Commons Sitting of 16 February 1971

Preamble
The House met at half-past Two o'clock
PRAYERS
[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]
PRIVATE BUSINESS

  FALMOUTH CONTAINER TERMINAL BILL [Lords]
  [Prince of Wales's Consent, on behalf of the Duchy of Cornwall, signified]
  Bill read the Third time and passed, with Amendments.

  BRITISH RAILWAYS (No. 2) BILL (By Order)
    BRITISH TRANSPORT DOCKS BILL (By Order)
    Bills read a Second time and committed.
  CHICHESTER HARBOUR CONSERVANCY BILL (By Order)
    CITY OF LONDON (VARIOUS POWERS) (No. 2) BILL (By Order)

      GREATER LONDON COUNCIL (GENERAL POWERS) (No. 2) BILL (By Order)
      HARINGEY CORPORATION BILL (By Order)
      ISLE OF WIGHT COUNTY COUNCIL BILL (By Order)
      LONDON TRANSPORT (No. 2) BILL (By Order)
      Orders for Second Reading read.
      Bills to be read a Second time upon Tuesday next.

  OXFORDSHIRE COUNTY COUNCIL (No. 2) BILL (By Order)
  Bill read a Second time and committed.

  TORBAY CORPORATION (No. 2) BILL (By Order)
  Order for Second Reading read.
  Bill to be read a Second time upon Tuesday next.

ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
  NATIONAL FINANCE

    Wilberforce Inquiry
    Sir G. Nabarroasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what instructions he gave to Treasury officials appearing before the Wilberforce Committee; and whether he will make a statement.
    The Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. Anthony Barber): Their instructions were to give the Court of Inquiry the assistance which had previously been requested by the Court.
    Sir G. Nabarro: Will my right hon. Friend observe that the outcome of his instructions to his Treasury officials was an award variously assessed between 10·9 per cent. and 16 per cent., all of which is highly inflationary? If the award is taken as a norm to be spread over the whole field of wage and salary demands, will not the effects on inflation be utterly catastrophic?
    Mr. Barber: It is quite clear from the report and recommendations of the Court of Inquiry that the proposals it put forward were not to be taken as representing a norm. The actual figures were that the electricity workers claimed 25 per cent., the employers offered 9·7 per cent. and the relevant figure for the proposals of the court of inquiry was 10·9 per cent.
    Mr. Taverne: Was it not inevitable, because of the nature of the inquiry, that civil servants would be subjected to political questioning? Was it not intolerable that they should have to answer such questions, and is it not quite wrong for Ministers to hide behind the skirts of their civil servants?
    Mr. Barber: I have already explained on a previous occasion that this procedure was not new but was something which had been done before. I reacted to a request which had been made by the secretary of the court in a letter addressed to the Permanent Secretary to the Treasury. Furthermore, the Court of Inquiry paid tribute to the officials who gave evidence.
    Mr. Stallardasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether it was with his authority that the Permanent Under-Secretary to the Treasury, in giving evidence to the Wilberforce public inquiry about wage bargaining in industry, stated that it was dangerous for claimants to build in factors for an expected increase in prices.
    Mr. Barber: I fully endorse what the Permanent Secretary to the Treasury said to the Court.
    Mr. Stallard: Is the Chancellor aware that the Conservative chairman of the London Borough of Camden's housing committee recently said that if three or seven year leases are to be offered to council tenants the rents charged will have to be high enough to cover inflation during the term of the lease? In view of the obvious contradiction between that statement and the one given to the Wilberforce Inquiry, may I ask whether the right hon. Gentleman will now make a statement on what is the Government's policy?
    Mr. Barber: It is clear from the report of the Court of Inquiry that the Court accepted that if everyone tried to cover himself against expected future price increases, this process would push up prices to a higher level than would otherwise be the case.
    Mr. Kenneth Lewis: Does my right hon. Friend agree that the original Question put by the hon. Member for St. Pancras, North (Mr. Stallard) is a clear indication that he and right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite are openly inviting increases in prices through increased wages?
    Mr. Barber: I certainly agree with what I think my hon. Friend is getting at—namely, that the Question is wholly misguided.
    Mr. William Hamilton: In view of what my hon. Friend said in his supplementary question, will the right hon. Gentleman undertake to get in touch with Camden Borough Council and any other authority which seeks to impose factors in contemplation of further inflation in any prices over which they have any control?
    Mr. Barber: It would be much more appropriate if the hon. Gentleman concerned put down a Question.

    Earned and Unearned Income (Taxation)
    Sir G. Nabarroasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what sum he is expecting to collect in surtax during the year 1970–71; and how this is divided between surtax revenue derived, respectively, from earned and unearned incomes.
    The Minister of State, Treasury (Mr. Terence Higgins): The Budget estimate was £277 million. I cannot divide this between earned and investment income because surtax is charged on the total of a mixed income and not on its separate parts.
    Sir G. Nabarro: Will my right hon. Friend take early steps to rectify the blunders of an earlier Chancellor of the Exchequer who introduced this invidious distinction between earned and so-called unearned income, and will not my hon. Friend observe that so-called unearned income is the due dividend to persons who have devoted a lifetime to the practice of economy, thrift and honest investment?
    Mr. Higgins: The views of my hon. Friend the Member for Worcestershire, South (Sir G. Nabarro) on this subject are, of course, well known, and I have taken a careful note of them.
    Mr. Fletcher-Cooke: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. Could my hon. Friend the Member for Worcestershire, South (Sir G. Nabarro) explain to us what the end of the Question, as printed, means?
    Mr. Speaker: I cannot, but I do not suppose it matters now.
    Sir G. Nabarro: On a point of order. Did I hear you say that it does not matter, Mr. Speaker?
    Mr. Speaker: The hon. Gentleman made that clear by asking a pellucidly clear supplementary question after the Minister's reply.
    Sir G. Nabarro: It is a typographical error, two lines having been transposed. It is the printers' fault and not mine.
    Mr. Speaker: Nobody suggested that it was the hon. Member's fault.
    Sir B. Rhys Williams: Does my hon. Friend the Minister of State not agree that if surtax were abolished altogether the result would be an increase in the yield of revenue to the Exchequer?
    Mr. Higgins: My hon. Friend's point would raise far wider questions than those raised in the original Question.
    Mr. Dykesasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what was the yield from income tax collected on wages and salaries in the fiscal year 1969–70, and the yield in the same year from income tax collected from interest and dividend payments.
    Mr. Higgins: About £3,400 million was collected on salaries, wages and occupational pensions. The answer to the second part of the Question is £723 million.
    Mr. Dykes: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for those figures. Do they not contribute to the ensemble of arguments against the irrational and anachronistic distinction between income tax on earned and so-called unearned income? Does not he agree that, far from there being disapprobation, there would be widespread approval for the abolition of this peculiar distinction?
    Mr. Higgins: As I assured my hon. Friend the Member for Worcestershire, South (Sir G. Nabarro), my right hon. Friend will bear in mind this point in his considerations before the Budget.

    Estate Duty
    Mr. David Jamesasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he has completed his consideration of the proposition to retain the capital sum of estate duty paid in trust for the surviving spouse and for dependent children still in receipt of full-time education; and if he will make a statement.
    Mr. Higgins: I am afraid I cannot anticipate my right hon. Friend's Budget statement.
    Mr. David James: Would my right hon. and hon. Friends agree that to hit a woman at the point of bereavement suggests a heartless society, and, since married couples are taxed as one in life, should they not be taxed as one in death?
    Mr. Higgins: I sympathise with my hon. Friend's views, but I am sure he will appreciate that I cannot say more at this time.

    Post-War Credits (Severely Disabled Persons)
    Mr. Ashleyasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he will provide for severely disabled people to obtain repayment of their post-war credits.
    The Chief Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. Maurice Macmillan): Some people who are 100 per cent. disabled can claim now; I have every sympathy with the intention behind this Questtion but we have no proposals for extending the qualifying categories.
    Mr. Ashley: Is the Minister aware that although the severely disabled have sufficient sympathy, what they need is cash? Is he also aware that I personally believe that people who are 50 per cent. disabled should receive repayment? Therefore, is the Min0ister prepared to meet me halfway and consider giving repayment to those who are 75 per cent. disabled?
    Mr. Macmillan: The difficulty here is not the degree of disability but the question of drawing a line, I will certainly look into what the hon. Gentleman has suggested. It would be extremely difficult once one relaxed the 100 per cent. requirement to define a line below it.
    Mr. Marten: Since part of this problem is one of definition could not the Government give a definition of what is meant by "severely disabled"?
    Mr. Macmillan: There is a great problem of definition here, but it extends greatly beyond the whole question of repayment of post-war credits.
    Mr. Alfred Morris: Will the hon. Gentleman look as sympathetically as possible into the suggestiton made by my hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent, South (Mr. Ashley)? Is he aware that some people are much too severely disabled to qualify for disabled persons' vehicles and that they are persons for whom the repayment of post-war credits could be extremely helpful in increasing their mobility?
    Mr. Macmillan: The hon. Gentleman is introducing a new criterion, which I will certainly look at.

    Money Supply
    Mr. Bruce-Gardyneasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what is his latest forecast of the rate of growth in the money supply in the current financial year.
    Mr. Barber: I do not think it would be appropriate to give forecasts of the money supply at various points during the course of the year.
    Mr. Bruce-Gardyne: My right hon. Friend has said that he intends to ensure that the growth of the money supply shall be restricted to something less than the going rate of inflation. Would it not facilitate the achievement of this essential object of economic strategy if, at any rate for the time being, the upper parity limit for sterling were suspended?
    Mr. Barber: No. I have dealt with this matter before and have explained that I do not think it would be appropriate. I appreciate my hon. Friend's point about forecasts, but for the reasons I have mentioned I do not think it would be appropriate to give these.

    Road Fuel Duty
    Mr. Bruce-Gardyneasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what is his estimate of the cost to the Revenue in a full year of a reduction of 6d. and 1s., respectively, in the petrol tax.
    Mr. Higgins: These reductions on all road fuel would cost about £120 million and £235, respectively.
    Mr. Bruce-Gardyne: Could my hon. Friend say whether the Chancellor in framing his Budget proposals will bear in mind that in Scotland management has attributed a number of recent factory closures wholly and exclusively to the virtual doubling by the Labour Government of road taxation and its effect on road transport costs in areas like Scotland? In view of that, would he view sympathetically the fact that a reduction in this tax would be disproportionately to the advantage of Scotland?
    Mr. Higgins: I am aware that the previous Administration increased the rate of petrol tax from 2s. 9d. to 4s. 6d. a gallon, and my right hon. Friend will bear in mind the points made by my hon. Friend in the course of reviewing indirect taxation before the Budget.
    Mr. Bob Brown: Would the hon. Gentleman recommend to his right hon. Friend that he should reduce the rate of tax by a shilling in his Budget, in keeping with the false promise of the Prime Minister to deal with prices "at a stroke"?
    Mr. Higgins: As I have said, my right hon. Friend will keep the whole of indirect taxation under review before the Budget.

    Building Industry (Bank Loans)
    Mr. Frank Allaunasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if, in view of the further growth in unemployment, he will now permit the banks to put loans to housebuilders in their priority lending list.
    Mr. Maurice Macmillan: I would refer the hon. Member to the answer which I gave him on 24th November last.—[Vol. 807. c. 56.]
    Mr. Allaun: Is not the inability to obtain loans the main reason why 1,300 building firms have crashed in the last 12 months at a time of desperate housing need?
    Mr. Macmillan: There are many factors which govern building starts, which began to pick up towards the end of last year. I would not like to attribute weight between them.
    Mr. Crawshaw: In view of the fact that the Government have cut down local authority building, is not the only possibility open to people the obtaining of housing through private builders? Will the hon. Gentleman try to ensure that private builders are allowed to remain in business?
    Mr. Macmillan: There is no particular case for giving a higher priority to builders than to other people in similar difficulties.

    Prices
    Mr. Horamasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if, in view of the evidence presented by Treasury civil servants to the Wilberforce Committee to the effect that prices will rise by 6½ per cent. in 1971, he will reconsider his decision not to impose a price freeze this year.
    Mr. Barber: No such evidence was presented.
    Mr. Horam: Would the Chancellor not agree that if a measure of price control were introduced this year, it would enable him to negotiate a voluntary element of wage restraint with the unions even at this stage? Would he not agree that this would not have any harmful effects on the economy, and indeed would have positive effects on inflation, on the rate of employment and on growth?
    Mr. Barber: Those remarks go very much wider than the original question, which is about alleged evidence given to the Wilberforce Court of Inquiry. With great respect, the hon. Gentleman should get his facts straight before putting down a Question.
    Hon. Members: Look who is talking!
    Mr. Barber: It is quite clear that the hon. Gentleman has never even taken the trouble to read the evidence.
    Mr. Bruce-Gardyne: Would my right hon. Friend try to get it into the heads of hon. Members opposite that if he were to impose a price freeze at the present time of galloping wage-cost inflation, this would simply remove what has been left of profit margins after the behaviour of the Labour Government, which destroyed all incentive to industrial investment?
    Mr. Barber: My hon. Friend is absolutely right.
    Mr. Taverne: Could the right hon. Gentleman clear up one point? There was a report in the Press after this inquiry about a projection of price increases in the next year. Was nothing said about this at all, or was this a pure invention of the reporter concerned in a perfectly reputable paper?
    Mr. Barber: The evidence is in the Library of the House of Commons for
    1588
    hon. Members to read. The hon. and learned Gentleman will see that Sir Donald MacDougall said that he was giving,
    "a purely hypothetical example".
    He went on to say:
    "This is, I repeat, a purely hypothetical example. It is not a forecast. It is not a policy."
    These were facts which were given to assist the court.

    Retirement Pensions
    Mr. Hardyasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what is the amount and the proportion by which the purchasing power of the single person's retirement pension has fallen since 1st July, 1970; and by how much it is expected to fall by 1st July, 1971.
    Mr. Higgins: The purchasing power of the single rate fell by the equivalent of 18 new pence or 3·5 per cent. between mid-June and mid-December, 1970. It is not usual to publish forecasts of possible changes in the future purchasing power of pensions.
    Mr. Hardy: Would not the Minister agree that the considerable increase in prices in recent months are likely to be very much dwarfed by those which are to come? Since the purchasing power of old-age pensions deteriorates daily, does he not agree that the Government should do something urgently?
    Mr. Higgins: No, I would not concede the point the hon. Gentleman made. It is not usual to make forecasts of this kind. In regard to the overall position, clearly inflation is a very serious problem for pensioners, and the Government are determined to win the fight against it.
    Dame Irene Ward: Could I ask the whole of the Treasury Bench, from top to bottom, to remember that there are quite a lot of pledges in the Tory Manifesto, and that my own requirement is that those living on small fixed incomes should have something done for them since the Labour Government so destroyed the standards of these people? Could I be assured that the Treasury Bench as a whole will have a conference to find out what it can do in the Budget, because I shall be watching and listening?
    Mr. Higgins: I sympathise with what my hon. Friend said, and she may rest

    1589
    assured that we shall certainly have a conference before the Budget. As for election pledges, I stress that we are determined to fulfil them all. If my hon. Friend will look at the manifesto, she will see that we have already succeeded in fulfilling a considerable number in a short period of time.
    Mr. Arthur Lewis: Which ones?
    Mr. Michael Cocks: Does not the hon. Gentleman agree, in view of the increased cost of living that many elderly people have to face, that his Department should give consideration to the totally unfair system whereby retired women have to continue to pay prescription charges up to the age of 65? This costs a great deal of money to many people and it is totally unfair. Is he aware that a measure to deal with this would be warmly welcomed on this side of the House?
    Mr. Higgins: This is a matter for my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Social Services, but it depends on circumstances in individual cases.

    Publication, "Your Guide to Decimal Money"
    Mr. Haselhurstasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer how many copies of the publication, "Your Guide to Decimal Money", have been put into circulation; what period was required for their printing; and on which date the text was approved.
    Mr. Higgins: I am informed by the Decimal Currency Board that it estimates that approximately 15 million copies of the booklet were distributed to households before the postal strike. The remainder of the Question is a matter for the Board, and I understand that the Chairman is writing to my hon. Friend.
    Mr. Haselhurst: Does not my hon. Friend agree that it was at least unfortunate and perhaps irregular that the Decimal Currency Board should have assumed, in framing paragraph 30 of the booklet, that the Post Office charges were going to be acceded to for 1st January, when this was not the commitment of the Government and the matter was still before the Users' Council?
    Mr. Higgins: This is a matter for the Board, and I will ensure that the point is drawn to the Chairman's attention.

    Industrial Investment
    Mr. Barnettasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what effect he estimates his taxation and monetary measures will have on industrial investment in 1971 and 1972.
    Mr. Maurice Macmillan: It is not possible to make a precise estimate. The Government's economic policies as a whole are designed to help create a climate favourable to investment.
    Mr. Barnett: Would it not be true to say that the Government's economic policies as a whole are having disastrous effects on industrial investment, as the figures from the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry show? In view of the serious consequences for the years ahead, have the Government still no intention of changing their policies?
    Mr. Macmillan: The latest survey of investment intentions shows that firms expect a small fall between 1970 and 1971 and no great change between 1971 and 1972. So the investment position is by no means satisfactory. In so far as it is exacerbated by shortage of cash, my right hon. Friend's reduction of corporation tax and other changes have helped. But, as the Treasury Memorandum to the recent Court of Inquiry made clear, one of the most adverse effects on investment is caused by the shortage and narrowing of profit margins, and this again is very much the Government's concern.
    Mr. Hordern: Is it not extraordinary that the Opposition should dare to put down a Question on the effects of taxation on industrial investment, since they increased the rate of corporation tax from 35 per cent. to 45 per cent., whereas the first action of my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer was to reduce the level?
    Mr. Macmillan: My hon. Friend is perfectly right. One of the difficulties has been the increasing rate of taxation of profits under the previous Government.
    Mr. Roy Jenkins: Does not the hon. Gentleman agree—I am sure he must—that many factors other than taxation bear upon the level of investment? Could he tell us when the survey of investment intentions last showed a fall?
    Mr. Macmillan: I have not got that information. Indeed, it is another question. Among other factors which affect investment is the rate of inflation, which is increased by the extremely inflationary wage demands which have come about, particularly since the controls were abandoned by the right hon. Gentleman just before the General Election.

    Balance of Payments
    Mr. Sheldonasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what estimate he has made of the balance of payments out-turn for the first quarter of 1971.
    Mr. Dykesasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what was the balance of payments out-turn for the United Kingdom for 1970 and the estimated out-turn for the financial year 1970–71.
    Mr. Barber: I expect a current surplus of about £600 million for 1970, and perhaps more. Detailed estimates of the balance of payments for last year and for the first quarter of 1971 will be published in March and June respectively.
    Mr. Sheldon: Since the balance of payments surplus is running at a level very much higher than expected by the Government, why is the right hon. Gentleman operating so restrictive an economic policy? In particular, why is he permitting records levels of unemployment and bankruptcies, the lowest level of industrial investment and a high level of inflation, all at the same time? Are these achievements of which he can be proud?
    Mr. Barber: The first necessity if we are to get these things right is to curb the present level of inflation. I am sure that the House agrees on that. The steps we are taking are designed to achieve that objective.
    Mr. Dykes: Would not my right hon. Friend agree that the curbing of the existing rate of inflation could go hand in hand with a faster deliberate policy of increasing real resources, bearing in mind that the balance of payments would help towards that end?
    Mr. Barber: The first necessity if we are to get an adequate rate of growth—which has been the aim of all Governments over the years but they have not been successful in achieving it—is to curb the present rate of cost inflation.
    Mr. James Hamilton: Bearing in mind the balance of payments surplus, will the right hon. Gentleman take cognisance of the point of view of the T.U.C. that we should have an expansionist policy? Is he aware that the next figures for Scotland will show 125,000 people unemployed? Is he not prepared to do something about it before it is too late?
    Mr. Barber: One of the reasons for the present high level of unemployment is without doubt the present high level of wage demands and wage settlements. There is no doubt about that. Sometimes I think that those trade union leaders who put in claims for excessive increases do not appreciate that by doing so they are causing unemployment among their own members.
    Mr. Kenneth Baker: In view of the encouraging figures my right hon. Friend has given, what progress does he expect to make this year in the repayment of overseas debt, the legacy which the last Government left us, of over £1,500 million?
    Mr. Barber: One of the reasons why we have to have a high level of surplus on our current account is this very heavy load of short and medium term debt to repay—a debt left to us by our predecessors.
    Mr. Roy Jenkins: Will the right hon. Gentleman tell us what, if any, is the amount of short-term debt outstanding?
    Mr. Barber: I can tell the right hon. Gentleman that, since the third quarter, published repayments for short and medium-term debt have totalled £156 million.
    Mr. Jenkins: Is there any short-term debt outstanding?
    Mr. Barber: The right hon. Gentleman knows perfectly well that these figures will be published at the normal time. [Interruption.] He also knows perfectly well that we are following the practice followed by the last Government.

    Selective Employment Tax
    Mr. William Hamiltonasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what has been the total net amount of revenue collected in each year from selective employment tax; and what estimate he

    1593
    has made of the reduction in prices consequent on the proposed abolition of the tax in April.
    Mr. Skinnerasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what estimate he has made of price reductions following the proposed abolition of selective employment tax.
    Mr. Maurice Macmillan: The net yield from S.E.T. from its introduction has been: 1966–67, £303 million; 1967–68, £325 million; 1968–69, £438 million; 1969–70. £527 million. The price effects of abolishing S.E.T. will depend on a number of variable factors. I have no statement to make on timing.
    Mr. Hamilton: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that the Prime Minister had a statement to make on this matter on 16th June last when he told Mr. Alastair Burnet in a T.V. interview that it was the Government's intention to introduce in their first Budget a package deal specifically dealing with the reduction of direct taxation and the abolition of S.E.T.? This commitment was made on 16th June. Why cannot we have a degree of honest government for a change?
    Mr. Macmillan: In so far as the hon. Gentleman's supplementary has any point at all, it is asking me to anticipate my right hon. Friend's Budget in a way which he knows perfectly well I cannot do.
    Mr. Skinner: Will the Minister assure the House that if there are to be any hypothetical price reductions as a result of the abolition of S.E.T. they will not be taken "at a stroke"?
    Mr. Macmillan: The abolition of selective employment tax reduces one element of labour costs. It has no effect on other elements, such as inflationary wage increases. The price effects of a reduction in selective employment tax. therefore, could easily be overshadowed by cost inflation.
    Mrs. Knight: Will my hon. Friend bear in mind that many hon. Members on this side of the House are extremely anxious about the abolition of this tax put on by the previous Government because there is a real connection between it and the rocketing of prices?
    Mr. Macmillan: Yes. My hon. Friend has made it quite clear that this Govern-
    1594
    ment have promised to take off selective employment tax——
    Hon. Members: When?
    Mr. Macmillan:—and will do so.
    Hon. Members: When?
    Mr. Macmillan: To ask "When?" at this stage is to invite the only answer which any Treasury Minister can give to such a question: I cannot anticipate my right hon. Friend's Budget.

    European Economic Community
    Mr. Deakinsasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer why he does not intend to publish the results of his studies of the proposals for economic and monetary union put forward by the European Economic Community Commission, when these studies have been completed.
    Mr. Barber: It has never been the practice of this, or any other, Government to publish the official advice which Ministers have before them when reaching their conclusions on matters of this kind.
    Mr. Deakins: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware of the widespread concern, both in this House and in the country, about the implications of these revolutionary proposals for economic and monetary union, particularly for parliamentary control of taxation? Why, therefore, on an issue of this magnitude and importance should the Treasury keep this advice secret?
    Mr. Barber: The Question refers to the proposals of the European Economic Commission. As the hon. Gentleman well knows, those proposals have now been overtaken by the agreement reached by the Six at their meeting on 8th and 9th of this month. As I have already said elsewhere, I welcome the conclusion reached by the Six on that occasion.
    Mr. Scott-Hopkins: Does my right hon. Friend agree that the Six have arranged a programme for their proposals stretching over 10 years and that if we have the opportunity of joining the Common Market in the next three years we shall be able to play an important part in the development of those proposals?
    Mr. Barber: My hon. Friend is quite right. I see no serious problems for the

    1595
    United Kingdom under the first stage proposals which have been agreed. Thereafter, if we are able to archieve acceptable conditions for entry we shall play a major part in the future of the Community.
    Mr. Laurance Reedasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what would be the effect on sterling of British entry into the European Economic Community.
    Mr. Barber: The Government believe that entry into the European Economic Community on acceptable terms will be economically beneficial and, therefore, favourable to sterling.
    Mr. Reed: Would the Chancellor agree that constant exchange rates between different currencies are essential in any customs union and, therefore, in any common market which provides for the free flow of capital between the various countries involved?
    Mr. Barber: Nothing in the rules of the Community as far as that is concerned is inconsistent with the rules of the I.M.F.

    Wealth Tax
    Mr. Deakinsasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he intends to propose a wealth tax in the forthcoming Budget.
    Mr. Maurice Macmillan: I cannot anticipate my right hon. Friend's Budget statement.
    Mr. Deakins: Will the hon. Gentleman use his undoubted influence with his right hon. Friend to put this forward as a serious proposition for the Budget, not only as a revenue raiser but as a means of ensuring the essential pre-conditions for a socially just prices and incomes policy?
    Mr. Macmillan: I am not sure whether my transmission of the hon. Gentleman's recommendation, coming from the source that it does, would necessarily carry much weight with my right hon. Friend.
    Sir B. Rhys Williams: Will my hon. Friend bear in mind that the introduction of a highly complex new tax in the forthcoming Budget would finally almost certainly break the back of the Inland Revenue?
    Mr. Macmillan: I think perhaps that a characteristic of some of the suggestions put forward in these matters has been to ignore the extent to which they increase the work load particularly of the Inland Revenue.

    Governor of the Bank of England (Meeting)
    Dr. Gilbertasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer when he next expects to have an official meeting with the Governor of the Bank of England.
    Mr. Barber: Soon.
    Dr. Gilbert: I am glad to hear that. May I ask whether, when the Chancellor next has a meeting with the Governor, we may expect some relief from having to suffer under the highest system of interest rates in the industrialised world, which is leading us, despite the right hon. Gentleman's election pledges, to three consequences, all of them unfavourable: a drop in investment, an increase in the bankruptcy rate, and an inflow of hot money?
    Mr. Barber: The meetings which I have with the Governor of the Bank of England are, of course, private. I have no doubt that the Governor of the Bank of England will take note of what the hon. Gentleman has said.

    Trustee Investments
    Mr. Tilneyasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what action is taken by Her Majesty's Government to alert investors in the obligations of public boards and other securities in the narrow range for trustee investments that any particular public authority is making losses not guaranteed by Her Majesty's Government; and what action is taken by Her Majesty's Government, when such public authority partially or wholly defaults, as to announcing the eligibility or not for buying or retaining its obligations outside or inside the narrow range by trustees limited by the Trustee Act.
    Mr. Maurice Macmillan: A trustee dependent on the general law for his trust powers is responsible for managing his trust's investments in accordance with the relevant Acts. It would be wrong for the Government to assume the responsibilities which my hon. Friend suggests.
    Mr. Tilney: Is my hon. Friend aware that the partial default by the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board is the first by a public board, at least in this century? Despite there being four Government members on the board, no bond-holder received the accounts and was, therefore, aware that the board was getting into financial difficulties. May this not be happening with other public boards?
    Mr. Macmillan: The status of a public trustee company or the fact that a security has trustee status has never implied any kind of Government guarantee or, indeed, that it is a perfectly safe investment. The rules are exactly the same. This particular type of investment is open to trustees in the narrower range fund with advice. It is up to the advisers of investors to guide them in their investments.
    Mr. Barnett: In view of the serious effect on local government investment generally and on other bonds, may I ask whether the hon. Gentleman will reconsider his decision to refuse to intervene and to change the callous decision to allow thousands of small investors to carry this burden?
    Mr. Macmillan: What the hon. Gentleman suggests is that the Government should guarantee every form of public investment, including local authority investment. This has never been the position of any Government. This Government do not propose to take it up.
    The future arrangements for the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board are governed by the Private Bill brought forward by the Board.

    Company Trading Profits and Employment Income
    Mr. Martenasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer by what percentage the gross trading profits of companies have risen between 1964 and 1970 and, in the same period, income from employment.
    Mr. Higgins: Between 1964 and the first three quarters of 1970 the level of the gross trading profits of companies (adjusted for nationalisation) increased by 11 per cent. and that of income from employment by 52 per cent.
    Mr. Marten: Does this not confirm that the narrowing of profit margins has had very adverse effects upon investment and, therefore, on our growth rate?
    Mr. Higgins: I certainly agree with my hon. Friend that the figures underline how far the rate of growth of wages and salaries has outstripped the growth of company profits in recent years. During the past year there has been a narrowing of profit margins because prices have recently been substantially less than earnings, which constitute a major part of companies costs. I also agree with him that this is a very worrying trend with important implications for future growth and for the sustainable growth of real income.
    Mr. Barnett: Will the hon. Gentleman confirm, therefore, that it is the Government's policy to encourage and maximise the growth of profits and, therefore, to do nothing whatever about price increases? What effect does he think this will have on wage negotiations?
    Mr. Higgins: The hon. Gentleman has got it exactly upside down. It is quite clear from our policy that we believe the important thing is to have a de-escalation of wage settlements, which will in turn have an effect on prices, tending to reduce them.

    Investment Incentives
    Mr. Kenneth Bakerasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he will take steps to modify the scheme for investment incentives to allow the balance after the initial allowance of 60 per cent. to be written off on a straight line rather than reducing balance basis.
    Mr. Maurice Macmillan: No: this would be contrary to my right hon. Friend's intention of simplifying capital allowances.
    Mr. Baker: Could I press the Minister to look at this again before the publication of the Finance Bill since industry will find it much easier to write off the balance of 40 per cent. in equal annual instalments rather than in indeterminable amounts over an indeterminable number of years?
    Mr. Macmillan: The straight line method appears to be the simpler but it is more complicated in the end. Certainly

    1599
    only a small proportion of the traders actually elect for that system as opposed to the other. I will certainly look at what my hon. Friend says.

    Personal Taxation Data
    Mr. Leslie Huckfieldasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what proposals he has for the integration of personal taxation data with information stored in other Government-owned databanks.
    Mr. Higgins: None, Sir.
    Mr. Huckfield: I wonder whether the hon. Gentleman is aware of what is going on in his own Department. Is he aware that the Civil Service Department says that there are such proposals? Are these to be the first steps towards the creation of a centralised Government transaction centre?
    Mr. Higgins: No. I have nothing to add to my previous answer.
    Sir B. Rhys Williams: Is my hon. Friend aware of the overwhelming administrative advantages in the integration of the income tax system with National Insurance?
    Mr. Higgins: I am well aware of my hon. Friend's views on this subject but I think that that is a different question.

    Tax Avoidance (Advertisements)
    Mr. Meacherasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he will introduce legislation to prohibit the placing of advertisements in public places which recommend the avoidance of income tax, surtax or estate duty in a manner designed to circumvent the intention of Parliament.
    Mr. Higgins: No, Sir.
    Mr. Meacher: Does the Minister not regard what is, in effect, the connivance of public advertisements, blatantly encouraging the circumvention of estate duty liability, as being inconsistent with the traditional hostility of the Conservative Party to the scrounger who is by definition circumventing his obligations to the community? Is this not yet a further instance of the class bias of the Conservative Party inasmuch as tax avoidance by the rich is condoned as a wife hus-
    1600
    banding of assets, while obtaining extra benefits——
    Hon. Members: Too long.
    Mr. Meacher:—and getting extra income to assist low income families is regarded as fraudulent and as an action liable to prosecution? Is this not a case of one law for the rich and one law for the poor, except that in this case if someone cheats the State in a small way, then he is a socially disreputable malingerer?
    Mr. Higgins: I do not agree with the views expressed by the hon. Gentleman. Tax evasion is dealt with by legislation.

  LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (SPEECH)
  Mr. Arthur Davidsonasked the Prime Minister if the public speech of the Lord President of the Council to the Newspaper Society in London on Government policy towards the Press on 19th January represents Government policy.
  The Prime Minister (Mr. Edward Heath): Yes, Sir.
  Mr. Davidson: Could I tempt the Prime Minister to go a little further with regard to the Government's intentions towards the Official Secrets Act than his right hon. Friend was, understandably, able to go in what was a very interesting speech? Would the Prime Minister not agree that the only circumstances in which officialdom is justified in keeping facts secret from the public is where national security and defence are at risk? Would he not further accept that Section 2 of the Official Secrets Act, which is now utterly discredited and has been for some time operating against the public interest, should be abolished forthwith on its own?
  The Prime Minister: The points which the hon. Gentleman has made are of the greatest importance. They were quite rightly emphasised by my right hon. Friend, and I have drawn attention to them in the past. The Government thought it right to wait until the conclusion of the case which has recently been before the courts before making any statement about this matter. My right hon. Friend the Home Secretary will be making a statement in the very near future dealing with the points raised by the hon. Gentleman.
  Mr. Harold Wilson: Is the Prime Minister aware that we took the same view about this that we must wait for this case to be heard? I think that some work had been done, as he will find, about terms of reference and possible personnel. On this question of official secrets and making information available, is he aware that, despite the debates we have had on Rolls-Royce, we do not feel that either this House or the public have been given the information required upon which to form a view about the issues involved? Is he aware that there is a strong feeling on this side of the House, and probably more widely, that it would be desirable to set up a Select Committee to inquire into the Rolls-Royce case at the earliest opportunity?
  The Prime Minister: I agree with the right hon. Gentleman that both major parties in the House have given considerable thought to the question of the Official Secrets Act over a long Period of time. As to the last point, as the right hon. Gentleman knows, the firm is to call a special meeting to ask for authority to request a full inquiry by the Department of Trade. This is the procedure laid down under our existing law, and it seems to be the right procedure to follow.

  COMMONWEALTH (MEMBERSHIP)
  Dr. Gilbertasked the Prime Minister whether he made any proposals at the recent Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference for widening the membership of the Commonwealth.
  The Prime Minister: There were no applications for membership pending, and no Head of Government put forward proposals for widening the membership of the Commonwealth.
  Dr. Gilbert: Can we have an undertaking from the Prime Minister that, should the membership of the Commonwealth be depleted by his persistence in trying to sell arms to his unattractive friends in Southern Africa, there will be no question of his trying to lend respectability to the régimes in South Africa or Rhodesia as long as they have racist legislation on their Statute Books?
  The Prime Minister: There is no need for anyone to leave the Commonwealth because of disagreements on any political subject whatever. This was quite rightly emphasised by the Prime Minister of Canada. As to any future membership or additional membership of the Commonwealth, that has always been a matter for consultation with all Governments in the Commonwealth.
  Mr. Walters: Is my right hon. Friend aware that many people in this country who wish the Commonwealth well have for a long time felt that if it is to survive it must move from myth to reality, and. therefore, they welcome the fact that at Singapore a realistic attitude was taken?
  The Prime Minister: I think the great majority of Heads of Government present came to the conclusion at the Singapore Conference that if the Commonwealth is to be meaningful we need to have a fresh, new form of meeting in which we can be absolutely frank with each other in private and in which we can exchange views in confidence.
  Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: Did the Prime Minister at Singapore ever tell the Commonwealth Prime Ministers that what the argument was all about was four Westland helicopters? If he had done so, does the right hon. Gentleman think that there would have been all this commotion about anybody leaving the Commonwealth?
  The Prime Minister: The Heads of Government at Singapore were told of the legal obligations on Her Majesty's Government, which, of course, were exactly as set out by the Law Officers in their advice to the House. At the same time they were told that the Government considered that British policy required the use of Simonstown and, therefore, that the South African Navy, which has been operating with us under that Agreement, should have the necessary replacements if it required them.
  Mr. Sandys: Before we enlarge the Commonwealth, would it not be a good thing to ensure that all the existing members are fully implementing the principles contained in the declaration approved in Singapore regarding racial discrimination, individual freedom and democratic government? Will my right

  1603
  hon. Friend consider asking the Commonwealth Secretariat to assemble information on this matter?
  The Prime Minister: All the Heads of Government accepted the declaration at Singapore; and, of course, responsibility for implementing it rests on each of them individually.

  CENTRAL POLICY REVIEW STAFF
  Mr. Barnettasked the Prime Minister what plans he has for a meeting with the Confederation of British Industry to discuss the membership of the Central Capability Unit.
  The Prime Minister: None, Sir. I have already made it clear that the Central Policy Review Staff will not be composed of representatives of special groups.
  Mr. Barnett: Does not the Prime Minister need the advice of the C.B.I., or certainly of someone, if he is to avoid a repetition of the sort of shambles we had last week over the Rolls-Royce affair and his handling of it? Will he therefore consider—bearing in mind the fact that one of his Ministers committed the Government to unlimited funds to beat any foreign bid—that this is perhaps the most expensive way of bailing out any company?
  The Prime Minister: This is not a matter which is the concern of the Central Policy Review Staff, either now or in the future.
  Mr. Ashley: Is there not a great danger of the C.B.I. becoming jealous of the Prime Minister's constant promises to strengthen the trade unions? Would the right hon. Gentleman explain to the C.B.I. which aspect of his policies is most calculated to strengthen the trade unions? Is it the policy of imposing a straitjacket on the trade unions or the policy of imposing a record rate of unempolyment on their members?
  The Prime Minister: The Industrial Relations Bill has been debated for many days, and several days still remain for it to be debated. The hon. Gentleman will, therefore, have several opportunities of being informed on this matter. It is, of course, a serious one. I have always
  1604
  believed in having a strong trade union leadership—[Interruption.]—and, similarly, in having a strong employers' organisation, because my experience as Minister of Labour showed me that one gets the healthiest industrial relations when employers and trade unions make agreements which they can each see are carried out.

  JAMAICA (VISIT)
  Mr. John Fraserasked the Prime Minister if he will seek to pay an official visit to Jamaica.
  The Prime Minister: I have no plans at present to do so.
  Mr. Fraser: If the right hon. Gentleman cannot go to Jamaica, will he convey to the Prime Minister of that country the fact that Britain will not change its pattern of trade in bananas with Jamaica in such a way as adversely to affect the livelihood of about 80,000 growers there?
  Because of the damage that this does to Britain's reputation in Jamaica and other Commonwealth countries, will the right hon. Gentleman make it clear to the Prime Minister of Jamaica that Her Majesty's Government and this Parliament disagree completely with the odious, repugnant and racial views of the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Mr. Powell), as expressed last night on the subject of repatriation?
  The Prime Minister: The hon. Gentleman is right to say that the future of the banana industry is of vital importance to Jamaica. The Prime Minister of Jamaica raised this matter with me in New York during the Special Assembly of the United Nations, and, as a result, we were able to make certain investigations, and I discussed the subject further with him at Singapore.
  The hon. Gentleman may be aware that Lord Justice Denning carried out an inquiry. This, unfortunately, did not lead to a solution, and I therefore proposed to the Prime Minister in Singapore that there should be a further attempt between the Jamaica Banana Board and Fyffes to make an agreement which would be in the interests of Jamaica, and said that we would make our good offices available to that end. I am glad to say that there

  1605
  will be a meeting on 22nd February to try to work out a fresh agreement between them.
  The answer to the second part of the hon. Gentleman's supplementary question is that my right hon. Friend was expressing his own views in his own way; and my attitude to this is already clearly known.

  DEVELOPMENT AREAS (VISITS)
  Mr. Sillarsasked the Prime Minister if he will now arrange a programme of official visits to the development areas.
  The Prime Minister: I intend to go to Scotland next month, but at present I have no specific plans for other visits.
  Mr. Sillars: When the Prime Minister finally gets round to visiting the regions, will he have the decency to apologise to the unemployed people for the promise he made on 16th June to cut unemployment "at a stroke"? [Interruption.] Whatever hon. Gentlemen opposite say, that is the promise which the right hon. Gentleman made. Will he have the honesty to admit that rising unemployment is due to the fact that the Government have made a shambles of both economic policy and regional policy?
  The Prime Minister: When one looks at the consequences of Labour rule and the loss of jobs during the four and a half years of Labour Administration, I am astonished that the hon. Gentleman has the nerve to ask such a supplementary question.
  Dame Irene Ward: Am I right in thinking that my right hon. Friend is, to our great pleasure, coming to Northumberland next month? Is he aware that we are looking forward to his visit with great enthusiasm? Does he know that I could give him a wonderful list of things that he could do while he is with us?
  The Prime Minister: My hon. Friend is right. I shall be going to the North-East. [Interruption.] It will be a party visit. The Question was about a programme of official visits. I thank my hon. Friend for her comments, and, as for her suggestion, I remind the House
  1606
  that she is constantly making suggestions to me.
  Mr. Grimond: If the right hon. Gentleman intends to accept only the most attractive offers, will be encourage other Ministers to visit other areas—where the feminist influence may not be as strong—to discuss Government policy, the unemployment situation, emigration from these areas and the fact that in many of them wages are being left far behind while prices are rising all the time?
  The Prime Minister: Yes, Sir. I certainly encourage other Ministers to make such visits. In fact, more than 20 visits have been made to the North-East and North-West in the last six months or so. As far as Scotland is concerned, there are, of course, the Scottish Ministers, though others visit these areas as well.
  Mr. Harold Wilson: Is the right hon. Gentleman now in a position to answer the question which I have repeatedly put to him since before Christmas and to his Deputy while he was at Singapore? Can he now state the number of firms about which he has information which were negotiating for new factories or were building factories in development areas but which have pulled out of those negotiations or have postponed them because of the change in Government policy away from investment grants or because of any other reason?
  Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the complaint is now widespread in industry that industrialists do not know where they stand in relation to investment grants, on the general position for development areas and in other ways? Will he now state all the facts he has on this matter?
  The Prime Minister: There is absolutely no reason for firms not to understand what the position is in relation to investment grants or investment allowances. This has been made perfectly clear, and, as I have repeatedly told the House, the differential benefit to the development areas—taking free depreciation and the special arrangements under the Local Employment Acts—will be the same at least as under the existing scheme. [Interruption.]
  As to the right hon. Gentleman's supplementary question about numbers, my

  1607
  hon. Friend the Minister for Industry gave these figures on 8th February to the House, when he said that there were two cases in which firms had abandoned their plans in part on the grounds of a change in investment incentives. As far as other changes are concerned, I understand that 37 firms have been reviewing their position but that the investment allowances were not necessarily the reason.
  Mr. Harold Wilson: If the right hon. Gentleman says that the position is clear and that there is no excuse for firms not to know all about it—he will be aware of the very large number of representations that have been made to the Government—for example, affecting a large number of small firms in relation to investment grants, hire purchase contracts and so on—and if it is clear to the industries concerned and if it is clearly clear to the right hon. Gentleman, would he tell us what the position is?
  The Prime Minister: If the right hon. Gentleman cares to let me have details of cases in which these problems arise, they will be investigated. We cannot deal with the cases of individual firms at Question Time.
  Mr. Tilney: Will my right hon. Friend take it that he will be a most welcome visitor to the development area of Merseyside, and that if he would visit us soon, he could see the potential site of a national airport which, in conjunction with fast customs trains on British Railways, would provide a superb boost to industry and morale in South-West Lancashire and North Cheshire?
  The Prime Minister: I am always glad to visit Merseyside, and I shall certainly consider that proposition.
  Mr. Heffer: The Prime Minister is not my favourite visitor to Merseyside, but I think that it would be a good idea if he came so that he could, perhaps, look at the high level of unemployment there, which is now about to be further worsened because of the Lucas difficulties resulting from the Rolls-Royce affair. Would he look also at the difficulties of the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board, directly the responsibility of the Government, and, further, would he tell the people of Merseyside that he will ensure
  1608
  that they have in future a much better deal than they have had up to now from his Government?
  The Prime Minister: In fact, it was the Conservative Government between 1959 and 1961 which persuaded the motor industry to go to Merseyside. Moreover, this Government have absolutely no responsibility for the situation of the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board, or for the situation of Rolls-Royce. If the hon. Gentleman, for his part, were prepared to do what he could to improve industrial relations on Merseyside, he would see a much better response in the docks.
  Mr. Ross: When the right hon. Gentleman comes to Glasgow, will he make a point of visiting the Rolls-Royce factories there, because I have a feeling that he will be very warmly received when he comes? Second, is he aware that his policies are so antiquated that the Scottish Office has produced a Rate Support Grant Order, 1971, giving the domestic element for the year 1872? Is it not time that the Government came up to date?
  The Prime Minister: I shall give no undertaking to visit any particular factory when I am in West Central Scotland, but I shall certainly have the opportunity to study the situation there.

MR. SPEAKER KING'S RETIREMENT BILL
Mr. Arthur Lewis: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I am sorry that I have not been able to give you notice of the matter, but it has arisen only in the last moment or two. You will recall that at 10 o'clock this morning I prophesied that the Government would try to get through on the nod the Bill dealing with Mr. Speaker King's pension. On page 5885 of today's Order Paper, what I prophesied has come true, for the fifth Order of the Day is Mr. Speaker King's Retirement Bill. The Bill is put down without suspension of the Standing Order in the hope that it will go through on the nod.
My point of order arises in this way, Mr. Speaker. There is no such Bill available, or there was not up to two minutes ago. Is it in order for the Government

1609
to try to get a Second Reading for a Bill which is not available, trying to slip it through without suspension, which means that hon. Members have no chance of reading the Bill or of preparing Amendments? Until 3.30 this afternoon no such Bill was available to hon. Members.
The Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons (Mr. William Whitelaw): Further to that point of order, Mr. Speaker. Perhaps I should make clear to the hon. Gentleman and the House that, since the Bill is founded on a Ways and Means Resolution, it is automatically exempted business and no suspension is required for it. It can be debated if and when it comes up tonight.
Mr. Lewis: But there is no Bill.
Mr. Speaker: It is not out of order to put this Bill down on the Order Paper. As to what happens in regard to it, one can deal with that when the occasion arises. There is no point of order now.
Mr. Lewis: But, surely, Mr. Speaker [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] I am raising a point of order with Mr. Speaker, and I am doing so now because Mr. Speaker will shortly be leaving the Chair when we go into Committee. How can we have the Second Reading of a Bill—the Leader of the House has put his foot further into it now—late at night when there is no chance to see the Bill because it is nonexistent? It means that late at night or early in the morning, we shall have to debate a non-existent Bill, with no chance of Amendment or the opportunity to put forward any ideas or suggestions. Is this not completely anti-democratic?
Mr. Whitelaw: Further to that point of order, Mr. Speaker. Perhaps I might help the House. I understand that the House was anxious to proceed with this matter. However, if there are hon. Members who are not anxious to proceed and who think that it should be delayed, very well, it will not be moved.

ORDERS OF THE DAY

  INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS BILL
  [SEVENTH ALLOTTED DAY]
  Considered in Committee [Progress, 10th February].
  [Sir ROBERT GRANT-FERRIS in the Chair]

  INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS BILL
    Clause 85

      INDUCEMENT OF, OR THREAT TO INDUCE, BREACH OF CONTRACT
      3.35 p.m.
      Mr. David Steel: I beg to move Amendment No. 252, in page 61, line 26, at end insert:
      (c) does so for reasons of conscientious objection to the work involved.
      In its amended form, subsection (1) would read:
      "It shall be an unfair industrial practice for any person, in contemplation or furtherance of an industrial dispute, to induce or threaten to induce another person to break a contract to which that other person is a party, unless the person so inducing or threatening to induce the breach of contract—

      (a) is a trade union or an employers' association, or

      (b) does so within the scope of his authority on behalf of a trade union or an employers' association.

      (c) does so for reasons of conscientious objection to the work involved."

      This is no mere hypothetical point. Here are two examples of occasions when such conscientious objection has been taken in our industrial past. First, there were the Lancashire cotton workers who, during the American Civil War, declined to work with imported cotton which had been picked by slave labour. An industrial stoppage occurred because of a conscientious objection. Similarly, in 1920, some dockers refused to load arms for use against Russian revolutionaries. Again, there was an industrial stoppage for conscientious reasons.
      I suggest three possible ways in which conscientious objection could be taken today. First—a topical example—among persons employed in a firm manufacturing Wasp helicopters, there might be those who wished not to participate in

      1611
      that work while nevertheless being under contract to the company, and there might be other persons outside urging them not to participate in work of that kind. As the Clause stands, would that be regarded as an unfair industrial practice?
      Second, a pacifist employed by an electronics firm may work perfectly happily until he discovers that a piece of work on which he engaged is for armaments of some kind. He may have no objection to continuing to work in another part of the firm, but he may object to working on that particular contract, and he may be advised not to continue on that work by a journal such as Peace News. Again, would that be regarded as an unfair industrial practice under the Clause as it stands?
      Third—I am sorry that the hon. Member for Chelmsford (Mr. St. John-Stevas) is not present, as I owe the inspiration of this example to him—a devout Roman Catholic may be employed in a drug company and suddenly find himself involved in the manufacture of the contraceptive pill. He may legitimately feel this to be contrary to his conscience and wish to take no further part in that production under the general terms of his contract of employment. I doubt if any of us would challenge the right of an individual so to object.
      These are all cases where an individual might feel that he does not want to involve himself in a particular piece of work in the course of his contract of employment. The particular matter of concern in Clause 85 is that these cases might become subjects of public controversy in which journalists, pressure groups and even political parties, who are not covered by the protection offered to the trade unions or employers associations under Clause 85, might all support this person or, in the words of the Clause:
      "induce another person to break a contract".
      The Solicitor-General might reply that inducing someone to disrupt work because of a conscientious objection would not be
      "in contemplation or furtherance of an industrial dispute".
      But we have to turn to Clause 148 to find the definition of an industrial dispute:
      1612
      "'industrial dispute' means a dispute between one or more employers or organisations of employers and one or more workers or organisations of workers, where the dispute relates wholly or mainly to any one or more of the following …
      (c) allocation of work as between workers or groups of workers;"
      This is precisely what a person can legitimately object to—the allocation of a particular piece of work to him.
      "(d) a procedure agreement, or any matter to which in accordance with this section a procedure agreement can relate;".
      An employer might argue that a person being induced to give up his particular employment because of conscientious objection was in breach of a procedure agreement and might claim that it was in furtherance of an industrial dispute and wish to refer the matter to the industrial court.
      I cannot see that the Solicitor-General will be able to give us an assurance on this matter because the interpretation of Clause 85 and of what is or is not an industrial dispute is not for him to give an assurance on but is a matter for interpretation by the Industrial Court, and I should therefore be interested to see what his reaction is. My belief is that unless we insert a line such as this into Clause 85 we shall be introducing, perhaps unwittingly, a gag on the freedom of speech and the freedom of action which we traditionally enjoy.
      Mr. Reg Prentice: I support the Amendment, but the case of the hon. Member for Roxburgh, Selkirk and Peebles (Mr. David Steel) would have been more convincing if the attitude of the Liberal Party to the whole Bill had been more consistent. It takes a mental contortionist to reconcile the sentiments expressed by him with general support for the purposes of the Bill, particularly when the hon. Member expresses doubts whether the Solicitor-General will be able to satisfy him on the narrow point of the Amendment. The logical position for those who support the Amendment is to oppose the whole of Clause 85 and the whole Bill.
      I look forward to hearing from the Solicitor-General on this. He has to explain two things to the Committee. One is the position of workers who, for conscientious reasons are unable or unwilling to handle certain kinds of work.

      1613
      This question probably goes wider than Clause 85 and, if it were to be dealt with properly, would need amendments to be made to other parts of the Bill as well. Secondly, and specifically on Clause 85, he should tell us about the position of those taking part in political or social controversy who urge workers either by speech or by writing not to take part in certain kinds of work.
      3.45 p.m.
      The two historical examples quoted by the hon. Member for Roxburgh, Selkirk and Peebles are particularly apposite to this discussion. In talking of the Lancashire textile workers in the 1860s and the dockers in 1920, we are considering groups of workers who were very poor by our standards even when they had a regular week's work. We are considering groups of workers who faced a heavy degree of unemployment and competition for jobs but who nevertheless decided, as a matter of principle, to make a considerable sacrifice involving themselves and their families because of the issues involved. The Lancashire cotton workers in the 1860s were saying that they would not be party to anything which would seem to be supporting the Confederacy in the civil war and the cause of slavery in the United States. In 1920 the dockers said that they would not handle arms which were to be used for counter-revolutionary purposes in Russia.
      We are not considering an academic point but a situation in terms that can be relevant in 1971. If the Conservative Government go ahead with their outrageous proposal to resume arms sales to South Africa, I hope and believe that the workers involved will refuse to manufacture or handle those arms. Certainly, there will be many of us who will urge them to take this view, whether or not the Industrial Relations Bill is on the Statute Book. As the Government know, a wide spectrum of the nation is opposed to the resumption of arms sales to South Africa, and I would not like to say who is covered by the point we are considering. I am wondering whether such pillars of the Establishment as the Editor of The Times, the Chairman of the Bow Group or the Archbishop of Canterbury, might fall foul of Clause 85 if they go on with their opposition to Government policy and suggest, as many will, that the
      1614
      workers concerned should not handle arms for South Africa.
      I put it to the Solicitor-General that, by any standards that should be acceptable to any political party, including the Conservative Party, it would be an intolerable invasion of liberty to pass an Act of Parliament that will limit the ability of workers to act as the Lancashire cotton workers acted in the 1860s or as the dockers acted in 1920. Equally, it would be an intolerable invasion of liberty, even by Conservative Party standards, to suggest that people should not speak or write in favour of them taking action of that kind. The Solicitor-General should either therefore accept the Amendment or find another way of covering the point. If he cannot or will not do so, the logic for all of us, and certainly for the Liberal Party is to oppose the whole Clause and the whole Bill.
      Mr. Stanley Orme: I support the Amendment. I was interested that the hon. Member for Roxburgh, Selkirk and Peebles (Mr. David Steel) instanced the Lancashire cotton workers opposing slavery in the United States and the dockers in London opposing the loading of arms on to the "Jolly George" in 1920. If this argument is followed to its logical conclusion, the cotton workers who suffered so bitterly in the nineteenth century and the dockers who fought so hard in 1920 were exercising collectively their right as trade unionists.
      As my right hon. Friend the Member for East Ham, North (Mr. Prentice) has said, it ill behoves the Liberals, who supported the regressive measures of the Bill which will weaken and break the trade union movement, such as Clause 5, to say that it is morally right to oppose the manufacture of arms for South Africa but not right for people collectively to bind themselves together as a trade union.
      I do not think that anyone who speaks on this issue can be accused of having illiberal views on social matters in overseas countries. It is very much like the argument which is heard so often and which advocates——
      Mr. John Pardoe: What about the Kenya Asians?
      Mr. Orme: I include the Kenya Asians. I voted against the Kenya Asians Bill.

      1615
      Let us have that on record. I voted against the Second Reading of that Bill.
      As I was saying, people frequently hold up the plight of those being exploited in countries overseas. I stand second to none in the fight against such exploitation, whether it be in Africa, Asia or anywhere else. But those same people, by supporting this Bill, are attacking the trade unionists whom they ask to oppose, say, the manufacture of arms for South Africa. The argument advanced by the hon. Member for Roxburgh, Selkirk and Peebles is neither logical nor right. Anyone who supports Clause 5 or the other punitive Clauses has no right to adopt this attitude now. Workers will be weakened to a tremendous extent if this Bill and all its rigours are introduced, especially when we come to consider secondary action in this regard, as we shall when we deal with Clauses 85, 86 and 87. It is no good urging people to take such action if they are to be denied their basic rights at home. They will be made into second-class citizens, never mind about supporting people overseas who are second-class citizens.
      Mr. Tom King: If I follow the hon. Gentleman's argument, it is that people will only take a stand on points of principle and conscience if they are members of a closed shop or a united union body. I apologise for my ignorance about the two examples which have been quoted. Were they closed shops? Were they solid union situations, or was it a case of unionists and non-unionists banding together to take this action?
      Mr. Orme: In the case of the cotton workers, I think that it is fair to say that they were mostly organised. The dockers were 100 per cent. trade union organised.
      I am not trying to make a cheap political point. My point is a fundamental one. My Liberal colleagues must understand that the Bill cannot be played about with in this way. It is no good right hon. and hon. Gentlemen on the Liberal bench moving a liberal Amendment on this Clause while they vote for the other Clauses. They cannot try to pick this point out of Clause 85, and then support the Clause in its entirety.
      Mr. David Steel: The hon. Gentleman must not assume that we will support either Clause 85 or the Bill at all.
      Mr. Orme: We on these benches have voted against these Clauses through the night, night after night, while the hon. Gentleman and his right hon. Friends have been elsewhere——
      Mr. Pardoe: We have been in bed.
      Mr. Orme: As the hon. Gentleman says, they have been in bed. They have joined the eiderdown gang. We on these benches carry our principles to the point of voting against any and every Clause which we regard as punitive. I make that point in a political sense, and I hope that right hon. and hon. Gentlemen on the Liberal bench take it in the manner in which I have made it.
      Not even this Amendment will improve Clause 85. However, we support the principle put forward by my right hon. Friend the Member for East Ham, North. If people so desire, not being directed by anyone outside, they should not be compelled to do anything that is morally wrong, whether it be in this country or anywhere else in the world. British workers have said so in the past, and I believe that they will say so in the future, not only with their voices but, if necessary, by industrial action.
      This group of Clauses is probably the most pernicious collection of provisions in the Bill, and even this Amendment will not improve matters. Nevertheless, many of us support the principle which is enunciated. However, I feel that it is important to bring our point of view to the attention of the hon. Member for Roxburgh, Selkirk and Peebles.
      Sir Charles Taylor: To say that I am unsympathetic to the idea behind this Amendment is wrong. I have always been sympathetic to the idea that no man should be forced to do anything against his conscience. It was for that reason in 1952 that I entered negotiations with a certain trade union with a view to trying to persuade its members that it was wrong for people to join the trade union contrary to their consciences. I was successful in that case, and the trade union concerned agreed to the insertion of a conscience clause in an agreement with the industry in which I was involved.

      1617
      Just as I thought then that it was wrong for a man to be forced to join a trade union against his wishes, thereby creating a closed shop, probably it is wrong for any man to be forced to do work which is contrary to his conscience and, in my view, he should be enabled without penalty to find other employment.
      Mr. Joseph Ashton: I want to refer specifically to a more modern case. It is one which arose last year and involved Mr. John Arlott. When the proposed South African cricket tour was being debated throughout the country, Mr. Arlott said that if the team came he would not take part in Test Match broadcasts.
      I do not know the basis of Mr. Arlott's contract with the B.B.C. I very much admire the decision that he took. I thought that it was courageous of him to speak out.
      Mr. Jeremy Thorpe: He is a good Liberal.
      Mr. Ashton: I accept that. If he was employed by the B.B.C. and was not on contract, then, as I read this Clause, the B.B.C. could have taken him to court and accused him of taking unfair industrial action.
      Sir Derek Walker-Smith: No.
      Mr. Ashton: It could be said that he was trying to induce other employees not to take part in those broadcasts.
      Sir D. Walker-Smith: That is different.
      Mr. Ashton: Having induced others not to take part in those broadcasts, it could have been argued by the B.B.C. that Mr. Arlott had put the Corporation to a great deal of expense since it would have to train new commentators for the Test Matches, hire other commentators, or possibly remove Mr. Arlott's name from future issues of Radio Times. To Mr. Arlott, this was a matter of principle, and I and many others admired him for the stand that he took.
      I think that a number of journalists were involved in similar circumstances. I recall that some journalists on The Guardian said that they would not report the cricket tour if the South African team came here. They probably stood to be
      1618
      penalised in some way, possibly on grounds of racialism, but, under this Bill, it would have been wide open to their employers to take action against them.
      Let me refer to a third example. We now have a law permitting abortion in certain cases. It is said that nurses and doctors cannot be compelled to take part in abortions if the operation is against their religious principles or they disagree with the Act. As I understand it, the Act states that no medical practitioner can be compelled to take part in an abortion. We accept that. But when it comes to a trade unionists who may have equally strong grounds for refusing to take part in the manufacture of arms for South Africa or even in loading them on a ship, we now propose to say that it will be unfair industrial action if he stands out against it.
      Sir D. Walker-Smith: No. He must induce a third party.
      4.0 p.m.
      Mr. Ashton: The right hon. and learned Member for Hertfordshire, East (Sir D. Walker-Smith) says that it must be to induce a third party, but that would be easy to prove. It could be said that he was inducing a third party by taking the action himself, by setting up as a martyr, by setting an example. In that way, it could be said that Mr. John Arlott was inducing a third party.
      Once this part of the Bill become law, we shall turn away from principles which the trade union movement has held dear for a long time, and we shall have to resort to lawyers in court deciding whether an action was inducement. It is a bad part of the Bill and I hope that the Solicitor-General will take note of the Amendment and that, if necessary, we shall vote for it.
      Mr. Michael Grylls: I was somewhat surprised to hear the references to South Africa, because if people feel strongly about working in industries which may be taking part in providing or manufacturing arms for South Africa, and no doubt many will so feel that, they will have an absolute right to do so and will have the clear option of being able to change their jobs. Nobody will be able to make them go ahead and do a job if they do not wish to do so. The object of the Clause is to stop

      1619
      outside people from trying to induce other to go on strike. The issue of arms to South Africa is an absolute red herring, because nobody is trying to stop anybody who has a conscientious objection.
      Mr. G. B. Drayson: The Rolls-Royce workers are anxious that a number of Buccaneer aircraft should be sold to South Africa, because those aircraft have Rolls-Royce engines and I do not think that those workers would give up their jobs because Buccaneers are going to South Africa.
      Mr. Grylls: I agree. I should have thought that only a very few people would want to exercise a conscientious objection. It should be made perfectly clear that there is nothing said or implied in the Bill which would in any way prevent their having a conscientious objection.
      Mr. Tom King: When my hon. Friend speaks of changing jobs, I presume that he means changing jobs inside a works and not moving to another works.
      Mr. Grylls: That was a helpful intervention. Apparently, I did not make myself as clear as I had hoped, but that is clearly the common-sense explanation of what I was saying. Most of the companies likely to be involved in the supply of arms to South Africa would be large industrial enterprises and, if it were not possible to find a job in some corner of that enterprise where the conscientious objection could be satisfied, I should be very surprised.
      Mr. Raymond Gower: This country has a noble record of dealing with the problem of conscientious objections, particularly in wartime. Like my hon. Friend the Member for Eastbourne (Sir C. Taylor), I have always strongly supported the view that no one should be compelled against his sincere conscientious belief to participate in war, or in membership of the trade union. Here we are asked to go much further, and I am not sure where it would stop.
      If a decision is taken by democratically elected Government to do a certain thing, anybody who then pays taxes is by implication supporting that cause. Similarly, anybody who works in any process in any industry during a period of war or some civil commotion will be participating in
      1620
      that cause, even by contributing to the total taxation of the country itself, for example, trading with South Africa.
      Mr. Thorpe: The hon. Gentleman has raised an important constitutional matter. Is he suggesting that by the mere fact that we happen to pay taxes to the duly elected Government we are deemed to be backing all the policies of that Government? If so, the rate of emigration will be very high indeed.
      Mr. Gower: I am saying that this is an example of the measures by which people unwittingly but inevitably contribute to certain policies laid down by the democratically elected Government. Let us pursue that further.
      The hon. Member for Roxburgh, Selkirk and Peebles (Mr. David Steel) has proposed that we should permit an individual with a conscientious objection actively to engineer a trade dispute and other actions against the policy of the democratically elected Government, whether right or wrong.
      Mr. Alex Eadie: Is the hon. Gentleman putting nurses and doctors on the same footing when they refuse to take part in abortions?
      Mr. Gower: We have made a definite exception for a narrow group of people, and that is very different. Here there would be no such limitation.
      Like my hon. Friend the Member for Eastbourne, I take the view that no individual should be allowed to carry his objection further and actively to canvass for and engineer disputes designed to thwart the policies of the elected Government. The elected Government, whether Conservative, Labour or Liberal, have to answer for their sins of omission or commission to the electorate. That is the proper process. It is not the right process that a policy is decided by the elected Government and may then be thwarted by persons who, for reasons of conscience or other reasons, may want to carry their objections further and deliberately to defeat the policy of the Government, the administration, the local council, or whatever it may be.
      Mr. Prentice: Is the hon. Gentleman saying that if it is decided to resume the sale of arms to South Africa and there is a public meeting addressed by a

      1621
      speaker from the Labour Party, the Liberal Party, the Council of Churches, or the United Nations Association, against the sale of arms to South Africa, and if in the course of that speech he says that he hopes that the workers will not co-operate with the programme, he may be subject to the sanction of damages under the Bill? Does not the hon. Gentleman recognise that that is an intolerable interference with our traditional liberties?
      Mr. Gower: The right hon. Gentleman is posing that in an extreme fashion, and I understand why. It is permissible for anybody at a public meeting to try to alter public opinion and to persuade those attending the meeting that it would be proper for the Government, or their successors, to change the policy. It would not be right for such a person to go into an industrial organisation and persuade others to take part in a stoppage or lock-out deliberately to support such a view. That is why, with all my deep sympathy for the man who wants to object on the grounds of conscience, I do not regard this as a legitimate Amendment.
      Mr. Thorpe: I should not have sought to intervene had it not been for the speech of the hon. Member for Barry (Mr. Gower). He advanced the strangest constitutional doctrines which did more to undermine the basic principles which hon. Members in all parts of the Committee have fought to preserve than anything I have heard for a long time, but I pay him the supreme compliment of saying that I am sure that he did so unwittingly. Secondly, he hypothecated a situation that one might be allowed the gentle art of persuasion at a meeting, but one must not go very much further because to do so would be a desperate industrial action which would cause grave damage to the economy of the country.
      Mr. Gower: In wartime.
      Mr. Thorpe: We are not talking about wartime, unless the Government are thinking of some Vietnam in which they may indulge; I hope that 1956 was the last time that a Conservative Government went to war and that even the Conservatives have learned their lesson.
      However much any citizen pays in taxation, of course he has the right to dissent from the Government's action.
      1622
      The only restriction is not that imposed by the politicians, it is that which is imposed by the law. Provided the protest is peaceful and does not involve a breach of the law or of the peace it is perfectly legal.
      Because we have clearly established that, we must be careful before we extend the scope of the restrictions of the law upon the freedom of the citizen to dissent. Therefore, this doctrine that those who pay tax are deemed to support the policies of the Government on, for example, the issue of South African arms is a totally new constitutional departure and, in my view, an extremely dangerous one.
      We are opposed to the second limb of the hon. Gentleman's argument which, as I understand it, is that if someone from the World Council of Churches—or any one of those respectable organisations mentioned, which still take a fairly moral view of the question of arms to South Africa—attended a meeting and said that those arms should not be manufactured that would be all right. That would be the gentle art of persuasion.
      But if we had the Lancashire cotton workers' situation of 100 years ago, under the Bill as drafted it would be perfectly in order for one trade unionist to say, "I am sorry, I will not work because I do not want to back up slavery in the Southern States of the United States". However, if he were to approach one other trade unionist—and that is what the word "induce" means—and say, "Look, are you aware of what you are doing? Are you aware that by continuing to work on this contract you are underpinning the system of slavery in the Southern States of the United States?" he would then be committing an offence.
      There are no two ways about it. That is inducing for the purposes of this Bill. It is legal for one man but the moment he transmits the reasons for his action to another with a view to persuading that other to take a similar course of action he is then inducing and committing an offence under the Bill. What we are trying to do in the Bill is to allow those who have a conscientious objection to transmit the reasons for that objection and if necessary induce others to follow their example.
      Mr. Nicholas Scott: There is nothing in the Bill which would prevent a trade unionist asking another trade unionist or another party or individual to stop supplying arms to South Africa or to stop supporting slavery in the southern States of the United States, as long as they did it in accordance with their contract, freely entered into. It is only when they are in breach of contract that this situation arises.
      Mr. Charles Fletcher-Cooke Mr. Charles Fletcher-Cooke (Darwen) rose——
      The Chairman: Order. It is much better not to have an interjection upon an interjection—but if the right hon. Gentleman really prefers it that way——
      Mr. Thorpe: Yes.
      Mr. Fletcher-Cooke: It goes further than my hon. Friend says. A person may induce another to break a contract and, if he does that, if he is a trade unionist or a representative of a trade union or of an employers association, he can induce a person to break the contract under Clause 85(1)(a).
      Mr. Thorpe: I am grateful to the hon. and learned Gentleman for raising the point, but I do not think that it takes us very much further.
      Mr. Fletcher-Cooke Mr. Fletcher-Cooke rose——
      Mr. Thorpe: Before the hon. and learned Gentleman answers the question which he has posed to me, perhaps he will allow me to answer that question. All that we are saying is that if individuals find it repugnant to carry out certain work which may come under the umbrella of the contract they are perfectly entitled not to do it. That is generally accepted and is written into the Bill.
      The moment an individual transmits that information and makes known his intentions, the minute he makes known his reasons to any of his fellow workers on the shop-floor, it becomes an offence under the Bill. We are saying that that is a nonsense, contrary to the whole doctrine of conscientious objection which we have defended in this country, under all political parties, and therefore this is a Clause which should be amended in the way suggested.
      Mr. Gower: The right hon. Gentleman must realise that the Amendment
      1624
      goes much further than a chat or a conversation with another person. It means that such a person under this proposal could engineer a complete lock-out in default of an agreement freely entered into.
      4.15 p.m.
      Mr. Thorpe: First of all I would say that neither of us should presume to interpret the word "induce". That is a matter for the courts. [Interruption.] The hon. Gentleman, and the right hon. and learned Member for Hertfordshire, East (Sir D. Walker-Smith) will know that there is a long series of precedents as to the interpretation of the word "induce".
      Sir D. Walker-Smith: I have all of them here.
      Mr. Thorpe: I am delighted that the right hon. and learned Gentleman has them because this Government during last week has sadly lacked any good legal advice particularly in regard to the Rolls-Royce case. The fact that they are now bringing their cribs with them shows that they are at least taking an interest.
      Sir D. Walker-Smith: The right hon. Gentleman has forgotten his law.
      Mr. Thorpe: The right hon. and learned Gentleman and I might have an exchange on that ground a little later on—with reference to particular cases in which he was involved. All I would say to the hon. Member for Barry, who I know is anxious to hear the reply, is that the word "induce" has been construed in the courts in a very narrow sense indeed. In its narrowest sense it is merely the transmission of information from one employee to another.
      I concede the point that he has made—in its ultimate it could mean a complete lock-out. I entirely accept that. It could mean that one individual as a result of the information he transmits not only persuades one employee but all employees in the shop to come out on strike. I accept that. I believe it is right that it should be written in the Bill and I unhesitatingly accept the logic of his conclusion. It is a conclusion which I believe is part of the conscientious rights which we have accorded to the citizen, and I do not see why the trade union movement should be an exception to the rule.
      The Solicitor-General (Sir Geoffrey Howe): I will not begin swopping degrees of learning with the right hon. Member for Devon, North (Mr. Thorpe). I fancy that the first time I saw his name in writing was when he signed a letter as President of the Oxford Law Society, a long time ago, so he has the credentials to talk about this. I would like the right hon. Member, and the hon. Member for Roxburgh, Selkirk and Peebles (Mr. David Steel) to consider that here, as in many other places, we are balancing two different factors. The factor which is running through the Bill and which becomes salient at Clause 85 is that unless the existing law is changed we have a situation in which strikes in breach of individual contracts of employment can be induced for any reason without notice. This is the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Barry (Mr. Gower) and my hon. Friend the Member for Paddington, South (Mr. Scott).
      This is at the heart of the prevalence of wild-cat, unofficial unconstitutional strikes which it is agreed on all sides are at the root of the problems in British industry. Clause 85 sets out to limit the right to induce strikes in breach of contract. That is a legitimate and important objective of the Bill. On the other hand I take the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Roxburgh, Selkirk and Peebles and others, including the hon. Member for East Ham, South (Mr. Oram) and my hon. Friend the Member for Eastbourne (Sir C. Taylor) that we have to be concerned to protect the rights of individual workers in respect of their conscientious views.
      This point is common to the rights of conscience which should be accorded to an individual worker in relation to the trade unions too. We must acknowledge the parallelism of the point and that is why we attach importance to it on both sides of the Committee. The point was put in one sense by the hon. Member for Salford, West (Mr. Orme) when he said that workers must remain free, "If they so desire and they are not directed by anybody else to withdraw their labour, if they have a conscientious objection to any work that is being undertaken." With that there is no quarrel at all. The Bill makes no difference to that. It certainly does not affect it adversely in any way.
      I should like to say a word en passant about the Abortion Act. The Act ex-
      1626
      pressly gives the right of conscientious objection in respect of abortions to every individual, as the hon. Gentleman knows——
      Mr. David Steel: In these very words.
      The Solicitor-General: The right of individuals to refrain from their work if they have a conscientious objection to it is unimpaired.
      Mr. Orme: Does the hon. and learned Gentleman agree, whilst he is underwriting the words I have used, that it would be impossible for any worker to do what I suggested without breaking his contract?
      The Solicitor-General: It is perfectly possible for workers to refrain from work on conscientious grounds. If they did, they would be breaking their contracts of employment in certain circumstances. But that is the position today.
      Mr. Orme: It becomes an unfair industrial practice.
      The Solicitor-General: There is a number of different possibilities, but let us consider the position if a worker is suddenly confronted with a fundamental change in his conditions of work. Perhaps he has been making aspirins and is suddenly required to make the pill, without any notice, and he may be affronted in conscience by that. It would depend on the precise facts of any given situation as to whether he breaks his contract of employment. He could well argue that it was a fundamental change of the terms under which he was engaged and that he was entitled to walk out. It would depend on the precise job he was doing. That is no different from the present law under which whether he breaks his contract of employment is a matter for decision.
      The Bill goes further than that. As a result of it two additional matters come into play to assist the worker in that situation. The Committee will probably agree that the first is no more than a declaration of the present law. Clause 114 sets out beyond doubt, quite plainly, that no court shall by way of an order or injunction
      "compel an employee to do any work or to attend at any place for the purpose of doing any work."
      In other words, that which is probably part of the law is there set out. The

      1627
      individual workers' right to walk out cannot be overriden by the Clause.
      The other point is that if at present a worker who wished to protest on conscience grounds at the change of his terms and conditions of employment walked out, then, depending on whether it was a change that justified him in walking out, he could be dismissed by his employer. If the employer could show that the worker had no justification for walking out the worker would have no remedy, because it would not be a wrongful dismissal. As a result of the unfair dismissal provisions in the Bill, if the worker exercises his conscientious right, as he sees it, and walks out, and the employer sacks him because he thinks that the employee had no such right, the worker would be entitled to say that the dismissal was unfair.
      Once the Bill was on the Statute Book the tribunal would be able to say whether in all the circumstances it was a fair or reasonable dismissal. So the worker has a new right. He has it plainly enshrined that he cannot be compelled to do the job, and also has the right to say, "I was quite unreasonably dismissed so far as invasion of the liberty of individuals is concerned."
      I shall come to the point of the right hon. Member for East Ham, North (Mr. Prentice) in a moment, because it is different. The Bill does not affect the individual's right adversely, but puts him in a rather stronger position.
      Mr. Sydney Bidwell: With great respect to the hon. and learned Gentleman, it does affect the right of the worker with regard to the terms of persuasion of a fellow worker, which can never be finally interpreted at law in any shape or form, no matter how the other Clauses try to encourage various situations and so on. How about the worker who, because of dangerous conditions which can suddenly arise, refuses to do his particular work, as is his right under the Measure, and who seeks as a trade union official to advise a fellow worker that it would be similarly dangerous for him, and that he would be absolutely mad to continue to work in those circumstances? He would be inducing his fellow worker to break the provisions of the Bill.
      The Solicitor-General: May I answer with a legitimate debating point and then come to the substance of the matter. The hon. Gentleman asked us to suppose that a man, as a trade union official, induces workers to come out on strike. He would be protected by the provisions of the Clauses, because he would do that as a trade union official.
      Mrs. Barbara Castle Mrs. Barbara Castle (Blackburn) rose——
      The Solicitor-General: Perhaps I may come to the underlying substance of the hon. Gentleman's intervention before I give way to the right hon. Lady. If the inducing was carried out because of dangerous conditions of work by someone who was not a trade union official the situation is this. Assume that the National Coal Board suddenly made a coal face that was not in compliance with the 1954 Act, or a factory temperature changed so as not to comply with the Factories Acts, or assume many of the other examples given in our debates. Such a change of conditions producing that result would amount to a breach by the employer amounting to a breach of the contract, and the workers would be entitled to cease work because of that.
      Suppose that the employer has produced a dangerous work place and his workpeople are induced to leave work by an unofficial leader. If he were so foolish as to try to restrain them or to obtain compensation, which seems very improbable, he would be met by Clause 102(3). The court would find that the unfair action had been caused or contributed to by the action of aggrieved party, the employer, and would reduce its assessment of his loss to nothing.
      So there are three different answers to the hon. Gentleman's point. First, if the man is a trade union official acting within the scope of his authority there is no problem. Second, if it is a breach of the work place conditions amounting to a breach of the employer's obligations, again there is no problem. Third, if the employer were foolish enough to bring proceedings he would get nowhere on Clause 102(3).
      Mrs. Castle: The Solicitor-General corrected himself later on the point I was going to raise with him. He said earlier

      1629
      that a trade union official would be covered automatically, but he later said that he would be covered if he was a trade union official acting within the scope of his authority. I just want to get on the record that the fact that a man is a trade union official is not a cover. There is the second gateway to go through, namely, the question of what authority under the rules may have been delegated to him. That, therefore, is one of the obstacles to the effective freedom of action of the local trade union official that we objected to earlier under the registration proposals. I am right, am I not?
      The Solicitor-General: The right hon. Lady is certainly right. I inadvertently compressed the phrase. It is the trade union official acting within the scope of his authority who is covered. As the right hon. Lady says, that authority will be determined by the rules of the union. We have a further debate on a subsequent Amendment on the different aspects of this.
      But this really brings us back to the original question, the proposal whereby the right to induce strikes in breach of contract of employment should be limited or restricted in some way.
      I move on to the position of the inducer, which was raised principally by the right hon. Member for East Ham, North. The position of the inducer, as in many of the examples cited, would probably be no different from that of the inducer under the present law. A number of examples were cited of the possible causes of strike action that might well on present law not fall within the terms of "trade dispute" anyway. Certain strikes in respect of some of the examples given might not be so covered, so that in some of those areas there is no significant change in the law.
      Let us look at the case of the World Council of Churches spokesman speaking at a public meeting and saying that it is wrong for Smiths Armaments, or whatever the firm may be, to supply arms to South Africa, and that it should forth-with discontinue that supply and that contract. Even under present law he could be described as inducing or attempting to induce Smiths Armaments to break its commercial contract. That is a situation which can arise in many circumstances now. There are many con-
      1630
      tracts, apart from contracts of employment, where, what somebody is saying could or could not be described as amounting to an attempt to induce such a breach. So that he is already, in this or in many other situations, on one view, under some restraint as to the freedom with which he speaks.
      4.30 p.m.
      However, we do not envisage actions being brought in respect of speeches of that kind being made freely. The reason is that there is no presumption that when I or any other hon. Member says that the supply of arms to such-and-such should be stopped, or that any other activity should be stopped, we are intending the supplier to discontinue in breach of his contract. There is certainly no presumption, if he follows that advice, that he does so as a result of what we have said. It is a very unrealistic and unlikely concept. In the operation of the Clause, which relates to inducing people to break their contracts of employment, this is the central situation.
      Suppose that it is an inducing in the context of an industrial dispute, in other words, that the situation can clearly be one where the inducer is trying to get people to strike to change their contracts of employment on conscientious grounds, as it could be put. Again, if he is a registered union or an official acting within the scope of his authorities, there is no problem.
      But there is the more fundamental answer. Why is it necessary or right in that situation for the inducer to be given the freedom to induce breaches of contract of employment? If workpeople at a workplace are confronted with a situation to which, on conscientious or other grounds, they object, they can themselves withdraw their labour or persuade their trade union or official to threaten an immediate withdrawal of labour to get the situation altered.
      If the workpeople cannot so persuade their union, or if there is no union, they can themselves give notice that they will discontinue work on that contract in accordance with their contract of employment. If the change in working conditions is such as to drastically alter their situation, they can go beyond that and say, "This is a fundamental change in our employment and in itself is a breach".

      1631
      To the extent I have indicated, all those rights remain, both to workpeople and to unions on their behalf. The only restraint is that in certain circumstances it should be done in accordance with the terms of their individual contract of employment. That is central, and it is that which I submit to the Committee remains as requiring to be central.
      Mr. Orme: Surely what is central to the argument is not the employees who are making aspirins one day and the pill the next. We are concerned about workers engaged on making Buccaneer aircraft, say, which are being sold to Government generally and perhaps to our own Government and then orders are made to sell them to South Africa. If those workers then take action, that is in breach of contract and they are fully trapped under the terms of the Bill. The right hon. and learned Gentleman has admitted the point.
      The Solicitor-General: I do not want us to be led down a false trail. If those workers then take action and break their own contracts of employment, they are no more liable than they are today and, for the reasons I have given, no less liable. If they walk out, their rights are greater under the Bill than they would be under present law. If their union or union official within the scope of his authority seeks to persuade them to walk out—this is the only narrow situation where it is relevant—again his right is the same as it is today.
      We say that it is not right or necessary to confer a right upon an unofficial person to induce all his workmates to strike without regard to the length of their original contracts of employment, even in the situation now before the Committee. That is the limit we are seeking to preserve.
      Mr. Prentice: May I pose a question in personal terms? I have spoken recently at many meetings against the proposal to sell arms to South Africa. I have been asked whether I thought that workers involved in making and handling those arms should refuse to do so, and I have said, "Yes, they should refuse to do so". If I continue to say that after the Bill is on the Statute Book, am I or am I not liable to actions for damages? If I am, I put it to the right hon. and
      1632
      learned Gentleman that this is an invasion of the right of free speech. The Solicitor-General must define and defend this if he can.
      The Solicitor-General: On the right hon. Gentleman's specific point, it would not follow from the facts which he has given that he would be liable in this situation for two reasons. It could not be concluded that what he was saying in fact had the result of inducing those people to break their contracts of employment. Nor would it follow that the right hon. Gentleman was expecting, requiring or intending them to do so in breach of their contracts of employment.
      We are here faced with two factors to take into account. The Committee must assert the proposition that reasonable discussion, reasonable debate, can take place without anyone being thought likely to be caught by this provision, but that in any event it should take place upon the footing that there is no necessity in this situation for people to get other people to break their contracts of employment. That is the factor we put forward.
      Mr. Prentice: If, in the situation which I described, the court were to decide that the effect of the words of the speaker had had some appreciable effect on the decision of workers to withdraw their labour, I take it that that speaker would be caught by this provision.
      The Solicitor-General: Under this provision, if it were in contemplation or furtherance of an industrial dispute, the example which the right hon. Gentleman gives may or may not be dependent upon to whom and where he was speaking. For example, if the right hon. Gentleman were speaking at a general discussion or meeting, he would not be speaking in contemplation or furtherance of a given industrial dispute; and he would be in the same position as under the present law. But if in contemplation of a particular dispute, with a view to getting people to break their contracts of employment, he said what he has just quoted, and as a result of that, in breach of their contracts and without giving notice, the workpeople ceased work, he would be so liable. But they themselves would not be liable. This is the balance.
      We are entrenching and enshrining the right of individuals to quit labour according to their conscience or for any other

      1633
      reason. We are also trying to restrict the right of calling people out on strike in breach of their contracts of employment. This is a part of this provision, and it is very important. It should be clearly understood that we are today in the presence of the result of 60 years of history and 60 years of the present state of Statute law. The 1906 Act included a provision concerning the right to induce breaches of contracts of employment. That was not in the recommendations of the contemporary Royal Commission, and it was not in the Bill as introduced by the Liberal Party at that time, nor in the Bill introduced by the Labour Representation Committee at that time; they were half a dozen words in an Amendment from Sir Charles Dilke. That is the foundation of something which has led to many of our present troubles and difficulties.
      In many other countries and systems of law, and indeed, under our own on a better view, the right to persuade people to break their contracts of employment in pursuance of an industrial dispute does not exist and is in no sense necessary as a foundation for the right to strike. It is this which is at the heart of the situation of irresponsibility in which anyone and everyone has felt increasingly free as the years have passed to induce his fellow workers to break his contract of employment at the drop of a hat. It is for that reason that, to the limit proposed by the majority of the Donovan Commission, the Clause is an important Clause in the Bill.
      Mr. John Mendelson: As the Solicitor-General has quoted that historic occasion, is he not under a duty, so that the Committee will be fully informed, to state the reason why it was done? Surely it was not an aberration on the part of Sir Charles Dilke or anybody else. It was done after 50 years of debate, because the workman does not own his means of production and the man who owns his means of production and who pays the workman his wages is in a far more powerful position. Therefore, if workers were to be able to assert their rights it was essential that they should not be liable for what is technically called a breach of contract. The Solicitor-General wants to change that historical right of working people.
      The Solicitor-General: First, the situation is very different from that which
      1634
      prevailed 60 years ago. Second, what we are not in any way seeking to do is to change the right of individual work people to quit their workplace. Indeed, we are making that plainer. Nor are we seeking to change the right of anyone to persuade them to quit their workplace in accordance with the terms of their contract of employment. We are enshrining the right of the union and of its official in the course of his duty and in his authority to do just that. This is a sensible balance which I commend to the Committee, and it is a reasonable restraint. It goes very close to the matter which every analyst has identified as the main cause of our persistence of unofficial, wildcat, unconstitutional strikes.
      In the context of this, to go as far as the Amendment proposes is unnecessary, for the reasons that I have stated, and would extend the immunity, as my hon Friend the Member for Barry (Mr. Gower) pointed out, over a very wide and ill-defined field.
      Mr. Eric S. Heller: The Solicitor-General has once again indicated how confusing the situation can become as a result of the Bill. He said at one stage that the Clause is designed to stop irresponsible action on the part of workers taken at the drop of a hat. A little earlier he had said that if individual workers wished to take strike action under the Bill when enacted they were entitled to do so. I therefore assume that individual workers who felt so strongly that they were prepared to walk out would walk out at the drop of a hat.
      On the other hand, the Solicitor-General says that this is what the Clause is designed to stop; it is designed to catch those who are inducing workers so to act. My right hon. Friend the Member for East Ham, North (Mr. Prentice) postulated circumstances in which he, addressing a meeting on the question of arms for South Africa, not merely made a speech in a general discussion but said to the workers involved, "I think that you should down tools and refuse to load arms for South Africa". That would be inducing. The Solicitor-: General admits that on that basis my right hon. Friend could be in trouble, although a few minutes earlier the hon. and learned Gentleman said that my

      1635
      right hon. Friend might be in trouble but then again he might not be in trouble; he was not sure whether my right hon. Friend would be in trouble or would not be in trouble. It is fantastic that the Solicitor-General does not know precisely what the position is. In the end what it boils down to is that my right hon. Friend would be in trouble if he made such a statement.
      [Miss HARVIE ANDERSON in the Chair]
      4.45 p.m.
      During the height of the Biafran war Liverpool dock workers refused to handle weapons destined for Nigeria. How does one determine the responsibility for that action? If all those workers walked out spontaneously at the drop of a hat, no one would be in trouble.
      How is the position reached at which the workers walk out? Some mythical person must make a speech. It could be my right hon. Friend the Member for East Ham, North, but it could be a staunch local Roman Catholic docker who says to his workmates, "These arms will be used in Nigeria against the Biafrans, whom I support, and I do not think that we should send the arms". That man would be inducing the workers to take that action, unless he were a trade union official acting under the authority of his union. His union might not have taken a decision to ban arms for Biafra. He may be a trade union official who is not acting under the authority of his union, in which case he would be in trouble under the Clause.
      Mr. Tom McMillan: In the present situation, before an unofficial or wildcat strike occurs there is a meeting and it is decided to post safety men at various points so that no harm can come to the factory or anyone in it. The Solicitor-General now says that men can walk out at the drop of a hat. Danger could result from that.
      Mr. Heffer: That is true. This reveals the Solicitor-General's lack of knowledge as to how unofficial disputes arise. It is unusual for an unofficial dispute to arise without there having been lengthy discussion amongst the workers and an atmosphere building up over a period. The idea that workers lay down their tools and
      1636
      walk out at the drop of a hat is not in line with reality.
      Workers will note that in future as long as they have no meetings and no discussions but just automatically walk out individually, though collectively it adds up to 10,000 dockers, it will be all right. The Solicitor-General knows that this is absurd.
      The Leader of the Liberal Party asked, in an aside, why the Labour Party had not tabled an Amendment since we support this Amendment. I confirm that we support this Amendment. We had intended to table an Amendment on Report, but at this moment we are dealing with the basic principles involved in the Bill as it affects the trade union movement and the working class in general; and on that basis we thought that this was not the stage at which to discuss it. However, now that the matter has been raised, we will support the Liberal Party if there is a Division.
      I hope that at this stage of the proceedings the Liberals will change their line on the Bill. Those Liberals of the past who were responsible for the 1906 Act and fought hard for the rights of the trade union movement must be spinning round in their graves when they hear what the Liberal Party is doing in relation to this Bill. I urge the Liberals to reconsider their position and once again be genuinely liberal. There may be only two votes here, but at least the Liberals could put pressure on their hon. Friends to support the Labour Party on this. I agree with my hon. Friend that the Clause is an infringement of liberty and imposes a restriction on our rights. The whole Bill is an infringement of liberty and of the democratic rights of the British people. On that basis I ask my hon. Friends to support the Amendment.
      Mr. F. P. Crowder: I ask my right hon. and learned Friend seriously to consider leaving Clause 85 out of the Bill. I do not think it assists the Bill and it adds complications. One of the first difficulties will be in the courts in understanding what Parliament meant when it passed the Bill and interpreting it. That is all very well for lawyers—and I speak more as an advocate than a lawyer—but how is the ordinary chap on the floor of the factory to begin to understand the 150 Clauses in

      1637
      the Bill and how they affect his personal rights?
      I do not like the word "induce", and I ask the learned Solicitor-General whether the word "induce" is as good as "a nod is as good as a wink". I am a little worried about the situation of the Government in relation to the Rolls-Royce contract. Can they be said to have induced a breach of that contract?—[HON. MEMBERS: "No."] Hon. Members say "No". I hope they are right because I happen to be on the Government side of the House, although my last remarks may not have led hon. Members to think so.
      If the Clause is not to be dropped altogether, I suggest that the word "induce" should be supplemented by "malicious conspiracy". There is all the difference between a casual inducement and a thoroughly nastly-minded attempt to break up a contract unfairly and unnecessarily. The word "conspiracy has been known to the law of England, and in particular to the criminal law, for generations, and I suppose everyone has a mild idea of what it means. It derives from "conspire", which initially in law meant "they breathe together". If it is ever held in the courts that people have conspired together, there must be an element of dishonesty or malice within that entirety. I do not find that in law on the basis of "inducement", and that is why I ask the learned Solicitor-General to look again at the Clause so that not only lawyers but ordinary British people and workmen can understand it.
      Mr. John Mendelson: In these discussions we should concentrate on the point at which the attack on the freedom of working people is made and not try to broaden the attack too widely so that we miss the real purpose of the legislation. I find it more than strange that the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Liberal Party should attend this session of the Committee and make a general attack on Clause 85 because, as he said, we must be particularly careful not to allow any extension of the law which will limit the freedom of individuals, when, until now, in all the Clauses which we have debated he has found no Clause to attack and no Amendment to support. He did not confine himself to the danger of the situation described by his hon.
      1638
      Friend the Member for Roxburgh, Selkirk and Peebles (Mr. David Steel) but, in an attack on the hon. Member for Barry (Mr. Gower), he said that we must be careful not to allow the extension of the law in this respect, when it is precisely the extension of the law into industrial relations that is the purpose of the Bill—not only of Clause 85. The Leader of the Liberal Party is disqualified from making these general assertions in this debate.
      The real matter is not the point raised by my right hon. Friend the Member for East Ham, North (Mr. Prentice). Where an outside person goes into a factory and asks a group of work people to refuse to fulfil their engagement, as things stand today, I do not believe that could not lead to action, but no action is taken because it is held that such action would not succeed.
      The Clause and the Bill are not aimed at the freedom of the Press or the freedom to write articles. The Clause is not trying to abolish, either at a stroke or at the drop of one vanguard, the freedom of the Press and the freedom of speech. We would be making life too easy for the Government if we made that the main burden of our critique. The Bill is meant to destroy the right of shop stewards and working people to take action on conscientious or other grounds if they see fit to do so. This is the attack which we have to nail.
      It may be a matter for argument what the courts would hold under the existing law if a Member of Parliament or a bishop of the Established or any other Church went into a factory and told people to do this or that, but that is not what we have in mind. I do not believe that this legislation would lead to a Member of Parliament being prosecuted for saying in Gloucester, "I think it is highly immoral to work in order to supply Vanguards to South Africa." The burden of the Clause is more definite, and represents an attack on the right of an individual, or of an individual with a group of his colleagues working in a factory in Gloucester where such production is going on who get together and say they do not intend to work under an existing contract of employment because they deeply object to the deliveries that will be made of the product which they are producing.

      1639
      As my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) has said, none of these disputes arises at the drop of a hat. It only shows that the Solicitor-General is no further ahead than the columnist in the Sunday Express in his knowledge of industrial relations when he speaks as he has done this afternoon——
      Mr. Dennis Skinner: On the point made by the Solicitor-General about strikes taking place at the drop of a hat, I left my place of work after twenty years without having been involved in a strike until October, 1969—and I had been trying.
      5.0 p.m.
      Mr. Mendelson: We take note of my hon. Friend's telling point. The description of people being so indifferent to reason and argument that at a drop of a hat they would down tools and go on strike is typical of the cloud-cuckoo-land sort of atmosphere in which Conservative Members regard industrial relations. This is why employers, when they hear what the Government Front Bench is saying on this Bill, do not take them seriously.
      The serious point involves the rights of groups of people to take action and to have discussions with other people to seek to persuade them to join in that action leading to a threat being made to an employer. The Bill tries to limit the right of such people to go to employers and to threaten them with potential action. This is far more typical of what goes on in industry than the actual downing of tools. Such discussions take place throughout the country. Here is where in intimating purpose of the Bill shows its ugly face once again. Jack Jones said the other day that this will be the charter of the informer. It will lead certain people to take part in discussions and then run to employers to tell on their colleagues. This shows the dangerous and nefarious purposes of the Bill.
      The reply of the Solicitor-General was wholly unsatisfactory. He, as the responsible Law Officer, has no idea of the effect of the Clause, and yet he is supposed to be advising the Cabinet on these provisions. This particular provision will provide a gateway for a fundamental attack on the rights of working people to act as hitherto they have been entitled to act. His reference to the extensive
      1640
      nature of the introduction of this right at the time of the 1906 Act betrays his attitude on this matter since he suppressed the fact that it had been preceded by 50 years of debate.
      The fundamental principle involved is that the trade unions should not agree to the introduction of legal provisions in regard to their own activities, although such provisions may apply to many other cases. The trade unions never supported the idea that people in factory workshops should be limited in this way by being prevented from exercising their fundamental rights. This is yet another reason for supporting the Amendment.
      Mr. David Steel: The hon. Members for Penistone (Mr. Mendelson), Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) and Salford, West (Mr. Orme) indicated their warm support for this Amendment by the roasting nature of their speeches. They have had some fun at Liberal expense. We do not agree on our respective attitudes to the Bill. We supported the Second Reading of the Bill as aimed at bringing in a new framework of law—a framework which was shared by the previous Administration—and we are keeping an open mind on the progress of the Bill in Committee. We have supported some Amendments and not others. Our minds are not made up on how we shall vote on Third Reading. If the replies given to Amendments so far, the non-discussion of many Clauses, and certainly the reply on this Amendment are any guide as to how the Bill is to proceed, our attitude on Third Reading is not likely to be favourable.
      Hon. Members on this side of the House have criticised us for not being here to march through the Lobbies all night.
      Mr. Mendelson: No.
      Mr. Steel: The hon. Member for Salford, West has severely criticised us—I make no complaint about it for he is entitled to do so—for not being here night after night during proceedings on the Bill to vote on Clauses which have not even been discussed. This has been done as a deliberate policy. We have said, and I believe we carry public opinion with us, that this House does itself no good by this sort of performance night after night.
      Mr. Heller: We have no alternative.
      Mr. Steel: The hon. Gentleman may not agree with us but that is our opinion. We shall stick to it through the rest of the debates.
      To return to the Amendment, the hon. Member for Bassetlaw (Mr. Ashton) mentioned the case of Mr. John Arlott on the precedents of a conscience clause and also referred to the Abortion Act. In Committee on that legislation we accepted that there should be a specific provision to that effect written into the Bill and the wording of my Amendment is taken from that provision. That Amendment was to effect that no nurse, or hospital orderly, would be involved in any operation if they had a conscientious objection. This may mean that the work of the hospital in that particular matter may be brought to a halt, but that conscientious objection is maintained. We felt it right to do that in order to recognise any strong conscientious objections which might arise. It did not invalidate the rest of the Act. I reject the Solicitor-General's argument that we should not recognise a conscientious objection for fear of bringing the whole work of the Industrial Relations Bill to a halt.
      The hon. Member for Barry (Mr. Gower) did not grasp the point about the danger facing journalists, Members of Parliament, and possibly even ministers of religion, in arguing their case. Let us take as an example the contract for the Wasp helicopters. Let us suppose that the workers in the factory or one of the many factories involved in the contract decided to break the contract and to cease working. Let us also suppose that this followed an editorial in The Guardian or The Times, or a sermon in the local church, copies of which were then distributed to the workers. Surely an employer, faced with such a situation, would say that Clause 85 gave him an open invitation to say that, as a result of what was said in a newspaper editorial or by a Member of Parliament, workers in the industry were induced to break their contract, and that employer would surely feel entitled to action against them. This is the point with which we are concerned.
      The hon. Member for Penistone (Mr. John Mendelson) was right to make the point that we are principally concerned with protecting the rigths of work people themselves to exercise their conscience.
      1642
      We had a similar Amendment down to Clause 34 but it was not selected, so we are forced to discuss the mater on this Amendment. We are as concerned with this as we are about the newspapers.
      Mr. Leslie Huckfield: I am pleased to have the hon. Gentleman's support for Amendment No. 753, which advocates exactly the kind of thing he has been speaking about. Can I count on the support of the Liberal Party on that Amendment?
      Mr. Steel: I assume that, if it has been selected, Amendment No. 753 is on the list. [HON. MEMBERS: "Next one."] In that case, there is a fair chance of our reaching it. But if the hon. Member for Nuneaton (Mr. Leslie Huckfield) is inviting me to cast a vote on a subject which has not even been discussed, I must decline to commit myself. I shall listen to what he has to say. Meanwhile, I trust that he will agree with my Amendment.
      Mr. Tom King: The hon. Gentleman has rather sketched over the point about conscience. He quoted the example of the Abortion Act, in which this matter is strictly defined. But how would he cover the point, for example, about an anarchist who, generally speaking, believes in the destruction of modern industrial society? If the anarchist is sincere, he will believe in that most conscientiously. Would not the hon. Gentleman's Amendment destroy that case?
      Mr. Steel: I do not think so. The hon. Gentleman must be aware that many precedents have been quoted in discussion of what does and what does not constitute a question of conscience. We need not chase that red herring.
      There is another point of fundamental departure between the Liberal Party and the Government in their attitudes to the Bill. The Solicitor-General more or less said that strikes in breach of contract were at the heart of the wild-cat strikes, which in turn were at the heart of the problems facing British industry and, therefore, the Government could not accept the Amendment because it would then be at the heart of strikes in breach of contract. This is a build up of logic which we do not accept. We do not, indeed, accept the inflated claims made

      1643
      for the Bill. We do not share the delusions of the Government that the Bill has the vast importance that they attach to it.
      Moreover, when the hon. and learned Gentleman refers me to Clause 114 and points out that the Industrial Court cannot compel a person to work or return to his work and that therefore a person's right is somehow protected, he does not answer the point. What we are afraid of is not that the court could compel a person to return to his work but that it could penalise him for breaking his contract. That is the point at issue. Nor can we ride away by saying that perhaps in certain circumstances there might be fundamental changes in work agreements—for example, a transfer from making aspirins to making the pill. That was a far-fetched argument by the Solicitor-General.
      The whole point at issue on the Bill is about new contracts being assumed to be enforceable. It is in that context that we must look carefully to ensure that we are not ensnaring in this doctrine some of the rights of free speech, of argument, of political difference and of conscientious difference. I believe that Clause 85 does just as it stands, however; I am dissatisfied with the Solicitor-General's reply; and I advise my right hon. and hon. Friends to divide the Committee on the Amendment.
      5.15 p.m.
      Mr. Frederick Lee: The way in which Clause 85 is drafted shows that the Government are becoming victims of their own propaganda. In the debate on the Consultative Document, I tried to make the point that, if we were not careful, we should reach a position in which a shop steward would be charged with inducing his colleagues to strike if he used certain words such as, "Failure to agree", which is common practice in the engineering industry. The Solicitor-General talked about the shop steward acting within the scope of his authority, and that, I suppose, was a paraphrase of Clause 85(1)(b).
      I do not take the view—and I think that this is paramount to the Bill as a whole—that what the hon. and learned Gentleman describes as "wild-cat strikes" are necessarily unofficial strikes.
      1644
      In other words—and I have had some experience here—as I read, for example, the rule book of the A.E.F., a shop steward in certain conditions is well within his rights in calling an unofficial strike. The rule book would say, in effect, that, if, in the opinion of the shop steward, the management were trying to take away from his colleagues some principle which they had won over the years, he would be entitled to bring them out on strike. If, on the other hand, he was trying to get new concessions, then he would have no right to call a strike until he had gone through the constitution. In this respect, I believe that the Government are in grave danger of misunderstanding—perhaps wilfully, perhaps not—the powers which such a man has. Unless we read the rule book in the way I have suggested, the shop steward will be charged with not acting within the scope of his authority and therefore not representing his trade union.
      The Bill has been conceived, as the Solicitor-General told us, as a method of cutting down unofficial strikes. None of us is saying that we want to see an increase in unofficial strikes or in any other sort of strike. What I am arguing is that Clause 85 as it stands takes for granted that, if an unofficial strike is caused by a shop steward, that by itself pre-supposes that he is acting outside the scope of his own authority. I would not accept that for a moment. I believe that the way in which Clause 85 is drafted presupposes that, until there has been a reference outside the factory, until an issue has gone through the whole of the constitution, a strike must not be called, and that, if one is called, then an official of the union—in this case, the shop steward—is acting outside the scope of his authority.
      I take it, therefore, that the Clause is saying that the Government will no longer permit a position in which a shop steward, having called a meeting of his colleagues and told them of his belief that the management is acting outside the scope of the agreement, says. "We are entitled to withdraw our labour". He will now be regarded as inducing people to go on strike or to withdraw their labour.
      This proposal would mean the complete emasculation of the shop steward

      1645
      movement as I know it. The Amendment has limited application to what I am saying but it is the only Amendment, as I see it, to subsection (1). One feels that one has to make the case that, if we agree to subsection (1) in its present form, we shall give the impression that we accept the Government's interpretation of the duties of a shop steward.
      The hon. and learned Gentleman talked about an official of a trade union. I take it that the Solicitor-General means that a shop steward is an official of a trade union.
      Therefore, we must, first, protest that the interpretation being placed by the Government on the powers and duties of shop stewards means that they are limiting powers which are much wider than they say.
      Secondly, we must not fail to vote against the contention of Clause 85(1), that any responsible person within a trade union who induces his members to come out on strike is exceeding his duty. I do not accept that. I hope that my right hon. and hon. Friends will not accept it either.
      Mr. F. Fernyhough: I hope that the Solicitor-General will take the good advice given to him by his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Ruislip-Northwood (Mr. Crowder). It was good and refreshing. I do not know how much the hon. and learned Gentleman knows about what happens in industry. The word "induce" is so wide that tens of thousands of people who have never committed any crime could, if this became part of the law, find themselves before the courts.
      Management claims that it has the right to hire and fire. Often it does so without prior consultation with any responsible trade union official.
      Problems arise on redundancy. Management, without consultation, may decide that 10, 20 or 30 workers shall
      be dismissed. In consequence, the rest of the workers in that establishment may immediately decide to down tools and quit the job, because they feel that, in selecting the redundancies, the management has picked out the awkward people and they see it as victimisation. In other words, workers whom the management could not get rid of in normal circumstances without industrial trouble are declared redundant. The management makes it clear, by the list that is put up, that it is getting rid of the difficult and awkward boys. This causes revulsion and there is a dispute. It may be that the management is able to keep on a few key hands, but the vast majority of the work force will down tools.
      What would be the position, under Clause 85(1), if those lads who downed tools decided to go outside and to put up placards warning carriers bringing in raw materials, whether it be steel or anything else, what has happened and thereby tried to induce those carriers not to deliver that material to the factory? If the full-time trade union official were not present, none of the men and women who felt deeply about the victimisation, which had been brought about by the redundancies, would be able to do anything to bring home either to the management or to those who would unwittingly sustain the management by maintaining deliveries the reason for the trouble. They would be denied that opportunity, that right. that facility.
      I repeat, the best advice which the Solicitor-General has been given today has come from his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Ruislip, Northwood. If the Solicitor-General takes that advice he will not only save himself a lot of trouble but will save industry a lot of trouble in days to come.
      Question put, That the Amendment be made:—
      The Committee divided: Ayes 251, Noes 282.

      Division No. 161.]

      AYES

      [5.25 p.m.

      Abse, Leo

      Barnett, Joel

      Boyden, James (Bishop Auckland)

      Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)

      Beaney, Alan

      Brown, Bob (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, W.)

      Allen, Scholefield

      Benn, Rt. Hn. Anthony Wedgwood

      Brown, Hugh D (G'gow, Provan)

      Archer, Peter (Rowley Regis)

      Bennett, James (Glasgow, Bridgeton)

      Brown, Ronald (Shoreditch & F'bury)

      Armstrong, Ernest

      Bidwell, Sydney

      Buchan, Norman

      Ashley, Jack

      Bishop, E. S.

      Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)

      Ashton, Joe

      Blenkinsop, Arthur

      Callaghan, Rt. Hn. James

      Atkinson, Norman

      Boardman, H. (Leigh)

      Campbell, I. (Dunbartonshire, W.)

      Bagier, Gordon A. T.

      Booth, Albert

      Carmichael, Neil

      Barnes, Michael

      Bottomley, Rt. Hn. Arthur

      Carter-Jones, Lewis (Eccles)

      Castle, Rt. Hn. Barbara

      Hughes, Roy (Newport)

      Parker, John (Dagenham)

      Clark, David (Colne Valley)

      Hunter, Adam

      Parry, Robert (Liverpool, Exchange)

      Cocks, Michael (Bristol, S.)

      Irvine,Rt.Hn.SirArthur(EdgeHill)

      Pavitt, Laurie

      Cohen, Stanley

      Jay, Rt. Hn, Douglas

      Peart, Rt. Hn. Fred

      Coleman, Donald

      Jeger,Mrs.Lena(H'b'n&St.P'cras,S.)

      Pendry, Tom

      Concannon, J. D.

      Jenkins, Hugh (Putney)

      Pentland, Norman

      Corbet, Mrs. Freda

      Jenkins, Rt. Hn. Roy (Stechford)

      Perry, Ernest G.

      Cox, Thomas (Wandsworth, C.)

      John, Brynmor

      Prentice, Rt. Hn. Reg.

      Crawshaw, Richard

      Johnson, Carol (Lewisham, S.)

      Prescott, John

      Cronin, John

      Johnson, James (E'ston-on-Hull, W.)

      Price, J. I. (Westhoughton)

      Crosland, Rt. Hn. Anthony

      Johnson, Walter (Derby, S.)

      Price, William (Rugby)

      Cunningham, G. (Islington, S.W.)

      Jones, Dan (Burnley)

      Probert, Arthur

      Dalyell, Tam

      Jones,Rt.Hn.Sir Elwyn(W.Ham,S.)

      Rankin, John

      Darling, Rt. Hn. George

      Jones, Gwynoro (Carmarthen)

      Reed, D. (Sedgefield)

      Davidson, Arthur

      Jones, T. Alec (Rhondda, W.)

      Rees, Merlyn (Leeds, S.)

      Davies, Denzil (Llnelly)

      Judd, Frank

      Rhodes, Geoffrey

      Davies, G. Elfed (Rhondda, E.)

      Kaufman, Gerald

      Richard, Ivor

      Davies, Ifor (Gower)

      Kelley, Richard

      Roberts, Albert (Normanton)

      Davis, Clinton (Hackney, C.)

      Kinnock, Neil

      Roberts,Rt.Hn.Goronwy(Caernarven)

      Deakins, Eric

      Lamond, James

      Robertson, John (Paisley)

      de Freitas, Rt. Hn. Sir Geoffrey

      Latham, Arthur

      Roderick,Caerwyn E.(Br'e'n&R'dnor)

      Dell, Rt. Hn. Edmund

      Lawson, George

      Rodgers, William (Stockton-on-Tees)

      Dempsey, James

      Leadbitter, Ted

      Roper, John

      Doig, Peter

      Lee, Rt. Hn. Frederick

      Rose, Paul B.

      Dormand, J. D.

      Leonard, Dick

      Ross, Rt. Hn. William (Kilmarnock)

      Douglas, Dick (Stirlingshire, E.)

      Lestor, Miss Joan

      Sheldon, Robert (Ashton-under-Lyne)

      Douglas-Mann, Bruce

      Lever, Rt. Hn. Harold

      Shore, Rt. Hn. Peter (Stepney)

      Driberg, Tom

      Lewis, Arthur (W. Ham, N.)

      Short,Rt.Hn.Edward(N'c't1e-u-Tyne)

      Dully, A. E. P.

      Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)

      Silkin, Rt. Hn. John (Deptford)

      Dunn, James A.

      Lipton, Marcus

      Silkin, Hn. S. C. (Dulwich)

      Dunnett, Jack

      Lomas, Kenneth

      Sillars, James

      Eadie, Alex

      Loughlin, Charles

      Silverman, Julius

      Edelman, Maurice

      Lyon, Alexander W. (York)

      Skinner, Dennis

      Edwards, Robert (Bilston)

      Lyons, Edward (Bradford, E.)

      Small, William

      Ellis, Tom

      Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson

      Smith, John (Lanarkshire, N.)

      English, Michael

      McBride, Neil

      Spearing, Nigel

      Evans, Fred

      McCartney, Hugh

      Spriggs, Leslie

      Fernyhough, E.

      McElhone, Frank

      Stallard, A. W.

      Fisher,Mrs. Doris(B'ham,Ladywood)

      McGuire, Michael

      Steel, David

      Fitch, Alan (Wigan)

      Mackenzie, Gregor

      Stewart, Rt. Hn. Michael (Fulham)

      Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)

      Mackie, John

      Stoddart, David (Swindon)

      Foley, Maurice

      Mackintosh, John P.

      Stonehouse, Rt. Hn. John

      Foot, Michael

      Maclennan, Robert

      Strang, Gavin

      Ford, Ben

      McMillan, Tom (Glasgow, C.)

      Strauss, Rt. Hn. G. R.

      Forrester, John

      McNamara, J. Kevin

      Summerskill, Hn. Dr. Shirley

      Fraser, John (Norwood)

      MacPherson, Malcolm

      Taverne, Dick

      Freeson, Reginald

      Mahon, Simon (Bootle)

      Thomas, Jeffrey (Abertillery)

      Galpern, Sir Myer

      Mallaleiu, J. P. W. (Huddersfield, E.)

      Thomson, Rt. Hn. G. (Dundee, E.)

      Garrett, W. E.

      Marks, Kenneth

      Thorpe, Rt. Hn. Jeremy

      Gilbert, Dr. John

      Marquand, David

      Tinn, James

      Ginsburg, David

      Mason, Rt. Hn. Roy

      Tomney, Frank

      Golding, John

      Mayhew, Christopher

      Torney, Tom

      Gordon-Walker, Rt. Hn. P. C.

      Meacher, Michael

      Tuck, Raphael

      Gourlay, Harry

      Mellish, Rt. Hn. Robert

      Urwin, T. W.

      Grant, George (Morpeth)

      Mendelson, John

      Varley, Eric G.

      Grant, John D. (Islington, E.)

      Mikardo, Ian

      Wainwright, Edwin

      Griffiths, Eddie (Brightside)

      Milian, Bruce

      Walden, Brian (B'm'ham, All Saints)

      Griffiths, Will (Exchange)

      Miller, Dr. M.S.

      alker, Harold (Doncaster)

      Grimond, Rt. Hn. J

      Milne, Edward (Blyth)

      Wallace, George

      Hamilton, James (Bothwell)

      Molloy, William

      Watkins, David

      Hamilton, William (Fife, W.)

      Morris, Alfred (Wythenshawe)

      Weitzman, David

      Hardy, Peter

      Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw)

      Wellbeloved, James

      Harper, Joseph

      Moyle, Roland

      White, James (Glasgow, Pollok)

      Harrison, Walter (Wakefield)

      Mulley, Rt. Hn. Frederick

      Whitehead, Phillip

      Hart, Rt. Hn. Judith

      Murray, Ronald King

      Whitlock, William

      Hattersley, Roy

      Ogden, Eric

      Williams, Alan (Swansea, W.)

      Healey, Rt. Hn. Denis

      O'Halloran, Michael

      Williams, Mrs. Shirley (Hitchin)

      Heffer, Eric S.

      O'Malley, Brian

      Williams, W. T. (Warrington).

      Hilton, W. S.

      Oram, Bert

      Wilson, Alexander (Hamilton)

      Horam, John

      Orbach, Maurice

      Wilson, Rt. Hn. Harold (Huyton)

      Houghton, Rt. Hn. Douglas

      Orme, Stanley

      Wilson, William (Coventry, S.)

      Howell, Denis (Small Heath)

      Oswald, Thomas

      Huckfield, Leslie

      Owen, Dr. David (Plymouth, Sutton)

      TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

      Hughes, Mark (Durham)

      Palmer, Arthur

      Mr. John Pardoe and

      Hughes, Robert (Aberdeen, N.)

      Pannell, Rt. Hn. Charles

      Mr. Russell Johnston.

      NOES

      Adley, Robert

      Atkins, Humphrey

      Batsford, Brian

      Alison, Michael (Barkston Ash)

      Awdry, Daniel

      Beamish, Col. Sir Tufton

      Allason, James (Hemel Hempstead)

      Baker, Kenneth (St. Marylebone)

      Bell, Ronald

      Archer, Jeffrey (Louth)

      Baker, W. H. K. (Banff)

      Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torquay)

      Astor, John

      Barber, Rt. Hn. Anthony

      Benyon, W.

      1648

      1649

      Biffen, John

      Gurden, Harold

      Morgan, Geraint (Denbigh)

      Biggs-Davison, John

      Hall, Miss Joan (Keighley)

      Morgan-Giles, Rear-Adm.

      Blakey, Peter

      Hall, John (Wycombe)

      Morrison, Charles (Devizes)

      Boardman, Tom (Leicester, S.W.)

      Hall-Davis, A. G. F.

      Mudd, David

      Body, Richard

      Hamilton, Michael (Salisbury)

      Murton, Oscar

      Boscawen, Robert

      Hannam, John (Exeter)

      Nabarro, Sir Gerald

      Bossom, Sir Clive

      Harrison, Brian (Maldon)

      Neave, Airey

      Bowden, Andrew

      Harrison, Col. Sir Harwood (Eye)

      Nicholls, Sir Harmar

      Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hn. John

      Haselhurst, Alan

      Noble, Rt. Hn. Michael

      Braine, Bernard

      Hastings, Stephen

      Normanton, Tom

      Bray, Ronald

      Hayhoe, Barney

      Nott, John

      Brewis, John

      Heath, Rt. Hn. Edward

      Onslow, Cranley

      Brinton, Sir Tatton

      Hicks, Robert

      Oppenheim, Mrs. Sally

      Brocklebank-Fowler, Christopher

      Higgins, Terence L.

      Orr, Capt. L. P. S.

      Brown, Sir Edward (Bath)

      Hiley, Joseph

      Owen, Idris (Stockport, N.)

      Bruce-Gardyno, J.

      Hill, John E. B. (Norfolk, S.)

      Page, John (Harrow, W.)

      Bryan, Paul

      Hill, James (Southampton, Test)

      Parkinson, Cecil (Enfield, W.)

      Buchanan-Smith, Alick(Angus,N&M)

      Holland, Philip

      Peel, John

      Bullus, Sir Eric

      Holt, Miss Mary

      Percival, Ian

      Burden, F. A.

      Hordern, Peter

      Peyton, Rt. Hn. John

      Butler, Adam (Bosworth)

      Hornby, Richard

      Pike, Miss Mervyn

      Carlisle, Mark

      Hornsby-Smith,Rt.Hn.Dame Patricia

      Pink, R. Bonner

      Cary, Sir Robert

      Howe, Hn. Sir Geoffrey (Reigate)

      Powell, Rt. Hn. J. Enoch

      Channon, Paul

      Howell, Ralph (Norfolk, N.)

      Prior, Rt. Hn. J. M. L.

      Chapman, Sydney

      Hunt, John

      Proudfoot, Wilfred

      Chataway, Rt. Hn. Christopher

      Hutchison, Michael Clark

      Pym, Rt. Hn. Francis

      Chichester-Clarke, R.

      Iremonger, T. L.

      Quennell, Miss J. M.

      Clark William (Surrey, E.)

      James, David

      Raison, Timothy

      Clarke, Kenneth (Rushcliffe)

      Jenkin, Patrick (Woodford)

      Ramsden, Rt. Hn. James

      Clegg, Walter

      Jessel, Toby

      Rawlinson, Rt. Hn. Sir Peter

      Cockeram, Eric

      Johnson Smith, G. (E. Grinstead)

      Redmond, Robert

      Cooke, Robert

      Jopling, Michael

      Reed, Laurance (Bolton, E.)

      Coombs, Derek

      Joseph, Rt. Hn. Sir Keith

      Rees, Peter (Dover)

      Cooper, A. E.

      Kaberry, Sir Donald

      Rees-Davies, W. R.

      Cordle, John

      Kellett, Mrs. Elaine

      Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon

      Cormack, Patrick

      Kershaw, Anthony

      Ridley, Hn. Nicholas

      Costain, A. P.

      Kilfedder, James

      Ridsdale, Julian

      Critchley, Julian

      King, Evelyn (Dorset, S.)

      Roberts, Michael (Cardiff, N.)

      Crouch, David

      King, Tom (Bridgwater)

      Roberts, Wyn (Conway)

      Crowder, F. P.

      Kinsey, J.R.

      Rossi, Hugh (Hornsey)

      Curran, Charles

      Kirk, Peter

      Rost, Peter

      Dalkeith, Earl of

      Kitson, Timothy

      St. John-Stevas, Norman

      Davies, Rt. Hn. John (Knutsford)

      Knight, Mrs. Jill

      Sandys, Rt. Hn. D.

      d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir Henry

      Knox, David

      Scott, Nicholas

      d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Maj.-Gen. Jack

      Lambton, Antony

      Scott-Hopkins, James

      Dean, Paul

      Lane, David

      Sharples, Richard

      Deedes, Rt. Hn. W. F

      Langford-Holt, Sir John

      Shaw, Michael (Sc'b'gh & Whitby)

      Digby, Simon Wingfield

      Legge-Bourke, Sir Harry

      Shelton, William (Clapham)

      Dixon, Piers

      Le Merchant, Spencer

      Simeons, Charles

      Dodds-Parker, Douglas

      Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)

      Sinclair, Sir George

      Douglas-Home, Rt. Hn. Sir Alec

      Lloyd,Rt. Hn.Geo Rrey (Sut'nC'dfield)

      Skeet, T. H. H.

      Drayson, G. B.

      Lloyd, Ian (P'tsm'th, Langstone)

      Smith, Dudley (W'wick & L'mington)

      du Cann, Rt. Hn. Edward

      Longden, Gilbert

      Soref, Harold

      Eden, Sir John

      Loveridge, John

      Speed, Keith

      Edwards, Nicholas (Pembroke)

      McAdden, Sir Stephen

      Spence, John

      Elliot, Capt. Walter (Carshalton)

      MacArthur, Ian

      Sproat, Iain

      Elliott, R. W. (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne,N.)

      McCrindle, R. A.

      Stainton, Keith

      Emery, Peter

      McLaren, Martin

      Stanbrook, Ivor

      Eyre, Reginald

      Maclean, Fitzroy

      Stewart-Smith, D. G. (Belper)

      Farr, John

      McMaster, Stanley

      Stodart, Anthony (Edinburgh, W.)

      Fell, Anthony

      Macmillan, Maurice (Farnham)

      Stoddart-Scott, Col. Sir M.

      Fenner, Mrs. Peggy

      McNair Wilson, Michael

      Stokes, John

      Finsberg, Geoffrey (Hampstead)

      McNair-Wilson,Patrick(New Forest)

      Stuttaford, Dr. Tom

      Fletcher-Cooke, Charles

      Maddan, Martin

      Sutcliffe, John

      Fookes, Miss Janet

      Madel, David

      Tapsell, Peter

      Fortescue, Tim

      Maginnis, John E.

      Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)

      Foster, Sir John

      Marples, Rt. Hn. Ernest

      Taylor,Edward M.(G'gow,Cathcart)

      Fowler, Norman

      Marten, Neil

      Taylor, Frank (Moss Side)

      Fox, Marcus

      Mather, Carol

      Taylor, Robert (Croydon, N.W.)

      Fry, Peter

      Maude, Angus

      Tebbit, Norman

      Galbraith, Hn. T.

      Maudling, Rt. Hn. Reginald

      Temple, John M.

      Gardner, Edward

      Mawby, Ray

      Thatcher, Rt. Hn. Mrs. Margaret

      Gilmour, Ian (Norfolk, C.)

      Maxwell-Hyslop, R. J.

      Thomas, John Stradling (Monmouth)

      Gilmour, Sir John (Fife, E.)

      Meyer, Sir Anthony

      Thompson, Sir Richard (Craydon, S.)

      Glyn, Dr. Alan

      Mills, Peter (Torrington)

      Tilney, John

      Godber, Rt. Hn. J. B.

      Mills, Stratton (Belfast, N.)

      Trafford, Dr. Anthony

      Goodhart, Philip

      Mitchell,Lt.-Col.C.(Aberdeenshlre,W)

      Trew, Peter

      Gorst, John

      Mitchell, David (Basingstoke)

      Tugendhat, Christopher

      Gower, Raymond

      Moate, Roger

      Turton, Rt. Hn. R. H.

      Grant, Anthony (Harrow, C.)

      Molyneaux, James

      Vaughan, Dr. Gerard

      Gray, Hamish

      Money, Ernie

      Vickers, Dame Joan

      Green, Alan

      Monks, Mrs. Connie

      Waddington, David

      Grylls, Michael

      Montgomery, Fergus

      Welder, David (Clitheroe)

      Gummer, Selwyn

      More, Jasper

      Walker-Smith, Rt. Hn. Sir Derek

      1650

      1651

      Wall, Patrick

      Whitelaw, Rt. Hn. William

      Worsley, Marcus

      Walters, Dennis

      Wiggin, Jerry

      Wylie, Rt. Hn. N.R.

      Ward, Dame Irene

      Wilkinson, John

      Warren, Kenneth

      Wolrige-Gordon, Patrick

      TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

      Weatherill, Bernard

      Woodhouse, Hn. Christopher

      Mr. Paul Hawkins and

      Wells, John (Maidstone)

      Woodnutt, Mark

      Mr. Victor Goodhew.

      White, Roger (Gravesend)

      Mr. Walter Johnson: I beg to move Amendment No. 797, in page 61, line 29, leave out from "organisation" to end of line 30 and insert:
      'of workers; any reference to an industrial dispute shall include a dispute between workers and workers and a dispute concerning the recognition or non-recognition of a trade union.'
      I believe that the Government would be wise to accept the Amendment, which would leave the difficult problems of demarcation disputes, recognition and inter-union disputes in the hands of the T.U.C. With due respect to the Government and the Industrial Court, if it is ever set up, or to any body set up by the present Government, the T.U.C. has far more experience in dealing with this problem than any such body is ever likely to have.
      The Solicitor-General will know of the Bridlington Agreement, which, in spite of its imperfections, has stood the test of time in dealing with many of the industrial disputes arising out of recognition and inter-union disputes. Under this Clause, the Bridlington principles and procedures are to be thrown to one side. They were introduced for the benefit of both sides of industry, employers as well as unions.
      In the last 30 years, the T.U.C. has dealt successfully with more than 1,000 inter-union disputes under the Bridlington Agreement. The understanding which existed among the unions has itself presented an indiscrimate number of these disputes from arising, particularly in factory, shop or office. It has halted the spread of break-away unions and has cut down the willy-nilly transfer of members from one union to another.
      The Government's proposals are intended to strengthen the authority of the unions and bring about orderly industrial relations. They will do nothing of the sort, and I will demonstrate why.
      Hon. Members will be aware of the number of demarcation disputes that have arisen in recent years. Many of these would have been impossible to
      1652
      solve without the intervention of the T.U.C. As I explained, the Bridlington Agreement has been responsible for solving a large number of them.
      Hon. Members will know the general terms. Where unions are in dispute, they have the opportunity of eventually coming before the T.U.C. Disputes Committee and, be they large or small unions, they can present the facts clearly and fairly about the dispute in question. At the end of the day the Disputes Committee reaches a decision, but that need not be the end of the story. If a union feels that the Disputes Committees has made a wrong decision, it can appeal to the T.U.C. itself and get the matter resolved there. In this way small unions are protected in exactly the same way as are large unions.
      It is difficult enough for the T.U.C., with the good will of the trade unions and with great experience of dealing with these problems, to get these disputes resolved. These include inter-union problems, demarcation difficulties and matters affecting the recognition of trade unions. There is no doubt that this background of experience places the T.U.C. in an excellent position to deal with these disputes which arise in our industrial relations.
      Sir D. Walker-Smith: The hon. Gentleman is putting forward the Amendment on the basis that it refers to the T.U.C. Considering the wording of Clause 57, which defines these terms—in that the Amendment refers to an organisation of workers—would not the T.U.C. be a federation of workers' organisations within subsection (2), and does that not present a difficulty in connection with the Amendment? Whatever virtues the hon. Gentleman's proposal may have in connection with the T.U.C., owing to the definition of "organisation of workers" the Amendment would extend to all sorts of ad hoc, unregistered and other bodies which could purport to come within Clause 57(1).
      Mr. Johnson: The right hon. and learned Gentleman makes a valuable

      1653
      point and the reason for our raising this matter is that we believe that further disputes will arise from this legislation. We have been able to demonstrate that instead of preventing strikes, this legislation will result in more strikes occurring.
      Great bitterness will arise and whereas at present unions by and large accept the advice of the T.U.C. Disputes Committee, if the Government remove these powers from the T.U.C. there will be more strikes. At present the T.U.C. is able to intervene when difficulties occur and so prevent those difficulties turning into strikes.
      If the Government force the Clause through unamended, trade unions will regard this as a gross interference with free trade union practice, which has been built up over the years and which helps the nation because it solves disputes in the way I have described. The Government will be asking for trouble if they force this through. It would be to their advantage—though, more important, to the advantage of the nation—to accept the Amendment.
      5.45 p.m.
      The Solicitor-General: The hon. Member for Derby, South (Mr. Walter Johnson) raised two specific points, one of a narrow and one of a general character.
      The more general point which the hon. Gentleman raised was that the Clause, if left unamended, would impede or obstruct the exercise by the T.U.C. of its conciliatory powers between unions and the resolution of recognition arguments or demarcation disputes. It is not the intention or desire of the Government to achieve that result and I suggest that the Clause will in no sense threaten or undermine the work that the T.U.C. has done and, one hopes, will keep on doing.
      There is nothing here to reduce the effectiveness of any agreement that may be made—either the Bridlington agreement or that which comes after it—by the T.U.C. or between different unions in regard to the resolution of arguments between them. I cannot see how this threatens to have that effect.
      Perhaps it creates an alternative legal machinery for the resolution of disputes of this kind. It is not the Clause so much that does that but, more particularly, the Clauses which we have already debated; namely, Clause 42 onwards which deal with recognition and which enable a union
      1654
      seeking recognition to have that matter determined and which enable an employer confronted with competing recognition schemes to have those schemes referred, through the court, to the C.I.R.
      In other words, the Clause as drafted would set up alternative machinery and would in no way diminish the power or rôle of the T.U.C. to do exactly what it has always tried to do. The Government argue that the provision of alternative legal machinery may in itself encourage unions, if the hon. Gentleman is right, to make use of the existing extra legal machinery. If that happens, well and good. Nevertheless, there is nothing here to stop it from happening.
      The Amendment would extend the definition of "organisation of workers" to cover an organisation of workers whether or not it was registered. The Committee may wish to debate that point on the Question, That the Clause stand part of the Bill. The concept of the Clause is that the right to induce a breach of contract without due notice being given should be confined to registered organisations. The Amendment challenges that and seeks to give that right to other organisations, registered or unregistered. This is a principle which I suggest it would be more appropriate to discuss on that Question.
      Mr. Heffer: The importance of this Amendment and the Clause to which it relates comes into perspective when one takes into account that the General Council is recommending to the 'Trades Union Congress that unions should not register.
      The Solicitor-General: That is a matter which can be debated more widely in other contexts. In the context of this Clause, we are saying that only a registered organisation should retain the right, either itself or though its officials, to induce breaches of contracts of employment. That is a central provision of the Bill to which we attach importance, which we can debate on the Question, That the Clause stand part of the Bill.
      The other point, which the hon. Member for Derby, South did not develop in detail but which arises on the Amendment, is the suggestion that the definition of an industrial dispute shall include
      "a dispute between workers and workers and a dispute concerning … recognition or non-recognition."

      1655
      The inclusion of those words in the Clause might have rather curious effects, and I imagine that hon. Members opposite would say that this point relates to the definition of industrial dispute in Clause 148. In Clause 148, "industrial dispute" is defined as including,
      "(c) allocation of work as between workers or groups of workers;
      (d) a procedure agreement, or any matter to which in accordance with this section a procedure agreement can relate;"
      One turns then to the definition of "procedure agreement", which relates, among other things, to,
      "machinery for consultation with regard to, or for the settlement by negotiation or arbitration of, terms and conditions of employment",
      and in paragraphs (c) and (d) there are included also "negotiating rights" and
      "facilities for officials of trade unions or other organisations of workers".
      Thus, if a union claims negotiating rights, and it claims them from an employer, it is in dispute with the employer within the terms of paragraph (c) of the definition of "procedure agreement", and it would be within the definition of "industrial dispute" as now drawn. Similarly, if there were a demarcation dispute, as opposed to a competing recognition dispute, as to the allocation of work between workers or groups of workers that also would be within the terms of paragraph (c) of the definition of "industrial dispute".
      I hope that the Committee will feel that the addition of the words proposed to make plain that a dispute concerning recognition is within the definition of "industrial dispute" is not necessary, and that any dispute covered by the matters to which we have just referred would be an industrial dispute for the purposes of Clause 85 and elsewhere in the Bill.
      In the view of many commentators, the inclusion of the words "workers and workers" in the 1906 Act has created as much doubt as it has resolved doubt. I think that Donovan said that it was uncertain whether the words "between workers and workers" actually applied to a recognition dispute. Rather than repeat those somewhat misleading words, we have included the much wider definition of industrial dispute in the two
      1656
      places to which I have drawn attention in Clause 148.
      Therefore, for the narrowly technical reason in respect of the definition of "industrial dispute", because the confining of the right to induce breaches of contract of employment to registered organisations is a central part of the policy of the Bill, and because nothing in the Clause either does obstruct or will obstruct the rôle of the T.U.C. in the resolution of demarcation or recognition disputes, I argue that the Amendment is not called for.
      Mr. Paul B. Rose: We shall be discussing the wider implications of the Clause later. My hon. Friend the Member for Derby, South (Mr. Walter Johnson) has given a useful exposition of how the trade union movement itself deals with some of these problems. We have proposed the Amendment because we recognise certain specific legal problems posed not merely by the Clause but by the 1906 Act as interpreted in a number of legal decisions, particularly in recent years.
      The difficulty in debating Amendment No. 797 in isolation is that Amendment No. 796 was not selected—in page 61, line 19, leave out subsection (1) and insert:
      (1) An act done by a person or organisation of workers in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute shall not be actionable on the ground only that it induces some other person to break a contract or that it is an interference with the trade, business or employment of some other person, or with the right of some other person to dispose of his capital or his labour as he wills.
      That Amendment is directly related to this definition subsection, and it is only with an understanding of the problems caused by the 1906 Act that one can understand the points now being put.
      There may be a strike for trade union recognition. A trade union on the register may well have organised a substantial proportion of the workers at a particular establishment yet it may be denied the protection of the 1906 Act, although it would seem that, under the new definition of industrial dispute, it may well be protected as regards unfair industrial practice.
      But even with the new concept proposed by the Solicitor-General regarding the bargaining unit, there seems to be a

      1657
      failure to meet a number of legal problems. There is not only the question of the strike for recognition. One has to consider also the embryonic union, the non-registered union, the de-registered union, the union which is fighting for recognition but which is not protected because it is not yet on the register. My hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) has reminded us that many large trade unions will not register and, therefore, will not be protected under the Clause.
      Refusal of recognition must inevitably lead to an industrial dispute because at that stage the machinery for negotiation on demands connected with the employment or non-employment—if I may use terms from the 1906 Act—or the terms of employment and conditions of labour of any person has not been set up. The situation—I am sure that this was not the intention in the 1906 Act—is that a strike for trade union recognition may well not come within the protection of the Act, and certainly not within Section 5.
      We have sought here modestly to return to the status quo and to implement at least one part of paragraph 1100 of Donovan in relation to commercial contracts. The difficulty arises because, although Lord Denning in the case of Beetham v. Trinidad Cement Co. in 1961 accepted that a recognition dispute would fall within the ambit of Section 5 of the 1906 Act, and although the Solicitor-General has assured us—we have to accept his assurance for the time being—that this is his intention as regards Clause 85, a recent pronouncement by Lord Reid in the case of Stratford v. Lindley casts considerable doubt on the protection offered by the 1906 Act. That dictum restricted the definition of trade dispute to mean a case arising from an individual complaint about the terms of the employee's service. So the question of the recognition of a union was excluded.
      Looked at in isolation, this may appear not relevant to Clause 85, but taken together with Amendment No. 796, which was not selected, it has a profound significance for the protection of trade unions.
      Again, we have the rather strange concept of "furthering the anger felt" rather than "furthering a trade dispute" which Lord Denning introduced in the Torquay
      1658
      Hotels case. I hope that the Solicitor-General will look into this. It casts doubt upon the protection offered to registered trade unions within the ambit of the 1906 Act. I hope that the hon. and learned Gentleman, who has at least clarified his intention with regard to industrial disputes in the Clause, will equally clarify his attitude to the position of the 1906 Act.
      [Mr. E. L. MALLALIEU in the Chair]
      6.0 p.m.
      The Solicitor-General: The effective provisions of Section 3 of that Act now appear in Clause 118(1) of the Bill, conferring total immunity over the area recommended by Donovan from actions in the ordinary courts in respect of a trade or industrial dispute. Our intention is to confer that immunity as widely as it exists now, but defining "industrial dispute" so as to make it plainer than the phrase "trade dispute" in the 1906 Act. If the hon. Gentleman follows "industrial dispute" in the subsection through to the definition Clause and the definition of "procedure agreement" and "negotiating rights", he will see that we intended to make it plain that all litigation about this kind of situation, whether the Beetham case or the Stratford v. Lindley case, is excluded from the ordinary courts and is subject to the new rules laid down in this provision. That is the intention, and I think that we have achieved it.
      Mr. Rose: I am not sure that the hon. and learned Gentleman has achieved that intention. I should like from him an undertaking that on Report he will at least make clear the intention with regard to the definition of industrial dispute and that it will apply also to a trade dispute within the meaning of the 1906 Act. Unless he does, we are faced with a curious anomaly where, for the purposes of "unfair industrial practice" he accepts a certain degree of protection, which disintegrates when we go to the subsequent Clauses. In relation to the 1906 Act and the later Clauses we have an entirely different problem, because we do not know—and the law is in a state of flux on this—whether a recognition dispute is included.
      I ask the hon. and learned Gentleman to look again at this problem and perhaps to introduce an Amendment on Report which will make it certain with regard

      1659
      to a tort that the protection for inducement under the 1906 Act will extend as widely as he has told us it will extend in regard to recognition disputes under his new concept of industrial dispute and unfair trade practice.
      The Solicitor-General: The 1906 Act, and in particular Section 3, disappears under the Bill. The equivalent protection to that contained by Section 3 of the 1906 Act in relation to trade disputes is conferred in Clause 118(1) in relation to industrial disputes. So the question of what is or is not the meaning of "trade dispute" no longer arises. A trade union brought before the ordinary court will no longer say, "We are acting in furtherance or contemplation of a trade dispute". It will say, "We are acting in furtherance or contemplation of an industrial dispute under Section 118", which is more widely defined, advisedly, than in the 1906 Act. The hon. Gentleman will find that that is how the matter is dealt with.
      Mr. Rose: I am very grateful to the Solicitor-General. I have just looked at Clause 118, and I think he will agree that it is based very largely upon the wording of the 1906 Act. I hope that he will look at it to make it entirely clear that a recognition dispute will now be covered, and that there will be no uncertainty about that.
      The second problem posed by what I can only describe as the legal sleight of hand of Her Majesty's Solicitor-Juggler is that the definition of "industrial dispute" differs from the definition of "trade dispute" so as to eliminate in this sense the protection given in cases in which both sides of the dispute may be employees. Happily, inter-union disputes, which were once a source of anxiety, have been diminishing recently and are now a tiny proportion of disputes within industry. Reference has been made to some of the actions of the T.U.C., and more amalgamations are taking place within the trade union movement. Therefore, they would be only a minor irritant in normal circumstances, but the minor irritant derives from the fact that the inter-union dispute may arise from bad communications by management or faulty decisions by management.
      The greater irritant derives from the astonishing and disruptive provisions on
      1660
      agency shops and bargaining units, which are calculated to cause inter-union disputes—not demarcation disputes, but disputes over representation which could well lead to a fragmentation of the trade union movement. In that context, to do what Donovan never suggested—limit the definition so as to do away with disputes between one section of workers and another—seems to me to be a major irritant for the trade union movement in the future. There is no legitimacy here derived from Donovan.
      Third, the Amendment includes in the protection "organisations of workers". I know that this is a matter that will be discussed in some detail on the Question, That the Clause stand part of the Bill. By excluding non-registered trade unions, the hon. and learned Gentleman effectively denies the right to strike, certainly the right to induce a breach of contract, to non-unionists. We have heard many hon. Members opposite protest on behalf of non-unionists earlier. Non-unionists, non-registered trade unions, and de-registered trade unions are denied the right to strike, and so-called unofficial strikes, even if subsequently recognised, will be left in the position in which those involved, certainly those inducing a breach of contract, will be liable under the Clause.
      Mr. David Mitchell Mr. David Mitchell (Basingstoke) rose——
      Mr. Rose: I am trying to develop a somewhat complex argument, so I will not give way at present.
      There is surely no juridical difference between official and unofficial strikes. What the hon. and learned Gentleman is trying to do here, when there is a breach of contract in both cases, is to try to draw an artificial distinction between an official and an unofficial strike. Denial of the right to strike to non-unionists and organisations of workers is contrary to Clause 6 of the European Social Charter.
      The Solicitor-General may claim that legitimacy is derived from Donovan, because of the split vote to which he referred earlier. But Donovan proposed a completely different framework for registration, not a system of State-licensed unions, and his proposals were also in the framework of an appeal not to the N.I.R.C. but to a panel which would be composed of two trade unionists and one

      1661
      independent member. So the Bill has a very different situation with regard to registration from that put forward by Donovan. But I leave those arguments until we debate the Question, That the Clause stand part of the Bill.
      By accepting the Amendment, or at least giving an undertaking on the two latter points, the Solicitor-General would go some way not only towards clarifying what he feels the law is intended to be but towards repairing some of the damage that will be done by the Clause. A little later we shall debate in full what goes to the root of the matter. We are now debating certain Amendments, but the fundamental premise of the Clause goes to the root of the whole social consensus that was arrived at in 1906 after the Taff Vale decision. On the Question, That the Clause stand part of the Bill, we shall have the opportunity to debate far more fully the very wide and serious inter-related ramifications of subsection (1), which we have been denied the opportunity to debate in the context of this Amendment. We have been denied the opportunity of relating the Amendment on inducement to the attempt to restore the status quo of the 1906 Act. The Solicitor-General is taking a remarkable step if he intends to deny the right to strike to a very large section of workers. This Amendment would at least alleviate his proposals to some extent.
      Mr. David Mitchell: I have been following the hon. Gentleman's argument carefully. He suggests that an unregistered trade union has no right to call a strike. Will he clarify his interpretation of the Clause and say what he believes will be the position of an unregistered trade union calling a strike when it has given due notice under the procedure agreement or the terms of the contract?
      Mr. Rose: We are dealing with inducement. We are in a position in which an unregistered trade union—in other words, an organisation of workers for the purpose of the Clause—is not afforded the same protection as that accorded to the official of a registered trade union under Clause 90(5) and Clause 85.
      The hon. Gentleman has not entirely followed my argument. The defence provided in Clause 85(1) is not provided for an unregistered trade union because the definition of "trade union" does not
      1662
      include an organisation of workers; nor will it take in a situation where workers are not members of a trade union. I think that the hon. Gentleman should look again at Clause 85.
      Mr. Mitchell Mr. Mitchell rose——
      Mr. Rose: No. I must not take up any further time. We shall be debating the principle later, when no doubt the hon. Gentleman will have a chance to deal with what is a fundamental principle, which is the denial to an unregistered union of the same privileges which apply to registered trade unions within a context of registration which differs in many ways from that put forward by the Donovan Commission.
      I ask the Solicitor-General to look at these three legal problems. In the light of what has been said from these benches about the work of the trade union movement, the hon. and learned Gentleman ought at least to undertake to come back on Report and undo some of the damage which may be done by this objectionable Clause.
      Mr. Mitchell: I want to return to this point because it appears, I am sure unintentionally, that the hon. Gentleman has misled the Committee. When I raised the matter with him just now, the hon. Gentleman skipped the point. I hope that my hon. and learned Friend will clarify it for the Committee.
      No one disputes that there is a difference betwen the privilege given to a registered trade union and that given to an unregistered union or collection of persons acting together. But to suggest that an unregistered union has no rights seems to be completely at variance with the facts. I accept that there is a difference of privilege. But to say in a sweeping way that an unregistered trade union has no right to call a strike seems to be a complete distortion of the facts, especially when one bears in mind that countless numbers of the hon. Gentleman's supporters in the country will repeat what he has said.
      It is somewhat ironic that the hon. Gentleman should make this statement on the same day as the T.U.C. has apparently advised its member unions not to seek registration. There seems to be an absolute irony in the situation in which the hon. Gentleman finds himself. He is out on a limb. I hope that my

      1663
      hon. and learned Friend will assure the Committee that my interpretation is correct and that the hon. Gentleman is wrong.
      Question put, That the Amendment be made:—
      The Committee divided: Ayes 245, Noes 278.

      Division No.162.]

      AYES

      [6.12 p.m.

      Abse, Leo

      Freeson, Reginald

      Marks, Kenneth

      Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)

      Galpern, Sir Myer

      Marquand, David

      Archer, Peter (Rowley Regis)

      Garrett, W. E.

      Mason, Rt. Hn. Roy

      Armstrong, Ernest

      Gilbert, Dr. John

      Mayhew, Christopher

      Ashley, Jack

      Ginsburg, David

      Meacher, Michael

      Ashton, Joe

      Golding, John

      Mellish, Rt. Hn. Robert

      Atkinson, Norman

      Gordon Walker, Rt. Hn. P. C.

      Mendelson, John

      Bagier, Gordon A. T.

      Gourlay, Harry

      Mikardo, Ian

      Barnes, Michael

      Grant, George (Morpeth)

      Millan, Bruce

      Barnett, Joel

      Grant, John D. (Islington, E.)

      Miller, Dr. M. S.

      Benn, Rt. Hn. Anthony Wedgwood

      Griffiths, Eddie (Brightside)

      Milne, Edward (Blyth)

      Bennett, James (Glasgow, Bridgeton)

      Griffiths, Will (Exchange)

      Molloy, William

      Bidwell, Sydney

      Hamilton, James (Bothwell)

      Morris, Alfred (Wythenshawe)

      Bishop, E. S.

      Hamilton, William (Fife, W.)

      Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw)

      Blenkinsop, Arthur

      Hardy, Peter

      Morris, Rt. Hn. John (Aberavon)

      Boardman, H. (Leigh)

      Harrison, Walter (Wakefield)

      Moyle, Roland

      Booth, Albert

      Hart, Rt. Hn. Judith

      Mulley, Rt. Hn. Frederick

      Bottomley, Rt. Hn. Arthur

      Hattersley, Roy

      Murray, Ronald King

      Boyden, James (Bishop Auckland)

      Healey, Rt. Hn. Denis

      Ogden, Eric

      Bradley, Tom

      Heffer, Eric

      S. O'Halloran, Michael

      Brown, Bob (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne,W.)

      Hilton, W. S.

      O'Malley, Brian

      Brown, Hugh D. (G'gow, Provan)

      Horam, John

      Oram, Bert

      Brown, Ronald (Shoreditch & F'bury)

      Houghton, Rt. Hn. Douglas

      Orbach, Maurice

      Buchan, Norman

      Howell, Denis (Small Heath)

      Orme, Stanley

      Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)

      Huckfield, Leslie

      Oswald, Thomas

      Callaghan, Rt. Hn. James Hughes, Mark (Durham)

      Owen, Dr. David (Plymouth, Sutton)

      Campbell, I. (Dunbartonshire, W.)

      Hughes, Robert (Aberdeen, N.)

      Palmer, Arthur

      Carmichael, Neil

      Hughes, Roy (Newport)

      Pannell, Rt. Hn. Charles

      Carter, Ray (Birmingh'm, Northfield)

      Hunter, Adam

      Pardoe, John

      Carter-Jones, Lewis (Eccles)

      Irvine,Rt.Hn.SirArthllr(Edge Hill)

      Parker, John (Dagenham)

      Castle, Rt. Hn. Barbara

      Jay, Rt. Hn. Douglas

      Parry, Robert (Liverpool, Exchange)

      Clark, David (Colne Valley)

      Jeger,Mrs.Lena(H'b'n&St.P'cras,S.)

      Peart, Rt. Hn. Fred

      Cocks, Michael (Bristol, S.)

      Jenkins, Hugh (Putney)

      Pendry, Tom

      Cohen, Stanley

      Jenkins, Rt. Hn. Roy (Stechford)

      Pentland, Norman

      Concannon, J. D.

      John, Brynmor

      Perry, Ernest G.

      Corbet, Mrs. Freda

      Johnson, Carol (Lewisham, S.)

      Prentice, Rt. Hn. Reg.

      Cox, Thomas (Wandsworth, C.)

      Johnson, James (K'ston-on-Hull, W.)

      Prescott, John

      Crawshaw, Richard

      Johnson, Walter (Derby, S.)

      Price, J. T. (Westhoughton)

      Cronin, John

      Jones, Barry (Flint, E.)

      Price, William (Rugby)

      Crosland, Rt. Hn. Anthony

      Jones, Dan (Burnley)

      Probert, Arthur

      Cunningham, G. (Islington, S.W.)

      Jones,Rt.Hn.Sir Elwyn(W.Ham,S.)

      Rankin, John

      Dalyell, Tam

      Jones, Cwynoro (Carmarthen)

      Reed, D. (Sedgefield)

      Davidson, Arthur

      Jones, T. Alec (Rhondda, W.)

      Rees, Merlyn (Leeds, S.)

      Davies, Denzil (Llanelly)

      Judd, Frank

      Rhodes, Geoffrey

      Davies, G. Elfed (Rhondda, E.)

      Kaufman, Gerald

      Richard, Ivor

      Davies, Ifor (Gower)

      Kelley, Richard

      Roberts, Albert (Normanton)

      Davis, Clinton (Hackney, C.)

      Kinnock, Neil

      Roberts,Rt.Hn.Goronwy(Caernarvon)

      Deakins, Eric

      Lamond, James

      Robertson, John (Paisley)

      de Freitas, Rt. Hn. Sir Geoffrey

      Latham, Arthur

      Roderick, Caerwyn E.(Br'c'n&R'dnor)

      Dell, Rt. Hn. Edmund

      Lawson, George

      Rodgers, William (Stockton-on-Tees)

      Dempsey, James

      Leadbitter, Ted

      Roper, John

      Doig, Peter

      Lee, Rt. Hn. Frederick

      Rose, Paul B.

      Dormand, J. D.

      Leonard, Dick

      Ross, Rt. Hn. William (Kilmarnock)

      Douglas, Dick (Stirlingshire, E.)

      Lestor, Miss Joan

      Sheldon, Robert (Ashton-under-Lyne)

      Douglas-Mann, Bruce

      Lever, Rt. Hn. Harold

      Shore, Rt. Hn. Peter (Stepney)

      Driberg, Tom

      Lewis, Arthur (W. Ham N.)

      Short,Rt.Hn.Edward(N'c'tle-u-Tyne)

      Duffy, A. E. P.

      Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)

      Silkin, Rt. Hn. John (Deptford)

      Dunn, James A.

      Lipton, Marcus

      Silkin, Hn. S. C. (Dulwich)

      Dunnett, Jack

      Lomas, Kenneth

      Sillars, James

      Eadie, Alex

      Loughlin, Charles

      Silverman, Julius

      Edelman, Maurice

      Lyons, Edward (Bradford, E.)

      Skinner, Dennis

      Edwards, Robert (Bilston)

      Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson

      Small, William

      Ellis, Tom

      McBride, Neil

      Smith, John (Lanarkshire, N.)

      English, Michael

      McCartney, Hugh

      Spearing, Nigel

      Evans, Fred

      McElhone, Frank

      Spriggs, Leslie

      Fernyhough, E.

      McGuire, Michael

      Stallard, A. W.

      Fisher,Mrs.Doris(B'ham,Ladywood)

      Mackenzie, Gregor

      Stewart, Rt. Hn. Michael (Fulham)

      Fitch, Alan (Wigan)

      Mackie, John

      Stoddart, David (Swindon)

      Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)

      Mackintosh, John P.

      Strang, Gavin

      Foley, Maurine

      Maclennan, Robert

      Strauss, Rt. Hn. G. R.

      Foot, Michael

      McMillan, Tom (Glasgow, C.)

      Summerskill, Hn. Dr. Shirley

      Ford, Ben

      MacPherson, Malcolm

      Taveme, Dick

      Forrester, John

      Mahon, Simon (Bootle)

      Thomas, Jeffrey (Abertillery)

      Fraser, John (Norwood)

      Mallalieu, J. P. W. (Huddersfield,E.)

      Thomson, Rt. Hn. G. (Dundee, E.)

      Thorpe, Rt. Hn. Jeremy

      Walker, Harold (Doncaster)

      Williams, Mrs. Shirley (Hitchin)

      Tinn, James

      Wallace, George

      Williams, W. T. (Warrington)

      Tomney, Frank

      Watkins, David

      Wilson, Alexander (Hamilton)

      Torney, Tom

      Weitzman, David

      Wilson, Rt. Hn. Harold (Huyton)

      Tuck, Raphael

      Wellbeloved, James

      Wilson, William (Coventry, S.)

      Urwin, T. W.

      White, James (Glasgow, Pollok)

      Varley, Eric C.

      Whitehead, Phillip

      TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

      Wainwright, Edwin

      Whitlock, William

      Mr. Joseph Harper and

      Walden, Brian (B'm'ham, All Saints)

      Williams, Alan (Swansea, W.)

      Mr. Donald Coleman.

      NOES

      Adley, Robert

      Eyre, Reginald

      Le Marchant, Spencer

      Alison, Michael (Barkston Ash)

      Farr, John

      Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)

      Allason, James (Hemel Hempstead)

      Fell, Anthony

      Lloyd,Rt.Hn.Geoffrey(Sut'nC'dfield)

      Archer, Jeffrey (Louth)

      Fenner, Mrs. Peggy

      Lloyd, Ian (P'tsm'th, Langstone)

      Astor, John

      Fidler, Michael

      Longden, Gilbert

      Atkins, Humphrey

      Finsherg, Geoffrey (Hampstead)

      Loveridge, John

      Awdry, Daniel

      Fletcher-Cooke, Charles

      McAdden, Sir Stephen

      Baker, Kenneth (St. Marylebone)

      Fookes, Miss Janet

      MacArthur, Ian

      Baker, W. H. K. (Banff)

      Foster, Sir John

      McCrindle, R. A.

      Barber, Rt. Hn. Anthony

      Fowler, Norman

      McLaren, Martin

      Batsford, Brian

      Fox, Marcus

      Maclean, Sir Fitzroy

      Beamish, Col. Sir Tufton

      Fry, Peter

      McMaster, Stanley

      Bell, Ronald

      Galbraith, Hn. T. G.

      Macmillan, Maurice (Farnham)

      Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torquay)

      Gardner, Edward

      McNair-Wilson, Michael

      Benyon, W.

      Gilmour, Ian (Norfolk, C.)

      McNair-Wilson, Patrick (NewForest)

      Biffen, John

      Gilmour, Sir John (Fife E.)

      Maddan, Martin

      Biggs-Davison, John

      Glyn, Dr. Alan

      Madel, David

      Blaker, Peter

      Godber, Rt. Hn. J. B.

      Maginnis, John E.

      Boardman, Tom (Leicester, S.W.)

      Goodhart, Philip

      Marples, Rt. Hn. Ernest

      Body, Richard

      Goodhew, Victor

      Marten, Neil

      Boscawen, Robert

      Gorst, John

      Mather, Carol

      Bossom, Sir Clive

      Gower, Raymond

      Maude, Angus

      Bowden, Andrew

      Grant, Anthony (Harrow, C.)

      Maudling, Rt. Hn. Reginald

      Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hn. John

      Gray, Hamish

      Mawby, Ray

      Braine, Bernard

      Green, Alan

      Maxwell-Hyslop, R. J.

      Bray, Ronald

      Grylls, Michael

      Meyer, Sir Anthony

      Brewis, John

      Gummer, Selwyn

      Mills, Peter (Torrington)

      Brinton, Sir Tatton

      Gurden, Harold

      Mills, Stratton (Belfast, N.)

      Brocklebank-Fowler, Christopher

      Hall, Miss Joan (Keighley)

      Mitchell,Lt.-Col.C.(Aberdeenshire,W)

      Brown, Sir Edward (Bath)

      Hall, John (Wycombe)

      Mitchell, David (Basingstoke)

      Bruce-Gardyne, J.

      Hall-Davis, A. G. F.

      Moate, Roger

      Bryan, Paul

      Hamilton, Michael (Salisbury)

      Molyneaux, James

      Buchanan-Smith, Alick(Angus,N&M)

      Hannam, John (Exeter)

      Money, Ernie

      Bullus, Sir Eric

      Harrison, Col. Sir Harwood (Eye)

      Monks, Mrs. Connie

      Burden, F. A.

      Haselhurst, Alan

      Montgomery, Fergus

      Butler, Adam (Bosworth)

      Hastings, Stephen

      More, Jasper

      Carlisle, Mark

      Hayhoe, Barney

      Morgan, Geraint (Denbigh)

      Cary, Sir Robert

      Hicks, Robert

      Morgan-Giles, Rear-Adm.

      Channon, Paul

      Higgins, Terence L.

      Morrison, Charles (Devizes)

      Chapman, Sydney

      Hiley, Joseph

      Mudd, David

      Chataway, Rt. Hn. Christopher

      Hill, John E. B. (Norfolk, S.)

      Murton, Oscar

      Chichester-Clark, R.

      Hill, James (Southampton, Test)

      Nabarro, Sir Gerald

      Clark, William (Surrey, E.)

      Holland, Philip

      Neave, Airey

      Clarke, Kenneth (Rushcliffe)

      Holt, Miss Mary

      Nicholls, Sir Harmar

      Clegg, Walter

      Hordern, Peter

      Noble, Rt. Hn. Michael

      Cockeram, Eric

      Hornby, Richard

      Normanton, Tom

      Cooke, Robert

      Hornsby-Smith,Rt.Hn.Dame Patricia

      Nott, John

      Coombs, Derek

      Howe, Hn. Sir Geoffrey (Reigate)

      Onslow, Cranley

      Cooper, A. E.

      Howell, Ralph (Norfolk, N.)

      Oppenheim, Mrs. Sally

      Cormack, Patrick

      Hunt, John

      Orr, Capt. L. P. S.

      Costain, A. P.

      Hutchison, Michael Clark

      Owen, Idris (Stockport, N.)

      Critchley, Julian

      Iremonger, T. L.

      Page, John (Harrow, W.)

      Crouch, David

      James, David

      Parkinson, Cecil (Enfield, W.)

      Crowder, F. P.

      Jessel, Toby

      Peel, John

      Curran, Charles

      Johnson Smith, C. (E. Grinstead)

      Percival, Ian

      Dalkeith, Earl of

      Jopling, Michael

      Pike, Miss Mervyn

      Davies, Rt. Hn. John (Knutsford)

      Joseph, Rt. Hn. Sir Keith

      Pink, R. Bonner

      d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir Henry

      Kaberry, Sir Donald

      Powell, Rt. Hn. J. Enoch

      d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Maj.-Gen. Jack

      Kellett, Mrs. Elaine

      Prior, Rt. Hn. J. M. L.

      Dean, Paul

      Kershaw, Anthony

      Proudfoot, Wilfred

      Deedes, Rt. Hn. W. F.

      Kilfedder, James

      Pym, Rt. Hn. Francis

      Digby, Simon Wingfield

      King, Evelyn (Dorset, S.)

      Quennell, Miss J. M.

      Dixon, Piers

      King, Tom (Bridgwater)

      Raison, Timothy

      Dodds-Parker, Douglas

      Kinsey, J. R.

      Ramsden, Rt. Hn. James

      Drayson, G. B.

      Kirk, Peter

      Rawlinson, Rt. Hn. Sir Peter

      du Cann, Rt. Hn. Edward

      Kitson, Timothy

      Redmond, Robert

      Dykes, Hugh

      Knight, Mrs. Jill

      Reed, Laurance (Bolton, E.)

      Eden, Sir John

      Knox, David

      Rees, Peter (Dover)

      Edwards, Nicholas (Pembroke)

      Lambton, Antony

      Rees-Davies, W. R.

      Elliot, Capt. Walter (Carshalton)

      Lane, David

      Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon

      Elliott, R. W. (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne,N.)

      Langford-Holt, Sir John

      Ridley, Hn. Nicholas

      Emery, Peter

      Legge-Bourke, Sir Harry

      Ridsdale, Julian

      1666

      1667

      Roberts, Michael (Cardiff, N.)

      Stodart, Anthony (Edinburgh, W.)

      Waddington, David

      Rossi, Hugh (Hornsey)

      Stoddart-Scott, Col. Sir M.

      Walder, David (Clitheroe)

      Rost, Peter

      Stokes, John

      Walker-Smith, Rt. Hn. Sir Derek

      Russell, Sir Ronald

      Stuttaford, Dr. Tom

      Wall, Patrick

      St. John-Stevas, Norman

      Sutcliffe, John

      Walters, Dennis

      Sandys, Rt. Hn. D.

      Tapsell, Peter

      Ward, Dame Irene

      Scott, Nicholas

      Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)

      Warren, Kenneth

      Scott-Hopkins, James

      Taylor, Edward M.(G'gow,Cathcart)

      Weatherill, Bernard

      Sharples, Richard

      Taylor, Frank (Moss Side)

      Wells, John (Maidstone)

      Shaw, Michael (Sc'h'gh & Whitby)

      Taylor, Robert (Croydon, N.W.)

      White, Roger (Gravesend)

      Shelton, William (Clapham)

      Tebbit, Norman

      Whitelaw, Rt. Hn. William

      Simeons, Charles

      Temple, John M.

      Wiggin, Jerry

      Sinclair, Sir George

      Thatcher, Rt. Hn. Mrs. Margaret

      Wilkinson, John

      Skeet, T. H. H.

      Thomas, John Stradling (Monmouth)

      Wolrige-Gordon, Patrick

      Smith, Dudley (W'wick & L'mington)

      Thompson, Sir Richard (Croydon, S.)

      Woodhouse, Hn. Christopher

      Soref, Harold

      Tilney, John

      Woodnutt, Mark

      Speed, Keith

      Trafford, Dr. Anthony

      Worsley, Marcus

      Spence, John

      Trew, Peter

      Wylie, Rt. Hn, N. R.

      Sproat, Iain

      Tugendhat, Christopher

      Stainton, Keith

      Turton, Rt. kin. R. H.

      TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

      Stanbrook, Ivor

      Vaughan, Dr. Gerard

      Mr. Paul Hankins and

      Stewart-Smith, D. G. (Belper)

      Vickers, Dame Joan

      Mr. Tim Fortescue.

      Mr. Leslie Huckfield: I beg to move Amendment No. 753, in page 61, line 30, at end add:
      (3) No action shall lie under this section for any unfair industrial practice contained in any newspaper, periodical, book, television, sound broadcast, public meeting (which shall include any meeting to which access is limited by any membership requirement) or any private conversation.
      My hon. Friend the Member for Penistone (Mr. John Mendelson) said that the main effect of Clause 85 was upon the unofficial inducement to a breach of contract at the place of work. I do not depart from his submission that the main intention of the Clause is to do something about the alleged problem of unofficial strikes. But I submit that the real intention goes much further than that. That is why the purpose of my Amendment is to deal with so-called inducements to breaches of contract onside the place of work.
      I refer to the main purpose of Clause 85 because it is one of the most monstrous Clauses in the Bill, particularly as the Solicitor-General has now further elaborated it, because, by saying that a trade union official had to be acting especially within the scope of his authority, he narrowed the Clause even more definitely. It is because the Solicitor-General has made the meaning and relevance of the Clause to legalised trade practices even narrower that my Amendment becomes even more necessary.
      The main purpose of the Clause is to damp down so-called sympathy strikes and go-slows and activities which may be construed to be non-union, or stemming from non-registered union activities. Various references have been made to
      1668
      some of the activities ancillary to industrial disputes. My concern is not just about industrial practices or industrial disputes inside a factory but about some of the practices which may occur outside.
      I give a few examples. In the recent strike of the National Union of Mineworkers it was fairly common practice, at least in the Midlands, for representatives, not necessarily official union representatives, to go to other collieries urging men who had not yet come out on strike to join the strike, which at that stage was official. Presumably, under this Clause those union men, not necessarily union representatives acting especially within the scope of trade union authority, would be guilty of inducing a breach of contract. They would have acted outside the gates of the colliery and in a public way. That is one reason why an Amendment such as this is necessary.
      A couple of Saturdays ago, the Union of Post Office Workers went on a march through Nuneaton. I was asked to speak at its meeting but, because of other important commitments, I could not do so. Had I gone along I would have found myself hard pressed not to support the union's case, and I would have done so. I wonder whether I would have been guilty under Clause 85 of inducing a breach of contract. Although my hon. Friend the Member for Penistone said that the main emphasis of the Clause was the work place, I put much weight on the evidence offered this afternoon by my right hon. Friend the Member for East Ham, North (Mr. Prentice) about public meetings of this sort.
      It goes even further. If we are to start referring to newspaper articles, public meetings, conversations and even

      1669
      closed private meetings—and all are definitely and specifically affected by the Clause—we can also think of the peripherals—phone tapping, bugging meetings and so on. I foresee all this happening with the Clause as it stands, and that is why the Amendment becomes doubly necessary.
      Mr. Eadie: Does my hon. Friend realise that this is coming very close to another aspect of this Clause, namely, that the right to picket will go completely?
      6.30 p.m.
      Mr. Huckfield: I am grateful for that intervention. That was precisely the sort of situation which was beginning to develop in one of our local collieries. It is this whole area of activity which lends weight to my Amendment. The Solicitor-General has not cleared up these matters this afternoon. I suppose it could be construed that some of the articles appearing in newspapers such as the Morning Star and the Guardian could have an effect. I suppose we could have an unofficial strike leader on television or on radio. If what he said resulted in the men coming out on unofficial strike presumably he would be affected by this.
      There could be all kinds of other situations involving people not directly concerned with the unions, such as Members of Parliament, who might come along to public places and say the sort of things which have been referred to. So many things which could happen that unless the Solicitor-General can offer a satisfactory explanation I can only reach the conclusion that Clause 85 represents a monstrous curtailment of freedom of speech.
      One of the things I have always valued in this country is that one can stand up and say what one likes without fear of being too publicly penalised, but it appears that if someone says something which can be construed as an inducement to break a contract the whole legal machine will start to work.
      It goes further than that, because we are talking not only about strikes which could be unofficial but about breaches of contract which could be occasioned in some other way. There are all kinds of peripheral activities which could be influenced. I have some severe reservations about this Clause and I hope that
      1670
      the Solicitor-General can enlighten the Committee in a clearer fashion than he did about Rolls-Royce last week. I hope that he can provide some greater enlightenment than he has on other Clauses today. This Clause troubles many of us. Not only does it refer to the rather narrowly defined activities at the place of work, but it refers to other peripheral activities. I would be grateful for some assurance from the Solicitor-General. If he cannot give that I will press my Amendment.
      Mr. Kenneth Lewis: The hon. Member for Nuneaton (Mr. Leslie Huckfield) has made out a good case for the Clause remaining as it is. The Clause relates only to those who seek to induce people to break contracts. I would have thought that once a contract had been accepted as generally binding it was reasonable to suppose that those in positions of leadership at whatever level should not induce others to break that contract.
      In so far as the hon. Member's Amendment relates to the Press, television and radio, I believe that there would be a good deal of advantage to the trade unions to the cause of peace and to the country as a whole if we had fewer appearances on television by some leaders of unions who appear to be prepared to argue their case on television rather than on the shop floor. The situation created in recent years through this new medium of television has been such that those responsible for bringing people to the screen are only too anxious to secure the most extreme elements. Many of the rank and file trade unionists are moderates and if this Clause will help in taking away those extreme elements from the television screen then it will have done a good job.
      Mr. Charles Loughlin: Is the hon. Gentleman now arguing that, irrespective of a point of view, there should be some censorship of the public media, be it radio, television or newspapers?
      Mr. Lewis: That is a fair point. I am not suggesting that anyone who is asked to appear on television to speak about industrial relations should be prevented from doing so. I say that they ought not to be allowed to go on television and ask people to break their

      1671
      contracts. Extreme elements should not be encouraged to go on television and urge people to do this. These contracts have been signed on behalf of members of trade unions and they are binding on employers and trade unions alike.
      Neither is it right that employers should go on television with the same end on view. It applies both ways. If there were more restraint, in particular with television, then Press and radio would gain an advantage. If this was voluntarily accepted there would be an advantage. In so far as this Clause will stop people going on television urging others to break contracts, it is a valuable Clause.
      Mr. Tom Driberg: The hon. Member for Rutland and Stamford (Mr. K. Lewis) has put forward the most astonishing argument. His premises seemed to me to be entirely wrong. It is simply not true that either B.B.C. or I.T.V. show only or mainly extremists who want to promote strikes. Whenever there is an industrial dispute the authorities ask spokesmen from both sides to put forward their point of view. In the case of I.T.V. there is a statutory obligation to preserve a balance. It would be very boring if both sides were not put, and almost invariably they are. Therefore, the hon. Gentleman's premise falls to the ground.
      The hon. Member's conclusion that the Clause and Bill should be used as an indirect method of censoring television is a most extraordinary proposal. Suscessive Postmasters-General before the change in the arrangements of the Post Office and successive Governments of both major parties have steadfastly refused to interfere in the programme planning or the programmes on television or radio.
      Mr. Kenneth Lewis: I do not suggest that special use should be made of the Clause for censorship. All that I said—I repeat it, and I wonder whether the hon. Gentleman will accept it—was that if by this Clause someone on the shop floor, outside the gate or anywhere else in the works, is not permitted to persuade others to break their contracts, it must follow that people should not be allowed to do it on television. Surely the hon. Gentleman is not suggesting that people should be allowed to do on television
      1672
      what they are not allowed to do in a public place in or out of a works.
      Mr. Driberg: I am sure that the hon. Gentleman means what he thinks he means, but he has not thought out thoroughly the consequences of what he has said. He says that it would be a good thing if the Government rejected the Amendment and, therefore, that the Clause could have the effect ultimately of preventing the appearance on television of certain people who might be in favour of an unofficial strike. That would be using the Bill, for the future, to censor television. It is clear that that is the only consequence of what the hon. Gentleman has said, whether he has thought it out thoroughly or not.
      That forms merely one more reason why I support the Amendment. I hope if there is time when we debate the Question, That the Clause stand part of the Bill, to show why the whole Clause is thoroughly harmful and dangerous.
      Mr. Richard Hornby: The hon. Member for Barking (Mr. Driberg) carries the argument much too far when he suggests that what my hon. Friend the Member for Rutland and Stamford (Mr. Kenneth Lewis) said amounted to a plea for censorship of the Press simply because he argued that it was not right that, according to the Bill, what could not be said in the factory could be said in a newspaper. When the hon. Gentleman and his hon. Friends talk about the threat to the Press or television, they wholly misunderstand that what the hon. Member, as he should well know, does as a writer or commentator on television is done in the full knowledge of the law on the subject under discussion. Taking the law into account on the subject which one may be discussing is nothing to do with the censorship of that particular medium. It is simply a question of taking account of the law as it exists.
      We are considering a Clause relating to agreements which, having been entered into by both sides in an industrial matter, subsequently are taken to stand. It is a total nonsense to suggest that making those who write in the Press or commentate on television no more and no less subject to the rules governing those in the factory on the management or union side adds up to censorship of the Press.
      Mr. Driberg: The hon. Gentleman is evading the point. The Press and television are already severely restricted by the laws of libel and they have to be careful about them. But it is argued by the hon. Member for Rutland and Stamford (Mr. Kenneth Lewis) and by the hon. Gentleman that it will be a good thing if, as a result of this Bill, extra legal restrictions are put on television and the Press. A Tory newspaper which thinks that strikers have a fair case will not be allowed to run an editorial to that effect.
      Mr. Hornby: Nothing is being added by the Clause. It merely provides that no special protection shall be given over and above that which exists in the factory between the disputants or signatories to an agreement.
      6.45 p.m.
      Mr. Eadie: It is becoming clear that the advice given by an hon. Member opposite that the Clause should be scrapped is proving to be very sound. It is most remarkable about every debate on the Amendments that the Front Bench continually loses the argument.
      Nobody in his wildest dreams would have thought that we would hear from hon. Members opposite that it would be a good thing if the freedoms for which we have fought for many years were suppressed or censored. People who read the report of this debate will read with amazement that we are discussing the question not only of industrial relations but of censorship, whether it be of the television or the Press.
      I am becoming concerned about the lack of knowledge among members of the Government Front Bench. I have spent 30 years of my life in the mining industry. Some of the legal arguments advanced from the benches opposite have been very faulty. It has been said that shop stewards in the mining industry would be able to have a say in a dispute or intended dispute. I ask the hon. Members opposite to read the Thinacre or Knockshinnock ruling. Strict restrictions were put on shop stewards in my trade union working underground. They had locus above ground but not underground. I wish that the Government's legal representative would do his legal work properly before presenting his arguments to the Committee.
      1674
      It is the very breath of the mining community that there should be argument and discussion. I am not conceited or arrogant, but I believe that that community has sent to the House of Commons people who have enhanced the prestige of democratic and parliamentary government in this country. I wonder whether hon. Members opposite realise that most trade unions have journals and readers' columns in which people can "let off steam". They may say that the union is not being militant enough or even that it is being negligent. But, according to the arguments of hon. Members opposite, if a miner writes "The Scottish Miner" or "The Miner" and says, "We should have industrial action tomorrow and more militancy", he is inducing and aiding and abetting. The hon. Gentleman opposite who said that the Clause should be scrapped put his finger on the point.
      It was common before I was born for one-day schools and conferences to take place in the mining industry. A group discussion is to take place in my constituency tonight. Some of the things said will be very embarrasing to right hon. and hon. Members opposite. But this is healthy discussion. My old schoolmaster used to say that it was healthy for people to go to football matches on Saturdays and do a bit of shouting. When one lets off steam it makes it healthier for the rest o the week. In an industry where admittedly they work and play hard, it is a good idea that people should let off steam. They can then think it out rationally. I am astonished at the arguments put forward that such conduct should be censored, that it should be subjected to some form of legality. We must have argument and debate in a democratic society.
      I hope that we shall be allowed to continue to have conferences and one-day schools and that there will be question and discussion periods. It is the very essence of democracy. It is good for trade union leaders. Before I came to the House of Commons I was a full-time trade union officer. There was nothing more stimulating than to address a one-day conference on some aspect of union policy or the kind of strategy that the union should carry out in future. A

      1675
      union is formed to look after and assist its members.
      At the one-day schools one is told that one is not doing enough and that there should be a general strike against the Bill, or a series of one-day strikes. There is nothing unpatriotic or undemocratic about the unions. They are decent people. Some are men of real calibre and character, who anybody would be proud to know. I am surprised that to some extent the argument has been transformed. We are not only fighting now to have the Bill's throat cut, to have it abolished, but we are fighting for essential freedoms and liberties that the people have fought for and enjoyed for many years. If the Solicitor-General does not reply adequately, I hope that my hon. Friends will vote for the Amendment.
      Mr. Gower: I sincerely hope that after the passing of the Bill we shall see a situation in our economic and industrial life where more and more agreements and contracts will be observed. I hope that hon. Gentlemen opposite share my hope.
      This is one matter on which our future prosperity depends. Only if we can foresee a future where agreements are increasingly observed can we hone for our industrial firms to be able to fulfil their agreements and contracts with overseas purchasers and so on. Therefore, it is highly desirable, however it is achieved, that in future more and more agreements should be fulfilled. Whether this is achieved by the enactment of the Bill or by better relationships between the parties in industry, I hope that this can be achieved and will be achieved and that every hon. Member opposite shares that hope.
      Mr. Orme: We do not accept the hon. Gentleman's premise.
      Mr. Gower: If hon. Gentlemen opposite do not share my hope, they are saying that they are not hoping that we will do better in the future competitive markets of the world.
      Mr. Eadie: We do not trust the Tories.
      Mr. Gower: The hon. Member for Nuneaton (Mr. Leslie Huckfield) tells us that he is basically opposed to the Clause altogether. But he has now moved an
      1676
      Amendment having the following effect. He says, "I want the Clause to be amended in this way, that if a person who is not acting on behalf of a trade union or employer's association, and not authorised by a trade union or employer's association, should induce or threaten to induce a breach of contract or agreement, he may do so"—that will be the effect of the Amendment—"provided he does not do it in a newspaper, periodical, book, television, sound broadcast, public meeting or meeting including a membership requirement, and so on". In other words, he can do these things provided he does not do them in one of these ways.
      Mr. Leslie Huckfield: The hon. Gentleman is trying to be very pedantic and to turn the Amendment on its head. I do not accept that. The hon. Gentleman has also demonstrated a deplorable lack of knowledge of the way the trade unions are run. I should have thought that the contribution made by my hon. Friend the Member for Midlothian (Mr. Eadie) is far more relevant than the hon. Gentleman's contribution.
      Mr. Gower: I can easily turn the Amendment on its head because it deserves to be so turned. The Amendment mentions a "periodical". That could include a house journal in a factory. According to hon. Gentlemen opposite, if we have this position, it would be illegal under the Clause to threaten or induce a breach of contract, but not so in a house journal, which would be a remarkable state of affairs. Similarly, if it were done in the form of some other periodical publication, some kind of newspaper published under any auspices, the action would be legal. The action would be illegal if done in some ways but legal if done in the form of any periodical or newspaper.
      The Amendment would not alter the terms of the Clause but would merely prescribe certain methods in which the Clause could not be enforced. This would be an open invitation to anybody wanting to achieve these results to elect to use one of the methods specified in the Amendment. It would be an open invitation to a man wanting to induce a breach of contract to do it in a house journal or a periodical. A person who

      1677
      wanted to induce a breach of contract under this Clause could do it by one of the methods specified in the Amendment. It deserves to be turned on its head because it is a completely wrecking Amendment designed to destroy the Clause.
      If my view spreads beyond the Committee and many people want agreements to be observed in the future, I hope that they will believe that that is what we are trying to achieve.
      Mr. Loughlin: I wonder how far removed the previous three speakers from the opposite side of the Committee are from the practical realities of industry. The hon. Member for Barry (Mr. Gower) tried to stand the argument on its head. He began by talking about the need for the acceptance of agreements in industry and the legal enforceability of those agreements. That is what we are talking about. The major employers' association, which pressed and pressed for two years for the legal enforceability of agreements, was the Engineering Employers' Federation. They are the people who said that that was absolutely necessary, as the hon. Gentleman said just now, and yet they have concluded that there is a futility in this argument and they are now prepared to agree to writing into all the contracts which they enter into with engineering workers' unions that there will be no enforceability of trade union agreements.
      7.0 p.m.
      The question of censorship is very important. The two important phrases are "induce" and "threaten to induce". I have had a fair amount of industrial experience, but I do not know what is meant when it is said that a person is guilty of inducing someone to break his contract—to go out on unofficial strike—or of threatening to induce him so to do.
      I postulate the case where there is the possibility of a dispute. A shop steward gives an interview to the local newspaper in the course of which he expresses the opinion that the only solution is to take strike action. In consequence of the interview being published in the newspaper the next day and presumably being read by those involved in the potential dispute, I assume that the statement would constitute an inducement to strike action.
      Mr. Crowder: If the hon. Gentleman were walking down the corridor and the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mrs. Castle) dropped her handkerchief on purpose and the hon. Gentleman picked it up, would that be an inducement?
      Mr. Loughlin: My right hon. Friend and I do not have a contract in terms of the Bill. I know and have a great respect for my right hon. Friend's husband, who is bigger than me. There is no likelihood of there being such a contract.
      If men in industry are concerned solely with their language lest they put themselves outside the Bill when enacted, a dialogue cannot be conducted between both sides of industry. If I as a shop steward or an official of the local union branch must concern myself wholly with my language lest, if I use the wrong word or words, the employer is able subsequently to make this charge against me, life would be impossible. I may say to an employer. "The only way to solve this will be by taking the men out on strike". That may well be a threat to induce. It may well be an inducement to the members. It may be a statement made on the spur of the moment by a responsible trade union official. Every hon. Member makes such statements in one walk of life or another. Subsequent to that, but not consequential upon it, a strike may occur. Therefore, as a shop steward or somebody who is not a trade union official I am subject to prosecution. I cannot envisage an industry carrying on on that basis.
      Union members in a plant can be just as important in the running of an industry as the shop steward. I was a member of a trade union branch for many years. Often my advice as a member of the trade union committee was more treasured than that of the official shop steward. If I am to conduct my activities in industry on the basis of a choice of words, there cannot be a dialogue between me and the employer. There is therefore bound to be a far greater degree of breach of contract than there would be if the Clause was not in the Bill.
      The Solicitor-General must define "induce" and "threaten to induce". It has been alleged that there are spies in industry. This may be exaggerated language. It is possible for a trade union branch meeting to be concerned solely

      1679
      with one plant and to discuss a specific issue which is a primary concern to the members employed in that plant.
      Throughout my union life I have known that whatever I have said at a trade union branch meeting has been retailed to the employer next morning. This applied even when I had the best possible relations with the employer. I had a very good relationship with employers. I operated largely in Birmingham. I can name firm after firm with which I had very good relations. My strike history is as good as that of anyone I know. However, whenever I had a branch meeting I knew that some one who sought to gain benefit would retail precisely what I had said, or perhaps a garbled version of it, to the employer.
      This is a most dangerous situation. It is an incentive for such a "spy" to transmit to the employer, and be prepared to say it in court, that the shop steward, or the chairman of the branch committee, or the secretary, of the members of the branch committee, have made certain statements to induce people to strike.
      The Solicitor-General should take advice, not only on the Amendment, but on the whole Clause, because it will be damaging to the whole basis of industrial relations and will be more counter-productive than productive.
      Mr. Norman Atkinson: On a point of order. Could you, Mr. Mallalieu, say whether you are thinking of having a wide debate on the Question, That the Clause stand part of the Bill?
      The Temporary Chairman: I gather that there is to be a fairly wide debate on the Question, That the Clause stand part of the Bill.
      Mr. David Mitchell (Basingstoke): I have listened with considerable interest to the hon. Member for Gloucestershire, West (Mr. Loughlin). It has been suggested that a column in a trade union journal might induce a breach of contract. I ask myself what penalty would fall on the head of a man who wrote a letter to a trade union journal urging a strike. The only penalty that could fall on him would be, if his letter succeeded and there was a strike, that the employer could sue him for compensation. I should have
      1680
      thought that it is extremely unlikely that any employer would ever find himself in the ridiculous position of seeking to sue an individual for having written a letter advocating strike action in a trade union journal.
      The hon. Member for Gloucestershire, West also referred to a rather different situation where the whole front page of a local newspaper might be taken up with a splash article appealing to men to strike in breach of their individual contracts, without notice and against the wishes of their trade union. If the writer of the article succeeded in inducing men to break their contract, there should be a right for the employer to seek compensation.
      Mr. Loughlin: The point I made was about a shop steward giving an interview to the local newspaper. The hon. Gentleman will have had the same experience as I have had of such interviews being blown up. My local Press are very good save in one instance of a most appalling headline. The hon. Gentleman is claiming that a man giving an ordinary interview would constitute a sufficient reason for the employer to receive damages.
      Mr. Mitchell: I do not want the hon. Gentleman to be under a misapprehension. I said specifically that I was referring to a blown-up article and this would presumably be in itself a defence, an article calling for a strike in breach of contract, without notice and against the wishes of the trade union—the three criteria which have to be fulfilled.
      Mr. Eadie: Does the hon. Gentleman realise that there are many voluntary contributions to trade union journals, which help in making the paper representative of shop floor views. According to the hon. Gentleman's argument there would be a danger of articles and ideas from the shop floor ceasing.
      Mr. Mitchell: I thought I had already made it clear that I was referring to people who are perfectly legitimately trying to persuade their union to take a certain course of action. That is entirely different from trying to induce people to break a contract which they have entered into and which the union has entered into. I hope the learned Solicitor-General will say whether or not I am right on this. There are three fences to be got over.

      1681
      Hon. Gentlemen opposite in their speeches have ignored the fact that there must be notice to strike, it has to be a strike in breach of procedure and a strike which the union is not prepared to back. Having jumped those three fences, there must be some possibility of the employer being prepared to sue.
      [Miss HARVIE ANDERSON in the Chair]
      7.15 p.m.
      In moving the Amendment the hon. Member for Nuneaton (Mr. Leslie Huckfield) spoke in the flowery language which is being used to work up heated meetings in the country about the Bill. I do not feel that we should allow his remarks to be reported and repeated without being answered. He referred to the "alleged" problem of unofficial strikes, as if over 90 per cent. of our strikes were not unofficial, unconstitutional and generally unpredictable and this is not therefore a matter of concern——
      Mr. Leslie Huckfield Mr. Leslie Huckfield rose——
      Mr. Mitchell: I have many more points to make about the hon. Gentleman's speech. If he will allow me to make them perhaps he will have an opportunity to reply to them all. The hon. Gentleman talked about the narrowing of the rights of trade union officials to those who have authority to act on behalf of a union. We have already dealt with union rules and how a union has to specify those officials who have the right to commit the union to strike action. Since we have already accepted that part of the Bill, it is extraordinary to suggest that this Clause has the effect of narrowing the rights of trade union officials. It is entirely up to the union whether it does or does not give authority to the shop stewards or unions concerned.
      The hon. Member for Nuneaton painted to the House a picture of himself in a terrible position because during the Post Office strike he, as a Member of Parliament, stood up at a public meeting and urged the men to continue their strike. How it could possibly be suggested that he had not the authority of the union, which would surely be blessing him, although the general public might take a different view, is beyond me and beyond the realm of reality.
      The hon. Member for Nuneaton spoke of an unofficial strike leader on tele-
      1682
      vision inducing men to strike action. If he is an unofficial strike leader, he has already succeeded in inducing and is already outside the scope of having the authority of his union. What this Amendment amounts to, quite simply and straightforwardly is an agitators' charter to create the situations——
      Mr. Arthur Lewis: So what!
      Mr. Mitchell: The hon. Member says "So what" from a sedentary position——
      Mr. Lewis: Some of our greatest statesmen and union leaders were agitators—Ernie Bevin, Nye Bevan, and I could give the names of hundreds of the greatest men in this country. It is no crime to be an agitator. I am proud to be an agitator—so what?
      Mr. Mitchell: The difference between the sort of agitator I am referring to and Ernest Bevin is that when Ernest Bevin made a deal he stuck to it and did his damnedest to see that the members of his union stuck to it. Those are the standards which we want to bring back to industrial relations and trade unions.
      If accepted, the Amendment would permit a newspaper or even a factory broadsheet to induce a strike. It would permit an agitator or a rabble-rouser who cannot persuade the union of his case to seek to induce people to break their contract——
      Mr. Leslie Huckfield Mr. Leslie Huckfield rose——
      Mr. Mitchell: If I could finish, I should be grateful. It would permit a union to make an agreement today and its shop stewards to come out tomorrow seeking to secure a breach of the agreement they have entered into. Is the hon. Member for Nuneaton suggesting that is a situation which he would wish to condone?
      Mr. Huckfield: I will not come back on that point. If the hon. Gentleman is supposed to be the chairman of some Conservative trade union advisory committee, I hope he does not give that kind of advice to the people whom he is supposed to represent. It would not be so bad if it were to be left to this side of the House to interpret Clause 85, but it will be left in the hands of the judiciary to decide the meaning of that Clause.

      1683
      Certainly nothing the hon. Member has said alters my conviction that this Amendment is very necessary.
      Mr. Mitchell: I am intrigued to hear the hon. Member refuse to pick up my challenge that he would condone a situation in which a trade union makes an agreement today and its shop stewards tomorrow seek a breach of that agreement. I thought he would take the opportunity to say that that was not the intention of the Amendment and that he would not wish it to apply in that way. But instead he seeks to dodge the point. The reality is that the Amendment would permit that to happen.
      Furthermore, the Amendment would permit the unions to agree to arbitration and then to decide not to use it. Certainly in the current industrial situation this is something the Committee would not wish to see. The whole basis of civilised society rests on people making and sticking to agreements. I am horrified to hear hon. Gentlemen opposite seeking to put up Amendments to prevent people carrying out their standard duties to society.
      The Solicitor-General: The Committee will forgive me if I resist the temptation to make a speech as though we were discussing the Question, That the Clause stand part of the Bill. I appreciate that the Committee is anxious to get on to that debate and there are a number of points which have been made in this discussion which would arise more appropriately on that Question.
      In the context of this debate, I wish to pick up the point made by my hon. Friends the Members for Basingstoke (Mr. David Mitchell) and Barry (Mr. Gower) that in general the object of the exercise is to see that contracts are observed and to secure a situation in which it becomes usual and normal for strikes to take place, at least if they are unofficial, after due notice has been given on behalf of the people calling the strike of their intention so to do. That is its limited objective. Even within that objective trade union officials, within the scope of their authority, are still to retain the right to call a strike without notice. Nothing in the Clause will affect the dialogue between both sides of industry, which was mentioned by the hon. Mem-
      1684
      ber for Gloucestershire, West (Mr. Loughlin). Both sides of industry will want to maintain a continuing dialogue.
      The only restraint we are putting forward is that that dialogue should be conducted on terms that due notice should be given of the intention to call a strike, at least if it is a strike called without the authority of the trade union. That is a modest limited protection which is part of a proper compliance with reasonably agreed standards. For that reason I do not see that the Committee should accept the suggestion put forward by the hon. Member for Nuneaton (Mr. Leslie Huck-field) that the roving unofficial strike inducers should retain the right to induce people to break their contracts of employment in the context of an unofficial strike while not acting in the pursuit of union duties. This is one of the points about which Lord Robens has felt so strongly.
      Mr. Arthur Lewis: And look at what happened to him.
      The Solicitor-General: Lord Robens and many other people have urged that there should be some restraint on the right of unofficial strike leaders to induce strikes in that way.
      Mr. Eadie: Is the Solicitor-General not aware that work to rule disputes, or what we call ca' canny, are as damaging or as difficult to solve as any others. I have been in a situation in which a contract has gone to arbitration, a bad decision has been made, and in such a situation the men have not come out on strike, but have gone on ca' canny, which is also illegal. As a result of their resort to ca' canny we have had to reach some decision after many months and have had to change the whole contract. What would the Solicitor-General do in such a situation, or would he advocate that we have more ca' cannies and less unofficial action?
      The Solicitor-General: The question arises whether this arises on Clause 6 or on the Question, That the Clause stand part of the Bill. I shall attempt to answer the hon. Gentleman within a limited compass. If the work people decide to work to rule, in other words in accordance with their contracts, there is no question of any unfair industrial practice arising in that respect. I am not anxious to embark on that matter, which we have debated already. Equally, if they

      1685
      are induced by their trade union officials within the scope of their authority not merely to work to rule in accordance with the contract, but to go slow in whatever way they like, there is no remedy against them or against the trade union official who induces that situation. It is a problem remote from what we are considering here.
      We are on the narrow proposition of inducing a strike in breach of individual contracts between worker and employer and that this should not take place unless it is within the authority of the trade union official. The Clause is therefore aimed at wholly unofficial unauthorised people inducing breaches of contract of employment without due notice being given. It does not go beyond that to the extent feared by some hon. Members. In regard to the position of other outside commentators against whom proceedings might be brought, one has to show first that what was being done was done other than by a union official in the exercise of his authority; secondly, that what he was doing amounted to a positive inducement of the breach of contract of employment, going beyond discussion, beyond advice and beyond the making of general speeches about it—in other words, making it plain that what he was doing or threatening to do was to induce people to take strike action in breach of contracts of employment. One has to get to that point before the matter can be established at all. That again takes one on to discussions on the Question, That the Clause stand part of the Bill.
      Mr. Loughlin: Would the Solicitor-General deal with the question which I posed concerning an interview? Against whom would action be taken—the editor, the reporter, or the shop steward?
      The Solicitor-General: I do not wish to get on to the Question, That the Clause stand part of the Bill, but once one accepts that it is necessary to limit, as was recommended by the majority of the Donovan Commission, the privileges formerly offered by Section 3 of the 1906 Act to registered people or those acting on their behalf, and that these provisions follow, namely that it becomes unfair or actionable for unofficial people to induce breaches of contract of employment without due notice, it must follow that the prohibition applies quite widely. One cannot accept the implications in the
      1686
      Amendment that an unofficial wildcat leader wanting to secure an instantaneous strike, who goes to the work place and says, "You will all strike in breach of your contracts tomorrow morning", is acting unfairly—except if he chooses to secure that result by taking a full-page advertisement in the local newspaper.
      Mr. Arthur Lewis Mr. Arthur Lewis rose——
      The Solicitor-General: I am coming to the points made by the Member for West Ham, North (Mr. Arthur Lewis). One cannot say that that which is unfair in any other situation becomes fair if done in the form of a deliberate securing of strikes, without due notice, on behalf of somebody and with no authority, if done through the medium of an advertisement of that kind.
      7.30 p.m.
      I come to the example given by the hon. Member for Gloucestershire, West. Suppose that a shop steward, acting outside the scope of his authority from the union—this is the first premise—goes to the work place and says, "I wish you to strike forthwith", and thereby succeeds in calling them out immediately without any notice being given. If he does that at the work place, then that is an unfair practice within the provisions of Clause 85. If he makes the same observations in full and they are so reported in a newspaper, so that it is plain that he is using the medium of the Press in order to get to a wider audience his inducement to strike without due notice in breach of the contract of employment without authority, then whether he does it in one place or another does not alter the quality of what he is doing. The man who makes the statement is plainly doing it with the intention of procuring that breach and would be procuring that result.
      But the reporter, for example, would not be seeking to induce the breach of contract of employment in the ordinary process of reporting a meeting. It may be that, in a given position, a commentator in a newspaper wants to secure some result and sets about writing an article urging men to strike in breach of their contract. If he is doing that, he will be in no different position from an unofficial, roving strike-inducer going up and down the country. There is no reason why someone who chooses to procure that

      1687
      result through any other means should be in any different position so far as liability is concerned.
      Mr. Arthur Lewis: Supposing a shop steward at Ford's gives an interview and says to the reporter, "I am telling my workers at Ford's not to go on strike. They must not carry out an unfair industrial practice. But tomorrow I am going to Ascot to see the Ford's directors who will be there, and if any of my colleagues wish to discuss any matter with me I shall be at Ascot. I am telling them that they must not come and discuss this with me and the directors at Ascot". What would happen if all the Ford workers ignored his advice and turned up at Ascot with the directors to discuss the problem? Would it be an industrial dispute?
      The Solicitor-General: The hon. Gentleman has raised that point before. It would be difficult to see how that could amount to inducing in that kind of way.
      I come to the more general point underlying the Clause. There is no question of any censorship being imposed on the Press by this or any other provision of the Bill. The Press and the other media operate, as they have done in many other ways, subject to the ordinary law of the land, and part of the law of the land is that they should have regard to the rights of other people. As my hon. Friend the Member for Rutland and Stamford (Mr. Kenneth Lewis), said, people commenting in such public media take care not to commit slander or libel. They take care, for example, not to induce breaches of commercial contracts, quite aside from contracts of employment. If anyone in the Press were to seek to induce people to break commercial contracts in this way, he would be liable. Those concerned have a remedy within civil law and people in the Press have to avoid infringing a whole range of civil rights.
      Our modest objective here is that an employer or society is entitled by and large to regard contracts, including contracts of employment, as intended to be honoured to the extent that both sides should give due notice of their intention to determine, that the right to have a contract honoured in that way is a right which should not be interfered with to
      1688
      the extent to which it has been interfered with under existing legislation, and that the protection from such interference is protection to which the nation or the party whose contract is being broken is entitled against anyone who seeks to interfere with it. It is a simple proposition, and we go beyond it and say that if the person who seeks to interfere with a contract of employment is a trade union or an official acting within the scope of his authority, he may induce people to break that contract.
      Mr. Driberg: Can we take it from what the hon. and learned Gentleman has said that he accepts the proposition enthusiastically put forward by the hon. Member for Rutland and Stamford (Mr. K. Lewis), that the effect of this Clause and the Bill, if this Amendment is rejected, will be to have a restricting effect on the present right of, for instance, television producers to invite an unofficial strike leader to appear on a programme?
      The Solicitor-General: I am not accepting that in that form. I am certainly not accepting any proposition relating to censorship. There is all the difference in the world, in a society such as ours, between people commenting or organising media respecting the rights of other people defined by the whole range of laws, and any discussion of censorship, which I, like every other hon. Member, reject—indeed, any public surveillance of what might be said. We say that, if the unofficial strike inducer goes on television and uses that medium, in addition to his more local medium, to persuade people to break their contract of employment without notice and without the authority of his union, he should be under liability in respect of that as well. This is entirely consistent with the general point.
      I return to the central theme. People who make contracts are in the ordinary way entitled to expect them to be fulfilled. In industrial relations, the problem arises time and again because of the facility with which people break and can be persuaded to break contracts without even giving due notice. We are preserving that right. Anyone may strike. Anyone may induce a strike if he is a trade unionist or a trade union official, unless it is in pursuit of certain very narrowly defined objectives. This is a very narrow limitation confining the right to induce

      1689
      strikes in breach of contract to officials of trade unions and only that.
      Mr. Orme: A reduction of freedom, then?
      The Solicitor-General: Yes, of course.
      Mr. Heffer: Oh.
      The Solicitor-General: The hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) keeps on sounding shocked about it, but it is in line with the recommendations of the Donovan Commission.
      Mr. Heffer: No it is not.
      The Solicitor-General: Indeed it is. Paragraphs 800 and 801 of the Donovan Commission Report make it plain that, where such immunity—that is, immunity under Section 3 of the 1906 Act—
      "…is no longer necessary or desirable in such circumstances …"
      —that is, for unofficial or unorganised bodies, then:
      "In order to avoid a breach of their contracts"
      —and this is the heart of the common sense about it—
      "most employees will need to do no more than give a week's notice of their intention to cease work; and it would not seem unreasonable to ask that they should do so."
      This is not some dreadful inspired proposition. This is the cool language of the Donovan Commission, which goes on:
      "If the persons who are organising the employees feel for some reason that the protection of Section 3 is vital to them, they can secure it by framing a constitution for themselves with the requisite objects and rules and register themselves as a trade union."
      Paragraph 801 states:
      "Moreover persons who are in process of organising a nascent trade union are not the only persons or combinations to be borne in mind in this connection. Unofficial bodies … are therefore collectively and severally immune from suit if … they induce workers to break their contracts of employment. The same members consider that the time has come when this immunity should cease".
      The central proposition is that the same provisions should apply to people, individuals or organisations which are not registered organisations or those acting on their behalf. For that reason, I suggest that this is a consistent provision in the Clause.
      Mrs. Castle: I do not intend to follow the Solicitor-General into
      1690
      arguments about what Donovan did or did not say. That is more appropriate for the debate on the Question, That the Clause stand part of the Bill. There is a wide issue of principle on the Clause as a whole on which I know my hon. Friends are anxious to speak. They will be capable of dealing with the points about Donovan.
      We have been trying to keep within the narrow confines of the Amendment. Although at first sight it might have appeared to be one of the more subordinate Amendments which we put forward, as the debate proceeded it proved once again to be very wide ranging. Time and again we have found, when we have put down an Amendment as much for clarification as anything else, believing that the Government and the Solicitor-General could not mean what appeared to be meant, that in fact it was meant. This has happened on this fairly narrow point which we have put forward. That is why it has proved an invaluable debate.
      I certainly hope that Press and T.V. commentators and all who write, broadcast and disseminate comment of any kind, have taken careful note of what hon. Gentlemen opposite have said this afternoon. Our arguments about the implications of the Clause have not been contested. That has not been the comeback. On the contrary, the implications have been accepted as entirely reasonable and, indeed, desirable.
      The hon. Member for Rutland and Stamford (Mr. Kenneth Lewis) endeavoured to justify restrictions on comment which arise under the Clause on the ground that we have too many extremists on T.V. The hon. Member for Tonbridge (Mr. Hornby) said that it was wrong of us to say that there was any censorship of the Press in suggesting that anybody who made a comment on any matter of public interest in industrial relations ought to take the law into account. The hon. Member for Basingstoke (Mr. David Mitchell) said that the Amendment, which is designed to try to save free speech in this country from yet further encroachments by the Government, was an agitator's charter.
      Finally, the Solicitor-General, confirmed in slightly less purple language the whole theme of the argument from hon. Gentlemen opposite. I am not talking about

      1691
      the cases which have been put forward by my hon. Friends of the shop steward and the unofficial strike leader going on television and being responsible for their own remarks; I am talking about the freedom to comment by the British Press commentators and broadcasters who have exercised, as I know as a former Member of the Labour Government, a great deal of freedom in arguing, exposing and commenting on what the Government do and what happens in industry. We have been told that if any of those commentators say anything which could be held to be inducing or helping to induce a breach of commercial contract, they shall be liable under this law.
      Mr. Kenneth Lewis: Why should not they be?
      Mrs. Castle: Exactly.
      Mr. Lewis Mr. Lewis rose——
      Mrs. Castle: I shall not give way. I promised my hon. Friends that I would be brief. I have listened to the hon. Member for Rutland and Stamford. Indeed, his remarks have been one of the jewels which we have garnered from the debate, and, by heaven, we shall bring them to the attention of the public.
      7.45 p.m.
      The hon. Gentleman asked why commentators should not be limited by what is a new restriction introduced into the law, a new restriction into the argument, first, about what is inducing, and, secondly, whether it is right to abandon the traditional immunity for inducing. We object to the abandonment of this traditional immunity. We contest what the Solicitor-General said about it being in line with Donovan.
      I shall try to apply it to the narrow sphere so that my hon. Friends can get to the broader area. Under this kind of provision an industrial correspondent of a responsible newspaper, for instance, commenting on the Pilkington situation, could be held to argue that grievances had become so intolerable and official action so closed to the workers that they were right to take unofficial action and could thereby be caught under this law. My right hon. Friend the Member for East Ham, North (Mr. Prentice), we are told by the Solicitor-General, could, mild
      1692
      man as he is, also be found in breach of the Clause by reason of a particular speech.
      It is not good enough for the Solicitor-General to say, "We are entitled to restrict freedom of comment in this way because all we are saying is that nobody from henceforth throughout the land in any media may, or should have the right to, induce people to take strike action in breach of contract of employment. We say that that should apply to everybody."
      When we say that that is a restriction of freedom of speech, we are told: "Naughty, naughty, naughty. Do you not think that we ought all to tell everybody that they ought to keep agreements? In any case, it is action which is open to a registered trade union." What shall we have next? Registration of journalists in order that they may qualify to comment under this law? That is what we are coming to if the Government have their way.
      It is not good enough for the Solicitor-General to say that a way out of this difficulty is to combine together, as good united commentators licensed by this Government, and to say, "All of you should give the requisite strike notice and then everybody will be within the law—commentators and all."
      Nothing is as straightforward as it seems in the Bill. There is no guarantee of a simple way of avoiding breach of contract of employment. As the hon. and learned Gentleman knows, the amount of strike notice which ought to be given under any particular contract of employment could vary from worker to worker. There could, therefore, be a walkout in which half the workers might be covered, having given the requisite notice, but the other half might not.
      Let us consider the irregular industrial action. The Solicitor-General has just admitted that if there were industrial action of any kind which might be said to have been induced, it would not be covered unless it had been organised by a registered trade union or by a trade union official acting within his authority. Therefore, the Solicitor-General is not concerned how widely the word "inducing" is to be interpreted; he maintains that inducing is not essential to the right to strike and that it is at the heart of our

      1693
      industrial troubles. He said it categorically—why should anyone be given that right?
      That is another example, I suggest, of his personal extremism. I only wish that he would listen to some of the saner voices on his own side of the Committee, like that of the hon. and learned Member for Ruislip-Northwood (Mr. Crowder),
      who said frankly and with knowledge and experience, "I do not like the word 'induce'." Nor do we, and that is why I ask my hon. Friends to vote for the Amendment.
      Question put, That the Amendment be made:—
      The Committee divided: Ayes 249, Noes 283.

      Division No. 163.]

      AYES

      [7.50 p.m.

      Abse, Leo

      English, Michael

      Lomas, Kenneth

      Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)

      Evans, Fred

      Loughlin, Charles

      Allen, Scholefleld

      Fernyhough, E.

      Lyon, Alexander W. (York)

      Archer, Peter (Rowley Regis)

      Fisher, Mrs. Doris(B'ham,Ladywood)

      Lyons, Edward (Bradford, E.)

      Armstrong, Ernest

      Fitch, Alan (Wigan)

      Mahon, Dr. J. Dickson

      Ashley, Jack

      Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)

      McBride, Neil

      Ashton, Joe

      Foley, Maurice

      McCartney, Hugh

      Atkinson, Norman

      Foot, Michael

      McElhone, Frank

      Bagier, Gordon A. T.

      Ford, Ben

      McGuire, Michael

      Barnett, Joel

      Forrester, John

      Mackenzie, Gregor

      Bewley, Alan

      Fraser, John (Norwood)

      Mackie, John

      Bennett, James (Glasgow, Bridgeton)

      Freeson, Reginald

      Mackintosh, John P.

      Bidwell, Sydney

      Galpern, Sir Myer

      Maclennan, Robert

      Bishop, E. S.

      Garrett, W. E.

      McMillan, Tom (Glasgow, C.)

      Blenkinsop, Arthur

      Gilbert, Dr. John

      McNamara, J. Kevin

      Boardman, H. (Leigh)

      Courlay, Harry

      MacPherson, Malcolm

      Booth, Albert

      Grant, George (Morpeth)

      Mahon, Simon (Bootle)

      Bottomley, Rt. Hn. Arthur

      Grant, John D. (Islington, E.)

      Mallalieu, J. P. W. (Huddersfield, E.)

      Boyden, James (Bishop Auckland)

      Griffiths, Eddie (Brightside)

      Marks, Kenneth

      Bradley, Tom

      Griffiths, Will (Exchange)

      Marquand, David

      Brown, Bob (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne,W.)

      Grimond, Rt. Hn. J.

      Marsh, Rt. Hn. Richard

      Brown, Hugh D. (G'gow, Proven)

      Hamilton, James (Bothwell)

      Mason, Rt. Hn. Roy

      Brown, Ronald (Shoreditch & F'bury)

      Hannan, William (G'gow, Maryhill)

      Meacher, Michael

      Buchan, Norman

      Hardy, Peter

      Mellish, Rt. Hn. Robert

      Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)

      Harrison, Walter (Wakefield)

      Mendelson, John

      Callaghan, Rt. Hn. James

      Hart, Rt. Hn. Judith

      Mikardo, Ian

      Campbell, I. (Dunbartonshire, W.)

      Hattersley, Roy

      Millan, Bruce

      Carmichael, Neil

      Heffer, Eric S.

      Miller, Dr. M. S.

      Carter, Ray (Birmingh'm,Northfield)

      Hilton, W. S.

      Milne, Edward (Blyth)

      Carter-Jones, Lewis (Eccles)

      Hooson, Emlyn

      Molloy, William

      Castle, Rt. Hn. Barbara

      Horam, John

      Morgan, Elystan (Cardiganshire)

      Clerk, David (Colne Valley)

      Houghton, Rt. Hn. Douglas

      Morris, Alfred (Wythenshawe)

      Cocks, Michael (Bristol, S.)

      Howell, Denis (Small Heath)

      Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw)

      Cohen, Stanley

      Huckfield, Leslie

      Morris, Rt. Hn John (Aberavon)

      Coleman, Donald

      Hughes, Mark (Durham)

      Moyle, Roland

      Concannon, J. D.

      Hughes, Robert (Aberdeen, N.)

      Murray, Ronald King

      Corbet, Mrs. Freda

      Hughes, Roy (Newport)

      Ogden, Eric

      Cox, Thomas (Wandsworth, C.)

      Hunter, Adam

      O'Halloran, Michael

      Crawshaw, Richard

      Irvine, Rt. Hn. Sir Arthur (Edge Hill)

      O'Malley, Brian

      Cronin, John

      Jay, Rt. Hn. Douglas

      Oram, Bert

      Crosland, Rt. Hn. Anthony

      Jeger,Mrs.Lena(H'b'n&St.P'cras,S.)

      Orbach, Maurice

      Grossman, Rt. Hn. Richard

      Jenkins, Hugh (Putney)

      Orme, Stanley

      Cunningham, G. (Islington, S.W.)

      Jenkins, Rt. Hn. Roy (Stechford)

      Oswald, Thomas

      Dalyell, Tam

      John, Brynmor

      Owen, Dr. David (Plymouth, Sutton)

      Darling, Rt. Hn. George

      Johnson, Carol (Lewisham, S.)

      Palmer, Arthur

      Davidson, Arthur

      Johnson, Walter (Derby, S.)

      Pannell, Rt. Hn. Charles

      Davies, Denzil (Llanelly)

      Jones, Barry (Flint, E.)

      Parker, John (Dagenham)

      Davies, G. E1led (Rhondda, E.)

      Jones, Dart (Burnley)

      Parry, Robert Liverpool, Exchange)

      Davies, Ifor (Gower)

      Jones,Rt.Hn,Sir Elwyn(W.Ham,S.)

      Pavitt, Laurie

      Davis, Clinton (Hackney, C.)

      Jones, Gwynoro (Carmarthen)

      Peart, Rt. Hn. Fred

      Deakins, Eric

      Jones, T. Alec (Rhondda, W.)

      Pendry, Tom

      de Freitas, Rt. Hn. Sir Geoffrey

      Judd, Frank

      Pentland, Norman

      Dell, Rt. Hn. Edmund

      Kaufman, Gerald

      Perry, Ernest G.

      Dempsey, James

      Kelley, Richard

      Prentice, Rt. Hn. Reg.

      Doig, Peter

      Kinnock, Neil

      Prescott, John

      Dormand, J. D.

      Lambie, David

      Price, J. T. (Westhoughton)

      Douglas, Dick (Stirlingshire, E.)

      Lamond, James

      Price, William (Rugby)

      Douglas-Mann, Bruce

      Latham, Arthur

      Probert, Arthur

      Driberg, Tom

      Lawson, George

      Rankin, John

      Duffy, A. E. P.

      Leadbitter, Ted

      Reed, D. (Sedgefield)

      Dunn, James A.

      Lee, Rt. Hn. Frederick

      Rees, Merlyn (Leeds, S.)

      Dunnett, Jack

      Leonard, Dick

      Rhodes, Geoffrey

      Eadie, Alex

      Lestor, Miss Joan

      Roberts, Albert (Normanton)

      Edelman, Maurice

      Lever, Rt. Hn, Harold

      Roberts,Rt.Hn.Goronwy(Caernarvon)

      Edwards, Robert (Bilston)

      Lewis, Arthur (West Ham, N.)

      Robertson, John (Paisley)

      Edwards, William (Merioneth)

      Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)

      Roderick,CaerwynE.(Br'c'n&R'dnor)

      Ellis, Tom

      Lipton, Marcus

      Rodgers, Wiliam (Stockton-on-Tees)

      Roper, John

      Stonehouse, Rt. Hn. John

      Wallace, George

      Rose, Paul B.

      Strang, Gavin

      Watkins, David

      Ross, Rt. Hn. William (Kilmarnock)

      Strauss, Rt. Hn. G. R.

      Weitzman, David

      Sheldon, Robert (Ashton-under-Lyne)

      Summerskill, Hn. Dr. Shirley

      Wellbeloved, James

      Shore, Rt. Hn. Peter (Stepney)

      Taverne, Dick

      Wells, William (Walsall, N.)

      Short,Rt.Hn.Edward(N'c'tle-u-Tyne)

      Thomas,Rt.Hn.George (Cardiff,W.)

      White, James (Glasgow, Pollok)

      Silkin, Hn. S. C. (Dulwich)

      Thomas, Jeffrey (Abertillery)

      Whitehead, Phillip

      Sillars, James

      Thomson, Rt. Hn. G. (Dundee, E.)

      Whitlock, William

      Silverman, Julius

      Tinn, James

      Williams, Alan (Swansea, W.)

      Skinner, Dennis

      Tomney, Frank

      Williams, W. T. (Warrington)

      Small, William

      Torney, Tom

      Wilson, Alexander (Hamilton)

      Smith, John (Lanarkshire, N.)

      Tuck, Raphael

      Wilson, Rt. Hn. Harold (Huyton)

      Spearing, Nigel

      Urwin, T. W.

      Wilson, William (Coventry, S.)

      Spriggs, Leslie

      Varley, Eric G.

      Stallard, A.

      Wainwright, Edwin

      TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

      Steel, David

      Walden, Brian (B'm'ham, All Saints)

      Mr.Joseph Harper and

      Stewart, Rt. Hn. Michael (Fulham)

      Walker, Harold (Doncaster)

      Mr. John Golding.

      Stoddart, David (Swindon)

      NOES

      Adley, Robert

      Digby, Simon Wingfield

      Hutchison, Michael Clark

      Alison, Michael (Barkston Ash)

      Dixon, Piers

      Iremonger, T. L.

      Allason, James (Hemel Hempstead)

      Dodds-Parker, Douglas

      James, David

      Archer, Jeffrey (Louth)

      Drayson, G. B.

      Jenkin, Patrick (Woodford)

      Astor, John

      du Cann, Rt. Hn. Edward

      Jessel, Toby

      Atkins, Humphrey

      Dykes, Hugh

      Johnson Smith, G. (E. Grinstead)

      Awdry, Daniel

      Eden, Sir John

      Jopling, Michael

      Baker, Kenneth (St. Marylebone)

      Edwards, Nicholas (Pembroke)

      Joseph, Rt. Hn. Sir Keith

      Baker, W. H. K. (Banff)

      Elliot, Capt. Walter (Carshalton)

      Kaberry, Sir Donald

      Balniel, Lord

      Elliott, R. W. (N'c'tle-uponTyne,N.)

      Kellett, Mrs. Elaine

      Barber, Rt. Hn. Anthony

      Emery, Peter

      Kershaw, Anthony

      Beamish, Col. Sir Tufton

      Eyre, Reginald

      Kilfedder, James

      Bell, Ronald

      Farr, John

      Kimball, Marcus

      Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torquay)

      Fell, Anthony

      King, Evelyn (Dorset, S.)

      Benyon, W.

      Fenner, Mrs. Peggy

      King, Tom (Bridgwater)

      Biffen, John

      Fidler, Michael

      Kinsey, J. R.

      Biggs-Davison, John

      Finsberg, Geoffrey (Hampstead)

      Kirk, Peter

      Blaker, Peter

      Fletcher-Cooke, Charies

      Kitson, Timothy

      Boardman, Tom (Leicester, S.W.)

      Fookes, Miss Janet

      Knight, Mrs. Jill

      Body, Richard

      Fortescue, Tim

      Knox, David

      Boscawen, Robert

      Foster, Sir John

      Lambton, Antony

      Bossom, Sir Clive

      Fowler, Norman

      Lane, David

      Bowden, Andrew

      Fox, Marcus

      Langford-Holt, Sir John

      Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hn. John

      Fry, Peter

      Legge-Bourke, Sir Harry

      Braine, Bernard

      Galbraith, Hn. T. G.

      Le Marchant, Spencer

      Bray, Ronald

      Gardner, Edward

      Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)

      Brewis, John

      Gibson-Watt, David

      Lloyd, Ian (P'tsm'th, Langstone)

      Brinton, Sir Tatton

      Gilmour, Ian (Norfolk, C.)

      Longden, Gilbert

      Brocklebank-Fowler, Christopher

      Gilmour, Sir John (Fife, E.)

      Loveridge, John

      Brown, Sir Edward (Bath)

      Glyn, Dr. Alan

      McAdden, Sir Stephen

      Bryan, Paul

      Godber, Rt. Hn. J. B.

      MacArthur, Ian

      Buchanan-Smith, Alick(Angus,N&M)

      Goodhart, Philip

      McCrindle, R. A.

      Bullus, Sir Eric

      Goodhew, Victor

      McLaren, Martin

      Burden, F. A.

      Gower, Raymond

      Maclean, Sir Fitzroy

      Butler, Adam (Bosworth)

      Grant, Anthony (Harrow, C.)

      McMaster, Stanley

      Campbell, Rt.Hn.G.(Moray&Nairn)

      Gray, Hamish

      Macmillan, Maurice (Farnham)

      Carlisle, Mark

      Green, Alan

      McNair-Wilson, Michael

      Cary, Sir Robert

      Grylls, Michael

      McNair-Wilson, Patrick (New Forest)

      Channon, Paul

      Gummer, Selwyn

      Maddan, Martin

      Chapman, Sydney

      Gurden, Harold

      Madel, David

      Chataway, Rt. Hn. Christopher

      Hall, Miss Joan (Keighley)

      Maginnis, John E.

      Chichester-Clark, R.

      Hall, John (Wycombe)

      Marples, Rt. Hn. Ernest

      Clark, William (Surrey, E.)

      Hall-Davis, A. G. F.

      Marten, Neil

      Mather, Carol

      Clarke, Kenneth (Rushciiffe)

      Hamilton, Michael (Salisbury)

      Maude, Angus

      Clegg, Walter

      Hannam, John (Exeter)

      Maudling, Rt. Hn. Reginald

      Cockeram, Eric

      Harrison, Brian (Maldon)

      Mawby, Ray

      Cooke, Robert

      Harrison, Col. Sir Harwood (Eye)

      Maxwell-Hyslop, R. J.

      Coombs, Derek

      Haselhurst, Alan

      Meyer, Sir Anthony

      Cooper, A. E.

      Hastings, Stephen

      Mills, Peter (Torrington)

      Corfield, Rt. Hn. Frederick

      Hawkins, Paul

      Mills, Stratton (Belfast, N.)

      Cormack, Peter

      Hayhoe, Barney

      Mitchell,Lt-ColC.(Aberdeenshire,W.)

      Costain, A. P.

      Hicks, Robert

      Mitchell, David (Basingstoke)

      Critchley, Julian

      Hiley, Joseph

      Moate, Roger

      Crouch, David

      Hill, John E. B. (Norfolk, S.)

      Molyneaux, James

      Crowder, F. P.

      Hill, James (Southampton, Test)

      Money, Ernie

      Curran, Charles

      Holland, Philip

      Monks, Mrs. Connie

      Dalkeith, Earl of

      Holt, Miss Mary

      Montgomery, Fergus

      Davies, Rt. Hn. John (Knutsford)

      Hornby, Richard

      More, Jasper

      d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir Henry

      Hornshy-Smith,Rt.Hn.Dame Patricia

      Morgan, Geraint (Denbigh)

      d'Avigdor-Coldsmid, Maj.-Gen. Jack

      Howe, Hn. Sir Geoffrey (Reigate)

      Morgan-Giles, Rear-Adm.

      Dean, Paul

      Howell, Ralph (Norfolk, N.)

      Morrison, Charles (Devizes)

      Deedes, Rt. Hn. W. F.

      Hunt, John

      Mudd, David

      1696

      1697

      Murton, Oscar

      Roberts, Michael (Cardiff, N.)

      Temple, John M.

      Nabarro, Sir Gerald

      Roberts, Wyn (Conway)

      Thatcher, Rt. Hn. Mrs. Margaret

      Heave, Alrey

      Rost, Peter

      Thomas, John Stradling (Monmouth)

      Nicholls, Sir Harmar

      Russell, Sir Ronald

      Thomas, Rt. Hn. Peter (Hendon, S.)

      Noble, Rt. Hn. Michael

      St. John-Stevas, Norman

      Thompson, Sir Richard (Croydon, S.)

      Normanton, Tom

      Sandys, Rt. Hn. D.

      Tilney, John

      Nott, John

      Scott, Nicholas

      Trafford, D. Anthony

      Onslow, Cranley

      Scott-Hopkins, James

      Trew, Peter

      Oppenheim, Mrs. Sally

      Sharples, Richard

      Tugendhat, Christopher

      Orr, Capt. L. P. S.

      Shaw, Michael (Sc'b'gh & Whitby)

      Turton, Rt. Hn. R. H.

      Owen, Idris (Stockport, N.)

      Shelton, William (Clapham)

      van Straubenzee, W. R.

      Page, John (Harrow, W.)

      Simeons, Charles

      Vaughan, Dr. Gerard

      Parkinson, Cecil (Enfield, W.)

      Sinclair, Sir George

      Vickers, Dame Joan

      Peel, John

      Skeet, T. H. H.

      Waddington, David

      Percival, Ian

      Smith, Dudley (W'wick & L'mington)

      Walder, David (Clitheroe)

      Pike, Miss Mervyn

      Soref, Harold

      Walker-Smith, Rt. Hn. Sir Derek

      Pink, R. Bonner

      Speed, Keith

      Wall, Patrick

      Powell, Rt. Hn. J. Enoch

      Spence, John

      Walters, Dennis

      Price, David (Eastleigh)

      Sproat, Iain

      Ward, Dame Irene

      Prior, Rt. Hn. J. M. L.

      Stainton, Keith

      Warren, Kenneth

      Proudfoot, Wilfred

      Stanbrook, Ivor

      Wells, John (Maidstone)

      Pym, Rt. Hn. Francis

      Stewart-Smith, D. C. (Belper)

      White, Roger (Gravesend)

      Quennell, Miss J. M.

      Stodart, Anthony (Edinburgh, W.)

      Wiggin, Jerry

      Raison, Timothy

      Stoddart-Scott, Col. Sir M.

      Wilkinson, John

      Ramsden, Rt. Hn. James

      Stokes, John

      Wolrige-Gordon, Patrick

      Rawlinson, Rt. Hn. Sir Peter

      Stuttaford, Dr. Tom

      Woodhouse, Hn. Christopher

      Redmond, Robert

      Sutcliffe, John

      Woodnutt, Mark

      Reed, Laurance (Bolton, E.)

      Tapseil, Peter

      Worsley, Marcus

      Rees, Peter (Dover)

      Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)

      Wylie, Rt. Hn. N. R.

      Rees-Davies, W. R.

      Taylor, Edward M.(G'gow,Cathcart)

      Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon

      Taylor, Frank (Moss Side)

      TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

      Ridley, Hn. Nicholas

      Taylor, Robert (Croydon, N.W.)

      Mr. Bernard Weatherill and

      Ridsdale, Julian

      Tebbit, Norman

      Mr. Hugh Rossi.

      8.0 p.m.
      Question proposed, That the Clause stand part of the Bill.
      Mr. Robert Mellish: On a point of order. May I seek your assistance, Miss Harvie Anderson? May I ask you to instruct the attendants not to shut the doors until you personally, as Chairman, so declare? Some confusion arose in the last Division because one door was left open and another was shut. Would you please make it clear that they are not to shut the doors until you tell them to do so?
      The Deputy Chairman: I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for raising that point. I certainly undertake to make that crystal clear to those concerned. Is the right hon. Gentleman asking for the Division to be recalled?
      Mr. Mellish: That will not be necessary.
      The Deputy Chairman: I am obliged to the right hon. Gentleman. I will see that what he requests is done.
      Mr. Rose: We have had a series of valuable debates on limited aspects of the Clause and I am particularly grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Nuneaton (Mr. Leslie Huckfield) because in answer to a number of points that he and others raised we have had some
      1698
      revealing comments from the Solicitor-General.
      By this Clause we see the virtual ending of what have been regarded as traditional immunities under the Trade Disputes Act, 1906. That Act was the settlement of a deep social conflict which rejected the middle-class attitude towards trade unionism which was represented by the Taft Vale decision.
      In destroying even those immunities which remain after a number of recent legal decisions, the Solicitor-General is opening wounds the extent and depth of which I do not believe he has yet begun to understand. Like his predecessors at the beginning of this century, he and his right hon. Friends will eventually reap the whirlwind. He has neatly disguised, by obscure legal language, some subtle definitions, changes and a number of hidden cross-references. This shields his desire to destroy trade union immunities which have been established for 66 years.
      The hon. and learned Gentleman will be looked upon in the coming four years as the architect of the destruction of the Conservative Government. I urge him to ponder what happened at the beginning of the century and, at the same time, to look at the Clause. Then let hon. Gentlemen opposite read the standard A level textbook on the birth of the party which hon. Gentlemen opposite recently

      1699
      replaced on the benches opposite. It says:
      "For a year or two its Secretary, J. Ramsay MacDonald, had a hard task to keep the new craft moving; but then a sudden wind filled its sails and blew hard in its favour till the general election. The source was a judicial decision, and that is the Taft Vale case."
      Already this Bill is acting as a catalyst for the Labour Movement, as the Taft Vale decision did. As my hon. Friends and I address larger and more enthuiastic audiences than we have ever known, we see a regeneration of the Labour Movement of a type that was seen following the Taft Vale decision; and that swept 53 hon. Members into the House of Commons as Labour hon. Members. I am sure that this proposal of the Solicitor-General will sweep in at least another 53 Labour hon. Members.
      We see here basically the destruction of the 1906 Act by subterfuge by the back door, just as in Section 6 we saw the destruction of the 1965 Trade Disputes Act, turning us back to the Rookes v. Barnard case. This is all because of the introduction of an alien concept of unfair industrial practice.
      At the same time, we must consider the question of inducement, and we have still to hear about this from the Solicitor-General. Indeed, we have yet to hear from him about anything. We heard in the earlier debates of danger not only to members of the trade union movement but to ordinary political commentators—to people who are involved in the mass media and who, by reason of that, may be guilty of an unfair industrial practice because, as a result of what they say, they may induce a breach of contract.
      The hon. Member for Basingstoke (Mr. David Mitchell) referred to the right to strike and his remarks were particularly relevant because it is impossible to envisage a strike as a result of which there is not a breach of some description. It may not be a breach of contract of employment but a breach of contract between an employer and some third party. This situation has been entirely overlooked in the Solicitor-General's consideration of this aspect, and we shall return to it.
      As for the definition of an industrial dispute, as I said when we discussed an earlier Amendment, the Solicitor-General may have been hoping that nobody would
      1700
      notice that he has left out the question of a dispute between one group of workers and another. As I pointed out, this frequently arises, not because of a fault of the workers but because of a fault on the part of management, perhaps through their failure to present sufficient information or through bad decision-making.
      The hon. and learned Gentleman has now introduced this in the concept of the agency shop, with bargaining units which are bound to cause friction and increase the number of inter-union disputes, and these will no longer be afforded the protection which they have had since 1906. It is vital, therefore, that we resist what may otherwise have been a minor irritant, albeit another departure from Donovan.
      We accept the Donovan Report in regard to an inducement to breach a commercial contract because it has become increasingly common for employers to obtain injunctions against union officials for inducing a breach. For example, Lord Denning went so far as to use the term "interfering with commercial contracts". We have the Torquay Hotel case and the case of the Boston Deep Sea Fisheries.
      However, this has more serious implications, which I am sure the Solicitor-General must have realised, because he has to a limited degree accepted the point in regard to the breach of commercial contracts. To carry out their functions, trade unions must not only be permitted to strike in breach of contract but their officials and members who carry out policy must be immune; and as far as I can see the hon. and learned Gentleman has not dealt with the problem of individuals compared with the problems of trade unions as a whole.
      The hon. and learned Gentleman must be aware of the problem posed by the case of Emerald v. Lowthian, where an injunction was granted against officers of the Amalgamated Union of Building Trade Workers preventing them from taking official action against a labour only sub-contractor. Since the purpose of these sub-contractors is to supply labour only and since any industrial action must interfere with that supply, there must be a tort of inducement; and the right to strike can be stopped by this legal subterfuge.

      1701
      The hon. and learned Gentleman is extending the limited protection, but it will apply only to registered trade unions or the officials of such unions acting within the scope of their authority; and we will return to this subject also. The fact remains that every striker must envisage that as a result of his action, some contract will be breached, even if he gives due notice, and there may be all sorts of periods of notice, according to the individual person involved. After the dangerous dicta in Stratford v. Lindley and Rookes v. Barnard, we can see the extent of the vulnerability of all registered unions.
      Perhaps the Solicitor-General will read the evidence given to the Donovan Commission by the Society of Labour Lawyers, by the Haldane Society and by Professor Wedderburn. I address myself to the Solicitor-General not just because he has been the only Minister on the Front Bench today—I make no criticism of his right hon. and hon. Friends—but because this is his Bill. The Secretary of State reminds me of some maiden who has been seduced by the soft tongue of the Solicitor-General, unwilling to divulge the paternity of the monster with which he has been left. Plainly, the Solicitor-General is responsible for the drafting of these proposals. He will remember that, on Second Reading, I asked his right hon. Friend:
      "Will the right hon. Gentleman clarify Clause 86, with regard to aiding and abetting, which hitherto has been a strictly criminal concept? Does it mean that the trade union which supports action under Clause 85 and turns a strike into an official strike is guilty of aiding and abetting and loses the immunity of the 1906 Act?"
      His right hon. Friend replied:
      "Perhaps I might ask one of my hon. Friends to deal with that point."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 14th December, 1970, Vol. 808, c. 979.]
      I assume that the right hon. Gentleman intended to ask the Solicitor-General. We have waited since before Christmas for a reply from the hon. and learned Gentleman. We are very patient on this side, but I hope that we shall not have to wait until next Christmas for a reply.
      The Solicitor-General will argue that officials of registered trade unions will enjoy immunity for acts done within the scope of their authority. But the courts will have a good deal of fun sorting out
      1702
      what is mean by "within the scope of their authority", and what is or is not within that scope, according to their particular rules. More than that, who is a trade union official? Is the Solicitor-General familiar with the rules of the A.U.E.W. and who is a trade union official according to those rules?
      Even though we have the bribe of Clause 90(5), one can imagine nothing more calculated to cause seething anger on the shop floor than to compel the industrial tribunals or the N.I.R.C. to milk the unions' funds or to punish individual strikers or those inducing a strike while protecting the union official who called the strike. That is the cumulative effect of these provisions, as I understand it. It could be the greatest ever irritant thrown into trade union law, with two possible exceptions—the blacklegs' charter in Clause 61(7) and the agency shop concept which is causing both employers and employees throughout the country to throw up their hands in horror.
      If we want more evidence of the ingenious way in which the Solicitor-General has played with definitions, we have merely to look at his use of the term "relates to" instead of "connected with". Although the difference may seem subtle, it is none the less serious because it is yet another restriction, and another narrowing of the protection offered to the trade union movement and individual trade unions.
      Above all—I repeat what I said on an earlier Amendment—the ordinary worker who is not a member of a registered trade union has lost his right to organise and strike, in clear breach of Article 6 of the European Social Charter. The Solicitor-General must not pray Donovan in aid here. It is curious that throughout our debates he has rejected Donovan, but, when he finds a 7 to 5 majority in favour of a particular proposal, although there is no reference there to individual trade unions—he has not answered that point—he suddenly prays Donovan in aid. But he fails to put Donovan in the context of what it meant by registration or to put it in the context of registration with an appeals machinery entirely different from that which he proposes in the Bill, under which he brings in the N.I.R.C. instead of a panel with a majority of trade unionists.

      1703
      This comment was made by the Economic Journal in March 1969:
      "This would not merely expose unofficial strikers to legal action … but also effectively withdraw the right to strike from non-unionists and from members of unregistered trade unions. The proposal is extraordinary in the main context of the Royal Commission's argument, which is that legal penalties on strikes are likely to be ineffective and that the right approach is to remove their causes—which it finds mainly in irrational wage structures and defective grievance procedures."
      8.15 p.m.
      What immunity is left when we add Clause 85 to Clause 86 and find that the very protection offered in Clause 85 disintegrates at a stroke as soon as one brings in the aiding and abetting provisions of Clause 86, when a trade union renders what was originally an unofficial strike official, which would seem to me to amount to aiding and abetting? To put it the other way, what would happen if a trade union decided in advance that every strike called by its members would be official? The Solicitor-General has some very difficult problems to deal with there.
      The protection given here is, to my mind, irrelevant because of the curious way in which the Solicitor-General has inter-related these Clauses and altered the definition of "industrial dispute" to make it so much more restrictive. Hiding behind these technicalities and legalisms, the hon. and learned Gentleman is making the same terrible mistake as was made over 60 years ago which swept his party from the Government side of the House. He must explain why, for the first time in this country, in a free society, the right to strike has been taken away from all but State-licensed trade unions, and in their case their rights have been severely curtailed by Clause 85 in conjunction with Clauses 86 and 87. The hon. and learned Gentleman is turning the clock back 70 years for registered trade unions, and longer for non-registered trade unions.
      This is an intolerable Measure. I have attacked it previously on the ground that it is impractical, unenforceable and irrelevant. I regard this Clause as vicious.
      Sir D. Walker-Smith: The speech of the hon. Member for Manchester, Blackley (Mr. Rose) was an engaging
      1704
      mixture. He managed to instil into it a certain amount of highly selective delving into history, peppering it with a good deal of polemics, and a cursory glance now and then at the law, but not for long. He then indulged in the dangerous delights of prophecy about the probable political effects of the Bill on this country's electoral fortunes.
      I have been in the House longer than the hon. Gentleman, and I am more cautious in political prophecy, but we can at least judge the accuracy of his prophecy by the accuracy of his assessment of the present situation.
      At the beginning of his speech the hon. Gentleman said that the effect of the Bill in the country was favourable to the fortunes of the Labour Party, and he prayed in aid the meetings which he has been addressing, meetings which, he said, are growing larger. But the focal point in that assessment is: At what figure did they start? If they were but teeny-weeny meetings with which the hon. Gentleman started, a very small addition to them would not be highly significant. All I know is that the one manifestation against the Bill in my constituency has been a considerable flop, and, from what I hear, that experience is paralleled in a good many parts of the country. [Interruption.] The hon. Gentleman is no longer a constituent of mine, which I regret on personal grounds, but if he wishes to make a point I shall gladly give way.
      Mr. Heffer: If the right hon. and learned Gentleman came to Liverpool he would find that thousands upon thousands of workers——
      Mr. Arthur Lewis: Or to the East End of London.
      Mr. Heffer: I know about Liverpool. The right hon. and learned Gentleman would find that thousands and thousands of workers have demonstrated at various demonstrations and meetings against the Bill.
      Sir D. Walker-Smith: Perhaps I shall be able to arrange a visit. No doubt the hon. Gentleman will accommodate me with a pair to enable me to do so, and we shall have a very agreeable time.
      Mr. Arthur Lewis: A lawyers' closed shop.
      Sir D. Walker-Smith: We do not need a pair to go to the hon. Gentleman's constituency.
      On one point I agree with the hon. Member for Blackley, and that is on the importance both of the Clause and, in this context, the Opposition Amendment No. 796, which was not selected. The Amendments selected, while raising important and interesting points, did not go to the heart of the matter, but that Amendment would have done so if it had been selected. No doubt it was not selected because it went so much to the heart of the matter as to get rid of the Clause lock, stock and barrel. It shows the Opposition's approach in the matter, that they would like to revert to the pervasive immunity of Section 3 of the Trades Disputes Act, 1906, immunity for all, registered and unregistered, collective and individual.
      Indeed, the Opposition wish to go further than even Section 3, because Amendment No. 796 would leave out the limiting words of that Section. Section 3 is limited to contracts of employment, but the Opposition would like to include all contracts, with no limitations. So it is not even true to say that they want to put the clock back to 1906, if I may borrow the hon. Gentleman's phrase. They want to give a still wider immunity.
      It is clear that the Opposition would like to proceed as if Part IV of the Bill did not exist. On that artificial assumption they would in effect do away with the Clause. They are quite entitled to wish that Part IV did not exist, but when we are debating Part V we must have regard to what the Committee has done. It has accepted Part IV, and we now proceed on the assumption that there is a system of registration to be put into force and a prescribed dichotomy between registered and unregistered bodies and between their respective rights and liabilities.
      At this stage we can pose the question and face up to the issue. The question, as I see it, is this: which approach is better and more logical, having regard to all the factors—the Clause 85 approach or the reversion to the previous practice, perhaps reinforced by the extension brought about by the omission of the restrictive words in Section 3 of the 1906 Act. The factors include on the one hand
      1706
      the desirability of preserving reasonable rights of strike action and on the other the desirability of upholding the sanctity of contracts and the rights of parties. The matter is well put in paragraph 848 of Donovan, where the Royal Commission says:
      "It is thus very largely for the law of tort to draw the line between the protection of the right to strike which, as Lord Wright said in a celebrated judgment, is 'an essential element in the principle of collective bargaining', and the protection of the rights of others which may be adversely affected by its exercise."
      That balance must be struck, and amongst the relevant factors we must take into account are Part IV and the fact of registration. The Clause takes account of both these things.
      One of the most important consequences of registration is that certain acts will be lawful for registered trade unions and their officials acting within the scope of their authority, but will be unlawful for others. If we went back on that, we should reverse the whole pattern of the Bill in this context and undermine its basic purpose. [Interruption.] As I have said, hon. Members opposite are entitled to want to do that, but we are approaching the matter now on the basis that the Committee has passed Part IV.
      The basic question is this: is immunity from action for tort, which means action for a civil wrong, a privilege which should be appropriately restricted to registered trade unionists, or should it be available for all, irrespective of registration, on the basis that they would otherwise suffer unfair discrimination?
      To answer that question we must look at the legal and social background and the nature of the immunity. The starting point is found in the words in the leading text book, Clerk and Lindsell on Torts at paragraph 792:
      "Knowingly to procure"—
      or, as it is sometimes put, to induce—
      "a third party to break his contract to the damage of the other contracting party without reasonable justification or excuse is a tort."
      So, apart from any statutory immunity, inducing a breach of contract is a civil wrong. It is something which causes damage to an innocent third party and therefore, apart from special considerations, the right of sanctity of contracts should be protected. If there is to be an

      1707
      immunity, that immunity must be justified for good social reasons. Section 3 of the 1906 Act provided a statutory protection in respect of the tort of inducing a breach of contract of employment, but, in the words of Professor Wedderburn,
      "It was expressed in language that establishes formal privileges or immunities in a trade dispute."
      That privilege or immunity is not done away with in Clause 85. On the contrary, it is expressly preserved for registered trade unions and their officials acting within the scope of their authority. But it is restricted to them.
      8.30 p.m.
      Mr. Rose: Perhaps the right hon. and learned Gentleman will put Professor Wedderburn's comment in context. It is not right that he pointed out that the words "immunities and privileges" only arise because, originally, trade unions were unlawful conspiracies. Professor Wedderburn is at pains to point out that this in no way represents what they are. He regards these as rights, and those words have been brought into law because of the early state of trade unionism.
      Sir D. Walker-Smith: They are rights in law in the sense that everything given by statute is a right. But anything given exceptionally as a departure from the normal law is not only a right; it is also a privilege or an immunity in every sense of those words.
      It is not right for the hon. Gentleman to denounce the Bill in general and the Clause in particular as a retrograde Measure when it expressly preserves the immunity for trade unions on condition that they are registered according to the pattern and principles of Part IV.
      Mr. Heffer: Surely that obviously means that the right is being limited. This must be a diminution of the right which existed previously.
      Sir D. Walker-Smith: The hon. Gentleman puts it that way but, of course, he will appreciate that one starts a stage further back. One starts with the ordinary right of parties to have their contracts upheld and to be protected against unlawful inducement to break them. To give any exception to that is of itself a right and a privilege and that right and
      1708
      privilege can be given only so far as it can be socially justified.
      That is the dividing line between me and the hon. Gentleman. I am happy for that privilege and immunity to be extended as far as it properly can be. But I would not be happy for it to be extended regardless of the other factor which Donovan and our own common sense tell us to weigh in the balance; that is to say, the rights of parties to a contract. In my view, the Bill's
      approach is right. This privilege, immunity or right, whatever one cares to call it, should not go beyond those responsibly and representatively engaged in the processes of collective bargaining.
      Of its nature, this is an exceptional immunity granted as an exception to the normal behaviour expected in commercial and industrial life and contrary to the normal philosophy of upholding the sanctity of contract. Being exceptional, therefore, the limitation which confines the immunity to registered trade unions and to those acting within the scope of their authority is not unreasonable. Again, I must differ from the hon. Gentleman when he suggests that the introduction of the words "scope of his authority" would give a great deal of difficulty. This is a concept which is well known to the law and about which there is a good deal of authority to guide us.
      It is right and reasonable that the privilege is limited to those and those alone for whom the action of inducing a breach of contract may be part of industrial action entered upon in a representative and responsible capacity. I believe that the case has not been made out for varying the Bill and extending this immunity to unregistered organisations and those acting for them. After all, whether they be unregistered organisations or individuals, their motives and interests may be good: they may be mixed: they also may be mischievous. If we depart from the principle of limiting the provision to the registered unions we treat all those alike. Similarly, whatever their status and permanence may be, they would be treated alike if the Clause were omitted and would be allowed to commit a civil wrong and thereby injure third parties.
      It is unregistered organisations and those alone who will come under the constraints of an unfair industrial practice under Clause 85 if they induce a breach

      1709
      of contract, and they alone who will be answerable to the industrial court under Clause 90 if a complaint is made.
      Even in respect of them, if a complaint is made and the matter goes to the industrial court, the court has to be satisfied that the complaint is well founded. In other words, the onus is on the complainant, even in the case of the unregistered organisation, and any remedy is in the discretion of the Court and, in the words of Clause 90, can be given only if it is
      "just and equitable so to do"
      The Clause gives sufficient safeguards for unregistered organisations and at the same time an appropriate immunity for responsible and representative registered trade unions and their officials acting within the scope of their authority. The balance has been fairly struck by the Clause and to go back on it or to weaken it would destroy part of the pattern and purpose of the Bill.
      Mr. Sydney Bidwell: The whole Committee recognises the considerable legal knowledge and experience of the right hon. and learned Member for Hertfordshire, East (Sir D. Walker-Smith), as it does the possibly lesser experience, but nevertheless considerable knowledge, of the Solicitor-General. What the Opposition very much doubt is whether that legal experience and knowledge properly match the realities of British industry and whether the Bill will help to create the national industrial unity at the point of production which is needed if we are to make our way as an industrial nation.
      This is the first time that I have taken part in these debates, for my attention has been directed to other Parliamentary matters. I bring to these discussions the attention which is important in debates of this kind and a background of considerable experience in the trade union movement. I hope that I shall be allowed to allude to that, because we must condition our thoughts and what we have to say to our experience, for there is no substitute for experience. I believe that to be the common quest of both sides of the Committee, but I profoundly believe that the Government are considerably mistaken in their revolutionary legal incursion into industrial relations, which is what the Bill is all about.
      I am concerned about Clause 85, especially as my right hon. Friend the Member
      1710
      for Blackburn (Mrs. Castle) went beyond the general ideas of the Donovan Commission in this respect. The Solicitor-General described this as the heartland of the Donovan Report, but that is a gross error, for the Report rejected the proposals to which we have fundamental objections. Clause 85 is concerned with preserving the right to strike while attempting to deal with the unofficial strike, which in this country is mostly short-lived and which is not always about wages and hard bargaining on the factory floor, but sometimes about conditions. It has become the lightning strike, what the Americans have called the wildcat strike.
      The last place on earth where we want to go for guidance on matters about the unofficial strike is the United States. There, when they get to the end of the contract period there are bloody and bitter collisions involving the use of tear gas and water cannon with the violence which must necessarily arise from that. I do not want this Committee to do anything which will lead to that.
      As I have said to my right hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn some time back in our discussions, we cannot make an absolute division between the feelings of working people on the question of official and unofficial strikes. It is much better to be involved in an official strike, but things do not always work out like that. The unofficial strike in a sense is an adjunct to our history of industrial relations development leading to the official strike. Some union officials do not mind, they give a bit of a nod and a wink to the unofficial strike because things have grown up in that way. There are other leaders who detest this kind of development. We have to set it in the complex situation throughout British industry. It varies tremendously.
      Before I became a trades union education officer—and I worked with the T.U.C. before coming here—I was a railwayman. I was a freight guard, and a shunter, working in filthy, dangerous conditions. Earlier I asked the Solicitor-General for some information, because what can happen in some circumstances is that things blow up from small beginnings and they can create difficult situations when one worker takes unilateral action.
      I was thinking of my days when I was a railway shunter and would go in the

      1711
      black of night along a siding where pig iron and other scrap iron was being unloaded. There would be so much of it spilled in the footway that it was highly dangerous to carry out any operations. It might be said that no one in their right mind would take any disciplinary action against me if I suggested, not as a trade union official but as a worker, or as someone who collected the trade union dues and who was therefore looked upon as someone a little more advanced in trade union activity than the bulk of the workers that some action should be taken.
      It could grow out of something like that. When we talk about law it is as serious as that. The right hon. and learned Member for Hertfordshire, East talked in terms of my hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Blackley (Mr. Rose) giving a cursory look at the law now and again. That is exactly as it should be in the best kind of industrial relations which we want to see promoted here. I would be going wide of the debate if I dealt with how relations can be bettered within a concept of Government partnership with industry, trades union management and industrial management. I know a fair amount, because of my background, about trade union law but I would not try to fight with lawyers. My favourite bedtime reading is not Clerk and Lindsell. The right hon. and learned Gentleman has talked in terms of an extension of privilege and immunity. We cannot extend what does not exist. We are talking in terms of the Bill.
      8.45 p.m.
      All hon. Members opposite, and some on this side of the Committee, could learn a great deal from Victor Feather's very good book called "The Essence of Trade Unionism". He shows that the character of British trade unionism is different from that of trade unionism in other countries. He shows how a major wage claim can start from very small beginnings, how discontent can grow and how the skill of industrial management comes into these matters.
      It is astonishing that, although we have heard living experiences related from this side of the Committee, there has been an absence, with one or two exceptions of hon. Members opposite telling us of their living experiences as employers and members of management in industry. The
      1712
      trade union movement has called the Bill a lawyer's paradise. This Clause is an extension of it.
      The Solicitor-General gave away the essential thinking of most hon. Members opposite about workers wanting to walk out at the drop of a hat. He used the expression "wild-cat strike". Many people not in trade unions and many card holders in unions who have not been involved in fierce collisions or struggles with the employers want to disown strikes until they begin to understand them and go more deeply into them.
      When one reacts to a Clause of this kind, it seems that one is being completely negative. We do not like or require compulsory registration. As with arbitration, the decision must be completely free. The right hon. and learned Member for Hertfordshire, East is quite right. We view these matters differently. When one is well off, individualism can be rampant. When one is poor and a wage earner with no income from investments and no stake in the ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange, the situation is entirely different. We can begin to achieve equality only when we combine with our fellows. That is bitten deep into the hearts of the British working class and no Clause of this kind will eradicate it because free men will struggle.
      When I was a shunter my union had a rule book. If we applied the rules we stopped the job. On occasions we had work-to-rule policies. The rule book would become part of the contract. The contract is broken every day for a great variety of reasons. In future workers will have to take the rule book with them to be sure of their ground. But they will also have to take the law book. It will not be "The Thoughts of Chairman Mao". It will be "The Thoughts of Geoffrey Howe".
      This massive Bill is an ingenious closing-up of the loopholes of overtime bans, unofficial movements and so on. Hon. Gentlemen opposite have it exactly wrong. We want our industrial relations changed. We will get them better. Already there is movement in that direction. We want more authority put in the hands of the General Council of the Trades Union Congress. That would be possible but not with the present Government, who have

      1713
      united the entire officialdom of the trade union movement.
      It is a miracle not that all trade union members who understand it a little, a little bit better or better still oppose it but that the entire trade union movement's officialdom is implacably opposed to the Measure. The Bill is a sort of excess of theoretical ability, but it does not measure up to the practicalities of industry.
      I sympathise with my hon. Friend the Member for Tottenham (Mr. Atkinson). It is not much good arguing about these Clauses. It is like hitting one's head against a brick wall. We should have a damned fine demonstration about the whole Measure, which is the way in which the trade union movement is doing it. But we have to set the record right and argue it Clause by Clause to show, not merely that we know as much about it as most hon. Members on the other side, but that we know a damn sight more.
      It is no dice. It is a recipe for collision and blow-up in British industry. It will not work. Throw it out. It is the hon. and learned Gentleman's baby. Throw the baby out with the bathwater. It will not solve the problems facing us. It will not bring about the spurt in productivity which we need to stay alive as an industrial nation.
      [Mr. BRYANT GODMAN IRVINE in the Chair]
      Mr. Scott: The Committee always listens to the hon. Member for Southall (Mr. Bidwell) with a great deal of respect, especially when he speaks about subjects within his direct experience. I was slightly surprised to hear him argue for more power to be put into the hands of the Trades Union Congress. If the hon. Gentleman means power in terms of bargaining about wages and conditions, that seems to fly directly in the face of experience——
      Mr. Bidwell: If I may qualify that, it is to get the affiliated unions centrally to come closer to the ideas of the T.U.C., working in harmony with the Government. They cannot do that under the Tory Government. They can do it successfully with a Labour Government, working out common targets and national
      1714
      economic objectives. In that setting, the affiliated unions will be prepared voluntarily to accept ideas for more collective or centralised leadership in a unique British way.
      The Temporary Chairman: Order. I hope that the hon. Member for Paddington, South (Mr. Scott) will not be led too far into temptation.
      Mr. Scott: Perhaps there is a rôle for the T.U.C. with a Conservative Government as well as with a Labour Government—not so much power as an educational and persuasive rôle. We know that the hon. Member for Southall is opposed to the Bill. In his peroration he came to the whole concept and wording of it, and he wants to throw it out. Yet, in spite of the rigidly doctrinaire attitude of hon. Members opposite about many of the Clauses, I believe that the Committee stage will at the end of the day be shown to have improved the Bill and to have made it more workable.
      Mr. Orme: Nothing has been changed.
      Mr. Scott: Let us wait until the end of the Committee and Report stages. The hon. Member for Salford, West (Mr. Orme) has been in the House of Commons longer than I have——
      The Temporary Chairman: Order. I hope the hon. Gentleman will confine his remarks to the Clause.
      Mr. Scott: I became diverted from my main theme.
      Another matter in which I have some sympathy with the hon. Member for Southall is his difficulty in working his way through Clerk and Lindsell on Torts. I hope that we shall be able to get from my hon. and learned Friend a clear and authoritative statement about "induce". Acts of inducement so far as they relate to the general law of contract require, as I understand it, knowledge and intention on the part of the person who is doing the inducement, and the inducement may not simply be advice; it must be active persuasion and enticement.
      We must not allow "induce" in any way to inhibit fair discussion at a meeting about the full range of possibilities of action which might be open at any time. There must be a real sense of active persuasion for a breach of contract to

      1715
      take place for it to be included within "inducement".
      The Clause seeks to make it
      "an unfair industrial practice for any person"
      other than a trade union or its authorised officers
      "to induce or threaten to induce another person to break a contract to which that other person is a party"
      and thus to make the unofficial promoter of a strike in breach of an agreement liable to action in court and then for the court to have three options open to it—first, an order determining the rights of the two sides; second, compensation; and, third, an order to the respondent to refrain from further action.
      Much emphasis is always placed on compensation. I think that in practice the most frequent order which is likely to be made is an order to the respondent to refrain from further action.
      The question the Committee must decide is: is it right that anybody should have the right to induce anybody to break his contract of service? I acknowledge that the question can be answered in different ways, but I am sure we can agree that this is the question.
      Mr. Heffer: Before the hon. Gentleman reaches that part, will he tell us, because we have not yet heard it from the Solicitor-General, how it will be known who is inducing groups of workers? Will somebody be planted amongst them who will dash to the employer to report that somebody has made a speech and is inducing the workers to take action? How will this be known? What sort of spy system will be established to sort the matter out?
      Mr. Scott: The hon. Gentleman is being even more fanciful than usual in his interventions.
      Mr. Orme: The hon. Gentleman should go and get some industrial experience.
      Mr. Scott: Hon. Members opposite are continually accusing us of having no industrial experience. I have worked in a factory and have had management experience on the shop floor, which gives me as much right as hon. Members opposite to speak on this subject. In the vast majority of cases, certainly those that
      1716
      are likely to come before a court, there will be no trouble in identifying those who induce a strike. There may on occasions be difficulty, but then no action will come to the court. If the person cannot be identified no action can be taken, but in most cases it will be quite apparent who has induced the strike—in fact no secret is made of it. Someone, perhaps not even an employee of the firm, may induce an action for breach of agreement, or an employee may hold an open meeting and do so. It will be absolutely clear who has induced the breach of contract.
      9.0 p.m.
      I come back to the point that we are asking the Committee to state whether anybody should have the right to induce people to break their contract of service. If hon. Gentlemen opposite believe that the mass of the people are opposed to the Clause, they are totally out of touch with reality. A criticism that I have frequently heard—and I disagree with it—is, why should unions and their authorised officers be totally immune if they are encouraging a breach of contract? I am not arguing that this is right, I agree that they should be immune, but it is an aspect of public opinion which hon. Gentlemen opposite should bear in mind.
      Mr. Kinnock: On this point of public opinion that the hon. Gentleman has brought in to substantiate his rather general remarks, the public might give general acclaim to this Measure, but when that public is affected by intolerable conditions, intolerable wage standards or a sudden difficult industrial situation, as a former industrial manager does not the hon. Gentleman agree that the public view of the Clause will be entirely different, and that it will be difficult to establish who induced the breach of contract and to criticise those who breach the contract?
      Mr. Scott: In practice the Clause will work fairly, and I do not believe that there will be that sort of reaction. The Clause does not prevent strikes, it does not take away the right to strike, but it does affect the right of individuals, other than trade unions or their authorised officials, to induce people to break contracts of service. Is that really so tyrannical an intervention of the law?
      Mr. Heffer: Yes.
      Mr. Scott: The country should judge that. In all fairness, I do not believe that it is. The Clause will shift the balance towards constitutional industrial action which is in accord with contracts that have been freely bargained and freely entered into by both sides, and it shifts the balance towards action which has been initiated and led by the trade union as opposed to action which has been initiated and led by unofficial bodies. There are few people in the country who doubt that such a shift in balance is appropriate and overdue. It is surely right that a distinction as to rights and privileges should be drawn between properly constituted trade unions and other bodies.
      I did not intervene at the time, but I should like to refer to the person who has a conscientious objection to supplying arms. Here the same principles apply. The position of the individual is not changed by the Bill. When the Bill becomes law a person will be able to refuse to do certain work on grounds of conscience in the same way as he can now.
      The trade union officials are protected. The Clause does not prevent the conscientious objector taking action. It seeks to extend to them precisely the same shift in balance as elsewhere, that is to say towards constitutional action and action which is led and initiated by the union. I am sure that this shift is overdue and is supported by the vast majority of people.
      Mr. Orme: The hon. Member for Paddington, South (Mr. Scott) laid great emphasis on the shift in balance. We do not consider that it is a shift in balance. We regard it as a landslide in favour of the employers, of the Government, and of the machine which they are bringing in to back it up. I say to the hon. Gentleman—whose record on international affairs, on the colour question, and on the rights of the individual is second to none—that he ought also to consider the people whom he represents in this country, many of whom, if the Bill goes through as drafted, will move from first-class citizen status to second-class citizen status.
      The whole question of the breaking of agreements and contracts is not a black
      1718
      and white issue. The fact we have opposed legally enforceable agreements is due to the fact that we feel agreements cannot be so perfect as not to be open to many interpretations. An agreement in industry is not like an agreement between two individuals in a particular set of circumstances. It is an agreement which is effective within a plant or union. It may involve many hundreds or thousands of workers, many of whom have a different interpretation of an agreement, and management itself may have different interpretations. My right hon. Friend the Member for Newton (Mr. Frederick Lee) was for many years a convenor in one of the largest plants in Britain. He will know that an agreement which may be in dispute in one department, may be completely accepted in another department.
      The Solicitor-General said that all that is needed is for us to accept agreements, and my hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Blackley (Mr. Rose) intervened to instance Clause 39, which will make it possible to enforce agreements. The Solicitor-General felt that it was a matter of carrying out lawful agreements. But it will not be as easy as that since agreements can be interpreted in so many different ways. The industrial situation is much more difficult.
      I myself have not taken part in negotiating national agreements since I was never a full-time official of a union. I have been an official of my union for many years and have taken part in negotiating local agreements and factory and plant agreements. Those of us who have taken part in such negotiations know that with the force of law behind those agreements they would have become absolute nonsense. The employers themselves recognise this and are becoming more and more worried about the situation. We are told by the Solicitor-General that what he is trying to do is to cut out the unofficial strike, the lightning strike, and so forth, and that these are at the root of all our industrial troubles. Is it? Donovan talks about 95 per cent. of our strikes being unofficial. That passage is frequently quoted at us. But the report goes on to say that these last only for a maximum of three days and that official disputes at the time the report was written lasted three times longer than unofficial disputes.

      1719
      What is an unofficial dispute? I worked in the engineering industry for about 25 years and many of our members went on unofficial dispute because they reacted immediately to some change in management practice, to some form of interpretation which the management was putting on an agreement. They may have been out for an hour, a day, two days, three days, perhaps a week. But the Donovan Report does not go on to say in how many of the 95 per cent. unofficial strikes the men were paid dispute benefit by their trade union at a later date.
      One should also make it clear that the trade unions could have reversed the rule book and made every strike official from the time it began. Why did they not do so? They did not do so in order to assist industrial harmony. They put it the other way round. They put it in such a way that members, as it were, could blow off steam, and, if it were possible, get their grievance settled quickly. On many occasions it was settled within an hour. If they could get that grievance settled, back they went to work, the machinery of the union was not involved and the whole paraphernalia which might have solidified the situation and maintained the dispute was removed. The Solicitor-General must face this situation.
      I do not retract from any of the arguments we had about the Press, which revealed a very interesting situation. In fact, when I interjected from a seated position and said to the Solicitor-General, "A reduction of freedom, then?", he replied, "Yes, of course." He went on to say that it was not a large reduction in freedom. But he confirmed the point that this was a basic reduction in freedom. This is something to emerge from the debate which we did not expect. We did not come into the debate prepared for the fact that the Solicitor-General, who is supposed to be such a liberal in these matters of Press freedom and freedom of speech, would say that.
      Mr. Skinner: He could have fooled me.
      Mr. Orme: My hon. Friend says that he could have fooled him, but I always try to give principles to my political
      1720
      opponents. Unfortunately, of course, the Solicitor-General in fact confirms the very worst fears of my hon. Friends on this point. But when we move away from that, when we move away from these issues, important as they are—and I know that my hon. Friend the Member for Barking (Mr. Driberg) is a journalist—and really understand this matter, we realise that the question of the inducement is going to be the inducement within the factory itself. This is where it will come.
      Who will report people to the Industrial Court? Supposing, for instance, the shop steward makes a recommendation to his members because of some outrage—and how many of us have seen this happen? Some of us have worked for employers who have recognised the value of trade unions and proper negotiations, but even in these circumstances at times there has had to be a lightning automatic reaction to what people see as a fact—a lessening of natural justice within industry. I have seen trade unionists respond in industry to situations that have not been directly affecting them in that sense. They have responded in a human manner to a situation. I could give illustrations.
      9.15 p.m.
      We could have a situation where a shop steward—it might not be a shop steward; it could be any individual—said to the men, "I think that we ought to take immediate action". More than likely, the men will have a vote on the matter and they might, by a large majority, vote in favour of that action. Who is responsible for the inducement then: the shop steward who has asked for it or the men who voted?
      Mr. Scott Mr. Scott rose——
      Mr. Orme: I should like to make this point before giving way to the hon. Member for Paddington, South.
      I think that the Solicitor-General has a duty to say how this kind of thing will be conducted on the shop floor; who will be the narks; who will be responsible; who will be the witnesses; and who will carry out this law. This is not only a change in industrial law and negotiations; it is a change in our basic freedoms, which trade unionists will not see eroded.
      Mr. Scott: I wonder how realistic is the scenario which the hon. Gentleman has just narrated—[Interruption.] The hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) will never let me finish a sentence. Where workpeople, not necessarily spontaneously, react to a situation in a factory where their rights and working conditions have suddenly been affected by bad management, is it realistic to think that that management will then resort to the courts and try to get a settlement in the courts? Even if it does, the Bill provides that the courts must bear in mind the extent to which that party has contributed to or caused the matter in question. I think that the hon. Gentleman is flying wide of reality.
      Mr. Orme: The hon. Gentleman thinks that I am flying wide. However, I should like to deal with the point which he has put to the Committee. This is absolutely central to the whole issue. We are talking about a breach of an agreement. The Clause states,
      "threaten to induce another person to break a contract"
      —a contract, which the Bill is trying to make legally enforceable—and that, in effect, means that a trade unionist cannot do anything without breaking it. If the hon. Gentleman can tell me how men can go on strike immediately reacting to an event without breaking the contract I should be pleased to know. It cannot be done. One is bringing into the centre of industrial relations the threat of the law and the law court. This will be held over workers time and again. Many people inexperienced in industry, perhaps not having the benefit of being in a union for many years, will be bamboozled——
      Mr. Scott Mr. Scott rose——
      Mr. Orme:—and what the Bill sets out to do—namely, a reduction in trade unionists—will in some cases be achieved.
      I want to go to the Donovan Report. The Solicitor-General quoted paragraphs 800 and 801 and said that the majority view of Donovan was that there should be some alteration in Section 3 of the 1906 Act.
      Paragraph 799 states:
      "The problem can be envisaged, as arising, for example, in a case where an effort is being made to organise employees who are not members of a trade union. If the effort is on
      1722
      behalf of a trade union already on the new register, the benefit of section 3 will apply."
      It then states that a small amendment to the 1906 Act would cover this situation. The Solicitor-General quoted Donovan to support Clauses 85, 86 and 87. But Donovan never envisaged this type of legislation. It is entirely wrong for the Solicitor-General first to reject Donovan and then to bring it in just when it suits his case. He brought it into this situation, but it does not deal with Clause 85.
      The Solicitor-General: The hon. Gentleman must allow me to put him right on this. The sentence that he quoted makes it clear that where, in this case, organisation of employees is undertaken on behalf of a trade union already on the new register, the benefit of Section 3 will apply. This could be made clear by a suitable addition. It provides that, for the union already on the register, it shall be made clear that Section 3 applies to it. That is what we are doing in Clause 85. The next two paragraphs deal with the alternative point, namely, that an unregistered organisation does not have and should not have the immunities of Section 3. They are the two sides of the same coin, the contrast between the registered and the unregistered.
      Mr. Orme: I do not accept all of the Donovan decisions, because I am on record as saying that Donovan is not a bible, but it is in favour of free collective bargaining. But we all know that there are contradictions within Donovan. In any event, what Donovan does not say is that it should be written in the form in which the Solicitor-General has it in Clauses 85, 86 and 87. This is crucial. The hon. and learned Gentleman is using Donovan in a situation which I am sure the Commission would not accept.
      I was dealing with the difficulties in which shop stewards will have to work. This matter was considered in the House in 1944, and a copy of the OFFICIAL REPORT of those debates is at this moment in the possession of my hon. Friend the Member for Barking (Mr. Driberg). In that debate, they were discussing strike regulation 1AA. A speech was made by the late Aneurin Bevan, nearly every word of which would be germane to this debate. He dealt with the mining industry, with which he was conversant, and even talked

      1723
      about the word "inducement", which is central to this Clause.
      He went on to ask about the position of a steward of the A.E.U., as it was then—it is now the A.U.E.W., but its rule-book has not changed—and pointed out that he could be induced to contravene his own trade union rules. Regulation 1AA was looked on as restrictive legislation, brought in in wartime conditions. It was opposed in the House and, of the very small number of hon. Members who voted against it, one was my hon. Friend the Member for Barking, with several other prominent hon. Members. It is to their credit that they did. If anyone has the right to speak against legislation like this now, it must be my hon. Friend and those who opposed it then.
      The Solicitor-General mentioned non-registered trade unions. He knows that the trade union movement has already taken some distinct decisions over this My own union, the A.U.E.W., was instructed by a unanimous delegate conference decision of 65 delegates to oppose this and not to register. The same may apply to the T. & G.W.U.
      The T.U.C. is to strongly recommend unions not to register. If this happens, and my union does not register, it will be completely caught as an unregistered union. Shop stewards will be entirely vulnerable to the implications of the Clauses dealing with this matter—Clauses 85, 86 and 87. If the Solicitor-General forces the Clause through in its present state he will be heading for a confrontation with the major trade unions, which have been trying to uphold agreements. This has been the case in the engineering industry, where they have been trying to renegotiate the York Memorandum.
      Industrial relations are improving, unions are modernising and are taking action which they have been told is necessary. In the face of this, the hon. and learned Gentleman is throwing down the gauntlet. My union, which represents 1,300,000 people, will have its very survival threatened if it does not register under the Bill. This part of the Measure is drafted in such a way that it attempts to capture the unregistered as well as the registered trade union.
      1724
      Part V is appropriately headed "Other unfair industrial practices"—as if we do not have enough of them already—and Clauses 85 to 87 are at the heart of this penal legislation and are aimed at the trade union movement. How hon. Gentlemen opposite can imagine that this will improve industrial relations I do not know. Indeed, a distinguished lawyer on the benches opposite, commenting on the question of inducement, urged the Solicitor-General to withdraw Clause 85 completely. Unfortunately, the vast majority of hon. Gentlemen opposite do not appreciate the magnitude of the decisions that will be taken under this part of the Bill.
      The Solicitor-General owes it to the Committee to explain precisely how these new policing provisions will operate and we have a duty to explain these provisions clearly to the unions. There is nothing in the Bill more pernicious than Clauses 85 to 87 and I hope that the Government will have second thoughts on the whole issue.
      Mr. Gower: I had not intended to take part in this discussion until I heard the remarks of the hon. Member for Salford, West (Mr. Orme). I appreciate his natural determination to put his views forward clearly and fearlessly, but I suggest that he has been led into a degree of exaggeration by suggesting that this legislation represents a landslide towards the employers. To use those terms in this context is to be unrealistic.
      The inference of his remarks—and the same can be said of the comments of the hon. Member for Southall (Mr. Bidwell)—is that the scales have been unfairly weighted in favour of the employers. Whatever may have happened in our industrial history, that has not been the case in recent years. Indeed, in their dealings with firms and industries in their constituencies, hon. Members will have been made aware of the anxiety of managements to avoid industrial trouble. That has been their main ambition. They have not been able to afford industrial troubles. Managements have had such a difficult job in other directions that industrial trouble has been the last thing they wanted.
      9.30 p.m.
      In recent years, one has had evidence not of the scales being unfairly weighted

      1725
      against employees but of managements being most anxious that the scales should not be tilted too far in the other direction. This has been the problem, and I am sure that it has been voiced to many hon. Members on both sides.
      The hon. Member for Salford, West said that the change would reduce work people to second-class status. What an exaggeration. How can he sustain such an assertion? There is nothing in the Bill to justify it for a moment.
      Mr. Skinner: What is it for, then?
      Mr. Gower: It is to assist in the development of better relations and to assist the avoidance of unnecessary disputes. The hon. Member for Salford. West and his hon. Friends have referred to the undesirability of any threat from the law courts—those were his words. Why should people regard legislation as a threat from the law courts? Is anyone minded to enter into a commercial relationship deterred from so doing by the knowledge that, if he contravenes some commercial law, he may have to appear in the courts? Of course not. Why should it be different in industrial relations?
      I have a great respect for the point of view of the hon. Member for Salford, West, and I hope that he has the same for mine. I put it to him that, whatever may be our differences on these questions, Great Britain Limited can no longer afford the luxury of unnecessary strikes. Great Britain Limited can no longer afford the luxury of stoppages and lockouts not based on real needs or real injustices impinging upon the right of individuals, and far too many in recent years have been of that nature.
      We have often read of agreements achieved after long periods of negotiation between both sides of industry, in some cases with reports of statements by the trade union negotiator that the agreement which he has just concluded has been the best he has ever settled, yet within a matter of weeks or months such agreements have unhappily been thwarted by the failure of individuals to abide by them. This is the problem which we face.
      It is a tragedy that so many hon. Members opposite are looking backwards into history, not forwards. They are
      1726
      looking back on grievances, some of them real, some of them not so real, some of them imaginary, of years gone by. We should be looking forward. Hon. Members opposite are haunted by the past, but we cannot afford in this country to be haunted by the past.
      We on this side—I hope that I speak for all my hon. Friends—are just as firmly attached to the ideal that an employee should have the right to strike. It is embodied in the Bill. [HON. MEMBERS: "Where?".] It has been recited so many times that hon. Members must know that it is there. There is provision that nothing shall be done to deprive a person of that right or oblige him to take certain action.
      The hon. Member for Salford, West said that trade unionists will not see their natural rights eroded. If the Bill were a threat to what I conceive to be their real, basic rights to withhold their labour, I am sure that I speak for my hon. Friend the Member for Paddington, South (Mr. Scott) and all my hon. Friends when I say that we would be fighting alongside hon. Members opposite to preserve those rights. We should be as strongly asserting those rights as hon. Members opposite. We depart from them only in our view of the chaos that has occurred.
      Mr. Skinner: What chaos?
      Mr. Gower: It cannot be denied that there has been a degree of chaos, represented by the non-observance of agreements freely entered into.
      Mr. Skinner: The Post Office.
      Mr. Gower: Britain cannot afford much of that sort of thing in the future, because of the nature of the battle the country faces. I hope that hon. Members opposite will gradually stop making the exaggerations we have heard tonight.
      Mr. Driberg: The hon. Member for Barry (Mr. Gower) spoke with great fierceness and robustness, but I thought that the noise he made was perhaps intended to conceal the emptiness of his matter. He talked an awful lot of rubbish. I did not think that his hon. Friends looked very enthusiastic when he appealed to them to say that they would come out on the side of the workers if they thought that anything was being

      1727
      done to infringe the workers' rights. They did not look as if they would, somehow.
      The hon. Gentleman said that trade union hon. Members on this side are always looking to the past. But it is very useful to look to the past to judge the character of the legislation being presented by a Conservative Government. It is not in the nature of the Conservative Party, or a Conservative Government, to bring forward legislation designed to help the organised workers. It is just not their job; it is not what they are here for. After all, we know that the Conservative Party exists, as always used to be said, as the executive committee of big business, and it still does.
      Mr. Skinner: That is where it gets its money from.
      Mr. Driberg: Yes, hon. Members opposite get all their Election funds from big business firms, whether or not the shareholders always approve. But that is their function, their raison d'être. If this were a Socialist country, which it will be some day, the Conservative Party would simply wither away—and good riddance.
      Let us look back a little to the past. Perhaps it is a melancholy statement, but as my hon. Friend the Member for Salford, West (Mr. Orme) remarked, I happen to be one of the very few survivors in the House of a number of hon. Members who voted against that strike Regulation 1AA in April, 1944, introduced by the wartime Coalition Government. A number of us who felt deeply on the matter, as my hon. Friends feel about this Bill, took part in a debate led by Aneurin Bevan and voted against the Government at the end of it. We were greatly reviled by some people for doing so, but I think that it was very fortunate that we did in the light of what followed, to which I shall come shortly.
      The debates on the Bill give me a feeling that I have been here before. It is extraordinary how the arguments and even the phrases repeat each other. The word chiefly used then was not so much "inducement" as "incitement". That was the wicked thing—incitement to strike.
      There had been some rather far-reaching strikes in the Yorkshire and other coalfields, and therefore, before the Regu-
      1728
      lation was suddenly sprung on Parliament without any warning, there was a campaign of calumny against the miners. The Press was fed with all sorts of statements by the Government, behind the scenes—it is known as "guidance"—to inflame public opinion against the miners, who were said to be guilty of unpatriotic conduct. The miners in Yorkshire and elsewhere had brothers and sons fighting in the Army and of course they were not guilty of unpatriotic conduct at all; but they were determined to preserve their rights, not only for themselves but for their brothers and sons to come back to eventually from the war.
      The similarities between that debate and our discussion today are quite extraordinary. As Aneurin Bevan said at one point,
      "The language, or its content, remains the same; the individuals differ."
      He was referring to yet another occasion in the First World war when similar suggestions were made, at the instigation of the same lot of people, though the individuals differed.
      I will not weary the House by digging up too much of this old debate, but I think that it is relevant because what was said then shows how easily matters can flare up suddenly and how a small dispute can start on the spur of the moment. It also shows how utterly remote all the legalistic talk that we have heard about contracts is from what actually happens on the shop floor.
      In his speech, Aneurin Bevan said:
      "Take the position of two men going to a factory. They arrive at the factory gates and the foreman says that the rate on the job has altered. Perhaps there is a reduction of 2d. a piece, or 3d. an hour. The employer is all right because he has not locked them out. All he says is, 'Take it or leave it.' In the definition under this Regulation, that is not a lockout. … But if one man says to the other, 'Let us go home,' …"
      he will have incited a strike under the penal Clauses. Today it is referred to as inducement, but it is exactly the same.
      Mr. Scott: Can the hon. Gentleman tell the Committee the name of the Minister of Labour who introduced those Regulations?
      Mr. Driberg: That is a simple trick. The hon. Gentleman is trying to catch me out. The Minister of Labour in the Coalition Government, as is well known, was

      1729
      Ernest Bevin—[Interruption.] So what? To some extent, he was captured by the majority of his colleagues in that wartime Cabinet.
      Mr. Skinner: No different from Ray Gunter.
      Mr. Driberg: I think that my hon. Friend the Member for Bolsover (Mr. Skinner) means the right hon. Member for Southwark (Mr. Gunter).
      The Temporary Chairman: Order. An hon. Member should be referred to only in the usual way.
      While I am on my feet, may I ask the hon. Member for Barking (Mr. Driberg) to return as soon as he can to the Question, That Clause 85 stand part of the Bill?
      Mr. Driberg: I do not think, Mr. Godman Irvine, that you can have heard me correct my hon. Friend the Member for Bolsover (Mr. Skinner). I said that I thought that he should have referred to the right hon. Member for Southwark (Mr. Gunter).
      The Temporary Chairman: I apologise to the hon. Gentleman. I can deal only with that which I hear in this part of the Chamber.
      Mr. Driberg: I know that the acoustics are precarious. In any case, all that digression was the fault of the hon. Member for Paddington, South (Mr. Scott). I hope that he will not interrupt me again. He has made his point and collected a few chortles from his hon. Friends as a result.
      I was in the middle of quoting a few sentences from the speech of Aneurin Bevan. Perhaps I might conclude them, because I think that they are highly relevant to Clause 85. They are exactly similar to what will happen if this Bill is put into effect. Personally, I think that it will be completely futile, because the workers will not have it.
      Aneurin Bevan went on:
      "Suppose the man strides across the shop floor, and says to one of the shop stewards, 'Look here, he has altered the rate and has not told me about it. Let us have a meeting.' If those shop stewards are not incorporated under the rules of the union, they are not persons authorised to call a meeting. If they meet in a corner of that shop and decide to strike, or if anybody at that meeting says, 'Let us go home; do not have it,' they are all liable to imprisonment, or a fine, or both."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 28th April, 1944; Vol. 399, c. 1068–9.]
      1730
      That is not exactly the same, but very similar to what this Government are trying to do. As has often been said, history repeats itself, but not verbatim.
      One tries never to interfere in what are purely industrial disputes in one's own constituency. Obviously it is not the job of a Member of Parliament to do so. Normally, the unions handle everything. But if we are asked to intervene in any way, by the unions or by a group of our constituents working in a factory, if we are asked to make some point in the House of Commons, it is clearly our duty to do so.
      9.45 p.m.
      The Bill has tremendously wide implications not only industrially but politically. Certainly it concerns us: we are devoting a great deal of time to it, quite properly, and we should be devoting a great deal more but for the guillotine. So I for one feel that if a number of my constituents—many of whom, incidentally, are on strike at the moment—were engaged in a strike and had convinced me that their cause was just if called upon to do so I should certainly go out, not to incite or induce a strike, but to tell them that I and my hon. Friends were on their side: and I should not care a damn whether it was an official or an unofficial strike.
      Mr. Ted Fletcher: Clause 85 is perhaps the most important in this thoroughly reactionary Bill, dealing as it does with the central theme of unofficial strikes and the punishment of those who might try to induce their colleagues and workmates to take unofficial action.
      We had unofficial strikes before the Bill was thought about and we shall have them when the Bill is passed. The Bill does nothing to frighten or intimidate the trade union movement into observing the law. The trade union movement in this country has been built up by defying the law. The Tolpuddle Martyrs were deported to Australia for defying the law; the dockers of 1885 defied the law; the 1926 General Strike was an illegal strike, according to Lord Simon; the Kent miners engaged in an unofficial and illegal strike. The whole history of the trade union movement is that its members have disregarded an unfair law, and I warn the Government that if the

      1731
      Clause is passed it will be disregarded by the trade union movement.
      Mr. Arthur Lewis: My hon. Friend omitted to mention the fact that during the period of the Geddes Axe, which he will remember, even the judges threatened to go on strike, but they did not have to do so, because their wage demands were met, but they will be the people who will be judging in these matters.
      Mr. Fletcher: I thank my hon. Friend for that information. If every section of the working class got the same increases as judges, 62 per cent. over four years, we should not have the present industrial unrest. Unfortunately, that is not the case and these are the people who have had a substantial increase and who will try working-class people.
      The Clause deals with unofficial strikes. There is a proposition which the Government have not grasped. Not all issues which arise on the factory floor can be solved immediately, but some must be solved immediately. They cannot be solved only if the two sides are parties to a procedure agreement and a contract. The men want immediate action. For example, if work people on a cold February morning such as we had today go into a factory which is so cold that they are unable to work, if the heating system has broken down and the factory is freezing, and they say, "It is impossible to work and we are going home", the employer may say, "You are parties to a contract and you must go through the procedure agreement". But if they go through the procedure agreement the flowers will "bloom in the spring, tra-la" before they get an answer to their application. It may be 80 degrees in the shade in July before there is an answer. So immediately they say, "Irrespective of the procedure agreement, we cannot work. It is too cold and we are going home". They are unofficial strikers. They are in breach of an agreement and they can be punished under the Bill.
      I give another example of what has happened in my area in the North-East. A few months ago 3,000 factory girls employed at West Hartlepool went on unofficial strike because the management decided to put a table outside the ladies' toilet as, they said, too much time was being wasted in the toilet. Every girl
      1732
      had to give her check number and name, and the time when she entered and the time when she left the toilet were put on a list. The girls said, "This is an indignity and we are not standing for it", and 3,000 of them walked out. They did not consult the union or take the matter through procedure. They said, "We shall not go back until the table is removed". As a result, some statistician in the Department noted down that another 3,000 days had been lost through an unofficial strike.
      This is what happens when there is a spontaneous outburst—a sort of spontaneous combustion—and the management outrage the feelings of workers, who take immediate action, and who will take action whether or not the Bill is passed. Right hon. and hon. Members opposite seem to disregard the fact that incidents of this sort happen.
      We are not talking with tiny, arid, sterile legal minds about nice tidy packages of what should happen. We are talking about miners working at a two-foot face in two feet of water; of construction workers working 100 feet up a tower block on a February morning; of shipyard workers who have to chisel ice off the plates before they can weld them; of factory workers putting up with an incessant din and the monotony of factory and foundry life; of textile workers who go deaf by the age of retirement because of the noise. We have experienced this sort of thing, and yet we cannot induce you to believe that in this situation problems arise——
      The Temporary Chairman: Order. The hon. Gentleman will not try to induce me to believe anything.
      Mr. Fletcher: I am sorry, Mr. Godman Irvine.
      Problems arise between employers and employees which must have an immediate solution. I speak as a former trade union official. I should like my union members to observe agreements which I have made. But I am human enough to recognise that that is not always possible and that situations arise in which workers say, "We know that you signed an agreement to go through a certain procedure, but this proposal is so intolerable that we must take action, and we are taking action". When we as union

      1733
      officials investigate matters, in the majority of cases we say, "Your action is quite justified. Your strike will be made official and you will get strike pay".
      It is no good referring to 95 per cent. of unofficial strikes because more than half of them are made official before they end and, according to the Donovan Report, unofficial strikes last on average only one and a half days. However, the 5 per cent. which are official last three weeks.
      Mr. Robert Redmond: I agree with the hon. Gentleman in most of what he said and I am certain that most of my hon. Friends would agree that anyone who put a table outside the ladies' loo in the way that he has described deserves all that he gets. I am certain that that sort of problem could be solved quickly by someone in senior management. How long did that strike last? If it were more than five minutes, I can only say that the management got what it deserved.
      Mr. Fletcher: It lasted a few hours. Under the Bill the employer is not prosecuted for this intolerable action, but 3,000 girls are at risk under the Bill. Who is to decide who will be prosecuted? This is what makes such nonsense of the legislation.
      Mr. David Mitchell: Surely the whole of what the hon. Gentleman has been saying is based on a false premise? No employer will sue for compensation in the situation he has outlined, the sort of situation when the employer is largely responsible for the trouble. As the hon. Gentleman made clear, this is something about which unions can say that they entirely agree that the unofficial strikers have a sound case. In such cases the employer will not sue for compensation.
      Mr. Fletcher: I am very interested to hear that. If the hon. Gentleman is saying that the employer will not prosecute unofficial strikers, all well and good, but he is encouraging unofficial strikers to disregard the Bill. I am sure that that is not his intention, but that is what is being said—"Carry on with the unofficial strike because the employer will not prosecute".
      There are other penalties for those who induce others to strike. Supposing that those girls who came out on strike
      1734
      had issued a leaflet to other factories saying that if such intolerable action were taken in their own factories they should walk out, too. If such a leaflet had been issued they would be guilty under the Bill—as would the man who published the leaflet, in my opinion—of inducing others to break their contract. This shows what a nonsense the Clause is.
      Then it might get to the industrial courts. I am sure that the judges would not consider the matter in this light. They would not ask: "Is it intolerable that employers should time people when they go to the toilet?" Would they not say to themselves, "No one times a judge when he goes to the toilet." Judges have to consider weighty things. Judges may spend a lot of time in the smallest room in the house, contemplating a case. They are not asked whether they would resent it, if they were timed; all they have to do is to interpret the law, and they would say that the unofficial strikers were in breach of contract and had broken the law.
      This is the absurd situation in which we shall find ourselves. This Clause is a nonsense which the trade union movement will ignore. The T.U.C. yeterday strongly advised affiliated unions not to register under the Clause. We shall see a tremendous campaign of non-registration within the trade union movement. Hon. Gentlemen opposite are bringing the law into disrepute with such Clauses as this. As a consequence the trade union movement will campaign against it once this Bill become law.
      I warn hon. Gentlemen opposite that a general strike in this country is nearer than some people think. We are incensed over this type of legislation which tries to tidy things up and make into a nice, rigid, legal framework something so complex as industrial relations. We have spent our lives in industry and we know the problems there. We know that it is mainly a problem of communications and human understanding.
      In the last analysis the problem can be solved only by reasonable men on the trade union side and the employers' side discussing their difficulties and arriving at a mutual agreement. That is the way to solve industrial disputes. We cannot bring the whole majesty of the law into

      1735
      this situation and set up rules and regulations—
      It being Ten o'clock, The CHAIRMAN left the Chair to report Progress, and ask leave to sit again.

      BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
      Ordered,
      That the Proceedings on the Vehicles (Excise) Bill [Lords] and the Hydrocarbon Oil (Customs and Excise) Bill [Lords] may be entered upon and proceeded with at this day's Sitting at any hour, though opposed.—[Mr. Goodhew.]

  INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS BILL
  Again considered in Committee.
  [Sir ROBERT GRANT-FERRIS in the Chair]
  Question again proposed, That the Clause stand part of the Bill.
  Mr. Fletcher: This legislation will not frighten the trade unions. They will not be intimidated by it. There will be so much disregard for the law that the Government will have to think again about this. The Government should think carefully about how far they will go along this road. Whether they bring the legislation forward or not, the trade union movement will continue in the way that it has over the last 150 years. The trade union is a shield amongst working people which they have built up to frustrate the attacks of employers and to obtain the best possible terms and conditions of employment that they can. They will not be frustrated by Clause 85 or by any other Clause.
  Mr. Tom King: The hon. Member for Darlington (Mr. Ted Fletcher) argued about how close we might be to a general strike. His problem may be that he is almost too close to many of his friends, both inside and outside the Committee, who are deeply involved. Without any attempt at propaganda, may I merely pass on my belief, borne of my observations, that the overwhelming mass of people in industry do not have such highly charged feelings about this legislation and that it commands much wider support than one would imagine on listening to speeches from hon. Members opposite.
  1736
  I recognise that there are highly charged feelings among union representatives. I had a meeting last Friday at a Labour headquarters with union officials. My experience there was that with the highly charged feelings went a certain lack of information and understanding as to what the provisions of the Bill were. Hon. Members on both sides of the Committee recognise the problems in communicating the intentions and provisions of the Bill.
  Mr. Kinnock: My intervention would be unnecessary if the hon. Member for Bridgwater (Mr. Tom King) had been in the Chamber earlier. The problem of communication will be overcome if and when the Bill becomes law. When it is applied to the day-by-day problems of industry, the hon. Gentleman will see that whatever public opinion appears to be at present, and however deep is the lack of knowledge of the minutiae of the Bill, the working people, because it is such an infringement of their freedom and an inconvenience in the way they conduct their working lives, will rise up against the Bill. The hon. Gentleman should not be too sanguine about his expectations for the Bill.
  Mr. King: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for that intervention. I agreed with everything in it until his final conclusion, and when he said that I was not here earlier. I think that I was here a little earlier than he, but I had to leave. The hon. Gentleman was not able to be here for the earlier part. We have been debating this issue, either on the main Question or on various Amendments, since the Committee started sitting this afternoon.
  As to the hon. Gentleman's point about the Bill's not being understood until it comes into operation, a professor who has been lecturing on this subject has said that in his opinion when the Bill is enacted its impact on companies and industries with good industrial relations will be almost negligible. This entirely supports what my right hon. Friends have said. We intend the Bill very much as a measure for those industries where good industrial relations are absent or have collapsed. We do not intend the Bill to obstruct or inhibit the development of good industrial relations in areas which are at the moment satisfactory.
  I, like the hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer), have experience in

  1737
  an industry in which industrial relations are at present satisfactory and which is making its own arrangements, as the hon. Gentleman knows, to ensure that nothing in the Bill will adversely affect their progress or the continuance of good relations. This is being secured by mutual agreement as to how certain Clauses will be interpreted. The hon. Gentleman will remember that the Clause dealing with legal enforceability is one such Clause.
  The hon. Member for Darlington treated us to an emotionally delivered catalogue of the situations that can occur. We have had this catalogue on this Clause and we had it on all preceding Clauses.
  Hon. Members opposite were very unkind in taking exception to my hon. and learned Friend's use of the expression "the drop of a hat" and saying that he had no experience in industry and that this was not a situation which arose. Hon. Members on both sides who have experience of industry know very well that situations can arise which can be described accurately by the expression "at the drop of a hat". Perhaps arising from a background of continuing friction, eventually some flash occurs. It may not be something which blows up from nothing in five minutes, but from a difficult background, it can result in "the drop of a hat" situation in which an agreement is thrown overboard.
  What needs stressing on this and all other Clauses is the point which was made by my hon. Friend the Member for Basingstoke (Mr. David Mitchell). I have found both inside and outside the House of Commons that critics of the Bill are under the impression that the Bill's provisions will create an immediate offence and that the very existence of an offence will make people not just liable to prosecution but certain to be prosecuted.
  I can think of nothing more farcical than the suggestion that an employer will hunt round Fleet Street to raise a lot of prosecutions against various leader writers, correspondents or feature writers. This suggestion convinces me how farfetched are some of the arguments advanced by hon. Members.
  Against every one of these provisions there must be set the position of the employer. The hon. Member for Dar-
  1738
  lington took great delight in stating that this demonstrated that the Bill was not valid because in the majority of cases—I do not think that any of my right hon. or hon. Friends would deny this—no sensible employer would dream of acting. What employer would consider mouting a prosecution in the case instanced by the hon. Member for Darlington of the ladies' lavatory and the table? The hon. Member said that there was no prosecution against the employer, but I ask him whether the girls had their pay docked, otherwise I understand that three hours' work was lost by 3,000 girls and presumably the employer stood that and, although there was no prosecution, he paid a financial penalty in loss of production for his own folly. So the argument that he was not open to prosecution hardly seems to be valid.
  Mr. Ted Fletcher: Will the hon. Gentleman answer a straightforward question? Would these girls be in breach of the Clause? Would they be guilty of the offence of taking unofficial action and breaking their contract?
  Mr. King: Without knowledge of the agreement and the situation I find it impossible to answer the hon. Gentleman. Since the hon. Gentleman has not answered my question to him, I presume the employer did not dock the pay of these girls, which means that he took this on the chin and lost 9,000 girl-hours, which must be equivalent to £4,000, for one piece of stupidity. This is a considerable financial penalty, far greater than the penalty which might be applied by a court. To say that he was not prosecuted is utterly spurious; he paid a heavy penalty.
  This is indicative of the muddled thinking there has been about the Bill. The whole impact of this Clause, as with others, will depend on the attitude of the employer. Unless the employer wants to put himself rapidly out of business, it will be only as a last resort that he will be driven to a prosecution. It will only be where the situation has so far deteriorated that he has no alternative that he will be prepared to face the problems and instruct a prosecution with all the damage it will do to human relations in his company.
  Mr. James Sillars: I take the hon. Gentleman's mind back to

  1739
  the B.S.R. dispute in East Kilbride. That was not about lavatories but about recognition. That involved an exceptionally stupid employer who went to the ultimate in legality to get his own back on the workers. Does not the hon. Gentleman agree that the workers at East Kilbride would be at risk under the Bill?
  Mr. King: I know that that was a recognition dispute and I know the company to which the hon. Gentleman refers, but I do not know all the details of the dispute. That is a question which might be answered by my hon. and learned Friend, equipped with the necessary backing. I accept that, unfortunately, neither employers nor unions have the sole prerogative in having some extremely stupid members among their ranks, and one cannot always cater for this. No sensible employer will use any of these provisions unless he has no alternative, and unless he is exposed to continual provocation so that action along these lines is imperative.
  For this reason, and because the Clause provides the ultimate fall-back safeguard for an employer who is being victimised and taken advantage of, I support the Clause.
  [Miss HARVIE ANDERSON in the Chair]
  10.15 p.m.
  Mr. Arthur Lewis: I am pleased to follow the hon. Member for Bridgwater (Mr. Tom King), because I have sat through this debate since 7 o'clock with one short interruption to go out to the toilet, for which I was not fined. With the exception of those few minutes, I have been present for the whole of this debate.
  I heard my hon. Friend for Darlington (Mr. Ted Fletcher) and my hon. Friend for Barking (Mr. Driberg) put excellent arguments. The hon. Member for Bridgwater spoke about what may happen in these circumstances. My hon. Friend the Member for Barking gave actual instances of what did happen. I remember Regulation 1AA quite well. That was a Statutory Instrument which was on the exact lines of Clause 85. I well remember how punitive and reactionary that was. That Regulation was introduced in wartime conditions. I warn the Government that even those penal sanctions did not
  1740
  stop strikes. Strikes took place in spite of Regulation 1AA and there will be strikes as a result of this provision.
  We are objecting to the fact that the present reactionary Government should bring in these penal Clauses to prevent ordinary working-class people from selling the only thing they have to sell—that is, their labour power at free, competitive rates.
  When I hear the legal gentleman coming to the House to give us their legal views and suggesting how this should be implemented, it reminds me that the lawyers have the greatest trade union of all. They operate a closed shop and get more in one day in refresher briefs than many mine-workers, for example, earn in a week. Indeed, some lawyers earn more in a week than many working people earn in a year. It ill becomes those sorts of people to come to the House and tell workers in the pits or in the workshops that it is wrong for them to come out on strike for a few extra shillings a week.
  What will happen once the Clause is carried into law? The Clause uses the words
  "any person in contemplation or furtherance of an industrial dispute …"
  That means that even if a person is thinking of doing something, for example, telling Post Office workers or Ford workers to come out on strike, he can be liable, even though he may not in fact have told them to come out on strike.
  It is customary for all hon. Members taking part in discussions to declare their interests, and I shall do so in this debate. I believe that I am the only Member in the House who can boast—and I emphasise that it is a boast—to holding three trade union tickets, of having been a trade union official while a Member of this House and actually leading official and unofficial strikes and of having the law brought in against me with an injunction. But it did not stop me and it will not stop trade unionists. The Government can bring in all the repressive penal legislation they like. The working class and the trade unions will get round it.
  The Clause says that it would be wrong in furtherance of an industrial dispute to
  "induce another person to break a contract to which that other person is a party …"

  1741
  Once the Clause is passed and I go to my Ford workers and say to them as a shop steward, "I am telling you that you must not strike", what will happen if I know that on the following day all the directors of the company will be going on strike, or its equivalent, since they will be away attending Ascot or Epsom? [Interruption.]—What happens if I then tell the workers, "Do not come out on strike and do not let us go and discuss the matter with these people at Ascot or Epsom"—[Interruption.]—but the workers decide, against my advice, that they will go and discuss with these people, who are not on strike but happen to be golfing or grouse shooting?
  Mr. Tom King Mr. Tom King rose——
  Mr. Lewis: I am not giving way. Or I might suggest to my workers, "Do not let us strike because it is illegal, but West Ham happens to be at home tomorrow and I shall watch the match. I shall not be on strike but you must not join me because that might be illegal industrial action." What if the workers decide that they will come and watch West Ham at home and win—which will be a change? Under this Clause, the Government will impose their penal sanctions.
  Mr. King Mr. King rose——
  Mr. Lewis: I am not giving way.
  Mr. King Mr. King rose——
  Mr. Lewis: I am not giving way. The hon. Gentleman supported the guillotine. He helped to restrict the discussion. If he had not supported the guillotine I would have given way.
  Mr. King Mr. King rose——
  Mr. Lewis: I am not giving way. I am not giving way. This is the trouble with hon. Members opposite. They just will not listen. "I am not giving way" means that I am not giving way. I am explaining that there are 101 ways in which this Clause can be interpreted and evaded. I oppose the Clause because it is punitive. [Interruption.] If the hon. Gentleman wishes to discuss with the Chair he can do so, but he must not sit and mutter.
  Mr. King Mr. King rose——
  Mr. Lewis: I am sorry but I am not going to give way. The hon. Gentleman should not have supported the guillotine.
  I am against this Clause because it is an attack upon the freedom of speech and freedom of action of such people as journalists and radio commentators. Earlier, the Solicitor-General, when most hon. Members who are here now were not present, admitted that if a journalist—it may be my hon. Friend the Member for Barking or my right hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Cross-man), or one of the radio or television commentators—happens to get an unofficial striker on to television and happens to use words Which could be called an inducement to him and his colleagues to break contracts, he can be liable under this Clause [HON MEMBERS: "And you."] Yes, of course—and me. But I am not afraid. I would be quite willing to do this. I am not afraid to get up and tell the workers. As far as I am concerned, I am happy to be liable.
  We have heard four lawyers give their views today. But I say, with great respect to them, that four have spoken and we have heard four different opinions. But that is not unusual. If one wants a legal opinion, one can get 100 different opinions from the 100 lawyers in the House. I do not say that in any derogatory sense, but it is true. What is going to happen under Clause 85? A lawyer might well say to a shop steward or a trade union, "I think that you should take action and refuse to do this because in my opinion it would be wrong for you to do it". Thereby, if they heed his opinion, the workers will be breaking a contract. Will the lawyer then be liable for inciting or contemplating incitement to induce a person or threatening a person to break a contract, although he is giving there a genuine piece of advice which may, however, be completely contrary to that given by other lawyers? Hence, the Clause is so widely drawn that it does not allow anyone to give an opinion without laying himself or herself open to action.
  The Clause states:
  "It shall be an unfair industrial practice for any person, in contemplation or furtherance of an industrial dispute, to induce or threaten to induce another person to break a contract".

  1743
  What does "threaten" mean? What is the position if I go to my Ford workers and say, "I do not think that you should put up with this; I think that you should take action", and they then come out on strike? I did not mean them to come out on strike; I meant them to go through the usual procedure. However, as I suggested that they should take action, I suppose that I could be reported under the Clause because I, or any member of the public, suggested that they should take action which resulted in the furtherance of a dispute—[Interruption.] If the hon. Gentleman looks at the Bill, he will see that it refers to "any person". That means that any hon. Member or any member of the public could be liable because he was threatening to induce a stoppage.
  My hon. Friend the Member for Darlington mentioned lavatories. The hon. Gentleman who tried to reply suggested that that employer, who I say was mainly responsible for that industrial dispute because of adopting a punitive, reactionary and antediluvian attitude in putting a time clock outside the ladies' loo, would not go to law. Would he not? That stupid type of employer, who took such punitive action, would invoke this Clause. The progressive employer
  1744
  would discuss the matter with his workers and would not put in these penal restrictive reactionary points which cause disputes like this to happen. The reactionary type of employer does not give two hoots about the workers in his factory; all he is concerned about is how much money he has lost because of a strike. He does not think that he has lost the money because he caused the strike. He is concerned only that 3,000 girls are out on strike for an hour or so and he has lost money. He conveniently forgets that he has been responsible for the calling of the strike and losing that money. That type of employer would be the first to take action to try to sue for damages against trade union workers in that establishment. Therefore, I hope that my right hon. and hon. Friends will oppose the Clause.
  Finally, to those who suggest that trade unionists are not up in arms, I say do not be so kidded. I ask those who suggest that there is no reaction on the part of trade unionists to try to walk or drive their cars down Oxford Street on Sunday next, because there will be thousands upon thousands of workers marching through the West End of London in protest against this punitive Clause.
  [Sir ROBERT GRANT-FERRIS in the Chair]
  10.30 p.m.
  Mr. Fernyhough: Listening to the debate I have been nonplussed. It has been very difficult for me to understand why hon. Gentlemen opposite are being kept here longer than they like. If we believe what they have said, the Bill and this particular Clause will have no effect upon the general body of people who engage in unofficial strikes. We have not been given one instance of unofficial action in which the Bill would have led to the employer taking action. The Bill is intended to reduce the number of official and unofficial strikes, yet the speeches of hon. Members opposite convince me that they do not believe that it will have any effect.
  Anyone with wide experience of industry knows that 90 per cent. of our strikes are to do not with money but with conditions and atmosphere. Hon. Members opposite must realise that unofficial action will be taken without the influence of Maoists or Trotskyists. Last week, in London, a Woolworth store was closed because of some derogatory remarks which one of the officials admitted. The girls in question looked on it as a slight, as a superior citizen talking to the inferior. They immediately decided that the only way to teach that responsible official how to use decent language about those serving under him was to walk out and close the store.
  In my constituency, which has not been free of industrial disputes, most of those which have been most difficult to solve had to do not with wages but with working conditions. Anyone who knows anything about the shipyards, the brick works or heavy industry in general knows that sometimes too much heat or cold or dust or noise can drive men to breaking point. I ask hon. Members opposite to go to any modern automated factory and see some of the people there, who are almost automated themselves, and ask themselves, if they had to do that job eight hours a day, five days a week, how long they would be as calm and collected and reasonable as they are expecting the men and women in the trade union movement to be.
  1746
  The tempo of modern industry is such that some of the men and women hate the very place. It is no good our saying that they should seek alternative employment, because it is not available in my constituency or in many others in the North-East and Scotland and various other areas. They cannot walk out, not only because there may not be other employment for them but because they would not be entitled to unemployment benefit because they would be out of work as a consequence of their own action.
  Let us now consider who could be prosecuted under this Clause.
  Mr. Gower: Nobody. Hon. Gentlemen opposite keep referring to people being prosecuted. There is no such provision in the Bill.
  Mr. Fernyhough: Then let us consider the penalties. If, on visiting an industrial estate, I am asked by some workpeople in a factory "What do you think of our job?" and I reply "I would not work here for three times the money you boys get", would I be inducing them to strike?
  Hon. Members: Yes.
  Hon. Members: No.
  Mr. Arthur Lewis: The lawyers say "Yes" and the rest say "No".
  Mr. Fernyhough: If I am in a pub or club discussing their jobs with some workers and I say, "If I worked there I would do something about it", would I be inducing them to take industrial action? If the following day they went on strike, would I, having spoken to them in a public place, have induced them to break their contracts?
  Mr. Michael Fidler: The answer seems to be "No" if the right hon. Gentleman came under subsection (1)(a) and (b).
  Mr. Fernyhough: The Clause says:
  "It shall be an unfair industrial practice for any person, in contemplation or furtherance of an industrial dispute, to induce or threaten to induce another person to break a contract to which that other person is a party, unless the person so inducing or threatening to induce the breach of contract."
  Would I be guilty?
  Mr. Arthur Lewis: The Solicitor-General should tell us.
  Mr. Fernyhough: I am asking the hon. and learned Gentleman.
  Mr. Gower: Nobody would suggest that the right hon. Gentleman was in furtherance of an industrial dispute. In any event, if he said he would not work there, they would probably tell him that they would not have his job.
  Mr. Fernyhough: The provision refers to "any person" and I await the Solicitor-General's reply.
  There has been much talk about trade union officials and shop stewards. We should remember that there are nine million trade unionists in Britain out of 24 million people in employment, which shows that many people are outside the trade union movement. There are still a lot of people outside the trade union movement who come out on unofficial strike. In fact, very often the unofficial strike is the beginning of their belonging to a trade union. When they come out, the trade union representatives go along and say, "Right, boys"—or "girls"—"we shall be here henceforth to assist you, to organise you, to guide you, to help you, and to see that your disputes are official from now on". That is what happens, but in such cases as that——
  The Chairman: Order. There is a tendency for the Committee to be a little too colloquial.
  Mr. Fernyhough: The problem here, Sir Robert, is that the debate has been carried on as though the 24 million employees in this country were all members of trade unions and that the unions could have some responsibility for the conduct of all employees. In fact, as hon. Members opposite are eager to point out in different circumstances and a different atmosphere from this, there are only 9 million in the trade unions and there are 15 million outside. Many of those 15 million come out on strike. They often have disputes. How in those circumstances are we to be able to pin it down and say who is responsible and who produced a particular dispute?
  Mr. Arthur Lewis: Was my right hon. Friend here earlier when the Solicitor-General admitted—this could apply to
  1748
  him—that if he were to write in his union journal—the New Dawn, I think it is—that others should join workers who were on strike, or that others in other industries should join them, he could be liable for just writing that article? [HON. MEMBERS "No."] Yes, the Solicitor-General said that.
  Mr. Fernyhough: Yes, I heard that discussion, and I was not greatly charmed by the hon. and learned Gentleman's reply. He may be learned, but he seemed to be skating on very thin ice, and he was not very convincing to those of his own profession who heard his answer.
  What staggers me is the assertion we have heard that there is wide support for the Bill. Where?—among large employers or federations of employers? Of course, in the Monday Club and the Primrose League hon. Members opposite can get their cheers about clobbering the unions and putting them in their place. But what is the purpose? If hon. Members opposite still think that these provisions will produce the results which they expect and desire, I beg them to read Appendix 6 to the Donovan Report, remembering that that deals with what happened in time of war when everyone felt that anything against the national effort was support for Hitlerism. Over 1,000 people defied the law nevertheless. We had Cabinet Ministers going to negotiate with men in prison to see whether they would call off the strike. The Minister went to negotiate with the strikers in prison, saying, "I think I can get you out". But then he had to go back to the Home Secretary, because it is the Home Secretary's job to release prisoners. It is not the job of the Minister of Labour.
  It will take hon. Members only five minutes to read Appendix 6. Then they should ask themselves whether, if any offences are committed under the Clause, they think that they will be able to give the law greater standing and greater morality than the law under which those men were prosecuted and the prosecutions brought completely into disrepute the law that was supposed to discipline them.
  The Government are in a mess. The country is in a mess, and we cannot begin to get out of that mess until such

  1749
  time as the Government begin to understand the trade union movement. Without the help and co-operation of the organised workers the Government cannot solve the big problems that they face. If they accept that premise, the Government, for the sake of their own limited life, should make, if not all the concessions for which we have asked, at least the concession for which we have asked on the Clause.
  10.45 p.m.
  Mr. James Hill: The right hon. Member for Jarrow (Mr. Fernyhough) wanted an example of whether the Clause could be brought in; he asked for a categoric illustration of a strike with which the legislation could have dealt. I ask him particularly to cast his mind back to last year, when we had the national dock strike. The union executive on behalf of the dock workers accepted a figure and conditions which shortly afterwards the London, Liverpool and Southampton dockers did not accept. The militants there rebelled, for want of a better term, against their own executive. That is one sort of case where we know that the Clause would have been of some use, with the wording "furtherance of an industrial dispute".
  Listening to right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite, we might feel that all is well in the world of union disputes. We might think that all is lily-white and that it is the rascals of employers, the employers' associations and the rest of the public who are not union members who are causing all the nasty strife. The public must have a balanced view of this.
  All is not right in the industrial world. Wherever we apportion the blame, we on this side realise that the Clause would deal with such a case as I have mentioned, and with many other cases that we could mention if there were time. But we have been reminded that it is our guillotine, and I should like to sit down there.
  Mr. Fernyhough Mr. Fernyhough rose——
  The Chairman: Mr. Frederick Lee.
  Mr. Fernyhough Mr. Fernyhough rose——
  The Chairman: Order. Did the hon. Gentleman give way, or had he finished?
  Mr. Hill: I will give way Sir Robert.
  Mr. Fernyhough: All I said was that it was remarkable that nobody had yet met an employer who, if the Bill were law, would use it. The Government say that everybody wants the Bill, but no one can name any employer who says, "I wish that the Bill had been on the Statute Book 12 months ago so that I could have dealt with my employees."
  Mr. Hill: From experience, I know that to be untrue. I meet many employers who say quite the reverse. It is fair to say that there is a general feeling in the country at present that the Bill is our only salvation in the industrial world. The reason why it is meeting such fierce opposition in the Committee is that right hon. and hon. Members opposite are aware of the defects in their own procedures. When this Measure becomes law, I am sure that all responsible trade union officials will feel the benefit of it.
  Mr. Arthur Lewis: They are queuing up outside.
  Mr. Frederick Lee: I want mainly to urge the Solicitor-General to address himself to subsection (1)(b). Earlier, both my hon. Friend the Member for Salford, West (Mr. Orme) and I referred to the dilemma in which a shop steward might find himself in certain circumstances.
  Suppose that there had been a long-established custom and practice in a factory, and that the employer decided suddently to contravene it. The shop steward would be in a dilemma in this sense. If he permitted that breach of custom and practice without challenge, it would go, and the employer could claim that what he had instigated was to be the custom and practice from then on. On the other hand, if the shop steward protested, the only way in which he could do it would be first by discussing the matter with the employer and, if that failed, by withdrawing his labour—at which stage, I take it, he would fall foul of Clause 85.
  In that event, the Solicitor-General would come up against an even greater difficulty. He might argue that, from the moment that this Measure is enacted, it is for the trade union concerned so to change its rules as to bring its representatives in factories within the

  1751
  meaning of Clause 85. But we now know that a number of important trade unions intend to refuse to register under these provisions. I ventured to suggest that possibility a few days ago, though I did not know that that was the intention.
  Mr. James Hamilton: I think that it should be made clear that the General Council of the T.U.C. has advised all affiliated organisations not to register. I am quite sure that they will accept the council's leadership.
  Mr. Lee: I agree. I merely suggested the possibility that some unions might not register. In such a situation, in what way will these provisions apply to unions which do not wish to register and whose rules, presumably, will not be vetted by the registrar? The result will be, surely, a number of trade unions whose rules are at complete variance with these provisions.
  In such circumstances, a shop steward cannot possibly win. That is why this kind of law must be flouted by conscientious people who find themselves in that situation. It does not matter what Measure we are discussing: if we reach a position of that sort, we bring the law into contempt. Here are conscientious people desirous of doing their duty by their fellow workers. They know that, if they take the only course open to them and advise a withdrawal of labour, they may fall foul of these provisions.
  The Solicitor-General had better tell us, particularly in the light of the recent T.U.C. advice, how he proposes to deal with a situation in which this legislation is bound to be at variance with the decision of the vast majority of unions not to register. This is a practical problem with nothing high falutin about it. I had the experience, especially during the war, of being threatened with prosecution by employers because I was trying to carry out the provision of my trade union rules at a time when there were restrictions such as 1AA operating, restrictions similar to the provisions of Clause 85.
  It cannot have escaped the notice of the Government that the trade union movement has based its rules upon consultation and collective bargaining. For 70 years we have led the world in collective bargaining and making agreements, most of which have always been
  1752
  honoured. Surely the fact that a movement of this sort, highly respected in the I.L.O. and other international circles, with its civilised approach, is now being driven by this legislation into a position when it is trying to avoid the provisions of what will become the law of the country shows how bad this Measure is.
  It is time that the Government began to take notice. These are not anarchists looking for a way out. They are trying to retain their constitutional approach to life and at the same time to prevent their members becoming victims of this kind of Measure. If the Government are to continue to be as insensitive as they have been up to now they must not complain if the trade union movement rebels in the way that I have suggested.
  I think that all Tory Governments are bad, but a frightened Tory Government is even worse. Twice since the first world war they have been frightened. The first occasion was the general strike in 1926. That began the Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act, 1927, conceived in malice and fear because of the general strike. Now we have a period in our industrial history when they are frightened again and the reason why they are frightened is because they do not understand why it is that trade unions can go on demanding more and more wage increases instead of having to defend themselves against wage reductions. This has brought a frightened Tory Government into being. Hon. Members opposite say that this is a poor pussy-cat of a Bill which will never be used; its provisions are long-stops and we are exaggerating the position when we point out what it really means.
  But the attitude of the Prime Minister is different. When he was running round Britain telling us that he had the answer to the vastly increasing number of days lost through strikes. He said that these provisions would be rigorously applied to any who dared contravene the agreements. The party opposite had better make up its mind. Is the Prime Minister wrong and, if so, is it just another way in which he misled the people in June last year?
  Mr. Tom King: The hon. Member will surely know the answer to the admitted conundrum he has attempted to create. He knows that there is a concentration of disputes in problem areas

  1753
  and in the bulk of companies and industries there is no trouble. This is common ground. The answer to the conundrum is to say that there is no discrepancy between the arguments we are making and the position of our Prime Minister.
  11.0 p.m.
  Mr. Lee: There is a grain of truth in what the hon. Gentleman says. For instance, a great number of working days is lost in the motor-car industry. But we shall not cure that by blanket legislation of this sort. We shall cure it by examining the car industry's problems. One day some genius will discover that they are caused by repetitive processes and the fact that highly skilled engineers can obtain more money in semi-skilled work on an assembly line than by working in the tool room at their own job. When skilled men are employed on repetitive work they occasionally blow up and have a strike.
  If the Government want the answer, that is the way to try to investigate, and not by bringing in this nonsense, which in every way condemns 26 million people to unnecessary restrictions given the background of the present position in our industries.
  One hon. Member opposite said that we on this side of the Committee were haunted by the past. The Government are haunted by the present. They do not know the answers. The Prime Minister tells us about the inflation problem. Apparently the only issue which brings inflation is wage increases. But when the Labour Government had an incomes policy and set a maximum above which increases should not go, the right hon. Gentleman led his troops into the Division Lobby every time any group tried to raise that ceiling. Was it inflationary then? Has it only become inflationary in the last six months or so?
  The generalisations and questions of principle which the Solicitor-General rides on will not do. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Salford, West (Mr. Orme) that this is a key Clause to which we take violent exception. It is a Clause which is causing the greatest constitutional trade union movement that the world has seen to refuse point blank to register under the aegis of this legislation. It is high time that the Government began to take notice of that.
  Mr. Maurice Orbach: I have listened to almost every speech from the other side of the Committee today, both in the debate on the Question, "That the Clause stand part of the Bill" and in the debate on the Amendments which preceded that. I very much appreciated the speech of the right hon. Member for Portsmouth, Langstone (Mr. Ian Lloyd), who called upon the Solicitor-General and the Secretary of State to withdraw the Clause.
  Various hon. Members opposite, who are concerned with omitting some parts of the Clause or with replying to my right hon. and hon. Friends, spoke on the basis that they were talking about hypothetical situations or employers who would finally have their businesses placed in the bankruptcy court.
  I speak as a trade unionist and as an employer. Therefore, I hope that I am in an objective position to deal with this subject. In the last few years we had "the £1 million strike" in which violence occurred and people were arrested. Many people in other industries struck in sympathy. At the behest of the employers, the chief constable of Stockport invited the Mayor to read the Riot Act. In consequence, the Riot Act was repealed.
  The strike was the Roberts Arundel strike, which continued for weeks. It caused great division in the town I represent. At one stage I endeavoured to mediate and met management and employees over a weekend for hour after hour in an attempt to end the strike and resolve the difficulties. I achieved the result of having the chairman of the company, who lived in South Carolina, renege on his own managing director. In the interim period I listened to all the complaints made by employees and management; and to all the accusations levelled by the employees against the employers because of the bad working conditions and the failure to recognise trade unionism the employers' answer was that there had been 13 unofficial strikes before the union had accepted that there was an official strike in existence. In that instance people had joined the union so that an official strike should be declared.
  The 13 strikes were not hypothetical The first strike was occasioned—my hon. Friend the Member for Darlington (Mr. Ted Fletcher) referred to a hypothetical

  1755
  case; this is an actual one—because on one of the coldest days in the winter there was no heat in the factory. The second strike occurred because there was no water in the compartments that my hon. Friend the Member for West Ham, North (Mr. Arthur Lewis) continually refers to. All the strikes were trivial, but they were things that no hon. Member would be prepared to accept in any circumstances.
  My hon. Friends have pleaded with the Solicitor-General to drop these stupid Clauses in Part V.
  Mr. David Waddington: Before the hon. Gentleman leaves the subject of the Roberts Arundel dispute, so that we may learn some lessons from it, will he tell us whether the firm is still in existence in Stockport and if anybody is working there now?
  Mr. Orbach: If the hon. Gentleman wants me to reply, I will do so. There are now nine people employed in the factory.
  Mr. Waddington: Nine?
  Mr. Orbach: Nine out of the scores that were employed there.
  Mr. Waddington: Indeed.
  Mr. Orbach: Not because of trade unionism, but because of a stupid or rather devious employer who had no other purpose than to close factory after factory and sell the land upon which his factories stood, for a very good price considering the period when he bought and when he sold. I met the gentleman concerned. He was a member of Moral Rearmament. He had declared to the newspapers on his arrival in Stockport that he had met me and had agreed to the terms of a settlement. At that stage he had never met me in his life.
  Mr. Patrick Wolrige-Gordon: Is the hon. Gentleman implying that the owner of the Roberts Arundel factory in Stockport was a member of Moral Rearmament? If so, it is absolutely untrue?
  Mr. Orbach: I am saying that.
  Mr. Wolrige-Gordon: It is untrue.
  Mr. Orbach: This gentleman declared it.
  Mr. Wolrige-Gordon: It is untrue.
  Mr. Orbach: Then he is doubly a liar. This is the sort of action which is to be called unfair industrial practice—people walking out in protest against an employer who imposes such conditions and who on every possible occasion lies, not only to his own people but to every other authority in the town.
  Right hon. and hon. Members opposite should reconsider this matter.
  Mr. James Hill: The union in this case was particularly lacking in allowing 13 unofficial strikes before coming to life and declaring an official strike. This puts the blame more on the shoulders of the union than on the employer.
  Mr. Orbach: Perhaps I should explain that at the beginning of the unofficial strikes a small minority of workers were members of a trade union. As unofficial strikes continued more workers joined the trade union to force official action and to get round the bargaining table with the employers. This has all been written up. I am making no unfair or untrue statements. When I was sitting on the Government side of the House I discussed this with the Minister of Labour and raised it on the Adjournment.
  In addition to the incidents I have described, the stupid chief constable, who is fortunately no longer there, tried to get the mayor to read the Riot Act, and those who were brutally treated by the police during the strike received compensation. The strike roused the whole city to militancy; business was disrupted, windows were broken, and heads, and many things were done which should not have been done.
  When I was acting as mediator I called in the union people and asked what exactly was the position. They went through the 13 strikes and said that the management had been responsible. My answer, which has a bearing on the Clause, was, "I am an accessory after the fact because, had I known of the conditions in the factory, I would have persuaded your members to strike and refuse to work under such conditions."
  On that basis I appeal to the Solicitor-General to give up his legal garb. He

  1757
  is a reasonable man to talk to in the Lobbies. I hope he will be reasonable now and listen to the lone voice on his side and the voices of hon. Members on this side and withdraw the Clause.
  The Solicitor-General: At an earlier stage in the debate it was suggested that we were not here trying to grapple with a real problem because unofficial strikes are not of grave importance. But I suggest that both sides of the Committee start from the premise which underlies all discussion about this in recent years—and the Donovan Commission said it earlier on—that the prevalence of unofficial strikes and their tendency to increase have such serious economic implications that measures to deal with them are urgently necessary. We may have got the wrong measures, or the right measures, but I hope the Committee can start from the premise that we are setting out to try to reduce that problem.
  Hon. Members on both sides of the Committee—perhaps mainly on the Opposition side—have tended to suggest that there is an accumulation of legal wisdom on the Government side and practical experience on the Opposition side of the Committee. Throughout the Committee, as throughout the country, there is experience and wisdom of all kinds about this matter, and the proposals in the Bill have not been evolved, as several hon. Members opposite have suggested, in the forensic bosom of the Solicitor-General. They are a seriously considered, well-balanced attempt by the Government—and it is the policy of the Government which I am putting forward—developed with a great deal of thought over a number of years, taking into account all the factors.
  The proposals involve a change in the legal setting against the background of which people on both sides of industry will conduct themselves, but we all conduct ourselves in all aspects of our life, consciously or unconsciously, to a greater or lesser extent, against a legal background, and the question is whether the quite modest but important shift we are proposing is or is not rightly balanced.
  11.15 p.m.
  The right hon. Member for Jarrow (Mr. Fernyhough) said that it was time the Government understood the anxieties of the trade union movement about what is
  1758
  now being debated. With equal force, I beg hon. Members opposite and the trade union movement to understand, more precisely than some speeches have suggested, the limits of the intentions of the Government's proposals. We are not setting out to clobber the trade union movement. That suggestion is a positive antithesis of the exceptions contained in subsection (1)(a) and (b).
  If one tries to strike a fair balance one finds an illustration of a lack of understanding in the ambiguous current of criticism that has flowed from hon. Members opposite. In one speech they say, "If this goes through no trade unionist will ever be able to walk in safety; everyone will be at risk of being penalised, whatever he does and wherever he goes", and, in the next speech, "Why are you fussing so much about this, if nothing is to happen?". Hon. Members opposite say, "No employer will dare to make use of this. It is futile. We can advise our trade union friends to ignore it". That has been said by hon. Members opposite. I beg the Committee to accept the possibility that the truth lies somewhere between the two extremes, and that what we have arrived at is a reasonable balance—which is what we have been striving for.
  I come back to the question of the limits of what we are trying to do. It is not—as was suggested by the hon. Member for West Ham, North (Mr. Arthur Lewis)—that the contemplation of industrial disputes should be unfair; the suggestion is that the right to call strikes without due notice is a right that should be enjoyed by registered trade unions and their officials within the scope of their authority, but is not a right which, in a free but complex, modern industrial society, should be enjoyed by everyone and anyone.
  To suggest—as one hon. Member opposite has done—that this is destroying the shield that the trade union movement represents to workers throughout industry is to misunderstand the purpose of the exercise. I would not stand in this House or anywhere else seeking to destroy that shield. My grandfather was a founder member of the tinplate workers' trade union in South Wales. My whole upbringing has been in South Wales. I know as much as other hon. Members about the importance of the trade union

  1759
  movement as a shield for our working classes.
  We are not seeking to destroy that shield; we are saying that the right to induce strikes in this sense should be confined to people who can legitimately hold that shield and say, "I am an official of the trade union, acting within the scope of my authority". Within those limits the law remains unimpaired.
  Mr. Loughlin: The significance of the Clause is contained in the phrase "to induce" or "threaten to induce". Unless that phrase is clearly defined or an explanation given, we cannot begin to assess this Clause and its implications for the trade union movement. Would the Solicitor-General now begin to look at the Clause on the basis of defining that phrase?
  The Solicitor-General: The point is one with which I am going to deal. I have very little time to deal with all the points which have been put, so I shall come to it.
  For example, the proposition that due notice should be given within the limited range of the Clause by unofficial unregistered strike leaders is not unreasonable or out of tune with what was said by the hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer). He said that in many situations the causes of tension build up over a period of time—[An HON. MEMBER: "And they break."] Yes, and they break. It is not unreasonable in the normal course of developing tension that due notice should be given at least by unofficial workplace leaders.
  To look at the other side of the matter, the hon. Member for Southall (Mr. Bidwell) said very compellingly—and I acknowledge the force of his argument—that we are here dealing with the rights of individual workpeople whose sole stake in the modern industrial society in which we live is their job and that in the process of collective bargaining with their employer it is only then they can throw these matters into the scale, and it is right that they should be entitled to do so collectively. I agree with that, but we must remember that there are many people—these are the people whose support we on this side of the Committee claim—who are in a
  1760
  workplace and whose desire is not merely to retain that job and be able to bargain for better terms with their employer, but to have some prospect of remaining stably at work. They are just as discontented as anybody else by the calling of a succession of short-notice unofficial strikes which jeopardise their right to remain at work as much as they jeopardise any other aspects of society.
  When we say that there should be this measure of change, that the inducing of unofficial strikes by unauthorised people outside the trade union movement should be subject in the ordinary way to the obligation to give notice, we are doing so not just in the interests of employers and of society on a wider scale, but in the interests of people who work in those places and who can be just as fed up by persistent unofficial strikes.
  Mr. Bidwell: It is to be hoped that circumstances will be as sweet as the Solicitor-General says they will be, but often this is not the case. Often when workers are aggrieved they go on moaning, eventually moaning to the management, and then comes a breaking point. There is no formality in these matters. That is the reality of British industrial life. It suddenly blows hot and cold. The law cannot take care of hot and cold human behaviour.
  The Solicitor-General: I shall come to that, if I may.
  Mr. Loughlin: Come to mine first.
  The Solicitor-General: I hope the hon. Gentleman will be patient. We have had some five hours on the Question, That the Clause stand part, and I am trying to deal with the points which have been put to me, and I will do so.
  The right hon. Member for Newton (Mr. Frederick Lee) raised the question of a shop steward who challenges a change in custom or practice or is taken to have allowed it to go by default. If that shop steward is a union official acting within the scope of his authority, he may challenge forthwith the change in custom or practice in whatever way he thinks fit. He may persuade his fellow employees to quit work immediately, if he is acting within the scope of his authority. Of course, in order for it to be shown that he is acting within the scope of his authority, as the right

  1761
  hon. Gentleman observed, the rules of the union, as laid down in Schedule 3, would no doubt specify what authority he had and in what situation he could or could not call strike action, and could say that he had the specific authority for which the right hon. Gentleman asked.
  Of course, if the union is not registered, it is clear that the question never arises, because the official of an unregistered union does not come within the protection conferred by the exceptions in Clause 85(1)(a) and (b). There is no secret about that. It is what we have been saying throughout the debate. These privileges, which survive and deserve to survive, should be confined to the officials of registered unions acting within their scope or authority. This is neither the time nor the place to consider how far and how wide any response may be to advice given to unions not to register. We have to look forward, as the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. Hooson) said, to the time when the Bill is on the Statute Book, when cooler thoughts are prevailing. I cannot believe that this problem will arise in that way.
  Mr. Orme: What if no trade union registers?
  The Solicitor-General: That again is a question we are very unlikely to have to contemplate. The provisions here contained are following the simple central proposition that the right to call strike action without notice is one that can legitimately be confined to registered trade unions in that way.
  I come to the other point raised in a wider sense. My hon. Friend the Member for Basingstoke (Mr. David Mitchell) intervened earlier to make clear a point which appeared thereafter to become obscure. I repeat it. Nothing in the Clause affects in any way the right of individuals to cease work and go on strike. Clause 85 does not impair it; Clause 114 makes plain the right of individual people to quit work.
  The hon. Member for Darlington (Mr. Ted Fletcher) quoted the example of the girls who walked out as a result of the placing of a table outside their lavatory. He asked whether those girls would be punishable. The answer is that there is no question of punishment in any event. Those who take part in spontaneous—a word used often by hon. Members oppo-
  1762
  site—action of this kind would not he under any kind of responsibility more than they are today—indeed, rather less, because it seems that they would have a right to a complaint of an unfair industrial practice, which they would not have today.
  The hon. Member also mentioned the Betteshanger case but missed the important fundamental principle of the Bill. It does not propose any criminal remedies at all, and it does not propose any remedies against individual workers who have gone on strike. It is confined, so far as this Clause is concerned, to those who induce action in break of contract of employment and are not trade union officials acting within the scope of their authority. We are on the validity of our proposals in respect of a very narrow middle ground. The unions official is all right; the individual worker is all right—indeed, more so than he is today. We are concerned, therefore, with the very narrow question of restricting the rôle of the unofficial leader.
  My hon. Friend the Member for Paddington, South (Mr. Scott) and others asked me to address some remarks to the question of inducing. I put it in this way: inducing implies first of all that the person who is said to have induced another person to break a contract should know of that contract; that he should have the intention to procure the breach of that contract, and that he should have brought persuasion to bear with the result of producing that breach. In other words, he must be shown to have acted purposely to secure those breaches with the intention of causing them. Without deliberation and intention the point of the effectiveness of the Clause would not arise. [Interruption.] Hon. Gentlemen opposite ask how we are going to find evidence about it. This may be so. If that be so, the matter will not arise very often.
  11.30 p.m.
  All we are saying is that in situations where it can be shown that, without any kind of cause—I shall come back to that later—unofficial people, without any authority from their union, actually produce breaches of contracts of employment other than on proper notice, they should be open to some remedy in respect of it.
  This is a narrow, modest proposal, and perhaps we may look at it a little more

  1763
  in the kind of situation which might arise. Several hon. Gentlemen opposite have said that this will enable employers to take quite outrageous, wholly unjustifiable, actions and to leave their workpeople with no remedy by way of strike action in face of such outrageous actions. I ask the Committee to look again at the way that an employer would have to proceed to get a remedy under Clause 85. The employer would have to commence proceedings in the industrial court and establish the matters which I have just set out as matters of fact.
  Mr. Orme: How can he do that?
  The Solicitor-General: He would have to get evidence to do it.
  Mr. Orme: This is the particular point made by Mr. Jack Jones, the General Secretary of the Transport and General Workers' Union. He was referring to this Clause, because he said that it would create factory spies. The hon. and learned Gentleman has just underlined that point.
  The Solicitor-General: The point was dealt with by my hon. Friend the Member for Paddington, South. No employer will be concerned to create a great sleuth-like organisation of this kind—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh!"] We are concerned with cases, well known in the Committee and in the country, where it is plain that people are inducing unofficial strike action without justification and continue to do so without any fear of liability or responsibility. In such cases the employer would have to establish, having proved the facts, that it was just and equitable for the court to give him a remedy. The court would then have to consider, in the light of Clause 102(3), whether it could be said that the employer had contributed to the strike action of which he was complaining. I have referred the Committee to that before.
  If an employer who takes outrageous action in a provocative way—sudden changing of the working conditions of his workpeople—believes that he can go to the industrial court and say, "I want an order restraining this strike", he will get the most astonishing surprise. Such an employer will be told, roughly and
  1764
  plainly, in the terms of the Bill, "You have no business coming here when it is your conduct which has provoked and caused this strike action."
  One of the lessons which will come through very clearly, not least because these matters will be heard by an industrial court, not by an ordinary court, is that such courts are no friend to the bad employer.
  Many examples which have been given by the hon. Gentlemen opposite of strikes and industrial action which they claim to be justified my hon. Friends would entirely agree are justified. Many of the examples were of strikes provoked by plain bad management, and bad management will get no support in this or in any other Clause.
  Mrs. Castle: How does the hon. and learned Gentleman know?
  The Solicitor-General: Because of the provisions which I have just recited. The court would have to be satisfied that the facts were proved, that it is just and equitable, that it is likely to make any kind of sense, to make the order, and that the strike complained of was not provoked or caused or contributed to by the action of the plaintiff employer. The employers who will get through those hoops with the prospect of getting a remedy under this or any other Clause will not be the bad employers. The hon. Member for Gloucestershire, West (Mr. Loughlin) underlined a point which I made earlier when he asked what was the point of the Clause. Here we find the Opposition shifting their ground.
  Mr. Loughlin Mr. Loughlin rose——
  The Solicitor-General: On the one hand it is being represented——
  Mr. Loughlin: Will the hon. and learned Gentleman give way?
  The Chairman: The hon. Member for Gloucestershire, West (Mr. Loughlin) can see that the Solicitor-General is not giving way.
  The Solicitor-General: In the last speech from the Opposition, the hon. Member for Stockport, South (Mr. Orbach) told a story with which the Committee is familiar. He listed 13 strikes in respect of that employer whose principal fault was a reluctance to

  1765
  recognise a trade union and trade unionism. That is as good an example as I can give of the extent to which the Bill is conferring rights on a union in that situation to claim recognition and to be recognised. That kind of problem would not be permitted to fester for months and years in the way which he described. That is one illustration of the kind of change which the Bill, and this Clause in particular, seeks to bring about. It seeks to change the general atmosphere within which both sides of industry conduct themselves.
  The hon. Member for Southall made a revealing remark when he said that we all know of occasions today on which a union official gives a nod and a wink to unofficial strikes because things have grown up that way. There will be no need for a union official to give as little as a nod or a wink to an unofficial strike which is provoked by absurd or outrageous conduct by the employer. We want to change the setting which has grown up so that the unofficial strike is normally regarded as something to be discouraged by management and by union officials. If a union official thinks that conditions are such as to justify strike action, he may call such strike action protected by the cloak conferred by Clause 85 in respect of union officials acting within the scope of their responsibility.
  But we should not continue to have a situation in which it is regarded as too easy, too routine, too normal for anyone, anywhere, at any time, to call a strike in breach of a contract of employment. If it is to be said that that results in a reduction of freedom for some people in a limited number of circumstances, I commend it to the Committee because it will in other ways be extending freedom to many more people in a wider sense, extending the freedom of society as a whole, and in many cases extending the freedom of the people who are being called out on strike in that situation. This is a balance which we commend to the Committee as a reasonable balance, making only a very modest change in the light of the needs of our modern society.
  Mr. Harold Walker: I am sensitive to the feeling of hon. Members that they want to proceed to a vote on this very important Clause, but it is important to pick up one or two of the
  1766
  points made by hon. Members opposite, particularly the two-faced remarks by the Solicitor-General. It does not lie in his mouth to accuse this side of the Committee of shifting ground. We have been treated once again by the hon. and learned Gentleman and his hon. Friends to this ambivalent approach which says: "You are taking these things to extremes. This is only to deal with extreme cases; it will not hurt anyone." But outside the House they parade up and down the country persuading their own supporters that they are going to murder the unions. It is time that they made up their minds——
  Hon. Members: Nonsense!
  Mr. Walker: All I am getting in reply is a lot of parrot cries, but we have heard them this afternoon saying that their interest is to support the unions. It seems to me that they are prepared to support the unions rather as a rope supports a hanging man.
  Whenever it suits his book, the Solicitor-General trots out selective quotations from the Royal Commission Report, and he did so today. Donovan also said:
  "We deprecate any attempt to deal with unofficial and unconstitutional strikes in isolation"
  and that is precisely what the hon. and learned Gentleman is trying to do here.
  The individual worker is to be safe. But when the Royal Commission was drawing a comparison between those who would be exposed by the withdrawal of the protection of Section 3 of the 1906 Act and unregistered unions, it was talking of organised bodies of unofficial strikers, whereas the Clause deals with individuals.
  The Solicitor-General said that the nub of the matter was the question of who was to have the right to call a strike. Earlier in our debates, as an example of what he thought was wrong with the present situation, he once again referred to the people to whom Lord Robens had taken exception in my own constituency. We have heard once or twice about South Yorkshire coal miners. He referred to flying squads of pickets going around trying to persuade their fellow workers to remain on strike.
  If there was violence—we all deprecate that and anything which goes

  1767
  beyond what is considered reasonable and normal—there is already redress in the law for such behaviour, but there is nothing wrong with trying to persuade one's fellow workers of the justness of one's cause and trying to persuade them to join in. But the hon. and learned Gentleman appears to think the opposite, and that is what the Clause provides the means of suppressing. In that way, as in so many other ways in the Bill, he is diminishing our freedom.
  The Government have deliberately distorted Donovan to suit their case. The Solicitor-General quoted paragraphs 800 and 801 of the Report but he would profit from reading paragraph 799 also. The Government have also ignored the fact that the Royal Commission was deeply divided about its own view and the Solicitor-General completely ignored the powerful arguments of the minority. They have plucked this one out of Donovan in isolation and clearly out of the context of its general proposals. As the Solicitor-General himself admitted in our first debate today, this Clause "limits the right to strike".
  11.45 p.m.
  This strikes a blow at our free society. It is a deliberate abrogation of rights conferred by Parliament in 1906 with equal deliberation. I have no doubt that the aim of the Clause, as my hon. Friends have eloquently pointed out, is to attack those much maligned people, the shop stewards, who will have their industrial rôle emasculated.
  The hon. and learned Gentleman quoted selectively from Donovan. I remind him that it was the Royal Commission which said:
  "One of the things no law can do is to make people co-operate if they do not Hunt to do so".
  That sentiment is embodied in the aphorism that one can govern only with the consent of the government. In this Clause we have blatant discrimination by the representatives of one section of the community against another. Those who will be the victims of this discrimination will reject this, and so do we.
  Mr. Loughlin: I must comment—[HON. MEMBERS: "Sit down."] I will not sit down. We still have nearly 15 minutes before the guillotine falls.
  I wish to bring the Solicitor-General back to the point I tried to get him to tackle earlier; namely, at least to try to define the two phrases "to induce" and "to threaten to induce". Unless these two phrases are explained, all the hon. and learned Gentleman's other arguments are immaterial. If we are told by lawyers on the benches opposite that the legal profession cannot understand what is meant by these phrases, how can the average men and women in industry be expected to comprehend this provision? Unless the Solicitor-General defines these phrases in the context of industrial relations, he cannot begin to justify the Bill.
  Question put:—
  The Committee divided: Ayes 285, Noes 259.

  Division No. 164.]

  AYES

  [11.48 p.m.

  Adley, Robert

  Bray, Ronald

  Corfield, Rt. Hn. Frederick

  Allason, James (Hemel Hempstead)

  Brewis, John

  Cormack, Patrick

  Archer, Jeffrey (Louth)

  Brinton, Sir Tatton

  Costain, A. P.

  Astor, John

  Brocklebank-Fowler, Christopher

  Critchley, Julian

  Atkins, Humphrey

  Brown, Sir Edward (Bath)

  Crouch, David

  Awdry, Daniel

  Bruce-Gardyne, J.

  Crowder, F. P.

  Baker, Kenneth (St. Marylebone)

  Bryan, Paul

  Curran, Charles

  Baker, W. H. K. (Banff)

  Buchanan-Smith, Alick(Angus,N&M)

  Dalkeith, Earl of

  Balniel, Lord

  Buck, Antony

  Davies, Rt. Hn. John (Knutsford)

  Batsford, Brian

  Bullus, Sir Eric

  d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir Henry

  Beamish, Col. Sir Tufton

  Burden, F. A.

  d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Maj.-Gen. Jack

  Bell, Ronald

  Butler, Adam (Bosworth)

  Dean, Paul

  Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torquay)

  Campbell, Rt.Hn.G.(Moray&Nairn)

  Deedes, Rt. Hn. W. F.

  Benyon, W.

  Carr, Rt. Hn. Robert

  Digby, Simon Wingfield

  Bitten, John

  Chapman, Sydney

  Dixon, Piers

  Biggs-Davison, John

  Chataway, Rt. Hn. Christopher

  Dodds-Parker, Douglas

  Blaker, Peter

  Chichester-Clark, R.

  Douglas-Home, Rt. Hn. Sir Alec

  Boardman, Tom (Leicester, S.W.)

  Clark, William (Surrey, E.)

  Drayson, C. B.

  Body, Richard

  Clarke, Kenneth (Rushcliffe)

  du Cann, Rt. Hn. Edward

  Boscawen, Robert

  Clegg, Walter

  Dykes, Hugh

  Bossom, Sir Clive

  Cockeram, Eric

  Eden, Sir John

  Bowden, Andrew

  Cooke, Robert

  Edwards, Nicholas (Pembroke)

  Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hn. John

  Coombs, Derek

  Elliot, Capt. Walter (Carshalton)

  Braine, Bernard

  Cooper, A. E.

  Elliott, R. W.(N'c'tle-upon-Tyne,N.)

  Emery, Peter

  Knight, Mrs. Jill

  Rees, Peter (Dover)

  Eyre, Reginald

  Knox, David

  Rees-Davies, W. R.

  Farr, John

  Lambton, Antony

  Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon

  Fell, Anthony

  Lane, David

  Ridley, Hn. Nicholas

  Fenner, Mrs. Peggy

  Langford-Holt, Sir John

  Ridsdale, Julian

  Fidler, Michael

  Legge-Bourke, Sir Harry

  Roberts, Michael (Cardiff, N.)

  Finsberg, Geoffrey (Hampstead)

  Le Marchant, Spencer

  Roberts, Wyn (Conway)

  Fletcher-Cooke, Charles

  Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)

  Rossi, Hugh (Hornsey)

  Fookes, Miss Janet

  Lloyd, Ian (P'tsm'th, Langstone)

  Rost, Peter

  Fortescue, Tim

  Longden, Gilbert

  Russell, Sir Ronald

  Foster, Sir John

  Loveridge, John

  St. John-Stevas, Norman

  Fowler, Norman

  McAdden, Sir Stephen

  Sandys, Rt. Hn. D.

  Fox, Marcus

  MacArthur, Ian

  Scott, Nicholas

  Fry, Peter

  McCrindle, R. A.

  Scott-Hopkins, James

  Galbraith, Hn. T. G.

  McLaren, Martin

  Sharples, Richard

  Gardner, Edward

  Maclean, Sir Fitzroy

  Shaw, Michael (Sc'b'gh & Whitby)

  Gibson-Watt, David

  McMaster, Stanley

  Shelton, William (Clapham)

  Gilmour, Ian (Norfolk, C.)

  Macmillan, Mauriec (Farnham)

  Simeons, Charles

  Gilmour, Sir John (Fife, E.)

  McNair-Wilson, Michael

  Sinclair, Sir George

  Glyn, Dr. Alan

  McNair-Wilson, Patrick (NewForest)

  Skeet, T. H. H.

  Godber, Rt. Hn. J. B.

  Maddan, Martin

  Smith, Dudley(W'wick & L'mington)

  Goodhart, Philip

  Madel, David

  Soref, Harold

  Goodhew, Victor

  Maginnis, John E.

  Spence, John

  Gorst, John

  Marples, Rt. Hn. Ernest

  Sproat, Iain

  Gower, Raymond

  Marten, Neil

  Stainton, Keith

  Grant, Anthony (Harrow, C.)

  Mather, Carol

  Stanbrook, Ivor

  Gray, Hamish

  Maude, Angus

  Stewart-Smith, D. C. (Belper)

  Green, Alan

  Maudling, Rt. Hn. Reginald

  Stodart, Anthony (Edinburgh, W.)

  Grylls, Michael

  Mawby, Ray

  Stoddart-Scott, Col. Sir M.

  Gummer, Selwyn

  Maxwell-Hyslop, R. J.

  Stokes, John

  Gurden, Harold

  Meyer, Sir Anthony

  Stuttaford, Dr. Tom

  Hall, Miss Joan (Keighley)

  Mills, Peter (Torrington)

  Sutcliffe, John

  Hall, John (Wycombe)

  Mills, Stratton (Belfast, N.)

  Tapsell, Peter

  Halt-Davis, A. G. F.

  Miscampbell, Norman

  Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)

  Hamilton, Michael (Salisbury)

  Mitchell,Lt.-Col.C.(Aberdeenshire.W)

  Taylor, Edward M.(G'gow,Cathcart)

  Hannam, John (Exeter)

  Mitchell, David (Basingstoke)

  Taylor, Frank (Moss Side)

  Harrison, Brian (Maldon)

  Moate, Roger

  Taylor, Robert (Croydon, N.W.)

  Harrison, Col. Sir Harwood (Eye)

  Molyneaux, James

  Tebbit, Norman

  Haselhurst, Alan

  Money, Ernie

  Temple, John M.

  Hastings, Stephen

  Monks, Mrs. Connie

  Thatcher, Rt. Hn. Mrs. Margaret

  Hayhoe, Barney

  Montgomery, Fergus

  Thomas, John Stradling (Monmouth)

  Hicks, Robert

  More, Jasper

  Thomas, Rt. Hn. Peter (Hendon, S.)

  Higgins, Terence L.

  Morgan, Geraint (Denbigh)

  Thompson, Sir Richard (Croydon, S.)

  Hiley, Joseph

  Morgan-Giles, Rear-Adm.

  Tilney, John

  Hill, John E. B. (Norfolk, S.)

  Morrison, Charles (Devizes)

  Trafford, Dr. Anthony

  Hill, James (Southampton, Test)

  Mudd, David

  Trew, Peter

  Holland, Philip

  Murton, Oscar

  Tugendhat, Christopher

  Holt, Miss Mary

  Nabarro, Sir Gerald

  Turton, Rt. Hn. R. H.

  Hordern, Peter

  Neave, Airey

  Vaughan, Dr. Gerard

  Hornby, Richard

  Nicholls, Sir Harmar

  Vickers, Dame Joan

  Hornsby-Smith,Rt.Hn.Dame Patricia

  Noble, Rt. Hn. Michael

  Waddington, David

  Howe, Hn. Sir Geoffrey (Reigate)

  Normanton, Tom

  Walder, David (Clitheroe)

  Howell, Ralph (Norfolk, N.)

  Nott, John

  Walker-Smith, Rt. Hn. Sir Derek

  Hunt, John

  Onslow, Cranley

  Wall, Patrick

  Hutchison, Michael Clark

  Oppenheim, Mrs. Sally

  Wall, Patrick

  Iremonger, T. L.

  Owen, Idris (Stockport, N.)

  Walters, Dennis

  James, David

  Page, Graham (Crosby)

  Ward, Dame Irene

  Jenkin, Patrick (Woodford)

  Page, John (Harrow, W.)

  Warren, Kenneth

  Parkinson, Cecil (Enfield, W.)

  Weatherill, Bernard

  Jessel, Toby

  Peel, John

  Wells, John (Maidstone)

  Johnson Smith, G. (E. Grinstead)

  Percival, Ian

  White, Roger (Gravesend)

  Joining, Michael

  Pike, Miss Mervyn

  Whitelaw, Rt. Hn. William

  Joseph, Rt. Hn. Sir Keith

  Pink, R. Bonner

  Wiggin, Jerry

  Kaberry, Sir Donald

  Powell, Rt. Hn. J. Enoch

  Wilkinson, John

  Kellett, Mrs. Elaine

  Price, David (Eastleigh)

  Wolrige-Gordon, Patrick

  Kershaw, Anthony

  Prior, Rt. Hn. J. M. L.

  Woodhouse, Hn. Christopher

  Kilfedder, James

  Proudfoot, Wilfred

  Woodnutt, Mark

  Kimball, Marcus

  Pym, Rt. Hn. Francis

  Worsley, Marcus

  King, Evelyn (Dorset, S.)

  Quennell, Miss J. M.

  Wylie, Rt. Hn. N. R.

  King, Tom (Bridgwater)

  Raison, Timothy

  Kinsey, J. R.

  Ramsden, Rt. Hn. James

  TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

  Kirk, Peter

  Redmond, Robert

  Mr. Keith Speed and

  Kitson, Timothy

  Reed, Laurance (Bolton, E.)

  Mr. Paul Hawkins.

  NOES

  Abse, Leo

  Barnes, Michael

  Boardman, H. (Leigh)

  Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)

  Barnett, Joel

  Booth, Albert

  Allen, Scholefield

  Beaney, Alan

  Bottomley, Rt. Hn. Arthur

  Archer, Peter (Rowley Regis)

  Benn, Rt. Hn. Anthony Wedgwood

  Boyden, James (Bishop Auckland)

  Armstrong, Ernest

  Bennett, James (Glasgow, Bridgeton)

  Bradley, Tom

  Ashton, Joe

  Bidwell, Sydney

  Brown, Bob (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne,W.)

  Atkinson, Norman

  Bishop, E. S.

  Brown, Hugh D. (G'gow, Provan)

  Bagier, Gordon A. T.

  Blenkinsop, Arthur

  Brown, Ronald (Shoreditch & F'bury)

  1770

  1771

  Buchan, Norman

  Horam, John

  Oswald, Thomas

  Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)

  Houghton, Rt. Hn. Douglas

  Owen, Dr. David (Plymouth, Sutton)

  Callaghan, Rt. Hn. James

  Howell, Denis (Small Heath)

  Palmer, Arthur

  Campbell, I. (Dunbartonshire, W.)

  Huckfield, Leslie

  Pannell, Rt. Hn. Charles

  Carmichael, Neil

  Hughes, Mark (Durham)

  Pardoe, John

  Carter, Ray (Birmingh'm, Northfield)

  Hughes, Robert (Aberdeen, N.)

  Parker, John (Dagenham)

  Carter-Jones, Lewis (Eccles)

  Hughes, Roy (Newport)

  Parry, Robert (Liverpool, Exchange)

  Castle, Rt. Hn. Barbara

  Hunter, Adam

  Pavitt, Laurie

  Clark, David (Colne Valley)

  Irvine,Rt.Hn.SirArthur (Edge Hill)

  Peart, Rt. Hn. Fred

  Cocks, Michael (Bristol, S.)

  Janner, Greville

  Pendry, Tom

  Cohen, Stanley

  Jay, Rt. Hn. Douglas

  Pentland, Norman

  Coleman, Donald

  Jeger,Mrs.Lena(H'b'n&St.P'cras,S.)

  Perry, Ernest G.

  Concannon, J. D.

  Jenkins, Hugh (Putney)

  Prentice, Rt. Hn. Reg.

  Corbel, Mrs. Freda

  Jenkins, Rt. Hn. Roy (Stechford)

  Prescott, John

  Cox, Thomas (Wandsworth, C.)

  John, Brynmor

  Price, J. T. (Westhoughton)

  Crawshaw, Richard

  Johnson, Carol (Lewisham, S.)

  Price, William (Rugby)

  Crosland, Rt. Hn. Anthony

  Johnson, James (K'ston.on-Hull, W.)

  Probert, Arthur

  Crossman, Rt. Hn. Richard

  Johnson, Walter (Derby, S.)

  Rankin, John

  Cunningham, G. (Islington, S.W.)

  Jones, Barry (Flint, E.)

  Reed, D.(Sedgefield)

  Dalyell, Tam

  Jones, Dan (Burnley)

  Rees, Merlyn (Leeds, S.)

  Darling, Rt. Hn. George

  Jones,Rt.Hn.Sir Elwyn(W.Ham,S.)

  Rhodes, Geoffrey

  Davidson, Arthur

  Jones, Gwynoro (Carmarthen)

  Richard, Ivor

  Davies, Denzil (Llanelly)

  Jones, T. Alec (Rhondda, W.)

  Roberts, Albert (Normanton)

  Davies, G. Elfed (Rhondda, E.)

  Judd, Frank

  Roberts, Rt.Hn.Goronwy (Caernarvon)

  Davies, Ifor (Gower)

  Kaufman, Gerald

  Robertson, John (Paisley)

  Davis, Clinton (Hackney, C.)

  Kelley, Richard

  Rodgers, William (Stockton-on-Tees)

  Deakins, Eric

  Kinnock, Neil

  Roper, John

  de Freitas, Rt. Hn. Sir Geoffrey

  Lambie, David

  Rose, Paul B.

  Dell, Rt. Hn. Edmund

  Lamond, James

  Ross, Rt. Hn. William (Kilmarnock)

  Dempsey, James

  Latham, Arthur

  Sheldon, Robert (Ashton-under-Lyne)

  Doig, Peter

  Lawson, George

  Shore, Rt. Hn. Peter (Stepney)

  Dormand, J. D.

  Leadbitter, Ted

  Short, Mrs. Renée (W'hampton,N.E.)

  Douglas, Dick (Stirlingshire, E.)

  Lee, Rt. Hn. Frederick

  Silkin, Rt. Hn. John (Deptford)

  Douglas-Mann, Bruce

  Leonard, Dick

  Silkin, Hn. S. C. (Dulwich)

  Driberg, Tom

  Lestor, Miss Joan

  Sillars, James

  Duffy, A. E. P.

  Lewis, Arthur (W. Ham, N.)

  Silverman, Julius

  Dunn, James A.

  Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)

  Skinner, Dennis

  Dunnett, Jack

  Lipton, Marcus

  Small, William

  Eadie, Alex

  Lomas, Kenneth

  Smith, John (Lanarkshire, N.)

  Edelman, Maurice

  Loughlin, Charles

  Spearing, Nigel

  Edwards, Robert (Biltton)

  Lyon, Alexander W. (York)

  Spriggs, Leslie

  Edwards, William (Merioneth)

  Lyons, Edward (Bradford, E.)

  Stallard, A. W.

  Ellis, Tom

  Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson

  Steel, David

  English, Michael

  McBride, Neil

  Stewart, Rt. Hn. Michael (Fulham)

  Evans, Fred

  McCartney, Hugh

  Stoddart, David (Swindon)

  Fernyhough, E.

  McElhone, Frank

  Stonehouse, Rt. Hn. John

  Fisher, Mrs. Doris(B'ham,Ladywood)

  McGuire, Michael

  Strang, Gavin

  Fitch, Alan (Wigan)

  Mackenzie, Gregor

  Strauss, Rt. Hn. G. R.

  Fletcher, Raymond (Ilkeston)

  Mackie, John

  Summerskill, Hn. Dr. Shirley

  Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)

  Mackintosh, John P.

  Taverns, Dick

  Foley, Maurice

  Maclennan, Robert

  Thomas,Rt.Hn.George (Cardiff,W.)

  Foot, Michael

  McMillan, Tom (Glasgow, C.)

  Ford, Ben

  McNamara, J. Kevin

  Thomas, Jeffrey (Abertillery)

  Forrester, John

  MacPherson, Malcolm

  Thorpe, Rt. Hn. Jeremy

  Fraser, John (Norwood)

  Mahon, Simon (Bootle)

  Tinn, James

  Freeson, Reginald

  Mallalieu, J. P. W. (Huddersfield, E.)

  Tomney, Frank

  Galpern, Sir Myer

  Marquand, David

  Torney, Tom

  Garrett, W. E.

  Marsh, Rt. Hn. Richard

  Tuck, Raphael

  Gilbert, Dr. John

  Mason, Pt. Hn. Roy

  Urwin, T. W

  Ginsburg, Dr. Alan

  Mellish, Rt. Hn. Robert

  Varley, Eric G.

  Golding, John

  Mendleson, John

  Wainwright, Edwin

  Gordon Walker, Rt. Hn, P. C.

  Mikardo, Ian

  Walden, Brian (B'm'ham, All Saints)

  Gourlay, Harry

  Millan, Bruce

  Walker, Harold (Doncaster)

  Grant, George (Morpeth)

  Miller, Dr. M. S.

  Watkins, David

  Grant, John D. (Islington, E.

  Milne, Edward (Blyth)

  Weitzman, David

  Griffiths, Eddie (Brightside

  Molloy, William

  Wellbeloved, James

  Griffiths, Will (Exchange)

  Morgan, Elystan (Cardiganshire)

  Wells, William (Walsall, N.)

  Grimond, Rt. Hn. J.

  Morris, Alfred (Wythenshawe)

  White, James (Glasgow, Pollok)

  Hamilton, James (Bothwell)

  Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw)

  Whitehead, Phillip

  Hamilton, William (Fife, W.)

  Morris, Rt. Hn. John (Aberavon)

  Whitlock, William

  Hannan, William (G'gow, Maryhill)

  Moyle, Roland

  Williams, Mrs. Shirley (Hitchin)

  Hardy, Peter

  Mulley, Rt. Hn. Frederick

  Williams, W. T. (Warrington)

  Harrison, Walter (Wakefield)

  Murray, Ronald King

  Wilson, Alexander (Hamilton)

  Hart, Rt. Hn. Judith

  Ogden, Eric

  Wilson, Rt. Hn. Harold (Huyton)

  Hattersley, Roy

  O'Halloran, Michael

  Wilson, William (Coventry, S.)

  Healey, Rt. Hn. Denis

  O'Malley, Brian

  Heffer, Eric S.

  Oram, Bert

  TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

  Hilton, W. S.

  Orbach, Maurice

  Mr. Joseph Harper and

  Hooson, Emlyn

  Orme, Stanley

  Mr. Kenneth Marks.

  Clause 85 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
  It being after Twelve o'clock, The CHAIRMAN left the Chair to report Progress and ask leave to sit again, pursuant of the Order of the House of 25th January.
  Committee report Progress: to sit again this day.

  CONSOLIDATED FUND BILL
  Considered in Committee.
  [Sir ROBERT GRANT-FERRIS in the Chair]

  CONSOLIDATED FUND BILL
    Clause 1

      ISSUE OUT OF THE CONSOLIDATED FUND FOR THE YEAR ENDING 31ST MARCH 1971
      Question proposed, That the Clause stand part of the Bill.
      12.1 a.m.
      Mr. Gerald Kaufman: On a point of order. Before we come to Clause 1, may I ask what we do about approving the Preamble, since it contains certain elements to which I take exception? Do we consider the Preamble when we discuss the Question, That Clause 1 stand part of the Bill?
      The Chairman: This is not the Preamble to the Bill. The hon. Gentleman is under a misapprehension. It is just simply the enacting formula of the Bill, and it is not debatable.
      Mr. Michael English: On a different point of order. Am I to take it, Sir Robert, that you have not selected the Amendments standing in my name?
      The Chairman: Yes. I owe the hon. Gentleman an apology. I should have said as much. I have not selected those two Amendments.
      Mr. English: Thank you, Sir Robert. Then, am I to take it that the principle involved in them is in order in our discussion of the Question, That Clause I stand part of the Bill? It concerns whether the Treasury "may" or "shall" issue out of the Consolidated Fund.
      The Chairman: At this stage, I would not care to give an authoritative Ruling on the matter. I prefer to wait and
      1774
      see how matters develop, and hold my fire, as it were.
      Mr. English: If I may say so, Sir Robert, your answer is perfectly acceptable.
      The Chairman: The Question is, That the Clause stand part of the Bill. As many as are of that opinion, say "Aye".
      Hon. Members: Aye.
      Mr. Mark Hughes Mr. Mark Hughes (Durham) rose——
      Hon. Members: Aye!
      The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. Patrick Jenkin): On a point of order, Sir Robert. Is not it clearly within your recollection that you put the Question and the Question was answered by cries of "Aye"? No hon. Member rose to speak on the Question. Therefore the Question ought now to be put.
      The Chairman: Order. The hon. Gentleman is not quite right. I had not actually collected the voices, and it is quite in order for an hon. Member to raise a point of order or continue the debate, provided that time does not block it, until such time as I have really started collecting the voices. By that, I mean that I have to collect the first lot of "Ayes" and "Noes".
      Mr. Jenkin: Further to that point of order, Sir Robert. You referred to continuing the debate. With respect, the debate never started. You put the Question, the "Ayes" were collected, and nothing happened.
      The Chairman: I was in the act of putting the Questiton. I think that hon. Members on the Opposition benches had every intention of starting the debate but did not quite realise what was happening. I suppose that I was not quite smart enough. Mr. Hughes.
      Mr. Mark Hughes: With your permission, Sir Robert, I will begin by outlining our position on this Question, and I want first to quote from a letter written by Edward Romilly to Benjamin Disraeli in 1866. The truth is that——
      Mr. Arthur Lewis: Would my hon. Friend give the Committee the reference because there are hon. Members who would no doubt like to get a copy.
      Mr. Kenneth Lewis: On a point of order——
      The Chairman: Question is, That the Clause stand part——
      Hon. Members: "No".
      Mr. Kenneth Lewis Mr. Kenneth Lewis rose——
      The Chairman: Order. Either some hon. Member wishes to raise a point of order with me or he wishes to continue the debate. Does the hon. Member for Rutland and Stamford (Mr. Kenneth Lewis) wish to continue the debate?
      Mr. Kenneth Lewis: On a point of order, Sir Robert. As I understand it, this Bill is not usually debated at this stage and that this is a most extraordinary procedure, and as I further believe that this Bill enables the Government to pay the salaries of hon Members on both sides of the Committee, and while we are not really interested in the other side losing their salaries but are concerned on this side, I beg to move, That the Question be now put.
      Hon. Members: No.
      The Chairman: I am afraid that I cannot accept that Motion at this stage.
      Mr. English: Further to that point of order. Is it not the case that only nine years ago this Committee stage of the Consolidated Fund Bill was debated for four hours?
      The Chairman: Order. That is not a point of order, it is a point of fact.
      Mr. James Wellbeloved: On a point of order. It might be to your convenience, Sir Robert, and save any further loss of time in your putting the Question through misadventure, if you were to indicate that there are a number of hon. Members on this side of the Committee who wish to participate in the debate. I hope that you will facilitate the desire of hon. Members.
      The Chairman: Of course. I am the servant of the Committee and, as long as hon. Members stay in order, they can continue to speak.
      Mr. Mark Hughes: It was due to my innocence that I sat down to let another hon. Gentleman raise a point of order.
      1776
      In answer to my hon. Friend's request, this is the 1867 Volume of Accounts and Papers, Vol. 39, page 32, manuscript page 195. It says:
      "Mr. Gladstone has seldom missed an opportunity of pointing out its dullness and although such assurance from so high a quarter was scarcely necessary he has been taken at his word. The Legislature, the public and the Press have left the matter pretty much in the hands of the Treasury and yet one of the professed objects of this Act was to supply an independent and trustworthy check over the Treasury itself."
      This is at a time when the whole office of Auditor and his relationship with the issues from the Treasury out of the Consolidated Fund was first being considered.
      The Chairman: Order. I must begin by keeping the hon. Gentleman on the straight and narrow path. That is something which issues out of the Consolidated Fund and therefore is out of order.
      Mr. Wellbeloved: On a point of order.
      The Chairman: Order. I think that we had better finish with one hon. Gentleman at a time. I understand the hon. Member for Durham (Mr. Mark Hughes) is raising a point of order.
      Mr. Mark Hughes Mr. Mark Hughes indicated dissent.
      Mr. Wellbeloved: On a point of order. In your Ruling, Sir Robert, you say that we cannot discuss the issue of moneys from the Consolidated Fund. That is precisely what Clause I deals with. The Claues states:
      "The Treasury may issue out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom and apply towards making good the supply granted to Her Majesty for the service of the year ending on 31st March 1971 the sum of £296,822,000."
      My hon. Friend is surely making a point relevant to the machinery and procedures for the issue of funds from the Consolidated Fund under this Measure.
      The Chairman: No. Unfortunately, it is not quite like that, because the audit is the audit of expenditure in detail, and that is not in order in this debate.
      Mr. Mark Hughes: May I continue by reading a very brief comment from Hallam's "Constitutional History"?
      "As early as the reign of Charles II, the House of Commons have been accustomed to

      1777
      the idea that they have something more to do than simply to grant money without any security or condition of its application."
      Sir Harmar Nicholls: Sir Robert, in order to avoid the proceedings of the House being the victim of such ridicule, which is the object, is this not an occasion on which the Chair could justifiably accept the Motion that the Question be now put?
      The Chairman: No. I could not justifiably do that at this stage.
      Mr. Mark Hughes: I will be as brief as I can, Sir Robert. Behind an apparently unimportant "may" there lies a deep constitutional issue which, throughout most of the 18th and the first three-quarters of the 19th century, many of our predecessors in the House on both sides spent many long hours in determining.
      In the period when Walpole was Prime Minister, the First Secretary to the Treasury attempted to lay it down that it was not the function of the House to inquire into the details of how the Ways and Means Fund should be allocated. Lowndes had established that in general terms long before. In discussion later in the century, at the time of Pitt and George Rose, there was considerable debate as to whether or not it was the proper function of the House to instruct the Treasury as to how it should spend the money voted by the House, and it was then accepted by many constitutional authorities, from Lord Eldon downwards, that it was the perfectly proper function of the House not merely to say to the Treasury, "You may spend such-and-such money", but to say to the Treasury, "You shall spend such-and-such moneys." This is the subject of the whole of our opposition to Clause 1.
      The Chairman: Order. What the hon. Member for Durham (Mr. Mark Hughes) says may be so, as far as it goes, but the Clause says nothing about "may" or "shall".
      Mr. English Mr. English rose——
      The Chairman: The Clause does not say "shall".
      Mr. Mark Hughes: If one is to accept the belief that not only is the House of Commons responsible for the raising of the revenue of this Kingdom, one must
      1778
      also take with it the corollary that this House is responsible for how that revenue shall be spent and that it is not to be left to the second hand authority of the Treasury to determine which way that money shall be spent.
      The Chairman: I repeat that the hon. Gentleman cannot discuss how the money can be spent.
      Mr. Mark Hughes: The Consolidated Fund, in its earliest inception, made an attempt to get round the problem and certain revenues were allocated in advance. This is why at present—as you have indicated, Sir Robert—we cannot discuss how one should allocate such funds.
      I am suggesting to the Committee, however, that it is the proper constitutional function of the Committee to determine that the Treasury shall not have discretion beyond a very limited field as to how it shall spend moneys voted by the House of Commons; that in the Consolidated Fund in its origins there was clearly laid down that the House of Commons should keep and for all times maintain to itself the right to examine in great detail on the Consolidated Fund Bill the way in which the Treasury expected at some future point in time to spend taxpayers' money; that Lord Althorp in his Budget speech——
      12.15 a.m.
      The Chairman: Yes, that is true, but the hon. Gentleman must realise that that has been done on Second Reading and it is not really in order on the Question, That the Clause stand part of the Bill.
      Mr. Kaufman: On a point of order. Is it in order for the hon. Member for Gillingham (Mr. Burden), but for whom I would have been in the House many years ago, to intervene from a sedentary position when all of us would like to hear from him at length in a standing position?
      Mr. F. A. Burden: On a point of order. I was suggesting that the hon. Gentleman who has been a referee should blow his whistle to try to keep everyone quiet so that we could hear.
      The Chairman: Order. This is Parliament. A certain amount of merriment is in order, but there is a moment when

      1779
      things begin to go too far. That point has not actually arrived, but it will arrive very soon if I do not check it now. I beg the Committee to remember that and to remember that we are on serious business. Hon. Members are seeking to debate the Question, That the Clause stand part of the Bill, and trying to find some way in which they can stay in order. I have told them publicly, as indeed I have told them outside—I am sure that they will not mind my saying this—that it is very difficult indeed to find a way in which one can debate the Clause and stay in order.
      Hon. Members seeking to debate the Clause should bear in mind that the Chair has a duty to the Committee to ensure that the rules of order are strictly interpreted. I am only trying to do my duty as best I can. I therefore hope that hon. Members seeking to speak will do so in a way which would not appear to be, and I am sure they would not wish to be, deliberately trying to provoke me or to goad me in any way. I do not think that they would, but it could appear in public, it could appear in the Press, it could appear to hon. Members on the other side, that that is perhaps what is happening. I hope that they will ponder their words and act accordingly. I have great faith in them and I am sure that I can rely on them.
      Mr. English: Further to that point of order. I support your remarks, Sir Robert. There is a serious point at issue in this distinction between whether the moneys authorised by Parliament "shall" be expended by the Treasury or whether the Treasury is merely authorised to do so and need not. We are talking about £4,000 million. On that issue, which is an ancient constitutional issue in the House of Commons, you ruled originally that my Amendments were not selected. You did not rule—obviously you have advice on this—that they were out of order. You ruled in the exercise of your discretionary duty not to select them. If they were in order but not selected, I submit to you that that serious issue can and should be discussed on the Question, That the Clause stand part of the Bill. There is no facetious intent behind my plea and that of my colleague the hon. Member for Durham (Mr. Mark Hughes), who has had previous experi-
      1780
      ence in a professional capacity in discussing this issue.
      The Chairman: I am much obliged to the hon. Gentleman for the moderation and kindness with which he has put his point of order. To some extent he is right. The word "may" does appear in Clause 1 and anything which concerns "may" would be in order, but it must not be compared with the word "shall", which should not be brought into discussion because it is expressly excluded.
      Mr. Mark Hughes: Although we have spent many years on constitutional issues determining what control the House of Commons shall have over the collection of revenue, the weakest point between the legislature and the executive comes precisely on the Clause we are debating tonight. The power of this Chamber to continue the expenditure of money by the executive is strictly limited. When we say through the medium of the Consolidated Fund that so much money may be permitted to be spent by the Treasury, we hand over to the executive arm powers which we cannot thereafter bring back unto ourselves. Once we pass this Clause, or Clause 2, whether we like it or not, sums well in excess of £3,000 million are gone beyond recall. If we do this with a light heart we do a grave injustice to our predecessors and to our current electors. We wish to establish that the executive, as personified by the Treasury, shall be held totally responsible to this Chamber.
      In 1740 Mr. Scrope managed to avoid being attainted on the grounds that he was the only man in the country who knew how to draw up a Treasury Bill. We do not want the Treasury to get away with public money which may be accountable at some long distant future date.
      The Chairman: Order. I am sorry to have to interrupt the hon. Gentleman again, but we are not here and now in a position to say how the Treasury shall do the things about which the hon. Gentleman is worried. That is why what he says cannot be brought into order, much as I should like to help him.
      Mr. Mark Hughes: If we may not question how the money is spent—and I accept your Ruling—I crave your indulgence to the plea that we may discuss on the Question, That the Clause stand part

      1781
      of the Bill, the more fundamental constitutional issue of how far, by granting moneys to the Treasury, we are abnegating the rôle of the House of Commons over the expenditure of public funds.
      The Chairman: It might be a very good thing if we could do so, but we cannot, because the House of Commons reached a decision on Second Reading and because of previous Rulings. We cannot discuss the broad principle which the hon. Gentleman would like to discuss.
      Mr. Kenneth Lewis: On a point of order. We are in some difficulty. The hon. Member for Durham (Mr. Mark Hughes) is suggesting that he should take the opportunity of discussing the Treasury spending of money on the Consolidated Fund Bill. There are other opportunities on which the Treasury spending of money can be discussed, and it would be wrong to give the impression to the public that the £3,000 million with which the Bill is concerned can be discussed only on this occasion. That is not true. My difficulty is that we have had a Second Reading debate already. I am not aware that any representations were made through the usual channels, or in other ways—[Interruption].
      The Chairman: Order. I am afraid that I am not responsible for what goes on through the usual channels. What the hon. Member has said is not a point of order.
      Mr. Lewis: I said, "through the usual channels, or in other ways", Sir Robert. I will correct that and ask whether any representations were made to you, on the basis that since the Consolidated Fund Bill provides an opportunity to hon. Members to debate at length any subjects that appeal to them as private Members, many hon. Members opposite took the opportunity to discuss in the Second Reading debate constituency matters that they wished to bring before Parliament.
      Since, in the Second Reading debate, hon. Members opposite were not interested in discussing the Government's spending of moneys through the Bill, what justification have they for wishing to discuss, in Committee, the matters that they failed to raise in the Second Reading debate?
      The Chairman: Fortunately, I am not concerned with the question of justification. All I am concerned with is the question whether at any given moment something is in order. No doubt hon. Members have heard what the hon. Member has said—but there is no point of order in it.
      Mr. Denis Howell: Further to that alleged point of order—or on another point of order, Sir Robert: Even though we respect your Ruling that what the hon. Member raised was not a point of order, may I put it to you for your consideration during the further stages of the debate on the Clause that it goes back to the very basis of our parliamentary right to have the redress of grievances before granting Supply, and that although 28 hon. Members wanted to exercise their right in the Second Reading debate—I was No. 13 and available throughout the night—only eight hon. Members were able to redress their grievances?
      The Chairman: I have to fall back on what I said before; this is nothing to do with the Clause. We are discussing the Question, That the Clause stand part of the Bill.
      Mr. O'Malley: Sir Robert, the Committee is in some difficulty, and perhaps you can help us. After a Bill has been given a Second Reading it goes on to the Committee stage, when points of detail can be raised, and on each Clause there is a debate which can be very broad, whether the Committee stage takes place upstairs or in the Chamber. Narrow debates arise out of specific Amendments to various Clauses, but the debate on the Question, That the Clause stand part of the Bill, is generally broad.
      Can you tell us why the debate on the Question, That the Clause stand part of the Bill, in respect of the Consolidated Fund Bill should apparently be more tightly drawn than is the case with normal non-finance Bills, and why, for example, it is not in order specifically to discuss the question whether the Treasury may or may not issue out of the Consolidated Fund the specific amount of money referred to in the Clause?
      The Chairman: I understand the point very well, because on many occasions I have been with the hon. Member in Committees upstairs, where the procedure

      1783
      he has outlined has been followed. But in this case there is a difference. The Bill and this Clause are founded on a Money Resolution of the House. Any debate following such a Bill has always been very tightly drawn indeed. That is the general principle. That is why we cannot have the sort of thing the hon. Gentleman and myself are so used to in Standing Committee.
      12.30 a.m.
      Mr. Kevin McNamara: To continue from the ruling you have just made, Sir Robert, may I say that I am concerned about this matter. Every Bill has a Money Resolution which can be debated on a narrow front, but even though a Bill is the subject of a Money Resolution we still have a broad debate on the general principle behind a particular Clause. It seems to me, with respect, that your Ruling tends considerably to narrow the area of debate for my hon. Friends and also for hon. Gentlemen opposite. This is a Parliament and we do not want to have voices from only one side. Could you further elucidate your Ruling?
      The Chairman: I do not know that I can say anything more than I have said, which is that the Bill is founded on a Resolution in Supply. Therefore, it is ipso facto very strictly drawn indeed and the debate which follows on a Clause such as this has to be by the rules of the House extremely tightly drawn.
      Mr. O'Malley: I am sure we can resolve this matter. You have gone some way, Sir Robert, to explain the position. Could you explain one further matter? Of course, it is the case that the procedure that is laid down is clearly affected by the Money Resolution which is considered in the House and on which, after 10 o'clock, three-quarters of an hour is given for debate. Can you explain why there is a difference between discussion on Clauses of other Bills which are affected directly by a Money Resolution and discussion on this specific Clause in this Bill which is affected in the same way by a Money Resolution?
      The Chairman: The answer is quite simple. This Bill is literally founded on the Money Resolution. With other Bills, such as the hon. Gentleman and I are used to, the Money Resolution lies on
      1784
      the table and anybody who wants to look at it can do so, and hardly anybody ever does. But this Bill is different. It is founded on the Money Resolution.
      Mr. Arthur Lewis: Sir Robert, I accept that what you are explaining to the Committee is the fact that we cannot on the Question, That the Clause stand part, debate whether or not the £296 million should be larger or smaller or should be used for this, that or the other purpose. As you will know, Sir Robert, we used to have in the House a great parliamentarian called "Talkey Williams". He was the hon. Member for Torquay and the reason we called him "Talkey" is obvious.
      The Chairman: Order. The hon. Gentleman is talking about a former Chairman of Ways and Means.
      Mr Lewis: This is the point I was coming to. He was very knowledgeable about these matters and year after year on this Bill asked for an explanation from the Treasury Bench as to what each word meant. I am asking—[HON. MEMBERS: "What is the point of order?"] I am on a point of order. Do not tell me what to do. [An HON. MEMBER: "You sit down."] Sir Robert, will you please tell the hon. Member that he is out of order in telling you to sit down.
      The Chairman: The hon. Gentleman can safely leave it to me. If he goes on addressing me I will keep the Committee in order.
      Mr. Lewis: Perhaps you can advise me, Sir Robert, if not hon. Members opposite, whether I am not completely in order in going through the Clause word by word and asking the Treasury to explain what each word means, whether any word has a double meaning or no meaning at all. I want to know, for example, what "Treasury" means. I want to develop this and, provided I do not go outside the wording of the Clause, am I not right in saying that, subject to catching your eye, I can go through each word and ask for explanations? Whether I get them is another matter.
      The Chairman: I would be a very poor Chairman of Ways and Means if I committed myself to that one at this stage. I think again that we must see what happens. In any case, the hon. Gentleman

      1785
      might do something which I think he would regret very much and might cause tedious repetition if he did—I am not saying that he would, but he might. I think that it would be better if he seeks to catch my eye and we will see how we get on.
      I would have thought on the whole that the Committee did not want to carry this discussion beyond the limits of endurance of all of us. We have a lot of work to do. We had a late night last night. Indeed, we shall have another tomorrow night. I would have thought that, on the whole, we have had an interesting discussion. [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] We only have to look at the clock to see that we have had more than 25 minutes discussion on what is and what is not in order. Some of the things which have been said have been in order—one can say, "Not many", but there it is. We shall have to see how we get on. I ask the indulgence of the Committee and hope that we can bring matters to a conclusion.
      Mr. Peter Tapsell: On a point of order, Sir Robert. Does it not strike at the heart of our parliamentary traditions if the concept of not voting Supply before the redress of grievances is made meaningless by this deliberate abuse through a prolonged and planned filibuster?
      The Chairman: I personally do not think that anything that has been done so far—I cannot speak for what may happen—is, strictly speaking, beyond the bounds of what is parliamentarily proper. Hon. Members are seeking to find out what is and what is not in order, and I think that they are gradually getting to the root of the matter and are discovering that there is, indeed, very little that can be said that is in order.
      Mr. Wellbeloved: On a point of order, Sir Robert. You expressed earlier, and have repeated, your desire for the Committee to act with good sense. The whole Committee agrees with you. There is one thing on which I would seek your advice. Because of the narrowness of the debate, quite rightly you have had to intervene on a number of occasions, and as a consequence there have been a number of points of order to elucidate the correct procedure. This has taken up probably about 20 minutes so far. The Patronage Secretary is in his place,
      1786
      and when he is in his place he always casts a sinister shadow over the Committee. It may be that in due course he will seek to move the Closure. I seek your advice as to whether, if the Motion for the Closure is moved, you will take into consideration the time that has necessarily been spent on points of order in coming to a decision as to whether the Motion should be accepted.
      There is another point on which I seek your guidance. I believe that, after the three Clauses to the Bill have been debated and voted upon—if it is decided that they should be voted upon—we will then move on to Report stage. If so, could you advise me whether, on Report, it would be in order to submit manuscript Amendments on some of the points which arise in Committee and obviously indicate to hon. Members that an Amendment on Report ought to be put down?
      The Chairman: I am obliged to the hon. Gentleman. I think that I can give the hon. Gentleman a 100 per cent. accurate answer to this point. There will be no Report stage, there being no Amendments. As the hon. Gentleman knows, I have to put the Bill immediately without more ado for Third Reading.
      Mr. Wellbeloved: May I ask you, Sir Robert, to rule on my point about the Patronage Secretary?
      The Chairman: That is another matter. It would be extremely foolish of me to express any view about what I should do in any set of circumstances. I prefer to judge that at the appropriate moment.
      Mr. Carter: On a point of order. My point of order arises from the point of order of my hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham (Mr. O'Malley).
      I am a comparatively new Member. I have been led to believe that on the Question, That the Clause stand part, it is permissible to discuss those subjects which have not been raised on Second Reading. If so, there are a number of items on the Vote on Account which were not discussed on Second Reading. Is it possible, if not to initiate a debate upon these items, to question the Minister about them? For example, Class XI, item 8, Miscellaneous Expenses, £191,000. Is it in order for us to question the Minister on those items which were not discussed on Second Reading?
      The Chairman: No, definitely not on this Clause.
      Mr. Mark Hughes: In view of your Rulings, Sir Robert, I shall, with diffidence, miss out various parts of what I was going to say—[HON. MEMBERS: "Speak up."]—and conclude by simply putting this point to the Committee. If we take the Clause on the nod, it is as though we are asking the Committee to accept that it brings together a series of Supplementary Estimates, and so on, already approved by Resolution, and that we are now being asked at this hour to give the Treasury the right to spend, or not to spend, in part or in whole, the sums mentioned in the Clause.
      Despite the points of order and the lateness of the hour, I think this matter carries with it a genuine constitutional point as to the accountability of the Treasury to this Chamber which we would be very foolish to let go without making a token protest of our disquiet at what is done.
      Mr. Michael Stewart: Sir Robert, we are greatly indebted to you for your Rulings earlier this evening. I shall endeavour to stay strictly within the rules of order as you have defined them.
      I understood you to give a Ruling that we may discuss the word "may" which appears in Clause 1, but that we must be most careful not to bring into the argument another auxiliary verb of five letters, which I shall be careful, in deference to your Ruling, not to mention. I understood you to say that we may discuss the word "may". This is what I should like to do for a few minutes.
      The nature of the difficulty is that we all know, in view of the constitutional and financial proceedings which are the foundation of the Bill, that the word "may" in the Clause does not bear nearly the meaning which it usually has in ordinary speech. It is talking about something which, in the opinion of the Committee, ought to be done and which we take the view will be done. We are giving the word "may" not the permissive——
      Mr. Clinton Davis: On a point of order. Is the hon. Member for commercial radio in order constantly to barrack from a sedentary position?
      The Chairman: I was listening intently to the right hon. Member for Fulham
      1788
      (Mr. Michael Stewart) and I heard nothing but the right hon. Gentleman. If I hear anything out of order, I shall say so.
      12.45 a.m.
      Mr. Peter Tapsell: On a point of order. Is it not clearly out of order for one hon. Member to refer to another in those terms?
      The Chairman: Hon. Members should refer to each other by the names of their constituencies and not in any derogatory way. I do not think that the hon. Member for Hackney, Central (Mr. Clinton Davis) meant to be offensive.
      Mr. Clinton Davis: Further to that point of order. I associate the hon. Member so much more with commercial radio than with his constituency that I forget the name of his constituency.
      The Chairman: Order. The hon. Member should not address me on that subject. He knows that it is not a point of order. When the Chair has endeavoured to clear up these little difficulties, they are best left there.
      Hon. Members: Withdraw.
      Mr. Peter Emery: On a point of order. It is obvious from his last remark that the hon. Member for Hackney, Central (Mr. Clinton Davis) had every intention of making the offence worse in his rudeness to another hon. Member. Is it not within the power of the Chair to ask him to withdraw?
      The Chairman: It is within the power of the Chair to ask him to do so. On the strength of what was said, however, I did not think it necessary to go as far as that. I deprecate the use of such terms in references to hon. Members, and I understood that the hon. Member for Hackney, Central accepted that.
      Mr. Clinton Davis: Further to that point of order. I certainly wish to abide by your Ruling, Sir Robert, and if I have offended in any way, I withdraw the comment. But I have forgotten which is the hon. Member's constituency.
      Mr. Arthur Lewis: Further to that point of order. If we are to have withdrawals, one of my hon. Friends distinctly heard the hon. Member who is sitting there with his fingers up to his nose—the hon. Member for Hendon, North (Mr. Gorst)—making rude and

      1789
      offensive remarks about my right hon. Friend the former Foreign Secretary. Should he not withdraw those remarks?
      The Chairman: If I had heard any such remarks—[HON. MEMBERS: "We heard them."]—The Chair must hear them. The Chair is busy listening very hard to the hon. Member who has the Floor, and it is difficult for the Chair also to hear other asides which may be heard by hon. Members. I heard nothing out of order. If I do, I shall act accordingly.
      Mr. Stewart: I was saying that the word "may" in this Clause clearly has not merely the permissive sense with which we normally associate it; it has something of an imperative sense, because it talks about things that ought to happen, and something of a prophetic sense, because it talks about things which we have every reason to know will happen. Is it now suitable to continue in the Consolidated Fund Bill to use the word "may" in a sense which it no longer bears in ordinary speech? It is not sufficient answer to say that for years the Consolidated Fund Bill has said that the Treasury "may" do this, when in fact it was talking about something that ought to happen and will happen.
      There are other examples in statutes where the lawyers will tell us that the word "may" means that very word which you, Sir Robert, have told us not to utter But it is surely a fair point that if, over many years, we have used an ordinary word in the English language in a Statute, and with the passage of time the gap between what the word is supposed to mean in the statute and the way people use it in ordinary speech becomes bigger and bigger, it is then legitimate to ask whether we should not then substitute a different word in the Statute, saying more precisely what we mean.
      We have heard examples just recently. You ruled that we "may" discuss the word "may". I did not understand you to be saying that we all must discuss it or even that we all will discuss it. Clearly, you were using the word in a sense which it does not bear in the Clause. When my hon. Friend the Member for Durham (Mr. Mark Hughes) advances a certain proposition, you told
      1790
      him, "That may be so". It was very clear from your tone of voice that you did not mean, "That will be so", or, "That is so".
      So we are driven to consider whether it is right after all these years to go on using the word "may" in this Statute——
      The Chairman: Order. I am sorry to interrupt the right hon. Gentleman, but we have to discuss what we find in the Clause, and we find the word "may" there. So we cannot, while remaining in order, discuss what may be put in the place of "may" at some future date.
      Mr. English: On a point of order, Sir Robert, you said, "At some future date", but I hope that, at some later stage in the proceedings, it will be possible to discuss the Public Accounts and Charges Act, which is already passed and already governs the Committee, and which uses the unutterable word for precisely the same purposes, and specifically refers to an Act
      "… authorising a sum to be issued out of the Consolidated Fund."
      This Bill will be such an Act, and it is precisely contrary to this.
      The Chairman: I think that that will probably be out of order when we come to it, if we come to it.
      Mr. O'Malley: On a point of order. Only a few moments ago, Sir Robert, I thought that I had become clear because of the explanation which you had given me of what we may or may not discuss. However, it now seems that a new issue has arisen, since you gave us your guidance some 20 minutes ago, and I would seek clarification on this point.
      My right hon. Friend the Member for Fulham (Mr. Michael Stewart), even up to this stage of his speech, has clearly demonstrated that the manner in which the word "may" is used in the Clause, and indeed its meaning as it is used, because of tradition, in the Clause, is different and perhaps substantially different, from the way in which it is commonly used in the English language.
      What worries me is that it appears that your interpretation is based on the fact that you have accepted that the word, as it is used in the Clause, is being used as it is commonly understood today. If my right hon. Friend is right, would you

      1791
      not consider what interpretation you put on the discussion which is allowable under the Bill?
      The Chairman: No, I would not be prepared to reconsider that. We must not get into an "Alice in Wonderland" world, in which it was Humpty Dumpty who said, "It is not what the word means but what I choose it to mean." I do not want any hon. Member to get into that position. The meaning of the Clause is clear. It clearly says that the Treasury
      "… may issue out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom"
      a certain sum of money.
      It is not mandatory. It is permissive. Indeed, I would have thought that it was as clear as daylight. I remind hon. Members that the right hon. Member for Fulham is in the middle of making a speech.
      Mr. Arthur Lewis: On a point of order. May I suggest, with the utmost respect, that perhaps you may not be correct in your interpretation of this matter? [HON. MEMBERS: "Shame."] I am not for a moment saying you are wrong. However, you said that "may" could have a double meaning. This was admitted earlier in the day by the Solicitor-General. Would it not be wise for the Solicitor-General to be sent for so that his opinion could be received by both the Committee and you, Sir Robert?
      The Chairman: I cannot agree with the hon. Member. To me the matter is quite simple. If I thought there were a serious legal difficulty which should be explained by a Law Officer, then while I am not able to send for one, I have no doubt that those in charge of the Bill would wish to send for one. However, the whole matter seems perfectly simple to me and perhaps the right hon. Member for Fulham will be allowed to complete his remarks.
      Mr. Arthur Lewis: Further to my last point of order. My right hon. Friend may inadvertently be out of order unless we get this point cleared up. I urge those in charge of the Bill to have a Law Officer present to advise the Committee.
      The Chairman: That is not a point of order for me. The right hon. Member
      1792
      for Fulham must make his speech in his own way, and if, unwittingly, he strays out of order and is called to order by the Chair, I am sure that, like all hon. Members, he will immediately obey the ruling of the Chair.
      Mr. Elystan Morgan: Further to that point of order. May I draw your attention to the long title of the Bill? It reads:
      "A Bill to apply certain sums out of the Consolidated Fund to the service of the years ending on 3st March 1971 and 1972".
      In my submission, the wording of the long Title is such as not to admit to the possibility that those sums are not to be applied. If it were intended that the application of these sums should be a permissive matter, surely those words would have read "A Bill to allow the application of certain sums". There would, therefore, appear to be a fundamental conflict between what is a permissive power in the body of the Bill and the long Title, which does not admit to the possibility of the sums being so applied.
      1.0 a.m.
      The Chairman: No, there is no substance in that point. It is not necessary for the Government to spend all the money for which it asks.
      Mr. Michael Stewart Mr. Michael Stewart rose——
      Mr. McNamara: Will my right hon. Friend allow me? He has been debating the difference between "may" and "shall" with reference to whether the Government should or should not pay in any situation. Does he have it in mind to suggest that it would be helpful to have the First Lord of the Treasury here to explain what the practice of his Department is?
      Mr. Tapsell: On a point of order. Sir Robert, you reminded the Committee about 40 minutes ago that this is Parliament and that we should be conscious of that fact. Is it not a sad reflection that even so distinguished a Member as the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Fulham (Mr. Michael Stewart) has now been interrupted repeatedly on points of order by members of his own party?
      The Chairman: That is not a point of order. Hon. Members must decide

      1793
      what their best manners are; it is not for me to be a judge of that. There is nothing unparliamentary in what has been done, but I think that the right hon. Gentleman should now be allowed to continue his speech.
      Mr. Michael Stewart: As I said, Sir Robert, I was trying to keep in order by confining myself strictly to the question whether the word "may" is a good word to use in this Clause. I do not think that it can be contended that to argue that is out of order. I advise those hon. Members who seem to imagine that the argument on which we are engaged is undignified and not suitable to the occasion to look back into history to the times when the Opposition have obliged Government Members to stay here a little longer than they might otherwise have wished. They will find that on several occasions, although there was always a certain amount of merriment in the exercise, important constitutional results flowed from it.
      I remember very well a notable exercise in which there were many exchanges and points of order, and much delay, but which ended in the appointment of a Select Committee which performed the most useful work of bringing the Army Act up to date.
      I am directing attention to one word in one Clause of this small Bill, but the point I am raising about the desirability of ensuring that the Bill really does say in twentieth-century English—which is how the courts will interpret it—what we wish it to say raises the general question of whether our whole machinery for raising, applying and appropriating money and giving legal authority for it is up to date.
      I ask hon. Members, therefore, not to be too impatient if they think that I have taken what seems a pernickety point, because it is out of points like this, and a careful consideration of them, that important constitutional discoveries may be made.
      Here is an example to illustrate my point about the difference between what the word "may" is likely to mean in this Clause and the common usage of the word. There was an article recently in either the Daily Telegraph or the Sunday Telegraph—I forget which—about what is sometimes called the permissive society.
      1794
      The author began by saying that for a sound morality one must have simply two principles—"Though shalt" and "Thou shalt not"—and he added that "Thou mayest" is no basis for morality. Since that article appeared in the Telegraph, one must assume that it was meant to make sense. Clearly, the word was being used there in a sense which it does not bear in the Bill.
      I shall refer briefly now to a historical episode which shows that the House should be careful, even pedantic, in ensuring that the documents which go out under its authority, whether statutes or Orders, present their meaning plainly in twentieth-century English. In using the word "may" here we are sticking to ancient form, but if we go on doing that for too long we fail to express our meaning properly.
      The example that I have in mind from the history of the 18th century refers not to a Statute but an order issued by the House directing a certain gentleman to attend at the Bar of the House. He was a Mr. John Wheble, who had printed what purported to be reports of the debates of the House. In those days that was considered to be a contempt of Parliament and a breach of privilege. It was resolved, therefore, that he should be ordered to attend the House. The Clerk, with great care for ancient forms, wrote at the top of the order, since it was Thursday, the words
      "Die Jovis"
      and underneath he wrote:
      "Ordered, That I. Wheble"
      —the capital letter "I" being in those days the usual formal way of expressing a Christian name beginning with "J"—
      "do attend this House on Tuesday next."
      This was sent by the Clerk, who, if anyone had raised the question whether everything was being done properly could have replied, "It is always done like this."
      But what happened? Mr. Wheble employed a lawyer, who sent a message back to the House of Commons saying, "'I. Wheble' is not a legal description of anybody. You might as well have written 'Eye Wheble' or 'Nose Wheble' as to take this for a description of Mr. John Wheble". He further said, "Mr. Wheble is ordered to attend the House on Tuesday next, when the document so

      1795
      ordering him has a date recorded only in a language which an Englishman is not under a legal obligation to understand. Therefore,"——
      The Chairman: Order. This is a fascinating story, but it is not germane to what we are discussing.
      Mr. Stewart: The story is nearly over. The lawyer pointed out that Mr. Wheble was ordered to attend "on Tuesday next", but there was nothing in the order to say what day the Tuesday was to be next after.
      Further, it was pointed out that Mr. Wheble was simply ordered to attend "this House", with no more precise definition of what the House was, and that since the order was addressed to Mr. Wheble "this House" was most likely to mean his house, and that surely he best complied with the order by staying at home.
      All hon. Members will be glad to hear, Sir Robert, that that is the end of the story.
      The Chairman: Order. I think that the right hon. Gentleman is overdoing it and trespassing a little too far upon my patience. He has not mentioned the word "may" for a very long time. He should leave that story now. It has been a good one so far, but it would be going too far to let it continue.
      Mr. Stewart: After all that, the House decided not to proceed with its order against Mr. Wheble, because it thought that it would look foolish if it did. The point of the whole story, and why it is relevant to our discussions, is that that is what comes of continuing to express oneself in ancient, traditional forms, however carefully one copies the traditions, without considering whether there is not too great a gap between those forms and the ordinary modes of speech of people in the century in which one lives.
      I have often wondered about the word "may" not only in the Statute before us but in a number of others.
      Mr. Norman Tebbit: On a point of order.
      Mr. Stewart: I shall be sitting down in two minutes.
      Mr. Tebbit: On a point of order. Is it in order for the right hon. Gentleman to bring into the discussion the question of the meaning of the word in other Measures? Are we confining ourselves to the one on the Order Paper?
      The Chairman: This is a very difficult question upon which to adjudicate. I am doing my best to keep the right hon. Gentleman in order. I hope that he will finish with this "may", since it is almost impossible for other hon. Members to pursue this line of argument without tedious repetition.
      Mr. Stewart: I was talking about "may", since I understand that it was the only matter that we could discuss. If it were only the length of time that I have taken, I do not believe that it would total more than about 10 minutes——
      Mr. Kenneth Lewis: More like 20.
      Mr. Stewart: I know that I have been trying to speak for 20 minutes, but that is quite different. In any event, the hon. Member for Rutland and Stamford (Mr. Kenneth Lewis) has taken more than his fair share of that time.
      If we in this House want our procedures to be respected, we must see that they are expressed—[Interruption.] I must point out to certain hon. Members opposite that the fact that they do not understand an argument does not mean that it is not a good one.
      Mr. Daniel Awdry: We have always respected the right hon. Member for Fulham (Mr. Michael Stewart). He is a man of great integrity. Does he think that the proceedings during the last half hour have done the House of Commons any good?
      Mr. Stewart: I can answer only for the part that I have played in them. If the hon. Gentleman cares to read my speech when it is published, he will see that it is a connected argument on the one point that our Chairman has told us that we may discuss. I admit that I introduced a somewhat light-hearted anecdote, but it was to the point. If one could never do that in a speech, this House would be a poorer place.
      Possibly at the end of the discussion on this Question, we may hear from the Treasury Bench why the word "may"

      1797
      is still used and whether the Government will consider in future using a more modern wording for this Act, which is a vital part of our constitution.
      Mr. Kenneth Lewis: On a point of order, Sir Robert. In proceedings which have lasted for about three-quarters of an hour, half an hour or more has been taken up with points of order. There has been no indication in the speeches which we have heard from the other side of the Committee that there is any ability on those benches to discuss this Clause. When the right hon. Member for Fulham (Mr. Michael Stewart) has to spend so much time telling a funny story and cannot relate his argument effectively to the Bill, it is clear that we have reached an "Alice in Wonderland" situation.
      I remind hon. Members that we are not only keeping ourselves here. We are keeping members of the staff of the House here, and they will have to be here on other nights. I think that we should have regard to that fact. Therefore, Sir Robert, I ask you to consider accepting a Motion, That the Question be now put. If you do not accept it, then I shall walk out of the Chamber, and I hope that some of my hon. Friends will join me.
      The Chairman: I do not think that I can accept that Motion at the moment. In any event—[Interruption.] In considering whether I ought to accept it, I should first want to hear from a Government spokesman.
      Mr. Tapsell: Further to that point of order. With great respect, some of us feel that the standard of debate has deteriorated to the point at which Parliament is in danger of being brought into serious disrepute. May I put it to you, Sir Robert, as the custodian of the traditions of the Chair, that it is your duty to prevent that happening?
      The Chairman: My duty is do the best that I can by the Committee as a whole. I hope and trust that the Committee will not pursue me beyond the limits of human endurance. I have done my best to listen to everyone. I have a duty to perform, as I have said before. I honestly think that the Committee would do more honour to itself and to the system if it now let this matter drop.
      1.15 a.m.
      Mr. Robert Maclennan: It is not my purpose at this hour to delay the Committee for more than a few moments. In the light of some of the remarks you made earlier, Sir Robert, in attempting to explain the limits of this debate, I felt it right to probe a little more closely the import of what you have said. It is obviously a matter of some seriousness that such an important Measure is not susceptible to debate in Committee. The reasons for that must be considered very closely.
      As I understood it, you purported to suggest that the reason for confining the debate to such considerations as my right hon. Friend the Member for Fulham (Mr. Michael Stewart) gave in his speech was that the House had already resolved that certain things from which this Consolidated Fund Bill emanated would take place. Because we had passed a Resolution to the effect of the purposes contained with the Consolidated Fund Bill we could not consider in detail these matters.
      It must be open to this Committee to consider in detail, if not those words in Clause 1—[Interruption.] We must consider "shall" instead of "may". It must be legitimate, too, to give some consideration whether the Bill accurately reflects the intentions of the Resolution to which this House has already given its assent. Bearing that in mind it is appropriate to look at the wording of the Resolution and the wording of the Bill and consider whether the Bill is an accurate reflection of Resolution. I tried to do this and turned to the Votes on Proceedings of the House, 31st January, in which I believe the Resolution is recorded.
      A number of points spring to mind which suggest that the Bill is by no means an exact or accurate reflection of the Resolution and that it goes much wider and in most important respects is more specific. For example, the Resolution put by Mr. Speaker, as I understand it, read as follows:
      "The Speaker proceeded pursuant to the Order this day to put the Question forthwith that a supplementary sum not exceeding 296,822,000 be granted to Her Majesty"——
      The Chairman: Order. I will not seriously quarrel with the hon. Gentleman but he must not discuss in detail

      1799
      what the Resolution was because it has been agreed to by the House.
      Mr. Maclennan: I was not proposing to discuss it at all. I was merely referring to it to compare it in substance with the terms of the Bill because it seems that there is a clear discrepancy between the words of the Bill and the words of the Resolution in a number of respects. One is that the House resolved that a sum be granted to Her Majesty:
      "… not exceeding the sum of £296,822,000"
      whereas the Bill per contra refers to a precise sum of £296,822,000. The House resolved nothing so specific as is put forward in the Bill.
      The Chairman: May I help the hon. Gentleman? I can put his mind at rest. It is the normal way in which this is done, year in and year out.
      Mr. Maclennan: I fully appreciate that, Sir Robert. But the mere fact of something having gone through year after year does not remove from hon. Members the right to examine whether what is being done is being done fittingly and whether a better form of words would be appropriate.
      I do not wish to labour the point about the precise sum in the Bill as opposed to an amount not exceeding that sum. There is a considerable difference. It may be that the wording of the Resolution should be looked at. It would be more appropriate to do that when the Resolution is brought forward. But it ought to be for consideration tonight whether the Bill's wording is appropriate in the light of the Resolution, and whether we ought to consider that the Bill ought to refer to a sum not exceeding £296,822,000, instead of the sum of £296,822,000.
      Mr. Eric Deakins: You, Sir Robert, in reply to a point of order, said that Parliament could vote a certain sum of money but that it was up to the Treasury whether it spent all of that money. I hope that I have stated that correctly. Surely the wording which my hon. Friend ought to be talking about on this Clause is "up to an amount of £296,822,000." If your Ruling, Sir Robert, were correct, surely the wording here ought to be up to that specific sum rather than not exceeding that specific sum, or the sum itself. Surely we are
      1800
      tying the Treasury's hands in the present wording of the Clause.
      The Chairman: Order. That will not do either. There is nothing about the words "up to" in the Resolution. The hon. Member for Walthamstow, West (Mr. Deakins) is putting an interpolation on it. That is quite a natural thing to do, but strictly speaking it is not in order.
      Mr. Maclennan: I am grateful to you, Sir Robert, and to my hon. Friend. He was attempting to give the sense of what was in the Resolution, although it might be argued that perhaps the words of the Resolution exactly might be more appropriate than those which he suggested.
      A number of other difficulties arise if one compares the Resolution with the Bill. For example, it is specified in the Resolution to which the House has agreed that the sum be granted out of the Consolidated Fund. It does not specify by whom the sum will be granted to Her Majesty or who will act as agent in this matter, for the House presumably. In the Bill it is quite specific that the Treasury has this power. Although I do not see why this automatically follows, nonetheless it is a noticeable difference between the wording of the Resolution and the Bill.
      I have made the general point which may open the discussion a good deal wider than perhaps some hon. Members might have considered possible, by drawing attention to the differences which exist between the Resolution and the Bill.
      I give notice that in future considerations of this Bill the House ought to bear this very much in mind and consider carefully whether there ought to be closer correspondence between the Bill and the Resolution if the Bill is not to be debated. While it is perfectly acceptable that if the House has already agreed something, there is no reason why it should be re-examined at length, it is not so acceptable that there should be any implication that the House has agreed to something which plainly it has not agreed to. I commend these considerations to the House.
      Mr. Kaufman: My right hon. Friend the Member for Fulham (Mr. Michael Stewart) mentioned a matter which has greatly concerned me in my consideration

      1801
      of the Bill and which will concern me when we debate the later Clauses; I refer to the need for legislation to be phrased in easily comprehensible twentieth century English.
      What disturbs me about the Clause is that the Bill, like all Bills, is subject for its language to the interpretation of the Interpretation Act, 1889. This Act governs every Act of Parliament and every Order that comes before Parliament. It is a matter of concern to me that a Bill of this kind, dealing with the issuing of large sums of money—altogether more than £5,000 million—should be phrased so loosely that the Interpretation Act, if applied to the Bill strictly, could turn the Bill into total nonsense and prohibit the Government from spending the £296 million to be granted in this financial year and the £4,835 to be granted in the next financial year.
      Altogether other words could be chosen. I choose simply three of the words which are contained in the Clause and which are defined in the Interpretation Act, 1889 and which therefore, if the Bill is enacted, will apply to an Act of Parliament. The first of these is the second word in the Clause, namely "Treasury". Section 12 of the Interpretation Act 1889 says this about "Treasury":
      "The expression 'the Treasury' shall mean the Lord High Treasurer for the time being".
      This is a serious point, although this is how the Interpretation Act, which governs the Bill, defines it. Who is the Lord High Treasurer? There are the Financial Secretary to the Treasury and the Chief Secretary. There is the First Lord of the Treasury. To my knowledge, there is no Lord High Treasurer. I notice with pleasure the presence of the Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury, who holds an office which is greatly to be respected. He knows a great deal, because he operates in the office; yet he, with great experience in the House of Commons, cannot tell us who
      "the Lord High Treasurer for the time being" is.
      Mr. John Biggs-Davison: Surely the hon. Gentleman knows that the office of Lord High Treasurer is in commission and that the office is exercised by the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury.
      Mr. Kaufman: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman. The hon. Gentleman is making a point which arises on the second half of Section 12(2) of the 1889 Act which says—
      "or the Commissioners for the time being of Her Majesty's Treasury".
      If we are to define words, we must define them with clarity. The hon. Member for Chigwell said that we have Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, but this Section refers to "Commissioners for the Treasury". This is a specific definition, because the 1889 Act deals simply with the definition of words. Therefore, when the hon. Gentleman says that the office of Lord High Treasurer is in commission and that the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury are doing the work of the Lord High Treasurer, he is drawing attention to a defect either in the 1889 Act or in the Bill. The Interpretation Act, 1889, on which the definition in the Bill depends, does not mention Lords Commissioners of the Treasury but mentions Commissioners for the time being of Her Majesty's Treasury.
      1.30 a.m.
      My other point of substance concerns Section 18(1) of the Interpretation Act. Clause 1 of the Consolidated Fund Bill refers to the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom. Section 18(1) of the Interpretation Act refers to the "British Islands" and it says:
      "The expression 'British Islands' shall mean the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands, and the Isle of Man."
      We can set aside the phrase "British Islands" and the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man——
      The Chairman: Order. I do not understand what this has to do with the Bill.
      Mr. Kaufman: I am about to clarify it.
      Mr. Ernie Money: There is on the Order Paper a Motion for the Adjournment in the name of the hon. Member for York (Mr. Alexander W. Lyon) on a subject of considerable importance. Many hon. Members are in the Chamber to listen to the debate and, if possible, to take part in it. The rights of back benchers on the Motion for the Adjournment are continually being affected by the length of the observations of some hon. Members. If speeches are

      1803
      lengthy and cause risibility, serious subjects will suffer. I ask you to rule, Mr. Chairman, that speeches which are far away from the Motion are not in order.
      Mr. Wellbeloved: Further to that point of order. The hon. Gentleman has drawn to your attention a valid point of order. We are all anxious to hear my hon. Friend the Member for York (Mr. Alexander W. Lyon), and there are also on the Order Paper the Vehicles (Excise) Bill and the Hydrocarbon Oil (Customs and Excise) Bill for debate tonight. A large number of my hon. Friends wish to speak on those Bills, and I understand that there will be difficulties in hon. Members remaining in order. We shall, therefore, be faced with a series of points of order. Is it possible for the Lord President of the Council to say for how long he will allow the Committee to continue to sit, and whether we shall have the pleasure tonight of debating the Bills on the Order Paper?
      The Chairman: Unfortunately, that is strictly not for the Chairman of Ways and Means but for Mr. Deputy Speaker, when he gets here, which I hope will be soon. The hon. Gentleman must contain himself in patience until the committee decides to terminate its business. So long as it wishes to go on with it, it is my duty to see that it does and that it keeps order. All I can do is to echo the sentiments expressed by hon. Gentlemen that the Committee will come speedily to a conclusion, so that the House can come together again and get on with its business. I cannot prejudge what the House will do.
      Mr. Arthur Lewis: Further to that point of order. We understand what you have said, Sir Robert, but my hon. Friend the Member for Erith and Crayford (Mr. Wellbeloved) has made a valid point, as did the hon. Member for Rutland and Stamford (Mr. Kenneth Lewis).
      The Chairman: The hon. Member may have raised a valid point, but it is not a point of order. I cannot adjudicate on it.
      Mr. Lewis: I appreciate that, Sir Robert. I was saying that if, as I understand is the case, it is within your prerogative to help both hon. Members who have tried to raise points of order—
      1804
      mention has been made of the staff of the House as well—by accepting a Motion to report Progress, I suggest that we should seriously consider that course.
      The Chairman: That cannot be raised as a point of order, in any case.
      Mr. Lewis: In that case, I beg to move, That the Chairman do report Progress and ask leave to sit again.
      The Chairman: Unfortunately, I cannot accept such a Motion from the hon. Gentleman at the moment, for the simple reason that he does not have the Floor of the Committee. It is in the possession of the hon. Member for Manchester, Ardwick (Mrs. Kaufman).
      Mr. Wellbeloved: I apologise for rising again, Sir Robert, but I think that you inadvertently misled the Committee in indicating that I had suggested that the Committee should speedily come to a conclusion. If the Lord President were prepared to facilitate the business of the Committee by indicating how much business he wishes to take tonight, we should be delighted to get on to the Adjournment debate after we have debated the three Clauses of the Bill. I know that many of my hon. Friends wish to speak on Clause 2, but it would facilitate business and affect our whole attitude to the proceedings of the Lord President could give us some indication of his intentions.
      The Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons (Mr. William Whitelaw): I do not know whether I am in order, in Committee, in saying anything, but I shall do so if you will permit me, Sir Robert.
      The Chairman: I think that the Committee would welcome a few words from the Lord President.
      Mr. Whitelaw: In those circumstances, I want to make it clear that the Committee stage of the Consolidated Fund Bill is normally taken very briefly. I accept the point made about the Adjournment debate. We are also very sensitive about the position of the staff, who have had to stay here for a considerable number of hours. It is important to get the Bill at this stage, and I hope that hon. Members would feel able to facilitate its passage. If that were the case I can say that it would not be the intention to move either of the other two Bills tonight.
      Mr. Kaufman: I take into account what the right hon. Gentleman said. Therefore, Sir Robert, I do not wish to detain the Committee. My point has some substance, and I hope that I shall be able to return to it on another occasion. In view of what the right hon. Gentleman said, I am prepared to bring by remarks to an end—although I would wish on future occasions to come back to the Interpretation Act, a matter which I regard as of great seriousness and importance to our proceedings.
      Mr. Arthur Lewis: My hon. Friends have discussed this matter through the usual channels, and we should like to express our sincere appreciation to the Leader of the House for the way in which he has helped us. We feel that we can now allow the Minister to reply on Clause 1, and if he can make his comments wide enough we shall probably not need to worry about Clause 2. We can then get on with the business and allow the Adjournment debate to take place. Perhaps the Minister can deal with the Bill in that way and save the time of the Committee.
      Mr. Patrick Jenkin: I am delighted to accept the invitation of hon. Gentlemen opposite to say a few words in reply to the debate on this Clause. It would, I think, be helpful if I were to explain how the Bill arises. I shall also endeavour to do my best to remain in order.
      The Bill deals with two matters, the Winter Supplementary Estimates 1970–71 and the Appropriation Account for 1971–72. To deal with the latter first because, although it relates to next year, it came before the House first in time, it was on 5th November of last year at the end of a two-day debate on public expenditure——
      Mr. English: On a point of order. Is not the Minister replying to Clause 2, rather than to Clause 1?
      Mr. Jenkin: I was invited by the hon. Member for West Ham, North (Mr. Arthur Lewis) to make my remarks relevant to both Clauses and I thought that rather than make similar points on Clause 2, I could deal with both now. But if hon. Members wish me to leave that matter I shall be happy to do so.
      1806
      The first point I wish to make is that the first of the Resolutions on which the Bill is founded was passed on 5th November and was related to the business on Supply covering the Vote on Account. The House was kind enough to agree to that Resolution. Then on 21st January this year I moved a further Resolution relating to the business on Supply covering the Winter Supplementary Estimates, of which notice had been given. Again, I am happy to say that the House agreed to that Motion. Thereupon the Consolidated Fund Bill was immediately brought in and read a First time. It received its Second Reading on Monday and finished yesterday morning. That is why we have now arrived at the Committee stage.
      I should explain what the Bill actually does since this may help to resolve some of the doubts and anxieties expressed by hon. Members. The Bill authorises the Treasury to issue a certain sum of money out of the Consolidated Fund and apply it in making good the Supply voted by the House. There are two types of Bill which achieve this purpose. One type is founded on the Supplementary Estimates and the Votes on Account. The second type, which comes at the end of the whole Supply season, is the Appropriation Bill. The Bill before us tonight is of the former kind. This is not an Appropriation Bill. It does not appropriate money for any particular purpose. It is in part for that reason not appropriate to discuss the details of the expenditure covered by the sum.
      I have said that the purpose of the Bill is to authorise the issue of money from a particular source, namely the Consolidated Fund. The debate has turned substantially on the use of the word "may" in Clause 1. I take the point made by the right hon. Member for Fulham (Mr. Michael Stewart) that it is right and proper that Governments should always look at old forms and old procedures to see whether they remain appropriate in current conditions. I suggest to the Committee that the form in which the Bill now is, which is virtually in the identical form as that introduced by the previous Administration of which the right hon. Gentleman was so distinguished a Member, is entirely appropriate for the purpose for which it exists.

      1807
      The key is to be found in the interesting and relevant remarks of the hon. Member for Caithness and Sutherland (Mr. Maclennan). He pointed out to the Committee the conjuncture of the Resolutions on which the Bill is founded. He said that the Resolution voted the Supply in a sum "not exceeding" the figure mentioned in the Resolution. That was the Resolution of the House on Supply.
      1.45 a.m.
      Clause 1 does no more than empower the Treasury to issue any part of the sums or the whole of them so voted out of the Consolidated Fund. The sum in the Resolution is a maximum figure and therefore it is entirely right that the word "may", which authorises, should be used in these cases. I cannot do better than rely upon the words of the noble Lord, Lord Boyle, one of my predecessors, who, in a similar debate ten years ago said:
      "The reason why we always have 'may' in a Consolidated Fund Bill and not 'shall' is because it obviously would be wrong to compel the issue of money out of the Consolidated Fund if that did not prove to be necessary."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 20th February, 1961; Vol. 635, c. 211.]
      One cannot say more today than that. That is the reason why "may" is there and not "shall".
      The hon. Member for Manchester, Ardwick (Mr. Kaufman) raised some interesting points but I think that they were answered by my hon. Friend the Member for Chigwell (Mr. Biggs-Davison) and others, and he will recognise, I am sure, that perhaps the constitutional points which he raised were not entirely appropriate to the Bill.
      I emphasise that the Bill is not concerned with the raising of money by taxation or borrowing. That would be dealt with in a Bill introduced on a Ways and Means Resolution. It is not directly concerned with expenditure because that was covered by the Supply Resolutions I mentioned. Here, we are purely dealing with the issue of money out of the Consolidated Fund.
      I hope that I shall be held to have done my best to answer the substantive questions which have engaged the attention of hon. Members. Our rules of order would, I fear, permit me to go little or no further than that. I hope that the Committee will now agree to accept the Clause.
      Mr. Arthur Lewis: I thank the hon. Gentleman on behalf, I am sure, of both sides, and I thank you, Sir Robert, for the kindly and courteous manner in which you have dealt with a very difficult situation.
      Question put and agreed to.
      Clause 1 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
      Clauses 2 and 3 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
      Bill reported, without Amendment.
      Motion made, and Question, That the Bill be now read the Third time, put forthwith, pursuant to Standing Order No. 89 (Consolidated Fund Bills), and agreed to.
      Bill accordingly read the Third time and passed.
      Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Rossi.]
      Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Robert Grant-Ferris): The Question is——
      Mr. Arthur Lewis: On a point of order. Mr. Deputy Speaker, may I seek your guidance? I understand that my hon. Friend the Member for York (Mr. Alexander W. Lyon) has the Adjournment and I see that the Minister is here.
      Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. I think that the hon. Gentleman would not wish to break the conventions of the House, which are that if the hon. Member who has the Adjournment is not here, that is it.
      Mr. Lewis: I accept the conventions, Mr. Deputy Speaker, but what if the business collapses because my hon. Friend may be otherwise occupied, particularly since the Minister is here? Is there not a possibility that my hon. Friend may be on his way? If that is so, can we not keep the Minister here until we know whether my hon. Friend is on his way?
      Mr. Deputy Speaker: Not without breaking the convention of the House.
      Question put and agreed to.
      Adjourned accordingly at ten minutes to Two o'clock.