Lords Sitting of 1 April 1805

ROMAN CATHOLIC PETITION.
The Bishop of Durham rose to express a wish that the noble baron who had presented the Petition from the Roman Catholics of Ireland, would have the goodness to name the day on which it was his intention to bring the object of that Petition under the consideration of the house. The subject it involved was one of such importance, that he felt it his duty to be prepared for the discussion of it, whenever the noble baron should think fit to bring it forward.
Lord Grenvillein reply, said that it was his intention, as far as he could now foresee, to bring forward his motion on that subject on the 10th of May next, Should it however be for the convenience of any noble lord to postpone the discussion for a few days be for one could have no objection.
The Bishop of Durhamonly wished that no delay might take place after the day appointed by the noble baron.

CONDUCT OF JUDGE FOX.
The order of the day being read for resuming the debate on certain questions relative to the case of Judge Fox;
Lord Aucklandrose to offer an amendment to a string of motions which he had
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submitted to their lordships this day sen-night, the substance of which was, to add to some of them, the words "punishable by the ordinary course of law." Here a very long conversion ensued on a point of order; whether the motions should be put collectively or separately, in which conversation the following noble lords took a part. For discussing them collectively, were lords Grenville, Spencer, Carlisle, Darnley, Auckland, &c.; for a separate discussion, were the Lord Chancellor, lords Ellenborough, Hawkesbury, sidmouth, Mulgrave, Buckinghamshire, and Redesdale. The conversation, which lasted a considerable time, at length ended in lord Auckland withdrawing his motion.

STANDING ORDER.
Lord Grenvilleafter shortly alluding to his having been interrupted on a former night on this subject, moved that the Standing Order, No. 30, purporting, that if any peer should require the house to go into a committee, for the purpose of delivering his opinion with greater freedom, by having liberty to, speak more than once, it ought not to be refused, be read. His reason, he stated, was to give a fair opportunity to noble lords to discuss this important point with freedom, by speaking as often as they were inclined.—A conversation of considerable length ensued on the interpretation of the standing order, the lord Chancellor, lords Hawkesbury, Redesdale, Morton, &c. contending that it was not imperative; and lords Grenville, Spencer, Ellenborough, &c. maintaining that so long as it stood on the books of the house as one of their orders, it was entitled to its full weight and effect.
The Lord Chancellorhaving, in the course of the discussion, referred to some expressions of his R. H. the Duke of Clarence on a former night, charging him with having violated the orders of the house, in himself addressing their lordships more than once;
His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales rose to express what had occurred to him as being the meaning and import of the observation alluded to, which had fallen from his noble relation. His noble relation as his Royal Highness understood him, wished to establish how essential it was that a liberal interpretation of the orders of their lordships on the usage of debate should take place. A Noble Friend of his (lord Grenville) had been called to order that evening by a noble earl oppo-

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site; and the remark of his noble relative then was, that the same liberty (that of speaking more than once) had been assumed by the noble lord on the woolsack, and that he thought it but proper that a similar indulgence should be extended to his noble friend, and other lords on that side of the house on which he commonly sat. In making this observation, His Royal Highness was conscious that nothing was more distant from the mind of his noble relation than to throw out any improper reflection against any noble lord whatever, particularly against any person who had the honor of filling the seat of Speaker of that house; and he submitted it to the candour of the noble and learned lord himself, if the observation of his noble relation was not strictly consistent with that liberal practice which had generally distinguished the proceedings of their lord ships.
After some further discussion, lord, Grenville agreed generally to move for the house going into a committee, without any reference to the standing order. The house having accordingly gone into a committee,
Lord Grenvillerose in support of the motion of lord Auckland for referring the different points which he had formerly submitted to the house, for the opinion of the twelve judges. His lordship particularly alluded to the precedents which he had pointed out on a former night, and state that, in consequence of the doubts suggested by a noble and learned lord (Ellenborough), he had caused the records of one of these cases, Bridgman v. Holt, to be searched for, and it clearly made out his original assertion, being a case directly in point; there, as in the present case, a petition had been presented to the house against three of the judges of the Common Pleas, which the house ordered them to answer. In the answer lodged, these judges refused to plead the merits of the case unless when called before a legal tribunal. They denied the jurisdiction of their lordships, and maintained that the calling them before the house was contrary to the established law of the land. On considering the matter, after taking the opinion of the other judges, the house came to be of the same mind, and the matter was dismissed.
The Lord Chancellorrecapitulated the arguments which he had formerly adduced in support of the centrary opinion; main-
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tained that the precedents referred to by the noble lord could not apply, as they occurred previous to the passing of the act of settlement; admitted it to be the established law of the land that no judicial proceeding of a criminal nature could originate in that house; but contended that the measure now before the house was not of a judicial nature, instituted with the view of punishment. He could not, at the same time, see why the judges should not be considered as equally safe in the hands of the two houses of parliament as in those of twelve ordinary men, whose verdict against them would, if the arguments on the other side went to any thing, be obligatory on their lordships, and would be a sufficient call on them to address his majesty for the dismissal of any judge against whom such a verdict should be found.
Lord Grenvillecould not at all see the meaning of the distinction laid down by the noble and learned lord. He stated that this was not a judicial matter, or one to infer punishment. It undoubtedly, however, was meant to go the length of grounding an address to his majesty for the dismissal of a judge for improper conduct in his judicial capacity, and such he contended could not originate in that house. He would wish the noble and learned lord to point out to them where the line was to be drawn, and what, if any thing short of murder, felony, or treason, was to be esteemed without the original cognizance of that house. As to the idea of the act of settlement subjecting the judges to a jurisdiction of which they were formerly independent, he saw nothing in the act which sanctioned such an idea, but the direct contrary.
Lord Hawkesburyopposed the motion of lord Auckland, and contended that the proceedings of the house had been completely regular. In this opinion he was seconded by lord Redesdale.
Lord Aucklanddefended the positions laid down by lord Grenville, by recapitulating the arguments which he had formerly adduced in support of his motions.
Earl Carisfortfollowed on the same side, and deprecated, in strong terms, the idea of subjecting the judges to a species of control from which every other subject of this country was exempt—thereby rendering them the tools of the minister of the day.
The Earl of SuffolkMaintained the necessity of resorting to the opinion of the

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judges as to the legality of their mode of proceeding.
Lord Ellenboroughdeclared, that his own opinion was decidedly in favour of the proceeding by scirc facias, as the question would thereby have a legal investigation, and as the learned judge would then be tried by his peers. But, as the case now stands, their lordships had adopted another mode of proceeding. The law clearly said, that they may in certain cases proceed to address his majesty for the removal of a judge; it was therefore evident, that they may make inquiry as to the facts upon which that address was to be founded. The words appeared to him to be so unambiguous, and the inference that their lordships had the legal power of proceeding as they had done was so plain and natural, that he had no hesitation in saying that there was no necessity for asking any opinion of the learned lords upon the case.
Earl Darnleysupported the motion as the only means of ridding their lordships' minds of any doubt upon the case.—The question was then put, and there appeared contents 18; not contents 32.—Adjourned.