Commons Sitting of 6 July 1982

Preamble
The House met at half-past Two o'clock
PRAYERS
[MR. SPEAKER in the Chair]
PRIVATE BUSINESS

  GREATER LONDON COUNCIL (MONEY) BILL
  Order for Third Reading read.
  To be read the Third time upon Thursday.

  BRITISH RAILWAYS (LIVERPOOL STREET STATION) BILL
  Considered; to be read the Third time.
Oral Answers to Questions
  EMPLOYMENT

    Unemployment Statistics
    Mr. Skinnerasked the Secretary of State for Employment what are the numbers of unemployed, both nationally and regionally; and if he will make a statement.
    Mr. Parryasked the Secretary of State for Employment what are the latest unemployment figures; and if he will make a statement.
    The Secretary of State for Employment (Mr. Norman Tebbit): At 10 June the number of people registered as unemployed in the United Kingdom was 3,061,229. Regional figures were published in the press notice issued on 22 June; a copy is in the Library.
    The total number of unemployed is rising as school leavers come on to the register, but the rate of increase is much slower than a year ago. There are also more vacancies, less short-time working and more overtime than a year ago. Unemployment may be expected to level out and begin to fall in the wake of further improvement in the economy.
    Mr. Skinner: Has not the Secretary of State a duty to tell the nation when the suffering of the dole queue will end and the unemployment figures will fall? Does he recall that when the Government came to power they said that they would cut taxes for the wealthy and that the figures would fall; that they would increase taxes for the poor and that the figures would fall; and that they would have a monetarist policy and clobber the nurses and that the figures would fall? All that has proved to be of no avail. Is it not time that the right hon. Gentleman came to the Dispatch Box and told us categorically that the unemployment figures will fall before the end of the year? If he cannot do that, he ought to get out.
    Mr. Tebbit: I thank the hon. Gentleman for putting his question as courteously as usual, although not, if I may say
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    so, with his usual intellectual rigour or normal clear memory. The hon. Gentleman will remember that although the Government that he supported from time to time more than doubled unemployment, he did not ask that sort of question then.
    Mr. Parry: When will the Secretary of State for unemployment make a genuine attempt to reduce unemployment instead of attacking the trade unions through his Draconian legislation? May I advise and inform the right hon. Gentleman that next Monday in Liverpool the Labour movement will fight and begin—
    Mr. Speaker: Order. Question Time is for asking questions, not for giving information.
    Mr. Parry: I wish to tell the Secretary of State that we on Merseyside will fight his Bill next Monday—
    Mr. Speaker: Order. I have just said that Question Time is not for making statements.
    Mr. Parry: We shall kill his Bill.
    Mr. Tebbit: Since the end of the war Labour Governments have presided over a loss of almost 1½ million jobs, while to date, under Conservative Governments, there has been a small increase in the number of jobs. The hon. Gentleman should consider the long-term record.
    Although competitiveness in British industry has increased by some 10 per cent. over the past year, we are still a third less competitive than in 1975. We still have to make up the ground that was lost largely by the Labour Government, before we can get these matters right.
    Sir William Clark: Does my right hon. Friend agree that the stupid strike that the country is suffering at the moment can lead only to increased unemployment? Does he further agree that the action of some union leaders is industrial suicide and will mean only that they are acting against the work force that they are supposed to represent?
    Mr. Tebbit: I agree with most of what my hon. Friend said, but the leaders are not committing industrial suicide, they are murdering the jobs of their members, and their members will remember it.
    Mr. Harold Walker: Will the Secretary of State confirm that since the general election unemployment has increased by almost two and a half times? Is he aware that the 3 million victims of the Government's policies are becoming sick of his monthly platitudes and hope that he will eventually switch from rhetoric to action? Is he not aware of the CBI's support for the Labour Party's call for massive investment in infrastructure? Will he urge his Cabinet colleagues to generate desperately needed jobs? If not, is it not time that he got on his bike and looked for another job?
    Mr. Tebbit: The right hon. Gentleman lowers his standards when he refers to the Government being responsible for 3 million unemployed, because he left us with more than 1¼ million of those. Therefore, he had better get the facts right. I again remind him that we inherited not only a doubling of unemployment but a doubling of prices and a massive loss of competitiveness in the middle of a world recession. Britain is not the only country that is affected. For example, in Germany unemployment has increased by 50 per cent. in the past 12 months compared with 14 per cent. here. Vacancies there have halved, while vacancies in Britain have increased.
    Several Hon. Members rose—
    Mr. Speaker: Order. This subject comes up repeatedly in later questions.

    Young Workers (Training)
    Mr. Leeasked the Secretary of State for Employment if he is satisfied with the quality of training available to implement his statement of 21 June on training of young workers.
    The Under-Secretary of State for Employment (Mr. Peter Morrison): I am satisfied that the support that our training proposals have received from employers, unions and others, and the arrangements for quality assurance proposed by the Manpower Services Commission, will ensure the success of the new scheme.
    Mr. Lee: What discussions has my hon. Friend had with the MSC and similar bodies with regard to the monitoring of the quality of these schemes? Is there any likelihood of any certification or similar proposal at the end of the young person's period of training?
    Mr. Morrison: We are closely in touch with the MSC on the monitoring of the schemes. It intends to set up a national supervisory board and local area boards to supervise the schemes, and those boards will include industrialists acting as advisers. The intention is that there should be a certificate at the end of the year.
    Mr Flannery: Does the Minister realise that all our young people now feel that the training that ought to be given is how to enter the dole queue, because that is where the vast majority of them end up? Is that not the reality? What will the Minister do to prevent those young people from going on to the scrap-heap and the dole?
    Mr. Morrison: The hon Gentleman is probably not aware that in the last survey more than 70 per cent. of the young people on the youth opportunities programme said that they were very satisfied with the programme. With the increased training element in the youth training scheme, I am sure that that figure will increase substantially.
    Mr. Needham: Will my hon. Friend congratulate employers, particularly the CBI, on the determination and spirit that they have shown in an effort to get the new training initiative off the ground? Does that not compare favourably with the carping and negative attitude of the TUC and Labour Members in their approach to this whole question and with their failure to introduce such a scheme when they had the chance?
    Mr. Morrison: I certainly take this opportunity of congratulating employers, not least because they will be the sponsors of the 400,000-plus places that will be needed in September next year. I agree with my hon. Friend that certain Labour Members seem to be out of step with what the rest of the country thinks of this scheme.
    Mr. Barry Jones: It was the TUC which in effect, saved the scheme and gave it the chance to exist. Will the Minister accede to the request of the MSC's task group and merge the young workers scheme with the new training scheme? Is he not apprehensive that £260 million has been earmarked by his Department for the young workers scheme, with no guarantee of any training?
    Mr. Morrison: The short answer to the hon. Gentleman's question is "No". The young workers scheme fulfils a different purpose from the youth training scheme, and I believe that each can work alongside the other.

    Youth Opportunities Programme
    Mr. Trippierasked the Secretary of State for Employment how many young people entered the youth opportunities programme in 1981–82.
    The Under-Secretary of State for Employment (Mr. David Waddington): The number is 553,000.
    Mr. Trippier: I thank my hon. and learned Friend for that reply. How successful is YOP in getting young people into employment?
    Mr. Waddington: A survey carried out last autumn showed that about 60 per cent. of trainees went either into jobs or further training at the end of their period on YOP. Further improvements seem to be indicated by another survey, which is now being analysed.
    Mr. Tilley: Is the Minister aware that recently in a written answer I was supplied with details of the number of injuries sustained by young people on YOP in the last year? What assurance can he give that the health and safety aspects both of YOP, if it continues, and the new training initiative, when it begins, will be improved so that we do not have a doubling of the length of the programme leading to a doubling of the number of injuries?
    Mr. Waddington: We are determined to ensure that safety standards are as high for trainees as they are for ordinary employees. There is no reason why they should not be.
    Mr. Haselhurst: Was there any evidence of many young people wilfully choosing not to go on to the YOP if an offer was made to them?
    Mr. Waddington: I know of virtually no evidence of that happening.
    Mr. Newens: Does the hon. and learned Gentleman recognise that at the end of these schemes many young people find that there are no opportunities for them to take up, as a result of which they merely become unemployed and completely disillusioned? Does he appreciate that until the Government change their attitude to the economy and embark on a policy of reflation to give more jobs for all, this process will be only a palliative and will not succeed?
    Mr. Waddington: I remind the hon. Gentleman of what I have already said. We should like to see every young person go into a permanent job at the end of his training. It seems that the number going into permanent jobs is increasing, and that is a good sign. I disagree entirely with the hon. Gentleman's suggestion about how we might increase employment opportunities. His method would have precisely the reverse effect.

    Unemployment Statistics
    Mr. Winnickasked the Secretary of State for Employment what are the percentages of unemployed in the United Kingdom and in the West Midlands at the latest date and in May 1979.
    The Minister of State, Department of Employment (Mr. Michael Alison): At June 1982 the rate of

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    unemployment, seasonally adjusted and excluding school leavers, was 12·2 per cent. in the United Kingdom and 14·7 per cent. in the West Midlands region. The corresponding rates at May 1979 were 5·4 per cent. and 5·1 per cent. respectively.
    Mr. Winnick: That is a grave indictment of Government policy. Will the Minister take note that, set against the tragedy of millions of our fellow citizens being denied the opportunity to earn their living, the usual jeering remarks of the Secretary of State are a grave insult to the unemployed? Will he also bear in mind that there has been no let-up in the factory closures and massive redundancies that constantly occur in the West Midlands? The people there have paid a dear price for the Tory electoral victory of May 1979.
    Mr. Alison:
    "To an extent, present unemployment is international"—
    Mr. William Hamilton: We are talking about ours.
    Mr. Alison: I repeat:
    "To an extent, present unemployment is international and beyond the control of the United Kingdom Government; record levels are being registered in most industrialised countries."
    The words that I have just quoted come from the report on unemployment by the Select Committee in another place, signed by Lord Lee, Lord McCarthy and Lord Melchett.
    Mr. Bulmer: Is my right hon. Friend aware that many people in my constituency believe that jobs have been lost in the Kidderminster carpet industry because selective help has been given to firms in other parts of the country, with which it competes? Will he discuss that with colleagues and ensure that such discrimination does not continue?
    Mr. Alison: I take note of what my hon. Friend has said and undertake to look into the matter.
    Mr. Golding: Where else in the world has unemployment in an industrial area increased as much as in North Staffordshire in particular, and the West Midlands in general?
    Mr. Alison: As the hon. Gentleman knows only too well, a sad loss of competitiveness was registered as a result—[HON. MEMBERS: "Where?"]—of our appallingly poor performance in terms of output and unit labour costs in manufacturing industry, which are unmatched anywhere else in the Western world. That explains why we have such high unemployment.
    Mr. Cormack: Is my right hon. Friend aware that there is deep distress in the West Midlands and that until that area recovers properly the economy as a whole is in dire danger? Does he accept that many of us believe that there is a great deal to be said for a Minister with special responsibility for this area, just as my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Environment was given special responsibility for Liverpool?
    Mr. Alison: I note both what my right hon. Friend has said and his strong constituency links and roots in the West Midlands. He will appreciate that the level of manufacturing activity in the West Midlands is much higher than the average for the United Kingdom. That leaves the West Midlands more exposed to the cold wind of recession than any other part of the United Kingdom.

    Long-term Unemployment
    Mr. Dormandasked the Secretary of State for Employment what is the number of long-term unemployed at the latest available date.
    Mr. Tebbit: At 15 April the number of people registered as unemployed for over 52 weeks in the United Kingdom was 994,395.
    Mr. Dormand: Is that not the highest-ever figure of people who have been unemployed for more than 12 months? Does the Secretary of State agree that the number of long-term unemployed is one of the most significant indicators to the state of the economy? Is he aware that the MSC has forecast that that number will be over 1 million for the next three years? How much evidence do he and the Government require to make fundamental changes in their policies?
    Mr. Tebbit: We should require evidence that better policies were available, and that evidence is in extremely short supply. If the hon. Gentleman does not believe me, I suggest that he takes a short trip to France to see what has already resulted from the implementation of policies similar to those advocated by the Labour Party and the SDP. Fortunately, that Government have now seen some of the difficulties and their policies are converging with ours.
    As to long-term unemployment, I hope that the hon. Member will use all his influence with his friends to persuade them to support the scheme being discussed within the MSC for expansion of help for about 100,000—[Interruption.] When hon. Members shout and interrupt they only cut other hon. Members out of Question Time. They should persuade their friends to support the scheme designed to help another 100,000 of the long-term unemployed back into jobs.
    Mr. Wrigglesworth: Does the Secretary of State agree that unemployment and the long-term unemployed are the major issues now facing the country? Therefore, is it not important that we should debate these matters fully in the House? If so, does he agree that it is deplorable that during the debate on unemployment last night only six hon. Members were ever in attendance on the Labour Benches, and that none of the Labour Members voted in the Division last night?
    Mr. Tebbit: That is probably accounted for by the fact that they had not expected to hear anything new—
    Mr. Wrigglesworth: From the Government Front Bench?
    Mr. Tebbit: —from the party that proposed the debate or from those who spoke from the Liberal and SDP Benches.
    The problem of the long-term unemployed is a major one. That is why the Chancellor offered to make available an extra £150 million to help ease that problem, and that is why we have to regain competitiveness to win back lost markets, not least at home.
    Mr. Kenneth Carlisle: Is my right hon. Friend aware that, after being unemployed for some time, many people wish to take on work within the community, often without pay? However, they are inhibited from doing so by fear of losing benefit. Will my right hon. Friend undertake to

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    review the regulations so that those who genuinely want to help the community while seeking work will be more freely able to do so?
    Mr. Tebbit: That was one of the principal objectives of the scheme put forward by my right hon. and learned Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer. We are always anxious to do that, but we are sometimes frustrated by those who believe, rightly or wrongly, that it would damage voluntary institutions, and others who believe that it will lead to widespread undercutting of regular wages. Both those beliefs are misconceived.
    Mr. Radice: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that unemployment in France is much lower than it is in the United Kingdom and has stabilised, whereas here, since the Conservative Party came to power, long-term unemployment has risen by two and a half times? Is it not time that the Government increased the community enterprise programme, which accounts for only 30,000 places, when the long-term unemployed number 1 million?
    Mr. Tebbit: Inflation in France is 14 per cent., it has just devalued its currency for the second time, it has a massive problem of a balance of payments deficit, and it is imposing freezes on prices and incomes. I do not think that its Government can be said to be holding to the policies on which they were elected, policies that are similar to those of the hon. Gentleman and his party.

    Flexible Retirement
    Sir David Priceasked the Secretary of State for Employment if he has made any assessment of the extent to which flexible retirement for men between the ages of 60 and 65 years would provide job opportunities for younger people.
    Mr. Peter Morrison: A recent survey of the job release scheme, which allows people nearing retirement age to give up work early provided that their employer undertakes to recruit an unemployed person as a replacement worker, showed that 40 per cent. of replacement workers are aged under 25.
    Sir David Price: That is an encouraging start, but is my right hon. Friend aware that over 900,000 men at work are aged between 60 and 65, and that more of them would be willing to take earlier retirement—
    Mr. Canavan: Speak for yourself.
    Sir David Price: —if the State pension scheme could be made fully flexible?
    Mr. Morrison: I heard my hon. Friend, but he will agree with me that the conditions of the job release scheme are perhaps the most effective way to get people into work.
    Mr. Greville Janner: Does the Minister agree that the most effective way of getting people back to work would be to allow men to retire at 60 if they wished, allowing some of those thousands of people out of work and desperate for those jobs to get them? Is it not a ludicrous paradox that in constituencies such as mine there are hundreds of men desperate for dignified retirement, while there are thousands of young people in desperate need of those jobs?
    Mr. Morrison: As the hon. and learned Gentleman is no doubt aware, if the retirement age for men were reduced
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    to 60 it would result in about another 420,000 jobs, but it would cost £2,500 million, and the Government must have regard to resources.

    Merseyside
    Mr. Allan Robertsasked the Secretary of State for Employment if he will meet the officers and board of the Merseyside urban development corporation to discuss measures to reduce unemployment on Merseyside.
    Mr. Waddington: Although my right hon. Friend has no plans at present to meet the Merseyside development corporation he would be most interested to discuss with it how this major initiative can contribute towards making Merseyside more attractive to industry and employment.
    Mr. Roberts: Will the Minister consider three specific proposals when he meets the Merseyside development corporation, bearing in mind that my constituency has 16 per cent. more unemployed now than at this time last year? First, will he consider giving it urban aid powers to give grants in the same way as local authorities? Secondly, will he consider extending the area covered by the Merseyside development corporation, especially in my constituency? Finally, will he consider with it giving development area grants in Merseyside to service industries and commercial concerns related to the docks, as well as to manufacturing industries?
    Mr. Waddington: The hon. Gentleman will appreciate that these are matters far more in the responsibility of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Environment, but I shall study the points that he has made. I should not like it to be thought that the Merseyside development corporation was not already doing some very important things in the hon. Gentleman's constituency. I have in mind the 45,000 sq ft of advance factory units already put up and the reclamation of 27 acres at Langton goods depot and the Rimrose improvement area.
    Mr. Alton: Is the hon. and learned Gentleman aware that many of these factory units are empty and that, however desirable trees and shrubs may be, they are no substitute for the 89,000 jobs that have been lost in Liverpool over the past 10 years, where there has been a 200 per cent. increase in unemployment? Is he further aware that the city planning officer estimates that in four years' time a further 30,000 people could become unemployed in Liverpool? What will he do about that? Is the hon. and learned Gentleman aware that youngsters on Merseyside—
    Mr. Speaker: Order. That is more than enough.
    Mr. Waddington: The hon. Gentleman is aware that there is no part of the United Kingdom where more Government incentives are available than in Merseyside. There is the Merseyside development corporation, which has already been referred to. There is the special development area, the Speke enterprise zone, the Liverpool inner city partnership area and my right hon. Friend's task force. Abundant aid is being made available, and Liverpool and Merseyside will benefit with the revival of the economy, as will other parts of the country.
    Mr. Tom Benyon: Further to the question of my hon. Friend the Member for Lincoln (Mr. Carlisle), is my hon. and learned Friend aware of the plight of the disabled and handicapped who are trying to get work? Will he ask the

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    Treasury to revise the rules for people, especially those who have multiple sclerosis, who are trying to work and who are in danger of losing their invalidity benefit because there is no scaling down for people who suffer from this disease and who wish to take part-time work?
    Mr. Waddington: I should point out to my hon. Friend that the question is about the Merseyside urban development corporation. I shall, of course, note all that he says and do what I can.
    Mr. Parry: Does the Minister agree that the Mickey Mouse gimmicks introduced by his right hon. Friend the Minister responsible for Merseyside, like the development corporation and the enterprise zone there, will in fact produce few jobs? Will he have a word with his right hon. Friend to see whether he will introduce measures that will make a positive attempt to reduce the 20 per cent. unemployment on Merseyside?
    Mr. Waddington: It is difficult to follow what the hon. Member for Liverpool, Scotland Exchange (Mr. Parry) is saying. I thought that most Opposition Members believed in assistance for the regions, and if one looks at the area one sees that it is getting more of that assistance than anywhere else.

    Wages Council Awards (Survey)
    Mr. David Atkinsonasked the Secretary of State for Employment if he will commission a survey to investigate whether, and to what extent, employers are inhibited from recruiting new employees by reason of the level of wages council awards.
    Mr. Tebbit: It is self-evident that wages are ultimately limited by the ability of employers to pay, which is in turn limited by the prices which, in the light of home and overseas competition, they are able to obtain for their products. There is, therefore, little doubt that the higher the level at which councils set minimum wages the fewer people will be employed, but I am doubtful that a survey could readily quantify this effect.
    Mr. Atkinson: I thank my right hon. Friend for that encouraging reply. Does he agree that the weekend speech by my right hon. and learned Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer in which he referred to the Conservative manifesto commitment to abolish wages councils, will be warmly welcomed by both unemployed people and trade union members alike—[Interruption]—because of the interference by wages councils, which has resulted in the loss of thousands of jobs in the private sector?
    Mr. Tebbit: Let us be quite clear about what my right hon. and learned Friend the Chancellor said. He asked: is there really a case for wages councils imposing minimum rates that frustrate market forces? In my opinion, any reasonably minded man must come to the same conclusion as my right hon. and learned Friend. To put it mildly, the answer to the question would appear to be "No".
    Mr. Ashley: Does the Secretary of State accept that, of all the methods for reducing unemployment, the most offensive and despicable would be to cut the wages of those who are already receiving the lowest wages in our society?
    Mr. Ashton: Scrooge.
    Mr. Tebbit: I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman understands that no job can exist for long if what it
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    produces is less than what the market is willing to pay for the product. That is the problem of wages councils, when they set wages above what the market will bear.
    Mr. John Townend: Does my right hon. Friend agree that our main priority should be the preservation and creation of jobs? If, as many of us believe, wages councils destroy jobs, should we not take prompt action, regardless of the International Labour Organisation? Does my right hon. Friend agree that this is a case for turning a Nelsonian blind eye to that body, in the interests of unemployed people, and especially the young unemployed?
    Mr. Ashton: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. May I draw your attention to the fact that Conservative Members who are asking questions have a vested interest—
    Mr. Speaker: Order.
    Mr. William Hamilton: The hon. Member for Bridlington (Mr. Townend) runs a sweat shop.
    Mr. Tebbit: Opposition Members could not run a sweet shop—I do not know about a sweat shop.
    The British Government do not lightly turn aside from treaty commitments. We are bound by the treaty into which we have entered, and we should comply with its provisions.
    Mr. Radice: On the subject of the Minister's theory of job creation by lower wages, has the Secretary of State seen the report issued by his own Department, showing that variations in youth unemployment have little systematic relationship with changes in earnings? Are the Department of Employment Ministers frightened of being confused by the facts?
    Mr. Tebbit: No, not at all. That is not the central point at issue. The central point of that survey was the relationship between youth wages and adult wages. Here we are talking about the overall level of wages. Unless someone has repealed the law of supply and demand, I am afraid that the hon. Gentleman has to accept that the higher the price that is asked for labour, the less labour will be employed.

    Northern Region
    Mr. David Watkinsasked the Secretary of State for Employment what are the current numbers and percentage of unemployed persons in the Northern region.
    Mr. Waddington: At 10 June the number of people registered as unemployed in the Northern region was 223,010 and the unemployment rate was 16·7 per cent.
    Mr. Watkins: Is the Minister aware that, serious as those figures are, male unemployment in my constituency is now 33·3 per cent. and rising? How does that, together with the regional figures that he has just given, reflect the alleged improvement in the national economy about which the Government keep telling us?
    Mr. Waddington: I fully appreciate the serious situation in Consett, but I think that Labour Members know that even there people are getting jobs. Indeed, 2,300 former BSC employees have found jobs or gone into training since the plant was closed. That is no mean achievement. Consett remains a special development area. Forty-five new small firms have been established since the

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    steel closure. Other firms in the Consett travel-to-work area have expanded, creating 300 new jobs. So it is quite wrong to say that the situation is hopeless. Consett is recovering from a traumatic and terrible experience.
    Mr. Dormand: Does the Minister agree that the three new towns in the Northern region have made a significant contribution in attracting new jobs to the North? In those circumstances, what possible justification can there be for the Secretary of State for the Environment—I realise that this is not the Minister's Department—winding up those three development corporations at the end of 1985? Will he undertake to make the strongest representations to his right hon. Friend to extend the life of those corporations for as long as there is a job need?
    Mr. Waddington: I shall, of course, pass on the hon. Gentleman's comments to my right hon. Friend. However, I do not want the House to imagine from what the hon. Gentleman said that no aid is going to the Northern region. Far from it. Only the other day the hon. Gentleman heard that Teesside was to become a special development area.

    Apprenticeship Reform
    Mr. Cadburyasked the Secretary of State for Employment if he has received representations on the need for reform of the traditional apprentice schemes.
    Mr. Peter Morrison: Consultations on the new training initiative have shown widespread agreement that traditional approaches to the skill training of young people need to be modernised. The Government have declared their support for the removal of both the time-serving and the age barriers in the apprenticeship system.
    Mr. Cadbury: I thank my hon. Friend for that reply. Does he agree that we need to move away from narrowly defined craft-based apprenticeship schemes towards a system that is capable of producing multi-skilled technicians who are more relevant to modern technology? Does he agree that that would help immensely to improve productivity in British industry, by helping to break down demarcation barriers?
    Mr. Morrison: The short answer to my hon. Friend is "Yes". We should have a much more flexible approach to skill training in this country. The objectives in the new training initiative, with which the Government agree, are designed to that end.
    Mr. Christopher Price: How much responsibility will industry take for the new training initiative? What proportion of that training does the Minister expect to take place in private industry and what proportion does he expect to have to dump on the further education system because employers are not playing their part?
    Mr. Morrison: At this stage the response from industry is very encouraging indeed. To give proportions would be impossible, because we are talking about a scheme that will be launched in full in September next year. Certainly industry is playing its part at the moment.

    General Employment Service (Rayner Review)
    Mr. Craigenasked the Secretary of State for Employment what arrangements have been made for the process of consultation on the report of the employment services division Rayner scrutiny on the general employment service in Great Britain.
    Mr. Peter Morrison: The report was published on 3 June 1982 by the Manpower Services Commission with an invitation to interested organisations and individuals to comment on its conclusions and recommendations by 9 July 1982.
    Mr. Craigen: Why has there been such a hole-in-corner approach to the publication of this document, which has such damaging prospects for the jobcentre network?
    Does the Minister subscribe to the implicit view of the authors that it is not worth bothering about the placement in employment of unskilled and semi-skilled workers in future and that they should be left to their own devices?
    Mr. Morrison: There has not been a hole-in-corner approach to the publication of the document. The Manpower Services Commission has made it available to whomsoever wanted it. It has been available in the Vote Office and has been given to the Clerk of the Select Committee on Employment. The matter rests at the moment with the Manpower Services Commission and the Government await its conclusions before making their judgment.
    Mr. Timothy Smith: As the report makes recommendations which, if implemented, would lead to savings of more than £10 million, will my hon. Friend ensure that in so far as he agrees with them they are implemented as soon as possible?
    Mr. Morrison: I certainly wish to see the jobcentre network run in as cost-effective a way as is possible. That is why my right hon. Friend the Member for Lowestoft (Mr. Prior), when he was Secretary of State for Employment, suggested the review to the Manpower Services Commission.
    Mr. Barry Jones: Is the Minister not ashamed that the MSC's employment services division has already sustained a staff cut of 1,700 and a budgetary cut of £60 million? Is it not the case that the disabled, the long-term unemployed and the young blacks will bear the brunt of cuts in jobcentres?
    Mr. Morrison: I am certainly not ashamed. I should be ashamed if the jobcentres were not run on a cost-effective basis. The point of the review is to ensure that they are.
    Mr. Stokes: Is my hon. Friend aware that, generally speaking, private enterprise can run an employment agency far more efficiently and at far lower cost than a State undertaking? The sooner they are all taken over by private enterprise the better.
    Mr. Morrison: There is a place for the private employment agency alongside the public employment service, which should be run on as cost-effective a basis as possible.

    Long-term Unemployment
    Mr. Leightonasked the Secretary of State for Employment how many long-term unemployed are registered at East Ham; and what was the comparable figure 12 months ago.
    Mr. Waddington: At April 1982 the number of people registered as unemployed for over 52 weeks in the East Ham employment office area was 1,308. The corresponding figure at April 1981 was 491.
    Mr. Leighton: Does the Minister recognise that those atrocious figures show an increase in the long-term unemployed over 12 months of well over 100 per cent.? Was that the Government's intention, or is it an indictment of their policies? Does the Minister realise the despair and social tension that such figures cause? What hope can he hold out to those of my constituents who are afflicted by such problems?
    Mr. Waddington: One thousand and seventy-three people have been placed in employment by the employment service in the past 12 months. Vacancies are well up compared with a year ago. It is wrong to paint a completely gloomy picture. East Ham and the hon. Gentleman's constituency will, like other parts of Britain, benefit as the Government's policies begin to work out.

    Unemployment Statistics
    Mr. Cryerasked the Secretary of State for Employment if he will make a statement on the latest unemployment figures.
    Mr. Tebbit: I refer the hon. Gentleman to my reply to the hon. Members for Bolsover (Mr. Skinner) and Liverpool, Scotland Exchange (Mr. Parry) earlier today.
    Mr. Cryer: Are not those deplorable figures brought about by the deliberate policies of the Government? Is the Secretary of State aware that under Tory rule—nothing to do with the Labour Government—there has been an increase in unemployment in my constituency of almost 200 per cent. and a similar increase in supplementary benefit payments to the unemployed? Is it not madness to cut back on public expenditure and create unemployment that results in over £4 billion being spent each year on supplementary and unemployment benefit? Would it not be better to use that money to create the jobs that the Government promised at the last election than to have their training scheme cosmetics?
    Mr. Tebbit: In turn, the question might be put to the hon. Gentleman—[Interruption.] The House will notice that I did not ask a question of the hon. Gentleman. I said that, in turn, the question might be put to the hon.
    Gentleman—[Interruption]—whether he took the view that the increased unemployment in his constituency while he was a Minister in the last Government was his responsibility. The fact of the matter is—[Interruption.]
    Mr. Speaker: Order. The Minister must be allowed to reply. Whether hon. Members like the answer or not, he must be allowed to give it.
    Mr. Arthur Lewis: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. May I refer you to your comment that the Minister is entitled to make a reply? The right hon. Gentleman said that he was going to ask the hon. Gentleman a question.
    Mr. Speaker: Order. I am much obliged to the hon. Gentleman, but we are taking time from Prime Minister's Questions. The Minister must be allowed to answer.
    Mr. Tebbit: The hon. Member for Newham, North-West (Mr. Lewis) did not hear me. I did not ask a question.
    Under the last Government, Britain's competitiveness suffered massively. We lost about 50 per cent. of competitiveness. In the past year we have regained about 10 or 15 per cent. of our competitiveness. That must continue in order to regain the jobs that the Labour Government exported to our rivals overseas.
    Mr. Cryer: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. In view of the totally inadequate nature of the Secretary of State's reply, I give notice that I intend to raise this matter on the Adjournment. The people of Keighley would like to return to the level of unemployment that existed under the Labour Government.

  PRIME MINISTER

    Engagements
    Mr. Sainsburyasked the Prime Minister if she will list her official engagements for Tuesday 6 July.
    The Prime Minister (Mrs. Margaret Thatcher): This morning I had meetings with ministerial colleagues and others, including one with Sir Anthony Parsons. In addition to my duties in the House, I shall be having further meetings later today. This evening I hope to have an audience of Her Majesty the Queen.
    Mr. Sainsbury: I suspect that during my right hon. Friend's busy day she might have occasion to consider the implications of the strike action being undertaken by some train drivers. Can she confirm that, given the acceptance by the work force of the necessity of operating the railways in the most efficient way possible for the benefit of the consumer, the Government would wish to continue their financial support for the railways and see the new investment that could give Britain the railway system of which it could be proud?
    The Prime Minister: I agree with my hon. Friend that we very much want a railway system of which we can be proud.
    There is already considerable investment in British Rail—about £3 billion since 1976 and about £350 million last year. However, if investment is to continue on anything like that scale we must be sure that it will secure a proper return. Therefore, we must have excellent productivity practices and not be dependent upon those that were agreed in 1919. There will then be greater hopes for an efficient railway. Where the Government request British Rail to run specific services that would not otherwise be commercial, they expect to meet the cost with a special operating grant.
    Mr. Foot: We have always urged, and will continue to urge, that there should be increased investment in British Rail. As the present crisis is undoubtedly causing great hardship and difficulty to all concerned, could not a settlement of the dispute be sought on the basis of the proposals that the British Railways Board put forward on 25 June?
    The Prime Minister: Investment itself is not necessarily good. It must be productive investment. Unproductive investment merely takes away from investment that could otherwise be made and produce a better return. The board has made every effort to solve the dispute. It is quite right to insist on the introduction of flexible rostering and to insist that there cannot be any more money without greater efficiency.
    Mr. Foot: Will the right hon. Lady answer my question? It is important, because the railways will suffer losses as a result of the strike. Does she favour a settlement on the basis of the proposals made on 25 June? Having put

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    forward those proposals, why did the British Railways Board withdraw them last week? Will the right hon. Lady consider the matter and try to secure a proper settlement?
    The Prime Minister: ASLEF went on strike. The handling of that stike must be left to the British Railways Board. It cannot be handled in the House or at No. 10 Downing Street. However, we can lay down the very important principle that it is totally wrong to try—as the Labour Party has frequently done—to encourage the unions to believe that there will always be more money without more efficiency and better working methods.
    Mr. Foot: We want to overcome this crisis. Will the right hon. Lady say whether she supports the board's proposals, which have now been withdrawn?
    The Prime Minister: I leave the negotiations—rightly—to the British Railways Board. The Government have stood behind the British Railways Board in its negotiations.
    Mr. Timothy Smith: Did my right hon. Friend hear Mr. Ray Buckton this morning when he explained to Radio 4 listeners that we live in a democratic country? Is it not about time that he introduced a little democracy into his union and consulted his members about this damaging dispute?
    The Prime Minister: I understand that a number of ASLEF members have made precisely the same point. A considerable number of them are now working because they attach more importance to serving the travelling public—which is quite right—than to insisting on increased pay without improved working practices.

    Falkland Islands
    Mr. Allan Robertsasked the Prime Minister when she intends the inquiry relating to the Falkland Islands to report.
    The Prime Minister: The inquiry must be given whatever time it needs to complete its review, but I hope that it will be able to report within six months, and sooner if possible.
    Mr. Roberts: Will the Prime Minister therefore confirm that she has categorically ruled out an October general election, because she realises that before any electoral contest the House and the country should be given the full facts about the causes of the Falklands crisis and about the Government's responsibility for it?
    The Prime Minister: I should be utterly amazed if there were an October election.
    Mr. Hill: Is my right hon. Friend aware that an extremely happy event will take place at 11 am this Sunday when "Canberra" returns home with 3,000 of our fighting men on board? If possible, will she send a message to the ship's captain and perhaps accompany me to the quay at Southampton to welcome the ship back?
    The Prime Minister: I am sure that everyone is extremely grateful for the excellent services provided by the whole of the Merchant Marine during the Falkland Islands crisis. We should like especially to congratulate the captain and crew of "Canberra" on having performed such a wonderful service on behalf of our country.
    Mr. Christopher Price: Might I welcome the Prime Minister—[Interruption.]—to the ranks of those who wish to get rid of the 30-year rule of secrecy for Cabinet documents?
    Is she aware that compared with her attitude to the Bingham report—which would have exposed some of capitalism's shortcomings—her change of heart is very welcome? Will she extend her strictures on the 30-year rule.
    The Prime Minister: I happen to be very much in favour of the 30-year rule against the publication of Cabinet documents. That is quite a different matter from revealing Cabinet documents, and Cabinet Committee documents, to Privy Councillors for an inquiry that wishes to draw its own conclusions. However, that does not mean that the documents can be published.

    Engagements
    Mr. Leightonasked the Prime Minister if she will list her official engagements for 6 July.
    The Prime Minister: I refer the hon. Gentleman to the reply that I gave some moments ago.
    Mr. Leighton: Does the Prime Minister recall the answer that she gave on 9 February to my right hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan), when he warned her of the serious error of paying off HMS "Endurance" and of the consequences of such action? I believe that it was to be sold for about £3 million. Events in the South Atlantic have, I understand, cost rather more than £3 million. What has been the cost of the killing and maiming? As the Foreign Secretary honourably resigned, is it not time for her to accept, in grace and humility, her share of responsibility and culpability?
    The Prime Minister: HMS "Endurance" was between the Falkland Islands and South Georgia at the time of the invasion. It was there throughout the invasion of the Falkland Islands. The ship has only two 20 mm guns and two Wasp helicopters.
    Mr. Marland: During the course of the day will my right hon. Friend find time to consider the proposed increase in charges that has been announced by British Telecom? It seems to illustrate the insensitivity of the nationalised industries, which pile more and more charges on private industry and individuals.
    The Prime Minister: I entirely agree with the point underlying my hon. Friend's question. We need much greater efficiency from British Telecom and from every other industry. We need to reduce overmanning and restrictive practices. However, much money is being invested in new equipment for British Telecom. Over the year British Telecom's profits are about £450 million, which is only about one-quarter of the amount that we are investing in British Telecom. We trust that that new investment will be used efficiently.
    Mr. Roy Jenkins rose—
    Hon. Members: Hear, hear.
    Mr. Jenkins: On the Falkland Islands inquiry—[Interruption]—will—
    Mr. Speaker: Order. It is very unfair if a right hon. or hon. Member is not allowed to put his question. If the House stands for anything, it stands for freedom of speech.
    Mr. Jenkins: Can the Prime Minister confirm that the inquiry's terms of reference will not now involve any leisurely ramble over the history of the past two decades, but will concentrate on immediate events, although possibly with a right to look back for the purposes of comparison and clarification?
    The Prime Minister: By kind permission of Mr. Speaker, the answer to a written question from the Leader of the Opposition was published at 2.45 pm today, setting out the terms of reference of the proposed inquiry in the following terms:
    "To review the way in which the responsibilities of Government in relation to the Falkland Islands and their dependencies were discharged in the period leading up to the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands on 2 April 1982, taking account of all such factors in previous years as are relevant; and to report."
    I am also glad to announce—as is stated in that reply—that Lord Franks has agreed to be chairman of the committee.

    Falkland Islands
    Sir David Priceasked the Prime Minister if, pursuant to her reply on 18 June, Official Report, column 353, she is now in a position to announce the result of her consideration of a suitable form of commemoration for the recovery of the Falkland Islands and their dependencies for the British Crown.
    The Prime Minister: As I said in the House on 1 July, a service of thanksgiving and remembrance for those who fell in the campaign will be held in St. Paul's cathedral on Monday 26 July at 11 am. Her Majesty the Queen, together with other members of the Royal Family, will attend. The next-of-kin of those who died will be invited, together with representatives of the Services, Merchant Navy and other direct participants in the conflict. Representatives of those involved in the support of the Falklands operation from Britain will also be invited. Seats will be available for the public and they will be allocated by ballot.
    Sir David Price: While thanking my right hon. Friend for making those proper and traditional arrangements to commemorate our victory in the Falkland Islands, may I
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    ask whether she will also ensure that our victorious Service men have an opportunity to parade through our capital city?
    The Prime Minister: We have not yet made arrangements for such a parade. It is likely that there will be one in the autumn. In addition to the Government, the lord mayor of the City of London is considering the matter, so that we may provide some entertainment.
    Mr. Christopher Price: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I do not dispute your decision to release the terms of reference of the Falkland Islands inquiry exceptionally at 2.45 pm. Many hon. Members who have questions down for written answer for a specific day would wish the terms of the answers to those questions to be available so that they might put supplementary questions to Ministers in the House. Are you aware, Mr. Speaker, that it is not right that the Government, at their caprice and whim, should be allowed to switch the traditional time for answering questions tabled for written answer simply for their political convenience?
    Mr. Speaker: I understand that this was the wish of both the Leader of the House and the Prime Minister and that it meets the wishes of the House. [HON. MEMBERS: "No".] The House has had information that it would not otherwise have received because it could not have been revealed until later. Secondly, I am following precedent; it has been done before. I did not create the precedent and, as the hon. Gentleman knows, from time to time, in the interests of the House, we find the appropriate precedent to follow.
    Mr. Faulds: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. As Prime Minister's Question Time started two or three minutes late, why should the Prime Minister be defended by not allowing it to run for 15 minutes rather than terminating it after 12 minutes?
    Mr. Speaker: When the hon. Gentleman is appointed Speaker, he can put that point of view, but in the meantime the House has asked me to accept that responsibility.
    Mr. Ashton: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. As there is some dispute about the flexible rostering of the business of the House, may we have a secret ballot on it?

Business of the House
3.33 pm
The Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons (Mr. John Biffen): With permission, Mr. Speaker, I wish to make a short business statement.
The business on Thursday 8 July will now be as follows:
Until about 7 o'clock, debate on a Government motion on the decision to appoint a committee to review matters leading up to the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands. Afterwards, Supply day debate on the Army, on a motion for the Adjournment of the House.
Several Hon. Members rose—
Mr. Speaker: Order. I shall call a few hon. Members to put questions, but this is a brief statement about a debate being available to us on Thursday.
Mr. Frank Hooley: Will the Supply day debate run until 10 o'clock or midnight?
Mr. Biffen: The motion that will govern the day's business will enable the Supply day debate to run long enough to make up for the time that will have been for-gone.
Mr. Tam Dalyell: In the interests of those of us who are not Privy Councillors, and reflecting what happened on Saturday 3 April when a truncated debate in the House led to a reflection of opinion that may not have been the true opinion of the entire House at the time, is it satisfactory that such a crucial debate should be limited to three hours?
If it is limited to three hours, will the Prime Minister outline the events that led to the firing of torpedoes on the "General Belgrano" and tell us especially whether Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse consulted her before giving the order to fire?
Mr. Speaker: Order. Those questions can be raised during the debate on Thursday.
Mr. Maurice Macmillan: May the House debate the terms of reference and amend them?
Mr. Biffen: The motion will be amendable.
Mr. Christopher Price: Will the Government announce the full membership of the inquiry committee before the debate or simply in the opening speech of the debate?
Mr. Biffen: I cannot anticipate the contents of my right hon. Friend's opening speech, but doubtless she will have heard the hon. Gentleman's point.
Several Hon. Members rose—
Mr. Speaker: Order. I propose to call the four hon. Members who have been trying to catch my eye.
Mr. Michael English: Will the motion include South Georgia as well as the Falkland Islands? I believe that Argentina invaded South Georgia first.
Mr. Biffen: I am sure that the debate will be sufficiently elastic to cover the point that worries the hon. Gentleman.
Mr. Harry Ewing: Although the Leader of the House cannot
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anticipate the Prime Minister's opening speech, will he ensure that she explains to the House the constitutional point raised by the right hon. Member for Sidcup (Mr. Heath), because she appears to be saying to the nation that she has the right, without asking permission, to examine the papers of previous Administrations?
Mr. Biffen: I am sure that that matter will be fully and adequately covered.
Mr. George Foulkes: Further to the matter raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham, West (Mr. Price), will the Prime Minister ensure that the names of the other members of the committee are made available before the debate and not in her introductory speech?
Mr. Biffen: I cannot go beyond the answer that I have already given.
Mr. Nigel Spearing: Will the Leader of the House make it clear whether the inquiry will be set up by a motion of the House or whether it will be an inquiry appointed by the Government on which the House is invited to make observations?
Mr. Biffen: The House will be invited to approve the inquiry.
Mr. Dalyell: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. Would I be right in thinking that the time for Back-Bench Members' contributions to the debate on the Falkland Islands inquiry will be limited to one and a quarter hours or, at most, one and a half hours, because there will be four major Front Bench speeches? Do you, as Speaker of the House, believe that it is satisfactory that Back-Bench Members' contributions should be limited to that extent?
Mr. Speaker: I do not decide the timing of the debate.
Mr. Dick Douglas: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker.
Mr. Speaker: Order. Points of order simply take time from the major debate in which many hon. Members, including the hon. Member for Dunfermline (Mr. Douglas), will hope to catch my eye.
Mr. Douglas: It was not my intention unduly to take up the time of the House, Mr. Speaker. The name of the head of the Falkland Islands inquiry has been widely leaked to the press. May we have an assurance that information about the other members of the committee of inquiry will not be leaked to the press but will be given to the House?
Mr. Speaker: That is not a point of order.

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY DOCUMENTS
Ordered,
That European Community Document No. 7298/80, concerning Energy Labelling, be referred to a Standing Committee on European Community Documents.—[Mr. David Hunt.]

STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS, &c.
Ordered,
That the draft Commonwealth Agricultural Bureaux (Immunities and Privileges) Order 1982 be referred to a Standing Committee on Statutory Instruments, &c.—[Mr. David Hunt.]

Disablement (Prohibition of Unjustifiable Discrimination)
3.40 pm
Mr. Jack Ashley: I beg to move,
That leave be given to bring in a Bill to provide that discrimination of an unjustifiable nature against disabled people shall be illegal.
The basic issue of the Bill is one of human rights because too many disabled people are suffering from a denial of those rights. They are being burdened with the dual handicap of their disability and of completely unjustified discrimination. Examples of such discrimination abound. It must be hard for a disabled person to be told that people like him should stay at home; that he is to be sacked because his work mates will not work with a disabled person; that teachers will not teach him because he is disabled; or that employers will not interview him as he has a disability, although the disability is irrelevant to that job.
Sometimes the discrimination is bizarre or downright silly. For example, a draughtsman with an artificial leg was offered a job, but the offer was withdrawn when his disability was discovered. Therefore, I can presume only that the employer thought that he drew with his feet. A Butlin's holiday camp refused to accommodate disabled people in the summer but said that it would accept them in the spring or autumn. The people there said that they could not accommodate them because of the hills in the area, so I presume that those hills disappeared during the spring and autumn.
Those examples are taken from the report of the Committee on Restrictions Against Disabled People, called CORAD, under the chairmanship of Peter Large. The committee was in no doubt that the evidence of discrimination that it received was the tip of the iceberg. After studying the problem for three years it felt that discrimination against disabled people was just as extensive as discrimination on the grounds of race and sex.
So the question I want to put is: how should the House try to deal with the unnecessary burden of discrimination placed on disabled people? CORAD was in no doubt that discrimination should be made illegal and that there should be legislation. I am convinced that that is the most realistic and effective solution to the problem. I am not suggesting that legislation is the only method. Of course, it is not. There is room for education and for persuasion, which have an important role to play. However, we need something stronger. What we require is strong legislation.
The Bill, which follows the recommendations of CORAD, would make illegal unjustified discrimination on the ground of disability. It would cover all areas where discrimination occurs, including employment, education, transport and the provision of goods and services. There would have to be a commission with powers to investigate and to conciliate, if necessary with the power to take
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appropriate legal action to stop unjustifiable discrimination. I emphasise the word "unjustifiable". I am not asking for something unreasonable. I believe that a sense of proportion is necessary. That would be embodied in my Bill.
No one pretends that disablement does not pose problems. I am not making absurd or preposterous demands for blind bus drivers; I am not suggesting that there should be deaf piano tuners. No one is making ridiculous suggestions. The Bill cannot be laughed out on those grounds.
The Bill does not seek an unreasonable ban or discrimination. For example, it would not be an offence to discriminate where the costs would be disproportionate to the benefits, if it was absolutely impractical to make changes or if the changes created definite safety hazards. I recognise all those problems and I take them into account in my Bill.
However, the Bill is necessary because unjustifiable discrimination exists. To outlaw discrimination is the most direct method of reducing it. The Bill will not immediately affect attitudes towards disabled people, but it can affect the behaviour of the public towards disabled people. In time its influence would be felt on attitudes, because antidiscrimination Acts approved by Parliament have a vital declaratory effect in contrast to the bromides that we have been hearing in recent years. Above all, such legislation would confer legal rights rather than hopeful expectations. In a generally law-abiding society such as ours, those rights will be respected and observed.
Similar legislative provision for disabled people has already been made in the United States. It is operating successfully. There has been legislation in Canada. In this country we have not proposed legislation to outlaw discrimination against disabled people, but we have legislation to outlaw discrimination on the grounds of race and sex. Therefore, we have recognised the principle of legislating against the evil of discrimination.
So far disabled people have suffered discrimination in silence, but there is absolutely no doubt that there is now a new awakening among them and a growing demand that they should have the same rights as everyone else. They look to the House to provide those rights. Although the Bill is merely a modest first step in according those rights, I hope that the House will show today and in the months ahead its determination to lighten the burden and enhance the prospects of our disabled people.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill ordered to be brought in by Mr. Jack Ashley, Mr. Lewis Carter-Jones, Mr. Jack Dormand, Mr. Alfred Morris, Mr. Dennis Skinner and Mr. Dafydd Wigley.

Disablement (Prohibition of Unjustifiable Discrimination)
  DISABLEMENT (PROHIBITION OF UNJUSTIFIABLE DISCRIMINATION)
  Mr. Jack Ashley accordingly presented a Bill to provide that discrimination of an unjustifiable nature against disabled people shall be illegal: And the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time upon Friday 9 July and to be printed. [Bill 160.]
Orders of the Day

  Defence
  Order read for resuming adjourned debate on amendment to Question [1 July]:
  That this House approves the Statement on the Defence Estimates 1982, contained in Cmnd. 8529.—[Mr. Nott.]
  Which amendment was to leave out from "House" to the end of the Question and to add instead thereof:
  "fully supports the United Kingdom's continued membership of NATO; recognises that this involves both a commitment to detente through negotiations for multilateral arms control and disarmament and to deterrence through conventional and nuclear forces; declines to approve Her Majesty's Government's decision to purchase Trident missiles but despite the present economic difficulties believes that the NATO commitment to an annual increase of 3 per cent. in defence expenditure should be maintained."—[Mr. Crawshaw.]
  Question again proposed, That the amendment be made.
  3.49 pm
  The Minister of State for the Armed Forces (Mr. Peter Blaker): My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence spoke last week largely about the direction of the defence programme. Today I shall speak first about people, especially the men and women in the South Atlantic task force and those who organised its despatch. My hon. Friend the Member for Chertsey and Walton (Mr. Pattie), if he catches your eye, Mr. Speaker, will say something about the role of British industry.
  The Falklands campaign has been a combined operation in two senses. First, it was a combined operation of the British people. The national upsurge of resolve when Argentina invaded our territory exceeded anything since the Second World War. Not only the Armed Forces, the Royal Fleet Auxiliary and the Royal Maritime Auxiliary Service, but the dockyard workers, the civilians who back up the forces in every part of the country, workers in the factories and supply depots and men and women in every part of the country were determined to do what they could to put right what they correctly saw as an international outrage. The speed with which the task force put to sea astonished the country, and, I believe, the world. It may even have surprised some of those who were directly involved in the operation. After years of self disparagement, the British people asked themselves in disbelief "Can it really be we who are doing this?".
  I pay tribute to the logistic and supporting elements of all three Services—I hope that I do not offend the other two Services if in this context I mention the Navy—and all the others who worked round the clock to get the task force ready for sea.
  In a narrower sense, the campaign has been a combined operation between the three Services. In peacetime there is normally a healthy rivalry between them. In wartime, especially in modern war, it must take second place.
  The Falklands campaign was a remarkable demonstration of combined operations between the three Services and the Merchant Navy. It was one of the main reasons for our victory. A good example of it was demonstrated in one of the most important and critical operations of the entire conflict—the landing of 3 Commando Brigade and the 2nd and 3rd battalions, the Parachute Regiment, at San Carlos. An amphibious assault is one of the most complicated and risky operations of war.
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  We have all read or heard graphic accounts of the action. What is less well known is the fact that at the same time as that landing, diversionary attacks were launched by RAF and Navy Harriers on Argentine positions at Stanley, Goose Green and Fox Bay. Frigates and destroyers bombarded Stanley and raiding parties of marines and paratroops went ashore to harass Argentine positions elsewhere on the islands. A Vulcan bombed Stanley airport. The aim was to convince the Argentine commanders that the threat of an invasion lay on the east or south of the islands. The strategy worked and the beachhead was established without serious opposition from Argentine troops and with no battle casualties.
  For each of the Services, a great deal could be said of their individual achievements while much is still not yet fully known. However, I should like to tell the House of some of them.
  For the Royal Navy, all our missile systems achieved success. With the land-based Rapier and Blowpipe, they were responsible for destroying about 38 Argentine aircraft. Naval gunfire support proved immensely important in the re-taking of South Georgia and in raids and the land battle in the Falklands. Nearly 8,000 rounds were fired by 4·5 in guns. The effect of our submarines on the Argentine navy was profound both before and after the arrival of the task force. After the sinking of the cruiser "General Belgrano", the Argentine navy did not venture again outside their 12-mile limit. Our submarines thus played a fundamental part in the exercise of sea control. Our anti-submarine warfare capability appears to have deterred Argentine submarines from playing an active part in the operations. For the Fleet Air Arm, the fact that throughout the operation we achieved 90 per cent. availability of all aircraft embarked, demonstrates the immense skill and dedication of the Fleet Air Arm support crews.
  I should like to say more about the outstanding success of the Sea Harriers. They shot down at least 28 Argentine aircraft, about 23 of which were fast modern jets such as Mirages and Skyhawks. Even when outnumbered by a factor of two to one, as was often the case, Sea Harriers continued to outperform and outfight the Mirages and the Skyhawks. On one raid, two Sea Harriers accounted for three Skyhawks of a flight of four. The fourth flew into the sea while attempting to evade. We suffered no losses in air-to-air combat during the campaign.
  The Sea Harrier's success can be attributed to a combination of a highly manoeuvrable and versatile fighter, a reliable and capable missile—the Sidewinder—and, above all, to the resourcefulness, skill and courage of our young pilots who fought in the highest tradition of the Fleet Air Arm. Together with the RAF's Harriers, those aircraft accounted for a total of about 36 Argentine aircraft in the air and on the ground.
  Mr. Stephen Ross: Will the Minister break down the figures? He said that 30 Argentine aircraft were shot down by missiles from ships and Blowpipe. Will he give the number of aircraft that were shot down by missiles launched from ships alone?
  Mr. Blaker: I would rather not do that at this stage. Attributing success to one missile or another or to one Service or another is a delicate operation. We are engaged on it now and I would prefer to wait a little longer until

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  we are more sure of the figures. I would prefer to get them right and publish them rather than break them down prematurely.
  Some 18,000 men from the Royal Navy, Royal Marines, Royal Fleet Auxiliary and Royal Maritime Auxiliary Service, Merchant Navy and supporting civilians sailed in the ships of the task force. Several ships had already been at sea for some months away from the United Kingdom and were due to return to Britain when the operation started. It is difficult to find adequate words to describe their performance. After long periods at sea, closed up, at high states of readiness, some not seeing daylight for many weeks, often in very bad weather—a good deal worse on average than in the North Sea—they kept their ships, aircraft and equipment in working condition without shore support and then fought well, without the help from shore-based aircraft and allied forces that we expect in the eastern Atlantic. By the time some of the ships return to the United Kingdom they will have been continuously at sea for more than six months.
  Mr. James Callaghan: I am sorry to interrupt, but I should like an answer to a question that I have been asked to ask by the representatives of the families of those who are on HMS "Endurance" which has been at sea continuously, I am told, for nine months. It is said that there is an inexplicable delay in their return and that they will not come back until September. The families are asking about the delay and the Ministry of Defence is not answering. The families are worried and anxious at not being able to discover the reason. We were told that "Endurance" would be one of the first ships to be relieved. Will the hon. Gentleman give me an answer, either now or later, that can be passed to those families as to when "Endurance" will be brought home? That would dispose of some of the reasons that I will not give in public here as to why it is being suggested that she is being kept in the Falklands.
  Mr. Blaker: I pay tribute to the crew of "Endurance". They have performed a remarkable feat of stamina. I was not aware of the right hon. Gentleman's point. I shall look into the matter immediately and let him know what is happening as soon as possible.
  Mr. Stanley Newens: Before the hon. Gentleman leaves the success of our operations at sea, will he deal with our defences against sea-skimming missiles which the majority of the public believe are inadequate?
  Mr. Blaker: I preface my reply to the hon. Gentleman with a request not to be asked to give way too often. I have much to say and I want to deal with disarmament, a subject that I know hon. Members want to discuss.
  I gather that the hon. Gentleman is referring to Exocet. It is a dangerous and effective missile. That is why we have equipped our ships with the surface-to-surface version. The air-launched version that was used against us did not have entirely its own way. A high proportion of missiles were successfully countered by the ships against which they were aimed. The position is therefore not quite so bad as some members of the public have thought, but we are certainly looking at this.
  Turning now to the men who fought on the ground, part of the initial landing force was 3 Commando Brigade, Royal Marines. These troops were, of course, ideally suited to this operation, first because of their amphibious
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  experience and techniques, secondly, because they are trained and equipped to operate in the cold and wet of the Arctic, and in the Falkland Islands it has been very cold and wet, and, thirdly, because their commando training enabled them to march 50 miles across the mountains and peat bog of the East Falklands with full equipment and then conduct a series of successful night assaults in the mountains west of Stanley against an enemy who had had nine weeks to prepare their positions. The same is true of the training of the parachute battalions who landed with them who shared their forced marches to Stanley and who carried out the now legendary attack on Darwin and Goose Green.
  Mr. Anthony Buck: The whole House will be glad that my hon. Friend has paid special tribute to the Royal Marine commandos. Could he at some stage say something about their command structure? They particularly captured our imagination. It is a small force and the pyramid is very thin at the top. Would it be possible occasionally for a commandant-general of the Royal Marines to become a member of the Admiralty Board and go on to become Chief of Defence Staff?
  Mr. Blaker: That is not a subject to which I have previously given attention, but I certainly undertake to look at it.
  It is difficult to overstate the achievement of any of the land forces, be they from the Royal Marines, the Parachute Regiment or 5 Brigade. In operations often against odds of two or three to one, their success has been a vindication of the high standard of their training and their professionalism.
  The problems of maintaining the fitness of soldiers in cramped, uncomfortable conditions on board ship during a long voyage in rough seas were substantial. Yet this was done successfully and when finally disembarked the ground forces were no less effective fighting soldiers capable of long and arduous marches over some of the most inhospitable terrain in the world. Their performance was in the highest tradition of the Armed Forces.
  A vital contribution to the success of our operations was made by the Special Forces. Patrols of the Special Air Service and the Special Boat Squadron were landed into East and West Falklands from the task force three weeks before the landing. Working in among the enemy, living in the field in conditions of extreme discomfort and danger, they were able to provide intelligence that was vital to the successful conduct of the landing and to carry out the most daring and successful raid against Pebble Island, destroying aircraft that would have been a threat to the subsequent landing.
  My right hon. Friend told the House something earlier about the contribution of the Royal Air Force. Let me say a little more today. Of the many essential tasks carried out by the RAF, perhaps the most important but least noted was that of supply. From the start of the operation, RAF Hercules and VC1Os were ferrying vast amounts of equipment and large numbers of Service men to Ascension Island, 5,000 miles from the United Kingdom. Every day for the past three months these aircraft and their crews have endured a punishing schedule which still continues despite the ending of active hostilities.
  One of the most remarkable features of the operation for the RAF was the way in which air-to-air refuelling dramatically lengthened their reach. The Hercules, for

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  example, have been making a regular shuttle of immensely long round trips to the Falklands and to the task group. The longest to date took 28 hours non-stop. That is a tribute to the crews.
  Mr. Tam Dalyell: In referring to the skill of the Service men involved, can the Minister tell us whether any cost tag has been put on the operation?
  Mr. Blaker: Yes, my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State's written answer to a question yesterday by the right hon. Member for Llanelli (Mr. Davies) shows the latest figures that we have been able to publish. We hope to publish more in the near future.
  After modification for deck operation and ski jump training, 14 RAF Harriers deployed to the South Atlantic. They carried out some 150 operational sorties with only three aircraft lost.
  An indispensable role was played, too, by the members of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary, the Royal Maritime Auxiliary Service and the crews of commercial ships. Some of them were at times in great danger, and sadly they too suffered casualties. To be a member of the crew of any of these ships must have required courage, not least those of the oil tankers and ammunition ships in the task force and of the commercial ships which entered San Carlos water.
  We have said that we do not propose to draw premature lessons from the campaign. I am sure that that is right. On many subjects it will require some months of careful analysis, with those who fought, of individual events and actions and the performance of individual weapons. The lessons, I believe, will be valuable, to us and to our allies.
  There have been reports, both in this country and abroad, that the victory of our forces owed much to superior equipment. We shall learn more about this in the coming weeks, but I can say now that on the whole there is little evidence that Argentine equipment was bad or inadequate.
  There is one lesson which I confidently draw now, however. Even in the age of the missile, one of the most important factors in this campaign has been the skill, training, courage, morale, fitness and team spirit of our troops, the leadership and example given by officers and NCOs, and, not least, the efficiency of logistic planning and command and control. All these depend principally on human beings, not on equipment.
  Some of the Argentine troops were well trained regulars whose professionalism was shown by the well-prepared defensive positions that our troops captured. There were many examples of Argentine skill and courage, not least from the Argentine pilots.
  Mr. Robert Atkins: Can my hon. Friend yet give us any idea of the usage and quantities of Argentine equipment taken since the conflict ended, in view of reports in magazines such as Aviation Week about the extent of equipment captured? I am thinking particularly of use by CCFs and territorial regiments back home as well as the garrison that may end up in the Falldands.
  Mr. Blaker: I have given written answers to one or two questions on this, which my hon. Friend may care to
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  study. The short answer is that there is a good deal of equipment, which we are still sorting. There is also a great deal of ammunition which will take some months to sort.
  Mr. Keith Best: My hon. Friend has suffered many interventions and I apologise for interrupting him again. Has he yet been able to carry out a full analysis of stocks of napalm and dumdum bullets left by the Argentine forces and the purposes to which they were likely to be put?
  Mr. Blaker: We have no evidence of the use of dumdum bullets. We discovered a substance bearing some resemblance to napalm, but it is still being evaluated.
  The leadership displayed by the Argentine officers was unable to compensate for the low morale of their conscripts, who made up 60 per cent. of their garrison. The relationship between officers, NCOs and men was poor. While they had good night vision aids they were not skilled in their use and not well trained in fighting at night. Their logistic planning was inadequate.
  In all the human elements I have listed there was, then, no doubt of our superiority. No praise can be too high for the way in which our forces, backed by their civilian support—and backed, I should add, by the nation—conducted themselves during the campaign. The quality of their weapons apart, the ultimate test of any nation's armed forces is whether they have the skill, the training, the courage, and the will to win. The answer for the Armed Forces of the United Kingdom is emphatically "Yes".
  I turn now, in striking contrast, to the Opposition Front Bench. The official defence policy of the Labour Party as approved last year is to reduce defence spending to the average proportion of the GDP spent by the West European countries. This would reduce our total planned defence budget by about one-third.
  Dr. Oonagh McDonald: That was last year.
  Mr. Blaker: I am talking about last year.
  As was pointed out in last year's debates on defence, this would mean some alarming cuts in our forces—the equivalent of eliminating one of the three Services in its entirety—and between 350,000 and ½ million extra unemployed.
  However, this year, the situation has changed. The resolution recently approved by the Labour Party national executive committee includes what the right hon. Member for Deptford (Mr. Silkin) referred to last week as "the proviso". The proviso adds to the commitment to reduce spending the words
  "bearing in mind the need to avoid widespread and precipitate redundancies for which no alternative work has been provided and Britain's need to provide adequate conventional defence forces".
  I must congratulate the right hon. Gentleman, who one imagines had some hand in the wording of that proviso, because whatever may be the pretence, the reality is that these words make nonsense of the commitment to a one-third reducton in spending. That is what they do and the right hon. Gentleman is to be congratulated upon it.
  "But," the right hon. Gentleman will say, "we shall have more money for conventional forces because we will abandon Trident." No so. This year's Labour Party motion destroys that case. It proposes that, while we should still remain good members of NATO, we should cancel the 3

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  per cent. annual increase in defence expenditure agreed by NATO. Even if the 3 per cent. increase were cancelled for only one year, and then resumed, this alone would eliminate from the defence budget all the money saved by Labour's proposed abandonment of the Trident programme. This is because the Trident programme will take only 3 per cent. of the defence budget over the 18 years of its introduction. That 3 per cent. is cancelled out by the Labour proposals.
  Mr. John Silkin: Will the hon. Gentleman now tell us what the perecentage of Trident on the budget would be during the peak year?
  Mr. Blaker: On the equipment budget, I believe it is 10½ percent.
  Dr. McDonald: It is 15 to 20 per cent.
  Mr. Blaker: The average over 18 years, which is the relevant point, is 3 per cent. That is why the abandonment of the 3 per cent. growth target by the Labour Party for even one year, because it would be carried forward to all successive years, would have the effect of withdrawing from the defence budget all that the Labour Party has undertaken to save by abandoning Trident.
  Several Hon. Members rose—
  Mr. Blaker: I shall not give way again. I have much to say.
  I suppose I should out of courtesy refer to the amendment in the names of the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen) and of hon. Members of the Liberal Party. It generally supports the Government policy except that it opposes the Trident programme. It was moved on Thursday by the hon. Member for Liverpool, Toxteth (Mr. Crawshaw)—who has kindly sent a note to my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State explaining why he cannot be here today—in a speech in which he generally supported the Government's policies but failed to mention the Trident programme. We shall wait to hear with interest what the other spokesmen for the SDP and the Liberal Party have to say, however numerous their opinions may be.
  I turn now to the subject of deterrence. I note with satisfaction that the national executive committee of the Labour Party accepts the policy of deterrence. Its latest document says:
  "Britain should have sufficient military strength to discourage external aggression and to defend ourselves should we be attacked".
  Those words were quoted with approval, by the right hon. Member for Deptford on Thursday. They express the doctrine of deterrence. The same document proposes that Labour should maintain its support for NATO, and I understand that also is the position of the Opposition Front Bench.
  It was under a Labour Government, with Ernest Bevin as its Foreign Secretary, that NATO was formed because of the perceived threat from the Soviet Union. The Soviet threat has not changed since 1949 except that it has become greater. The Soviet Union has become more powerful, its record of aggression longer and more alarming. Russia since 1917 has absorbed 17 countries or territories which were not its and has imposed its dominion on half a dozen more in Eastern Europe. Its forces grow steadily stronger and it continues to declare that its destiny
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  is to expand the power of Russian Communism. Its interference in the internal affairs of other countries is ever more brazen.
  Since NATO was born it has relied on the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. In that time we have had peace in Europe. I believe that is no coincidence. It has had to rely on that doctrine because the Soviet Union rejected the Baruch plan put forward in 1946 by the United States, which then possessed the world's only atomic weapons, for abolition of nuclear weapons and international control of nuclear weapons and nuclear power. Since 1949 the Soviet Union has had nuclear weapons of its own.
  The knowledge that created nuclear weapons cannot be wiped from men's minds. So long as the Soviet Union has nuclear weapons—even a few—the West must have them, too. For if the West had none its conventional weapons, however powerful, would have only the value of scrap metal. We would not, in the words of the Labour Party document, have sufficient military strength to discourage external aggression from the Soviet Union, nor to defend ourselves should we be attacked.
  Mr. Joan Evans rose—
  Mr. Blaker: I shall not give way again.
  The question is whether Britain should have its own independent nuclear deterrent. We have had our own independent nuclear deterrent since 1955. We have been unanimously supported in doing so by our NATO allies on many occasions. We believe that if the Soviet Union were to imagine, however mistakenly, that the United Stales would not come to the defence of Europe if it were attacked, the British deterrent would be an added safeguard. The Labour Party now proposes to abandon this policy, which has been upheld by eight successive British Governments, in favour of a policy that relies for nuclear protection on NATO and, therefore, on the United States nuclear deterrent. I find the morality of that position confusing, to put it mildly.
  But the unreason of the Labour Party does not stop there. Its latest document goes on to propose the closing down of all nuclear bases, including American, on British soil or in British waters. This is a policy intended to save our own skins while asking the Americans to protect us by risking theirs. But it would, in fact, make Soviet aggression or blackmail more likely.
  The document proceeds to reach the apogee of silliness by calling for a European nuclear weapon free zone, ignoring the fact that the Soviet Union's SS20 missiles can reach almost any point in Western Europe, and the whole of the United Kingdom, from outside Europe. This is a shabby document drawn up in a hopeless attempt to cure the ills of the Labour Party. Would that Ernie Bevin were with us now to give his views on a document such as this!
  If we are to have an independent nuclear deterrent, it must at least be effective. We believe, on all the evidence available to us, that by the 1990s Polaris, even with Chevaline, which is now in service, may not be effective because the Russians will have improved their defences and because the Polaris boats will be at the end of their useful life. We therefore need a more modern system. Of those available, Trident is by far the most cost-effective. Any system based on submarine-launched cruise missiles would either be ineffective or many times more expensive, for three reasons: the likely vulnerability by the 1990s of the cruise missiles unless launched in very large numbers;

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  the fact that the cruise missile carries only one warhead; and the limited sea area in which the cruise missile submarine would have to operate because of the range of the missile.
  If the Labour party believes that Britain should have sufficient military strength to discourage external aggression, Trident is the weapon for it. It is indeed accurate, but so are the nuclear weapons of the Soviet Union. In the form in which we intend to acquire it, it will represent only what is necessary to assure deterrence in the 1990s and beyond. The ratio between the British Trident and the Soviet strategic systems will be about the same as that for Polaris when it came into service.
  A number of hon. Members spoke last Thursday about disarmament. The Government believe in disarmament that does not increase the danger of war or of military blackmail. In the words of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister at the United Nations special session last month, we believe in
  "the balanced and verifiable reduction of armaments in a way which enhances peace and security".
  This is entirely in line with the final document of the first United Nations special session on disarmament in 1978; whose basic assumption was that disarmament should be sought by multilateral means, by negotiation and not by unilateral gestures.
  Yet we hear calls from the Opposition for one-sided disarmament and for the United Kingdom to throw away its nuclear weapons, apparently in the hope that other nuclear powers would respond. What I have never heard from any Labour spokesman is any suggestion on which of the other four nuclear powers would respond. China? France, whose Socialist Government have just launched their sixth nuclear ballistic missile submarine? The United States? The Soviet Union? There is no answer.
  If the United Kingdom were to be so foolish it would make a futile gesture that would profoundly destabilise NATO and would cause delight in the Kremlin whose leaders, in the words of the right hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan)—I hope I quote him correctly as I am relying on newspaper reports—would laugh at our naivety.
  Mr. James Callaghan: I do not know whether I said that, but I hope I did.
  Mr. Blaker: I am much obliged to the right hon. Gentleman.
  Successive Governments since the war have worked for arms control and disarmament. Of the nine agreements achieved since the 1950s, five were signed under Conservative Governments and four under Labour. The one real disarmament agreement, the biological weapons convention of 1972, was signed under a Conservative Government, as was the partial nuclear test ban treaty of 1963.
  The main reason why the world has not achieved more is not want of effort by the West. As the Labour Party, of all parties, should understand, it takes two sides to make an agreement. The main obstacle has regularly been the refusal of the Soviet Union to admit verification of the necessary measures on its soil because of the closed nature of its society. Time and time again, that is the block we have come up against.
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  In the face of slow progress towards balanced and verifiable disarmament it is very tempting to throw up our hands and call for dramatic gestures. To do that is to forget that wars have more often come from an imbalance between a powerful, acquisitive State and a weaker peaceful State than they have from an excess of armaments on both sides. One has only to look at the 1930s to see the lesson. Hitler was encouraged in his aggression by the weakness, disunity and lack of resolve of the free world. I doubt whether the Afghans would support the view that the present war in their country is the result of their excessive armaments. Nor would the Poles attribute that cause to the coercion they have recently suffered at the hands of the Soviet Union.
  Nevertheless, we are entering a period of negotiation between East and West. The negotiations on intermediate range nuclear weapons are under way in Geneva, resulting from the Western proposal of 1979. The START talks in Geneva have recently begun, on President Reagan's initiative, for the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons. The West is about to put forward new proposals at the Vienna talks on mutual and balanced conventional force reductions in Europe. The West has proposed talks on improving confidence building measures between both sides.
  I do not believe we should expect rapid results from these discussions. That is not the Russian way. The Russian way is to probe for disunity in the Western camp, to test our resolution and our firmness, and only when it fails to divide us, to make any move forward. That is the lesson of how we got the Russians to the INF negotiating table.
  We must expect further Russian calls of unverifiable but high-sounding declarations. They have called for a declaration on no first use of nuclear weapons. We have a better position—no first use of any weapons. That is what the Soviet Union is already bound to by the United Nations charter and the Helsinki agreement. The Soviet Union has called for a freeze on intermediate range nuclear missiles in Europe. The West has a better proposal—the abolition of all intermediate range nuclear missiles in Europe or targeted on Europe. The Russians have called for a freeze on strategic nuclear weapons. The West has a better position—reductions by one-third in the nuclear weapons of both of the super powers. Some time ago the Russians called for a declaration on the avoidance of the use of force in international relations. Three years later they invaded Afghanistan.
  Some of the Western proposals I have mentioned have been put forward by the United States. But they have been fully discussed in advance in NATO and received NATO's support. The United Kingdom Government, for their part, have not been idle. Within the last two years, the Government have put forward, with the Netherlands, the draft which became the basis for the 1981 United Nations agreement to restrict the use of certain inhumane weapons. The Government put forward a proposal in the committee on disarmament for means of verifying a ban on chemical weapons. They put forward last year, with four other countries, not including the United States, the draft of a comprehensive programme on disarmament, much of which has been incorporated in the document now being discussed by the United Nations special session.
  The right hon. Member for Deptford quoted on Thursday the saying
  "The price of freedom is eternal vigilance".

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  It cannot be eternal vigilance to throw away our own nuclear defences and destabilise the Western alliance at a time when the Russians have given no comparable undertaking and their spending on arms has increased by 40 per cent. in the last 10 years.
  Mr. Robert Banks: Will my hon. Friend give way?
  Mr. Blaker: I would rather not. I am about to conclude.
  As we enter this crucial period of international negotiations on disarmament, it cannot advance the cause of disarmament by both sides to throw away our own nuclear defences and to pretend that a Labour Government would cut our conventional forces by one-third while we and our allies are at the negotiating table. Nothing could be better calculated to make the Russians play for time in the hope of disunity in the Western camp.
  Our best course is to maintain our defences and insist that, if we are to disarm, the Russians must do the same. That has been the policy of the West for over 30 years, during which peace has been kept in Europe. The best route to continued peace and to agreed disarmament is to convince the Russians that the West remains united, resolute and strong. The brilliant success of our forces in the Falklands campaign will not have been lost on the Russians. It will, I believe, have enhanced in Europe the prospects of peace and freedom.
  4.24 pm
  Mr. Denzil Davies: Like other right hon. and hon. Members, I pay my tribute to the skill, bravery and dedication of the Armed Forces and members of the Merchant Navy for their achievements in the Falklands. In doing so, I am sure that hon. Members will not forget those who gave their lives and the grief caused to their relatives and families. We must also not forget the pain and suffering of those who were injured and maimed. Some of that pain and suffering may last a considerable time.
  The Minister made a curious speech. The hon. Gentleman sought to attack the Labour Party defence policy. He did not do so very effectively. He did, however, make some strange statements in relation to nuclear weapons. One part of his speech was to a great extent a rehash of the Trident debate. It contained the very strange statement—made more blandly on this occasion than on any other occasion—that it is immoral for a member of NATO not to have nuclear weapons. His point was that it was somehow immoral for Britain not to have Trident and to rely on the American contribution to NATO in terms of strategic weapons.
  Many countries belong to NATO. Presumably those that do not possess nuclear weapons are acting in an immoral way. If this means, for instance, that Germany is being immoral, then long may that immorality continue. The real problem today is the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Opposition appreciate that neither Russia nor the United States will give up its weapons unilaterally. We want weapons merely to be in their hands and for those weapons to be reduced. The hon. Gentleman's arguments are not worthy of him. He should drop that kind of approach and argue the substance of the case.
  Mr. Ioan Evans: Is it not the case that the only country within the Warsaw Pact to possess nuclear weapons is the Soviet Union? If one follows the logic put
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  forward by the Government, not only Canada but all other NATO countries should have an independent nuclear deterrent as, presumably, should all the Warsaw Pact countries. That would mean a massive proliferation of nuclear weapons.
  Mr. Davies: My hon. Friend is right. We oppose any proliferation of nuclear weapons wherever that may occur. If we could get back to a situation in which only the two super-powers owned them, that would be a step towards a world that was safer and more free of nuclear weapons.
  In the first part of his speech, the Minister dealt with the Falklands campaign. I should have thought that a substantial part of what he had to say could have been included in the White Paper. The Government have published a White Paper that ignores the Falklands campaign completely.
  Mr. Best rose—
  Mr. Davies: I shall give way in a moment. I should like to conclude this point. The Government have published a two-volume document with a glossy cover, costing £8·50, without a single reference to the war in the Falklands. This shows the kind of insensitivity that the Secretary of State has displayed, I am sorry to say, on occasions during his tenure of office. The only mention of the war made in the document upon which we have to vote tonight is a pathetic half-page foreword that is not even incorporated into the main document.
  I understand the argument that there must be a military analysis of the consequences. I understand that there should be a wish, over the next few months, to examine which weapons worked well and which worked badly, what went wrong with some of the radar and why the Welsh Guards were left immobilised at Bluff Cove without air cover. These factors have to be examined over a longer period of time. But that need not have prevented the Secretary of State from publishing a White Paper that dealt with some of the things we have been told today and that at least acknowledged the fact that over the past few months, for the first time in almost a generation, Britain has been at war with another country.
  Nowhere does it mention that more than 250 men were killed, twice as many were injured, five Royal Navy ships were sunk, and that the "Sir Galahad" was sunk with 30 Welsh Guardsmen still entombed. How on earth can we be asked to approve a document that lists Royal Navy ships as operational when we all know that they are at the bottom of the South Atlantic? That is insensitivity that the Secretary of State should not have shown towards the House.
  It is not an academic subject. We are being asked to vote on a White Paper when the facts contained in that White Paper are incorrect. We should not be asked to vote upon it. The Secretary of State should have published a short White Paper incorporating an account of what is known about the Falklands war and in the autumn he should have published a fuller analysis. He could have had his Estimates before the Summer Recess—he has to—and they could have been voted upon. No doubt in the autumn there will be further Supplementary Estimates to pay for the increased costs. That would have been the most prudent and sensible course for the Government to have pursued.
  Mr. Best: I should like to return to the point that the right hon. Gentleman made about the morality of this

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  country not dispossessing itself of nuclear weapons. Does the right hon. Gentleman consider that there would never be an occasion on which the United States of America would not whole-heartedly dedicate the use of its nuclear arsenal to the defence of Europe? Secondly, does the right hon. Gentleman believe that it is realistic for Europe not to have an essential element in the concept of a deterrent, to which his party subscribes, against the threat of the Soviet Union?
  Mr. Davies: Europe has an essential element. The countries to which the hon. Gentleman has referred are members of NATO. The hon. Gentleman is saying that he does not trust the Americans. That is a great condemnation of NATO. I did not appreciate that the hon. Gentleman held those views about NATO.
  The White Paper contains another statement that I believe will be proved to be wrong by the end of the year. It states that for the financial year 1982–83 defence spending will be just over £14 billion. I understand that that figure has already been overtaken by events and is wrong. The correct figure will be much higher. The Secretary of State looks puzzled. Can he tell us whether at the end of the year defence spending will be £14 billion, because the Falklands expenditure will have to be added to that sum? Despite the answers given by the Ministry of Defence it is clear that when we take account of the costs of the war, the replacing of equipment in this financial year, the cost of maintaining a garrison in the Falklands for the rest of the year—the Ministry of Defence does not yet know how much that will cost—the cost of the Falklands campaign for this financial year may not be far short of £1,000 million. That pushes defence spending for this financial year to nearly £15,000 million, or from 5·1 per cent. of the country's gross national product to 5·3 per cent.
  Next year the defence budget and the percentage of gross national product will be even higher, because, apart from the cost of the Falklands, the Secretary of State has given a commitment that the defence budget will increase by 3 per cent. in real terms. If we assume defence inflation of 10 per cent.—that is a conservative estimate because what is often laughably described as defence inflation is the causal relationship between the armaments industry and the Ministry of Defence and it exceeds general price inflation—that adds 13 per cent. to the core £14 billion, and if we add about £500 million for the Falklands, defence expenditure next year may be close to £,16½ billion or almost 5·5 per cent. of the gross national product. Gross domestic product is hardly increasing.
  The Secretary of State apparently believes that the Falklands part of the expenditure will come from the contingency fund. Having read the Sunday Express, I am not sure to which contingency fund he is referring, whether it is one that everyone knows about, or one that he keeps in the Ministry of Defence—according to the Sunday Express—out of reach of the Treasury. I assume that it is the main contingency fund. The House knows that that contingency fund is not a bottomless crock of gold; it is a mere accounting device. Eventually, the extra expenditure will have to be found. The Government should tell us how they will find the extra expenditure that increases the percentage of gross national product from 5·1 per cent. to 5·5 per cent. Where will the money come
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  from? It will not come from growth in the economy because, from the Bank of England's report a few days ago, we can see that the economy is not growing. The increase could come from extra borrowing, but the Government do not like borrowing and have spent three years of their existence reducing public borrowing. It could come from increased taxes, but again, the Government theory and philosophy is that taxes should be cut, although they have failed to do so during the past three years.
  Under this Administration the increase in defence expenditure will be paid for by other Departments and other public bodies. It will be paid for by the education budget—there will be fewer teachers and larger classes—by less investment in public infrastructure, and by money that should be used to rebuild the country's industrial base. Members of the Conservative Party—especially the defence lobby—no doubt do not mind that. However, I remind hon. Members that the country's ability to defend itself depends not only on the percentage of its wealth spent directly on defence, but on its public infrastructure, the state of its manufacturing industry and, in this sophisticated age of electronics and technology, on the education of its children.
  It is interesting to note from the latest parliamentary brief from the CBI that the CBI calls for urgent investment to improve the nation's infrastructure. It asks for £2 billion this year. I have news for it. That £2 billion will not come this year, because at least £1 billion will have to be cut from the budgets of other Departments.
  Mr. Julian Critchley: Did the right hon. Gentleman deploy those arguments in 1977 when his right hon. Friend the then Prime Minister decided to accept a 3 per cent. increase in real terms in defence spending?
  Mr. Davies: The 3 per cent. is not being met by other NATO countries. It is questionable what is meant by a 3 per cent. increase in real terms. The hon. Gentleman should not be so glib about the 3 per cent. We accepted and agreed with the NATO decision. There are difficulties about the 3 per cent. It is not as easy as the hon. Gentleman makes out. If the Government are true to their philosophy the rest of the public sector will pay the increased arms bill. I am told that the Chief Secretary to the Treasury is already moving around the Departments of Whitehall, except perhaps the Ministry of Defence.
  The Secretary of State apparently justifies the publication of the White Paper in its present form on the grounds that the Government's defence strategy has not been affected by the Falklands war. If that is so it is a ridiculous over-simplification of the position, because the Falklands war highlighted the fact that the strategy was never credible in the first place and will hasten its inevitable reappraisal.
  As I understand it, the Government's defence policy is based on four major roles. There is, first, the strategic nuclear deterrent—upon which there will soon be a substantial increase in expenditure as more money is spent on Trident. There is, secondly, the direct defence of the United Kingdom. Thirdly, there is the continental commitment in West Germany, and finally, the maritime commitment within NATO, which is mainly in the eastern Atlantic. Before the war, there was additionally a rather minor role—described as the out-of-area role—of looking after about 14 dependencies scattered all over the world.

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  They are the residuary legacy of the British empire. They include not only the Falklands but Gibraltar, Hong Kong, Brunei, Belize and many others. Before the war, little money was spent on that out-of-area defence, but that is becoming a major drain on our resources in addition to the four other roles upon which Government strategy is based.
  We have to meet the cost of fighting the Falklands war and in the foreseeable future we shall need to maintain a not insignificant garrison on the islands. If the White Paper is right and the main threat is from the Soviet Union, there may be a call from within NATO to replace some of the ships and aircraft that will have to be kept in the South Atlantic. In addition, there will be the cost of replacing the ships and aircraft that were lost in the war.
  Moving up the coast of South America we come to Belize. The Government have committed themselves to defending an independent State against the claims of its neighbour. I understand that there are about 1,500 British troops in Belize, some Harriers and probably a frigate. We all heard with trepidation last week the bellicose statements of the president of Guatemala on the treaty between Britain and Belize and of his country's designs upon part of Belize.
  The Government's foreign policy in South America cannot be described as a crowning success. The Financial Secretary to the Treasury used to be the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office with responsibilities for these matters. Before the Falklands conflict the hon. Member for Cirencester and Tewkesbury (Mr. Ridley)— the Financial Secretary—used to carry the Government's policy around South America. I am sorry that the hon. Gentleman is not in his place. Over the past few months he must have been gratified that he was able to bury himself in the bowels of the Finance Bill. The Government have a responsibility for the way in which he tried to negotiate with Right-wing regimes in South America.
  One result of the Falklands conflict is that the Government will be ultra-cautious in respect of the other dependencies. That does not mean spending less money and it may mean spending more money. The out-of-area role has increased. That, in addition to the cost of Trident II and the commitment to 3 per cent. growth within NATO in real terms, means that finally the Government's strategy will not be able to be carried out.
  When the Prime Minister dismissed the last Secretary of State for Defence, the present Foreign Secretary, she did it apparently because the right hon. Gentleman insisted on buying Trident as well as maintaining the level of conventional defence forces. I believe that the Prime Minister's instincts on that occasion were right. They told her that it was not possible to have Trident and that level of conventional forces. I believe that the present Foreign Secretary was wrong. However, the Prime Minister was wrong in maintaining that Trident was sacrosanct and that conventional forces should be sacrificed. We know that the present Secretary of State for Defence was given his job to implement the Prime Minister's policy. He immediately cast around for areas in which conventional defence could be cut.
  When the right hon. Gentleman began that exercise he had to find less money than that which will be needed in future. At that time the commitment was to buy Trident I at a cost of about £5,000 million. Unfortunately, Trident II will cost about twice that sum. The cost will be about £10 billion at today's prices. The right hon. Gentleman
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  looked for cuts because that was his brief. There was not much scope for cutting the direct and immediate defence of the United Kingdom.
  A substantial reduction in Rhine Army may have appeared attractive, but apart from the question whether the savings would ultimately be very great there were political difficulties contained in a complete withdrawal of troops from Germany. Different views have been expressed from all parts of the Chamber and it is clearly a difficult subject. My view is that we should not underestimate political difficulties, especially if the proposition is that there should be a complete withdrawal of the British Army. We must consider carefully the political effects on some other countries in Western Europe and the Soviet Union's perception of what is going on in central Europe.
  Mr. Best: What is the Opposition's policy on Rhine Army? By how much should it be reduced?
  Mr. Davies: AE. I have said, it is an extremely difficult issue to determine. It is one that Government of both major parties have considered. There have been speeches from both sides of the House telling us how difficult an issue it is.
  Mr. Best: I know that.
  Mr. Davies: A complete withdrawal of British troops, especially if they were replaced by German troops, would have to be considered extremely carefully because of the effect on some other countries in Western Europe and the perception of the Soviet Union. If the British troops were not replaced, we would be lowering the nuclear threshold in Europe. It would mean that we would have fewer conventional forces. That would make it more likely that nuclear weapons would be used in a war in Central Europe.
  The Secretary of State could not move very far in that direction, so he cast his greedy merchant banker's eye on the surface ships of the Royal Navy. That was the only area in which he could try to cut defence spending. He thought that he could do that because of the many trendy and fashionable theories concerning surface ships and the needs of the Royal Navy. Having spent only a few months as a shadow Defence Minister—I know that that is obvious from my speech—I am of the opinion that there is not a portfolio in which there are more trendy and dotty academic theories.
  Apparently one of the theories is that Britain does not need a navy any more because it does not have an empire. It is argued that we are now firmly and irrevocably anchored to the Continent of Europe and that we do not need much of a navy. Another theory is that if a conventional war breaks out in Central Europe it will be all over in a few days, or a week, and that then NATO will have to go nuclear. That is said to support the argument that there is no need for a large navy. It is based on the view that the Soviet Union enjoys massive superiority in conventional forces, but I do not subscribe to that view. There is some superiority but I do not believe that it is massive. The final argument is that surface ships are too vulnerable in the age of the missile.
  The Secretary of State saw an added bonus in cutting the surface fleet. He recognised that fewer ships meant fewer dockyards. That meant that more money could be saved and used in part to fund a nuclear strategic deterrent.

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  In addition, he felt that he would be able to go to the chairman of Marks and Spencer to tell him that he was reducing the number of civil servants in the Department. The closure of Royal Navy dockyards reduces the number of civil servants in the Ministry of Defence.
  The Opposition welcome the very temporary relief for the Portsmouth yard. We deplore the closure of Chatham and the Gibraltar yard. We shall be able to discuss in some detail the proposed closures when we consider the Navy Estimates in a few weeks time.
  The Secretary of State has been rather unlucky. He almost got away with his scheme. It is rumoured—we can only read the newspapers—that he was so pleased with his handiwork that he was contemplating a short and pleasant walk across Whitehall to Great George Street and up to the commanding heights of the Treasury. The right hon. Gentleman was a Treasury Minister for a few months. He was not in the Treasury team for four years as I was.
  Mr. Robert Atkins: That shows.
  Mr. Davies: Yes, it does. Apparently it was the right hon. Gentleman's ambition to cross Whitehall, but unfortunately he left his flank unprotected. His defence strategy, apart from his personal political strategy was, in effect, torpedoed by General Galtieri. We all know that a task force had to be despatched. We all know, also, that because of the right hon. Gentleman's policies it contained ships that were either on their way to the breaker's yard, under the auctioneer's hammer or in mothballs. The ships were manned by sailors with dismissal notices in their pockets. They were prepared by dockyard workers who were on their way to the dole queues.
  When the Secretary of State comes to analyse the military lessons to be learnt from the Falkland campaign, I hope that he will not use the conclusions to bolster and reinforce his own prejudices and attempt to justify his decision to reduce the number of Royal Navy surface ships. It is true that the nuclear powered submarines were extremely successful in keeping the Argentine navy in port, but it does not follow from that that there should be a greater reliance on submarines at the expense of surface ships. The House knows that they perform different roles and that one role is complementary to the other and that one role cannot be a substitute for the other.
  It has been reported that the naval chiefs—we can get this information only from the newspapers—feared the loss of a carrier in the Falkland campaign and that they considered such a loss militarily acceptable. If that is so, presumably the Prime Minister considered such a loss politically acceptable. If she had not, she would not have sent the task force on the basis of that military assessment.
  What is demonstrated is not necessarily the inherent vulnerability of surface ships but the enormous gamble the Government took in sending the task force to the South Atlantic knowing that many of the ships, in particular the carriers, were not really designed for the role that they were asked to perform. They performed the role very well. Without a land base and with carriers that could be described as truncated, because that is how they were built for anti-submarine work, the Government were lucky that the casualties were not higher in men and equipment.
  The conclusion to be drawn from the Falklands should not be that the Falklands war was an aberration and can therefore be ignored, or that surface ships are inherently
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  too vulnerable, but that those suface ships placed in that situation were asked to perform a role that made them vulnerable because not many of them were designed for the role they were asked to perform. That is the lesson to be learnt from the Falklands.
  The lesson to be learnt—I am glad that I take the Secretary of State with me—is that in future our ships and the men sailing in them must be adequately protected for whatever role they are asked to perform in an uncertain and a dangerous world—[HON. MEMBERS: "More money on defence."] I am coming to that. I knew that hon. Members would say that.
  We believe that the Government are trying to spread scarce resources too widely and too thinly and that there will have to be a major reappraisal of priorities in defence strategy. The Secretary of State may feel—he is now looking pleased with himself—that he has managed to steal a march on the Treasury but, inevitably, either under the present Government or under a future Government of whatever party, defence budgets and this budget in particular will come under pressure. Corners will again be cut, ships will again be built using inferior materials and risks will be taken to save money. In the colourful language of the hon. Member for Ashford (Mr. Speed), who is not here today, frigates will again be designed by the Treasury. That will be a fact of life because this budget is not sustainable. Far better for the Government to cut their coat according to their cloth than to try to make a coat which is larger but more threadbare and therefore gives less protection.
  The Government should cancel Trident because it is a major escalation of the arms race. Its enormous cost—£10 billion at today's prices—means that conventional forces will have to be cut, thereby bringing the use of nuclear weapons in any crisis that much closer. In consultation with our allies, we should have another look at the costs of our commitment to keep British forces in Germany, although I do not believe that that is an easy option.
  Our conventional defence policy should in the main be concentrated on two areas—first, on the defence of the United Kingdom itself. I pay tribute to some of the things that the Government have done in that regard, although there is more that must be done. Secondly, within NATO, we should concentrate mainly on doing what is best suited to our geographical position and tradition. That means making an effective maritime contribution in the Eastern Atlantic. We believe that if a war broke out in Central Europe it is more likely to be a war of attrition, not of blitzkrieg, and the strength and efficiency of naval forces in the Atlantic would again become crucial. That means that Britain must have a modern and well-protected surface fleet as well as an efficient submarine fleet, with proper dockyard facilities to support them—[HON. MEMBERS: "Where will the money come from?"] I have covered that point.
  The Secretary of State has got himself into a corner from which there is only one means of escape. He, the Prime Minister and the former Foreign Secretary failed to deter the invasion of the Falklands, a failure of judgment which has cost us dearly in lives and resources. The Secretary of State is still committed to a defence policy which could not have been carried out before the Falklands war and which cannot be carried out now. There will have to be another fundamental examination of defence policy,

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  but since it appears that the Secretary of State is too blinkered and too much a prisoner of his past errors to carry it out, he should make way for someone who will.
  4.53 pm
  Mr. Julian Amery: The right hon. Member for Llanelli (Mr. Davies) said that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister had taken a gamble. What is clear is that he would not have taken it had he been in her shoes, and General Galtieri would be sitting in the Falkland Islands today. At the beginning of his speech the right hon. Gentleman said that the issue that matters is proliferation. He looked back nostalgically to the days when the two super-powers alone controlled nuclear weapons. If the Labour Party ever aspires to Government again it should look at the real world. Not only Britain, France and China have nuclear weapons, but long before the Labour Party is likely to be in Government again, Israel, India, Pakistan, South Africa, Argentina and Libya may have them, too. If the right hon. Gentleman really believes that Mr. Begin or Mr. Botha will be influenced by the policies of an incoming Labour Government on proliferation, I suggest that he is being a bit of a Bourbon on those matters and that perhaps he should think again.
  The Falkland Islands crisis teaches us several important lessons that we shall no doubt examine more closely in the debate in the autumn or winter. It provides clear justification for the reorganisation of the Ministry of Defence, and proved by the response it was able to make to a virtually unexpected threat. It provides a remarkable justification of the decision to go over from National Service to all-professional forces. It goes a long way to justify our choice of equipment. But it also teaches another lesson which is fundamental to what I am about to say.
  We lost some lives and we spent a great deal of money to win a victory that should never have been necessary had we been prepared. That is the issue that I wish to raise in the debate today. Have we analysed the global threat better than the Foreign Office analysed the threat to the Falkland Islands? Is our response adequate not to secure victory but to prevent the threat from developing?
  The threat is graver than it has ever been at any time since the war.
  There is the nuclear threat. As a Back Bencher I can say openly—it is obviously difficult for a Minister to say it—that now there is nuclear parity between the super-powers no one can expect to shelter under the American umbrella. We are therefore extraordinarily vulnerable, or would be if we did not have our own nuclear deterrent, to the threat of nuclear attack or of nuclear blackmail. That must be clear.
  There is also the threat from the Warsaw Pact whose conventional forces have achieved considerable superiority over those of NATO in both conventional weapons and, with the deployment of the SS20, in tactical nuclear weapons. The deterrent power of the Western Alliance has been fading with the achievement of nuclear parity between the super-powers. Therefore, the validity of our defences in Europe has been declining steadily.
  There is also the area of danger beyond which NATO and the threat that has been developing there to our sources of raw materials in South-East Asia, the Gulf and Southern and Central Africa, and to the trade routes on which we and Japan depend, upon which the whole industrialised West depends, for survival. This danger arises from the deployment of Soviet sea and long-range air power far
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  outside the Soviet Union and from the network of bases that the Soviets have developed all over the world. They are manned either by the Soviets of by their allies, in Aden, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Cuba, Vietnam, and Luanda in Angola. That is already a worldwide network with other corresponding facilities.
  In addition, there are local dangers. We had one in the Falklands, unrelated to the Soviet challenge. There is the Iran-Iraq war which threatens the resources of the Gulf. Any of those local conflicts could merge into the greater East-West conflict.
  As I have already said, this is the gravest threat that we have ever faced. The Soviets enjoy what Dr. Kissinger has called "a window of opportunity" in which they have a temporary superiority. It will be some time before the window can be closed. The Americans are trying hard to close it. They are doing so by defence expenditure that has produced the enormous borrowing requirement with high interest rates about which some of us have been complaining, but which in the long run are in our interest. I see no other way in which the Americans could finance what they are doing.
  What is our response, and does it measure up to the threat? Here I congratulate my right hon. Friend on his staunch adherence to the doctrine of maintaining an independent British deterrent. As my hon. Friend the Minister of State said, we have it with the Polaris brought up to date, and we shall have it with Trident. It is quite clear that there can be no British strategy of any sort unless we have our own nuclear power; otherwise it is only an adjunct of someone else's strategy. If we are threatened with nuclear blackmail from the Soviet Union, or, indeed, anyone else, and have no nuclear power, it will be impossible to continue on our desired course. No responsible Government could have embarked on the Falklands operation had we not had our own independent nuclear power.
  I well remember that during the Suez operation Mr. Khrushchev threatened Britain with a nuclear strike. We had to turn to the Americans, who were against the operation, and ask, "Will you protect us?" We therefore had to turn to one ally, who did not approve of the course we had adopted, and ask, "What are you going to do?" The Americans said, "We will tell the Russians not to do it", but it meant that we were in the hands of our allies.
  This time, we were not. At the beginning, Mr. Haig wanted to support us but he was not quite sure how far. Eventually, he made up his mind, but without the cover of our independent deterrent any threat from the Soviet Union might have been decisive.
  Mr. Denzil Davies: Is the right hon. Gentleman saying that had we had Polaris or Trident we could have gone on with the Suez operation, even in the teeth of American opposition?
  Mr. Amery: Yes, in respect of the Russian threat. I shall not go into the history of the Suez operation. I am content to abide by Churchill's verdict when he said, "I do not know if I would have dared to start; I would never have dared to stop".
  I am still in some doubt about whether, in considering the nuclear deterrent, we are right to settle for four boats rather than five. The case for four has been argued, but I ask my right hon. Friend to look at this again before he presents his second White Paper in the winter.

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  What of our contribution to NATO? My hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Sutton (Mr. Clark) and The Times have asked whether we have got the balance right and whether we should take a bit out of BAOR and give a little more to the Navy and the maritime air force. They have a point if we are in absolutely rigid financial constraints. I brush aside the argument that we are naturally a maritime country—[HON. MEMBERS: "Why?"] I shall explain. In the list of our heroes, the achievements of our generals—the Black Prince, Henry V, Marlborough, Wellington and the generals of the First and Second World Wars—are at least equal to the achievements of Nelson, Rodney, Drake, Raleigh and the admirals in the wars of this century. The difference is that before the advent of modern weapons, the Channel provided a moat behind which we could mobilise. Therefore, all that we needed was a standing Navy, not a standing Army. There was also a political advantage because there was no danger of a military coup.
  We defended ourselves perfectly adequately behind that moat until 1940, but in 1940 we cut it damn fine. Had we lost the Battle of Britain—and we nearly did—and had the Germans gained air mastery over the Channel, the Navy would not have been able to prevent a German landing and God knows what would have happened. Just imagine what would happen were the Soviet forces to reach the Channel ports. Only the nuclear deterrent could prevent them from landing. Would it not be wise to man the outer ramparts as successfully as we can rather than simply sitting back behind the moat and waiting for things to develop? I do not see how we could possibly have fewer forces on the Continent than we have today. I join General Hackett in saying that we ought to have quite a few more.
  In saying that, I do not disagree with the Navy lobby. It may well be—as far as I understand the matter, it is probably true—that we need more ships purely to fulfil our NATO commitment. I shall not say what sort or enter the argument about how many surface ships or submarines there should be, but I am sure that we shall need quite a few more to meet the third threat that arises from beyond the NATO area.
  It must now be clear to the meanest intelligence that our withdrawal from south-east Asia, Aden and the Gulf was an unmitigated disaster. It led directly to an increase in oil prices and led on to the fall of the Shah. The bill that we have had to pay is already many times more than what we would have incurred had we retained minimum forces there. Belatedly, our American friends have come up with the rapid deployment force. Paragraphs 237 and 238 of the White Paper say what we could contribute beyond the NATO area. It looks pretty thin to me. It is true that we have just carried out a major and remarkable operation outside the NATO area in the Falklands, but we did it at the expense of our NATO commitments, by withdrawing forces from NATO, and with ships that were destined either for the scrap-heap or the market.
  It may be said that another Falklands is unlikely. That is what people said after Suez; yet in 1961 we sent an armada to Kuwait. Like everything in war, these things happen unexpectedly. I do not know whether there will be another lone British operation, but I am pretty sure that, given the way that the world is developing—three wars were in progress only a fortnight ago—there will be a need for a British contribution somewhere outside NATO.
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  We already make a small contribution in Sinai. We now have another in the South Atlantic, and if we are to form a South Atlantic community, which I hope, we may enlarge it. It is also likely that we shall have to make a contribution to the United States rapid deployment force for the Middle East.
  Nor can we be sure that emergencies beyond the NATO area will be isolated. They may well be harmonised with an increasing Soviet threat in Europe which may call for a greater state of readiness in NATO. We need to build again what we had until very recently—a force of perhaps two brigades, with the necessary air and sea support, capable by its training and equipment of operating outside the NATO area. Of course, in normal times it could be available to NATO, but it would be surplus to the NATO requirement.
  We were very lucky in the South Atlantic, as the Minister explained, that the Marines had had Arctic training. Do we have people who are desert or jungle trained? We do not know where the next emergency will break out, but I should think that we need to have something as least as strong as the task force that we have just despatched to the South Atlantic, but outside the NATO assignment. To have this would be to have the best reason to believe that our American friends will have the guts when the crisis comes, and it may be very near, to put in their overwhelming potential strength in the defence of all our vital interests.
  I may be exaggerating the gravity of the threat. If I am, I hope that my right hon. Friend will tell me so, and if so, much of my argument falls away. I hope that it may, but I am also afraid that he may be the victim, as were his predecessors in 1914 and 1939, of financial constraints. It is easy for Cabinets to face the immediate problems of domestic affairs and to give money to them, but to say that they do not know about the foreign danger and take a risk on that. It was very costly in 1914 and in 1939, and it was rather costly in the Falkland Islands.
  I am sure that my right hon. Friend will read the signs aright with the help of his professional advisers, and will fight for what he thinks is right by of Government expenditure for our defences. However, hon. Members have a part to play as well. We are the people who vote Supply, and we must play our part and make our views plain to the Government. The issue is the gravest that any of us are likely ever to face.
  5.12 pm
  Mr. James Callaghan: I disagree with so much of what the right hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Mr. Amery) said that I hope that he will forgive me if I do not spend the whole of my speech answering his. There were some plums that I pulled out from time to time on which I agreed, including the issue on which he finished—the capacity for a force operating outside NATO.
  The right hon. Member for Pavilion allows that romantic self of his to run away with him if he believes that if the Royal Navy had still been in the Gulf, the Shah of Persia would be on his throne today. Further, it was not Polaris or the absence of Polaris at the time of Suez that ended that fiasco. It was the fact that Mr. Harold Macmillan, having discovered the impact it was having on our finances, decided that the Suez adventure should no longer be supported. That was what turned the tide.
  Mr. Amery: I was not trying to argue that that issue of Khrushchev's nuclear deterrent turned the tide. I was merely saying that it was an embarrassing position when, threatened by the Russians, we had to turn to the Americans because we had no nuclear weapons of our own. It was not decisive—many other things were decisive, including Mr. Gaitskell's attitude. However, this argument has a clear military application.
  Mr. Callaghan: We had atomic weapons at that time, but we were dependent on the Americans. My conclusion is different from that of the right hon. Member for Pavilion. We cannot fight a war unless the Americans agree that we should do so, or unless we have at least their acquiescence in what we are doing. That is as true today as it was at the time of Suez. It is not something that I necessarily welcome, but it happens to be the case.
  For example, the crisis in Cyprus occurred at a time when America's attention was engaged in President Nixon's final resignation and Mr. Henry Kissinger had all his attention taken up by that. It was because we could not get the support of the Americans that we did not stop the Turks. The American fleet could have interposed itself. However, I do not wish to spend my whole speech on these issues, because I have other things that I wish to say.
  I shall not vote for the Defence Estimates tonight. The Secretary of State can have the money that he wants—that is not the issue. The policy is wrong. I do not deny the Secretary of State the money, although I disagree with important parts of the policy. My particular point is that I disagree with the Secretary of State's assertion last week that we have a balanced mix of forces—Navy, Army and Air Force—which must not be abandoned, and which is appropriate to our needs. That is the central issue for me. I shall not discuss nuclear issues, because my views on them are well known and do not need repeating.
  I agreed with the right hon. Member for Pavilion when he asked whether we had analysed the threat. It is to this that the House is turning its attention more and more. I congratulate my right hon. Friend the Member for Llanelli (Mr. Davies) on the parts of his speech in which he discussed this matter. He came to the nub of it in a way that we have not done for some time in the past.
  The truth is not, I regret to say, that we have a balanced mix of forces but that the structure of our forces has been unbalanced for some years, including the period when I was Prime Minister, that it is unbalanced at present and that the Government's new policy is making the problem worse and not better. That is my starting point.
  The Government propose to reduce our aircraft carrier strength, cut down the number of frigates and destroyers, close dockyards and run down the strength of officers and naval ratings by 10,000 men, leaving us with the smallest Navy of the century. This policy has serious potential dangers for our country's safety. It is a misapplication of the proper division of resources between the Services. We do not have the right mix, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Llanelli said. I support him and I refuse to support the Defence Estimates as they have been published because they have that issue wrong.
  I question the prevailing wisdom on two main subjects, both of which were touched on by my right hon. Friend for Llanelli and one which was touched on by the right hon. Member for Pavilion. I question that, in the vernacular, the Falklands was a "one-off' event and can
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  be ignored, and I question the theory of the short, sharp war that will last for only days. That was something that was said before, in 1914 and in 1939.
  I am reinforced in this because our maritime strategy policy has not been the result of a careful re-examination of the problems. It has been caused, as my right hon. Friend for Llanelli pointed out, by the fact that the Secretary of State, having been plucked from the obscurity of the Department of Trade, presumably because he was more biddable than the present Foreign Secretary, found himself with some issues that he was unable to touch. He could not touch Trident for particular reasons, he could not touch the troops in Germany for other reasons and so the whole of the expenditure savings that he was required to make fell on our maritime strategy.
  There was no balanced judgment about our defence role, and it is this issue that the House as a whole ought to challenge and not merely accept. Just because these fixed constants were there, we do not have to accept what has happened to our surface fleet. We have cut ships large and small. I felt some shame when I heard that we were selling off ships—something that we have never done before in this way—out of the active Fleet to other countries.
  We invited Chile to purchase HMS "Norfolk". We attempted to sell HMS "Invincible" to Australia. We asked the Americans whether they would like the Royal Fleet Auxiliary "Stromness", and they said "Yes" and grabbed it with both hands. We have never run our defence system in this way before. I felt rather humiliated when I heard that that was the way in which we intended to try to rake up the money to get within the limits. Nothing was spared.
  Perhaps the greatest irresponsibility of all involved HMS "Endurance". I shall not discuss the matter this afternoon, except to say that she was sacrificed, despite repeated warnings from both sides of the House about the impact that it would have. We now know that Mr. Costa Mendez took it as a signal that we would not fight. I shall now leave the issue, but in my opinion, it was a classic example of penny wise, pound foolish.
  It is clear from what has been said that there is serious and growing disagreement about our present defence strategy. Indeed, when I listen to my own Front Bench, I begin to feel that we are becoming a Navy party.
  Mr. John Silkin: We are.
  Mr. Callaghan: In that case, all I can say is that the speeches that I have been making for years on the subject are having more success now that I have given up any Front Bench responsibility than they ever had when I sat there.
  Mr. Robert Atkins: Give him the job.
  Mr. Callaghan: I am hoping to become a PPS again one day.
  I want to deal with the particular issues, and I shall take a little longer than I usually do on them. I hope that I do not normally intrude in this way.
  The present Fleet is designed for its main task of acting as an anti-submarine Fleet, and in the light of Soviet deployment I entirely agree with that. Its major purpose is to provide backing for the central front in Europe by protecting the eastern Atlantic and the approaches to Europe. Indeed, I should like its role to be strengthened in that area, and I shall come back to that matter. Up to

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  the moment, it has been flexible enough to undertake other duties. It has been flexible because it has been capable of swift adaptation, and it has been capable of swift adaptation because it has had shore facilities and dockyard support. To cut that support will now undercut our ability to have a flexible surface Fleet which, although basically and rightly designed to meet our NATO responsibilities, has nevertheless been capable of operating in other directions, as we saw in the recent Falklands crisis.
  Now some of the dockyards are to be axed, and the combination of a smaller, seagoing surface Fleet, and the withdrawal of shore support means that our Fleet will be less able to fulfil general tasks. It has been able to do that up to the moment. I am certain that the Secretary of State himself has sent task forces on tours around the globe, and that was done during my day. We should strengthen and continue that ability. My hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Attercliffe (Mr. Duffy), had responsibility in that regard. I am not sure, but I believe that it was the intention to do the same this year, although the damage caused by the air attacks on the Fleet probably now make that impossible. However, with the cuts that are being made in the Navy today, we shall not be able to do that in future. So an element that has existed up to the moment is being destroyed as a result of this policy.
  Sir Frederick Burden: Does the right hon. Gentleman remember that after the NATO exercise "Ocean Safari", Admiral Cox emphasised that defeating enemy submarines could not be done by aircraft or nuclear submarines alone—and I quote—
  "contrary to some suggestions made in London."—[Official Report, 15 February 1982; Vol. 18, c. 23.]
  Mr. Callaghan: The hon. Member for Gillingham (Sir F. Burden) adds to my point. I do not believe that his Front Bench—which he supports, at least on some occasions—understands the role of maritime power, or how it is to be deployed. I do not say that we always understood it either. I sometimes felt that my Front Bench, even when I was on it, did not understand it. However, it has much improved since my right hon. Friend the Member for Deptford (Mr. Silkin) has taken over.
  Most serious professional naval opinion believes that we could not carry out an operation like the Falklands as swiftly or as successfully—some say, even at all—in two years' time. Even a layman like myself could see that it was a close-run thing. If that opinion is held, it is something on which the Secretary of State should reflect very carefully before he proceeds with these plans.
  The Government argue, as do some others, that the Falklands was a one-off affair, unlikely to be repeated, and that we should not change our strategy because of that. I do not ask the Government to change their strategy of supporting the central front. Indeed, I shall argue that we might reinforce that strategy. However, I also argue strongly, as did the right hon. Member for Pavilion, for retaining the flexibility to deal with one of the so-called one-off incidents.
  My right hon. Friend the Member for Deptford said the other day that we have already had a series of one-offs that will never be repeated. He mentioned the Beira patrol. That was one-off. He referred to the cod war. That was one-off. There was the protection of our shipping in the Gulf of Oman during the recent war between Iraq and Iran.
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  That was one-off. Each was different from the one that went before. No one knows what the next one will be. We should have a capacity to deal with that situation, and we shall not have it if these plans go through.
  There are other possible scenarios that all of us can imagine. I shall not go into them today. However, I want to repeat what the right hon. Member for Pavilion said. I want to emphasise the point on which I agree with him, and not the 99 points on which I disagree with him. Today our ships sail every ocean.
  There seems to be general agreement that NATO should not act as a body outside its own self-imposed boundaries. Therefore, it takes no notice of the threats to its members' interests outside its area. Someone must—for such threats are growing, and they could become serious. Something which appeared as trivial as interference with our merchant ships and trade could occur with pirates off the coast of Indonesia, yet when one looks at the conditions off the coast of south-east China today and off the coast of the Malasian peninsula, who would guarantee that British ships will be able to sail freely through those waters? I should not like to guarantee that. Where is the flexibility that we should need to deal with trouble in that area? In my opinion, the Royal Navy is particularly suited by its history to undertake such a role. We are a maritime nation. We have special expertise. With our ability and experience, we can undertake such a role.
  I am still on the subject of the one-off. I believe that we should discuss these matters with other ship-owning nations. The threats that are growing are of such a character that merchant ships may need to arm themselves more than they have done in the past and be more adaptable in protecting themselves.
  Mr. R. C. Mitchell: I agree.
  Mr. Callaghan: I am glad to have the support of the SDP on this matter.
  Mr. James Wellbeloved: Not from me.
  Mr. Callaghan: The hon. Member for Erith and Crayford (Mr. Wellbeloved) should not be provocative about that. If he had stayed, he might have reinforced me in what I say about the Royal Navy.
  I turn to the other role of the Navy, which is to support the central front in Europe and control the eastern Atlantic. It seems that every generation has to learn the lesson afresh that Britain and Europe depend wholly on overseas seaborne supplies of food, energy, minerals and raw materials for our industries if we are to survive as a continent and a nation. In the past, Britain has always been more deeply aware of that fact than has continental Europe, but in recent years—here I do not exclude my own years—we seem to have overlooked this basic truth. If we have to fight a war against the Soviet Union, those supplies will need to be safely transported, for without them we should be utterly defeated.
  If we are to carry on a war against the Soviet Union, 30 ships, day in, day out, week in, week out, month after month, will need to leave the eastern ports of the United States and arrive here safely with their goods. I regret that we do not have the strength at the moment to do that satisfactorily.
  There is a prevailing wisdom that such measures will not be required because war, if it comes, will be short,

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  sharp and brutish, with the total destruction and horror that will accompany the use of nuclear weapons. Those who hold that view may be right. That is why all must press as hard as possible for mutual agreements to reduce nuclear weapons and to outlaw nuclear war.
  However, another scenario is at least possible and the Government should provide against it. At present, there is a nuclear stalemate because the Soviet Union knows the dreadful destruction that can he visited on it, just as CND makes us aware of the terrible horrors that could afflict the civilian population in these islands. Surely, the real use of Europe to the Soviet Union is not as a nuclear devastated land mass, the cities and industries of which have been destroyed, but as a potential base for the extension of Soviet influence and the Soviet system, and as a source of technology and skill. That would require a Europe that had become subservient to the Soviet Union, not devastated by it. It would be completely opposed to Europe's destruction.
  The strangling of Europe by blockade at sea, destroying our supplies and reserves so that we cannot be reinforced, coupled with a conventional attack in Europe, is at least a possible scenario for the Soiet Union. It is one that we should prepare against. Therefore, we must be able to withstand a long war, as well as envisaging a short, horrible nuclear exchange that would end with mutual devastation.
  Mr. Peter Hordern: The right hon. Gentleman has plainly spelt out to the House his support for a stronger Navy and he is now treating us to his views about the nuclear deterrent. In the present circumstances, knowing how he substituted Chevaline for Polaris, does he support Trident?
  Mr. Callaghan: I will, if I may, continue my theme and return to that point towards the end of my speech. We are not ready to withstand a long war. Under the influence of our allies we have succumbed to the view that continental land and air forces are more important than sea protection and re-supply.
  Despite what the Secretary of State says, we have never been, and are not today, a significant land force. The whole of the British Army is smaller than the reserves that the Americans hope to pour into Europe in the event of a war. As the right hon. Gentleman said a year ago in his defence White Paper, we are following the least natural course in our history. In recent expenditure-cutting exercises that fallacy has led to low priorities and the scrapping and selling of ships that should have been kept. I agree with the hon. Member for Plymouth, Sutton (Mr. Clarke) on that point.
  We are the one nation that should take a strong lead in discussions with our NATO allies on this matter. They should review their priorities and we should convince them that the ability to ensure supply, reinforcement and protection is as important to the safety of continental Europe as is the presence of 50,000 British troops there. It is our job to argue that with them. If we have to withdraw a division, it is my clear conviction that we would be adding to their security and safety if we were to reduce the number of British troops serving in Germany today as a means of strengthening the Navy in the way that I have suggested.
  Sir Nicholas Bonsor: Is the right hon. Gentleman suggesting that we should reduce the British
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  Army of the Rhine and have fewer soldiers altogether, or reduce the British Army of the Rhine and bring them home? The latter case would result in a very small saving indeed. The right hon. Gentleman has already said that we have a small Army. I hope that he is not suggesting that it should become even smaller.
  Mr. Callaghan: I do not know the answer to the hon. Gentleman's question. All I can say is that I would certainly bring many of them home because there would be a considerable saving in foreign exchange, which could be spent in better and different ways. However, as to the exact numbers, I do not know. It might cost us more initially to provide barracks, but I am talking about the long-term consequences of British policy in that area.
  I want a return to our natural role. If we, with our history, experience and leadership in maritime matters do not give such a lead and argue the case, no one else will. My criticism of the Secretary of State, and, indeed, of some of his predecessors, is that they have not given such a lead. They do not believe in it, and the result is that Britain has the wrong defence priorities. The Secretary of State is not alone he is only the latest to embrace such a short-sighted view. However, he has done more damage than his predecessors. I regret that the Chiefs of Staff did not act as a body last year. Instead, it is well known that there was an unseemly scramble, each defending his own service and fighting for what he could get, and the Navy came off worst.
  I am not speaking about these matters simply because there is a Navy lobby—as though there is something indecent or obscene about a Navy lobby. I am concerned about Europe as a whole and about Britain's interests. I am concerned that we should get the balance of resupply and reinforcement right, as opposed to what we have in the front line. If we were to withdraw, say, for the sake of argument, half our troops from Germany—I do not know what the figure might be—it is absurd to say that they would not be made up. Of course they would be made up. Once our continental allies were convinced of the need for Britain to fulfil its natural role of being their security and defence—as we have been in the past—it is absurd to say that they would not then make the necessary arrangements.
  What should we do? First, we should not take unilateral action but should urge upon NATO a fresh examination of the balance between front line forces in Germany and our contribution to their protection through resupply facilities by sea. We should argue that Britain's contribution can best take the form of a stronger naval presence. I understand that that would have consequences on our land commitment and I would try to convince our European allies that we are looking through their eyes as well as our own.
  Britain's maritime contribution should take the form of more surface ships, with adequate air cover and air defence to protect merchant shipping. I should reverse the mistaken policy of abandoning the modernisation of ships half-way through their life. If the Falklands has shown anything—I am ready to wait for the conclusion of the examination—surely it has shown the necessity of up-to-date air defence systems, which change, perhaps, every 10 years or so. Therefore, if the Secretary of State can be persuaded to change his mind about anything, will he please change his mind at least about modernising those ships' air defence systems, even if he does not want to go for a full-scale refit?
  The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. John Nott): I greatly respect the right hon. Gentleman's experience in all these matters and his intellectual and emotional attachment to the Royal Navy, but before he concludes his excellent speech—much of which I agree with—will he discuss resources? He talks all the time about the need for a stronger Navy. I also happen to want a stronger Navy. However, the right hon. Gentleman has not explained how he intends to free resources from the British Army of the Rhine. The share of the defence budget taken up by the Royal Navy today is greater than the share taken up when he was Prime Minister. If the nuclear element is excluded altogether, the share of the Royal Navy's conventional budget will be about the same in 1990—under my plans—as it is today.
  How does the right hon. Gentleman square the problem of resources? That is the central issue. The right hon. Gentleman led his party into an election on the proposition that as a percentage of our gross national product, the defence budget should be smaller. That was in his manifesto. Therefore, will the right hon. Gentleman address his mind to resources?
  Mr. Callaghan: I shall try to address my remarks to that, but I have already spoken for a long time. However, I shall try to answer the questions that have been asked. I believe that the figure is now 29 per cent. of the budget and that the figure was 28 per cent. when we had some responsibility for the matter. That is the margin of difference and there is really nothing in it. I understand that in a year or two the percentage will be lower. However, anyone can prove anything with statistics and there is not much in the right hon. Gentleman's first point.
  Some of his other points are extremely important. On resources I have come to the conclusion that we should not proceed with Trident. A year ago I made much the same speech in the defence debate and said that I would keep an open mind about the matter. I hoped that we would be able to find resources elsewhere. However, if we cannot—and it seems that we cannot—I am ready to give up Trident and to continue to run Polaris, updated by Chevaline, as long as possible. For the reasons that I have given, we shall, after that, have to rely on the United States of America. I simply do not accept the view put by my Front Bench that we should deny the Americans bases for nuclear weapons in this country. I cannot understand that view, although I do not want to get into an argument with my right hon. and hon. Friends now.
  Just as other countries have found that they have to give up certain of their defence requirements, so must we. They do not all have nuclear weapons. I must say that I thought it was a little odd for the Minister to argue that every country should have its own nuclear weapons. Perhaps I misunderstood him, but that is what it sounded like to some of us. My answer will not satisfy those who want to continue with Trident. However, like the Secretary of State, they must face the choices. In addition, I would find more resources by saving on the foreign exchange of BAOR and, if necessary, by reducing the size of the land forces and increasing the number of reserves.
  We cannot dodge such issues. There is one area in which we might have done more and in which the Secretary of State is doing even worse, despite what the White Paper says. I refer to naval reserves. We should be building up our reserves far more than we have done so far. In that way, we could save money and could provide
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  for the overriding necessity. I do not have a romantic affection for the Navy. I regard my view as a cold analysis of where the interests of Britain and Europe lie.
  I apologise if I have not answered one of the Secretary of State's questions. However, I have said that we should increase the number of naval and other reserves. We should keep the facilities at Portsmouth dockyard to modernise our ships. I had hoped that the Secretary of State would deal with the modernisation of air defence systems when he intervened. I hope that he will consider my proposition seriously. Modernisation is important because protection from air attack is vital and can be achieved only if our weapons systems are kept up to date. The Merchant Navy is absolutely indispensable. I am glad to see that the views that I have expressed for some time—I and a few others expressed them last year—are beginning to win. The debate on what we should do is beginning. I am glad that that should be so and I hope that we shall continue to stimulate the debate so that we can get matters right. None of us want to attack the Secretary of State because he is a Conservative. Unfortunately, that is his weakness. He is a witty and intelligent man, but he happens to be wrong.
  I shall not rest until the Secretary of State has been removed from office and until we have a Secretary of State with a more basic understanding of where Britain's national interests and its strategic role lie.
  5.46 pm
  Sir Frederick Burden: The speech by the right hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) was most interesting and I agreed with much of it. The success of the Falkland Islands action was due to a wonderful combined operation. The use of all three Forces together is a legacy of the late Lord Louis Mountbatten's ingenuity. I was fortunate enough to serve on his staff in South-East Asia.
  During the debate last Thursday, the Secretary of State confirmed the closure of Chatham dockyard, with the loss of 7,000 jobs, by the middle of next year. He also stated that, while there would be a reprieve for Portsmouth, the manpower reduction there would go ahead early in the new year. At the conclusion of the debate my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for the Armed Forces gave thanks to the Royal Navy dockyards generally, and singled out Devonport and Portsmouth for special praise. I was surprised that particular dockyards should be treated in that way. I should have thought that all were entitled to equal commendation. As I knew how much it would mean to the workers in the dockyard at Chatham and to the people of north Kent, because of the threat hanging over them, I intervened and said:
  "I am greatly surprised that the Minister singles out Portsmouth and Devonport. He should be generous and pay tribute to four major dockyards. Chatham did its best and served well."
  The Under-Secretary of State for the Armed Forces (Mr. Jerry Wiggin)rose—
  Sir Frederick Burden: I shall give way, with pleasure in a moment. When I made that intervention the Under-Secretary smiled and smiles were exchanged between him and the Secretary of State. My hon. Friend replied:
  "I was hoping to be as generous as I could, but I believe that little, if any, task force work was carried out at Chatham."
  At that, I felt impelled to leave the Chamber. A few minutes later, my hon. Friend said:

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  "My hon. Friend the Member for Gillingham chooses to leave before I make my comments about his dockyard. That is somewhat discourteous."—[Official Report, 1 July 1982; Vol. 26, c. 1127.]
  There was nothing more that the Minister could say about the closure of Chatham dockyard. The hopes for its future role had all been raised before. It would have been an ineffectual cosmetic. The next day, I received a letter from the hon. Gentleman that merely demonstrated that all that he would have said, had I remained, would have been cosmetic. I take the greatest exception to his remark. Nothing that the Minister could possibly say would go beyond conciliatory mutterings that would do little, if anything, to provide real hope for the vast majority of workers in Chatham dockyard and to the people in north Kent as a whole.
  By a touch of good fortune, the next morning I received a copy of the local newspaper. In it, a headline stated,
  "Well done dockyards, says boss".
  That praise for the dockyard workers came from Captain Philip Stearns, the production manager in the yard, who had sent a shipyard brief to the workers. He said that 38 miles of rope had been produced during the Falklands crisis by workers, all of whom have been told they will be made redundant in September. He said that another startling success was the double refit of HMS "Phoebe", a frigate that has now been converted for anti-submarine work. The workers also made the inflatable rubber lifeboats for the Falkland Islands operation, according to Captain Stearns, and they put in 800 man-hours on HMS "Phoebe" in 11 weeks. At the very least, they did all that they were asked to do. The workers resented most bitterly the suggestion that they had done little or nothing.
  I hope that the words of the captain of the dockyard gave them some comfort. I had hoped today that my hon. Friend would apologise for saying that the Chatham workers had done little or nothing. I also resent the Minister's remark that I was discourteous in leaving the Chamber after that statement was made. There was no way in which I could have remained in my seat.
  The Under-Secretary told me yesterday that he had spoken on radio Medway. My hon. Friend the Member for Faversham (Mr. Moate) and I pressed the Minister about this interview. I telephoned radio Medway this morning. I do not know whether he asked to go on radio or whether they asked him.
  Mr. Wiggin: The latter.
  Sir Frederic Burden: I was told on the telephone that the Minister had said that he stood by everything that had been said last Thursday about Chatham dockyard. The Minister said that he had no reason to apologise, and that he stood by everything that he had said last Thursday. Can one but wonder that the people in that part of Kent are disillusioned with and disgusted by the lack of generosity for all the work that has been done by the Royal Navy and the Forces in that area for hundreds of years?
  Mr. Wiggin: I seek no quarrel with my hon. Friend. I opened my remarks on the subject by congratulating all the dockyards and ports for the work that was done. My hon. Friend accused me, perhaps justifiably, of a sin of omission. I readily acknowledge the part that Chatham played in some of the task force work. I said so in a letter to him and in the lengthy interview that he mentioned. If I gave the impression, in the heat of the moment, that Chatham did nothing, I apologise and wish to withdraw
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  any such imputation. I am sure that the work carried out at Chatham was done with the usual skill and enthusiasm that we have come to expect from that dockyard.
  Sir Frederick Burden: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his generosity and I accept his remarks. They will give confort to many people in Kent, especially in my constituency.
  Unfortunately, that was not the first gaffe made about Chatham. On 27 April, the local newspaper stated that the dockyard workers had been informed that there would be no further redundancies. The next day, they were informed that there would be further redundancies, starting on 20 May. The following day, another statement was issued saying that the redundancies would be held up. In disbelief, I telephoned the office of my hon. Friend—who was not there—and was told by a senior civil servant that it was true and that minds had been changed. I hope and pray that no such mistakes will be made in the future, in view of the terrible trouble that they can cause to many men and their families.
  The first intimation of the cuts in the defence forces was in the House in late May of last year. To everyone's surprise, The Daily Telegraph forecast almost everything in my right hon. Friend's White Paper. When it was published, it confirmed the forecast almost word for word. It announced, among other things, the withdrawal of HMS "Endurance" from the South Atlantic. "Endurance" is a Chatham-based ship and I have a great interest in her. But the fact that she was to be scrapped and not replaced was an invitation to the Argentines, after they had invaded South Georgia, to accept that we had no intention of resisting any attempted annexation of the islands by force.
  However, that was certainly not the view of my self and 80 other Conservative Members. On 22 March five senior members of the House and I tabled a motion stating:
  "That this House, being greatly disturbed at the implications evident as a result of the recent landing on the Falkland Islands Dependency of South Georgia, of a party of Argentinians conveyed there by an Argentine naval transport ship, calls upon Her Majesty's Government to give an assurance that a Royal Naval force, of sufficient strength to repel any attempt by the Argentine Government to annex this British colony by force., will be kept on station in the area; and further asks Her Majesty's Government to declare in unequivocal terms that the Falkland Islands sovereignty will not be transferred to any foreign power, unless the islanders have asked for such a transfer in a referendum".
  I wonder whether at that stage a warning was sent through our ambassador to the Government in Argentina. I am told that the captain of "Endurance" on two occasions warned the Ministry of Defence, I assume, because he would have to get in touch with it and not the Foreign Office, that the Argentines were building up an invasion force. Did he do that? When was it? What action was taken after the warnings? That is very important.
  My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State has emphasised the enormous value of the hunter-killer submarines. My right hon. Friend intends, apparently, to increase the number to 17 from 12. In his White Paper last year he described it as our most important naval defence weapon. However, Devonport is to be given the sole task of looking after those vessels in future—the task of refuelling, refitting and repairing. HMS "Swiftsure" is the only one on which it has started. That is a first-time refit, which is the most simple. It has been in that dockyard for three and a half years and will not be operational again until March or April, which means that it will have been

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  out of operation for four years. However, Chatham has been looking after such vessels and been turning them out every two years. It should be reprieved.
  It has been stated that the hunter-killer submarines bottled up the Argentine Navy. That is true. One of them sank the Argentine cruiser. However, I wonder whether there might be a question hanging over the invulnerability of the nuclear hunter-killer submarine. After the NATO operation "Ocean Safari" last year, Admiral Cox stated that the Russian diesel electric submarine was "deadly" because of its silence and because it could pick up a nuclear propelled submarine long before that submarine could pick it up. We know that the Russians have a considerable number of submarines. Can it be assumed beyond doubt that our SSN submarines would not be vulnerable in the confined areas of seas in which NATO would probably operate against the Russians, in view of the enormous Russian fleet of "deadly" diesel electric submarines? It is easy to assume invulnerability of vessels in war, but that is not so, as has been shown in the Falkland Islands.
  The Foreign Secretary was completely and utterly wrong to announce that he was introducing his White Paper for 1982. It has appeared with the Defence Estimates. It is admitted that it goes up to only March of this year, before the Falkland Islands operation began. Would it not have been wise to wait and discover the lessons that must be learnt from it?
  The Minister stated that some of the ships that were intended to be scrapped or sold—four destroyers—would be retained. Surely they and the other ships that were damaged in the Falkland Islands will require, in many instances, a considerable amount of refit and repair work. It is impossible to estimate the real scale of that until after the ships have been docked and after investigation has been carried out in full.
  It is wrong to close down or to suggest further closures at Portsmouth from January this year. Nothing has been said by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State about HMS "Invincible". I objected in the House on 15 February to the sale of "Invincible" to Australia at a knock-down price of £175 million, against the price of replacement of £330 million at the time. She has performed yeoman service in the Falkland Islands. Will we let her go to Australia? We want the answer. It has not been given. Not one word has been said about it. The "Illustrious" will soon be operational. If we are to be assured of having two aircraft carriers always operational, this country must have three in case of damage to or the refit of one.
  I apologise for speaking for a long time. I should like to say much more. I beg the House to bear with me for speaking for a long time. I feel deeply about these matters. They are of great national interest. If the Falkland Islands problem had arisen in two years' time it would have been impossible to send the task force with any real chance of success. I believe that it was at my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister's insistence that that operation was undertaken. I thank God for her insistence and the success.
  Each of the Services should have a political Under-Secretary who is operating for them. Each Under-Secretary should fight the corner of his Service. That position should be restored. It was a tragedy that it was ever removed. My hon. Friend the Member for Preston, North (Mr. Atkins) shakes his head. I say to him with
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  respect that I have been a Member of the House for a long time. I have been engaged in war. I have studied this problem. I believe that each of the Forces needs an Under-Secretary to fight its corner, work within it and get to know all that goes on in that Service. The time is ripe for that to happen again.
  Several Hon. Members rose—
  Mr. Speaker: Order. I remind the House that everyone feels deeply on this subject. Two hon. Members have been called in one hour. I know that all hon. Members who have been rising in their places wish to speak. They must bear that in mind.
  6.9 pm
  Dr. David Owen: The debate started appropriately with heartfelt tributes to our Service men in all three Armed Forces. We have done that in previous defence debates but it has a special poignancy now when one remembers the loss of life, the injuries that have been sustained and the immense courage that has been demonstrated by all our Services in the Falkland Islands.
  It has sometimes not been easy to hold the commitment of the House to the Services and to the necessity to spend money to ensure that our Service men do not risk their lives as a result of outdated equipment or because they are inadequately supported. I hope that the events of the past few months will refresh the commitment of those who have always felt that it is essential for the country to commit reasonable expenditure to the Services.
  The debate so far has not grappled with the real, hard choices that face any Government. For those who wish to register their dissatisfaction with the Government's defence policies—there are many on both sides of the House—our amendment represents a realistic alternative. We accept that the NATO commitment, which was first entered into in late 1977, of a 3 per cent. real terms increase in the defence budget must be fulfilled. It is also realistic to remind ourselves of the debate of almost a year ago when the Secretary of State presented his cuts. In fairness to him, he had to make those cuts because the defence budget was running out of control. It was necessary to rein back and to make some difficult choices.
  The hon. Member for Gillingham (Sir F. Burden) rightly upheld his constituents' interests. In spite of the harshness of this closure, no one can doubt his sincerity. Some hard decisions lie behind keeping defence expenditure even at its present 3 per cent. per annum in real terms increase.
  What are the lessons of the Falklands? They will emerge in the investigation, but some are immediately obvious. The first is that the submarine, whether nuclear or diesel-electric, has showed itself to be an extremely powerful weapons system in modern naval warfare. The nuclear-powered submarines that we deployed in the South Atlantic completely bottled up the Argentine navy. That was one of the most successful aspects of the campaign.
  Those of us who argue for increased expenditure on the conventional Navy are right to insist that it be spent on submarines. Submarines are the real battleships of the future. One of my main and serious criticisms of the Secretary of State, which I also made a year ago, is that he has not sufficiently protected the build rate of nuclear-powered submarines. There is much anxiety that in the

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  early 1990s the number of our submarines will have dropped to a point when they are sufficient to meet neither our world-wide role nor our North Atlantic seaborne role. That remains a serious criticism of the Secretary of State's strategy.
  No one knows whether we shall ever need another amphibious assault. I tend to agree with those who say that the Falkland Islands conflict cannot be dismissed as one off. There are many parts of the world where we may need to use force again. We are concentrated in Europe, but our foreign policy is not yet completely constrained within the European context. As long as we have the capacity to do so, we should maintain the capability to reinforce our foreign policy world-wide.
  The maritime role is extremely important. The Secretary of State has effectively recognised that already—he has saved "Intrepid" and "Fearless". No one who has commented on the Falklands issue has doubted that those ships were essential for putting some of the heavy equipment ashore. I have always been sceptical about an opposed assault on the northern flank. That is not a realistic role for the amphibious forces in the future. It may be realistic on the southern flank and world-wide. Having got the ships, however, it is worth retaining them. Nevertheless, spending the same quantities of money again cannot be justified.
  The through-deck cruisers, as they used to be called, have shown themselves to be effective in war. I took them through the Admiralty Board in 1969. I have always had some doubts about whether they would fulfil their role and justify their expense. There can be no doubt that the maritime aircraft—the VSTOL, and the Ski Jump—have provided effective attack weapons. So too has the helicopter base.
  The Secretary of State faces a difficult decision about "Invincible". The Australians were immensely generous to offer to cancel the arrangement. The offer was a bargain. Nevertheless, we must recognise that some Commonwealth countries have been our firmest allies throughout the emergency in the Falklands. If "Invincible" were to go to Australia, that would not be of no account to us. Indeed, she would be deployed in an area where we are unable constantly to deploy. That would have some value and should be taken into account.
  Perhaps the Secretary of State will decide to keep "Hermes". He will then face the difficult decision whether to lay down a new ship. That would be an expensive commitment. If he makes it, he may be forced to tell the Navy that some of the expense must be met both from the sale and from the reduction of surface ships. On that issue, I part company with some of what has been said. I strongly favour a re-balance, and I criticised the Secretary of State last year for making cuts that were too deep into the conventional naval force. That decision does not necessarily mean the perpetuation of a large number of hulls.
  Another lesson to be learnt from the Falklands is that a hull must have a modern weapons system. There has been inadequate spending on weapons systems by, I fear, successive Governments. The admirals have concentrated too much on the number of hulls. The Secretary of State must be honest with himself and his supporters. Why does the Honiton Division Conservative Association, Newspoint say:
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  "Talk of running down the Navy is nonsense … There will be more major ships and submarines operational in 1985 than there are today. A massive modernisation programme of the fleet is in hand"?
  That is not true. The total number of major warships—frigates and above and submarines other than Polaris—in the conventional fleet when the Government took office was 98. By April 1982 there were 86 and current plans are for a further decline by the end of the decade. Therefore, the Secretary of State's statement on 7 April—
  "we cannot be criticised for cutting back the conventional Navy, when it is far larger today than it was when we took office, and so it will be in the late 1980s" —[Official Report, 7 April 1982; Vol. 21, c. 1050.]—
  is not true. He should say so. He is shifting spending withing the Navy. That is fair enough, it has some validity, but he should not try to pretend that the Navy is larger or that it will be able to answer every demand in the future.
  I am worried whether we have enough frigate hulls to meet all the demands. As I said in the previous debate, when I was Foreign Secretary I kept asking for frigates and the Ministry of Defence constantly found difficulty in having them available to deploy. I am glad that the type 23 is now a general purpose frigate. It will be better for that.
  I come to some of the wider questions. How is this to be paid for? Some of it will involve increased expenditure. The House must face this. The fundamental thrust of our amendment is that we cannot afford Trident, but I am not so unrealistic as to claim that that means a great saving in the defence budget now and in the next few years. It is high time that the Labour Pary started to face that reality. The reality is to live within our budget over the next few years. Trident will pose immense problems for the defence budget in the next 10 to 15 years. Frankly, we cannot afford it under present budgetary constraints. The country must face that fact.
  In this context, again, the argument advanced in the White Paper is basically dishonest. The Secretary of State always asks us to compare any alternative to Trident with his own system. We have never made any attempt to do that. Those of us who have argued that we should extend the life of Polaris and consider alternative options in the 1990s have always accepted that it will be a less effective and a lesser deterrent. It could not have as many warheads. The Secretary of State says in the White Paper:
  "We should therefore have to deploy many more cruise than ballistic missiles for the same striking power."
  That is clear, but we are not arguing that it has to have the same striking power. We have argued consistently that we are extremely reluctant to give up the nuclear deterrent. Having spent the money on Polaris, we wish it to continue its life. We will consider replacement of Polaris when the time comes—in my view, not before eight years' time. If it needs to be done a little earlier, we will consider it a little earlier. I am simply saying that the country cannot afford the super-sophisticated 'Trident system. There are differences of opinion on this, of course, and there will be differences of opinion on other things, but at least our proposal offers the possibility of extra resources to go into the conventional forces in the next 15 years.
  Mr. Nott: The right hon. Gentleman makes a very interesting argument, but I am sure that he will agree that for a nuclear deterrent to deter it must be credible in the eyes of the potential aggressor. I do not think that he has really given attention to this. Given what we know of the

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  likely developments in the ABM defences in the Soviet Union in the 1990s and beyond, expenditure on a second-rate deterrent that is not credible in the eyes of the potential aggressor is money ill spent. In my judgment, we must have something that deters or it is not worth spending a penny on it.
  Dr. Owen: Credibility is a matter of judgment. The right hon. Gentleman refers to ABM defences. As yet, the only system of this kind is the Galosh system around Moscow. There are signs that that is being uprated, but I believe that Polaris could continue to penetrate it. In any case, I have never taken the view that it is essential for a British deterrent to be able to hit Moscow. I have always argued the strategy of a minimum deterrent still being credible for the potential and only task for which we need it—the situation in which NATO has been completely destroyed and the United States is no longer an effective, reliable ally in Europe. However, those are issues to which we can return. The basic fact is that if the House wishes to commit itself to a higher standard of conventional defence in Europe and world wide, we must ask ourselves whether we can afford this massive tranche of expenditure in the next 15 years.
  With regard to BAOR, I have always regarded this commitment, and particularly its foreign exchange costs, as excessive for this country. Having said that, however, it is extremely difficult to reduce the numbers of BAOR at present.
  Two areas must be seriously examined. First, we must get some momentum into the MBFR negotiations. With the new Western proposal due to be tabled fairly soon, it ought now to be possible to sidestep the issue of data and, in the four-stage approach with a seven-year reduction period, to achieve verifiable lower figures. It should be possible to avoid getting locked on the present data problem in which, for a breakthrough to be achieved, the Soviet Union would have to admit that what it has been saying for the past eight or nine years is incorrect. It will not do that, so we shall have to circumnavigate that issue.
  In my judgment, it is essential to achieve a better balance of conventional forces in Europe because we could then start to remove the battlefield nuclear weapons, which I believe are by far the most dangerous part of the nuclear equation in Europe. We should move away from talks about the very ambitious object of "no first use" of nuclear weapons to the more limited but none the less important objective of "no early use" of nuclear weapons. I have always believed that it is dangerous and incredible to have battlefield nuclear weapons within 20 kilometres of the border. I believe that a battlefield nuclear weapon free zone is negotiable, provided that it is accompanied by a conventional balance.
  The White Paper's claim that the Trident issue could continue to be kept out of the START talks is nonsense. Indeed, another argument for not going ahead with Trident is that of disarmament and arms control. If President Reagan succeeds in achieving deep cuts in the number of nuclear warheads and reducing the United States arsenal to 5,000 warheads, the British deterrent will represent 10 per cent. of United States warheads and the French deterrent, with its land-based systems and extra submarine, would represent 15 per cent. In other words, Britain and France would have 25 per cent. of the then
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  lower level of warheads. It is nonsense to think that they could be kept out of the START or the INF talks. It is essential that we begin to consider how this issue is to be dealt with in the strategic arms reduction talks. If we go for deep cuts, in which I very much believe, there will have to be a contribution from Britain and also, one hopes, from France.
  Mr. Churchill: Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?
  Dr. Owen: Time is pressing, so I hope that the hon. Gentleman will forgive me if I do not give way.
  It is extremely difficult to take seriously almost anything said by the Labour Party in this debate. There have been some robust and splendid contributions from the Labour Back Benches, arguing almost without exception for increased defence expenditure. The Labour Party itself and its Front Bench spokesmen, however, argue an incredible policy. This has never happened before. If there is anything on which there has been agreement and broad consensus in the House, it has been over defence policy. The positions of the various Opposition Front Bench spokesmen in defence have had a great deal of continuity and inner coherence. That is no longer so. It is time that some Labour Back Benchers refused to go through the Lobbies with their Front Bench colleagues and the Tribunite lobby. It is no longer credible for Labour Members to come together, as they will tonight, to vote against the Defence Estimates. They dare not vote for the only proposal for which they should vote—our amendment. They are to vote against the Government on the Defence Estimates. That is the minimum programme on which they can agree, because it says nothing. It is simply a negative vote.
  Labour Members are incredible. They tour the country promising that every dockyard and every establishment being cut back would be maintained, paying their Danegeld to the Transport and General Workers Union, forgetting that at every TUC conference that same union moves resolutions calling for a severe reduction in defence expenditure. Moreover, such a reduction is also usually part of a composite at the Labour Party conference. The whole procedure is dishonest and it is no longer possible for it to continue,
  Labour Front Bench spokesmen are effectively putting the argument contained in those resolutions. In the old days, the Labour Front Bench completely disowned the lunatic Left, but they now say that they want a non-nuclear defence policy, the removal of all United States nuclear bases from this country and a substantial reduction in the defence budget—one may argue about whether it would be one-third or one-quarter—while at the same time they want every job saved, no redundancies and no closures. The whole thing is rubbish. Indeed, it is not just rubbish—it is serious rubbish.
  The fact that the Labour Party is no longer credible was demonstrated throughout the Falklands crisis—half its heart was in the right place but the rest was unable to say what needed to be said. This cannot go on. The Labour Party is in an incredible position. One cannot have a party claiming to be the official Opposition with no policy on defence and what is more, allowing its shadow Cabinet to go along with it. I hope that there are some hon. Gentlemen in the Labour Party who know in their hearts

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  that the Labour Party's defence policy is rotten and that they will at least not vote against the Defence Estimates, even if they feel unable to vote for our amendment.
  6.30 pm
  Mr. Robert Atkins: The whole House is no doubt grateful for the speech made by the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen). I hope that he will forgive me if I do not develop his detailed analysis of the problems of the Labour Party policy.
  I understand the reasons for the publication of the Defence Estimates and I look forward to the next White Paper, such as it will be, on the Falklands. I imagine that that will be towards the end of the year. It would be unwise of me to speak at length on the Falklands until all the results are known, except perhaps to make three brief comments. I pay tribute, as all hon. Members have rightly done, to the contribution made by our Armed Forces. That almost goes without saying, but ought to be said, and said continually.
  I intervened in the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Blackpool, South (Mr. Blaker) to ask about the equipment captured during the Falklands conflict. My question followed an article this week in Aviation Week. The article specified in detail some of the equipment that was taken over. What will happen to that captured equipment? Will it stay in the Falklands, or will it be utilised for training and other purposes in this country, particularly among those forces which so often suffer—the cadet forces, the Territorial Army, and the home service units?
  Before directing my remarks to the substance of my speech which, hon. Members will not be surprised to learn, deals with the P110, I refer to the requisition of merchant ships, aircraft and other property where that property, particularly aeroplanes, is subject to leasing or other financial arrangements that involve foreign banks and foreign companies. Are our requisition powers capable of taking them over? I am led to believe by some informants within British Airways that they are not entirely certain that some of their equipment could be taken over by the Ministry of Defence, even though it was not needed in this instance.
  I also refer to the Trident offset agreement—or the lack of it—and the lack of dual sourcing. I know that my hon. Friend the Member for Chertsey and Walton (Mr. Pattie) is to answer the debate and I therefore want to deal with some industrial problems. I quote from a leading article in The Engineer of 3 June. This states:
  "Etched in tablets of stone at the time Britain agreed to buy Trident was this statement: 'United Kingdom manfacturers are to compete on the same terms as United States firms for subcontracts for Trident 2 weapon system components for the programme as a whole.' … The Engineer's evidence is that the invitation from America has been treated as cynical. The timetable of the programme is such that one-quarter of the subcontractors will have been selected by the year end. And British companies new to the technology appear daunted by the suffocating documentation and approval procedure."
  If that is the case and 50 per cent. of subcontractors will have already been selected by next year, clearly British industry will have to work extremely fast and realise that the administrative, bureaucratic security and contract period constraints will have to be overcome. Is the Ministry of Defence doing enough?
  There is a requirement under air staff target 1228 for an urgent and early decision on what are loosely known
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  as either Alarm or Harm anti-radar missiles, essential for Tornado. On 2 April I asked my hon. Friend for information, but he said that no news was forthcoming. I want to know when that news will be available.
  I now turn my attention to the P110 which, in a number of ways, is essential to this country. It is also important to the Fylde area of northern Lancashire. My hon. Friend the Member for Blackpool, South (Mr. Blaker) will also be aware of this problem because his constituency is directly affected. There is no mention of the P110 in the White Paper. We all know that AST403, as it used to be called—the European combat aircraft or, loosely, the Jaguar replacement—was effectively cancelled by statements in the last White Paper.
  The Prime Minister's exhortation to the aerospace industry at the SBAC dinner in 1980, when she expressed the view that the Government were entitled to look to the aerospace industry to point out export opportunities and reminded us that the prospect of overseas orders would be a factor that would play an increasing part in defining our own operational requirements is most appropriate to the P110 project. A market survey carried out by British Aerospace shows that in a collaborative programme it could expect to produce 850 aircraft—500 for the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy, and 350 for export. These conclusions have been validated by an independent consultant and the Ministry of Defence, Sales, is in broad agreement.
  For those who are not familiar with it, the P110 is a single-seat, air superiority aircraft powered by two Rolls-Royce RB 199 engines. I inquired on Thursday whether the 67R derivative of that engine, which is related to Tornado and which will be essential to the P110, will be ready. Again, I am not entirely happy with the answer that I received. Much of the P110's structure is of a carbon fibre composite. Its systems and equipment are either based on existing developments or on already funded research programmes. The high power of the engines, combined with light weight, the sophisticated aerodynamics, and the fly-by-wire control system result in a highly energetic and agile aircraft outstanding in the air superiority role and equally effective in ground attack roles.
  An aircraft like the P110 is essential to the defence needs of the United Kingdom. There is an operational case for the Royal Air Force to purchase P1lOs to fill a gap in its commitments in the central region in the 1990s and to satisfy the AST 403 and replace air defence Phantoms. There is a further operational case for additional P1lOs to complement the Tornado interceptor in defence of the United Kingdom air defence region.
  The aircraft is designed to make cost-effective use of a combination of Tornado-related developments and new technology available from demonstration programmes. This approach has the advantages of reduced development costs, reduced time scale, reduced risks, and confidence in performance predictions, in service dates, and so on. Moreover, the project is in accord with paragraph 20 of Cmnd. 8288 of June 1981.
  The development of a new fighter aircraft would represent a logical technology step towards the development of an advanced short take-off and vertical landing aircraft—the so-called STOVL—to meet air staff target 410 planned for entry into RAF service towards the end of this century. Furthermore, the aircraft would be operationally complementary to the STOVL aircraft.

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  The threat is not just in strategic terms. There is also a threat to industry. The industrial case for launching a new high performance military aircraft revolves around the need to maintain a national capability. The main thrust of this argument is that without such a project the military side of the aerospace industry could run down to a level from which it might not be possible to recover. Furthermore, the equipment manufacturers depend on new aircraft projects to launch their products on the export market. The recent Falklands crisis also produced a strong argument for the retention of a national defence industrial base with the capability of effective, flexible and rapid reaction.
  In this project the industry, recognising the trend in rising costs for the development and production of defence equipment, proposes a partnership between Government and industry aimed at easing financial and management problems. International co-operation with Germany and Italy has arrived at the stage where the aircraft configuration and the development programme have been finalised. Discussions are proceeding rapidly towards contractual agreements. It has the added bonus of keeping the French aircraft industry at bay.
  The proposal to the United Kingdom Government represents a radical change in procurement procedures, but it is hoped that a step-by-step plan will be agreed by British Aerospace and by the consortium involved that will minimise the joint commitments and risks at each stage.
  Until now the project has been supported by private venture funding, by a consortium of British Aerospace, Rolls-Royce, Dowty, Ferranti, Lucas, Marconi and Smiths Industries—that in itself represents a unique
  situation and a roll-call of our successful industries—amounting, by the end of this year, to £25 million and to £35 million by the middle of 1983. Understandably, without some limited customer commitment, industry cannot continue indefinitely to write off this level of expenditure against profits. Some urgent commitment by the Government is needed.
  The cost of the P110 as presently constituted has the United Kingdom providing 40 per cent., the West German Government 40 per cent. and Italy 20 per cent. Over 10 years, that represents about £500 million to the United Kingdom Government, not the £1,000 million figure that is sometimes bandied around. From that £500 million, it is anticipated that the industry will provide between £150 million and £175 million, reducing the Government's commitment to between £300 million and £350 million.
  The aircraft industry runs down this year. This certainly applies to the aircraft division based at Warton, near my constituency. Jobs, especially among the design team, are at risk. The P110 is vital in this regard. Once a design team is broken up, it is extraordinarily difficult to reconstitute it.
  In regard to exports, the possibility of £6,000 million in foreign income is at stake. It may appeal to the right hon. Member for Llanelli (Mr. Davies), with his Treasury experience, to know that about £2,000 million in tax revenue, together with support services income, is also possible. Operationally, the aircraft meets the demands of what was the AST403 and is a step technologically towards the AST410, the STOVL aircraft.
  Most important perhaps in terms of the emotion that surrounds defence is that any alternative to the P110, a
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  necessary aircraft, will entail buying foreign. That prospect is unacceptable to me, and I suspect to many hon. Members. It is, I hope, recognised that defence spending must be raised at least to the 4 per cent. level suggested by SACEUR. This argument was eloquently expressed by my right hon. Friend the Member for Aldershot (Mr. Critchley) last Thursday. By following this course, many of the problems to which hon. Members have referred will be resolved. Above all, we shall be able to fund the P110, which is vital not only to the Preston factories of British Aerospace but to the subcontractors and other members of the consortium who are actively involved.
  Mr. Bill Walker: What is the cost of this aircraft relative to the cost of the air defence version of the Tornado?
  Mr. Atkins: I shall tread cautiously in this regard. I am not privy to all the detailed figures that my hon. Friend the Member for Chertsey and Walton no doubt has at his fingertips. I shall not therefore be drawn into the argument unless my hon. Friend has some information.
  Mr. Walker: The figure, I understand, is about £7·5 million, as against £14·5 million for the air defence version of the Tornado.
  Mr. Atkins: It is pleasant to have informed friends ready to leap to one's aid. I am sure that hon. Members on both sides recognise the vital importance of the project in a wide variety of areas. I hope that my hon. Friend the Member for Chertsey and Walton will be able to give me confidence that the Government intend to move towards funding this aircraft in the near future.
  6.43 pm
  Mr. Dick Douglas: I shall not take up the remarks of the hon. Member for Preston, North (Mr. Atkins), who has spoken about a constituency interest in the P110. I hope to learn more of the significance of that aircraft in coming days. However, I wish to speak directly of my own constituency where the naval base and dockyard of Rosyth is located. Other hon. Members representing dockyard constituencies have referred to the work undertaken to meet the Falklands crisis. I am sure that the Minister is well aware of the wonderful work done at Rosyth.
  We are thankful that some of the ships sent out originally from Rosyth such as the "Plymouth" and the "Yarmouth" will be returning. I understand that the frigate "Plymouth" is due to return in the next week or so. We are grateful for a change of policy by the Government which means that the "Fife" county class destroyer has been reprieved. There is nothing that better indicates the patched-up and patchwork nature of the White Paper than the omission of a massive annex that appeared in the previous year's White Paper dealing with merchant fleets.
  There is nothing in the current White Paper to show the importance of the Merchant Navy in the Falklands crisis, nor that the Government have grasped the importance of having a suitable and viable Merchant Navy to support other naval operations. When I raised the question last Thursday of a replacement for the "Atlantic Conveyor", the response was clearly a bromide. No other nation with a maritime background and depending on a naval strategy would be so mealy-mouthed as to say that it would be left to the vagaries of the market to decide a replacement for a ship like the "Atlantic Conveyor". As my right hon.

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  Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) has remarked, it will be necessary to pay more attention to merchant ships if massive use of naval forces is contemplated in future. It is therefore absurd to rely on foreign yards to build ships for the Merchant Navy.
  We are seeing the rundown of our maritime capability. The Select Committee on Industry examined British shipbuilding. There is need for a maritime strategy. Part of that strategy should be devoted to ensuring an increase of merchant vessels built in British yards. There has also been a rundown in refits in the dockyards. In 1976–77 there were 58 major and normal refits. In 1980–81, the figure had fallen to 38. I concede that refits are becoming much more complicated and more costly. I appeal to the Minister to give further information about the dockyard study to which reference is made in paragraph 521 of the White Paper. All the paragraph says is:
  "the Dockyard Study referred to in last year's Statement is now being re-examined in the light of the defence programme review to see to what extent its recommendations remain valid."
  I imagine that few of its recommendations remain valid in the light of the Falklands dispute. I want to know what the Government intend to do about the overall position of the dockyards. What are the implications, if Trident is set in train, for the refit programme of a dockyard such as Rosyth? I understand that an "Ohio" type class submarine is to be built in the United Kingdom. Is it intended that the refit will take place at Rosyth or at Devonport? Or is some other programme of study to be embarked upon? Those in Rosyth who recognise that the programme had to be set aside because of the commitment to the needs of the Falklands crisis want to know about the long-term programme. I take the view that it is questionable whether we should build Trident. I am not unilateralist. I have made my view clear. I am sorry that the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen) is not here. He flits in and makes his inflammatory speech, and before anyone can reply he walks out. Privy Councillors have that privilege.
  One of the major arguments against Trident, as my right hon. and hon. Friends have pointed out, is that payments for it will swallow 15 to 20 per cent. of the Ministry of Defence's capital expenditure from the end of this decade until the middle of the next. There was some argument as to what would be included in capital expenditure. That is the view of David Greenwood, the director of the centre for defence studies at Aberdeen. I presume that he knows what is meant by capital expenditure, and that is an enormous chunk of the expenditure that would go on equipment.
  If the view is taken that we should remove ourselves from the strategic nuclear deterrent area—I accept that is what it means and that Polaris will not last much beyond 1990—then certain other things are set in train. The buildup of what are loosely called conventional weapons has to be considered. Currently we rely on a threat to destroy the whole of the northern hemisphere to keep West Germany free. To anyone who looks at the matter sensibly that is an absurd proposition.
  I am not sure that it is correct to take the view that the major threat is that posed by the Soviet Union. I believe that there is a great deal to be said for the views expressed by Gerald Smith, who led the United States of America in the SALT 1 discussions. It was felt that there was great advantage in new technology by which one man could knock out a number of tanks with new weapons. There was
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  evidence of the vulnerability of tanks to new weapons during the Yom Kippur war. If the great advantage of the Soviet Union is in their tanks, what are the Government's views about the new technology? We have heard little about that.
  I pay regard to the changing nature of Soviet power and believe that it has moved away from looking at Europe. I do not pretend to be an expert, but if one looks at Jane's "Fighting Ships" one must be impressed by the might of the Soviet navy. It is not a navy that is content with looking at Europe; it is looking at the Soviet world role. If we are to combat that, our Navy must have a world role. I accept what is said about SSNs, but it is absolutely absurd that a gestation period of almost 10 years is needed to get a replacement for the "Oberon" class diesel-powered submarine. There are arguments for SSNs and diesel-powered submarines, but equally there is an argument for a powerful surface fleet. My criticism of the Government is the same as that of my right hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East—that they have not considered that.
  For a long time we have been designing and redesigning ships when we should have been moving ahead because that would provide jobs for our shipyards. It should have been done for a long time and not just as a result of the Falklands crisis.
  There has been a great deal of criticism about materials used on the ships. I take those criticisms on board, but I recognise that ships in any war will be sunk and the most inflammable and dangerous material used on a ship is fuel and ammunition. The other materials of course have to be looked at. The Admiralty marine research technology establishment is a unique centre in my constituency that was being run down. What role will it be given in assessing the consequences of the Falklands campaign on ship design?
  We have had no discussion of new technology. One of the most fearful aspects of the White Paper appears in para 312 headed "Space". It states:
  "The Soviet Union devotes enormous resources to the development and operation of spacecraft. This effort is steadily increasing. The number of satellites launched gives an indication of the scale of the Soviet programme: in 1981 the total was 124. By contrast the West launched 28. A comparison of the number of rocket launchers used to put single or multiple payloads into orbit shows an all-time total by the end of 1981 of 1,437 for the Soviet Union, 7861or the United States and 45 for the rest of the world."
  I remember going to an election meeting where Lord Bertrand Russell received guffaws of laughter from the audience when he said that humanity would be capable of producing satellites that went round the world and fired whenever attacking forces desired. That was fancy, but I have been told that the Soviet Union has a satellite in space with a life of 4,000 years. We argue about deterrence, but how does the West react to that fearful prospect? How do we make the Soviet Union recognise that space should be peaceful? I am annoyed at the Government and my party for not saying what is in train because those of us who are not experts cannot comprehend what is happening.
  If people had seen at the time what was happening in Goose Green, San Carlos and elsewhere in the Falklands, they would have been horrified. One of the most terrible things I have seen was some of our people returning to this country who were not our nationals, and what hurt me most was to be told—I hope the Minister will deny it—that these people, who were mainly catering staff, had to go through immigration. That is a disgrace, and one I hope

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  that can be expunged. Our Forces deserve great credit. I pay my tribute to them all. I hope that the House will pay regard to those effects of the Falklands campaign.
  6.58 pm
  Sir Geoffrey Johnson Smith: This debate and the one that took place last Thursday established four good points. First, there is the recognition of the invaluable role of the Royal Navy. There has been complete agreement about that. Secondly, although this is not a united view, there is a recognition of the need to maintain the British Army of the Rhine. Thirdly—there is far from united recognition here—should Trident be sacrificed to make room for expenditure on conventional weapons? Fourthly, most of those who have contributed to the debate have tried to take up the challenge that has been thrown down by the Government, especially by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State, about the need to face painful choices.
  I shall make some brief observations on those four issues as a Back Bencher, as a member of the NATO Assembly and especially as a member of the military and political committees and chairman of the manpower sub-committee of the NATO Assembly.
  In his foreword to the White Paper, my right hon. Friend states:
  "Only when the Falklands crisis has been fully studied will we be in a position to take reasoned and considered decisions on what adjustments need to be made to the defence programme". How right he is. With respect to the right hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan), the Prime Minister of the former Labour Government, who spoke with considerable authority, it seemed that he was already making some considerable and rather sweeping sudden adjustments. The effect of his proposal would be to destroy the efficacy of the British Army of the Rhine. It seems that he would withdraw it and that is would cease to be the British Army of the Rhine. He argued that the best way out of our expenditure difficulties is no longer to remain a nuclear power and no longer to be a contributor to the land forces of Western Europe. He suggested that we should concentrate exclusively on the Royal Air Force and on our maritime tradition.
  That is too sweeping a judgment to make. It is one that runs away from the main problems that we face. The Royal Navy has a vital role to play. Those of us who consider these matters from a NATO point of view are increasingly concerned about the vulnerability of NATO in the northern and southern flanks, in which a maritime capability can play an important part. In NATO there is a growing perception of an increasing risk that hostilities can develop in areas outside NATO, which are of vital concern to NATO. The perception of the risk has grown with the growth of the Soviet fleet, which now can operate worldwide. The need to have the ability to operate outside the NATO area, which means a maritime capability, is one that the United States has taken up with its rapid deployment force.
  There is little doubt that our American friends in NATO accept prime responsibility. They recognise that there are interests that are European and that are outside NATO. If we are to carry American public opinion with us, it will be necessary for us to recognise that the Royal Navy can play a part, should it be necessary, rather than leave the
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  United States to go it alone. For example, we, too, have vital interests in the Gulf. If there is an outbreak of hostilities, which could break out into something more important, in the Indian Ocean or elsewhere, we should be there to help out. This suggests that the strength of our Navy will need to be enhanced, in view of the possibility of undertaking duties outside the NATO area, including the East Atlantic.
  I do not want to draw too rash a conclusion because in doing so I would fall into the trap into which others have fallen. However, the preliminary studies that we make of the Falkland Islands campaign leads us to ask "Is the role of the Royal Navy, or of any navy, one which has a real future and which is credible in the face of modern missile tactics, strategy and capabilities, or is a navy really a sitting duck?" This question is posed because of the losses that we suffered. There is no time to go into the details, much as I should like to do so. In any event, we can expect a full study from the Government.
  The way in which the Navy behaved in the South Atlantic tells me that there is a role for it and that it can protect itself in future. The costs of strengthening its defences and its ability to protect itself may not be as great as some might imagine. If they think that that will be a heavy burden, they must come to the conclusion, as others have, that something must give elsewhere. In doing so, they will have to argue that the role must be taken up by the Air Force or the Army. They probably adopt this argument because they fear that the lessons to be learnt from the Falkland Islands campaign will be expensive.
  I speak with an open mind. I feel that those who argue against the strengthening of the Navy probably believe that we were outsmarted by the Argentines to the detriment of the Navy. I do not think that we were.
  The British Army of the Rhine is professional but it is small. It would have a catastrophic effect on our allies if we were seriously to entertain withdrawing this small but effective army. I see no other group that is likely to come from the Dutch or the Germans that could match what the British force does in playing a supportive role on the central front in Western Europe. I do not know how it could be argued in Washington that it is vital for the defence of the United States to station about 300,000 of its men in Europe while we feel that it is not vital to station 55,000 of our men in Europe. In political terms, let alone defence terms, that does not add up. Neither would it add up for those countries on the continent of Europe which have conscription and believe that we should.
  I have discussed this issue with many politicians and military staff in the course of my duties as a member of the manpower sub-committee. We can get away with the argument that we do not need conscription because we fulfil certain roles with the Royal Navy and the Air Force and because we have highly professional forces. However, if we reduce our forces in Europe or withdraw them, that argument will prove impossible to sustain. The pressure will then be on us to fulfil our role in NATO by introducing conscription.
  My hon. Friend the Member for Aldershot (Mr. Critchley), whose knowledge in these matters is widely respected on both sides of the House, suggested that the important thing about a military presence in central Europe is not the reserves but the forces in being. He argued that if the forces in being are ready and available to defend, they deter. The decision to move soldiers in a crisis will always be a difficult one. How right my hon. Friend is.

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  He is supported by a former commander of the British Army of the Rhine, General Sir Harry Tuzo, who thinks that the warning of any attack on NATO, certainly on the central front, could come in the form of fragmentary, confused and ambiguous signs. In The Times today, he writes that a decision to move large blocks of troops across the Channel
  "will be stigmatised by some as provocation but will in any case, make a strong political and emotional impact in the countries concerned".
  Those of us who live in the shadow of the Falkland Islands war know that the decision to send a task force while negotiations were still proceeding was regarded by some hon. Members as provocative. By stationing our Air Force and ground forces on the Continent of Europe we avoid falling into that trap. The problem becomes simpler and our forces, as my hon. Friend rightly said, will be seen to be acting as a true deterrent.
  I do not want to rehash the Trident argument, but I believe that it would be folly now for a British Government to give the signal to the Soviet Union that we no longer believe that Trident or a British nuclear missile system has any strategic role to play. From the figures that I have heard today the cost arguments do not prove that on these grounds alone it should no longer be in our budget.
  The costs in terms of proportion of defence effort and equipment do not at any time, as I understand the figures from the Government White Paper, exceed those that we have comfortably afforded or, if we have not comfortably afforded, agreed should be part of the cost of the development of a conventional aeroplane such as the Tornado.
  There is also the wider political argument. As someone who respects the United States enormously, I say that it is prone to making political miscalculations and misjudgments along with the rest of us. If the Russians thought that they could take the risk of attacking the Alliance in the mistaken belief that the United States would not be prepared to use its nuclear weapons, they would have to take into account a nuclear weapon force which is British and European based. If we were to deny ourselves that, the risks and uncertainties of starting a war would be that much greater.
  Mr. Allen McKay: If the hon. Gentleman is arguing that we should fulfil our commitments to the British Army of the Rhine by keeping the forces there, why does he not argue that, instead of an independent nuclear deterrent, we should have a NATO deterrent?
  Sir Geoffrey Johnson-Smith: It would be nice to try to work out a NATO deterrent—our deterrent is NATO targeted and to that extent it is a NATO deterrent—but if one is thinking of having a command system that embraces all the nations, one is restricted by the problem that Germany does not want any part of it. If Germany did want a part of that system old enmities would be aroused. There would be one dickens of a political football if that sort of argument were started again. We have a deterrent in British hands and our friends in NATO are happy that it should be. It is targeted within NATO but they recognise that in certain circumstances we have the right to use it. They know the sort of circumstances that we have in mind.
  I turn to my fourth point, which has been very much established during the two-day debate—the choice thrown to us by the Secretary of State. In one sense there is no choice. No one who takes these matters seriously could
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  argue that we have the choice of reduction in expenditure. There are some who think that that argument does not stand up, certainly not in the light of previous events and certainly not when one looks at the figures of the growing threat of Soviet arms expenditure.
  Investment in defence is investment in peace because strong defence is the best way of preventing a potential enemy from making miscalculations, as has happened so often in the past, about our resolve and our ability to defend ourselves. I know that some hon. Members believe that we spend too large a proportion of our GNP on defence expenditure but that is not the only way to measure these matters, although perhaps it is the most accurate way. We spend more of our GNP because we are poorer. Our GNP is smaller than that of France or Germany. We do not spend more per head than the Germans or the French. If we want to argue on those terms, so be it. If we want to do that, we will lose our influence. But there is much more than that. We would begin to lose the battle. We would begin rot to provide effective forces. We would no longer act in any sense as a reliable military ally in NATO and by our playing around with figures, by deciding, as the Opposition have, that we should reduce the proportion of GNP to spend on defence, we would be getting out of the defence business altogether. For the reasons I have already mentioned, that would be fatal. Defence expenditure helps industry and sustains employment at a time when it is vitally necessary to sustain both. It keeps alive important technical skills in Britain.
  I conclude as I began. There is no option but to consider the possibility of some increase in expenditure. I believe also that the Government's strategy is right. It is a balanced strategy between Navy, Army and Air Force. It may be that, as a result of the Falklands, more will have to go to the Navy, but if more has to go to the Navy at the cost of sacrificing the efficiency of the Air Force and the Army, in the face of the evidence of the Soviet threat, future generations will think us shortsighted and that we walked a perilous path.
  7.17 pm
  Mr. Stanley Newens: The hon. Member for East Grinstead (Sir G. Johnson Smith) deployed his arguments on the basis of the defence statement prepared by the Government. I differ from him in a number of respects on the four issues that formed the theme of his speech. Unlike him, and in common with many of ray right hon. and hon. Friends on the Opposition Benches, I consider that the defence statement was out of date before it was officially published.
  The statement fails to take account of the Falklands crisis and many other world facts. On that basis it should be rejected in the Lobbies tonight. The basic assumption on which the statement rests is that the main threat to the United Kingdom is posed by the USSR and its allies. On that basis the argument for rearmament and for participation in the arms race is justified. I believe that the main threat to the United Kingdom and to many other countries is world war or our becoming involved in a major conflict that will destroy our way of life, and perhaps life itself. Our policy must therefore have as its main objective the safeguarding and protection of our people against such an eventuality.
  The history of recent decades and a survey of the world scene underlines the fact that the biggest threat to world peace today arises not in Europe or in the developed

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  countries but in the Third world where there are innumerable instabilities that could lead to a war at any time. Events only this year illustrate that. There was the conflict in the South Atlantic, the conflict in the Middle East and the continuing Iraqi-Iranian war. Neither the USSR nor its allies have been directly involved in those wars. Today, Africa, Asia and Latin America are seething with problems that could easily lead to war that could escalate and spread far beyond ordinary expectations into a major conflict.
  This is not new. The First World War arose out of an escalating arms race between the great powers at that time, with instability on the fringes that produced a succession of crises. There was Morocco in 1905, Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908, Morocco in 1911, the Balkan War in 1912 and the shooting of the Archduke of Austria at Sarajevo in 1914. The last-mentioned event plunged the world into armed conflict far beyond anything that most leading statesmen at the time imagined possible. There are parallels today, but despite that the great powers vie with each other to sell arms to the Third world where the greatest danger arises of the type of conflicts to which I have referred breaking out. The competition to sell arms is a form of Russian roulette in which the Russians may not be involved. No one knows whose Blowpipe or Exocet missiles will eventually be used against whose Service men. Regardless of our experience in the conflict with Argentina, the defence statement in paragraph 409 states:
  "We shall also be paying greater attention to the sales potential of projects and programmes authorised for the Armed Forces."
  It is estimated that defence sales transactions in 1982–83 will be £1,800 million. My right hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) referred earlier to the sale of warships. Even as the task force was setting sail for the South Atlantic, we were transferring a former destroyer, HMS "London", to the Pakistan navy. In what way would such a transfer help to promote world peace?
  We have supplied arms and trained forces and seconded our own personnel to train foreign forces in a long list of countries that are wholly devoid of any democratic practices and which not infrequently have appalling records on human rights, which they have denied and trampled underfoot.
  Last year, the Secretary of State for Defence, when challenged by my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Hillsborough (Mr. Flannery) on arms sales to dictatorships such as Chile, El Salvador and Argentina, stated in defence of his policy:
  "I regret that there are many dictatorships in the world, and if we sold defence equipment only to countries with our constitutional arrangements, our sales would be very small".—[Official Report, 21 July 1981; Vol. 9, c. 156.]
  Frankly, that is the morality of the pimp or the drug pusher. The merchants of death are sowing dragon's teeth in flagrant defiance of what experience shows, and our experience in the South Atlantic ought to convince us of the need to turn our backs on this particularly pernicious policy.
  The military cliques, juntas and dictators that we arm are the largest threat to the peoples whom they claim to defend. The military coup is now becoming the standard way of changing a government in many parts of the world. To defend the suicidal rush to supply the means of destruction to the world's dictatorships is like laying a trail
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  of gunpowder to our own back door, because sooner or later one of the crises that will explode, which will be fought with weapons supplied by the great powers, will embroil us all in a major world conflict.
  Side by side with that madness, we are indulging in an unparallelled race to develop, manufacture and deploy ever more destructive nuclear weapons systems on the ground that the only real threat comes from the Soviet Union. The Falklands crisis showed that nuclear weapons cannot be used to our advantage in many—I would say all—circumstances. Even the advocates of nuclear weapons usually accept that if they were ever used, the deterrent theory on which their possession is based would have failed.
  The price of deploying nuclear weapons on our territory and in our submarines against the Soviet Union is to have Soviet nuclear weapons targeted on our country. That means that any nuclear attack on the Soviet Union from any source—even a reckless or accidental attack—could result in those missiles targeted against us being launched on their way. Those attacked could not afford to delay to ascertain the origin of the attack even if it were not clear. In those circumstances, the weapons deployed on our soil do not defend us but put our people at a tremendous risk.
  The vast expenditure involved in deploying such weapons is not merely a waste but increases our vulnerability to destruction. Furthermore, if we allow another power to deploy its weapons on our soil, we run an additional risk that they could be used without our being properly consulted, despite the claims that that could never occur.
  I have never argued in favour of a vast escalation of defence expenditure, and in that respect I oppose the commitment of the Government, the SDP and the Liberal Party. I believe that Britain would be much safer and more secure if it used the money at present devoted to nuclear weapons to provide adequate conventional forces to defend our country. That is the basic case advanced by the Labour Party.
  When the ships arrived in the South Atlantic, they had no effective defence against sea-skimming missiles. When the Secretary of State was challenged on this point—relatives of Service men on those ships told me that they had no proper form of defence—he said that we did not have that defence because the Russians did not possess sea-skimming missiles. However, we had nuclear weapons that we could not use. It would be very much better if our defence expenditure was made on equipment and weapons that we shall need in the real world.
  If Britain renounced nuclear weapons and promoted schemes for nuclear-free zones and non-proliferation, our country would be less likely to be the victim of nuclear attack than it is at present. Furthermore, it would help to convince other countries that they do not need nuclear weapons to defend themselves. Although the Minister renounced the contrary point of view when challenged, the logic of his position is that if we need nuclear weapons to defend ourselves, every other country has a case for possessing them as well. We must all be aware of the tremendous increase in the danger of world and nuclear war that that would mean.
  Britain should take a lead against arms sales and seek to persuade other countries to do likewise. The world would become less, not more, likely to be beset with

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  armed conflicts in developing countries if we greatly reduced the continued sale of armaments to Third world countries.
  The sort of policy that I have defended, and which the Labour Party is advancing, would not mean discarding our conventional defence forces. Conservative Members should not argue that case. On the contrary, we believe that our defence forces should be well trained and equipped to deal with any circumstances that they may reasonably be expected to face. We can never justify the sacrifice of conventional defence to build up nuclear capability. If we still cannot afford conventional defences on the scale that is necessary, I and a number of my hon. Friends believe that we should begin withdrawing our forces from Germany. The resources that became available could then be deployed in the interests of Britain.
  Government policy as set out in the White Paper does not recognise or attempt to fulfil the requirements that I have indicated for Britain's defence policy. The statement should be rejected on these grounds. It fails to meet the real defence needs of Britain and it provides for an escalation of defence expenditure. In that respect, the Government are now supported by the Liberals and the SDP, and I hope that the supporters of the alliance outside the House will take careful note of what it is saying in here, as many of those supporters are not saying the same thing.
  If we continue escalating defence expenditure, we shall cripple our economy and destroy any hope of a real recovery, as President Reagan is already finding with the policy of escalating arms expenditure in the United States. I believe, as I have always believed, that it is up to hon. Members to take a stand against the madness of the nuclear arms race. Accordingly, I hope that we shall register in the Division Lobbies a good vote against the statement. It is against the real interests of the defence of the people of this country.
  7.31 pm
  Mr. Churchill: I begin by paying tribute to our Armed Forces in the South Atlantic, the dockyard workers who volunteered to accompany them and the men and, all too often forgotten, the women of the Merchant Marine. In their skill and courage they have no equal among the armed forces of any nation. I know that that is a view shared on both sides of the House. We mourn those who did not return and who by their gallantry and sacrifice made the victory possible. Nor should we forget in our deliberations today the dangers faced by those who serve us so well in Northern Ireland.
  The lessons of the Falklands are many and will be pondered for many years. We all have our pet lessons that we feel ought to be learnt. Broadly speaking, the lessons fall into two categories—tactical and strategic. At a tactical level, the most obvious one is the vulnerability of surface ships to attack by submarine and by air. The power of nuclear hunter-killer submarines was vividly demon-strated not merely by the sinking of the "Belgrano" but by the fact that thereafter the entire Argentine navy was effectively bottled up by a handful of British submarines so that General Galtieri had little more than his bathtub in which to play battleships.
  The necessity for air cover was once again vividly demonstrated, if it was not already clear. The Harriers and, above all, their pilots performed superbly, losing not one aircraft in air-to-air combat. None the less, it was a
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  close run thing, and had the Falkland Islands been 100 miles closer to the Argentine mainland it would have made the entire operation one of great risk.
  Why, one must ask, are there no tracked Rapiers deployed with British forces today? This equipment has been available for several years. It was designed originally for the Shah of Iran, but successive Governments have failed to press ahead and order it. The tragedy of Bluff Cove could have been avoided had tracked Rapiers been available. I am delighted that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State announced that three batteries of mobile Rapiers—by which I presume he meant the tracked version—are to be ordered now.
  The need for the Royal Air Force to have a long-range strike capability was also vividly demonstrated. The Vulcan strikes were probably the longest strategic bombing raids ever mounted by any air force in the world. They involved nine in-flight refuellings for each aircraft striking Port Stanley.
  Why, one must ask, were they equipped only with 1,000-lb iron bombs of Second World War vintage 15 years after the Six-Day War—which I had the opportunity to report and write a book about—made clear the effectiveness of the Israeli so-called runway dibber bombs? Why does it take, with our system of committees in the MoD, 15 years to develop an effective airfield denial weapon? It is something that must cause us grave concern. We have one in the pipeline, but it was not available this spring. It will not be available until next year. Perhaps my right hon. Friend can say something about that, and about what is to be the future of the Vulcan force.
  My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State has been criticised for publishing the White Paper, but let us not forget that, however glorious our victory in the South Atlantic, it was a limited war against a third-rate power. The threat to the people of these islands will come not from what the right hon. Member for Deptford (Mr. Silkin) called a "tinpot Fascist dictatorship" in Latin America but from the conventional nuclear forces of the Soviet Union. It is those forces that pose a constant threat of world war and nuclear war.
  More important even than the tactical lessons learnt from the Falklands are the strategic ones. These have a direct application to the Soviet threat that confronts us. It has been said that we were attacked with little warning. The Prime Minister, in a radio interview recorded in New York during her recent visit, remarked on this to the interviewer. She said that there had been no warning time. This is something that is deeply entrenched in the Foreign Office ethos of how war should be conducted. There should be no war without a proper warning time and we have been told, with reference to the Soviet threat, that we can rely on a warning time. Smoke signals will appear from the Kremlin when it plans to move.
  If there is one thing that one can deduce from the volumes of Soviet military writings and doctrine it is that it is at the heart of its doctrine to exercise to the maximum the advantage of surprise. In 1968 I was in Prague reporting in the weeks before the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. It was no surprise that it was at the moment when the Soviets were engaged with their Czech allies at Czarna and Bratislava that the military attack on Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union came.
  I pray that there will not be, but if there is to be a third world war initiated by the Soviets, one can be sure that it will be when we are sitting round a disarmament table in

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  Geneva. It will come at the moment when one least expects it. I hope that we shall learn this vital lesson about warning time. It is not something that should be relied on.
  A further lesson that is clear from the Falklands operation is that more often than not, certainly in the present century, wars arise from miscalculation. British Governments, sad to say, with the Foreign Office in the forefront inevitably, have an unfortunate track record of misleading dictators. We did it effectively with Signor Mussolini and Herr Hitler, and now we have done it again with General Galtieri, falling victim to this peculiar and particular form of diplomacy in which we convince our prospective opponents that we shall not resist them if they attack. It is vital that those who hold sway in the Kremlin should never be placed in the position of miscalculating what might be the reaction of the British Government and our allies in NATO.
  The recent demonstration of resolve by the British Prime Minister and Government and, above all, by the British nation as a whole, will not have been lost on the Soviet leadership. That is almost certainly the most important aspect of our victory in the Falklands, because it is on Soviet perceptions of the resolve of Britain and her allies that the peace of the world today depends.
  The Falklands operation has provided a vivid demonstration of the fact that deterrence is invariably cheaper than war. We did not do enough to deter war in the South Atlantic, and it is appropriate that there should be an inquiry, but—far more serious—we are not doing enough as a nation or as an alliance to ensure the maintenance of peace by a policy of deterring war. That is the foundation of the NATO strategy. Our vast outlays, collectively as an alliance, on defence, are not so as the better to fight a war or the better to win a war, but so that that war which is unthinkable in the nuclear age will never come upon us.
  My right hon. Friend the Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Mr. Amery) has emphasised on more than one occasion in our debates that the strategic deterrent is an essential component of our defences. It is idle for Opposition Members to talk about scrapping Trident and devoting the resources to a larger Navy, so that we may more effectively take on more tinpot dictatorships in Latin America. That would completely undermine any basis for any independent military action in the future, should that prove necessary, by this country. We have already heard in this debate how, at the time of Suez in 1956, the Soviets used the threat of nuclear blackmail to try to forestall Britain's intervention in the Middle East. Now that we have the nuclear deterrent, it is significant that no such threat—so far as we know—was ever made by the present incumbents of the Kremlin. I do not believe that even those sitting below the Gangway on the Opposition Benches would suggest that that is out of an excess of good nature on the part of the men in the Kremlin. It is, above all, because we have a nuclear deterrent, and it is absolutely vital to maintain that strategic capability.
  I find it regrettable that the internecine warfare between the Services outside this House should have been reflected in our debates in this Chamber. I fear that it is inevitable that my hon. Friend the Member for Aldershot (Mr. Critchley) appears to favour a larger Army at the expense of Trident, while my hon. Friend the Member for
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  Plymouth, Sutton (Mr. Clark), having a naval con-stituency, not surprisingly favours a larger Navy at the expense of the Rhine Army. The right hon. Member for Deptford, speaking on behalf of the Opposition, pretends to favour the same line—a larger Navy at the expense of Trident—but his claim and that of his party are utterly disingenuous, not to say dishonest, because the Labour Party is committed to slashing our defence budget by onethird—a sum equivalent to 10 times the entire Trident programme. The Labour Party's policy is one of unilateral disarmament—not only nuclear, but conventional. How can one provide for our conventional defences if at the same time one slashes by one-third the resources allocated to defence?
  I do not share the enthusiasm of some right hon. and hon. Members for robbing Peter to pay Paul in this context. The fact is that we need more resources for defence all round. It is essential that we maintain a well-balanced capability to respond effectively to a wide variety of threats—limited, major, conventional or nuclear.
  It has been suggested that we should reduce, or even withdraw, the British Army of the Rhine and RAF Germany, but it is Britain's participation on the central front that represents a vital contribution to NATO's capability to deter war. Of 55,000 Soviet tanks, 30,000 face us in Western Europe, and the Rhine is Britain's front line of defence. Even in the present situation, Britain is no more than 22½ minutes' flying time from the Soviet air bases in East Germany. We could not contemplate the fall of West Germany and other parts of Western Europe without gravely undermining the whole basis of our security here. I welcome the fact that the present Administration have increased by 25 per cent. the number of tanks that we have manned in the Rhine Army at present. To reduce or withdraw the British Army of the Rhine and British RAF Germany would lower the nuclear threshold, increase the risk of war, and pull the rug politically from under our allies in Europe. Our Army is already far too small, and to withdraw it would be to demobilise it. Certainly I see no scope for savings in the British armed forces in Germany.
  The air defence of the United Kingdom and our surrounding waters remain a critical area of weakness. I am delighted that the Government are to arm 70 Hawk trainers, but when will that programme be completed? Perhaps my hon. Friend, in winding up, will tell us. The fact is as I had occasion to say in a defence debate when I sat on the Opposition Benches five years ago—and nothing has changed to this day—we have no more than 70 air defence aircraft available for defending our shores, the North Sea, the Channel, and the Western approaches. Seventy aircraft are far too few.
  The vital importance of airborne early-warning radar has been demonstrated in recent weeks in the south Atlantic. When will Nimrod AEW be in service? Will it now have in-flight refuelling installed from the word go, as I suggested earlier this year? I was told that that was not being contemplated at that time.
  We need a larger and more capable Air Force. Certainly I see no room for cuts there.
  Then there is the defence of the United Kingdom base. In the face of eight Soviet airborne divisions, the United Kingdom home defences are grossly inadequate. While the addition of 20,000 reservists proposed by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State is a worthwhile beginning, it in no way matches the gravity of the threat. We as a

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  nation should aim at being able to mobilise no fewer than ½ million men and women under arms for the defence of our homeland. Territorials are the most cost-effective form of manpower, and I see no room for budget cutting on that front either.
  I have already mentioned the strategic deterrent, and in my view it is right to go ahead with the purchase of Trident. Certainly it is the most cost-effective system that is available to us, and it is one-third less than the cost of the RAF's Tornado programme.
  That brings me, finally, to the Royal Navy, which is so much in our thoughts at present and so much a bone of contention in our debate. The Secretary of State was right last year to see the nuclear hunter-killers as the capital ships of today and to shift the emphasis increasingly towards a sub-surface navy, including the announcement of a new class of diesel-electric submarine. We must also maintain a substantial force of surface ships to safeguard our supply and energy lines around the Cape and, above all, the NATO reinforcement capability across the North Atlantic, on which the entire strategy of NATO depends.
  I am delighted that the Government have rethought their plan to reduce the Royal Navy to a two-carrier fleet by its decision to retain "Invincible". I know that I am not alone in expressing my gratitude to the Premier and Government of Australia for their generous offer in that regard. However, that cannot be done within the existing budget.
  Mr. Kevin McNamara: The hon. Gentleman is obviously privy to information which other hon. Members, and perhaps his own Front Bench, have not received. When did Mr. Sinclair give that great concession and have the Government agreed on "Invincible" remaining?
  Mr. Churchill: It was not Mr. Sinclair who made such a concession; it was Mr. Fraser. He said that he would be more than happy to renegotiate the agreement and if Britain wished to retain "Invincible" he would be agreeable to that, although reluctant. My right hon. Friend has made clear his wish to retain "Invincible". I know that he will have the support of almost all Conservative Members.
  It is urgent that a significant proportion of the resources that have recently been lost to the defence budget be restored. Last year, supported by 10 of my hon. and right hon. Friends, I tabled an amendment to the Prime Minister's motion on the Defence Estimates for 1981–82. It backed the Secretary of State's defence priorities but expressed the view that greater resources should be provided to safeguard peace and freedom. Nothing that has happened in recent months causes me or my hon. Friends to modify that view. Indeed, it reinforces it. We must have more resources for defence.
  Britain is currently devoting no more than 10·5 per cent. of its public expenditure budget to defence. To raise it to the levels pertaining in the mid-1960s would require a 50 per cent. increase in the existing defence budget. It is urgent that a significant proportion of the resources that have been lost to defence over recent years should be restored. In that context, one area that might be looked at is the £1,926 million currently being devoted to the work of the Manpower Services Commission and other make-work projects. With so many jobs to be filled in defence, and with the external threat so grave, it defies belief that
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  such resources could not be better allocated in the provision of real jobs and real security. For that reason, I appeal to my right hon. and hon. Friends to insist that the Government do what is necessary to strengthen our defences and to safeguard peace.
  7.52 pm
  Mr. Stephen Ross: To take up one of the points made by the hon. Member for Stretford (Mr. Churchill), page 34 of the "Statement on the Defence Estimates" shows that the United Kingdom comes third after the United States and France in defence spending on a per capita basis. The hon. Gentleman appears to be suggesting that we can go way ahead of that even though vast sums are already being spent on defence.
  As this is the first speech from the Liberal Bench on the Defence Estimates, I should like to follow the example of other hon. Members and express my admiration, and that of my right hon. and hon. Friends, for the bravery, fortitude and leadership shown in the Falklands campaign by all the Forces involved—in which I include the Merchant Navy.
  My constituency has had a long tradition of service in Her Majesty's Forces. As I found when I met some of the wives and mothers of my constituents recently, many of them were present in the South Atlantic. One at least, regrettably, lost his life, on HMS "Sheffield", and others were wounded.
  It was an honour for me to attend the Camp Hill prison officers' club, last Saturday—we have three prisons on the Isle of Wight—where I received a cheque well in excess of £3,000 towards the South Atlantic fund. That shows some of the feeling on the island. It is a notable achievement for the prison officers to raise so much money.
  It has long been the Liberal Party's policy to oppose the whole concept of the independent nuclear deterrent. The right hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Mr. Amery) does not need to remind me of the last war, but that certainly has been the Liberal Party's policy for the past 20 years. We have initiated several debates in the House on that subject—certainly two in the past two years.
  We predicted at the time of those debates that Trident's cost would surely escalate from the then stated figure of a maximum of £5 billion. In paragraph 121 of the Defence Estimates statement, we see that the price has indeed soared to £7,500 million. That was the figure at last September, and no doubt it will go higher still.
  I have listened to all the protestations to the contrary from various defence spokesmen, but there is no doubt that that burden will have a seriously constricting effect on the provision of adequate conventional equipment. That is the main area of our disagreement with existing Government policies. We are strong supporters of NATO and should like to see—as our joint amendment clearly implies—more money spent on the development and purchase of the best available conventional weapons.
  The Warsaw Pact countries certainly possess a marked superiority in the number of battle tanks. The figures show a ratio of about 2·5 to 1. My understanding is—I do not claim any expertise in the field—that tank technology is now relatively static, while at the same time there have been substantial advances in the development of anti-tank devices.
  As so many hon. Members have already pointed out, some of our ships in the Falklands did not have the benefit

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  of the latest missiles, such as Sea Wolf. That was because cuts had to be made, although it has proved to be a costly mistake. As an ex-matelot myself, I thought that our ships did extremely well. I thought that we might lose more. We did not lose a carrier, the QE2 or the Canberra. Those ships were protected remarkably well. I should like to know how many planes were shot down by our ships. I believe that it was quite substantial.
  Effective investment in conventional forces, which must include renewed efforts at standardisation within NATO, using the most modern equipment, raises the nuclear threshold and therefore positively reduces the threat of nuclear war. It also puts in doubt the concept of the so-called "flexible response", which I am glad to see is now under attack from many reputable sources. I and my right hon. and hon. Friends share the views of Lord Zuckerman, Lord Carver, Mr. McNamara, the former United States Defence Secretary and others on that subject. We welcome the recommendations of the Palme report, with its call for the establishment of a battlefield nuclear weapon-free zone in Europe, starting with Central Europe and ultimately extending from the northern to the southern flanks of the two Alliances.
  May I turn to the Secretary of State's speech last Thursday, and welcome the partial reprieve that was announced for Portsmouth, although I wish he had gone further. Many of my constituents work in the dockyard. I should like to congratulate the Portsmouth Evening News, which has run an effective campaign to stop the cuts in the harbour. It delivered a large petition to 10 Downing Street only the other day.
  Like the hon. Member for Ashford (Mr. Speed), whose speech I listened to last Thursday, I believe that there is a role for Chatham if we are to keep our nuclear submarines adequately maintained. I am delighted to see that we are to build more, but if so, is it really to be said that Devonport and Rosyth can manage them all?
  Where are the SSNs to be built? Do we only have one yard—I think it is Vickers—that can now build nuclear submarines? Will we reactivate Cammell Laird or somewhere else? That is the question I asked a year ago. Chatham has already proved itself in the role of maintaining nuclear submarines.
  With Spain joining NATO, does it make sense to close Gibraltar? One senior American admiral, whom I shall not name, serving in the Mediterranean, would like to make use of some of Gibraltar's facilities. The dockyard workers in Gibraltar are also to be praised for their role in the Falklands dispute.
  Although it may now be our intention to keep HMS "Invincible"—and I was interested to note that the hon. Member for Stretford seemed to have some inner knowledge—so far we have only been told that the decision has yet to be taken. I suspect that we may yet sell either HMS "Illustrious" or HMS "Ark Royal". That would be a great mistake. We need all three ships. Long before the Falkland Islands crisis, that same American admiral went on exercises with HMS "Invincible" and said that it was an exceptionally good ship and the American navy would like to have one like it.
  I shall conclude on the subject of hovercraft. That will be no great surprise to the Minister. I do, of course have a major constituency interest. The first hovercraft invented by Sir Christopher Cockerell was built and launched at
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  Cowes as long ago as 1959. Yet despite its obvious attractions, the Royal Navy still, regrettably, cannot make up its mind about whether it wants any hovercraft operating in the fleet on a permanent basis. it is about to close facilities at Lee-on-the-Solent and I understand that it has sent its remaining hovercraft back to Cowes. The one purchased from Vosper Thornycroft is on the sales list. It was, of course, a mistake to purchase it from Vosper Thornycroft.
  In the meantime, the Russian and American forces are making, or intend to make, very good use of this British-invented technology. Some hon. Members may have seen pictures of large hovercraft landing troops on the beaches during Warsaw pact exercises last autumn. I am now told that the United States Marines intend to build no fewer than 103 hovercraft during the next 10 years, each of which can carry one main battle tank for the Marines. It is known as the LCAC programme. Fortunately, there is a spin off, because the skirts will be built at Cowes under a £3 million contract.
  It would surely have been a godsend if the force commanders in the Falkland Islands had been able to take advantage of large modern hovercraft to land troops and equipment on the beaches. I watched the film of tanks and heavy lorries coming off landing craft into what appeared to be fairly deep sea. At any moment, I expected one of them to stall. Perhaps we did not see those pictures. However, it would have been much easier to land straight on to the beaches.
  I may be wrong, but I wonder whether the troops on HMS "Sir Galahad" would have had to wait there for three hours if we had had the ability to put them straight ashore. Some years ago a hovercraft was tested on the Falkland Islands, but I do not know the results of that exercise. However, there is another, more vital role for the hovercraft. I refer to its mine hunting capability. At present, there is a requirement for a single role mine hunter. It is referred to in paragraph 212 of the Estimates.
  I understand that British Shipbuilders, a French-Dutch consortium and my local company, the British Hovercraft Corporation, have been asked to submit proposals, which will then be assessed in October. Given the prejudice that exists against air-cushioned vehicles in some naval circles—although not among the technicians—at this stage I ask only that the hovercraft should be given a fair crack of the whip. In the long run, it will be cheaper and more effective, as the trials at Lee-on-the-Solent must have proved. They tried hard enough to blow one up, but they singularly failed to do so. I ask the Minister to give me an assurance that the competition—that is what it should be—between the three different vessels is still open and that the outcome has not been prejudiced as some of us, regrettably, suspect.
  8.7 pm
  Mr. Anthony Nelson: It is a pleasure to speak after the hon. Member for Isle of Wight (Mr. Ross), whose constituency is just across the water from mine. He has made a valiant case for some of the industries in his area which will benefit from defence procurement. I agreed with some of his points, but he will not be surprised to hear that I did not agree with his comments on Trident. I am a firm adherent of that programme.
  I add my tribute to those paid by others who have spoken in the debate and commend the valiant efforts of our Service men in the South Atlantic and elsewhere. I pay

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  special tribute to the Secretary of State for Defence, who has come in for some fairly tough criticism and press comment. In recent months he has had to shoulder an enormous burden of responsibility. It is remarkable that the whole campaign did not suffer greater losses. It is very much to my right hon. Friend's credit that so many of his decisions—a lot must have been finely balanced—were right. He deserves a fulsome tribute from Conservative Members and I am sure that those sentiments will be echoed by Opposition Members.
  I also have drawn some pet lessons—as my hon. Friend the Member for Stretford (Mr. Churchill) referred to them—from the battle of the Falkland Islands. If anything, the conflict vindicates the defence strategy set out not only in this White Paper, but in previous Conservative Government White Papers. The broad strategy of moving away from numbers of vessels as floating targets and towards greater firepower, not only for our maritime forces, but for our airborne and land-based forces, is broadly sensible. The division of responsibilities between nuclear and conventional forces should be maintained, along with our presence in Central Europe. Our presence in Central Europe has been a matter of some contention in the debate but I broadly agree with the strategy that has been followed for the past few years.
  The second lesson to be drawn is that we should not pay too much attention to the more extreme elements of the Naval lobby. Many people in my constituency press me hard on the matter, but next time round the conflict could be in an entirely different theatre. In such circumstances, an airborne capability could be the essential requirement instead of a maritime capability. If we had had a longer airfield on the Falkland Islands and if we had accepted the Shackleton committee's recommendation in this respect, we might—if we had had the fixed-wing aircraft—have been able to use airlifts of troops and we might even have been able to pre-empt the conflict. Major lessons can also be drawn from this by members of the previous Administration, who substantially reduced the RAF's Transport Command.
  Lessons can also be drawn about the extent to which naval vessels should be better armed. There is a tremendous amount of work for the Admiralty surface weapons establishment. I am sure that it will carefully consider any assessement or report made by the Minister on necessary improvements.
  The first part of the White Paper covers Trident. Many right hon. and hon. Members have commented on it. I was very sorry to hear the right hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan), say that he had now decided that he is not in favour of Trident and that he thought our decision to order it was wrong. It is a matter of great regret that a former Prime Minister, whose sincerity and experience in such matters is unquestioned, should make such a decision after heading an Administration that substantially improved our existing nuclear deterrent through the Chevaline programme. I would point out to him that we are making a decision for the next generation. That weapons system will not only be the best guarantee of Britain's security and independence for the next 10 years, but perhaps for the next four decades. It will come on stream in the 1990s.
  Some of us here today may be in the House in 2020 and we shall want to look back and see that the right long-term decision was made for our security interests that looked to the generation which would benefit rather than short-term
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  defence needs. It is impossible, given the development lead time of some of these weapons and technologies to finance, over a decade or less, weapons that are supposed to have a life of 30 years and a development period of 10 years. It is nonsense to look at it in that way. We should spread and discount the financing over a much longer time.
  So much for the capital cost, which, on the latest estimate of £7·5 billion, is admittedly substantial. But one of the great advantages of this weapons system is not only that it provides the ultimate deterrent—so it has proved over the past 30 years—but that its current running costs, year on year, are relatively small. The annual cost of Polaris, our existing British nuclear deterrent, is £327 million this year, which is about the equivalent of building 15 miles of motorway. That expenditure amounts to 2·3 per cent. of our whole defence budget for that ultimate and very important guarantee of our national security.
  As for personnel manning the nuclear deterrent, that accounts for only 2,400 men, which is only 0·7 per cent. of our defence manpower. Therefore, I would argue that the deterrent is highly cost-effective, that the running costs, year on year, are extremely low and that it is an excellent investment for our long-term security.
  One reason why I very much agree with the White Paper is because it adheres to the re-equipment programme that was begun under the Labour Administration, but which has broadly been followed since then, despite the pressures on the budget in recent years. I especially welcome the continuing commitment to improving our air defences and the delivery, albeit on a slightly longer phased programme, of Tornado.
  I share very much the sentiments of my hon. Friend the Member for Preston, North (Mr. Atkins) in pressing for the P110 tactical combat aircraft to come on stream at the end of this decade in succession to the Jaguar. It is essential that we have this aircraft, and that it is British technology and British-bought technology, rather than presenting another generation of politicians with the only alternative of having to buy American because of a failure by this generation of politicians to decide now for the future. Political time scales in defence are far too short. They rarely exceed the time of the next general election and we should look to a much longer time scale.
  There has been a great deal of comment about defence savings and the Secretary of State challenged many of us who have asked for improvements in our defence capability to say where we would make savings. It is surely right that, without any substantial further commitment to defence spending above the 3 per cent. real increase, any improvements in our capability can only be at the expense of other items in the defence budget.
  Substantial moneys can be saved, not only within the defence budget, to make room for some of the priorities such as the P110, which I would like to see. Also, the Secretary of State should be better armed by many of his hon. Friends in his arguments in Cabinet for a greater shale of public expenditure for defence.
  I shall consider first the savings that can be made. One of the substantial items of the so-called defence budget pensions for Service men, which I believe this year will cost £657 million. Another £240 million will go on assistance for Service men and their families with such things as education. Few other Departments of State have to bear on their own budget the pensions year by year of former employees or civil servants. They all come under

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  the Paymaster-General and are paid for separately. Yet with the Armed Forces, the entire pension cost comes from within the defence budget. It is a substantial sum that has risen by more than the rate of inflation in recent years and that makes a sizeable hole in what could otherwise be afforded in terms of defence equipment. I wish to see a redefinition of that expenditure.
  Secondly, substantial savings could be made in local administration and communication, which will cost about £903 million this year. That is an enormously large sum for a rather amorphous description of activities. I hope that those responsible for those activities will examine much more incisively what is involved to see whether costs can be cut.
  Thirdly, procurement should not be exempt from greater scrutiny. I know that the Select Committee examined it. The procurement executive, which is a large spender, should be subject to much more rigorous control and substantial change. Project definition, which has been the subject of improvement and where efficiencies have been made, needs even more economies and efficiencies. An inordinate amount of time is spent in the development process. To take a tactical combat aircraft as an example, we have been talking about that for more than five years. The time between taking the decision that we need such a weapons system and the time when it comes into service is often 10 or 15 years. Time costs an enormous amount of money in defence. We must try to reduce the entire development period and thereby save much money.
  Many schemes would stand a much better chance of going ahead if we made decisions earlier. The previous Government spent a long time on bilateral discussions with the French, the Germans and the Italians about whether we should have a single or double-vectored thrust on tactical combat aircraft. The discussions proceeded slowly and eventually the scheme was dropped because we could not sustain the cost. As a result there is great uncertainty about the future of an essential front-line piece of air defence equipment.
  Mr. Kenneth Warren: Can my hon. Friend comment on the fact that the British aircraft industry has not sold the RAF on the idea that it needs the P110? Is that not a waste of time?
  Mr. Nelson: That is not the information that I have. As my hon. Friend will know, the background to the project was an assessment of an air staff target. The RAF brought forward a blueprint of its requirements. There was an attempt by British Aerospace—rightly if it had to develop the scheme independently—to produce a tactical combat aircraft that would be attractive to other countries, as it was to Germany and Saudi Arabia. There must be more give and take by the RAF. The RAF changed its mind about what it required with the Harrier, so there is nothing sacrosanct about Air Staff targets.
  We have not maintained our commitment to increase defence expenditure by 3 per cent. a year in real terms since 1977. I make a serious allegation which, if it is true, could be used by Defence Ministers to much better advantage in the Cabinet when they say "We must have what we told the House and the public that we would have."
  The reality is that, because of Treasury voodoo and the way the figures are assessed in volume terms, the increase
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  since 1977 has been rather less than 3 per cent. a year. If the increase had been the full 3 per cent., as at 1975–76 prices, the estimated expenditure for this year would not be £14·09 billion but £14·7 billion. If we had maintained that commitment, I estimate that we would have over £600 million more to play around with. That is a substantial sum. The deficiency has spread over both Labour and Conservative Administrations.
  The Secretary of State may say that this year we are increasing the defence budget by 3·8 per cent. compared with the previous year, but that follows an increase in the previous year of only 1·8 per cent. Between 1980 and 1981 defence expenditure in 1975–76 terms, according to the latest estimates, increased by only 1·3 per cent. This year the increase is to be 3·8 per cent. Therefore, over the last two years the increase has averaged out at only 2·5 per cent.
  Even if we say that we are not responsible as a Government for what happened under the previous Administration, when, in one year, the budget fell in real terms, and if we look at what we have done since we came to power in 1979, we see that we have underperformed. We have short-changed ourselves on the defence budget. Instead of an increase of 3 per cent., there has been an increase of approximately 2·9 per cent. It may be said that that is a small difference, but it works out to about £50 million or £60 million.
  I hope that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State will bear in mind that there is strong support from the Back Benches for Ministers who will argue the case more forcibly in the Cabinet that we must get not only the 3 per cent. increase that we were promised but a greater commitment towards our defence needs, which inevitably will require a greater political commitment, which I trust my speech has demonstrated.
  8.22 pm
  Mr. A. E. P. Duffy: I pay tribute to Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse, Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet, and his forces, on a brilliant feat of arms in the Falkland Islands campaign. I am thinking especially of the task force commander, Rear Admiral John Woodward, the ships' companies of the task force, General Moore and the soldiers and marines in his land forces, the men of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary, the mercantile marine and the men and women who, stretching back to the United Kingdom from deep in the South Atlantic, made possible a most impressively improvised logistical tail.
  However, I reserve my special congratulations and my sympathy as well as admiration for the task force commander, Rear Admiral John Woodward. This was the first war that has been conducted almost on television. Unfortunately, he had to cart around in his flagship what appeared to be half of Fleet Street. As a result he now has to contend in the writing of his dispatches with judgments that have been made up and down the country by tens of thousands of armchair strategists. Some have already been arrogant enough to commit themselves on paper. Not surprisingly, they have been members of the press.
  Rear Admiral Woodward deployed his task force at an almost unprecedented distance from home base in the harshest possible environment and in the face of threats about which we can relax now, but he could not then. He was shipborne for weeks on end, planning as he went along. He was in regular contact, perhaps not always for

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  his peace of mind, with Northwood and Whitehall. Despite all those factors he achieved his objectives and preserved the core of the fleet.
  As has been said by the hon. Member for Isle of Wight (Mr. Ross), a former sailor, the wonder is that there were not more losses. What losses there were were on the fringe. They were mainly of radar pickets. We grieve for those who were lost on the ships and those who were injured. But the wonder is that there were not more. As has been said today and last Thursday, it was a close run thing. Our eventual judgment will be that we are all enormously indebted to the man who carried the greatest responsibility on his shoulders, Rear Admiral John Woodward. He fulfilled the highest traditions of the Royal Navy.
  Those of us who have been fortunate enough to he in the Chamber for the whole of the debate will have been immensely stimulated by the speech of my right hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan). I have taken the liberty of telling him that he gets better. His speech today was a tour de force. Although he was most provocative there cannot be any hon. Member who was not interested and, perhaps, charmed by what he had to say. Not even the Secretary of State, to whom he dealt some heavy blows, could have resented what he said. He backed up his charges with argument. The points that appealed most to me related to the continuing argument about a long or a short war. I agree that it is likely to be a long rather than a short war. If we allow ourselves to fall into the frame of mind that accepts that it will be a short war, we have lost before it begins. I include the Secretary of State and even some of my hon. Friends in that category.
  I also liked what my right hon. Friend said about there not being the right mix in our forces. He pointed out that the present structure was wrong, that there was a need for more balanced priorities and, therefore, more balance in our contribution to NATO. As he said, the matter can be reduced to a question of choice. I especially like his suggestion that the Labour Party has become the Navy party. Above all else, we must think hard about the charge that the structure of our forces is now unbalanced. Several hon. Members, notably the hon. Member for East Grinstead (Sir G. Johnson-Smith), insisted that the balance was right. I shall deal with that first.
  It is clear, upon examination of last Thursday's debate, that many hon. Members are prone to forget that we are members of an alliance. All of us are liable to fall into that trap, but we must assess defence needs against the background of that alliance's strategy and objectives. Both we and NATO must get our priorities right. The greatest problem of alliance planning, given the explosion in defence costs, is, as the Secretary of State said, resource allocation. I am sure that my right hon. Friend recognises that the budgetary constraints that bear heavily on the Secretary of State now are likely to intensify rather than to be relieved.
  That explains the growing call for burden sharing in the Alliance. It must point to a division of tasks between the members of the alliance. It points clearly to one of the major points of my right hon. Friend's argument. The United Kingdom should make its prime contribution, on a comparative task basis, on that which we do best, the historic maritime role.
  At the moment, Britain is trying to make an all-round contribution to the Alliance. We are trying to do too much
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  rather than doing that which we are best equipped to perform, historically, geographically and from the point of view of performance. As a result, there is too much penny-pinching between and within the Services rather than concentration of scarce resources in an efficient and comprehensive Service. That is best illustrated by the Secretary of State's cuts of the surface fleet.
  It is extraordinary how complacent some hon. Members have been today, despite what was said last Thursday. They have still not fully understood the seriousness of the Secretary of State's attacks on the Navy. It is no good the Secretary of State arguing—the hon. Member for Stretford (Mr. Churchill) accepted it—that we will go sub-surface in compensation. The Government have ordered only two SSNs in the past three years. They will do well to get one more out of existing capacity before it is commandeered for Trident which, as my right hon. Friend said, is substantially responsible for the present lack of balance. The House wants a balanced and interdependent force of not only SSNs and maritime patrol aircraft but also escort vessels and other surface units.
  Overall, greater precision in alliance priorities is required if we are to provide for the most efficient use of increasingly scarce resources, because the problem will continue and become more pressing. We are unlikely to achieve such precision, however, so long as we insist on maintaining the appearance of making an all-round contribution to the Alliance, rather like the United States. Furthermore, those same budgetary constraints, which are now also bearing more and more on the United States, could increasingly push us into a high risk strategy in the Atlantic in relation to reinforcement and resupply. Again, my right hon. Friend issued the sternest warnings about that. That commitment is largely ours in the East Atlantic and Channel. We can take no chances on that, because to do so might lower the nuclear threshold.
  Why does the Secretary of State persist with his 1981 defence review in the form and content of his 1982 Defence Estimates? Why is he intent on cutting our naval strength in the face of the ever-growing Soviet maritime threat that has been described by hon. Members on both sides of the House today? The effect on the Navy of his 1981 defence review has been dramatic. In addition to being saddled with virtually the whole bill for Trident, the naval programme has had to suffer cuts of £5 billion to £6 billion for the next nine years. Let me put that in perspective. Those cuts amounted to more than twice the funds lost by the Army, and more than seven times those lost by the RAF—on top of unbalanced and substantial reductions the previous year. Consequently, our overall military balance will be impaired and our flexibility to meet the unforeseen will be eroded.
  As my right hon. Friend reminded the House, we need only recall the cod war, the Beira patrol and the Gulf of Oman requirement, as well as the Falklands crisis, to appreciate examples of operations arising at short notice. They demonstrate typically the flexibility of maritime power through its presence and the wide range of options that it offers to diplomacy.
  In our lifetime, there can have been few more convincing demonstrations of the flexibility and effectiveness of sea power than that shown in the Falklands crisis. Nothing else would have done the job. Precisely the same forces appropriate to peace-time presence world wide through our annual global deployments and the

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  exercise of deterrence within the NATO area were suddenly called upon to submit to the test of war, seemingly on the other side of the world.
  Fortuitously, the Falklands crisis occurred before the cuts in the Navy's front line capability had gone too far down the road. As the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen) mentioned, at the height of the crisis a party political handout was printed and circulated to local Conservative parties. I have a copy with me, but I need not discuss its points in detail. The right hon. Gentleman mentioned one or two of them. By dint of selective quotation, it sought to show that the doubts increasingly being voiced were groundless and that last year's defence review had—believe it or not—given the Navy more money, better capability, and so on. Like the defence review itself, that public relations exercise was a con trick. It was a catalogue of half truths or, as The Times put it on 21 June 1981,
  "some sleight of hand in ministerial explanations."
  Even some members of the Government have been saying that if Argentina had waited until 1985–86 it would have found more Royal Navy ships afloat. As I shall show, the Secretary of State said that in the House a few weeks ago, although not in relation to Argentina.
  Let us briefly examine one or two of those claims. The number of ships, for example, is vital not merely to our assessment of the defence review but because if offers useful comparisons between the performance of the Government, the Ministry of Defence and No. 10 and that of the previous Administration of the kind that have already been made in the debate.
  The word "operational" is open to several definitions. Leaving that on one side, we are facing a steady decline in the number of warships in the conventional fleet. When the Government took office there were 98 major warships—frigates and above—as well as submarines other than Polaris. By April 1982 the number was down to 86. Current plans, despite the Secretary of State's shipbuilding announcements last Thursday, show a further decline by the end of the decade. It follows that the statement by the Secretary of State in the House on 17 April that
  "we cannot be criticised for cutting back the conventional Navy, when it is far larger today than it was when we took office, and so it will be in the late 1980s."—[Official Report, 7 April 1982; Vol. 21, c. 1050.]
  is simply not true. Certainly new ships are entering service, but, as the Secretary of State said to me at Question Time yesterday week, this is almost overwhelmingly the result of orders placed by the Administration of my right hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East.
  The planned numbers of carriers, destroyers, frigates, nuclear submarines, Sea Harriers, Royal Marine Commando groups, assault helicopters, and Royal Fleet Auxiliaries are all fewer than those inherited from the Labour Government. Recent orders show that the shipbuilding figures in the handout are, again, highly selective. Of the 27 major warships that have entered service since 1979, or will enter service over the next five years—there is some interesting information to be found in answers to written questions in Hansard—only four type 22 frigates and two SSNs have been ordered by the Government. That is only four out of 27 major warships.
  Furthermore, the Government have so far placed orders, before last week's announcement—and that was
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  for only one ship—which average only half the value per year achieved by the Labour Government. That is an average expenditure of £300 million per year—the handout claims £400 million for last year—compared to £600 million per year under the Labour Government.
  However, the Under-Secretary of State for the Armed Forces was brazen and misleading enough when replying to the debate last Thursday—I am sorry he is not here tonight—to refer to the
  "Government's inheritance of a defence machine which was starved of funds and equipment".—[Official Report, 1 July 1982; Vol. 26, c. 1129.]
  Mr. Blaker: Hear, hear.
  Mr. Duffy: Will the Minister therefore say what equipment the Government have been starved of since they came to office?
  Mr. Blaker: We inherited a situation in which the defence finances were running into an impossible position.
  Mr. Duffy: When I challenge the Minister, as I was prepared to challenge the Under-Secretary, to name one weapons system or one item of equipment of which the Government were starved by the previous Administration, he cannot do so. This is from a Government who dithered over the lightweight version of the Sea Wolf system that sailors were praying for a few weeks ago, dithered over Sea Eagle and have only confirmed the system in recent weeks, and who cancelled the improvement programme for the Sea Dart that was needed in the type 42s. Only now have the Government, after three years in office, made up their mind about the Sea King replacement and put in hand the type 23 frigate and type 2400 submarine.
  Mr. James Callaghan: The Government had better surrender.
  Mr. Duffy: There are many other consequences of the 1981 defence review that time does not allow me to mention. I shall content myself with referring to only two.
  Mid-life modernisation of destroyers and frigates is to be abandoned. That will result in increasing obsolescence in the surface flotilla weapons systems. I can understand the Under-Secretary of State's dilemma, but he should reconsider this again, not merely on account of the dockyards and support depots that are to be run down or closed but because it could prove to be a false economy. The second consequence of the review is that between 8,000 and 10,000 officers and men are to be made redundant by 1986, with a similar number in the last half of the costing period.
  Like many hon. Members, I wish to examine some of the lessons of the Falklands for the Royal Navy. The main lesson is the need to be able to cope with unexpected situations. We must retain flexibility and versatility as well as an adequate capability in our future Fleet. We were able to deploy quickly and effectively for the Falklands operation because we were living on the fat of the pre-1981 defence review. This did not amount merely to the ships and weapons systems that I have mentioned. There was also the setting up of the merchant shipping register in 1978. Did that not work brilliantly? Is the situation not contrary to the claims made last Thursday by the Under-Secretary of State for the Armed Forces?
  Inherited from the previous Labour Government and available for the Falklands crisis were 55 running destroyers and frigates. Even so, others had to be brought forward from the disposal list. Moreover, there were still

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  three carriers if one includes "Illustrious" and five dockyards with no rundown in manpower. By the middle of the decade, we shall have only about 50 destroyers and frigates, of which as few as 42 might be operational, perhaps only two carriers in service, two dockyards and about 10,000 fewer naval officers and ratings. Afloat support will also have been seriously reduced.
  Greater risks will be taken with manpower and support. The fleet will possess markedly less flexibility. Two absurdities stand out against the background of the Falklands crisis. The first is the projected sale of "Invincible". The second is the cancellation of planned improvements in the Sea Dart weapon system. Its performance in action in the Falklands crisis was entirely as expected. It did not disappoint. It could not do any better. We are not now in a position to put in hand an improvement to the system. That is the responsibility of the Government.
  We must retain three carriers, including "Hermes", until "Ark Royal" is available in mid-1985. The Aussies have given us the opportunity but, contrary to the optimistic view of the hon. Member for Stretford, they clearly wish to return to the status quo ante. The Aussies will not let us off this hook if they can help it. We shall have to watch the sales pitch. We must improve the capability of surface forces, especially against aircraft and missile attack. We must have 50 destroyers and frigates in operation with none in the standby squadron. The dockyard capacity at Portsmouth must be expanded beyond the level announced last week. There must be consequential support ashore.
  Perhaps most important, given the Government's handling of the defence review or, as The Times put it, the Government's "sleight of hand", we need to look closely at battle casualty replacement. We cannot replace the two type 21s. We can replace the type 42 but cannot improve its missile system following the Government's decision last year. Realistically, we can only look to the type 22s. But the Government did not make a good start last week with its announcement of a single type 22 order. There is a time factor as with the "Fife", "Glamorgan" and "Bristol", which are to be retained. They can have a life expectancy of only six years before their missile systems become inadequate. Will the type 23 be ready by then, and in what numbers?
  On the Government's record to date, we can entertain little hope. We run the risk of being dangerously deficient at sea by the end of the decade. That is why my right hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East has suggested that the Opposition are now perhaps the Navy party. We know the dangers to which it may be exposed late in this decade if the Government's cuts in the surface fleet are allowed to pass.
  8.43 pm
  Mr. Peter Viggers: This has been an interesting and distinguished debate. I have enjoyed listening to the hon. Member for Sheffield, Attercliffe (Mr. Duffy) whose speech I followed in a previous debate in the Chamber, as I did his contribution in the North Atlantic Assembly. The hon. Gentleman's comments were most useful. I respect the compliment that the hon. Gentleman paid to his right hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) whose speech was also interesting and distinguished. There has been reference to the "Navy party". I hope that the right hon.
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  Member for Cardiff, South-East feels that the Navy party spans the whole of Portsmouth harbour, from his original home at Portsmouth to my constituency at Gosport.
  I should like to add my tribute to the men of the task force on behalf of the people of Gosport, with which the force is strongly connected. I pay tribute to the eight men from Gosport who lost their lives in the South Atlantic, the 22 men now in Haslar hospital, Gosport, and others who are badly injured and coming home by sea. We think of them and their families, those who waited and those who still wait. There have been a number of problems in fighting a war effectively in the blaze of the television cameras and the press. The number of difficulties with mail, personal and communications problems, has been comparatively small when one thinks that 26,500 families were separated. I pay tribute to the families, who behaved excellently.
  It is an extraordinary story of courage and professional skill. The civilians should be praised for preparing the task force. The Gosport-Portsmouth area was the main embarkation centre for the departure of the D-Day forces in 1944 and it was the main departure centre for the task force on this occasion. It is an excellent logistics centre with victualling and repair facilities, armaments, fuel, and personnel living close by. It makes the Portsmouth harbour area an excellent one-stop shop for the Fleet.
  I give strong support to the Government's overall strategy outlined in the White Paper although it has been under attack in some areas. We need to be involved in four areas—the nuclear deterrent, the home base, a presence in Europe and in the eastern Mantic, as well as our out-of-area capacity. The hon. Member for Sheffield, Attercliffe and other hon. Members have made the point that we must grasp the essential truth that we are spending more and getting less. The pressure on resources has been enormous. The number of ships that the Navy had in 1950 is four and a half times the number it has now; it had twice as many submarines. The RAF had three times as many aircraft and the Army 300 more tanks. That is when we have spent more in real terms on defence and when the equipment budget has increased from 30 per cent. of defence expenditure to 46 per cent. of the budget. Those who talk about defence cuts talk about the diminished number of ships and aircraft and do not face the fact that we are suffering from disarmament by inflation. There is a real resources problem that must be grasped.
  The Government's response to the pressure on resources has been justified by the Falkland Islands crisis. Many commentators asked where the country would have been if it had had to face the Falkland Islands crisis and mount a task force in three years' time. How many people have asked where the country would have been had it been necessary to mount a task force in April 1979, when Service pay was well below the level accepted as being fair and when the previous Government had been building a number of ships? Cynics might say that the previous Government used defence as a job creation scheme. Ships were being built, but did they have the missiles, the torpedoes, the war stocks, the POL and the necessary facilities—the logistics of war? There are many ways in which the task force was better equipped and more capable than it would have been in 1979.
  I support the Government's strategy but there are some caveats that I have raised previously and that remain a matter of interest to me. The first is the need for the surface Fleet. We talk about the need for reinforcements from the

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  United States of America. Can we really expect the United States of America to pour men and equipment in American ships, protected by American warships, across the Atlantic and to provide the necessary war stocks unless we are prepared to play our part in providing the surface ships and submarine sea capacity needed in the eastern Atlantic? We have been devoting considerable resources there but they have been under pressure in recent years.
  The balance in the North Atlantic between NATO forces and Warsaw Pact forces shows that NATO has 43 submarines, excluding SSBNs, whereas the Warsaw Pact has 85. NATO has 73 surface ships to the Warsaw Pact's 52. These raw facts conceal the reality which is that the Warsaw Pact does not need its surface ships or submarines except to attack ours whereas we have a crucial and overriding need for sea support in times of emergency. Russia and its allies have available about 400 submarines, which is eight times the number with which Hitler faced us in 1939. This is a threat that we cannot ignore.
  The dockyard's future is linked with the future of the surface and the submarine fleets. I accept that we plan to have more ships operational in 1984 than in 1981 and that the previous style of mid-term refit may not be appropriate in future. However, I must put to my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for Defence Procurement that there may be a longer-term requirement for Portsmouth dockyard.
  In the shorter term I put it to my hon. Friend that the fleet returning from the South Atlantic will undoubtedly have repairs and refitting requirements that will last well beyond the end of the year. I am no expert in these matters but I anticipate that there must be a work load that will keep our dockyards going for a year or more and probably considerably longer than that. Is it possible for my hon. Friend to make a firmer commitment and to give a clearer indication of the shorter-term future of Portsmouth dockyard, which is the future spanning the repairs and refits of the South Atlantic fleet?
  When my hon. Friend has dealt with the so-called shorter-term needs of the ships and the requirements of the dockyard, I ask him to give an early indication of the dockyard's work load and the need for an updating of the missile packs and radar equipment, which everyone in the House accepts to be a necessity. There may not be a need for mid-term refits in the accepted sense, but I believe that there will be a need for updating the missile packs and missile kits that the ships carry. If we move to ships with modular construction, which will make it easier for missile packs to be replaced and updated, I expect that this will provide a work load for the dockyards.
  To these thoughts we must add the lessons learnt from the Falkland Islands, which should be specific rather than general. I do not think that we should completely change our defence posture or strategy because of the Falkland Islands conflict. The Fleet's capacity to mount such an effective exercise has proved that it was in good shape and appropriate for what are known as out-of-area operations. However, we must remember the vulnerability of surface ships to attack by, at best, a second-rate air force that used iron bombs.
  The Argentine fleet was not used. How would our surface fleet match the Russian fleet with its 400 submarines, of which about 85 are deployed in the Atlantic? The first and obvious lesson must be that, as far
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  as we can, we must go submarine. Secondly, in so far as we can, we must avoid the need for sea supplies by trying to build up essential stocks and considering ways of providing food supplies in emergencies in the United Kingdom rather than using the North Atlantic for food supplies and other essential reinforcements.
  Having done that, having updated our Merchant Marine and used that, having employed various ingenious ways of operating Harriers from container ships and having manned our merchant ships with guns and one or two other ingenious fitments, we shall still be left with a heavy demand for a surface Royal Navy to protect surface convoys. This means that we return to the resource argument. There are those who say that the resource argument is not a problem because resources can be found by scrapping Trident. That is an argument with which I do not agree but it is respectable arithmetically.
  Another answer is given by many of my right hon. and hon. Friends who say that we should increase the resources that are made available to the Royal Navy, especially to the surface fleet. But we already spend a considerable percentage of our GDP on defence. It is a higher percentage than that spent by all of our allies, excluding Greece and the United States, which are special cases. If we ask for an increase from 3 per cent. to 4 per cent., we are entitled to ask "3 per cent. or 4 per cent. of what?" We are entitled to look sideways at our allies and to see if we can persuade them by negotiation and discussion to accept a higher percentage of the burden of defence within the NATO area. We cannot continue indefinitely to fulfil three roles well—our home-based role, our European role and our Atlantic role. One of the roles needs to be diminished.
  Have we analysed the threat? Where, for instance, do we want our Army to be if there should be a pre-emptive strike in Europe? Do we really want our Army to be on the Continent should it be subject to a pre-emptive strike? Our NATO allies should shoulder more of the burden in Europe for land forces. We are entitled to look to Germany, Norway and Denmark to commit more forces on the Continent. We are entitled to ask Canada why its percentage of gross domestic product for defence is only one-third of that which we provide for defence. I can understand the arguments that have been used against the point of view that I am expressing. I can understand that to the Army a roulement between Aldershot and Northern Ireland may not sound attractive but I am sure there are also ways of dealing with that.
  I say to the Secretary of State and to my hon. Friends, "If you want more money for defence, do not take on the Treasury and claim an even larger percentage of scarce resources. Take on the Foreign Office and persuade it to persuade our allies to take a greater share of the common burden."
  Whatever resources we devote to defence they will be of little value unless we have the resolution to use those forces. We have shown as a nation that we have that resolution and we can be proud of it because it is our greatest strength.
  8.56 pm
  Mr. Ioan Evans: I join others in paying tribute to those courageous men who were involved in the Falklands conflict. The tragedy of the debate is that there seems to be an atmosphere in the House that we are on the eve of the third world war when we should be examining realistically the situation that we face.

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  The Prime Minister announced today that the long-awaited inquiry into the Falklands conflict is to take place. We should remind ourselves of the debate on Trident when the hon. Member for Ashford (Mr. Speed) asked the Secretary of State why the Government were prepared to spend £10 billion on Trident when they were not prepared to spend £3 million on defending the Falklands. The Secretary of State replied:
  "I do not intend to get involved in a debate about the Falkland Islands now. These issues are too important to be diverted into a discussion on HMS 'Endurance'.".—[Official Report, 29 March 1982; Vol. 21, c. 27.]
  It is significant that the Secretary of State has restored HMS "Endurance" to defending the Falkland Islands. That shows the Government's complacency on defence matters. The position was compounded by the letter that was sent by the Prime Minister to Mrs. Nichols of Gerrards Cross on 3 February in which she said:
  "Our commitment to the territorial integrity of the Falkland Islands is not in doubt. Our judgment is that the presence of the Royal Marines garrison, which unlike HMS "Endurance" is permanently stationed in the Falklands, is sufficient deterrent against any possible aggression."
  That letter reveals the Government's complacent approach.
  The Opposition Front Bench has already put the case that the Labour Party is not a party of unilateral disarmers. That must be put clearly. There must be a defence force to defend our island, but choices must be made, and we believe that the Government are making the wrong choices in embarking on a massive expenditure on nuclear weapons.
  For some time now, prominent world leaders have warned us of the dangers of a nuclear conflict. I quote from a speech made by Lord Louis Mountbatten in Strasbourg on 11 May 1979. He spoke of a nuclear attack on Britain in the following terms:
  "In the event of nuclear war there will be no chances and there will be no survivors. All will be obliterated. I am not asserting this without having deeply thought about the matter. When I was Chief of Defence Staff I made my views known. I have heard arguments against this view but I have never found them convincing."
  There have been no convincing arguments in this debate for a further escalation of nuclear weapons. The words of Lord Mountbatten are just as true today. It was a tragedy that that man of peace was assassinated.
  Lord Zuckerman, the chief scientific adviser to the Government, said in a speech in America in November 1979:
  "As our own White Paper on Defence put it as long ago as 1957, there was then no means of protecting the nation against the consequences of a nuclear war. There is none today when the scale of attack may be 100 times greater than it was in the 1950s".
  We must recognise that we are living in a world that possesses 50,000 nuclear weapons with a destructive power of a million Hiroshimas. Why are the Government prepared to add to defence expenditure totalling £15 billion a further £10 billion on acquiring a nuclear weapon which, if used, will constitute failure? We are living in an Alice in Wonderland world when we talk about nuclear weapons. That is why it is important to talk about disarmament. We should not be escalating the arms race, which the Government are doing. We should seriously be talking with the Russians and others in an attempt to achieve multilateral disarmament. If we are prepared to take unilateral action to increase expenditure, we should consider taking unilateral action to reduce world tension.
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  Frank Blackaby, the chairman of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, said in his annual report:
  "During the past four years, world military spending has been following an upward trend at the rate of about 3 per cent. per annum (in volume). This is rather faster that in the previous four years in spite of the deteriorating performance of the world economy. So the burden measured as a share of the world total output has probably been rising. It is difficult to get a meaningful measure of the world total, for what it is worth the current dollar figure in 1981 was 600–650 billion dollars".
  That is the extent of the arms race. About £380 billion is now being spent. We must try to get ourselves out of this massive arms race, because if we are not careful we shall talk ourselves into a third world war.
  I do not believe that the United States or the Soviet Union will start a nuclear war. Those who have studied the consequences of such a war know that it must be avoided. That is why the Labour Party is putting forward a realistic policy by saying that if the Soviet Union and the United States possess nuclear weapons that can destroy the world 17 times over, we should stop other countries escalating that race.
  The danger is not that the super-powers will press a button and start a world war. The danger we face is that there may be a computer mistake. We could well have a war by accident.
  When the Prime Minister addressed the United Nations she said:
  "Let us face the reality. The springs of war lie in the readiness to resort to force against other nations and not in 'arms races' whether real or imaginary".
  "Imaginary"? They are real.
  Armaments are not simply the consequence of international tension. They are also a cause. That is why we must use our diplomatic efforts to reduce world tension because of the arms race, and why the Labour Party is right to reject the White Paper. It is already out of date in view of what has happened in the Falklands, but more than that it is on the wrong path in putting more of our eggs in the nuclear basket and cutting back on conventional forces. We should maintain our conventional forces to a greater extent than we can because of this massive nuclear expenditure. At the same time, we should reject the massive build-up of the arms race and the nation should play its part in the United Nations to get out of the arms race.
  9.6 pm
  Mr. Kevin McNamara: Like other hon. Members, I wish to congratulate the task force on having done its job well. In particular, with my colleagues, the hon. Members for Kingston upon Hull, East (Mr. Prescott), and Kingston upon Hull, West (Mr. Johnson), the latter whom I am sure all hon. Members will be delighted to see in his place today. I wish to pay a particular tribute to the peculiarly civilian input to the task force from the people of Hull and Humberside. The North Sea ferry "Norland", the "Tor Caledonia", and the maids of all work, the ocean-going tugs "Yorkshireman", "Irishman"—that is a good combination—and "Salvageman", are less glamorous than the QE2 and the "Canberra", but equally important. Unfortunately, they are known in Hull as the forgotten ships, and their families are the forgotten families. Here I take up a point made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) about the families of the men on HMS "Endurance".

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  I quote from a local newspaper about the wife of somebody on the "Tor Caledonia". She says:
  "We have had no mail for six weeks and the company has had no information apart from a telegram saying they are alive and well.
  We don't know where they are or how long it will be before we get any news."
  The reporter says:
  "While one fully understands the necessity for security in order to safeguard the lives of men and the safety of ships, it is particularly galling to have specific queries dealt with in a negative, off-hand manner, and then hear the very news one has been asking about broadcast on television the same evening.
  Several times promises to ring back—even with negative answers—were unfulfilled—showing a deplorable lack of courtesy."
  In the case of the "Norland", relatives were told by the Department officials in Portsmouth that she was likely to be back in a fortnight, only to have this denied later and to be told that she would be back in mid-August. The relatives know that a job has to be done and are prepared to carry it through to its conclusion, but they are entitled to accurate knowledge. They should be the first to know, and I urge the Government that this should be so.
  I use Hull as an example. My right hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East referred to his ship, but there must be many other wives and families in other ports who are baffled and confused by the conflicting stories that they hear. Hon. Members representing ports will know how a rumour can spread from central Hull to east Hull in 5 or 10 minutes, as it goes from family to family. Anguish and confusion grows and people wish to know about it.
  Two other matters worth mentioning here are of some importance. We hope that we shall have the same bands and the same official welcome home for the sailors from the Royal Fleet Auxiliary vessels and for the civilian ships as were available for the more glamourous vessels. Secondly, it is incumbent on the Government to bring to an end this sudden cheeseparing and shoddy attitude demonstrated by the Admiralty over the payment of crews of RFA vessels, where the Government are now in dispute with the National Union of Seamen. There should be no distinction between civilians in either the RFA or the Merchant Navy who were in the task force. This important matter must be looked into.
  Today's business could have appeared on the Order Paper as the "Keith Speed justification debate". Rarely so quickly and so sadly has a Minister who has resigned been shown to be correct. The hon. Member for Ashford (Mr. Speed) has probably exercised more power and influence over naval matters from the Back Benches than he was ever allowed to at the Ministry.
  My right hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East and my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Attercliffe (Mr. Duffy) dealt with naval matters in great detail. We have yet to hear about the Royal Air Force and the problems of the P110, apart from what the hon. Member for Preston, North (Mr. Atkins) said, and I agreed with much of what he said. So I want to discuss some of the thinking behind this increasingly irrelevant White Paper and to explain why Labour Members completely reject it.
  We shall vote "No" because we do not believe that the policies in the White Paper are relevant to the defence needs and the security of these islands. We have no confidence whatever in those who conduct our affairs in
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  this most sensitive national issue. The hon. Member for Ashford (Mr. Speed) said that the White Paper was "out of date" and contained few positive proposals.
  We believe that the Secretary of State should have used the occasion of the Falklands campaign to have a fundamental rethink of his policies and attitude towards NATO. Whether or not the Falklands is a one-off out-of-area exercise, its influence on future defence thinking is bound to be profound. It has not only been a laboratory for weapons and systems—as well as human bravery—but for political and diplomatic responses to crises, for consideration of allied support, and for strategic and tactical thinking.
  If the White Paper promised for the autumn is nothing but a tactical or professional examination of weapons and weapons systems, the Secretary of State and his hon. Friends—or perhaps his successor—will have lost a great opportunity for rethinking the whole position. He may come up with conclusions which are identical to those he has already reached, although I suspect not, but even if he does, the exercise will have proved worth while if he shows that he has not shut his mind to any of the lessons that one can learn from the Falklands dispute.
  There is an opportunity, as a result of some of these experiences in the out-of-area activity, to examine our whole attitude to NATO. Ever since the inception of the Alliance, we have concentrated our efforts on the European central front. Certainly it is the most politically sensitive area, but over the years it has proved to be the most stable area.
  The northern flank is very vulnerable, but it is particularly on the southern flank that stability in central Europe is most lacking. On that flank, NATO faces not only the Warsaw Pact, but an unstable region, where States with frustrated nationalism, fundamentalist religions, bursting populations, and great gaps between the rich and poor are threats to the world's peace and stability. Moreover, they sit astride sources of energy—if not ours, certainly those of our allies and the United States. Their social priorities and moral goals are alien to those of the materialistic philosophies of the East and West. We do not always understand them. They must give concern, because their actions sometimes appear to us irrational and unpredictable. We must therefore pay careful attention to the southern flank. For historical and political reasons, the main thrust of our largely static defence force is in Central Europe.
  My right hon. Friend the Member for Deptford (Mr. Silkin) and I suspect, my right hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-east, and I, are not suggesting that RAF Germany or BAOR should be shipped home tomorrow. We are saying that in the decade after the Brussels treaty, NATO priorities should be re-examined, both in terms of what we are committed to in the Treaty and in terms of the task now facing NATO.
  In terms of our responsibilities, we must ask ourselves, "Do we really need such a large Rhine Army? Does it need to be stationed there permanently as a garrison on the Rhine? Could not units be rotated to Germany, as they are now from Germany to Northern Ireland, and that enormous tail of administration and families deployed in the United Kingdom?" Clearly, the Department has thought about the matter very carefully. It has shown much sensitivity in this regard. Otherwise, the Secretary of State and the Under-Secretary would not have made so many assertions in the debate and produced so few arguments.

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  We should like to see the evidence because we believe that the additional expenditure in the United Kingdom would be more than offset by the foreign exchange earnings and by the increased job opportunities in the United Kingdom.
  My right hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East and my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Attercliffe spoke about the Fleet's capability and the reinforcement and supply that is needed across the Atlantic. I intend not to deploy those arguments but merely to assert that there was a great deal of wisdom in their attitudes. Firm consideration should be given to the points that have been made.
  We understand the sensitivities of our allies about such matters. However, we are the greatest European contributor to NATO and we are entitled not only to ask for an examination but to have it.
  The hon. Member for East Grinstead (Sir G. Johnson-Smith) should have had his facts right. Britain's total defence expenditure is the highest in Europe and, per capita, is second only to that of France. We may be a poor nation but we are contributing far more than many of the richer nations in Europe. It is quite right that they should be asked to make their contribution.
  I turn now to the item in the White Paper that governs the whole of the Government's defence policy and which takes an increasing share of defence expenditure, making us vulnerable as an island and less able to contribute in the most effective manner to NATO. That is the Trident programme.
  The Government argue for the Trident replacement as though it were just an up-market version of Polaris. It is not. Trident creates an immediate and significant escalation in the nuclear arms race. It is quantitively and qualitatively different from Polaris. Its range, precision and boasted ability to take out silos make it a strategic first-strike weapon. The number of its targetable warheads is 10 times greater than that of Polaris.
  Mr. Churchill: Surely the hon. Gentleman is aware that there is no sea-based system with a navigational system accurate enough to have a counter-silo capability. From that point of view it is not a first-strike weapon.
  Mr. McNamara: That may well be so, but it is still a first-strike weapon in terms of its ability—[HON. MEMBERS: "Nonsense."] Hon. Members should not talk about nonsense because there is an awful lot of that in the White Paper.
  Trident is a mere fig leaf to cover a significant escalation in the capacity, capability, accuracy and lethalness of Britain's strategic nuclear force. Labour will have none of it and a Labour Government will not carry it through.
  There are other arguments. The building of the Trident submarine will distort our building programme of hunter-killer submarines. The Secretary of State conceded that last Thursday when he referred to SSN19. Yet those submarines have demonstrated in the South Atlantic their ability to bottle up a hostile fleet without adequate ASW equipment. They are a powerful weapon against both the Russian surface and submarine fleets.
  On one matter I disagree with the hon. Member for Gosport (Mr. Viggers) and the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen). There is still the need for a surface capability. We do not yet have a submarine from which we can launch either a Sea Harrier or a helicopter.
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  Trident also puts pressure upon funds available for defence spending. Already its cost has leapt to £7·5 billion at 1981 prices. Many commentators think that that figure is at least £10 billion now. With inflation and with untried systems, in building the submarines and the weapons system, prices are likely to escalate out of all proportion, distorting the defence budget and harming our conventional capability.
  No matter how much the Government massage the figures, that money could be available for defence and many chiefs of staff would have shopping lists for more effective conventional weapons which would improve our general defence capability.
  We could, for example, have paid money for something that the Secretary of State lamented that he could not pay for. I refer to the reopening of the Nimrod production line as a major defence and sales priority. Indeed, that might appeal to the hon. Member for Preston, North. We could have done with Nimrod and an advanced early warning facility in the Falkland Islands, provided that it had its air refuelling system. We could also have kept Chatham, Portsmouth and Gibraltar dockyards open. Naval dockyards are not only about defence, but about loyalties. Those loyalties are two-way; from the Government to the workers and from the workers to the Government. However, the Trident project has closed Chatham and has left the prospect of 30 per cent. local unemployment in Medway. It has ruined Gibraltar and has, at best, put Portsmouth on a life support machine. There would have been no need for the closures if we did not have Trident.
  Why do we have to have Trident? Talking of the aims of his policy, the Secretary of State said:
  "The first is the maintenance of a credible strategic nuclear capability to deter nuclear blackmail by our enemies."—[Official Report, 1 July 1982; Vol. 26, c. 1056.]
  The first and obvious observation is that our nuclear weapons—whether tactical or strategic—did not deter the Argentines. It is interesting that the Secretary of State did not refer on that occasion to an independent deterrent, although the Minister did this afternoon. To paraphrase the Prime Minister, we need Trident in case we stand alone. However, to justify our forces in Europe the Secretary of State talks of the need not to disturb the dormant isolationist tendencies in the United States.
  Therefore, the argument is that if the United States of America becomes isolationist and cuts itself off from the United Kingdom and Europe, we need our own independent deterrent. What independence? The missile and delivery system are American. The submarine and warhead are British, except of course for the explosive. The enriched uranium needed for the warhead is now to be manufactured in the United States of America.
  If the United States is not isolationist, we do not need Trident. If it becomes isolationist we shall have many big submarines and empty warheads, but nothing with which to deliver them. Apart from those minor difficulties we shall have in the Secretary of State's words an "independent nuclear deterrent". The Russians must be quaking! The greatest contribution that the Government could make to peace and to de-escalating the arms race would be to show, at the outset of the START negotiations, their determination not to go ahead with Trident. The next Labour Government will do just that.
  On Thursday, my right hon. Friend the Member for Deptford spoke about the cruise weapon controversy and quoted the Minister who had said that cruise missiles were

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  "intended by the United States, at the request of Europe, to demonstrate its commitment to the defence of Europe".—[Official Report, 1 July 1982; Vol. 26, c. 1075.]
  Therefore, cruise exists not for defence, but for political reasons. I never thought that the 200,000-strong United States forces on the Rhine were just searching for the Lorelei. If Europe wants a commitment from the United States it has it in those 200,000. However, in some ways we in Europe—and, indeed, in the world—must be grateful for American largesse. It has galvanised Europe and to a degree—but, for obvious reasons, only to a degree—Eastern Europe and particularly the young, into becoming aware of the dangers and horrors of the nuclear arms race and of the threat the weapons pose for mankind. Last autumn's massive demonstrations forced a change in presentation and—I hope—in policy in the United States of America and in its attitude towards the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Without those demonstrations there would certainly not have been any Geneva talks.
  We believe that the Government can help the progress of those talks in two ways. First, they can help the talks by not blindly supporting President Reagan's zero option. Secondly, they can help their progress by not unthinkingly attacking President Brezhnev's freeze proposals and the idea of a status quo. Both of those are negotiating positions that neither side can accept. The Russian status quo would lead to immense superiority in SS20s, which NATO could never accept. Equally, President Reagan's zero option, which does not include seaborne weapons, weapons in the United Kingdom, or the Fill flying from East Anglia, would give NATO a considerable edge that the Warsaw Pact would find unacceptable.
  We in the Labour Party believe that the overall European theatre nuclear balance must be considered. All NATO and Soviet nuclear weapons systems based in the geographical continent of Europe or targetted towards it must be included in the Geneva negotiations. That is what we believe, work for and wish to see happen.
  Thus, Labour regards the White Paper as completely unacceptable because of its first priority, Trident. From that first priority flow all the distortions and errors to which all parties have drawn attention. But if the White Paper is faulty, what of the judgments of its writers? Can we trust them and their judgment in the defence of these islands? The answer must certainly be "No". The policy was one of deterrence and it failed to deter the moment that the first Argentine marine landed on the Falklands.
  Let us examine the evidence in what might be called the first and only epistle of the blessed Margaret to her disciple Madge and the party assembled at Gerrards Cross. We read in chapter I verse 3:
  "Our commitment to the territorial integrity of the Falkland Islands is not in doubt. Our judgment is that the presence of the Royal Marine garrison, which unlike HMS Endurance"—
  Mr. Robert Atkins: We have heard it before.
  Mr. McNamara: Yes, the House has already had this quote and it will have it many times again—
  "is permanently stationed in the Falklands, is sufficient deterrent against any possible aggression."
  "Any possible aggression". The right hon. Lady's commitment may not have been in doubt but her judgment certainly was and her blunder led to the loss of 250 brave men and many proud ships.
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  Despite her posturings on Cheltenham race course, the right hon. Lady appeared not as Britannia triumphant but more as an Ethelreda the Unready. It was her blunder, yet she has the gall to say to her right hon. Friend the Member for Sidcup (Mr. Heath):
  "I am sure my right hon. Friend would not wish to prejudice a judgment made on a very distinguished Foreign Secretary".—[Official Report, 1 July 1982; Vol. 26, c. 1039–40.]
  I suspect that she is concerned not so much to justify Lord Carrington as to protect her own position. It was her blunder.
  After all, as Prime Minister the right hon. Lady transferred the evaluation of intelligence functions from the Foreign Office to the Cabinet Office, her own Department, over which she had precise and direct control. If we cannot trust her judgment to protect the Falklands, what possible reason have we for trusting her judgment, or that of her Secretary of State—the office boy living on borrowed time—to protect the British Islands? They could not protect a whelk stall.
  So the right hon. Lady blundered and the task force sailed to save the Falkland Islands, but it was sent by a Government more intent on saving themselves. The right hon. Lady is still seeking to do that, as she tried to do in her speech at Cheltenham racecourse, when she tried to justify nearly 4 million people unemployed.
  Mr. Robert Atkins: She is a better bet than you are.
  Mr. McNamara: I would not be so sure, brother. One thing is certain, you will not be back in the next Parliament to collect it.
  Mr. Speaker: Order. I know that. [Laughter.]
  Mr. McNamara: I beg your pardon, Mr. Speaker. You may not be here then, but you will be missed by us all. The hon. Member for Preston, North certainly will not be here in the next Parliament. After all, we know he is hurriedly looking round for constituencies despite requests from his office not to do so.
  Let us get back to Cheltenham racecourse. The right hon. Lady tried on that occasion to use nearly 4 million unemployed, a failing economy, social distress and a breakdown in our social cohesion as reasons for her success in the Falklands. Now it appears from her comments last week that she is trying to use the thanksgiving service at St. Paul's cathedral to achieve that same purpose.
  Did the 250 men die for that? Is that why a task force went to the Falkland Islands, or did we go to liberate people and to secure their independence and their right to self-determination? The right hon. Lady's behaviour during the past few weeks over the defence of the Falkland Islands has been beneath contempt. For that reason, we cannot vote for the White Paper. We have no trust in it or in the Government and we wish to see the back of them all.
  9.29 pm
  The Under-Secretary of State for Defence Procurement (Mr. Geoffrey Pattie): The hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull, Central (Mr. McNamara) may well feel that he has crossed the line in some of his concluding remarks when he reads them tomorrow.
  It is hardly surprising that many participants in the debate have concentrated on the Falklands campaign rather than on the contents of the defence White Paper.

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  [Interruption.] I shall do so myself. A fair amount of emphasis has been given to the Falkland Islands by Ministers. That is as inevitable as it is right.
  Before the debates some people criticised the Government for publishing a White Paper at all, thereby posing the intriguing prospect of a defence White Paper debate without a defence White Paper. Such critics ignore the make-up of a defence White Paper, which is part policy, part finance and part an end-of-term report dealing with a variety of military deployments and exercises.
  The publication of a necessarily pre-Falklands White Paper underlines the Government's firm belief that, whatever the so-called lessons and conclusions of that campaign may be, the main threat continues to lie with the Soviet Union. It is all the more important that the Falklands campaign with its special and even unique problems should not necessarily become the arbiter of defence priorities in the NATO area.
  There is, however, one very clear lesson and that is the vital importance to this country of a strong and vigorous defence industrial base. In a moment I wish to pay tribute to the exceptional performance of British industry throughout the Falklands conflict. I have some examples that I wish to share with the House. Many remarkable stories of industrial performance are yet to be told.
  The key element in the performance of industry was speed of response. It is worth bearing it in mind that every time we buy systems from abroad, to the detriment of our industry, we run the risk of undermining that capacity to respond quickly, a capacity that was crucial in the Falklands conflict.
  British companies have been extremely co-operative, inspired greatly by public recognition of the emergency as being both national and genuine. Action has often been launched in response to requests by word of mouth from controllerate staff, with the necessary paperwork following later.
  There are obvious implications in that for the modus operandi of the procurement process. If the paperwork and the procedures can be circumvented in the national interest, why can that not happen all the time? Some people have suggested that it was possible only because financial constraints were removed. That is not the case and I would go so far as to say that, in many instances, the total cost would be cheaper because of the shorter time taken to carry out a project. That aspect will form part of the post-Falklands analysis.
  The response by large and small companies has been excellent. Most hon. Members will have many examples of dedicated and unstinting effort from their constituencies. I emphasise that my examples are only examples and that our thanks and gratitude go to all of those whom I cannot mention for reasons of time.
  As was quoted in the Sunday Telegraph on 4 July:
  "Sabre Safety, a small company in Aldershot make a range of safety equipment such as breathing sets. The Navy had originally planned to purchase 2,000 of its Elsa (Emergency Life Support Apparatus) sets, but a week after the sinking of the Sheffield, this was increased to 11,000. Since the Elsa gives a person trapped in a fire eight minutes of extra air, the Navy's urgent interest was obvious.
  Sabre's problem was how to increase production of the Elsa from 50 to 2,000 a week to accommodate what was a £1 million contract, a big one for a company with a 1981 turnover of around £2 million.
  Yet by augmenting its 76 strong workforce with 11 extra staff, working up to seven days a week and getting the co-operation of
  232
  suppliers, Sabre was able to deliver—ahead of schedule. Remarkably, it has also been able to maintain production of its other products.
  A similar story is told by Peter Lockey, joint managing director of Newcastle-based Berghaus, which specialises in high-quality rucksacks. Before the Falklands crisis, around 700 special rucksacks had been sold to what Lockey terms 'specialist units' of the Army.
  A week before the Queen Elizabeth 2 sailed, Berghaus was asked if it could produce another 3,000 rucksacks. Back came the answer that this was impossible in such a short time The MOD persisted and asked if it could have 600.
  Lockey believed that this was still impossible but a mass meeting of the rucksack section of his 280-strong workforce convinced him it could be done."
  Mr. Denzil Davies: Without a ballot.
  Mr. Pattie: The point that the right hon. Gentleman finds so amusing is that I am trying to make it clear to him and the House that the performance of British industry has been exceptionally good. The management and the work force, in which the right hon. Gentleman is supposed to be interested, by working from dawn to dusk over a weekend, supplied all those goods.
  With regard to shipping, particular mention ought to be made of the civilian shipyards that were involved. A notable example of these was Vosper Shiprepairers at Southampton, which converted at great speed some 11 ships, including the Queen Elizabeth 2 and the Canberra, involving extensive overtime working, including night shift and weekend working. Swan Hunter Shipbuilders on the Tyne achieved a two-and-a-half month advancement in the completion of HMS "Illustrious" by a combination of redeployment, overtime and night shift working and some short-term recruitment, all of which effectively doubled the labour input for the vessel for the period mid-April to mid-June. Yarrow Shipbuilders achieved a three-and-a-half month advance in the completion of HMS "Brazen" by introducing a night shift and extensive overtime. At Cammell Laird HMS "Liverpool" has been delivered 12 months ahead of schedule, an excellent achievement.
  The Royal Ordnance factories have also played a prominent part. Among the items supplied to meet urgent requirements were 4·5 in. naval gun spares and ammunition, Sea Skua anti-ship missile warheads, safety and arming units for Sea Cal anti-aircraft missiles, depth charges and a number of other explosives for Royal Engineers' use. For Rapier, which was, of course, of significant importance in the land element of the campaign, British Aerospace Dynamics provided spares and advanced modifications at very short notice, in parallel with its subcontractors, Marconi Space and Defence Systems, which make the Rapier Blindfire radar. The same two companies were also heavily involved in responding to the urgent need to produce Sea Skua missiles rapidly before the main task force sailed. Night vision equipment and communications were also the subject of hectic activity, with. Thorn/EMI, Marconi Avionics, Rank Taylor Hobson and MEL and their subcontractors working long hours to fulfil additional requirements.
  Hercules transport planes were also converted for in-flight refuelling by Marshalls of Cambridge. The modification was achieved in two-and-a-half weeks by dint of round-the-clock working and dedicated effort, providing an inspiring example. The conversion of the Nimrods, the anti-submarine reconnaissance aircraft, for in-flight refuelling, was an early priority. The task was

  233
  carried out by British Aerospace, Manchester division, in 17 days, the firm having been given a tight deadline of 21 days. To have beaten that deadline and converted the required number of aircraft within 30 days of the go-ahead is an outstanding feat
  Conversion of helicopters has been another essential task, in particular the provision of a rocket-firing capability by Westland Helicopters for Gazelle. Staff of the contractor worked round the clock over the Easter weekend to produce the necessary modification kits and designed, produced and cleared the installation within a few days.
  Electronic firms have also been required to work near-miracles. Smiths Industries produced a major new software programme for the Sea Harriers in a matter of days. Ferranti doubled the production rate of Blue Fox radars for the same aircraft and also planned and organised a modification programme that could be carried out on board the carriers while the task force was in transit, two engineers sailing with the fleet to do the job.
  The examples that I have given illustrate, I hope sufficiently clearly, the ingenuity, adaptability, and sheer hard work displayed in all parts of the industry throughout the crisis. Management and work forces alike gave unstintingly of time and effort. Weekends and holidays were disregarded in the interests of getting the job done and industry can be proud of having matched the efforts of our fighting troops during this testing period. It can rightly share in the credit for success.
  Mr. Allen McKay: The hon. Gentleman has given a list of achievements by British industry of which Members of the House and people outside are well aware, because there is no work force like the British work force in time of emergency. Will he now tell that work force how the Government intend to win the peace and get the 4 million back to work?
  Mr. Pattie: Within the confines of a defence debate, I thought it appropriate to place on record our appreciation of what industry has done. Time does not allow me to do true justice to the magnificent support provided by the civilian staff of the Ministry to the armed forces during the crisis. I merely itemise some of them. Without the men of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary and their ships, the task force could not have refuelled, rearmed and revictualled. The Royal Navy Supply and Transport Service issued and transported massive quantities of weapons, ammunition, food, fuel, general stores and spares from its United Kingdom depots, at sea on the RFAs and from the air bridgehead on Ascension Island. The Royal Maritime Auxiliary service was deployed for possible salvage operations. I mention, too, the large numbers of key civilian staff in the Army, Navy and Air Force departments, both in headquarters buildings and at outstations, the procurement executive, the Metereological Office, the research establishments, and last but not least the royal dockyards, which bore the brunt of the task of civil conversions and refits of Royal Navy and RFA ships. It has been said in some newspapers that these men and women are the forgotten heroes of the Falklands campaign. They are not forgotten, and I pay tribute to them all.
  The key question underlying all contributions to the debate has been the allocation of resources. My hon.
  234
  Friends the Members for Stretford (Mr. Churchill), Gosport (Mr. Viggers), Chichester (Mr. Nelson) and East Grinstead (Sir G. Johnson-Smith) and my right hon. Friend the Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Mr. Amery) all argued powerfully for more expenditure on defence. I am sure that the Treasury and the Foreign Office will have noted what has been said. I certainly hope so.
  My hon. Friend the Member for Preston, North (Mr. Atkins) raised a series of points. He asked what would happen to the Argentine equipment captured in the Falkland Islands. Some of the aircraft and helicopters will be brought back here. The small arms are still being catalogued, which is an extensive and lengthy process. My hon. Friend also mentioned requisition powers. To the best of my belief, they are adequate, but in the light of his comments I shall certainly look into the matter.
  With regard to Trident, I am aware that many people in British industry feel that the arrangement with American industry may not be starting as well as it might. I can tell my hon. Friend now, however, that the next stage is the publication of the guide produced by the strategic systems project office and now being widely disseminated to British industry. This is the jumping-off point for British companies to see the American prime contractors and get the business.
  The air staff target 1227 "Alarm and Harm" will be the subject of a statement in the fairly near future.
  I turn to the P110, on which I know that for a few sparse moments I shall have the attention of the hon. Member for Kingson upon Hull, Central. My hon. Friend the Member for Chichester also supported the P110. I assure the House that hardly a day goes by without our discussing this programme with British Aerospace or other companies. In an extremely interesting intervention, my hon. Friend the Member for Hastings (Mr. Warren) asked whether it was true that the Royal Air Force had doubts about the acceptability of the P110. To put it another way, the key question at the moment is whether the P110 satisfies the needs of AST403. I remind my hon. Friends especially that the "T" in "AST" stands for "target" and that the next step is to translate that air staff target into an air staff requirement. Some work will need to be done and only at that stage can a contract be let and a contract placed. Much work is going into this at present and I shall certainly keep the House and my hon. Friend the Member for Preston, North closely informed
  Mr. Robert Atkins: Does my hon. Friend recognise the urgency of a decision, whether or not it be converting from target to requirement, bearing in mind that the private venture capital must end, probably by the end of this year?
  Mr. Pattie: I assure my hon. Friend that the urgency, the timing and the needs of British industry are well appreciated.
  My right hon. Friend the Member for Brighton, Pavilion felt that certain lessons had come from the Falklands campaign that vindicated the recent reorganisation in the Ministry of Defence, and vindicated the decision not to have national service but to favour all voluntary forces, as was decided some years ago. It also vindicated our choice of equipment. He rightly felt that we should consider the growing global threat from the Soviet Union and what he described as the window opportunity that is in its favour.
  My hon. Friend the Member for Gillingham (Sir F. Burden) made another extremely eloquent and passionate

  235
  speech on behalf of Chatham dockyard and rightly drew attention to the first-class work done at Chatham to help the task force.
  The right hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) asked about HMS "Endurance". HMS "Endurance" has been involved in the operation from the beginning and has played a uniquely valuable role. As the right hon. Gentleman pointed out, she has been in the South Atlantic for a considerable time. I can understand that the families of her crew are anxious for her return. "Endurance" will be returning to the United Kingdom as soon as is operationally possible and we are taking into consideration the time she has been deployed. I cannot as yet, for operational reasons that the right hon. Gentleman will understand, give the actual date of her arrival in the United Kingdom. The long association of "Endurance" with the Falkland Islands and her familiarity with the operating conditions in the South Atlantic have made her peculiarly and particularly useful. That is why it is not yet possible to release her.
  Mr. James Callaghan: I am sure that the hon. Gentleman does not want to create greater uncertainty with that general reply. The families who have been in touch with me understood that "Endurance" would be returning in September. To say that she will be returning at some time in the future will reawaken that uncertainty. Their case is that, because "Endurance" has been in the South Atlantic so long and because they understood that she would be one of the earliest ships to return, they want to know whether she can return before September. I understand that the ship's company would also like to know.
  Mr. Pattie: This enables me to refer to an important point made by the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull, Central. I realise that rumours are rife in ports with people saying that this or that is to happen. Where there is uncertainty we shall do everything possible to remove the periods of uncertainty quickly. It is clearly not in anyone's interest that these families should be anxious for longer than is necessary.
  I remind the House that these are not peacetime conditions. As regards the South Atlantic, we have still not received agreement from the Argentine Government that, apart from a ceasefire, they are prepared to end hostilities. Therefore, it is necessary to make sure that operational considerations apply.
  Sir Frederick Burden: My hon. Friend has made an important statement. Unless we can be assured of peace, it is wrong to consider the lessons and make provision in the dockyards for what work is necessary until the ships return.
  Mr. Pattie: We are making what provisions we can for the ships that are at present returning.
  Mr. James Callaghan rose—
  Mr. Pattie: I prefer not to give way. I intend to deal with other points that the right hon. Gentleman has made. I assure him that if he is still unhappy about the point I shall write to him. I hope that I have given the assurance that we shall try to end the uncertainty.
  Several hon. Members, including the right hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East, have used the phrase that if the Falklands campaign had happened two years from now Britain could not have coped. The facts simply do not
  236
  support this argument. It has been suggested in the polemics of the debate that the task force was made up of sailors most of whom had redundancy notices in their pockets. There were almost 10,000 sailors in the task force. Ninety of them had redundancy notices; five were compulsory and 85 voluntary. I wish to put that point in context.
  It has also been suggested that most of the ships were on their way to the scrap yard, were being sold or something of that sort, and that for these reasons the operation could not possibly have been mounted in two years. I shall say just one more time what has been stated on several occasions. We have two carriers, "Invincible" and "Hermes". Before either was disposed of, they would be replaced by other carriers of the "Invincible" class. I refer to the "Illustrious" and the "Ark Royal". We are therefore talking about two carriers that are operational now. The question about being able to mount the operation in two years time is perfectly fair. It is also true to say that of the 42 warships that have been deployed in the task force six were on the disposal list.
  Mr. Douglas Jay: The right hon. Gentleman has mentioned the "Invincible". Can he say tonight that the "Invincible" will not be sold to Australia?
  Mr. Pattie: No, I cannot. I am also glad to have the opportunity to say in response to my hon. Friend the Member for Stretford, who prematurely announced that we had taken that decision, that his announcement was premature.
  The right hon. Members for Cardiff, South-East and for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen) spoke about the balance between our forces. I regarded their contributions as almost a continuation of last year's White Paper debate. The right hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East said that our forces had been unbalanced for years. The right hon. Gentleman is a pretty authoritative source to be saying that, and to be saying that it was also true in his day. It is not sufficiently appreciated that this unbalance of which the right hon. Gentleman speaks has occurred more within a Service than between Services. It is all very well to say that the Navy should be doing this or the Air Force doing that. What about the balance that is provided and contributed towards our defence efforts within a Service? If the Government were as hostile to surface ships as the right hon. Gentleman seemed to imply, we would hardly be bringing forward the type 23 frigate with such care and attention. We are making it a general purpose frigate to give precisely the flexibility that the right hon. Gentleman requires.
  Of course we rely on sea routes but we have to take account now of the speeds of merchant vessels, which are vastly different from what they were in 1943. An escort vessel that turns aside to prosecute a possible target or contact 30 or 40 miles away from the ships it is escorting will have its work cut out to catch up with the vessels it is escorting. We are looking at new techniques of protected lanes and of getting convoys to their destination. It is important that we keep up with technology and that we make ships capable of improvement without the major refits that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State outlined in his White Paper last year. Several people have said that the choice is still between more platforms or better weapons. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State intervened during the speech of the right hon.

  237
  Member for Cardiff, South-East to say that the fundamental question remains one of resources: where will we get the resources from? In the Labour manifesto of 1979—not from futuristic documents—we saw:
  "We shall continue with our plans to reduce the proportion of the nation's resources devoted to defence"
  The last election was fought on that issue but we are now told that we must have new resources. I was disappointed that a former Prime Minister, in the search for resources, should point the finger at the British Army of the Rhine, without apparently considering the critical effect that will have on the cohesion of the Alliance and on the apparent perception by the United States of America of our ability in Europe to resist. He is against Trident, and I find that the saddest thing of all. I do not know how the right hon. Gentleman can take that position. We either want a strategic nuclear capability or we do not. If we want one it has to be effective.
  The right hon. Gentleman was the Prime Minister in a Government who took the leading role in achieving the Chevaline improvement programme. Apparently that was all right, but we are now to continue until some unspecified future date and just fall off the end. The right hon. Gentleman apparently knows more about what will happen than the rest of us.
  Mr. Douglas: I return to the issue of mid-life refits. Where would the "Yarmouth" have been if it had not had an extensive refit?
  Mr. Pattie: The "Yarmouth" would have satisfied operational requirements perfectly well. The hon. Gentleman has raised several detailed points that are important. I do not have time to respond in detail but I shall write to him after the debate.
  My hon. Friend the Member for East Grinstead in an excellent speech took a position which has not been fashionable. He argued the case for retaining BAOR because in-place forces outweigh the value of reinforcements. That was the line followed by my hon. Friend the Member for Stretford.
  The hon. Member for the Isle of Wight (Mr. Ross) asked whether his hovercraft would feature in the competition in October. The answer is "Yes".
  My hon. Friend the Member for Chichester, in a first-class speech, stressed the importance of air power. He pointed to some possible savings, in which of course we are interested. He talked about pensions, local administration and communications, and the procurement executive, which is of interest to many hon. Members.
  The Falklands conflict revealed the usual spectrum of opinion, ranging from those who do not want a task force, those who want the task force sent provided it is never used to those who are prepared to accept that force had to be used to resist an aggressor after all diplomatic efforts to resolve the matter had failed.
  Before we indulge in such a welter of analysis and inquiry that we begin to doubt whether we won we must remember that the Falkland Islands were invaded by Argentina on 2 April and British troops re-entered Port Stanley on 14 June. Whatever arguments there are about weapons systems and detailed operations, there can be no escaping the fact that many things went right. If they had not gone right we should not yet be in Port Stanley.
  238
  The Falkland Islands campaign subjected British forces to the most vigorous series of challenges faced for many years, and they were overcome by superior motivation, training and sheer professionalism.
  Mr. John Roper rose in his place and claimed to move, That the Question be now put.
  Question, That the Question be now put, put and agreed to.
  Question put accordingly, That the amendment be made:—
  The House divided: Ayes 30, Noes 295.

  Division No. 257]

  [10 pm

  AYES

  Bradley, Tom

  Magee, Bryan

  Brocklebank-Fowler, C.

  Mitchell, R. C. (Soton Itchen)

  Brown, Ronald W. (H'ckn'y S)

  O'Halloran, Michael

  Cartwright, John

  Owen, Rt Hon Dr David

  Cunningham, G. (Islington S)

  Penhaligon, David

  Ellis, Tom (Wrexham)

  Rodgers, Rt Hon William

  Freud, Clement

  Ross, Stephen (Isle of Wight)

  Ginsburg, David

  Sandelson, Neville

  Grant, John (Islington C)

  Steel, Rt Hon David

  Grimond, Rt Hon J.

  Thomas, Jeffrey (Abertillery)

  Horam, John

  Thomas, Mike (Newcastle E)

  Howells, Geraint

  Wellbeloved, James

  Jenkins, Rt Hon Roy (Hillhead)

  Williams, Rt Hon Mrs (Crosby)

  Mabon, Rt Hon Dr J. Dickson

  Wrigglesworth, Ian

  Maclennan, Robert

  McNally, Thomas

  Tellers for the Ayes:

  NOES

  Adley, Robert

  Cadbury, Jocelyn

  Aitken, Jonathan

  Carlisle, John (Luton West)

  Alexander, Richard

  Carlisle, Kenneth (Lincoln)

  Alison, Rt Hon Michael

  Carlisle, Rt Hon M. (R'c'n)

  Amery, Rt Hon Julian

  Channon, Rt. Hon. Paul

  Ancram, Michael

  Chapman, Sydney

  Arnold, Tom

  Churchill, W. S.

  Aspinwall, Jack

  Clark, Hon A. (Plym'th, S'n)

  Atkins, Rt Hon H.(S'thorne)

  Clark, Sir W. (Croydon S)

  Atkins, Robert(Preston N)

  Clarke, Kenneth (Rushcliffe)

  Atkinson, David (B'm'th.E)

  Cockeram, Eric

  Baker, Kenneth(St.M'bone)

  Colvin, Michael

  Baker, Nicholas (N Dorset)

  Cope, John

  Banks, Robert

  Cormack, Patrick

  Beaumont-Dark, Anthony

  Corrie, John

  Bendall, Vivian

  Costain, Sir Albert

  Benyon, Thomas (A'don)

  Cranborne, Viscount

  Best, Keith

  Critchley, Julian

  Bevan, David Gilroy

  Crouch, David

  Biffen, Rt Hon John

  Dickens, Geoffrey

  Biggs-Davison, Sir John

  Dorrell, Stephen

  Blackburn, John

  Douglas-Hamilton, Lord J.

  Blaker, Peter

  Dover, Denshore

  Body, Richard

  du Cann, Rt Hon Edward

  Bonsor, Sir Nicholas

  Dunn, Robert (Dartford)

  Boscawen, Hon Robert

  Dykes, Hugh

  Bottomley, Peter (W'wich W)

  Eden, Rt Hon Sir John

  Bowden, Andrew

  Edwards, Rt Hon N. (P'broke)

  Boyson, Dr Rhodes

  Eggar, Tim

  Braine, Sir Bernard

  Elliott, Sir William

  Bright, Graham

  Emery, Sir Peter

  Brinton, Tim

  Eyre, Reginald

  Brittan, Rt. Hon. Leon

  Fairgrieve, Sir Russell

  Brooke, Hon Peter

  Faith, Mrs Sheila

  Brotherton, Michael

  Farr, John

  Brown, Michael(Brigg & Sc'n)

  Fell, Sir Anthony

  Browne, John (Winchester)

  Finsberg, Geoffrey

  Bruce-Gardyne, John

  Fisher, Sir Nigel

  Bryan, Sir Paul

  Fletcher, A. (Ed'nb'gh N)

  Buchanan-Smith, Rt. Hon. A.

  Fletcher-Cooke, Sir Charles

  Buck, Antony

  Fookes, Miss Janet

  Budgen, Nick

  Forman, Nigel

  Bulmer, Esmond

  Fowler, Rt Hon Norman

  Butcher, John

  Fraser, Peter (South Angus)

  239

  Fry, Peter

  Marten, Rt Hon Neil

  Gardiner, George (Reigate)

  Maude, Rt Hon Sir Angus

  Gardner, Edward (S Fylde)

  Mawby, Ray

  Garel-Jones, Tristan

  Mawhinney, Dr Brian

  Glyn, Dr Alan

  Maxwell-Hyslop, Robin

  Goodhart, Sir Philip

  Mayhew, Patrick

  Goodhew, Sir Victor

  Meyer, Sir Anthony

  Goodlad, Alastair

  Miller, Hal (B'grove)

  Gorst, John

  Mills, Iain (Meriden)

  Gow, Ian

  Mills, Sir Peter (West Devon)

  Grant, Anthony (Harrow C)

  Miscampbell, Norman

  Gray, Hamish

  Mitchell, David (Basingstoke)

  Greenway, Harry

  Moate, Roger

  Griffiths, Peter Portsm'th N)

  Monro, Sir Hector

  Grist, Ian

  Montgomery, Fergus

  Gummer, John Selwyn

  Moore, John

  Hamilton, Hon A.

  Morgan, Geraint

  Hamilton, Michael (Salisbury)

  Morris, M. (N'hampton S)

  Hampson, Dr Keith

  Morrison, Hon C. (Devizes)

  Hannam, John

  Morrison, Hon P. (Chester)

  Haselhurst, Alan

  Mudd, David

  Hastings, Stephen

  Murphy, Christopher

  Havers, Rt Hon Sir Michael

  Myles, David

  Hawkins, Sir Paul

  Neale, Gerrard

  Hawksley, Warren

  Needham, Richard

  Hayhoe, Barney

  Nelson, Anthony

  Heath, Rt Hon Edward

  Neubert, Michael

  Heddle, John

  Newton, Tony

  Henderson, Barry

  Nott, Rt Hon John

  Heseltine, Rt Hon Michael

  Onslow, Cranley

  Hicks, Robert

  Oppenheim, Rt Hon Mrs S.

  Higgins, Rt Hon Terence L.

  Osborn, John

  Hill, James

  Page, John (Harrow, West)

  Hogg, Hon Douglas (Gr'th'm)

  Page, Richard (SW Herts)

  Holland, Philip (Carlton)

  Parkinson, Rt Hon Cecil

  Hooson, Tom

  Parris, Matthew

  Hordern, Peter

  Patten, John (Oxford)

  Howe, Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey

  Pattie, Geoffrey

  Howell, Rt Hon D. (G'ldf'd)

  Pawsey, James

  Hunt, David (Wirral)

  Percival, Sir Ian

  Hunt, John (Ravensbourne)

  Peyton, Rt Hon John

  Irvine, Bryant Godman

  Pollock, Alexander

  Irving, Charles (Cheltenham)

  Porter, Barry

  Jenkin, Rt Hon Patrick

  Prentice, Rt Hon Reg

  Jessel, Toby

  Price, Sir David (Eastleigh)

  Johnson Smith, Sir Geoffrey

  Proctor, K. Harvey

  Jopling, Rt Hon Michael

  Raison, Rt Hon Timothy

  Joseph, Rt Hon Sir Keith

  Rathbone, Tim

  Kaberry, Sir Donald

  Rees, Peter (Dover and Deal)

  Kershaw, Sir Anthony

  Rees-Davies, W. R.

  Kilfedder, James A.

  Renton, Tim

  Kimball, Sir Marcus

  Rhodes James, Robert

  King, Rt Hon Tom

  Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon

  Knight, Mrs Jill

  Ridley, Hon Nicholas

  Knox, David

  Ridsdale, Sir Julian

  Lamont, Norman

  Rifkind, Malcolm

  Lang, Ian

  Rippon, Rt Hon Geoffrey

  Latham, Michael

  Roberts, M. (Cardiff NW)

  Lawrence, Ivan

  Roberts, Wyn (Conway)

  Lawson, Rt Hon Nigel

  Rossi, Hugh

  Lee, John

  Rost, Peter

  Lennox-Boyd, Hon Mark

  Royle, Sir Anthony

  Lester, Jim (Beeston)

  Rumbold, Mrs A. C. R.

  Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)

  Sainsbury, Hon Timothy

  Lloyd, Ian (Havant & W'loo)

  St. John-Stevas, Rt Hon N.

  Lloyd, Peter (Fareham)

  Scott, Nicholas

  Loveridge, John

  Shaw, Giles (Pudsey)

  Luce, Richard

  Shepherd, Colin (Hereford)

  Lyell, Nicholas

  Shepherd, Richard

  McCrindle, Robert

  Shersby, Michael

  Macfarlane, Neil

  Silvester, Fred

  MacGregor, John

  Sims, Roger

  MacKay, John (Argyll)

  Smith, Dudley

  Macmillan, Rt Hon M.

  Smith, Tim (Beaconsfield)

  McNair-Wilson, M. (N'bury)

  Speller, Tony

  McNair-Wilson, P. (New F'st)

  Spence, John

  Madel, David

  Spicer, Michael (S Worcs)

  Major, John

  Sproat, Iain

  Marland, Paul

  Squire, Robin

  Marlow, Antony

  Stainton, Keith

  240

  Stanbrook, Ivor

  Waldegrave, Hon William

  Stanley, John

  Walker, Rt Hon P. (W'cester)

  Steen, Anthony

  Walker, B. (Perth)

  Stevens, Martin

  Waller, Gary

  Stewart, A. (E Renfrewshire)

  Walters, Dennis

  Stewart, Rt Hon D. (W Isles)

  Ward, John

  Stewart, Ian (Hitchin)

  Warren, Kenneth

  Stokes, John

  Watson, John

  Stradling Thomas, J.

  Wells, Bowen

  Tapsell, Peter

  Wells, John (Maidstone)

  Taylor, Teddy (S'end E)

  Wheeler, John

  Tebbit, Rt Hon Norman

  Whitelaw, Rt Hon William

  Temple-Morris, Peter

  Whitney, Raymond

  Thatcher, Rt Hon Mrs M.

  Wickenden, Keith

  Thomas, Rt Hon Peter

  Wiggin, Jerry

  Thompson, Donald

  Wilkinson, John

  Thorne, Neil (Ilford South)

  Williams, D.(Montgomery)

  Thornton, Malcolm

  Wilson, Gordon (Dundee E)

  Townend, John (Bridlington)

  Winterton, Nicholas

  Trippier, David

  Wolfson, Mark

  Trotter, Neville

  Young, Sir George (Acton)

  van Straubenzee, Sir W.

  Younger, Rt Hon George

  Vaughan, Dr Gerard

  Viggers, Peter

  Tellers for the Noes:

  Waddington, David

  Mr. Anthony Berry and

  Wakeham, John

  Mr. Carol Mather.

  Question accordingly negatived.
  Main Question put:—
  The House divided: Ayes 292, Noes 219.

  Division No. 258]

  [10.13 pm

  AYES

  Adley, Robert

  Carlisle, Rt Hon M. (R'c'n)

  Aitken, Jonathan

  Channon, Rt. Hon. Paul

  Alexander, Richard

  Chapman, Sydney

  Alison, Rt Hon Michael

  Churchill, W. S.

  Amery, Rt Hon Julian

  Clark, Hon A. (Plym'th, S'n)

  Ancram, Michael

  Clark, Sir W. (Croydon S)

  Arnold, Tom

  Clarke, Kenneth (Rushcliffe)

  Aspinwall, Jack

  Cockeram, Eric

  Atkins, Rt Hon H. (S'thorne)

  Colvin, Michael

  Atkins, Hobert (Preston N)

  Cope, John

  Atkinson, David (B'm'th,E)

  Cormack, Patrick

  Baker, Kenneth (St.M'bone)

  Corrie, John

  Baker, Nicholas (N Dorset)

  Costain, Sir Albert

  Banks, Robert

  Cranborne, Viscount

  Beaumont-Dark, Anthony

  Critchley, Julian

  Bendall, Vivian

  Crouch, David

  Benyon, Thomas (A'don)

  Dickens, Geoffrey

  Best, Keith

  Dorrell, Stephen

  Bevan, David Gilroy

  Douglas-Hamilton, Lord J.

  Biffen, Rt Hon John

  Dover, Denshore

  Biggs-Davison, Sir John

  du Cann, Rt Hon Edward

  Blackburn, John

  Dunn, Robert (Dartford)

  Blaker, Peter

  Dykes, Hugh

  Body, Richard

  Eden, Rt Hon Sir John

  Bonsor, Sir Nicholas

  Edwards, Rt Hon N. (P'broke)

  Boscawen, Hon Robert

  Eggar, Tim

  Bottomley, Peter (W'wich W)

  Elliott, Sir William

  Bowden, Andrew

  Emery, Sir Peter

  Boyson, Dr Rhodes

  Eyre, Reginald

  Braine, Sir Bernard

  Fairgrieve, Sir Russell

  Bright, Graham

  Faith, Mrs Sheila

  Brinton, Tim

  Farr, John

  Brittan, Rt. Hon. Leon

  Fell, Sir Anthony

  Brooke, Hon Peter

  Finsberg, Geoffrey

  Brotherton, Michael

  Fisher, Sir Nigel

  Brown, Michael (Brigg & Sc'n)

  Fletcher, A. (Ed'nb'gh N)

  Browne, John (Winchester)

  Fletcher-Cooke, Sir Charles

  Bruce-Gardyne, John

  Fookes, Miss Janet

  Bryan, Sir Paul

  Forman, Nigel

  Buchanan-Smith, Rt. Hon. A.

  Fowler, Rt Hon Norman

  Buck, Antony

  Fraser, Peter (South Angus)

  Budgen, Nick

  Fry, Peter

  Bulmer, Esmond

  Gardiner, George (Reigate)

  Butcher, John

  Gardner, Edward (S Fylde)

  Cadbury, Jocelyn

  Garel-Jones, Tristan

  Carlisle, John (Luton West)

  Glyn, Dr Alan

  Carlisle, Kenneth (Lincoln)

  Goodhart, Sir Philip

  241

  Goodhew, Sir Victor

  Meyer, Sir Anthony

  Goodlad, Alastair

  Miller, Hal (B'grove)

  Gorst, John

  Mills, Iain (Meriden)

  Gow, Ian

  Mills, Sir Peter (West Devon)

  Grant, Anthony (Harrow C)

  Miscampbell, Norman

  Gray, Hamish

  Mitchell, David (Basingstoke)

  Greenway, Harry

  Monro, Sir Hector

  Griffiths, Peter Portsm'th N)

  Montgomery, Fergus

  Grist, Ian

  Moore, John

  Gummer, John Selwyn

  Morgan, Geraint

  Hamilton, Hon A.

  Morris, M. (N'hampton S)

  Hamilton, Michael (Salisbury)

  Morrison, Hon C. (Devizes)

  Hampson, Dr Keith

  Morrison, Hon P. (Chester)

  Hannam, John

  Mudd, David

  Haselhurst, Alan

  Murphy, Christopher

  Hastings, Stephen

  Myles, David

  Havers, Rt Hon Sir Michael

  Neale, Gerrard

  Hawkins, Sir Paul

  Needham, Richard

  Hawksley, Warren

  Nelson, Anthony

  Hayhoe, Barney

  Neubert, Michael

  Heath, Rt Hon Edward

  Newton, Tony

  Heddle, John

  Nott, Rt Hon John

  Henderson, Barry

  Onslow, Cranley

  Heseltine, Rt Hon Michael

  Oppenheim, Rt Hon Mrs S.

  Hicks, Robert

  Osborn, John

  Higgins, Rt Hon Terence L.

  Page, John (Harrow, West)

  Hill, James

  Page, Richard (SW Herts)

  Hogg, Hon Douglas (Gr'th'm)

  Parkinson, Rt Hon Cecil

  Holland, Philip (Carlton)

  Parris, Matthew

  Hooson, Tom

  Patten, John (Oxford)

  Hordern, Peter

  Pattie, Geoffrey

  Howe, Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey

  Pawsey, James

  Hunt, David (Wirral)

  Percival, Sir Ian

  Hunt, John (Ravensbourne)

  Peyton, Rt Hon John

  Irvine, Bryant Godman

  Pollock, Alexander

  Irving, Charles (Cheltenham)

  Porter, Barry

  Jenkins, Rt Hon Roy (Hillhead)

  Prentice, Rt Hon Reg

  Price, Sir David (Eastleigh)

  Jessel, Toby

  Proctor, K. Harvey

  Johnson Smith, Sir Geoffrey

  Raison, Rt Hon Timothy

  Jopling, Rt Hon Michael

  Rathbone, Tim

  Joseph, Rt Hon Sir Keith

  Rees, Peter (Dover and Deal)

  Kaberry, Sir Donald

  Rees-Davies, W. R.

  Kershaw, Sir Anthony

  Renton, Tim

  Kilfedder, James A.

  Rhodes James, Robert

  Kimball, Sir Marcus

  Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon

  King, Rt Hon Tom

  Ridley, Hon Nicholas

  Knight, Mrs Jill

  Ridsdale, Sir Julian

  Knox, David

  Rifkind, Malcolm

  Lamont, Norman

  Rippon, Rt Hon Geoffrey

  Lang, Ian

  Roberts, M. (Cardiff NW)

  Latham, Michael

  Roberts, Wyn (Conway)

  Lawrence, Ivan

  Rossi, Hugh

  Lawson, Rt Hon Nigel

  Rost, Peter

  Lee, John

  Royle, Sir Anthony

  Lennox-Boyd, Hon Mark

  Rumbold, Mrs A. C. R.

  Lester, Jim (Beeston)

  Sainsbury, Hon Timothy

  Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)

  St. John-Stevas, Rt Hon N.

  Lloyd, Ian (Havant & W'loo)

  Scott, Nicholas

  Lloyd, Peter (Fareham)

  Shaw, Giles (Pudsey)

  Loveridge, John

  Shepherd, Colin (Hereford)

  Luce, Richard

  Shepherd, Richard

  Lyell, Nicholas

  Shersby, Michael

  McCrindle, Robert

  Silvester, Fred

  Macfarlane, Neil

  Sims, Roger

  MacGregor, John

  Smith, Dudley

  MacKay, John (Argyll)

  Smith, Tim (Beaconsfield)

  Macmillan, Rt Hon M.

  Speller, Tony

  McNair-Wilson, M. (N'bury)

  Spence, John

  McNair-Wilson, P. (New F'st)

  Spicer, Michael (S Worcs)

  Madel, David

  Sproat, Iain

  Major, John

  Squire, Robin

  Marland, Paul

  Stainton, Keith

  Marlow, Antony

  Stanbrook, Ivor

  Marten, Rt Hon Neil

  Stanley, John

  Maude, Rt Hon Sir Angus

  Steen, Anthony

  Mawby, Ray

  Stevens, Martin

  Mawhinney, Dr Brian

  Stewart, A. (E Renfrewshire)

  Maxwell-Hyslop, Robin

  Stewart, Ian (Hitchin)

  Mayhew, Patrick

  Stokes, John

  242

  Stradling Thomas, J.

  Waller, Gary

  Tapsell, Peter

  Walters, Dennis

  Taylor, Teddy (S'end E)

  Ward, John

  Tebbit, Rt Hon Norman

  Warren, Kenneth

  Temple-Morris, Peter

  Watson, John

  Thatcher, Rt Hon Mrs M.

  Wells, Bowen

  Thomas, Rt Hon Peter

  Wells, John (Maidstone)

  Thompson, Donald

  Wheeler, John

  Thome, Neil (Ilford South)

  Whitelaw, Rt Hon William

  Thornton, Malcolm

  Whitney, Raymond

  Townend, John (Bridlington)

  Wickenden, Keith

  Trippier, David

  Wiggin, Jerry

  Trotter, Neville

  Wilkinson, John

  van Straubenzee, Sir W.

  Williams, D.(Montgomery)

  Vaughan, Dr Gerard

  Winterton, Nicholas

  Viggers, Peter

  Wolfson, Mark

  Waddington, David

  Young, Sir George (Acton)

  Wakeham, John

  Younger, Rt Hon George

  Waldegrave, Hon William

  Walker, Rt Hon P. (W'cester)

  Tellers for the Ayes:

  Walker, B. (Perth)

  Mr. Anthony Berry and

  NOES

  Abse, Leo

  Edwards, R. (W'hampt'n S E)

  Adams, Allen

  Ellis, R. (NE D'bysh're)

  Allaun, Frank

  English, Michael

  Alton, David

  Ennals, Rt Hon David

  Anderson, Donald

  Evans, Ioan (Aberdare)

  Archer, Rt Hon Peter

  Evans, John (Newton)

  Ashley, Rt Hon Jack

  Ewing, Harry

  Ashton, Joe

  Fitch, Alan

  Atkinson, H. (H'gey,)

  Flannery, Martin

  Bagier, Gordon A.T.

  Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)

  Barnett, Guy (Greenwich)

  Foot, Rt Hon Michael

  Barnett, Rt Hon Joel (H'wd)

  Ford, Ben

  Beith, A. J.

  Forrester, John

  Benn, Rt Hon Tony

  Foster, Derek

  Bennett, Andrew (St'kp't N)

  Foulkes, George

  Bidwell, Sydney

  Fraser, J. (Lamb'th, N'w'd)

  Booth, Rt Hon Albert

  Freeson, Rt Hon Reginald

  Boothroyd, Miss Betty

  Freud, Clement

  Bottomley, Rt Hon A. (M'b'ro)

  Garrett, John (Norwich S)

  Bray, Dr Jeremy

  Garrett, W. E. (Wallsend)

  Buchan, Norman

  Golding, John

  Callaghan, Rt Hon J.

  Gourlay, Harry

  Callaghan, Jim (Midd't'n & P)

  Graham, Ted

  Campbell, Ian

  Grimond, Rt Hon J.

  Campbell-Savours, Dale

  Hamilton, James (Bothwell)

  Canavan, Dennis

  Hamilton, W. W. (C'tral Fife)

  Cant, R. B.

  Hardy, Peter

  Carmichael, Neil

  Harrison, Rt Hon Walter

  Carter-Jones, Lewis

  Hart, Rt Hon Dame Judith

  Clark, Dr David (S Shields)

  Hattersley, Rt Hon Roy

  Clarke, Thomas C'b'dge, A'drie

  Healey, Rt Hon Denis

  Heffer, Eric S.

  Cocks, Rt Hon M. (B'stol S)

  Hogg, N. (E Dunb't'nshire)

  Coleman, Donald

  Holland, S. (L'b'th, Vauxh'll)

  Cook, Robin F.

  Homewood, William

  Cowans, Harry

  Hooley, Frank

  Cox, T. (W'dsw'th, Toot'g)

  Howell, Rt Hon D.

  Craigen, J. M. (G'gow, M'hill)

  Howells, Geraint

  Crowther, Stan

  Hoyle, Douglas

  Cryer, Bob

  Huckfield, Les

  Cunningham, Dr J. (W'h'n)

  Hughes, Mark (Durham)

  Dalyell, Tam

  Hughes, Robert (Aberdeen N)

  Davidson, Arthur

  Hughes, Roy (Newport)

  Davies, Rt Hon Denzil (L'lli)

  Janner, Hon Greville

  Davis, Clinton (Hackney C)

  Jay, Rt Hon Douglas

  Davis, Terry (B'ham, Stechf'd)

  John, Brynmor

  Deakins, Eric

  Johnson, James (Hull West)

  Dean, Joseph (Leeds West)

  Johnson, Walter (Derby S)

  Dewar, Donald

  Jones, Rt Hon Alec (Rh'dda)

  Dixon, Donald

  Jones, Barry (East Flint)

  Dobson, Frank

  Kaufman, Rt Hon Gerald

  Dormand, Jack

  Kerr, Russell

  Douglas, Dick

  Kilroy-Silk, Robert

  Dubs, Alfred

  Kinnock, Neil

  Duffy, A. E. P.

  Lambie, David

  Dunwoody, Hon Mrs G.

  Lamborn, Harry

  Eastham, Ken

  Lamond, James

  243

  Leadbitter, Ted

  Morton, George

  Lestor, Miss Joan

  Moyle, Rt Hon Roland

  Lewis, Arthur (N'ham NW)

  Mulley, Rt Hon Frederick

  Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)

  Newens, Stanley

  Litherland, Robert

  Oakes, Rt Hon Gordon

  Lofthouse, Geoffrey

  O'Neill, Martin

  Lyon, Alexander (York)

  Orme, Rt Hon Stanley

  McCartney, Hugh

  Palmer, Arthur

  McDonald, Dr Oonagh

  Park, George

  McElhone, Frank

  Parker, John

  McGuire, Michael (Ince)

  Parry, Robert

  McKay, Allen (Penistone)

  Pavitt, Laurie

  McKelvey, William

  Pendry, Tom

  MacKenzie, Rt Hon Gregor

  Penhaligon, David

  McMahon, Andrew

  Powell, Raymond (Ogmore)

  McNamara, Kevin

  Prescott, John

  McTaggart, Robert

  Price, C. (Lewisham W)

  McWilliam, John

  Race, Reg

  Marks, Kenneth

  Radice, Giles

  Marshall, D (G'gow S'ton)

  Richardson, Jo

  Marshall, Dr Edmund (Goole)

  Roberts, Allan (Bootle)

  Marshall, Jim (Leicester S)

  Roberts, Ernest (Hackney N)

  Maxton, John

  Roberts, Gwilym (Cannock)

  Maynard, Miss Joan

  Robertson, George

  Meacher, Michael

  Robinson, G. (Coventry NW)

  Millan, Rt Hon Bruce

  Rooker, J. W.

  Miller, Dr M. S. (E Kilbride)

  Ross, Ernest (Dundee West)

  Mitchell, Austin (Grimsby)

  Ross, Stephen (Isle of Wight)

  Morris, Rt Hon A. (W'shawe)

  Rowlands, Ted

  Morris, Rt Hon C. (O'shaw)

  Ryman, John

  Morris, Rt Hon J. (Aberavon)

  Sever, John

  244

  Sheldon, Rt Hon R.

  Tinn, James

  Shore, Rt Hon Peter

  Torney, Tom

  Short, Mrs Renée

  Wainwright, E.(Dearne V)

  Silkin, Rt Hon J. (Deptford)

  Watkins, David

  Silkin, Rt Hon S. C. (Dulwich)

  Weetch, Ken

  Silverman, Julius

  Welsh, Michael

  Skinner, Dennis

  White, Frank R.

  Smith, Rt Hon J. (N Lanark)

  White, J. (G'gow Pollok)

  Snape, Peter

  Whitehead, Phillip

  Spearing, Nigel

  Whitlock, William

  Spriggs, Leslie

  Wigley, Dafydd

  Stallard, A. W.

  Willey, Rt Hon Frederick

  Steel, Rt Hon David

  Williams, Rt Hon A.(S'sea W)

  Stewart, Rt Hon D. (W Isles)

  Wilson, Gordon (Dundee E)

  Stoddart, David

  Wilson, William (C'try SE)

  Stott, Roger

  Winnick, David

  Strang, Gavin

  Woodall, Alec

  Straw, Jack

  Woolmer, Kenneth

  Summerskill, Hon Dr Shirley

  Wright, Sheila

  Taylor, Mrs Ann (Bolton W)

  Young, David (Bolton E)

  Thomas, Dafydd (Merioneth)

  Thomas, Dr R. (Carmarthen)

  Tellers for the Noes:

  Thorne, Stan (Preston South)

  Mr. Frank Haynes and

  Tilley, John

  Mr. Lawrence Cunliffe.

  Question accordingly agreed to.
  Resolved,
  That this House approves the Statement on the Defence Estimates 1982, contained in Cmnd. 8529.

  National Health Service (Charges to Overseas Visitors)
  10.25 pm
  Mr. Bob Cryer: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. May I draw your attention to the statement on the Order Paper that the instrument has not been considered by the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments? That is not the case, because the Joint Committee considered the instrument at its meeting this afternoon. The Committee asked the Clerk to make representations to the Leader of the House because the Committee took evidence from representatives of the Department of Health and Social Security which is linked to the statement that has been placed in the Vote Office by the Committee this evening in order to help the House.
  The evidence could not be printed in time and therefore the Clerk was asked to contact the office of the Leader of the House to see whether this instrument could be deferred and the prayer dealt with next week. The Committee asked that it should be dealt with in that way because the Leader of the House represents the Government who have control over the time of the House. It is not the Opposition who dictate the time for a prayer to be put down and debated.
  As you know, Mr. Speaker, the Joint Committee is set up under a Standing Order of the House. The Committee feels that it is extremely foolish for the House to set up a Committee and entrust it with the job of examining instruments and, where a report has to be made, for the House then to ignore the Committee's report by going ahead with the debate tonight.
  I should like you, Mr. Speaker, to look at this matter with a view to enforcing the Standing Order in such a way that this position cannot occur again.
  Mr. Speaker: This prayer was put down by the Leader of the Opposition and Opposition Members and I must follow the Order Paper. However, if the Opposition do not wish to pursue it, the simple remedy is not to move it.
  Mrs. Gwyneth Dunwoody: I am grateful to you, Mr. Speaker, for that guidance.
  Mr. A. J. Beith: On a point of order—
  Mr. Speaker: I shall take the point of order, but I remind the House that we have now embarked upon the time which will run out at 11.30 pm.
  Mr. Beith: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I apologise, but I understood that the hon. Member for Crewe (Mrs. Dunwoody) wished to raise a point of order. I seek your guidance, Mr. Speaker. The Joint Committee must have been placed in difficulty because the Government originally laid the instrument on 14 June, but withdrew it and tabled another instrument, which differs only in one sum of money and one small bit of wording from the original instrument.
  I understand that the Government laid this instrument not because of any defect in the original instrument, but to enable the official Opposition to pray against it, as my hon. Friends and I had already prayed against the first instrument. Is that not why the Joint Committee was unable to consider the second instrument until recently?
  Mr. Mike Thomas: Further to that point of order, Mr. Speaker. The House is also entitled to know the Government's intentions on the instrument relating to Scotland. That has also been prayed against—
  Mr. Speaker: Order. That cannot be a point of order. The hon Gentleman has raised a business matter, not a point of order. I must tell the hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Mr. Beith) and the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne, East (Mr. Thomas) that I have to follow the Order Paper. The Speaker is not given authority to decide its contents. The rules are simple. The hon. Member for Crewe (Mrs. Dunwoody) wishes to move the prayer and she must be allowed to do so.
  Mr. Thomas: Further to that point of order, Mr. Speaker. I apologise for pursuing the matter further, but we are entitled to ask whether it is proper for the Government to withdraw an instrument when they see it prayed against by one group of hon. Members so that, apparently, another group of hon. Members can pray against it.
  Mr. Speaker: It is not for me to interpret the Government's motives. I should be on very dangerous ground if I did so.
  10.33 pm
  Mrs. Gwyneth Dunwoody: It does not matter at what point of the calendar the prayer is moved. I beg to move,
  That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, praying that the National Health Service (Charges to Overseas Visitors) (No. 2) Regulations 1982 (S.I., 1982, No. 863), dated 24th June 1982, a copy of which was laid before this House on 24th June, be annulled.
  The regulations are obnoxious and unacceptable and should be defeated by the House. The original decision to charge overseas visitors was presented to the House by a previous Secretary of State, because, as he said some time ago in an extremely emotive speech at St. Stephen's hospital, the National Health Service was being exploited by people whom he categorised as being well-heeled foreigners.
  The former Secretary of State then said that he intended to ensure that the British taxpayer was not in any way penalised. That has been found to be a totally and utterly shallow boast. Although it would be out of order to refer to the Scottish instrument, when I speak from the Front Bench on behalf of the Opposition I do so on behalf of everyone in the United Kingdom, including the kingdom of Scotland. It is sometimes necessary to go outside to discover the reasoning behind the political moves that occur. I have never suspected the Chancellor of the Exchequer of having a sense of humour. To be frank, I have always regarded him as a rather pedestrian thinker. However, we have the Conservative political centre summer school in Cambridge to thank for a really good joke from the Chancellor. At least, if it is not a funny, it deserves to be, especially as it gives us a clue about what is behind the regulations. On 3 July the Chancellor spoke about health and said that the Conservatives had long questioned
  "whether subsidised universal provision would effectively help those in need".
  He also said:
  "The use of economic pricing of services is currently restricted to only small areas of the programmes concerned. Opening up the supply of a much wider range of goods and

  247
  services to something approximating the market place may be a way of enriching and enhancing the quality and variety of what is provided. In some cases, a system of charging can help to direct resources where they are most required and at the same time induce a sense of priorities amongst recipients of the services involved."
  People do not only get a free service, but apparently they have to be suitably chastened and grateful as well.
  The Chancellor went on:
  "In some cases charges might be a preliminary to some form of private sector involvement. As we develop our thinking along these lines we must never cease to proclaim that the objective of such an approach is not to defend a rump of privilege for the few,"—
  perish the thought—
  "but to enlarge the bridgehead of choice for the many."
  It does not matter how often the Chancellor tries to put forward that line of thought, no one will believe him. The only thing that can be read into the absolute determination to bring forward these regulations, which are both divisive and unacceptable, is the fact that the Conservative Government are committed to a decision that is racist and unacceptable in every way. They have it in mind, first, to pander to the straightforward xenophobia of the Conservative Party.
  Never mind that even after energetic research the Government can produce only the flimsiest evidence of any abuse of the National Health Service. Never mind if the previous Minister's encomium must be scaled down because of a lack of hard facts. The Government have pushed ahead with this destructive scheme, determined to bring it into operation by 1 October 1982. When it was first suggested, the chorus of complaint, not only from organisations representing students but from those representing the immigrant community, forced them at least to accept some consultation, but they have done their best all the way through both to limit the terms of reference of the working party and to ignore many of the representations that were made to it. Their impact on race relations has been wholly unacceptable.
  When the working party was set up, the implicit justification for the new charges was to stop abuse of the NHS, but the working party found that, of the 8,152 who were questioned in the survey, only 81, or 1 per cent., were even suspected of being chargeable after stage one of the questioning. During that time the Kensington, Chelsea and Westminster area health authority—an area that must have one of the largest concentrations of overseas visitors to Britain—said that abuse formed a minute proportion of the total work load with no perceptible effect on its waiting lists.
  Mr. Douglas Hogg: Is it not also true that only 12 of those who were asked objected to answering the questions?
  Mrs. Dunwoody: If one asks someone to participate in a voluntary scheme often, because of his good manners—a quality not always shared by the Conservative Government—he will respond positively. If he is forced to answer a series of personal questions, his response may be very different.
  The facts in this case have not concerned the Government. Their cavalier attitude to the money that they said would be raised in this way are clear evidence of that. First, we were told that the measures would save £5 million. Then we were told that they would save £6 million, but we have not had evidence for those calculations.
  248
  The Secretary of State has never offered an estimate of the administrative costs of bringing in the scheme. He must know that if the detailed charging that is revealed in the schedules to the regulations is implemented the extra administration involved will be large, not only because of the exemptions that he has been forced to include—no matter what he says, many people will not be required to pay—but because of the complexity of the categories. It is comforting to know that patients will not be charged for their treatment if they present the hospital with plague.
  The creation of a large and detailed price structure is a costly hammer with which to crack a tiny nut, unless the real reason behind the whole elaborate charade is to dismantle the National Health Service as a free service and put in its place after the next general election a system that will force everyone to pay for some of the services that they receive under the National Health Service. If one looks at it in that light, one begins to understand that this statutory instrument is meant not just to damage the interests of students and overseas visitors but to deter those most in need.
  Let us consider overseas students. The Government have had to change the arrangements that they initially made. There is a long list of people who will manage to obtain exemptions from the overseas charges, but students who come from the poorest countries overseas will be most damaged by this imposition. The Government have never made it clear whether they intend to take out insurance for Third world students who otherwise would be deterred from coming here because they would not be able to afford the insurance cover so that they could follow their studies. If the Foreign Office and the British Council will have to undertake large payments for the students, is it not true that the savings about which we have been told are illusory?
  Is it not clear that this procedure will result in direct and open conflict in our hospitals? We are told that the admission staff will ask everyone the same straightforward set of questions. That will be so throughout the country, whether or not there are large numbers of visitors. Although there has been consultation about that aspect, it is obvious that the Government have no intention of consulting on the second stage of the questioning. It is that second stage that will be the most delicate, most important and most open to misinterpretation.
  The manual that should have been provided by the DHSS, which I am told is available, although I have not been able to get hold of it, lays down a number of suggestions on the way in which a patient should be handled. However, a great many questions remain unanswered. Will there be delays? There is a fairly calm assumption in the manual that if a patient presents himself in a hospital and cannot answer the first stage of questioning satisfactorily, unless there is clear evidence of urgency, he must wait for the second stage of questioning, if needs be after consultation with an authority that can establish the patient's right to treatment.
  Mr. Andrew F. Bennett: Does my hon. Friend accept that the manual is unsatisfactory because it shows the short procedure and the detailed procedure for those who do not escape on the first count, but it does not go into whether people can afford to pay for the treatment? The major problem is what happens when someone does not have the insurance to guarantee to the hospital that he has the money. The draft procedure does nothing about how the hospital ensures that people

  249
  have the money. In the evidence given to the Select Committee today there appeared the major problem of the hospitals giving treatment without being sure that they can get the money.
  Mrs. Dunwoody: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for making those points.
  Such complex charging machinery must be backed up by means of collecting debts. If one collects debts from people who are ill, and if one does it on the word of a questioning procedure that is extremely doubtful and will be easily misinterpreted, one will run into considerable difficulty. If we return to the days when people who were seriously ill were questioned in considerable detail before they could receive any assistance, that is a negation of any sort of civilised treatment. The Government should be ashamed of suggesting it.
  The regulations have public health implications for British citizens because it is not clear what the Government intend to do in the case of people with communicable diseases who entered the country within the 12-month period. Clearly such people will be likely not to tell the entire truth about their circumstances. At present, for example, people coming from Third world countries and presenting themselves at large hospitals are routinely screened for open tuberculosis because it is still a common disease in many such countries, although it has been largely eradicated from the British population.
  The Minister has a responsibility to make clear what he intends to do about this in future. If people coming into this country know that if they admit to being here for only a short time they will be charged for medical treatment inevitably they will either not present for screening and thus may be a public health danger or they will be encouraged to lie about the circumstances.
  The Minister for Health (Mr. Kenneth Clarke): The hon. Lady will see that tuberculosis is one of the communicable diseases exempt from charges under the regulations.
  Mrs. Dunwoody: My point is much simpler. For example, Asian mothers entering this country are already at much greater risk. There may also be a language barrier. They will not present themselves to the doctors if they think that there is any likelihood whatever of being committed to paying heavy charges, so they will not present themselves for screening.
  With regard to ante-natal care, too, it is almost inevitable that instead of coming early for assistance the mothers most at risk will present themselves only as emergencies, with consequent far higher risks to themselves and their babies. That will be the effect of these utterly deplorable regulations.
  The scheme is the result of a political decision. It will affect a large number of people in this country in many different ways. There is no clear statement as to how the Government intend to confirm the status of patients presenting themselves at hospitals. The immigrant community in this country may be forgiven for regarding this as yet another extension of internal immigration controls. It is not clear whether they will be asked to produce their passports. People born and brought up here will inevitably resent being closely questioned by hospital admissions staff. Moreover, if the answers given are
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  regarded as unsatisfactory, will the admissions staff be expected to check with the Home Office or some other Government Department to decide whether the patient has the right to be treated?
  I shall put some simple questions to the Minister. How will the status of patients be confirmed if they are suspected by hospital staff of being overseas visitors? Will they have an unnecessary wait for treatment? Presumably the estimate of the urgency of the case will be made by the admissions clerk or the senior officer who is called.
  What will happen in the case of overseas students? Who will provide insurance cover for them? What plans has the Minister to protect those coming from the poorest countries who will be most deterred by the burden of extra cost?
  Mrs. Jill Knight: I appreciate that the hon. Lady has been kind enough to give way on several occasions. I am following her argument carefully. I am sure that she is aware that a very large number of countries make charges for the medical care of those who visit them for long or short periods. If the other countries which make such charges are able to do it simply and as a matter of routine, why cannot we do so in the United Kingdom?
  Mrs. Dunwoody: The hon. Lady knows that when this matter was previously discussed there were only three major countries that could be demonstrated to be sending people here who had no cover or reciprocal agreement. I should have thought that behaving in a civilised manner because we have a National Health Service was a matter of pride, to be coveted, and copied elsewhere in the world.
  Mr. Douglas Hogg: Answer the question.
  Mrs. Dunwoody: Very well. I am proud of the education system in this country and I welcome those who come here to receive post-graduate training, further education, and take back to their countries a new form of education. If we do anything to deter them from doing that, we are behaving in the bigoted way that we now expect from a Conservative Government.
  Mr. Tom Benyon: Will the hon. Lady answer the question put by my hon. Friend? The hon. Lady has changed her story. She was referring earlier to those who damage the system the most and to damaging the service irrevocably. Now she says that she is proud of the fact that the service is free. Will the hon. Lady be kind enough to balance the argument?
  Mrs. Dunwoody: The hon. Gentleman should do me the courtesy of listening. I said that the education system in this country is good and that is why students from overseas, particularly from the Third world, want to come here. I also believe that if they come from poor countries they will be deterred by the enormous increase in fees imposed by the Government and by the heavy insurance they will have to carry to make sure that if they are ill they can receive treatment. If that is the hon. Gentleman's idea of civilised behaviour, I have news for him—it is not mine.
  I do not want to take up much time on the details of this scheme. Whatever organisation has been asked to comment on it, without exception the response has been one of appalled denial that such an idea should have been brought into operation. The World University Service said that it was very worried about the exemptions and that

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  individuals who come here as refugees, or to visit refugee relatives, from outside the European Community will not be covered. The Joint Council of the Welfare of Immigrants, the Commission for Racial Equality and students' organisations all regard the decision to charge overseas visitors as politically unacceptable, administratively unworkable and a clear sign that the Conservative Government are more concerned with their prejudices than with the administration of the National Health Service.
  We shall vote against this nasty little prayer tonight because it is a racist and divisive measure.
  Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Bernard Weatherill): Before I call the Minister, I remind the House that it will be necessary for me to put the motion to the House at 11.30 pm.
  10.54 pm
  The Minister for Health (Mr. Kenneth Clarke): The attack of the hon. Lady the Member for Crewe (Mrs. Dunwoody) on the regulations was so excited and yet so confused that she ended by inviting the House to vote against her own prayer. However, I got the gist of her argument. At times her general intention was to widen the debate into arguments about the validity of charges in the National Health Service generally. She said that the regulation was a threat to a free service and that it was racialist, and she made various other accusations. She was, however, shot out of the water by the question put to her by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Edgbaston (Mrs. Knight). My hon. Friend indicated that practically every other country charges overseas visitors, including British visitors, for health treatment. Most people will see ours as a fairly commonsense change to make more effective and fairer long-standing arrangements that are supposed to apply in this country. We are introducing a more effective arrangement to levy charges against short-term visitors to this country.
  The proposition defended by the Government is that short-term visitors should usually insure themselves against medical costs and pay for their medical treatment when they fall ill just as British subjects make similar arrangements when making visits abroad. We have made wide exemptions to ensure that this principle does not give rise to hardship. We exempt those who come here to work, who have been here for more than a year and who come from countries with which we have reciprocal agreements. We exempt accident and emergency treatment, and communicable diseases, including tuberculosis. We exempt refugees and the seriously mentally ill. To charge the ordinary short-term visitor, who is probably a tourist who will expect to insure himself before arriving, will raise a potential £6 million. This would benefit the National Health Service and the taxpayer.
  Mr. Douglas Hogg: Does my hon. and learned Friend agree that it is remarkable to hear the Labour Party denounce the regulations when one considers the 1949 and the 1977 statutes for which they were responsible? Both statutes empower the Minister to make precisely this kind of regulation.
  Mr. Clarke: We are using Labour powers to make the regulations. The trouble is that the regulations were never made. It is a system that the Opposition operated but about
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  which they did nothing while in power that turns out to be racially discriminatory, haphazard and ineffective in raising revenue for the Health Service.
  We shall raise £6 million in a fairer and better way. That amount cannot be waved aside given that the Government say that the benefit can be kept by the health authorities.
  Mrs. Dunwoody rose—
  Mr. Clarke: I shall give way when I have made this point.
  The estimate that we have made is comparatively modest. As the hon. Member for Crewe has pointed out, a small number of patients is potentially involved. If only 0·5 per cent. of the cost of all acute hospital treatment was raised by this measure, we would raise about £15 million. A figure of 0·25 per cent. of the total cost would raise £7·5 million. The sum of £6 million is therefore a modest estimate of the benefit that we expect.
  I underline how little we are changing the principles of the present position. Those hon. Members who have already spoken appear to imply that it has always been the case that everyone who happens to be in this country at any time is eligible for National Health Service treatment. That is not the case. The hon. Member for Crewe sounded dangerously near to saying that. The National Health Service is only available broadly to ordinary residents of the United Kingdom, people who have temporarily been abroad, people who are here to work and visitors staying for not less than a year. We also have reciprocal agreements with other countries. In theory, all others have not been eligible for treatment in this country. They should be treated as private patients. The only guidance ever issued on the subject in 1963 assumes that this will be the case.
  In fact, some are treated as private patients. Some are treated on the National Health Service. As my hon. Friend the Member for Grantham (Mr. Hogg) says, the Labour Government took powers in the 1949 Act to charge those who were not eligible, but no regulations were ever made under it. A number of visitors have been charged. As a matter of law, there was no means legally whereby charges could be recovered if patients failed to pay. That was the ramshackle system that we inherited. It gave rise to risk of abuse. It led us to examine the system and to decide how best to raise revenue that should be raised in a fair manner.
  Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: The Minister is a lawyer. He has referred to the legal position. Does he not agree with the minority report of the Select Committee that there has never been any legal right to charge anyone prior to the introduction of these regulations? The 1949 Act enabled powers to be taken to make regulations but they were never made. Any money deducted was therefore probably deducted illegally.
  Mr. Clarke: That is more or less what I have just said. The 1949 Act, which was introduced by a Labour Government, enabled regulations to be made, and charges to be levied. No regulations were subsequently made, and we are using those powers to make these regulations. Charges have sometimes been collected in a rather haphazard way. If the patient had refused to pay there was almost certainly no legal basis upon which the charges could have been recovered.
  That unsatisfactory position led us to look at the procedure and to contemplate a system of charges. We

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  found that the existing system was used in a way that gave rise to a serious risk of racial discrimination. The regulations and the draft manual of guidance are steps to eliminate the discrimination against ethnic minorities that the working party that we set up found existed. The working party included representatives of ethnic minorities and we were careful to ask the working party to look at that problem. Ministers asked that care should be taken to ensure that any procedures that were proposed were fair and acceptable to all patients and should not disadvantage ethnic minorities living here.
  When the working party looked at the present arrangements it found that the way charges are levied depends upon the intuition of the staff and the practice in individual hospitals. Its finding was:
  "The present arrangements pose a distinct risk of discrimination against members of ethnic minorities living here."
  We decided that that must be stopped. We have devised a procedure, about which we are consulting, in the manual of guidance that seeks to eliminate that risk. There must be a simple procedure so that the same questions are directed at all patients, and no longer must those with the wrong colour skin or funny foreign names be concentrated upon.
  Mr. David Ennals: Come on.
  Mr. Clarke: It is no good the right hon. Gentleman saying "Come on". He was obviously not aware while he was in office of the fact revealed by the working party that that is the present practice in some of our great hospitals. We shall now ask all patients the same simple questions aimed at establishing residence. When the hon. Member for Crewe studies the manual of guidance—anyone is entitled to do so, and we invite comments because we are consulting upon it—she will find that passports are dealt with quite explicitly. The assumption throughout the manual is that officials will ask only for passports for European Community countries and others with which we have reciprocal agreements because the passport is the quickest way to prove entitlement. There are strong warnings against using passports in other cases because of their sensitivity.
  The manual of guidance is aimed at eliminating racial discrimination. The campaigning has been pretty silly when it comes from Labour Members who claim that we are introducing a racialist measure when in fact we are correcting an abuse of which they were not aware all the time that they were in office.
  The hon. Member for Crewe argued about the cost of introducing the new arrangements. We were sensitive to that and the working party was asked to look at that aspect. The working party included administrators who would be mindful of any cost to the service. The request to the working party by Ministers was:
  "That the procedures should be as simple as possible and should not be unduly burdensome to the National Health Service or costly to operate."
  The working party found that the present arrangements were haphazard and, as I have said, relied on the intuition of staff, and that the staff complained about their lack of guidance. It found that the present administration needed improvement. I quote paragraph 7 of the working party's report:
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  "There is a need for clearer guidance irrespective of the Government's present proposals to introduce National Health Service charges."
  The working party held a trial of the system that we propose and found that it worked in a simple and effective way and that it could be implemented without additional staff being employed. It was found also that the staff reaction was generally favourable. My hon. Friend the Member for Grantham has said that over 80,000 patients took part in the trial and that only 12 of them, when asked specifically, said that they objected to being asked the questions. The working party's conclusion was that our proposals should be capable of being implemented by health authorities without any significant increase in administrative costs.
  I accept that the second stage will involve the recruitment of a few additional staff in some hospitals. The costs involved in a few hospitals taking on the odd additional administrative officer will be far outweighed by the financial benefits of finally getting round to levying properly the charges that should be paid by the short-term overseas visitor.
  Several Hon. Members rose—
  Mr. Clarke: I wish to refer to students without taking the entire debate. We have tried to accommodate students within our proposals because we do not wish to victimise students who are already here by imposing costs upon them. The arrangements that we have arrived at are substantial concessions for students and others. We have reduced the period of residence before exemption from charges from three years to one year. New students will not be exempt in the first year. However, we have announced transitional arrangements, which provide that students will be exempt if they have enrolled here and commenced their studies by 1 October 1982, which is the proposed commencement date for the entire arrangements.
  There are some who have argued about the commencement date of 1 October 1982. It is claimed that it is unfair to students who are not here and have not commenced their studies prior to 1 October. There are bound to be problems with any commencement date. We are making some special arrangements for students vis-a-vis other people, but in practically every category there will be some who come on 2 October who find that they are worse off than those who came here on 30 September.
  The idea was that students already here would be exempt in their first year, but we have gone beyond that and some students who arrive for the first time will be lucky. They will enrol and start their studies before 1 October and they will be exempt. The idea that some students will be lucky because of the transitional arrangements should not be extended to become argument for exempting all students enrolling this year for the first time, thereby giving them a complete year's exemption.
  There has been plenty of warning of the arrangements. The history of this issue goes back to March 1981, when we first began to moot a change in the arrangements. Draft regulations were issued, the working party was appointed and there have been consultations. On 22 February a statement was made to the House. We made it clear that we intended to bring the new arrangements into effect on 1 October. We made substantial concessions to students, but those who come after 1 October will have to insure like other people. There will be insurance costs, which will

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  probably amount to £100. That is not a large sum compared with the thousands of pounds that it costs to educate a student in Britain.
  There are arrangements for assisting students from poorer countries with their education in Britain, but that is a matter for my right hon. Friend the Minister for Overseas Development, and the Overseas Development Administration, who have the task of determining insurance cost arrangements for poorer students. Students from America, Canada, Australia and the Middle East—these are the students who come to Britain from more prosperous countries than the United Kingdom to further their education—cannot regard it as too onerous if, after the transitional arrangements are over, they have to pay a modest charge to receive treatment like other people. That is the basis upon which we move the regulations.
  I shall not deal in detail with the Joint Committee's proposals and the report that has been made available today. We have amended the regulations and before doing so we withdrew them. The prayer of the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne, East (Mr. Thomas) has been lost and the hon. Member for Crewe had the dubious privilege of moving the misconceived motion that is before us. We withdrew the original regulations and amended them in line with suggestions that came from the Joint Committee, whose chairman, the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne, East, has expressed such indignation that we are ignoring his suggestions. The Committee's report, which became available today, contains detailed drafting proposals to which I shall reply if I have the opportunity to do so. I probably will not, and in that event I shall take up the detailed proposals in correspondence. However, they are before the House and the details are available in the Vote Office. They are all capable of answer either in this debate or afterwards.
  The policy has been before us since March 1981. The Government have gone through the most laborious process of producing draft regulations, withdrawing them, and then amending them. There have been consultations and a working party with representatives of ethnic minorities and professional administrators. Concessions have been made to students. What we have now achieves the commonsense aim enunciated by my hon. Friend the Member for Edgbaston. To say that there is still room for abuse, hardship, racialism and all the other nonsense is fanciful nonsense, which neither the regulations nor the prayer will support.
  Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. I again remind the House that it will be necessary for me to put the Question to the House at 11.30. I therefore appeal for short speeches.
  11.11 pm
  Mr. Bob Cryer: I shall be as brief as I can. First, I wish to express the views of the all-party Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments, which was set up in 1979 to scrutinise instruments coming before the House. It is not good enough for the Minister to say that, when the first regulations were put before the Committee and we asked for a number of questions to be answered, they were all met, because that is not the case. We asked for a memorandum on the first regulation which we received virtually simultaneously with the second set of regulations, which were also defective. We considered those items and put a report in the Vote Office. I said, on a point of order, that the Government dictate the time of Parliament and not
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  the Opposition. The Opposition were right to seize the opportunity to debate the instrument because we feared—our fears were confirmed by the Minister's rapid progress through the various points—that if the time to debate the prayer was lost tonight it would not reappear. On the basis of parliamentary procedure, it would have been fairer and better had the Government said "We will not debate the regulations tonight. We will provide time, but only when the House has had time to read and understand the report and also when the Committee has had time to provide the evidence." That evidence was taken this afternoon. We spent about 35 minutes cross-examining representatives from the Department of Health and Social Security. That evidence contained some useful points that would benefit the House. Otherwise we would not have bothered to undertake the expense of printing it.
  The Committee felt that to debate the prayer would be to ride roughshod over the procedures of the House. I can well remember the present Lord Chancellor talking about an elective dictatorship when we had a Labour Government, but tonight we have had an example of an elective dictatorship riding roughshod over our procedures.
  Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: If my hon. Friend is feeling injured because of the neglect of the Select Committee report, he may notice that speeches were made from both Front Benches, neither of which referred to the Select Committee on Home Affairs, which considered this important issue. Its report was published only a few months ago.
  Mr. Cryer: I do not want to go into the relative merits of Select Committees, but the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments is designed to help the House over specific instruments. It considered this specific instrument this afternoon. It listed a number of ambiguities and reported the instrument to the House on the basis that it needed elucidation. As I said before, it is not true that all the various points were met. I do not propose to go into them, because they are in the report. The Minister will reply, but that is not the same as answering the points in a debate. If the report is tabled and the Minister has time to read it, those points can be made and put on the record.
  My second point is that the manual of guidance and explanation of application of the regulations is an integral part of the regulations. When people express fear and concern about the application of the regulations, if there is a manual of guidance that fear and apprehension will apply to it, too. The manual was not supplied by the Department of Health and Social Security to the Committee. We were told, on examination of the witnesses, that a copy had been placed in the Library. The Committee has expressed regret that copies of the manual of guidance were not placed in the Vote Office or the equivalent Office in the House of Lords. It is an affront to the legislative process to have a manual of guidance which is being circulated to regional and area health authorities and to the medical organisations but which is not provided for the very body that is scrutinising the legislation. Moreover, it has not been provided for the Committee that was set up to scrutinise the legislation.
  Mr. Kenneth Clarke: The manual of guidance has been in the Vote Office for a long time. It is attached as

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  an annex to the draft circular, which the hon. Gentleman, despite his careful scrutiny, has not had the time to read, beyond page 1.
  Mr. Cryer: I am told that it went into the Vote Office on Monday night. I am merely repeating what the witnesses told the Committee this afternoon. The Minister ought to ensure that his witnesses give more accurate information.
  Mr. Clarke: I am told that the witnesses said that the manual was in the Library. It is from that that on careful consideration the Committee has leapt to the conclusion that it was not in the Vote Office. Surely the Committee should have asked the witnesses or gone to the Vote Office to find out.
  Mr. Cryer: The Minister is on thin ground if he attempts to argue that point. If he were really concerned about the Committee, he ought to have ensured that copies of the manual reached it in time for consideration of the instrument this afternoon. Moreover, the hon. and learned Gentleman ought to have ensured that the explanatory note to the instrument referred to the manual of guidance so that people were not unaware of the fact that other official documents were in circulation.
  Paragraph 3 of the manual of guidance states:
  "Hospitals should use the 'Liability to Charges' Form … or may adapt their patient registration form to include its contents. It is important that the wording of the questions should be preserved".
  A form is included in the manual. Why not make it a prescribed form? If it is so important to preserve the wording, make it a statutory requirement. The Committee would like an answer on that point.
  The hospital authorities will be judge and jury in disputes regarding charges. They will decide whether a charge will be applied. They will also decide whether a refund should be made and what evidence is required to prove that a refund is necessary. That cannot be right, particularly when, as I understand it, the Minister has powers to establish the well-known tribunal system to administer this sort of thing.
  The Minister's representatives told the Committee that there would be reference to the courts. I cannot imagine a more difficult process than arguing a dispute over charges through the courts.
  The Committee came to the conclusion that:
  "More generally, the Committee are concerned about the practical problems posed by a patient who may in fact fall within one of the categories of visitor exempt for charges under Regulation 4, but who because of his illness is unable to supply the information necessary to establish his exempt status. The witnesses agreed that the burden of proof would be placed on the person claiming exemption".
  That places a difficult burden on that person and diminishes the rights of citizens. That is the limit of the Committee's views, because it does not examine the merits of the instrument, only the powers exercised by the Minister within the framework of the primary legislation and the application of the statutory instrument.
  That conclusion of the Committee indicates that there are real reservations about the merits of this instrument. It will place citizens at considerable disadvantage. That does not strike at the Committee's report but at the merits of the instrument, which in its application to the procedures of the House as well as its merits, is defective.
  11.18 pm
  Mr. Teddy Taylor: I am in favour of the principle of these regulations which the Minister has argued so ably.
  I wish to put three brief questions which I hope my hon. and learned Friend will think about. First, is it sensible and wise again to pass regulations that so clearly discriminate against the Commonwealth, particularly after the events in the Falklands when the Commonwealth made its views so clear? Is it right and sensible that when someone presents himself to a hospital as a short-term visitor, if he is Australian he will be liable to be charged whereas if he is Irish he will be automatically exempt?
  Secondly, if someone requiring health care comes from Guyana, is it the case that if they come from British Guyana they will have to pay, but, if they come from French Guyana, they will not have to pay because they are exempt?
  Mr. Kenneth Clarke: There is a simple answer to all these questions—it all depends on what treatment the countries extend to British visitors. If there are reciprocal agreements, we treat visitors from those countries on the same basis as we treat our residents. That means that the country in question has agreed to do the same with our visitors. In the case of Australia and British Guyana, they would charge a British visitor having health treatment in their country.
  Mr. Taylor: The case is not as simple as that. If the Minister will read his Secretary of State's evidence on page 28, paragraph 146 of the report of the Select Committee on Home Affairs, he will see that it says that the procedure in the Common Market is different from that of our country, and accepted to be so by the Government.
  Mr. Clarke: That is not what I said. The principle is that where there is a reciprocal agreement, the country concerned treats visitors to that country on the same basis that it treats its residents. We therefore treat German visitors here on the same basis as British residents and the Germans treat British residents in the same way as they treat German residents. That is broadly the principle that is applied.
  Mr. Taylor: I am aware of the position that the Minister has explained and has mentioned time and again in the annexes. However, does he not think that this is unfortunate and regrettable? This is particularly so in view of the fact that we have just considered another set of regulations that would mean, for example as it affects students, that a medical student from Australia who wishes to study to become a doctor at a British university will now pay £6,000 a year, while a student from any EEC country will have to pay £500 and will have an automatic grant of £5,100 a year from the British taxpayer.
  If we accept that the basis is so-called reciprocity, although the Secretary of State said in his evidence that the procedures were different in Britain and the EEC, will the Minister give us an assurance that any Commonwealth country seeking reciprocal agreement with the United Kingdom will be granted this provision? For example, if Australia or Canada, or other Commonwealth countries, say that they would like the same reciprocal agreement, will the answer be "Yes"? It is important that if we are preserving the alleged principle of reciprocity, it should be available, particularly, to Commonwealth countries.

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  Thirdly, will the Minister explain the meaning of the second part of paragraph 4 of annex A? It refers to EEC nationals who expressly seek treatment. They are not casual visitors or holidaymakers but people who want to come to the country for medical treatment. If the person is Australian or American, he pays, but an EEC national does not pay and all that is needed is a certificate from the local social security institution saying that that treatment is not readily available in the country.
  There then follows this statement:
  "Such patients … must be given the same priority as patients living in the UK."
  This is a facility available only to those who are in the EEC. They will get free treatment for advanced arranged treatment not available in their country. For example, it is not possible to have a heart transplant in Italy. An application can be made to a British hospital and the person concerned must be given the same priority as a patient in the United Kingdom.
  What does that mean when our hospitals have extensive waiting lists, particularly for the costly and difficult treatment? Does it make sense when many of our people and taxpayers are waiting, often in pain and great difficulty, for such treatment, that we should insist that the same priority must be given to any EEC national who comes for the same treatment in this country? Is this correct, do the Government mean it and do they intend to implement it?
  While I am in favour of the principle, I hope that the Minister will give two assurances—that a Commonwealth country seeking reciprocity will achieve it, and that he does not mean the second to last sentence in paragraph 4 of annex A.
  11.25 pm
  Mr. A. J. Beith: It is deplorable that the House should have so little time to comment on such an important matter, and that it should do so in the absence of the report from the Joint Committee. I shall say a few brief words to explain why I hope that my hon. Friends will vote against the regulations.
  I want to stamp out abuses—as, I assume, do the Government—in the use of the Health Service by overseas visitors who come here, for example, for the purpose of obtaining treatment. However, the existing system provides for that, and its defects could have been dealt with without resorting to these procedures.
  First, it is obvious that ethnic minorities will inevitably find themselves the subject of greater scrutiny than other groups, especially as they will be brought into the second stage of the procedure. Secondly, it is quite wrong that anomalies should be built into the system such as that mentioned by the hon. Member for Southend, East (Mr. Taylor), in that citizens from French overseas territories, for example, will be treated more favourably than citizens of some of our own dependencies and Commonwealth countries. The effect on students from poor countries is particuarly regrettable at a time when they face many other burdens.
  Moreover, it is stupid of the Government to have chosen 1 October as the starting date. That adds to the administrative complications and divides the intake of students between those who will be affected and those who
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  will not. The Government could quite easily have chosen the end of December, when the number of students and tourists coming in is much smaller than at other times.
  The Government have failed to cost the scheme and have failed to explain what the real savings will be. That is a grave deficiency.
  Lastly, the Government have confused everyone by introducing two sets of regulations. The differences between the two are very slight. One of them is quite extraordinary. The new instrument makes it dearer to stay in a dormitory in a mental hospital than to stay in a single room, whereas the original instrument, quite properly, made it cheaper to stay in a dormitory than in a single room. In my opinion, the second was a device to enable the Labour Party to be the party which prayed against it. That is a device that is unworthy of the Government on a matter of this importance.
  11.26 pm
  Mr. Douglas Hogg: First, I support one of the criticisms made by the hon. Member for Keighley (Mr. Cryer) about regulation 8. He is right when he says that it is unsatisfactory that the authority should be a final judge on refunds when the charges have already been paid. The authority is, of course, the beneficiary, and it is undesirable that it should have the final say in the matter. I should like a system of appeal to the existing courts
  Moreover, the point is compounded when I reflect that if someone declines to pay, the only way to enforce payment is to sue that person in the courts, and that person then has recourse to the courts. I hope that the Minister will look at that anomaly.
  The hon. Member for Crewe (Mrs. Dunwoody) was entirely wrong to denounce the regulations as racist. I do not agree. The criteria are quite clear. They depend on 12 months' residence or occupation, or an intention to settle here permanently. There are, of course, some minor exemptions, they are dealt with clearly in form L, which contains three specific questions. Those questions are wholly free of racial overtones. They can be answered very simply. The cry that this is a racist measure is wholly unsubstantiated, alarmist and, if I may say so, disgraceful.
  Lastly, I am satisfied that this system is entirely cost-effective. The working party looked at it carefully. It was tested in, I think, 10 hospitals. The hospital authorities approved it. It was found that stage 1 could be performed without taking on any additional staff, and stage 2 will require few additional staff, if any.
  These regulations are worthy of the House's support, and I hope that they receive it.
  11.28 pm
  Mr. David Ennals: These regulations are absolutely unnecessary. There is no proof whatever, and the Minister did not attempt to give any, that there has been any significant abuse of the present system. He says that he will save £6 million. He has given no costing whatever. He said absolutely nothing about what will be spent on staff training, administrative and clerical staff, the cost of drawing up bills, the legal costs of going to court for those who do not pay, and so on.
  The Minister says that the regulations are not racist, but he knows perfectly well that the people who will be most affected, the people who will be asked to complete the forms—particularly section 2—will be ethnic minorities, people whose faces are black. He knows, although he

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  denies it, that the present system has never led to racial discrimination in the Health Service. That is what the Minister is doing. He has not given the House a reason. The cost of administration will be as high as the value of the money that he will bring in. The order is a load of bureaucratic nonsense to satisfy the ignorance and prejudice of many Government Back Benchers.
  11.29 pm
  Mr. Mike Thomas: The World University Service represents a group of 100 to 150 student refugees who have been given refuge by—
  It being half-past Eleven o'clock, MR. DEPUTY SPEAKER put the Question pursuant to Standing Order No. 4 (Prayers against statutory instruments, &c. (negative procedure)):—
  The House divided: Ayes 220, Noes 276.

  Division No. 259]

  [11.30 pm

  AYES

  Abse, Leo

  Douglas, Dick

  Adams, Allen

  Dubs, Alfred

  Allaun, Frank

  Duffy, A. E. P.

  Alton, David

  Dunwoody, Hon Mrs G.

  Anderson, Donald

  Eastham, Ken

  Archer, Rt Hon Peter

  Edwards, R. (W'hampt'n S E)

  Ashley, Rt Hon Jack

  Ellis, R. (NE D'bysh're)

  Ashton, Joe

  Ellis, Tom (Wrexham)

  Atkinson, N.(H'gey,)

  English, Michael

  Bagier, Gordon A.T.

  Evans, Ioan (Aberdare)

  Barnett, Guy (Greenwich)

  Evans, John (Newton)

  Barnett, Rt Hon Joel (H'wd)

  Ewing, Harry

  Beith, A. J.

  Faulds, Andrew

  Benn, Rt Hon Tony

  Flannery, Martin

  Bennett, Andrew(St'kp't N)

  Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)

  Bidwell, Sydney

  Foot, Rt Hon Michael

  Booth, Rt Hon Albert

  Ford, Ben

  Boothroyd, Miss Betty

  Forrester, John

  Bradley, Tom

  Foster, Derek

  Bray, Dr Jeremy

  Foulkes, George

  Brocklebank-Fowler, C.

  Fraser, J. (Lamb'th, N'w'd)

  Brown, Ronald W. (H'ckn'y S)

  Freeson, Rt Hon Reginald

  Buchan, Norman

  Garrett, John (Norwich S)

  Callaghan, Rt Hon J.

  Garrett, W. E. (Wallsend)

  Callaghan, Jim (Midd'tn & P)

  Ginsburg, David

  Campbell, Ian

  Golding, John

  Campbell-Savours, Dale

  Graham, Ted

  Canavan, Dennis

  Grant, John (Islington C)

  Cant, R. B.

  Hamilton, James (Bothwell)

  Carmichael, Neil

  Hamilton, W. W. (C'tral Fife)

  Carter-Jones, Lewis

  Hardy, Peter

  Clarke, Kenneth (Rushcliffe)

  Harrison, Rt Hon Walter

  Clarke,Thomas C'b'dge, A'drie

  Hart, Rt Hon Dame Judith

  Cocks, Rt Hon M. (B'stol S)

  Hattersley, Rt Hon Roy

  Coleman, Donald

  Haynes, Frank

  Cook, Robin F.

  Healey, Rt Hon Denis

  Cowans, Harry

  Heffer, Eric S.

  Cox, T. (W'dsw'th, Toot'g)

  Hogg, N. (E Dunb't'nshire)

  Craigen, J. M. (G'gow, M'hill)

  Holland, S. (L'b'th, Vauxh'll)

  Crowther, Stan

  Homewood, William

  Cryer, Bob

  Hooley, Frank

  Cunliffe, Lawrence

  Howell, Rt Hon D.

  Cunningham, Dr J. (W'h'n)

  Howells, Geraint

  Dalyell, Tam

  Hoyle, Douglas

  Davidson, Arthur

  Huckfield, Les

  Davies, Rt Hon Denzil (L'lli)

  Hughes, Mark (Durham)

  Davis, Clinton (Hackney C)

  Hughes, Robert (Aberdeen N)

  Davis, Terry (B'ham, Stechf'd)

  Hughes, Roy (Newport)

  Deakins, Eric

  Janner, Hon Greville

  Dean, Joseph (Leeds West)

  Jay, Rt Hon Douglas

  Dewar, Donald

  John, Brynmor

  Dixon, Donald

  Johnson, James (Hull West)

  Dobson, Frank

  Johnson, Walter (Derby S)

  Dormand, Jack

  Jones, Rt Hon Alec (Rh'dda)

  262

  Jones, Barry (East Flint)

  Roberts, Allan (Bootle)

  Kaufman, Rt Hon Gerald

  Roberts, Ernest (Hackney N)

  Kerr, Russell

  Roberts, Gwilym (Cannock)

  Kilroy-Silk, Robert

  Robertson, George

  Kinnock, Neil

  Robinson, G. (Coventry NW)

  Lambie, David

  Rooker, J. W.

  Lamond, James

  Roper, John

  Leadbitter, Ted

  Ross, Ernest (Dundee West)

  Leighton, Ronald

  Ross, Stephen (Isle of Wight)

  Lestor, Miss Joan

  Rowlands, Ted

  Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)

  Sandelson, Neville

  Litherland, Robert

  Sever, John

  Lofthouse, Geoffrey

  Sheldon, Rt Hon R.

  Lyon, Alexander (York)

  Shore, Rt Hon Peter

  Mabon, Rt Hon Dr J. Dickson

  Short, Mrs Renée

  McDonald, Dr Oonagh

  Silkin, Rt Hon J. (Deptford)

  McElhone, Frank

  Silkin, Rt Hon S. C. (Dulwich)

  McGuire, Michael (Ince)

  Silverman, Julius

  McKay, Allen (Penistone)

  Skinner, Dennis

  McKelvey, William

  Smith, Rt Hon J. (N Lanark)

  MacKenzie, Rt Hon Gregor

  Snape, Peter

  Maclennan, Robert

  Spearing, Nigel

  McMahon, Andrew

  Spriggs, Leslie

  McNamara, Kevin

  Stallard, A. W.

  McTaggart, Robert

  Steel, Rt Hon David

  McWilliam, John

  Stoddart, David

  Magee, Bryan

  Stott, Roger

  Marks, Kenneth

  Strang, Gavin

  Marshall, D(G'gow S'ton)

  Straw, Jack

  Marshall, Dr Edmund (Goole)

  Summerskill, Hon Dr Shirley

  Marshall, Jim (Leicester S)

  Thomas, Mike (Newcastle E)

  Maxton, John

  Thomas, Dr R. (Carmarthen)

  Maynard, Miss Joan

  Thorne, Stan (Preston South)

  Meacher, Michael

  Tilley, John

  Millan, Rt Hon Bruce

  Tinn, James

  Miller, Dr M. S. (E Kilbride)

  Torney, Tom

  Mitchell, Austin (Grimsby)

  Wainwright, E.(Dearne V)

  Mitchell, R. C. (Soton Itchen)

  Watkins, David

  Morris, Rt Hon A. (W'shawe)

  Welsh, Michael

  Morris, Rt Hon C. (O'shaw)

  White, Frank R.

  Morris, Rt Hon J. (Aberavon)

  White, J. (G'gow Pollok)

  Moyle, Rt Hon Roland

  Whitehead, Phillip

  Mulley, Rt Hon Frederick

  Whitlock, William

  Newens, Stanley

  Wigley, Dafydd

  Oakes, Rt Hon Gordon

  Willey, Rt Hon Frederick

  O'Neill, Martin

  Williams, Rt Hon A.(S'sea W)

  Orme, Rt Hon Stanley

  Williams, Rt Hon Mrs (Crosby)

  Palmer, Arthur

  Wilson, Gordon (Dundee E)

  Park, George

  Wilson, William (C'try SE)

  Parker, John

  Winnick, David

  Parry, Robert

  Woodall, Alec

  Pavitt, Laurie

  Woolmer, Kenneth

  Pendry, Tom

  Wright, Sheila

  Powell, Raymond (Ogmore)

  Young, David (Bolton E)

  Prescott, John

  Price, C. (Lewisham W)

  Tellers for the Ayes:

  Race, Reg

  Mr. George Morton and

  Richardson, Jo

  Mr. Hugh McCartney.

  NOES

  Aitken, Jonathan

  Blaker, Peter

  Alexander, Richard

  Body, Richard

  Alison, Rt Hon Michael

  Bonsor, Sir Nicholas

  Ancram, Michael

  Boscawen, Hon Robert

  Arnold, Tom

  Bottomley, Peter (W'wich W)

  Aspinwall, Jack

  Bowden, Andrew

  Atkins, Rt Hon H.(S'thorne)

  Boyson, Dr Rhodes

  Atkins, Robert(Preston N)

  Braine, Sir Bernard

  Atkinson, David (B'm'th,E)

  Bright, Graham

  Baker, Kenneth (St.M'bone)

  Brinton, Tim

  Baker, Nicholas (N Dorset)

  Brittan, Rt. Hon. Leon

  Banks, Robert

  Brooke, Hon Peter

  Beaumont-Dark, Anthony

  Brotherton, Michael

  Bendall, Vivian

  Brown, Michael (Brigg & Sc'n)

  Benyon, Thomas (A'don)

  Browne, John (Winchester)

  Best, Keith

  Bruce-Gardyne, John

  Bevan, David Gilroy

  Bryan, Sir Paul

  Biffen, Rt Hon John

  Buchanan-Smith, Rt. Hon. A.

  Biggs-Davison, Sir John

  Buck, Antony

  Blackburn, John

  Budgen, Nick

  263

  Bulmer, Esmond

  Haselhurst, Alan

  Butcher, John

  Hastings, Stephen

  Cadbury, Jocelyn

  Havers, Rt Hon Sir Michael

  Carlisle, John (Luton West)

  Hawkins, Sir Paul

  Carlisle, Kenneth (Lincoln)

  Hawksley, Warren

  Carlisle, Rt Hon M. (R'c'n)

  Hayhoe, Barney

  Channon, Rt. Hon. Paul

  Heddle, John

  Chapman, Sydney

  Henderson, Barry

  Churchill, W. S.

  Heseltine, Rt Hon Michael

  Clark, Hon A. (Plym'th, S'n)

  Hicks, Robert

  Clark, Sir W. (Croydon S)

  Higgins, Rt Hon Terence L.

  Clarke, Kenneth (Rushcliffe)

  Hill, James

  Cockeram, Eric

  Hogg, Hon Douglas (Gr'th'm)

  Cope, John

  Holland, Philip (Carlton)

  Corrie, John

  Hooson, Tom

  Costain, Sir Albert

  Howe, Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey

  Cranborne, Viscount

  Hunt, David (Wirral)

  Critchley, Julian

  Hunt, John (Ravensbourne)

  Crouch, David

  Irvine, Bryant Godman

  Dickens, Geoffrey

  Irving, Charles (Cheltenham)

  Dorrell, Stephen

  Jenkin, Rt Hon Patrick

  Douglas-Hamilton, Lord J.

  Jessel, Toby

  Dover, Denshore

  Johnson Smith, Sir Geoffrey

  Dunn, Robert (Dartford)

  Jopling, Rt Hon Michael

  Dykes, Hugh

  Joseph, Rt Hon Sir Keith

  Eden, Rt Hon Sir John

  Kaberry, Sir Donald

  Edwards, Rt Hon N. (P'broke)

  Kershaw, Sir Anthony

  Eggar, Tim

  Kimball, Sir Marcus

  Elliott, Sir William

  King, Rt Hon Tom

  Eyre, Reginald

  Knight, Mrs Jill

  Fairgrieve, Sir Russell

  Knox, David

  Faith, Mrs Sheila

  Lamont, Norman

  Farr, John

  Lang, Ian

  Fell, Sir Anthony

  Latham, Michael

  Finsberg, Geoffrey

  Lawrence, Ivan

  Fisher, Sir Nigel

  Lawson, Rt Hon Nigel

  Fletcher, A. (Ed'nb'gh N)

  Lee, John

  Fletcher-Cooke, Sir Charles

  Lennox-Boyd, Hon Mark

  Fookes, Miss Janet

  Lester, Jim (Beeston)

  Forman, Nigel

  Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)

  Fowler, Rt Hon Norman

  Lloyd, Peter (Fareham)

  Fraser, Peter (South Angus)

  Loveridge, John

  Fry, Peter

  Luce, Richard

  Gardiner, George (Reigate)

  Lyell, Nicholas

  Gardner, Edward (S Fylde)

  McCrindle, Robert

  Garel-Jones, Tristan

  Macfarlane, Neil

  Glyn, Dr Alan

  MacGregor, John

  Goodhart, Sir Philip

  MacKay, John (Argyll)

  Goodhew, Sir Victor

  Macmillan, Rt Hon M.

  Goodlad, Alastair

  McNair-Wilson, M. (N'bury)

  Gorst, John

  McNair-Wilson, P. (New F'st)

  Grant, Anthony (Harrow C)

  Madel, David

  Gray, Hamish

  Major, John

  Greenway, Harry

  Marland, Paul

  Griffiths, Peter Portsm'th N)

  Marlow, Antony

  Grist, Ian

  Marten, Rt Hon Neil

  Gummer, John Selwyn

  Maude, Rt Hon Sir Angus

  Hamilton, Hon A.

  Mawby, Ray

  Hamilton, Michael (Salisbury)

  Mawhinney, Dr Brian

  Hampson, Dr Keith

  Maxwell-Hyslop, Robin

  Hannam, John

  Mayhew, Patrick

  Meyer, Sir Anthony

  Shersby, Michael

  Miller, Hal (B'grove)

  Silvester, Fred

  Mills, Iain (Meriden)

  Sims, Roger

  Mills, Sir Peter (West Devon)

  Smith, Dudley

  Mitchell, David (Besingstoke)

  Smith, Tim (Beaconsfield)

  Moate, Roger

  Speller, Tony

  Monro, Sir Hector

  Spence, John

  Montgomery, Fergus

  Spicer, Michael (S Worcs)

  Moore, John

  Sproat, Iain

  Morgan, Geraint

  Squire, Robin

  Morris, M. (N'hampton S)

  Stainton, Keith

  Morrison, Hon C. (Devizes)

  Stanbrook, Ivor

  Morrison, Hon P. (Chester)

  Stanley, John

  Mudd, David

  Steen, Anthony

  Murphy, Christopher

  Stevens, Martin

  Myles, David

  Stewart, A. (E Renfrewshire)

  Neale, Gerrard

  Stewart, Ian (Hitchin)

  Needham, Richard

  Stokes, John

  Nelson, Anthony

  Stradling Thomas, J.

  Neubert, Michael

  Tapsell, Peter

  Newton, Tony

  Taylor, Teddy (S'end E)

  Onslow, Cranley

  Tebbit, Rt Hon Norman

  Oppenheim, Rt Hon Mrs S.

  Temple-Morris, Peter

  Page, John (Harrow, West)

  Thomas, Rt Hon Peter

  Page, Richard (SW Herts)

  Thompson, Donald

  Parkinson, Rt Hon Cecil

  Thorne, Neil (Ilford South)

  Parris, Matthew

  Thornton, Malcolm

  Patten, John (Oxford)

  Townend, John (Bridlington)

  Pattie, Geoffrey

  Trippier, David

  Pawsey, James

  Trotter, Neville

  Percival, Sir Ian

  van Straubenzee, Sir W.

  Peyton, Rt Hon John

  Vaughan, Dr Gerard

  Pollock, Alexander

  Viggers, Peter

  Porter, Barry

  Waddington, David

  Prentice, Rt Hon Rug

  Wakeham, John

  Price, Sir David (Eastleigh)

  Waldegrave, Hon William

  Proctor, K. Harvey

  Walker, B. (Perth)

  Raison, Rt Hon Timothy

  Waller, Gary

  Rathbone, Tim

  Walters, Dennis

  Rees, Peter (Dover and Deal)

  Ward, John

  Rees-Davies, W. R.

  Warren, Kenneth

  Renton, Tim

  Watson, John

  Rhodes James, Robert

  Wells, Bowen

  Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon

  Wells, John (Maidstone)

  Ridley, Hon Nicholas

  Wheeler, John

  Ridsdale, Sir Julian

  Whitelaw, Rt Hon William

  Rifkind, Malcolm

  Whitney, Raymond

  Rippon, Rt Hon Geoffrey

  Wickenden, Keith

  Roberts, M. (Cardiff NW)

  Wiggin, Jerry

  Roberts, Wyn (Conway)

  Wilkinson, John

  Rossi, Hugh

  Williams, D.(Montgomery)

  Royle, Sir Anthony

  Winterton, Nicholas

  Rumbold, Mrs A. C. R.

  Wolfson, Mark

  Sainsbury, Hon Timothy

  Young, Sir George (Acton)

  St. John-Stevas, Rt Hon N.

  Younger, Rt Hon George

  Scott, Nicholas

  Shaw, Giles (Pudsey)

  Tellers for the Noes:

  Shepherd, Colin (Hereford)

  Mr. Anthony Berry and

  Shepherd, Richard

  Mr. Carol Mather.

  Question accordingly negatived.

  Trident Development (Clyde)
  Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Goodlad.]
  11.42 pm
  Mr. Gavin Strang: I am glad to have the opportunity to raise the important question of some of the planning issues associated with the Government's decision to buy the Trident II weapons system from the United States and to install it on the Clyde.
  My hon. Friend the Member for Dunbartonshire, West (Mr. Campbell), who represents Coulport, where the development is to take place, intends to raise some of the local issues of particular concern to his constituents. It is almost two years since the former Secretary of State for Defence announced the Government's decision to acquire the Trident I C4 weapons system from the United States as the replacement for Polaris. As the House knows, earlier this year the present Secretary of State for Defence announced that the Government had decided to acquire the Trident II D5 weapons system instead from the United States.
  At the outset it must be recognised that the D5 is a very different weapons system from the C4. I was in the House when the Secretary of State made the announcement and the decision is probably the most important to be taken by any Cabinet. It certainly amounts to a most massive and irresponsible escalation of the international nuclear arms race.
  It is fitting that the debate should take place just after the debate on the Government's White Paper on defence. Trident, of course, is a very important element in the Government's defence strategy. Many hon. Members took the opportunity provided by the debate to complain about the enormous cost of Trident II and the resources that the decision will involve. Indeed, most people agree that Trident will cost about £10 billion at current prices. However, the most important factor is Trident's enormous power to destroy a large proportion of the human race. If we remember that one Polaris submarine can destroy about 15 million Russians in the main Soviet cities, and understand that the Trident weapon system is many times more powerful, we get some idea of the enormity of the decision.
  It must be understood that Trident II has not only a much greater range than Trident I but an enormously enhanced accuracy that is designed to enable the weapon to destroy the inter-continental ballistic missiles in their silos. It is its accuracy that makes Trident a counter-force weapon—a first-strike weapon—that undermines the basis of the policy of deterrence and creates the philosophy of mutually assured destruction.
  Mr. Bill Walker: Is the hon. Gentleman now saying, contrary to what he said in the defence debate, that Trident cannot knock out the SS20s, which are mobile and which will be our principal problem in the future?
  Mr. Strang: The hon. Gentleman will agree that if we know where the SS20 is, Trident II can take it out. But the basis of the SS20s and cruise missiles is that they are
  266
  mobile, so it is not accurate to say that Trident is designed to take out SS20s. However, it is designed to take out the massive intercontinental ballistic missiles.
  The development has provoked massive opposition in Scotland. The Minister will be aware of the thousands of people who marched through Glasgow only a few months ago in opposition to the development. The demonstration was important, not just because of its size but because it brought together people with differing political views and from all walks of life throughout Scotland. Many important questions must be answered about the development, which amounts to the compulsory conscription of the people of West Central Scotland into the front line of any nuclear exchange between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
  The central purpose of this debate is to urge upon the Government the case for referring the Trident development proposals to a planning inquiry commission set up under section 44 of the Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1972. The major authority on planning law in Scotland is Eric Young's "The Law of Planning in Scotland" published in 1978. He states, in relation to such developments, that two main reasons for referring the planning proposal to a planning inquiry commission are
  "(a) that there are considerations of national and regional importance of which a proper evaluation cannot be made without a special inquiry; (b) that there are unfamiliar technical or scientific aspects of the proposed development."
  Either of those considerations would justify referring the proposed development to a planning inquiry commission, but the House will agree that the Trident base qualifies on both grounds.
  A local planning inquiry, such as that held into the plan to extend the NATO air base at Stornoway, would not be adequate. We understand that a Government Department—and this includes the Ministry of Defence—does not require planning permission for such a development, but it is right that the issues should be brought out at a public inquiry. The enormity of the local issues is such that only a planning inquiry commission could provide the proper framework within which those points could be made.
  While it is true that the report did not affect the Secretary of State's decision to agree to the extension of the Stornoway airport base, in the light of that inquiry the Secretary of State in his statement in December last year announced that some modifications would be made to that proposal. Although the inquiry at Stornoway was non-statutory, it enabled some important points to be brought out and some adjustments to be made in the plan as a result.
  It would be scandalous if, despite the massive opposition to the project in Scotland, the Government were to press ahead without a proper inquiry, enabling the people of Scotland to express their views and raise the many important objections and issues that relate to the proposed development.
  The Dunbartonshire district council has unanimously voted in favour of a planning inquiry commission. I received an answer from the Under-Secretary of State for the Armed Forces on that issue on 23 June this year, which stated:
  "The Ministry of Defence wrote to Dunbarton district council on 21 May about the planning aspects of the development. No reply has yet been received, but my hope would be that the

  267
  council would soon agree to resume planning consultations. The matter therefore has not yet been referred to the Secretary of State for Scotland."—[Official Report, 23 June 1982; Vol. 26, c. 129.]
  If the matter is referred to the Secretary of State for Scotland, he will have to decide the issue. There should be a proper planning inquiry commission.
  That reply conceals the great concern in the Dunbartonshire district council about the development. As the Minister knows, it has unanimously voted to ask the Ministry of Defence to bring forward a new notice of proposed development. The original notice of proposed development predates the D5 decision. It is hard to believe that the major difference between the D5 and the C4, not to mention many other developments since then, is not a sufficient justification for a new notice of proposed development.
  My hon. Friend the Member for Dunbartonshire, West may want to raise some of the unanswered questions that arose out of a meeting that he, Councillor Leitch and others attended with Viscount Trenchard. He will want to raise some important local points.
  If the Minister tells us about the benefits that will derive from this project in the form of jobs, I hope that he will understand that that is a policy of despair. It is a sad day when people, in order to find work, must work on projects of mass destruction. Those people will take those jobs if they are available, but they would prefer to carry out useful work, for example in the National Health Service and the education system, which have been attacked by the Government, and in the factories where they could produce useful goods rather than take part in a development that is designed for mass destruction and in a nuclear arms race that can have only one end—the elimination of human civilisation.
  I emphasise that I hope that the Government will take heed of the views of Dumbarton district council. I hope that the Ministry of Defence will submit a new notice of proposed development so that proper negotiations can take place with the local authority. Above all, I hope that the Government will accede to the demands that are now being made from many quarters, including the local planning authority, that there should be a proper planning inquiry commission into the development. Anything less would be a denial of the basic rights of the many people in Scotland who are rightly concerned about the development.
  11.54 pm
  Mr. Ian Campbell: As in a good Scots sermon, I should like to make three points. Unlike a minister at the pulpit, however, I do not have 15 minutes or more to develop my theme. I wish to re-emphasise the matters raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh, East (Mr. Strang).
  I put down a question for Scottish Question Time last week, but unfortunately it was not reached. I asked:
  "if there has been any advance in the planning negotiations for the Trident site at the Clyde submarine base."—[Official Report, 30 June 1982; Vol. 26, c. 350.]
  The Minister has told me, however, that Dumbarton district council has already submitted a request for a revised notice of proposed development.
  From my knowledge of talks and discussions with the district council, I believe that both sides must start from the beginning again on a solid base. As my hon. Friend has said, the planning application may have altered substantially as a result of the change from Trident I to
  268
  Trident II and I believe that the district council is now ready to consider the matter again. I know that in the past there was some blockage of the proposals by the council, but I think that that attitude is changing. I hope that the Minister will put it to the Ministry of Defence that the matter should be started again from scratch. This would mean, of course, the readvertisement of the various proposals according to the normal procedure for planning applications.
  Another point that is disturbing many people in the district, particularly the convenor of the Dumbarton district council planning committee, relates to the public meeting at Helensburgh, at which the matter was raised in the first instance by Lord Trenchard on behalf of the Government. Cognisance was taken of plans submitted to the audience about the safety limit shown on the map of the Rosneath peninsula. The line was drawn just beyond existing housing and other buildings. In answer to a question at the meeting, it was stated that the line had been drawn in that way to show the safety zone and that various buildings in the planning application had to be sited without the explosion zone. It was agreed by the Minister and by civil servants who were there at the time that the formula used to decide the zone would be submitted to the planning officer so that he could check the measurements taken, which would be a valuable assistance to councillors and others in making up their minds about the planning application. Again, in Dumbarton district council and elsewhere, there is a feeling of having been let down as the agreement seems to have been withdrawn on a unilateral basis—the word "unilateral" has appropriate connotations in this context—by the Ministry of Defence.
  Finally, in relation to the planning inquiry and planning permission, a document entitled "Faslane-Facts and Feelings" has been written by Iain 0. Macdonald, a minister of the Church of Scotland, and published by the society, religion and technology project of the Church of Scotland. I was one of many who gave evidence to the author. Its conclusions go across the board from those who actively oppose the development and those who are worried about it to those who are worried about the defence capability of this country. The general feeling behind the document, however, is that there is a lack of knowledge among the people in whose midst the development is proposed to take place.
  I hope that the Minister or his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State will have the chance to consider this and will take on board the points that have been made. I suggest sincerely to them that they should try to expand any inquiry into a full commission of inquiry so that all the various fears and questions can be raised and perhaps set at rest when the inquiry takes place.
  12 midnight
  The Under-Secretary of State for Scotland (Mr. Allan Stewart): I am glad to have the opportunity to reply to this debate and to some of the planning questions put to me by the hon. Members for Edinburgh, East (Mr. Strang) and for Dunbartonshire, West (Mr. Campbell). The debate also gives me the opportunity to clear up some misunderstandings among some members of the public about my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State's position as regards consideration of the planning aspects of the proposed Trident development.
  As the hon. Member for Edinburgh, East said, development proposals by Government Departments do

  269
  not require planning permission, but procedures broadly similar to those prescribed in planning legislation are followed in determining whether particular developments should go ahead. These procedures are set out in circular 49/1977 dated 2 November 1977 issued to local authorities when the right hon. Member for Glasgow, Craigton (Mr. Millan) was Secretary of State. That circular is admirably clear and lucid and I shall summarise the main points in it for the benefit of the House.
  In the first instance, the developing Department is called upon to inform the planning authority concerned of its proposals by submitting a notice of proposed development. The notice may be submitted in outline only—this is relevant to the debate—on the understanding that detailed proposals will be provided in due course or in a form equivalent to that of a detailed planning application. The circular makes it clear that the notice should be given just as much publicity as if it were an application for planning permission. Subsequently, the planning authority invites representations from interested parties.
  If, following the consultation stage—which should normally be completed within two months—the planning authority decides that it cannot agree to the proposals and the developing Department cannot resolve the issue to the satisfaction of both sides, the developing Department is required to bring the matter to the attention of the Scottish Office—the Scottish Development Department—should it wish to proceed with the development. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State must then consider by what means he will resolve the situation.
  It might be of assistance to the House if I put on record the steps that have so far been taken to have the planning aspects of the proposed Trident development examined. Both hon. Gentlemen referred to this. Following presentation of their proposals at the Helensburgh meeting, to which the hon. Member for Dunbartonshire, West referred, in June 1981 the Ministry of Defence submitted to the district council a notice of proposed development in outline relating to the construction at Loch Long of berthing facilities for submarines, facilities for the storage and processing of Trident missiles and other support buildings and services. This notice specified the area of land required for the project. It provided some broad information about the buildings to be constructed on the site, it made clear that any necessary infrastructure provisions would be the subject of further consultations with the local authorities and it emphasised the determination of the Ministry of Defence to minimise the environmental impact of the development so far as was reasonably possible.
  A start was made on consultations set out in the notice, but the district council subsequently decided that it was not prepared to consider the plans in outline. The council therefore withdrew from discussions, indicating that it would give further consideration to the proposals only if it was provided with details and plans equivalent to those accompanying a detailed planning application. As the Ministry of Defence was not in a position to provide fully worked out and final detailed design proposals for a project with an eight-year planning and construction period, it was, for a time, not possible for any progress to be made on consultations with the council.
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  The Ministry considered that it had provided sufficient information about the scope of the project to enable the outline planning decisions it was seeking to be taken. But as it wished to consider certain detailed changes in its proposals, which would not alter the scope of the project but which would, incidentally, have some significant environmental advantages, it decided not to refer the matter to my right hon. Friend immediately but to use the intervening period to work up these new proposals.
  On 11 March, my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence announced our decision to purchase the Trident D5, rather than the Trident C4 missile system. This anouncement led the district council to invite the Ministry of Defence to submit a new notice of proposed development, the implication being that the council would be prepared to reopen discussions with the Ministry on this basis. This is a point to which reference has been made. I emphasise, therefore, that the Ministry replied to the effect that it saw no need to submit a revised notice because its original notice had taken account of the possibility that a larger missile might at some stage supersede Trident C4. It again indicated that it had in mind certain changes that it felt would have significant environmental advantages and gave an undertaking that it would submit revised proposals as soon as these had been fully worked up.
  The council has asked the Ministry to reconsider this decision and correspondence on the matter is continuing. I hope that it will be possible for a basis for reopening the discussions to be agreed because it is obviously of very considerable importance. It is in the best interests of local people that the process of local consultation on the Ministry's proposals should be completed.
  It has been suggested—although not in this debate— by some organisations that my right hon. Friend has decided that he will not make arrangements for a public inquiry to be held. This is absolutely untrue. I wish to put that clearly and firmly on the record. As I have explained, the established procedures for the consideration of proposals for developments by Government departments provide for such a proposal to be referred to my Department by the developing Department if objections put forward by the planning authority cannot be resolved to the satisfaction of the two parties.
  Mr. Gordon Wilson: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?
  Mr. Stewart: I make no complaint about the fact that I received less than half the time available for the debate, but I should like to finish my speech. In this case, consultations between the Ministry of Defence and Dumbarton district council have not been completed. The circumstances in which reference of the matter to my Department might be appropriate have not therefore arisen and, until such a reference is made, my right hon. Friend has no locus in the consideration of the planning aspects of the Trident proposals. He has not, therefore, been involved in the discussions which have so far taken place.
  I hope that it will be possible for Dumbarton district council and the Ministry to reach agreement. If not, my right hon. Friend could seek to deal with the matter on the basis of written representations, an informal meeting with the parties, or a non-statutory public local inquiry. No disagreement has, however, as yet been referred to him for

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  resolution and it would not be right for me to speculate at this stage on the steps which he might take should such an approach be made.
  That brings me to the points made by the hon. Members for Edinburgh, East and for Dunbartonshire, West about a planning inquiry commission for which provision is made under the Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1972, although there has never been such a commission. The right hon. Member for Craigton agrees with me about that.
  I cannot speculate about the measures that might be adopted by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State to resolve a disagreement between the planning authority and the Ministry of Defence if the matter were eventually to be referred to him. I appreciate the importance of the Trident proposals, but it is not immediately apparent that they give rise to any local planning problems that could not be dealt with comprehensively and satisfactorily under the usual planning procedures that I have set out.
  Reference has been made to Strathclyde regional council which aims to interest all the local authorities in the region in making arrangements for an environmental impact assessment of the Trident proposals to be followed
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  by an unofficial local inquiry. There has been no final decision to put those plans into operation. In the light of what the hon. Member for Dunbartonshire, West said, as the planning authority appears to be prepared to resume consideration of the Ministry's proposals in accordance with established procedures I hope that the regional council will not take precipitate action to promote an independent inquiry. That inquiry would have no status. It would be better for the regional council and us to wait and see what the Ministry's new proposals are, how Dumbarton council reacts to them, whether the matter has to be referred to my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State, and, if so, what action he proposes to take, before the regional council considers any such steps.
  We have no means of knowing how the planning aspects of the Trident proposals will be resolved. As hon. Members made clear—
  The Question having been proposed after Ten o'clock and the debate having continued for half an hour, Mr. DEPUTY SPEAKER adjourned the House without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.
  Adjourned at twelve minutes past Twelve o'clock.