INCITEMENT TO RACIAL HATRED

HC Deb 27 October 1976 vol 918 cc625-55

Lords amendment: No. 37, in page 45, line 13, leave out from beginning to "be" in line 14 and insert: with the intention that hatred shall".

Mr. John

I beg to move, That this House doth disagree with the Lords in the said amendment.

This, again, is a matter that has been canvassed at considerable length in Committee, on Report and on Third Reading, before the recess, and in the other place. I do not believe that there is a great deal of novelty that can be imported into the argument at this stage.

Let me remind hon. Members of the effect of what the other place's amendment would be. The words put into the Bill by the other place would return to the Bill the element of subjective intent. This would take it back to Section 6 of the 1965 Act. It would not, however, mean—and Opposition Members who are tempted to make speeches on this matter should remember this—that the idea of stirring up racial hatred would cease to become a crime. It is accepted and is common form between the two Houses at the moment that the idea of stirring up racial hatred shall become a crime.

What the amendment would do is to make the proving of this offence a matter of subjective intent on the part of the person concerned. Section 6 of the 1965 Act was considered at length by Sir Leslie Scarman in his inquiry into the Red Lion Square matter, which was published as a White Paper. I should like to read briefly what Sir Leslie said, because it is important that if hon. Members wish to agree with the other place on this matter they should be clear what it is they are doing. In the opinion of a very distinguished Lord Justice: The statute law does, however, call for scrutiny. Section 6 of the Race Relations Act is merely an embarrassment to the police. Hedged about with restrictions (proof of intent, requirement of the Attorney-General's consent) it is useless to a policeman on the street. He ends by saying that Section 6 of the Race Relations Act needs radical amendment to make it an effective sanction, particularly … in relation to its formulation of the intent to be proved before an offence can be established.

Mr. Ivan Lawrence (Burton)

Sir Leslie Scarman was calling for a re-formulation of the intent. The Minister of State has brought before the House the abolition of the intent.

Mr. John

If the hon. Member will show a little more patience, I shall deal with that point. I doubt whether the report I have read out shows clearly that that was what was being said. Sir Leslie was calling for a radical revision with a view to strengthening the law as it was. If hon. Members agree with the other place on this issue, they are seeking to keep it in its weak and enfeebled state. The main objection raised by Lord Hailsham was that it conflicted with the fundamental principle of English criminal law that the crime should consist of the actus rens and the mens rea. He said that he was concerned not with summary offences but only with indictable ones under Section 6 of the Race Relations Act and Clause 70 of this Bill.

We have said that we think this departure to be justifiable, and I will not rehearse the arguments for that now. But I think that Lord Hailsham was in error in one of his considerations. Section 5 of the Public Order Act—the Government amendment would have made it Section 6—is the exception which does not need intent. Lord Hailsham said that that was because it was only triable summarily. But he was in error. It is triable summarily or on indictment. That section does not import intent. To that extent I agree with the hon. Member for Burton (Mr. Lawrence) that we have proposed something which removes intent in the sense that it only makes the words which are uttered a matter of intent and then the inference is made from the surrounding circumstances as to what the intention was.

He and his hon. Friends must address their minds to one point. If they are at one with Sir Leslie Scarman in believing that Section 6 of the 1965 Act needs to be strengthened if it is to be effective—and the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. Hooson) has been preaching the virtue of the effectiveness of this legislation—it has to be strengthened from the present form. But the Lords have returned it to the former Section 6, and we believe that that is too weak and too ineffective to continue to be the law. It is not a matter of stirring up ill-feeling that needs to be visited with the full rigours of criminal law. We have kept to the definition of racial hatred, and we are equally right to say that the existing law needs to be greatly strengthened.

The effusions and emanations which stir up racial hatred go beyond the bounds of honest debate to the sort of ugliness we have seen recently, though, fortunately, not too often. That is why, in the absence of any suggestion of how the clause could be strengthened while keeping the necessity for intent within it, I ask the House to disagree with the amendment.

11.45 p.m.

Mr. Budgen

It must be emphasised that the provisions of Clause 70 are in addition to those in section 5 of the Public Order Act 1936. The Act lays down that a man commits a criminal offence when he makes a speech or writes words with an intent to provoke a breach of the peace or whereby a breach of the peace is likely to be occasioned.

I should have thought that the House would agree that the real mischief with which most of us are trying to deal is in relation to speeches or writings about racial matters which might lead to violence. Violence is the criminal element about which we should be concerned.

While Section 5 of the 1936 Act remains, there is no need for legislation along the lines of Clause 70 of the Bill. The more one looks at the clause, the more objectionable it becomes.

The Minister said blandly that the Government preferred to stick to the expression "racial hatred", as though it were a term which is well defined in law and capable of precise meaning. As far as I can see from an admittedly not very detailed perusal of "Archbold", there is no clear judicial interpretation of what "hatred" means. It is capable of very wide meaning.

What does "hatred" mean? Lloyd George's Limehouse speech about the great privileges enjoyed by the rich might have been regarded as stirring up hatred against the rich. If, for the sake of argument, I make a speech about the special privileges enjoyed by council tenants and say that the system by which they are subsidised by the taxpayer and ratepayer is unfair, it might reasonably be argued that because I was pointing out their special privileges I was inviting the public as a whole to think less well of council tenants.

One might argue that it is wrong for racial groups in this country to have the right to bring fiancés from their country of origin. I have put this view on a number of occasions. It is attacking the privilege of a particular racial group in this country. Does that constitute stirring up hatred against them? I do not know. That may be tested in the courts at some time.

It is clear that the expression "racial hatred" in defining a crime fails to give that element of precision and certainly which ought to be one of the essential elements of any crime which is likely to form the basis of a prosecution against any citizen. That is the point which I wish to make for myself.

Much wider and more important points were made in the other place by my noble and learned Friend Lord Hailsham. I agree with him that it is undesirable to make it a condition precedent to any prosecution of this nature that the Attorney-General should give his consent. That would bring within the political ambit the whole question whether a prosecution of this nature should be made possibly against a political opponent of the Attorney-General of the day. It breaches the whole basis of the British criminal law that any individual may, if he so wishes, bring a private prosecution. It imposes a form of political sanction as a pre-condition to any kind of prosecution under this clause.

It is wrong that the Government should seek to take away the requirement that was previously upon the prosecution to prove an intention against a person accused of stirring up racial hatred. This crime will do nothing whatever to deal with the special problem of the use of words with intent to stir up violence.

This is a dangerous and unnecessary crime to put on the statute book. Indeed, if it had been either necessary or useful in the past, one would have thought that there would have been more than 19 prosecutions since 1965—unless this offence has been prosecuted frequently since December of last year.

On 11th December last year I asked the Attorney-General how many prosecutions had been undertaken under Section 6 of the Race Relations Act 1965. In a Written Answer I was told: To date, 19 persons have been subject to prosecution under Section 6 of the Race Relations Act 1965. Convictions were obtained in 12 cases. One of these convictions was quashed on appeal. In four cases terms of imprisonment were imposed. In one case a probation order was made. In four cases fines were imposed and in two cases there was a conditional discharge."—[Official Report, 11th December 1975; Vol. 902, c. 295.] Therefore, it does not look as though this crime has been anything other than an embarrassment to those whose duty it is to try to prevent the outbreak of violence consequent upon racial strife.

Crimes such as this achieve only a useful blackmailing point to those who wish to try to stifle adequate discussion of racial matters. It is unfortunate that until this year there have been almost no debates about immigration in this House. In Westminster it has been regarded as rather unpleasant to talk too much about the problems that vast immigration into industrial areas have caused. As a result, we have found that, when anybody has sought to discuss race relations or immigration outside this House, there has been a great wail from the liberal intelligentsia who say not merely that they disagree but that the subject should not be discussed at all. When I say "liberal intelligentsia", I do not mean simply the Liberal Party. I would not accuse members of the Liberal Party of being members of the intelligentsia. There are members of the liberal intelligentsia in all parties.

About a year ago I made a speech suggesting that it was wrong to extend the privilege of a right of entry to male fiancés. A great wail went up from the Indian Workers Association in Wolverhampton. It was good enough to report me to the Attorney-General with a view to letting me prosecuted under Section 6 of the 1965 Act. I do not know what "hatred" means in that section. It may be that the association was right. It just could be that because I was pointing to a particular interpretation of the word "hatred" a case against me could have been proved. I do not know.

However, I was being threatened with a view to trying to get me to shut my mouth. I know that the assocation was saying "You can say this sort of thing in the House of Commons, where you are privileged, but if you wish to discuss it outside the House of Commons we shall threaten you with criminal proceedings."

This will happen throughout the length and breadth of the land. We in Westminster have made very considerable mistakes in the past in respect of our immigration policy. My father and many of my relatives have lived in other Commonwealth countries for many years. They have spent most of their lives there. On the whole, I was opposed to the 1962 Act. I understand the views of may of those who were reluctant to impose controls.

However, we in Britain, especially we at Westminster, have made substantial mistakes in our immigration policies in the past. It really will not be good enough if we try to bottle up resentments by stifling freedom of speech. This particular crime is designed to stifle that. If it be that the ordinary people of Britain cannot talk about their problems, sometimes in a robust or an offensive way, unhappily their only resort is to violence.

Mr. Rose

I am sorry that the hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Mr. Budgen) should confuse freedom of speech with incitement to hatred, but his statistics underline the weakness of Section 6 as it now stands. Ten years ago, many of us warned, in Committee, of the fact that it was weak because the prosecution would have to overcome two hurdles.

However, it is possible for those supporting the Lords amendment to take one of two positions. There is, first, the fundamentalist position of the hon. Gentleman, opposed to any legislation at all dealing with racial incitement, or there is another position, which is more tenable, and that is one which objects to the removal of the words importing intent. Those are two different positions, and one has some sympathy with the latter.

The problem here is that just as it is difficult in the courts to prove intent, let us say on a charge of receiving, it is even more difficult here when one receives—as I have done in the past few weeks—leaflets depicting schoolchildren and given to schoolchildren which do no more than show a change in the racial balance in the schools and then go on to tell those children that they are being swamped by immigrants.

One of the difficulties that one faces here is that one is dealing with a situation where not only does the prosecution have to prove first that the words are— threatening, abusive or insulting"— that is the first hurdle—but, even given the removal of the Lords amendments, the prosecution will have to show from surrounding circumstances a likelihood.

12 midnight.

There are two burdens on the prosecution. To impose a burden of showing an explicit intent renders it almost impossible, except in the most extreme cases, to sustain a conviction. Hence the fact that there have only been those 19 cases to which the hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West referred.

There are weaknesses which many people pointed out, notwithstanding the quite obscene material which many of us have received, and many have seen, over the years from various organisations. On the fundamentalist side we are doing no more than almost every other civilised country in its application to the United Nations—in Europe, to the Council of Europe—under the various conventions. I shall not rehearse those arguments, which were ventilated on Second Reading.

If one looks a the penal codes of almost every other European country, in particular those of Austria and Germany—countries which have known what racial incitement ultimately leads to—they have very strict laws with regard to this. The one which appeals to me most is probably Norway, where there is no more than a reference to people who— publicly insult or provoke hatred on contempt of a race on account of its creed, extraction or origin, or who threaten such a race or spread false accusations about it. It merely deals with the act; it does not deal with intent.

If one looks through the penal codes of almost every other European country dealing with this by convention, there is no word about intent because what is important is the result. What is important here is that one is not stifling free speech and one is protecting the right of a citizen, not merely against violence but against vilification. A citizen surely has a right to protection against vilification on the basis of his pigmentation or racial or ethnic origin—perhaps even more of a right to protection against accusations of being a thief or a rogue under the law of libel and slander.

One poses a basic human right not to be vilified by having jack-booted members of the National Front walking through one's area with an abusive and insulting placard against the other right, which is free speech. If free speech is confused with the—

Mr. Budgen

Would the hon. Gentleman not concede that many of the placards of the National Front might he properly considered from the point of view of prosecution under Section 5 of the Public Order Act?

Mr. Rose

Indeed, I am sure there are some that might be and some that are. There are many which are not susceptible to that and there are many actions which are threatening, abusive and insulting which are permitted under the law at the moment—which are calculated to stir up racial hatred—where it is almost impossible to say that that was the intent because the defendant in the case will always say he was merely ventilating a legitimate argument. No one wants to prevent arguments of that nature and that is why the words "threatening, abusive or insulting" are in the sanction.

But the fundamental basis in this is a protection for every citizen, and that has to be posed against the other right of free speech. What ultimately matters is the fact that if the effect of placards, marches or behaviour is to incite haired and not necessarily violence—because hatred ultimately leads to violence—I believe this proposal is entirely justified. I do not lightly remove the idea of intent. Take the example given in an earlier debate in respect of speeding. One does not have to show that a motorist who is speeding has an intent to injure other people. It follows naturally from the act of speeding that he is a potential danger to other motorists and perhaps to himself.

In this case, with the words or behaviour of themselves, in the circumstances referred to—that is the safeguard—what matters is what can result. During the election, in my constituency, someone nearly lost an eye and others were shot at with shotguns. One realises that such acts of violence are ugly things and that the law needs to be firm about them.

There is no such thing as absolute free speech. One has to choose whether to elevate the licence to incite hatred above the right to be free from the results of that hatred. That is the choice that the Government have to make, and it is not made lightly. Those who have to deal with these things take the question of intent very seriously. I am sure that Lord Hailsham was sincere in what he said.

One has to consider the question of intent to see what is the burden that one has to overcome at the moment. Possibly it is an almost impossible burden, except in a few very extreme cases. For that reason it was necessary to amend the Act. The Lords have wrecked that amendment of the original Act, and I believe that this House should restore it so that we can gain effective control.

It is easy to say as a defence, "What I said was reckless; there was no intent." If recklessness can be a defence, as it could be if one took away—

Mr. Lawrence

No.

Mr. Rose

It certainly could be a defence. If one does not remove the consideration of intent, recklessness becomes a defence.

In those circumstances, it is absolutely necessary to do what the Government are doing in reversing the Lords' decision.

Mr. Lawrence

It does not become a defence.

Mr. Rose

If the burden of the prosecution is to prove an intent to do something, if, after someone has stirred up racial hatred and violence has ensued he says, "I did not intend to do it, but perhaps I was a little reckless," that would be a defence.

Mr. Lawrence

No.

Mr. Rose

I am sorry, but there it is. The burden would be on the prosecution. The Government are right, and the statistics which were quoted earlier emphasise the need for the strengthening of the original section.

Mr. Hooson

As I listened to the hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Mr. Budgen), I could not help thinking that he was being wise by hindsight. He referred to the paucity of debates on immigration. Between 1951 and 1962, when there was unrestricted immigration under Governments of his complexion, there were very few debates about immigration.

We are concerned now not with immigration but with its results. The legislation is surely designed to achieve, in the shortest possible time, a higher degree of racial harmony than we have previously had. In my experience, certainly in a democratic country, what is right in many people's minds is what the law says is right. That is why the framework of legislation is very important in this sphere.

The House is in a very unhappy position on this amendment. The Government's proposal is far too wide and could lend itself to injustice. But I am dissatisfied with the Lords amendment. The following words would meet the bill: where, having regard to all the circumstances, he or she must know that hatred is likely to be stirred up". That would mean that the person would have to be aware that his action was likely to stir up racial hatred.

The question of intention in the amendment goes back to Section 6 of the 1965 Act. We must have regard for the view of Lord Justice Scarman in his report on the Red Lion Square disorder. He said: Section 6 of the Race Relations Act 1965 needs radical amendment to make it an effective sanction, particularly I think in relation to its formulation of the intent to be proved before an offence can be established". The Government have removed the requirement of intent altogether, and that goes too far. For that reason, if I must make the difficult choice I prefer the Hailsham amendment. The Government should reconsider the matter and proceed along the lines that I suggest.

Mr. Ivor Stanbrook (Orpington)

The Minister complains that no one has suggested any other method of strengthening the provisions of Section 6. The only suggestion he makes is to drop a fundamental principle of English liberty.

It is inconvenient for the police to have to prove that anyone accused of a crime meant to commit it. It means that the police must find evidence that the accused had a guilty intent—and that applies to 99.9 per cent. of all crimes. That requirement on the police and prosecution is vital to liberty but it is that requirement which the Government are seeking to drop in the Bill. For that reason the House should support the amendment.

Mr. Edward Lyons (Bradford, West)

In this case the prosecution has to prove certain primary facts which have nothing to do with intention; they are set out in Clause 70. The prosecution must prove that there has been publication or distribution of written matter which is threatening, abusive or insulting. Alternatively, he must prove that a person has used words which are threatening, abusive or insulting in a public place. Those matters must be proved before considering the next stage, which applies the test which has been applied for hundreds of years in connection with breaches of the peace.

The test of a breach of the peace involves behaviour which is threatening, abusive or insulting whereby a breach of the peace is likely to be caused. That is the test that hon. Members opposite seek to say is terribly unusual and previously unknown in Britain.

Confronted with the difficulty presented by breach of the peace legislation, Lord Hailsham was driven backwards to say that the difference is that breach of the peace is only a summary offence whereas in this legislation prosecution can be either summary or on indictment. He said that he objected to indictment. If that is so, the amendment should be based on deleting prosecutions on indictment and limiting them to summary proceedings. That would bring the matter into harmony with the existing law, but that is not the Lords amendment. We have a trumped-up, misconceived objection that we are doing something which is totally unusual, when in fact it is not. Further—and this is not the case with the breach of the peace legislation—we must have the fiat of the Attorney- General, which is sparingly given. Accordingly, one would expect very few prosecutions under the clause.

For these reasons, a great deal of fuss is being made about something which does not warrant it.

12.15 a.m.

Mr. Stokes

Not being a lawyer, I am somewhat hesitant to enter the debate. the clause as it was before the Lords amended it has caused considerable disquiet in many quarters, not only among the public but among those who report the news. Before it was amended the clause seemed to me extremely wide. As I came to the House this morning a line of Wordsworth went through my head and I wondered whether an Englishman would be allowed to say it in front of an immigrant after the Bill became law. The line, which will be known to all hon. Members, is: This is my own, my native land! Could it be said without seeming to an immigrant to be "threatening, abusive or insulting"? I hope so, but I believe that the effect of the clause, as of all this legislation, is to erode an Englishman's pride in his history and descent. It is no wonder there has been such a sharp decline in national pride. By this legislation an Englishman is constantly made to feel inferior and guilty in any dealings he may have with an immigrant in law. Our grandfathers and even our fathers would not recognise us in the sort of antics in which we have been engaged tonight. Foreigners who admire this country so much think that we are mad in our whole attitude to immigration, and they are right. Free speech is threatened by the Bill and the written word is also under attack.

Mr. Deputy Speaker

Order. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will keep to the amendment.

Mr. Stokes

Newspaper editors, particularly local editors, are nervous about reporting speeches about immigration. The clause will make matters far worse. I fear that if the clause is passed without the amendment a blanket of silence will soon be placed on the whole subject. Englishmen will once again have suffered a defeat in their own land on a matter which concerns them so vitally.

Mr. Flannery

I shall do my utmost to extricate us from the miserable chauvinism we have just heard from the hon. Member for Halesowen and Stourbridge (Mr. Stokes).

Mr. Stokes

That is a compliment.

Mr. Flannery

It is time we made it clear that large numbers of people, especially in the Conservative Party, now use the word "immigration" when they really mean "coloured immigration". The debates carefully skirt that real meaning and make us think that there is a colour bar on the Conservative Benches.

I feel that I am intruding in a nest of lawyers. I speak as a lay person.

When we are talking about a colour bar and the intent to do something which is to do with colour, it is of course difficult, and, of course, people who are opposed to folk who are against a colour bar will rake up all kinds of methods to prove that we must delve more deeply into the mind when things are perfectly obvious. Let me give a case in point.

Some time ago, a programme laughingly called "Open Door" was broadcast, a programme about which I wrote on three occasions to the Home Secretary. It was brutal and naked racialism. It was one of the nastiest pieces of racialism I have ever seen. I hope that many hon. Gentlemen opposite saw it. It would be most difficult to delve into the recesses of the mind of the producer and prove that he had the intention of being racialist, although everybody who saw the programme knew that it was a racialist programme.

Mr. A. J. Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed)

I hope that the hon. Gentleman will draw a distinction between the producer of the programme who is employed by the broadcasting authorities to perfom a service for the outside body doing the programme and that outside body, and lay the responsibility properly at the door of the body which put out the programme, availing itself of the facilities.

Mr. Flannery

No. I will not withdraw it. From the inception that was a racialist programme designed to be such and designed to cause precisely the trouble which we are trying, in this Bill, to stop. We are doing our best to stop it, against the arguments of the Opposition, who are trotting out exactly the racialist argument which we knew would come, and which the other place gave the opportunity to discuss.

The attempt to help the House of Lords in what it is doing here is a reactionary and backward attempt to try to keep racialism going in this country. [Interruption.] It ill behoves the hon. Member for Blaby (Mr. Lawson) to laugh when I am talking about racialism. It is a serious issue, and the Opposition are trying to inject something into this which will hold back progress. He should be fighting for that instead of against it.

Mr. Nigel Lawson (Blaby)

I believe in free speech.

Mr. Flannery

I also believe in free speech and in standing up to those who think of immigration as an issue between white and coloured. The Conservative Party is really talking about coloured immigration. That is the basis of its approach, and I hope that the Lords amendment will be rejected for what it is, a backward and reactionary move.

Mr. Lawrence

Having heard the hon. Member for Sheffield, Hillsborough (Mr. Flannery) I think it timely to remind the House of the exact effect of this clause, to which I would invite the House to accept the Lords amendment.

The effect of the clause is to render a man liable to up to two years' imprisonment when he is innocent of any intention to stir up hatred against any racial group. It will allow the conviction of a man who is genuinely innocent of any racialist intent. The hon. and learned Member for Bradford, West (Mr Lyons) said that the clause changes nothing in our criminal law. Lord Hailsham—and he was a very distinguished Lord Chancellor—says this clause subverts a fundamental doctrine of English law. I should have thought that no hon. Gentleman in this House, least of all perhaps if his pretensions are just, like the hon. Member for Hillsborough, would want to introduce into English law a principle which undermines civil liberties.

If there had been a Bill before the House dealing with theft and it was seriously proposed that there should not be an intention to commit theft written into the Bill—that a person innocent of any intention to steal should be convicted of theft—what would the National Council for Civil Liberties have said about that?

I wonder how many hon. Members have received communications from the National Council for Civil Liberties about the fact that a fundamental principle of our law, which is the safeguard of individual liberty in our society, is being taken way. I seem to remember sitting here for many hours during the passage of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions Act, when Labour Members who professed to be speaking in defence of civil liberties said that there was not enough protection in that measure to prevent a person who was merely suspected of terrorist offences being kept in police custody for a number of days. People were being blown to pieces and the National Council for Civil Liberties and those Labour Members who speak for it were saying that we must remember the importance of civil liberties.

We all profess to want civil liberties. What concerns some of us on this side of the House is that sometimes the National Council for Civil Liberties seems to be being used by some Labour Members as an excuse for undermining our society and subverting our institutions. Otherwise, why are they not speaking up now on a clause which takes away the fundamental principle which protects the liberty of the individual in our society, namely the requirement in all serious crime for there to be proved beyond any doubt an intention to commit an evil act?

What is the justification for this proposal? The Government say that it is necessary because Section 6 of the Race Relations Act has not proved an effective sanction. They rely upon what Lord Justice Scarman said in the report of the tribunal examining the Red Lion Square demonstration. But what he said was not that we should abolish intent as a necessary requisite for this kind of offence. He said that we should re- formulate it. What has happened here is not a re-formulation of intent but an abolition of it. That is something which goes a great deal further than Lord Justice Scarman was suggesting. It is true to say that, perhaps because it is difficult to re-formulate the intent, the distinguished judge did not seek to do so. But he stopped short of saying that he recommended that intention should henceforth be taken away.

I ask the Government to consider this. Not every evil that exists in our society can be cured by law. Sometimes the medicine we seek to adminster to the illness is worse than the illness itself. If the Government cannot produce a stronger case for undermining this fundamental principle of our law than it has done we should be careful before we act. What guarantee can the Government offer that the clause will result in the conviction only of those who are guilty? It is for this reason that the Lords have thought it right to introduce this amendment. I earnestly invite my hon. Friends and all Labour Members who genuinely care for civil liberties to think carefully before brushing this bulwark away. I ask them to uphold this amendment which the Lords, in their wisdom. have put forward.

Mr. Ronald Bell

My hon. Friend the Member for Burton (Mr. Lawrence) put his finger on the basic objection to the Government's attitude here when he said that if we were discussing the law of theft or some other aspect of the ordinary criminal law no one would suggest that the element of intent should be removed. Labour Members would be the most energetic objectors to any such proposition.

Once again we find that a perfectly normal safeguard is being swept away unconcernedly for the same reason—namely, that this is about discrimination on the grounds of race and colour. Underlying the formative attitude of some Labour Members is the belief that when we are talking about colour and discrimination we need not bother about safeguards. They are so much against it that they do not really care about the processes of justice. I have said that about five times tonight, and each time it has been relevant. That is because on each occasion the Government have been seeking to do something that they would never do in relation to any other sort of offence. They adopt this approach because of a frenzied obsession with this business of colour.

12.30 a.m.

I invite the House to consider what is being done. It is said by the Minister of State and by others that there is sufficient safeguard in the words "threatening, abusive or insulting". There is not. Let us remember the words that are used against any expression of opinion upon immigration or its related subjects that are so profoundly disagreeable to Labour Members. They do not feel that such mild words are adequate; they call such expressions of opinion "obscene", a much over-worked word. Anything that one says about the immigration phenomenon in this country which is disagreeable to the liberal Left is at once condemned as "obscene". The proposed safeguard is not a safeguard.

I remember some of the earlier attempts to pass Bills of this sort through the House. I resisted such attempts by Fenner Brockway and people like that. For example, there were amendments to the Public Order Act along these lines. I remember the Labour Party spokesman asking from the Dispatch Box on such an occasion "It it seriously suggested by Conservative Members that someone should be at liberty to say that coloured immigration into this country should be totally stopped? Is that what they are saying? Are they saying that people should be allowed to express such sentiments? No, of course we must have the Bill to make that sort of thing a criminal offence." That was the nature of what was said by the spokesman for the Labour Party from the Dispatch Box. I have kept the relevant page of Hansard. That shows the danger that people face if they wish to express what seem to me to be perfectly tenable opinions upon this controversial matter.

The words "threatening, abusive or insulting" are no safeguard. It is said that hatred is likely to be stirred up. The hon. and learned Member for Bradford, West (Mr. Lyons) asked why anyone should complain as the words in this so-called safeguard are used in relation to breaches of the peace. But we are not talking about breaches of the peace; we are concerned with hatred being stirred up. I do not know how we estimate that hatred is likely to be stirred up. It is an impossibly subjective conception altogether.

Mr. Stanbrook

What does it mean?

Mr. Bell

What is hatred? What is likely to be stirred up? My hon. Friend the Member for Orpington (Mr. Stan-brook) questions the meaning of the expression. In fact, racial hatred is not linguistically a possible term. We know about "racial"—of or pertaining to race. What is racial hatred? Hatred that is of or pertaining to race? That is nonsense. It is an inexact colligation of words that, strictly speaking, does not mean anything at all. That being the position, it is a very loose penumbra of an argument that develops around a colligation of two words that do not logically colligate.

We cannot ignore the fact that there are in our society strong forces working to suppress the truth of various matters. There is the National Union of Journalists, which has passed a resolution threatening to expel members who print opinions which may be true but which the union thinks should be suppressed in the interests of harmonious race relations. That has been widely condemned. A letter from the Guild of Newspaper Editors in The Times a week ago about this clause said how dangerous it will be for any editor trying to operate within the law if an objective test, instead of a subjective test, is imported into the question of stirring up racial hatred. There are many other bodies with the attitude of the NUJ. The Community Relations Commission is not exactly a go-getter after truth if the truth is inconvenient to its preoccupations.

Against that background, let us look at the foreground. I remember the processes by which we have arrived at this stage. There was Section 5 of the Public Order Act, which hinged upon the causing of a breach of the peace; then there was the Race Relations Act 1965, which I and others opposed in this respect. That Act got rid of the whole question of breach of the peace, whereby one could say what one lives in England as long as one did not cause or make likely a breach of the peace. That is the proper test of freedom of speech—not that one's views are disagreeable to other people but that they may cause a breach of the peace.

We left that concept behind in the 1965 Act, replacing it with Section 6 of the Act saying "there shall be" an intent to stir up racial hatred. Now we are dropping intent and saying "You said something which is likely in the circumstances to stir up racial hatred." So the concept is not that of something which will cause a breach of the peace, or something which one intends to stir up racial hatred. It is only something which may do so.

Then we had the White Paper underlying the Bill. In it, the Government said "This is how far we are going in the Bill", which is the position I have described. They added, "We know that there are many who feel that we should go further, but we feel that that is as far as we can go at the moment in circumscribing the freedom of speech. But we are prepared to listen, during the passage of the Bill, to those who feel that we ought to go further and ban absolutely all racial propaganda." So the next stage is when we do not even bother about the test of stirring up racial hatred.

The White Paper says that the tone of discussion on racial matters has changed, that it is now urbane and moderate. But now the Home Secretary says "That is even more dangerous than the extreme language because it is more rational and acceptable, and we may have to act against it because we cannot allow people to be persuaded by rational, urbane, peaceful argument to hold views which we Socialists find repugnant."

This is the new Lysenkoism of the Left. Certain views—the truth is irrelevant—may be outlawed. People who hold views about the importance of genetic factors in life should be silenced. These people are obscene, they are unacceptable and they must not be allowed to speak.

I see this clause, before the Lords amendment, as the second stage in a movement away from breach of the peace, with each stage being a precedent for the next. The third stage is on its way if this clause is restored to the state in which it left this House for another place.

When this Bill receives Royal Assent the race relations industry will have the public by the throat. We in Parliament can say what we like about race relations and immigration, but those outside the privilege of Parliament are gagged and silenced. It is a scandal and a shame that we should allow this to happen.

Mr. Douglas-Mann

I also have reservations about the provisions of Clause 70, but for very different reasons from the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Bell) and the hon. Member for Halesowen and Stourbridge (Mr. Stokes). I find it difficult when talking about certain hon. Members to avoid language which is abusive or insulting. If I were black and talking to a black audience it could be considered that the way in which I was referring to individuals was likely to stir up racial hatred.

I would prefer that the provisions of this Bill redefined the word "intent", rather than removing it altogether. The hon. Member for Burton (Mr. Lawrence) referred to the desirability of redefining intent, and if the Lords had proposed an amendment which made it possible to infer intent from past conduct or propaganda, such as a number of years of membership of the National Front, it would have been more effective than removing it altogether.

It is very easy to infer intent from newspapers which publish photographs of black defendants but not of white ones. They send out teams of reporters to get stories about black crime, rather than white crime. The courts could infer intent from the conduct of individuals. If the provision proposed by the Lords had been to substitute that instead of removing intent altogether, many hon. Members on this side, myself included, wound have supported them. But the Lords have chosen to remove the provisions of Clause 70 completely. We could have supported them had they gone about this more intelligently and presented the House with an amendment enabling us to tackle the most outrageous forms of incitement to racial hatred. But we cannot do without a provision in the law which enables us to tackle the obnoxious and distasteful things that are constantly being published and spread about.

Therefore, we must restore the clause. It is unfortunate that the Lords have not given us an opportunity to do this more effectively.

12.45 a.m.

Mr. Lawrence

If the change that the hon. Member envisages were brought about, the word "intent" would have to be in the clause. We cannot presume intent if there is no mention of intent in the clause. The hon. Member is, in fact, saying that provided the word "intent" is construed in the way he wishes he will support the amendment. If he is not accepting the word "intent", he is being quite illogical.

Mr. Douglas-Mann

On the contrary; the Lords have put in a provision which has restored the word "intention". With my provision intent could have been inferred in certain circumstances, but with no provision to enable the courts to decide how intent is to be inferred I feel that a clause such as we have in the Bill is necessary—reluctant as I am to accept it in the grounds of free speech and civil liberty—because the Lords have provided no substitute.

Therefore, we must reject the Lords amendment.

Mr. Carlisle

I want to make only one point. I hope that the Minister will apply his mind to it when he replies. I refer to the effect of this clause on newspapers and the media generally. The effect is to make it an absolute offence to publish any written matter which is insulting and is likely to stir up racial hatred against any racial group in Great Britain.

Like my hon. and learned Friend, I find no difficulty in understanding what is meant by racial hatred. I find no difficulty in thinking of many occasions when speeches made by extremist groups have clearly been likely to stir up racial hatred.

What worries me about the clause is that by removing "intent" it appears to make it impossible for any responsible newspaper or any form of the media safely to report such a speech or occurrence. I question whether that is right.

If we look at the clause we see that we are specifically providing for the fair and accurate reporting of parliamentary proceedings and of judicial proceedings. There is no provision for the fair and accurate reporting of any other proceedings of a public nature. I ask the Minister of State to spell out what he says is the effect of the clause on newspapers, and whether he does not see the danger that they will hesitate to print anything which, although it may be unpleasant, is probably better for people to know is being said at public meetings rather than have it brushed under the carpet.

I see the point of wishing to strengthen Section 5 of the Public Order Act, in view of the comments on Section 6 made by Sir Leslie Scarman, as he then was, but I feel that the way in which the Minister is proposing to do it has in itself certain drawbacks in terms of the free publication of opinion in this country.

Mr. Alison

I share the view, expressed by my right hon. and noble Friend Lord Hailsham in another place, that if we reject the Lords amendment we shall be making a major and undesirable departure from the doctrines and principles of English law in the sense that we shall be postulating as a criminal offence an offence for which there was no criminal mind—or, at least, we shall not have to prove that the criminal mind was there.

I believe that that is profoundly unsatisfactory, and that it cannot be tolerated in any circumstances. I speak not as a lawyer; I am not a lawyer, and I do not try to argue this case against the background of great changes in the principles of English law. I argue from the simple and commonsense view that if we provide that a citizen shall be treated and punished as a criminal when there is no criminal intent in what he has done, or in the words that he has used—words which the great bulk of the population feel not to be criminal—we are bringing the whole of Parliament and our civil and criminal law into disrepute.

Here the Government are evacuating consent from the great mass of the population in the kind of laws that we have. It will almost certainly mean the stirring up of overt protest, violence and hostility, not towards a particular minority or group but towards Parliament and the law-making machinery. It will be forcing the concept of criminality on people when that carries no conviction with them. That is the situation which arises when someone who had no criminal intention is treated as a criminal.

Insulting words will be peculiarly a risk and hazard to which unpolished, uneducated and relatively illiterate people will be exposed. It is the people who are clumsy and uncertain but no doubt entirely sincere in their use and choice of words who will be exposed to the worst kind of hazard. Paradoxically and ironically, it will almost certainly prove to be the West Indian and Pakistani immigrants, with no great command of the English language and with a crude vocabulary at their disposal, who will find themselves caught by this provision in some of the protests they may make about the treatment they receive from the whites. The outcome will be the obverse of what the Government are seeking to achieve.

It is unacceptable to introduce a measure which will treat people as criminal over a sincere and bona fide attempt to express views which are not criminal and which no one in his right mind would consider as such. The real danger will come with the arbitrary nature of the fiat provided in the Attorney-General's permission Groups wish to make quite certain that a particular speaker, letter writer or publisher becomes branded as one who has insulted a racial group in such a way as to be likely to cause hatred. By taking overt action they will make quite certain a fortiori that hatred is clearly stirred up.

It would be necessary for them only to take a parade down a street and throw stones through the windows of the home of a particular individual who repeatedly wrote strong-worded letters to the local newspaper for it to be shown beyond peradventure that hatred had been stirred up. What does the Attorney-General do? Must he wait for hatred and violence to escalate and provide a positive incentive to particular groups to make it clear beyond peradventure that hatred exists before he gives in and brings a prosecution? This is a built-in incentive to groups to demonstrate Increasingly vociferously until the Attorney-General is forced to take action.

This is the wrong way to proceed. It will cause more violence and dissent than the Bill is seeking to obviate. Certain of my hon. Friends have referred to the words of the President of the Guild of British Newspaper Editors. I make no apology for taking a minute to put upon the record the words that that gentleman used in respect of the likely damage to a free Press. I quote from his letter to The Times on 27th September. He said: It is to be hoped that the House of Lords will approve an amendment to the Race Relations Bill due to be moved by Lord Hailsham when the Bill comes before their lordships this week. Clause 70 of the Bill, dealing with incitement to racial hatred. inserts a new section to the Public Order Act 1936 which, as it stands, would place newspapers and their editors in an intolerable position. The implications of this section and in particular of the last paragraph are so serious and uncertain in their effect on newspapers that one can only conclude that MPs had not considered them in any depth during the Bill's passage through the Commons. In fact, we considered them in great depth. The phrase 'hatred is likely to be stirred up' would make it almost impossible for an editor to decide whether or not he would be risking prosecution, despite the fact that he might well be dealing with a matter of important public interest. The effect would undoubtedly be to gravely restrict information of events, of speeches, and of statements about which the public have every right to know, and which it is an editor's duty to publish. Lord Hailsham's amendment would oblige the prosecution to prove intent. … Those responsible for this Bill should remember that a meeting, perhaps attended or witnessed by several hundred people, is an event of public knowledge and public importance, and that no newspaper should be inhibited from publishing a report of it. The same considerations apply equally to written material such as party manifestos or candidates' leaflets. I ask the Minister to bear in mind the view of this eminent newspaperman that the uncertainty which will be caused if the Government do not accept the amendment will profoundly limit proper reporting and freedom of speech.

The Chairman of the Race Relations Board, Sir Geoffrey Wilson, said in a speech to the Guild of British Newspaper Editors in Bristol—reported in the Bristol Evening Post on 18th October—that any speech by my right hon. Friend the Member for Down, South (Mr. Powell) was followed by increased harassment of black people. If that is true, it means that speeches by my right hon. Friend will automatically be banned from newspapers because the Chairman of the Board has said that they are followed by harassment—an overt expression of hatred apparently stirred up automatically following a speech by my right hon. Friend.

This is a grotesque potential limitation on freedom of publication and speech, and it is entirely unacceptable that editors might be put in the position of being unable to report the speech of a Privy Councillor.

If the fiat is left in the hands of the Attorney-General the whole matter becomes political. If he does not prosecute the right hon. Member for Down, South, it will be because he is partial to him, and if he does prosecute, it will be because he is politically motivated, against the Ulster Unionists or the Conservatives. If the right hon. and learned Gentleman does not prosecute a Privy Councillor on the Government side, he will be said to be politically motivated. He cannot win. He will be criticised by everyone. It is entirely unsatisfactory that the matter should be left with the Attorney-General in this arbitrary way.

Mr. John

I start by saying to the hon. Member for Halesowen and Stourbridge (Mr. Stokes) that, as a Welshman, I believe that the English are declining in only one way—the mis-attribution of quotations. The words ascribed by the hon. Gentleman to Wordsworth were actually written by Sir Walter Scott.

I had hoped that some of the hon. and learned Gentlemen who took part in the debate would have taken up the point made by the hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Mr. Budgen) when he talked about this matter becoming political because consent to prosecution rested with the Attorney-General. He knows that the Attorney-General does not act politically when he gives consent. That is a tradition of British political life which has never been departed from by any Attorney-General of whom I have known. I hope that the suggestion will be firmly quashed.

1.0 a.m.

Thirdly, a number of Second Reading points have been made. Many hon. Gentlemen were in a dilemma whether they opposed legislation on racial hatred or merely legislation which took out the element of intent. That was pointed out by some of my hon. Friends.

I suggest that the hon. Member for Burton (Mr. Lawrence) should re-read with care what Sir Leslie Scarman said. Sir Leslie Scarman said: The section needs radical amendment to make it an effective sanction, particularly, I think, in relation to its formulation of the intent to be proved before an offence can be established. I believe that the clause, as drafted, makes it more effective. It does not make it something which is outside the whole realm of voluntary action. First, a person must, in a public place or meeting, use words which are threatening, abusive or insulting. It must be a case where hatred is likely to be stirred up against any racial group having regard to "all the circumstances". That answers a couple of the points which were made, particularly by the hon. Member for Barkston Ash (Mr. Alison), who suggested that a person's lack of command of English might cause him to use inflammatory language. If so, "all the circumstances" would mean that hatred was not likely to be stirred up.

I repeat to my hon. Friend the Member for Mitcham and Morden (Mr. Douglas-Mann) that the evil against which the Bill is aimed is racial discrimination or racial hatred. It is not aimed against racial hatred or racial discrimination practised by people of a particular colour or race. It is aimed at wherever racial discrimination is practised.

The mistake that the hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Bell) often makes is that anyone of whatever colour or ethnic origin who practises racial discrimination or stirs up racial hatred is liable to the sanctions of this Bill.

Mr. Ronald Bell

No black people have been prosecuted under Section 6.

Mr. John

The hon. and learned Gentleman either speaks in profound ignorance of the facts or he has not researched with care. I can refer him, but will not do so at this time of night, to who precisely were prosecuted because they made black power speeches. Michael de Freitas was one of them. If the hon.

and learned Gentleman would care to receive a letter from me, he might then consider his intervention rather more calmly than he is doing now.

Mr. Bidwell

The hon. and learned Gentleman can read my book.

Mr. John

He can do that, too, but that would be too bracing a glimpse of the truth for his tender stomach.

Mr. Goodhew

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Mr. John

No, I will not give way on this point. I am developing my argument. The hon. Gentleman has been in the Chamber but rarely during the evening and has sought to speak on almost every occasion when he has been present. I am dealing with a serious point made by the hon. and learned Member for Runcorn (Mr. Carlisle) regarding newspapers, a point which was taken up by the hon. Member for Barkston Ash.

It is true that the President of the Guild of British Newspaper Editors wrote to The Times on 27th September. I am sure that the hon. Member for Barkston Ash will confirm that that was the first approach that the Guild had made to any member of the Committee or the first notice that it had taken of any of the proceedings on the Bill. I am rather surprised at some of the wording. Referring to importing the idea of intent, Mr Tom Cooke, the President of the Guild of British Newspaper Editors, said: Such an amendment would be a vast improvement and, I feel sure, would be accepted

by editors as a situation which they could live with. That has been the law for 11 years. Yet nothing in his words leads me to believe that he realised that fact.

When newspapers print the stories of meetings at which words are used that are threatening, abusive or insulting in the circumstances of the clause, they are no more deserving of protection than if they had printed a defamation—except under subsection (2), where court or parliamentary proceedings are given protection.

There is a judgment to be made here as to whether—I address my words particularly to the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. Hooson)—by approving the Lords' formulation this House will revert to or perpetuate a situation in which the law is too weak to bear upon the case of racial hatred, as Sir Leslie Scarman, as he then was, suggested, or whether by disagreeing with the Lords amendment and reintroducing Clause 70 it will make the law against racial hatred—that most serious and most extreme of all cases—a proper sanction against it so that we may eradicate it and the violence that surely follows it.

Mr. Carlisle

Before the Minister sits down, may I ask him whether he really means—

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Oscar Murton)

Order. I think that the Minister has resumed his seat.

Question put, That this House doth disagree with the Lords in the said amendment:—

The House divided: Ayes 175, Noes 142.

Division No. 350.]	AYES	[1.6 a.m.
Anderson, Donald	Cant, R. B.	Dean, Joseph (Leeds West)
Archer, Peter	Carmichael, Neil	Dell, Rt Hon Edmund
Armstrong, Ernest	Cartwright, John	Dempsey, James
Ashton, Joe	Castle, Rt Hon Barbara	Doig, Peter
Atkins, Ronald (Preston N)	Clemitson, Ivor	Dormand, J. D.
Atkinson, Norman	Cocks, Rt Hon Michael (Bristol S)	Douglas-Mann, Bruce
Bagier, Gordon A. T.	Cohen, Stanley	Dunnett, Jack
Barnett, Guy (Greenwich)	Colquhoun, Ms Maureen	Eadie, Alex
Bates, Alf	Conlan, Bernard	Edge, Geoff
Beith, A. J.	Cook, Robin F. (Edin C)	Ellis, John (Brigg & Scun)
Bennett, Andrew (Stockport N)	Corbett Robin	Ennals, David
Bidwell, Sydney	Cox, Thomas (Tooting)	Flannery, Martin
Bishop, E. S.	Craigen, J. M. (Maryhill)	Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)
Blenkinsop, Arthur	Crawshaw Richard	Ford Ben
Boardman, H.
Boyden, James (Bish Auck)	Crowther, Stan (Rotherham)	Forrester, John
Bray, Dr Jeremy	Cryer, Bob	Fowler, Gerald (The Wrekin)
Brown, Hugh D. (Provan)	Cunningham, G. (Islington S)	Fraser, John (Lambeth, N'w'd)
Buchanan, Richard	Davies, Bryan (Enfield N)	Freeson, Reginald
Campbell, Ian	Davies, Ifor (Gower)	Garrett, John (Norwich S)
Canavan, Dennis	Davis, Clinton (Hackney C)	Gilbert, Dr John
Golding, John	Mallalieu, J. P. W.	Silverman, Julius
Gould, Bryan	Marks, Kenneth	Skinner, Dennis
Graham, Ted	Marquand, David	Small, William
Grant, George (Morpeth)	Marshall, Dr Edmund (Goole)	Smith, Cyril (Rochdale)
Grant, John (Islington C)	Marshall, Jim (Leicester S)	Smith, John (N Lanarkshire)
Hamilton, James (Bothwell)	Maynard, Miss Joan	Spearing, Nigel
Hardy, Peter	Mikardo, Ian	Stallard, A. W.
Harrison, Walter (Wakefield)	Millan, Rt Hon Bruce	Sloddart, David
Hatton, Frank	Miller, Dr M. S. (E Kilbride)	Stott, Roger
Hooley, Frank	Moonman, Eric	Strang, Gavin
Hoyle, Doug (Nelson)	Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw)	Summerskill, Hon Dr Shirley
Hughes, Rt Hon C. (Anglesey)	Morris, Rt Hon J. (Aberavon)	Swain, Thomas
Hughes, Robert (Aberdeen N)	Moyle, Roland	Thomas, Jeffrey (Abertillery)
Hughes, Roy (Newport)	Murray, Rt Hon Ronald King	Thomas, Ron (Bristol NW)
Hunter, Adam	Newens, Stanley	Thorne, Stan (Praston South)
Jeger, Mrs Lena	Ovenden, John	Tinn, James
John, Brynmor	Park, George	Torney, Tom
Johnson, Walter (Derby S)	Parry, Robert	Walden, Brian (B'ham, L'dyw'd)
Jones, Barry (East Flint)	Perry, Ernest	Walker, Terry (Kingswood)
Jones, Dan (Burnley)	Price, C. (Lewisham W)	Watkins, David
Kaufman, Gerald	Price, William (Rugby)	Watkinson, John
Lamborn, Harry	Radice, Giles	Weetch, Ken
Lamond, James	Rees, Rt Hon Merlyn (Leeds S)	Wellbeloved, James
Latham, Arthur (Paddington)	Robinson, Geoffrey	White, Frank R. (Bury)
Lestor, Miss Joan (Eton & Slough)	Roderick, Caerwyn	White, James (Pollock)
Lipton, Marcus	Rodgers George (Chorley)	Whitehead, Phillip
Luard, Evan	Rooker, J. W.	Whitlock, William
Lyons, Edward (Bradford W)	Roper, John	Willey, Rt Hon Frederick
McCartney, Hugh	Rose, Paul B.	Williams, Alan (Swansea W)
McDonald, Dr Oonagh	Ross, Rt Hon W. (Kilmarnock)	Williams, Alan Lee (Hornch'ch)
McElhone, Frank	Rowlands, Ted	Wilson, Alexander (Hamilton)
MacFarquhar, Roderick	Ryman, John	Woodall, Alec
MacKenzie, Gregor	Sandelson, Neville	Woof, Robert
Mackintosh, John P.	Sedgemore, Brian	Wrigglesworth, Ian
Maclennan, Robert	Shaw, Arnold (Ilford South)	Young, David (Bolton E)
McMillan, Tom (Glasgow C)	Shore, Rt Hon Peter
McNamara, Kevin	Short, Mrs Renée (Wolv NE)	TELLERS FOR THE AYES:
Madden, Max	Silkin, Rt Hon John (Deptford)	Mr. Joseph Harper and
Magee, Bryan	Silkin, Rt Hon S. C. (Dulwich)	Mr. Donald Coleman
Mahon, Simon
NOES
Adley, Robert	Gower, Sir Raymond (Barry)	Meyer, Sir Anthony
Alison, Michael	Grant, Anthony (Harrow C)	Moate, Roger
Arnold, Tom	Gray, Hamish	Molyneaux, James
Atkins, Rt Hon H. (Spelthorne)	Griffiths, Eldon	Monro, Hector
Bell, Ronald	Grist, Ian	More, Jasper (Ludlow)
Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torbay)	Hall, Sir John	Morgan, Geraint
Berry, Hon Anthony	Hall-Davis, A. G. F.	Morris, Michael (Northampton S)
Biffen, John	Hannam, John	Morrison, Charles (Devizes)
Biggs-Davison, John	Havers, Sir Michael	Mudd, David
Body, Richard	Hawkins, Paul	Neave, Airey
Boscawen, Hon Robert	Hayhoe, Barney	Neubert, Michael
Bottomley, Peter	Hicks, Robert	Newton, Tony
Brocklebank-Fowler, C.	Higgins, Terence L.	Onslow, Cranley
Brotherton, Michael	Holland, Philip	Page, John (Harrow West)
Budgen, Nick	Hooson, Emlyn	Page, Rt Hon R. Graham (Crosby)
Bulmer, Esmond	Hordern, Peter	Parkinson, Cecil
Burden, F. A.	Howe, Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey	Penhaligon, David
Butler, Adam (Bosworth)	Howells, Geraint (Cardigan)	Percival, Ian
Carlisle, Mark	Hunt, David (Wirral)	Raison, Timothy
Carson, John	Hurd, Douglas	Rathbone, Tim
Channon, Paul	Hutchison, Michael Clark	Ridley, Hon Nicholas
Churchill, W. S.	James, David	Ridsdale, Julian
Clark, Alan (Plymouth, Sutton)	Jenkin, Rt Hon P. (Wanst'd & W'df'd)	Roberts, Michael (Cardiff NW)
Clegg, Walter	Jessel, Toby	Ross, Stephen (Isle of Wight)
Cope, John	Jopling, Michael	Rossi, Hugh (Hornsey)
Corrie, John	Kershaw, Anthony	Rost, Peter (SE Derbyshire)
Dodsworth, Geoffrey	Kitson, Sir Timothy	Royle, Sir Anthony
Douglas-Hamilton, Lord James	Lamont, Norman	Sainsbury, Tim
Drayson, Burnaby	Latham, Michael (Melton)	Shaw, Giles (Pudsey)
Dunlop, John	Lawrence, Ivan	Shelton, William (Streatham)
Durant, Tony	Lawson, Nigel	Shersby, Michael
Eden, Rt Hon Sir John	Le Marchant, Spencer	Silvester, Fred
Eyre, Reginald	Lester, Jim (Beeston)	Sims, Roger
Fairgrieve, Russell	Lloyd, Ian	Smith, Dudley (Warwick)
Farr, John	Loveridge, John	Speed, Keith
Finsberg, Geoffrey	Luce, Richard	Sproat, lain
Fookes, Miss Janet	McCrindle, Robert	Stanbrook, Ivor
Forman, Nigel	Macfarlane, Neil	Steen, Anthony (Wavertree)
Fowler, Norman (Sutton C'f'd)	Mates, Michael	Stewart, Ian (Hitchin)
Freud, Clement	Maude, Angus	Stokes, John
Gardner, Edward (S Fylde)	Mawby, Ray	Stradling Thomas, J.
Goodhew, Victor	Maxwell-Hyslop, Robin	Taylor, Teddy (Cathcart)
Gow, Ian (Eastbourne)	Mayhew, Patrick	Tebbit, Norman

Temple-Morris, Peter	Wakeham, John	Young, Sir G. (Ealing, Acton)
Thomas, Rt Hon P. (Hendon S)	Walters, Dennis
Townsend, Cyril D.	Weatherill, Bernard	TELLERS FOR THE NOES:
van Straubenzee, W. R.	Wells, John	Mr. W. Benyon and
Vaughan, Dr Gerald	Whitelaw, Rt Hon William	Mr. Carol Mather.
Viggers, Peter	Wiggin, Jerry

Question accordingly agreed to.