§ Upon the motion for the second reading of the Irish Customs and Fees regulation bill,
The Earl of Lauderdaleobserved, that this was a bill which infringed upon one of the Standing Orders of that house, by which it was declared that any matter foreign to and having no connection with the purport of any aid, supply, or money bill, being introduced therein, and thereby fettering their lordships' discretion, was destructive to the rights of that house, and unparliamentary. The bill in question purported to be for the Regulation of Customs and the Fees of custom-house officers in Ireland; and it enacted that the right of taking 6d. upon certain duties be repealed; and then it enacted, that 3d. be paid upon the same duties; after which it proceeded to regulate the holidays kept by persons employed in the customs. Now, he certainly must contend, that this bill tended immediately to subvert the orders of that house, and on that account he was in duty compelled to resist it; for it became their lordships to be extremely jealous of any infringement upon their standing orders, considering that it might lead to dangerous consequences. After shewing that matter foreign to the title of the bill, as a money bill, was introduced by the other house of parliament, his lordship moved an amendment, that instead of the words 'be now read a second time,' there be substituted 'that this bill be rejected.'
§ Lord Hawkesburysaid, that what had been stated by the noble earl, respecting the Standing Order of that house, applied to bills of aid and supply. He must admit that the bill before them was a money bill; but he conceived, that in respect to some particular bills, the order was not imperative but admonitory, and in the case under consideration, left it to the option of that house to put it in force, if their 540 lordships, after exercising their discretion, should be induced to think that such was the intention of the house of commons, at the time of passing the bill, viz. to introduce foreign matter, with a view to fetter their discretion; but he did not perceive that the principle of that order could be justly applied in the present instance, and therefore should not vote for the rejection of the bill.
The Lord Chancellorthought that so far as this bill regarded duties on the customs of Ireland, it might properly be deemed a money bill. He could see no impropriety in first taking off the 6d. duty which had been formerly paid, and afterwards substituting 3d. This arose from the officers having been authorized to take half themselves, and to pay the other half to government. And when the bill was framed for the purpose of regulating their fees, it was not improper to introduce regulations concerning the holidays kept by such officers. On this account, and on the ground of these orders being sometimes rather admonitory than imperative, he should leave it to their lordships' discretion to consider whether the bill before them was one to which the order should be applied.
Lord Hollandregarded the standing orders of very great importance. The noble baron (Hawkesbury) had taken considerable pains to draw all the distinctions his mind could suggest, when the standing orders of that house ought, or ought not, to be observed: for this purpose, he had gone through all the modes, and had defined at what time they were to be considered in the imperative. There could be no such distinction, for they must at all times be imperative; and their lordships might as well have no orders, if they could be thus frittered away, by leaving it to their discretion to consider them imperative or admonitory. He had no disposition to put any obstacle in the way of the present bill, other than resisting its infringement upon the orders of that house; for if the commons once found out a mode of sending up bills in that way which tended to a breach of the orders of that house, they might be induced to do so on some occasions highly dangerous to their lordships' privileges.
The Earl of Lauderdalewas surprized at what had fallen from the noble lord (Hawkesbury) in laying down a distinction, when the orders of that house should be considered imperative, and when admonitory. It was absurd to consider any Standing Order admonitory: that house might 541 as well have no orders at all if they were not imperative. This doctrine had been also laid down by the noble and learned lord on the woolsack, and it was astonishing to him that those two noble lords could thus attempt to destroy their lordships' standing orders. He could not account for it but upon this principle, that the language used by them was intended, on their part, to be imperative towards that house.—The question was then put upon the original motion, and agreed to without a division.