Lords Sitting of 26 January 1809

OVERTURES FROM FRANCE AND RUSSIA.
The Earl of Liverpoolrose to move an Address to his majesty upon the Correspondence with France and Russia, relative to the Overtures from Erfurth, which had, by his majesty's command, been laid before parliament. His lordship said, he should have thought it unnecessary to trouble the house with any observations on the subject, had it not been for an intimation of dissent. He was, however, at a loss to anticipate any objection to the line of conduct which had been upon this occasion adopted by his majesty's government, as it appeared to him to be most clearly dictated by every consideration of sound policy, and of what was due to the honour and character of the country. Every man in the country must have been convinced that the overtures on the part of France were not made in the spirit of peace, following, so immediately as they did, the aggression committed by that power against the Spanish nation, and the usurpation of the government of that nation, which had then been attempted, by nominating a person as king of Spain. He was ready to admit, however, that the Overture from Erfurth, setting aside the preliminary observation, and taking what was substantially the offer, was prima facie fair. His majesty's ministers, acting upon that principle which had been invariably
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the rule of their conduct, determined to meet the offer in a fair and candid manner, and by making those explanations in the first instance which must necessarily result from any negociation, an answer was returned, stating our relations with Portugal, the king of the Two Sicilies, Sweden, and the government of Spain, and our determination to support the cause of the Spanish nation. The reply of the ruler of France, stigmatizing the Spanish nation as Insurgents, might not, perhaps, cause much surprize; but it was impossible not to consider, without the deepest feelings of regret, the Answer of the emperor of Russia, stigmatizing as Insurgents a loyal people, who were fighting to support their legitimate monarchy, against a horrible and atrocious usurpation. By charactering the Spanish nation as Insurgents, who were supporting the legitimate monarchy of the country, it must be clear, at least negatively, that the brother of Bonaparte was to be held out as the lawful and rightful king. He could not have conceived it possible, had it not been for the intimation on a former evening, that any objection could have been made to the expression of the determination of his majesty's government to support the Spanish nation, as he believed there was scarcely a man in the country who did not, at the time it was known an Overture was received, think that such an answer ought to have been returned. It was not now the question as to the mode in which Spain ought to have been assisted—that had no relation to the discussion. Those only could object to the expression used who thought that no assistance ought to have been given to Spain, and that she ought to have been left to herself, and he believed there was no man in that house who held that opinion, nor scarcely any one in the country. But, where there were only shades of difference of opinion, with respect to the mode of assisting Spain, there could, surely, be no objection to our giving a distinct pledge of our determination to support generally the cause of that nation. He believed, upon this subject, there was a little difference of opinion in the country, as the people were rather inclined to accuse ministers of having not done enough in Spain, than of having done too much. With respect to the Answer returned to the propositions of France and Russia, he contended, that the honour and character of the country required that the determination to support the Spanish nation

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should be frankly and decidedly avowed; a public pledge having been previously given of that determination, and the assistance rendered having been equally public. His lordship concluded by moving an Address to his majesty, thanking his majesty for his most gracious communication, and expressing their approbation of the wisdom and justice of the conduct of his majesty's government, evinced in the Answer returned to the Overtures from Erfurth, and in the determination expressed of supporting the Spanish government, acting in the name of their legitimate monarch, Ferdinand the VIIth.
Lord Grenvillesaid, he had hoped that the Address would have been so worded as to have enabled him to have done that which he should have wished to have done, to concur in voting it; but as it was now drawn up, he was compelled to give it his dissent, as he could not applaud the wisdom and justice of that conduct which he thought neither wise nor just, he was ready to admit, that at the time the Overture was made, there was no prospect of its leading to any practicable negotiation for peace. The Ruler of France had at that time arranged his plans for the achievement of an object the most important to him of any that he had yet in view, that of completely subjugating Spain. A most horrible and atrocious usurpation had been set up in that country, and unfortunately, the Ruler of France possessed the means of carrying his plan into effect; he went to Spain with a moral certainty of effecting his object, and, no doubt, was sincere in his wish that a large British army might be landed in Spain, he having in his hands the means by which the great object he bad in view might be attained, and which he actually had attained in the course of two months—the subjugation of Spain. With this great object in view, and a moral certainty of attaining it, whilst we, on the other hand, had taken up the cause of the Spanish people against this usurpation, and hoped to defeat the object of the Ruler of France, it was impossible to expect that any negotiation: would take place. It could not be supposed that he would give up his object; it could not be expected that we should give up ours; it could not be imagined that either party would give up by a stroke of the pen what each expected to obtain by force; of arms. But though convinced that the Overture was not made in the spirit of peace, and that no negociation could have
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resulted from it, yet he could not applaud the conduct of ministers in the Answer which they returned to it. They asked of the Ruler of France in their Answer, to give up as a preliminary to negotiation, the most important object for which he was contesting; because, calling upon him to acknowledge the persons exercising the power of government in Spain, in the name of Ferdinand VII. was requiring to give up at once his views upon the government of Spainߞto give up the very object of his attack upon that country. This, therefore, he contended, was impolitic, as putting us in a worse situation than we might have been, by resorting to another mode of reply, Had the Answer expressed the readiness of this government to sacrifice British objects, for what was certainly a most important British object, the preservation of the legitimate government of Spain, it would have had the effect of placing the French government still more wrong, and of still shewing our determination to support Spain. He could not avoid, however, noticing, that it was stated, that a Treaty of Alliance had been concluded with Spain, although no such Treaty had been communicated to parliament. It was the constitutional practice to lay all Treaties concluded with foreign powers before parliament, that parliament might advise his majesty upon them. Of this Treaty, however, nothing was known to parliament; he knew nothing of it, and therefore could not speak on the subject, but he must deprecate the practice of making private Treaties, which were not communicated to parliament. His lordship recurred to what he had before alluded to, the Answer returned to the Overture, and observed, that as he could not approve of the terms of it, he must dissent from the Address, which applauded its wisdom and justice.
The Lord Chancellorcontended, that the question was not with respect to the Answer returned to the Overture, whether the Ruler of France should, at once give up his views upon Spain, but whether the Spanish nation should be admitted as parties to the negotiation? The noble lord (Grenville) had said, that the person exercising the powers of government in France had accomplished his object in two months, and had completed the subjugation of Spain. He was of a very different opinion; he did not think that Spain was now subjugated; nor did he think that it would be: the contest in. that country might still be carried to a

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successful termination on the part of the universal Spanish nation, against that most unjustifiable and unprincipled usurpation, which was now attempted to be imposed upon it. The Answer that was returned to the Overture was, in his opinion, the most proper under the circumstances of our situation and our existing relations with Spain. It was of the greatest importance when such an Overture was made, and made, as admitted on all hands, evidently not in the spirit of peace, that no time should be lost in shewing to the Spanish nation, that his majesty's government adhered to the pledge given to parliament and the people, in the Speech of his majesty delivered through the medium of his Commissioners in that house, and at once convincing them that their interests would be scrupulously attended to. It was of the utmost importance that we should place before the Spanish nation, in the strongest point of view, the good will and kindness which they would experience from us on the one hand, and the injuries which they must feel from the attempted usurpation on the other. It was under these circumstances that ministers advised his majesty to return that Answer, and he was still convinced that it was the only Answer that ought to have been returned, consistently with the honour and character of the country.
Viscount Sidmonthexpressed his perfect concurrence in the opinion delivered by the noble secretary of state, that no confidence could or ought to be placed in the offer of negotiation made by the Russian and French governments from Erfurth. When such a confederacy was formed, it was almost a duty to doubt the sincerity of that offer; hut when it was coupled with a proposal for the abandonment of the Spanish people, he believed, there was not a man in that house or in the kingdom who could have hesitated for a moment, as to the line of conduct the British government ought to have pursued. When he was first acquainted with the communication from Erfurth, the first question which occurred for his consideration was, to resoive the inducements which operated with the head of the French government to make this otter of negotiation. Three motives presented themselves to him as operating on the French ruler: the first was, to create a strong wish for peace among the people of this country, and to excite a popular feeling, that the blessings of peace were not the object
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of those entrusted with the management of the national concerns. The second was, the presumption that his majesty, miscalculating the feelings of his people, would have acted on these supposed prepossessions, and have entered on a negotiation in a seeming compliance with those wishes. The last hope was to profit by his old stratagem, of imputing to G. Britain the principle of unnecessary hostility, and of a desire to prolong, for its selfish purposes, the calamities arising from the continuance of hostilities. This delusion he had long practised upon the different States of Europe. Had this country but acceded to his proffer of pacification, he would not have failed to draw from that conduct inferences degrading to its character, and injurious to the best interests of the empire. Besides, the very entertainment of the proposition, without first demanding the acknowledgment of the independence of them, would have surely excited amongst that people a justifiable distrust and suspicion of the purity of British co-operation. Such were his opinions on the propriety of his majesty's Declaration; but in delivering that conviction, he wished to be understood, as considering his majesty's government responsible to the parliament and to the public, for those consequent measures, which they advised and executed, with a view of assisting the people of Spain, in their endeavours against the iniquitous usurpation of France.
Lord Mulgravemaintained, that it was impossible to have done more towards supporting the cause of Spain, than had been done by his majesty's ministers. The boast of Buonaparte, that he would, within the space of two months, be in possession of the Spanish capital, could not possibly have been in his conception, at the time of making it. If any man, however, supposed that the cause of Spain was now hopeless, and that it ought to be abandoned, he, for one, must express a contrary opinien. So long as the Spaniards continued true to themselves, so long would Britain continue true to them. It was the determination of his majesty's present ministers to act on this principle, and to consider the cause of Spain, though a distant, yet an important point in the defence of these kingdoms, Though they did not dispute the. notion that our navy might be equal to the defence of these kingdoms, they did not wish to hazard any thing on a conviction of the kind;

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neither were they willing to indulge in that narrow and selfish feeling, that we ought to look to ourselves alone, and to live within ourselves, there to await the attack of the enemy. They entertained more enlarged and comprehensive viewsof the subject. They thought that the most vigorous assistance which we could possibly lend to the cause of Spain and of any other country disposed to withstand the common enemy, ought to be afforded. That we should not, like other powers, selfishly lie by till the enemy was ready to attack us, but should endeavour, as far as in us lay, to further and promote any more distant check which might be militated against him. If noble lords on the other side entertained different views of the subject from these, let them openly and candidly express them, and let the country judge between the two, who were more entitled to their confidence, or most likely to bring the struggle in which we are engaged to a successful and honourable issue. Let the house also judge between noble lords on the other side, and his majesty's present ministers on this point, and if they approved of the opinions and sentiments of the former, in preference to those of the latter, let them at once address his majesty to dismiss his present ministers from his councils.
Lord Aucklandsaid, that he had listened to the speech of the noble baron with an attention approaching to astonishment. The noble baron had, with much complacency, congratulated himself on the share which he had had in directing the campaign, the disastrous results of which will long be deeply deplored by the whole British empire. The noble baron, not content with self-consolation, had proceeded, at great length, to congratulate the country on its well-timed and fortunate escape from the counsels and guidance of the late administration. Lord Auckland found himself called upon to answer, and to assert, that if the ministry of his noble friend, (lord Grenville) had not been unfortunately interrupted, at this hour we should have possessed, and without any stain on the national character, a full access to unconquered states in the Baltic, and a full enjoyment of the Baltic trade:—at this hour we should have enjoyed the uninterrupted friendship of the United States, and all the benefits of their commercial intercourse and perhaps also their alliance offensive against France:—and certainly at this hour we should not have had to lament
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the useless sacrifice of the finest army that G. Britain had ever sent into the field. These were his sentiments, called forth by the inconceivable exultation which their lordships had witnessed; and he believed that these sentiments, and this justice towards the pre-eminent mind of his noble friend, would gradually find their way to the conviction of every thinking man in the kingdom. In answer to the loud and repeated assertion that the cause of Spain was not yet at an end; he was aware that the popular delusion on that subject was not yet at an end; nevertheless, he would not hesitate to avow his opinion, that what we call the Spanish cause was lost, for the present at least; and without any rational hope that it could be soon revived.—He then proceeded to state his reasons for thinking that the Erfurth Overture was a mere fallacy, practised by the Ruler of France, both on this country and on Russia. He was disposed to give credit to the Secretary of State who had conducted that Correspondence; perhaps it would have been more eligible, to have explicitly reserved our just protection of the Spanish monarchy for Negotiation at the proposed Congress, and to have insisted only on the admission of our allies; but this was a diplomatic doubt, on which he was not disposed to insist. He must, however, express his concern, that in the proposed Address the house was led to a sort of indirect acknowledgment of Ferdinand VII. He could not forget that he had been present at the coronation of Charles IV.; and he had not seen any ground for recognizing the abdication of that unfortunate monarch, who had since stated, what was sufficiently evident, that he had done nothing but by compulsion, and did not mean to be thus superseded by his son.
The Earl of Suffolksaw many errors in the system which had been pursued in our attempt to protect Spain. The great duke of Marlborough had laid it down that no army entering Spain, and wishing to secure to itself a retreat, should omit to possess themselves of Barcelona. There was also on the opposite coast a fortress, which had been overlooked by us, but which the French had since occupied, and rendered almost impregnable. There was another circumstance which, in his opinion deserved inquiry, and to which, on some future occasion, he should, in all probability, call the attention of the house; namely, why col. Shrapnell's spherical case shot, which it was staled, had contributed

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greatly to decide the battle of Vimiera, had not been furnished to our army in Spain?
The Earl of Liverpooldeclared it to be the anxious wish of ministers to meet every inquiry into the conduct of the war in Spain. He challenged his noble friend on the cross bench, or the noble lord opposite, to bring forward any motion they chose on this subject, on as early a day as they chose, that the question might be fairly and at once discussed.
Lord Grenvillesaid, that thus attacked, he could not sit silent. He declared sincerely that there was not a single measure adopted by ministers, which, had he been in their situation, he would have thought he acted right in resorting to; and he was equally persuaded there was not one step he would have recommended which they would have adopted. He did not refer to Spain alone; he alluded to their whole conduct since they were entrusted with the management of affairs. He could not, however, consent that he should be called on to bring forward any motion on the subject. Much information was still wanting on the subject of the operations and plans of operations in Spain, which it was the duty of ministers themselves to furnish: particularly, it was incumbent on them, in the first place, to put the house in possession of that document, transmitted to this country by sir John Moore, and which it was the dying wish of that gallant officer should be published, that the country might have a due appreciation of his services. Accounts were daily received from officers in our army, his lordship was sorry to say, not of a consoling nature, but which were calculated to grate the ear and wound the heart. It was not on him, however, or on any other noble lord, that a call lay to make this a subject of inquiry. It was the incumbent duty of ministers themselves to furnish every possible information on a subject in which the feelings not only of that house, but of the public, were so peculiarly interested.
Viscount Sidmouthbeing called on as he had been, must also say, that he deemed it incumbent on ministers themselves to bring the matter fairly before the public.
The question on the Address was then put and agreed to, nem. Diss.