and were better provided for in hostile countries than the armies of those countries themselves. Must there not have been in our case a great want of foresight and arrangement for the provisioning of our army upon our making the attempt we did, in the heart of Spain; He had heard from those who had since been through that part of the country, that after the French had been twice there, there were still sufficient means of provision. The French, in fact, sent out a number of small parties, who collected provisions and kept the peasantry quiet, and we took no means to counteract the operations of those parties. This did not evince much merit on our part.—No more painful task could fall upon him than to object to thanks in a case where great and indisputable bravery had been shewn by our gallant army: he wished not to withhold the rewards of parliament but to make them greater, and raise their value higher, by dealing them out sparingly, and appropriating them solely to those great occasions that incontestibly demand them. He thought that at Talavera what we did, with all that could be said or thought in praise of it, could not be magnified into what was truly and justly to be described a victory.—The noble earl (Liverpool) had read the General Orders issued by his Majesty, relative to the victory stated to have been gained at Talavera, and he (lord Grey) must again protest against using his Majesty's name for the purpose of influencing the deliberations of that House. As to the impression however which those General Orders were cited to prove, they only proved the impression which ministers wished to convey. When the noble earl talked of the impression made by the victory, as he called it, of Talavera, what had not ministers to answer for, for the deceptive impression which they strove to create, by the publication of extracts of dispatches from lord Wellington, which conveyed a totally different meaning from that of the dispatches themselves. Thus, in the extract which was published of a dispatch from lord Wellington, dated from Talavera, in which he says, "I cannot move from hence for want of the means of transport and provisions," was

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it not meant that it should be understood that he could not advance? although ministers knew at the time that his dispatch stated that he could not retreat for want of these necessary means. His Majesty's ministers at the time they trumpeted forth the battle of Talavera, as a splendid and glorious victory, were in the possession of lord Wellington's dispatches, in which he stated the unfortunate situation of his army, the necessity of his retreating, and the difficulties he had to encounter in effecting that retreat. The impression made in the country was not to be wondered at when the publication of lord Wellington's dispatches was so managed as to carry all the appearance of the intelligence of a splendid victory. Had the news arrived during the sitting of parliament, and ministers had immediately moved for the Thanks of that House to lord Wellington, he (lord Grey) should have most readily and cordially joined, conceiving from the dispatches, as published in the Gazette, that a splendid and decisive victory had actually been gained; but, how great would afterwards have been his indignation, when he had discovered the unworthy deception practised by his Majesty's ministers? Under all these circumstances, whatever pain and reluctance he might feel in opposing a motion of this nature, believing as he did, that lord Wellington was an able, skilful, active and enterprising officer, and not wishing to oppose a Vote of Thanks to other officers employed for their skill and ability, or to the army, for the bravery and good conduct it displayed in the battle, he still must, in the execution of his duty as a member of that House, and for the reasons he had stated, oppose the motion now under consideration.
The Marquis Wellesleyreplied to the noble earl who had just sat down. If it was painful, he said, to the noble earl to perform a public duty by opposing the present motion, and that it was really painful to him would be readily believed by all who knew the honourable feelings which belonged to the character of that noble earl, the generosity of his nature, the liberality of his sentiments, and his proud descent from a person so highly distinguished for military talents and services: how painful must be the situation in which he stood, who could not but be open to private feeling, while he also had a public duty to perform: who had to vindicate the character and conduct of so
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near and dear a relation as a brother; of an officer whose eminent qualities he had had such frequent opportunities of observing, qualities of which whatever opinion it might please the noble earl to entertain, were attested by the universal voice of the officers and soldiers of the armies he had commanded, and of the countries in whose defence they had been exerted: of Portugal where he was almost adored, and where he was invested with power little short of royal: and of Spain, where he was equally beloved by the people, and respected by the government. In standing forward on the present occasion in defence of lord Wellington, he might safely contend that his noble relative had taken a judicious view of the objects which he had to accomplish; of the means which he possessed for their accomplishment; and of the mode in which these means were to be applied. On these public grounds he was willing to try and rest the merits of lord Wellington, and confident of their strength, he would endeavour as far as possible to discharge his mind from the influence of all private feeling.—And now in the outset he must beg leave to observe that the noble earl did not seem very clearly to understand the objects of lord Wellington's operations. They were briefly these: His first thoughts were directed to the situation of Portugal. On the arrival of his brother in that country, he found that the enemy were not only in possession of its northern provinces, but that they manifested a disposition to advance into the south. It was indeed evident that the French did not intend to act merely on the defensive: but that they had formed a plan by which, Soult and Victor were to advance from, different points. The first object, therefore, of lord Wellington, was the deliverance of Portugal; and on the praise of the operation by which he expelled Soult, it was not necessary for him to dwell. In the eyes of all Portugal and of every military man, it was an operation as able, as active, as rapid and conclusive as any which the page of military history records. It was therefore surely unfair, as some noble lords have done, to describe such an operation merely as an affair with the rear-guard of Soult's corps. Having thus achieved the expulsion of Soult from the north of Portugal, lord Wellington proceeded to the south to oppose Victor, who had actually advanced in that direction, but who on the approach of lord

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Wellington had thought it prudent to retreat. But here again lord Wellington was reproached with a delay of 10 days at Abrantes. This was another misconception, which it was proper to rectify, for in point of fact the delay imputed to his noble brother, was not protracted a moment beyond what was absolutely necessary, for refitting his army after so long, so rapid, and so fatiguing a march. Having effected that object, lord Wellington immediately advanced into Spain; and here he must beg leave to correct another error into which some noble lords on the other side of the House had fallen. A comparison had been drawn between the situation of that gallant and deeply lamented officer, sir J. Moore, and that of lord Wellington on their entering Spain. There was not, however, the least similarity between the two cases, and that dissimilarity arose from the different state of Spain at the two periods. When sir John Moore entered Spain, the members of the Central Junta had hardly taken their seats; their authority was scarcely acknowledged, and little or no organization had been effected in their armies. Hence sir John Moore had justly said, that on entering Spain he had neither seen a Spanish army nor a Spanish general. The part of the country, moreover, through which he had to pass, was deficient in resources; nor was he invested with sufficient authority to avail himself of those which it afforded. Such was the destitute situation of sir John Moore, while he had at his back the whole of the French army, commanded by the French emperor in person. In stating these circumstances, the noble marquis wished not to be considered, as delivering any opinion with respect to the policy or impolicy of the march of sir J. Moore. That was a question upon which he wished to be considered as completely unpledged. All that he thought requisite for his present purpose, was, to state the naked fact.
Now, what was the situation of Spain when lord Wellington advanced into that country? The Central Government had long been established and their authority was generally recognized. The part of the country through which his march lay abounded in resources of every description, nor was it fair to entertain a doubt, of the power and disposition of the Spanish government, to render them available. The only hostile force which he would at first have to encounter, was Victor's
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corps, consisting of 28,000 men. So circumstanced it was proposed to him both by the Spanish government and by general Cuesta to advance against Victor. What discretion could he have used, what justification could he have offered for declining such a proposal? It was not proposed by gen. Cuesta, as the noble earl seemed to insinuate, to march to Madrid, and to expel the enemy from the Spanish capital: but the joint request of the Junta, and of general Cuesta, was, that he would co-operate with the Spanish army in driving Victor beyond the Tagus, by which operation he would protect the southern provinces of Spain, one of the great objects of his instructions, and perhaps also compel the enemy to evacuate the northern provinces, another of the objects which it was thought very desirable to accomplish. Having thus to look to a government fully established; to a country abounding in provisions: to an army of 48,000 men well equipped and in all appearance well disciplined; to a general who possessed the confidence of Spain and of that army, how could lord Wellington have refused his assistance in the attainment of that limited object. Would not a refusal on his part have argued a supposition that the Spanish government was incompetent to perform its duty; that the country, though full of provisions, was incompetent or unwilling to supply them? How besides could he have answered for the safety of Portugal, unless a blow was struck against Victor that would have prevented him from joining and co-operating with Soult or any French corps that might invade that kingdom from the northward? By advancing into Spain, therefore, it was not Spain only that he was anxious to assist, but Portugal that he was resolved to defend. Mindful of his instructions, lord Wellington kept these main objects steadily in view, and he proceeded to the prosecution of them with zeal, courage, activity and judgment.
But in thus entering Spain, did lord Wellington take the necessary precautions for the security of his army? To this he would answer that his brother had taken every precaution that depended upon him, or which the prospect of things could have suggested at the moment.—Besides, was he to place no reliance on gen. Cuesta or his army with whom he was to co-operate? Was he to place no reliance on the Spanish government, who

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Solicited his assistance? Was he to place no reliance on the country which he came to defend? Did not the plan moreover concerted between him and gen. Cuesta hold out every promise of success? that plan was briefly this: lord Wellington was to move against Victor's corps in concert with gen. Cuesta. In the mean time gen. Venegas by a circuitous march was to advance towards and threaten Madrid, in order by this demonstration to draw off the attention of the French corps under gen. Sebastiani and king Joseph, and thus prevent their forming a junction with Victor. From this plan, if duly executed, lord Wellington was justified in expecting every success. Accordingly he advanced against Victor at Talavera on the 22d of July, and soon came in sight of the enemy, whom he proposed to attack on the following morning. Victor's corps was then unsupported by any other, and consisted of no more than 28,000 men. If therefore the attack upon Victor had been made on the morning of the 23d as proposed by lord Wellington, must not the result have been most glorious and complete, the more so as after Victor had been joined by the corps of Sebastiani and king Joseph, lord Wellington had been able to defeat him? And even had Soult afterwards advanced, would there not have been every certainty of another splendid victory? General Cuesta however refused to attack the enemy on that day; for what reason had never yet been explained; but the consequence was that Victor retreated, and made his escape on the very night of the 23d, and effected a junction with Sebastiani and king Joseph. At the same time general Venegas, who ought to have been at Arganda on the 22d, had received a counter order from the Junta not to move. It is true that that order was afterwards withdrawn; but Venegas only reached on the 29th the position which he ought to have occupied on the 22d. Of the reason why the Junta issued that counter order, although he made repeated enquiries, he had never been able to obtain any explanation. Such was the failure of a plan which seemed to have been so wisely contrived. Against such strange mismanagement what human prudence could provide? What general, what minister could stand if brought to your lordships' bar to answer for the consequences of such unlocked for, such unaccountable casualties? He perfectly agreed with the noble lords
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on the other side of the House respecting the necessity of a radical change in the government of Spain, and his opinions on that head, he believed, were not unknown. But that change could not be the work of a day; and were we to make no one exertion, not risk a single soldier in the Spanish cause, until Spain had attained the full perfection of a free state? It must no doubt be our wish to see Spain connect the action of the executive power which the spirit of the people, draw forth her own energies, and act a part worthy of herself and of her brave and generous ally, but it surely was not to be expected that she should reach at once the vigour of a free government, just emerging as she was from that dreadful oppression under which a wretched government had broken down the faculties of her people; emerging as she was from those inveterate habits and ancient prejudices, which have so long contracted her views, and retarded her improvement; emerging as she was from that disconnection and disunion between her different provinces, among which, however they might join in the hatred and detestation of their common enemy, no cordial harmony had prevailed in other respects. The thing was impossible, but were we therefore to abandon the Spaniards to the mercy of their cruel invaders? Were we therefore to desert them in this crisis of their fortunes?
With these observations he should now leave that part of the question, and come to the battle of Talavera itself and the circumstances which attended and followed it. In a military sense perhaps nothing more could be said of the result of that battle, than, that the British troops had succeeded in repulsing the attack of a French army almost double their numbers, the efforts of which had been chiefly directed against the British troops. But was there no skill, no bravery, no perseverance displayed in the mode in which that repulse was effected? Did no glory redound from it to the character of the British arms? Has it not been acknowledged even by the enemy as the severest check they had yet sustained? Now as to its consequences. Were they really such as to disparage the merits, and mar the splendour of that day? He would boldly maintain that the defeat of the enemy at Talavera had essentially contributed to the main objects of the campaign. For unless

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that blow had been struck against Victor, it would have been impossible to prevent the enemy from over-running the South of Spain, or from making a fresh irruption into Portugal. It saved the South of Spain from absolute destruction. It has afforded time to Portugal to organize her army, and to strengthen her military posts. It also enabled lord Wellington to take a position, where he might derive supplies from Spain at the same time that he chew nearer to his own magazines? Were not all these achievements essential to the objects of the expedition; And what was the general result? Until then, the French armies had been acting vigorously against Spain and Portugal; but since the battle of Talavera, they have been compelled to abandon their offensive operations and to resume the defensive. He should not attempt to diminish the disasters, which afterwards befel the Spanish arms. Both his noble brother and he himself had earnestly advised the Spaniards to keep to their defensive positions: but flushed with the victory of Talavera, and with hopes too sanguine of further successes, they advanced at all points; and the result but too fatally justified the propriety of the advice, that had been given to them. But he would not go into any critical disquisition of military discretion. It was enough for him to have shewn that in the prosecution and attainment of the objects, on which he was employed, lord Wellington made a judicious application of the means entrusted to his hands, and derived from them every advantage to which they could be turned. He arrested the progress of the French armies into the South of Spain, and procured a breathing time for Portugal to organize her forces, and Improve all her means of defence. He would not take upon him to say, that Portugal was placed in a state of complete security; but he might safely assert, that time had been gained for producing an essential improvement, in the condition of her army; so that it would be enabled effectually to assist and co-operate with the British troops. In fine, Portugal was placed in a greater degree of security, than at any period since she has been menaced by France. All these advantages were fairly to be ascribed to the skill, the courage, and the activity which directed the exertions of lord Wellington and his army, and upon the whole he did not hesitate to say, that his brother was justly entitled to every distinction which his sovereign
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has conferred on him, and to every honour and reward which it was in the power of that House to bestow, as any noble lord who for his personal services had obtained the same distinctions, or who sat there by descent from his illustrious ancestors.
Lord Grenvilleobserved, that he never rose to perform his duty with greater pain than he did at this time; but a public duty it was, and he could not shrink from it. The view he had of the subject was this from the first moment that it had been agitated he knew that it could not be regarded in that narrow light as to make this the sole question, whether eminent valour and even skill had been displayed on the day of battle. No; he thought that the subject must be treated in a manner which would shew the propriety of giving, in the first place, the information which his noble friend (Grey) had required on a former occasion respecting the campaign, and especially relative to that most calamitous event, the march into Spain. His opinion was supported by the manner in which his noble friend opposite (Wellesley) had discussed, the subject. He had, and properly in his opinion, not confined himself to the transactions of the day of battle, but taken a comprehensive, view of the causes and consequences of that battle. The events of twenty-four hours might be sufficient to prove the merits of the soldier, although the sufferings both before and after a battle might constitute no small portion even of the soldier's deserts. But the case of a general was widely different. This question was none of his seeking. But he must say, that even a victory, if attended with calamitous circumstances, did not deserve the thanks of that House. The conduct of lord Wellington ought to be examined as connected with the plans of the government at home, and as connected with the state of the country whose cause he had been sent to support; and it was for these reasons that he thought the information to which he had adverted ought to be granted before coming to any vote on this subject. If the Spanish forces had been directed by the spirit which distinguished the British troops, then, certainly, any one might be justified in forming the most brilliant expectations of the result of a plan in which both co-operated. But, as the case stood, the question was, whether a British army ought to have been risked in an enterprise which depended, so much on Spanish co-operation. A plan was,

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however, formed, and Victor was to be attacked by the combined armies, and when the moment of attack came, the Spanish general refused to co-operate. He was willing to suppose that lord Wellington had, by the letter or spirit of his instructions, been compelled to engage in this combined effort. But what, then, were we to think of our councils at home, which had exposed a British army to so much peril, by depending upon the efficacy of Spanish co-operation? Their lordships were then told, that general Venegas had been prevented from co-operating by counter-orders from the Spanish government. He called then upon their lordships to consider what the ministers had been doing for the last two years, to consider how much dependance they had in the course of that time placed upon such a government as this. The chief object of this ought to be preservation. Their lordships would reflect whether they would be justified in supporting them, in a continuation of error. We were now told that the security of Portugal was not complete, but that great reliance was to be placed upon the co-operation of the Portuguese with the British. Of this he would only say, that they ought to judge of the future from the past, that they ought to recollect the retreat for want of co-operation, and that the remnant of the army was in a situation not dissimilar to that in which it was placed by its advance to Talavera. This was most strongly impressed on his mind, and he could not avoid taking advantage of this opportunity to express his feelings. With regard to the immediate question, he thought that it could not be narrowed to the events of a particular day. He did not attribute these disastrous events to lord Wellington. Sure he was that nobody could think he had any desire to do so. He believed that he was fettered by the nature of the service on which he had been sent, and by his instructions, and that the plan and its calamitous consequences were to be attributed to ministers. They had on a former night argued against what they called prejudging a question. Sure he was that they were now prejudging, when they called for the opinion of their lordships, and refused to produce the documents on which alone that opinion could be correct founded.
The Vote of Thanks to lord Wellington, was put, and carried without a division. The motions of thanks to the in-
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ferior officers and the army were then read.
Earl Greyprofessed his hearty concurrence in these motions. The inferior officers and the army had done their duty in the most admirable manner, and he hoped these motions would pass nem. dis. The motions were then unanimously carried.