§ The Third Session of the Fourth Parliament of the United Kingdom was this day opened by commission: the Commissioners were the archbishop of Canterbury, the Lord Chancellor, earl Camden, and the duke of Montrose. At half past three o'clock the lords commissioners took their seals upon the woolsack; and the Commons, pursuant to message, having attended, with their Speaker, at the bar, the Lord Chancellor informed them, that his Majesty had been pleased to direct his commission to certain lords, therein named, to open the session; which commission they should hear read, and afterwards his majesty's most gracious Speech. The commission was then read by the clerk at the table; after which, the Lord Chancellor read the Speech, as it here follows:
§ "My Lords and Gentlemen; We have it in command from his Majesty to state to you, that his Majesty has called you together, in perfect confidence that you are prepared cordially to support his Majesty in the prosecution of a war which there is no hope of terminating safely and honourably, except through vigorous and persevering exertion.—We are to acquaint you, that his Majesty has directed to be laid before you copies of the proposals for opening a negotiation, which were transmitted to his Majesty from Erfurth, and of the Correspondence which thereupon Vol. XII. 2 took place with the governments of Russia and of France; together with the Declaration issued by his Majesty's command on the termination of that correspondence.—His Majesty is persuaded, that you will participate in the feelings which were expressed by his Majesty, when it was required that his Majesty should consent to commence the negotiation by abandoning the cause of Spain, which he had so recently and solemnly espoused.—We are commanded to inform you, that his Majesty continues to receive from the Spanish government the strongest assurances of their determined perseverance in the cause of the legitimate monarchy, and of the national independence of Spain; and to assure you, that so long as the people of Spain shall remain true to themselves, his Majesty will continue to them his most strenuous assistance and support.—His Majesty has renewed to the Spanish nation, in the moment of its difficulties and reverses, the engagements which he voluntarily contracted at the outset of its struggle against the usurpation and tyranny of France; and we are commanded to acquaint you, that these engagements have been reduced into the form of a Treaty of Alliance; which Treaty, so soon as the ratification shall have been exchanged, his Majesty will cause to be laid before you.—His Majesty commands us to state to you, that while his Majesty contemplated with the liveliest satisfaction, the achievements of his forces in the commencement of the campaign in Portugal, and the deliverance 3 of the kingdom of his ally from the presence and oppression of the French army, his Majesty most deeply regretted the termination of that campaign by an Armistice and Convention, of some of the articles of which his Majesty has felt himself obliged formally to declare his disapprobation.—We are to express to you his Majesty's reliance on your disposition to enable his Majesty to continue the aid afforded by his Majesty to the king of Sweden. That monarch derives a peculiar claim to his Majesty's support in the present exigency of his affairs, from having concurred with his Majesty in the propriety of rejecting any proposal for negociation to which the government of Spain was not to be admitted as a party.
§ Gentlemen of the House of Commons; We are commanded by his Majesty to inform you, that he has directed the estimates of the current year to be laid before you. His Majesty relies upon your zeal and affection to make such further provision of supply as the vigorous prosecution of the war may render necessary; and he trusts that you may be enabled to find the means of providing such supply without any great or immediate increase of the existing burthens upon his people.—His Majesty feels assured, that it will be highly satisfactory for you to learn, that notwithstanding the measures resorted to by the enemy for the purpose of destroying the commerce and resources of his kingdom, the public revenue has continued in a course of progressive improvement.
§ My Lords and Gentlemen; We are directed to inform you, that the measure adopted by parliament in the last session for establishing a Local Militia, has been already attended with the happiest success, and promises to be extensively and permanently beneficial to the country.—We have received his Majesty's commands most especially to recommend to you, that, duly weighing the immense interests which are at stake in the war now carrying on, you should proceed with as little delay as possible, to consider of the most effectual measures for the augmentation of the regular army, in order that his Majesty may be the better enabled, without impairing the means of defence at home, to avail himself of the military power of his dominions in the great contest in which he is engaged; and to conduct that contest, under the blessing of divine Providence, to a conclusion compatible with the honour of his Majesty's crown, and 4 with the interests of his allies, of Europe, and of the world."
§ The commons having retired, the lords commissioners withdrew to unrobe. The earl of Liverpool (late lord Hawkesbury) took the oaths and his seat. An adjournment for a short time took place. At five o'clock the house resumed, when the Speech was again read; after which,
The Earl of Bridgewaterrose for the purpose of moving an Address to his Majesty thereon. His lordship began by observing, that he was persuaded he should meet the unanimous concurrence of that house in supporting his Majesty in the effectual prosecution of a war which the country is engaged in, for the purpose of securing and establishing uponsolid foundations the blessings of peace. He was equally convinced that, with respect to the proposals for opening a negociation with the enemy, the conduct adopted upon that occasion would meet with the approval of the House, and that in his exertions on behalf of Spain and of liberty, the sacrifices the country had made, and would make, would continue to be sanctioned by their warmest approbation. He entertained no doubt that whatever might be thought of the result of the war in Portugal, yet that the valour of our armies there must merit the most profound applause, and that the aid to be afforded to the king of Sweden, would be acknowledged the well-earned need of that gallant monarch's fidelity and zeal in the glorious and honourable cause wherein he had embarked. And he no less anticipated the grateful sensation they must feel, that, notwithstanding the efforts of the enemy to injure our commerce, yet, that when their lordships took into consideration the fact, that, in spite of those efforts, our commerce had increased, and our revenues increased in proportion. Influenced by I these, sentiments he would not trespass longer upon the time of the House than just to move the following Address to his Majesty.—Here his lordship read the Address, which, as usual, was an echo of the Speech, and nearly the same as that which is inserted in this day's proceedings of the house of commons.
§ Lord Sheffieldrose to second the Address, and said, My lord; we cannot express, too strong, our gratitude to his Majesty, not only for the transcendent situation in which we now stand as a nation, but for the whole of his able and judicious government, during so long a reign and under circumstances of unexampled difficulty.—His Majesty gra- 5 ciously acquaints us, that he has renewed his engagements with Spain, and observes that, there is no hope of safety but through a vigorous and persevering prosecution of the war, of which, I flatter myself, the great mass of this country is perfectly convinced, and it must he highly consoling to all Europe, to learn that his majesty is resolved most strenuously to support the cause of Spain. It is cur own cause;—it is the cause of Europe and of the world; and we cannot but concur in applauding the determination of the Spaniards to persevere, to the last extremity, in the glorious contest, for their liberty;—a resolution worthy of that noble nation. We cannot but admire their spirit, when we reflect on the completely disorganized state, into which they were thrown by the treachery of an implacable usurper.—If they should not, in every instance, act according to our notion of what is expedient, or even if prejudice should prevent them from receiving assistance in the way we think adviseable;—if their communications, among themselves and with us, should not be so prompt and perfect as might be expected from a country, whose government, and every thing derived from it, had not been recently dissolved, and overthrown;—if we should observe among them, a degree of party spirit, or struggles for power, we should consider it as the lot of human nature; and when we look among ourselves, (and it is highly to be lamented, especially at this crisis), we discover the same. In short, if all these circumstances should exist, we ought still to respect and admire their general conduct, and not despond, even though great reverses should take place.—The military spirit of the Spaniards is wonderful, if we consider the numerous veteran armies to which they are opposed, and as to our own troops, we have reason to expect from them, every thing that can be done by men. They have the highest confidence in their general, whether he advances or retreats, and we should be satisfied that whatever may happen, a British army, so commanded, will not disgrace the character of our country.—I believe there are few among us who are not convinced, that general ruin must ensue if the war is not carried on with the utmost vigour, and that Spain is the country where the great effort should be made: and how great should be our exultation when we hear that, during such a war, our trade, on the whole, is not diminished. 6 The export of certain manufactures decreased for a time, but not very considerably, or by no means as much as was supposed. Buonaparté threatened to subdue us by ruining our commerce, or by the expence of the war. We may thank him for having made the experiment; we are now relieved from all apprehensions on those points, for it is proved, that neither Decrees nor Embargoes can materially affect our trade, and that the flourishing slate of our finances enables us to carry on this expensive war, without any considerable loan or new taxes. As to the Embargo laid by the American States, I am confirmed in the opinion I always entertained, that it will prove much more beneficial to the empire than injurious: and we are indebted to the firmness of the present administration for a very great improvement in our situation, in respect to that country, and for the expectation that no machinations or menacing measures shall make us abandon those principles and that system, on which its greatness and power have been established.—It is by contemplating these circumstances that we discover the real greatness and power of this country, and which, I conceive, never can be destroyed but through our own misconduct. Look round the British Empire; look to the East and to the West; and we shall find it, notwithstanding this rancorous war, in as good a state, in all parts, as at any period;—but these matters will be much more ably slated to the house by those capable of rendering them interesting to your lordships.
Earl St. Vincentsaid, that the Address just read was such, that no man who had a veneration for his sovereign, or a love for his country, could ever assent to. Some parts of it, which went to express a determined hostility to the common enemy, and which went to declare the firm determination to carry on the war against him, all must approve. But when he adverted to the manner in which that opposition to him had been conducted on the peninsula of Europe, it was wholly impossible not to express both sorrow and indignation. He would assert it in the face of the country, and in the face of the world, that it was the greatest disgrace that had befallen Great Britain since the days of the Revolution; and this he openly declared, whether he took into consideration the manner in which the war was carried on in Portugal, or the way in which our troops had been sent 7 there. Transports were hired, and great merit was to be attributed to the ingenuity of ministers in providing these transports; but the public ought to be undeceived upon that head; there was not a tittle of merit in the case; it was only going to market, and offering a little more than the market price, and transports were to be obtained in abundance. He wished, however, to notice the important services to which these transports were eventually applied: "why truly," said his lordship, "they were at last employed to convey the rascally ruffians whom Junot commanded to that part of France which was nearest the boundaries of Spain, that they might, as speedily as possible, be again brought into action with more effect against our own soldiers. So that those devils," added his lordship," are at this moment harassing the rear of our retreating army". The impolicy of sending British troops to Portugal he always disapproved; but the result of the war there he was disgusted with: and then the delay that prevailed before we sent a man from thence towards Spain was disgraceful. In fact it would seem as if ministers had not even a geographic knowledge of the country through which they were to pass, insomuch that they ought to go again to school, to make themselves masters of it. But their ignorance of that species of knowledge, one would suppose was official; for a "Heaven-born Minister", just after he first came into power, asked whether Port Mahon was in Europe or not? and the persons at present in power manifested just the same local ignorance, when they sent an army to traverse a wild and inhospitable country, at the very commencement of the rainy season, to be overwhelmed with disease as well as fatigue. So little confidence did he place in these men, that he was decidedly of opinion, that unless they were removed, the country would be lost. The Convention of Cintra could not be considered, without feeling sentiments of alarm as well as indignation, rising in the mind; the more especially when he observed the cold-blooded treaty, that gave up a contest with the ships of an enemy, upon a compromise so unworthy the nation's character There was a time when such old-fashioned words as "sink, burn, and destroy", were understood and exercised: but now we are to negotiate to be ships' husbands, and we take possession by bargain and barter, instead of by battles, by bravery, and by 8 balls; we are to hold ships in trust by contract, and not in right by conquest. We had Princes of the Blood, all of whom are bred to arms; why, he asked, were not some of these illustrious personages employed to lead our armies; they had made the science of war their study from their childhood? If they were not to be employed, he was at a loss to ascertain for what purpose they were bred to arms. There was a distinguished person near him (earl Moira) who had the confidence of the people, who had the love of the soldiery, and who possessed the esteem of his majesty: why was not such a person as that nobleman employed? The reason was evident— it was because management prevented it. But was it to be supposed that because a Court of Enquiry had deemed no further investigation necessary, that therefore there ought to be no investigation? Whenever he looked at the terms of the Convention; whenever he reflected on the decision of that court, he could not avoid exclaiming, that the decision so announced was a blot upon the country. Whenever he heard of Councils of War being called, he always considered them as cloaks for cowardice; so said the brave Boscawen, and from him he imbibed the sentiment which time and experience had completely confirmed. At Vimiera we gained a victory, and in the moment that our soldiers were flushed with conquest, recourse was had to a council of war: that, he presumed, could only have been necessary, or indeed apologized for, in the moment of defeat. Upon what principle, therefore, such an expedient was resorted to, he, for one, accustomed to other methods, could not account; they only who acted in it can explain it. Just the same opinion he entertained of the Court of Enquiry; it was a shield to ward off investigation from ministers themselves; but he trusted that their lordships would not be prevented from making a scrupulous investigation of it in their own way. He knew the character of the Portuguese exceedingly well; they excepting the city of Lisbon, were as brave people as any upon the continent of Europe, and, officered with British soldiers, would have presented an undaunted front to Frenchmen. Why was not that expedient made use of? Ministers ought to have known their value, and if they did not, their ignorance was inexcusable. If that house did its duty, they would immediately proceed to the foot of the throne, and there tell the so- 9 vereign the bold truth, that if he did not remove them he would lose the country. These were the sentiments of his heart; he spoke them as a solemn duty, which he found himself bound to express. It was probably the last time he should trouble their lordships, and with that, said the noble admiral, I wish your lordships a good night. (At these words the noble earl instantly walked out of the house.)
Earl Grosvenorcomplained, that in consequence of the mode which his Majesty's ministers had of late years adopted respecting the Speech from the throne, noble lords were often betrayed into an involuntary approbation of the Address. Formerly, it was the custom to read the Speech previously to its being read from the throne, by which the members of both houses were put in possession of the substance of it at least. That excellent custom had been discontinued; and any noble lord who might disapprove of the Speech, was thereby precluded from offering an Amendment to the Address. He would, however, admit on this occasion, that there was not much in the Address to produce a difference of opinion. He cordially approved of that part of the Speech which expressed a determination to give all possible assistance to the Spaniards, so long as they should be true to themselves. He did not despair of the Spanish cause, provided the vast means of this country were employed in the manner best calculated to distress and embarrass the enemy. He also concurred in that part of the Speech which expressed disapprobation of the Convention of Cintra; but he would have been better pleased if that disapprobation had been followed by an avowal that ulterior measures were intended. Ministers having professed their determination to persevere in the cause of Spain, he trusted that their exertions would henceforth be made in a manner different from what they had been. His lordship severely censured that military arrangement by which a British army was sent into the heart of Spain, when it should have been sent to the foot of the Pyrenees. It should have been sent to a situation where it could not be exposed to the possibility of hiring obliged to retreat.—The noble earl expressed considerable regret that the disposition of America should not be favourable towards this country, but was rather inclined towards the Ruler of France. It must be admitted by all, that the Orders in Council did not originate in the smallest degree 10 of hostility on the part of Great Britain against America, but were only framed for the sole purpose of counteracting the obnoxious Decrees of Buonaparté; and these Orders in Council, it was well known to the Americans, were designed to cease, the very moment the enemy reversed his unjust decrees.—There was another subject to which he would desire the attention of the House; namely, the necessity of looking into our internal regulations, for the sake of immediately reforming the abuses which may have crept into the different departments of the government. In these times, when the people were called upon to make such weighty sacrifices, he did think that all useless Places and Pensions should be speedily abolished. When he intimated the existence of such abuses, he had no intention to say that this or any other administration were to be condemned, for he considered they were what might be properly termed, the rust of time, but ought quickly to be done away, lest they should corrode the welfare of the state. Buonaparté, from wicked and malevolent motives, had attended to the removal of every abuse which could possibly retard the success of his schemes; and although he did so from evil, it might well become this country to imitate his example, and do so from the best of motives.
§ Viscount Sidmouthobserved, that there was one point upon which there could not, he was persuaded, be any difference of opinion among their lordships, namely, the propriety of assuring his majesty of the gratitude with which they received his Speech. In expressing that assurance, a language was employed, which to him appeared to commit the house to certain points upon which they were not adequately informed. For himself, he would approve of continuing to support Spain so long as any hope remained; but he was not prepared to thank his majesty for a Treaty, of the conditions and engagements of which he was wholly ignorant. It was not impossible, when the Treaty came to be discussed, that he might approve it; but until the documents were before him, he must suspend his opinion, and, above all things, decline to pledge himself to an unreserved approbation of the measure. Before he could come to a proper decision on this subject, he must also obtain some information respecting the state of Spain. At no period within his memory was there so much spirit, so much loyalty and zeal 11 in the country, and yet, at the same time, so much dissatisfaction. It was a dissatisfaction not arising from a turbulent disposition in the people of this country, or from any marked reverses, or from the pressure of the public burthens, but a dissatisfaction produced by a feeling most honourable to the nation. The dissatisfaction was proportioned to the zeal and expectation of the country. It was not content either with the extent of the exertions that had been made to aid the Spaniards, or with the manner in which they were employed. Some statement, he trusted, would be made to allay this very laudable feeling of the public mind. His lordship here declared that he rose chiefly for the purpose of qualifying the assent he should give to the greatest part of the Address. With the reservation he had made, and that the means which would be liberally given would not be misemployed; that the sacrifices of blood and treasure that the people of this country were disposed, beyond all example, to make, would be spent for the glory of the nation, and the honour of his Majesty's crown, he would give his assent to the Address. He wished, however, not to be considered as committing himself to its full extent, but merely as concurring in that part which recommends a vigorous prosecution of the war, and expresses a determination to assist Spain, so long as Spain shall prove true to herself. He also concurred in the expediency of increasing our military means in proportion to those of the enemy with whom we have to contend.
§ Lord Grenvillerose and spoke nearly as follows: It. could not but be imagined, my lords, that there were parts of the Address in which it was impossible for me to concur, but I most willingly gave way to other lords who wished to deliver their sentiments. It was the constant practice, until the present administration came into office, to refrain both in the Speech and the Address from calling upon parliament, to deliver any decided opinion approving of past measures, the documents relating to which were not in the possession of the House, or expressing a determination to support any future system, the details of which had not been communicated. We are now, on the contrary, called upon to express our decided approbation, not only of past measures, but of a future system of which no explanation is given. Surely, it must be deemed incumbent upon minis- 12 ters to make some statement to your lordships, to give some explanation of the events which have passed, and of the system which it is determined to pursue. As it is, I must enter my decided protest against certain parts of the Address which your lordships are now called upon to vote, and which go to pledge this House, in approbation of a system, of which I, for one, cannot approve—My lords, with respect to Spain, it would be an idle waste of your lordships' time and patience for me to declare my opinion as to the nature of the contest in that country. Of the base and treacherous, the atrocious and cruel invasion of the independence of the. Spanish people, there is but one opinion in the country, but one opinion as to the cause in which they were fighting, against the tyrant who unjustly and cruelly attacked them. I have not, however, my lords, ever wished to conceal my opinion, with respect to the policy of sending a British army to Spain. I do not mean to say, that there might not be circumstances under which it might be advisable and expedient to send British troops into Spain; but I mean to assert that, during last summer, there was no prospect that ought to have induced any reasonable men to send a British army into the interior of Spain. I am anxious not to be misunderstood upon this point. I do not mean to apply my observation to naval co-operation, to the mode of sending fleets with troops on board to annoy particular parts of the coast, to keep the enemy in a constant state of alarm, and obtain partial advantages which may be of essential service. I confine myself to the policy of sending a British army into the interior of Spain, and I contend, that there was not that prospect which ought to have induced reasonable men to have so sent an army. Nor were there any circumstances which could justify the sending a British army, large, it is true, as a British army, but small, as an army acting on the continent, to meet the whole disposable force of France, without having any of the great powers of Europe as our auxiliaries. With the Pyrenees unlocked, and the road between Paris and Madrid as open as that between Paris and Antwerp, there was nothing which could justify our sending into the interior of Spain thirty or forty thousand British men to meet an army of 500,000. I can only compare such a measure to the far-famed march to Paris, to which it is fully equal in wildness and absurdity. It is perfectly clear 13 that it must rest with the Spanish people themselves to maintain their independence, and that without that spirit amongst themselves no army that we could send would be of any avail. They adopted a system, which was published in the early part of the summer, under the title of "Precautions", and which contained a most excellent plan of defence adapted to the peculiarities of the country, and calculated to harrass and annoy an invading army, and to wear them down by a continued system of partial attack, without incurring the risk which must necessarily attend a pitched battle with regular and veteran troops. This system was the best which could be adopted by that country, under its then circumstances, and might have produced a great effect upon the enemy, whose troops would have been continually harassed and fatigued, whilst the Spaniards, taking advantage of the peculiarities of their country, would have incurred little immedate risk, and would have gained a knowledge and attained a discipline which might have subsequently qualified them to contend in the field with the regular troops of France. This excellent system we forced them to abandon, by sending into the interior of the country a British army: it then became impossible for the Spaniards to leave our army to fight their battles by itself; our army would, of course, proceed in the manner and according to the usual routine of a regular army; and thus the Spaniards were forced on to engage in pitched battles, at a period when they were not competent, with regular troops, whilst the British army, too small to cope with the great superiority of troops brought into the field by France, can only retreat. In this way, my lords, I contend that the sending a British army into the interior of Spain has been actually injurious to the cause of the Patriots in that country.—I waited anxiously towards the close of last session for some communication on the subject of Spain, which I. did expect Ministers would have made for the purpose of obtaining the decision of Parliament. Had such a communication been made, I should certainly have delivered my opinion as to the impolicy of sending British troops into the interior of Spain. Ministers, however, chose to act without asking the advice of Parliament, and in what way have they contributed to the assistance of the 'Universal Spanish Nation', as it has been called? In what manner have they 14 afforded the aid of which they now so much boast? Setting aside for a moment the consideration of the general question of the policy or impolicy of sending British troops into the interior of Spain, it may be said, that there was a time when a British force of 30 or 40,000 men might have contributed to obtain a great temporary advantage, which, whatever effect it might have had upon the ultimate fate of the war, would at least have enabled the Spaniards to arrange their defence, and to mature their preparations. It may be said, that there was a period of the contest, when the French having been driven from Madrid, and forced to take refuge in the neighbourhood of the Pyrenees, a British force, sent there at that particular crisis, might have driven the French beyond the Pyrenees, and placed in the hands of the Spaniards the keys of their country, which they might then have been enabled to defend under infinitely more advantageous circumstances than they had since been placed in. It might be said, that this case did, from peculiar circumstances, actually occur. Allowing it to be so, how was it taken advantage of? One might have supposed, that, to make the proper use of such an advantageous conjuncture of affairs, our troops would have been sent to the port nearest the scene of action, and from whence they might be marched, in the shortest time, to the spot where their services were most wanted. But, instead of the nearest port, the farthest seemed to have been chosen, and the troops were sent to Lisbon. They are there employed in compelling the French to evacuate Portugal, who could not have held it if Buonaparté could not conquer Spain, and who must get possession of it if he does; and afterwards remain there for two months before they inarch to join the Spaniards. The moment was urgent, the occasion was pressing, every thing depended upon promptitude of action, and taking advantage of a small portion of time; and yet two months pass away before the army is even put in march to join the Spanish troops; and the general who commanded in chief, in giving an account of his conduct, says, that no arrangement was determined upon for putting the army in march. The transports which ought to have conveyed our troops are used to convey the troops of the enemy; and our army, compelled to make a long march over land, are too late for any effective purpose, and the enemy triumphs in the 15 capital of Spain before even a British musket is fired. The Spanish people may truly reproach us, "You promised us protection and assistance; you induced us to engage in the dangerous warfare of pitched battles, quitting our more desultory mode of warfare, but more secure to ourselves and more harrassing to the enemy; and now the oppressor lords it in our capital, plunders our property, and puts to death our nobles, whilst not a single British musket has yet been fired". Shame that such a reproach should truly attach to us! Most unfortunate is it that our army should be placed in such a situation which must necessarily give rise to apprehension. The dilemma stated by my noble friend (lord Sidmouth), most aptly applies to ministers upon this subject: either they did or they did not know that a British army, sent into the interior of Spain, would have to encounter the whole disposable force of France. If they did know it, by what infatuation could they have been induced to place an army in a situation in which no rational men would ever have thought of placing it; if they did not know it, then they must confess that they were wholly ignorant of the resources of France—that they were wholly ignorant that the ruler of Trance had the resources of the greater part of Europe at his command—that they were wholly ignorant that France had a large army which could be brought to bear upon any given point. With this view of the subject, it is, of course, impossible that I can concur in applauding the past measures adopted by ministers with respect to Spain; nor can I concur in supporting the system proposed to be adopted for increasing the army, with the view of sending more troops to Spain, for this must be the object, or the expression means nothing; although I do not mean to deny, that with the evils with which we are now surrounded, the increase of our regular force is a necessary measure. To the approbation, however, which is implied of their conduct, and their wise and vigorous system, I must decidedly dissent, contending, as I do, that there has been neither wisdom nor vigour in their measures. When praising themselves for wisdom and vigour, I wonder they did not add success, as that term would have been equally applicable with the two former.—There is one point, my lords, in the Speech and the Address, to which I feel it indispensably necessary to advert, I mean the Convention of Cintra, 16 and the Armistice which preceded it. An Armistice of which the House knows nothing; a Convention of which the House knows nothing. I was wondering what answer would be returned to that part of the Speech, and it was with no small surprize I heard it moved, as part of the Address, an expression of our regret, that such an Armistice and Convention should have been entered into. What! my lords, pronounce judgment before investigation; condemn a transaction before we are made acquainted with the details of it? I have now heard, for the first time, that his majesty has found it necessary to express his disapprobation of some of the articles of that Armistice and Convention, and from that circumstance it will of course form a future subject of discussion in this house, but at present they are not regularly before us. It is true, that the public have had those transactions before them, and have pronounced their condemnation; the people of England have complained of those transactions at the foot of the throne, and I cannot applaud the tone of the Answer, which was returned to the Address of the City of London. It being, however, contrary to the principles of British justice to pronounce judgment without investigation, what must we expect, after unequivocally condemning the Armistice and Convention, of which we know nothing, neither the documents, nor any details respecting the transaction being before us? what must we expect upon going to the foot of the throne with an Address, containing such an unequivocal condemnation without examination, or the means of examination? we must expect to be told, "You, the parliament, have forgotten the first principles of British justice in pronouncing judgment without investigation, in condemning a transaction with the details of which you are unacquainted". The Armistice and Convention have, it is known, been referred to a Board of Military Officers, who have reported that no blame attaches to any of the generals employed on that occasion. That Board of Inquiry have abstained, and very properly abstained, from giving any opinion respecting the conduct of ministers; but from the displeasure expressed by his Majesty, it is evident that they alone were to blame—the Board having declared their opinion that no blame attaches to the generals, and his Majesty having subsequently expressed his displeasure at the Armistice and Convention, that displea- 17 sure must apply of course to the conduct of ministers. The generals may alledge the want of cavalry; they may alledge the want of artillery—all which must arise from the neglect of ministers. This must of course form a part of the Inquiry when the subject comes regularly before the house.—There is another point also of considerable importance, upon which the Board of Inquiry have very properly abstained from giving an opinion, I mean the naval part of the transaction; I do not mean to convey any censure upon the admiral who agreed to the Convention, or to insinuate that he stands in any other situation than that of the generals, to whom it is decided that no blame attaches; but when, instead of that phraseology to which we have been accustomed in the transactions of our navy, that of sunk, burnt, and destroyed, when, instead of taking prisoners of war, a Convention is entered into, by which the fleet of an enemy comes into our ports with a stipulation, that it shall be delivered up at the conclusion of peace, it becomes a subject which demands inquiry and investigation. That investigation will, I trust, take place, and then our decision will follow regularly and formally; but to applaud or to condemn, without investigation, conveys neither approbation nor censure.—There is one most important topic which I think it my duty to press upon the attention of your lordships, though no notice is taken of it either in the Speech or the Address; I mean the present state of our relations with the United Stales of America. The noble lord who moved the Address has indeed stated, that the embargo was advantageous to this country. Without entering at length into the discussion of the question, there is one thing of which I entertain no doubt, that it is to the measures of the British government that we owe the embargo, and that it was laid on in America in contemplation of our Orders in Council. If there ever could be any doubt upon this subject, that doubt was completely removed in the month of July last, when it was proposed by the government of the United States, that the embargo, in as far as it regards us, should be taken off, provided our Orders in Council were rescinded. From that time, therefore, a new era commenced, at which the embargo began (if it was not so before) to be the effect of our own choice; and so far from its being a measure advantageous to his country, I am prepared to shew Vol. XII. 18 when the proper time for the discussion arrives, that instead of being advantageous, it is extremely injurious to our interests, and will prove still more detrimental than past experience has shewn it to be, if it is continued. But even the interruption which it has occasioned to the commercial intercourse between the two countries, though a great and serious evil, is not the only nor the worst mischief with which it is pregnant. The wish to maintain mutual relations of peace and amity, is, I believe, the prevalent sentiment among the people, both of this country and America; but I am afraid that the government of neither of the two countries corresponds with the popular sentiment. I am ready to acknowledge, that the government of the United States has, in more instances than one, manifested a considerable partiality to the side of France. But I cannot, on the other hand, acquit the British government of a want of fairness in its proceedings towards America. The people of this country, I am firmly persuaded, desire nothing more than to live at peace with America; but I am as firmly persuaded, that the intention of the king's government is to drive things to extremity with America. I know that there are some persons amongst us who are mad enough to believe, that a rupture between tile two countries is an event rather to be desired than deprecated. They think, that were such a case to happen, we should sweep every ship from the seas, and monopolize the commerce of the world. Wild imagination! Who does not know that commerce is most desirable when the advantages of it are mutual, and that it can only thrive by reciprocity? But, supposing that it was desirable that we should engross the whole commerce of the world, are we likely to attain our object by compelling other nations to renounce the use of our manufactures, and to refuse to supply us with their commodities? I say I believe it to be the intention of government to force matters to a rupture with America; for, if this were not their intention, would they have neglected, as they have done, the opportunity which occurred in the course of the season of effecting a compleat and cordial reconciliation? But, instead of embracing this opportunity with eagerness, in the insultins and sophistical answer written by his Majesty's foreign secretary of state, a principle is laid down still more objectionable than any which they had formerly profes 19 sed, and which is no other than this—that whatever acts of injustice may be committed by the enemy, gives us a right to commit acts of injustice equal in degree and extent, under the pretence of retaliation—a principle in itself so horrible and absurd, that there is nothing so criminal or extravagant that it would not sanction. In all their former definitions of retaliation the acquiescence of the neutral was supposed as indispensible to authorize the exercise of it: but in this letter the doctrine is broadly laid down, that whatever the enemy does you have a right to do also. Upon this principle you might send an army to dethrone the king of Sweden, and to place one of the princes of the blood royal of England upon his throne, because; Bonaparte has dethroned the king of Spain, and given the crown to his brother. In short, were this principle once generally admitted, there could be nothing sacred among men. The proposition of America, it ought also to be recollected, went farther than to hold out a prospect merely of repealing the embargo. It went so far as to say, that if you would rescind your Orders in Council, not only should the embargo be taken off but the American government would, in the case of France refusing to follow your example, have made common cause with you against the common enemy. And you have rejected all the advantages of commerce, peace and alliance, rather than retract an act of injustice of which you have been guilty! This is a subject which merits the serious consideration of the House, and though it is not mentioned in the Speech, it is of such importance, that an ample and full discussion of it in the course of the session you will find unavoidable; but as it is not my intention to move any amendment to the Address, I shall not at present press it farther upon the attention of your lordships.—There is really, my lords, very little of the Address in which I can concur. And I cannot omit the present opportunity of entering my protest, in particular, against that part of it which thanks his Majesty for renewing his engagements with the Spanish government, for to this hour I did not know that any engagements did exist. I was willing to give ministers credit for at least avoiding; in the present precarious situation of Spain, to tie themselves down by any stipulations, by which our policy might in future be embarrassed. It is therefore with the most poignant grief that I find, not only that such engagements 20 have been entered into, but that they are to be ratified by a solemn treaty. Upon the negociation it would be premature to deliver any opinion, till the papers containing the correspondence are before the House. I must, however, be permitted even now to observe, that his Majesty's Declaration is at variance with the Speech, respecting the ground upon which the correspondence was broken off. In the I Declaration the rupture was ascribed to the refusal of Buonaparté to abandon his views upon Spain, and in the Speech it is attributed to the resolution of the British government not to abandon its ally. AH I shall now say is, that the demand was unreasonable for either party to make. But let me not be misunderstood. I do not mean to say, nor do I think, that peace was at all attainable; and from the time that the first propositions arrived from Erfurth, I was uniformly of this opinion. If the Uti possidetis was proposed as a basis of negotiation, such a basis was, under all the circumstances, most absurd; for at that very time, it implied, that we should retain possession of Portugal, of which we were then in possession, and that Buonaparté should keep those provinces which were occupied by his army. Peace, therefore, was impracticable, except, which was not to be expected, that he should renounce what he had conquered, or that we should leave the Spaniards to their fate, and thereby become parties to a measure of most wanton violence and horrible oppression. The only question to be considered was, whether the negociation was conducted by the British government in such a way as to leave matters on the best possible footing.—In that part of the Address which relates to the character and conduct of our army, I most sincerely and heartily concur. No language; can be too strong, or too glowing, when applied to its deserts; and, if the country is to be saved at all, I am convinced that its salvation can alone be effected by maintaining our military force upon a scale commensurate with the increasing dangers of our situation. Measures of vigour also will be necessary; but these measures ought to be adopted under the guidance of wisdom and prudence, and care taken not to waste our resources in Quixotic schemes which it is impossible to accomplish, and where failure is pregnant with calamity. Our army, brave and well disciplined, and capable as it is of doing every thing which men can be expected to perform, will, in these times, find ample. 21 employment in securing our own defence. Impressed with this opinion, it is with the deepest pain that I reflect upon the actual situation of so large a proportion of the military force of the country wantonly committed in a hopeless contest, in which success cannot be the reward of valour, however eminent, and where a safe retreat is all that the most brilliant exertions can reasonably be expected to effect—I have thus felt it my duty to state my sentiments upon those topics which will afterwards form the subject of full and distinct discussion. It will be matter of future inquiry, how it comes that all the assistance which you have given to the Spaniards is to turn your back upon them; what were the causes which led to the Armistice and: Convention, of some articles of which his Majesty has declared his disapprobation; whether a war with America be or be not avoidable; and, above ail, whether the plan of continuing to send troops into the heart of Spain is to be persevered in? The last-mentioned subject I conceive to be of so great magnitude, that all other questions are, in comparison with it, of very subordinate importance. I have no hesitation whatever in declaring it to be my most decided opinion, that if the system hitherto acted upon, be farther pursued, and the whole armed force of the country sent into the interior of Spain, the destruction of this Monarchy is inevitable; and that we shall soon be reduced to the same condition with Prussia and the conquered States of the Continent. It is admitted upon all hands, that our navy alone is not adequate to our national defence; and if we lose our army, the strong arm of our protection, we may, indeed, replace it with numbers, but not with soldiers. I trust, therefore, that the future conduct of the war, in as far as it involves this most important question, will take precedence of all other subjects of discussion.
The Earl of Liverpool(late lord Hawkesbury) confessed, that upon the various important topics comprized in his majesty's Speech, he was prepared to expect both that the noble lord who had just sat down, as well as other noble lords, would deliver their sentiments; at the same time he thought the Address was so cautiously worded, that he did conceive it would have met with the unanimous approbation of their lordships. The Address was so framed, that it could not have the effect of committing any one in the way of approbation of those measures, which ministers 22 had felt it to be their duty to adopt during he recess. In the first place, with regard to the affairs of Spain, the Address only rent to give his Majesty a general assurance of support, in maintaining the cause of that nation as long as they proved true to themselves. In what way this support ad been given, or how it was to be in future administered, would be a subject of distinct and detailed consideration; nor would the House, by now agreeing to the Address, pledge themselves to approve of those particular engagements which had been contracted. All that they were now called upon to do was, to record a public avowal of their determination not to desert that cause which the government and the country had espoused, and that they will not be so far dismayed by those reverses which had been experienced, and which were from the beginning to be expected, as to renounce that system of support to which both his Majesty and the nation were most solemnly pledged, and in which it was, in consequence of these reverses, even become a more sacred duty to persevere. Those who inferred that the cause was desperate, from those disasters which had already happened, reasoned upon a most contracted and imperfect view of the relative situation of the parties engaged in the contest; and he intreated those who were inclined to despond, before they gave way to their fears, to consult the records of history, and to review those instances of nations who had been compelled to struggle for their independence in circumstances similar to those in which the Spaniards were now placed. There it would be found, that nations, after maintaining struggles for ten or twenty years, in the course of which they had been almost uniformly worsted in battle, had eventually succeeded, in spite of the triumphs of their adversaries, in securing the object for which they contended. It was difficult to conceive any situation which would better warrant hopes of ultimate success, than that of Spain at this day. The people were unanimous in their resistance to the invader; and it was the only instance since the French revolution, in which a whole people had taken up arms in their own defence. The territory of Spain was as large as that of France within its ancient limits, and the country possessed many local advantages which were extremely favourable to its defence; advantages the value of which the Spanish history in former times ought to teach us 23 duly to appreciate. The noble lord might, indeed, say, that if their advantages, both physical and moral, were so great, the Spaniards ought to be left to themselves. Ought we, then, to risk nothing where so much was at stake? The success of the enemy had, in many cases, been nearly in proportion to his risk; and because he had gained a great deal by risking much, where we have much to gain, ought we to risk nothing? The cause in itself was most interesting to the best feelings of the human mind—it offered the last chance of salvation to the continent of Europe; and, taken in a more contracted and selfish point of view, our own immediate security was in some measure involved in its fate. He asked, then, if nothing was to be risked in support of a generous ally; if nothing was to be risked for the re-establishment of the general tranquillity; in fine, if nothing was to be risked for our own safety and independence?—With regard to the measures which had been already adopted by his Majesty's ministers, when the period came for discussing them, he was prepared to vindicate them both in whole and in part, but he could not even now suffer the noble lord's statements to go forth to the public without making some observations upon them. The noble lord seemed to be of opinion, that the military assistance which this government gave to the Spaniards ought to have been confined to sending detached expeditions to particular points of the coast; and to him (lord Liverpool) it appeared not a little extraordinary, that he should have objected to the policy of the expedition to Portugal, which was almost the only point of the coast which, at the time, was in possession of the enemy. It was the general sentiment of the people of this country, that the aid of government ought not to be limited to sending supplies of arms and money, but that succours in men should also be sent in support of a cause in which every individual felt the strongest interest. A large force had been prepared with unexampled expedition, and in its application ministers had taken the advice, not only of military men of high reputation at home, but had consulted the Spaniards themselves, who, both in the north and south, had recommended the reduction of general Junot's army as the most acceptable service which it was in our power to perform. The consideration due to an ancient and faithful ally, who was then groaning under a foreign yoke, he admitted 24 to have had considerable influence with his Majesty's ministers in undertaking the deliverance of Portugal. He requested also the noble lord to bear in mind, that at the time when our expedition sailed, and which he seemed to think might have acted with greater advantage in the north of Spain, the passage from Paris to Madrid was just as open as it is now; and that the French army was in possession not only of the passes of the Pyrenees, but of a large district in the south of Spain.—The noble earl stated the advantage which had been derived from general Spencer's small force, in facilitating the reduction of the army of Dupont, and, in consequence of the evacuation of Portugal, the Spaniards had been delivered from a large force, which, by acting in their rear, might have embarrassed and impeded all their future operations. His lordship also defended the equipment of the expedition to Portugal, and asserted, that in every respect, and specifically in the proportion of cavalry and artillery with which it was accompanied, it was perfectly competent to execute the service on which it was sent. Neither, he contended, hail there been one moment's unnecessary delay in the march of our army from Portugal. If it did not proceed immediately to Spain after the conclusion of the Convention, it was, because no central government had then been established, and it was impossible to arrange any plan of operations with the provincial Juntas.—With respect to the Cintra Convention, there were some articles in it of which his majesty disapproved; but these were not of a military nature, and he assured their lordships, that no information should be withheld by ministers, which might be deemed necessary to a lull and fair discussion of this or any other measure.—As to the Answer returned to the Address of the City of London, he was at a loss to see any ground for the noble baron's observations. As far as it called for inquiry, no reflection or stricture was made upon it; but when it prejudged the conduct of the officers engaged in that transaction, and the character of the transaction itself, by branding both with the strongest disapprobation before any inquiry could be had upon them, such an attempt to prejudice the matter could not have been passed over unnoticed or uncensured.—Much stress had also been laid by the noble baron on the conduct of government towards America. He still imputed the measure of the Embargo to 25 the Orders in Council issued by the British government; but if the noble baron would refer to the correspondence between Mr. Madison and Mr. Erskine on that occasion, he must be convinced, that at the time of laying on the embargo, the American government were acquainted only with the decrees of the French government, and that they adopted the measure of the embargo on the supposition that the French decrees would produce on our part some measure of retaliation, such as that of the Orders in Council. There was no disposition on the part of the British government to irritate America; on the contrary, every thing was done in the tone of conciliation, as far as the honour, the interests, and the rights of the country could allow: but, no consideration should prevail upon us to impair these things. On the vindication of them depended all our strength and national dignity and importance; and, surely, they were not to be sacrificed to America, at the very moment when America seemed so blind to her own interest, and had betrayed so decided a partiality in favour of France, to the prejudice and injury of Great Britain. When the time arrived for a minuter explanation of all these points, he should be happy to afford every information in his power more fully to explain them. The present he did not conceive to be the proper moment for entering into that explanation.
Lord Sidmouthshortly explained the motives which induced him to concur in the Address. He did not conceive it to pledge him to any of the particular measures to which it referred; and with that reservation it was that he gave it his present concurrence.
Earl Moiradisapproved of many of the paragraphs in the Address; but would still refrain from moving any Amendment. He particularly insisted on that which referred to the Armistice and Convention concluded in Portugal, and took occasion to explain the opinion which he had delivered upon it as a member of the Court of Inquiry. He concurred, indeed, with his colleagues in saying, that no further military proceeding should be had in that matter; and he had emphatically made use of the word 'military,' on the occasion. As far as the officers, who took a part in the transaction, were engaged, he would repeat it, that they had behaved with unquestionable zeal and firmness. They might have perhaps imputed to them an error in judgment; but, circumstanced 26 as they were, their error was not such as fell within any infraction of the articles of war; it was rather an error imputable to his majesty's ministers, and to the manner in which they had prepared and sent out the expedition.—The Address also alluded to further aid to be afforded to Sweden. Should it not be inquired how that aid was to be applied? Was the further assistance, to be hereafter granted to Sweden, to be applied in the manner in which we had hitherto afforded that support? What, in fact, had been done for Sweden, that in the least contributed to give her any material assistance? From her adherence to our alliance, she had already lost almost half of her territory, and was now exposed to the severest fate. We were as much bound therefore to attend to Sweden as to Spain. Looking to the unfortunate peninsula, where our principal exertions were said to have been directed, what was the situation there? Did the Address at all indicate the feelings of this house, or of any man in the kingdom on that weighty subject? The noble earl had said, that the Spaniard would not accept our proffered assistance. Was the fit application made to them? Where was the question asked? At the extremity of the kingdom farthest removed from the scene of danger. Supposing an enemy were to enter Scotland; would an ally, anxious for our protection, take an army to Penzance, and inquire of a council there, if he could give the inhabitants of that remote quarter protection? But, he was warranted from the evidence before the Court of Inquiry to say, the aid was applied for, not for Gallicia, but for the Pyrenean frontiers. What was the situation of the French at that time? Buonaparté, in the plenitude of self-confidence, had imprudently distributed his forces in small divisions all over the kingdom. The natives rising throughout the provinces, indignant at the perfidy of their enemy, were competent to the utter destruction of these scattered legions. What was then our duty? It was to interpose 50,000 men between Spain and France, which would be increased to 150,000 by the zeal of the natives. This immense army, organized and disciplined as it would have been, blended with British regulars, would take possession of the passes, and the consequence would have been, that not a Frenchman could have entered or quitted Spain, unless he had cut his way through this prodigious force. It was not enough to 27 drive the French out of Spain, not a subject of Napoleon should have passed the frontiers, unless exchanged as a prisoner. Then would have been the moment to have called on Austria, and to have told her, that her existence depended upon immediate hostility against France—to have informed her, that the British forces, supported by their ally, were hovering, like a dark storm, on the summits of the mountains, and would pour onward in a torrent, to spread devastation in the plains beneath, the moment she should declare her purpose. All these golden opportunities had been lost by the gross mismanagement of his majesty's ministers. Nor could he concur in the Address in what respected the Convention of Cintra. The speech of the commissioners was designed to screen from accusation the real culprits. He had said, in common with his colleagues, that there was no ground for any further military inquiry; but this was not saying that there was no ground for inquiry at all. The conduct of the naval department had not, and indeed could not, come before them. The fitness of the political instructions on which the military or naval officers proceeded, was not at all examined. What were these instructions? They were, that the enemy should be driven out of Portugal. They were forced out of the country: and so far these instructions were complied with. Neither was there any want of zeal or courage in the manner in which this business was accomplished. If there were errors in judgment, those errors were in the ministers who removed an army of the enemy from a state of total inutility to a scene of action. Where they were they could have formed no junction with the French armies in Spain, and they must in the sequel have been reduced and subdued.—Nor could he concur in the propriety of the conduct of ministers in what related to the Address of the City of London. The citizens came forward to do what freemen ought at all times to perform. They petitioned his majesty on a subject of great national importance, and in doing so they had not committed what ministers had charged them with, criminated any man before his conduct had been examined at the proper tribunal.—So much he would say on the subject of the Address now moved, and on the conduct of ministers as connected with it. He would now inquire what was the duty of their lordships. Was it to sit silent at the present momentous crisis, 28 when the eyes of the country and of Europe were directed to them? Now, more than ever, the salvation of the stale depended upon the wisdom of their decisions. He ardently wished, that while the governments of the earth were crumbling around them, they would vigilantly attend to the dangers to which the British empire was exposed, augmented as they daily were by the indiscretion of those to whom the conduct of public affairs had been unhappily entrusted.
§ The Earl of Buckinghamshire,while he approved of the exertions made by ministers in favour of the Spanish Patriots, could not refrain from expressing his disapprobation of the manner in which our gallant troops were employed; and no man more lamented than he did the mistakes which had placed them in situations which rendered them incapable of displaying those energies for which British soldiers are every where characterised. He wished to avoid pledging himself to any measure whatever, until ministers laid fully before the House their motives for their conduct.
§ Lord Erskinereprobated the Address, as in many respects disingenuous, particularly in the attempt which it made to screen ministers, by shifting the blame of the Convention of Cintra from their own shoulders to those of the officers who commanded the expedition in Portugal. If there was an error of judgment any where, it was to be charged on his majesty's ministers, who had placed those officers in a situation which reduced them to the necessity of acceding to such terms. The conduct of ministers in rejecting the proposal of America, he must also reprobate. It would lead to the worst consequences. It would throw America into the arms of France, and tend to separate the new from the old world, which must deeply wound the commercial prosperity of this country. The Lord Chancellor combatted the opinions of his noble and learned friend. Nothing could be more unfounded than the idea which some noble lords seemed to entertain, that the government of this country seemed to be actuated by a spirit of hostility towards America. They harboured no such feeling, on the contrary, they were sensible that the interests of the two countries were closely connected; but that England must maintain her dignity, her rights, and her laws: otherwise, indeed, she would soon prove but an unavailing friend to America or any other coun- 29 try. Nothing could be more unfounded than the charge of disingenuousness, brought against the Address by his noble and learned friend. What was there disingenuous in it? It did not preclude the house from the fullest investigation of any of the measures it had referred to, but left them open for future discussion and censure. In the reference it made to the Armistice and Convention, it did not intend any reflection upon the military conduct of the officers concerned in them. It rather had in contemplation circumstances of a mixed nature, rather political than military, and these most probably it was of which his majesty has declared his disapprobation. When all these measures came hereafter to be discussed, noble lords would find themselves fully at liberty to treat them according to the judgment they might then form of them. Their concurrence in the Address at the present moment would not preclude them from that liberty.
§ Lord Mulgravevindicated ministers from the reproaches bestowed on them; and merely indicated, that they were ready to discuss the various subjects mentioned, whenever the noble lords on the opposite tide chose.
Lord Aucklandsaid, that several parts of the Address might bear the interpretation of committing the house; as it was said, for instance, that they heard 'with satisfaction,' that his majesty had entered into a treaty. But he was glad to hear it expressly declared, that their agreeing to the Address did not involve their approbation of the measures of government.
The Address was then agreed to.—The Earl of Liverpool then gave notice, that on Monday he should move the thanks of the house to sir Arthur Wellesley, and the other officers and troops, for the victory of Vimeira.