MILITIA TRANSFER BILL.

HL Deb 10 August 1807 vol 9 cc1106-51

—The order of the day being read for the second reading of this bill,

Lord Hawkesbury

observed, that it had been the wish of his majesty's ministers to have avoided, if possible, proposing any new military measure during the present session, in order that they might have had more experience of the effects of the plan proposed by a right hon. gent. in the other house (Mr. Windham), and adopted by parliament, and which it was their wish should have a fair trial. After, however, the events which had unfortunately occur red, it became incumbent upon ministers to propose some measure for increasing the military force of the country, in order still further to guard against the increased power of the enemy. He did not wish the country to believe, that, whatever had been the dangers of invasion, they were not now increased. Whilst at a former period, if the enemy failed in an attempt to invade our shores, the failure was sure to recoil upon the continent, and environ him with danger there; and when now, from the unfortunate situation of the continental powers, that expectation could not be indulged, at least only to a very limited extent, it could not be supposed that the danger of invasion had not increased. With these difficulties to encounter, ministers felt it their duty to propose to parliament an augmentation of the military force of the country. It was evident that a sufficient augmentation could not be obtained by ordinary recruiting, as that did little more than repair the annual waste of men; neither could it be obtained by any additional stimulus given by the new plan, as it appeared from the statement of the number of recruits obtained, that that number had rather diminished than increased, whilst the desertions, which it was confidently expected would be decreased, had on the contrary increased. No one, indeed, who supported that plan, had considered it as capable of producing a large increase of men immediately; but as calculated gradually to improve the army. That it was necessary to increase the regular force of the country there could be no doubt, as that must prove the substratum of the general force of the country. The militia and the volunteers were capable of rendering services to the country of great importance; and he thought the latter force had been most unwisely decried, as if it were said, that because such a force was not good for every thing, that, therefore, it was good for nothing. They on the contrary, were highly important parts of our force. It was, however, of the greatest importance to keep up and to increase the efficiency of our regular disposable force, and the most effectual mode of increasing that force was conceived by ministers to be the measure now proposed, by which 28,000 soldiers, already trained and disciplined, would be obtained by the regular army, and by which 56 second battalions, now very deficient in numbers, would be rendered efficient. He conceived this plan to be preferable to an army of reserve, in raising which a considerable period must elapse before the men could be at all fit for service. Besides, the unwise measure of remitting the fines incurred under a recent act for raising men, tended to destroy the effect of measures of this nature by discouraging activity. The noble lord then went over the different provisions of the bill, and contended in favour of the clause for allowing the men the option of enlisting for a limited or an unlimited period, that it would be highly impolitic that the terms of service of 28,000 men should all expire together; he, besides, was of opinion that the only fair principle upon which service for a limited period ought to be supported was, the giving the men an option of a similar nature. The noble lord alluded to the measures of ministers respecting the volunteers, and contended that inspecting officers were absolutely requisite to take care that the corps were maintained in a proper state of discipline, and to communicate with government upon the subject. The allowances had been also restored, the withholding of which, according to the plan of the late ministers, must have tended to the destruction of the volunteer force. He concluded by moving the second reading of the bill.

Lord Sidmouth

said, that though he concurred in many of the sentiments expressed by the noble baron (lord Hawkesbury) who had just sat down, his mind had not been brought to the same conclusion, with respect to the measures of defence fit to be adopted at the present crisis; and this difference arose, in a great degree, from the different view he had taken of the crisis itself. It was indeed evident, independently of the avowal of the noble baron, that notwithstanding the unfortunate and decisive circumstances which attended the opening of the campaign on the continent (he alluded particularly to the fall of Dantzic) there was no intention on the part of government, at the time of the meeting of parliament, to propose any measures for the augmentation of our military force. No communication to that effect was contained in the speech from the throne, nor had the subject been at all adverted to by ministers at an early period of the session; and even now, the plan, which was at length brought forward, appeared to him, he was sorry to declare, ill adapted to our actual situation, and inadequate to the nature and magnitude of the danger. It was chiefly founded upon the expediency of increasing our disposable force, and upon the supposition, that, for a considerable time at least, there was no reason to expect an attack on the coasts of Great Britain or Ireland. Imperfectly informed, as he must necessarily be, he was nevertheless decidedly of opinion, that we could not be justified in acting upon such a supposition; and that, without losing sight of the expediency of increasing our disposable force, our leading object should be to provide effectually for our domestic security. For this purpose it was necessary, not only to resort to such additional measures, as were adapted to the immediate exigency, but to carry into effect. without further loss of time, the principle of the training act of the year 1803, which had been altered, but not, as he thought, improved, by an act of last year; and likewise to found upon the principle of that act, a permanent system, without which, we could not reasonably hope to be rendered completely secure against what ought now to be considered as a permanent danger. It was evident, from what he had said, that whilst he could not agree with ministers in their view of the species and degree of preparation which the crisis demanded, he differed still more from those who were of opinion, that, even at such a moment as the present, we ought to rely entirely and exclusively on the effects of the new, and, as he readily admitted, improved conditions of military service, which had been last year adopted by parliament, but which it was then distinctly acknowledged, were not likely to be attended with rapid success. This opinion surprised him, as coming from persons, not only of great talents and authority, but from persons who had themselves been forward, at an early period of the war, in complaining of the insufficiency of our military, force, for the purpose of domestic security. At the time when this complaint was most vehemently urged, there were in arms in the United Kingdom, between 6 and 700,000 men; of which number, 182,000 were regulars and militia (92,000 of the former description), 25,000 sea fencibles, and considerably more than 400,000 volunteers. One of his majesty's principal secretaries of state (Mr. Yorke) had also brought forward measures, which were afterwards interrupted by the change of government, for adding 40,000 men to our disposable force, and he also laid upon the table of the house of commons, a classification and enrolment of 1,800,000 men; the whole, or any part of which, were liable to be trained and disciplined, and, in the event of invasion, to be required to supply vacancies in regiments of the line, or to be employed for the defence of the country, in any other manner that his majesty should direct. This force, upon which he should abstain from making any observation, was at that time called insufficient: but now, when the danger was enormously increased, by the increased dominion and power of the enemy, we were told that no extraordinary efforts were necessary, and that a new system of recruiting, wise, as he admitted, in principle, but confessedly slow in its operation, was the only resource, on which we ought to rely for the augmentation of a force, which, even previous to the late embarkations, did not exceed 168,000 men, and of which, 140,000, including 78,000 militia, would, he feared, at this time, be an exaggerated estimate. On the policy of sending a large part of our army at this moment, on a foreign expedition, he would, whilst the object of it must be supposed to be generally unknown, refrain from offering any other remark, than that, though offensive operations were undoubtedly, in some cases, the best species of defensive warfare, yet, under such circumstances as the present, it was obviously desirable, that the distance and nature of the service to which the force was to be applied, should not be such, as to render its return, within a short period of time, either hazardous or uncertain. Of the insufficiency of our domestic force at this moment, and even previous to the embarkations alluded to, he trusted that amongst their lordships there was no difference of opinion; and with a view to the safety of the country, he should rejoice to find, that they were equally convinced of the unfitness, as well as the inadequacy, of the means upon which they were now to decide. The necessity of extraordinary exertions being however assumed, the remaining question, respecting the best mode of acting, under the pressure of such a necessity, could not but be attended with great and peculiar difficulties. It was an undoubted fact, that there was no nation in the world, in which the disproportion between its population and the demands upon it for military service was so considerable, as Great Britain; and none, in which the obstacles to the supply of such a demand were so numerous and powerful. The degree of compulsion resorted to for this purpose in most other parts of the world, would be unwarrantable, under a free government, as long as the safety of the state could be otherwise provided for; and the ordinary inducements to enter into the army, are here counteracted by the strong attractions of the naval service, by the facility of procuring a comfortable subsistence in the various occupations and pursuits of civil life, and (in case of want of employment) by the certainty of provision, secured by the humane policy of our laws, and charged upon the landed property of the country. Under such circumstances, it is not to be wondered at, that ordinary inducements have been found inadequate: even the effect of high bounties has been proved to be inconsiderable: local and personal influence has indeed been more productive; and the consequences of the measures adopted last year, for shortening the necessary duration of military service, and for improving the situation and prospects of the soldier, had been such as to justify sanguine hopes of complete, though gradual success: but still he feared, that, to meet the present emergency, voluntary service ought not to be exclusively relied upon. He therefore concurred with those who were of opinion, that, for this purpose, some species of compulsion must be resorted to, and that, upon the whole, ballot was the most equitable, and least severe: on this point, therefore, his difference with ministers was not upon the principle itself, but upon the mode of applying it. The plan now before their lordships, was to encourage 28,000 men to volunteer into the line from the militia of Great Britain and Ireland, at present consisting of 78,000, and to raise by ballot 44,000, of which, 28,000 would eventually be wanted to supply vacancies: of the remaining 16,000, five were to provide against the loss of that number of ballotted men, whose period of service would expire in a few months; three to obviate the waste of three or four years, during which, ballot was to be suspended; and the remaining 8000 were to consist of an addition to the militia of Ireland: a measure which, when brought forward early in 1804 (combined with the acceptance of offers from several Irish militia regiments, to serve in Great Britain), had been strenuously opposed by persons who had themselves recommended it to Parliament in the ensuing year, and some of whom concurred in urging the adoption of it at this time. To this plan he objected on various grounds: he objected to it, because the very attempt to execute it, must necessarily be accompanied by circumstances, which even its warmest advocates could not fail to lament. Persons, whether ballotted men or substitutes, having entered into the militia, must suppose that they were not liable to be called upon to engage in any other military service: but being there, they are now to be tempted and importuned; their good and bad qualities worked upon; their spirit and loyalty piqued and flattered; their inclination to revelry and irregularity indulged and gratified; their subordination to their officers relaxed and suspended; and all this, to induce them to forego, voluntarily, as it is termed, their original conditions of service, and to enter into the line. Though this could not perhaps be justly deemed a breach of faith, it was not, he feared, strictly consistent with fair dealing! upon that account he felt a strong repugnance to it. He also objected to the measure on account of its uncertainty; for though it was probable that the men would be obtained, it was by no means clear that this would be the case; and nothing should be left to chance at such a time. But his objections to the plan were not so much founded upon the danger of its failure, as upon the consequences which were to be apprehended from its success. If effectual, it would deprive the militia, admitted to be now in the highest state of discipline, of 28,000 of its best and most active men; and with the residue, consisting of 50,000, were to be mixed and incorporated 44,000 recruits, whose ignorance and inexpertness would furnish constant employment, during a long interval, to the non-commissioned officers, and necessarily suspend the efficiency of the whole body of militia, for a considerable period of time, and under circumstances the most critical. But weighty as these considerations appeared to him to be, there were others not less important; he adverted particularly to those arising out of the situation in which this measure would place the officers of the militia; a description of persons who had strong claims to the respect and gratitude of their country. On two former, occasions they had surrendered their personal feelings to the exigency of the public service; and at those periods, when our domestic danger was far less, and when a sufficient number of troops could not otherwise be procured for foreign expeditions, then in contemplation, the militia furnished the means of carrying into effect the wishes and plans of government; but the injury to the militia service itself was immediate and lasting. In 1805, the measure of recruiting from the militia arose from other causes: in the preceding year it had been provided by Mr. Pitt's Additional Force bill, that the militia should not receive any further supply of men, till casualties had taken from it a number equal to that of the Supplementary militia; and accordingly, in the spring of 1805, when the hopes which had been entertained of a large increase of the army from the Additional Force bill were disappointed; when 500 officers had quitted the militia service; and when the number of privates was wasting unprofitably, the measure of permitting a proportion of the militia, equal to the supplementary part of it, to enter into the line, was resorted to, but, as it appeared from documents upon the table, with incomplete success. What, however, must be the feelings of officers on seeing a renewal of this measure, not under such circumstances as those which he had just described; not with a view to foreign expeditions, on which militia regiments could not be employed, but when that species of service was likely to arise, for which they were peculiarly and exclusively calculated, and with a view to which alone the militia was instituted, and could be said to exist; and when a hope might be indulged by the honourable and high-spirited individuals to whom he had adverted, that they should reap the noblest reward of their exertions and sacrifices in the peril and the glory of defending at the head of those whom they had trained and disciplined, the laws, liberties, and independence of their country? Under such circumstances, though their loyalty and patriotism would remain unshaken and unabated, their zeal, their ardour, their becoming pride as militia officers, must be checked and subdued; and if these bills should pass, the life and soul of that valuable and distinguished branch of our military system would, he feared, be extinguished for ever. These reflections were the more painful to him, as he was convinced that the consequences he had described would be unnecessarily produced; inasmuch as the object immediately in view might be accomplished by another measure, which had been sanctioned by experience and success; and to which not only no such objections, but no objections of equal validity, could be justly stated to apply. The description of force to which he adverted, was that which had been called the Army of Reserve; though, if its services were confined, as he should recommend, to Great Britain and Ireland, it might properly be denominated the militia of the United Kingdom. The success of such a measure might be deemed certain, as in the year 1803, immediately subsequent to a ballot for 90,000 men for the militia, it produced, within a month after the passing of the bill, 15,000 men; 25,000 in two months; and in four months, 37,000. It would be executed in the same mode, by the same lists, and by the same agency, as the measure of constituting the militia: the appointment of new officers was unnecessary, as the second battalions were now, or might soon be, in a state to receive the men as they were raised. It was marked by fair dealing, as it would be known beforehand that all persons serving in such corps would be encouraged to enter into the army for general service, and that, if they thought proper to do so, they would receive a bounty for that purpose. But it had been stated by the noble baron (lord Hawkesbury), that the process of training such a force would be slow, whereas the men volunteering from the militia would be already in a high state of discipline: the latter part of this proposition was an assumption without proof, and without the possibility of it: for it was not certain that the expected number would be procured at all; and it was evident that government did not rely upon procuring the full number from those now serving in the militia, as there was a clause in the bill, authorizing newly ballotted men and substitutes to enter into the line. But admitting that the whole number should volunteer, and that it should consist entirely of disciplined soldiers, the question was (and upon this issue he rested his view of the subject), whether the superior quality of men entering from time militia over an equal number in the Army of Reserve, was such as, on that account, to render it expedient to suspend during a considerable and most critical period, the efficiency of the whole body of militia, consisting of more than half of our domestic force, and to incur the risk of so wounding the feelings of honourable and high spirited men holding commissions in that service, and of creating such a distaste for it, as to shake and endanger the militia establishment itself. On this point he entertained no doubt whatever. He thought it obviously preferable to leave the militia entire and undisturbed, in its present high state of discipline, and instead of raising the men wanted at this time, by a circuitous, and, as it appeared to him, most objectionable process, to resort to a mode direct and certain, which bad been successfully tried under circumstances from which the present only differed in this respect, that the difficulty of carrying it into effect was then much greater, and the necessity of it considerably less. His lordship further stated it to be his opinion, that it would be desirable at this time to raise ten or twelve battalions upon a plan which had been successfully resorted to, upon a limited scale, in the year 1804, and which, but for the change of government, would have been carried to a greater extent. The plan to which he alluded, was that of trying the effect of personal and local influence, for the purpose of raising men for one step of rank: it differed materially from a measure adopted at an early period of the last war, as at that time almost any person might have acquired for the stipulated number of men, any military rank below that of colonel. By the measure he was now recommending, no individual would gain a step in the army, whose character was not free from imputation, and who was not of standing sufficient to allow him to obtain promotion by purchase. To this proposition he knew there were objections, but he had heard of none that appeared to him to be of sufficient weight to justify the rejection of it, under such circumstances as the present: as far as it went, it would lessen the number to be raised by ballot, which, he admitted, was a process not to be resorted to, except under the pressure of an urgent and overruling necessity.—The noble viscount then proceeded to take a detailed view of the military establishment of the country, and expressed his decided opinion, that, as lord Hawkesbury had also observed, it must unavoidably consist of diversified materials, and of different descriptions of force; and that the necessity of compulsion could only be diminished by resorting to various methods, for the purpose of drawing from a disproportionate population as much military efficiency as could be obtained, consistently with the inclinations, the habits, and occupations of the people. The regular army must unquestionably be considered as the foundation, and, as it had been called by the noble baron, the substratum of the whole: for the supply of it, great confidence might, he thought, be justly placed in the measure adopted last year, for altering the conditions of military service: the benefits of this system could only be progressive; but they were already sufficient to warrant sanguine expectations of complete success. With this opinion, he greatly lamented the introduction of a clause in the present bill, affording to the militia soldier, on entering into the regular army, the option of serving either for seven years, or for life. A small increase of bounty would probably operate irresistibly at the moment of enlistment, and induce a large proportion to accept the latter alternative: repentance would speedily follow; all the uneasiness arising from contrast would be soon, and continually, felt: discontent and desertion, he feared, would ensue, and the advantages of the system would, in other respects, be circumscribed, and materially impaired. He was apprehensive too, that this clause might be the forerunner of a similar provision in the mutiny bill of the ensuing year; and if so, a system founded on the soundest principles and the most enlarged views, must be considered as abandoned and destroyed. This would extinguish the hope, now reasonably entertained, of our being enabled, at a future period, to supply and keep up a large regular army, by no other means than those of voluntary service. But, under the most favourable circumstances, a regular army, sufficient of itself to provide for our domestic defence, as well as for the security of our foreign possessions, could not possibly be raised and maintained; and, for reasons unnecessary now to be stated, ought not, as he thought, to be desired: auxiliary means must be resorted to, without which, in the event of a landing of the enemy in considerable force, effectual resistance would be hopeless. These means were partly to be derived from the zeal and spontaneous exertions of a large proportion of the community, and from the application of a principle solemnly established by the act of 1803, of the right of the state to demand the military services of all or any members of the community, for the purposes of domestic defence. Of the first description were the Volunteers, a force which, considering its amount and the spirit which produced it, is without a parallel in the history of the world. Of the disposition of government to cherish and encourage that spirit, he had the satisfaction of being perfectly convinced; and in general he approved of the measures which had been adopted for that purpose. In the management of the volunteers, it was essential to manifest a strong and liberal sense of their value; to avoid, and to discourage, unnecessary expense; and to aim at such a degree of military discipline and proficiency as may be consistent with a due attention to their ordinary civil occupations. Of the militia (a description of force raised under compulsory authority), he would add nothing to what he had already said, than that he believed it to be impossible that they should long continue to exist upon their present footing, but that they ought to know distinctly what they were to expect in future. The extension of their services to the whole of the United Kingdom could not, as the establishment was now constituted, be reasonably expected; and, indeed, without far more consideration and indulgence than for several years past it had been judged proper, or perhaps been found practicable to show, for the personal convenience and comfort of individuals belonging to the militia, it would be fruitless to hope that a large number of ballotted men would serve, or that the regiments would be officered by a considerable proportion of noblemen and gentlemen from the counties in which they were respectively raised. He was strongly inclined to think that the connexion of the militia with the volunteers, for the purpose of forming local and provincial corps, which should remain in their different counties, except in case of actual invasion, or immediate danger of it, would, upon the whole, be the most useful purpose to which those branches of our military system could now be applied. But all the means of defence and exertion, to which he had adverted, ought to be consisidered as far from commensurate with the exigency of the present crisis, and with the permanent danger, for such we ought now to deem it, against which it was our urgent duty to provide. For these purposes, it was indispensably necessary to exercise the authority solemnly confirmed to his majesty by the legislature in 1803, of calling upon all or any of his liege subjects, not only to assist in repelling an invading enemy, but previously to submit to such a course of training and discipline as would qualify them for active service in the field. Under such circumstances as the present, our actual and prepared means of defence should know no limits, bus those of our population: and considering the inestimable value of the stake for which we are contending, we cannot be justified, in suffering our internal pre- parations to be in any degree diminished by our confidence in our insular situation, or even in the undisputed superiority of our navy. Let our force at sea be what it may, whatever may be its distribution, it is well known, that no degree of skill, vigilance, or exertion, can ensure the confinement of the enemy in their own ports, and that it is also impossible to prevent their disembarkation in considerable numbers, on various parts of the coast of the United Kingdom. It is therefore necessary, for the purpose of being perfectly secure; of being, as far as human means can render us so, invulnerable, or at least invincible, that we should meet the enemy with what he cannot bring. He must find us an armed nation. With these impressions, it was to him a matter of astonishment and deep regret, to hear that the parliamentary measures, which, it appeared, were still necessary for carrying the plan for a general training into effect, were not to be proposed till the ensuing session; and it had been said, from official authority, in another place, that no danger was to be apprehended till the spring. It was indeed evident, from the conduct, the language, and measures of ministers, that they considered and treated the danger as remote: it might be so; but to delay, upon such a supposition, the adoption of measures confessedly essential to our security, was a species of confidence, to say the least, for which he was unable to conceive any rational pretence, or suggest any possible excuse. Was it founded upon the fact, that the great body of the French army was still in Poland? Let their lordships recollect the marches of the armies of France, in the autumn of 1805 and 1806. In 1805, they reached Ulm within a month from the time of their departure from Boulogne; and shortly after, 80,000 Austrians were prisoners of war. In 1806, they not only traversed in eight weeks, the vast tract of country between the banks of the Rhine and the Maine, and those of the Vistula, but crushed in their way, one of the greatest military powers in the world. The approach of autumn, or even of winter, would afford no security: on the contrary, long nights were favourable, when the object was to elude the vigilance or pursuit of a superior fleet; and it must be recollected, that it was the depth of winter, when General Hoche anchored in Bantry Bay. Let it not however be supposed, that France is at this moment destitute of means of making a formidable attack. Independently of her native troops, of which, the march of 60,000 had been stopped, 40,000 Dutch troops are returned to the frontiers of Holland, and a Spanish army, of 25,000 men, on their route towards Poland, had halted on the borders of France. These were circumstances, which surely called for the serious and immediate attention of ministers, and imposed upon them the urgent and imperious duty of making the most of the time yet allowed for preparation. This view of our situation might perhaps be considered as too gloomy; but he assured their lordships, that he had never yet been guilty of the crime of despairing of his country: and even under the present circumstances, his anxiety chiefly arose from the sentiments which government appeared to entertain of this momentous and unexampled crisis; and particularly from his conviction of the unfitness and inadequacy of the measures now brought forward; and not from any distrust of the actual sufficiency of our means to provide effectually for our security. We must however, by foresight, by vigour, by exertion, by perseverance, maintain ourselves on the eminence upon which we are now placed, or we should soon descend to the foot of the declivity, and in that state of humiliation, greater privations and sacrifices would be necessary, to enable us to make a comparatively feeble, and probably an ineffectual struggle, for our insular independence, than are now requisite, for the protection of our wide-spread dominion, and for the support of our formidable power. No plea, no pretence, for imperfect and incompetent measures, was to be found in the disposition of the people. They had not embarrassed the plans and operations of government, nor the deliberations of parliament, by complaints of the continuance of the war, and of the burdens which it had occasioned. On the contrary, their conduct had been highly honourable to the sound sense, the manly fortitude, and ardent loyalty of the country; and he was convinced, that, at the present moment, measures of efficiency and vigour, with a view to our domestic defence, would be hailed with approbation and joy by the united voice of the whole nation.—On the present occasion, he had discharged what he considered as an indispensable duty. He had expressed sentiments, which he had long entertained, and upon which he had formerly acted. A slight difference of opinion would not induce him, upon such an occasion, and at such a period, to oppose a measure of the government: but he now did so, from a firm and conscientious conviction, that it was highly objectionable in itself, and that it impeded the adoption of other measures, far better adapted, in all respects, to our present situation, and to the permanent security of the empire.

Lord Boringdon

contended, that there was every probability of the measure being effectual to the extent of the whole number of men sought to be raised. That these men, when transferred from the militia into the regulars, would be at least equal to what they were in the militia, that they would even be equal to most regular troops, he thought could hardly be denied. The noble viscount had said, that a long time must intervene before the deficiency produced by the draughting of them from the militia could be supplied. This was, in his opinion, the very point in which the present system was most efficient, and that in which it had the most decided advantage over the measure of the noble viscount. By the noble viscount's plan, the new levies would be formed into separate corps, consisting entirely of untrained men, By that now proposed, the 28,000 newly raised recruits were to be engrafted into 100 different battalions, into which they themselves would infuse additional vigour, and from whose almost complete state of training, on the other hand, they must be brought in a comparatively short period to the use of arms. He confessed there was one part of the bill he did not like, and that was the clause by which any infringement was made on the improved mode of recruiting the regular army, introduced during the last year. He should have preferred it had the period of limited service been still adopted, raising the bounty progressively, as 7 guineas for seven years, 8 guineas for eight years, 9 guineas for nine years, &c.

Lord De Dunstanville ,

though he seldom found himself disposed to compliment the present ministers, could not refrain from giving them his thanks for any measure which went to add to the force of the country at this important crisis. To the mode, however, in which this additional force was sought to be raised, he felt himself called on to object. He would greatly prefer the measure recommended by the noble viscount; namely, the Army of Reserve. It had been tried, and found effectual. If, however, the present measure passed into a law, it should have his utmost assistance to give it effect; but at the same time it had not his approbation.

The Earl of Selkirk

rose and spoke nearly as follows:^*—My lords; Though I concur in many of the objections which have been stated to the particular provisions of the bill before us, yet I cannot consider these details as an interesting subject of discussion, when the measure is liable, in its very principles, to an objection of paramount importance—I mean, that it is totally inadequate to the exigencies of the crisis in which we are placed. The noble secretary of state who moved the bill, has opened the subject with many forcible observations on the dangers with which we are surrounded, and on the necessity which we are under, of making extraordinary exertions, in consequence of the recent great successes of the enemy. But when the noble lord proceeded to specify the exertions, which he wishes the country to make, I could not help thinking the measures which he proposed, a strange contrast to the exordium of his speech. When the noble lord, after taking such ample time to consider the subject, brings forward a proposal prefaced with such observations, we are surely led to expect, that the preparations to be made, should be in some degree commensurate with the exigency, and with the amount of the force, which we may expect to be brought against us. But, supposing that the measure now proposed were free from all the particular objections which have been urged against it—to what does it amount? All that is even proposed is, to raise 44,000 men in the course of twelve months; and that by a ballot, of which the acknowledged effect will be to impede and nearly to suspend the ordinary recruiting, by which in the same space of time at least one half of that number would be raised. The noble lord then considers an addition of 20 or 24,000 men to our regular and militia force, as a counterpoise to the increase of power, which France has obtained during the last three campaigns. With this additional number of men we are to be enabled to resist the gigantic power, which is now preparing to overwhelm us.—Good heavens! my lords, is it possible that the noble secretary can be serious in making such a proposal? or are we to believe that his majesty's ministers have never at all reflected on the nature and amount of the danger with which we are menaced? Have they forgot that we have to contend with the most formidable military power, which the world has ever seen?—that we have to contend single-handed, not ^*From the original edition printed for John Hatchard, Bookseller to Her Majesty, Piccadilly; 1807. against the power of France alone, but, I may almost say, against that of all Europe. Every resource, which the continent can afford, we may soon expect to see arrayed for the subjugation of this country; and all this immense power is in the hands of one, who is not apt to neglect his advantages. The conqueror who with such unexampled rapidity has crushed the most formidable powers on the continent—he who has humbled Russia, who has laid Austria prostrate, and has scattered the legions of the great Frederick like dust before the wind, is preparing, with still increased resources, to carry his victorious arms into England, urged on by every motive that ambition and revenge can dictate. This island is now the only bar that stands between Napoleon and the empire of the world. He knows that when England is crushed, no other power on earth will dare to give him any further molestation;—but that while England exists, he will ever have a jealous rival, a watchful and a formidable antagonist. Can we doubt, that every sinew will be stretched to accomplish the annihilation of a power, which has so repeatedly obstructed his views?—Nor is it by ambition alone that he is animated. He makes no secret of the implacable hatred he bears to this country, and the vengeance which he meditates for the repeated mortifications, which he traces to the enmity of England. Assuredly, it is now no ordinary war that we have to wage—no war of colonial contests or distant campaigns;—the blow is now aimed it our heart—our struggle is to be for the existence of Britain. It is not the humiliation of a rival that France now aims at,—it is the annihilation of a foe, that, has for ages been the rallying point of her enemies. Nothing short of total and absolute conquest can now be expected to satisfy her ambition. To others the conqueror has shown moderation, only that he might direct his efforts with more security and effect against his main enemy. To others, he has shown moderation, only that he might the better accomplish our destruction. But if England be once at his feet, as Austria and Prussia have been—never—never will she be allowed to raise her head again. Calamities severe enough have followed the conquests of France in Italy, in Swisserland, in Holland; but the fate of these countries has been mildness itself, when compared with that which is now preparing for England. In these countries, ambition and avarice were the only motives to excess—here they will be aggravated by rancorous vengeance, and national hatred, not confined to the com- manders alone, but extending to the lowest soldiers. Hitherto the French have been more or less restrained by motives of policy—but if they conquer England, they may safely give a loose to every brutal passion; and the Englishman that survives the ruin of his country, must expect to see every horror, to which rapacity and insolence can prompt a licentious soldiery, and a jealous usurper.—With such a prospect before us, from the gigantic power of the French empire,—with the task of guarding against the destruction of every thing that is dear to us, his majesty's ministers are satisfied with an increase of 20 or 30,000 men to the army. Surely, my lords, when we consider the horrors to which any deficiency in our preparations may lead, it is the duty of those who conduct the affairs or the nation, to see that at all events our means of defence should be amply sufficient. Were the chance of successful invasion but as one to a hundred, it ought not to be neglected. Where we risk every thing, we should guard against the possibility of defeat, with as much solicitude as, in cases of ordinary concern, against the strongest probability. The noble secretary of state seems to entertain doubts as to the probability of an invasion being attempted: even if these doubts were well founded, to act upon any such presumption would be an unpardonable breach of duty. Though it were ever so improbable, yet if there is the slightest possibility, that by any concurrence of chances the enemy can make good their landing, we ought to be ready to meet them. To act otherwise would be to trust our existence to chance, and to throw away the security that is in our power.—But, my lords, is the chance of invasion a mere possibility?—When we look at the vast extension of the resources of France, at the means of, recruiting her navy, which she has acquired by her continental conquests, it would be blindness not to perceive, that her naval power must soon become far more formidable than it has ever yet been. France is now in possession of the finest forests it Europe, and of countries capable of affording ample supplies of every naval store: she may command the services of all the seamen which the continent can afford, from Memel to Cadiz, and from Cadiz to Constantinople. We may look too to the certain prospect, that the whole energy of the French government will now be directed to this object: we know in fact that during all the pressure of their continental wars, the most active exertions in ship-building have never been discontinued in their naval arsenals: they have now no other object to divide their at- tention; and we may be well assured that all the ability of the ruler of France will now be turned to naval affairs. The same genius, which has created such an astonishing change in the discipline and tactics of the French army, will now be unremittingly employed in the improvement of their navy; and if we recollect that the disorganized bands, which a few years ago were flying before Suwarrow out of Italy, are now the victorious legions of Austerlitz, of Jena, and of Friedland, we shall not be disposed to underrate the change, which the same genius may effect in the navy of France.—We have therefore every reason to believe, that the naval superiority of England must ere long be exposed to a more severe contest, than any which it has recently had to maintain. Whatever confidence we may entertain in the valour and skill of our seamen, it is not the part of a prudent politician, under such circumstances, to overlook the possibility of our navy being worsted. This, my lords, is an event for which we ought to be prepared; and fortunately there is room to hope that we shall have sufficient time to prepare against it. But any one who considers well what the state of this country would be, if the French had obtained a superiority at sea, will certainly not be disposed to think, that we can begin too soon to provide against such an emergency.—But, my lords, this is not all—we have dangers more closely pressing upon us, dangers which if we are to meet, we have not a moment to lose.—An invasion is certainly no impracticable undertaking for the French, even at this moment, notwithstanding all our actual superiority at sea. The ablest and most experienced naval officers have given their opinion of the practicability of the enemy landing in force on our shores. Repeated experience has proved the impossibility of effectually blockading the ports of the enemy, notwithstanding the greatest naval superiority; and when we consider the vast range of coast that is now under their influence—a range which ere long may have no other limits than those of Europe itself, it is evident that we may be threatened at the same moment from so many different points, that it will be more difficult than ever to watch them all, and that thus the chances are greatly increased, of the enemy being able to convey an armament to the most vulnerable points of our empire. Our ablest admirals have repeatedly seen the French fleets escape from them, even when their whole vigilance was directed to the single port of Brest: But what would be the case, if armaments were ready at the same time in Cadiz, in Ferrol, in Rochefort, in Brest, in Cherbourg, in Flushing, in the Texel, in the Elbe, and perhaps even in Norway? What rational hope could be entertained that some one or other of them would not escape, and land either in England or in Ireland a force sufficient to put the existence of our empire on the hazard of the die?—But why, my lords should I speak of armaments that are yet to be prepared? Have we forgotten that the enemy have already a most formidable one in full readiness, that they have only again to fill the camp of Boulogne to give us the most serious ground of alarm^*? It may be admitted that the embarkation of an army to pass the channel, while our navy continues as superior as it now is, must be a hazardous undertaking; but we have every reason to believe that the attempt will be made in spite of every hazard. We know that our enemies are not very tender of the lives of their men; and though they were certain of the loss of one half of their army, they would not scruple on that account, it with the other half they can hope to accomplish their object. With such determination on their side, and taking into account the number of accidental circumstances which may favour their attempt, what are we to think of the blindness of those, who affect to treat this as a danger against which there is no need of guarding?—Three years ago, when the French armies occupied the camp of Boulogne, our wisest statesmen were sensible that invasion was no empty threat, and England was all alive to the danger. Yet in comparison with the present time the danger was inconsiderable. The ruler of France, it he had then made the attempt, would have staked the existence of his power on the success of the enterprise. His authority in France was ill secured; his enemies without were formidable. He had unequivocally pledged himself to lead the expedition in person; and even if he had not, ^*It has been the fashion to treat the preparations of the enemy in that quarter as a subject of derision: but some of the ablest of our naval officers have considered them in a very different light. Some details as to the nature and powers of the flotilla might here be stated, upon authority of the first eminence, and they are withheld only from prudential considerations, and from the apprehension that information might thereby be conveyd to the enemy. Were it not for this restraint, these particulars might be sufficient to convince the most sceptical of the danger of immediate invasion, perhaps in the very face of our fleet, but at least under circumstances, the occurrence of which could not be prevented by the utmost vigilance on the part of our commanders. the undertaking was too great to be delegated. An unfortunate result, though it had not been fatal to his person, would have occasioned a counter-revolution in France; and even a doubtful contest would have drawn upon him a dangerous attack from the continental powers. In the present circumstances, all these obstacles are removed. Napoleon has reaped an ample harvest of glory, and may now afford to delegate the conquest of England to some of his generals. He may take that course, without appearing to imply any doubt of its success, or any wish to avoid personal danger. The continental powers are so completely crushed, that there is no reason to apprehend any obstruction on their part; and the power of Bonaparte in France is so confirmed, that even the failure of the expedition to England would not shake it. When he has so little to apprehend from an unfortunate result, and when the effect of success will be to confirm Napoleon as the master of the world, have we not every reason to suppose that the greatest hazard will be run for such a prize?—ln those who shut their eyes against the danger of immediate invasion, there is something like absolute infatuation. Because our enemy is at a distance, and has for a while had his back turned to us, we seem to imagine, that he can never again threaten our shores. His army indeed is now on the banks of the Vistula:—But have we forgot the rapidity with which he moved from Boulogne to Vienna, and from the Rhine to Berlin? Nor are France and the adjacent provinces left so entirely destitute of troops, but that a week or two, perhaps, would be sufficient to collect again at Boulogne, such a force as might be sufficient for the invasion. Even before the next winter sets in, it is not impossible that a French army may be on English ground; and if the blow is delayed, it will only be that it may be struck with greater certainty. Under these circumstances, not only is the nation sunk in apathy; but his majesty's ministers, setting the example of blind insensibility, are not ashamed of bringing forward such a proposition as the bill before us, telling the nation that 20 or 30,000 more troops are to ensure their security.—If ever, my lords, there was an example of that infatuation which seems to be the natural forerunner of the fall of empires, is not this one? In what are we more wise than the Prussians, who, a year ago, rushed headlongon destruction, and would not believe in the possibility of defeat? They thought that the legions of the great Frederick were invincible, as we seem now to think that the channel is an impassable barrier. Will no experience teach us wisdom? and is England destined to afford another terrible example that "quos Deus vult perdere, priùs dementat?"—Let us rouse, my lords, from this, fatal security: let us trust no longer to a barrier that may be overcome. It is not to the channel that we must look for security, but to the hands of Englishmen fighting for their liberties, for the glory and the independence of their country. To put our trust in the sea, if it were not the extreme of folly, would be the extreme of cowardice. Shall the descendants of the men, who conquered at Agincourt and at Cressy, acknowledge that they cannot meet the armies of France hand to hand, and that it is only at sea that we can cope with our enemies? Away with the base idea, that England must entrench herfelt behind a miserable ditch, instead of coming out into the field! Let us look the danger in the face, and prepare for our defence, as if the cliffs of Dover touched those of Calais, or as if the fleets of France had been as victorious as her armies. Till we can hear without dismay that the flotilla of Boulogne has effected a landing on the coast of Kent; that a French army of 120,000 men are in possession of Dover, and that 20 or 30,000 more have made their way to Ireland—till we can hear all this without a well-grounded apprehension, I shall not consider the state of our defence as worthy of the name of England. The probability is, that a year may not elapse before such news will reach our ears: and when it does come upon us, what consequence can any reasonable man anticipate if our state of defence remain such as it now is, or such as it will be, with all the addition which his majesty's ministers now call for? Let any man of military knowledge, who is acquainted with the present situation and disposition of our regular and militia force, calculate the time regular would be necessary for bringing together an army capable of opposing 100,000, or even half that number, of the troops of Bonaparte, flushed with all their late astonishing successes. Let him look back to the rapid marches of these troops in the campaigns of 1805 and 1806, and let him figure to himself what their movement would probably be, were they at this hour landed on the shores of England. Let him say, whether the enemy might not be in possession of London, and of all our military depôts, before our army could even be collected? whether, advancing with his usual rapidity into the centre of the country, he might not intercept our scattered battalions before they could reach a rendezvous, or from the semblance of an army fit to oppose him—Last year, we saw Prussia over-whelmed after a short and feeble resistance: Heaven grant that England may not shortly exhibit a parallel, or a still more disgraceful spectacle! Prussia at least fought a battle before she submitted to the conqueror—England may probably be overrun, before her army is even in readiness to take the field and to face the invader; and this far-famed empire may be crushed, without our having the glory of making, one stand for the liberties we value so highly!—Great, my lords, as the dangers are, with which this country is now surrounded, nothing is farther from my mind than to say, that the contest is beyond our strength, or that the resources of this country, if well directed, are not adequate to meet all its dangers. But if that is to be done, it must be by very different measures from this that is now before us, and by exertions of which Englishmen have as yet been little accustomed to think.—In considering the means of resisting the now gigantic extent of the power of France, there is one point abundantly evident, that something more than a standing army, or any description of regular force, is absolutely necessary. I am perfectly sensible, that a strong regular army must be the basis of our defence; that every other description of force can only serve as accessories; that, without a large army, nothing can be done by volunteers, or any similar local force, or by any exertion of the zeal and courage of the civil population of the kingdom. On the other hand, my lords, it is equally clear, that if we trust to our regular army alone, if we cannot find means of giving effectual support to our army by some species of accessory force, we, must be overwhelmed: it is physically impossible for us to raise a regular army strong enough, to meet that which may be brought against us.—It has been justly observed, that our army is already so numerous, as to form a greater drain on the population of this kingdom, than that of any other country in Europe has to supply. There is no other country, in which so great a number of men, in proportion to the total population, are employed in the military service of the state, In this calculation, the militia, and the seamen in his majesty's navy, must be taken into the account, as much as the troops of the line: for they are equally withdrawn from the pursuits of industry, in which they would otherwise be engaged. Thus, independently of foreigners, the total number of our own people, who have no other business but to defend the British empire and its dependen- cies, amounts to about 375,000, which is not less than one fortieth of our whole population. In several of the petty German principalities, where the princes were the most oppressively severe in their demands of military service from their subjects, it was found impossible to carry the numbers of their troops to a higher proportion than one sixtieth of the population, and few of the greater powers in Germany have ventured even this length. It has been argued from this fact, that we are already arrived at the utmost limit, to which the numbers of our regular force can be carried, and that no improvement in the system of recruiting, or in the condition of the soldiery, will enable us to make any very great addition to our army. The idea certainly has some plausibility; but whether it be correct or not, this at least is clear, that there must be some limit to the numbers of our regular forces—that there is some proportion to the population, beyond which no country can extend its army; and we have no reason to suppose that we can afford a greater proportion of our population, than our enemies can of theirs.—It is therefore quite impossible that the British islands, with a population of about 15 millions, can maintain a standing army equal to that, which may be drawn from the countries under the control of the French emperor, peopled with 50 or 60 millions: and the disproportion of numbers is too great to be counterbalanced by any superiority of personal prowess. If, therefore, we were reduced to the necessity of maintaining the contest against France by our regular armies alone, no hope could be entertained that we should ultimately prevail; and our subjugation would be inevitable. Happily, however, for the liberties of mankind, there is a natural and a material difference between the case of a nation which has to defend its own independence, and that of a nation engaged in offensive warfare. An invading power can act only by its regular armies; but the nation that is invaded may bring the great mass of its population to support its army. The bulk of the people, who are engaged in the pursuits of peaceful industry, can give no assistance in attacking a neighbouring country, but may be of great use in the defence of their own. To the employment of this great resource, France herself owed the preservation of her independence, from the dangers with which it was threatened in the early periods of the revolution. It was by the levée en masse, that the united Austrian and Prussian armies were repulsed; and it is only, by similar means that we can now hope to save our country from still more imminen[...]t perils.—Here, my lords, I shall no doubt be told, that our government does not mean to trust to the standing army alone. The noble secretary of state has spoken of the necessity of a varied force, and has hinted at improvements which he has in view in the system of the volunteers.—I could have wished, my lords, that if such ameliorations are in contemplation, they had been brought forward for the immediate consideration of parliament, instead of being put off for months, as if it were a matter in which delay can produce no inconvenience. In my view of our situation, never was there a time when we could less afford delay. Whatever measures are to be adopted for our defence, there is not a month, not a week, to be lost in applying them to practice. A delay of no long period may be fatal.—Without waiting, however, till the noble lord may explain what his views are, I feel confident in asserting, that it is impossible to devise any plan, by which the volunteers can be rendered a defensive force adequate to the present crisis. I am far, my lords, from feeling the least disposition to undervalue the merits of a body of men, who have made the noblest and most patriotic sacrifices; but the system of their institution is liable to fundamental objections, which no exertions on their part can ever overcome. I have seen too much of the patriotic zeal of the volunteers not to honour the spirit which animates them, and not to trust that, when the hour of peril comes, they will meet it with all that determination, which an enthusiastic attachment to the cause of their country's freedom can inspire.—I am sensible too, that the volunteer establishment, even if it were to be broken up immediately, has already done important services to the country. It has diffused a military spirit, and no inconsiderable portion of military knowledge, throughout the nation. It has infused into the people a confidence in our own resources; and, above all, it has removed every clog to the full employment of these resources, by extinguishing totally, and I trust for ever, those, jealousies which formerly prevailed between the government and the people, in regard to military force. Formerly there was an excessive diffidence on the part of government, to put arms into the hands of any but the standing army; while, on the other hand, a corresponding jealousy subsisted in the people and in parliament, against intrusting the crown with a considerable standing army. While this spirit mutually prevailed, the exertions of the country were cramped. There was no m[...]ore in which our military resources could be called forth, that was not, on one side or the other, an object of jealousy. This spirit is now at an end, and it is the volunteer establishment that has annihilated it. At the commencement of the present war, the government, with a magnanimous confidence in the spirit and loyalty of the people, threw itself upon their spontaneous efforts for support, and put arms into the hands of 4 or 500,000 volunteers. This act of confidence was met by a reciprocal confidence on the part of the people. Indeed it could not be otherwise. How could the people entertain any suspicion of a design against their liberties on the part of a government, which did exactly what a treacherous and designing ruler would be most afraid of doing? How could they fear that the army would be turned against their liberties, by those men who gave them the arms by which every such attack might be repelled? This great measure was not only a mark of confidence on the part of government, but an unequivocal earnest of the rectitude of their intentions; and as such it has been received by the country. We hear no more of scruple about granting to the crown the most numerous armies that can be raised. The only question now is, how their numbers can be most effectually augmented; and were any member of parliament now to repeat the declamations against standing armies, that were formerly so popular, what would he meet with but ridicule? The result then of this magnificent experiment has been, not only to prove the perfect safety with which the people may be trusted with arms, but to establish a degree of mutual confidence between the crown and the people heretofore unknown, and to fix it on an immoveable basis. If the volunteer establishment had done no other service to England than this, I should think the ministers, who had accomplished so noble a work, entitled to the lasting gratitude of their country.—But, my lords, while I pay a just tribute of praise, both to the individual merit of the volunteers, and to the utility that has been derived from the institution, I cannot shut my eyes on the intrinsic difficulties, which stand in the way of every attempt to form on this basis an efficient defensive force; and, at a moment like this, when every exertion of which this nation is capable, will not be more than adequate to the crisis in which we are involved, I should think it a very ill judged compliment, to persist in expecting from the volunteers, a species of service for which they are not formed, and to neglect the means that are in our power, of drawing from the mass of the people a more efficient species of defensive force.—It is admitted on all hands, that the discipline as well as the numbers of the volunteers has experienced a material decline. On this I should not be disposed to insist much, if it were merely an accidental circumstance; for I am well convinced, that when the necessity of renewed exertions becomes manifest, the energy of the volunteers may be revived in proportion to the apparent exigency of the crisis.—But, my lords, it would be deceiving ourselves, to consider this decline of the volunteers as an accidental circumstance: it has arisen from the very nature of the institution. A system, the efficiency of which rests so entirely on individual exertion, cannot be permanent and steady in its effects. At the period when the volunteer establishment was formed, the loyalty and patriotic spirit of the people had been roused to the highest pitch of enthusiasm. The apparent danger of the country called forth unprecedented exertions of spontaneous zeal; but as the exigency became less apparent, these exertions naturally relaxed. Even before there was any evident change in the situation of public affairs, the energy of this spirit had begun to decline. Such vehement efforts of enthusiasm could not be of long continuance: the public mind had been on the stretch, and naturally sunk back into a state of languor. To this is to be added, that military exercises were, to many of the volunteers, so great a contrast to their ordinary occupations, as to be a recreation while the attraction of novelty continued: but when that zest was lost, it has been found in general very difficult to preserve their attention unimpaired. From this cause, men of experience have observed, that the state of discipline in the volunteer corps, has in many cases followed an opposite rule, from that which is found to obtain among regular troops; among regular regiments, the oldest is generally supposed to be the best corps; among volunteers, it is more frequently the newest.—This instability must be expected in every institution, the efficiency of which rests on the efforts of voluntary zeal; and even if we could reckon with certainty on the revival of an enthusiastic spirit, upon every occasion of danger, that would not be enough. The danger of the country may often be seriously great, when it is not apparent to vulgar eyes. In the present circumstances of Europe, our danger may be considered as permanent; for, even if peace should be concluded, we must look to the probability that our enemy will renew the attack, if ever he can take us unawares. In these circumstances, our defensive preparations cannot be safely trusted to the desultory efforts of spontaneous zeal: they ought to be arranged on a permanent system, that shall never relax in its energy, and that wall keep our defensive force in a constant state of efficiency, in peace not-less than in war.—For this reason, were there no other, the volunteer system must-be considered as inadequate to the present necessities of the country; and it seems to be admitted, even by the warmest advocates of the volunteers, that there is a necessity of devising some establishment of a more permanent nature to replace them. In considering what that establishment ought to be, it becomes us to profit by the experience which has been already obtained; and that we may steer clear of the errors which have obstructed the utility of the volunteers, it is necessary to examine into the inconveniences, which have actually been observed in that system.—In the first place, the privilege of each individual to quit his corps, though essential to the idea of a volunteer force, is a material obstruction to the perfection of its discipline. The slender tenure open which the officers hold their authority, compels them to humour every caprice of the men under their command: and though a corps, composed of men of education, sensible of the importance of the object for which they are associated, may be induced to pay that zealous attention, which will enable them to acquire a considerable proficiency in military evolutions; yet it is scarcely possible that the common run of men, place under so precarious an authority, can acquire that steady habit of ready and implicit obedience, which is the most important and perhaps the most difficult lesson, that a soldier has to learn.—Secondly, from the composition of the volunteer corps in general, they are of less efficiency and at the same time of more inconvenience to the business of the country, than corps differently composed might be rendered. Many of the volunteers though not beyond the age proper for military service, are yet so far advanced in life, as neither to have the same facility acquiring new habits, nor to be capable of going through the fatigues and hardships of real service with as little personal suffering as men in the prime of youth. From circumstances too in the original formation of the volunteer establishment, the greatest proportion of the men are above the lower class. To serve in a volunteer corps, requires in most instances a pecuniary sacrifice, sufficient to deter the most numerous class of the people, while, on the other hand, many incidental motives have contributed to induce men in the middle classes of society to enter very generally into this service. In conse- quence of this, the men who are to be employed in repelling the enemy, are in a very great proportion heads of families, or persons whose superintendance is essential, for the management of various agricultural, manufacturing, and commercial establishments, of more or less extensive scale. These men I have no doubt would fight with spirit, if they were led at once to meet the enemy; but if their absence from home should be protracted for a long period, the interruption of their domestic concerns might be of material inconvenience. From this cause it is a matter of great and almost insuperable difficulty to bring together a large body of volunteers, or to keep them embodied for any great length of time. The operations of the enemy may, however, render it indispensable to require this sacrifice from the persons who compose our defensive force. Previously to their grand attempt, the enemy may harass us by frequent false alarms. The volunteers may thus be fatigued by long-continued preparations, or may be disgusted by the frequent recurrence of a summons to the field, repeatedly terminating to no apparent purpose; and, under the impressions to which this may lead, they may perhaps be remiss in their exertions at the moment of the serious attack. This disadvantage would be in a great measure avoided, if the persons who compose our defensive force were of a different description. A young journeyman, or farm-servant, might certainly be spared from his occupation and his home with infinitely less inconvenience than his master; and he would probably fight as well, and stand the fatigues of service much better. There is another important consideration, which leads to the same conclusion. Since lives must be lost in the defence of the country, either the risk ought to tall equally on all; or, if any difference is to be made, those ought to be exempted from the post of danger, whose lives are of most consequence to the good of society. In the volunteer system, the very opposite to this rule takes place: those who are selected to be exposed to the weapons of the enemy, are chiefly men of the middle classes of society, upon most of whom there are many other individuals dependent for their maintenance and their welfare. By any great slaughter among men of this description, the œconomy of society would be deranged, infinitely more than in proportion to the mere numerical amount of lives lost. Such a loss upon a class of men, the peculiar pride and distinguishing feature of our country, would be a national calamity not easily to be repaired; and in this view the employment of a military force, composed as the volunteers in general are, must be considered as a species of profusion, for which no pecuniary advantage can sufficiently [...]compensate. Lastly, it does not seem equitable that those who are, from their age and circumstances, the most suitable persons to defend the country, should be exempted from this duty, merely because they are not so well disposed as others, who are perhaps by nature less qualified. Still more must it be reckoned unfair, that the pecuniary burthen of the defence of the country should be made to bear harder on the loyal and zealous, than on those who are otherwise. In the establishment of the volunteer corps, a preference was shown, from very natural motives, of public œconomy, to those corps which agreed to serve on terms apparently the least burthen-some to the public revenue. It cannot however be overlooked, that any advantage which could thus be gained to the revenue, could only arise from the individual volunteers taking upon themselves a greater share of the actual expense of their own establishment. The burthen, to which many of them have thus subjected themselves, is of very serious amount, and is evidently a real and effective tax, not less than if it were collected from them, and paid out again from the exchequer, and this tax is levied exclusively from the liberal and the zealous. It must surely appear more consistent with justice, that the whole expense of the defence of the kingdom should be paid by the public at large, and raised from every man according to his pecuniary means; and also that the personal service required should be fixed by law,—that a general rule should point out the description of persons on whom this duty ought to fall, and impose it on them without partiality. For all these reasons, my lords, I think the volunteer system is inferior in equity as well as in efficiency, to the system of training the people at large, first laid down by the act of 1803, commonly called the Levy en Masse Act. That act, though its principles are in my opinion unquestionably just and important, has unfortunately not been carried into execution, and was replaced last year by a new training bill, differing from it in no essential point, and in scarcely any that can be deemed an improvement. Both acts, however, distinctly lay down and proceed upon the great and important principle, that military, service for the internal defence of the kingdom is a general duty on all the subjects of the crown—that it is the right of the state to call for that service, in any way that may be deemed most proper and expedient.— The rules for apportioning this service among the people, appear to me to be founded in juster principles in the act of 1803, than in that of last year. A classification is made of the male population of the kingdom, within the ages of military duty, according to the age and domestic circumstances of each individual; and it is the clear intention of the act that the youngest of the men who are come to the age of maturity, and those who are least incumbered with families, ought to be the first called on for military service. The evident propriety of this principle is such as to need no commentary; but in the application of this principle I would incline to deviate in a small degree, from the provisions of the act to which I have alluded. By this act, the first class is to include all unmarried men between the ages of seventeen and thirty. The age of seventeen is perhaps too young:—that of eighteen is low enough to be taken as the standard of manhood: and I should think the first class sufficiently extensive, if it included all from that age to twenty-four or five. Within these limits it does not appear necessary to make any distinction of married or unmarried. The number of married men of this age will not be very numerous: and there is no probability that they should have such numerous families, as to call for any relaxation in their favour. Those who have paid a due attention to the valuable speculations of Mr. Malthus, certainly will not think it a politic measure to make any distinction, that might operate as a temptation to premature marriages among the common people; and, since we must consider the measures now to be adopted as of permanent continuance, these remote effects are not to be overlooked. At all events, the number of married persons of this age cannot be so considerable as to occasion much inconvenience, even though it were necessary to adopt some means of providing for their families at the public expense; and this would be preferable to the allowance of an exemption, which might have the effect of deranging the whole system.—Calculating upon this principle, from approved tables of the ordinary duration of human life, the population of Great Britain would afford nearly 600,000 men between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five; and from the returns made under the Levy en Masse Act, there is ground to believe that, after deducting sea-faring men and all others exempted by that act, there will remain liable to military duty upwards of 500,000 men within the description of the first class here laid down. This number, my lords, I am inclined to consider as sufficient for the object in view; and on this account it appears to be unnecessary to extend the first class any further. Perhaps, however, it would be advisable to form the men between the ages of twenty-five and thirty into a second class, or body of reserve, to be resorted to in cases of extreme urgency.—The most important question, however, relates to the measures to be adopted for giving these men a sufficient degree of training. It is certainly of more importance, to give a complete training to a moderate proportion of the people, than to extend over the whole that slight degree of instruction, which will not render them capable of the service that may be required from them. The men who are to be trained ought, in my opinion, to be rendered complete soldiers; and I think it a very ill-judged œconomy not to give them a sufficient allowance of time for becoming so. The provisions both of the Levy en Masse act, and of the Training Bill of last year, are in this respect equally objectionable. The duty required is limited in both of them within such narrow bounds, that it is scarcely possible to expect from it any real practical utility. The men are not to be called out more than twenty-four days in the year, and even these can only be reckoned half days, as the men have to go and return from their homes. The limitation too, provided by the Training Bill, that the men are not to be called to a greater distance than five miles from their homes, will, in most instances, effectually prevent the assemblage of any considerable body of men together, without which, the exercise in petty platoons will be of very little use in preparing men for real service.—The anxiety of the framers of these bills, not to interfere with the ordinary avocations of the people, in the attempt to give them military instruction, appears to have been carried to excess, and has led them to adopt regulations calculated totally to defeat the principal object they had in view. A training so very slight and desultory, as that which is provided for, would, in all probability, prove entirely useless; the whole expence would be thrown away; and all the inconvenience arising from the interruption of labour, would be to no purpose. Thus, by an over-anxiety to economize the time of the people, an absolute waste is occa- sioned. In fact, something like this is ever the result of an attempt to reconcile objects that are incompatible. To train men to military discipline without interfering with their civil avocations, is an absolute impossibility. If men are to act as soldiers, a portion of their time must be devoted to the object of learning the duty of soldiers;—for a certain length of time they must be separated from their families, and cease to be any thing but soldiers. The truth of this principle is fully evinced by the experience of the volunteers. The testimony of every volunteer officer, who has paid attention to the improvement of his corps, is uniform upon this point, that the greatest number of days, devoted to drilling in an unconnected and desultory manner, has never enabled them to make the same progress, that has been obtained in a very small space of time, when the men were assembled in quarters at a distance from their homes, and kept on permanent duty under military law.—In making arrangements, therefore, for training the people to arms, we must reckon upon a considerable sacrifice of their time as absolutely unavoidable. No unnecessary sacrifice ought to be required; but, on the other hand, we ought not to hesitate to make the sacrifice to the full extent that is necessary for the complete attainment of the object. We have then to enquire, what length of time devoted to military discipline may be considered as sufficient, to form new recruits into good soldiers. This is a question on which professional men only can pretend to judge; but on the authority of officers of eminence I am led to believe, that three or four months, when well employed, may in general be found sufficient. An advantage will certainly be found, in this respect, from the description of men who are proposed to be trained. Young men below twenty-five are at a period of life when new habits are easily adopted, and when impressions readily become permanent. Men of this age will probably become good soldiers in a much shorter time, than men of a more advanced age, and will also retain more permanently what they learn. When they have once thoroughly attained the habits of military discipline, a very little practice will be sufficient to keep up these habits even to a late period of life.—Upon these principles, my lords, I would propose to arrange the details of the measure. There should be formed in each county a corps, to consist of all the young men from the age of eigh- teen to twenty-five. They should be fully officered, and regularly organized as a local militia, but should remain peculiarly under the superintendance of the lieutenantcy, not to be called out of their respective counties, except in cases of emergency. The young men, who have recently entered into this militia, and are in the first year of their service, should be considered as forming a separate class, to be kept embodied for at least three months, and during this time assiduously employed in military exercises. Those who have gone through their first year, and have attained the requisite degree of proficiency, would not require more than a few weeks practice in the course of each of the succeeding years of their service, to keep up the habits of discipline, and ought not to be called out on duty for any longer period than is necessary for this purpose. The most advantageous arrangement would be, that for a few weeks in every summer the whole of this local militia should be assembled in suitable encampments. Being thus collected in considerable numbers, they could the better practise those exercises, which have the nearest resemblance to the operations of real service against the enemy. All officers are agreed as to the importance of collecting men in large bodies for exercises of this kind; and to obtain this benefit in a higher degree, it would be proper that during this general assemblage of the local militia, those of two or three adjacent counties should join in the same encampment, and carry on their exercises in one body.—Immediately after the breaking up of this general assemblage, the annual enrolment should be made of the young men who, in the course of the preceding year, have attained the age of service. Instead of collecting all of them at once, it would be preferable, that they should be classed into different divisions, to join their corps in rotation. By this means the labour of training them would be less burthensome, and smaller number of officers would be sufficient for the task. By this means, also, a certain proportion of the local militia of each county would always be embodied. [...]Corresponding to this proportion, there should be, in each county, a permanent establishment of officers, drawn from the regular army, and acquainted with real service, whose duty it would be, not only to direct the training of the men, but to instruct the younger officers. The superior officers of the local militias ought to be selected, like the officers of our present militia, from among the principal landed proprietors of the county. Of the subaltern ranks, a considerable proportion would naturally be composed of the young men of superior station, who are enrolled in the local militia, as falling within the ages of service. Young men destined for a military life could not perhaps have a better school, than to be thus employed for a few years, under the superintendance of men of experience, in training a continual succession of recruits to military exercises.—According to the arrangement which has been proposed, there can be little doubt that these corps of local militia would be rendered completely effective, and little inferior even to regular troops which have not actually seen service. This would be done, too, with as little interruption to the ordinary avocations of the people, as could perhaps be reconciled with the effectual accomplishment of the essential object. In the beginning, indeed, a great and extraordinary effort would be necessary: but after the proposed measures had been brought into a regular train, the burthen of duty would be very light on all except the young men of eighteen or nineteen, who are in the first year of their training. There is no other description of men whose absence from their homes and their ordinary occupations would so little interfere with the business of the country. The men of this description may be calculated at between 90 and 100,000 over the whole of Great Britain; and if they join their respective corps according to a plan of rotation, each for three months, there would only be one fourth of these constantly embodied, i. e. never above 25,000 men at one time; and the interruption to the ordinary business of the country would not be greater, than would be occasioned by an addition of this amount to the regular army. To this are to be added the few weeks during which the whole of the local militia would be assembled. If this should be reckoned at three weeks, the individuals subject to this service, would not be called upon for a greater sacrifice of their time than many of the volunteers submit to,—all of them, indeed, who are in any degree fit for real duty; so that this plan cannot be considered as a greater burthen on the country, than an establishment of an equal number of volunteers. It would indeed be less burthensome; for the volunteer corps are in great part composed of men, the real value of whose time is far greater than that of the young men, of whom it is proposed to form this local militia^*.—An exception must no doubt be admitted, for the first moments of this establishment, when a great and extraordinary effort will be necessary, for bringing our state of preparation up to what it would have been, if this system had been sooner adopted. If it had already gone on for some years, all the young men from the age of nineteen to that of twenty-five would now be in a state of full preparation, having entered the local militia at eighteen, and having undergone a thorough training during the first year of their service. As matters actually stand, however, there is a great arrear to be cleared off; and to make up for the tardiness which we have shown in resorting to the system, we have no choice but to take immediate measures for training all the young men below the age of twenty-five—a great and a burthensome effort, no doubt, but one which the exigency of the crisis imperiously demands.—When the system which has been proposed, is compared with that of the volunteers, no doubt can be entertained that its efficiency must be incomparably greater. The men within the ages that have been stated, cannot be reckoned at less than 500,000; and to this extent we should at all times have a force ready at an hour's warning to march against the enemy; a force regularly and systematically disciplined, and on which a commander might fully rely; a force composed of men in the full vigour of life, and animated with all the ardour which characterizes the prime of youthful manhood. With such a force to back our regular army, we might bid defiance to all our enemies. A local militia, constituted in the efficient manner that has been proposed, would certainly be alone sufficient for the defence of all those parts of the coast that are not peculiarly exposed, and where the principal descent of the enemy is not to be expected, The whole of the troops of the line, and of the regular or old established militia, might then be concentrated in one powerful army, in a position calculated to meet the main invasion. If the enemy should succeed in landing an army of such force, as to be an overmatch for that which is thus prepared to receive him in the first ^*According to the plan which has been here sketched, the expense incurred to the public would not be very widely different from that of the volunteers, when their establishment was at its height. instance, the skill of our commanders would be tried, in avoiding a general action as long as possible. Our army retiring from one strong position to another, towards the interior of the country, would be continually approaching to their re-inforcements, and the local militia pouring in from all sides, would soon form such an addition of force, as to be capable of overwhelming the most powerful army, that the invader would choose to risk in the undertaking. In the course of these operations, indeed, some part of our country would unavoidably be left exposed to the ravages of the enemy, but it is not likely that we should be under the necessity of abandoning the metropolis; for the metropolis itself would furnish so large a re-inforcement, as might, in all probability, decide the fate of the campaign.—The measures that have been suggested, would thus be of great importance in enabling us to meet the immediate exigency, which now presses upon us. But this is only a part of the benefit to be expected from them. Were they established as a permanent system, our means of defence would go on, in a continual progress of improvement. Every year a new crop, it I may use the expression, of nearly 100,000 youths would enter the local militia to begin the acquisition of military discipline; every year a corresponding proportion would quit this militia, but would carry with them habits firmly fixed in that period of life when lasting impressions are most easily made. Every year, therefore, a greater and a greater proportion of our people would be ready to take up arms in defence of their country; and if the dangers of our situation should continue to increase, so that even a force of 500,000 well-disciplined men in aid of our regular army should appear insufficient for our security, the second class of local militia would soon be composed of men who had been thoroughly trained in the first class, and who would still be perfectly capable of doing the duty of soldiers. In process of time, the whole people will have gone through a course of discipline; we shall become, like our enemies, a nation of soldiers; and then England will assuredly be, invincible.—There is no reason for apprehending that this institution will ever relax in its efficacy. Established on a systematic plan, the training of the local militia must go on in peace as well as in war. If there be any probability that peace can be obtained, on terms which this country can accept without disgrace, we must assuredly look upon it as a hollow and insecure peace, as a mere truce which the enemy will be ready to break, whenever he can see an opportunity of taking us unawares. But, with the institution that has been sketched, we never can be unprepared to meet an invader. Whether therefore we look to the continuance of war, or whether we may hope for peace, it is of equal importance that we should establish our defence on a system of this kind; a system of permanent efficacy, commensurate with the prospects that are before us, of a long period of unabated danger.—It is not perhaps the least of the recommendations of this proposal, that it will render it possible for us to make peace with a prospect of security. If a peace should be made, we have no reason to suppose that our enemy will abandon his views of conquest, or relinquish his naval preparations. His means of making a successful invasion will be continually on the increase; and an interval of peace will only enable him to augment his naval force with the greater rapidity. On this account many persons, who on general principles are sincere friends of peace, are now advocates for the continuance of war, as being, under our present circumstances, absolutely necessary for our immediate safety. If however we adopt the system which has been proposed, our means of meeting invasion will also be on the increase; and whatever addition our enemy may be able to make, during an interval of peace, to his naval power and his means of attack, we shall be able fully to keep pace with him in the improvement of our means of defence by land. Being thus under no danger of losing in our relative strength during an interval of peace, or of being obliged to renew the war under circumstances of greater disadvantage, in the comparative state of our own force and that of our enemies, the obstacles which now stand in the way of peace, will be in a great measure removed. We may then conclude a peace, with the prospect of undiminished security, and therefore with a prospect of permanence. Perhaps, indeed, if such a system as that now proposed, had been established ten years ago, Europe might have been spared the whole of the present war, and all its disastrous consequences. Our rupture with France might have been avoided, if our internal situation had been such, as both to deter the enemy from hostile designs, and to enable our own government to entertain a confidence in our means of defence. Soon after the rupture it was emphatically observed, that we were at war because we could not be at peace. But if our means of defence in the year 1803 had been such as the system now proposed might soon establish, we should not have been under the necessity [...]of resorting to measures of hostility, with a view to our immediate security; neither would the enemy have been disposed to give the provocations which he did, to a power in a contest with which, he could have entertained but little hope of any great or signal success.—When I compare the system which I have now ventured to propose, either in its immediate or its more remote effects, with the measure which has been brought forward by his majesty's ministers, I can scarcely imagine non there can be a doubt in deciding between them, or how your lordships can be satisfied, in such a crisis as the present, with a mere temporary expedient for making a small addition to our regular force: nor is it easy to comprehend on what principle his majesty's ministers can hesitate to adept [...]this or some other plan of equal efficacy, if it be not that they dread the unpopularity of calling upon the people for severe and burthensome sacrifices. If this idea has really been entertained, I am persuaded it is a mistaken one. The people of this country are not so dead to every feeling of patriotism, they are not so insensible to the value of what they have to lose, as to be unwilling to make the sacrifices that are necessary for preserving the name and the privileges of Englishmen, provided they are made distinctly to perceive the necessity, and are fully persuaded that the sacrifices they are to wake will secure their object. On this ground I am persuaded they will acquiesce with more cheerfulness, in such measures as those I have now suggested, than in those which his majesty's ministers call for.—The ballot for which we are desired to vote, lays upon the people an oppressive, because an unequal, burthen, without affording any reasonable probability that our liberties are thereby to be preserved. The ballot, under the name of a demand for military service, we all know to be in effect nothing more than a mode of compelling individuals to pay for substitutes: these substitutes differ in nothing from the recruits who enter the army by voluntary enlistment, except that in the one case the bounty is paid out of the general revenues of the state, in the other the payment is imposed on individuals, without any regard to their ability to pay: the ballot is thus nothing more than a tax, the most objectionable in principle that can be imagined—a mere poll-tax, the most unequal and oppressive form in which money can be levied. When this burthen is laid upon the people to make a trifling addition to our regular force, such an addition as will scarcely diminish in a perceptible degree the perils of our situation, can it be supposed that the people will submit to it with the same alacrity, as they would to an effective demand of real military service, imposed according to an equal and impartial rule, on those to whom it will be least burthensome, and the operation of which must be to put an end to all anxiety respecting the security of the kingdom?—But in truth, my lords, I cannot bring myself to believe that in such a crisis as the present, his majesty's ministers can be actuated by such a despicable motive as the fear of unpopularity—that their anxiety for the preservation of their places can go so far, as to make them overlook the danger to which they expose themselves, as well as their king and their country. The situation of things is now such, that there is no possibility of saving the nation, without resorting, in one form or another, to burthensome and severe measures. It would be mere state quackery to delude the people with any different expectation. The time is past when a minister might have indulged a tenderness for the comforts and the convenience of the people. We have now to make our measures effectual,—to that consideration must every other bend; and of those who complain of hardship there is but one question to be asked, whether the hardships imposed on them are worse than the rigours of French despotism?—Perhaps, however, it may be alleged, that I am now proposing a superfluous and unnecessary degree of preparation. But this, my lords, I cannot admit. When we consider the immense military resources that may be brought to bear against us, when we consider the number of points from which we may be assailed, and the extent of coast which we must be prepared to guard; above all, when we consider the hazard in which the whole empire is involved, from the prevalence of disaffection in Ireland, the force that would be gained by the adoption of the measures I have now suggested, cannot be deemed extravagantly great for meeting the exigencies to which we may ere long be reduced. But were it otherwise, it is right that our preparations should be superabundant: if the least shadow of doubt can remain as to their sufficiency, they are not what they ought to be. Even on principles or œconomy, our defensive force ought to be ample and superabundant. Granting that a more scanty plan of preparation should ultimately prove sufficient, and that the invader should in the end be repulsed; yet if this is to be done after a severe contest on English ground, our country would suffer from the desolation of a protracted warfare, far greater losses than would be sufficient to balance the utmost inconvenience, that could possibly be apprehended from preparations unnecessarily great. By providing ample means of defence, we have the best chance of deterring our enemy from the attempt at invasion, and thus saving our country from the ravages of war, or at least of shortening their duration by insuring the speedy overthrow of the invader. But can any one reflect for a moment upon the countless horrors that would ensue if our means of defence should prove inadequate, can any one reflect that it is for the liberties, for the very existence of England that we are to fight,—and be content with scanty preparations? Who is there that can imagine without horror, our aged and beloved monarch weltering in his blood,—his place occupied by a heptarchy of French usurpers, the minions of the conqueror,—the family of our sovereigns, along with the sad remains of, all that is now eminent and dignified in England, wandering as exiles in foreign lands, while the mansions of our nobility are parcelled out to French generals, and every thing that is desirable in England becomes the prey of a Frenchman,—all the comforts which industry and œconomy have accumulated around the dwellings of our yeomanry, our tradesmen, and our manufacturers, scattered to the winds, the pillage of a licentious soldiery,—all the civil and religious institutions, that have hitherto been the boast of Britain, trampled under foot,—our people left to groan under the oppression and contumely of insolent and domineering strangers, forced to submit to every wrong and to every insult, with the sad reflection, that they have no longer the protection of English law, of an English magistracy, or an English jury^*? All this, my lords, This is but a faint and feeble sketch of the and yet more than this, we have to guard against; and shall we then consider the inconvenience, of making preparations rather greater than absolutely necessary, as deserving of a moment's thought?—By the adoption of the measures which I have detailed, our situation may be rendered perfectly secure; and if our activity and resolution be commensurate with the exigency of the crisis, a very few months may be sufficient to bring our preparations to maturity. With such a local militia, as I have suggested, to back the efforts of our regular force, I should consider our army as already sufficiently numerous; or at least there would be no necessity, of resorting to a measure so objectionable as the ballot, for obtaining an immediate augmentation of our disposable force.—I am ready to admit to the noble secretary of state the advantages, which a regular and disposable force must have over an equal number of troops of any other description, even for the purposes of defence. But these advantages may be purchased too dear: and certainly, if ever there was a conjuncture of affairs, in which these advantages were of less value than usual, it is the present. If ever there was a time when the immediate defence of the kingdom ought to engross our thoughts, to the exclusion of every distant object, it is now. But, from the observations of a noble lord, who spoke in support of this bill, it would appear that ministers are thinking of Alexandria, and the Cape, and South America, when they should be looking to Kent and to Essex. Gracious heavens! is it possible that infatuation can be carried to this length?—that when the existence of England is in question, her strength is to be wasted in distant expeditions and colonial conquests? Gladly would I hope that the noble lord has misconceived the ideas of his friends; but the extreme anxiety which is manifested for a disposable force, and the whole tenour of the measure before us, form such a commentary on the observation that dropped from the noble lord, as fills me with dread and anxiety. As if our internal defence were not already sufficiently precarious, his majesty's ministers propose to make a trifling augmentation to our disposable force, at the expense of disorgani- consequences of French conquest: but the picture has been drawn in detail, and with a was masterly hand, by the author of The Dangers of the Country;—a picture which Englishmen would do well to look at, while yet the danger may be averted. zing the militia, suspending its efficiency at most critical moment, and disgusting its officers; and to gain a momentary addition to the total amount of our force, they propose an expedient which will give a serious interruption to the measures, that have lately been adopted, for the permanent improvement of the regular army.—Looking, my lords, to the dangers of our situation as likely to be permanent, I cannot agree to sacrifice to a mere momentary convenience the lasting and important advantages arising from the measures I have alluded to—measures, founded on a just and profound view of human nature, the benefits of which every year's experience will render more apparent, and which will do lasting honour both to the administration which carried them into effect, and to the enlightened individual with whom they more particularly originated. The observation of the noble secretary of state, that the interference will only be temporary, is not in my mind a satisfactory answer to the objection; for the benefit to be expected from these measures depends in so great a degree, on a general belief in the permanence of the new system, that any thing which has even the appearance of tampering, must have a destructive effect in shaking the confidence of the country. I am the more inclined to insist on this objection, because the interference which I deprecate, is wholly unnecessary. I have stated, my lords, that by the establishment of an extensive and well-trained local militia, we should preclude the necessity of any great and immediate addition to our regular force. But it is not on this alone, that I rest my objection; for if such an addition be necessary, and it a compulsatory levy for the immediate augmentation of our regular and militia forces be unavoidable, that levy may be enforced, without affecting in any degree the success of the new system of enlistment.—The mode in winch the ballot interferes with the recruiting of the regular army, has been repeatedly and amply illustrated. It is now admitted on all hands, that the demand for substitutes establishes a competition against the recruiting service; and that when an extensive ballot is to be enforced, the price of substitutes will be so high, that no recruits can be expected to accept of the low bounty now offered for the regular army. This is the unavoidable effect of a ballot accompanied, as ours now is, with the power of substitution; but it is evident, that this effect, arises from substitution and not fromballot,—that no such effect would arise from a ballot, if the individuals balloted were to serve in person.—I know my lords, that the power of serving by substitute is considered as necessary, for mitigating the severity of the ballot, and for obviating the excessive hardship which might be occasioned in particular cases, it the individual whose name is drawn were under the absolute necessity of quitting his home and his business. But this hardship may be obviated by other means less objectionable than the power of serving by substitute. I would propose, my lords, as a commutation for this power, that those who are anxious to avoid the necessity of serving in person, should be allowed, upon payment of an adequate pecuniary fine, before the ballot takes place, to take their name out of the list of those subject to be drawn. When every individual has thus an opportunity of withdrawing himself beforehand from the operation of the ballot, there would be no necessity of leaving any power of serving by substitute, and those whose names are actually drawn, should be bound to serve in person. It is evident, that by this arrangement, we should avoid the pernicious effect of the ballot, in drawing off, as substitutes, persons who would otherwise be disposed to enlist into the troops of the line. At the same time, it does not appear that such an arrangement would occasion to individuals any greater oppression than the present form of ballot, since the payment of a fine before the ballot would not be a more severe tax, than the burthen of paying a substitute after it.—I do not mean, my lords, to argue, that this arrangement would be sufficient to do away every objection to the ballot. That is certainly an institution which I think it would be very desireable to avoid altogether; and I would anxiously wish that the supply of men, for our regular force of all descriptions, could be trusted entirely to the operation of voluntary enlistment. If, however, that is impracticable; if a compulsory levy must be made, and if ballot must be resorted to, I cannot but consider this as a less objectionable form of ballot than that now established. Perhaps, by some further ameliorations, the oppressive severity of that institution might be still more alleviated. The age of the men subject to the operation of the ballot should be reduced, and ought not, I think, to extend beyond twenty-five years: the period of service imposed should also be limited to three years, as in the original institution of the militia. The unavoidable hardship of the ballot, its interference with the personal liberty of individuals, ought to be compensated by great liberality in pecuniary bounty. In particular, all the fines paid for exemption from the ballot, ought to be applied, by the magistracy of the district in which they are levied, to the use of the balloted men, or of their families.—The ballot, thus mitigated, would be liable to infinitely less objection than it now is; and might perhaps be used for obtaining a much larger addition to our regular domestic force, than that now proposed by his majesty's ministers. There are some parts of the empire, to which a local militia, such as I have proposed, could not perhaps be safely extended. The inhabitants of these parts would thus be exempted from the burthen of a military duty, imposed on the rest of their fellow subjects; and as a commutation for this duty, it may not be improper, that the corresponding class of men there should be subject to a ballot in the mitigated form, which I have now pointed out. The population of the districts, to which I allude, might afford a large supply of men, without any material interruption to agricultural or manufacturing industry: and all the supply that can be obtained would be doubly useful, both as directly adding to the military force of the empire, and as draining off a leaven which may eventually become dangerous.—But, my lords, whatever compulsory levy may be resolved upon, I must concur in the opinion, which has already been urged with irresistible force of argument, that the balloted men ought to be placed in the second battalions of our marching [...]regiments, on the principle Of the Army of Reserve act, rather than in the militia. To ballot for an addition to the militia, in order to have an opportunity of drawing off a corresponding number of men from the militia into the line, seems to me to involve a very inconvenient complication, without any adequate motive whatever. The pernicious effects which may be expected, from disturbing the discipline and efficiency of the militia regiments at such a moment as this, have been clearly pointed out by a noble viscount (Sidmouth), as well as the effect which this measure must have, in undermining the present militia establishment altogether, by disgusting the officers. Their patience has already been sufficiently tried, in the frequent repetition of the same expedient, tending to impress them with the idea that their corps are to be degraded into mere subsidiary battalions, to be employed in drilling recruits for the line. But if ever this expedient was objectionable, it is doubly so at this moment, when the defence of the kingdom should be our chief concern, and when the militia is more likely than ever to be called into that active service for resisting invasion, for which their institution was peculiarly framed.—These topics, my lords, have already been so ably discussed, that it would be presumptuous in me to suppose, that I could add any thing to the force of the arguments that have been urged. I shall conclude, therefore, with declaring that I cannot give my assent to the bill now before us, when its particular provisions appear to me so objectionable, when the advantages to be expected from it are so inconsiderable, and when its immediate objects would be rendered wholly superfluous, by the adoption of measures commensurate with the exigency of our situation.—The question being then put, that the bill be read a second time, a division took place: Contents 42; Non-Contents, 15; Majority, 27.