Lords Sitting of 11 February 1808

DISPUTE WITH AMERICA.
Lord Grenvillerose, pursuant to notice, to move for certain papers, which would tend to throw some light on the nature of the relations, as they now existed, between this country and America, and on the terms and tendency of the treaty which, in Dec. 1806, was concluded. between the two nations. It had fallen to his lot to be engaged more than once in discussions with the ministers of the united states, and, he had bestowed on what regarded the connection and mutual interests of the two states, all the attention, labour, and diligence, of which he was master, and which the high importance of the subject so seriously imposed on him. Indeed, the cultivating and maintaining of a good understanding with America, an understanding that included and promoted the reciprocal interests of the two countries, was, in his mind, the most material and important consideration that could possibly engage the attention of the British government and parliament, next to the care of conciliating and uniting, in one bond of union, all descriptions of his majesty's subjects in these kingdoms. He had of late taken occasion, more than once, to express this opinion, and he now wished to repeat it in the most serious and solemn manner. This disposition powerfully animated his views and his conduct, whenever any thing occurred that threatened to embarrass or interrupt the friendly intercourse and connection of the two countries. In
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the year 1794, in consequence of events to which the war that broke out in the preceding year gave rise, he had to discuss and adjust some differences which then occurred with the united states. It was his good fortune to have to deal in that transaction with a man (Mr. Jay), whose talents and disposition eminently qualified him for the office he had undertaken. Never in the course of his public life had he met with a person on whose probity, candour, and sincerity, he could so confidently rely. Mr. Jay felt the value and the necessity of a close and amicable connection between the two nations, and he laboured most impartially duly to weigh, and to ascertain the real interests of both. These unquestionably were qualifications indispensably necessary to a negotiator; and no negotiation could be fairly carried on except in a mutual spirit of justice and impartiality. He trusted, that such was the spirit which actuated the negotiation at that time, and which brought it to a successful termination: sure he was, that Mr. Jay acted on these principles; yet when he returned to his own country, he was accused, very unjustly indeed, of having sacrificed her interests, or yielded too far in favour of those of England. Mr. Jay had long since retired from public life; but he felt happy in having this opportunity of paying a due tribute of praise to his character. Under the influence of this disposition were the late discussions with America carried on, and brought to what was expected to be a happy termination, when circumstances arose, that might put to hazard the final issue of that negotiation. He had much to complain of the false light in which ignorance or malice had endeavoured to represent it. His noble friends who conducted that negotiation, with talents of which he could not now speak as he ought, because they were present, had been reproached as having made unwarrantable and dangerous concessions to America—concessions which had been causelessly and mischievously held out to the public as the bane of the interests of Great Britain; yet, while these reproaches were vented against the administration at home, no sooner had the treaty reached America, than the government of the united states were accused of having yielded too much to the British plenipotentiaries. Even the speech by which the session was opened, contained assertions respecting this treaty, which were not correct. It

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said the treaty had not taken effect by the refusal of the president to ratify it. Now, the president had not refused to ratify it; but deferred the ratification, as far as the ratification depended upon him, because the treaty contained certain articles, which, though they were agreed upon between the respective plenipotentiaries, were not however signed by them, because some further explanation upon the points they contained, was to be previously had with the American government. As to the concessions that were said to be made to America, in essential points, and which were reprobated as the bane of the interests of England, no assertion could be more unfounded. It was no doubt difficult to say, what were or were not the points which might be conceded, in balancing the interests of the two countries. Since America was declared an independent state in 1782, many points had arisen in discussions, which had never before been brought .into agitation, Most of them might easily be adjusted by taking for rule, the mutual advantages resulting from an amicable convention between the two countries: but in points that could be fairly considered as essential, never had he, nor those with whom he was connected, consented to make any concession. He considered as essential, what was connected with the preservation of the naval power and pre-eminence of this country, and sooner would he see England perish in a contest for the assertion of her maritime rights, than that she should yield a tittle of them: for these rights once given up, what contest would she be afterwards able to carry on? They were connected not only with her power, but with her very existence as an independent nation; and therefore no man could ever think of sacrificing them. This was his firm resolution, and nothing could bring him to depart from it. No dangerous concessions had therefore been made to America in the late treaty; and when the two governments came coolly to consider its nature and tendency, they would discover that it equally consulted the interests of both countries; and that, he would repeat, was the only basis upon which any treaty could be solidly and permanently built.—The noble lord then entered into a minute examination of the difficulties that resulted to both countries from the practice of searching merchantmen. From a thousand circumstances, it must be obvious that it was attended with more diffi-
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culties between American and British officers, than between the officers of any other nation: but a spirit of candour, moderation, and mutual regard, which he could not too forcibly inculcate, would tend to compose every difference upon that head. As to the right of searching national ships of war, it had never been assumed, and should not be practised. The noble lord again implored the house seriously to appreciate the value of an uninterrupted amity and intercourse with America, and expressed his anxious expectation that the mind of the Americans would become cooler and more considerate, and that this country would meet them with correspending sentiments. his lordship concluded with moving for copies or extracts of the Dispatches which passed between his majesty's government and the government of the United States, respecting the Treaty signed by the plenipotentiaries of both governments.
Lord Hawkesburymost perfectly coincided in opinion with the noble baron, that an impartial regard to the interests of the two countries was an essential basis of this, or any other negotiation; and under that impression he trusted that he and his colleagues were disposed to act. No man could be more impressed than he was with the necessity of cultivating a good understanding with America, and making her feel how indispensable was such a connexion to the reciprocal interests of the two countries. After having acquainted the noble baron that he did not intend to oppose his motion, he did not expect he would have gone so largely into the question: but he should not imitate his example, as he would now, and as he had on former occasions, abstain from agitating any question respecting America; as our relations With the united states must soon come, in all their bearings, under the consideration of the house.—After a short conversation the motion was agreed to.

MEDIATION OF RUSSIA AND AUSTRIA.
Earl Greysaid, he had to apologise to their lordships, for postponing that part of the motion of which he had given notice, which related to the Expedition to Constantinople. He found himself obliged to do this from having been unable to examine the dates of certain papers, which it was necessary to investigate. With respect to the other points of his motion, he thought it of great importance that the house should be put in possesion of some additional information relative to the Me-

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diation offered by Russia and Austria. At a crisis like the present, it was of great importance to know, whether ministers had taken advantage of any opportunity that offered for pacific negociation, with a disposition favourable to the attainment of peace. With respect to the qualities of a mediator, he did not think it was necessary that a mediating power should be totally unconnected with both the belligerents: it was scarcely possible in human affairs to meet with perfect impartiality, at the same time he admitted that where there was a close connection between the power offering to mediate and one of the belligerents, that the other belligerent was justified in refusing a mediation under such circumstances. With respect to Russia, much had been said about the treaty of Tilsit: he did not believe that at the time of concluding that treaty, there was any dereliction of our interest on the part of Russia, but that that measure was the offspring of necessity. His noble friend (lord Hutchinson) had stated on a former evening the vast losses sustained by the Russian army; and, after hearing that statement, could there be a doubt of the necessity under which Russia must find herself of making peace? It had been said, that there was a secret article in the Treaty of Tilsit, in which Russia pledged herself that the Danish fleet should be at the disposal of France; but he did not believe the existence of any such article. Was it possible to suppose that Russia, even prostrate as she was at the feet of France, would have agreed to an article which would have rendered France mistress of the Baltic, and placed the Russian empire completely in her power? He did not believe that Russia was really hostile to this country until the event of the expedition to Copenhagen; a measure which he feared we should repent to the latest hour of our existence. The Russian offer of mediation, limited as it was in point of time with respect to our acceptance of it, and communicated as it was, might be considered grating to the feelings of this country; but from the statement of his noble friend (lord Hutchinson) on a former evening, it was proved that the emperor did riot wish to limit the time of our acceptance. If, however, he was not disposed, under all the circumstances, to find much fault with the rejection of the Russian mediation, he saw much to blame in the rejection of the Austrian offer of mediation. He thought the answer to prince Starhem-
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berg was petulant, and did not evince any disposition on the part of ministers favourable to peace. Whatever were the objections to the mediation of Russia, they did not apply to that of Austria. The note of Prince de Starhemberg on this subject was dated the 25th of April, and nothing appeared about it in the Papers before the house until the 20th Oct. During this long interval, he had conceived that there would be some further correspondence on the subject; he had been, however, informed by the noble secretary of state, that in point of fact there were no official notes: there had been some conversations, which, however, were not in a shape to be laid before parliament. It was important, however, that their lordships should be in possession of all the information that could be had, and it should be recollected that we had at that time two ministers at Vienna, one of whom was there on a special mission. He therefore intended to move for copies, or extracts, of Dispatches which passed between his majesty's government and the Austrian minister, and from the British minister at Vienna. —The next point on which he wished for further information related to the note of baron Budberg, of the 30th of June. In that note, some charges affecting the honour and character of this country were preferred, charges which it was the duty, of his majesty's minister at the court of Russia to repel. These charges were afterwards repeated in the note of count Romanzow, and more specifically set forth in the Russian Declaration. They were contained under three heads: the refusal to lend any military assistance to Russia, the refusal to facilitate the negociation of a loan in this country, and the vexations suffered by the commerce of Russia. Of these three heads of accusation the last only was repelled in his majesty's Declaration. The two first were passed over in that perfect silence, which implied an acquiescence in the truth of the charges. The first was by far the most serious, and upon that he must claim their lordships indulgence for some time. The refusal to make any military diversion in favour of the continent, was one of the chief accusations against that administration, of which he had the honour to form a part. It was a charge which had been pressed against them by their opponents in all possible shapes. This calumny had been industriously circulated among the public, and much relied upon in another place; but

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he trusted before he sat down he should satisfy their lordships that it was wholly unfounded. His lordship here went into a detail of the military operations upon the continent during the time the late administration were in power, and maintained that at no time was the course of events such, as to justify them in sending a large army to the continent. There were only three points at which a diversion, or co-operation, could be effected. It must have been attempted either in France, Holland, or within the Baltic. What would 25 or 30,000 men, the most which could have been spared by this country, effect against the population of France? It would be to send them to certain captivity or destruction, for within three days, three times their number might be collected against them. Was it in Holland that this diversion was to be attempted? Independant of the difficulty of establishing magazines, there were other obstacles to the effecting a descent in that country. The season rendered access to the coast almost impossible, and there was no strong place under cover of which the army could take post. Was it within the Baltic that this diversion was to take place? He would put it to the noble lord (Mulgrave,) both in his military and nautical capacity, to declare, whether, after the Russians had been driven across the Vistula, any descent could have been attempted with the smallest chance of success, on the coast of Denmark. Stralsund was the only place where a landing could have been safely effected, and Swedish Pomerania was observed by a French army, too powerful for any force that this country or Sweden could have collected in that quarter. Where, then, was this military assistance to be given? Did the noble lords opposite suppose, that the landing of 20 or 30,000 men at Memel could have changed the fortune of the war? His noble friend behind him (lord Hutchinson) could bear testimony that it would not. The Russians were so deficient in arrangements, that they were often in want of provisions. They had neglected to establish magazines; and the accession of such a force, instead of being an advantage, would have only added to their embarrassments. He trusted that he had fully replied to this charge; the next, respecting the refusal to facilitate a loan, would be more easily disposed of Russia, it was true, had proposed to make a loan of six millions in this country; but it was found upon consulting with some of the first Mer-
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chants, that it would be impossible, unless the repayment was guaranteed by the British government. Russia offered a species of security, to be sure; namely, that the duties levied in that country, upon the importation of British goods, should be made payable here as an export duty; but this being a duty of a precarious and uncertain nature, was not accepted. The lenders would accept of nothing short of a guarantee of the government; and that, for many reasons, could not be granted. The negociation, therefore, fell to the ground.—The only charge remaining was, the injury sustained by the Russian commerce. It was true, a number of Russian vessels bound to the ports of France had been detained; but they were afterwards released, and ample compensation made to those who suffered by their detention. They were released in consequence of a representation from the Russian minister, that though France and Russia were at war, there was no interruption to the commercial relations between the two countries. In proof of this he mentioned, that the Russian consuls remained at all the French ports, in the full exercise of their functions. To this representation ministers listened, and the detained ships were released, and an assurance given, upon an understanding that they should convey no contraband of war, that they should meet with no interruption for the future. The noble lord expressed his hopes, that he had in some measure satisfied their lordships as to the injustice of some of the charges preferred against him and his colleagues, and the propriety of their refusing to accede to the proposals which made the subject of another; and concluded with moving for the several Papers to which he had referred in the course of his speech.
Lord Hawkesburyfelt it necessary for him to make some observations on the speech which the noble lord had just delivered. That speech was principally divided into two heads: first, respecting the Russian mediation, and the conduct of the present ministers upon the subject; secondly, the noble lord had thought it necessary to go at considerate length into an apology or defence of the late ministers front the charges which had been made against them by persons in this country, and by the Russian Declaration, which charged the government of this country with neglecting to co-operate with their allies on the continent. As to the first point, namely, the Russian mediation, he

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must state that his majesty's present ministers never disguised or concealed the desire they had to conclude a peace with France, if such a peace could be concluded on fair and honourable terms, and should extend to his majesty's allies, as well as to his own territories. If they had thought such a peace could have been obtained through the Russian mediation, they would have gladly embraced it; but it was well known that Russia had, at the treaty of Tilsit, entered into secret articles, which they could not doubt were directed against the interests of this country, or perhaps against the existence of some of the powers who were allies of his majesty. The Russian minister the baron de Budberg himself did not deny that there were secret articles prejudicial to this country. He would not, however, state what those articles were, but only said, 'that, upon his honour, the shutting of the Russian ports against the English trade was not one.' Under these circumstances, his majesty's ministers thought it necessary to ask what was the basis, on which it was proposed to make peace,. and what were these secret articles in the treaty of Tilsit? They thought that if either the basis was inadmissible, or that these secret articles went directly to the prejudice of his majesty, or his allies, in such case it would be idle and dangerous to carry on a mock negociation for peace, which could not produce any beneficial effect, but which would prove delusive to the hopes, and prejudicial to the interests of this country. If an honourable peace could be made, his majesty's ministers would be glad to conclude it, but if the thing was impossible, they thought it dangerous to hold out false hopes to the country. No peace could be honourable to this country which would surrender its allies to the enemy; and as the secret articles of the treaty must be supposed to be directed either against his majesty, or his allies, it appeared to his majesty's ministers, that it was absolutely necessary that they should have some information on that subject before they could consent to have the country lulled into the idea that they were to expect peace.—As to the second point in the speech of the noble lord, the apology that he thought it necessary to make for the late ministers from the charges in the Russian Declaration, which appeared to him to be countenanced by his majesty's present ministers; he should first observe, that there was no public document or offi-
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cial paper to be found, in which his majesty's ministers had countenanced or supported those charges. If, however, he was called upon to pronounce an opinion, it would be hypocritical in him to deny, that he thought the late ministers acted in many points from a very different view of the subject from that which was entertained by the present ministers. There were many points in which he agreed with what had been stated by the noble lord, and some in which he differed. He agreed with him in thinking that the late ministers could not have prevented the quarrel between France and Prussia, nor that defeat which was so disastrous to the Prussian nation; but although it was out of their power to give any effectual succour to Prussia, yet in the next campaign, which ended so unfortunately, but which began so fortunately—[Here lord Grey asked across the house, when or where it was fortunate?] He meant when the power of Russia had been brought into the field to support Prussia, then the cause of the continent appeared to be by no means in so desperate a state as the late ministers seemed to consider it. If it were allowed that the French succeeded principally by superiority of numbers, then it might be supposed that a great part of that superiority might have been taken off by proper co-operation, especially as it was allowed that Sweden was ready to co-operate with its whole strength. He agreed with the noble lord also in the principle he laid down, that he would not grant a larger loan to any foreign power than he would a subsidy, as it might be expected that such loan would fall ultimately upon this country, and that a, larger sum would be asked in the way of loan than would be demanded as a subsidy. He thought the sum of six millions was too great to give to the emperor of Russia, either as subsidy or loan; but it did not follow that because that sum was too large, ministers should have drily refused him and not given any thing. It was natural for the power who asked assistance to name the highest sum, but it did not follow that if that was too great, no assistance at all should be given. Although he should have objected to 6 millions, yet, when he considered that it was a campaign upon which the last stake of Europe was depending, he should not have objected to three millions, either as a subsidy, or, if it was more gratifying to the pride of Russia, as a loan. He thought,

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then, the late ministers were wrong in not giving, at least, that pecuniary assistance which the circumstances required, and which our allies had a right to expect. He thought also, that, although he did not charge them with any positive breach of promise or violation of any express assurance of co-operation, yet that they had by their expressions held out a hope, and induced a belief in the allies that it was their intention to co-operate. Those hopes and expectations had been deceived, and the continent were now taught to look upon this country as a nation that goaded others, but which avoided partaking in the dangers and losses of a continental war. He thought it would have been better to have run the risk of a loss of troops, than to lose our national honour, and be considered a country which would involve others in dangers, which we ourselves would decline. He also thought that the late ministers had been wrong in talking of co-operations, when they made no preparations for that purpose. So far from having a proper number of transports ready, they actually discharged in the month of March many transports, which had before been in the service of government. After a variety of observations on the other parts of the speech of the noble lord, his lordship concluded with expressing a readiness to grant many of the papers moved for; but there were some which he thought it would be improper to produce.
Earl Moiraconceived that his majesty's present ministers had no right to ask Russia to communicate the secret articles of the treaty she had been forced to sign at Tilsit. If the emperor of Russia signed secret articles, he had pledged his honour that they should be secret, and we could not reasonably expect him to violate that pledge. At the same moment, however, and in the same breath, that we denied the power of Russia to be a fair guarantee between us and France, and rejected that mediation, we solicited it as between us and Denmark, and thought that,, in that case, her. guarantee Was quite sufficient. If the late ministers, however, did not send an army to the assistance of Russia, it was because no army which this country could send had the smallest chance of turning the fate of the last unfortunate campaign. The greatest force that was ever spoken of as possible to attempt a diversion with, was 30,000 British troops and 15,000 Swedes. This force, collected at Stralsund, could have had but very little
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effect on the campaign. It would not have prevented the defeat of the Russians, and if the event of the battle had even turned out the other way, and that the French had been defeated, still that force would have been too small to throw in the rear of such an immense army on its retreat. It was impossible that this force could have acted upon the flank of the enemy, for they were covered by great rivers, the Oder and the Vistula. In such an expedition, our risk would not be merely an army, but it would be the army of G. Britain. This certainly should not be risked, unless there was a probability of gaining some most important advantage. The fact was, that the late ministers were convinced upon the fullest consideration, that the troops which they could send were not likely to produce any important effect, and that there was only one chance remaining for Europe. To that one chance they paid the utmost attention. That chance was that Austria might be brought to move, and that if the Austrian army marched down to the Lower Elbe, behind the communications of the French army, in that case Europe would have had a fair chance of its deliverance. If that chance had occurred, the circumstances would have arrived in which the late ministers would have been prepared to co-operate with a military force. Combined with the Austrians, every thing might be hoped for; but if merely combined with the Swedes, the danger that our army would run was much greater than any chance they could have of altering the fate of the campaign. It appeared from all accounts, that the French army had a superiority over the Russians of at least 60,000 men; and when it was considered in how different a manner the two armies were commanded, it could not be supposed that any reinforcement we could have sent would have out-balanced this disproportion in numbers. He utterly denied that the Russians had ever any prospect of success, although their soldiers gained immortal honour at Eylau. it was a military policy in all countries to endeavour to keep the people in good humour by giving very favourable accounts of their military successes; but the fact was, that in the battle of Pultusk, (which they claimed as a victory,) they were defeated with the loss of 80 pieces of cannon, and the Russian army would have been utterly annihilated, if the badness of the roads had not prevented a division of the

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the French army from coming up in time.
Lord Hutchinsonhoped the house would allow him to state some matters which, from the situation he had held, were within his own personal knowledge. The Russian army never had any chance of succeeding in the campaign, or even in the battle of Eylau, where they fought so bravely. The French had certainly the victory. They remained for ten days in the field of battle, and immediately after made themselves masters of the magazines at Elbing, and returned to their cantonments, where they effectually covered the blockade of several strong towns, which afterwards surrendered to them. At that time the king of Prussia retired from Konigsberg to Memel, and not thinking himself quite safe there, had even engaged a house at Riga. On the 23d of Feb. he wrote to ministers, mentioning that a French general had arrived at Memel to propose a separate peace; and if the count de Zastrow supported the idea of a separate peace, it was not because he was less attached than any other man to the cause of Prussia and the continent, but because he knew the situation of Russia and Prussia, and was convinced that they had no chance by continuing the contest. In the beginning of April he had had a long conversation with the emperor of Russia, who afterwards referred him to one of his ministers, who told him, that as soon as the Russian guards came up they would be superior in number to the French, and were determined to attack them. The Russians neither knew the force that opposed them, nor how much their own numbers in the field were inferior to their armies upon paper.—The noble lord was then proceeding to state the nature of different dispatches between him and the present ministers, when
Earl Bathurstrose to order. He thought it was completely out of order for any noble lord to state, at his own pleasure, all the conversations between kings and emperors, which, from his official situation, he might have heard, or to divulge the confidential communications which took place between him and his government; and if it was competent for any one individual to do so, it was equally competent for any other individual in his majesty's service.
The Duke of Norfolksaid, that whether the noble lord acted right or not in entering into these details, they were completely relevant to the question under dis-
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cussion, and therefore that he could not be said to be out of order.
Lord Grenvillewished to know whether their lordships would submit to the doctrine, that it was quite regular, as had been done in another place, to read partial extracts from correspondence, where, by stopping short in the middle of a sentence, the meaning was altogether perverted, and that they should be debarred from the privilege of rectifying the false impressions to which this conduct had given rise? And he would ask, whether it was for those who had themselves set the example of publishing garbled extracts from official papers, which of all others ought to be considered as the most secret and confidential, to complain of his noble friend, particularly when it was recollected that he deemed it absolutely necessary to the justification of his own character, which had been most wantonly and falsely aspersed?
The Lord Chancellorreminded the noble lord that it was a great breach of order in that house to refer or allude to any thing which had passed in another house of parliament. And if a breach of order had been committed and permitted in another place; that was surely no reason why a similar breach of order should be tolerated by their lordships. He was clearly of opinion, that it was disorderly in any person who had been employed in a public capacity to read a part, or to disclose the contents of a public dispatch, without the leave of his majesty, to whom that dispatch was supposed to belong; and he thought that they had already gone a very dangerous length in allowing a minute of a conversation, supposed to have passed between an accredited minister and a foreign sovereign, without his majesty's permission to that effect.
Earl Greycontended that his noble friend was not reading a dispatch, and much less a partial and garbled extract from such dispatch, when he had, in his opinion, been most improperly called to order by a noble earl. He had been merely giving an account of his public conduct, in perfect consistency with his duty, and, as he conceived, within the rules of order by which discussions in that house were regulated. He was happy, however, to hear from so high an authority as the noble lord upon the woolsack, an admission of the impropriety and indecency of reading extracts from dispatches, which he asserted to be the pro-

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petty of his majesty, and he hoped that the animadversions of the noble lord upon this novel and dangerous practice, would operate as a useful lesson to those by whom it had been introduced. With all due deference, however, to the opinion of learned and noble lord, he submitted it to the house, whether, after so foul a use (for foul he must call it) as had been made of the letters of his noble friend, was not to be permitted to state the facts as they really stood in his own vindication, and whether, after his conduct and character had been arraigned, he was not to be suffered to wipe off the aspersions which had been cast upon him by declaring the truth, and the whole truth of the case. He must suppose, however, from what had just fallen from the noble lord upon the woolsack, that had an attempt been made to do a thing so irregular, and fraught with so much danger, as to read, in his hearing, extracts from any public and official communications unauthorized and uncalled upon, he would immediately have interrupted the person by whom the attempt was made. He would not allude to any thing that had passed in another place, but it was rather surprising, that the noble lord upon the woolsack, with these rigorous sentiments respecting duty and order, did not on this very evening admonish the noble secretary of state of his irregularity, in reading a part of a public dispatch, to which their lordships' attention had been called in the course of his speech. At any rate, after the reproof which had now been administered, he hoped that the noble secretary would kiss the rod with meekness, and receive the chastisement with humble submission.
Lord Hawkesburysaid, that it certainly was highly irregular to refer to any thing which had passed in another place, and he conceived it to be very improper for any noble lord, who had been employed in a public capacity, to disclose the secrets of his mission; particularly without any previous communication with those to whom his dispatches were addressed. He knew of no charge or imputation that had been brought against the noble lord, and therefore he considered such a disclosure, in the present instance, to say the least of it, altogether unnecessary.
Lord Grenvilleinsisted that his noble friend had said nothing which was not necessary for his own vindication from a charge which was brought against him in the Morning Post, and which was there
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imputed to his majesty's secretary of state for foreign affairs.
Lord Mulgravereminded the noble lord, that if the Morning Post contained any thing improper, there was an authority in another place quite competent to set it to rights.
Lord Hutchinsoncontinued: As soon as he found that the Russians were not likely to advance, he was decidedly of opinion, that we ought not to send a single man to the continent. He gave every degree of credit to the bravery of the Russian troops, but the French had every kind of advantage over them; and in no mission on which he might be sent would he ever deceive the country, by representing things in a different point of view from that in which he saw them. In the month of June, Buonaparte, a greater master of the art of military movements than any man who perhaps ever existed, had assembled a corps of 40,000 men upon the Elbe, upon which, in case of sustaining any misfortune, he could have fallen back, so that though at that time there had been 30,000 English and Swedes at Stralsund, they might have met with some disaster, but could have done no good.
Lord Grenvillehad looked forward with considerable anxiety to this night's discussion, to which he trusted for the vindication of his own character, and that. of his colleagues, from several charges which had been brought against their conduct while in administration. His anxiety had been much relieved by the candid admission of the noble secretary of state, who in the course of his speech had deserted several of the articles of charge which had been thrown out on other occasions, but which he was happy to find were now done away. If any person had ever been so silly and so little of a statesman as to suppose that any provision could have been made for the rupture between Prussia and France, their opinion would probably be corrected by the admission of the noble secretary on this evening, that no such provision was to be expected. In addition to what his noble friend (earl Grey) had said on this subject, he had only one particular to subjoin, viz, that the Prussian minister was recalled from this country, where he had been invited to stay, as an organ of amicable communication, in the middle of August, and so rapid were the decisions of the court of Berlin, that

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he was apprized of the change of system on his arrival at Hamburgh. In the Russian Declaration it had been stated, that this government had not acted upon assurances which had been given of sending a military force to the continent, in order to create a diversion in favour of the allies. The noble secretary had admitted in his speech that no such assurances had ever been given; but he considered his majesty's Declaration as extremely defective, in not replying to the allegation of our not acting upon those assurances, by the assertion, the truth of which the noble secretary had admitted in debate, and which was necessary to the exculpation of the present ministers, their predecessors, and the country. He had been a good deal surprised to find no Note upon this subject in the Correspondence which had taken place between his majesty's ambassador and the ministers of the emperor of Russia. He was satisfied with the assurance of the noble secretary, that no opportunity had occurred of presenting such a note; still however, this circumstance rendered it more necessary that the calumny should be refuted in the counter-declaration. But, instead of this, ministers had left the cause of the country to shift for itself, because they could not do justice to the country without likewise doing justice to their predecessors. There was another charge from which he had been relieved—not, indeed, by the admission of the noble secretary, but by something still more eloquent—his silence. His noble friend had called upon ministers when they talked of diversions, to specify the time, place, and mode, in which those diversions ought to have been made; but the noble secretary could neither name a moment for such an attempt, nor put his finger upon a point of land to which an expedition could have been sent, with advantage. So that this point, like the others, when it was touched, crumbled into dust. But, said the noble secretary. if we could not make diversions we should at least have made preparations. If a case did not occur, a case might occur. To this he thought it no bad answer for a statesman to say, that in fact no such case ever had occurred. He confessed, that from the first opening of the campaign, neither he nor his colleagues were sanguine in their hopes of success, and while they were endeavouring to counteract the fatal delusion, in which the country from long habits was too prone to indulge, he had
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not forgotten the pains which were taken to represent them as gloomy, spiritless, and apprehensive, because they would not condescend, by an empty shew of preparation, to court a reputation for vigour. There was only one case, in which he thought that great and ample sacrifices ought to have been made, in the event of procuring the co-operation of Austria.—But the noble lord had said, that pecuniary aid might have been afforded; that the late ministers refused even to sanction a Russian loan in this country of six millions. To this he would answer, that under the state of affairs on the continent, when facilities of raising money were required of this country, the money could not be obtained here without the guarantee of government; and, taught by the experience of a former guarantee for an Austrian loan, it behoved the late government to act with some caution before she gave another guarantee for such a sum as 6 millions, which might ultimately fall as a burthen on the people of this country. But, said the noble lord, you might have granted a subsidy of 3 millions, and you would then at least have shewn your zeal to assist Russia, and secured her good opinion, by shewing her, that you felt for her distresses. He would answer, that they were ready to subsidize, if it could have been stewn that any good to be gained by it. Noble lords said, but why did you not at least make a shew of diversion, by collecting a large fleet of transports, and a march of troops to your coasts, in order to excite alarm in the enemy and divide his attention? To this he would answer, that the enemy knew as well as we that we could not be serious in such an enterprize, which served only to delude our ally, and encourage him to continue a fruitless contest. Still, his lordship said, the country was not without resources, and could have gone very great lengths both in military and pecuniary aids, had there been a probability of such aid being in any way useful; and as to an observation made that the late ministry should have advised Russia to make peace with France, he would not transgress the point of order so recently discussed, by stating the contents of dispatches; but if the noble secretary of state would read the Russian dispatches of the last three months, he was confident he would never again come down to that house, and rebuke him on the same ground.—The noble lord next adverted to the disastrous issue of the war,

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and the final loss of Europe—a consequence which he did not hesitate to impute to a measure from which he was always strongly ,averse, and which, had not the country and the world sustained the calamitous loss of a great statesman now no more, probably might not have happened, namely, the last continental coalition of the powers of Europe in 1805, stirred up by this country to a renewal of the war against France, at a time when they were actually unprepared for such a contest. The utter defeat of Austria was one of the first fruits of that conflict, which was commenced in direct opposition to the opinion and advice of the ablest authority in the German empire, and that defeat had been followed by the complete subjugation of the continent to the power of France. He concluded by expressing his confidence, that the house and the country were now satisfied; and that he should never hear it urged again, that any thing done, or omitted to be, done, by his majesty's late ministers, had any thing to do in the causes that led to the subjugation of Europe.
Lord Mulgravereplied briefly, and contended that a successful diversion might have been effected by a timely supply of troops from this country.— The question was then put, and agreed to without a division.