HL Deb 29 July 1807 vol 9 cc998-1001

The following Protests were entered against the American Indemnity bill:

"Dissentient; 1st, Because it ought to be shewn on behalf of those whom it is proposed to indemnify for a violation of the law, not only that their act was necessary to preserve the public from injury, but that this necessity was not induced by their fault. In the case on which the house has decided, the necessity was created by his majesty's ministers themselves, who advised the dissolution of the last parliament, when the consequence must evidently be, that the trade and interest of the public would suffer material injury, or that the power of the crown must be exerted against law, and in manifest derogation of the common liberty.—2d, Because, if on the one hand, the principle of the constitution requires that the power of dissolution should reside in the crown, it is not less true, on the other, that the power of par- liament over the public purse, and the right of the two houses, exclusively to advise his majesty in the making, repealing, suspending and altering of laws, is the proper constitutional check upon this prerogative. But if it be admitted that a dissolution of parliament is in itself sufficient to justify the continuing beyond the term fixed by parliament, and by the sole authority of the crown, the operation of any legislative provision, and particularly of an act of Supply, the power of the purse, and the legislative functions of both houses, would be virtually transferred to the crown, and all the securities which the constitution has provided for the due administration of his majesty's affairs, and for the property and liberty of the whole nation, would be utterly invalidated and destroyed.—3d, Because at the time of the late dissolution all the measures recommended by government having been adopted, all the supplies granted, and no difference existing between the two houses, or between his majesty and his parliament, it is evident that there was no urgent political and public necessity which could warrant the exposing government to an alternative so serious and important as that which is the subject of the present proceeding."—CARYSFORT for the two first reaons: "And moreover, because the pretences alledged for the dissolution of parliament, viz. the dismissal of the late administration, the discussions which arose upon it, and the causes which led to it were not, in my judgement, sufficient to justify those who advised so unusual an exercise of prerogative, together with a consequent breach of the law and an acknowledged invasion of the rights of the subject.—The notion that either on the bare removal of a ministry, or in consequence of motions purporting to criminate the advisers of the crown, parliament may and ought to be dissolved, has a direct tendency to subvert the freedom of debate, to break the independent spirit of of commons house of parliament, and to render that branch of the legislature the subservient organ of the minister of the day—Nor can any just plea for an extraordinary exercise of prerogative and manifest violation of law be founded on the measures projected by the late administration in favour of Roman Catholics and other dissenters; measures always reconcileable to the true principles of wisdom and justice, and now not only imperiously called by the exigencies of the times, but absolutely necessary to the safety of the united empire. VASSALL HOLLAND ROSSLYN."

"Dissentient; 1st, Because the amendment to the preamble moved upon the report was rejected by the house.—2d, Because though a bill of Indemnity unquestionably implies that the law has been violated, and though it was admitted in debate, that nothing but necessity can possibly justify the violation of law; yet the frequency and facility with which bills of indemnity have of late years been granted, the sacred nature of the law which has in this instance been transgressed, and the circumstances which gave rise to the necessity, seemed to me to call for some more solemn declaration of the constitutional principles, which by such transgressions of the law are manifestly violated, than a simple recital of the necessity of the violation, and an immediate and unqualified indemnity for it, without reference to the events which produced that necessity, or to the peculiar nature of the illegal measure itself.—3d, Because the principles which have in this instance been violated are so sacred and fundamental in our constitution, that at all seasons and upon all occasions, even if the ground of necessity were incontrovertibly proved, it would become the dignity of the house of lords, and would be consistent with that jealous and independent spirit, which, where the privileges of the subject are concerned, should always characterize a British parliament, scrupulously and anxiously to record, in the instrument of indulgence itself, their sense of those invaluable rights; the infringement of which nothing but an over-ruling necessity had or could have induced them to overlook.—The right by which the subject is exempted from all taxes not granted by common consent of parliament, has at all times been deemed by sound constitutional lawyers, and has frequently been recognized by parliament itself, to be coeval with the frame and constitution of the kingdom, and has repeatedly and solemnly been declared and secured by charters of our princes and acts of our legislature.—By the great charter of our liberties, in the reign of king John, no aid or scutage can be levied on the kingdom without the consent of the common council of the nation. By the statutum de tallagio non concedendo*, in the reign of Edward I. First, no tallage or aid can be levied by the *34 Edw. I. stat. 4. king without consent of the archbishops, bishops, earls, barons, knights, burgesses, and freemen of the commonalty of this realm; and as in the frequent remonstrances of the parliaments of Edward III.* the jealous attachment of our ancestors to this fundamental maxim of our constitution is recorded, so in the impeachment, condemnation and punishment of the lord Latimer, which took place at the close of that reign † their determination to enforce it is strongly exemplified: and at subsequent and later periods of our history the endeavours of our forefathers were uniformly, but more particularly in the petition of rights in 1627, and in the acts of Charles II.‡ recited in the rejected preamble, directed to the solemn recognition and perpetual security of this inestimable privilege. And finally, in that solemn act of the legislature, commonly called the Bill of Rights II, the levying money without consent of parliament, and the dispensing with laws, both which practices have in this instance occurred, are declared and enacted to be illegal.—It seemed, therefore, to me no light or trivial matter, no ordinary or indifferent proceeding, to indemnify persons for the violation of such fundamental maxims of the constitution, and prudence required a solemn and studious declaration of the great delicacy and importance of the transaction, a precaution which the frequency of such bills, and the repeated, though, perhaps, unpremeditated exertions of such illegal authority of late years, have in my judgement rendered indispensably necessary.

VASSALL HOLLAND."