Lords Sitting of 12 August 1807

MILITIA TRANSFER BILL.
The order of the day being read for the third reading of this bill,
Lord Sidmouthrose chiefly with a view to re-state the opinion he had on a former occasion expressed of the tendency of this measure, and to correct a misconception of it, which some noble lords seemed to labour under. It was acknowledged by his noble friend (lord Hawkesbury), that it had lately been matter of consideration with his majesty's ministers, whether at the present crisis it were better to resort to the principle of the Army of Reserve bill, or to adopt the new one now under discussion. Much enquiry was said to have been made respecting the subject; but after mature deliberation, the opinions of the cabinet prevailed in favour of the present measure. He also had instituted enquiries into the matter; the result of which most completely decided his preference to the principle of the Army of Reserve bill. The country was now almost precisely in the same situation as that in which it was placed in 1803, when that bill was adopted. The crisis at present was perhaps more urgent, and the state of the continent less favourable; but, still, under such circumstances would he have looked to the operation of the Army of Reserve act. The beneficial effects of that act became more visible every day, and promised the fairest success; but it was thought proper to substitute a measure in its room, which at the end of 20 months did not produce more than 8000 men. The noble viscount then entered into a comparative statement of the operation of the two acts, the Army of Reserve and the Additional Force bills, which he compared with that now under discussion, and declared it to be his conviction, that there
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could not be a moment's hesitation in preferring the principle of the Army of Reserve bill. The success of the measure was at best but contingent. It would avail but little, unless peace were concluded within 5 years at farthest. With what probability such an event could be looked for, he was unable to conjecture. Now, the whole benefit to be expected from its fullest success was that it would raise 28,000 men for the line, and thus far increase our disposable force; that he confessed to be no small advantage, if it could be acquired to that extent, which, however, he doubted: but, even if it did so far succeed, still the advantage was too dearly bought by injuring an establishment of 77,000 men, or rather by unhinging or perhaps destroying that constitutional force altogether—and to answer what end? to increase our defensive force? and was not the militia a main portion of our defensive force? and would not the present bill tend to frustrate all the hopes that could reasonably be reposed in that body, an excellent body of men as it now stood? but what might it become when 28,000 of its best disciplined men were suddenly withdrawn from it? He must protest most seriously and solemnly against the adoption of such a measure.
Lord Hawkesburyacknowledged having said that it was matter of deliberation with ministers, which of the two measures they should prefer, and the present was not resolved upon without full conviction of its being preferable under all the circumstances of our situation. It was allowed by the noble viscount, that the bill might in a great measure, if not fully, accomplish its object, but that still its benefit was contingent. Granted. But what was the wish of government? Was it not to meet the pressure and diminish the evil of the present moment; and how? by increasing our defensive and disposable force. This, then, would be, in some degree, accomplished, even in the view of the noble viscount: and so far then it would succeed. But he had little or no doubt of its complete success, and then our military means would have received a very great increase indeed. For those who well understood the condition of a soldier, and of a disposable force, would readily acknowledge that by such an addition to it as that of 28,000 men, not only was our defensive force considerably increased, but also considerably strengthened, which was a distinction not to be overlooked.
The Lord Chancellordid not think that his habits authorized him to aspire to great military knowledge; but, he would, however, venture to concur with the noble viscount (Sidmouth) in giving the most ample praise in favour of the Army of Reserve act. At the time it was brought forward, that act had most certainly his concurrence, and even now he did not hesitate to say, that it was one of the most able military plans that had ever been produced in this country; but while he made that acknowledgement, he must also observe, that there was room to think otherwise of that measure at present. It was not so well adapted now to the crisis of affairs, and it should be remembered, that the effects which at first it might have produced must now be considerably altered, not only by the change of the actual circumstances of the country, but by the operation of the other different measures that had since been introduced.
Lord Mulgravethought the noble viscount had laid too much stress upon a distinction between a disposable and defensive force. No doubt, a disposable force was also a defensive one; but from every kind of defensive force, the same services, the same resources, could not, under all the circumstances that might call for these services, be reasonably expected. He however, of opinion, that at a moment like the present, there was no room to hesitate between the two plans.
Lord Sidmouthin explanation, again insisted that the principle he laid down was, that the advantages gained by the bill would be more than counterbalanced by the inconveniences that must arise.—The bill was then read a third time.