§ The order of the day for summoning their lordships having been read,
§ Lord Grenvillerose and spoke as follows: It will he in the recollection of your lordships, that I gave notice towards the latter end of last session of a motion grounded upon the Evidence which had then recently been taken at the bar, to address his majesty to rescind the Orders in Council. I was induced to withdraw that notice in consequence of some favourable reports which I then heard as grateful to my feelings, as, if realised, they would have proved beneficial to the best interests of 772 the country, viz., of there being a probability of an adjustment of the differences between this country and the United States of America. Those reports I have unfortunately found to be erroneous; and I now feel it to be my duty to bring forward a motion upon this most important subject. It is now of no consequence, whether the Orders in Council were the cause, or one of the causes, of the American Embargo. That question is now set at rest; a proposition having been made in August last to this government on the part of the United States, to suspend the Embargo with respect to this country, if we would rescind our Orders in Council; it is clear therefore, whatever might have been the case before, that since last August the continuance of our Orders in Council is the sole cause of the continuance of the American Embargo, inasmuch as that would be removed if they were rescinded. And, if I could be induced to imagine these Orders in Council to have been, previous to last August, consistent with the principles of justice, the rights of nations, of sound policy, still, my lords, the question has, since that period, assumed a different shape, and we must consider the question as it relates generally to our policy towards the United States. From the year 1783 to the commencement of the last war, the line of policy pursued by this country towards America, was conciliation; that was the system adopted by the administration of the late Mr. Pitt, and it was continued on the commencement of that war, when it became still more the policy of this country to conciliate America. Accordingly, in the year 1794 a Treaty of Commerce was concluded with the United States, which although said by some persons in this country to be too favourable to America, and by some persons in America to be too favourable to this country, was, I believe, an impartial treaty, giving to neither party too great an advantage over the other. The amity and the friendship between the two countries continued till the termination of that treaty. Some differences subsequently arose, and two years ago, when I was called to his majesty's councils, I conceived it to be my duty immediately to set about atchieving, if possible, that important object, the adjustment of our differences with America. It was highly satisfactory to mo, that the details of this negociation devolved into abler hands than mine, and a treaty was concluded. No sooner was it known that 773 a treaty had been concluded, and before its provision could be known, than every engine was set to work by persons in this country, who were determined to leave no means untried to provoke hostility with America, and the most gross misrepresentations were made of the object and provisions of the treaty. I waited with impatience until the treaty could be published; it was at length sent back irons America and published, and then it was seen how grossly untrue these misrepresentations had been; it was then discovered, that whilst every provision had been made fairly to conciliate America, the greatest care had been taken to maintain the maritime rights and maritime superiority of this country, and that in this respect we had been more provident than the noble earl opposite, his majesty's Secretary of State, had been, in a communication made by him to the government of the United Stales, in which he laid down in some sort a basis for a new Treaty. Upon this head we had decidedly the advantage in the treaty we concluded; having done away the effect of the unwise proposition made by the noble earl. By that time the noble lords opposite, and their colleagues, had been called to his majesty's councils, and they determined on pursuing a line of conduct totally different from the system we had thought it our duty to adopt. With reference to Ireland, to the Northern Powers, to America, every part of their system was totally different. I am glad it was so— I do not mean to say that I am glad to see such a system pursued, but seeing what their policy is, I am glad that it is totally different to what ours was. After their ill-advised and unjust expedition to Copenhagen, America was the only neutral power that could be looked to, and one would have thought that his majesty's government would have gladly sought to conciliate America, seeing that nearly all Europe was combined against us, and shut against our trade; and that America opened to us a market capable of taking nearly all our commerce, and with the probability, that with the increasing prosperity and population of this branch of the parent state, the market would be in no very long period so extended, that we should scarcely be able, with all our means, to supply it. His majesty's ministers, unfortunately, pursued a different line of conduct: America covered the ocean with her ships, and is majesty's ministers determined on 774 sweeping them from it. They therefore issued their Orders in Council to compel the vessels of an independent state to pay duties to the British Government, for leave to carry on their trade. It was natural, that the people of the United States should be jealous of such an extraordinary attack upon their independence; it was natural that that jealousy should be the greater, from the circumstance of their independence having been so recently acknowledged by this country. This attempt to levy duties upon the ships and merchandize of the United States, bears a close analogy to the attempt made forty years ago, to levy taxes in America, which caused the revolution that ultimately severed those colonies from the parent state. I hope, my lords, the system now pursued will not plunge the two countries into hostilities, so fatal to their best interests; but, unfortunately, there appears a determination in the part of his majesty's government, to do every tiling, that can tend to force on that very hostility, which is so much to be deprecated. What have they attempted to do by these Orders in Council but to deprive the people of the United States in reality of their independence, by forcing them to bring all their productions to this country, to pay duty, and thus to reduce them again in effect to the situation of colonies of this country. It is well known that there is a vulgar notion in America, that it is the object of the British Government to destroy their independence, and to reduce them again to the situation of colonies. It cannot be supposed for a moment that any enlightened statesman, or even any man of common sense in this country, can be desirous that the United States should again become the colonial possessions of this country. It is a well-known and notorious fact, that the commerce, the wealth, and the prosperity of this country have been greatly increased in consequence of the revolution by which the colonies, now forming the United States, were separated from this country, and it is impossible that any man of common sense can wish that they should be again brought back to the situation of colonies. What, however, is the effect of the Orders in Council? They were clothed in a number of words which even those who framed them scarcely understood; which were very difficult to be understood by others. But what has been their effect, for to their practical effect we must 775 look in considering the extent and relations of these measures? America, in the present stale of the world, is the only country upon which they could operate; and with respect to America, their effect is to produce a colonial monopoly of all the merchandize of the United Stales, which is to be brought to this country to pay duty before it can be conveyed to any part of the world. How, then, must such a measure operate upon the minds of the people of America, jealous of their newly acquired independence, and still more jealous of this country, from the notion which I before stated to prevail amongst them; how much must such a measure tend to alienate their minds from this country? We were told in high sounding language when these measures were before parliament, of the sums, which would be raised by the duties levied upon neutral commerce, of rendering the commerce of the enemy tributary to this country, and of making the enemy himself contribute largely to the expences of the war, and to relieve the pressure and the burdens of the people of this country. What, my lords, has been the revenue actually raised from this source, the productiveness of which was so pompously announced? It appears by a statement of the produce of the duties levied under the Orders in Council Acts, up to the 5th of January, that they have produced the enormous sum of Thirty-one thousand pounds! Thirty-one thousand pounds, my lords, to relieve the pressure and burdens of the people, and to contribute largely to the expenses of the war; and this sum levied upon vessels brought by force into our ports. (A cry of No, no! from the other side of the house!) It has been, however, partly levied upon vessels brought by force into our ports, and partly upon those coming in voluntarily. In looking at such a sum thus produced, it may well be asked, as it was with respect to the Tax on Tea, forty years ago, in America, what price do we pay for this paltry revenue? And yet the Tea Duty, would have produced mints and millions, compared with the produce of the Duties, levied under that unjust and impolitic measure, the Orders in Council. When I contemplate such a paltry issue derived from this measure, so much boasted of, for the benefit which it was to confer upon the country, I cannot impute to his majesty's ministers so much ignorance as to suppose they bad any other motive in carrying into effect the Orders in Council 776 than to force America into hostility. I do not wish to have this expression considered as uttered in the warmth of argument, for I do firmly believe, that it is the object of his majesty's ministers to do every thing in their power to force America into hostility with this country. It is incumbent, upon me, my lords, to declare my retractation of an opinion which I had taken up in consequence of an erroneous impression from an expression used in the President's Message to Congress, and which I was at first induced to believe displayed a greater partiality to France than to this country, in offering to the former power to become a party in the war against this country. I had no further information upon the subject.— Ministers ought to have been informed upon it, and yet the noble earl, his majesty's Secretary of State, argued, that this partiality to France was actually evinced; that this difference in the overtures made to the two countries actually took place, although it is now perfectly clear that there was no difference, that there was no greater partiality to France, than to this country, and that the propositions made to the two countries, were not merely in effect, but were verbatim the same. An attentive consideration, even of the expression in the Message of the President, which has been so much misrepresented, will clearly prove that the difference stated to exist between the propositions made to the two countries, was not stated by him to exist. The expression in the Message, to which I allude, is this: "The instructions to our ministers, with respect to the different belligerents, were necessarily modified with a reference to their different circumstances, and to the condition annexed by law to the executive power of suspension, requiring a degree of security to our commerce, which would not result from a repeal of the Decrees of France. Instead of a pledge, therefore, for a suspension of the Embargo as to her, in case of such a repeal, it was presumed that a sufficient inducement might be found in other considerations, and particularly in the change produced by a compliance with our just demands, by one belligerent, and a refusal by the other, in the relations I between this other and the United States" —It must be clearly evident that the repeal of the French Decrees, would not give the necessary security to the commerce of America, and therefore it was not thought necessary to offer to the 777 French government the repeal of the Embargo in ret urn; bat it was offered to France, that it she would repeal her Decrees, and we refused to rescind our Orders in Council, that America would then be at war with this country; but it was offered to us, not merely that if we repealed our Orders in Council, and France refused to rescind her Decrees, America would be at war with France, but that the Embargo should be suspended with respect to this country. Thus the greater advantage was offered to us, instead of any partiality being shewn to France. That this was explained to his majesty's ministers, and must have been understood by them, appears clearly front the papers on the table. In a letter from Mr. Pinkney to Mr. Secretary Canning, dated the 23d of August, 1808 will be found the following passage. "If, as I propose, your Orders should be rescinded as to the United States, and our Embargo rescinded as to Great Britain, the effect of these concurrent acts will be, that the commercial intercourse of the two countries will be immediately resumed; while, if France should adhere to maxims and conduct, derogatory to the neutral rights of the United Stales, the Embargo continuing as to her, will take the place of your Orders, and lead with an efficacy, not merely equal to theirs, but probably much greater, to all the consequences that ought to result from them. On the other hand, if France should concur in respecting those rights, and commerce should thus regain its fair immunities, and the law of nations its just dominion, all the alleged purposes of the British Orders will have been at once fulfilled. If I forbear to pursue these ideas through all the illustrations of which they are susceptible, it is because the personal conferences to which I have before alluded, as well as the obvious nature of the ideas themselves, render it unnecessary."— In these personal conferences, there can be no doubt that the propositions made by America were fully explained, and by the subsequent Note from Mr. Secretary Canning to Mr. Pinkney, dated the 23d of Sept. it must appear evident that his majesty's ministers were convinced that no such partiality, as alledged, had been shewn by the United States to France. There is another Letter from Mr. Secretary Canning, published in an American paper, but which is not amongst the Correspondence on the table, in which it still more clearly appears that ministers were fully aware of the real na- 778 Ture of the propositions made by America to France. The nature of the propositions made to France, is distinctly proved by a reference to the Instructions given to general Armstrong, the American minister at Paris, the material words of which will be found to be verbatim the same with the instructions to Mr. Pinkney here, with respect to the change that would be made in the relations with either power refusing to repeal its Decrees or Orders, the other power consenting to rescind them. It is therefore perfectly clear that no partiality was evinced towards France; and it is also evident, that his Majesty's ministers must have known that such was the fact. I cannot help, however, whilst upon this correspondence, remarking upon the monstrous principle assumed in the note of Mr. Secretary Canning, to which I before alluded, in which he states, that the Orders in Council were founded: "on the unquestionable right of his majesty to retort upon the enemy the evils of his own injustice, and upon the consideration that, if third parties incidentally suffered by these retaliatory measures, they were to seek their redress from the power by whose original aggression that retaliation was occasioned." Is it because the enemy has been guilty of gross injustice, that therefore we are to commit injustice? Are we to imitate the enemy in his crimes, and commit the same enormities because he has committed them? Upon this principle we might, because he has unjustly invaded the territory of an ally; send a king of our own choosing to Sweden or to Sicily, and force them to accept of him. The principle here assumed does not hint at the acquiescence of a neutral, but claims at once the general and sweeping right of retaliating upon the enemy his own injustice, whether neutrals acquiesced in it or not. I cannot also help remarking upon the chain of irony and sarcasm adopted in this note, a style new to diplomatic correspondence, and which is wholly unsuited to the subject. It is well known, I believe, that the passage alluding to the inconvenience which must be occasioned in America by the Embargo, produced, when read in Congress, an universal sentiment of indignation. It is absolutely essential that independent states, however one may be inferior to the other in power, should negociate on the footing of equality. And how, I ask, would it be received here, if the government of the United States, in any 779 official correspondence with this country, should allude for instance, to the supposed effect of any measure adopted by this government upon the manufacturers of Lancashire.— My lords, the only ground upon which the Orders in Council have been defended in this house, has been the acquiescence of America in the Decrees of France. It is now clearly proved, that if America ever did acquiesce in these Decrees, she no longer does so. It is now clearly ascertained, that America has offered you to suspend her Embargo, if you rescind your Orders in Council, and to go to war with France, if France then refuses to repeal those parts of her Decrees which affect the neutral rights of America. Here, then, is a clear proposition, which takes away the only ground, upon which the Orders in Council stood, upon which they were defended by noble lords on the other side. This only ground being taken away, it of course clearly and obviously follows, that the Orders in Council ought to be rescinded. If, however, we are to judge from the Note to which I last alluded, the experiment is to be tried, whether we can exist without the commerce of America, with all Europe combined against us, and thus the vital interests of the country are to he wantonly hazarded. I have heard of a man who was desperately wounded, but there being several wagers laid as to whether he could recover from his wound, no surgical assistance was allowed to be given him, in order that the experiment might be tried, at the hazard of his life, whether he could recover or not. So, it seems as if ministers wished to try a similar experiment with the country, and that because France has said that we cannot exist with Europe shut against us, and without the commerce of America, that therefore the experiment is to be tried, and the very vital interests of the country put to hazard. The noble earl (Bathurst) has this night moved for some Returns respecting our North American colonies. It does seem most extraordinary that at such a critical moment, the force in these colonies should have been sent to atchieve a distant object, with no probability of success, which has since failed, and which, if it had succeeded, would have been of no consequence, would have been merely the acquisition of another sugar island, an object which at the present moment can surely be deemed of no importance. I hope that force has since eturned to its former station,— My lords, 780 it is my duty to impress upon your attention, however painful the task, some of the melancholy consequences of these Orders in Council. The diminution of our commerce from the operation of this measure is an evil of alarming magnitude. It appears by the documents on the table that the exports, which in the year ending the 10th of October, 1807, amounted to 48,500,000l., amounted in the year ending the 10th of October, I8O7, to only 42,300,000l., a diminution of 6,200,000l.; the diminution of imports in the same period amounts to 5,200,000l. In this statement, also, it should be recollected that Ireland and Scotland, a great part of whose trade was with America, are not included; giving them therefore, a proportionate share, the diminution of our commerce may be fairly estimated at 14,000,000l. It should also be recollected, that this diminution has taken place in a year during four months of which the Orders in Council did not operate, these Orders not having been issued till November, and not being in full operation till January. In the article of wool, the staple commodity of the country, and in a number of other articles, an alarming diminution has taken place, and also in the importation of raw materials, essential to our manufacture. A number of cotton mills have in consequence been stopped, and the workmen thrown out of employ. The great importance of the linen manufacture of Ireland is well known, and the difficulty in procuring flax-seed is at present a serious evil; of 45 hogsheads required for sowing, 35 must be procured from America. Inconsequence of the interruption of the trade with America the price of flaxseed, which was from 2l. to 3l. per quarter, has risen to from 22l. to 24l. per quarter. It is now February, and if the necessary quantity of flax-seed is not procured before May, the consequences will, indeed, be serious. Another evil, my lords, of serious magnitude, is the deficient supply of corn; it is well known that we do not grow enough for our own consumption, and that as the ports in the north of Europe are now shut against us, we can only look to America for an adequate supply, and I need not point out to your lordships the distressing consequences which must result from the want of such a supply. I wish, however, to be distinctly understood upon one point, with respect to the maritime rights and the maritime superiority of the country. The evils which I 781 have enumerated must necessarily accumulate, with the continuance of the Orders in Council, but whatever may be the increase of those evils, I wish distinctly to be understood to be of opinion, that, if the maritime rights, and the maritime superiority of the country are really in question, then war in support of them will become a just and legitimate war, and every privation ought to be submitted to in such a cause; but the war which his majesty's; ministers appear determined to wage with America would be an unjust and unnecessary war, a war without ground or pretence. Upon their own ground of colonial monopoly they ought to rescind the Orders in Council, upon the proposition of America; as then, by the very terms of that proposition, they would have, in effect, a colonial monopoly, and America would be at war with France. By rescinding the Orders in Council, as proposed by America, they will secure, in effect, all the advantages which they proposed to themselves, as the result of the operation of those Orders, with the great additional advantage of conciliating America, and securing her friendship. It is deeply to be lamented, that this proposition on the part of America was not acceded to in August last when made: it is of great importance, in my opinion, that that proposition should be now acceded to. The Orders in Council, unjust in their principle, are now proved to be most injurious, in their effect, to the interests of this country, whilst the pretence, on which they were founded, is now completely taken away; it being proved to demonstration, that America does not acquiesce in the infringement of her neutral rights by the Decrees of France.— His Lordship concluded with moving,
"That an humble Address be presented to his majesty, humbly to represent to his majesty, that in consequence of certain Decrees, made by his majesty's enemies, contrary to the usages of war, and the rights of neutral nations; and also in consequence of the alledged acquiescence of neutral nations in the said Decrees, his majesty was advised to issue certain Orders in Council respecting the trade of neutrals to and from the ports and countries of his majesty's enemies: and that the said Orders were further enforced by certain acts passed in the last session of Parliament: but that both in the said Orders and in the Acts passed thereon, a power was reserved to his majesty of annulling the same, whenever Rich revocation should appear expedient,— 782 That the Congress of the United States of America, alarmed at the dangers to which neutral commerce was exposed, by the said Decrees, and by the system then known to be in the contemplation of his majesty's government, and actually carried into effect by the said Orders in Council, passed laws for laving an immediate Embargo on all American vessels and exports.—And that by the operation of such laws, all trade of export, from the said States into this kingdom or its dependencies, has been prohibited, and the commercial intercourse of his majesty's subjects with the said States has been, in other respects, essentially impeded.—That in the month of August last, the minister of the United States, resident at this court, made to his majesty's government an authorised and explicit offer of re-establishing the said intercourse, proposing, that if his majesty's Orders in Council should be repealed, as far as regarded the United States, the Embargo imposed in the said States should be removed, as far as regarded his majesty's dominions; and adding, that if his majesty's enemies should not rescind their Decrees, the said Embargo should be continued as with respect to them.—That this offer on the part, of the United States appears to us just in principle, and in its tendency highly advantageous to the essential interests of this country. Just, in as much as it removed all pretence of the acquiescence of the United States in the French Decrees; which acquiescence was the only ground on which any right could accrue to his majesty to interrupt the innocent commerce of a neutral power; and advantageous to Great Britain, inasmuch as if it should not have produced the repeal of the French Decrees (the avowed purpose of his majesty's Orders), it must have secured to this country the exclusive commerce of America, and the alliance against I a power which has become the common enemy of both.— That we believe and hope that it is still open to his majesty to renew them on the basis of this proposal; the commercial intercourse between this country and the United States; every interruption of which we consider as manifestly injurious to the interest of both, and particularly calculated, in the present crisis, to assist the designs of our enemies, I and to weaken our own resources — That we, therefore, most humbly pray his majesty to adopt, without delay, such measures as may best tend to the immediate? 783 re-establishment of the commercial intercourse between his majesty's dominions and the United States of America, and to bring, by temperate and conciliatory negociation, all other points of difference to a just and amicable conclusion.— Assuring his majesty of our firm and invariable support, in maintaining, against every Unjust aggression, and every novel claim, the ancient and essential maritime rights of his majesty's crown."
§ Earl Bathurst,in delivering his sentiments upon the motion which had been submitted to their lordships, did not mean to follow his noble friend through all the topics which he had introduced into his speech; but proposed to confine himself to that head of discussion to which their attention had been principally directed, namely, the Orders in Council. Upon the origin of the American War, which had not escaped his noble friend's animadversion, he would refer them to some family notes upon that event, which were, he presumed, in his possession. The main object of his noble friend's motion was to address his majesty to renew the negociation with the American government, for the purpose of adjusting the existing differences between the two countries. That it was perfectly within the competence of their lordships to resort to such a measure, he was ready to admit, at the same time, that he considered it to be a right in the exercise of which much caution was required. Indeed, such in his mind was the delicacy of interfering with the executive government in matters of negociation, that he thought it generally a preferable mode of proceeding, when their conduct failed of giving satisfaction, at once to address his majesty to dismiss the ministers composing it from his councils. The greater part of the noble lord's speech was, indeed, an attack upon ministers, and of their conduct as connected in particular with the Orders in Council he disapproved on three grounds: Ist, He was of opinion that they were originally unjust and impolitic: 2dly, That their consequences were such as ought long ago to have led to their repeal; and 3dly, That the proposition made by America to this country in August last, ought to have been accepted. The noble earl attempted a refutation of lord Grenville's arguments upon each of these separate heads. The justice and policy of the Orders, he endeavoured to shew from the violence of the enemy's aggressions, the necessity we 784 were under of resisting them, and the efficacy of this restrictive measure, in retorting the effects of the enemy's violence upon himself. He denied, that the object of the Orders in Council was, as his noble friend had stated, to improve our own revenue. All that was proposed by them was to distress the enemy; and this object had been completely attained, as was manifest from the accounts received from those countries which were unfortunately subject to his dominion, He was ready to allow, that our own trade had not been quite so prosperous in the last as in former years, at the same time that he could not admit the comparison instituted by his noble friend, in the two years of 1807, and 1808, as fair, much less would he admit that the apparent diminution was altogether to be imputed to the Orders in Council. The noble lord had forgotten that in 1807 the ports of Russia, of Denmark, and of Sweden were open to us, whereas throughout the whole course of 1808, the ports both of Russia and Denmark had been shut against us. This change alone had produced a considerable effect upon the general state of our trade. But even the defalcation in our commerce with America, was not, as the noble lord had argued, attributable to our Orders in Council; on the contrary, it was wholly attributable either to the American Embargo, or the American Non-Importation Act. The noble earl contended, that the Embargo was not the effect of the British Orders in Council; and this he endeavoured to prove, as well from the language held in the American official documents, as from a comparison of dates. Nothing could be more conclusive evidence upon this subject, than the fact of the Embargo having been imposed three days before the Orders in Council were issued. Indeed so far was the diminution of Exports to be ascribed either to the Embargo or the Orders in Council, that our Exports had previously undergone a diminution of four millions sterling in consequence of the Non-Importation Act, which had been passed long before either of the other two measures was resorted to. And here he particularly requested their lordships to bear in mind, that, when the propositions of August last were, made by the American government, there was no hope whatever held out of this act being repealed, even though these propositions had been accepted. He did not wish to disguise from himself or to conceal from their 785 lordship, the inconveniencies felt by this country in consequence of the suspension of intercourse with America, particularly on the score of Imports, though these inconveniencies had been greatly exaggerated in the speech of the noble lord. His noble friend had urged (he knew not upon what authority), that ministers had only the other day become aware of the difficulties with which we were beset, and with which we were likely soon to be overwhelmed. He could assure his noble friend, however, that, in as far as Ireland was likely to be affected by them, government had long ago turned its attention to them. The high price of flax seed was found, on inquiry, to are in a great degree, from monopoly, and for the purpose of disappointing the speculations of interested individuals, they had applied what, in such cases, was found to be the most effectual remedy by encouraging competition. They had ordered purchases to be made in different parts of the continent; and though he could not at present say what quantity had been bought up, he had no doubt that supplies to a considerable extent would soon arrive. An order had also been sent out to Lower Canada, though from the freezing of the river St. Lawrence, the cargoes were not likely to arrive till the month of May or June. He took this opportunity of correcting a very erroneous notion, which some persons entertained, that the soil of Ireland was not properly calculated for raising flax-seed, and he was happy to state, that large tracts of ground in that country were now preparing for this species of cultivation, and that there was every prospect of a sufficient quantity of flaxseed being soon grown in that country, not only for its own supply, but also for the supply of Great Britain; so that, though the inconvenience might be felt for a time, it was very far from being one which, as his noble friend had stated, was likely to be a growing evil.—The noble Earl proceeded to advert to the alledged embarrassments felt by our West India Is-lands in consequence of the suspension of intercourse with America, and contended, that so far were they from suffering to the degree that had been stated, they were every day becoming more and more sensible of their independence of that country. As a proof of this, he stated the Assembly of Jamaica having recently passed an act, imposing a tax upon the importation of fish into that Island from the United 786 States, and laying a duty of a dollar a ton upon every American vessel which entered their harbours. The fact was, that the British fisheries in North America were amply sufficient to supply the Islands with that necessary article of provisions, and that the commerce between our colonies in that part of the world was in a state of rapid encrease. For example, in 1807, only 120 vessels had cleared out from the British American colonies to the West Indies, whereas, in only three quarters of the year 1808,no less than 259 had cleared out for the same destination. And in the same three quarters of 1808, 40,123 loads of timber had been sent thither from the same quarter, whereas in the same course of the proceeding year there had been only 16,269 loads.— The noble earl next endeavoured to repel the charge brought by lord Grenville against ministers for having rejected the propositions made by the American government in August last, and which his lordship had termed fair, just and liberal. Their lordships he argued, in judging of this proposition, had only to consider, whether it was made in such a shape as could be accepted, and ought entirely to lay aside those explanations, which were afterwards given of it. The circumstances were shortly these. France, by her decrees, had declared Great Britain in a state of blockade. Great Britain retaliated by declaring France in a state of blockade. America, which was an accidental sufferer from these measures, interferes, and proposes that we should retract our act of retaliations leaving the enemy to persist with impunity in his aggression; and because his majesty's ministers refused to accede to this proposition, their refusal was now brought forward as matter of accusation against them, and by whom?— those very ministers, who issued the Order of the 7th of January, and. who had themselves declared, that this Order should not be repealed till the French Decrees, which had provoked it, were annulled. In making this declaration, they had gone farther than their successors, for, said the noble Earl, we never have made such a declaration, we did not say to America that we would not recal our Orders in Council, excepting France repealed her Decrees, though we are quite aware of the inconveniences which would result from so doing. The American Embargo was therefore neither the cause nor the consequence of our Orders in Council, and consequently we see no reason why the 787 repeal of the one ought to he connected with the removal of the other. It has been asserted, that the embargo was an act of resistance on the part of the American government to the unjust Decrees of the enemy. But this act of resistance, if it was one, was directed as well against the party aggrieved as against the aggressor, and having resorted to a measure of equal hostility to both parties, the American government had turned round to ask satisfaction from the party aggrieved, the effect of which, if granted, would have been to relieve the enemy both from the pressure of the Embargo, and from the pressure of the Orders in Council, and to relieve us merely from the pressure of the embargo, without an assurance being given that the Non-Importation act would be repealed. From the charge brought against ministers by the noble lord, of being actuated by a hostile disposition towards America, he felt it to be quite unnecessary to vindicate either himself or his colleagues. It was not the interest, and it could not be the wish of the British government to involve this country in a war with America; but ministers on the other hand were bound not to surrender the rights, nor to compromise the honour of the nation, with whose character and interests they were intrusted. On these grounds the noble Earl felt it to be his duty to oppose the Address which had been moved by his noble friend.
§ Viscount Sidmouthsaid, that, notwithstanding the reasons assigned by the noble earl (Bathurst) who spoke last, for the issue of the Orders in Council of November 1807, he had always supposed the chief cause of that measure to have been a conviction on the part of His Majesty's Ministers, that the danger arising from the power and influence of France was only to be counteracted by means similar to those which had produced it. Against this doctrine, particularly as applied to our conduct towards neutral States, he should ever protest; being fully convinced, that a strict observance, without encroachment or concession, of the true and established principles of public law, of which the maritime code formed a material part, was not only due to our national character, but far better calculated to secure our commercial interests and maintain our maritime power.— Of the principles to which he had adverted, those which bore upon the present subject, were, 1st, That neutrals have a right to carry on, 788 during war, their accustomed trade, without any other molestation or obstacle, than such as arises from search and blockade. 2dly, That this right of neutrals is sacred and inviolable, and cannot be forfeited, but by their own wrong. 3dly, That neutrals have not a right to carry on during war a trade which they have never possessed, and which they hold by no title of use or habit, during peace.— Lord S. said, that his chief objections to the Orders in Council of the month of Nov. 1807 were, that they violated the first and second of these principles, and compromised the last. He mentioned the Orders in Council of Nov. 1807 only, because notwithstanding all that had been said by the noble Earl and others, he denied that those Orders were merely "an extension in operation, and not in principle, of the Orders of the 7th of January 1807;" and that the present Ministers had therefore done no more than follow the line marked out by their predecessors. The Order of the 7th of January was, in its principle, an application of the rule to which he had adverted, to the coasting trade of France and her dependencies, which, though neutrals had no concern in it during peace, they had been encouraged by our enemies to carry on under the assumed protection of their flag during war. Such was the principle of that Order; but if in the means of enforcing it there was any actual infringement on the rights of neutrals, in that degree and proportion the Order itself ought to be modified, and its operation restrained. According to this view of the Order he contended that the right to issue it did not at all depend upon the Berlin Decree of Nov. 1806; and though it might have been denominated a retaliation against France, it was a retaliation against France without injustice to neutrals.—Lord S. then proceeded to state what ought to have been the conduct of his majesty's present government in consequence of the Berlin Decree, which he described as the extravagant ebullition; of a mind inflamed by resentment and intoxicated by victory. Instead of making that Decree the measure of our conduct, not merely towards France, as we were fully justified in doing, but also towards third parties not engaged in our quarrel, it appeared to him, that it would have been far wiser, with a view to our own interests, and obviously more just, for Ministers to have given neutral Stales to Understand that the intimation conveyed in 789 the letter from Lords Holland and Auckland of the 1st of Dec. 1806, to the American Commissioners, would be strictly observed; that our conduct would depend upon their own; that we should respect their rights, whilst they refrained from lending themselves to the violence and injustice of our enemy; but that, in the language of the concluding paragraph, "If the enemy should carry his threats into execution, and neutral nations should, contrary to all expectations, acquiesce in such usurpation, his majesty might probably be compelled, however reluctantly, to retaliate in his own just defence, and to issue orders to his cruizers to adopt towards neutrals any hostile system, to which those neutrals shall have submitted from his enemies" He also thought that the American Government should have been explicitly told, that, as they had rejected the proposed Treaty of Commerce between the two countries, the same terms would not be renewed; that the increased and increasing dominion and influence of France on the Continent, which it was her declared and main object to make use of for the purpose of interdicting British commerce, and of thus circumscribing the sources of our opulence and naval power, rendered it incumbent upon his majesty to retaliate upon the sources of the wealth and naval power of his enemy; and that this could not be so effectually done as by the application of his maritime superiority to the exercise of his unquestionable right of preventing any intercourse whatever between neutral nations and the colonics of his enemies during war. What, however, had been our conduct? Ministers had asserted the acquiescence of neutrals, but had totally failed in their attempts to prove it; and having so failed, they abandoned and violated the principle they had distinctly rocognised in the preamble to the Orders, wherein the acquiescence of neutrals is described as the basis of that measure. We had therefore invaded the indisputable rights of neutral States, and improvidently surrendered our own. Those branches of their trade which we. ought, in justice, to have spared, we had in effect prohibited; and those which we ought to have prohibited, we had taken credit for having spared: he said, in effect prohibited, because it was impossible that America could have submitted to such a combination of indignity and injustice.—With respect to those injurious branches of American commerce, which have been too 790 long permitted to exist, and which, instead of being prohibited, had been sanctioned by the Orders in Council, he quoted Mr. Erskine's letter to Mr. Maddison, of the 23d of Feb. 1808; (p. 244) "It will not escape you, that by this Order in Council, thus modified and regulated, the direct intercourse of the United States with the colonies of the enemy is unrestrained; an indulgence, which, when it is considered to be (as it really is) not only a mitigation of that principle of just reprisal upon which the order itself is framed, but a deviation in favour of the United States, from that ancient and established principle of maritime law, by which the intercourse with the colonies of the enemy in time of war is limited to the extent which that enemy was accustomed in time of peace to prescribe for it, and which, by reference to the conduct of France in time of peace, would amount to a complete interdiction, cannot fail to afford to the American government a proof of the amicable disposition of his majesty towards the United States.— You will observe, also that the transportation of the colonial produce of the enemy from the United States to Europe, instead of being altogether prohibited (which would have been the natural retaliation for the rigorous and universal prohibit ion of British produce and manufactures by France), is freely permitted to the ports of (heat Britain, with the power of re-exporting it to any part of Europe under certain regulations" — It appeared, therefore, that Mr. Erskine had been instructed to take credit for the continued relaxation of an unquestionable and most important right, which instead of compromising, Lord S. contended, the British Government ought to have re-asserted, and enforced.— On the subject of the Regulations to which Mr. Erskine had adverted, Lord S. remarked, that they were not consistent with the policy of these Orders, which was, to inflict the inconveniences of privation upon the enemy, and to subject him to all the evils with which he had threatened this country. But so far from adhering to this principle, Ministers had determined to take the chance of exchanging, in most instances, the advantages of total privation for those which might arise from an increase of charge to the enemy upon the cargoes of neutral vessels forced into our ports for the purpose of being permitted to depart upon no other condition but that of becoming tributary to our own revenue, which was thus to be augmented 791 by an unjust and insulting exaction levied upon the trade of neutral and independent States: and this system is described by the term of mitigated retaliation! The produce of those duties was, it appeared 32,000l., equal to about one-third of the sum annually raised by licences to wear hair-powder; and even that sum, he understood was levied upon articles which had been exported from America, previous to the Embargo, and consequently previous to intelligence having been received of the Orders in Council, the actual issue of which, he acknowledged, appeared to him not to have been known in America till after the Embargo had taken place.— As a financial project, therefore, the measure had failed, and yet it was in the form of a Money Bill only that it had been brought his year before Parliament.— In what other respect had it succeeded? A noble Friend of his (the Earl of Liverpool) had formerly said, that he thought it of all measures the most likely to bring the enemy to reason. Had his noble Friend's expectation been realized? Had he, during the last six months, seen any symptoms of returning reason on the part of France? At the close of the last session, the Lords Commissioners expressed in his majesty's name a persuasion "That in the result the enemy will be convinced of the impolicy of persevering in a system which retorts upon himself, in so much greater proportion, those evils which he endeavours to inflict upon this country." Is that period arrived, and have we real grounds for believing that such has been the effect of our Orders, or that our own conduct has tended to produce it?— In fact, the consequences which might have resulted from a system of just and salutary rigour, had, in a great degree, been precluded by our licenses to import from France and Holland various articles, a vent for which was highly advantageous to those countries, although not called for by any national interest of our own. The export, by license, of many articles of foreign, and particularly of colonial produce, had also been allowed. Here again the conduct of Government was completely at variance with their system: the beneficial effects of privation appeared to be lost sight of: though he acknowledged it to be his own opinion, that the probable advantages of that system had been greatly over-rated. The want of tobacco, rice, coffee, molasses, &c. &c. was not likely to be so severely felt on 792 the Continent as along-continued want of employment must be by the manufacturers and artisans of Great Britain: besides which, the people of France and her dependencies were taught to believe, that in submitting to such privations, they contributed to create so much distress and discontent in this country, as must necessarily accelerate the restoration of peace. —But the complete and triumphant result, to which all our wishes and efforts should be directed, undoubtedly was, that amity and intercourse should be discontinued between America and France, and cordially renewed between Great Britain and America; and that the enemy should suffer not merely as much, or more than this country, but that whilst they laboured under all the inconveniences of a total suspension of commerce, those experienced by ourselves should be comparitively inconsiderable.— Such was the prospect opened to us by the offer through Mr. Pinckney, and he trusted that it was not finally destroyed by the ill-considered and repulsive manner in which that offer had been treated by our Goverment.— The professed object of the Orders, an object undeniably legitimate was "to retort upon the enemy the evils of his own injustice." It was however evident, that unless America submitted to the measures adopted for its attainment; which it was fruitless, if not impossible, to expect, it could not be accomplished without a large participation of those evils by Great Britain. The proposal from America through Mr. Pinckney had a direct tendency to relieve us from this dilemma, and to place us in a situation more advantageous than could have been reasonably hoped for: namely, that of seeing the threats and projects of the enemy, as directed against us, rendered in a great degree abortive, and the "evils of his own injustice fully retorted upon himself." — Amongst the reasons assigned for the rejection of this proposal, it was stated to be "important in the highest degree, that the disappointment of the hopes of the enemy should not have been purchased by concession." Nor would it have been so; for the proposal was not merely, in case the Orders in Council were revoked, to take off the Embargo as far as regarded Great Britain, but "If France persisted in her unjust Decrees, to continue the Embargo as to her, and by thus giving it the place of the British Orders, to lead, with an efficacy not merely 793 equal to theirs, but probably much greater to all the consequences that would result from them. Unfortunately, however, his Majesty was advised to declare his intention to enforce these Orders, as long as the Berlin Decree remained unrepealed. He said unfortunately, because the condition which had been deemed indispensable, appeared to him most undesireable; as he did not scruple to acknowledge it to be his wish, that, intercourse and harmony being restored between Great Britain and America, the Berlin Decree might remain unrescinded; exposing the unavailing violence and injustice of the French Government, and irritating and rousing America to a sense of her true interests, which were, connexion with this country, and alienation from France.— On this view, however, of their duties to their Sovereign and their country, ministers had unfortunately taken their stand. To this condition, although the beneficial objects of their measure might have been otherwise more effectually secured, they were prepared and resolve to sacrifice not only the advantages arising from the application of American capital and industry to other purposes than those of internal trade and manufacture, but also those held out to us by the extensive and growing demands of the market of America.— But to these consequences of their pertinacity, ministers appeared to have been rendered insensible, or indifferent, by the circumstances which might be supposed to hate produced it.— At the precise period of the rejection of the overture, a prospect was opening in Spain, Portugal, and their dependencies, which they seemed unfortunately to have considered as having rendered the friendship, the conduct, and the market of America, comparatively unimportant to Great Britain. A spirit of intoxication, excited by success, which had the principal share in producing the Berlin Decree, seemed also to have occasioned the rejection of the overture from America. The avowed objects of their own measure, exceptionable in most respects as it has been justly deemed, appeared to be so completely within their reach, that ministers were fully entitled to congratulate themselves, and to take credit for its success: but for the chance of a triumph, paltry at best, by which too, if accomplished, that success would have been rendered less perfect, the proffered advantages were thrown away, and the probability of again bringing them within our 794 grasp could now only be effected by the timely and authoritative interposition of Parliament. Such was the purpose of the noble baron's motion, which called upon their lordships, to obviate, if possible, the effects of past error on the part of ministers, by humbly recommending it to his Majesty still to accept the proposition from the united States of America as a basis of negotiation.— It had, however, been said that "if third parties were sufferers from measures of retaliation against an unjust belligerent, they were to seek redress from the originally offending power." Without stopping to make upon this assumed principle the observations to which is was liable, the noble lord said it was enough to state to those, by whom it was advanced, that such had been the conduct of America: she had not only sought redress from France, but demanded it in a manner, which evidently shewed that, in the event of an accommodation with this country, redress, or war, was the only alternative. The same proposition was made to each of the belligerents, and having been rejected by Great Britain, he should be apprehensive indeed that it would be accepted by France, was it not for the known and hitherto inflexible pertinacy of the ruler of that country— To guard, however against sin h a possibility, it was material that no time should be lost: it was also highly desirable to allay and stop the progress of the irritation created in America, which had nearly silenced the friends of Great Britain in that country and united Federalists and Republicans in a common sentiment of indignation, excited by supposed injustice and apparent contempt. Still, however, he was decidedly of opinion, that war itself was far preferable to the concession or compromise of any maritime right founded upon the established principles of maritime law which, was equally binding on all countries. On this basis rested what was called the rule of the war of 1756; and to the principle of that rule, instead of the system of "pernicious indulgence" commenced in 1794, we must recur and inflexibly adhere, unless we meant to allow the enemy advantages arising from his own weakness, and to forego those which were due to our own strength; unless we had ceased to feel the importance of impairing to the utmost of our power some of the most valuable sources, of the revenue, the commerce, and navigation of France, and of cherishing and preserving those of Great Britain. The 795 urgent expediency and necessity of this just policy increased in proportion to the extension and consolidation of the dominion and influence of the enemy on the Continent: it was the only instrument by which we could balance his power.
Non ill imperium Pelagi sævumque tridentem, Sed mihi sorte datum,might be confidently asserted by Great Britain; but we must act upon this system with energy and vigour; the enemy must feel, that, with the greatest part of the Continent at his feet, to the Continent he is still confined:— I llâ se jactet in aulâEt clauso carcere regnet.He must feel, and it must be made manifest to the world, that, except by chance or stealth, he could have no communication with his foreign possessions; not even any intercourse by sea, with the distant parts of his own European dominions: and that for all these purposes the neutral flag was not less interdicted than his own. This was a legitimate application of our naval superiority, in the preservation of which, America was not less interested than Great Britain; and by no other means could it he effectually maintained; it was the great barrier against the attempt of universal empire, and, if wisely exercised, might, humanly speaking, be deemed sufficient to uphold the independence and preeminence of this country against every possible combination. Still, however, those appeared to him to be shallow statesmen, who supposed that a good understanding with America was not highly important to the naval interests of Great Britain. To renew and strengthen that good understanding was the object of the noble baron's motion, and he felt that in supporting it he was discharging his duty to his sovereign and his country; being fully convinced that it was calculated to soften animosity, to remove impediments to a connexion, on all accounts important to ourselves, and certainly not less so to the United States of America; a connexion directly adverse to the wishes and policy of France, and more capable of setting bounds to her insatiable ambition than any other which could reasonably be hoped for in the present distracted state of the world. — On these grounds, though he did not concur in all the opinions expressed by the noble baron (Grenville) who made the motion, he approved of the motion itself, and should cordially support it.
Lord Melvillesaid, he should not intrude upon their lordships time; but he wished to observe, that the question seemed to be wholly misunderstood, both by the noble mover and the noble viscount who spoke last. The one said that his object was to discuss the entire merits of the case; the other, that he was desirous of submitting to the notice of his majesty the distrust he felt of the persons at the head of government. The former alluding to the transactions, the latter to those who were concerned in conducting them. The noble lord said he should have thought it more manly to have taken a direct course, instead of attempting to pass a vote of censure thus blended, in which the real design was rendered obscure, He resisted this Address, because it was an unnecessary interposition of the house during a negociation now pending with the United States. Other motives he had for opposing the motion of the noble baron, which he would briefly explain: the origin of the Orders in Council was to be found in the Edicts of Berlin, which had violated all the maritime and neutral rights that had been recognized in Europe for centuries. The first proceeding in consequence of those Edicts, the Order in Council, was of the7th of January, 1807; and the nature of it had been misapprehended. The rule of the war of 1756 was supposed to be the effect of the Order in Council; but if this were all, the Order itself would have been unproductive and nugatory; if such were the whole result, it would have been incompetent to encounter the Berlin Decrees, which extended not only to France, but to all the nations dependant upon her authority. The rule of the war of 1756 might merely be considered as a coasting Regulation, the Order in Council of the 7th of January was founded on the just principle of retaliation, and so it had been correctly explained in Lord Howick's admirable letter on the subject.— He (lord M.) had stated, that the Berlin Edicts were a violation of all maritime and neutral rights. But there were neutral duties as well as neutral rights. A neutral state should hold the balance even between the belligerent powers; and if this duty were neglected, the neutral rights would be forfeited. Lord Howick properly contemplated these duties, and seeing the preference which must be given to France under the operation of the Edicts, he properly observed, that he could not rescind the Orders in Council until those Edicts were re- 797 voked; and he added, as fitly, that under other circumstances, to abandon the Orders in Council would be to resign the best principles of our maritime rights. Why should not these just maxims be regarded? Could the flimsy correspondence between general Armstrong and the French minister at Paris, vindicate their surrender It was no wonder that France was mortified and America disappointed; for before the salutary operation of the Orders in Council, the whole produce of the colonies of the former was conveyed to Europe by the shipping of the latter. The Orders in Council had undergone a long and laborious discussion; and unless their lordships meant to abandon all that they before respected and approved, they could not now consistently agree to an address for the repeal of them, unless, admitting the measure to be correct, they had seen so much mischief in the mode of its execution, as to overthrow or obstruct all its beneficial tendency. But no such objection had been mentioned, and he believed no such existed. It was said, that by the correspondence on the table, between Mr. Pinckney and Mr. Canning, it appeared, that if the Orders in Council were rescinded, the Embargo would be withdrawn. Were we, on such a proposal, to desert what was considered so essential to the preservation of our maritime lights? Were we on such an obscure intimation to resign what we and our predecessors in office deemed to be so important to our highest interests? He was no advocate for prejudicing America. God forbid, that he should ever consider that the adversity of America was the prosperity of Great Britain; on the contrary he thought, that the prosperity of the one was now, and would be for a long while, highly conducive to the interests, wealth, and welfare of the other. If all Asia and Africa, and all Europe, this kingdom excepted, were with America, and this country against her, it would not be so advantageous a situation for her as if we were with her, and all the rest of the globe opposed to her; and he hoped that America would so far understand her true interests, and shew her correct views of them by her future conduct towards us. Never was there a period more favourable to a close union between Great Britain and the American States than the present (hear! hear!), but this desirable purpose was not to be attained by revoking the Orders in Council on the feeble grounds now stated. He could not coincide with the noble mover, 798 because he could not on this occasion condemn ministers without applying the same condemnation to their lordships, who had deliberately sanctioned the measures represented in this address as unjust and impolitic.
Lord Aucklandadmitted that the noble viscount had argued his propositions with great fairness, but totally differed in the conclusions deduced from them. He was not accurate in observing, that the revocation of the Embargo would be the only beneficial consequence of the abandonment of our Orders in Council; Mr. Pinckney had distinctly referred to other advantageous effects of such a concession. Nor were the noble lords quite justified in the remark, that the Embargo originated in the Edicts of Berlin. It was the consequence of the Orders in Council, which although not officially announced in America, were known there to have been adopted when the Embargo was resorted to, and such was the reason assigned in many of the eloquent speeches lately delivered in the senatorial assemblies of the United States. Be the cause, however, what it might, we could not act more impoliticly, than by such orders to compel America to supply herself by her own internal industry, with those manufactures she formerly procured from Great Britain, which was attended with this double inconvenience, of raising to our traders here the price of the raw commodity, and lessening the demand for the article in its manufactured state. The noble Viscount seemed not to be satisfied with the assurances of the American minister; but no scruples would any longer remain, since there had been an act of the legislature in which a power had been given to the executive authority to rescind the Embargo, as soon as the British Orders in Council should have been repealed. In addition to this important and exclusive advantage, a commercial war, at least, would be waged by the United States against France, and all the abundant benefits would result from the concession, which an extensive intercourse with America must inevitably secure.
The Lord Chancellorhaving left the woolsack, said, that the late ministers had perfectly concurred in the principle of retaliation, which it was the object of those Orders in Council to regard and enforce. To agree to the Address would be to contradict every opinion their lordships had before pronounced, unless some new case could be presented which rendered a 799 change in the measure expedient. The noble mover and the noble baron who had just spoken, differed as to the event on revoking the Orders in Council; the one only contemplated the cessation of the Embargo as the consequence; the other looked to a much more extensive result, which he (the Lord Chancellor) could not admit to be at all a necessary or probable effect. On the whole, he trusted that the same policy would be adhered to which had been adopted after so much grave deliberation.
§ Lord Erskinesaid, that in every discussion on the Orders in Council, and as an answer to every statement of the calamities that had flowed from them, it was the constant and invariable practice of noble lords on the other side to refer to the order of the 7th of January. Accordingly, his noble and learned friend had laid all upon the 7th of January; though certainly nothing could be more distinct than the measure of that period and the memorable Orders in Council which were the source and fountain of the incalculable mischiefs which the noble lord, the mover of the question had so emphatically described. The noble and learned lord had described the admirable paper of his noble friend as the joint production of the states man and the lawyer. Highly as he would be flattered by the reputation of having contributed, in the least degree, to the composition of that paper, he must declare, that he had only to admire it in common with every man who heard it, but could lay claim to no part of its merits. It contained in itself the whole statement, and all the argument of the case. He had no occasion to refresh his memory by looking back to his own minutes. It presented him with a full view of the impolicy, the mischief, the ruin of the measure. The noble and learned lord (Erskine) summoned the secretary of state (according to the fashion of the day) to meet him fairly on the point, and say whether it would not be much more advantageous, as well as more graceful in the British Government, to take advantage of the proposition, which the Americans had made to the two belligerent's, and instantly to do away the Ordure in Council. He challenged him to meet and argue the case fairly; whether, even on their own proceeding, this would not be the more prudent as well as more dignified course. By the letter of Mr. Erskine, they had directed him to say, that if the French did away their Decree, our 800 Orders in Council would of course be at an end. They had put themselves therefore, into that predicament, in which if the French yielded, they must yield also; and then they were to come in for a share only, in common with France, of the American commerce. Whereas if they took advantage of the offer fairly made by the Americans, and repealed their Orders in Council, without waiting for the French repeal, they would have a monopoly of the American commerce, and would be able to deprive the French of all participation in it. As a matter of policy, therefore, as well as of grace, they ought not to omit this opportunity which their own misconduct had afforded them. For though it was wrong originally to put themselves into this state with America, the very declaration they made by Mr. Erskine enabled them to profit in this way from the present posture of their affairs. The noble and learned lord concluded a very able and argumentative speech with a strong appeal to their lordships on the calamities which a perseverance in this system was certain to bring upon the country and which he was sure, whatever they might be disposed to admit in language, they all must feel in their hearts.
The Earl of Liverpoolsupported the Orders in Council, as being founded upon the right, which every belligerent nation had, of retaliating upon its enemy the acts of aggression, which that enemy had adopted against it. He considered the evil of the Orders in Council, as they affected America, only as incidental consequences of the just retaliation, which, as a neutral nation she, could have no right to impute to Great Britain as an act of hostility, or of unjustifiable violence upon her neutrality; but should seek redress from France, with whom the first cause of complaint originated. America should call on the aggressor to redress the wrong he had committed and return to the law of nations. On this subject he had never any contradiction with the late Government, and the principle, upon which he was now arguing, he said, was to be found expressly laid down in lord Howick's letter to Mr. Rich. He contended also, that the Milan Decree of the 10th of December could afford no reason for the Order of the 10th; January. With respect to the offers of America; he treated them as very unsatisfactory. America, he said, had shewed no disposition to act properly towards us, I but, on the contrary, had held out every 801 temptation to France; had allowed the right in France to make any Orders, which might affect Great Britain, provided she only repealed those Decrees which interfered with the convenience of America, while, at the same time, she demanded of us, that we should repeal the whole of our Orders in Council. It was never distinctly held out to us, that if we would repeal the Orders, she would act with hostility to France; but only, that the consequence of such a repeal would be the alteration of the conduct of France, or that it would lead to some change, which would be a return to the law of nations. That, if we would revoke so much of our Orders as affected their neutrality, that would have an effect upon the Embargo as to us, but no distinct proposition was made. Much had been said upon the commerce of the country being injured by the Orders, which led to a very important question. As far as concerned the colonies it was connected with the navigation laws; those laws which it had upon some occasions been the practice of late political economists to consider as of doubtful policy, but which had been the great support of the commerce of the country. He imputed in this respect, much impropriety to the conduct of the late government, and charged them with having by their procedures, with respect to the operation of those laws in the colonies, done great injury, even of having gone very far towards ruining the shipping interest. He also noticed the Abolition of the Slave Trade, as greatly affecting the interest of the colonies, and making them less able to bear the inconvenience of the Embargo at the present time. In answer to the arguments drawn from the effect of the Orders in Council on the export trade, he contended, that our exports had risen, since those Orders, with respect, to all nations, except America. The noble mover had stated the injury to commerce as a growing evil, which would be felt more now than at the first; but he considered, that the reverse of this was the truth, and that the inconvenience felt in the novelty of the measure would be lessened or removed in the colonics, by the means which they would resort to of obtaining supplies from other sources. In confirmation of the flourishing state of commerce, as opposed to the noble lord's statement upon the exports, he stated, that the four quarters for the years 1807 and 1808, had produced to the Consolidated 802 Fund 3,339,000l. which, as being derived from every species of revenue, proved the flourishing state of the resources of the country. He concluded by declaring, that the Orders in Council were founded in justice, approved by experience, and were the best means of retaliating upon the aggressor, the acts by which he had violated the laws of nations.
§ Lord Grenvillesaid, that at so late an hour of the night he should not think of troubling their lordships, but with a very few words indeed. He adverted with great feeling to the allusion that had been made by a noble earl (Bathurst) to Mr. Grenville, as having been the first cause of the separation of America from Great Britain. He corrected the noble earl's statement, and shewed from dates, that though Mr. George Grenville had more than 40 years ago proposed a small tax on the United States, yet the measure was in a few months repealed; and when afterwards taken up by another minister of the crown, it had met with his warm opposition, as a measure, which once conceded upon principle, ought never to have been resumed. The least calamity, that flowed from that inconsiderate measure, was the separation of the colonies; the real calamity was the loss of character which the parent state incurred. When the noble earl therefore recalled his view to the conduct of his ancestor, in regard to America, he recalled to him only what gave him pride and satisfaction. He next alluded to what had fallen from a noble viscount (Melville,) but as he had left the house, he should not combat the opinions he had held— one thing, however he deplored— that the noble viscount had left the house, and had not heard the language of his majesty's Secretary of State, who had spoken last— for the noble viscount had said, that, he would vote for the Address moved this night, if he saw any indisposition in the king's minister to negociate with America in the spirit of peace. Now, if he had heard the noble earl who had just sat down, he must have been convinced that there was no amicable disposition in his majesty's government towards America, and consequently he must have voted, on his own principles, for the Address. — The noble lord painted in strong colours the argument of the noble earl (Liverpool), in his attempt to raise a difference in the proposition that had been made by America to the two belligerents, though, by a comparison it would, be 803 found, that they were shortly and literally the same. The noble lord explained this, by shewing that the French Decree had a double character; that of municipal regulation, which it was admitted every independant state had a right to enact unquestioned; and the other, that which attempted to touch the law of nations, on the high seas, and which was the only matter of aggression to America, lie complained of the noble earl's not stating the position fairly, and then drawing from his own mistatement an unjust and injurious inference, that the American minister professed his willingness to acquiesce in the principle, nay to afford the means to France, of annoying England, provided only she would give the Americans relief from their own grievance. Nothing could be more disingenuous than this interpretation; and the noble earl had further insinuated, that an amicable termination of the differences could not be looked for while a party hostile to this country held the government in America—an insinuation which was certainly not calculated to conciliate. He concluded with an animated appeal to the house to interfere between the passions of the king's ministers and the distresses of the county.
The Earl of Liverpoolexplained, and stated, that he only said, that if the same disposition to friendship prevailed in America now as when Washington and Adams were in office, the same difficulties would not be felt.
§ The house then divided on the Question—
| Contents | 31 | Not Contents | 64 |
| Proxies | 39 | Proxies | 51 |
| 70 | 115 |
| List of the Minority. | |
| Present. | |
| Dukes of | Viscount |
| Gloucester, | Sidmouth. |
| Norfolk. | Lords |
| Marquises of | St. John, |
| Stafford, | Hastings, (earl of Moira), |
| Headfort. | |
| Earls | King, |
| Derby, | Clifton (earl of Darnly), |
| Essex, | |
| Albemarle, | Ponsonby (earl of Besborough), |
| Bristol, | |
| Cowper, | Mountfort, |
| Stanhope, | Hawke, |
| Buckinghamshire, | Sundridge (duke of Argyle), |
| Rosslyn. |
| Bulkeley, | Spencer (marquis of Blanford), |
| Somers, | |
| Grenville, | Ailsa (earl of Cassilis), |
| Auckland, | |
| Carrington, | Bishop of Oxford. |
| Dundas, | |
| Erskine, |
| Proxies. | |
| Dukes of | Grey. |
| Grafton, | Viscounts |
| St. Albans, | Hereford, |
| Bedford, | Bolingbroke. |
| Devonshire. | Duncan, |
| Marquises of | Anson. |
| Buckingham, | Lords |
| Bute. | Monson, |
| Earls | Foley, |
| Suffolk, | Ashbnrton, |
| Shaftesbury, | Braybrooke, |
| Jersey, | Mendip (viscount Cliffden), |
| Cholmondeley, | |
| Wentworth Fitzwilliam | Yarborough, |
| Glastonbury, | |
| Thanet, | Lilford, |
| Guildford, | Carysfort, |
| Darlington, | Ossory, |
| Hardwicke, | Lauderdale, |
| Spencer, | Crewe, |
| Fortescue, | Ponsonby of Imekilly |
| Lucan, | |
| St. Vincent, | Bishop of |
| Orford, | Lincoln. |