§
Lords Amendment: No. 55, in page 23, line 18, after "effect" insert:
and shall have an extended time for presenting a complaint under Part VI of this Act in respect of a dismissal where the effective date of termination falls within that period".
§ The Solicitor-GeneralI beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
§ Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Robert Grant-Ferris)It will be for the convenience of the House if we also discuss Lords Amendments No. 56, in page 23, 1360 line 28, leave out from beginning to "shall" in line 31 and insert:
a complaint to which those provisions apply".
§ No. 322, in Schedule 6, page 154, line 7, leave out from "Act" to second "the".
§
No. 323, in Schedule 6, page 154, line 10, leave out "with the effective date of termination" and insert:
§
No. 324, in Schedule 6, page 154, line 11, leave out from "termination" to end of line 12 and insert:
unless the tribunal is satisfied that in the circumstances it was not practicable for the complaint to be presented before the end of that period.
(2) Any provision made by regulations in pursuance of the preceding sub-paragraph shall have effect subject to any order of the Industrial Court under section 30 of this Act.
§
No. 325, in Schedule 6, page 154, line 12, at end insert:
. In relation to proceedings on complaints under section 103 of this Act, the regulations shall include provision precluding an industrial tribunal from entertaining such a complaint unless it is presented before the end of the period of four weeks beginning with whichever is the latest of the following dates, that is to say—
§ The Solicitor-GeneralAmendment No. 55 is designed, again in the context of exempting certain cases from the statutory procedure because a voluntary procedure is in existence, to take account of the relevant substantive changes to be made by Amendments 322–325 in Schedule 6. The Amendments are designed to alter, in a direction which I think is favoured in the House and by others, the circumstances in which an employee may proceed out of time, after his time for application has expired, to an industrial tribunal. I will explain in a moment the substantive provisions.
§ Lords Amendments 55 and 56 are designed to alter Clause 30 so as to ensure that on revocation of an exemption order an employee is not barred from access to the kind of remedies on the same kind of terms he would have had if there had been no exempted agreement.
§ The substantive Lords Amendments No. 322 onwards are to Schedule 6. The first, No. 322, takes account of the fact that it is now possible for an employee or worker to complain under Clause 102 not only of unfair dismissal but of other unfair action.
§ Lords Amendment 323 does the same thing by making it plain that the date from which the time begins to run against him is either the date of dismissal, in a dismissal case, or the date of the act of which he complains.
§
The substantive point is contained in Lords Amendment No. 324. As originally drawn, it was possible for the tribunal to extend his period for applying for relief to the tribunal "for special reasons". In this context, as hon. Members suggested, that simple provision "for special reasons" was not sufficiently precise, and so the concept of power to extend the time "for special reasons" is now being replaced by the power to extend the time where the tribunal
is satisfied that in the circumstances it was not practicable for the complaint to be presented before the end of that period".
§ The tribunal has to look at the practicability and, if reasons are shown why the employee or worker concerned could not have got to the tribunal any quicker than he did, power is given to extend the time in those circumstances. Lords Amendment 324 also requires the court, in discharging or ending the exemption agreement, to give the worker the same kind of opportunity of going to the industrial tribunal, and that is the substantive effect of Lords Amendments Nos. 55 and 56.
§ Lords Amendment No. 325 deals with a similar point. As the Bill now stands the employee or worker will have the right to present a complaint not only under Clause 102 but also under Clause 103 in respect of different kinds of action taken against him, and in that context as well the tribunal will have the same power as to the period in which he should have presented his complaint.
1362§ I hope the House will follow the object of the exercise. It is in substance to remove the concept of "special reasons" from any application under Clauses 102 and 103 to the industrial tribunal and allows an extension of time where the worker could not get to the tribunal any sooner than he did. On that basis I commend these Lords Amendments.
§ 4.45 p.m.
§ Mr. HefferThe hon. and learned Gentleman quite rightly concentrated on Lords Amendments 322 to 325 which are really the Amendments of substance. He quite rightly said that the "special reasons" are being removed. Nevertheless, we are not happy because we find that despite the fact that a certain amount has been done to meet our objections this does not meet the serious objection which this side of the House has about the period of four weeks. We regard that as a matter of principle.
We believe that it should not merely be left to the tribunal to decide whether there are special reasons. We believe that the time for a worker to bring forward a complaint about unfair dismissal should be much longer than four weeks. There are all sorts of reasons why this should be so. The worker could find himself dismissed unfairly, or he may believe, and rightly, that he was dismissed unfairly, but is not able to ascertain the truth of the situation within the period of four weeks. That may require him or his trade union or his friends to dig around, as it were, to get the actual proof, and although he may know the situation, he may require a longer period of time to establish the facts. If there is a period of only four weeks, and if the tribunal has discretion, it may not be prepared to grant the application for the matter to come before the tribunal.
We contrast this provision of four weeks with what happens in relation to unfair industrial practices. Until an Amendment was moved in another place the time was almost unlimited in which an employer could go to the court and say that an unfair industrial practice had taken place. In another place an Amendment was moved by the Government, and accepted, that there should be a limitation of at least six months. That was pressed upon the Government by the Opposition. 1363 It is fair to contrast that situation, in which for up to six months the employer can say that in his opinion an unfair industrial practice has taken place and that he wishes to bring it before the court, with this situation where the worker who has been dismissed and feels he has been unfairly dismissed has to bring that before the tribunal in four weeks. We regard that as inequitable.
§ The Solicitor-GeneralWill the hon. Member acknowledge this fact, that the rather more complex provisions of Clause 34 of the last Government's Bill provided for a claim to be brought within 15 days, and that it was because we regarded that as insufficient in this kind of case that we extended the period to four weeks and improved the provisions in this Bill?
§ Mr. HefferI do not care what was in that other Bill. I want to make that absolutely clear I also want to make it quite clear that if that 15 days suggestion had come before the House I would have moved an Amendment to exclude it and to have a longer time provided. We are now discussing what has been brought forward to the House by the right hon. Gentleman and this Government, and it is time that the Government stopped hiding behind certain provisions which were in a Bill which was brought forward by my right hon. Friend but which was never discussed by this House. The Government really ought not to continue to do that, but should deal with what is in this Bill and the points we are raising about it, and we are saying that if it is right for an employer to have up to six months—it was an unlimited period until an Amendment was brought forward in another place—in which to go before the court and apply on the ground of an unfair industrial practice, then the time in which a worker who feels he has been unfairly dismissed should be allowed to present his case should be extended from four weeks to a much longer period.
On that argument we are not prepared to accept this Lords Amendment and we shall certainly be voting against it.
§ Mr. Stanley Orme (Salford, West)My hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) is right about this issue. The whole paraphernalia of appeals against unfair dismissal is nega- 1364 tive unless there is a right of reinstatement. We believe that allowing pieces of eight to be paid for getting rid of a worker—and it is sometimes worth up to £4,000 to an employer to see the back of a worker—is no solution to industrial problems.
It is interesting that the period has been reduced to four weeks. The Amendment moved by my noble Friend in another place assisted the Government and made another loophole for the man to jump through. No wonder the Government accepted the Amendment with such alacrity. Speaking purely for myself, I think it is a bad Amendment, yet the Solicitor-General is trying to convince the House how fair he is being to the trade union movement, and how nice it will be for a man who thinks he has been unfairly dismissed to go to a tribunal which can award damages.
I have never known a worker to be dismissed for trade union activities. Dismissals take place for bad time-keeping, failure to do the job properly, for redundancy reasons, and the gentle methods of the Solicitor-General in putting over these proposals should be exposed for what they are.
This series of Amendments will not assist the trade union movement. The exercise is valueless unless there is a right of reinstatement. Unfair dismissal is most difficult to prove, and that is why workers take industrial action over it and why employers resist industrial action. Apart from wages and conditions it is the thing the workers fight for most when employers sometimes try to get rid of dissident workers. I do not think it possible for a court of law or an industrial tribunal to adjudicate on such matters.
Once unfair dismissals are taken out of collective bargaining and are no longer an issue betwen trade union and employer but are brought into the realms of law we go into a land of no return. The Solicitor-General has not given the trade union movement anything, and the provision for four weeks as against the six months for unfair industrial practices shows where his bias lies.
§ Mr. John Fraser (Norwood)I am subject to correction, but I believe that the time for making a claim for redundancy payment, which is analogous to a claim unfair dismissal, is a much longer 1365 period than four weeks. The Solicitor-General will no doubt correct me if I am wrong, but my recollection is that it is about six months. I hope that he will think seriously about this four-week period.
Any person who has dealings with industrial injury claims, damages claims, and so on, will agree that short limitation periods create gross injustice. A man often does not realise that he has been unfairly dismissed until four or five weeks afterwards. He might have been dismissed while he was on holiday. No doubt the Solicitor-General will say that that will be a special reason and it was impracticable for him to make a claim within four weeks. But there are other circumstances where a man might need to investigate. He might have been dismissed because he did not have a certain qualification. Probation officers and youth leaders have special diplomas and qualifications for their jobs, and it might sometimes take three or four months to establish whether a man had the correct qualifications. Some qualification regulation are extremely complicated and provide for exemptions, and it might, therefore, be a long time before a man could prove his case.
A man might be dismissed because of his conduct. Before putting in his claim, he might have to obtain statements from his work mates or people who might not be accessible at the time. To do all that within four weeks places a severe burden on the man, and may mean that he has to put in his claim without knowing whether or not it is justified. It is much better that a claim should be investigated before it is made, so as to save waste of time by the tribunal.
Once claims are made, attitudes tend to become frozen. This is why accident proceedings are not instituted in the High Court or the county court very often for 18 months to two years after the accident. It is realised that to negotiate is better than to go to a court or a tribunal.
It is better, especially on his Bill which has no provision for reinstatement, for a man's lawyer, trade union representative or friend to go to the employer and say, "We could make an application to the tribunal for damages for unfair dismissal, but all our chap wants is to get back into the job which he has been doing for 1366 many years." The man may have his family established in the neighbourhood and may have bought a house near to his place of employment. The employer might reply that the man was dismissed because of his conduct. His representative might then say, "I think you are mistaken about that and, if you give me time, I can provide evidence to prove that you are mistaken." So long as a claim has not been presented to the tribunal there is a possibility of fruitful negotiation with the employer with a view to reinstatement and settling the matter amicably. Early application to the tribunal precludes this fruitful and sensible way of solving these problems.
In an earlier contribution the Solicitor-General reiterated that legal aid will not be available before the tribunal. This is crazy. If at the moment a man is dismissed unfairly because he has had only two weeks' notice when he is entitled to four weeks' notice, he has six years in which to make an application to the county court to recover damages for unfair dismissal which is a breach of his contract of employment, and he can get legal aid for that purpose. A man who has been dismissed may have no funds at his disposal, but may badly need to take legal advice and be represented in a complicated and difficult case. He is caught two ways. He is caught because he has to get his application in within four weeks, and he is caught because he cannot get legal representation.
There is an increasing reluctance for people to go to tribunals, even for redundancy payment claims, because employers are increasingly employing legal representatives and, as case law accumulates, it is becoming more difficult to establish claims. To give one example, on a claim to the industrial tribunal for redundancy payment, an employer can sometimes get away with meeting the claim by proving that there was another principal reason for the dismissal. I have known claims to be dismissed because, although there was some evidence that the man was redundant, the employer has proved some other principal reason for dismissing him.
§ Mr. FraserThe case may not have involved industrial misconduct. Sometimes a salesman who may not have been doing well may have been got rid 1367 of. If such a man is not legally represented it is extremely difficult to meet the points that arise. There is a reluctance to go to a tribunal if there is not legal assistance in dealing with difficult cases.
The absence of legal aid for cases before a tribunal coupled with the short limitation period work a double injustice. This contrasts unfavourably with the rights of a person to go to the Industrial Court to complain about unfair industrial conduct. I hope the Solicitor-General will think seriously about this matter and, if necessary, will introduce a manuscript Amendment to lengthen the period to six months.
§ 5.0 p.m.
§ Mr. David Waddington (Nelson and Colne)I listened with interest to the hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer). I do not think I missed any part of his speech, but I did not hear him say what he thought would be a satisfactory period within which a man should have to bring a case of unfair dismissal. Perhaps he would tell the House what sort of period he had in mind.
I have some sympathy with hon. Members opposite who say that perhaps four weeks is not long enough, but on the other hand everybody would agree that one can allow too long a period because it is vitally important that all the facts should be clear in everybody's mind.
The hon. Member for Norwood (Mr. John Fraser) said that the object of the exercise was to try to get the man reinstated. If that is the aim, then one does not want to develop a situation in which lawyers are busy preparing a case in minute detail, when they should be getting on with the job as quickly as possible and presenting the case before the tribunal so that the man may be reinstated.
§ Mr. John FraserThe hon. Gentleman has misunderstood me. Under the legislative provisions reinstatement cannot be altered. There is a stage, before the matter is crystallised by legal proceedings, at which it may be possible to negotiate reinstatement. That was the point I was making. I say that we should allow a period of at least four weeks to get that kind of negotiation under way. I agree that it is important to have a 1368 rapid conclusion of the proceedings, but if reinstatement is sought it has to be negotiated.
§ Mr. WaddingtonI take the hon. Gentleman's point, but I do not accept that once proceedings have been launched before the Industrial Tribunal all hope of negotiating reinstatement with the employer has gone. I am anxious that we should not allow a state of affairs to develop where nothing happens for a great length of time because under the rules there is no need for urgency and as a result opportunities to reinstate a man are not grasped.
I have, as I say, a certain sympathy with the hon. Gentleman's position. I would like to hear what sort of period the Opposition have in mind. One has to strike a fair balance; there must be ample time for proper advice to be taken; and finally, proceedings have to be instituted as quickly as possible so that all the facts are fresh in everybody's minds.
We know from experience that some employers are zealous in making quite sure that all opportunities to obtain evidence of an industrial injury are grasped. The National Coal Board ensures that within days of a man being injured all possible witnesses are interviewed; indeed, almost everybody concerned is interviewed by the Board. It is important that these matters should be dealt with expeditiously. I repeat that the Opposition have my sympathy on their point about legal aid. It is a pity that provision has not been made to make legal aid available in dealing with important cases.
§ Mr. Alex Eadie (Midlothian)The Solicitor-General should have another look at this proposal. I believe the legal profession in Scotland will feel some resentment at what has been done since the right hon. and learned Gentleman seems to be riding roughshod over established procedures of Scottish law.
I should like to explain what the four week provision will involve. Established procedures are laid down in the mining industry. A situation can arise in which one court can battle against another. Do we know exactly what we mean when we talk about "court"? In the mining industry there is a procedure to deal with anybody who is alleged to have committed a breach of the Coal Mines Act. 1369 Such a man generally is dismissed straight away, if the management feel that the case warrants such a course. It is a tradition that the miners' union never contests an allegation of a serious breach of the Coal Mines Act. The offence may involve smoking underground, or a serious offence against procedure—the man may have been riding on trucks underground, which could endanger life and limb and could interfere with machinery. The trade union never attempts to interfere with that sort of case, and the man must wait until he is tried by the court.
If the man has to wait a couple of months, what is he to do in the meantime? It might be said that the man was guilty and that was why he was dismissed in the first place. But the man may not be guilty. He may come before the court and be found not guilty. If that happens and the four week period has elapsed, what will happen if the man alleges unfair dismissal?
To take a more difficult example, what will happen if the man's case is found to be not proven? This may be a matter with which the Solicitor-General is not acquainted in Scottish law. I feel that the Scottish legal professional will resent the right hon. and learned Gentleman writing into this legislation a provision which will not take account of the Scottish legal situation.
I personally have gone to the union and said, "This case was found not proven and therefore I, as the man's accredited representative, demand his reinstatement." I have to some extent been successful in getting men reinstated, but the management has often said ' We are prepared to reinstate the man, but there is some doubt about loss of earnings since the verdict was not proven rather than not guilty. "Does the Solicitor-General say that the man will be entitled to say," I am going to the Industrial Court to claim unfair dismissal and will claim compensation. Although I have my job back, I have suffered loss of earnings in the time I have been unemployed." Is the right hon. and learned Gentleman also saying that the Industrial Court will then decide on the validity of a not proven verdict? Does he intend to give guidance on that aspect of the law?
I doubt very much whether the Amendment is a starter in relation to both 1370 English and Scottish law. I certainly believe that it would build up deep resentment in the legal profession in Scotland, irrespective of what the hon. and learned Gentleman may think. There has not been sufficient thought on this matter. The hon. and learned Gentleman must consider re-examining the proposal with a view to taking it back. I trust that we will not have to go into the Division Lobby not only in protest against the lack of time provided but in order to establish the fact that Scottish law is entitled to some consideration in legislation about industrial relations.
§ Mr. Edwin Wainwright (Dearne Valley)I want to say something to the Solicitor-General about his attitude to the Amendment. He mentioned that the Bill brought in by the Labour Government specified a 15-day period. He gave the impression that it was wonderful of the present Government to extend that period to one month. If the Labour Government had not brought in a Bill, or had not mentioned a 15-day period in it, I wonder what length of time the present Government would have recommended. Would it have been 30 days, or 60 days, or 90 days, or even six months?
§ The question of obtaining evidence is always difficult. We are not here talking about good employers on every occasion. In this context, we are talking about bad employers—on this side of the House, anyway. There are still too many bad employers in the country. As my hon. Friend the Member for Salford, West (Mr. Orme) mentioned, a bad employer will want to get rid of a man because of his trade union activities but he will choose other reasons. Other things are brought in against the employee. Provocation comes into it on many occasions when the employer wants to get rid of a man. In effect he compels the man to do something that common sense would advise him not to do. Then, when he is dismissed, he has been so unhappy in the job for a long time—when he has been fighting on behalf of his fellow workers—that he decides, "There is no future for me at this plant. I will find work elsewhere."
§ Then, however, the unfortunate fellow finds that he cannot get other work because he has been blacklisted. Wherever he goes, they will ask what his name is. 1371 When he tells them, they will reply, "We are sorry. There is no work for you here." He thereupon drifts about trying to find a job. This happens on many occasions, and, of course, it is more difficult with the present rate of unemployment for a man to get a job anyway, quite apart from the reluctance of employers to take him on. He is running about for one month or two months trying to get another job but finding that he cannot get one.
§ Then he thinks, "I should now make application on grounds of unfair dismissal", only to be told, "Sorry, but you are out of time." There is no fairness in this limit of one month. Perhaps it is not a good analogy, but a claim for damages has a statutory period of three years. I believe that the judge says, in a claim for damages, that three years after the date of the accident is in effect a claim for damages on the first day. Three years is allowed to a man before he is barred by Statute in such cases. Here, however, a dismissed man is to be allowed only 30 days. It is my candid opinion that no consultation has taken place with the trade union movement about this period.
§ 5.15 p.m.
§ I ask the Solicitor-General whether he has consulted the trade union movement on this matter. Is he satisfied that the 30 days is a fair and just period? What knowledge has he got about what is happening in industry? From where has he got his information? Has he got it from the employers on every occasion? Has he ever discussed this sort of issue with shop stewards or full-time officials of the trade union movement? Of course he has not, for otherwise, I am certain, he would not have recommended a one-month period.
§ This is too short a time. A man's future is at stake on many occasions. When we talk about £4,000 that can be paid instead of reinstatement, it is rather disgusting to think that one can rob a man of work in the area that he has been living in for a long time—rob him of his work because of his trade union activities, his willingness to fight on behalf of his fellow men against bad employers on many occasions—so that he has no future in the area and has to leave it. 1372 It is not a pleasant thing to have to move from one place to another and to keep being told, when one's name is mentioned, "You are not wanted". Many of us have experienced this sort of thing.
§ The hon. and learned Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. Waddington) mentioned that no time limit had been suggested by my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heifer). I will suggest a time. I suggest that it should be at least six months so that the man has plenty of time and can get the proof by questioning people and obtaining evidence. Do not let us forget that when a man goes for evidence in a plant where there is a bad employer there is a freeze, in effect, from his fellow workers because they are afraid of what will happen to them. All industry is not like work in some of the modern plants where there is a strong trade union movement and some understanding between unions and employers. Many plants have employers who are not fit to be in charge of men.
§ Because of all this, we must make certain that such employers cannot take advantage of any legislation. I hope, therefore, that the Government will listen to what has been said by my hon. Friends on this issue and will extend the time beyond one month to at least six months in order to enable a man to build up his case, thereby ensuring that he can be dealt with fairly and justly.
§ Mr. Ronald King Murray (Edinburgh, Leith)I would like to echo the feeling of disquiet which have been expressed by my hon. Friends about the limit of four weeks on these particular complaints. It seems to me that my hon. Friend the Member for Midlothian (Mr. Eadie) has raised a substantial point which certainly has validity in regard to Scots law and may well have a validity which extends beyond that into the law of England and Wales, because it is obvious that many dismissals may well proceed upon a ground which is also a ground for a statutory prosecution in regard to some statutory provision—for example, in regard to the Factory Acts or some equivalent Act.
In such cases, it is obvious that the question whether the facts justify such a dismissal will be bound up in such a way that they cannot be separated from the facts on which a prosecution is 1373 grounded. As far as Scotland is concerned it is the case that a summary prosecution for a statutory offence has to be completed within a period of six months. Therefore, it would follow that the period of four weeks was much too short. On any view, the period for such a complaint—and it is justifiable to ask whether there is need for a period of limitation, whether this kind of procedure demands any sort of limit at all—should be much longer than four weeks and, I should have thought, longer than six months, in order to allow the matter involved to be properly canvassed and to cover amply the procedure which may be involved in a criminal prosecution.
My hon. Friend the Member for Midlothian mentioned the Scottish verdict of "Not proven." A more sympathetic view would be to take the case of a clear acquittal when an accused is acquitted of the statutory offence which is the ground for the dismissal. It is obvious that in that case the court might say that there was no ground for the complaint and the man would be entirely vindicated. It would be extraordinary that he should be completely vindicated in a criminal court and, long before that, be found guilty in a civil court under the tribunal set-up which is given jurisdiction for this purpose in the Bill.
The argument from this side of the House is, first, that we should probe the matter strongly and ask the Government why there should be a limit and, secondly, if there is to be a limit, that it should be at least six months, as it is for complaints of unfair industrial practices in Clauses 97 and 98.
I have some sympathy for the point made by the hon. and learned Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. Waddington) about reinstatement. It is clear that were the emphasis in this part of the Bill on reinstatement there might be an argument for speed. It might be that one could say that reinstatement is so important that one must get people moving so that the man who has been unfairly dismissed may be fully reinstated to his position in the quickest possible time.
My hon. Friend the Member for Norwood (Mr. John Fraser) dealt with that matter in his opening remarks. He pointed out that the Bill makes no provision for reinstatement. That is one of the worst features of the Bill in the view 1374 of the Opposition. It is a serious defect. The Bill provides for re-engagement, but nowhere does it provide that a person who has been unfairly dismissed, dealt with in a scabby way, shall be reinstated. The proper way to deal with such a situation would be for the man concerned to be restored to his former position, and that would be nothing short of reinstatement.
The Bill is basically deficient in this respect and therefore we are justified in voting against these provisions in their entirety. The absence of a provision for reinstatement shows the Bill for what it is. When we look into the four weeks limitation we see what a miserable Bill it is. So far from giving a dismissed worker full reinstatement, restoration, or restitution in law, we have a shabby limitation.
I should like to raise a short technical point of some importance. The words used in Lords Amendment No. 324, allowing a tribunal to go beyond the four weeks, are:
unless the tribunal is satisfied that in the circumstances it was not practicable for the complaint to be presented before the end of that period.I do not want to be unfair, but it seems that clearly the Amendment is better than the original provision which dealt with "reasonable cause" which is so unsatisfactory from the legal view. Criticisms made by the Opposition both here and in the other place in that regard were well justified.What worries me is that the industrial tribunal, in construing the words "not practicable", may take a legalistic or a common sense approach. If it took a common sense approach—I hope that that is the approach which the tribunals will take in construing those words—the tribunal would not take the view that it was hidebound to some period of about four weeks. It is important to stress this point. If the words "not practicable" are to be construed in a common sense way, then, on the face of it, there is no reason for a tribunal, presented with the argument so cogently put forward by my hon. Friend the Member for Midlothian, not saying, "Obviously this is a case where it was not practicable for the complaint to be presented earlier", and to extend the period of four weeks to seven or eight months or even a year. From the common sense view, if common sense is to 1375 rule the tribunal rather than legal interpretations, we would not have a great deal to fear, because the tribunal is composed of people who, one hopes, are not predominantly lawyers but have practical experience of industrial relations. The common sense view would take them beyond the legalistic limit of four weeks.
My fear all along has been that the National Industrial Relations Court, on the one hand, in its divisions, if there are divisions, and the industrial tribunals, on the other hand, transformed by the Bill into mini courts, will tend to be riddled with legalism. That is one reason for strongly echoing the plea of my hon. Friend the Member for Norwood that, if the tribunals are to become legalistic in their interpretation of the Bill and in their application of its provisions, the need for legal aid will be paramount. It will be essential for people to have legal aid if they are to get adequate legal advice and assistance. However, if the tribunals are to be common sense bodies, as they were before the Bill got at them, where the dominant consideration is practical knowledge of industrial relations, this fear would not be justified.
I end by making a powerful plea for the words "not practicable" to be construed in a common sense, rather than a legalistic, way. My fear is that if they are to be construed by an industrial tribunal as a mini-court in a legalistic fashion, they will take the view that
not practicable for the complaint to be presented before the end of that periodwill be the kind of thing which is limited by the period of four weeks which is set in the Bill. They will probably say that "not practicable" is to be taken as something of the order of those few weeks. In other words, they will be contemplating an extension of a week or possibly two weeks, not an extension many times the limitation.I hope that we shall hear some reassuring words from the Government on this matter, but I fear that we shall not. I believe that we shall be left in the legalistic quagmire with which the Bill has presented us throughout its passage.
§ 5.30 p.m.
§ Mr. Albert Booth (Barrow-in-Furness)It is exceedingly difficult to discuss an Amendment to part of a Bill which claims to give men protection against unfair dismissal 1376 when we know that the whole effect of this portion of it is to take away from a number of practical trade unionists the only effective protection they have against unfair dismissal, which is the right to threaten to withdraw their labour until they have had a proper opportunity of discussing whether notice given to an active trade unionist is fair or unfair. Therefore, I propose to consider the matter against the background of what happens in practice.
If, in an engineering works, a shop steward, who normally has a good timekeeping record and is known to be a good worker, comes in late one morning and that afternoon receives notice of dismissal because he was late, no suggestion is made that he should go along to a court of law if he wants redress against his employer for unfair dismissal. His convenor goes to the manager and says, "If that chap goes outside the door in one week's time, he will not be the only one going out. All the other members of his union in this works will also go out. "The manager then calls in the trade union representative and they sit round a table and try to thrash the thing out. In other words, they will discuss whether the dismissal was unfair, with the man not outside the door, but still on his job.
If they cannot resolve the issue, the convenor will ask that the notice be withdrawn while a full-time representative of the union and a full-time representative of the employers' association are brought in to consider the matter further. A works conference will be held on the issue whether the man is to be dismissed, irrespective of any provision made for that in procedure agreements, or otherwise. At that works conference evidence will be adduced to show whether the man is being fairly or unfairly dismissed. That evidence can be adduced because the man is still at work, and other men who can testify to the way in which he did his work can be brought forward.
If the Bill is amended in the way suggested it will take away a man's right to have discussed whether his dismissal was fair or unfair while he continues at work. Whether it is the intention of the Government or not, it will introduce a presumption of guilt, because the man will be outside the door, having been dismissed by his employer on some charge or other, and he will have to prove before 1377 the Industrial Court that he is innocent before he can return to work. That will place him at a great disadvantage.
All men who believe in justice feel that it is necessary to protect people against unfair dismissal. The trade union movement not only shares that concern, but has a special concern to protect against that form of unfairness which relates to getting rid of men who are active on behalf of their fellow workers. In other words, the trade union movement has to protect the representatives of its workpeople.
Once a work people's representative is put outside the door the organisation of his case and the means of protecting the man who is to follow him as shop steward, or work people's representative, or whatever name he is given, are undermined. His successor is at a disadvantage because the same threat hangs over him of being put outside the door and being forced to appeal through the machinery provided by the Bill.
It will be a severe handicap to anybody who is dismissed and told to go to a court if he has to operate under the proposed procedure, compared with his position under the present procedure because at the moment, whether there is provision for it in a procedure agreement or not, his case can be discussed while he is still at work.
In so far as special machinery will be required to obtain evidence, it is fair to say that that situation does not apply now. And who is to say that the employer will facilitate the obtaining of evidence about whether the man was fairly dismissed? The allegation can be extremely vague. It can be said that the man's work was unsatisfactory. But which part of his work was unsatisfactory, and in what capacity was he acting? Where was he at the time? Who says that his work was unsatisfactory? The very people who will give evidence about that at the court will be those who themselves are in danger of having the same action taken against them by the employer.
Let us imagine a shop steward being dismissed and going before an industrial court to answer the allegation of not doing a certain job properly. He will say that he wants to call the foreman to give evidence that he did do his job properly. What will happen to the fore-man 1378 before he goes to the court? He will be called in to see the manager. Does anybody think that the manager will say to him, "I want you to make sure that justice is done on behalf of this ex-shop steward. I want you to speak highly of his work." Anybody who imagines that industry is run on such fair and just lines has not tried organising men in any shop in any engineering works.
This provision will create an unjust situation and impose unreasonable pressures upon people. Reinstatement is the only thing which can be satisfactory in terms of trade union representation. The least that the Government must concede is that there will be adequate time for the preparation of a case. In all equity that time must be comparable to the time that would be allowed to an employer to bring a case of unfair action against a trade union.
§ Mr. Neil McBride (Swansea, East)If a worker complainant is denied legal aid in a case before an industrial court while the employer defendant, because of his circumstances, is able to have full and adequate legal resources, that seems to me to be a travesty of justice. If the Government say that legal aid can be granted in some cases, clearly we have the right to ask why they are refusing it in this instance. The Government must give a reason for their refusal to grant legal aid in the circumstances which I have described.
I turn now to the point made by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Edinburgh, Leith (Mr. Ronald King Murray) about reinstatement. The Solicitor-General will remember that I raised this matter last night, but I make no apology for raising it again, as it is in order to do so. If the worker complainant wins his case, reinstatement should be full and automatic, and the onus should be on the employer to perform that operation. Such a provision should be written into the Bill.
§ The Solicitor-GeneralOn a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I am prepared to discuss the comparative provisions in respect of reinstatement and what ought or ought not to be in the Bill. The hon. Member for Swansea, East (Mr. McBride) raised the question of reinstatement last night. When I attempted at the beginning of my reply to the debate 1379 to deal with the point, and to discuss it on the merits, the right hon. Lady the Member for Blackburn (Mrs. Castle) protested that I ought not to do so. I am glad to see the hon. Member for Edinburgh, Leith (Mr. Ronald King Murray) acknowledging his recollection of that.
The hon. Gentleman has raised the matter again now. As I was prevented by the right hon. Lady's protest from replying to the matter last night, is it, or is it not in order on this Amendment to discuss the broad general question of reinstatement? I should find it difficult to see how such a proposition could be brought within the rules of order, but if you think that it is within the rules of order, and that the hon. Gentleman is entitled to go on with this point, I hope that I may be allowed to reply to it.
§ Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Robert Grant-Ferris)In the circumstances I think that it will be for the benefit of the House if the hon. Member continues with the point he is making, and the Solicitor-General has a chance to reply to it.
§ Mr. HefferOn a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. As I understood it, my right hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn (Mrs. Castle) was not complaining about the issue of reinstatement having been raised. She was complaining about the fact that in our previous discussions we had never been able to have a full and lengthy discussion of the whole question.
§ Mr. Deputy SpeakerI think that in a debate such as this, when we are operating under the guillotine procedure, a certain amount of latitude must be allowed. We are very near the conclusion of this great matter, and my view is that a certain amount of leniency from the Chair and forbearance on the part of the Government should be the order of the day.
§ Mr. R. CarrOn a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. We willingly accept your Ruling, but I should like to make it clear—I am sure that you would not wish to be unfair to the Government benches—that it was not lack of forbearance on our part which brought the debate on this subject to an end yesterday, but that it was concluded because of an objection by the Opposition.
§ Mr. Deputy SpeakerI readily accept what the Minister said. I did not wish to imply that. I feel that we should be a little broad in the debate, and I am casting no aspersions whatsoever on the Government's action yesterday.
§ Mr. McBrideThank you, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I am gratified to know that my observations are in order because, to a man who is dismissed, the ability to take action to prove that his was an unfair dismissal is of great value to his self-respect. It is very important to him to prove himself right in a court of law.
Coming to the reasons for dismissal, I wonder whether the Solicitor-General has ever heard of the black list referred to by my hon. Friends the Members for Salford, West (Mr. Orme) and Dearne Valley (Mr. Edwin Wainwright)? Those who come from industry are aware of such a list. It is unpublished, but it is none the less extant. Many a trade unionist has found that the ostensible reason for his dismissal is not the real one. One never hears of a trade unionist being dismissed for indulging in trade union activities. He is dismissed because he is alleged to have done some other specified thing. I believe that this period of four weeks should be increased to six months. A person wishing to enter an action should not be precluded from doing so because the specified period is four weeks.
On the matter of collecting evidence, the hon. and learned Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. Waddington) said that some firms were very good when it came to offering facilities for the collection of evidence for and by employees. That is all to the good, but not all employers extend these facilities, Furthermore, not all workers have an adequate knowledge of the law. It therefore follows that in terms of legal aid the worker is at a disadvantage all along the line, and that he should have adequate legal representation. If that is not so. I should like to know the Government's idea of the meaning of the word "justice".
In my view there is a sense of apology on the part of the Government for the Bill that they are putting before the House—a Bill that has gone sour on public opinion and is no longer backed by it. Those who have anything to do with industry are very apprehensive that insufficient attention has been paid to the 1381 employees' position, in terms of the rightful prosecution of his interests. That seems to have been a sin of omission on the Government's part. They have not eliminated the sense of injustice that exists as a result of their omissions from the Bill. As my hon. Friend the Member for Norwood (Mr. John Fraser) said, they could still make a manuscript Amendment to rectify the position.
If the Government consider the matter seriously they should take into account the necessity for adequate legal aid for employees in the institution of such actions. The worker-complainant is entitled to that; no more and no less. If the Government accede to my request in that respect they will have at least gone a little way towards helping the worker. He is entitled to every protection in the form of legal aid, and the logical outcome of a successful court action should be immediate and full reinstatement in the job from which he has been unfairly dismissed.
§ Mr. HefferI want to put one or two points arising from what my hon. Friends have said, and the remarks of the hon. and learned Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. Waddington). My hon. Friend the Member for Barrow-in-Furness (Mr. Booth) raised a very important point when he drew attention to the fact that until the application of the Bill workpeople in factories will be able to defend their shop stewards and others who represent them on the basis of industrial action for unfair dismissal.
That has always been the practice. It has been understandable that such action should be taken by workers. Whenever their shop stewards or other representatives have been under threat of dismissal by their employer the workers have made it clear to the employer that they would withdraw their labour in the event of such a dismissal. Under the provisions of the Bill, however, if they withdrew their labour the workers would be carrying out an unfair industrial practice, which means that a right that they have enjoyed up to now, in terms of defending their fellow workers—their elected representatives—is being taken away from them.
§ The Solicitor-GeneralThis point is so important that I must ask the hon. 1382 Member to specify where in the Bill it is stated to be an unfair practice to call for industrial action as a means of protest against unfair dismissal or for the reinstatement of an unfairly dismissed person. Does not the hon. Member appreciate that that point was suggested to us and we have formally rejected it? Not one provision in the Bill makes it illegal to call for industrial action in support of a worker who has been unfairly dismissed.
We have made it clear that we are providing alternative arrangements. We are discussing remedies for the worker. He can go to the tribunal and challenge the justice of his dismissal, but alongside that there is the unchanged and unfettered right to take industrial action. It is wrong to suggest that that right has been eroded or minimised in any way.
§ 5.45 p.m.
§ Mr. HefferThe Solicitor-General knows that if workers taking unofficial strike action, or similar action, are going against an agreed contract they will be carrying out an unfair industrial practice, which means the removal of one of the basic rights that workers have had up to now to defend their shop stewards from being dismissed. There is no point in the Solicitor-General trying to deny that. It also puts into context the point with which I did not agree in my right hon. Friend's Bill—the point about the 15 days. There were no unfair industrial practices in that Bill.
We have a position in which the workers are not guaranteed reinstatement. I am glad that you, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, have allowed a slightly wider-ranging debate on this point. Employers are put into favourable position in respect of workers who have been unfairly dismissed. A worker is allowed legal representation, but he may not have the money to pay for it. That means that the rich will be placed in a better position. An employer can come before the tribunal with a battery of lawyers while the worker has to suffer because legal aid is not involved.
It is clear that the Bill is weighted in the interest of the employer, against the worker, despite all the great fanfares of trumpets about unfair dismissal. We cannot allow the Solicitor-General to get away with it so easily.
1383 I was asked a fair question, namely, what did I think was a fair period of time in which a worker should be able to apply. I thought that I had made it clear in what I said, namely, that if it were recognised as fair for an employer to be able to go to the Industrial Court within a period of six months and claim that there had been unfair industrial practice it should be equally fair for a worker to go to the tribunal within a period of six months if he felt that there had been an unfair dismissal. That point has been stressed by my hon. Friend the Member for Norwood (Mr. John Fraser) and other hon. Members, who have argued that a period of six months is a reasonable one.
A little earlier the Solicitor-General made what I thought was an interesting and revealing statement in relation to the £4,000 that could be paid to a worker if he could prove that he had been unfairly dismissed. He said that that put things right, because it tipped the balance in favour of the employer whereas in the past it had been tipped in favour of the workers.
§ The Solicitor-Generalrose—
§ Mr. HefferIf the hon. learned Gentleman wishes to deny this, let him look up HANSARD tomorrow to see what he said.
§ The Solicitor-GeneralIf the hon. Gentleman is suggesting that, in answering the point of the hon. and learned Member for Leicester, North-West (Mr. Greville Janner), I suggested anything of that kind, either he or I must have got it wrong. What I was saying, it is plain beyond peradventure, is that, without the unfair dismissal provisions of the Bill, an employer could dismiss anyone and, subject to damages for breach of contract, could not be brought before any tribunal or made to pay any compensation. It is true that industrial action could be taken against him.
After the Bill, he will not be able to escape without paying compensation. He will still be liable to industrial action but he will, in addition, be liable to pay a maximum of £4,000 compensation. Whereas, pre-Bill, dismissal could have been the subject of no compensation at no cost, post-Bill it will be at the cost of compensation up to £4,000. It is on that basis that I made the same point as I have 1384 made many times before—that the scales are being tilted against the employer so as to make it more expensive for him to contemplate dismissing anyone unfairly in that situation. Surely that point is now clear beyond peradventure.
§ Mr. HefferWe shall just have to look at tomorrow's HANSARD to see what the hon. and learned Gentleman said. I noted it carefully because it seemed to me to be completely in line with the basic thinking behind the Bill—that is, that the scales are being tipped in the interests of the employers and against the workers and the unions. I say in advance that, if I am wrong, I apologise to the hon. and learned Gentleman. We shall have to look at HANSARD in relation to the part that I noted down, because it seemed to me to underline the basic philosophy of this Bill.
On that basis, unless we get some pretty convincing arguments from the Minister, we shall certainly divide the House. Since we shall not get anywhere near the Amendments of consequence, Nos. 324 and 325, we shall have a token Division on this one.
§ The Solicitor-GeneralMay I reply with the permission of the House. To take the hon. Member's last point first, if I mis-recollected what I was saying, I apologise, but my clear recollection is that I said what I have just explained. We can both check this, because one makes mistakes of this kind in this kind of discussion.
On the more general point, the hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) used characteristic phraseology in suggesting that I should stand here as though I were facing some accusational charge and that, if he had his way, the House would not let me "get away with it". I do not know what it is that I am supposed to be getting away with, but let us bring ourselves back to reality for a moment and remind ourselves what we are talking about.
We are talking about a group of Amendments designed to remove the concept of "special reasons" and to replace it with the more benevolent concept—as the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh, Leith (Mr. Ronald King Murray) acknowledged—of entitling a person to have extended time when he could not bring a complaint to the tribunal before. 1385 No one has been speaking against these Amendments. They have been generally acknowledged and if the debate were confined to that, the defence that I should have to put up would need to be very slender.
But beyond that, in the wider context, we are discussing provisions introducing new remedies for unfair dismissal. We are not doing anything in respect of which we have to defend ourselves. I welcome this opportunity to make it clear to the country and the workers affected that there are here new rights and remedies which, if they were to listen to what hon. Members opposite are saying about them, they might wholly fail to observe or appreciate.
I should like to deal first with the reinstatement or non-reinstatement point. I know that the hon. Member for Swansea, East (Mr. McBride) has taken a close interest in this because of his own experience and—if I may say so without doing him irreparable injury—from his own interest in the law as one of his side interests.
The comparison between the two Bills in respect of reinstatement, without going through it at enormous length, can be put as follows. Under the last Government's Bill, it was open to a tribunal to order an employer to reinstate an employee, but under that Bill, as under any system of law so far in sight, the employer could disregard such an order. The Bill went on to provide for what happened if the employer did disregard it. Under Clause 52, the employee could go back to the tribunal for a larger cash award.
In human relationships, one cannot ultimately compel someone to take someone else back into a job and the sanction against an employer at the end of the day must be a cash award. That was the provision in the last Government's Bill.
§ Mr. Stanley Orme (Salford, West)Indeed, and that was the weakness of it. It is just the same as the weakness of this Bill. If there is a feeling of injustice, there is only one remedy—that is, workers taking or threatening to take industrial action to compel the employer to take back a worker or group of workers.
§ The Solicitor-GeneralAt least I am now clear that we have disposed of that argument. The hon. Member said that that was the weakness of the last Government's Bill and it is just the same as this Bill. That is my point. At the end of the day, an order for reinstatement or a recommendation for re-engagement can be disregarded by an employer and a cash award is all that this machinery can provide.
§ Mr. Harold WalkerThe hon. and learned Gentleman will understand that I have some personal feeling in this, since my name was on that Bill. He is saying that, in this respect, this Bill is no different from the previous Government's proposals. But the important difference is, that, unlike the present Bill, the former Bill did, as he said, provide for the tribunal to make an order compelling the employer to reinstate. If he had defied it, he would have suffered a financial penalty. There was a financial sanction. This is the normal sanction in law for any infringement of that law. There is not that sanction within the present Bill——
§ The Solicitor-GeneralThere is.
§ Mr. WalkerThen I am waiting for him to tell me under what provision the employer suffers a heavier penalty for refusing to comply with any requirement to reinstate.
§ The Solicitor-GeneralUnder Clause 111(4). When an industrial tribunal has made a recommendation for re-engagement and it is not complied with, the tribunal may increase the cash award against the employer concerned. If anyone believes that an order for reinstatement, enforceable by a higher cash award if disregarded, is different in any respect from a recommendation for re-engage-men enforceable by a higher cash award if disregarded, I can only say that there is no difference in substance at all. The hon. Member for Salford, West (Mr. Orme) is right on this point. He says that it is just the same——
§ The Solicitor-GeneralI am surrounded by a cloud of talent.
§ Mr. RoseModestly, I accept the compliment. Is it not right that the difference is that in this case it is permissive, in that the wording is "may", 1387 whereas what we want is wording which will enforce a cash penalty when an employer fails to reinstate? There is a serious difference between the two.
§ 6.0 p.m.
§ The Solicitor-GeneralI do not want to conduct a detailed analysis of these proceedings, but I am prepared, if necessary, to meet that point.
The recommendation in the Labour Government's Bill for an increase in the cash award was still not mandatory. A scale was provided and reference could be made to it. The position, in practical terms, is exactly the same, as the hon. Member for Salford, West pointed out.
Hon. Gentlemen opposite will have noticed in this Bill the specific reference to the question of reinstatement. One of the express functions conferred on conciliation officers, for which provision is here made, is directly to try to promote the re-engagement of an employee who has been subject to unfair dismissal——
§ Mr. Harold WalkerI apologise to the hon. and learned Gentleman for the number of interruptions he is having to suffer. Does he recognise that there is a gulf between, on the one hand, the reinstatement provisions which appeared in the Labour Bill, and for which we are asking, and "re-engagement", which is the term he is using in this connection? "Re-engagement" means a new job. "Reinstatement" means going back to one's original job and continuing with it as if there had been no interruption. There is a great difference between the two.
§ The Solicitor-GeneralI wondered when someone would get round to that. Again, the order for reinstatement provided for in Clause 38 of the Labour Bill allowed, in the alternative, for the reinstatement order to be made in a different position—[Interruption.]—and the order for re-engagement under this Bill requires the tribunal to determine——
§ Mr. Walkerrose—
§ The Solicitor-GeneralThe hon. Gentleman must contain himself and allow me to finish a sentence or two.
1388 If one has a provision which entitles the tribunal to order reinstatement, either in the original job or in such other job as seems reasonable, then it is re-engagement by any other name——
§ The Solicitor-GeneralI hope that hon. Gentlemen opposite will allow me to make this point.
§ Mr. Walkerrose—
§ The Solicitor-GeneralI appreciate the hon. Gentleman's courtesy in wishing to interrupt me as little as possible, but I trust that he will listen for a moment to what I am saying.
The order for re-engagement under this Measure, on such terms as the tribunal considers reasonable, includes the concept of reinstatement—[HON. MEMBERS: "No".]—so we are arguing about a non-point. The tribunal would in each case have to consider what sort of remedy it should secure, at best supported by a cash sanction in the event of default by the employer.
You have been tolerant, Mr. Speaker, in allowing us to go this far in discussing a point which, by no stretch of the imagination, arises directly on this Amendment. Without discourtesy to the hon. Member for Doncaster (Mr. Harold Walker) and a number of hon. Gentlemen opposite who I know are particularly interested in this issue, I move on to the other topic we have been discussing.
The hon. and learned Member for Leith was supported by the hon. Member for Salford, West in saying that these provisions were complex, and we were told that the Scottish translation of "complex" was "legalistic quagmire". It is worth bearing in mind that these provisions dealing with unfair dismissal are contained in 11 Clauses in this Bill compared with 24 Clauses in the Labour Measure, with the same structure of remedies, simply because we wish to reduce the complexity of the legalism implicit in the former presentation. One of the first things I said when I saw the precedents laid out in the earlier Measure was, "Gracious me. Need we have 24 Clauses to deal with this? Can we achieve a reduction?"
There is a curious division on this issue among hon. Gentlemen opposite. 1389 The hon. Member for Salford, West and the hon. Member for Barrow-in-Furness (Mr. Booth) tend to reject the value of any pattern of tribunals or courts for determining the fairness or unfairness of a man's dismissal and believe that the only sort of sanction to which the worker should have resort is industrial action. I think I see the hon. Member for Sal-ford, West nodding his head in assent.
§ Mr. OrmeNo, though I am prepared to acknowledge that this is central to my argument. I do not say that it should be ruled out entirely. Perhaps there should be some sort of machinery which is independent of this Bill and of the State. In the main, however, I believe that this matter can be resolved only by trade unionism and by trade unionist support within the factory. To that extent, therefore, the hon. and learned Gentleman is correct.
§ The Solicitor-GeneralSo be it, but it is an approach which the House, almost in its entirety, rejects. [Interruption.] It is an approach which was rejected by the Labour Government and which the country rejects. One despairs of reducing the causes and quantity of industrial strife which takes place, to the disadvantage of the workers and the country, if one is to reject altogether the idea of setting up alternative machinery which can solve these matters without resort to industrial action.
The hon. Member for Midlothian (Mr. Eadie) explained how difficult it was, without such a procedure, to secure a remedy for a man wrongly or unfairly dismissed. He was supported in particular by the hon. and learned Member for Leith in the circumstances of a case in which a criminal charge had been brought and in which a verdict of not proven was returned, or there was an acquittal, by a jury——
§ Mr. EadieThe hon. and learned Gentleman will appreciate that as well as a jury, it might be a sheriff.
§ The Solicitor-GeneralBy all means—the magistrate, sheriff, jury, tribunal, court; the criminal court. I do not wish to be drawn into an exposure of my comparative ignorance of the terms of art used north of the Border. I have great respect for the Scottish legal system and we owe many of our recent reforms 1390 to what goes on there. I leave it there because I do not want to follow the hon. Gentleman into the heart of Midlothian on this subject.
With or without this machinery, it is difficult, as the hon. and learned Member for Leith knows from experience, to overcome this problem, and sometimes one would have to secure a situation in which one would attain reinstatement without compensation when negotiating as a trade union official. That is a possibility that the tribunal can recommend under this machinery, just as it could have done under the Labour Bill. In other words, it can do what it considers to be just to secure the redress of what was unfairly done to the worker.
In the situation postulated by the hon. and learned Member for Leith, in which the worker has been triumphantly acquitted by the sheriff or jury, the hon. Member for Midlothian would no doubt seek to negotiate reinstatement with full back pay. Equally, the tribunal would no doubt seek to do it; and under this Measure, as under the Labour Bill, it is free to do so.
§ The question is whether the power to extend the time within which a complaint may be brought would be sufficient, and the hon. and learned Member for Leith was right to raise this point. The wording relating to the power of the tribunal to extend the period for a complaint to be presented will be sufficient to deal with this.
§ It may be—I would have thought that this would happen—that the dismissed worker would give notice to his employer saying "I am up before the sheriff court, but I am not guilty. If you have sacked me on the strength of that, I have been unfairly dismissed", and his claim would be left in abeyance, no doubt until the criminal proceedings had been brought to an end. That is the way we would want it to work and how it should work.
§ I return to the remarks of the hon. Member for Barrow-in-Furness, in which there were three fundamental misconceptions. The Bill does nothing to prevent or restrain industrial action from being taken in support of a claim for the reinstatement of a dismissed worker, or by way of protest against his dismissal.
§ There is nothing to erode the right which the hon. Member for Salford, West regards as at the heart of trade unionism, 1391 save in a respect to which the hon. Member for Walton referred. He said that it would not be open to workers to promote unofficial strike action by way of protest against an unfair dismissal if, by so doing, they were breaking a no-strike clause in an enforceable agreement.
§ The hon. Gentleman went on to describe the right to take strike action in those circumstances as one of the basic rights of trade unionism. It is a sad, tragic and unnecessary picture. If a trade union has entered into an enforceable collective agreement providing for a proper grievance procedure in respect of a fair or unfair dismissal, which is no doubt what it would do, or if the State has provided this alternative machinery so that a worker who is being as he thinks unfairly dismissed can go to the tribunal and seek redress, it can no longer be claimed as a basic right of trade unionism to call unofficial strike action whether or not there is an agreement in existence to restrain it. To that extent certainly civilisation is intended to prevail, but not to the extent of destroying or removing anything resembling a basic right of trade unionism.
§ Mr. OrmeMay I enter a caveat here in regard to the industrial action? The Solicitor-General spoke as if we were welcoming it as the most marvellous thing. He must realise that workers will take action to defend someone who they think has been unfairly dismissed only if they see just cause for doing so. If a worker is properly dismissed, or if he does not think that he has been unfairly dismissed, the matter falls at that point. It is in the minority of cases in which workers feel that it is an anti-trade union activity or where a worker has been victimised for his industrial activity that workers take action. At that point there is no other way of redressing that grievance
§ The Solicitor-GeneralThe hon. Gentleman speaks sincerely about this. I acknowledge the significance of what he says. I appreciate that the most perfect system in the world, whether in terms of industrial relations or in any other sector, will never produce total justice in every case and will not satisfy every observer, particularly interested 1392 observers, that total justice has been arrived at.
What I am saying is that the machinery here proposed is an alternative to which the workers and their representatives can go to appeal against a dismissal and which should much more often than not, produce an answer which will satisfy them and, in that case, produce a situation which is infinitely to be preferred to the resort to industrial action. I should have thought that that at least is common ground.
§ Mr. BoothThe hon. and learned Gentleman's original contention went further than that he is now pressing. For a strike to take place, or even for the threat of a strike to be made which would enable discussions to take place before the man went out of the door, there would have to be a procedure agreement, enabling a strike to be called within the period of notice. In practice such procedure agreements do not exist in the vast majority of industries. Therefore, the alternative which is being offered is that of having the discussion at a court at a later date as opposed in practice, if there is strong feeling on the part of work mates, to having the discussion while the man is on the job. I contend that that is a vastly inferior alternative and not one greatly to be desired.
§ The Solicitor-GeneralAlmost every word that the hon. Gentleman utters is in support of our case. He says that procedure agreements do not exist for the discussion of such matters while the people remain at work. This is one of the deficiencies which we want to remedy. This is the point my right hon. Friend referred to in saying that he wished to encourage the evolution of procedure agreements designed to do that.
The whole object of this set of provisions is not to impede negotiation on an allegation in respect of unfair dismissal. On the contrary, the requirement for notice to the employer within four weeks and concurrent notice to the conciliation officer is designed expressly to bring a conciliation officer in to get the parties talking even when there is no procedure agreement to try to promote a peaceful settlement. It does not impede negotiations.
1393 The hon. Gentleman's third point, that the worker who has been dismissed should be presumed guilty once he has been sacked, is the precise opposite of the presumption which we laboured throughout last night and the first part of today to write into the Bill. It is now plain that the worker who has been dismissed has to be shown to have been fairly dismissed by the employer, and not the other way round.
6.15 p.m.
I do not wish to take a great deal of time in answering this, because I have already spent more than a few minutes on it. The real heart of the criticism of the Government here is that this period is too short and that it is evolved as a result of no consultation. The hon. Member for Dearne Valley (Mr. Edwin Wainwright) almost flattered me by suggesting in the tone of his argument that four weeks was a figure which was dreamed up out of the back of my head and that it was my pitiful lack of experience across the board of industry that had led to this bizarre figure being advanced.
That is absolute, if I may say so out of great respect to the hon. Gentleman, nonsense. The figure is one evolved from trying to be in line with comparable provisions in the Bill, it is longer than that contained in the last Government's Bill, and admittedly not founded on extensive consultation with the trade unions, to the regret of my right hon. Friend, as he has repeatedly said, but a perfectly reasonable period.
§ Mr. Edwin WainwrightWill the hon. and learned Gentleman get it into his mind that the Bill which was brought in by my right hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn (Mrs. Castle) never faced the trade union movement in the Parliamentary Labour Party when we were in government? We should have argued as strongly against that part of that Bill as we are doing against this one, so the 15-day period would never have gone through.
§ The Solicitor-GeneralI entirely accept that. I fully see that the Bill which was introduced, I think only days before the last General Election was announced, had not been subject to the scrutiny either within or outside the Houses of Parliament. The only interesting reflection I have on that is that if even that non- 1394 contentious Bill which was entirely acceptable to the Labour movement, as the hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton said, was likely to provoke as many Amendments of that kind on representations by the hon. Member and his hon. Friends, how many Amendments in all would that modest, non-contentious Bill have provoked; and how far is it justifiable to criticise the present Government for our willingness to respond to representations and to introduce and support Amendments as we are now doing?
§ Mr. HefferThe hon. and learned Gentleman must not constantly assert that I said that the Bill was acceptable to the Labour movement, not in the context in which he is raising the question. I certainly said that the Bill was acceptable in the main to the Labour movement but that it would need to be revised and changed in the course of its progress through the House of Commons. That was the caveat I entered. The hon. and learned Gentleman must not put words into my mouth as though that Bill would have been in its entirety completely acceptable without amendment.
§ The Solicitor-GeneralIt is manifest from this discussion that it would not have been entirely acceptable. The only point I am seeking to make from that is that it ill lies in the mouths of hon. Members opposite to criticise us for having introduced this Bill when even their own Bill would, as they say, have been subject to many amendments.
§ Mr. Harold WalkerOn a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. Is it in order for the hon. and learned Gentleman repeatedly to waste the time of the House by making references to a Bill which is not and which was not before the House? We are debating the Government's Bill and it is their Bill that they must be answerable for. We are not answerable for a Bill which is not under debate in the House.
§ Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Robert Grant-Ferris)With the utmost good humour, may I say that it ill-becomes Opposition Members to raise points of order of that kind when the Chair has been fairly lenient with them. We shall come to a conclusion fairly soon now on this matter and I do not think that 1395 the hon. Gentleman should tax the Solicitor-General with being unfair.
§ The Solicitor-GeneralSimply on the question of the length of the notice, the practical point is that, if a man has been dismissed and if the intention of all sides of the House is to secure a quick remedy for that, it is obviously in everybody's interests for the claim to be got to the bargaining table as quickly as possible. The idea of discussion should be promoted as soon as may be. That is the object of this. If the House recollects, under Clause 142 it is the function of the conciliation officer so soon as the matter is reported to him to try to promote re-engagement. The sooner that is done as a matter of ordinary course the better. That is the point that was made by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. Waddington). He said that it was important to get the parties together quickly. The hon. Member for Midlothian said that they had to get together as quickly as possible. It will be recalled that the hon. and learned Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. Peter Archer) secured the introduction into Clause I of the words "expeditious and" before the words "orderly procedures". That is why we have a short period before notice is given, but capable of being renewed, and this is the substance of these Amendments.
§ Mr. Ronald King MurrayThe Solicitor-General mentioned Clause 1 which contains the word "re-engagement". May I take him back to what he said in answer to a previous point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Doncaster (Mr. Harold Walker) concerning "re-engagement" in comparison with "reinstatement"? The Solicitor-General referred to Clause 111(4)(b) in that connection. If one looks at that subsection, however, one finds that it says:
if the tribunal or Court finds that the reason for which the recommendation was not complied with was that the employer in question refused or failed to make such an offer …That must be an offer of re-engagement.If "re-engagement" is to be taken in that context, it seems to me that the Solicitor-General's answer to my hon. Friend the Member for Doncaster will not do. There is a difference between re- 1396 engagement and reinstatement. A re-engagement can be for a considerable time after the original job has ceased—that is, after dismissal. The difference between that and reinstatement is quite obvious. An offer of reinstatement must be an offer of restitution at that date. Re-engagement cannot be raised to that level, so far as I can see. Compensation given under Clause 111(4)(b) can never reach the level of reinstatement.
§ The Solicitor-GeneralI am slightly at a loss. A moment or two ago I was denounced by the hon. Member for Doncaster for discussing provisions in the last Government's Bill, and now the hon. Member for Edinburgh, Leith invites me to go back to it. There is a similar variable in the last Government's Bill. The amount of interim compensation which could have been awarded for that period was also in the discretion of the tribunal.
I say one thing more. Several hon. Members have discussed the availability or non-availability of legal aid in this context. The hon. Member for Norwood (Mr. John Fraser) compared the existence of remedies in respect of wrongful dismissal, which will still be available, in the situation of the worker who is dismissed in breach of contract. But the machinery that we are seeking to set up and maintain for the resolution of these unfair dismissals is deliberately designed to discourage legalisation and legalism. We do not wish to give open-ended encouragement or make provision for the introduction of lawyers into this kind of machinery.
There has been no evidence of any growing reluctance by workers to bring redundancy claims. It is for this reason that we have provided the alternative machinery of the conciliation officer, the same kind of person who intervenes in a case brought under the Race Relations Act. There is no direct legal access for the aggrieved party on these points. The worker who claims unfair dismissal has his case referred to the conciliation officer. If that does not work, he goes on to the tribunal. He may be represented by a trade union official. He can have the total resources of his union at his disposal. That will be one of the powerful arguments in favour of union membership rather than any semidetached relationship.
1397 In this kind of way the balance of the remedies which we have discussed at great length is, I suggest, entirely right. Certainly the Amendments that we are discussing have not been put up as candidates for dismissal by anyone on the other side of the House. They may not think the Amendments go as far as they
§ would like, but no argument has been advanced as to why the House should reject them.
§ Question put, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment:
§ The House divided: Ayes 274, Noes 231.
1401| Division No. 455.] | AYES | [6.25 p.m. |
| Adley, Robert | Elliott, R. W. (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, N.) | Kilfedder, James |
| Alison, Michael (Barkston Ash) | Emery, Peter | King, Evelyn (Dorset, S.) |
| Allason, Jame (Hemel Hempstead) | Eyre, Reginald | King, Tom (Bridgwater) |
| Amery, Rt. Hn. Julian | Farr, John | Kinsey, J. R. |
| Archer, Jeffrey (Louth) | Fell, Anthony | Kirk, Peter |
| Astor, John | Fenner, Mrs. Peggy | Kitson, Timothy |
| Atkins, Humphrey | Fidler, Michael | Knox, David |
| Awdry, Daniel | Finsberg, Geoffrey (Hampstead) | Lambton, Antony |
| Baker, Kenneth (St. Marylebone) | Fisher, Nigel (Surbiton) | Lane, David |
| Baker, W. H. K. (Banff) | Fookes, Miss Janet | Langford-Holt, Sir John |
| Balniel, Lord | Fortescue, Tim | Legge-Bourke, Sir Harry |
| Barber, Rt. Hn. Anthony | Foster, Sir John | Le Marchant, Spencer |
| Batsford, Brian | Fowler, Norman | Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland) |
| Beamish, Col. Sir Tufton | Fox, Marcus | Lloyd, Ian (P'tsm'th, Langstone) |
| Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torquay) | Fraser, Rt. Hn. Hugh (St'fford & Stone) | Longden, Gilbert |
| Benyon, W. | Fry, Peter | Loveridge, John |
| Berry, Hn. Anthony | Galbraith, Hn. T. G. | Luce, R. N. |
| Biffen, John | Gardner, Edward | McAdden, Sir Stephen |
| Biggs-Davison, John | Gibson-Watt, David | MacArthur, Ian |
| Blaker, Peter | Gilmour, Ian (Norfolk, C.) | McCrindle, R. A. |
| Boardman, Tom (Leicester, S.W.) | Gilmour, Sir John (Fife, E.) | McLaren, Martin |
| Body, Richard | Glyn, Dr. Alan | Maclean, Sir Fitzroy |
| Boscawen, Robert | Godber, Rt. Hn. J. B. | McMaster, Stanley |
| Bossom, Sir Clive | Goodhart, Philip | Macmillan, Maurice (Farnham) |
| Bowden, Andrew | Goodhew, Victor | McNair-Wilson, Michael |
| Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hn. John | Gorst, John | McNair-Wilson, Patrick (NewForest) |
| Braine, Bernard | Gower, Raymond | Maddan, Martin |
| Bray, Ronald | Grant, Anthony (Harrow, C.) | Madel, David |
| Brewis, John | Gray, Hamish | Maginnis, John E. |
| Brinton, Sir Tatton | Green, Alan | Marten, Neil |
| Brocklebank-Fowler, Christopher | Grieve, Percy | Mather, Carol |
| Brown, Sir Edward (Bath) | Grimond, Rt. Hn. J. | Maude, Angus |
| Bruce-Gardyne, J. | Grylls, Michael | Mawby, Ray |
| Bryan, Paul | Gummer, Selwyn | Maxwell-Hyslop, R. J. |
| Buchanan-Smith, Alick (Angus, N & M) | Gurden, Harold | Meyer, Sir Anthony |
| Buck, Antony | Hall, Miss Joan (Keighley) | Mills, Peter (Torrington) |
| Bullus, Sir Eric | Hall, John (Wycombe) | Mitchell, Lt.-Col. C. (Aberdeenshire, W) |
| Burden, F. A. | Hall-Davis, A. G. F. | Mitchell, David (Basingstoke) |
| Butler, Adam (Bosworth) | Hamilton, Michael (Salisbury) | Moate, Roger |
| Carlisle, Mark | Hannam, John (Exeter) | Molyneaux, James |
| Carr, Rt. Hn. Robert | Harrison, Col. Sir Harwood (Eye) | Money, Ernie |
| Channon, Paul | Haselhurst, Alan | Monks, Mrs. Connie |
| Chapman, Sydney | Havers, Michael | Monro, Hector |
| Chichester-Clark, R. | Hawkins, Paul | Montgomery, Fergus |
| Churchill, W. S. | Hayhoe, Barney | More, Jasper |
| Clark, William (Surrey, E.) | Hicks, Robert | Morgan-Giles, Rear-Adm. |
| Clarke, Kenneth (Rushcliffe) | Higgins, Terence L. | Morrison, Charles (Devizes) |
| Cockeram, Eric | Hiley, Joseph | Mudd, David |
| Cooke, Robert | Hill, John E. B. (Norfolk, S.) | Murton, Oscar |
| Coombs, Derek | Hill, James (Southampton, Test) | Neave, Airey |
| Corfield, Rt. Hn. Frederick | Holt, Miss Mary | Noble, Rt. Hn. Michael |
| Cormack, Patrick | Hooson, Emlyn | Normanton, Tom |
| Costain, A. P. | Hordern, Peter | Nott, John |
| Critchley, Julian | Hornby, Richard | Onslow, Cranley |
| Crouch, David | Hornsby-Smith, Rt. Hn. Dame Patricia | Oppenheim, Mrs. Sally |
| Curran, Charles | Howe, Hn. Sir Geoffrey (Reigate) | Orr, Capt. L. P. S. |
| d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir Henry | Howell, David (Guildford) | Osborn, John |
| d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Maj.-Gen. James | Howell, Ralph (Norfolk, N.) | Owen, Idris (Stockport, N.) |
| Dean, Paul | Hunt, John | Page, Graham (Crosby) |
| Deedes, Rt. Hn. W. F. | Hutchison, Michael Clark | Page, John (Harrow, W.) |
| Dixon, Piers | Iremonger, T. L. | Parkinson, Cecil (Enfield, W.) |
| Dodds-Parker, Douglas | James, David | Peel, John |
| Drayson, G. B. | Jessel, Toby | Percival, Ian |
| du Cann, Rt. Hn. Edward | Johnson Smith, G. (E. Grinstead) | Pink, R. Bonner |
| Dykes, Hugh | Jopling, Michael | Pounder, Rafton |
| Eden, Sir John | Kaberry, Sir Donald | Powell, Rt. Hn. J. Enoch |
| Edwards, Nicholas (Pembroke) | Kellett-Bowman, Mrs. Elaine | Proudfoot, Wilfred |
| Elliot, Capt. Walter (Carshalton) | Kershaw, Anthony | Pym, Rt. Hn. Francis |
| Quennell, Miss J. M. | Soref, Harold | Vaughan, Dr. Gerard |
| Raison, Timothy | Spence, John | Vickers, Dame Joan |
| Rawlinson, Rt. Hn. Sir Peter | Sproat, Iain | Waddington, David |
| Redmond, Robert | Stanbrook, Ivor | Walder, David (Clitheroe) |
| Reed, Laurance (Bolton, E.) | Stewart-Smith, D. G. (Belper) | Walker, Rt. Hn. Peter (Worcester) |
| Rees-Davies, W. R. | Stodart, Anthony (Edinburgh, W.) | Walker-Smith, Rt. Hn. Sir Derek |
| Renton, Rt. Hn. Sir David | Stoddart-Scott, Col. Sir M. | Walters, Dennis |
| Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon | Stokes, John | Ward, Dame Irene |
| Ridley, Hn. Nicholas | Stuttaford, Dr. Tom | Weatherill, Bernard |
| Ridsdale, Julian | Sutcliffe, John | Wells, John (Maidstone) |
| Roberts, Wyn (Conway) | Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne) | White, Roger (Gravesend) |
| Rodgers, Sir John (Sevenoaks) | Taylor, Edward M. (G'gow, Cathcart) | Whitelaw, Rt. Hn. William |
| Rossi, Hugh (Hornsey) | Taylor, Frank (Moss Side) | Wiggin, Jerry |
| Rost, Peter | Tebbit, Norman | Wilkinson, John |
| Russell, Sir Ronald | Temple, John M. | Wolrige-Gordon, Patrick |
| St. John-Stevas, Norman | Thatcher, Rt. Hn. Mrs. Margaret | Wood, Rt. Hn. Richard |
| Scott, Nicholas | Thomas, John Stradling (Monmouth) | Woodhouse, Hn. Christopher |
| Scott-Hopkins, James | Thomas, Rt. Hn. Peter (Hendon, S.) | Woodnutt, Mark |
| Sharples, Richard | Thorpe, Rt. Hn. Jeremy | Worsley, Marcus |
| Shaw, Michael (Sc'b'gh & Whitby) | Tilney, John | Wylie, Rt. Hn. N. R. |
| Shelton, William (Clapham) | Trafford, Dr. Anthony | |
| Simeons, Charles | Trew, Peter | TELLERS FOR THE AYES: |
| Sinclair, Sir George | Tugendhat, Christopher | Mr. Keith Speed and |
| Skeet, T. H. H. | Turton, Rt. Hn. Sir Robin | Mr. Walter Clegg. |
| Smith, Dudley (W'wick & L'mington) | Van Straubezee, W. R. | |
| NOES | ||
| Albu, Austen | Duffy, A. E. P. | Jones, Barry (Flint, E.) |
| Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.) | Eadie, Alex | Jones, Dan (Burnley) |
| Allen, Scholefield | Edelman, Maurice | Jones, Rt. Hn. Sir Elwyn (W.Ham, S.) |
| Archer, Peter (Rowley Regis) | Edwards, Robert (Bilston) | Jones, Gwynoro (Carmarthen) |
| Ashley, Jack | Edwards, William (Merioneth) | Jones, T. Alec (Rhondda, W.) |
| Ashton, Joe | Ellis, Tom | Kaufman, Gerald |
| Atkinson, Norman | English, Michael | Kelly, Richard |
| Bagier, Gordon A. T. | Evans, Fred | Kerr, Russell |
| Barnett, Guy (Greenwich) | Faulds, Andrew | Kinnock, Neil |
| Barnett, Joel | Fernyhough, Rt. Hn. E. | Lambie, David |
| Beaney, Alan | Fisher, Mrs. Doris (B'ham, Ladywood) | Latham, Arthur |
| Benn, Rt. Hn. Anthony Wedgwood | Fitch, Alan (Wigan) | Lawson, George |
| Bennett, James (Glasgow, Bridgeton) | Fletcher, Ted (Darlington) | Leadbitter, Ted |
| Bidwell, Sydney | Foley, Maurice | Lee, Rt. Hn. Frederick |
| Bishop, E. S. | Foot, Michael | Leonard, Dick |
| Blenkinsop, Arthur | Ford, Ben | Lever, Rt. Hn. Harold |
| Boardman, H. (Leigh) | Forrester, John | Lewis, Arthur (W. Ham, N.) |
| Booth, Albert | Fraser, John (Norwood) | Lewis, Ron (Carlisle) |
| Bottomley, Rt. Hn. Arthur | Freeson, Reginald | Lipton, Marcus |
| Boyden, James (Bishop Auckland) | Galpern, Sir Myer | Loughlin, Charles |
| Bradley, Tom | Garrett, W. E. | Lyon, Alexander W. (York) |
| Brown, Hugh D. (G'gow, Provan) | Gilbert, Dr. John | Lyons, Edward (Bradford, E.) |
| Brown, Ronald (Shoreditch & F'bury) | Ginsburg, David | Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson |
| Buchan, Norman | Golding, John | McBride, Neil |
| Buchanan, Richard (G'gow, Sp'burn) | Gordon Walker, Rt. Hn. P. C. | McCartney, Hugh |
| Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green) | Gourlay, Harry | McGuire, Michael |
| Grant, George (Morpeth) | Mackenzie, Gregor | |
| Callaghan, Rt. Hn. James | Grant, John D. (Islington, E.) | Mackie, John |
| Cant, R. B. | Griffiths, Eddie (Brightside) | Maclennan, Robert |
| Carmichael, Neil | Hamilton, James (Bothwell) | McMillan, Tom (Glasgow, C.) |
| Carter-Jones, Lewis (Eccles) | Hamilton, William (Fife, W.) | McNamara, J. Kevin |
| Castle, Rt. Hn. Barbara | Hamling, William | Mallalieu, J. P. W. (Huddersfield, E.) |
| Clark, David (Colne Valley) | Hannan, William (G'gow, Maryhill) | Marks, Kenneth |
| Cocks, Michael (Bristol, S.) | Hardy, Peter | Marquand, David |
| Coleman, Donald | Harrison, Walter (Wakefield) | Marsden, F. |
| Conlan, Bernard | Hart, Rt. Hn. Judith | Marshall, Dr. Edmund |
| Corbet, Mrs. Freda | Hattersley, Roy | Mason, Rt. Hn. Roy |
| Cox, Thomas (Wandsworth, C.) | Healey, Rt. Hn. Denis | Meacher, Michael |
| Crawshaw, Richard | Heffer, Eric S. | Mellish, Rt. Hn. Robert |
| Cunningham, G. (Islington, S.W.) | Horam, John | Mendelson, John |
| Dalyell, Tam | Houghton, Rt. Hn. Douglas | Millan, Bruce |
| Darling, Rt. Hn. George | Howell, Denis (Small Heath) | Miller, Dr. M. S. |
| Davidson, Arthur | Huckfield, Leslie | Milne, Edward (Blyth) |
| Davies, G. Elfed (Rhondda, E.) | Hughes, Mark (Durham) | Mitchell, R. C. (S'hampton, Itchen) |
| Davies, Ifor (Gower) | Hughes, Robert (Aberdeen, N.) | Molloy, William |
| Davies, S. O. (Merthyr Tydvil) | Hughes, Roy (Newport) | Morris, Alfred (Wythenshawe) |
| Davis, Clinton (Hackney, C.) | Hunter, Adam | Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw) |
| Davis, Terry (Bromsgrove) | Irvine, Rt. Hn. Sir Arthur (Edge Hill) | Morris, Rt. Hn. John (Aberavon) |
| de Freitas, Rt. Hn. Sir Geoffrey | Janner, Greville | Moyle, Roland |
| Delargy, H. J. | Jay, Rt. Hn. Douglas | Mulley, Rt. Hn. Frederick |
| Dell, Rt. Hn. Edmund | Jeger, Mrs. Lena (H'b'n & St. P'Cras, S.) | Murray, Ronald King |
| Dempsey, James | Jenkins, Hugh (Putney) | Ogden, Eric |
| Doig, Peter | Jenkins, Rt. Hn. Roy (Stechford) | O'Halloran, Michael |
| Douglas, Dick (Stirlingshire, E.) | John, Brynmor | O'Malley, Brian |
| Douglas-Mann, Bruce | Johnson, Carol (Lewisham, S.) | Oram, Bert |
| Driberg, Tom | Johnson, Walter (Derby, S.) | Orme, Stanley |
| Oswald, Thomas | Roper, John | Tinn, James |
| Owen, Dr. David (Plymouth, Sutton) | Rose, Paul B. | Tomney, Frank |
| Paget, R. T. | Sandelson, Neville | Torney, Tom |
| Palmer, Arthur | Sheldon, Robert (Ashton-under-Lyne) | Urwin, T. W. |
| Pannell, Rt. Hn. Charles | Shore, Rt. Hn. Peter (Stepney) | Varley, Eric G. |
| Parker, John (Dagenham) | Short, Mrs. Renée (W'hampton, N.E.) | Wainwright, Edwin |
| Parry, Robert (Liverpool, Exchange) | Silkin, Hn. S. C. (Dulwich) | Walker, Harold (Doncaster) |
| Peart, Rt. Hn. Fred | Silverman, Julius | Wallace, George |
| Pendry, Tom | Skinner, Dennis | Watkins, David |
| Pentland, Norman | Small, William | Weitzman, David |
| Perry, Ernest G. | Smith, John (Lanarkshire, N.) | Wells, William (Walsall, N.) |
| Prentice, Rt. Hn. Reg. | Spearing, Nigel | Whitehead, Phillip |
| Prescott, John | Spriggs, Leslie | Willey, Rt. Hn. Frederick |
| Price, J. T. (Westhoughton) | Stallard, A. W. | Williams, Alan (Swansea, W.) |
| Probert, Arthur | Stoddart, David (Swindon) | Williams, Mrs. Shirley (Hitchin) |
| Reed, D. (Sedgefield) | Storehouse, Rt. Hn. John | Wilson, Alexander (Hamilton) |
| Rees, Merlyn (Leeds, S.) | Strang, Gavin | Wilson, William (Coventry, S.) |
| Rhodes, Geoffrey | Summerskill, Hn. Dr. Shirley | Woof, Robert |
| Richard, Ivor | Taverne, Dick | |
| Roberts, Albert (Normanton) | Thomas, Rt. Hn. George (Cardiff.W.) | TELLERS FOR THE NOES: |
| Roberts, Rt. Hn. Goronwy (Caernarvon) | Thomas, Jeffrey (Abertillery) | Mr. Joseph Harper and |
| Robertson, John (Paisley) | Thomson, Rt. Hn. G. (Dundee, E.) | Mr. Ernest Armstrong. |
| Rodgers, William (Stockton-on-Tees) |
§ Subsequent Lords Amendments agreed to.