CAMPAIGN IN SPAIN AND PORTUGAL.

HL Deb 21 April 1809 vol 14 cc121-72

The order of the day being read,

Earl Grey

rose and addressed their lordships as follows:—My Lords; In undertaking to bring under the consideration of your lordships, the various military ope- rations of the last summer in Portugal and Spain, I feel, that I have taken upon me a task, to which I am afraid my abilities will prove inadequate. To detail, my lords, the history of those transactions, the true character and bearings of which are to be sought for and explored in a large series of official documents, so voluminous and perplexed, that they seem rather to confound than to assist inquiry; to produce these before your lordships in such a manner as to enable you to pronounce that judgment, which the importance of the case requires, and the country expects, would be for me, I fear, almost impossible. I feel, therefore, the necessity, at the outset of what I am about to state, to solicit a more than usual portion of your lordship's patience and indulgence, while I endeavour to execute a task that I should rather have seen committed to abler hands. But, as no other peer has expressed an intention of standing forward, I feel that I owe it to my country, in this most perilous crisis of her fate, not to suffer the consideration of such a subject to be any longer deferred. It cannot be necessary to recal to the recollection of the house the universal sentiment that prevailed on the first news of the people of Spain to an usurpation which, whether on account of the violence and injustice of the act itself, or the fraud and perfidy with which it was accompanied, it is impossible adequately to describe. The sensation was universal; one universal spirit broke forth, without distinction of rank or party; and, what was far more calculated to insure the advantage of our assistance, was, that all the generous sympathies of the nation, that love of liberty, hatred of oppression, a sense of the blessings we enjoyed, and a forecast of the struggles we might have to preserve them, all conspired to excite in the breasts of Englishmen, those feelings, which I trust we never shall want when the contest is between justice, freedom, and public independence on the one side, and the highest degree of atrocity and oppression on the other. Accordingly, the feelings of the country in favour of Spain, were universal, and the voice of opposition ceased. A liberal indulgence was given to ministers of what they pleased to demand. All was given that they asked for, under that responsibility which attached to them for the truth of the statement they held forth to the public, and for the solidity of the grounds on which they acted. Under that responsi- bility every thing was granted for the support of that righteous cause in which the country had so enthusiastically embarked. The day is now come when we are bound to ask, in justice to ourselves and the country, what fruits have been derived from those advantages with which ministers set out in the cause of Spain. It is now to be shewn that what was granted liberally has been employed wisely and with a vigour proportionate to the magnitude of the trust. We have a right to expect from ministers this; first, to shew us that they had sufficient and satisfactory information to justify them in the hopes they held out to us, to aid the resistance of the Spanish nation; secondly, that, having that information, and being able to shew the grounds on which they acted were solid, their measures were proportioned to the end, and that they acted with energy, firmness, promptitude, and caution—that they have been looking to the affairs of Spain with the eyes of statesmen—that their means were well proportioned to the attainment of the object—and that they acted with that happy union of energy and caution, so indispensibly necessary to ensure success. I was not one of those, who, however inviting the prospect held out to us in the month of May, last year, with respect to Spain, thought that the situation of his majesty's ministers was not surrounded with difficulties—I could not say, at that time, as had been said upon another occasion in another place, that his majesty's ministers were placed upon a bed of roses. I think their situation was a situation of great difficulty and danger; requiring the utmost vigour, caution, and wisdom in preparing the means by which this country was to afford its effectual assistance to Spain. I hope I shall not be charged with having a disposition to undervalue the resources of the country. Even after all our losses—after the losses of the last campaign, great as they were in blood and treasure, in character, and honour—Even after those losses, I am persuaded, and I use no vain boast when I say it, that, under an administration of prudence and wisdom, the country is possessed of ample means to bring the contest in which it is engaged to an honourable termination. I trust I shall not be thought to talk the language of despondency, when I say, that, in order to maintain the ultimate contest which is to decide for ever the power and independence of the country, the true policy of those who govern it must be to pay a strict attention to œconomy, to be actuated by a determination to concentrate your means, not to endanger them in any enterprize or speculation in which the event is doubtful, but pursuing the economical system of husbanding your resources, by which alone you will enable yourselves to continue the contest, the cessation of which does not depend on you, but upon the injustice of your enemy. I remember this policy, so well expressed in this sentiment of a celebrated poet,

"Durate et vosmet rebus servate secundis." was much derided on a former occasion; but, notwithstanding the ridicule which was thrown on it, I think the country will one day know how to appreciate that system which was steadily pursued and acted upon by the last administration. I am not prepared to say that that policy should be extended, so far as to prevent our availing ourselves of a good opportunity of applying our resources upon occasions which hold out a reasonable prospect of success. On the contrary, I think that the advantage of that system of policy is, that while it enables you to maintain a protracted contest, it also enables you to fight with effect the last battle which is to decide the fate of the country. It is the concentration of your means, and the improvement of your resources, by which alone you can have every thing ready to avail yourselves of such an opportunity. I will not conceal from your lordships that I am one of those who thought such an opportunity was given to this country by the events which took place in Spain last year. I certainly, without having too favourable an opinion of ministers, did give them credit for their exertions in a situation in which it behoved them to guard against popular delusion, as well as not to excite popular enthusiasm. In such a situation I gave them credit for this; that they would not of themselves willingly do any thing to excite those passions which were necessary to be restrained, and, least of all, to hold out hopes which were not justified by facts.—And this leads me to the consideration of the first point on which his majesty's ministers are bound this day to give an account; Whether they took means to obtain information with regard to Spain, and whether the information they re-received was such as justified the hopes they held out to the public? We cannot forget the magnificent accounts which were circulated at the time, of the resources of Spain; of the enthusiasm and spirit of the people; of the vast armies they had collected, and with which it was expected they would drive the French beyond the Pyrenees. I remember that it was asserted that every thing but official documents justified the statement of the amount of the Spanish armies as consisting of upwards of four hundred thousand men, exclusive of a body of reserve, consisting of a million; and both these exclusive of the volunteers. We heard then of nothing but the spirit and enthusiasm of the Spaniards. I have looked for proof of this in vain to the documents presented by his majesty's ministers; I find nothing of the kind. I find, on the contrary, in the letters of every officer, of the greatest character, and whose credit stands highest with this house, statements of a very different description. I find lord William Bentinck, soon after his arrival at Madrid, sending accounts of the state of the army highly unfavourable; that the greatest danger was to be apprehended from their inability to contend with the French, that their armies were in a state of total disorganization, that he found it impossible to prevail on the Supreme Junta to confer the sole command on some one distinguished officer, and that they were not prepared for the reverses they had met with.—After the defeat of general Blake, I find the accounts received were, still more unfavourable. If I look to the letters of general Broderick, I find them no less discouraging with respect to the people of Spain. In the letters of September 10, and November 5, you have accounts of the French army, and of the Spanish army opposed to them, which were calculated to encourage his majesty's ministers in any thing rather than in sanguine hopes of success. In some of the letters there are accounts of the total want of confidence in those who ought to have set the first example of heroism and devotion to their country. By the letters of general Baird and general Moore, we find that spirit which was so supposed to be universal, and which to be successful must be persevering, had wholly subsided. Sir John Moore states, that he had heard of enthusiasm, but he had met with it no where—that the first reverses checked it, and that he had not been able to collect any grounds to justify the sanguine hopes which had been formed.—I have found it my duty on some former occasions, to state my feelings of the disadvantage aris- ing from the want of a political correspondent as well as a military one, and I have heard no satisfactory reason for withholding that information I required. If the enthusiasm of the people of Spain, excited by their hatred towards the French, was what it has been described, nothing could be so necessary as that the government established there should give a direction to that spirit. Surely, it was of importance that political agents should have been sent to that country, to co-operate with its government; but it has been remarked by my noble friend, (lord Auckland) that there seems to have been a disunion in the government upon this occasion, and while we have ample documents laid before us by the Secretary of State, the political correspondence of the Secretary for Foreign Affairs has been withheld, except some documents which it was impossible to withhold. We have Mr. Frere's letter of Nov. 30, in which he tells sir John Moore, that the parts of Spain through which the latter had passed were the least military, and represents the population of the plains of Leon and the two Castiles as neither capable nor disposed to resist the enemy.—I have called your lordship's attention to this letter, because it shews by the admission of Mr. Frere that there was a deficiency in those means which were necessary to enable the people of Spain to defend themselves against the attacks of the armies of France. But I fear this passage in Mr. Frere's letter is applicable to a much larger description of country, than gen. Moore could have passed. Gen. Moore could have seen nothing of Spain but what was to be seen on his march from Portugal to Salamanca. But Mr. Frere describes a much larger portion of country, and I suspect that there is an omission in this letter, in order that it may appear as if Mr. Frere was writing as to the small district between Leon and Salamanca, and not as to the whole Leonese. If Mr. Frere should have expressed himself with regard to such an extensive portion of country, stating, that throughout the whole of it there was a want of energy and exertion, then I ask what credit can be given to his majesty's ministers, for deliberately holding out to the people of England, such sanguine hopes of the ultimate success of the exertion of the people of Spain? I know not upon what authority his majesty's ministers could have considered themselves as justified in the statements they made at the time; conscious as they must have been of the contents of the official documents which we have before us. But their information was not confined to the statements of British officers and agents; all the information they received was of the same description. I would refer your lordships to the proclamations of the Governments of the two Castiles and Leon, and the proclamations of general Romana after the defeat of general Blake, complaining of the want of every thing necessary to enable him to resist the enemy. I would refer you also to the statement of general Castanos, who gives the same accounts after the defeat of Tudela, and states the frequency of desertion in his army. How strongly is this confirmed?—We find that the whole united force of the principal armies of Spain, the army of general Blake, the army in Estremadura, and the army of Arragon, instead of amounting to 400,000 men, was not equal to the army with which the French began their attack in August: and I have authority for stating that the army of general Blake never exceeded 30,000; that the army in Estremadura was not more than 12,000; that the army of Castanos, which was said to amount to 80,000, never exceeded 26,000; ill cloathed, and ill provided with every necessary to enable them to keep the field; that his army, including the army of Arragon, did not exceed forty thousand, and was composed of men of all descriptions, deficient of supplies, arms, and accoutrements, and labouring under all the disadvantages of new-raised levies.—When we have these things before us, are we not called on to exact a severe account from ministers, and to oblige them to shew that they had some better means by which they could expect to oppose a successful resistance to the ambitious views of France, than any of those of which we have hitherto heard? I know I shall be told that it was by these new levies general Dupont was defeated, that Saragossa was defended, that the French were repulsed from Gallicia, and Joseph Buonaparté driven from Madrid. That an ebullition of enthusiasm and spontaneous resistance on the part of the people of Spain, broke out at once, is not to be disputed; but, it was stated in a letter from the Secretary for the War Department, that it was not a sudden ebullition of rage that was to be looked to, upon the continuance of which we could not depend with certainty, but that it was a persevering spirited feeling of patriotism, which, as stated in this letter from lord Castlereagh, was not to be intimidated by threats or seduced by compromise; a spirit which was calculated to carry the people through a long and difficult contest. Certainly, it was the existence of such a spirit alone that could warrant his majesty's ministers in risking in Spain, so large a proportion of the disposable forces of this country.—But let it be considered, what was the situation of affairs at the beginning of the contest. Early in July, you have gen. Dupont defeated; towards the latter end of July, Joseph Buonaparté retired, and it was not till November following, that the trench armies received any reinforcements. At the time the French were concentrated behind the Ebro, their force did not amount to more than 45,000 men. If we have these facts as existing at the first insurrection, we have also the proof, that the whole of the period during which the French force was there, there was a fatal inaction on the part of his majesty's ministers, as well as of those who had the conduct of the affairs of Spain, which suffered the French to remain there unmolested until they had received the reinforcements they expected. Now this must have arisen from one of two causes; either that there was not that persevering spirit in existence in Spain, or that these being the elements of that spirit, there was not a government capable of giving a proper direction to it; and, whichever of these two views you take, in neither case is the conduct of his majesty's ministers exempt from blame. Either they had information or they had not. If they had not, they stand charged with culpable negligence; and if they had information, and held out hopes which that information did not justify, they stand, in a much higher degree, responsible to the public for their conduct. I have already said, it was not a sudden ebullition that should have led us to depart from those principles of œconomy I have so often recommended. His majesty's ministers should have been satisfied, not only of the existence of a proper spirit in the people, but that there was a government in that country which had acquired sufficient authority to give it the necessary energy. If neither of these things existed, or if the one existed without the other, it was the very acme of madness in his majesty's ministers, under such circumstances, to lavish as they have done the resources of this country. If there was a spirit in the people, though acting under the disadvantage of not having a proper spirit in the government, I do not say that assistance should have been wholly withheld; but we certainly should not have sent an army where we had not the necessary means to afford supplies to that army, or effectual assistance to those it was intended to protect: we ought rather to have given our assistance by money, and by the well-applied exertions of our naval force on the coast of Spain. Unless both these circumstances were united; unless, according to the best information, there were good grounds for believing there was a persevering spirit in the Spanish nation, and a spirit in the government to give it a proper direction, the government of this country should not have hazarded a British army there.—Now let us consider what his majesty's ministers have done. It maybe said, that, though there was not in the first instance a Central government to direct the energies of the people of Spain; yet, every body must be convinced of the necessity of giving effect by our means lo their exertions. It may be said there were proofs of the existence of a considerable spirit of enthusiasm, and with those proofs it may be asked, would you wait till that spirit had subsided, without taking any measures for its support? I say I would not; I would have made preparations; but before I allowed myself to send an English army into Spain, I would have seen that there were reasonable grounds of success.—Then, let us consider under these circumstances, what we have done. Supposing the spirit of the people to have been as we wished it; and I confess I was among the most sanguine upon that head; let us consider what measures haw; been taken with a view to bring the powers of this country to give the most effectual aid to the cause of Spain.—In considering this subject, I shall first state the different modes of action, and then it will not be necessary to do any thing more than state my objections to the plan upon which his majesty's ministers resolved to act. I state that there were four different ways by which this country might have assisted Spain. We might have assisted Spain by sending an army to the north into Asturias and Biscay; to Catalonia in the east; by the attack of the French army in Portugal, or by assembling an army on the frontiers of that kingdom, with a view to operations in the south of Spain. As to assembling an array in the north, it has, been stated by one minister, that it was a must chimerical project, but that was not always his sentiment; for in one of his documents, we find Gijon and St. Andero pointed out as the best places to act in. Undoubtedly, with respect to the co-operation of an army as applicable to that point, much depended on the time. Unless sit acted in the month of August, it could not act at all; the difficulties with respect to supplying the army with provisions would have been very great, in consequence of its having been found necessary to supply general Blake's army. When I look to the difficulty of finding provisions, the disadvantages of the debarkation and the insecurity of a retreat, I am not inclined to say that that would have been an advisable point. As to Catalonia in the east I should say, that the time which would elapse before you could assemble an army there, would be an objection to that point. The remaining quarters to which an army might have been directed, are Portugal and the south of Spain, the preference to the one over the other depending upon the time; that which is of the greatest value in all military operations. If you could have been ready in August or September, it might have been advantageous to have collected an army in the south of Spain. But, sure I am, if you could have sent an army before the end of September, there could be no question (for reasons which I will not enter at large into,) that the preference ought to have been given to the south, and that the disembarkation should have been at Cadiz instead of Corunna.—With respect to the advantage of the last mode of employing a British army, I am inclined to agree with his majesty's ministers that it was striking an important blow by the destruction of the French force in Portugal, and by its effects in giving encouragement to the people in Portugal, and enabling you to avail yourselves of the whole population of that country in addition to that of Spain. I have therefore no difficulty in stating, that to commence an attack en the army in Portugal, provided that attack had been properly conducted as a part of a general plan, and not as a separate movement, which ended, as all such measures must end, that would unquestionably have been the best mode.—Let us consider how his majesty's ministers found themselves called upon to act. I have said, that of the four plans they might have chosen any one; but then it was absolutely necessary that they should have had some plan. Buonaparté, in one of his publications, states, that success in military operations depends on having a regular plan. Whether the plan they might adopt would have been the best one, is quite another question; yet, whatever they did, considering the interests of Spain, and the character of the enemy against whom they were to act, a regular plan was necessary before a single movement was made.—I have stated that the true policy of the country was to husband its resources, and concentrate its means, for a favourable opportunity. Now, let us see in what situation his majesty's ministers found themselves at the commencement of the transactions in Spain. One expedition had been sent to Sweden, under that gallant and ever-to-be-lamented officer sir John Moore, with 11,000 men. If it was not for pressing circumstances, I would stop to speak of that expedition, in which 11,000 men were sent to assist the king of Sweden, attacked from Norway, by Russia, by France, and by Denmark. To support this monarch 11,000 men were sent, without any knowledge of any point on which they were to act, or without any thing having been previously concerted on the subject. Hence arose those extraordinary circumstances which have never yet been fully explained; the return of the expedition without having effected or attempted any one object, in consequence of the manner of sending it out, whilst in these extraordinary times we had the extraordinary spectacle of the commander of a force sent out to assist an ally, compelled to escape from the capital of that ally in disguise. It is impossible to advert to what has happened to Sweden, without referring to a great deal of what has passed in this case. We have had under our consideration the unfortunate success of that expedition, in which the Danish navy was destroyed. It was said that the safety of Sweden was the object of that expedition. We now pay the penalty of that expedition by the state of ruin to which the king of Sweden by our means has been reduced. His majesty's ministers think they did their duty by sending 11,000 men under an officer who does not know the object for which he is sent. When it arrived there, it seemed to be unexpected; the king of Sweden is disappointed as to its employment, and we have the unfortunate circumstance of a British officer being forced to escape in disguise. Sir John Moore had been sent to Sweden with 11,000 men, from whence he returned in the manner I described.—Another expedition, consisting of 5,000 men, under general Spencer, was destined for Ceuta; which, having reconnoitred the place, found that nothing was to be done there: and a third under sir Arthur Wellesley, consisting of 9,000 men, as is now generally understood, was destined for South America. I am much afraid, that, even after the commencement of the ferment in Spain, ministers were looking out for some separate object for this country; and that they thought it a good opportunity for plunder and conquest in South America. So late as the 14th of June, when sir Arthur Wellesley set out to take the command of the expedition, I do believe it was with the intention of going to South America. The noble earl (Liverpool) shakes his head, and says "No;" but it is remarkable, that when the expedition sailed, it sailed with a great deficiency of horses. Now, it is well known that horses to draw the artillery and for the cavalry, would not have been necessary to be sent to South America, and were absolutely necessary to be sent to Portugal. But, ministers having had such a force at their disposal, the first thing to be considered was the plan of operations on which it was to be employed; they acted on the same system of thoughtlessness they had done before. With all these means in their hands, they embarked on a sea of difficulties without chart or compass. Instead of appointing one commander to direct the whole expedition, they send sir Arthur Wellesley under a roving commission, to act where and how he can. They send an order to general Spencer to co-operate with him; sir Arthur Wellesley being instructed to depend on general Spencer, and, at the same time, they gave general Spencer a discretion by which he was enabled either to co-operate with sir Arthur Wellesley, or to go through the Straits of Gibraltar, if he should think he could thus advantageously employ the force under his command.—I contend, that when there was a general resistance on the part of the people of Spain to the power of France, the first thing his majesty's ministers ought to have done should have been to have collected means adequate to the object, before they undertook to act at all.—I have said that the proper opportunity was afforded in Portugal: but I have also said that there should have been a preliminary plan. How did his majesty's ministers act? I think after the first accounts in May, an expedi- tion was sent off for the purpose of taking advantage of the disturbances in Spain. Sir Arthur Wellesley left London after the 14th of June, with orders for Portugal, with a probability that something might occur to lead him to Spain. The noble lord opposite shakes his head again and says, No. I shall be glad to hear how sir Arthur Wellesley's expedition was fitted out. I know it was sent out under the greatest disadvantages, deficient in horses and cavalry, and those equipments, which are most wanted for such a service as that on which he was employed.—I have stated that there was an advantage arising from the expeditions which his majesty's ministers had planned not having been acted upon; but there were also some disadvantages. General Moore's force required time to recruit, and sir Arthur Wellesley's being intended for a different service was deficient in what was most required. When it was that ministers first undertook to employ the army in Spain, I cannot say, but it was subsequent to the 21st of June. Lord Castlereagh writes to sir A. Wellesley that the accounts from Cadiz were bad; but it appears that he had an expedition in view, for on that day col. Brown is ordered to collect information with respect to the state of the country in Portugal. On the 30th of June they send their final instructions, and there are two separate Instructions of the same date. In the first, he is directed to proceed to the coast of Spain, to collect information with regard to any point on which it may be possible to act; and by another letter, of the same date, a second positive instruction is sent desiring him to proceed off the Tagus. In the interval between the first and second letter, it appears, that intelligence came from sir Charles Cotton, representing the French force at 4,000 men: without waiting to hear from colonel Brown, but acting upon the intelligence of a naval officer certainly entitled to every attention, for his gallant services, though perhaps, not the fittest person to be relied on in this instance, his majesty's ministers changed their object, and directed sir Arthur Wellesley to proceed immediately, without loss of time, to the Tagus. He was hardly clear of the Channel before ministers received from general Spencer more accurate accounts. General Spencer stated the amount of the French force to be 20,000 men; then all was alarm and confusion, and ministers contemplated sending out an expedition upon a more extensive scale, and thought 25,000 men hardly sufficient. When the force was augmented by so large a number, it appeared to his majesty's ministers to be too large to be entrusted to the command of sir Arthur Wellesley. It is supposed, that considerable difficulties existed with respect to the appointment of a commander in chief of that army. First, it was said, that the command was to be given to an Illustrious Duke (the Duke of York); then it was confidently stated that a noble earl now in my eye, (the earl of Chatham) was to have the command. It seems most extraordinary, that the gallant officer who had so recently returned from Sweden, whose military talents were of the first order, and who had seen a variety of service, should never have been thought of; or that there should have been any hesitation in placing the command in hands so worthy to receive it, as those of sir John Moore. It appears, however, that it was not thought fit to appoint sir John Moore to that important trust, and the chief command was given to sir Hew Dalrymple. I do not mean to say, that this was an improper selection. I have the honour of a slight personal acquaintance with sir Hew Dalrymple; but from the little conversation I have had with him, I conceived him to possess ability, and to be well informed upon military subjects; and whilst at Gibraltar, he evinced, in the assistance he rendered to the Spaniards, both discretion and judgment. But, it has happened to him, as it has happened to many, that he has risen in the service without having been much employed. It does appear, however, as if ministers acted from some direct personal feeling towards sir John Moore, for it seems as if they were determined to prevent sir John Moore from having the command under any probable circumstances, by appointing sir Harry Burrard, his senior officer, second in command to sir Hew Dalrymple; and singularly enough, sir Harry Burrard was sent out, I believe, in the same vessel with sir John Moore.—(Here the noble Earl entered into a detailed view of all the circumstances, attending the different expeditions sent out to Portugal, their landing in that country, and until the battles of Roleia and Vimiera.)—I have already, continued his lordship, stated what justice obliged me to say with regard to sir Hew Dalrymple. I am not less willing to pay to sir Arthur Wellesley the tribute which his high services and talents deserve. I believe him, from all. I have heard of him, to be a deserving officer, of great merit and abilities; in short, such an officer, as, in these times of difficulty, the country may look to with the hope of the most advantageous services. But sir Arthur Wellesley was placed in a situation in which no officer ought to be placed. It was impossible that sir Arthur Wellesley should not have felt a considerable irritation at the command being taken away from him; and if he fell into an error on this occasion, it was an error, into which every man of ardent zeal and honourable ambition was likely to fall, when he saw an opportunity of acting with honour and advantage for his country against the enemy.—On the 17th of August he came into contest with an advanced corps of the French army, and then the Battle of Vimiera took place on the 21st. I do not wish to cast any blame upon him; but I think the situation in which he was placed did induce him to incur a hazard which he ought not to have done. He advanced with an army little more than superior to Junot's, and he hazarded this certain consequence, that, though his success could not be decisive, a defeat would have been fatal, as, had the fortune of the day been different, the whole of the expedition must have failed. On the 21st sir Harry Burrard landed. Sir Harry Burrard shewed his high mind on this occasion, when he declined to take the command, and gave to sir Arthur Wellesley all the merit. The Battle of Vimiera was gained with honour to the troops engaged in it. I have no doubt that with the impressions of success further advantages might have been obtained by an immediate pursuit, but I think the reasons given by sir H. Burrard, are very substantial and satisfactory. Whatever prejudice may have arisen to the country from that event, is to be, ascribed to his majesty's ministers, in having so arranged their system of action, that an officer should take the command of an army in the midst of an action, and before he could have any opportunity of examining the scene, was not to be expected, that an officer, with so heavy a responsibility, should have acted otherwise than he did—By the next day sir Hew Dalrymple arrived, and thus there were three commanders succeeding each other, within the four and twenty hoars.—Then followed that which has been the subject of so much debate; the Convention of Cintra. A subject upon which the public are unanimous in their opinion. His majesty's ministers have themselves stated that it has disappointed the hopes and expectations of the country. Its effects may be summed up by stating, that the French general obtained the transport of his army to France with his artillery, six rounds of ammunition, and 800 horses equipped and ready for action, and obtained those advantages which would have been well purchased with the loss of half his army. We may appreciate its advantage, by recollecting what happened at Corunna after the disastrous defeat, of the French troops, in the battle which we are told was fought without hope of advantage. We find, that before our army could embark, it lost 7,000 men, all the horses, stores, ammunition, provisions, and baggage; and that that it was in such a state of complete disorganization, that at this moment it is not those 7,000 men only that are lost, but the whole army is lost to the service of the country, find must be so for months to come. If such has been the effect of the retreat from Corunna, what has not the enemy to boast of, for the retreat from Cintra?—The noble Earl, after stating many other circumstances connected with the Convention of Cintra, expressed his opinion that it was an act which, in every point of view, was unadvisable; but the principal blame he imputed to his majesty's ministers, for that extraordinary arrangement, by which they had appointed a succession of officers, equally ignorant of local circumstances, and equally jealous of each other; but, above all, he blamed them for not having instructed them with regard to their ulterior views.—I am, said his lordship, no friend to fettering the discretion of a general officer; to whom, after having formed a plan, and concerted his operations, I think as large a power as possible ought to be given; but surely it was not difficult to foresee, that with such a force as was employed against the French, and with the co-operation which might be expected from the courage of the Spanish armies, some terms were likely to be entered into with the enemy. His majesty's ministers ought, therefore, to have given such general views of their sentiments and wishes, as would have enabled the officer commanding the Expedition to have acted on those principles, which if they had acted upon, they would not have had to have said of the Convention that it had disappointed the hopes and expectations of the country. Here, then, is a strong ground for the condemnation of his majesty's ministers, to whom, for this, as well as for every other part of the transaction, the chief blame is to be imputed.—The noble Earl argued at considerable length upon the general impolicy of the conduct of his majesty's ministers with respect to the people and government of Portugal. The result of that conduct had been, that instead of having an army on the frontiers of Portugal, protecting the interior, we had been obliged to retain a considerable portion of the army to keep in subjection the people for whose deliverance they were sent. Besides, the Portuguese force was actually less in November than in August last. These grounds, added his lordship, I think sufficient to call on the house to arraign the conduct of his majesty's ministers. What a contrast does the conduct of his majesty's ministers afford to that of the consummate general whose plans they had to oppose! Do you ever hear, said his lordship, of Buonaparté appointing marshal Ney to command an army, and, in the midst of an action, sending general Soult to supersede him, and then, in the midst of a battle, sending Massena or some other general to supersede him? No.—You have seen how differently he acts. You have seen how the moment affairs took an unfavourable turn, he kept his army behind the Ebro, where it might defy attack, and wait for reinforcements. You find him, as soon as his preparations are ready, carrying on one great and simultaneous operation. Whoever speaks of him, it is not possible he should speak of him without admiring him for his great abilities, whatever may be thought of his character in other respects. In rapidity of execution he is only equalled by his patience in preparing the means; he has all the opposite qualities of Fabius and Marcellus, whether you consider the country in which he acts, the people with whom he has to contend, or the means by which he is to subdue them. He rivals Hannibal in the application of the means, and is exempt from his only fault, that of not improving by past experience.—Are we to be surprised then, that such arrangements have been followed by such calamities in Spain, as make men shudder and the blood run cold? I come next to examine the means, which his majesty's ministers adopted to obtain information of the disposition and resources of the Spanish nation. Thirty or forty officers, it appears, were sent in various directions into Spain, to obtain that information which should have been obtained some months before. Whilst Buonaparté was engaged in the most active endeavours, to collect a force from all quarters to pour into Spain, no orders, it appears, were issued to our army in Portugal to move towards that country, till the 26th of September, when the first instructions to sir John Moore to that effect were dated. On the 28th of September, sir David Baird received orders to proceed to Spain. And here I cannot avoid calling your lordships' attention to another instance of neglect upon the part of ministers. It was not until three days before these orders were given to sir David Baird, that instructions were transmitted to general Broderick, directing him to concert with the Junta of Gallicia, measures for the debarkation of the army, and for enabling it to advance immediately. It has been said, that the correspondence of captain Kennedy represented that the Junta would oppose no difficulty to the landing of the troops; but that correspondence is on the table, and your lordships will perceive by looking into it, that it relates altogether to the refusal of the Junta of Gallicia to suffer the army to land. In point of fact, though sir David Baird arrived at Corunna on the 13th of October, it was not till the 30th that permission was given for the disembarkation of his army. Now when we consider the whole of this case; that the troops had been put in motion at so late a period; that no means had been taken to insure their reception when they arrived; when we consider besides the particular point at which his majesty's ministers had chosen to act, I am persuaded that your lordships will perceive throughout the whole of their measures, a system of improvidence, imbecility, and impotence, which would be a disgrace to the government of any country, still more to that of a great empire. Situated as he was, it was impossible for sir John Moore to begin his march before the beginning or middle of the month of October; and if the Secretary for the War Department had exercised those talents which I know him to possess, and had given himself the trouble to calculate dates or distances, he must have known, that it would not be possible for the army to form a junction on the frontiers of Leon and Gallicia before the middle of December. Did ministers suppose that Buonaparté, taking example from their own inactivity and supineness, would not make any effort to retrieve those losses, which he had unexpectedly sustained in Spain? Did they suppose, that the encampment upon the Ebro had been maintained for no other purpose than to keep up a defensive position in Spain, without any intention to make an attempt to regain the ground that had been wrested from the enemy in that country? or did they imagine, that reinforcements would not be expedited, with all possible dispatch, to that post to which the French army had some months before been compelled to retreat? On the contrary, would not all the examples of Buonaparté's past conduct have shewn them, that no effort would be spared by him—that the utmost possible exertions would be made to retrieve his losses in Spain?—This, ministers might have calculated upon as a certainty, that, before the end of the month of October, even though he might be obliged to draw the reinforcements from the Danube or the Vistula, he would have collected an army in Spain adequate to the reduction of that country. Upon this head we had not been without information from the French accounts, which had been published in all the newspapers of this country. By these accounts it appeared, that, in a Message of Buonaparté to his Senate, on the 16th of September, he declared his determination to continue the war against Spain with vigour, and to destroy those armies which the English had landed on the Peninsula. Here there was a distinct declaration of Buonaparté's views upon Spain, previous to the orders sent out to sir John Moore to advance into Spain, or the instructions given to sir David Baird, to proceed from Falmouth to Corunna. Then followed a Report from the French minister of war, stating, "That it was of no small advantage, that in the ensuing campaign the French armies were to meet the English; that the English might themselves, at length, feel the effects of the war; that they would be destroyed or driven into the sea; or compelled to do as they had done at Toulon, the Helder, and in Sweden." Such language as this, proceeding from a minister of a foreign nation, could not but be most galling to every English feeling; and what rendered that language still more afflicting was, that the representation it contained, had unfortunately been realised by the event, and might have been pre- vented by ordinary prudence and foresight. Then, an addition of 200,000 men was called out in augmentation of the existing army, as appeared by the Paris papers of the 21st of October, received in this country on the 3d of November. By these channels of information we knew that between the middle of October and the 18th of November, reinforcements of infantry and cavalry, to the amount of 57,390 men, had actually joined the French army in Spain. The report of general Castanos states, that between the 1st of October and the 20th of November, not less than 68,000 men had arrived in Spain; which, with the force of 45,000 already in that country, made an army of 113,000 men, (of which 18,000 were cavalry,) applicable to the reduction of that nation. In this state of information, however, his majesty's ministers thought proper to send a British army to act against so superior a force in the open country, where their vast superiority in cavalry would give the enemy a decisive advantage, and where there was no adequate native force to support the British army. But even if the Spaniards had an army, which, instead of amounting in the whole to 85,000 men, as far exceeded its actual strength, as the exaggerated accounts received in this country stated, what should have been the first operations of the campaign? What was to have been expected in the first conflict, between new raised levies, and the best disciplined troops in Europe? What was to be looked to but losses in the first instance, though by unabated spirit and persevering exertions the Spaniards might ultimately triumph? The course they should have adopted was to retreat to their fastnesses, and at first to have abandoned a great part of the open country to the enemy, in which they might incessantly harrass him by desultory attacks, and learn in the school of adversity that experience and efficiency which would enable them finally to prevail over their enemies.—Under the actual circumstances of the country, therefore, no one could have supposed that the point selected by ministers would be that, in which the British army must have been employed against so superior a force of the enemy without any prospect whatever of success. It was not, then, till the 12th of October, that sir John Moore began his march from Lisbon for Spain. On the 14th of November he arrived with the head column of his army at Salamanca, and on the 5th of December, when the other columns had successively come up, sir John Moore wrote that general Hope was at Avila, sir David Baird at Astorga, and that he expected within a short time to be able to assemble the whole army. It has been said, in another place, that if any responsibility were to attach any where for this line of march, which the army had taken, that responsibility rested with sir John Moore. Nothing, I contend, can be more unfounded than such an assertion. Sir John Moore had no choice, and the course he actually took was perfectly right, and it will, I am convinced, meet the concurrence of every military authority in the country, that his decision in favour of a march by land was sound upon military principles. It would certainly not have been desirable for him to venture on an uncertain passage by sea at that season, nor would it have been prudent in him to land his army in a country which had not the means of affording him the necessary supplies. On the 15th of November, sir David Baird began his march from Corunna, and on the 14th of that month the head of sir John Moore's army arrived at Salamanca.—Having thus stated what was the situation of the British army in the middle of November, I beg now to call the attention of your lordships to the situation of the French army at that period. On the 4th of November the French reinforcements had arrived in great strength in Spain, so as to enable their army to commence active operations. In point of fact, the French had begun to act on the 26th of October, as appears by their having surrounded and taken a column of 1,200 men. On the 30th of October the French began to act against the army of general Blake, and between that and the 11th of November totally destroyed or dispersed that army. On the 4th of November Buonaparté arrived at Vittoria; on the 10th the army of Estremadura was destroyed; and on the 13th Buonaparté actually established his head-quarters at Burgos, the very point where our army was to unite, one day before the head of sir John Moore's army arrived at Salamanca; two days before sir David Baird began his march from Corunna.—All these were circumstances that might have been foreseen by any ordinary capacity; and with the certainty that such circumstances must have taken place, it was the height of madness to send a British army to act in the North of Spain. It was the opinion also of sir John Moore, that the whole of the British army under his command should have been assembled on the Portuguese frontier, and directed its march to Seville, and not to Salamanca. If that plan of operations had been adopted, he might, if pressed, retire behind the Tagus, and thence into the province of Andalusia, where there was an important iron foundery at Seville; where the spirit of the people was most enthusiastic; and where there was a secure and impregnable port, Cadiz, to which in any emergency the British army could securely retreat. The port of Cadiz was capable of affording shelter to the fleet, and security to the army if obliged to fall back upon it. But here I do not mean to go into the cause of that jealousy which existed with respect to admitting our troops into that port; yet, if such a jealousy could have prevailed after we had sent a large army into that province to assist the cause of Spain, at all events our own impregnable fortress, Gibraltar, was a point, to which the army could securely retreat. That plan of operations would have been best for the security of the British army; most effectual for the Spanish cause, because it would establish the British army as a reserve round which the native troops might rally; and most harrassing to the French, because it would oblige them to act upon a more extended line.—But scarcely had sir David Baird begun his march, when at Lugo he heard of the destruction of general Blake's army: on his arrival at Astorga, he heard of the dispersion of the army of Estremadura: so that before he could have arrived at the scene of action, every army, from which he could have hoped for support, had been destroyed. And here I must beseech your lordships' attention to the Letter of sir D. Baird, dated the 22d of November, and to that of sir John Moore, dated the 24th of November, and to the representations of both as to the absence of all support from the native armies, and the want of the reported spirit or enthusiasm on the part of the people. In his letter, sir John Moore said, that if the real strength of the Spanish army, or the real state of the country had been known, Cadiz, not Corunna, would have been the point selected for the landing of sir David, Baird's corps; and Seville, not Salamanca, the place at which the army ought to have been assembled. These documents shewed how hopeless the situation of af- fairs in Spain was, how low the disposition of the people was at that period.—The letter from sir David Baird had been received here on the 3d of December; that of sir John Moore on the 8th; and it is in the recollection of your lordships, that these documents were in the possession of his majesty's ministers, when, on the 16th of December, they thought proper to advise his majesty to issue that celebrated Proclamation which pledged his majesty to "the universal Spanish nation;" which bound this country to a cause, which, according to every information, was at the time actually hopeless. I am ready to admit, that it would be the interest of this country, as it must be in its disposition, to maintain the cause of the independence of Spain, as long as there could be any reasonable expectation of success. But I cannot but disapprove of this gratuitous pledge solemnly proclaimed to the world under such circumstances; a pledge, which could not be of any service to Spain, and might be of considerable inconvenience to this country. This declaration is a point, upon which I think ministers are bound to give some explanation to parliament, as to the grounds upon which they thought proper to issue it, whilst they had such documents in their possession. But whilst general Hope was at Avila and sir David Baird at Astorga, the army of Castanos was defeated and dispersed, a part having retreated into Arragon, and another part proceeding south towards Andalusia. So that in three short weeks after he had commenced operations, Buonaparté completely succeeded in destroying the three armies upon which the British army was to depend for support. This was the result of the combination of the activity, foresight, and prudence of the enemy, as contrasted with the supineness, rashness, and arrogance of the councils of his majesty's ministers. The means provided by Buonaparté for the accomplishment of his purposes are so well combined, and his objects so ably prosecuted, as generally to give him a moral certainty of success; and whatever may be thought of his total disregard of the justice of those objects, it is impossible not to admire the ability and wisdom with which he combines the means of accomplishing them. A person high in office has, in another place, in adverting to this subject with a view to shew that fortune may be controlled by wise combinations and persevering spirit, applied to it the celebrated quotation, Nullum numen abest si sit Prudentia, sed te Nos facimus, Fortuna, Deam, cœloque lo-" camus. Buonaparté might unquestionably with the greatest justice apply this quotation to himself. He is said to be superstitious, to rely on his fortune, and to place confidence in his star; but whatever may be his disposition or his feelings in these respects, he never neglects to provide all the means that possibly can contribute to ensure success. It is not with him as with his majesty's ministers; he never enters into an enterprise without any calculation of consequences; he never exposes his fortune to risk upon the desperate chance of a distant possibility of success. In this situation, however, were the affairs in Spain, when sir John Moore, determined and properly determined, to retreat; and in this determination he continued till the 5th of December. It must now be obvious to your lordships, that that course would have been best for the safety of the British army, and most advantageous for the interest of the people whom it had been sent to assist; because, by retiring to the frontier of Portugal, sir John Moore might take advantage of any favourable opportunity to return to the assistance of Spain. Upon these grounds, therefore, sir John Moore persevered in his intention to retreat until the middle of the day, on the 5th of December, when his determination was changed. The noble Secretary of State has thrown down the gauntlet, and gallantly offered to justify this change. But I rather think the noble Secretary will find it extremely difficult to shew, that it was not only right but necessary for sir J. Moore to advance from Salamanca upon that occasion. The whole of the Spanish armies were dispersed and flying before the French, who had possession of the passes of Somosierra and Guadarama, and also of the great road to Madrid. Was that a situation, I would, ask, in which sir John Moore should have advanced, and with an army, too, of only 26,000 men? I am aware that the noble Secretary of State, among other extraordinary things, has alleged that sir John Moore had 40,000 men at Salamanca. That is, the noble Secretary opposes the report of the papers in his office neatly bound up with red tape, to the assertion of sir John Moore, who had the army before his eyes. Yet with this army the noble Secretary would maintain that sir John Moore should, without any Spanish army, or even armed peasantry to sustain him, have advanced into the centre of the country depriving himself of the means of retreat, at 200 miles distance from any place of embarkation. The proposition, in fact, need only to be stated, in order to demonstrate the impossibility of defending the noble secretary's opinion, not merely to military men, but indeed to any description of persons capable of combining two ideas. Under all the circumstances of the situation of the British army it was highly imprudent to advance, and nothing was to be expected to result from such an operation, but a hasty and disastrous retreat. It is an afflicting consideration to Englishmen that the consequence has been precisely what was to have been expected, and has reflected disgrace upon the counsels which led to it; but certainly did not leave any stain either upon the high character of the general, or the unparalleled spirit which had been displayed by his brave army. The prudent determination of sir John Moore, which he persisted in till the 5th of December, he was induced to alter on that day by the communications which he received from Mr. Frere, a gentleman, who, whatever may be his talents in other respects, and however painful and unpleasant it may be to me to make the observation, appears to be wholly unqualified, from his folly, ignorance and presumption, for that high and important station which he at present occupies. To prove the incompetence of this gentleman, I need only refer to his letter of the 27th of November, in which, appearing to be ignorant of the arrival of reinforcements to the French army which had augmented it to 113,000 men, he mentions to sir John Moore how desirable it would be for him, and how politic, to make an attack upon the French army before it should be reinforced; and yet at the date of that letter, the French army had been increased to 113,000 men. Another reason assigned by that gentleman for the advance of sir John Moore was that France was always weak" after a great effort. Was France weak after the battle of Marengo? Was she weak after the great efforts made at the battles of Jena, of Vienna, of Ulm, of Austerlitz, or of Friedland? What could be such a proof of existing strength and powerful resources as the means that had been sent forth by France to insure success, and for the achievement of these important victories? Sentiments such as those expressed by that gentleman could not fail to remind one of the case of those who from being in the constant habit of telling stories, came at length to believe them themselves. Mr. Frere seems to me to be one of those, who in this country make a practice of decrying every effort of France, and predicting the failure of all her projects. Before the battle of Marengo the defeat of Buonaparté was anticipated; on the late coalition the downfall of his power was represented as certain in almost all the newspapers, not even excepting the Anti-Jacobin.—I come now to shew that the advance of the army from Salamanca was the work of this Mr. Frere. It will be in your lordships' recollection, that the instructions from lord Castlereagh to sir John Moore, directed him to be guided in every thing respecting the Junta of government by, and to take all his information on that, and all the subjects concerning the state of Spain from, Mr. Frere: not however, that he was to submit to his communications as to commands, but to pay every attention to them short of what should be paid to commands. I wish your lordships to bear these instructions in mind, in order that you may be able to judge of the weight which the letter of Mr. Frere must have had in determining the conduct of sir John Moore. In this letter Mr. Frere recommended to sir John Moore to suspend his retreat for the present: for the present he said, because such was the spirit of the people, that, if they should be abandoned by the British army, he was convinced they would still accomplish their object. When Mr. Frere stated the determined spirit of the Spaniards—nay, when he went the length of alledging, that if that people were even left to themselves, he had no doubt of their ultimate success, he still urged sir John Moore to advance to their aid, adding, that such a movement was at that time of so much importance to the interests of Spain, and he was so certain of its happy result, that he would be ready to take the whole responsibility of it upon himself. To this strong, and, as it afterwards proved, false statement, was owing the change which took place in sir John Moore's opinion on the 5th of December. This officer received another letter from the ambassador, stating that Castanos had an army of 40,000 men, which the Central Junta communicated their expectation of speedily augmenting to 75,000. Therefore sir John Moore was exhorted to advance to place himself in a situation either to join the army mentioned by the Junta, or to attack the flanks of the French. Accompanying these communications of false intelligence was a most improper letter from Mr. Frere, which deserved the strongest terms of reprobation; which, by recommending the examination of the messenger who bore it before a council of war in the event of his not complying with the recommendation it contained, actually proposed to take out of the hands of sir John Moore the command of his army. But who was this bearer, to whose representations such respectful attention was to be paid? Why is his name withheld? Was he any great officer of experience? Was it Dumourier, or that great rival of Buonaparté, Moreau? No such thing;—but M. Charmilly, one of the most infamous characters existing. I am fully aware who he is; and I would appeal to my noble friend en the cross-bench (viscount Sidmouth), whether he was not, when in office, cautioned against this man? He is, in fact, one of those who commenced the sanguinary revolution at St. Domingo, where he was actually concerned in assassination. From St. Domingo he went to France, as one of the delegates from that island; and from France he came to take refuge here, where he attempted to impose upon the government, by assuming an authority and official character which he did not possess from the government of St. Domingo. Such was the man whom ministers thought fit to entrust. How, I would ask, could they be ignorant of his character? He who, for several years, has notoriously practised usury in this town, who can be traced through all the courts of law in actions for such practices; and whose name the noble lord on the woolsack may find among the list of fraudulent bankrupts. This then, my lords, is the sort of man whom Mr. Frere thought proper to select for the purpose of influencing; the decision, if not of superseding the authority, of sir John Moore. In denouncing this man, whose name I have learned from private letters transmitted by sir John Moore to his relations, and in marking him as one of those emigrants, who took refuge in this country in consequence of the French revolution, I beg I may not be understood as casting any general reflection on that description of persons. God forbid that I should use any expression calculated in the slightest degree, to disturb the feelings of those high-minded persons, those generous spirits, who, from a chivalrous devotion to their sovereign and his family, fied from the French revolution. The conduct of such men not only entitles them to compassion but to admiration. But I mean not to confound such a person as I allude to with those whom I have just described. This person, who was the bearer of this extraordinary letter from Mr. Frere, it appears, left Madrid on the 2d, and of course could not be unaware of the state of that city at the time. In addition to the letter from Mr. Frere, he also brought a letter from Morla, who, on the very day he wrote the letter exhorting sir John Moore to advance towards Madrid, was actually negociating with Buonaparté for the surrender of that city. Thus, had sir John Moore been influenced by Mr. Frere's confidential messenger, whom there was great reason to consider as a traitor and a spy for the enemy, or by the exhortation of Morla, whose treachery to the Spanish cause had since become glaring, the probability was, that our whole army would have been destroyed or taken prisoners; certainly, if sir John Moore had advanced towards Madrid, such must have been the consequence, and it was not alone the loss of that ever-to-be-lamented officer, that the country would have had to deplore, but the destruction of his whole army. How are ministers to account for arrangements which exposed this gallant officer and his force to so much imminent danger? That danger was indeed so felt by sir John Moore himself, that it was impossible to read, without emotion, the letters he wrote to his friends upon the subject.—The conduct of this gallant officer was, indeed, throughout that unfortunate campaign, which terminated in his glorious death, calculated in an eminent degree to excite the interest of every generous and just mind. His arrangements at Corunna, both as to the contrivance and the execution, were honourable to his character and worthy of the highest eulogiums of fame.—There are other points connected with this question, which I must leave to be discussed by others; having, I fear, trespassed too far upon the attention of the house, and feeling much exhausted myself. I could dwell upon the want of information and foresight which ministers betrayed, upon the inadequacy of their supplies to the army in every respect, and particularly in cavalry, of which they sent but 2,000 altogether, to a country, too, where that description of force was peculiarly necessary. This deficiency could not proceed from, the limited number of our cavalry. For we had now no less than 27,OOO of that body, and it would be remembered that in the years 1793 and 4, when we had only 14,000, we had 7 or 8,000 then upon the continent. I could also animadvert upon the circumstance of leaving both sir David Baird and sir John Moore in want of money; upon the inattention of the admiralty in sending no instructions to admiral Cotton from April to the dale of the Convention; the improvidence manifested with respect to the security of the fleet at Ferrol; but, above all, I could call the particular attention of your lordships to the consequence of this unfortunate campaign; to the loss of 7 or 8,000 men, without any advantage to Spain or to this country; to the loss of horses, stores, and money sent to Spain, &c. &c, to the amount of no less than eight millions. With this review of the conduct of ministers; of those who produced such a calamitous result, how is it possible to attend to the cant of modern patriotism, that it is of no consequence by whom the administration of our government and resources is conducted? As well might it be maintained, that it would answer as well to have an army directed by a commander whose folly and inexperiences was proverbial, as by a Marlborough. How can it seriously be urged, that it is the same tiling whether the government be entrusted to incapable persons or to able statesmen? I am really astonished at the absurd extravagance of the doctrine, into which men of general good sense and good intention have been recently betrayed upon this subject. To the principles of reform; to a temperate, intelligible, and definite reform; I have been always, and still continue, a friend To promote that desirable object was, I contend, the study of the last administration; and, I can answer for it, that no man is more friendly to such an object than my noble friend near me (lord Grenville). It was, in our endeavours to attain that end, we incurred the reproaches of those-who covered their censure under the specious phrases of a "sordid economy and want of vigour."—The noble lord concluded with an animated appeal to the house, exhorting their lordships by their regard for themselves and their posterity, by their consideration for the wasted blood of their countrymen, for the dilapidated resources of their country, for their national character, for the interests of the Spanish cause, and for the ruined pro- spects of Europe, to acquiesce in a motion, which had for its objects, to call to an account the men, to whose mal-administration such numerous and severe calamities were attributable.—The noble lord then read the following Address, which he proffered for adoption:—

"That an humble Address be presented to his Majesty, to represent to his Majesty that we have considered with attention the various documents, incomplete as they are, which have been laid before us respecting the efforts made by his Majesty during the last campaign, in support of the resistance of the people of Spain and Portugal to the unjust aggression and usurpation of the French government.—That we feel ourselves bound to represent to his Majesty, that on the result of this examination, we have seen with mortification and grief the disgrace brought on his Majesty's councils, and the injury sustained by the British empire from the want of information and foresight which have been evinced in every part of the conduct of his Majesty's Ministers. That no rational plan of operations has at any time been formed by them cither for the direction of our own exertions, or for combining them with those of the Spanish and Portuguese nations; no just view taken of the political situation of either country, nor any due attention paid to the supply of those means which alone could have enabled the British armies to act with a reasonable hope of success.—That with such proofs before us, it would not be consistent with our duty to withhold from his Majesty a declaration of our full conviction that, owing to the rashness and mismanagement of his Majesty's Ministers, the hopes which the nation had been led to entertain have been disappointed, a large and useless expenditure of the means and resources of the country has been incurred, a great and dangerous accession of political naval and military strength has already been obtained by the enemy, and above 7,000 of his Majesty's brave troops, together with their gallant commander, have been sacrificed without advantage in enterprize without plan, combination, or foresight, and equally ill-timed and misdirected."

The Earl of Liverpool

rose in reply. His lordship began by agreeing with the noble earl, that the feeling of fair confidence in the executive department of the state which had been expressed by almost every man in the country, when the first prospect appeared in Spain of resistance to the aggressions of France, laid on his majesty's ministers as heavy a responsibility as any, to which a government was perhaps ever subjected. On the part of his majesty's ministers he was anxious to declare, that the furthest wish from their minds was to avoid inquiry into their conduct; their only desire was, that that conduct should be fairly investigated, and that no misrepresentation of the facts should be substituted for the facts themselves. The first of these misrepresentations which he should notice was, the insinuation that his majesty's ministers had used every means in their power to stir up the popular feeling on this subject. It must be evident to every unprejudiced mind that this was not the case, but that the popular feeling had been expressed spontaneously and consentaneously. The noble earl had censured his majesty's government for precipitation; he had declared it to be his opinion that they ought to have waited to ascertain the probability of the success of the cause of patriotism in Spain, before they offered the Spaniards assistance. This was a most extraordinary opinion. What! when the feeling of resistance against oppression was so strong and so general in Spain, would it have been honourable to the British character, had his majesty's ministers told the gallant Spaniards; "We will not give you aid while you are most in want of it; while your efforts at emancipation are in infancy; but we will defer our assistance until you are in full strength, and need it net?" Had such been the language held by his majesty's ministers, they would, indeed, have deserved the reprobation of every man in the country.—It was a singular circumstance in the hostility? shewn to his majesty's ministers, with respect to their conduct in the affairs of Spain, that each individual who censured their plan had a plan of his own, but that unfortunately none of these plans had a single principle of agreement with each other. This at least shewed the difficulty under which his majesty's ministers had laboured in the formation of their own measures, although it afforded a facility in defending them. He was convinced, that he should be able satisfactorily to prove to their lordships two things; the first, that the plan adopted by his majesty's ministers with respect to Spain, was the most wise and expedient, that could have, been adopted in the view in which circumstances at first presented themselves; and that it was pursued with the utmost steadiness and firmness; the second, that, had any other plan been adopted after more full information had been obtained, it would probably not have been more successful than the plan adopted by them. The noble earl had contended that his majesty's ministers had been remiss in not having made a great effort in Spain itself in the first instance. Now, before any opinion could be formed on the propriety of such a step, it must be considered, that prior to any extensive operation of the nature alluded to, it must have been necessary to look for some safe port, where the troops might be disembarked without danger; into which the victuallers could be received with ease, and near which the men of war might have remained for the purpose of co-operation. As a general principle, he might safely contend that it was impracticable, and that if practicable, it was not wise to send a large British army into the interior of any continental country, without the previous attainment of the means by which that army would be rendered secure. These means were wholly wanting on the North West Coast of Spain, recommended by the noble earl. No security could there be found for re-embarkation of troops; no facility existed there for extensive operations. There was considerable danger even to single ships off that coast, and the provinces there were worse supplied with provisions than any other in Spain. If any confirmation of these assertions were wanting, it would be found in the opinion of the marquis de Romana, who, being to be sent with his limited force to St. Andero, where he had every inducement to wish, for the neighbourhood of a British army, distinctly declared, that we might have an entrepot at Corunna, at Vigo, at Ferrol, at Lisbon; but at no port on the North West of Spain. Thus far it was proved that such a measure would be militarily impracticable. It remained to shew that had it not been militarily impracticable, it would have been politically inexpedient at that time to have sent a large British army into Spain. Spain rose by separate provinces; these separate provinces had separate Juntas, separate armies, and separate generals. There was no common center of union, and although he did not state this as an objection to sending a definite force for a definite object; yet he contended, that considering the unavoidable jealousies which must have existed among so many authorities of equal rank and power, it would have been highly imprudent to have trusted a British army in the heart of Spain, until some one of those authorities obtained a predominating influence. He knew that it had been urged as matter of complaint, that demands had been made for assistance by some of the provinces in Spain, which demands had been uncomplied with. Ten thousand men had been asked for by the province of Asturias. This was for local defence. It became a matter of consideration to his majesty's ministers, whether or not it would be wise to grant this request; and that certainly formed one of the principal reasons for their refusal. The point for which the assistance was sought, was one of the least vulnerable to the enemy. Another complaint made was, that the province of Gallicia had called for the assistance of cavalry, which had never been sent there. He believed, however, that no minister who knew his duty would have, advised his majesty to send cavalry to Gallicia without accompanying it with a due proportion of infantry. Besides, in his opinion, it would have been most fatal to the cause of Spain, and the Spanish army, to have sent them this aid of cavalry, for it would have drawn the Spanish infantry from the mountains down to the plains where alone the British cavalry could have acted, but where the French infantry were in irresistible superiority of numbers. In June, when the Asturian Deputies, and afterwards the Gallician Deputies, arrived in this country, a British military force was preparing for embarkation under the command of sir Arthur Wellesley. The noble earl was, however, mistaken in supposing, whatever might have been the original destination of that force, that there existed in the breasts of his majesty's ministers the least intention to persevere in carrying that original object into execution, after they were informed of the appearance, however partial, of resistance in Spain to French tyranny.—This force was sent out with directions to proceed either to the coast of Spain or to the Tagus; and it was judged expedient to entrust sir Arthur Wellesley with a discretionary power on this subject. The noble earl had stated, that his majesty's ministers had sent this force to sea without any definite object. But what would he or any other man have thought of his majesty's government if they had delayed their operations, and risked the loss of an important object, by waiting for precise details, possessed as they were of general information respecting the occurrences in Spain? They knew that they could safely trust the gallant officer at the head of that expedition with the discretion vested in him; they knew that even as a diversion alone, the expedition would answer a most important object. Were their lordships aware of the advantages which might have been derived from that force, even had it not proceeded to the place of its destination, by diversions upon the coast? In the state of Spain and Portugal such diversions would have been most serviceable. It was to the diversion of general Spencer at Ayamonte that the speedy defeat of Dupont was attributable, because it prevented a division sent by Junot to his assistance, from passing the frontiers into Spain, in order to co-operate with Dupont. In his opinion, it was the duty of government, as it was their invariable effort, to equip the best force they could, and to direct it against the object which it seemed to them most material to attain, but without such a final determination as should preclude all discretion on the part of the commander. This force, under sir Arthur Wellesley, called at Corunna at a very critical moment. The Gallician Junta declared, that the first object of the British ought to be the expulsion of the French from Portugal. At that time such an operation was obviously the most advantageous, both for Spain and Portugal. General Dupont was in a state of resistance. The contest in the south was undecided. But even after the surrender of Dupont, there could be little doubt of the policy of expelling the French from Portugal, and thus enabling the Spaniards to direct all their attention to the Pyrenees. In compliance with the wish, of the Gallician Junta, sir Arthur Wellesley proceeded to the Tagus, and determined to attack the French there. He could say with truth of that gallant officer, that in coming to this determination he was influenced by his public duty alone; for amidst all his brilliant qualities, no one was more eminent than the complete absence of envy and of any feeling of humiliation or degradation at being employed under any other officer. He would not repeat any eulogy on the victories obtained in Portugal; he would only observe, that in thirteen days sir Arthur Wellesley beat the French army in one general and two partial engagements, and compelled them to an armistice, and to an ultimate evacuation of Portugal. With respect to the supercession of sir Arthur Wellesley, it was impossible that any member of parliament should say who ought, or who ought not to command an army. Sir Hew Dalrymple was at Gibraltar when the first communications of the emotions in Spain arrived, and had conducted himself with distinguished ability. Having thereby gained the confidence of the Spanish nation, he was selected as a proper person to take the command of the British army destined to act in aid of the Spanish cause.—But to proceed with the accusations of the noble earl. The next was the alledged want of cavalry in Portugal, and the assumption, that to that supposed deficiency the Armistice and Convention were to be ascribed. He wished to enter at some length on the subject of the British cavalry which had been sent to the continent. The public mind had been very much misled on this topic, and it was material, with reference both to this and other expeditions, that the house and the country should not run away with false ideas. Had the noble earl ever inquired what the proportion of tonnage for cavalry bore to that of tonnage for infantry? For infantry (and for a short distance) a ton per man was considered as sufficient; for every horse transported, not less than nine or ten tons were allowed. Thus it would appear, that it would take as much tonnage to carry 5,000 cavalry, as 40,000 infantry. But the amount of tonnage was a small part of the question. The quality of the transports was a more material consideration. A horse transport must be a vessel of a certain description, having a certain height between the decks, &c. The quantity that government could at any time procure of such vessels was very limited; besides, it was to be recollected that cavalry horses were not the only horses sent with an army; there must be horses for the artillery, for the staff, &c. This was one point to be kept in view, when the neglect to send cavalry was attributed to government. The next consideration was the nature of the country to which the cavalry was to be sent. The central provinces of Spain were cavalry countries; but this was not the case with the frontier provinces; it was not the case with Gallicia, with Asturias, with Portugal. When sir John Moore was retreating, he was forced to separate the cavalry from the infantry, because the nearest rout for the infantry was not calculated for affording supplies to the cavalry, and the infantry under sir David Baird was delayed, owing to the necessity of bringing forward the cavalry in small detachments. Along with this he desired their lordships again to look at the difficulty of sending cavalry. He requested them to consider, that to Egypt, where they might have been of great use, not more than 150 were sent, and the men themselves had been obliged to move the artillery. Cavalry could only be sent to the peninsula by degrees, on account of the difficulty of procuring the supplies for that species of force there. But notwithstanding this, when it was known that from 8 to 9,000 horses had been sent, and that no less than 12,000 would have been sent in all, had it not been for the information that sir David Baird was retreating, he trusted that their lordships would allow that this was the greatest effort of the kind that had ever been made by this country.—In applying these observations, the noble secretary said, that it was neither wise nor practicable to send in the first instance, more cavalry with sir Arthur Wellesley than had actually been sent. On the 22nd of August the cavalry of the British army was superior to the number which the enemy had at the beginning. It was owing to the rapidity with which sir Arthur Wellesley had advanced, that they were not present on the day of the battle of Vimiera, although he was very far indeed from conceiving that this rapidity was improper under all the circumstances. Whatever might be thought of the Armistice and Convention, the want of cavalry had no effect upon the consideration of these subjects. Whether the French ought or ought not to have been permitted to quit Portugal except as prisoners of war, was a question which he would leave to military men to determine. If more favourable terms could have been obtained, they ought, of course, to have been insisted upon. But what he wished to press upon their lordships, was, that if the operations in Portugal had been delayed for six weeks longer, the army, owing to the rainy season, would probably have been deprived of 5,000 men more than it had actually lost. The noble Secretary, before he left the question of Portugal, observed, that the only object for the government to pursue, with respect to the internal affairs of that country, was to support the power left there by the Prince Regent. The British army had entered Portugal, as allies, not as conquerors. With respect td the operations in Spain, he observed that before the government had intelligence that the campaign in Portugal was likely to be so soon finished, instructions had been sent out to sir Hew Dalrymple to prepare the army for their march to Spain as soon as possible.—There was one material omission in the speech of the noble earl, which he thought it necessary to recal to their lordships attention. Whilst the noble earl had indulged in so wide a latitude of censure upon the line of conduct pursued by his majesty's ministers in the planning of their operations in Spain, it was not a little remarkable, that that noble lord should have entirely forgotten that the line of operations marked out and prosecuted by the British government had received the sanction and approbation of the two first generals in the Spanish armies. The noble earl seemed also to have forgotten that the course of proceedings suggested by us was at the very same time concerting; in Spain, and preparing to be carried into effect. This did not appear to him to be a proof of the absurdity or folly of the course of proceeding that, under such circumstances, had to ministers appeared eligible. After sir John Moore had come to a determination of maching into Spain through Portugal, he would ask the noble earl how, in his wisdom, he would have disposed of the forces of the country then upon the peninsula? Having driven the French out of Portugal, an object which the Gallician Junta had pronounced to be of the last importance to the cause of Spain; after having effected that object, he would ask, would it have been advisable to have let the army remain in inactivity, or to have sent them where nothing could have been done? Or was it not rather the imperious duty of those to whom the power and the wishes of this country in that cause were at that time entrusted, to have made an effort in Spain for the cause in which the best feelings of Englishmen were so deeply interested? Would it, he asked, have been an adequate and suitable evidence of the zeal and ardour, that prevailed throughout the empire, to have suffered so fine an army to have remained patient spectators, while their ally was bleeding in the cause it had been sent out to assist? Not that he meant that ministers, at such a period, were to yield implicitly to the cry of popular enthusiasm; he was aware that such an enthusiasm called for a proportionate exercise of the coolest deliberation, and the most dispassionate judgment. And here he could not help animadverting on that part of the speech of the noble lord, in which he insinuated that that enthusiasm had been industriously stimulated by the government. He, for his part, knew of no stimulus greater than the common sympathy of freemen in the cause of freedom. He was aware, too, of the indignation such a sympathy was calculated to excite in contemplating an usurpation as tyrannical in its design, as it was perfidious in its execution; but he denied, that those feelings to any criminal excess were allowed to bias the cooler judgment of the government of the country, in deciding on the best and most efficacious manner of disposing of our military means in support of the Spanish cause. His majesty's ministers in embarking in that cause, were not so weak, so improvident, so foolish, as to expect, that the first efforts of the Spanish people, contending with such an enemy, would be crowned with unqualified success; that no discomfitures, no checks, no disasters, no reverses, would retard and embarrass the early and crude operations of undisciplined bravery, when brought down into open plains to contend with the superior discipline, the superior strength, and the superior generalship of such a power as France. No; weak as the noble lord might suppose ministers, they were not yet guilty of calculating with certainty upon impossibilities; they did not expect that such a cause as the cause of Spain, to be fought for with such an enemy as the ruler of France, could possibly be determined in one campaign. They, who had such an expectation, must have taken a narrow view, indeed, of the subject. Reverses they had certainly met, but they had not been owing to the cause to which the noble earl seemed so anxious to ascribe them. Those reverses had not been owing to the indifference or the apathy of the Spaniards. They were to be imputed to their want of discipline; to an ill-judged contempt of their enemy; a sentiment that was to be traced to any other feeling rather than that of apathy or indifference, and that in itself was a proof of their zeal and ardour; and this in the commencement was so much relied upon, that the marquis de la Romana did not think it would be eventually necessary for our reinforcements to act in the interior of the peninsula, such confidence was reposed in the native spirit of the country. With regard to the measures adopted subsequently to the arrival of sir John Moore at Salamanca, he would not detain their lordships by going at large into detail upon the transactions; but he was willing to meet the noble earl upon the general ground of the consequences resulting to the cause of Spain from the measures subsequently adopted. When sir John Moore first arrived at Salamanca, he received intelligence of the defeat of Blake's army. He received intelligence of the defeat of the army of Estremadura, and of the signal defeat of general Castanos. Upon a due consideration of those disastrous events, and of the state of his army, not being furnished with a due portion either of cavalry or artillery, he finally determined on a retreat, and accordingly ordered sir David Baird to retire upon Corunna, while he would fall back upon Vigo. In this situation general Hope formed a junction with sir John Moore, who about the same time received the intelligence that Madrid resisted the progress of the enemy. By the junction of general Hope, the army of sir John Moore received its fair proportion of cavalry and its full proportion of artillery. Thus circumstanced, and apprised as he then was of the spirit manifesting itself in Madrid, was it, or was it not, he would ask the noble lord, an opportunity that called for some effort upon the part of the British forces, situated as they then were? or if it was not, he put it to their lordships, what would have been the general sentiment in Spain and in England, had the army retired without attempting any thing? If in that most interesting crisis, when after all their repeated disasters, the spirit of Spain was reviving, and her chief city bidding defiance to an immense army at her very gates, if in such a moment a British army, so marshalled and equipped, were, after a long march to the aid of their ally—if they were in the hour of trial coldly to turn their backs upon his danger, what would be thought of the sincerity of the effort of British co-operation. But the noble lord had animadverted in strong terms of disapprobation on the conduct of Mr. Frere. The noble lord had even gone so far as to question the propriety of the appointment of that gentleman. If the noble lord's objections were to the office itself he did not see upon what they could be grounded. Nothing had been more sanctioned by prescription than the custom of having a diplomatic agent to co-operate with the officer entrusted with the chief military command. But even if this had not been customary, still the pe- culiar circumstances of the case itself, where the operations of the army were in a great measure to be influenced by the result of events on the Spanish councils, such circumstances more than justified the appointment; and he could not agree with the noble lord, that the making out such an appointment was in any degree trenching upon the authority of sir John Moore.—And here he was naturally brought to the correspondence, that had passed between those two persons, and which called forth so much commentary from the noble lord; and in the first place it did appear upon the face of that correspondence that it had not originated in any intrusion on the part of Mr. Frere. Mr. Frere's first letter was an answer to one from sir John Moore, in which that officer called for the sentiments of the king's minister there. There was nothing unusual or extraordinary in persons so situated wishing that the common cause in which they were engaged should have every advantage resulting from the aid of their mutual advice and consultations; but there was one assertion of the noble lord, in commenting on that correspondence, which he believed would not be found to be correct, at least he hoped it would not, for the sake of sir John Moore himself; it was that sir John Moore had been influenced contrary to his own judgment, by that correspondence, to advance from Salamanca; this did not appear on the face of the correspondence; but it did appear that sir John Moore had refused to suffer Mr. Frere's judgment to influence his military movements; and in so doing there could be no doubt of the propriety of his conduct. As to Mr. Frere's letter requiring the Messenger to be examined before a council of war, he did not mean to vindicate it; at the same time that he believed too much justice could not be done Mr. Frere, as far as respected his zeal for the country's interests and the purity of his motives; but to prove, to their lordships that sir John Moore did not suffer himself to be influenced so far as had been insinuated by the noble lord, he would, with their lordships leave, read to them an extract from the letter he alluded to from sir John Moore to Mr. Frere. The noble lord then read as follows:—"With respect to the determination which I made on the evening of the 28th, upon receiving from Mr. Stewart the account of Castanos's defeat, I should, had you been with me, have communicated it to you, but should never have thought of asking your advice or opinion, as that determination was founded on circumstances with which you could not be acquainted, and was, besides, a question merely military, of which I should have thought myself the better judge." Here then, it was evident, not only that sir John Moore's judgment had not been influenced by the advice of Mr. Frere, but that he himself was averse to that advice, or at least did not approve of it. Besides, with respect to the advance into Spain beyond Salamanca, not being a measure originally of sir John Moore's, it appeared in that correspondence that before he had heard of the defeat of Castanos, he had determined to march to Madrid, and even notwithstanding that, he would, perhaps, have done so subsequently, had it not been that the great passes of Somosierra and Guadarama had been previously occupied by the French. He contended, that the advance of sir John Moore was the spontaneous result of his own free judgment. He was retiring, when he is joined by general Hope; his army is supplied with artillery and cavalry, and Madrid firmly resolved to hold out; and in consequence he altered his previous determination. And now that he had said so much as to this advance being the determination of sir John Moore himself, he would say one word on the consequences resulting from that advance. Whatever might be the sentiments of other persons on this subject, he, for his part, believed in his conscience, that that forward movement of sir John Moore had saved Spain. There perhaps were some, who were startled at this assertion; it was his fixed and decided opinion, and as such he would avow it. After the defeat of Castanos, after the dispersion of the army of Estremadura, after the destruction of the army of Gallicia, after the capitulation of Madrid, that promised to emulate the glory of Saragossa, and would have done so, had not treachery interposed?—After such a series of success on the part of the French ruler, what was his next object?—evidently to over-run the South of Spain as he had the North. What would have been the result, if he had at that crisis pursued his conquests by pushing to the Southern Provinces? why, the troops of Spain would never have had time to rally in the South; but they have had time to rally and to revive with encreased vigour; and what, he asked, gave them that time and that opportunity, but the diversion created by the advance of sir John Moore at that critical period in their favour. Never was there a more effectual diversion. The French ruler had been obliged to abandon his preconcerted project on the South; and to that diversion were to be ascribed all the successes that had since it taken place in Spain. Nor was the moral effect of thus reanimating the spirits of the nation to be wholly laid out of consideration. But if the noble lord wanted further testimony of the result of this forward movement, sir John Moore himself said, that the movement as a diversion had completely and effectually succeeded. Nor, in considering the means of taking advantage of a diversion of this kind, was the nature of the country itself to be overlooked. Its mountains were well adapted for breaking and dispersing the movements of immense armies over the surface of the country, while they were at the same time secure retreats for nursing to maturity that inferiority of force and discipline which must expose the natives in any pitched action on a plain with a French army, to say nothing of the superiority of the enemy both in cavalry and artillery. After the retreat had been finally determined on by sir John Moore, government having been informed that Vigo was the most conveniently circumstanced port for embarking the army, had ordered the transports and victuallers there; but in the course of the retreat sir John Moore had met with sufficient and good reasons to induce him to alter his line of march, and fall back on Corunna instead of Vigo. For this proceeding there was not the slightest blame imputable to that officer, but neither did it follow in this instance, that because he was blameless his majesty's ministers were culpable. The transports were countermanded from Vigo to Corunna as speedily as it was possible. With respect to the termination of that retreat in the splendid action at Corunna, he should now say nothing, but the signal display of British valour upon that occasion would not speedily be forgotten by the enemy. Much had been said by the noble lord as to the squandering of British blood, and the waste of British valour. He was prepared to say, that, taking the extent of the exertion (to say nothing of the success), and comparing the loss upon that occasion with the losses sustained at the Helder, at Egypt—comparing here to the extent of the exertions, that it would be found, that the loss in this instance had been comparatively small; the casual the of the army were included in his view of the loss, and they amounted to three or four thousand men, besides the unavoidable loss in two general actions; and they were not to forget their comparative deficiency in the commissariat, considering the superior means of the enemy in this department, from their superior experience, arising out of eighteen years continued warfare.—The noble earl concluded his speech in the following terms: "Having gone through the several points adverted to by the noble lord, I wish now to consider what has been the event of the campaign.—By it we have gained the possession of the Russian fleet, while our own has been relieved from the tediousness and difficulties of a blockade; we have materially assisted the cause we undertook to support; and I maintain, whatever may be the final result of the contest we are engaged in, France has not yet succeeded in subduing Spain. I admit Buonaparté has 200,000 men in that country, that his troops are of the bravest, and his generals among the most skilful in the world; and, above all, that he has been himself at their head; and yet, with all this, he has not got possession of more territory than he had last year; on the contrary, he only holds such parts as in every war fell to the lot of whichever brought the largest army into the field. Even by the last accounts, he had gained no fresh advantages. I well remember what was said a year ago, that either Buonaparté must wholly succeed, or wholly fail, for that partial successes would never answer his purpose. What, then, is the fact? He nas had partial success; and, notwithstanding, he has not yet got into his possession more than half of Spain, and the people have evinced a spirit that may be truly called persevering. I am far from saying, regard being had to the man and the circumstances of the case, that the Spaniards must ultimately succeed; but, at the same time, looking at the spirit they have evinced, and the actions that have happened, particularly the defence of Saragossa, so gloriously persevered in, I cannot feel lukewarm in my hope that their efforts will be crowned with ultimate success. When your lordships consider the great popular revolutions that have occurred, do they ultimately succeed without great changes? Switzerland and Holland are instances of this; but above all, America. In that fatal contest with America we had gained every battle; we had as- sailed and taken every town we besieged, until the capture of general Burgoyne; and yet the Americans had ultimately succeeded by perseverance in the arduous contest. In the present important struggle, do not the extent and nature of the country afford a hope of success; does not its population forbid despair? The noble earl concluded his speech with a censure upon the conduct of his majesty's ministers. The noble earl may not approve of our measures, so neither do I approve of his counsels; I do not approve of those sublime operations in Egypt, at Buenos Ayres, at Constantinople, and other places, that emanated from the wisdom of those with whom the noble earl has been used to act. Upon the whole I have the satisfaction, in common with the rest of his majesty's government, to reflect, that whatever may be the consequences of the struggle we are embarked in, we have not lost the confidence of the Spanish people; we know that every true Spanish heart beats high for this country; we know that whatever shall happen, they do not accuse us. Submission may be the lot they are fated to endure in the end, but they do not impute to us the cause of their misfortunes; they are sensible that neither the thirst after commerce, nor territory, nor security, is to be imputed to us, in the assistance we have afforded to them upon this important occasion. Whatever may be the result, we have done our duty, we have not despaired, we have persevered, and will do so to the last, while there is any thing left to contend for with a prospect of success.

Earl Moira

supported the motion of the noble mover. He condemned the king's ministers as well for what they did, as for what they did not do. Let the house but remember the situation of Spain, and of the French armies in that country at the period of the simultaneous rising of its people. That occurrence was unexpected by the French government, and his majesty's ministers here were in full possession of the plan of operations which the French armies in Spain had adopted on that event. Nay, the precautions of the enemy apprised them of the very course of operations which was necessary to defeat those very precautions. The position which the enemy took invited Great Britain to the very theatre to which it should have directed the progress of its armies. That position plainly proved that it was the object of France to consolidate its force on the banks of the Ebro, with the view of keeping open its means of supply and reinforcement by the passes of the Pyrenees. What, then, should have been the natural pursuit of a British army destined for an efficient co-operation with the Spanish Patriots? It certainly was to lose no time in effecting its disembarkation in the northern provinces of the Peninsula, and then to proceed to cut off the means of supply from France to its armies on the Ebro. Perhaps there was one grand objection to this plan existing in the minds of the king's ministers; namely, that to men of such extensive views it was a system both too simple and obvious. There was, indeed, some plea or excuse in the argument of the noble secretary, that St. Andero did not admit of the disembarkation of a large army. Allowing this objection its fullest force, still there was the port of Santona close to the position of the enemy, and fully capable of affording space for the largest body of troops, and offering every convenience for supplying that army on its march to the passes of the Pyrenees. If the object was to co-operate with the Patriots in the north of Spain, this was the line of operations which it was incumbent on this country to pursue. On the other hand, the south of Spain was open for our exertions, with the opportunity of haying Gibraltar for a depot. In such case there was the advantage of being fully acquainted with the subsequent proceedings of the enemy. Neither of these objects, which seemed to press themselves upon the view of those who looked for a successful British co-operation, were attended to by the noble secretary and his colleagues. That night it was contended that Portugal was their first and fixed object. In arriving at that conclusion the light of conviction reached ministers very tardily, for from the papers before the house, it would be seen that not many days before the dispatches were sent to sir Arthur Wellesley desiring him to disembark in Portugal, he was by the noble secretary of state (lord Castlereagh) strenuousiy directed to proceed to the coast of Spain. This dispatch ordering him to Portugal was dated the 30th of June, and the change in the destination may be attributed to very loose information which his majesty's ministers received on the next day from admiral Cotton, stating to them that there were only 4,000 French troops in Lisbon. This it was that gave a new direction to the hopes and a new object to the policy of the British go- vernment. It was upon this loose expectation of a light but speedy triumph, that all our sympathies for Spanish success were in a moment deadened, and the armaments destined for their support were diverted from their original destination; and to this change, and to it alone, were all the subsequent evils to be attributed. It was this change that prevented sir John Moore from advancing to Madrid, and supporting with his gallant army the determined spirit and enthusiastic patriotism of its inhabitants. It was this change that led to the division of that army into two columns, which impeded the one from advancing in an opportune moment, lest it should not be able to secure its junction with the other. The noble secretary had adverted to the circumstances which closed the campaign in Portugal, and attempted to release himself and colleagues from being considered as advocates for all the specific provisions of the Convention of Cintra. Although such were his professions, he seemed to justify a different conclusion from the manner in which he extenuated these transactions. Indeed, he went the length of contending, that a great deal had been done for the public cause by that event. It was for their lordships to consider where or when this great benefit was effected? Was it effected either in diminishing the number of the French troops then pouring into Spain; or in co-operating with any of the Spanish armies then in the field to oppose them; or in defending any of those strong positions capable of affording so much advantage, either as points of attack or of retreat. No such good consequence followed; there was no French reinforcement retarded, no Spanish army assisted, and ultimately almost the whole of the peninsula was over-run by the enemy. But the evil effects did not even terminate here; they affected most vitally the best interests of the country. They depreciated Great Britain in its character for sincerity, and zeal for the rescue of the continent.—The noble secretary does not now despair of a successful termination to the glorious struggles of the patriotic Spaniards; neither (said the noble earl) do I; but I still have the lamentable conviction, that if they fortunately shall succeed in, erecting a proud trophy to their heroic efforts, Great Britain has, by the conduct of her public servants, incapacitated herself from sharing the credit of having supplied a single stone. This discouraging feeling is not a little embittered by the reflection of having shed, so ineffectually shed, our best blood; of being obliged to admit its truth at a moment when we lament in sorrow and regret over the tomb of a gallant soldier who, although snatched from his country, in the moment of victory, still perished with the consciousness that his victory could be of no avail (Hear! hear!). We have heard much of the lukewarmness of the Spanish people during the retreat of the British troops. Is it not possible to find a very natural source for such a change of disposition; for such an impediment to ultimate success? Was the course pursued by his majesty's government calculated to attract the feelings and to allay the jealousies of the Spanish people?

Viscount Sidmouth

said, that whatever differences of opinion there might be as to the merits, there could be none as to the importance, of the motion under consideration; it was connected with the best interests of the Country. He did not hesitate to pronounce, not only, that the preponderance of argument was in favour of the noble earl who brought forward the motion, but there was no answer whatsoever given to the points he had urged. He would not go into the detail of this subject at that hour. He never heard of an intention to employ the British forces on the continent without entertaining much apprehension; he would not say that there could be no occasion to justify it; but the experience of the last 15 years had taught him a lesson of caution. If an army was to be sent into the interior of Spain,, it should not have been sent until necessary provisions were made to secure its retreat in case of disaster; it was necessary that there should be a supreme executive authority in the country; it was necessary that there should be a commander in chief, and though he thought it perfectly right in his majesty's ministers not to stipulate for any advantage as the price of succour, it was yet necessary to stipulate for such protections as might be wanting to their more complete security. If it had been known that Dupont was defeated, it would have been right to send troops to Portugal. Sir A. Wellesley should not have quitted the country without an adequate force. The object of the expedition to Portugal was stated to be the expulsion of the French; but the armistice in which it concluded formed a just ground of complaint; never was there a better description of it given, than what his majesty's ministers had themselves stated; that it had disappointed the hopes and expectations of the country. Among other causes which contributed to the armistice so unfortunate for the public service, was, the rapid succession of officers appointed to the command.—The noble viscount then adverted to the conduct of Mr. Frere, whose influence on sir John Moore alone induced that gallant general to make the fatal movement he did. Mr. Frere appeared to possess ardour without judgment, and his majesty's ministers seemed to approve his measures; measures which compelled sir John Moore to retire with haste, when he had no secure place of retreat, and to seal a life of honour with a death of glory. He agreed with the noble lord who spoke last but one, as to the propriety of supporting, the cause of Spain, while there was the least chance of success, and would on all occasions mark his abhorrence of the atrocious conduct of Buonaparté. He concluded by observing, that, while he gave his majesty's ministers credit for zeal and sincerity in the Spanish cause, it had been deplorably mismanaged, and yet he confidently trusted was not to be despaired of.

Lord Mulgrave

said, that the opinions given by noble lords, upon the proper mode of conducting the operations in Spain and Portugal, were so various, that had they been in power, they must have found a difficulty in laying down a plan of operations. One noble lord approved of the troops going to Portugal; another would have had them at the Pyrenees; while another recommended the co-operation of flying squadrons. A noble lord would have had them placed, between the Pyrenees and the French army! But he was at a loss to know, how they were to maintain themselves against the force of Buonaparté? O! they were to form a chain of 20,000 men across the Pyrenees, and completely shut them up. This reminded him of a story of a Chemist who had discovered the means to destroy Rattle-snakes, but it unfortunately happened, that the first article to make his recipe was a Rattle-snake, and the difficulty was how to procure one for the purpose; so with the Pyrenees, it was no doubt desirable to shut them up, but the difficulty was in doing it.—They must first be taken possession of, before the French could be prevented from passing through. The Spaniards desired artillery, arms- ammunition, and money; they did not want men. Sir Arthur Wellesley was to call at Spain; he did so; when he was desired to expel the French from Portugal, which would be the most desirable object. He differed in opinion with the noble viscount, that Spain should be the last place in the world to which troops should be sent. Spain was once great in arms, but she had ceased to be so, since her connection with France, and was no longer a military nation; hence arose the necessity of sending a British force to her assistance.—He did not conceive it necessary to vindicate the propriety of the expedition to Portugal; a more brilliant three weeks could not be found in military annals; he would not therefore detain the house by entering upon it. As to the Convention of Cintra, it did not originate with his majesty's ministers, neither did they approve it, as might be gathered from what had been said by them in that house. The noble lord then vindicated ministers from any blame in carrying on the operations in Spain. With respect to what had been laid of the conduct of Mr. Frere, he did not think a general like the late sir John Moore would regulate his movements by the instructions he might receive from a man in the situation of Mr. Frere. The gallant general's letters afforded ample proof of the contrary. The blood that had been spilt, and the lives which had been lost, were not to be charged to ministers, as they resulted from operations which were not of their contrivance, and which, had they been of their contrivance, would not have disgraced them. He hoped he had shewn that his majesty's ministers were not so reprehensible as they had been represented; he contended that they had shewn no want of sound discretion, or political wisdom, and trusted that they would not lose the confidence of their lordships or of the country.

Lord Erskine

rose, and said, God forbid that he should wish to pass censure on any set of men, if they had not justly deserved it! If his majesty's ministers plans had been overpowered by any unforseen circumstances, he would have come forward as their advocate; but they acted without system, and ran head foremost into every thing that was wrong; by which means every thing they undertook was defeated, and at the end they would be lost themselves; that loss would be but trifling, compared with the lives of 35,000 men they had endangered. He was of opinion that it would have been better for the service of the country, had the men who lost their lives in the late campaign been shot in St. James's Park. The men who were sent to Spain were sent there to be massacred, without any prospect of their being able to do any good. Mr. Frere said in one of his letters, that if they had been sent out to injure the Spanish cause in every respect, with, the single exception of not filing on the Spanish troops, they could not more effectually accomplish it, than by their retreat. He was of opinion Mr. Frere alluded to the miseries entailed on that unhappy country by our sending an army thither only to retreat before a superior army, pillaging the helpless inhabitants on the way. Either general Moore must have been culpable, or those, who placed him in such a situation that he could do nothing but afflict the inhabitants, must be so. They had sent no troops when they might hare been of service; but when the opportunity of assisting the Spaniards was lost, they had devoted a body of men, than which a finer never left this country, to be immolated in the heart of Spain. Had an efficient force been sent in time to co-operate with the Patriots, their armies would not have been dispersed, (as they were,) like chaff before the wind; it would probably have given them discipline and stability, and perhaps have enabled them to defeat their invaders. Though requisitions for cavalry had been made by the Spanish government, no adequate supply had been afforded them; no forces had been sent to their assistance, while there was an opportunity of their coping with the enemy to advantage. But when the French were reinforced, and were 113,000 strong; when the ardour of the Spaniards, damped, by misfortune, had wholly subsided; British soldiers had been sent to fly and to fall before the common enemy. As men he respected those in the administration, but as ministers he accused them of an improvident waste of the resources of the country; and thought them guilty of the death of every British soldier who had fallen in Spain.—There was one circumstance which had escaped his noble friend, namely, that the greater part of the communications from sir D. Baird had been suppressed; he knew it, he could prove it at the bar of the house, that sir D. Baird wrote to his majesty's ministers an account of the apathy and want of spirit amongst the Spaniards, and they had received the communication when they were pressing sir John Moore to advance. He concluded by observing, that he considered the Battle of Corunna a victory: as for the great, the brave, the valiant, and heroic Moore, who died, to use the words of a great English author— In joys of conquest, lie resign'd his breath, And fill'd with England's glory, smil'd in death!

The Earl of Westmoreland

thought the noble lord who brought forward the motion and those who had followed him, had been pretty liberal in their censures on government. According to them, ministers were wholly unfit to hold their places; he did not doubt but they knew of persons who, in their opinion, might be substituted with great advantage. He thought at that late hour it was unnecessary for him to consider what precise line of conduct England ought to have pursued; but this he would say, that honour, justice, and, above all, policy, called upon her to support the Spanish cause by every means in her power. The noble lord opposite, he said, shaped his conduct like most prophets, in order to fulfil his ends. Was it, he would ask of the noble lord, a measure of disgrace to free ourselves from a troublesome and dangerous blockade, and to restore to the people of Portugal the possession of their native land? Upon the whole, he received the noble lord's animadversions on this head as a compliment which merited his thanks. He would beg leave, however, to say, that the brilliant expedition to Alexandria or Constantinople, was never considered by the noble lords opposite as matter of disgrace. In fact, they gave themselves always that liberal latitude which they withheld from others. The noble earl concluded by giving his negative to the motion.

Lord Grenville,

in a very eloquent and able speech, animadverted upon the impropriety of the noble lord who had preceded, having made use of sarcasms upon such a serious occasion. He then entered into a critical examination of the two expeditions to Portugal and Spain, and enlarged considerably upon the inconsiderateness of ministers sending out troops so badly equipped and so ill provided with cavalry. He also threw out many reflections upon ministers for having allowed Mr. Frere to interfere with the military operations of sir J. Moore, owing to whose superior judgment our army had been prevented from falling into the hands of the enemy. Above all, he thought that ministers were reprehensible for endeavouring to throw the blame off themselves, and transferring it upon sir John Moore, who could not now appear to speak in his own justification. He hoped that such conduct would not lessen the ardour and zeal of the army, on which the salvation of the country so greatly depended. Upon these grounds he should vote for a motion that attributed to ministers the loss of seven thousand men, the loss of sir John Moore, eight millions of money, and created the addition of half a million of money to the burdens of the country, and above all disgrace to our councils and our national character.

Earl Grosvenor

spoke a few words in favour of the motion.

Their lordships then divided.

Contents	50
Proxies	42
	—92
Non-Contents	83
Proxies	62
	—145
Majority against the Motion	53

Adjourned at half past seven o'clock on Saturday morning.

List of the Minority.
Dukes.	Cassilis
Gloucester	Guilford
Norfolk	Eglington
Somerset	Thanet
Devonshire	Carlisle
Grafton	Besborough
St. Alban's	Darnley
Bedford	Suffolk
Argyll Marquisses.	Fortescue
	Darlington
Buckingham	Cowper
Stafford	Jersey
Headfort	Albemarle
Blandford	Lucan
Bute	Bristol
Douglas	Hardwicke
Townshend Earls.	Upper Ossory
	Breadalbane
Spencer	Cholmondeley
Essex	Shaftesbury
Donoughmore	Grosvenor
Rosslyn	Lauderdale
Derby	Carysfort Viscounts.
Fitzwilliam
Moira	Sidmouth
St. Vincent	Hereford
Carnarvon	Clifden
Tankerville	Duncan
Stanhope	Anson
Buckinghamshire	Bulkeley
Selkirk	Bolingbroke Lords.
Grey
Charlemont	Erskine

Ellenborough	Yarborough
Say and Sele	Lilford
De Clifford	Cawdor
St. John	Somers
King	Crewe
Braybrooke	Ponsonby
Ashburton	Carrington
Stawell	Monson
Auckland	Montford
Glastonbury	Hawke
Foley	Grantley Bishops.
Southampton
Hutchinson	Oxford
De Dunstanville	Lincoln
Grenville	St. Asaph
Dundas	Gloucester