HL Deb 11 February 1805 vol 3 cc338-64
Lord Mulgrave

moved the order of the day for taking into consideration the papers relative to the discussion with Spain, and also the additional papers, presented on the 2d, 4th, and 6th days of February, copies of which will be found in p. 61, 171, 229, and 291 of this volume. His ldp. said, that in laying the different papers and documents before their ldps. from time to time, he had been guided by a sincere and anxious wish to have that house as fully and completely informed upon the subject, in every respect, as the other house of parliament. He wished to call the attention of the house to this point, merely with a view to impress their ldps. with the conviction that whatever difference of opinion might possibly exist as to the subject in general, or any of its parts, there existed no desire, on the part of his maj.'s ministers in that house, to conceal or withhold any information whatever, which it was safe or practicable to lay before parliament. With respect to the general subject which they were about to consider, he was fully sensible of its importance and magnitude, and he trusted it would fully appear, on due enquiry and investigation, that the state in which this country is now placed, with respect to Spain, was not in the smallest degree desired, sought for, or still less provoked by any conduct on the part of his maj.'s govt. One of the first considerations which naturally presented itself, in viewing the question, and one upon which much of its merits depended, was the stipulations of the treaty between France and Spain, concluded at St. Ildefonso, On this document, great stress was naturally kid, and, in appreciating its merits, comparisons were entered into between it and the treaty concluded between the French and Spanish branches of the house of Bourbon, in 1761, known by the appellation of the Family Compact. However, he thought the fair result of a comparison between these treaties would be very different from certain con elusions which had been drawn. The Family Compact paid due regard to that general principle of the law of nations, which dictates a relative equal stipulation between the parties; a treaty constituted otherwise, one wherein the stronger power dictates to the weaker, militates against the law of nations; it goes to deprive the weaker power of its sovereignty, and identifies it at once with the more powerful party. His Idp. then recapitulated some of the leading stipulations of the treaties adverted to, and contended, that in the family compact, the relative power and the resources of Spain were duly attended to, while, in that of St. Ildefonso, a very different ratio was observed, even to the exaction of the whole force of the country, though the object of the war should not respect the interests of the nation required. Such a treaty of alliance prevailed between France and Spain at the time of the rupture between G. Britain and the former, and in considering the question between her and the latter, that circumstance was of material importance. With respect to this, as well as to every other part of the subject, their ldps, may see, from a reference to the documents before them, that the most anxious desire existed with his maj.'s govt. to preserve the relations of peace with Spain, and this was uniformly, as appeared by the instructions transmitted from time to time to Mr. l there, the case, whatever changes might have taken place in his maj.'s councils, until, from the conduct of the Spanish govt. a state of war became unavoidable. In endeavouring to this effect, it was deemed proper to ascertain the impressions which the treaty of St. Ildefonso had made, und how far the Spanish govt. felt itself obliged to adhere to the letter of its stipulations, if called upon. Accordingly, instructions in that spirit were sent to the British minister at Madrid, who was, however, impressed with the like considerations, and had, previously to their arrival, acted upon them. His ldp. here made frequent references to the relevant parts of the documents, particularly to the results of Mr. Frere's various conferences with the prince of peace (the real governor of that country) upon the subject. He considered the answers given by the prince on the occasion, as perplexing and inconclusive; notwithstanding the conduct of the govt. of this country was, as upon a former occasion, equally moderate and dignified; every thing was done to avoid the extremity of war, which could be effected consistently with the honour, the interests, and safety of this country.—The next prominent consideration, to which the noble sec. of state adverted, arose from the proposal on the part of France, to march a large body of troops through Spain, the remonstrance against which, equally spirited and moderate, appeared to be attended with some effect. With regard to the important considerations of the naval armaments, and the sale of prizes, the conduct of the Brit, govt. guided by the same spirit, was equally moderate and firm. With respect to the required contingent of furnishing the stipulated number of ships of the line, the forbearance of the British govt. was, under the existing circumstances, far more moderate than it otherwise might be, as the French govt. were occupied almost solely with a particular project against this country, viz. its invasion by means of flotillas, Sic, Another light in which our forbearance at the time was to be viewed, was the. interest and security of our ancient ally Portugal; we warded off the danger from that quarter, as long as it was practicable. In considering this part of the subject, the noble sec. made frequent references to the progress of the negotiation; the spirit and perseverance of the Brit. govt. blended at the same time with a due degree of moderation and forbearance, appeared to be the cause of substituting a pecuniary supply for the contingent stipulated by the treaty. The diplomatic transactions with the Spanish govt. then wore a different complexion; it became expedient to as certain the amount of the proposed subsidies, and a comparative calculation thereof, with the probable expences of the contingent, if furnished in kind; this was entered into by his ldp. for the informa- tion of the house, as well as a detail of that part of the correspondence, He adverted to the perseverance of the British govt. in their system of moderation and forbearance, with respect to this part of the transactions, which was manifested by its acquiescence in the payment of the subsidy, so-long as it could be considered as a temporary measure. The comparative calculations to which he referred, were necessary to refute the assertions of the Spanish govt. that the subsidy was less advantageous to France than would be the furnishing the contingent. His statements were drawn chiefly from what had been estimated as the value in contingent of a given number of ships of the line, and number of troops, as laid down in former treaties of contribution. He particularly recurred to that between G. Britain and Holland in 1788, the result of which was, that, with respect to the infantry, the calculation was at 10l. per man. An amount, referred to in the treaty of subsidy in question would cover a considerably greater number of troops than Spain possibly could supply; and, in point of fact, more than 8 times an equivalent for the number of men stipulated for in the treaty with France. Still, the system of forbearance was adhered to on the part of G. Britain. However, when the restless ambition, and domineering influence of France was considered, it became important to the British govt. not to relax in point of vigilance. This was the more necessary, as French soldiers were at the time clandestinely allowed to march through Spain, and the armaments were, to a certain extent, yet going on. At length strong remonstrances were made; and the impossibility of the British minister continuing longer at Madrid, were the naval armaments not completely stopped, was held out. In explaining this part of the transaction, several references were made to the documents, and the justifiable conduct of the Brit govt. and its minister contended for by his ldp. During these transactions, Spain might be fairly regarded as in a state of suspended hostility, and with respect to the sale of the prizes, the conduct of the Brit govt. was borne out, were it necessary to defend it by precedents or arguments drawn from analogy, by the case which occurred in America, during the diplomatic residence of Mr. Hammond. His ldp. proceeded, by a detailed exposition of the case, to refute the allegation of the Spanish minister, that by concealing the affair of the prizes, they had considerably injured their colonial interests. Throughout the whole of this, transaction, which may in some point of view be regarded as a war of piracy, the overbearing influence of France was manifest; the firmness and moderation of the Brit, govt. were, notwithstanding, attended with effect, and the French ambassador, considering that this war of piracy benefitted only the subjects of his country, permitted M, Cevallos to concede the point.—His ldp. repeated the observation, that the Brit. govt. were determined to persevere in their system of forbearance and moderation, as long as it could consistently or safely be done; at the same time, their vigilance and precautionary system were not suffered to relax a moment. In this spirit was the dispatch of Ld. Harrowby to Mr. Frere, wherein he instructs him to ascertain, as far as possible, the real state of the armaments in the different naval depots in Spain, as well as subsequent documents to which he particularly referred, and which evinced, not only the vigilance, but the anxiety of the British govt. to preserve the relations of amity with Spain. He pointed out the evasive conduct of the Spanish govt. particularly the allegation of M. d'Anduaga with respect to the destination of the armaments at Ferrol, namely, that they were to suppress an insurrection which had broken out in Biscay; this assertion was alledged to be made on the information conveyed by an officer, whose regiment was among the troops ordered for that purpose. But, he would ask, was such a communication to be deemed authoritative or satisfactory under the circumstances of the case? Certainly not! It was more rational to suppose other objects were in view. Nothing which sound and vigorous policy dictated was left undone by the Brit, govt. The Spanish ministers were repeatedly called upon explicitly to declare the nature and extent of their engagements with France; and at the same time, they were required to reduce their naval armaments to the state they were in at the commencement of the hostilities between G. Brit, and France. This proposition was spiritedly urged by the British blockading officer, who said, "unship your guns, and it will be considered as disarming; your lying a little farther in the road is no disarming at all." No satisfactory answer could be obtained on this head. They deemed it not prudent to declare the real state of their engagements with France, and they did not dare, bona fide, to disown that the influence of the French ambassador, Bournonville, preponderated; and it was not too much to advance, that the whole was temporizing, until the arrival of their treasure. Under such circumstances, in which a system of delay and evasion on the part of Spain was apparent, G. Brit, was forced to depart from that system which, while moderation was safe, or forbearance honourable, she had scrupulously adhered to. He hoped and trusted, that the opinion which was already marked as that of the country, with respect to these transactions, would be felt in that house. He hoped and he believed, that his noble friends opposite to him were incapable of proceeding upon a false ground of opposition that night, on a question which involved the interests and the honour of their country. He trusted these grounds of opposition, if such was determined on, would be on the merits alone of the transactions themselves. There was one circumstance which he should not think it necessary at all to mention, as making no part whatever of the case, had it not been touched upon by a noble friend of his on a former night; he meant the detention of the frigates, respecting which he conceived it impossible, informed as their lordships were, to have the least dispute. They alt knew that transaction was entirely unconnected with the cause of the war; it made no part whatever of the discussion, and was not even known at Madrid, until the Brit. minister had quitted that capital. The transaction, he hesitated not to aver, was, by the law of nations, by arguments drawn from analogy, or on grounds of obvious expediency, completely justifiable. And farther, the previous relative situation of the country would have called for the proceeding. The case of 1761 afforded a parallel, but with this difference in favour of the present instance; in 176l, the whole year's treasure was in the ports of Spain: the war is now begun with the treasures of Spain at the disposal of G. Britain; and, in proof that the measure alluded to was not made a ground for the war, his ldp. made some further references to the documents. Drawing towards a conclusion, his ldp. contended, that no nation ever was placed in a state of war with such complete and accurate grounds of moderation and forbearance to rest upon, as this country in the present instance. No proof of aggression, or ill will, could be advanced against us. Every nerve was strained by his maj.'s govt. to avert the dreadful alternative of war, and the evil day was kept off as long as possible: that nothing had been done, which could not be justified by the right the country had to defend itself was perfectly evident: he called on the house for its support. He was compelled by a sense of his duty to his country, and a perfect reliance on the justice of her cause, and on which was grounded his confidence that their lordships would unanimously concur in the address he should have the honour to propose. The noble secretary then moved an address to his maj. corresponding with, the relevant paragraph of his maj.'s speech, applauding the wisdom and justice of the measures of his maj.'s govt. in the recent transactions with Spain, and more especially that system of moderation and forbearance which characterised the whole, which was persevered in as long as the same could be done consistently with a just regard to the honour of his maj.'s crown, and the interest and welfare of his subjects, and promising the cordial support of their ldps. The address being put,

Earl Spencer

rose. His lordship said, he saw the matter in a light so extremely different, in almost every particular, from the noble lord who had just sat down, that he should ill discharge his duty to his sovereign and the country, did he not state some of his reasons of dissent from the address which had just been moved. Without any prefatory observations on the subject, he trusted that noble lords would believe that he would be one of the last men in that house, for the mere sake of opposition to a minister, to do any thing which could at all cast discredit on the govt. where the character of the country was so intimately concerned in the discussion. He felt, however, that he should in this case be committing the, honour and dignity of the country, were he to abstain from delivering the sentiments which occurred to him, on a fair, dispassionate, and careful examination of the materials on the table. In doing so, what appeared to him as being the most regular and parliamentary course would be to move an amendment, He could not propose to negative the address moved; by the noble lord. Having such materials; before them as were now lying on the table of that house, such a line of conduct would indeed be improper. They could alone discharge their duty by laying their sentiments on this important subject before his majesty. In the first place, he felt no hesitation in saying, he most cordially acquiesced in that part of his maj.'s declaration which states, that from the first moment of the commencement of hostilities between this country arid France, justifiable grounds existed for our going to war with Spain also. On that subject he presumed to think there could not be two opinions. But if govt. thought proper to wave that right, and to enter into negotiations how far they would allow Spain to fulfil, and how far they would not allow her to fulfil her treaty with France; if they thought it prudent to wink at her supplying the enemies of this country to a certain extent, they ought clearly and explicitly to have intimated to what extent that, supply was to be countenanced, what were the specific terms of neutrality they would submit to, and none other. If they had done so, and if their conduct had been actuated by that moderation and humanity which the noble lord had stated, he should have agreed in the propriety of their conduct, he should have rejoiced that they had made every becoming effort to preserve peace. But was this really the case? Had the conduct of our govt. been characterized by humanity and moderation? All he had read on the subject, in the voluminous bodies of papers on the table, led him to form a very different opinion. He had seen nothing of firmness or consistency, nothing of moderation or humanity; their conduct was altogether made up of inanity and indecision. He should notice a few particulars, from which he was induced to draw this conclusion, and to regret, that in many respects, duplicity and want of candour had distinguished the instructions of ministers to our ambassador at Madrid, more than open and ingenuous conduct, which ought to distinguish a great nation. Mr. Frere was desired, in his instructions from govt. to get every explanation from the Spanish minister he could, but himself to give no information. The Spanish ministers, therefore, justly complained, that they did not know what he wanted. In one place he is desired to state, that the granting of pecuniary succours will be esteemed a sufficient ground of war; and immediately afterwards he is instructed to require infor- mation on certain other points before he, gives any answer on that subject. Mr. Frere's own conduct shewed that he did not know what his instructions meant. Indeed they were so various and contradictory in themselves, that he could hardly be supposed to be able to reconcile them. There was, besides, a want of vigour and attention on the part of govt. which was truly astonishing, and was unquestionably reprehensible in the highest degree. There, appeared in the communication from ministers in this country to Mr. Frere, a chasm, at one period, from the 22d June to the 24th Nov.; again, one to a smaller extent, being from the 2d Nov. to the middle of Jan.; and a still more remarkable one from the 21st of Jan. to the 29th Sept. being a period of upwards of eight months, during which a new and important discussion was going on; one in which from its delicate nature, as embracing the alternative of peace or war, the honour and character of the country were concerned; but in which not a single line of instructions was sent from the govt. of this country to the person at Madrid, who was carrying on this important negotiation.— The detention of the Spanish treasure ships, was also an instance of the mild measures of hostilities, adopted by the British govt. It had been attempted, but most unjustly, to assimilate it to an embargo laid oil in a port. To such a measure it had not the most distant resemblance; and before our govt. resorted to such a step it was called on by every principle of candour and good faith, and by every sentiment of honour and propriety, to give the Spanish govt. intimation that if it did not receive every information required, it was its determination to adopt a step of the kind. It was said that Mr. Frere had left Madrid before the news of their capture or detention was known there. But what did that avail? Could that circumstance render their detention lawful f Mr. Frere had never intimated to the Spanish minister that such was the intention of our govt. But what was still more remarkable, and might afford greater ground for calling the integrity of the intentions of our govt. into question, the register ships, it was well Known, were then expected. Mr. Frere, as well as every person else, must have been aware of that circumstance, and at this very period is, he found all at once using decisive language and insisting on having his pass- ports.—His ldp. after noticing several other topics, in which be animadverted on the conduct of his maj.'s ministers, from the commencement of the negotiation, to the actual exercise of hostilities, concluded by moving an amendment similar to the one moved this day in the House of Commons by Mr. Grey, to which we refer the reader. The original motion for the address, and the proposed amendment having been put from the woolsack.

Lord Sidmouth

rose, for the purpose of supporting the address. The noble viscount said, that he saw no difficulty whatever in justifying the grounds of the war. With respect to that part of the papers now before parliament which more immediately referred to his own conduct while in power, and that of those who acted with him, he found it needless to go into any length of discussion. As to the grounds of the war, he had no hesitation in saying, that if ever there was a time when the policy and necessity of a war were justifiable, it was the present. The govt. of this country had acquitted itself with great propriety and great honour on the occasion. He rejoiced in that system of patience and forbearance which had been adopted by the British govt. from the very commencement of the discussion between the two courts till the rupture which followed. At no period of his life did he feel more satisfaction than at that in which he spoke; because he could conscientiously support those measures which reflected so much honour on the liberality of this country. Our govt. had not only discharged its duty to the public with great fidelity, but had taken special care that we should not injure the interests of our old and faithful ally, Portugal, in the discussion which had engaged the attention of the ministers-of the two countries. The system of patience and forbearance which had distinguished our proceedings towards Spain, was so connected with the safety and happiness of Portugal, that our ministers were under the absolute necessity of acting with the greatest delicacy, watchful at the same time of our national honour. They had triumphed in the result. If that system was commendable and wise in policy towards Spain, how much more was it in preserving our interests with Portugal, by preventing an immediate rupture between the latter and France! But the period had not then arrived when France was to force Spain to break its neutrality, and therefore the latter was allowed to conduct it- self towards us with apparent friendship.—No vindication, his ldp. thought, was requisite for the part which he and his colleagues had acted at the commencement of the discussion or negotiation; neither was there any particular necessity for vindicating the measures which had been pursued by their successors in office. He would, however, with the permission of their ldps. merely refer the house to the first letter of his noble friend (Hawkesbury) dated 2d June, 1803, in which his ldp. lays down the line of conduct to be then adopted by Mr. Frere. In that letter his noble friend strongly recommends the greatest respect to the system of neutrality then apparently resolved on by the Spanish govt.; he states, that it was his maj.'s earnest desire, that the system of neutrality which. had been begun by Spain, should be strictly maintained. Lord Hawkesbury, in that very letter, says, "you will therefore endeavour by all means in your power, to impress upon the Spanish ministers the expediency of their adopting this system; and you will assure them, that if it be adopted, his maj. will respect it with the most scrupulous good faith." Another particular passage corrobated the sentiments and policy of our govt. in the most incontrovertible manner. His noble friend (Hawkesbury) in the letter now alluded to, advises Mr. Frere in these words, if the Spanish govt. should state to you, that they conceive themselves to be under the obligation to furnish to France the number of troop's and ships which are stipulated in the treaty (of St. Ildefonso, 19th Aug. 1796,) but that their co-operation will extend no farther, you will refrain from giving any opinion upon this measure, but will content yourself in signifying that you will transmit the information of it to your court." He rejoiced that the same system had been pursued afterwards by our govt,; and that as no contradiction of these instructions had ever been recommended, it was but fair and just to conclude that the same plan of policy had invariably been adopted. But while his noble friend conducted himself with such wisdom, it appears that he acted with great precaution towards our national interest and honour. In another part of the same letter he advises Mr. Frere in these terms, "you will, however, watch, with the most unremitting vigilance, the progress of any preparations which may be made for carrying it (the military contingent) into execution; and you will from time to time transmit such intelligence as you may be able to acquire upon the subject to the commanders of his maj.'s ships," &c. Thus we find every effort made to preserve a good understanding between the two countries, while at the same time we were vigilant that no impropriety should be committed so as to endanger our peace without a knowledge of it communicated to our govt.—The noble viscount afterwards continued to review farther the measures which had been adopted while he and his colleagues were in power, and compared them in a cursory manner with those which had been pursued by their successors. From every view of the business, from first to last, he saw nothing to condemn but much to praise. The system of forbearance which we had displayed with such dignity to ourselves and such benefit to Portugal, his Idp. considered with much satisfaction and pleasure. The noble earl had dwelt upon that want of decision on the part of the British govt. which he was pleased to censure, as weak and inefficient. It was, however, part of that system which he had now taken the liberty of praising, and which was so honourable to the British govt. So far, therefore, was his Idp. from entertaining such an opinion, that his sentiments were diametrically opposite to those of the noble earl. The noble viscount again rejoiced in the tardiness evinced by the British govt. because it proved how averse we always had been to force Spain into the war. He had no doubt but that the Spanish govt. notwithstanding its avowed hostility, was sensible of our patience and forbearance; and, on that account, was certainly a very unwilling coadjutor in the present war. The noble earl had adverted to a letter, dated 13th Dec. 1803, in which Mr. Frere particularly notices the very delicate situation in which he was in with regard to the conduct of Spain, which had then assumed an aspect of hostility, contrary to the conditions understood between the two countries. A reference to that letter was unfortunate for the noble earl's argument; for it proved what he (lord Sidmouth) had already maintained, that our govt. had allowed that of Spain to assume an unfriendly appearance without availing itself of it as aground for an immediate cause of war. After stating the usual professions of friendship between the two countries, Mr. Frere, in the letter to M. Cevallos of the 13th Dec. mentions that he had then found it expedient to recur to the conditions understood between the two countries, viz. in the first place, that Spain was bound to maintain a system of absolute neutrality; and, secondly, to cause it to be respected by other belligerent powers, He represented to the Spanish court, that his Brit. maj. perfectly sensible of the difficulties in which Spam was placed, as well by reason of her antient ties with France, as on account of the character and habitual conduct of that power, and of her chief, was inclined to pass over in silence several acts which, ought strictly speaking, to require explanation. Mr. Frere then also stated, that "this consideration would induce his maj. to act with forbearance to a certain degree, and particularly to overlook such pecuniary sacrifices as should not be of sufficient magnitude to force attention on account of their political effects. But it is expressly enjoined rue to declare to your excl. that pecuniary advances, such as are stipulated in the convention recently concluded with France, cannot be considered by the British govt. but as a-war subsidy." This declaration was certainly sufficiently indicative of our sentiments, and deserved the most serious attention on the part of the Spanish govt. Still Mr. Frere was to avoid any hostile measure, provided a satisfactory explanation were given. From these testimonies of our good conduct towards Spain, then, there was a presumption, that we hail done every thing which could be done to avoid the consequence of hostilities. The noble viscount then affirmed, that there were many instances in which the conduct of Spain would have served as just grounds of war, had the British govt. not wished to have avoided such a disagreeable alternative. The noble earl had dwelt with some sarcasm on what he was pleased to term "the mild measures of hostilities" adopted by the British govt. in the attack and capture of the Spanish ships, and the destruction of one of them. He wished, however, to charge the noble earl's memory with the recollection of a similar plan of policy, when the noble earl was at the head of the admiralty. An order to a similar effect was issued by him, and acted upon. The Dutch ships before any hostilities had been declared between the two countries, were detained, and several of them sunk in being compelled to keep up with the convoy by which they had been detained. The detention of the Spanish frigates, therefore, was not a solitary precedent, but one of which there were frequent examples in the naval practice of the country. I am sorry, said the noble viscount, to trespass so much upon your ldp.'s attention, but considering the share I have had in the negotiation, I thought myself called upon to reply at considerable length to the observations of the noble earl who has moved the amendment. If, my lords, as I have said before, there was ever a justifiable cause of war, a cause which could scarcely admit of a doubt, much more a difference of opinion, it will be found in the conduct of Spain. To no representation which had been made to the court of Madrid, excepting that respecting the sale of prizes, has the smallest attention been paid. Spain was required to discontinue her armaments; this she did not do. She was required to communicate the terms of that convention which she had last entered into with France; this she either evaded, or when strongly pressed to it, peremptorily refused to do. She was required, not to permit the entrance of French troops into her territory; in defiance of this, the French ships of war, which were blockaded in the port of Ferrol, were recruited through Spain, and enabled, by the reinforcements so obtained, to contend with the squadron by which that harbour was observed. I will, notwithstanding the immense difference of opinion between the noble lord and me, admit that it is difficult not to agree with him in this one point, that the detention of the Spanish ships could not be well considered as other than as an act of hostility. There is, however, strong ground, my lords, upon which that act can be justified. The time was, or had nearly arrived, when France would no longer suffer Spain to enjoy the advantages of that neutrality, which, upon certain conditions, his maj.'s ministers were disposed to admit. No, my lords, that would by no means suit with the ambitious views of that power; her own means being crippled or exhausted, she wanted to possess herself of the naval power of Spain, and she was seeking for pretexts to seize it, when she found that her neutrality would be no longer beneficial to her. My lords, I lament that the noble earl has stigmatized the causes of the war in the manner he has done. The people of this country will not exert themselves in the manner that their spirit and loyalty would induce them to do, if they are not persuaded of the justice of the war; they have moral feelings, and those feelings must be con- sulted and satisfied, before the government can expect to derive the full effect of their zeal and patriotism. I shall therefore, my lords, oppose the amendment' of the noble earl, which goes in my mind materially to clog the war. It would be in vain to say, that we either support his majesty, or the cause in which he is engaged, by adopting it.

Lord King

contended that the principles on which this discussion with Spain had been conducted were inconsistent and contradictory. The forbearance that had been exercised at the beginning of it ill accorded with the system of hostility that succeeded. Ministers denied the existence of any convention between them and the govt. of Spain, respecting the stipulated sums that Spain was to pay to France in lieu of contingents; but even from their own statements it was impossible not to discover some sort of agreement or understanding. Without gross misrepresentation, it could hot be denied, that satisfaction, was obtained on the principal points that were at issue. The noble lord's instructions shewed that he had obtained satisfaction from some quarter. If he was satisfied, why did he not inform Mr. Frere so? or if not satisfied, why did he not press that gentleman to get farther satisfaction? But the noble lord had perhaps been busy with the volunteer bill when he should have been attending to his foreign relations. The noble lord then at-temped to account for the activity exhibited so lately in that department. The present ministers had declaimed against the former for their want of energy, and they wished, perhaps, to shew that they had more spirit, and as they could make no impression on France they made Spain the object of their aggression. The noble lord then contended, that before any re-monstrances could have arrived in Spain, even before they had been dispatched from this country, acts had been committed that amounted to war, and this had been done without any explanation. And this act of hostility was not a precaution for the purpose of preventing troops being sent to Ferrol, which had been complained of, but a precaution taken to prevent a subsidy to France, to which they seemed to have made no positive objection. They had not taken measures to secure Portugal previous to breaking with Spain, nor were we now in a situation to protect her. Nor were we. able, he thought, to make any impression or the Spanish settlements of America, which with some might be thought a principal motive for the war, and even if we were he would disapprove, he said, of such a measure. It would only be multiplying those grounds of dissension of which we had already too many. For these reasons, the noble lord flattered himself that a great part of the house would be ready to give their concurrence to the amendment proposed by the noble earl.

The Earl of Westmoreland

contended, that the system of forbearance pursued by his maj.'s ministers in the early period of this business, was justified by our own situation, and by that of Europe. Spain had also held out some hopes that she might not be entirely subservient to the views of France. From reasons of policy also he justified the subsequent conduct of govt. Were they blamed because they had made no previous declaration of war? this conduct, the noble lord argued, was not unprecedented. It was thus that the Spanish armada had attacked our shores, and it Was thus that the war of the year 1756 had commenced without any previous notice. This point the noble lord farther illustrated from ancient as well as modern policy, and argued, that it was by no means inconsistent with the laws of nations. Though they had made no declaration of war, however, a dispatch had been sent intimating that their forbearance was only temporary. It was impossible for his maj.'s govt. as circumstances stood, to avoid the war: he would therefore, his lordship said, give his vote for the address.

Earl Darnley

maintained, that if war was commenced without any previous declaration, it ought to be on such grounds only as were clear to ourselves and to all Europe. Nothing less could justify the omission of such a formality. He reprobated the capture of the frigates, and thought it little better than a species of piracy. He contended that the sum given to France by Spain was not, contrary to what had been stated, more thin an equivalent for the stipulated contingents, of men and ships. There were strong grounds for peace, he argued, founded in policy, on account of Portugal, which was by this means, left exposed, or would be obliged to declare against us also. He had never heard the reason, he said, why other ships of war, and vessels carrying naval stores, were permitted to pass unmolested, while we had thought ourselves authorized to seize on the frigates. This circumstance-would na- turally lead one to imagine, that the arrival of those ships had induced his maj.'s govt. to commence hostilities. His ldp. concluded with observing, that we had the misfortune to have the opinion of the rest of Europe against us.—The house then divided on the question, "that the amendment do stand part of the motion."

Contents 36
Non-contents 114
Majority against the amendment 78
List of the Minority.
Duke of Clarence, Earl Cholmonderey,
Duke of Norfolk, Karl of Gulldford,
Duke of Devonshire, Earl Cowper,
Duke of Grafton, Earl Forte scue.
Duke of Bedford, Earl Darnley,
Duke of St. Alban's, Earl of Stair,
Marquis of Buckingham, Earl of Cassilis,
Marquis of Lansdowne, Earl of Besborough,
Marquis of Bute, Lord De Clifford,
Earl of Derby, Lord Say and Sele,
Earl of Carlisle, Lord King,
Earl of Suffolk, Lord Montfort,
Earl Fitzwilliam, Lord StaWell,
Earl of Berkeley, Lord Grantley,
Earl of Thanet, Lord Grenville,
Earl of Leicester. Lord Dundas,
Earl of Albemarle, Lord Carysfort,
Earl Spencer, Lord Hutchinson.

The original question was then resumed.

Earl Fitzwilliam

was of opinion, that at so late an hour, it would be advisable to adjourn the debate.

Lord Hawkesbury

said, that he should Certainly oppose the adjournment, if a motion to that effect were made. The question had already been discussed at great length; but if the noble earl thought that it still required farther consideration, it was not so late but they might yet hear every objection that could be started to the address, and on many occasions the house had sat to a much later hour. If any observations were made which required an answer, he should claim the indulgence of their lordships for that purpose.

Earl Fitzwilliam

said that in his opinion no satisfactory answer had been given to the observations of his noble friends on these, most extraordinary papers.

Lord Grenville

then rose, and in a speech of considerable length, entered into an examination of the papers on the table, and of the whole conduct of ministers during the negotiation. His ldp. professed his utter astonishment that the noble lord who had risen to express his determination to oppose any motion for an adjournment, had not thought it his duty to say one word in explanation of the huge mass of papers on the table, so as to throw some light on a transaction, which in his mind reflected no credit on the administration of which he formed a part; nay, which brought great discredit on the country itself. It was impossible to conceive any thing more extraordinary, than the conduct of his maj.'s ministers had been in the whole of the negotiation, if they were to judge from the documents that had been laid before them; for though paper was heaped on paper, and they had deliveries after deliveries, there was no communication made by which they could learn the motives of govt. in this most important and calamitous affair. There appeared nothing but negligence, inattention, and mystery. For the whole course of 18 months that this negotiation had lasted, there appeared but four dispatches from ministers to Mr. Frere, at Madrid; and even these were distinguished only by their containing nothing to the purpose, or by being unintelligible, or contradictory. The noble lord opposite to him had thrown out a challenge that no charge could be brought against ministers for their conduct in this negotiation; he accepted the challenge, and presumed to say he should prove, from their own papers, that they had been most criminally remiss, silent, and inattentive to all the eager and repeated applications which had been made to them by the Spanish govt. to explain their system; that they had even kept their own agent at the court of Madrid ignorant of their views; that they had neglected every opening that had been made them of preventing a rupture; that they had. without provocation, treated, in the first instance, with indifference and contempt the court of Spain, and when they had thus finally driven them into the hands of France that they had acted with violence, injustice, and unpardonable precipitancy. The noble lord to illustrate these points, shewed from the documents on the table, that after the commencement of the war with France, ministers had taken more than a fortnight to think of an instruction to Mr. Frere at Madrid, how to conduct himself towards that important court on that interesting emergency. Their first instruction was dated the 2d of June, and from that period no second letter was sent by them to their minister at Madrid, until the 24th of Nov. following. And this, though he repeatedly solicited them to be explicit, and urged the necessity of treating the Spanish court with care, attention, and respect. This was not all. The Spanish court was most desirous of coming to a good un- derstanding with England, and made the most earnest applications for that purpose; No answer whatever was given to these ref peated invitations to an amicable negotiation. Though goaded by the French govt. and in the most anxious state of suspense, they could not obtain from our ministers any other treatment than that of silent contempt. In this way the months of June, July, and Aug. passed, without the slightest attention by ministers to their applications, and even to the letters and instances of their own minister resident there. Although he informed them that, at that time, the cause of England was then popular with all ranks of people in Spain; that they were most desirous of connecting themselves with G. Brit, as the means of keeping them out of the hands of France; and that the moment was most favourable for that purpose. All this was neglected, and, at length, driven by the criminal neglect and silence of England, the Spanish govt. was forced to yield to the influence of France, and. agree to permit a small body of 1,500 men to march through Spain to recruit their ships at Ferrol. This fact Mr. Frere transmitted oh the 12th of Sept. and stated. the remonstrance which he had made of his own head, on the subject. Notwithstanding this, it was not till the 24th of Nov. that he received an instruction on the subject; and then Mr. Frere being at length relieved in some; soft from the painful ignorance and nullity in which he had been kept, thanked ministers most gratefully for telling him what he was to do.—The noble baron displayed, in strong colours, the indecision, and weakness of the whole system of the few instructions which appeared in the immense space of time that elapsed, which he described as "Yari nantes in gurgite vasto." In no one instance had ministers given Mr. Frere plain, intellible grounds to act upon. In the first dispatch of his noble friend, he not only avoids giving any opinion himself respecting the contingent to be furnished to France, but he absolutely prohibits the English charge d'affaires at the Spanish court from giving any; or in other words, he sends him instructions to negotiate, and prohibits him at the same from going into the particulars of negotiation. If noble lords would cast their eyes over the correspondence, they would clearly perceive, that a mutual distrust had taken place between the Spanish minister and Mr. Frere. The latter in his letter says, that there were all good dispositions on the part of the Spanish govt.; he states the subject of his conversation with the prince of peace, from which it was apparent, that he was afraid to make an opening to us until we had made one to him. This was surely a case which it was natural to suppose would elicit some fresh instructions from his maj.'s ministers; quite the contrary; from any thing that appeared in the correspondence on the table, it passed without a single observation on their part. Mr. Frere then goes on to state how popular the English govt. and character was with the king of Spain, the nobility, the government, the mercantile body, nay even with the mob, and that this happy disposition was only to be maintained by a system of conciliation. This, one would have thought, should have produced something; he such thing; even the Spanish minister here was treated with a degree of disrespect, as far as not paying any attention to his representations, that no gentleman should experience. The offer of the king of Spain to mediate was, it would appear, treated with total contempt and indifference, and during all the time that those conferences took place, France had not negotiated. Had the English minister been authorised to have met the Spanish govt. France might have been anticipated, and not suffered to negotiate, as she did in the sequel, upon her own grounds. The conference with the prince of peace had this singularity in it, that to all the overtures made by him, Mr. Frere, in consequence of peremptory instructions from his court, declined answering any one of them; he says "my mouth is shut, I can neither converse with you in mj own name, nor in that of my government." He would put it to the noble viscount (Sid-mouth) how, if the case were reversed, he would have endured such treatment. Well might the charges of indecision and incapacity have been brought against the govt. Time, it was said, waited for no man; opportunity, it may be as truly said., waited for no one; French demand and necessity could not wait for the tardy progress of negotiation.—His lordship having' expatiated at some length, on the remissness of his maj.'s ministers with respect to the necessary instructions to Mr. Frere, proceeded to state, that the whole of that gent.'s mission, during the continuance of this negotiation, was marked by the same atyle of remissness, and that at successive periods he had been suffered to remain for 2 months, for 6 months, and even for 8 months together, without any, specific instructions from his own court how to act, but left entirely to himself; and, at one time particularly, from the 21st Jan. until the 22d of May, when the noble lord retired from the secretaryship for foreign affairs, no instructions whatever were sent to Mr. Frere; the consequence of which was, that he was treated by the Spanish ministry as a person not having the confidence of that court by whom he was accredited; and he was constantly made to feel that they had weekly communications from their minister at London, upon topics of Mr. Frere's own mission, but upon which he was totally uninformed, and thus incapacitated to maintain his station with due respect to his official character, or to act with the necessary degree of effect upon those with whom be was appointed to treat. Of the documents necessary to the information of the house upon this important subject, there was one which had been referred to, both in the notes of Mr. Frere and the chev. Cevallos, but which appeared not only to be lost but that even not one of the ministers concerned in the formation of that treaty, could remember any one article of the contents, more especially as the treaty was referred to as a convention of neutrality, both by the Spanish minister and British ambassador; but of the merits of which convention the house could, not possibly judge, unacquainted, as they were with its specific terms. So far as the documents laid before the house served to throw any light upon the subject of neutrality, as to Spain, his majesty's ministers had acted with the most shameful duplicity; for, at first, it appeared from those documents, that the treaty by which Spain agreed to supply a certain military contingent to France, in case of a war, was recognized by his maj.'s ministers. But Spain professing the most zealous wishes, to avoid every thing like hostility towards this country, by a subsequent treaty with France, had commuted her contingent in military force for one in money, to which there was apparently no objection. Shortly afterwards the specific price of respect to the neutrality of Spain, as stipulated by Mr. Frere, was the cessation of every thing like armament in any of her arsenals, preclusion to the condemnation and sale of British prizes in Spanish ports, and the same treatment to British as to French ships of war in all her harbours, and notwithstanding that all those terms were strictly complied with on the part of Spain, nevertheless, the Spanish govt. is again told, that their stipulated contingent in money must not be paid to France, without leaving the British govt. perfectly at liberty to consider such payment a legitimate cause of war, whenever they should find it convenient to act thereupon. Ministers were still farther reprehensible, after circumstances of personal irritation had occurred between Mr. Frere and the person who was supposed to have the greatest weight in the councils of the Spanish govt. (the prince of peace), in having committed the remainder of the negotiation, after it became necessary for Mr. Frere to take his departure, to his brother and secretary, as chargé d'affaires; a gentleman certainty of whom he should never wish to be supposed as speaking otherwise than with the highest respect, and who, however highly respected in his private character in this country, yet whose official rank did not bear that high estimation in the other courts of Europe, suited to the importance of such a negotiation, but least of all others at the court of Spain. Instructions were sent to this gent, to require, on the part of the Spanish govt. not an explanation, but the declaration of a disposition to explain certain particulars with respect to the treaty last entered into with France; and in case of such declaration, that a minister properly accredited was to be sent to the Spanish court to enter into that explanation, and settle finally the question respecting the neutrality of Spain; but Mr. Frere oversteps his commission, demands the explanation himself, is refused, and takes his departure; and no accredited minister is sent to Spain to avert the consequences of this misunderstanding. Nevertheless, the Spanish minister at London, the chev, d'Anduaga, as soon as he heard of the departure of Mr. Frere from his court, waits upon the British minister for foreign affairs, is unable to see him through indisposition, addresses to him a respectful letter, signifying his readiness, notwithstanding all that has passed, to enter into negotiation, and prevent, if possible, all hostile extremities between both countries; but to this letter he never receives the slightest answer, nor even the usual attention Of ordinary civility. Such was the treatment shewn to a high-minded and most gallant nation, who plumed itself on the observance of etiquette, and whose pride was wounded by the slightest appearance of neglect. Such was the style, of the negotiation which ministers could boast of as being free from reproach! Such was the. moderation which they bad shewn in this most delicate affair!—But in this way was the negotiation managed until the cloud came over our heads and the thunder burst; Admiral Cochrane wrote home to say, that there were 3 ships of the line apparently fitting out in the port of Ferrol. At the same time be wrote to Mr. Frere and to the governor of Ferrol. The Spanish govt., had at once and unequivocally declared, that the sole object of this was to transport some troops to the bay of Biscay, where a rebellion had broken out; and at the same time the governor of Ferrol had said, that as it gave him uneasiness the men should be put. ashore, and sent round by land, however inconvenient. Admiral Cochrane was not content with this, but said he should insist on receiving a detailed account of their being dismantled. The noble baron intreated noble lords to make this case their own, and say what their feelings would be if such language were used to a British admiral commanding at Portsmouth, because he had chosen to send troops round the coast in a few ships of the line? Such was the commencement of our violence; and though a satisfactory answer, as he thought, was given, (for he sincerely believed that they had no object in putting some few men and provisions on board these 3 ships, but really to quell the tumult in Biscay, it being much easier to send troops by sea than through that mountainous province; at a time, too, when they were labouring under the dread of a malignant fever,) yet we proceeded to the violence of assaulting their ships on the high seas. This had been said to be no more than laying an embargo on an enemy's ships. Was there no difference between delaying merchant's ships which might be delivered back; and assaulting ships on the high seas? There was a mighty difference. Stop the ships of a merchant and they may be delivered up. Take his property and he might be indemnified. Imprison seamen and they might be discharged. But burn, sink, and blow up ship and crew, and who can restore the innocent blood which is spilt? There were some acts of hardship and severity which the laws of civilized war permitted, but this atrocious act of barbarity was contrary to all law of nations, and stamped indelible infamy on our name. The French branded us with the name of a mercantile people, and said that we were ever thirsting after gold. They would therefore impute this violence to our eagerness for the dollars. Better that all the dollars, and ten times the quantity, were paid, so as it could wash away the stain which had been brought on our arms. At a time when we were armed to repel the atrocities of France, this was not a time to display such a spirit.—His lordship shewed that the seizure of the treasure ships had no resemblance to the stoppage of the Dutch, nor to the measure recommended by the Earl of Chatham, in 176l. He deprecated the war in which this series of neglect, insolence, contempt, and violence bad plunged us. He denied that it was popular. A war with Spain, however easy ministers had shewn that it was to provoke and begin, was not so easy to get out of. If the stories that were floating were true, of desperate, mad, and romantic expeditions against Spanish America, he would prophecy, that it would be a most calamitous war to G. Britain. A more perilous, and a more calamitous adventure for the sake of mere plunder, could not be undertaken than such an expedition, either for the country that gave it birth, or for humanity in general; for while it would operate to entail misery on a great portion of the human race, it tended to exhaust the blood and treasure of this country, to disperse our naval force, to ruin our army, and be productive of the worst mischiefs to the country. The great principles which it was the duty of a wise govt. to hold up to the people of this country, were truth, justice, and moderation, and not rapacity and blood.—His lordship, concluded a most brilliant and impressive speech by saying, that he did not rise thus to discharge his duty from any motive of wanton attack on the king's ministers, or to strive to destroy their popularity, but from a serious conviction that the war might have been prevented by common care on their part, and that as it was totally unprovoked and unnecessary, so also would it be most grievous and unfortunate to the country.

Lord Hawkesbury

said, he had purposely avoided rising earlier in the discussion; because, feeling his own official conduct deeply interested in the whole of this negotiation, he wished to bear, at length, the whole of the arguments against it, before he offered himself to the consideration of the house. His lordship then entered very much at length in reply to the observations of the noble baron; and argued, that, however the house might be disposed to censure his maj.'s ministers, on this subject, they were bound to support his maj. in bringing the war to an honourable conclusion. He thought, from the whole conduct of Spain, as well as the. treaty of Ildefonso, by which she became, ipso facto, the offensive and defensive ally of Trance, she must be justly considered as hostile to this country, and regarded not as a neutral power, but as one against whom policy enjoined the forbearance of hostility as long as it was possible. When we entered into the present contest with France there was nothing like a continental diversion in our favour. It would have been therefore almost an act of insanity to provoke at once all the enemies of whom we had in different shades and degrees to complain. We were at all events to wait until our naval and military establishments had been raised to their proper height. Spain, in this point of view, required peculiar management; and the more so, as the safety of Portugal was involved in the issue. Here was therefore, a radical mistake on the part of the noble baron who had last spoken. He wished that every question should be so categorically put as to leave no issue but that of peace or war. This was certainly not the mode to be pursued when the great object in view was delay; a delay which might serve to enable Spain to disentangle herself from her obligation, and empower us to provide for the safety of our ally, the queen of Portugal. If these objects were held in view, he would appeal to the documents on the table, and boldly ask, whether the instructions transmitted to our minister at Madrid were not fully adequate to every emergency? There were some points on which it was impossible to give a definite instruction. It was difficult to say, for instance, whether a contingent in men or money, supplied to an enemy would be least disadvantageous. With respect to a pecuniary aid, the question was in the degree. If it surpassed the value of the military contingent, then its operation was most hostile and mischievous; but this was a point which, with all our efforts, we could not possibly ascertain.—On one other point the noble bart. was clearly mistaken in his argument. It was true that Mr. Frere had stipulated with M. Cevallos for the cessa- tion of the Spanish armaments, and for the stoppage of the condemnation and sale of prizes in the Spanish ports. These, however, were conditions, on the observance of which he promised to remain at Madrid; they were not, as had been wrongly supposed, conditions of neutrality, or binding as such on this country. But, even supposing them to be of the latter description, the obligations had been all violated by Spain.—The armaments in Ferrol had been lightly treated by the noble baron. But, when it was recollected, that there were four French sail of the line in that harbour, and that, by an effort of no great difficulty, a junction might be made highly dangerous to our blockading squadron, the suspicions wore a more serious aspect. As to the conveyance of troops to Biscay it was all a feint, as there was no port in that quarter where a single man could be landed. The fact was, that Spain was determined to declare war, as on every former occasion, as soon as her treasure ships were safely arrived. In the interim, the hostile mind of that country was manifested in every possible way. The permission given to French troops, sailors, and artillerymen, to march through her territory, was certainly no slight indication of hostility. This, the noble baron will probably say, is one of admiral Cochrane's stories; but if he will look into the correspondence, he will find two notes on the subject from Mr. Frere, stating the circumstances, and which are not, in any the minutest particle, disavowed. It was on these full and ample grounds that we entered on that modified hostility which is so much the ground of reproach. Why, it is said, did we not issue letters of marque and reprisal? The answer is obvious. The property of the captors it would not have been in our power to reclaim and restore, but by detaining the vessels the power of restitution was left in our hands. This was certainly an incomplete hostility; but let it be recollected, that when this was ordered, the right of full, complete, and absolute hostility, was substantially in our hands. If Spain has suffered in this instance, let it be recollected that the fault is entirely her own. Had she been capable of manly exertion in her own behalf, from us she would have found every support and assistance, But as history shews that small states have arisen to the greatest heights by industry, activity, and energy, so large empires are found to moulder away through apathy, inertness, and pusillanimity. Our view of the question this case must be merely personal. We must not permit either the strength of one power, or the weakness of another, to be converted into a weapon for our destruction. This has been stigmatized as a mercenary war; but this proposition, said his ldp. I must deny. Wars of ambition, wars for conquest, wars for extension of territory— all these are hateful; but a war for profit has in it something loathsome and revolting to every generous mind. The carrying the war into the Spanish Colonies, which has been thrown out this evening, had no weight whatever hi the decision of ministers. They forbore, as long as forbearance: was practicable, and they did not strike, until the blow, in their judgment, could no longer be avoided. If we could see the once great and illustrious nation of Spain rouse once more from the lassitude into which she has sunk, and display that spirit and those noble energies which once rendered her so justly renowned amongst the nations of Europe, then might we hope to see her retrieve that honourable character heretofore so justly venerated: but, sunk as she is under the vassalage and dictation of the person who now rules France, friendly to us she dare not be; neutral she cannot be; and hostile she must be, at the mandate of her ally: and, therefore, it was the duty of his maj 's ministers to be guarded against those hostilities to which from necessity or otherwise she might be disposed.

Lord Mulgrave,

in the absence of his noble friend, lord Harrowby, felt it his duty to vindicate that noble lord from every imputation of lassitude or insufficiency, which had been thrown upon his conduct; and to assure the house, that, on all occasions, from his accession to office, his exertions had been most sedulous and indefatigable, in endeavouring to avert hostilities, by every means honourable to the Country.—At 4 o'clock in the morning, the question was put by the Lord Chancellor on the original address, which was carried without a division; and the house adjourned till Wednesday.