HL Deb 03 March 1808 vol 10 cc874-7
Earl Darnley

rose to make his promised motion on this subject. His lordship took a review of the principal circumstances connected with this, expedition; and contended, that the only ground on which it could be justified was actual necessity; which was not proved to exist by any documents before the house, nor by ministers, who, on the contrary, continually shifted their ground of justification, and had made out no case which, in his opinion, was at all satisfactory. It had been said, that an option was given to the prince regent to deliver up the Danish fleet; but could it be said to be an option, when it was evident, that if he had delivered up the fleet, Holstein and Jutland would immediately have been seized by France? This expedition, it had been said, was sent to ward of off danger from this country; but how had that danger been prevented? The danger was not of an invasion of this country, but of the Baltic being shut against us; and instead of precluding this danger, the expedition had accelerated it. Possession of Zealand had not been retained, and Denmark had been thrown completely into the arms of France. The national character had, in his opinion, been degraded, and the national. honour stained by this expedition; and what had we gained? 16 ships of the line, which could be of little service and as to stores, they did not amount in value to the stores expended in the expedition; and the whole was not equal to the expence of the expedition.—The noble earl concluded with moving, "That an humble Address be presented to his majesty, submitting, That after attentively considering all the public documents before us concerning the late attack on Copenhagen, and the war which it had produced, we have found the information which they afford extremely imperfect and unsatisfactory.—That in a matter in which both the honour and the interests of our country are so deeply concerned we had hoped for the fullest explanations. The principles of our constitution and the uniform practice of his majesty, and the sovereigns of his illustrious house, require, that parliament should be distinctly apprized of the true grounds of entering into new wars, especially in a situation of our country wholly unprecedented.—Had Denmark been a party to any hostile confederacy against the rights or interests of the British empire, our resistance would have been necessary, and our warfare legitimate. Under such circumstances, we should only have had to regret, that the ports and arsenals of that country should so lightly have been abandoned, when advantages so very inconsiderable had been derived from their temporary occupation, and when by our continuing to hold them during the war, all real danger from that quarter might have been effectually averted.—But we cannot doubt, that Denmark, instead of engaging in hostile leagues, had resolved still to maintain her neutrality.—This fact is proved even by the imperfect documents which have been laid before us, and is confirmed by the proclamation issued by his majesty's commanders immediately before the attack.—Certainly Denmark was no party, nor does it appear that she was privy to any confederacy hostile to this country. We are not even satisfied that such a league did really exist.—The conclusion of any secret articles at Tilsit affecting the rights or interests of the British empire appears to have been uniformly denied both by Russia and France.—The correspondence of his majesty's secretary of state, and. the dates of the transactions themselves; prove that his majesty's ministers could not be in possession of any such articles when the attack was ordered against Copenhagen; and it has been distinctly admitted in this house, that they have not yet obtained a copy of them.—The king's ambassador at Petersburgh, in an official note, rested the defence of the measure not on any hostile purposes either of Denmark or of Russia, but solely on the designs which it was said the French government had long since been known to entertain.—His majesty's ministers not only forbore to advise such measures as would have been necessary to repel any real hostility of Russia: but they actually solicited the mediation of that power, to extinguish a war, and her guaranty to defeat projects in which it is now pretended they knew her to have been a principal and contracting party.—Allegations thus inconsistent with each other, and contrary to admitted facts, weaken, instead of supporting the cause to which they are applied.—With respect to the alledged necessity of the case, we beg leave to assure his majesty, that we cannot think so meanly of the power and resources of his empire, of the spirit of his people, or of the valour and discipline of his fleets and armies, as to admit that such an act could have been required for any purpose of self-preservation.—Any temporary advantages which the possession of such ships and stores as were taken at Copenhagen can afford, are already much more than counterbalanced by the other consequences of a measure which appears not less objectionable in policy than in principle. That measure has augmented the number of our enemies; it has countenanced the injurious representations circulated throughout Europe respecting our principles and designs; and has inflamed against us the warmest passions of neutral and of friendly nations.—But it has above all shaken our own persuasion of the justice of our cause: a sentiment which had hitherto supported us through all our difficulties, commanding the respect of other powers, and encouraging us in an humble but confident reliance on the ultimate protection and blessing of Providence. Unwilling as we are even yet to pronounce definitively on a subject the full knowledge of which has been so pertinaciously withheld from us, and reluctant as we must ever be to admit conclusions unfavourable to the justice of those councils by which his majesty's conduct has been actuated, we are yet compelled on such an occasion to speak to his majesty the language of truth. And we must therefore, with all humility, and with the most unfeigned and heartfelt sorrow, represent, that in a ease which above all others required the clearest proof, every presumption is against us, and that no particle of evidence has yet been adduced by which our national character can be vindicated from the guilt of an unprovoked and premeditated violation of that good faith, justice and humanity which have hitherto been at once the glory and the safeguard of the British empire."

Lord Eliot

rose to oppose the Address. So far from any fair ground existing in support of such an address, to him it ap- peared that there was abundant cause to commend, instead of censuring the conduct of ministers with respect to the Copenhagen expedition. The noble lord then took a survey of all the circumstances which had marked the transaction, and concluded with reading a Resolution of approbation, which it was his intention to move, if the Address moved by the noble earl should be negatived.

Lord Holland

highly regretted the degree of national dishonour that had been brought upon the country by the shameful conduct of ministers, in sending a large armed force to attack the territories, and seize the shipping of a neutral power. It was unaccountably strange, that ministers should still persist in asserting the necessity of that odious measure in order to frustrate the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit, of which ministers pretended to have known the substance. We were publicly challenged by the enemy to produce the least evidence of the assertions which ministers had put into the sacred mouth of his majesty: yet we were totally incapable of supporting them by the least shadow of evidence. The noble lord said, he detested to hear the plea of necessity and self-preservation urged in our defence. It was particularly calculated to instil into the British people passions and opinions subversive of that liberality and generosity that distinguished our ancestors. Had France even got possession of the 16 Danish ships, the acquisition could not materially injure this country, or increase our alarms of invasion, whilst we should have been secure of the friendship and attachment of the Danish people, and their indignation at the French for forcing them to abandon their esteemed neutrality, and become a party in an unnatural war. Without possessing the hearts of the Danish people, Buonaparte could do us little injury through their means; whilst under their present circumstances, they must be filled with the utmost resentment by our unparalleled outrage. His lordship then entreated the house to vindicate the tarnished honour of the country, and shew to the nation, to Europe, and to the world their abhorrence of so flagrant a breach of the laws of civilized nations.

Lord Boringdon

defended the expedition, and contended that, after the battle of Friedland, it was evident that Denmark was unable to defend the neutrality, and must make her election between England and France; and that it was also evident from her previous conduct that her inclinations were with France.—The house divided:

Contents-26 Proxies 25—51
Non-contents-56 -54—110
Majority—59

Whilst strangers were excluded there was a short conversation on the motion of lord Eliot, for an Address to his majesty, stating, "That this house, considering the Declarations laid before them by his majesty's command; the state to which the Continent was reduced, in consequence of the negociations and peace of Tilsit; the avowed declaration of the French government to exclude the British flag from every port of Europe, and to combine all the powers of the continent in a general confederacy against the maritime rights and political existence of G. Britain; most highly approve the prompt and vigorous measures which were adopted by his majesty's ministers, for the purpose of removing out of the reach of his majesty's enemies the fleet and naval resources of Denmark."—The house then divided:

Contents-64 Proxies-61—125
Non-contents-29 Proxies-28— 57
Majority—68