DEFENCE

HC Deb 27 February 1964 vol 690 cc685-769

Question again proposed, That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question.

6.15 p.m.

Sir A. V. Harvey

As I was saying just before we were summoned to another place, I am certain that the Ministers who are taking part in the debate are putting forward views based on the best advice obtainable in their respective Services and the Ministry of Defence, adding their own views, but mainly on that advice.

I was disappointed by the very long speech of the right hon. Member for Belper. He said that a Labour Govern- ment would see that Britain was defended, but he did not say how. Whether this is an election year or not —and I agree with the right hon. Member for Easington that whether we have the TSR2 or something else will not be a major issue—the British people will be concerned about the broader aspect of affairs and will want to know how Britain is to be defended.

We were not told a word about that by the right hon. Member for Belper. He said that Britain would be loyal to N.A.T.O. Have not the Government been loyal to N.A.T.O.? We have handed over our V-bomber force almost in its entirety. He said that a Labour Government would be even more loyal to the Western Alliance than the present Government, but I do not see how that could be done.

On the other hand, the speech of my right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence yesterday was of a very high order. He set out the case for the Government very well. During the last year we have had speeches from hon. Members opposite saying that if in an emergency we were called upon to carry out a local operation, our Regular forms would not be able to do so, because they would be too stretched. But, in fact, since Christmas, our forces have operated in Cyprus and East Africa and Indonesia and, so far, our forces in Germany have not been touched. Even if they were transferred, I would have no objection, for I believe that we have every right to draw upon British forces in Germany if they can play a more important rôle elsewhere.

This is where mobility comes in. The troops and their officers have done an exceptionally fine job and everybody in the country is proud of them. In Cyprus, not a shot has been fired by them in anger. What they have achieved has been remarkable. I should like to know how long it will take the United Nations to make a decision. We were told that should go to the United Nations and ask to be relieved of our burden in Cyprus. The issue has been discussed there for days and it looks as though Britain will be saddled with this burden for some time to come. We must expect some help from the alliance in this Cyprus problem, which is costly, apart from anything else.

The troops have been moved exceptionally expeditiously, but I should like mobility to be still further improved. Transport Command has done well, but it has much old equipment and has to use aircraft which need to make intermediate landings. Greater mobility means a saving in numbers and costs. With proper mobility, troops in Germany can be reinforced from Salisbury Plain, and the average soldier is better living at home than in Germany. When will Transport Command get the new types of aircraft, the VC10 and the Belfast? When will these aircraft be in squadron use?

It would be a brave man who would underestimate the usefulness of the manned aircraft. There has been considerable rethinking on this issue both in the United States and this country during the last year or two. I foresee many years of useful life for the manned aircraft. The TSR2 is an important piece of equipment for the Royal Air Force. It was designed as a tactical strike reconnaissance bomber.

In debate after debate the Opposition have made speeches which seem to show that they do not like it. I do not know why. I know that it is costly, and nobody likes heavy expenditure. Nevertheless, a lot is going into this aircraft. There is nothing of a similar type, which is so far advanced, anywhere else in the world. I understand that it has had its engine and resonance tests, and will be undertaking its first flight in the next few weeks. It is able to fly at 200 ft., at a fantastic speed, without the pilot having to operate the controls. The pilots will have to be very brave men, and I am sure that they will be. The black boxes used by the TSR2 have already been tried in the Canberra bombers. This is not something new. All the forms of control have been tried out.

There is a bonus in this aircraft, in that it has a strategic rôle, since it can carry a nuclear weapon. This will give new life to the Royal Air Force, and will add to the deterrent when Polaris comes into being.

My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Air spoke at some length about the capability of our V-bombers. I ask hon. Members opposite not to belittle these aircraft and their crews. They are undoubtedly the best bombers in the world today, and they are probably manned by the best crews. Our friends in Omaha are willing to admit that these aircraft are far superior to theirs. They are capable of flying very low. Their engines are built in, whereas the engines of the American aircraft are underslung. These aircraft will cost £1 million each, but it will be impossible for any country to put up a defence against them. No. country could scatter its air defences all over its territory without bankrupting itself. It just is not on. While that is so our V-bomber force has a real capability as a deterrent.

I would ask hon. Members opposite to visit Bomber Command, and the bomber squadrons. I am sure that they would be able to obtain permission to go there and talk to the crews. Much can be learnt without infringing the Official Secrets Acts. While I am on that point, I suggest that the House should be told considerably more than it is at present. Yesterday, my right hon. Friend made some announcements about the new types of Phantom aircraft for the Navy. I see why, on this occasion, it is right for us to order an American aircraft, and the aircraft do have British engines. Nevertheless, it is unfortunate that the Americans never order British aircraft. I would like to see a certain amount of "horse trading" in this respect. British equipment might even be sold to the N.A.T.O. countries, for once.

I should like to know how many Phantom aircraft have been ordered. Or is it a secret? I have no doubt that we shall read it next week in detail in the American aviation magazines. We do not expect to be told the exact numbers, or the exact details of performance, but even much of that information is obtainable. I ask my right hon. Friend to be more forthcoming and to take the House into his confidence. The Russians will know all about this before the House of Commons does. We should be given more of this preliminary information.

We have been told that the British Polaris programme is to be increased, to the extent of five submarines. I welcome that announcement. Speaking in the defence debate of a year ago, I said that to be effective the force would need six or eight submarines. However, I understand that these submarines carry 16 weapons each, and if they have the degree of accuracy that we are told they have, even three of them at sea would be a formidable force.

Mr. David Devine, writing in the Sunday Times, said: The only opponents of Polaris today appear to be the Labour Party, who have yet to declare without equivocation what they would do with it". We have been told that a Labour Government would renegotiate the Polaris agreement. That is not good enough. The Opposition must be more forthcoming if they are to convince the electorate that they are sincere in this matter. At the moment, the detection of the Polaris weapon seems remote, but in time detection of these submarines may be brought about by the laser light, or similar means. In the unlikely event of that taking place, the TSR2 might be an insurance.

If we are to have the Polaris submarine as part of our deterrent, I should like to know what is being done about oceanic research. I question whether we can do much to discover what is at the bottom of the oceans. Like the Russians, our American friends are spending vast sums on this form of research, and I should like to know whether they are informing us of their discoveries. I feel that at present the interchange of information is a one-way traffic. I should like to be assured that we are getting this information from the United States.

We are told that the French are building a Polaris type of submarine, and are also adapting the Mirage bomber to carry a nuclear weapon. If General de Gaulle lives long enough to build his submarines and bombers it will be a serious matter if the British have then not got a deterrent. It is important that we should have it. If we give it up tomorrow it will not make an iota of difference to General de Gaulle or the Chinese. All that would happen is that we would be placed in an inferior position.

It is no good hon. Members opposite talking about "the chair at the top of the table." This problem goes much deeper than that. I am concerned about the future. What we must achieve is real disarmament, and to do that we shall have to proceed by negotiation, step by step. I am sure that Britain can play a bigger part in these negotiations if she has a deterrent. I have on many occasions seen Britain bring her influence to bear. In Indo-China, a year or two ago, she virtually prevented the spread of war. Britain can bring a tremendous influence to bear. While we have a negotiations liaison with the Strategic Air Force, although we are not equals we are considered by the Americans to be worth-while partners. At least, the Americans to whom I have spoken think so.

Our five Polaris submarines will take considerable manning and maintenance. Are we satisfied that sufficient is being done to get the right men and to train them, even in the five or six years available, to the high degree of efficiency that is required? Recruitment is not good. There are so many industrial openings available for our young men that a special reason is needed before any of them wants to join the Services. It may be a desire to travel. In any event, it will probably become increasingly difficult to recruit young men. Today the pay in the Armed Forces is almost comparable to that in industry. Nevertheless, this problem will continue to confront us. It was suggested yesterday that it would help if we had more married quarters for our young men. I should like to know whether the Government think that we shall have the men available to man the submarines when they come into operation.

I read somewhere that the right hon. Member for Belper was of the opinion that the Polaris weapon was 2,500 times more powerful than the bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima. If that is true, five submarines will probably be sufficient to do the job that we have in mind. The whole purpose of the deterrent is not to use it; if it were to be used both sides would be finished. The right hon. Gentleman has said that our V-bombers have not yet gone to war, or been involved in the threat of war. Neither have the American Polaris submarines, but the Americans are satisfied that they are effective.

Hon. Members opposite are now trying to persuade the country that they are fairly well together on questions relating to defence, and that they would be quite happy to leave the defence of this country to the Americans. That is all right as far as it goes, but in that case they should remember that the Americans would wish to retain their aircraft bases in Britain and also their nuclear submarine base in Holy Loch. I should like to know whether hon. Members opposite are united in the view that the Americans should be allowed to retain their submarine base in Holy Loch. I question whether they are. Those hon. Members who sit on the back benches opposite are not in their places at the moment, but I should like to hear from them how they feel about this matter. They should let the country know what they think.

I know that hon. Members on this side of the House have their differences, but we are nothing like as divided on important matters involving the defence of our country as are the members of the Labour Party. I see that the hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes) has just entered the Chamber. I should like to know whether, in the unlikely event of his party coming to power, he would he happy to see the Americans continuing to operate their nuclear submarines from Holy Loch. Would the hon. Member welcome that, if the Labour Party were in power? The hon. Gentleman does not seem to understand my question.

Mr. R. T. Paget (Northampton)

The hon. Member for Macclesfield (Sir A. V. Harvey) should not "pull that gag" after the speech yesterday of his right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Hall Green (Mr. Aubrey Jones).

Sir A. V. Harvey

My right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Hall Green (Mr. Aubrey Jones) comes to the House—I wish that he were present this afternoon—every six or eight weeks and makes a speech against the Government—

Mr. Paget

And a very good one, too.

Sir A. V. Harvey

—but it is interesting to note that when my right hon. Friend was Minister of Supply he ordered the very weapons which he now wishes to get rid of.

Mr. Emrys Hughes (South Ayrshire)

rose—

Sir A. V. Harvey

I shall be interested to see how my right hon. Friend votes tonight and what he will put in his election address if he stands again for Hall Green.

Mr. Emrys Hughes

I merely wanted to ask the hon. Member for Macclesfield (Sir A. V. Harvey) whether he would be quite so enthusiastic about Polaris bases if he had them in his constituency, in view of the increase in the illegitimate birth rate and in the incidence of venereal disease?

Sir A. V. Harvey

I understand what the hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes) is doing. He is evading my real question. Unfortunately, at Macclesfield we have only a canal. The hon. Gentleman is evading the question.

Reference has been made to helicopters. I hope that when my right hon. Friend considers this matter he will try to give a break to Short Bros. and Harland. The Government own 25 per cent. of that company. I have no axe to grind regarding the type of helicopter to be ordered, but I hope that Northern Ireland will get a break, all things being equal. More trouble has occurred in Indonesia this week. Things seem to be "brewing up" there again, and in that area men are useless without helicopters. They are almost as important as guns. It would be of no avail to send out 9,000 men to strengthen the forces there without providing helicopters. It has been said that we shall be short of helicopter pilots. I suggest that more use be made of Royal Marines as pilots. It is a job which they could do very well.

Unified control is something which will have to be considered by my right hon. Friend. With the new set-up at the Ministry of Defence, weapons are becoming more costly and complex. Today, it is impossible to estimate the cost of some of the more complicated weapons before the start of a project. The Government should make more use of civilian accountants to act as overseers of production. They would not be able to watch every detail, but they might succeed in preventing some problems from arising. Highly qualified accountants could act in liaison with the technical men.

Better arrangements for formulating requirements for future weapons are necessary. I hope that my right hon. Friend will bring this about for the three Services. There must be financial control. We have been told what has happened recently, but, as an inquiry is being held, I cannot go into that now. There must be rigid financial control right down to a comparatively low level in the Ministry. I doubt whether my right hon. Friend has that control at present. If not, he should do everything possible to obtain it.

We talk about the enormous defence expenditure, amounting to £2,000 million. But nearly £650 million is spent on pay and I am glad that it is because, it is right that men should be paid the proper rate. A sum of £56 million goes in moving units and families and individual stores. But if my right hon. Friend really wishes to encourage recruitment, he should do something about pensions. After great pressure from hon. Members an improvement has been made in the pensions awarded to widows. But the whole question of pensions reviewing. A captain or a sergeant who retired in the 1930s would today be old men and would find it extremely difficult to live on their meagre pensions.

I am sure that it is right that we should have a professional fighting force even though there may be a small deficiency in its numbers. I am not belittling the part which was played by the National Service men, but it took a great many professionals to teach them during the short period of service which they did. I should like to know from the Leader of the Opposition what is the "form" regarding a multi-national force. We read that the right hon. Member for Smethwick (Mr. Gordon Walker) denied statements which he was said to have made in America. He said that the door should be left open and we should like to know what he meant by that.

We are told the same thing about nationalisation. May we be told a little more of what is meant by right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite and whether they are for or against a multi-national force?

Mr. Mulley

Perhaps I can help the hon. Gentleman. if the Government have been unable to make up their mind, they having access to all the information and having participated in the talks which have taken place, it is a little hard to expect the Opposition to come down hard and fast on this matter. Although my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition has made it clear from such information as we have, we think that a multi-national force is not a good idea.

Sir A. V. Harvey

All the same, it would appear that the Leader of the Opposition and the Shadow Foreign Secretary do not seem to be in step on this matter. It will be interesting to see how it progresses.

This debate arises from a Motion of censure by the Opposition. I noticed last night that when the debate was being wound up from the Opposition Front Bench by the hon. and learned Member ror Northampton (Mr. Paget) there were only three or four other hon. Members on the benches opposite. If the Labour Party is concerned about the defence of Britain it is deplorable that only three or four hon. Members of the Opposition should have been present. The fact is that hon. Members opposite are trying to drag up every little hit of "dirt" against the Government as a build-up before the General Election. But I am convinced that the people of Britain have seen throne, this; they realise that there is a "one-man-band" which is doing everything for hon. Members opposite. The debate has revealed the fallacy of what they are trying to put over to the country.

6.36 p.m.

Mr. Roy Jenkins (Birmingham, Stechford)

The hon. Member for Macclesfield (Sir A. V. Harvey) is a considerable expert on detailed questions of weapons and we listen to him on those subjects with interest. But when he comes to deal with the wider issue of the British deterrent—which attracts us all like a magnet at some stage in our speeches in these debates—I think that the logical structure of his argument was a great deal looser even than that of the arguments which we have heard from some other hon. Members opposite.

I noticed particularly that when the hon. Member was trying to deal with his right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Hall Green (Mr. Aubrey Jones) he made no attempt to answer the powerful argument which was advanced by the right hon. Member for Hall Green. He merely denounced him for bad attendance and referred to what his right hon. Friend might put in his next election address. I should have been more convinced by a solid argument put against his right hon. Friend.

I wish to refer to the question of the deterrent and the rôle of Britain. I hope that it is not too late to try to do this in non-electoral terms. I do not think that the Minister of Defence did that in his speech yesterday, or that it is something many other Members opposite have done. The right hon. Member for Hall Green was an exception.

It is essential that we should look a little further ahead and decide what should be our aim in the defence sphere. This issue is clouded, if we try to decide too much in terms of catch questions, or questions of any sort, relating to exactly what someone is going to do about a particular weapon in a set of circumstances which have not yet arisen and which cannot be wholly foreseen.

As I see it, the aim of the Government is for all time, and almost at all costs, to retain the façade of the British nuclear independence. That is the long-term aim. I shall come to the practicabilities and possibilities in a moment, but I am quite clear in my mind that the aim I should rather see is a more integrated alliance than ours playing a rôle more geared to deterring possible enemies than competing with our principal allies.

It is important to notice about Government statements on defence policy at present that they are to a most extraordinary extent related not so much to deterrence of possible enemies which, I should have thought, should be the aim of a rational defence policy, but to arguments about what our allies are doing or may do in future. They are more related to whether and the extent to which we can trust the United States; about the refinement of this argument of the extent to which we can appear in the eyes of other countries to be trusting the United States; about the question of preserving or having a ticket of entry to the top table; and about whether we can contract out if de Gaulle is contracting in.

No doubt de Gaulle will get his bomb, but it is a great fallacy to assume that he will be very much luckier than we have been in the past four or five years about modern, independent means of delivery. I should have thought one would soon come to the position in which de Gaulle and the French would begin to face some of the difficulties we had with Blue Streak and other weapons. I do not think that his will can automatically be equated with his achievement. He may still find great difficulties in the way of making France a fully independent nuclear Power. All the arguments we hear from the Government are related to what our allies are or are not doing and not to any concept of common defence against possible enemy. They are related to a status symbol competition with allies.

There can be no question even in the mind of the Minister of Defence that if we in the West and in the N.A.T.O. area were fully integrated, whether it was a federation or not, no one would suggest that we, as part of the alliance, should assume a separate nuclear rôle and duplicate what is done in those circumstances. The argument looked at from that point of view is a purely political one related to the degree of integration in the alliance and not a military argument.

Looking at it from this point of view, I am impressed by two considerations. I take the view that if this could be achieved by two nuclear Powers only in the expansive sense of the word that would be a safer position. By this means we would avoid the dangers of proliferation and two highly-developed nuclear Powers using nuclear weapons with great sophistication would be safer than other nuclear Powers using simpler, cheaper and, therefore, in a way more dangerous nuclear weapons.

The hon. Member for Macclesfield told us a lot about the V-bomber force, but he did not try in any way to contest that it is a first-strike weapon and is, therefore, more dangerous than something which can be used as a second strike. Polaris would clearly be an improvement, but even that is only an anti-city weapon. The second consideration we have to have in mind is what effect the nuclear policy on which we in this country decide is likely to have on the world situation and the proliferation of weapons. I should be extremely sceptical of a view that a single gesture of renunciation by this country would automatically bring every one in step behind us. It seems to be a fallacy, based on the view which some of us, on both sides of this House hold, perhaps for historical reasons, that to do so would have influence and that a moral influence could be exercised.

Mr. John Hynd (Sheffield, Attercliffe)

That probably is a fallacy, but can my hon. Friend tell us whether anyone has expressed this fallacy?

Mr. Jenkins

I agree with my hon. Friend on most things and I am not sure that it is necessary for him to interrupt me on that because I was saying that I regard it as an exaggerated point of view to think that if we made a single gesture of renunciation that would automatically be followed. People have expressed their views on the general unilateralist position, but I do not think that it can help the debate if he and I get into an argument on this particular point.

Although I would not take that extreme view, it seems even less acceptable to take the view which, as I understood, the Minister of Defence put forward quite firmly yesterday that our deciding that our long-term rôle is not as a nuclear Power would have absolutely no effect on what anyone else decided to do. That seems a much more exaggerated view than the one expressed in the other direction and it fits very oddly with the view that with or without nuclear weapons we are a great centre of things in the world. Can it really be argued that what we decide to do in this field we have no influence on what Germany does in nuclear policy looking over the next ten years or so?

I should like to see Germany kept non-nuclear, but I do not think that there can be any future in believing that we can indefinitely keep her so on the basis of being different from others of equal power in the alliance. If one starts from those two propositions it seems rash indeed to say that what we do will have no effect at all on what happens in Germany and a number of other countries. This ties in with the particular dangers of the way in which the Prime Minister has been putting the argument recently. This applies from two points of view. First, there is the point of view of the ticket of admission argument, whether it is the ticket of admission to a conference table or to a top table. This is an argument which by its very nature is bound to be a standing invitation to every other country which can possibly get a nuclear weapon to get it.

I rather regret the argument that it decides whether we are in this situation, but if the Prime Minister convinces people in this country that we are in this situation, does it not occur to him that it will convince Germany as well? If one is talking of high-level East-West talks the conference is most likely to be about Germany and in those circumstances is it not inevitable that we should be encouraging every country which could lay hands on a nuclear weapon and develop one of its own perhaps through the Paris-Bonn axis to do so?

The second aspect, if I correctly understood the Minister of Defence yesterday, is that he shrugs his shoulders and says that nothing we do can have any influence on other nations in going ahead with nuclear deterrents. Because it is technically possible for a number of other countries to do that, presumably his view of the nuclear position is that a few years ahead there will be a substantial number of additional countries which have, at any rate, some sort of deterrent which to some extent they can call their own. What happens to the ticket of admission to the top table when we get into that position? Will the top table be ex tended indefinitely, or is the ticket of admission to apply only to those countries which have nuclear weapons by a particular date which this country chooses to fix?

If one accepts this position, as I understood the Minister of Defence to do yesterday, as something which is bound to arise, as something which it is no good blinking at, as a situation which is inevitable, the ticket of admission to the top table argument collapses completely, because the ticket of admission is valid only if it is exclusive. If the tickets get into rather general circulation, it is not all that worth while being at the top table.

Therefore, in considering this question, we must have clearly in our minds the sort of world, and the sort of defence structure in the West, which we want to achieve if we can a few years from now. My view is that it should be more integrated, based as little as possible on national nuclear weapons, or, indeed, on national weapons of other sorts.

To propound an aim is not automatically to achieve it. However, it is the case that, if the aim which is propounded is the opposite of the direction in which we really want to go, we shall certainly not get there. The point is not so much what is to be done about particular weapons, but what aim we have in mind in the defence policy and where we would like to go in that direction. I wonder whether it does not disturb the Minister of Defence and the Secretary of State for Air, who this afternoon banged the Dispatch Box and made rather high-sounding chauvinistic remarks about our defence position, our defence aims, and our service to the world in this respect, that most independent commentators outside and most hon. Members opposite, not only the right hon. Member for Hall Green, who try to think seriously and independently on these questions, are not with him on this issue. I therefore think that the Minister of Defence should think a little more carefully.

In my view, what we do about pariticular weapons at a particular time depends on what the world looks like when this decision has to be made, on what sort of response we get to the aims we would like to achieve. In these circumstances we should not rush the decision about what we should do. None of us would rush decisions about the V-bombers. I would not rush decisions about Polaris. Not only the sensible but the courageous answer to the question what is to be done is that one honestly cannot give an absolutely certain answer at present. Many hon. Members know in their own minds, if they think, not in terms of the hustings, but in terms of the deeper interests of our defence policy and the national interest, that that is a perfectly sensible answer.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown), in his extremely effective and convincing speech, pointed out the dangers of the Government being in a position in which their defence policy seemed to contradict their foreign policy, where in their foreign policy they were standing, to some extent at any rate, for co-operation and for respect for the alliance, whereas in their defence policy they were moving in the other direction towards nationalism, independence, towards a chauvinistic approach to these matters.

It is important that we on this side of the House do not get into the reverse position in which our defence policy points towards integration and our political attitude and our foreign policy point in a different direction. We cannot have an integrated defence policy without accepting the corollary of an integrated foreign policy. We cannot be too attached to national sovereignty. I hope that we shall accept that. Provided that we do so, I think that the attitude of my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper and others of my hon. Friends who have spoken, although people who want to play politics on the issue can go on throwing party points across the Floor of the House, is, in terms of the national interest, a perfectly sensible and defensible attitude.

6.54 p.m.

Sir Thomas Moore (Ayr)

In his long, interesting but somewhat muddled speech, the right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. Brown) made a rather curious remark. He said that the Labour Party, if it ever got in, would have greater influence in the councils of the world than the present Government. However, after making that statement, all the rest of his speech was devoted to contradicting that very assertion. I do not think that the length of the right hon. Gentleman's speech was quite justified.

Yesterday, in a most admirable speech, my right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence indicated that one of the many problems facing any Minister of Defence today was to preserve the right balance between traditional, or conventional, forces and nuclear forces. In view of what we all pray is the improbability of a nuclear war and of the growing and increasing demands on our conventional forces, the ratio of 90 per cent. to 10 per cent. seems to me to be reasonable, though I think—my right hon. Friend stressed this fact yesterday and devoted a good deal of his speech to it—that it is important to consider the purpose for which these two forces are required and the rôle that they must play.

As I see it—some may not agree with me—traditional forces are for defence, including police work, while nuclear forces are for attack when that defence fails. Most of us on this side of the House believe, as several speakers have asserted, that there is another and vital purpose for our nuclear forces, and that is simply and plainly to deter any other nuclear power from attacking us. It is obvious from the many speeches made yesterday and today by members of the Opposition that they would prefer to shelter behind the skirts of the United States and, like a subsidiary company in industry, have no voice in framing policy. If the special relationship which we all value so highly continues, that might well be able to work. However, I remind those who draw comfort from this thought that, as was pointed out by my hon. Friend the Member for Louth (Sir C. Osborne), yesterday, Aneurin Bevan did not think that. We all remember his famous description of Britain without her nuclear deterrent going naked into the council chambers of the world.

If the assumptions I have made are correct, I should like to examine how they correspond with the facts as given us and with the proposals made in the White Paper. In passing, I commend the reluctance of Her Majesty's Government to participate in this fantastic, objectionable project of a mixed-manned force. I was very pleased to hear my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister confirming this reluctance the other day. Of all the ideas that have ever emanated from the Pentagon, I think that this is the least well considered. We all appreciate the good intentions behind it, but we all know where good intentions can lead us sometimes.

As Freddie Grisewood would say, let us pass on. I have mentioned, as my right hon. Friend did yesterday, the growing demand on our conventional forces. We are told in the White Paper that we are 95 per cent. up to the target. Does the target quite agree with our needs? This is the problem which worries a number of us. I do not think that it does. After our experience in the last few months, in Kenya, Tanganyika, Cyprus, South-East Asia and elsewhere, I have growing doubts about our ability to discharge all these commitments. I feel that, reluctantly or not, we are approaching the time with this strain going on when we shall have to resort once again to some form of national service.

Someone to whom I mentioned this the other day said, "The Ever-readies are always ready to be used". I cannot agree that they are a good substitute. A young National Service man starts his Service career between times, so to speak, before he has adopted a permanent career and while he is still more or less free and not committed to any definite rôle in life. The "Ever-ready" is probably of fairly substantial age and in a fairly substantial position. It will not only disrupt his life if he has to be dragged out to assist the Regular forces. It will disrupt the economy as a whole.

When National Service was first introduced by the late Hore-Belisha just before the last war, I was an immediate convert to it and to the whole idea, or, rather, to the idea which had first been envisaged by Kipling, of dukes' sons and cooks' sons all mucking in together and learning to get to know each other, having the rough edges of both of them worn off. It seemed to me to be almost the nearest thing to that classless society which appeals to so many.

Somehow, after the war, something went wrong. It apparently began to have a disturbing and unsettling effect on the young soldier and officer. I imagine that the continued tedium and discipline compared ill with the freedom and the fortune which the transient National Service man had already thought out for himself when released into civilian life. I do not think we should let that experience disturb us now, because we know, as my hon. Friend the Member for Macclesfield (Sir A. V. Harvey) reminded us, that there have been extensive increases in pay and gratuities, and there has been a very welcome—although not yet enough—extension of married quarters. I believe that that is very important, because the young, both in civil life and Service life, are marrying younger and, naturally, they want to live together. Therefore, married quarters are one of the things that would primarily attract Regular recruits, especially the younger Regular recruits.

I spent sixteen very happy years in the Regular Army, and I watch with fascinated interest and admiration the amazing transformation that has taken place in the Army. I am referring only to the Army because I have no personal knowledge of the Navy or the Royal Air Force. The development of the personality of the soldier has been made much more a feature of Army life. There is adventure training; in fact, so many things have improved since my day that I cannot understand why recruiting went down in 1963, and I hope that the Minister will explain that.

I am reaching the end of the time I have allotted for my speech, but before closing I should like to add my counsel, if the Minister will receive it, on one or two important matters. The first is in regard to the establishment of the three separate Ministries under one super Minister. It is only commonsense to avoid duplication of separate makes of vehicles and weapons calculated to do the same job, and of bathtubs and doorknobs and what not in different barracks. I would ask my right hon. Friend, however, not to push that integration too far, because there is just a risk, although perhaps a slight one, that we might possibly lessen that esprit de corps which second only to discipline is the most valuable asset in any of the three Services.

I shall not deal with the Navy or the Royal Air Force because a very comprehensive picture has been given in the White Paper of both their position today and what it is likely to be in the future.

As the hon. Member for Birmingham, Stechford (Mr. Roy Jenkins) indicated, in the end our military strength must really depend on the success or failure of our foreign policy. We know what our foreign policy is, no matter what Government are in power. It is to establish and to ensure permanent peace throughout the world. The potential enemy threatening that peace is Russia and the Communist bloc—at least that is the common impression. That threat to peace, both on the West and East side of the world, is due, as I have mentioned before, to suspicion and fear.

If we could eliminate this suspicion and fear, it would be possible to make staggering cuts in our defence forces. If we are now set on grasping nettles, we would be well advised to grasp this one and to take Mr. Khrushchev at his word. He has many reasons for wanting peace, too. The whole of his people want peace. I was in Russia for some weeks only a few years ago, and it was the clamant cry of everyone from the highest to the lowest—peace, peace, peace. Therefore, if we take that risk and assume that Mr. Khrushchev is genuine in that he, too, wants peace, I believe that we shall have it. All I ask is that we now send a message to our own Foreign Secretary, to Mr. Dean Rusk and to Mr. Gromyko to back up this noble and sensible idea of having a bonfire of all these vicious and destructive weapons.

Mr. G. Brown

I apologise for interrupting, but I thought that since we were accused this afternoon of wanting to get rid of the V-bombers he might like to say what would happen as a result of his argument.

Sir T. Moore

I am only acting on the very sensible proposal made by Mr. Dean Rusk and supported by our own Foreign Secretary that we make a bonfire of all these destructive weapons, and so, at any rate, give some comfort to an anxious humanity.

7.8 p.m.

Mr. John Hynd (Sheffield, Attercliffe)

The last words of the hon. Member for Ayr (Sir T. Moore) were enlightening because it seems that the summing up by hon. Members opposite of the Government's policy is that they want to build more and more nuclear weapons so that they can have a bigger and bigger bonfire. Although that may be a very admirable objective it is a very expensive one. I am not an expert on the quality or otherwise of particular weapons, but the political argument which has run through the debate, and which, I think, is not yet entirely exhausted, may be judged from some of the reactions of the other side of the House.

The Secretary of State for Air, in a rather polemical speech—in contrast to the useful and constructive speech made yesterday by the Minister of Defence, which was appreciated by the whole House, apart from the controversial sections of it—made great play with the need for debate on the key issue of the British nuclear independent weapon in order that the electorate may be clear about the facts involved. The right hon. Gentleman made that plea in a curious way, for he accused the Opposition, of all people, of obfuscating the position by being unclear where they stood on various issues.

We were recently challenged by the hon. Member for Macclesfield (Sir A. V. Harvey) as to why the Opposition could not make up their mind on the multinational force question but, as we have heard, the Government themselves are not clear on this matter, let alone the Opposition. Any challenge of that sort is merely a counter-challenge, because no one is completely clear and these sort of challenges cannot possibly help the electorate.

The Secretary of State also tried to throw a lot of mud about by implying that the 1951 defence budget of the Labour Government was almost as high as the present defence budget. He did not explain that the Korean war was going on at the time and that that had a bearing on defence expenditure. When we talk about the size of defence budgets, the effectiveness of our defence forces and other implications at the time of the Korean war, and when we make the same sort of comments about what happened at the time of Suez, we are discussing only an element of defence matters and we should, above all, not deliberately, in party interests, seek to mislead the electorate because we have a much more important rôle to play.

When it is said that the Labour Party's position over nuclear weapons is only a form of unilateralism, hon. Members opposite must know that that is not true. The word "unilateralism" has a meaning of its own in the present political situation and it has nothing whatever to do with the Labour Party's views about nuclear weapons. To suggest that it has is only confusing the issue. Serious issues like this must on no account be used for party political purposes.

The Minister of Defence tended to shuffle off the significance of our nuclear contribution by saying that, after all, it represented only 5 per cent. of our total Budget. He must know that 5 per cent. of£2,000 million is£100 million. It has been suggested, on the other hand, that the figure should not be 5 per cent. but 10 per cent., in which case the total would be £200 million. Not long ago the Minister was making great play with promises that a Conservative Government, if elected—this was in 1951—would sot about saving£100 million of Government expenditure. One should keep these sums in balance and remember that 5 per cent. is 5 per cent. of a considerable amount of money.

When I intervened earlier on the question of whether if we abandon the bomb everyone else will follow us, my intervention was merely calculated to correct the impression that anyone had supported that idea. There may be this implication in the argument of the unilateralists, but I have never heard it suggested that other countries would follow automatically if we abandoned the bomb. However, that is not really the point. The Minister of Defence said about this yesterday that we should not imagine that if we abandoned our nuclear weapons anyone else would follow because, he said, they would not.

The stage of development of nuclear weapons in France has not yet reached the Blue Streak point. They may ultimately approach something like the degree of obsolescence which many of our projects have reached, but whether or not they will reach an effective state of nuclear defence which is independent is another question. Is not our insistence on having our own unilateral so-called independent weapon an encouragement or assistance to General de Gaulle?

Are we not encouraging him in his policy, which is not aimed at the creation of a nuclear weapon which depends on an American warhead, but on a completely independent French nuclear weapon? If he should achieve that position, our semi-independent weapon will not ensure us a place at the top table if, as the Government appear to imagine, the top table will be reserved for those with the most powerful weapons.

We must not get the idea that General de Gaulle is the only man in France. He may often appear to be, but I can assure the House that powerful voices are being raised in France against his policy. One of the defences of his policy is precisely the fact that Britain insists on having her own independent weapon. It must be remembered that there is a strong challenge to General de Gaulle's policy in France and that we should be assisting the critics of his policy rather than making it more difficult for them.

Germany is not now the owner of nuclear weapons. It is bound, under the Treaty, not to produce or store any of her own. It is part of N.A.T.O. and is responsible for its part in the common defence of Europe; and that includes the establishment of nuclear weapons on German soil. Despite some of the statements that are made from time to time and which, I can assure hon. Members, have no basis in anything other than Communist propaganda, Germany is quite satisfield with its present position. There is no evidence to prove that there is any important or responsible voice in that country demanding that Germany should reach a position of independence in nuclear weapons.

If not only Britain but France, within the European Community, becomes an independent nuclear Power, will it be possible for Germany to maintain her present position, because at present the balance of forces in the European Community is a balance between France and Germany? If France will be the single dominating partner by being the only one with nuclear weapons, it will not be surprising if voices are raised in Germany insisting that Germany, equally, should sit at the top table.

It is interesting to note, in the present situation, that whereas France is the only country in the Community which is developing an independent nuclear weapon, it is not France which leads the Community, but Germany. France may be in a position to try to dictate, or sometimes even effectively to dictate, the policy of the Community, but it is Germany to which the other members look for an effective lead against that domination. This shows that it is the German influence and example which is more copied in the Community than that of the country which is building up its own nuclear weapons.

The Minister of Defence said yesterday that we should not imagine that we could abandon our own nuclear weapons and get control of other people's weapons, for we could not. He explained that by the control of other people's weapons he meant a share in the policy decisions. That was a surprising statement, particularly in view of the remarks of the hon. Member for Ayr (Sir T. Moore) that we would be becoming a kind of second-rate subsidiary of a commercial enterprise.

Is N.A.T.O. an alliance or is it not? It has been said that we would be entirely dependent on the Americans and that we would not have a say in policy decisions. If N.A.T.O. is an effective alliance, then surely we must have a say, and insist on a say, in its policy. Hon. Members must agree that there is a considerable sharing of the making of policy decisions in N.A.T.O. about nuclear and other weapons. What disturbs me and most of my colleagues is the Government's insistence that the present nuclear deterrent of the West is entirely an American one. I think that it was the Minister of Aviation who said that the Labour Party accepted that the deterrent should be only an American one, but it is not just an American deterrent. It is also a N.A.T.O. deterrent, and, although much of it is reserved for American purposes, the N.A.T.O. deterrent is at the disposal of the N.A.T.O. Alliance, and each member of that alliance can and should, claim its own responsibility for decisions on the strategy of the weapon.

The Minister then asked whether, if we believed—as evidently he did not—that Great Britain will always have an ally to depend on, our prospective enemies believed that. In other words, he was asking whether, even if we in Britain are foolish enough to have confidence in our allies, we can expect our enemies to believe that those allies will always be there. In saying that, as hon. Members opposite have said so often, is not the right hon. Gentleman putting into the minds of our prospective enemies, or confirming in them, the thought that the N.A.T.O. Alliance is divided, and that we, as a leading member of the alliance, do not have that confidence in it that we should be expressing on every occasion?

Hon. Members opposite often make the charge that the Labour Party and the Liberal Party tend to play down the country's defence policy, and to play down our country, but it is surely one of the most dangerous things to put in the minds of potential enemies, or into the minds of the country's potential aggressors, that we have no confidence in the N.A.T.O. Alliance. That alliance is, indeed, our only sure defence, and the only sure defence of the rest of the Western word.

Sufficient has been said of the prestige value of this weapon to make it unnecessary to say very much more, but, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) pointed out, never before has a British Prime Minister used the argument that we are piling up this so-called independent deterrent, and spending on it£100 million or£200 million—which might well be devoted to the greater efficiency of other branches of the Services—entirely because we want to ensure our prestige, and our place at the conference table.

I do not think that the Minister of Defence would suggest that Western Germany is without influence on American policy at present—indeed, the feeling is growing that Western Germany has greater influence on American policy than we have—but, far from having the independent deterrent, Western Germany neither has it, nor plans for having it.

At the time of the Suez affair, the fact that we had the knowledge to create a nuclear deterrent, and were developing one, did not prevent the Americans from telling us that they would not support us in that adventure. Hon. Members opposite, and particularly the Secretary of State for Air, may say that one of the main purposes of the deterrent is to prevent ourselves from being black- mailed by a potential enemy in some other smell affair of that kind, but did not Mr. Khrushchev's threat over Suez have any effect? I am sure that hon. Members opposite will chorus, "No", but everyone knows that at that time we were deserted by most of our own allies and the Commonwealth, and threatened by a nuclear Power, so we called the thing off. It is, therefore, no use hon. Members opposite suggesting that the bomb is the thing that matters for prestige.

Much has been said in this debate that I and many of my hon. Friends will endorse about the valuable contribution to maintaining peace and saving democracy made by British conventional forces. Those forces are certainly playing a prominent part in that respect. But is not the most effective contribution we can make the fact that we are the only single country in the Western Alliance, outside the United States, that is capable of sending so many forces to so many parts of the world in such a short space of time? Can that be written off by anyone, including our own allies? Is not our ability to play this rôle the finest guarantee of our prestige in the alliance?

I suggest that we could play that rôle much better if we were not burdened by this idea that we can spend our resources on weapons that are 2 per cent.—or whatever may be the percentage—of the total nuclear deterrent of the West, but 2 per cent. of an already existing surplus. If it were 2 per cent. of what was necessary, that would be one thing but everyone knows that it is 2 per cent. of something that is already overwhelmingly in surplus.

I do not particularly want to develop arguments on Polaris and the multinational farce, because these are matters of great technical complication on which we have not yet had enough experience to form positive views. I myself am convinced that Polaris is positively the most effective deterrent that exists. If we have to play our part by providing the bases and the facilities for Polaris, and learning the "know-how", and all the rest of it, I am all for it, but I cannot see that we are doing anything particularly effective by seeking to have the Union Jack painted on five of the hulls. That, again, is merely a question of confidence or no confidence in our allies.

The multi-national force is a very good experiment. It is a fine thing to bring the people of the Western Alliance —indeed, all peoples of the world—together on all possible occasions, and in the context of Western defence it is fine to see how it will work out. Whether it would work effectively is another matter. I am undecided about that, as I think most of my colleagues are, as well as hon. Members opposite and the Government themselves. However, I have nothing against it, and I am sure that most of my colleagues feel the same way about it.

I am more concerned about whether we are not taking on too much in Africa, the Far East, Cyprus, the Middle East and elsewhere. Are we not getting too far stretched? Some might suggest conscription at this stage, but that is not the answer. I do not think that people will stand for conscription in peace-time and in present conditions; they do not believe it to be essential for the defences of the Western world. To talk about the unilateral defence of the country without reference to the N.A.T.O. partnership is another matter, but what our people want, and what they are prepared to support, is the maximum contribution to our own defence and the common defence of the West that can be borne in the circumstances in which the country finds itself throughout the world.

Britannia no longer rules the waves —certainly not on her own. Once upon a time she did, and once upon a time it was desirable and necessary that the British Navy should be used, and that British troops should be landed and protected by the Royal Navy in places like the Persian Gulf, Aden and Singapore. There were many reasons for that. We first went to the Persian Gulf to suppress piracy. Later, we went there to protect the oil interests. Are we still there to protect that coast against piracy? If we are, I can only say that it is not the particular responsibility of this country, but the much wider responsibility of the West or of the United Nations.

If we are there to protect the oil wells, are we protecting them by being there? Are we not by our presence inciting a lot of revolts? We can suppress those revolts, but we in no way assist our oil interests, as we know from our experience in Persia, and Egypt, and from our experience of the Iraqi oil wells. When we had a Labour Government in power and there arose the question of Persia nationalising these interests, we did not send out gun boats, or use force to protect the oil interests. We withdrew and negotiated new agreements with the Persians and we are still getting the oil. The Persians are getting a better deal, our interests are entirely safe, and we are on better terms with them.

In the Suez affair we took the opposite course. We sent out our forces to try and protect our interests then we withdrew them and we made great enemies of the Egyptians. Are we doing the same kind of thing in the Persian Gulf? Are there places in the world about which we should consider whether we ought to be there at all?

Should we still be in Cyprus? It was necessary that we should go there in fulfilment of our part of the Treaty. What has happened since? Makarios and the Greek authorities in Cyprus have told us that we are sending too many troops. They are going to tell us how many should be there. They are going to control the troops. They have demanded a United Nations force, which cannot be provided. Cyprus will not accept a N.A.T.O. force, so we are "holding the baby" once again in an impossible situation, where we are attacked on all sides and are prevented from taking effective action to protect ourselves, let alone keep order in Cyprus.

Is it not time that we said to the Cyprus authorities that we are not "holding the baby" any longer, that conditions are impossible and, therefore, we are withdrawing and they should get on with it? Somebody else will then have to do something. I do not know, but it might be Turkey, but, certainly, the United Nations will have a responsibility which it must face. We must consider carefully whether we are not letting ourselves in for far too much in some of these circumstances.

To summarise, the position of the Labour Party has been made perfectly clear with regard to the deterrent, the Polaris submarine, the renegotiation of the Nassau Agreement, the argument about prestige, and the stand against the so-called independent deterrent because we do not want to give anyone any excuse for trying to follow us in the proliferation of this dangerous weapon. Our real rôle and the contribution that we can make is limited by our resources and our position in the world. We should have a complete review of defence equipment and capacities in that relation. If that were done we could play a more effective and positive part in the defence of peace and democracy through the N.A.T.O. Alliance.

7.33 p. m.

Sir John Eden (Bournemouth, West)

Quite properly, questions concerned with Britain's nuclear deterrent have dominated the debate. This and the associated issue of what should be Britain's foreign policy are the overriding issues with which we are concerned. Before one can answer questions about the deterrent, or what the deterrent policy should be, one must first try to answer the question about what we expect from Britain; what sort of rôle do we expect Britain to play in the world?

I have tried to summarise some of the points which I regard as being important in answering this question. The first is to protect British interests. The second is to support, strengthen and widen our alliances. The third is to help our friends when called upon to do so and to bring assistance when required, particularly to those with whom we have treaty obligations. The fourth is to contribute to the maintenance of world peace by resisting tyranny and upholding law and order. The fifth is to continue to play a leading part, justified by our native genius and by our experience as a world Power, in helping to solve major world problems.

These five important points which I expect to see as the objectives of British foreign policy have been very well lived up to over recent months and years. This has been particularly the case in the last few months when British Forces have been called upon in many instances to fulfil a major and peace-keeping rôle in various parts of the world. I would emphasise to those who seek to further the alliance aspect of our rôle that it is British troops who have been called in in every case. It is British troops who have been called upon in East Africa. British troops are at present in Cyprus, in British Guiana, and in Malaysia. Throughout all these incidents British troops have been called upon to fulfil this particularly difficult rôle.

It is hoped, of course, that in days to come it will be automatic that others will be alongside us in many of these sorts of commitments. We are not dealing entirely with British dependent territories. We are also concerned in supporting independent nations, and they can call for assistance from whomsoever they please. The fact is that we are best equipped both mentally and physically to fulfil this rôle, but I hope, particularly in Cyprus, that the day will not be far removed when we shall have some evidence of other countries in active support of us there.

If British troops are to continue to do this sort of duty, which I believe they will be called upon to do for many years to come, two things are vital. The first is that they are equipped with the best possible equipment to discharge their duties.

This brings me to the whole question of hardware and the supply of various equipment for our. Armed Forces. Inevitably, it involves us in producing a very wide range of equipment. In the first place, to ensure a high degree of mobility, these forces have to be carried and they have to be supported by air transport and other means of transport. They have to be mobile in the local areas in which they are required to operate, which means helicopters as well as other forms of transport. In many instances, they will need further support from the sea, which requires carriers and so on. We therefore at once get into a very wide range of aircraft and different forms of defensive equipment to protect the aircraft themselves.

I was sorry to hear from my right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence that he was not able to achieve a common aircraft for the replacement of the Sea Vixen and the Hunter, but I am relieved to know that the P.1154 is at least to go ahead, although, like others, I should like greater detail about how definite this decision really is. I could not help a wry smile when I heard my right hon. Friend yesterday mentioning that we are in the forefront in the development of vertical take-off. We have been in that position for a very long time. I know that it is terribly difficult to arrive at decisions on these highly complicated forms of equipment, but I hope that when we have some clear lead and some breakthrough, as we have had in this case, in developments in future we shall have some machinery to come to a more rapid decision so that at least we have the opportunity to take full advantage of the lead that we have gained.

I wonder why we were not able to find a common aircraft. My right hon. Friend referred to weight. I would not attempt to quarrel with any of the technical judgments involved here because I do not begin to know about them or understand them, but I wonder whether the actual requirements written by the Navy and the Air Force were too stringent or too far-reaching or whether, had each been satisfied with or prepared to accept something slightly simpler, we might have got it out of the frame of the P1154, or the 1127 as it now is.

I hope that we shall follow my right hon. Friend's indication yesterday that we are to go for slightly simpler operational requirements so that we may have quicker decisions and not have the sort of delay we have had in regard to VTOL and the question of the light helicopter for the Army. It is common knowledge that the Army has been waiting for the helicopter for a very long time, and I should have thought that it was not a very grave decision to take.

The Opposition have moved an Amendment in which they accuse the Government of having failed to produce an adequate defence policy and provide forces to meet the nation's needs". In fact, we have been doing rather more than meet the nation's needs. We have been providing forces to meet the needs of many other nations besides our own. The mere evidence of where British troops are currently engaged emphasises this. In addition, of course, we have been providing forces to meet the needs of our North Atlantic Treaty Alliance as well as the South East Asia Treaty Organisation and CENTO.

Mr. Healey

indicated dissent.

Sir J. Eden

The hon. Gentleman shakes his head. It is not necessary just to have troops on the spot in Germany in order to fulfil our obligations to N.A.T.O. British troops in Cyprus are currently fulfilling our obligations to N.A.T.O. British troops in East Africa fill an obligation to N.A.T.O., as did our troops in the Persian Gulf and the Kuwait operation. These are all primary concerns of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. It is not just a coincidence, but there are major historical reasons why British troops, and British troops only or primarily, are engaged in peripheral operations of this sort which are of vital significance to the central organisations of the Western Alliance.

If British troops are engaged so widely over the world, it becomes even more important that they be absolutely assured of the defence of their base. When British troops are engaged in far-flung theatres of war, it is vital that they do not have constantly to look over their shoulder, being concerned about the security of the defences of these islands. This is why, most importantly, we need to continue an effective nuclear deterrent, for it is the possession of—[Laughter.] The hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) gives his usual mocking laugh—

Mr. John Hall (Wycombe)

Guffaw.

Sir J. Eden

—or guffaw, but British troops do not regard this in terms of ridicule as he does. They are very happy to know that, in the likelihood of any major threat against these islands, there is the potential here of being able to meet it. It is vital that we continue to possess an effective deterrent in this country, in British possession, for so long as we can envisage British troops being engaged in operations overseas. This is a prime military reason for possessing a nuclear deterrent, but, of course, there are also strong political grounds for doing so.

Hon. and right hon. Members opposite do not like references to the conference table. They do not like to be reminded of, or to be asked to support, aspects of British prestige. I can quite understand that. The Labour Party has never exactly been in the forefront of upholding the prestige of Britain—

Mr. Wigg

Suez?

Sir J. Eden

—and, if they came to power, right hon. and hon. Members opposite would, no doubt, behave in the same way again in eroding some of this country's greatness. But the fact remains that, if we were today to remove from British possession the nuclear deterrent, gradually we should move to the position of not controlling our own foreign policy. It is not so much a military matter as a political matter that is at stake here. In a very short time, we should find the United States of America heeding our advice and opinions less and less and dominating the discussion more and more.

Mr. Wigg

Cuba?

Sir J. Eden

In the Cuba situation, as the hor. Gentleman should know, the United States was extremely grateful for the presence and alertness of the V-bomber force and for the contribution —[Laughter.]—that is absolutely true—

Mr. Wigg

Oh, dear.

Sir J. Eden

—which the British V-bomber force made at that time in effectively helping to talk down the Russians. This, of course, was a clear example of the need for continuing an effective deterrent policy. If hon. Members opposite do not give much credit to it, the Russians certainly did at that time, and they still do today.

If we were to get rid of the nuclear deterrent, as, apparently, the Opposition want to do, it would be the first step in a process of handing over the conduct of our foreign policy to other countries. This would be the obvious result, because the United States would have to have more bases in this country and would have to take over a greater rôle in the defence of this country, or, if it were not the United States which did it, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation or some other organisation or alliance to which we belonged would have to do it, and we should be involved in a process of gradually diminishing the independence of our foreign policy.

This may come about in the course of events in any case. This is what we are striving for in due time. When we talk about the Atlantic Alliance or, in a more localised sphere, of European union, political union and so on, we are accepting a diminution in our independence and accepting the fact that, in course of time, we shall be handing over certain aspects of our independence to wider organisations and other bodies. But what seek to emphasise now is that this is not likely to come about today or tomorrow. It is not present reality.

The political union of Europe is still a very long way off, and the political union of the Atlantic Alliance is even further. Although we may wish and strive for it, while it is such a long way off we should be doing ourselves a great deal of harm if we were unilaterally to divest ourselves of elements of power which we now have. Not only should we be doing ourselves a great deal of harm and affecting others inasmuch as we should not be able to fulfil our obligations so well, but we should be working even against the interests of the Labour Party were the Opposition ever to come to power.

The right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) said today, as I understood him, that he wanted to see whether we could use Polaris or the British nuclear deterrent in order to secure a better position in the alliance, or words to that effect. He saw it as some kind of bargaining counter to improve our standing within the alliance, within the new organisation of defence in the Atlantic which, apparently, will come about overnight once he and his right hon. and hon. Friends come into power.

But the right hon. Gentleman has gone about this in the most extraordinary way. He declared his intention this afternoon of renegotiating the Polaris Agreement, but has made it perfectly clear to all of us that if when his party comes to power there is only one Polaris submarine built that is the end for the submarine programme and for the British nuclear deterrent. He and others have declared that they are not in favour of the British nuclear deterrent. Yet, if they come to power they will use the deterrent forces, such as they find, to secure a better position in the alliance vis-à-vis the United States.

It is a most extraordinary way to start off a bargaining position by declaring that one does not believe in the thinking which one is trying to use as a bargaining counter. In industry, I have some association with a company which seeks to promote mergers and amalgamations. When companies seek to merge, it leads to a number of delicate situations, but if one company knows that in the end it will be virtually absorbed in a bigger organisation it does not start by chucking away all its assets at the negotiating table. This is what the right hon. Member for Belper and other leaders of the Labour Party are inviting us to do.

Mr. Wigg

rose—

Sir J. Eden

I will not give way to the hon. Gentleman.

I do not believe that hon. Members opposite know how important a step it is that they are proposing to take. The hon. Member for Birmingham, Stechford (Mr. Roy Jenkins) made a very interesting speech and gave us his views about the British deterrent. He, too, hoped that in due course we should find our way into alliances in Europe and elsewhere. But until we get into that position we must face the fact that we have to rely primarily on ourselves and our own equipment to defend this country.

Hon. Members opposite have sought to bait me with the cry of "Suez". I am glad that they reminded me of Suez, because one thing which is clear, as was said earlier, is that, in spite of the fact that we were a nuclear Power and were on very close terms with the United States, the support of the United States could not have been guaranteed at that time. It is important that, in circumstances as we can envisage them taking shape in future, we should prepare ourselves for every possible likelihood and eventuality.

Since Suez, both sides of the Atlantic have gone a very long way. There has been a great improvement in the machinery for defence organisation and planning and also in the unified approach of our foreign policy generally. I do not envisage a comparable situation to the Suez episode arising again. But what I do see arising is the need for British forces to be effectively protected. That protection can be guaranteed only if they know that this country is secure in the likelihood of nuclear attack.

Mr. Healey

Surely what happened at Suez was a precise example of the falsity of the hon. Member's whole basic assumption. Although we had nuclear weapons then, when we were threatened by the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons, according to Mr. Robert Murphy, the British Prime Minister was frightened to death. But our American allies, although strongly disapproving of our local opertions, came in through General Gruenther to offer us the support of their whole nuclear force. I should be confident that that would be so on any other occasion and that a British Prime Minister who sought to rely solely on the British deterrent would be as weak-kneed as the British Prime Minister was at the time of Suez.

Sir J. Eden

The important thing to recognise is that the situation is a changing one. No one can foresee what the circumstances are likely to be in 10, 15 or 20 years' time in which British troops are likely to be engaged. The one thing which the Suez lesson should have taught us is the absolutely vital importance of guaranteeing the adequacy of the shore defences of these islands when British troops are engaged in other parts of the world. That is why we must have a most effective nuclear deterrent system today, and that is why it has been built up since the time of Suez.

Mr. John Hall

My hon. Friend is on an interesting point. When the Russians threatened to use nuclear weapons at the time of Suez, does my hon. Friend believe that, if we had been left without American support, either we should have been prepared to use them ourselves against Russia, or that Russia would have thought that we would be prepared to use them?

Sir J. Eden

It is difficult to live the past again. What I am saying is that, as a result of our experiences at the time of Suez, we have successfully built up a strong British nuclear deterrent to the point where, if a similar situation were to arise again, it would be credible from the Russians' point of view that we had the means to retaliate effectively and to a damaging extent.

Mr. Wigg

Nonsense.

Sir Eden

It is not nonsense. That is the case today with the British V-bomber force, equipped as it is with the stand-off bomb, and as it will be later with the other weapons systems when they come into operation with Polaris.

I should like to say a few words about the multilateral force. It is clear that we have not committed ourselves one way or another on this and that we are discussing the best way of evolving a form of unified command among a number, if not all, European nations. I hope that we shall not exclude from our consideration the possibility of creating a unified command structure using the existing V-bomber force as a nucleus. This is a force committed to N.A.T.O. Already we have a joint nuclear command structure in N.A.T.O. Already we have joint planning at Omaha. This could well be the best way of bringing the other countries into the general planning and targeting arrangements of our nuclear force.

When one considers the general policy of the Labour Party, I think that one is bound to conclude that, if it were now responsible for the course of events, for the maintenance of our position in the world and for the equipping of our forces, it would not leave this country in the strongest position effectively to negotiate with friends and others in building up alliances. This is the aspect which I view with great concern, because not only is the possession of the nuclear weapon system by Britain vitally important from the military point of view, but it is also of very great significance in ensuring that we discharge effectively our obligations to other nations as well as to our own.

This we have been doing under the Conservative Government. We have very effective equipment, and we have more coming along. Of course, it is expensive and complicated, but we have produced a policy. We are discharging that policy most effectively, and I see no justification for the Amendment. I shall certainly support my right hon. Friend tonight.

7.59 p.m.

Mr. John Morris (Aberavon)

I hope to deal with some of the points raised by the hon. Member for Bournemouth, West (Sir J. Eden) in next week's debate on the Army Estimates. He is under some illusions. One of them concerns British prestige and his attacks on the Opposition, alleging that we denigrate this country from time to time and lower our prestige. One of the most important confessions that he made was that he did not envisage a situation comparable to Suez occurring again. The point made many times from both sides of the House in the inquest which we had following Cuba was that, despite the possession of nuclear capability by this country, there was not adequate consultation between the United States and ourselves. We had the weapon, but in the course of those crucial weeks we were merely informed by the United States and there was little consultation in fact. The hon. Member might care to refer to our debates on that occasion.

Mr. John Hall

On what ground is the hon. Member saying that there was evidence conclusively to show that there was no adequate consultation between America and this country? I cannot remember such evidence.

Mr. Morris

I invite the hon. Member to refer to our debate in the October following the Cuba crisis. There were attacks from many parts of the House concerning the lack of consultation. I do not propose to go into them now, but the hon. Member may take it from me that strong views were held in the House on that occasion.

I wish to follow the hon. Member for Bournemouth, West, on one point and I hope to deal almost exclusively with the question of the mixed-manned force. The Government have from time to time toyed with this idea. We are told that they are not entirely committed but are merely taking part in trials. I want to deal with the question of the multilateral force and how it fits into the Treaty of Moscow.

One of the major topics of discussion today and for many years has been the question of disarmament and, on a lesser scale, disengagement. Recently, the Foreign Secretary has gone to Geneva to stiffen up the disarmament negotiations. It is vital for us to try to fit the suggestion of the multilateral force into the philosophy of disarmament as expressed from time to time by the Government, both at Geneva and in the signing of the Treaty of Moscow. That treaty was the practical fruition of the thoughts of many—in fact, all—of us, on both sides of the House, concerning disarmament.

I raised the question of the multilateral force in Paris, at the meeting of Western European Union, when there was a heated argument between delegates from many countries as to whether the proposals before the Western European Assembly concerning the multilateral force should be accepted. As it turned out, the proposal was rejected by a narrow majority, by, I believe, 32 votes to 27. Both sides of the House of Commons were represented at Paris and rejected the proposal which was before the Assembly, although I hasten to explain that there were different reasons for its rejection.

One of the things that I witnessed as a junior delegate at the Assembly was that the German Chairman of the Defence Committee tried to use every possible obstructive tactic to avoid a vote on that crucial issue. Every effort was made to avoid the Assembly coming to a decision. I will not comment further upon this, but it was noted by many of us and it would have been far better on that occasion for a decision to have been taken without those obstructive tactics, which left a sour taste in the mouths of many people.

We all regard the Moscow Treaty as an important step forward. The nuclear Powers realised how important it was for us to arrive at a modus vivendi to avoid the further pollution of the world. That was one of the main purposes of the treaty and it was the realisation by the great nuclear Powers that the mutual terror upon which we have depended for the peace of the world should be stabilised.

Despite the stabilisation arrived at by the Treaty of Moscow, far too many countries are still chasing butterflies and trying to create, develop, extend or buy off the shelf their own personal credible deterrent and their own sort of personal blackmailing outfit in the nuclear world. The reason why some countries do this is that they are suffering from a number of hallucinations. They want their own status symbol. I will try to deal with the question of countries trying to get this status symbol as a ticket for the top table in nuclear conferences.

The Prime Minister believes that, and my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Stechford (Mr. Roy Jenkins) dealt with that argument very ably. The Cuba incident disposes of a great deal of the argument that the mere fact of possession of the nuclear weapons entitles us to full consultation. At the Western European Union Assembly, it was felt strongly by the other countries of Europe, N.A.T.O. Powers, that they were not consulted sufficiently before the Moscow Treaty was signed. The claim by ourselves that we should pursue the independent nuclear rôle is a positive invitation to other European countries to claim the same for themselves. If this is the reason why countries want this independent power, the doubt can be resolved immediately by the United States and Russia saying that there will be no future nuclear peace conference without the presence of the United Kingdom and other countries whether or not they have independent nuclear power. That would cut all the ground from under the Prime Minister's feet.

This is a strange argument. It can be compared with the suggestion that nobody would be entitled to attend a conference to ban cock fighting who did not possess a fighting cock or, similarly, that nobody could attend R.S.P.C.A. conferences who did not practise cruelty to animals. That is the kind of argument which is put forward as regards the suggestion that unless we have the independent nuclear power, we have no right to a seat at the top table.

The greater the number of countries which have a seat at the top table, the more the table must be extended, and in these circumstances the value of the ticket of admission might well be reduced. Ridiculous arguments are put forward for the retention of independent nuclear capacity.

Originally we were told that there might be a mixed-maimed force of submarines. Those of us who have been to sea in a Polaris submarine know immediately how ridiculous would be a project to have a mixed-manned force in a Polaris submarine. Now, the Government are discussing an armada of surface vessels, the case for which is far from proved. I do not know what would be the result of this aquatic Tower of Babel or whether in the defence of the West this armada would be more effective than the Armada of Philip of Spain. One doubts whether such an idea adds any value to the defence of the West. There are vague hopes in Europe that this armada might be controlled by majority rule. That shows how divorced from reality some of the advocates of this kind of force are.

The two arguments which are being put forward for the multilateral force are that it would increase the credibility of the West and that it satisfies the needs of the West. That is a military argument. When, however, we consider the size of this force, if we add it to the British forces and to whatever forces the French may have, it would amount only to a mere 5 per cent. of the nuclear capability of the West. 95 per cent. the overwhelming bulk of the remainder, would remain in the hands of the United States. It would be a small and second strike force and it would be relatively inaccurate despite recent developments, and it would be used in the main against cities by way of retaliation.

Would this kind of force be sufficient to act alone as a deterrent to put a stop to any activity which would be contrary to our interests? There is obviously a danger, as we have been told in the past, of escalation. If we are first of all using the tactical nuclear weapons, there is the great danger of escalation into the use of the strategic weapon. Similarly I find it extremely difficult to imagine a situation when Britain would be using either her own independent nuclear deterrent or this multilateral force if we had control of it. I cannot conceive of a situation arising whereby we should use it without full consultation with the United States and without inevitably involving the United States and the whole of the rest of the deterrent in war.

We know the immense nuclear capability of the United States. We are told from time to time of the "overkill" which the United States has com- pared with the forces of the East. Having regard to that "overkill", the question that many of us ask is: what, in military terms, would a multilateral force add to the credibility and value of the Western deterrent?

The real argument for the multilateral force is not a military one but a political one. We are told that it would satisfy, or go a long way to satisfy, the countries in the West which do not have their own nuclear force. But that argument is in direct contrast to the philosophy of the Moscow Treaty. The creation of this type of force would be a direct act of proliferation and contrary to the spirit and the letter of the Moscow Treaty.

As to control of the force, one wonders how far the countries which might participate have thought how effective their control would be in practice. The difficulty all the time is that there is a strange dichotomy between what would amount to possession of nuclear capability and participation in control. That is the difficulty which has not been solved by the West. Even with regard to this fore the possession of the warheads would remain in the hands of the United States. If there was any change, if the warheads themselves were handed to the countries of Europe, and if the control were handed over, that would be a further act contrary to the Moscow Treaty.

The confusion that has arisen is that between participation in control and possession. That is where the countries of the West have gone wrong, and it is at that that we should aim for our future policy—not at independent possession but rather at getting more effective participation in control of the whole of the Western deterrent. There are time factors which militate greatly against effective participation in control. There is the argument about how many fingers there are on the button, and the length of time that will be taken. The greater the number of people who participate, the less credible will it all be in the lime to come. Because of the need for consultation, it may become too late for anyone to take effective action. These are real difficulties, and we should try to solve them. We should aim in that direction. We should draw up a number of contingencies in which the Western deterrent would be used. That would, of course, not be exhaustive or complete, and there would be residual power to control in the hands of only one participant—the United States. There does not seem to be any way out of that at the moment if the Western deterrent is to remain credible.

But if we aim in that direction and say that we do not really aim at acquiring possession because that would be obviously impracticable and would proliferate the weapon, and that we aim at participation in control instead, and draw up a list of causae belli, that would he a method of aiming at greater anticipation in the use and control of the Western deterrent.

Much more important would be far greater and wider expenditure on conventional troops. I pay tribute, and have done so previously, to what British troops have done in the rôles they have recently been asked to carry out. I am sure that we shall return to that issue in the debate next Thursday. The hon. Member for Bournemouth, West commented on the fact that it was British troops who were called out to the trouble spots. Of course they were British troops, because these were Commonwealth obligations. One hopes that the burden will not all the time fall on us but that we may share it, but it is natural for Commonwealth countries, even independent ones, to call on us first of all, and I take great pride in what British troops have been able to do.

The difficulty is that the part which British troops have been called upon to play has been one of policing duties. If they were asked to play a part in an outbreak of local war, even though I am sure they would do what they could and do it exceedingly effectively, obviously having regard to the fact that so many of them are strung out all over the globe, there would be a severe limit to how long they would be able to participate in any series of substantial local wars.

That is why I feel strongly that we should concentrate more and more on conventional weapons, a need which the West feels, and that there should be far more and more effective conventional troops. In that way we should be meeting the needs of the West and have a far better chance to participate in the control of all the defences of the West. We should be providing something which is needed rather than something which is not needed having regard to the "overkill" capacity of the United States.

8.18 p.m.

Mr. Stanley R. McMaster (Belfast, East)

I should like to take up immediately the last remarks of the hon. Member for Aberavon (Mr. Morris). I listened with very great interest to his speech, as I have to all the speeches throughout the debate, particularly the speeches by the hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey), the right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) and the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget). I was very disappointed by the thoughts and philosophy expressed by the Opposition.

The hon. Member for Aberavon said that we should concentrate more on conventional arms. We are already spending £2,000 million per annum on defence, and less than 10 per cent. of that is spent on the nuclear deterrent, and that figure will, as the Minister of Defence said, fall during the next four or five years—because the heavy part of the equipment, the V-bombers and the Polaris submarines will have been acquired—to about 5 per cent. of our total defence expenditure.

This is a small figure when viewed against the gross national product. Our total defence expenditure is about one-fifth of the gross national product. The gross national product is £20,000 million, and our total public expenditure is £10,000 million a year. We are provided with our defence for about one-fifth of our total public expenditure. To be precise, the figure is between 7 and 8 per cent. of the gross national product, and no hon. Member on either side of the House has suggested that it be reduced in any way.

I hear a murmuring among hon. Members. I have been rounding up the figures to the nearest 10. The total gross national product is about£24,000 million. I have been rounding my figures up for the sake of intelligible comparisons. Defence expenditure is about 7 per cent. of the gross national product, representing a fall since the Korean War and the end of the Labour Government, when it was about 9 per cent. of the G.N.P. It is less than is spent on defence in the Soviet Union and in many other countries. Our commitments are as great as those of any other country and are spread across the world, stretching from Borneo to Africa and to British Guiana. We are required to send troops to keep the peace in those far-flung parts of the world as well as keen a force in Europe in order to meet the threat there.

My reply to the hon. Member for Aberavon is that, if we did spend the small sum of£150 million to£200 million—now used for the nuclear force—on conventional arms instead, we would get little extra. Yet that small part of our defence budget provides, in my submission, more real defence than the other nine-tenths put together, because it is the nuclear deterrent which has kept the peace since the war. Right hon. and hon. Members opposite, including the right hon. Member for Belper admits that.

Mr. E. G. Willis (Edinburgh, East)

I am trying to relate the hon. Gentleman's remarks to what my right hon. Friend said about the nuclear deterrent. It is not the British nuclear deterrent that has kept the peace, but the Western deterrent, of which ours is a small part.

Mr. McMaster

The hon. Gentleman has not altered one bit of what I was saying. I said that it was the nuclear deterrent which had kept the peace. Right hon. and hon. Members opposite have made conflicting comments in the debate. They admit that the nuclear deterrent keeps the peace. They will not say that we should abandon our contribution to it. They do say that we should abandon our independent deterrent. Some of them also question whether our deterrent is truly independent, but that is beside the point.

I do not see logic in the Opposition's argument. If we are to make a contribution to the West's nuclear deterrent, but abandon that bit over which we feel we have independent control, while, at the same time, we spend about the same amount of money on a contribution to the West, what do we gain? There is great illogicality and lack of frankness by hon. Members opposite on this issue.

From the constituency point of view, I am gravely concerned at the lack of precision by the Labour Party. It criticises the White Paper, but puts forward no alternative. We are within months of an election and many workers in my constituency, both at Harland and Wolff and at Short Brothers and Harland, are concerned with the details of the Labour defence programme. But we have not heard a word in the debate about that programme. The greater part of the time has been spent by hon. Members opposite on generalisations, which I have heard repeated time and again, about whether the nuclear deterrent should be independent or not.

Mr. Leslie Spriggs (St. Helens)

Did not the hon. Gentleman hear the Minister of Defence tell us yesterday that the Government were ordering helicopters from a foreign Power? Is not he aware that he has in his constituency an aircraft firm with a first-class team of technical experts who would be able to provide us with all the helicopters we need—indeed, could have done so years ago if their firm, Short, Bros. and Harland, had been given the green light to serve the country with machines, which would also have saved valuable foreign currency?

Mr. McMaster

I do not think that any hon. Member would expect me to make a speech without referring to my constituency interest. But I do not think that that was a very intelligent interruption and it does not help us a great deal. I shall deal with that matter, but I prefer my speech to follow some kind of logical sequence. I hope that the hon. Member will forgive me if I do not deal with it at once.

The Defence White Paper recalls the decision, announced last year, to build a new aircraft carrier. I ask the Government to consider this decision again. I am confide ice that the Conservative Party will be returned to power and that, therefore, it will be our decision to make.

It has been decided to have one new carrier to replace the four rapidly ageing carriers in service and the one undergoing refit. That seems to be inadequate. It has already been pointed out in the debate that we are losing our overseas bases. Perhaps we shall not have a base in the Mediterranean in five years time. If we do lose our overseas bases then we shall need floating bases to carry troops and aircraft to meet the danger of "brush fires". I believe that the minimum carrier replacement should be two new vessels so that we could have one at least in the Far East and another in home waters.

I have, of course, a constituency interest in this matter. Many of our aircraft carriers were built at Harland and Wolff. Many workers at the firm live in my constituency and have suffered severe redundancy during the past four or five years. They are particularly interested in this matter. It has not been mentioned by hon. Members opposite, however.

Mr. Spriggs

rose—

Mr. McMaster

I shall not give way. The last interruption by the hon. Gentleman was too long, and there are many other hon. Members who wish to speak.

I should like the defence budget to be used to help to develop a British nuclear engine. Perhaps one of the two new aircraft carriers which I suggest might be powered by such engines. At the moment, it is only the Polaris submarines being built here which are to be so powered, but the defence budget could be used to give Britain the "know-how" for building and installing nuclear power plants in surface vessels, something which has a wide civil as well as defence application. Many such vessels are already being built in the United States and elsewhere, including Russia.

I should like to take issue with my right hon. Friend. He said that this country must practise moderation in operational requirements and technical solutions. I feel very strongly that, with its small defence budget, this country can afford to have nothing but the best equipment. It is no use having second rate. We have a very small amount of money and a very small Army, less than 500,000, and it must have the best equipment, because if it comes to war, even a "brush fire", we might be facing enemies equipped by Russia, which has huge sums of money to spend on the best equipment. It would be a waste to engage in any programme which accepted equipment which was not the most modern in the world.

Finally, I come to the question of the need for greater mobility. There has been a great deal of discussion during the debate of R.A.F. requirements, with which the Defence White Paper also dealt. I want to mention several aircraft of which the first is the HS681, which is a tactical transport aircraft. This stems from a decision taken a year ago. The Minister of Defence said that a substantial part of the work was to go to Short Brothers and Harland. Can some of the research and development work be done there? What does my right hon. Friend mean by a substantial part? Does he mean one-third or one-half of the construction of the plane? Unless a proportion such as one-third is given to Short Bros. and Harland, it will not be a viable and feasible proposition. To give less than one-quarter or one-fifth would make a nonsense of the whole suggestion. To make it worth while at least one-third or one-quarter of the work should be carried out in Belfast.

In the meantime, as there has been a delay in deciding which engine should power this plane, I draw my right hon. Friend's attention to the use of the Belfast freighter aircraft, which has just made its maiden flight, for this tactical rôle. Short Bros. and Harland has pointed out that the take-off and landing distances of this aircraft are very short and that it is capable of carrying bulky loads and meeting tactical as well as strategic requirements. In this way it meets Recommendation No. 5 of the Second Report of the Estimates Committee, which was: Future plans for transport aircraft requirements for the R.A.F. should be based on the principle that as few aircraft types as possible should be in service at any time. The use of an aircraft such as the Belfast freighter for two purposes, which it is perfectly capable of performing, would help to meet that recommendation.

I should also like my right hon. Friend to consider whether there is not a use for the turbo-prop Skyvan. This plane has been given the go-ahead within the last week. It is a small aircraft which is capable of carrying troops and stores and equipment to forward areas and of meeting a definite Army need. There is a potential of civil orders for it, but a small defence requirement would help to sell the aircraft abroad to meet the military needs of this and other Commonwealth and foreign countries.

I want to say a few words about the Hiller helicopter. My right hon. Friend has stated that it is being considered and that he hopes to announce his decision early next week. I have carefully studied the specifications of the Hiller, the Bell and the Hughes helicopters—the last of which my right hon. Friend has said is not now being considered—and I notice that in range, performance and operational height the Hiller and the Bell are comparable. However, there are two or three considerations which I should like to bring to my right hon. Friend's attention. I will not go into details of performance, but I believe that they are similar aircraft in this respect.

The Bell Company has licensed European production to the Augusta Company in Italy, and Westlands has an association with that company. If the order was placed for the Bell helicopter it would presumably be assembled by Westlands for use by our Armed Forces. A licence fee might have to be paid to Augusta and some parts might have to be bought from it, and this would increase our import bill, which is already running rather high. Further, there would be no export potentiality.

As its chairman said recently, the Westland Company is doing a lot of work on helicopters, and it has a full labour force and labour programme. The Hiller helicopter is used slightly more extensively by the American Air Force and the American Navy. It is already being used by our Navy, and the Army is receiving training in it. It would, therefore, seem logical to order the Hiller. The Hiller is also capable of more stretch than is the Bell, and it can be adapted—as it has been by the Canadian Army—for use with a turbine engine.

I admit that I am now expressing a view which takes into account my constituents and their employment, and I would expect other hon. Members to express an opposite view if they feel like it; but I ask my right hon. Friend to bear there important considerations in mind. The Hiller is capable of stretch, and with modifications it can provide three or four places in the cabin. It would be assembled on licence by Short Bros. not only for the Army but to meet any European, African or Commonwealth requirement. This aircraft is already widely used by America, both here and in the Far East. I am sure that before my right hon. Friend reaches a decision next week he will bear these points in mind.

Finally, I come to the question of the strategic transport requirement. Here again, I would refer my hon. and right hon. Friends to the second Report of the Estimates Commitee. In paragraph 40 the Report points out that the Treasury is often the nigger in the woodpile, but with some stringency it charges the Air Ministry with lack of proper advance planning. In the case of a heavy freighter aircraft, such as the Belfast, it takes at least four or five years after the placing of the original orders for the aircraft to come into production. If we carefully consider our requirements and think ahead we realise that the 10 Belfasts already on order will not be adequate to meet our needs in five, six or seven years' time.

It is impossible for this country to equal the United States military transport fleet figures, but it is relevant to point out that the Americans have many of these aircraft. They have the C124, the C130E, the C133, the C135 and the C141A. They have 594 of these aircraft available and over 200 large jet aircraft, with a 10 ft. by 9 ft. hold on order already. Our Transport Command has 172 aircraft, most of which are old and out-dated. We have 71 on order, making a total of 243 against the United States total of 834. The significant fact revealed by comparing the figures is the number of large transport aircraft which the United Slates already have, or have on order.

In view of the mobility requirements of the British forces in the years ahead, particularly at the end of this decade and the beginning of the next, I wonder whether we have been looking sufficiently far ahead. The Belfast is capable of a great deal of stretch and would take an 18-ft. or 20-ft. propeller and a larger Tyne engine. The company have suggested a jet-engine version. By ordering more aircraft the cost per plane would go down. We have to put the entire development costs against the ten already on order. I suggest that my right hon. Friend considers carefully whether that is sufficient to meet the demands of Transport Command.

Against the cost of the Transport we must offset the fact that if modern equipment is conveyed by sea it is immobilised for weeks and sometimes months. It might well prove an economy to have a small fleet of transport aircraft which could carry almost every item of equipment to any part of the world within hours. This would enable our small defence forces to be sufficiently mobile to meet any demand.

The defence bill of £2,000 million represents a great deal of money. But besides providing vital defence for this country there is as a by-product a great deal of scientific know-how derived from its expenditure. Our communications have been improved and sub-orbital research is going ahead far faster. There are advantages in the sphere of nuclear physics and atomic energy which have resulted from our defence budget expenditure and Britain has been helped to remain in the lead in the scientific field. For these reasons I support the White Paper and disagree strongly with the policy of the party opposite which reveals a lack of ideas.

8.43 p.m.

Mr. Dick Taverne (Lincoln)

Before getting to the part of his speech dealing with constituency interests, the hon. Member for Belfast, East (Mr. MacMaster) made a number of interesting points He asked what difference it would make if we handed over the nuclear deterrent to N.A.T.O. and suggested that this point had not been referred to. He could not have been in the Chamber when my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Stechford (Mr. Roy Jenkins) made his speech. My hon. Friend dealt with the fact extremely well. Our insistence on an independent deterrent makes the proper planning and reorganisation of N.A.T.O. very difficult.

The hon. Member then referred to the question of looking into the possibility of a British nuclear engine for certain ships. I am not sure to which ships he referred, or whether he meant aircraft carriers, but I agree that this is something which we should look into much more closely. For a moment I thought that he was about to deal with a very important and interesting topic which has not been dealt with in the debate—the sort of greater mobility we need.

The tragedy about the debate, perhaps because of the particular insistence of the Government in independent nuclear status, has been that the arguments have been concerned with the rôle of the deterrent and particular weapons. We should consider the question which goes much further—whether we are meeting our commitments in the right way and have the right resources. I want to look at the commitments we have east and south of Suez. We have commitments in the Persian Gulf and, one which is most often stressed, in Kuwait.

I doubt whether a "military umbrella" is the right way to approach the problem of Kuwait. I assume—this certainly applies to other parts of the Gulf—that we have an important commitment there. Also, we have commitments in Africa. The East African commitments which have arisen recently have come as something of a surprise, but I do not think that anyone can imagine it unlikely that that kind of situation will arise again. Quite apart from East Africa it seems probable that at some stage we may face commitments in Southern Africa which will be very serious indeed, particular those in the High Commission Territories.

We have commitments in Malaysia; we are the only major Power with commitments in that area. Our commitments are considerable, but there are weaknesses about the way in which our forces are deployed at present to meet them. A very vital rôle is played by Transport Command. That is our main instrument for getting forces quickly to trouble spots and it is necessary if part of the Strategic Reserve in this country is called on. Our present dependence on flying troops out from the United Kingdom is somewhat unsatisfactory because there is a definite insecurity about access routes.

The main route has been via Libya, Sudan and the Red Sea. During the last few days something has been made clear which should have been clear all along, that this is an extremely uncertain route. We may be faced—it seems we are being faced—with an Arab barrier against use of this route which has been treated as the main route along which Transport Command has operated. Apart from Libya, if there were a change of Government in the Sudan, or a change of attitude there—which is quite possible—that route would no longer be available to us.

There is also the route through Turkey and Persia. That route might be a sort of substitute, but it is not a particularly good one because of high mountains, difficulties of traffic control and the absence of accurate weather forecasts in the area. It is not a particularly safe route, either. There have been a number of accidents and it is quite unsuitable for unpressurised aircraft. There is a world of difference between regular routes where troops are flown out regularly and where a major act of policy would be needed to change the position and a route, such as that over Turkey and Persia, where we should need special permission on each occasion. It is much easier to refuse a request for permission to fly over such a route than to refuse it when it would involve departing from a regularly-established practice.

There have been refusals in the past such as that when the Americans refused permission for the Dutch to fly over a route. I am not criticising this decision, but if we depend on special permission to fly a particular route it is not very satisfactory. It may be that permission would be given if CENTO were involved, but whether it would be for a Far East mission is doubtful.

There is a third route. This is the route through Bathurst in Gambia to the Ascension Islands across Southern Africa. Quite apart from the long hops which this involves, nothing could be more unsatisfactory than having to depend on such a route. It means that we would have to depend on the good will of those countries —Portugal, South Africa and possibly Southern Rhodesia—with which we might well be in conflict if our troops were required in the area concerned. We would have to curry favour, or depend on good will, and perhaps modify our policy to maintain our access routes.

It is, therefore, an extremely unsatisfactory position that this very important area depends on access routes which may not be safe in the future. There are further weaknesses. There is the difficulty of acclimatisation if troops have to be flown out from the United Kingdom, as was shown at Kuwait. The Secretary of State for War at the time did not represent the picture very accurately when he minimised the effect which the sudden change of climate had on our efficiency, when about one-third of the troops from Britain and Germany had to report sick. Clearly, a sudden change in climate severely limits the effectiveness of troops flown straight out from Western Europe.

There is a more important objection. There is a very thin spread, in view of the commitments I have outlined, to cover a very wide area indeed. We have plans at the moment for a brigade group in the theatre reserves at Aden. There is also the brigade group in Malaysia. A question which arises is how far we can use the brigade group in Malaysia for activities which take place further to the West. It is true that we used it at the time of Kuwait. It is true that in Kuwait there was no proper air cover for the first seven days until the first aircraft carrier arrived. The whole Kuwait operation depended on forces coming from Malaysia or from the Far East station.

Can we do this again? The defence agreement with Malaya, which now applies to Malaysia as a whole, provides that the uses to which the forces there can he put are limited to the defence of Malaya or of the Commonwealth or the preservation of peace in South-East Asia. It is doubtful whether, in the future, we could use forces from the Malaysia area, which are based on Singapore, to deal with a crisis in the Middle East.

It is true that our position will be improved when the amphibious warfare squadron is brought up to date, when we have landing ship docks, when we have two Commando ships, perhaps supported by landing ships logistic at sea. Then we can be at sea longer, which means that we can hover round an area of crisis and stay there for perhaps 30 days or more. It means, also, that we will be able to carry more troops by this amphibious warfare squadron. It means also that the new squadron will be able to move twice as fast as the present obsolete ships based on Aden.

Incidentally, if we have a modern amphibious warfare squadron which can stay at sea much longer and hover round the crisis point before any call for assistance is received, it raises the question of what sort of bases we need in the area, and the strategic necessity of Aden as a base becomes much more questionable. It is a better position for a base in that it is closer, but the important difference between Aden and the Seychelles and Mauritius would become much less important than it is now.

Even then, have we got enough? Is there enough in that area if we cannot depend on assistance from the Malaysia squadron? It should be remembered that our forces would have arrived in Kuwait too late if any serious action had been taken and if Kassem had been really determined to move on Kuwait, because we did not have really effective air cover in time. All we are at present able to provide is token forces. Have we not, in fact, got too little in that area? Should we not look at the whole reorganisation of the reserve and put rather less emphasis on the present Strategic Reserve in Britain and rather more emphasis on the theatre reserves east of Suez?

I suggest that, particularly in view of the unsatisfactory nature of the air corridors on which we are now dependent and the excessively great emphasis which now has to be placed on Transport Command, there is a strong case for putting more emphasis on the theatre reserves and for enforcing the amphibious warfare squadron and placing more emphasis on it. This is where I agree with part of what the hon. Member for Belfast, East said. I agree with him that the Navy should look much more at the question of nuclear propulsion for surface ships. If we did this and if we could provide nuclear-propelled tankers, for instance, it would enable the amphibious warfare squadron, or our forces in the area, to stay at sea longer and to move faster.

All these things could be done. But they have not been examined. There is no discussion on any of these questions anywhere in the White Paper. It is not perhaps surprising that, as a result, there has not been much discussion of them in this debate. There is a strong case for having stronger naval forces, for ensuring that we have naval forces which can stay at sea longer and move faster. If we did have such forces, we would be in a much better position to face the very widespread commitments which we have in that area.

At the moment, we are making a very vital contribution to the West, as has been pointed out by a number of speakers, but we are not making it in the best possible form. I hope that the Minister of Defence will deal with this point in reply. I hope that the Government will examine it. Of course, it will be more expensive if we are to have more landing troop docks and if we are to have nuclear propulsion for tankers. This is where the whole question of the amount of money which we are spending on the nuclear deterrent arises.

It may be a matter of only 8 per cent. of the total expenditure on defence, but this marginal 8 per cent. can make all the difference between having a really effective squadron in this area, being able to meet these commitments in a really effective way, and not being able to meet them at all, or at any rate not being able to meet them saisfactorily. After all, we have not really yet been tested.

I agree entirely with the point made yesterday by my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds. East (Mr. Healey) that this matter is not properly set out in the White Paper and there is not an argued case for the relation of particular weapons and particular forces to particular commitments. This is something we should have.

Lastly, we in the House do not have an adequate chance to discuss some of the detailed points of defence. We can offer the same old familiar remarks, as we have done endlessly in this debate, about having the independent deterrent or not having the independent deterrent. We do not consider some of the vital questions which we should consider, such as the ones which I have raised and which, I suggest, are important. Perhaps the only way in which the House of Commons can make an adequate contribution to the discussion of the vital question of our defence is to have a standing Select Committee to consider the matter generally.

8.58 p.m.

Mr. Frederick Mulley (Sheffield, Park)

I am sure that all hon. Members listened with great interest to the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Lincoln (Mr. Taverne), and I am equally sure that he realises that the necessary equipment to ensure the complete mobility of our forces is extremely expensive to provide; although it was right for my hon. Friend to underline the fact that the complacency shown by the Secretary of State for Air from time to time to this mobility is completely unjustified.

It is one thing to take forces to an area where there is an existing stock of equipment, but quite another to take them to a part of the world where equipment is not waiting for them. Heaven forbid that we should be forced to make landings against opposition, for I doubt whether Transport Command would he adequate if, as well as men, it had to transport the necessary equipment, armoured vehicles and so on which they would need. I hope that my hon. Friend will join in the Estimates debate, when we can pursue some of the points he raised in greater detail.

The debate was opened yesterday with a remarkable speech from the right hon. Gentleman the Minister of Defence. As he was speaking, I could not help asking myself why it was that his speech writer had not been employed to write the White Paper as well. I suspect that the right hon. Gentleman is his own speech writer. Certainly, the best speech he ever made was that which he delivered on one occasion after he had resigned office and at which time, of course, he could not have had Ministerial assistance. It would have been a great help if the White Paper, which is a shoddy one, had been of the quality of the right hon. Gentleman's speech.

It was an extraordinary speech in another sense, because it had three rather different parts. The first was wholly unobjectionable. While he was speaking, I said to myself, "This sounds wonder- ful", because the right hon. Gentleman has the great capacity of saying things which everyone else has been saying for years as though they are original and novel ideas. The contrast between his speech and the 1957 and 1958 White Papers could not have been more marked. Indeed, he borrowed phrases which have frequently been used by my hon. Friends, even to referring to the fact that one cannot tie a label to a missile to distinguish between a tactical and strategic use.

The right hon. Gentleman readily conceded that, at least in this sphere of policy, none of the Government's current shortcomings could be blamed on the Opposition because, he said, in 1952–53, as a result of the policies of my right hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell), we were spending at current prices a higher sum than is now proposed in the Estimates before us.

In the second part of the right hon. Gentleman's speech, he was rather less comfortable. Even his own considerable histrionic abilities were not sufficient to convince the, House that the aircraft announcements he made were well considered and well thought out, although I will be saying something about that later. In the third part of his speech, he dealt with the question of the independent nuclear deterrent. This was a particularly interesting section of his remarks, because he brought forward, as I will try to show later, a third Government explanation for their policy in this matter.

While the right hon. Gentleman is without equal in the House as an erector of Aunt Sallys and of being able to knock them down, I thought that his aim was a little less accurate on this occasion than it normally is. The real insult of the Government's defence policy came in what I would call the appendix to the right hon. Gentleman's speech, when he was so unwise as to try to trip up my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) and was shown up completely in the real policy which his eloquence had tried to disguise.

When one tears apart the coloured tinsel screen, as my hon. and right hon. Friends have done in this debate, a very sorry picture is revealed behind it. When we deal with the facts of defence instead of the fantasies we find a completely different story to that told by the right hon. Gentleman, because the hard fact is that this Government, during the last 12 years, have spent more than£20,000 million and are not able to produce the defence the country needs.

Hon. Members

What about peace?

Mr. Mulley

Although hon. Members opposite shout "what about peace", it seems that, for internal debating purposes, they do not consider that we belong to the N.A.T.O. Alliance. [HON. MEMBERS: "Nonsense."] Hon. Members opposite may disagree with me, but it is significant that very little has been said by them on this topic during the debate.

We had what can only be called a cameo of complacency from the Under-Secretary of State for Air last Monday night when, replying to an Adjournment debate, he said: Examine our contribution in four continents and consider whether it is not remarkable that the expenditure of 7 per cent. of this small island's resources should be producing such returns".—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 24th February, 1964; Vol. 690, c. 205.] My only comment is "sic".

The hon. and gallant Member for Harrow, East (Commander Courtney) has said, if I quote him correctly, that our defences are "stretched taut as a bowstring round the world". Everyone who has given serious thought to our defence postures realises that we are facing a great number of very serious problems—

Commander Courtney

If the hon. Gentleman agrees that our defences are stretched taut as a bowstring round the the world, would he, perhaps, suggest that we ought to have more than 7 per cent. of the gross national product for defence?

Mr. Malley

I shall deal with that point, but the short answer would be that there ought to be a reconsideration of priorities and a reallocation of some of these expenses.

Before dealing with our manpower situation, I want to deal with a few points made by the right hon. Gentleman about the proposals for new aircraft. As we are sometimes asked what a Labour Government will do in various situations, one thing that I can categorically promise is that a future Labour Government will not make decisions[HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."]—about aircraft between the issue of the White Paper and the holding of the defence debate, and we shall not consider the purchase of helicopters for the Army, the model of which is unknown to the Secretary of State for War.

The skill of the right hon. Gentleman was in trying to pretend either that these aircraft would soon be ready or that in some way or other they would be covered by the existing Estimates. It is quite clear that this is a bill that the right hon. Gentleman will present to the next Government for payment. There is nothing, or virtually nothing, in his statement that will be contained in the Estimates to come before the House this year.

The P1154 is a sorry example of Government delay. Three or four years ago we could proudly say that we led the world in the significant development of V.S.T.O.L. aircraft, but because of the Government's failure either adequately to back the P1154 or, more seriously, to support the Rolls-Royce system that is now being taken up by the French—and will, I suspect, be taken up in similar form by the Americans—we are in danger of not producing, as we should have done, the first V.S.T.O.L. fighter aircraft.

Incidentally, perhaps the right hon. Gentleman will correct what I think was a mistake. He spoke of the RB168, which I think is the Spey, as being the vertical lift engine, but I take it that he is continuing to support the Rolls-Royce RB162. It is important that we should have this correct.

Turning to the Phantom II, one can understand that for cost reasons the right hon. Gentleman prefers to buy foreign to meet the requirements, but he did not make it absolutely clear whether it is intended that the airframes should be made under licence here, or whether the British engines are being sent out to be assembled in America, and that very little of this order will come to our aircraft industry.

We welcome the decision to have the Medway engine as the engine for the HS681, and I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will deal with the points raised on this subject by my hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, North (Mr. Edelman). He should also bear in mind that this question was first raised as long ago as 1960. After four years, the Government now announce a development contract, which means that it will be another four or five years before this aircraft is with us.

When it came to dealing with the helicopters, I thought it was extremely shoddily done, but one point worthy of note was that in this connection the right hon. Gentleman felt that he could take the House into his confidence about the numbers to be bought. He had not decided what to buy, but he could give us the numbers. However, when it came to the Phantom he flatly refused to say how many he would buy and at what cost, presumably on security grounds. Does the right hon. Gentleman think that the House of Commons, and through it the public, should be treated in this way? Will he come clean and tell us how many Phantoms there are to be and what is the estimated cost?

The other point in this general connection is that these are only a few of the requirements in terms of aircraft, without considering the other weapons which the Government have ordered—and the bill is being left to be paid in future. There are the TSR2 aircraft. We shall certainly need a Canberra replacement. We shall shortly need a Shackleton replacement. We have heard from the hon. Member for Belfast, East (Mr. McMaster) about the need for a bigger order for the Belfast. How much will all this cost? The House should be told what the right hon. Gentleman expects the cost of all this equipment will be over the next year and the following years if his policies are to be continued.

There was also a very serious error in the right hon. Gentleman's speech in that paragraph in which he quoted from Mr. McNamara's speech. The right hon. Gentleman said that Mr. McNamara said that there were 500 Minutemen, now increasing to 1,700 in 1956, but this is what Mr. McNamara told the 'United States Congress: We had planned last year a total programme of 800 Minutemen I, plus a large number of the improved Minutemen II missiles. The first 160 Minutemen should be in place at the end of the fiscal year 1963. By June this year we expect to have 600 in place and by June 1965, 800. This is a very serious error on the right hon. Gentleman's part. I am sure that lie did not wish to mislead the House.

I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will correct it, because it seems to me that he was including in the figures not only the Minuteman but all the intercontinental missiles and the Polaris submarines that the United States possessed, although in the context the right hon. Gentleman went on to say that in addition to the se numbers there were all the Polaris figures. I hope that in reply tonight the right hon. Gentleman will put the matter straight.

The trouble is that the right hon. Gentleman quotes Mr. McNamara but he never reads him. He would be a much better informed Minister of Defence if he did so. He might then understand how much a Minister of Defence can tell Parliament and the public about the nation's defence policy with a view to getting their support for that policy.

I thought that the right hon. Gentleman was extremely complacent on the question of manpower. I agree with him that it is desirable to have professional forces, but to have a deficiency of 5 per cent., or of 8,000, is not a slight matter at all, particularly when one recognises that the actual number on which the deficiency is based is not one calculated to discharge the defence obligations of the country but one which was rut forward as the best figure that it was hoped to obtain by recruitment. We discovered later in the debate from the Secretary of State for War that the same principle now seems to operate on the strength of battalions, with the new strength of an infantry battalion at 660. Just as the total defence is defective, so individual battalions, although they are on active service, are seriously short on an establishment figure fixed to take account of reduced Army recruitment figures.

This is an extremely serious situation. It would more become the Minister if he were to be frank with the House. If he told the House that, having regard to the very serious demands on our manpower, we needed to call up reserves or we needed to think of new ways of getting additional men, he would be received with great sympathy. We have never sought to take any party political points on this issue. Indeed, last month my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition offered to have talks to try to deal with the serious problems which now face us.

Among all the skeletons in the cupboards of Whitehall which we shall find when we take office, the biggest will be in the Ministry of Defence. We do not shrink from public debate about defence issues. The sincerity of the right hon. Gentleman in having public debate would be more conspicuous if he were prepared to give us more information on which a reasonable debate could be held.

As I have said, we have not been given the cost of the Phantom. Today, we were told by the Secretary of State for Air, no doubt on instructions, that we could not be told the cost of the V-bomber modifications, although Mr. McNamara has given Congress a detailed account of all the costs involved on his side. We just cannot take it that the cost is negligible unless we are told what the estimate is. Can figures of this kind possibly be a matter of security?

When it suits the right hon. Gentleman, he is prepared to be extremely precise. When talking about the cost of the nuclear part of the defence programme, he was prepared to tell us not about this year but about next year, 1965–66, that it would be 7.6 per cent. That is a very precise figure. If it has any relevance at all, he must have worked out what he expects the total cost of defence in that year to be. To have arrived at the total cost, he must have worked out how much of it is for new aircraft and so on. Will he tell the House tonight what the figures are? In an area which suits his argument, he has projected his estimates as far as the 1970s. What is the total sum on which he bases his estimate that the nuclear element will be less than 5 per cent. in the 1970s? It is exactly this sort of thing that we want to know and are entitled to know in judging the Government's policy.

In estimating the proportion for the nuclear element of defence, has the right hon. Gentleman included the TSR2 as part of it? I have heard it suggested that, although the TSR2 is regarded by his right hon. Friend the Minister of Aviation as an important nuclear contribution, in this estimate the TSR2 is not included at all. Is that the kind of ducks and drakes which the Minister is playing with the House? We want a serious reply from him tonight to these questions.

We know that the right hon. Gentleman has a taste for party polemics and he is competing with the Prime Minister for the rôle of chief nuclear flag-wagger of the party opposite, but he must understand that he is tonight asking the House to approve a detailed statement on defence. Moreover, he is asking, quite rightly and with the support of the Opposition, for supreme powers over the whole defence field. He must, therefore, be accountable for all the Services under his control. He is asking us tonight for£2,000 million. I hope that we shall have a serious answer to our questions.

We are very often asked what are the Labour Party's policies on defence. I think that it is a very fair answer to say that it would be impossible to give an answer before we had discussions with our allies on the nature, scope and cost involved. Until we have these discussions we cannot make up our minds.

When the Foreign Secretary, in the debate on the Queen's Speech, was asked to say what the Government's policy was about the multilateral force, a matter on which there had been active discussion for two years, he said. "Until we have these discussions we cannot make up our minds". My right hon. Friend the Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) and my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East have spelt out extremely patiently and clearly what our policy is in all these connections. We are not prepared to debate nuclear policy on the simple basis of, "Shall we keep the bomb or will you give it up?". This kind of dramatic simplicity is extremely dangerous in dealing with nuclear policy.

In an article in the Economist, which was on the whole favourable to the Government's policy, it was stated in dealing with nuclear matters: Dramatic simplicity is the last thing one wants. We have no objection to debating these nuclear issues, but we would hope to do so on a rational and not an emotional basis.

We are getting very tired of this false allegation of patriotism. We had it today at Question Time. Apparently, to question the wisdom of a 5 per cent. Bank Rate today was undermining the confidence of the country. Had we said yesterday that it ought to be 5 per cent., that also would have been undermining the confidence of the country. We are getting to a situation in which any criticism of Government policy is said to be anti-patriotic. I do not know whether the Government, having adopted General de Gaulle's defence policy, also want to adopt his attitude to public discussion as well. We shall continue to discharge our public duty.

I remind the House of what the British Council of Churches said on this question: In a matter of such profound human consequence, and one which involves such serious consideration of the rôle of Britain in the service of mankind, Christians can rightly ask the political parties to refrain from making unreal issues out of it, or exaggerating differences for party purposes, and can properly demand that the parties should together be as frank and objective as possible to enable the nation to reach a right choice. It would help if the Government spoke with one voice on this matter.

I thought that it was extremely serious that, after the Foreign Secretary had made proposals at Geneva, his speech was made nonsense of by the Minister of Defence in his speech yesterday, when he said—and I ask the House to note the words—that in no circumstances would we forgo the five Polaris submarines."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 26th February, 1964; Vol. 690, c. 481.] when clearly President Johnson's proposal for a strategic nuclear freeze, which was properly endorsed by the Foreign Secretary on behalf of the Government at Geneva, would be quite absurd if our Polaris programme went through. I hope that tonight the right hon. Gentleman will retract that part of his speech of yesterday.

Then we get the third item in the chorus, the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister, whom I am glad to see in his place, at least removed one ambiguity in his speech of 16th January when he made it clear that our withdrawal clause from N.A.T.O. was based only on the defence of this island. This immediately cut away all the kind of arguments, some of which have been used in this debate, about circumstances in which we would either use or threaten to use nuclear weapons outside the N.A.T.O. area.

The Primo Minister has also brought in the argument that we need to have nuclear weapons to participate in top-table discussions. I should like to ask, as did my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper this afternoon, whether we would have needed independent nuclear means to be at Geneva. I go further and ask what is the point of a Government like this being in those discussions when the Fcreign Secretary is denied in the House of Commons the very next day, when the Government's defence policy is sabotaging the efforts of those at Geneva who are trying to take another step on the road to disarmament.

It has already been abundantly established that the credibility of our so-called independent deterrent is in doubt. What we on this side want, and what we would certainly do, is to restore the credibility of a British diplomatic initiative. Although the Government have participated in the talks, we have nothing whatever to show from Government diplomacy over the last year.

The other point with which, I hope, the Minister of Defence will deal is why he stressed hat it would be unwise to give up our nuclear independence at this moment. Is he preparing, if the worst happens and the Government were to win the election, to abandon it if that serves their political purpose? The Ministry of Defence arguments are exactly the arguments of General de Gaulle, but they lack the logic of the General. Ai, least, he has a completely French force. How can ours be called independent and British when we rely upon the United States to provide the delivery means? Also, in a way that our deterrent does not, the General provides the technological work in France. One of the arguments in favour of this kind of nuclear independence is that it gives work to our industry especially in these important sectors.

We tend, as we got from the Secretary of State for Air, to have passion as a substitute for argument. I hope that in his reply the Minister of Defence will produce more light and less heat. The Government have divided the alliance, are seeking to delude the electors and now seem to be in danger of deceiving themselves.

We have moved our Amendment and will divide the House upon what amounts to a Motion of censure because of the sorry state into which the Government have brought not only the country's defences, but our aircraft industry also. Despite an expenditure of£20,000 million in the last 12 years—and it is no good the Minister of Defence talking as though he joined the Government only yesterday, as he tended to do in his opening speech; he must bear responsibility for the whole of this sad story. Despite this expenditure, through procrastination, incompetence and political prejudice the Government, in the words of the Amendment, have failed to produce an adequate defence policy and provide forces to meet the nation's needs". The Government seem also determined to sabotage the Geneva disarmament talks. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] If instead of seeking these objectives—disarmament, the strengthening of the Western Alliance—the Government persist in the few weeks or months left to them in carrying out their declared policy of putting party political survival before the defence of the nation, they will deserve, and get, the condemnation of the electors when the time comes.

9.30 p.m.

The Minister of Defence (Mr. Peter Thorneycroft)

I should like, by leave of the House, to reply to the debate. [HON. MEMBERS: "Why?"] I have, at least, I think, listened to more of the speeches throughout the two days than any other right hon. or hon. Gentleman.

We are reaching the conclusion of what is of necessity a controversial debate, because these matters are controversial, but what has also been a good-tempered debate. It was wound up by a speech of characteristic ability, asking many pertinent questions, by the hon. Member for Sheffield, Park (Mr. Mulley).

I shall try to reply to as many of the points that were raised in the debate as I can. Nine-tenths of the debate was devoted to what really is one-tenth of the problem—namely, the nuclear side. Nevertheless, that was the main theme of speech after speech. It is, therefore, necessary and right that to begin with I should say something on that score.

I hope that no one will accuse me of questioning the patriotism of hon. Gentlemen opposite. That is not in my mind. I do not hold the view that because some people hold sincerely that they wish to abandon a weapon they are necessarily unpatriotic. Nor, I hope, do those who disagree with me accuse me merely of seeking to retain weapons for some jingoistic reasons. I hope that we can respect one another's sincerity.

want to say a few words about the main theme of the debate before coming to the actual points which were made. It seems to me that on the nuclear side there are two themes: one, the military; the other the political. I want to say a word, first, about the military theme. It can be put quite shortly. It is that today there is no conventional defence of this country that is possible; that is to say, no matter how we amass conventional forces, be they naval, air or a conscripted Army, the only defence of this country today is the certainty of retribution, the knowledge that if an attack is made it is certain that a wholly unacceptable degree of damage would be suffered by the aggressor. That is the situation in which we find ourselves. Because of that, what we decide to do about this is a grave matter.

As against that, it is said that an enemy would be always just as impressed by a deterrent that was perhaps 2,000 miles away, or which was under the ultimate control of another Government. If that is said—and it is a perfectly fair point to make—equally it can be said that a potential enemy might not be so impressed by a deterrent so distant and under someone else's control and, as one hon. Member opposite pointed out, what matters here is not what we think but what a potential enemy thinks. It is no reflection on any ally to probe what we think might be in the mind of a potential enemy in the years to come.

Should we have, in these circumstances, a deterrent of our own, and independent? There are many who doubt the wisdom of abandoning it for the reason I have given, and because of that quite a lot of hon. Members change the argument from that of policy—which is, "Should we have it?" —to the argument of means—"Is it possible to have it?" They question the possibility whether one can have an independent deterrent. I am talking at the moment in purely military terms.

I say that, in purely military terms, what matters is not who makes the deterrent, but who controls it. That is the one thing that matters to the potential enemy. Therefore, in the case of these weapons—those we have now, those under construction and those planned—whatever views we hold, and whatever differences we have, we must admit that the control is fairly and squarely in our own hands. Everyone knows this. Every potential enemy knows it. It is a fact. These weapons are under the control of the British military and can only be fired under the authority of the British Prime Minister.

That is the military side. It is not the only side. Throughout the debate there has been another theme—the political theme—concerned with these weapons. There may come a point where the world may change, where national States as we know them may disappear, where it will be possible to concentrate things into centres—perhaps one centre in the East and one in the West, perhaps eventually into one centre alone.

Always I have thought that this growing together might start in Europe. I have never been ashamed to state that. I do not pretend that it is my own thought. It is shared by many right hon. and hon. Members on both sides of the House. But I am bound to admit that all our hopes in this have been somewhat disappointed. Some right hon. and hon. Members opposite, including the Leader of the Opposition, have, perhaps, been less ardent than others in that direction.

But the truth is that if we are to talk about concentration for national survival, which is the greatest issue that mankind has to contemplate, we might have to go through some process of concentration in some lesser, or not so imaginative spheres, such as trade and commerce. But it might happen. It might happen in Europe. I do not think that we all remember as we should the very great speech by the late President Kennedy, at Frankfurt, the last time he was in Europe, envisaging the possibility of an Atlantic alliance. That may happen, too.

We must strive to see that these things do happen, because, on the achievement of them, Dr something like them, survival in the world may ultimately depend. But we must also ask ourselves whether the best way to achieve this is to start off by a one-sided—I shall not use the word "unilateral", which has a special connotation of its own—abandonment of the weapons that we possess.

To cast them away at this moment, as it seems to me—and I put my honest view about it and if hon. Members disagree with me they will respect my sincerity—is to be in danger of doing us some military damage, for weapons of this kind, whoever owns them, are the only kind of weapons which can offer a defence for this country at present. To abandon them will, at any rate, make it more difficult to achieve some of those wider aims about which right hon. and hon. Members on both sides of the House have spoken.

That is the background to the debate as I see it. I am most grateful to the House for listening most patiently to me before I reply in a little detail to the points raised and for allowing me to say what I think the theme is and what my approach to it is.

The right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) was put up to defend the abolition of these weapons and, as always, he made a very able and fair speech. He said that it was rather a difficult speech to make, and I agree with him. He did not have an easy case to argue, but he did it with his accustomed skill. The right hon. Gentleman started by saying that he would see that Britain was defended. Let me say at once that I am absolutely satisfied that he fully intends to see that Britain will be defended. I am not for a moment questioning that, but we are entitled to ask, "What with?". That is a fair question to pose and, if my diagnosis is right and the defence of these islands is not practicable with conventional weapons, then the only answer is that he has got to rely in the ultimate upon the deterrent for the defence of this country.

The right hon. Gentleman went on from there to say that that was all right, but that he was loyal to the alliance. But so are we. One is not being disloyal to an alliance to secure to oneself some means of striking back in one's own defence. It is not disloyalty to an alliance, but a perfectly proper and sensible thing for an ally to achieve. He said that he would seek a rôle which would give us greater influence in the world. Supposing that he had complete power tomorrow morning, does he honestly think that if he said, "I am now going to abandon the Polaris missiles and run down the V-bombers," that would give us a greater rôle in the world?

Mr. G. Brown

I did not say that.

Mr. Thorneycroft

If the right hon. Member will forgive me, if he did not say it that is what his leader said. [HON. MEMBERS: "Ah!"] The right hon. Member for Huyton (Mr. H. Wilson) said that the Labour Party would renegotiate or denegotiate the agreement to buy Polaris submarines from the United States. His inimitable phrase referring to my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, was, "Has he got it now?".

The last point which the right hon. Member for Belper put to me—and this is important—was that I was claiming something in flat contradiction to what the Foreign Secretary had been doing at Geneva. At one moment I thought that he held the view that the Foreign Secretary had somehow managed in Geneva so to freeze the situation that the Russians would have all the nuclear weapons that they possessed today, but that we would have no weapons ourselves. I say that the Foreign Secretary has not been engaged upon that at Geneva.

The facts are that on 21st January President Johnson proposed that the United States, the Soviet Union, and their respective allies should agree to explore a verified freeze of the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive vehicles. The United States Government are now working out their plans before discussing them with their N.A.T.O. allies, and they have given Her Majesty's Government an explicit assurance that nothing in the proposals would inhibit them from honouring their obligations under the Nassau Agreement to supply Polaris missiles. I hope that that is as complete an answer as hon. Members want.

Mr. Gordon Walker (Smethwick)

Will the right hon. Gentleman address himself to the point that our own Foreign Secretary, in Geneva, said that he himself—whatever the President had said—was in favour of freezing all nuclear missiles?

Mr. Thorneycroft

The Foreign Secretary was supporting the proposal of President Johnson on the explicit assurance that America would preserve the supply—which they are obligated to give—of the Polaris missile. [HON. MEMBERS: "Read it."] I have read what he said. The right hon. Gentleman then went on—

Mr. G. Brown

It will be within the recollection of the House that the right hon. Gentleman has just said that I had attributed to the Foreign Secretary something which he had not said. Will he tell us what the Foreign Secretary did say?

Mr. Thorneycroft

I have not the whole of the Foreign Secretary's speech here, but I can say that he supported President Johnson's statement, and so do the whole Government. If the right hon. Gentleman thinks that he can get out of his political difficulties on the basis that the Foreign Secretary has somehow accidentally frozen Britain's nuclear strike power at nil while keeping the Russian one at its present value, he is completely mistaken.

The right hon. Gentleman went on to say, "What will we do?" He said, "Of course we will not abandon the existing system. We will keep the V-bombers, but we will spend no more upon them, and we will not seek to extend them into the future." That is a terrifying way of dealing with a great weapons system. It is not the way to treat our Services. If we have weapons they must be kept up to date, and extended into the future. The right hon. Gentleman said that he would open negotiations to see how, in the light of existing circumstances, he could share the control with others. Whatever else he believes or disbelieves, he surely cannot believe that to announce that he will give up British missiles—[HON. MEMBERS: "He never said that."] Then what did he say, other than that? If he announced this, how could he hope to achieve control of somebody else's weapons?

There may be many other arguments for giving up the British deterrent, and many other points that can be put, but to enter this great debate and try to persuade this country, or the House of Commons, that somehow, by giving up our own weapons, we can achieve control of some one else's is to make the biggest error that has ever been made.

Mr. Healey

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for giving way. This is an interesting argument. The right hon. Gentleman has supported the Prime Minister in saying that the project for a multilateral force is well worth considering. Is not this precisely a project whose whole aim, as expressed by the Prime Minister, is to persuade countries to try to find an arrangement for sharing the control of weapons which they themselves do not possess?

Mr. Thorneycroft

No. That is just what it is not. I did deal with this rather fully in the speech which I made in opening the debate. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will study the problem of the multilateral force which has a quite strong political construction. But no one has ever suggested, no one in the State Department, the Pentagon, or anywhere else that this gives in any sense effective control or use of this weapon to anyone except the United States. Unless the right hon. Gentleman understands these things he cannot address himself to them.

I turn to what I think was one of the most interesting and important speeches in this debate, that of my right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Hall Green (Mr. Aubrey Jones). He made an important contribution. What he really said was that the pace of technological advance was, in any event, putting a limit to the nation-state. I believe this to be true. It is the underlying argument for the European adventure. It always was; and I think that, in fact, everyone would agree with him in what he said.

But what my right hon. Friend said was rather missed by quite a number of right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite. He said: If my argument has any cogency, we are then faced with the question: what shall this single centre of nuclear decision be? To my mind, it cannot be a United States national centre. Feeling in Europe has gone much too far for his. Political and economic resurgence in Europe has outrun this. If that is so, we are forced back upon only one thing. All that I wish to do today is to put this forward as an objective. We are forced back upon a single centre of joint decision by major allies. I shall not discuss today how to achieve that objective."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 26th February, 1964; Vol. 690; c. 491.] I do not believe that anyone would dissent from that. Of course, we all agree that it would be an admirable thing if the world, or the West, could achieve a single centre for decision.

May I say this to my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper. We are just a little way from the point at which the United States is prepared to give up its sovereignty in this matter. We are perhaps just a little way away from the point at which General de Gaulle is willing to give up the force de frappe to anybody else. I do not say that these great objectives may not be attainable. I certainly do not say that any of us should fail to strive for them. But I beg the House to try to look at the problems of the world in which we live and not a possible world which might come about eventually.

If I may say so to my right hon. Friend the Member for Hall Green—I hope that I seem fair in my comment on his speech —there is, I think, some danger in a misunderstanding of his argument. I think that he must have been as shocked as anybody else when he heard himself immediately followed by the hon, Member for Ashfield (Mr. Warbey), who delivered the speech thereafter from the benches opposite, and who took his speech as an argument for scrapping the lot right away. I hope that I have done my right hon. Friend a service in dissociating him from some of his supporters.

My hon. Friend the Member for Macclesfield (Sir A. V. Harvey)—I thank him for his commendation of my own remarks— asked a very pertinent question. He said that if the Opposition believe in reliance upon the American deterrent may we have an absolute assurance that the party opposite is solid in its support of the American Polaris base? Now, can we have it?—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] The head drummer is away.

The whole of this argument, which has gone on for two days, is rendered absolutely meaningless by the Opposition's failure to answer this question. It is one thing to say that one is a loyal member of an alliance and that what is wanted is absolute faith in one's allies, but it is another thing to flinch from allowing them to have bases from which that defence would have to be conducted on one's soil. I shall not press hon. Members opposite for anything more. It is an embarrassment which is too painful, too acute. [Interruption.] The right hon. Member for Belper begs me to move on to something else. [Interruption.] I take up the right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell), who, as always, made an interesting contribution to our discussion.

Mr. G. Brown

This is cheating.

Mr. Thorneycroft

The right hon. Member for Easington said today that he had not had all the information on nuclear weapons from us that he would have wished to have, but, to be truthful, he did not get all the information from Lord Attlee that he would have wished. He asked me, could we not get all the N.A.T.O. countries together and somehow get the strike decisions made there? N.A.T.O. is a great conception and a great alliance, but it is not a sovereign Power. Does the right hon. Member think that it is possible, at this moment in time—I do not say what may be possible, but at this time—so to reorganise that alliance that we can get people together and have the sort of single centre which my right hon. Friend the Member for Hall Green spoke about? That would not be facing the realities of the situation as it is today.

I have sought to cover as much of the debate—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."]— as I have been permitted to cover. The debate, as most others, has been about power. I say this to right hon. Members opposite. In all their desire to get rid of British weapons it seems that what they are flinching from is power. They should not be afraid of power. Power is not an evil thing. The right thing to do with power is to use it wisely and sensibly and in the cause of peace, which is the policy of the Government.

Question put, That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question: —

The House divided: Ayes 337, Noes 238.

Division No. 32.]	AYES	[10.0 p.m.
Agnew, Sir Peter	Birch, Rt. Hon. Nigel	Carr, Compton (Barons Court)
Allan, Robert (Paddington, S.)	Bishop, Sir Patrick	Carr, Rt. Hon. Robert (Mitcham)
Allason, James	Black, Sir Cyril	Cary, Sir Robert
Amery, Rt. Hon. Julian	Bossom, Hon. Clive	Channon, H. P. G.
Anderson, D. C.	Bourne-Arton, A.	Chataway, Christopher
Arbuthnot, Sir John	Box, Donald	Clark, Henry (Antrim, N.)
Ashton, Sir Hubert	Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hon. John	Clark, William (Nottingham, S.)
Atkins, Humphrey	Boyle, Rt. Hon. Sir Edward	Clarke, Brig. Terence (Portsmih, W.)
Awdry, Daniel (Chippenham)	Braine, Bernard	Cleaver, Leonard
Balniel, Lord	Brewis, John	Cole, Norman
Barber, Anthony	Bromley-Davenport, Lt. -Col. Sir Walter	Cooke, Robert
Barlow, Sir John	Brooke, Rt. Hon. Henry	Cooper, A. E.
Barter, John	Brown, Alan (Tottenham)	Cordeaux, Lt.-Col. J. K.
Batsford, Brian	Browne, Percy (Torrington)	Cordie, John
Bell, Ronald	Bryan, Paul	Corfield, F. V.
Bennett, F. M. (Torquay)	Buck, Antony	Costain, A. P.
Bennett, Dr. Reginald (Gos & Fhm)	Bullard, Denys	Coulson, Michael
Bevins, Rt. Hon. Reginald	Bullus, Wing Commander Eric	Courtney, Cdr. Anthony
Bidgood, John C.	Burden, F. A.	Craddock, Sir Beresford (Spelthorne)
Biffen, John	Butcher, Sir Herbert	Crawley, Aldan
Biggs-Davison, John	Butler, Rt. Hn. R. A. (Saffron Walden)	Critchley, Julian
Bingham, R. M.	Campbell, Gordon (Moray & Nairn)	Croathwalte-Eyre, Col. Sir Oliver
Crowder, F. P.	Hulbert, Sir Norman	Page, Graham (Crosby)
Cunningham, Knox	Hurd, Sir Anthony	Page, John (Harrow, West)
Curran, Charles	Hutchison, Michael Clark	Pannell, Norman (Kirkdale)
Currie, G. B. H.	Iremonger, T. L.	Partridge, E.
Dalkeith, Earl of	Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)	Pearson, Frank (Clitheroe)
Dance, James	Jackson, John	Peel, John
d'Avigdor-Gofdsmid, Sir Henry	James, David	Percival, Ian
Deedes, Rt. Hon. W. F.	Jenkins, Robert (Dulwich)	Peyton, John
de Ferranti, Basil	Jennings, J. C.	Pickthorn, Sir Kenneth
Digby, Simon Wingfield	Johnson, Dr. Donald (Carlisle)	Pike, Miss Mervyn
Donaldson, Cmdr. C. E. M.	Johnson, Eric (Blackley)	Pitman, Sir James
Doughty, Charles	Johnson Smith, Geoffrey	Pitt, Dame Edith
Douglas-Rome, Rt. Hon. Sir Alec	Jones, Arthur (Northants, S.)	Pounder, Rafton
Drayson, G. B.	Jones, Rt. Hn. Aubrey (Hall Green)	Powell, Rt. Hon. J. Enoch
du Cann, Edward	Joseph, Rt. Hon. Sir Keith	Price, David (Eastleigh)
Duncan, Sir James	Kaberry, Sir Donald	Price, H. A. (Lewisham, W.)
Duthie, Sir William (Banff)	Kerans, Cdr. J. S.	Prior, J. M. L.
Eden, Sir John	Kerby, Capt. Henry	Proudfoot, Wilfred
Elliot, Capt. Walter (Carshalton)	Kerr, Sir Hamilton	Pym, Francis
Elliott, R. W. (Newc'tle-upon-Tyne, N.)	Kershaw, Anthony	Quennell, Miss J. M.
Emery, Peter	Kimball, Marcus	Ramsden, James
Emmet, Hon. Mrs. Evelyn	Kirk, Peter	Rawlinson, Rt. Hon. Sir Peter
Errington, Sir Eric	Kitson, Timothy	Redmayne, Rt. Hon. Martin
Erroll, Rt. Hon. F. J.	Lagden, Godfrey	Rees, Hugh (Swansea, W.)
Farey-Jones, F. W.	Lambton, Viscount	Rees-Davies, W. R. (Isle of Thanet)
Farr, John	Lancaster, Col. C. G.	Renton, Rt. Hon. David
Fletcher-Cooke, Charles	Langford-Holt, Sir John	Ridley, Hon. Nicholas
Forrest, George	Leavey, J. A.	Ridsdale, Julian
Foster, Sir John	Legge-Bourke, Sir Harry	Rippon, Rt. Hon. Geoffrey
Fraser, Rt. Hn. Hugh (Stafford&Stone)	Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)	Roberts, Sir Peter (Heeley)
Fraser, Ian (Plymouth, Sutton)	Lilley, F. J. P.	Robertson, Sir D. (C'thn's & S'th'ld)
Freeth, Denzil	Lindsay, Sir Martin	Robson Brown, Sir William
Galbraith, Hon. T. G. D.	Linstead, Sir Hugh	Rodgers, John (Sevenoaks)
Gammans, Lady	Litchfield, Capt. John	Roots, William
Gardner, Edward	Lloyd, Rt. Hn. Geoffrey (Sut'nC'dfield)	Ropner, Col. Sir Leonard
George, Sir John (Pollok)	Lloyd, Rt. Hon. Selwyn (Wirral)	Royle, Anthony (Richmond, Surrey)
Gibson-Watt, David	Longbottom, Charles	Russell, Sir Ronald
Gilmour, Ian (Norfolk, Central)	Longden, Gilbert	Sandys, Rt. Hon. Duncan
Gilmour, Sir John (East Fife)	Loveys, Walter H.	Scott-Hopkins, James
Glover, Sir Douglas	Lucas, Sir Jocelyn	Seymour, Leslie
Glyn, Dr. Alan (Clapham)	Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh	Shaw, M.
Godber, Rt. Hon. J. B.	McAdden, Sir Stephen	Shepherd, William
Goodhart, Philip	MacArthur, Ian	Skeet, T. H. H.
Goodhew, Victor	McLaren, Martin	Smith, Dudley (Br'ntf'd & Chiswick)
Gough, Frederick	McLaughlin, Mrs. Patricia	Smyth, Rt. Hon. Brig. Sir John
Gower, Raymond	Maclay, Rt. Hon. John	Spearman, Sir Alexander
Grant-Ferris, R.	Maclean, Sir Fitzroy (Bute&N. Ayrs)	Speir, Rupert
Green, Alan	McLean, Neil (Inverness)	Stainton, Keith
Gresham Cooke, R.	Macleod, Rt. Hn. Iain (Enfield, W.)	Stanley, Hon. Richard
Grosvenor, Lord Robert	McMaster, Stanley R.	Stevens, Geoffrey
Gurden, Harold	Macmillan, Rt. Hn. Harold (Bromley)	Steward, Harold (Stockport, S.)
Hall, John (Wycombe)	Macmillan, Maurice (Halifax)	Stodart, J. A.
Hamilton, Michael (Wellingborough)	Maddan, Martin	Stoddart-Scott, Col. Sir Malcolm
Harris, Frederic (Croydon, N. W.)	Maginnis, John E.	Storey, Sir Samuel
Harris, Reader (Heston)	Maitland, Sir John	Studholme, Sir Henry
Harrison, Brian (Maldon)	Markham, Major Sir Frank	Summers, Sir Spencer
Harrison, Col. Sir Harwood (Eye)	Marlowe, Anthony	Talbot, John E.
Harvey, Sir Arthur Vere (Macclesf'd)	Marples, Rt. Hon. Ernest	Tapsell, Peter
Harvey, John (Walthamstow, E.)	Marshall, Sir Douglas	Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)
Harvie Anderson, Miss	Marten, Neil	Taylor, Edwin (Bolton, E.)
Hastings, Stephen	Mathew, Robert (Honiton)	Taylor, Frank (M'ch'st'r, Moss Side)
Hay, John	Matthews, Gordon (Meriden)	Taylor, Sir William (Bradford, N.)
Heald, Rt. Hon. Sir Lionel	Maudling, Rt. Hon. Reginald	Teeling, Sir William
Heath, Rt. Hon. Edward	Mawby, Ray	Temple, John M.
Henderson, John (Cathcart)	Maxwell-Hyslop, R. J.	Thatcher, Mrs. Margaret
Hendry, Forbes	Maydon, Lt.-Cmdr. S. L. C.	Thomas, Sir Leslie (Canterbury)
Hicks Beach, Maj. W.	Mills, Stratton	Thomas, Peter (Conway)
Hiley, Joseph	Miscampbell, Norman	Thompson, Sir Kenneth (Walton)
Hill, Mrs. Eveline (Wythenshawe)	Montgomery, Fergus	Thompson, Sir Richard (Croydon, S.)
Hill, J. E. B. (S. Norfolk)	Moore, Sir Thomas (Ayr)	Thorneycroft, Rt. Hon. Peter
Hirst, Geoffrey	More, Jasper (Ludlow)	Thornton-Kemsley, Sir Colin
Hobson, Rt. Hon. Sir John	Morgan, William	Tiley, Arthur (Bradford, W.)
Hooking, Philip N.	Morrison, John	Tilney, John (Wavertree)
Hogg, Rt. Hon. Quintin	Mott-Radclyffe, Sir Charles	Touche, Rt. Hon. Sir Gordon
Holland, Philip	Neave, Airey	Turner, Colin
Hollingworth, John	Nicholls, Sir Harmar	Turton, Rt. Hon. R. H.
Hope, Rt. Hon. Lord John	Nicholson, Sir Godfrey	Tweedsmuir, Lady
Hopkins, Alan	Noble, Rt. Hon. Michael	van Straubenzee, W. R.
Hornby, R. P.	Nugent, Rt. Hon. Sir Richard	Vane, W. M. F.
Hornsby-Smith, Rt. Hon. Dame P.	Oakshott, Sir Hendrie	Vaughan-Morgan, Rt. Hon. Sir John
Howard, Hon, G. R. (St. Ives)	Orr, Capt. L. P. S.	Vickers, Miss Joan
Howard, John (Southampton, Test)	Orr-Ewing, Sir Charles	Vosper, Rt. Hon. Dennis
Hughes Hallett, Vice-Admiral John	Osborn, John (Hallam)	Walder, David
Hughes-Young, Michael	Osborne, Sir Cyril (Louth)	Walker, Peter

Walker-Smith, Rt. Hon. Sir Derek	Williams, Paul (Sunderland, S.)	Woollam, John
Wall, Patrick	Wills, Sir Gerald (Bridgwater)	Worsley, Marcus
Ward, Dame Irene	Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)	Yates, William (The Wrekin)
Watkinson, Rt. Hon. Harold	Wise, A. R.
Webster, David	Wolrige-Gordon, Patrick	TELLERS FOR THE AYES:
Wells, John (Maidstone)	Wood, Rt. Hon. Richard	Mr. Chichester-Clark and Mr. Finlay.
Whitelaw, William	Woodhouse, C. M.
Williams, Dudley (Exeter)	Woodnutt, Mark
NOES
Abse, Leo	Grey, Charles	Mellish, R. J.
Ainsley, William	Griffiths, David (Rother Valley)	Mendelson, J. J.
Albu, Austen	Griffiths, Rt. Hon. James (Llanelly)	Millan, Bruce
Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)	Griffiths, W. (Exchange)	Milne, Edward
Allen, Scholefield (Crewe)	Grimond, Rt. Hon. J.	Mitchison, C. R.
Bacon, Miss Alice	Gunter, Ray	Monslow, Walter
Barnett, Guy	Hale, Leslie (Oldham, W.)	Moody, A. S.
Baxter, William (Stirlingshire, W.)	Hamilton, William (West Fife)	Morris, Charles (Openshaw)
Beaney, Alan	Hannan, William	Morris, John
Bellenger, Rt. Hon. F. J.	Harper, Joseph	Moyle, Arthur
Bence, Cyril	Hart, Mrs. Judith	Mulley, Frederick
Benn, Anthony Wedgwood	Hayman, F. H.	Neat, Harold
Bennett, J. (Glasgow, Bridgeton)	Healey, Dens	Noel-Baker, Francis (Swindon)
Benson, Sir George	Hendereon, Rt. Hn. Arthur (RwlyRegis)	Oliver, G. H.
Blackburn, F.	Herbison, Miss Margaret	O'Malley, B. K.
Bottomley, Rt. Hon. A. C.	Hill, J. (Midlothian)	Oram, A. E.
Bowden, Rt. Hn. H. W. (Leics, S. W.)	Hilton, A. V.	Oswald, Thomas
Bowles, Frank	Holman, Percy	Owen, Will
Boyden, James	Holt, Arthur	Padley, W. E.
Braddock, Mrs. E. M.	Hooson, H. E.	Paget, R. T.
Bradley, Tom	Houghton, Douglas	Panned, Charles (Leeds, W.)
Bray, Dr. Jeremy	Howell, Charles A. (Perry Barr)	Pargiter, G. A.
Brockway, A. Fenner	Howell, Denis (Small Heath)	Parker, John
Broughton, Dr. A. D. D.	Howie, W.	Parkin, B. T.
Brown, Rt. Hon. George (Belper)	Hoy, James H.	Pavitt, Laurence
Butler, Herbert (Hackney, C.)	Hughes, Cledwyn (Anglesey)	Pearson, Arthur (Pontypridd)
Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)	Hughes, Emrys (S. Ayrshire)	Peart, Frederick
Callaghan, James	Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)	Pentland, Norman
Carmichael, Neil	Hunter, A. E.	Popplewell, Ernest
Castle, Mrs. Barbara	Hynd, H. (Accrington)	Prentice, R. E.
Chapman, Donald	Hynd, John (Attercliffe)	Probert, Arthur
Cliffe, Michael	Irvine, A. J. (Edge Hill)	Proctor, W. T.
Collick, Percy	Irving, Sydney (Dartford)	Pursey, Cmdr. Harry
Corbet, Mrs. Freda	Janner, Sir Barnett	Randall, Harry
Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)	Jay, Rt. Hon. Douglas	Rankin, John
Cronin, John	Jeger, George	Rees, Merlyn (Leeds, S.)
Crosland, Anthony	Jenkins, Roy (Stechford)	Reid, William
Crossman, R. H. S.	Jones, Rt. Hn. A. Creech (Wakefield)	Reynolds, G. W.
Dalyell, Tam	Jones, Dan (Burnley)	Rhodes, H.
Darling, George	Jones, Elwyn (Westham, S.)	Roberts, Albert (Normanton)
Davies, G. Elfed (Rhondda, E.)	Jones, J. Idwal (Wrexham)	Roberts, Goronwy (Caernarvon)
Davies, Harold (Leek)	Jones, T. W. (Merioneth)	Robertson, John (Paisley)
Davies, Ifor (Gower)	Kelley, Richard	Robinson, Kenneth (St. Panoras, N.)
Davies, S. O. (Merthyr)	Kenyon, Clifford	Rodgers, W. T. (Stockton)
Deer, George	King, Dr. Horace	Ross, William
Delargy, Hugh	Lawson, George	Royle, Charles (Salford, West)
Dempsey, James	Ledger, Ron	Shinwell, Rt. Hon. E.
Diamond, John	Lee, Frederick (Newton)	Silkin, John
Dodds, Norman	Lee, Miss Jennie (Cannock)	Silverman, Julius (Aston)
Doig, Peter	Lever, Harold (Cheetham)	Silverman, Sydney (Nelson)
Donnelly, Desmond	Lever, L. M. (Ardwick)	Skeffington, Arthur
Driberg, Tom	Lewis, Arthur (West Ham, N.)	Slater, Mrs. Harriet (Stoke, N.)
Duffy, A. E. P. (Colne Valley)	Lipton, Marcus	Slater, Joseph (Sedgefieid)
Ede, Rt. Hon. C.	Lubbock, Eric	Small, William
Edelman, Maurice	Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson	Smith, Ellis (Stoke, S.)
Edwards, Rt. Hon. Ness (Caerphilly)	McBride, N.	Snow, Julian
Edwards, Robert (Bilston)	McCann, John	Sorensen, R. W.
Edwards, Walter (Stepney)	MacColl, James	Soskice, Rt. Hon. Sir Frank
Evans, Albert	MacDermot, Niall	Spriggs, Leslie
Fernyhough, E.	Molnnes, James	Steele, Thomas
Finch, Harold	McKay, John (Wallsend)	Stewart, Michael (Fulham)
Fitch, Alan	Mackie, John (Enfield, East)	Stonehouse, John
Fletcher, Eric	McLeavy, Frank	Stones, William
Foley, Maurice	MacMillan, Malcolm (Western Isles)	Strauss, Rt. Hn. C. R. (Vauxhall)
Foot, Dingle (Ipswich)	MacPherson, Malcolm (Stirling)	Stross, Sir Barnett (Stoke-on-Trent, C.)
Forman, J. C.	Mallalieu, E. L. (Brigg)	Swain, Thomas
Fraser, Thomas (Hamilton)	Mallalieu, J.P.W. (Huddersfield, E.)	Swingler, Stephen
Galperm, Sir Myer	Manuel, Archie	Symonds, J. B.
George, Lady MeganLloyd (Crmrthn)	Mapp, Charles	Taverne, D.
Ginsburg, David	Marsh, Richard	Taylor, Bernard (Mansfield)
Gordon Walker, Rt. Hon. P. C.	Mason, Roy	Thomas, Iorwerth (Rhondda, W)
Gourlay, Harry	Mayhew, Christopher	Thompson, Dr. Alan (Dunfermline)
Greenwood, Anthony		Thomson, G. M. (Dundee, E.)

Thornton, Ernest	White, Mrs. Eirene	Woof, Robert
Thorpe, Jeremy	Whitlock, William	Wyatt, Woodrow
Tomney, Frank	Wigg, George	Yates, Victor (Ladywood)
Wade, Donald	Wilkins, W. A.	Zilliacus, K.
Wainwright, Edwin	Willey, Frederick
Warbey, William	Williams, W. T. (Warrington)	TELLERS FOR THE NOES:
Weitzman, David	Willis, E. G. (Edinburgh, E.)	Mr. G. H. R. Rogers and Mr. Redhead.
Wells, William (Walsall, N.)	Woodburn, Rt. Hon. A.

Main Question Put:—

The House divided: Ayes 335, Noes 237.

Division No. 33.]	AYES	[10.13 p.m.
Agnew, Sir Peter	Curran, Charles	Hirst, Geoffrey
Allan, Robert (Paddington, S.)	Currie, G. B. H.	Hobson, Rt. Hon. Sir John
Allason, James	Dalkeith, Earl of	Hocking, Philip N.
Amery, Rt. Hon. Julian	Dance, James	Hogg, Rt. Hon. Quintin
Anderson, D. C.	d'Avigdor-Gokfemid, Sir Henry	Holland, Philip
Arbuthnot, Sir John	Deedee, Rt. Hon. W. F.	Hollingworth, John
Ashton, Sir Hubert	de Ferranti, Basil	Hope, Rt. Hon. Lord John
Atkins, Humphrey	Digby, Simon Wingfield	Hopkins, Alan
Awdry, Daniel (Chippenham)	Donaldson, Cmdr. C. E. M.	Hornby, R. P.
Balniel, Lord	Doughty, Charles	Homsby-Smlth, Rt. Hon. Dame P,
Barber, Anthony	Douglas-Home, Rt. Hon. Sir Alec	Howard, Hon. G. R. (St. Ives)
Barlow, Sir John	Drayson, G. B.	Howard, John (Southampton, Test)
Barter, John	du Cam, Edward	Hughes Hallett, Vice-Admlral John
Batsford, Brian	Duncan, Sir James	Hughes-Young, Michael
Bell, Ronald	Duthie, Sir William (Banff)	Hulbert, Sir Norman
Bennett, F. M. (Torquay)	Eden, Sir John	Hurd, Sir Anthony
Bennett, Dr. Reginald (Cos & Fhm)	Elliot, Capt. Walter (Carshalton)	Hutchison, Michael Clark
Bevins, Rt. Hon. Reginald	Elliott, R.W.(Newcastle-upon-Tyne, N.)	Iremonger, T. L.
Bidgood, Join C.	Emery, Peter	Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)
Biffen, John	Emmet, Hon. Mrs. Evelyn	James, David
Biggs-Davison, John	Errington, Sir Eric	Jenkins, Robert (Dulwich)
Bingham, R. M.	Erroll, Rt. Hon. F. J.	Jennings, J. C.
Birch, Rt. Hon. Nigel	Farey-Jones, F. W.	Johnson, Dr. Donald (Carlisle)
Bishop, Sir Patrick	Farr, John	Johnson, Eric (Blackley)
Black, Sir Cyril	Fletcher-Cooke, Charles	Johnson Smith, Geoffrey
Bossom, Hon. Clive	Forrest, George	Jones, Arthur (Northants, S.)
Bourne-Arton, A.	Foster, Sir John	Jones, Rt. Hn. Aubrey (Hall Green)
Box, Donald	Fraser, Rt. Hn. Hugh (Stafford & Stone)	Joseph, Rt. Hon. Sir Keith
Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hon. John	Fraser, Ian (Plymouth, Sutton)	Kaberry, Sir Donald
Boyle, Rt. Hon. Sir Edward	Freeth, Denzil	Kerans, Cdr. J. S.
Braine, Bernard	Galbraith, Hon. T. G. D.	Kerby, Capt. Henry
Brewis, John	Gammans, Lady	Kerr, Sir Hamilton
Bromley-Davenport, Lt. -Col. Sir Walter	Gardner, Edward	Kershaw, Anthony
Brooke, Rt. Hon. Henry	George, Sir John (Pollok)	Kimball, Marcus
Brown, Alan (Tottenham)	Gibson-Watt, David	Kirk, Peter
Browne, Percy (Torrington)	Gilmour, Ian (Norfolk, Central)	Kitson, Timothy
Bryan, Paul	Gilmour, Sir John (East Fife)	Lagden, Godfrey
Buck, Antony	Glover, Sir Douglas	Lambton, Viscount
Bullard, Denys	Glyn, Dr. Alan (Clapham)	Lancaster, Col. C. G.
Bullus, Wing Commander Eric	Godber, Rt. Hon. J. B.	Langford-Holt, Sir John
Burden, F. A.	Goodhart, Philip	Leavey, J. A.
Butcher, Sir Herbert	Goodhew, Victor	Legge-Bourke, Sir Harry
Butler, Rt. Hn. R. A. (SaffronWalden)	Gougn, Frederick	Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)
Campbell, Gordon (Moray & Nairn)	Cower, Raymond	Lindsay, Sir Martin
Carr, Compton (Barons Court)	Grant-Ferris, R.	Linstead, Sir Hugh
Carr, Rt. Hon. Robert	Green, Alan	Litchfield, Capt. John
Cary, Sir Robert	Gresham Cooke, R.	Lloyd, Rt. Hn. Geoffrey (Sut'nC'dfield)
Channon, H, P. G.	Grosvenor, Lord Robert	Lloyd, Rt. Hon. Selwyn (Wirral)
Chataway, Christopher	Gurden, Harold	Longbottom, Charles
Clark, Henry (Antrim, N.)	Hall, John (Wycombe)	Longden, Gilbert
Clark, William (Nottingham, S.)	Hamilton, Michael (Wellingborough)	Loveys, Walter H.
Clarke, Brig. Terence (Portsmth, W.)	Harris, Frederic (Croydon, N. W.)	Lucas, Sir Jocelyn
Cleaver, Leonard	Harris, Reader (Heston)	Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh
Cole, Norman	Harrison, Brian (Maldon)	McAdden, Sir Stephen
Cooke, Robert	Harrison, Col. Sir Harwood (Eye)	MacArthur, Ian
Cooper, A. E.	Harvey, Sir Arthur Vere (Macclesf'd)	McLaren, Martin
Cordeaux, Lt.-Col. J. K.	Harvey, John (Walthamstow, E.)	McLaughlin, Mrs. Patricia
Cordle, John	Harvie Anderson, Miss	Maclay, Rt. Hon. John
Corfield, F. V.	Hastings, Stephen	Maclean, Sir Fitzroy (Bute&N. Ayrs)
Costain, A. P.	Hay, John	McLean, Neil (Inverness)
Coulson, Michael	Heald, Rt. Hon. Sir Lionel	Macleod, Rt. Hn. Iain (Enfield, W.)
Courtney, Cdr. Anthony	Heath, Rt. Hon. Edward	McMaster, Stanley R.
Craddock, Sir Beresford (Spelthorne)	Henderson, John (Cathcart)	Macmillan, Rt. Hn. Harokd ( Bromley)
Crawley, Aldan	Hendry, Forbes	Macmillan, Maurice (Halifax)
Critchley, Julian	Hicks Beach, Maj. W.	Maddan, Martin
Crosthwalte-Eyre, Col. Sir Oliver	Hiley, Joseph	Maginnis, John E.
Crowder, F. P.	Hill, Mrs. Eveline (Wythenshawe)	Maitland, Sir John
Cunningham, Knox	Hill, J. E. B. (S. Norfolk)	Markham, Major Sir Frank
Marlowe, Anthony	Proudfoot, Wilfred	Teeling, Sir William
Marples, Rt. Hon. Ernest	Pym, Francis	Temple, John M.
Marshall, Sir Douglas	Quennell, Miss J. M.	Thatcher, Mrs. Margaret
Marten, Neil	Ramsden, James	Thomas, Sir Leslie (Canterbury)
Mathew, Robert (Honiton)	Rawlinson, Rt. Hon. Sir Peter	Thomas, Peter (Conway)
Matthews, Gordon (Meriden)	Redmayne, Rt. Hon. Martin	Thompson, Sir Kenneth (Walton)
Maudling, Rt. Hon. Reginald	Rees, Hugh (Swansea, W.)	Thompson, Sir Richard (Croydon, S.)
Mawby, Ray	Rees-Davies, W. R. (Isle of Thanet)	Thorneycroft, Rt. Hon. Peter
Maxwell-Hyslop, R. J.	Ronton, Rt. Hon. David	Thornton-Kemsley, Sir Colin
Maydon, Lt.-Cmdr. s. L. c.	Ridley, Hon. Nicholas	Tiley, Arthur (Bradford, W.)
Mills, Stratton	Ridsdale, Julian	Tilney, John (Wavertree)
Miscampbell, Norman	Rippon, Rt. Hon. Geoffrey	Touche, Rt. Hon. Sir Gordon
Montgomery, Fergus	Roberts, Sir Peter (Heeley)	Turner, Colin
Moore, Sir Thomas (Ayr)	Robertson, Sir D. (C'thn's & S'th'ld)	Turton, Rt. Hon. R. H.
More, Jasper (Ludlow)	Robeon Brown, Sir William	Tweedsmuir, Lady
Morgan, William	Rodgers, John (Sevenoaks)	van Straubenzee, W. R.
Morrison, John	Roots, William	Vane, W. M. F.
Mott-Radolyffe, Sir Charles	Ropner, Col. Sir Leonard	Vaughan-Morgan, Rt. Hon, Sir John
Neave, Airey	Royle, Anthony (Richmond, Surrey)	Vickers, Miss Joan
Nicholls, Sir Harmar	Russell, Sir Ronald	Vosper, Rt. Hon. Dennis
Nicholson, Sir Godfrey	Sandys Rt. Hon. Duncan	Walder, David
Noble, Rt. Hon. Michael	Scott-Hopkins, James	Walker, Peter
Nugent, Rt. Hon. Sir Richard	Seymour, Leslie	Walker-Smith, Rt. Hon. Sir Derek
Oakshott, Sir Hendrie	Shaw, M.	Wall, Patrick
Orr, Capt. L. P. S.	Shepherd, William	Ward, Dame Irene
Orr-Ewing, Sir Charles	Skeet, T. H. H.	Watkinson, Rt. Hon. Harold
Osborn, John (Hallam)	Smith, Dudley (Br'ntf'd & Chiswick)	Webster, David
Osborne, Sir Cyril (Louth)	Smyth, Rt. Hon. Brig. Sir John	Wells, John (Maidstone)
Page, Graham (Crosby)	Spearman, Sir Alexander	Whitelaw, William
Page, John (Harrow, West)	Speir, Rupert	Williams, Dudley (Exeter)
Pannell, Norman (Kirkdale)	Stainton, Keith	Williams, Paul (Sunderland, S.)
Partridge, E.	Stanley, Hon. Richard	Wills, Sir Gerald (Bridgwater)
Pearson, Frank (Clitheroe)	Stevens, Geoffrey	Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)
Peel, John	Steward, Harold (Stockport, S.)	Wise, A. R.
Percival, Ian	Stodart, J. A.	Wolrige-Gordon, Patrick
Peyton, John	Stoddart-Scott, Col. Sir Malcolm	Wood, Rt. Hon. Richard
Pickthorn, Sir Kenneth	Storey, Sir Samuel	Woodhouse, C. M.
Pike, Miss Mervyn	Studholme, Sir Henry	Woodnutt, Mark
Pitman, Sir James	Summers, Sir Spencer	Woollam, John
Pitt, Dame Edith	Talbot, John E.	Worsley, Marcus
Pounder, Rafton	Tapseil, Peter	Yates, William (The Wrekin)
Powell, Rt. Hon. J. Enoch	Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)
Price, David (Eastleigh)	Taylor, Edwin (Bolton, E.)	TELLERS FOR THE AYES:
Price, H. A. (Lewisham, W.)	Taylor, Frank (M'ch'st'r, Moss Side)	Mr. Chichester-Clark and Mr. Finlay.
Prior, J. M. L.	Taylor, Sir William (Bradford, N.)
NOES
Abse. Leo	Crosland, Anthony	Greenwood, Anthony
Ainsley, William	Crossman, R. H. S.	Grey, Charles
Albu, Austen	Dalyell, Tam	Griffiths, David (Rother Valley)
Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)	Darling, George	Griffiths, Rt. Hon. James (Llanelly)
Allen, Scholefield (Crewe)	Davies, G. Elfed (Rhondda, E.)	Griffiths, W. (Exchange)
Bacon, Miss Alice	Davies, Harold (Leek)	Grimond, Rt. Hon. J.
Barnett, Guy	Davies, Ifor (Gower)	Gunter, Ray
Baxter, William (Stirlingshire, W.)	Davies, S. O. (Merthyr)	Hale, Leslie (Oldham, W.)
Beaney, Alan	Deer, George	Hamilton, William (West Fife)
Bellenger, Rt. Hon. F. J.	Delargy, Hugh	Hannan, William
Bence, Cyril	Dempsey, James	Harper, Joseph
Benn, Anthony Wedgwood	Diamond, John	Hart, Mrs. Judith
Bennett, J. (Glasgow, Bridgeton)	Dodds, Norman	Hayman, F. H.
Benson, Sir George	Doig, Peter	Healey, Denis
Blackburn, F.	Donnelly, Desmond	Henderson, Rt. Hn. Arthur (Rwly Regis)
Bottomley, Rt. Hon. A. G.	Driberg, Tom	Herbison, Miss Margaret
Bowden, Rt. Hn. H. W. (Leics, S. W.)	Duffy, A. E. P. (Colne Valley)	Hilt, J. (Midlothian)
Bowles, Frank	Ede, Rt. Hon. C.	Hilton, A. V.
Boyden, James	Edelman, Maurice	Holman, Percy
Braddock, Mrs. E. M.	Edwards, Rt. Hon. Ness (Caerphilly)	Holt, Arthur
Bradley, Tom	Edwards, Robert (Bilston)	Hooson, H. E.
Bray, Dr. Jeremy	Edwards, Walter (Stepney)	Houghton, Douglas
Brockway, A. Fenner	Evans, Albert	Howell, Charles A. (Perry Barr)
Broughton, Dr. A. D. D.	Fernyhough, E.	Howell, Denis (Small Heath)
Brown, Rt. Hon. George (Belper)	Finch, Harold	Howie, W.
Butler, Herbert (Hackney, C.)	Fitch, Alan	Hoy, James H.
Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)	Fletcher, Eric	Hughes, Cledwyn (Anglesey)
Callaghan, James	Foley, Maurice	Hughes, Emrys (S. Ayrshire)
Carmichael, Neil	Foot, Dingle (Ipswich)	Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)
Castle, Mrs. Barbara	Forman, J. C.	Hunter, A. E.
Chapman, Donald	Fraser, Thomas (Hamilton)	Hynd, H. (Accrington)
Cliffe, Michael	Galpern, Sir Myer	Hynd, John (Attercliffe)
Collick, Percy	George, Lady MeganLloyd (Crmrthn)	Irvine, A. J. (Edge Hill)
Corbet, Mrs. Freda	Ginsburg, David	Irving, Sydney (Dartford)
Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)	Gordon Walker, Rt. Hon. P. C.	Janner, Sir Barnett
Cronin, John	Gourlay, Harry	Jay, Rt. Hon. Douglas

Jeger, George	Morris, John	Small, William
Jenkins, Roy (Stechford)	Moyle, Arthur	Smith, Ellis (Stoke, S.)
Jones, Rt. Hn A. Creech (Wakefield)	Mulley, Frederick	Snow, Julian
Jones, Dan (Burnley)	Neal, Harold	Sorensen, R. W.
Jones, Elwyn (West Ham, S.)	Noel-Baker, Francis (Swindon)	Soskice, Rt. Hon. Sir Frank
Jones, J. Idwal (Wrexham)	Oliver, G. H.	Spriggs, Leslie
Jones, T. W. (Merioneth)	O'Malley, B. K.	Steele, Thomas
Kelley, Richard	Oram, A. E.	Stewart, Michael (Fulham)
Kenyon, Clifford	Oswald, Thomas	Stonehouse, John
King, Dr. Horace	Owen, Will	Stones, William
Lawson, George	Padley, W. E.	Strauss, Rt. Hn. G. R. (Vauxhall)
Ledger, Ron	Paget, R. T.	Stross, Sir Barnett (Stoke-on-Trent, C.)
Lee, Frederick (Newton)	Pannell, Charles (Leeds, W.)	Swain, Thomas
Lee, Miss Jennie (Cannock)	Pargiter, G. A.	Swingler, Stephen
Lever, Harold (Cheetham)	Parker, John	Symonds, J. B.
Lever, L. M. (Ardwick)	Parkin, B. T.	Taverne, D.
Lewis, Arthur (West Ham, N.)	Pavitt, Laurence	Taylor, Bernard (Mansfield)
Lipton, Marcus	Pearson, Arthur (Pontypridd)	Thomas, Iorwerth (Rhondda, W.)
Lubbock, Eric	Peart, Frederick	Thompson, Dr. Alan (Dunfermline)
Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson	Pentland, Norman	Thomson, G. M. (Dundee, E.)
McBride, N.	Popplewell, Ernest	Thornton, Ernest
McCann, John	Prentice, R. E.	Thorpe, Jeremy
MacColl, James	Probert, Arthur	Tomney, Frank
MacDermot, Niall	Proctor, W. T.	Wade, Donald
McInnes, James	Pursey, Cmdr. Harry	Wainwright, Edwin
McKay, John (Wallsend)	Randall, Harry	Warbey, William
Mackie, John (Enfield, East)	Rankin, John	Weitzman, David
McLeavy, Frank	Rees Merlyn (Leeds, S.)	Wells, William (Walsall, N.)
MacMillan, Malcolm (Western Isles)	Reid, William	White, Mrs. Eirene
MacPherson, Malcolm (Stirling)	Reynolds, G. W.	Whitlock, William
Mallalieu, E. L. (Brigg)	Rhodes, H.	Wigg, George
Mallalieu, J. P. W. (Huddersfield, E.)	Roberts, Albert (Normanton)	Wilkins, W. A.
Manuel, Archie	Roberts, Coronwy (Caernarvon)	Willey, Frederick
Mapp, Charles	Robertson, John (Paisley)	Williams, W. T. (Warrington)
Marsh, Richard	Robinson, Kenneth (St. Pancras, N.)	Willis, E. G. (Edinburgh, E.)
Mason, Roy	Rodgere, W. T. (Stockton)	Woodburn, Rt. Hon. A.
Mayhew, Christopher	Ross, William	Woof, Robert
Mellish, R. J.	Royle, Charles (Salford, West)	Wyatt, Woodrow
Mendelson, J. J.	Shinwell, Rt. Hon. E.	Yates, Victor (Ladywood)
Millan, Bruce	Silkin, John	Zilliacus, K.
Milne, Edward	Silverman, Julian (Aston)
Mitchison, G. R.	Silverman, Sydney (Nelson)	TELLERS FOR THE NOES:
Monslow, Walter	Skeffington, Arthur	Mr. G. H. R. Rogers and Mr. Redhead.
Moody, A. S.	Slater, Mrs. Harriet (Stoke, N.)
Morris, Charles (Openshaw)	Slater, Joseph (Sedgefield)

Resolved, That this House approves the Statement on Defence. 1964, contained in Command Paper No. 2270.