CAMPAIGN IN SPAIN. (Hansard, 14 April 1809)

Lord Auckland
wished to put a few questions to the noble Secretary of State, to which, however, he did not expect or require an immediate answer. His object in putting these questions was to disentangle, as much as possible, and clear the ground for the main discussion respecting the conduct of the late Campaign in Spain and Portugal, and to endeavour to fix the leading points upon which that discussion might be expected to turn. That discussion would naturally involve not only the conduct of the war in those countries, but also the nature and tendency of the Treaty lately negociated between this country and Spain. And first, he would beg leave to ask in what sense were to be understood the terms "lawful successor," in the Article by which this country was bound not to make peace until Ferdinand 7th was restored, or his lawful successor and heirs. If it was intended not to make peace until Ferdinand 7th was restored, or until the crown of Spain was again placed on the head of the lawful successor of Ferdinand, a Bourbon, such an Article of a Treaty might expose the country to difficulties 26 which it might not be expedient to draw upon it. If, again, the article only meant that we were to consider any person, even Joseph Buonaparté, should the choice of the Spanish nation appear to appoint him the sovereign of that country, as the lawful sovereign of Spain, he should then say the Treaty in this respect would be wholly nugatory. This, however, might be a matter of delicacy, and he by no means desired to press the noble Secretary for an answer respecting it; wishing only that he would bear in mind how material a point the consideration of that part of the Treaty must prove, in the approaching discussion. The next point he had to allude to was also a delicate one; he meant the two Letters and Message of Mr Frere to sir J. Moore. There was no person who was more disposed than he was to make every allowance for the conduct of gentlemen in diplomatic situations; but he could not but consider the tone of these letters as somewhat out of the usual way. What must appear still more extraordinary was a message sent to sir J. Moore, desiring the bearer of the message to be heard before a Council of War, on the nature of the military plan to be adopted on the emergency in which the British army was then placed, when Mr. Frere and the Spanish Junta were themselves obliged to take to flight; and most extraordinary again must it seem, was it to be found that the bearer of such a message was a Frenchman! In what light must he have viewed the treatment to which a British commander in chief was thus submitted? These letters, this message, or the nature of it, at least, he conceived, should necessarily be laid before the house for a proper understanding of such a strange mode of proceeding. Sir J. Moore treated the letters' and the message in a manner worthy of him; he could scarce believe they were intended to be seriously acted upon.—He had now to advert to another point which he had on a former occasion endeavoured to press upon the attention of the house, and that was, the facility with which the enemy was allowed to take possession of Ferrol, of the naval squadron and naval arsenal in that place. It was true that some communications which passed upon that subject between sir David Baird and admiral de Courcy had been laid before the house, but it contained no satisfactory explanation of the matter, and indeed was far from shewing that any effectual steps had 27 been taken to secure that great national object. Here, then, was another point upon which the late Treaty bore, and which must naturally find an important place in the discussion of the merits of that Treaty, or in any discussion respecting our present connection with the issue of affairs in Spain.—The other points he had to call the attention of the noble Secretary to, might be considered of minor importance; but they were still what that house and the public should be fully and accurately informed upon. He meant a correct Return of the losses sustained in the British infantry and cavalry, which he feared far exceeded what they were generally understood to amount to. He feared the losses of both would not be found short of 8,000 men; of cavalry it was said, that 3 or 4,000 had been sent out, and that of these not more than some hundred horses had returned. He should not only wish to see it stated, how many horses exactly belonging to the mounted cavalry had been lost, but also how many belonging to the waggon-train, &c. &c. had never returned. Without due information on these matters, no complete and satisfactory estimate could be formed of the real loss sustained by the British army during the late campaign in Spain and Portugal. These questions he had proposed to the noble Secretary of State, not expecting an immediate answer to all of them, but from a wish to have it understood, that a more complete explanation of these points would be expected in the course of the approaching discussion than had yet been submitted to the house by his majesty's ministers.

The Earl of Liverpool
acknowledged the noble lord had acted with perfect propriety, in not pressing for an immediate answer to many of the questions he had put. Indeed, most of them were rather matter of argument for future discussion than of immediate explanation; and he should therefore defer touching upon them, until that discussion came regularly before the house. With regard to Mr. Frere's Letters, and the Message alluded to by the noble lord, they had never come in an official shape into the hands of his majesty's ministers; and he therefore did not imagine they could be regularly produced or argued upon. Even in the department to which such a correspondence more regularly belonged, he did not believe that much was known of the nature of the message upon which the noble lord had laid 28 so much stress; but whatever was known would no doubt be communicated, when that point came more immediately under their lordships consideration. With respect to the losses said to be sustained by the British army in its retreat from Salamanca to Corunna, an Account of them had been laid before the house in as complete a shape as it could well be made out; but he must entreat the house to remember, that in estimating these losses they would take into the account the losses sustained in Portugal, in the battles of Roleia and Vimiera, as well as what resulted from the retreat of the army to Corunna, and the memorable battle at that place. The whole should be embraced in a comprehensive view, and not frittered into separate and minute particulars.

§ Earl Grey
could not consider the points touched upon by his noble friend, as mere matter of argument, but as questions which called for a full and explicit explanation. Could any thing be more important and urgent to ascertain, than what was the real meaning of the most important article of the recent Treaty with Spain? That article bound this country to make no peace with France until Ferdinand VII, or his lawful successor, was restored to the throne of Spain. Why, in the first place, Ferdinand the VII.? What was his right to the throne in preference to Charles IV.? Or what authentic information was the house in possession of respecting that right? Charles IV. was said to have abdicated in favour of his son; but did we know that that abdication was a voluntary one? Besides, if the Spanish nation had thought proper to make choice of Ferdinand in place of his father, were we to acknowledge and sanction the propriety of that choice? It was true, Ferdinand would, in the course of things, have succeeded his father as the lawful successor; but upon what ground did we sanction his actual possession of the supreme power while his father lived? In this respect, the house were in possession of no accurate and official information, and therefore, the thus binding the country to persist in a war for his restoration, or that of his lawful successor, he held to be matter of the most serious consideration. Ministers had, however, in various documents described Ferdinand as prince of the Asturias; upon what ground was it that they now considered him as the only legitimate sovereign of Spain, in whose cause we were to co-operate with the Supreme Junta of Spain? 29 If by 'lawful successor' was to be understood any person whom the Spanish nation might acknowledge as their sovereign, then it might apply to the present usurper; and in that case he must join with his noble friend in considering the Treaty as wholly nugatory. On the subject of the losses sustained by the British army in the retreat from Salamanca, the house were by no means accurately informed. In its consequences, that retreat would be found to have proved extremely fatal. Such was the excessive fatigue to which it exposed both officers and men, that many of those who had escaped from Spain had died since their return. These consequences must greatly aggravate the original loss, and in order to ascertain it more accurately, he should on Monday next move for some additional accounts to that effect.

Lord Auckland
made some further observations on the dates of some of the articles of the Treaty with Spain, such as the date of the last article, which purported to be of the 21st of March last. It was impossible that this article, at least, could have been ratified. It would therefore follow, that what was before the house as a Treaty, could not as vet be regularly considered as such.

The Earl of Liverpool
seemed to admit the force of the observation, but deferred any explanation respecting it to a future occasion.

§ Earl Grey
then observed, that in order to meet the wishes of some noble lords to whom it was inconvenient to attend on Tuesday next, he would, with the permission of the house, defer his motion respecting the late Campaign in Spain till this day se'n-night, on which day he was determined to bring it forward.