Commons Sitting of 13 November 1962

Preamble
The House met at half-past Two o'clock
PRAYERS
[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]
ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
  LOCAL GOVERNMENT

    Public Conveniences (Turnstiles)
    Mrs. Castleasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government and Minister for Welsh Affairs how many turnstiles have been removed from municipal public conveniences since 31st July, 1962; and how many local authorities are still refusing to remove their turnstiles.
    The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Housing and Local Government (Mr. F. V. Corfield): At least 423 turnstiles either have been or are going to be removed—56 more than at 31st July. The number already removed is not known. Fifty authorities have refused to remove any turnstiles; nine have removed some turnstiles but are keeping others.
    Mrs. Castle: Does not the figure of fifty local authorities which have refused to remove turnstiles mean that four more have decided to defy the Minister since his last Answer to me in July? In other words, is not rebellion on the increase, instead of there being conformity on this urgent public matter? In view of this, will the Minister now undertake to introduce legislation immediately to compel local authorities to fall into line, because women are losing all patience on this matter?
    Mr. Corfield: It is certainly true that the number of definite refusals has risen, but this is due to the fact that four further authorities which had not replied at all have now done so. I think the hon. Lady will agree that an increase to
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    60 per cent. shows that progress is being made. I do not think that the powers of persuation have been exhausted, although my right hon. Friend in no way departs from the undertaking with regard to legislation, should this prove necessary.

    Local Authority Members (Pecuniary Interests)
    Mr. Abseasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government and Minister for Welsh Affairs if he has yet received the report of the Working Committee on the law concerning pecuniary interests of members of local authorities; if he is aware of the difficulties caused to many authorities by the inability of councillors who are council house tenants to vote on housing matters; and if he will make a statement.
    The Minister of Housing and Local Government and Minister for Welsh Affairs (Sir Keith Joseph): I have this Report. Members who are council house tenants may take a full part in housing questions in which they have no pecuniary interest. Where they have such an interest, the general rule is that they should not vote. I am sure this rule should be maintained, but I am prepared to consider applications for removal of the disability to vote in cases where otherwise a policy to which the majority of a council are opposed seems likely to be adopted.
    Mr. Abse: Is not the Minister aware that he is merely repeating what has already been said on very many occasions? Assurances were given by the previous Minister that he was looking at a report from a Working Committee which held out some hope to local authorities. Will the Minister consider getting rid of this anomalous law so that we will not have a position, as we have now, Where one rule apparently is applies to local councillors and a totally different rule is being applied to Ministers who leave the Front Bench and take up City appointments? [HON. MEMBERS: "Speech."]
    Sir K. Joseph: I must defer any statement until I have completed the study of this report, but I should not like to hold out any hope that any changes in my policy on voting by council house tenants is probable.

    Boroughs and District Councils (Mergers)
    Mr. Moreasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government and Minister for Welsh Affairs what proposals he has received from the Association of Municipal Corporations providing for a new solution for the merger of boroughs and district councils.
    Sir K. Joseph: The Association of Municipal Corporations has sent me a memorandum on the reorganisation of local government units within counties—that is as part of the forthcoming county reviews—in which it proposes the formation of joint "borough and district councils" by amalgamation. This is to be discussed with the Association in the near future.
    Mr. More: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the preliminary implementation of tae provisions of the Local Government Act, 1958, has given rise to much criticism and hostility among our ancient boroughs? Will he consider, as a matter of urgency, discussions with this association and with representatives of other local authorities to see whether a basis agreeable to all local authorities can be found for amending legislation?
    Sir K. Joseph: Discussions are imminent, and I should certainly welcome any practicable and generally acceptable way of oiling the wheels of change.
    Sir P. Agnew: Can my right hon. Friend give an assurance in considering this matter that, whilst agreeing to the non-county boroughs preserving the traditional trappings to which they are accustomed, he will in all reasonable cases preserve to them also the realities of local government administration?
    Sir K. Joseph: It is difficult for me to give a general answer going beyond the circular which outlines the policies which I hope that counties will bear in mind, but, of course, counties are obliged to consult local authorities concerned about any proposals they may wish to make.

    Planning Appeals
    Mr. Snowasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government and Minister for Welsh Affairs what is the total number of planning appeals in respect of property in England and Wales
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    notified to his Department and waiting the holding of inquiries by his Department's inspectors, at the latest convenient date and at the equivalent dates 12 and 24 months previously.
    Mr. Corfield: At the end of September there were 2,949 appeals awaiting local inquiries; the comparable figures requested are 3,134 and 2,390 respectively.
    Mr. Snow: Has there not been any inquiry as to the cause of these continuing high figures of appeals?
    Mr. Corfield: The clear answer is that the intake of planning appeals has been progressively increasing. For example, the appeals in 1960 were 28 per cent. up on 1959, and those in 1961 were 20 per cent. up on those of 1960. There has, at the same time, been a substantial increase in the number of inspectors and I am glad to say that we are now booking inquiries over a shorter period than before, and hope to maintain the improvement.
    Mr. Lagden: Can we be told the number of inspectors available to carry out these inquiries at the moment?
    Mr. Corfield: There are 121 engaged on full-time work, with a dozen on part-time work.

    Planning Application, Staffordshire
    Mr. Snowasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government and Minister for Welsh Affairs if he will state the reason for his failure to come to a decision in the case called in Planning Application No. 1286 (Staffordshire County Council), dated April, 1962, which has been the subject of verbal and written representations by the hon. Member for Lichfield and Tamworth during May and June, 1962, and which is still undecided.
    Mr. Corfield: The application to which the hon. Member refers was one of nine applications being dealt with together. My right hon. Friend's decisions on all these applications are being conveyed to the parties today. He regrets the delay in reaching this position and I am writing to the hon. Member to explain matters to him.
    Mr. Snow: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that in the west Midlands, the

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    planning delays attaching to overspill migration will become more and more serious; and that this sort of unpardonable delay means that people are not getting their homes but, under Government policy, are transferring from the Birmingham conurbation to my constituency? Will he please see that this sort of case does not happen again?
    Mr. Corfield: As I assured the hon. Member the other day, we are considering most seriously any suggestions for improvement, but I would deny that the delay in this case has been unpardonable. This is an area that lacks main drainage, which means a lat of complications in reaching a decision.

    West Street Site, Brighton
    Sir W. Teelingasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government and Minister for Welsh Affairs when he will make a decision on the West Street site in Brighton as the result of the inquiry held several months ago.
    Sir K. Joseph: I am now considering the inspector's report but it will be a little time yet before I can give my decision.
    Sir W. Teeling: Does my right hon. Friend realise how much trouble this is causing in Brighton because of the waste of the land and because of the uncertainty of the people in knowing what to do with that part of the town? Can he tell us how long he has had this report before him, and, furthermore, how true is the rumour that he cannot get on with it because of the shortage of typists?
    Sir K. Joseph: No. This is a very complex project involving a large number of individual interests and property and it must take time before I can come to a decision. The inspector's report was received in June of this year.

    Blackbushe Aerodrome
    Mr. Goughasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government and Minister for Welsh Affairs if he will now make a statement about the future of Blackbushe Aerodrome.
    Mr. Corfield: My right hon. Friend is at present considering certain planning appeals relating to this aerodrome, and
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    he hopes to be able to announce his decision shortly.
    Mr. Gough: Does my hon. Friend appreciate that this appeal dates back to last March, that many months have gone by, and that the uncertainty is causing a great deal of hardship to those who wish to develop Blackbushe as a civilian aerodrome? Can he give an assurance that an answer will be given in the reasonably near future?
    Mr. Corfield: I can assure my hon. Friend that everything possible is being done to expedite the decision. I would point out to him that this matter has raised very complicated legal issues with regard to common rights and this has caused the delay.

    Coastal Areas (Development)
    Mr. C. Johnsonasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government and Minister for Welsh Affairs when he expects to issue to local planning authorities the circular on the review of development plans, particularly in relation to the coastal area within their boundaries.
    Mr. Corfield: My right hon. Friend has decided that a general circular on the lines originally proposed is not now needed, but he intends to issue quite soon a separate circular about development in coastal areas.
    Mr. Johnson: Has not this circular been in the course of preparation and under discussion with the interested parties for more than a year? As the problem is getting increasingly acute in the coastal areas, will my hon. Friend see that it is made public without delay?
    Mr. Corfield: Yes, I can certainly give the hon. Gentleman that undertaking. However, it is not quite true to say that, in its present form, it has been under consideration for all that time.

    Eldon Square, Newcastle-upon-Tyne
    Mr. Ridleyasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government and Minister for Welsh Affairs if he will take action to preserve Eldon Square, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, in view of its architectural and historical importance.
    Mr. Corfield: These buildings are listed under the Town and Country Planning Act, 1947, as being of architectural interest. The City Council has just submitted an amendment to its development plan under which the buildings would be demolished. In considering this my right hon. Friend will take account of the architectural and historic interest of the Square as well as the arguments in favour of redevelopment.
    Mr. Ridley: Is my hon. Friend aware that the importance of these buildings is national and that it goes beyond purely local interest? This is one of the few cities with really fine 18th Century town planning. Will he urge his right hon. Friend to use his position as guardian of the nation's artistic heritage to make sure that these buildings are not demolished?
    Mr. Corfield: I can assure my hon. Friend that my right hon. Friend's advisory committee on buildings of special architectural and historical interest has been consulted and its views will be taken carefully into consideration. However, I cannot anticipate my right hon. Friend's final decision.
    Mr. R. W. Elliot: Is my hon. Friend aware that, in the opinion of many people, the commercial aspect of urban redevelopment is being overstressed? Many small business people—those with businesses which are important to the life of the City of Newcastle and district—are concerned at the probable high rents they will have to pay following redevelopment. Is my hon. Friend further aware that in the neighbouring Percy and Blackett Streets, which are affected by this scheme, many small shopkeepers are likely to be priced out of existence by the multiple stores and branches of the co-operative society? Will he persuade his right hon. Friend to use his influence to persuade local authorities to liaise to the fullest extent with private enterprise?
    Mr. Corfield: My hon. Friend has raised a number of points which do not arise out of this Question. I assure him that my right hon. Friend is constantly urging local authorities to give consideration to the points he has raised.
    Mr. Popplewell: Is the Parliamentary Secretary aware that there are two very
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    decided schools of thought about this? To many people there is nothing of real outstanding architectural or historical value attached to Eldon Square; at least, nothing to the degree that should hold up the planning development of the City of Newcastle-upon-Tyne? Does the hon. Gentleman realise how necessary it is that this replanning should take place so that Newcastle may attract industrialists to develop in the area?
    Mr. Corfield: As I told the House I cannot anticipate my right hon. Friend's decision. All these factors will be taken into account. I am sure the hon. Member for. Newcastle-upon-Tyne, West (Mr. Popplewell) appreciates that if there were not two schools of thought on almost everything, our lives would be much more tedious.

    Rates
    Dame Irene Wardasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government and Minister for Welsh Affairs whether he will co-operate with the County Councils Association in its inquiries into the possibility of levying rates on the financial resources of a household to pay.
    Sir K. Joseph: I understand that what the Association has in mind is an inquiry into the whole subject of local government finance. I welcome its initiative and will be happy to help in any way I can, but I do not think it desirable that I should be associated with the inquiry.
    Dame Irene Ward: My right hon. Friend will bear in mind, will he not, that a great many of us want to have the rate based on ability to pay? Does he not agree that this is a wonderful opportunity to do something for those living on small fixed incomes? May I have his co-operation?
    Sir K. Joseph: Yes, but it is into the practicability of this idea that the County Councils Association is setting up this inquiry.
    Mr. M. Stewart: As the Minister has already expressed the view that private landlords should be allowed to take ability to pay into account when collecting rents, surely public authorities, when collecting public revenue, would have an equally good case for doing the same?
    Sir K. Joseph: But in fact, of course, the rating system is based on the occupation of property and anyone who chooses to occupy property must take into account the rate implications of that occupation.
    Sir P. Agnew: Whatever may be the views of the electors of Tynemouth, many people believe that one Income Tax is quite high enough as it is without having another one superimposed on it.
    Sir K. Joseph: My hon. Friend brings out cogently one of the factors one is inevitably led to if one departs from the objective test of rates which we have at the moment.

  WELSH AFFAIRS

    Slum Clearance (Investigation)
    Mr. Abseasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government and Minister for Welsh Affairs what stage the investigation of the slum clearance problem being conducted by the Welsh Office has reached; when it is anticipated it will be concluded; and whether the results of the investigation will be published.
    Sir K. Joseph: One hundred and fifty-three of the 168 Welsh local authorities have given information to my Welsh Office about their residual slum clearance problems. The fifteen which have not done so are being pressed for this information. The results of the investigation are now being assessed and these will be set out in the next Report on Developments and Government Action in Wales and Monmouthshire.
    Mr. Abse: May we have the Minister's assurance that in conducting this investigation there will be no attempt, as would appear to have been indicated in the last Report, to minimise the seriousness of the problem? May we also have an assurance from the Minister that in considering what should be categorised as slum clearance careful attention will be given to all those houses which are pre-1875?
    Sir K. Joseph: I can assure the House that a realistic survey is being made, the results of which will be published.
    Mr. C. Hughes: When may we expect the Report on Developments and
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    Government Action in Wales and Monmouthshire.
    Sir K. Joseph: 1st March.

    Rural Transport
    Mr. J. Griffithsasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government and Minister for Welsh Affairs what action he proposes to take to implement the recommendations of the Council for Wales and Monmouthshire in its Report, Command Paper No. 1821, on the rural transport problem in Wales.
    Sir K. Joseph: Although the Council's Report was submitted to me in accordance with the normal practice—and I should like to take this opportunity of warmly thanking them for it—action on the recommendations, so far as this is the responsibility of a Minister, is a matter for my right hon. Friend, the Minister of Transport. But I shall, of course, keep in close touch with him at all stages.
    Mr. Griffiths: May I ask the Minister whether, in view of the fact that in addition to the Report of the Council, which he had before him for seven months before it was published, he has had last week's recommendation of the Transport Users' Consultative Council, which bears out what the Committee has said, he will now urge the Minister of Transport to suspend the closure of the line which connects South-West Wales with Mid-Wales and the Midlands until the reports of his own Council and of the Transport Committee have been fully considered?
    Sir K. Joseph: There is a Question on this sort of matter to my right hon. Friend from one of the right hon. Gentleman's hon. Friends tomorrow.
    Mr. Griffiths: May I ask the Minister, as he is responsible for the Council of Wales, whether he has conveyed with his own support this recommendation to the Minister of Transport?
    Sir K. Joseph: I am in close touch with my right hon. Friend on all the implications of this Report.

    Council for Wales and Monmouthshire (Report)
    Mr. J. Griffithsasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government and Minister for Welsh Affairs why the

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    Report of the Council for Wales and Monmouthshire, Command Paper No. 1821, which was submitted to him in February, 1962, was not presented to Parliament until September, 1962.
    Sir K. Joseph: Although the Report was first submitted by the Council on 6th February, it did not wish to have it published immediately. When it was eventually put forward for publication about the middle of the year, arrangements were made for it to be presented to Parliament with the least possible delay.
    Mr. J. Griffiths: Does the Minister realise that the withholding, by whatever action it was, of this Report during these crucial months has prevented all those responsible from having these recommendations before them when certain rail closures have been considered in Wales which have a serious effect on the rural population?
    Sir K. Joseph: I think that the right hon. Gentleman will understand that this was arranged fully in accordance with the wishes of the Council and that is my responsibility.

    Compulsory Purchase Order, Fulham
    Mr. M. Stewartasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government and Minister for Welsh Affairs why he refused to confirm the compulsory purchase order made by the council of the Metropolitan Borough of Fulham in respect of 12A North End Crescent, W.14.
    Sir K. Joseph: The council failed to establish that the tenant was in danger of being made homeless and that the rent was exorbitant in relation to comparable property.
    Mr. Stewart: Does the Minister realise that the rent being asked was five times the gross value? Does he appreciate that if he does not regard that as exorbitant it will render nugatory any powers that local authorities have to prevent extortion? Does he remember that he said that in coming to his decision he looked to the owner to put the property in repair but that nothing was done, and that it has been done now only
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    because the council threatened to take further action?
    Sir K. Joseph: On the repairs point, the landlord did undertake to carry out repairs at once. He did not carry out that undertaking and proceedings were commenced against him. On the other point, the council did not produce any evidence that the rent asked was beyond the tenant's means or that he could not afford alternative accommodation at an economic rent. The tenant made no attempt to negotiate with his landlord.
    Mr. Stewart: But does not the right hon. Gentleman realise that the tenant was already paying the economic rent and was being asked for much more than that? If the Minister is to take as a criterion whether the rent is within the tenant's means, it means that the landlord can screw up the rent indefinitely according to the size of the tenant's income.
    Sir K. Joseph: But the rent of accommodation must reflect its size and the rent of comparable accommodation in the neighbourhood and, to a certain extent, the means of the tenant—[HON. MEMBERS: "No."] Certainly. The rent-paying capacity is a factor to be taken into account. I am told that in this case the tenant made absolutely no attempt to negotiate with the landlord.

    Improvement Grants
    Mr. Allaunasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government and Minister for Welsh Affairs how many improvement grants for installing baths, hot water systems and inside lavatories were made in each of the first three quarters of 1962; and how many of these were made to private landlords, owner-occupiers and local authorities.
    Sir K. Joseph: I would refer the hon. Member to the relevant tables in the Housing Return which is published quarterly. These give as much of the information asked for as is available to me from the returns made by the local authorities.
    Mr. Allaun: I thought that the Minister might have told us what it was, but does not the right hon. Gentleman's recent circular encourage local authorities to use compulsory purchase orders,

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    which is an admission that compulsion is the only way to make the landlords, or most landlords, apply for grant? Is not that policy exactly contrary to what the Government have previously said?
    Sir K. Joseph: No. The hon. Gentleman has perhaps failed to notice that in a recent speech in this House I said that persuasion was the proper policy for the Government up to now, and now, but that maybe we shall have to consider whether some pressure upon both landlords and tenants may not be necessary one day.
    Mr. Allaun: If the Minister has further measures in mind beyond his recent circular, as I hope he has, will he bear in mind the proposals of the public health inspectors for giving to local authorities themselves the power to install baths in the landlords' houses?
    Sir K. Joseph: I told the House that I was studying all these matters.
    Mr. Callaghan: In view of the Minister's astonishing statement that landlords should have some regard to tenants' means, does the right hon. Gentleman say that, in addition to any increase of rent arising out of that position, the landlords should see how well dressed tenants are, or what furniture they have—or how are they to be judged?
    Mr. Speaker: That supplementary question does not appear to arise out of this Question.
    Mr. Callaghan: If it does not arise out of this Question, may I ask the Minister if he proposes——
    Mr. Speaker: If it does not arise out of the Question it is out of order as a supplementary question.
    Mr. Callaghan: This is not out of order——
    Hon. Members: Oh.
    Mr. Callaghan: I am entitled to make a submission to Mr. Speaker and I shall do so, and hon. Gentlemen opposite will not put me off. What I want to put to you, Mr. Speaker, is that arising out of the improvement grants there will be increases in rent. [Interruption.] It follows that if a landlord gets an improvement grant the rent goes up. If the Minister
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    proposes to make an early statement to us about how he intends to assess, and how landlords are supposed to assess, increases of rent based on tenants' means, is it not possible for him to say what are to be the criteria in his judgment?
    Mr. Speaker: I am unable to accept the hon. Gentleman's argument. I am afraid that I do not agree with it.

    Local Authority Houses (Rent Costs)
    Mr. Warbeyasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government and Minister for Welsh Affairs what is his estimate of the full-cost rent of a typical three-bedromed council house, taking into account current costs of land, construction and maintenance and current rates of interest; and what he estimates the full cost rent would be on the assumption that the average price of building land, builders' profits and maintenance costs had increased since 1948 by no more than the increase in the general price level, and that interest rates for long-term housing loans were at their lowest postwar level.
    Sir K. Joseph: The only comparison I could make is on the basis of building costs, which, since 1948, have risen by rather less than the general level of prices. But I do not think that any such comparison would be useful unless account is also taken of changes in the level of earnings over the same period and the increased rent-paying capacity of tenants.
    Mr. Warbey: Why has the Minister left out comparison on the basis of interest charges? He has already indicated to other hon. Members that interest charges today represent two-thirds of the economic cost of a house or flat? Will he undertake to go to Prague, where I was recently, and see the flats built there by the State or by local authorities and let at rents that vary between 1½ per cent. and 5 per cent. of the tenant's income. He will find that that is done because the State owns the land, and because no interest rates at all are charged on the capital invested. If that can be done there, why can it not be done here?
    Sir K. Joseph: This country has made considerable progress by its own system, and while we can always learn a certain amount from abroad I assure the hon.

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    Gentleman that housing progress here is not limited at the moment by the rate of interest.
    Mr. Warbeyasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government and Minister for Welsh Affairs what proportion of a householder's income he assumed to be reasonably available for the payment of rent when he advised local authorities to charge full-cost rents to those tenants who could afford to pay such rents; what estimate he has made of the number of persons in, or seeking, rented accommodation who are in this category; and what proportion this forms of all adult male wage earners.
    Sir K. Joseph: It is for each local authority to determine in the light of local conditions which of their tenants can reasonably be asked to pay full-cost rents. My concern is that rent rebates should be given only to those tenants who really need help with their rents. It is of course the income of the household, not only of the householder, that should properly be taken into account.
    Mr. Warbey: How can the Minister possibly give that sort of advice to local authorities unless he has some concept of what it is reasonable for a tenant to afford out of his total income? Does he really think that there is any large proportion of the community today who can afford to pay rents of £3 5s. a week or more for houses?
    Sir K. Joseph: There are more and more very successful differential rent schemes being applied by local authorities that show that good houses can be provided for all ranges of tenants by use of these schemes.
    Mr. M. Stewart: How far is the Minister going to push this principle? When improvement grants are paid to the owners of private property is there to be any inquiry into the means of the owner of the private property to ask him if he could not improve his property at his own expense?
    Sir K. Joseph: The taxpayer is at the moment finding £63 million a year by way of subsidy, for local authorities to use sensibly to enable tenants, whatever their incomes, to have decent accommodation. That is the immediate answer to the hon. Gentleman's supplementary question.

    Derelict Land (Reclamation)
    Mr. Boydenasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government and Minister for Welsh Affairs what part the reclamation of derelict land is intended to take in his department's plans for slum clearance.
    Sir K. Joseph: Speeding up slum clearance means in the first place building houses quickly for those who will be displaced and then making the best use of the cleared sites. If reclamation of derelict land can enable more houses to be built quickly, no doubt the local authorities concerned will have this possibility in mind.
    Mr. Boyden: Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that the amount of industrial derelict land has increased, is increasing and ought to be diminished? Is his Manchester office, for example, to have anything to do with advising the smaller local authorities technically and making more financial provision for dealing with this problem?
    Sir K. Joseph: No, not as such, though where land is short, extra land that can be recovered from a derelict state will be eagerly sought after. On the first point, my Department has asked all local authorities to report the amount of derelict land in their areas and the action that they propose for reclamation, in their quinquennial review.
    Mrs. Braddock: Is the Minister aware that Liverpool has a very big slum problem and that derelict land, which has been standing there since the war finished, is in a completely shocking condition? Will he make arrangements to come to my constituency to look at it for himself, because there are no words that can describe the state of the central area in Liverpool?
    Sir K. Joseph: I think that the hon. Lady knows that the Government are deeply aware of the need for haste in dealing with the housing problems in the hon. Lady's constituency. As to the first part of her supplementary question, perhaps she will send me details of the land to which she is referring.

    Local Authority Houses (Tender Prices)
    Mr. Boydenasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government and Minister for Welsh Affairs what are the

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    provisional figures for June, July and August of this year for the average tender price per square foot for local authority houses.
    Mr. Corfield: The average prices per square foot of three bedroom houses in tenders approved during June, July and August were 44s., 43s. 8d. and 45s. 3d. respectively.
    Mr. Boyden: Does not the Parliamentary Secretary agree that this is getting worse and worse?
    Mr. Corfield: I do not think that the increase is as much as would be expected in view of the very considerable increase in wage rates in the same period.

    Young Married People
    Mr. Brockwayasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government and Minister for Welsh Affairs (1) if he will take steps to grant financial aid to local authorities in order that they may make provision for young married people who cannot obtain accommodation suitable to a home life;
    (2) if he will send a circular to local authorities proposing that they should build bungalows for newly-weds to enable them to begin their married lives under conditions where children would be permitted and have opportunities for healthy growth; and if he will take steps to grant financial aid for this purpose.
    Sir K. Joseph: It is not for me to tell local authorities whether they should build for one class of applicants on their waiting lists rather than another. Each authority must settle its own housing priorities, taking account of all needs, including those of newly-weds. All houses approved under the Housing Act, 1961, attract subsidy whatever the purpose for which they are provided.
    Mr. Brockway: Despite the rather negative character of that reply, does the right hon. Gentleman realise that I appreciate the letter which he has sent to me on this problem? May I ask whether he has yet reached a decision on the proposal, which has been made from both sides of the House, that he should consult with the local authorities and the building societies with a view to facilitating the deposits and mortgage interest rates for the purchase of houses by newly-weds?
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    Secondly, while recognising that all human needs must be taken into account by local authorities, does he not regard it as important for the future of our nation that as much attention should be paid to young married people as is being paid to older people?
    Sir K. Joseph: Yes, certainly I do. But the problem in the hon. Gentleman's constituency is likely to be more that of land than either of these issues. His constituency has enough land for the immediate future, but land is far more likely to be a limiting factor than the factors he is discussing.
    Mr. Longden: May I ask my right hon. Friend if his attention has been drawn to a scheme which has been devised and successfully carried out by the Bushy Urban District Council to meet this problem, and, if not, may I send him particulars of it?
    Sir K. Joseph: Yes, gladly. My hon. Friend's intervention goes to show that it lies within the initiative of local authorities to take considerable steps to help in the sort of problem to which the hon. Gentleman referred.
    Mr. Brockway: Will the right hon. Gentleman reply to the specific question which I put to him and which he ignored?
    Sir K. Joseph: Yes, I will, of course. I am not trying to avoid anything. The building societies can lend only the money that they raise, and that has a large effect on the interest charges that they have to apply. Local authorities have power to lend money and, as the intervention of my hon. Friend the Member for Hertfordshire, South-West (Mr. Longden) shows, many of them have used it extremely constructively.

    Thorncliffe Court, London, S.W.4 (Rents)
    Dr. Alan Glynasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government and Minister for Welsh Affairs if he will study the evidence submitted to him regarding the high rents demanded by a company, whose name has been sent to him, with particular reference to new leases and renewals at Thorncliffe Court, London, S.W.4, with a view to authorising compulsory purchase either of individual units or the whole property.
    Sir K. Joseph: I have studied the evidence. It is for the local authority to decide whether to make a compulsory purchase order, and submit it to me for confirmation.
    Dr. Glyn: I thank my right hon. Friend for that reply. Would he not agree that many hon. Members on this side of the House have made similar complaints about the activities of this company? Would he not further agree that the Peachey group of companies, while acting within the law, is exploiting the scarcity market and is giving a thoroughly unsavoury name to all good landlords?
    Sir K. Joseph: I have to preserve a careful impartiality when compulsory purchase orders may be submitted to me, but I would say, seeking to be absolutely impartial, that in some cases tenants appear to be unreasonable in what they expect of their landlords. In the case of these particular landlords, it appears that they are often particularly insensitive in their relations with tenants.
    Mr. M. Stewart: Does the right hon. Gentleman realise that some of the answers he is giving today are difficult to square with that reputation for impartiality? When the Minister invites local authorities to make compulsory purchase orders they will remember how he has treated some local authorities which have tried to prevent extortion. He has laid down the doctrine that the landlord is entitled to push up a rent according to the income of the tenant so that, when he has done that, the high rent which that landlord charges may be used as an excuse for neighbouring landlords to charge the same high rent.
    Sir K. Joseph: The hon. Gentleman is misrepresenting what I have said. I was replying to a question on the use I have made of my power to confirm a compulsory purchase order. In this field, compulsory purchase orders have been confirmed where there is an exorbitant rent and the threat of homelessness. Obviously, in judging whether there is a threat of homelessness, the capacity of tenants to find other accommodation within their means in a neighbouring area must be taken into account.
    Mr. Callaghan: Does not the Minister recall that he told us that private landlords may certainly pay some regard to
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    the means of their tenants in fixing rents? In this connection, to what extent does the right hon. Gentleman think that a landlord is entitled to take tenants' means into account?
    Sir K. Joseph: I can best answer that in two stages. Firstly, I think that I was referring—and I hope that I was careful to refer—not to the landlord's attitude primarily but to my attitude in deciding whether to confirm a compulsory purchase order. Secondly, where a landlord has property in a scarcity area and is dealing with tenants who wish to live in an area where property of that sort is scarce, he must assume that the tenants draw an implication of the rent they will have to pay.
    Mr. Callaghan: Is the Minister saying that a private landlord should not take into account a tenant's means when he is fixing the economic rent for the property which he proposes to let?
    Sir K. Joseph: The landlord will take into account the market value of the property in the neighbourhood. I hope that he will also take into account, when moving from the distorted rent situation of a controlled market into a free market, giving his tenants, where they need it, time of transition in which to adjust.

    Homeless People, London
    Sir C. Osborneasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government and Minister for Welsh Affairs what is his estimate of the number of London homeless people; and how many are immigrants.
    Sir K. Joseph: I am informed by the London County Council that on 3rd November it had in its care 1,014 homeless families, representing 4,724 persons. The Council does not keep records showing the countries of origin of homeless families, but its special report on homelessness published earlier this year showed that in 1961 about 30 per cent. of the wives were born abroad.
    Sir C. Osborne: In view of the repeated and strong representations made in the House, especially by London Members on behalf of the London homeless, may I ask whether it is not unfair

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    to London people to allow further immigration into this city until our own people are properly housed?
    Sir K. Joseph: The movement of population, whether from abroad or in this country, obviously adds to the housing problem in the centres of attraction, such as London, but there is a substantial housing problem in London quite apart from that.
    Mrs. Slater: Will the right hon. Gentleman always bear in mind that these people are human beings, no matter what their colour or race? Could he not do something to persuade his hon. Friend the Member for Louth (Sir C. Osborne) not to continue this sort of persecution which is absolutely out of keeping with the Christian philosophy which he often professes?
    Sir K. Joseph: My hon. Friend the Member for Louth (Sir C. Osborne) is as sincere in his concern for the housing of the people as is the hon. Lady.
    Sir C. Osborne: In view of the acknowledged difficulties in London of housing the people of London, will my right hon. Friend use his influence to see first that English people in their own country have the first chance?
    Mr. M. Stewart: Will the Minister bear in mind that inquiry has shown that it is no good trying to muddle study of the homeless problem in London by bringing in the immigrant question? Will he bear in mind that the immigrant population help to keep the hospitals of London open, and help to run the city's transport and to build its houses and that the people who do that work have got to live somewhere, whether the hon. Member for Louth (Sir C. Osborne) likes them or not?
    Sir C. Osborne: The hon. Member for Fulham (Mr. M. Stewart) never speaks for Londoners.
    Mr. Stewart: The hon. Member is never here when I do.

    Hampstead Garden Suburb
    Mr. Shinwellasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government and Minister for Welsh Affairs what representations he has received from residents of the Hampstead Garden Suburb who
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    are concerned about interference with the original character of the suburb owing to a change in ownership; and whether he will give an assurance that he will not allow any alterations which affect the structure of buildings or open spaces against the wishes of residents.
    Sir K. Joseph: I have received no formal representations from residents of Hampstead Garden Suburb though two of the local bodies have had an informal discussion with my Department on the question of a Private Bill. Applications to develop land are a matter for the local planning authority in the first instance and on the information before me I see no reason to intervene.
    Mr. Shinwell: Is not the right Gentleman the supreme planning authority in this country? In view of the anxiety expressed by a very large body of residents in this suburb about the interference with the amenities and the character of the suburb, may I ask whether it is not desirable that the right hon. Gentleman should take note of what is happening? Would he make some inquiries into the matter?
    Sir K. Joseph: I should be glad to have any evidence that the right hon. Gentleman cares to send me. I know that there is anxiety but I am not aware of evidence of any occurrences to justify it, and I have complete confidence in the ability of the local authority to handle it.

    Housing Loans
    Mr. Frank Allaunasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government and Minister for Welsh Affairs what was the nature of his reply to the resolutions sent to him by the representatives of eighteen north-west county borough and borough councils asking for housing loans at 3 per cent. interest and for a review of housing subsidies.
    Sir K. Joseph: I have told these authorities that the Government cannot accept the view that housing loans should be made available at a specially low rate of interest. I have also reminded them that they are already receiving large sums by way of Exchequer subsidies and that by pooling their subsidies, and adopting realistic rent policies, they should be able to continue

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    building without having to charge rents beyond what their tenants can reasonably be asked to pay.
    Mr. Allaun: Is it not ridiculous that throughout the country the more houses councils build the more unpopular they become? Does not this result from the fact that the Government's high interest rates are forcing these councils almost yearly to raise rents and rates to cover about £60 a year deficiency for sixty years on each house they build?
    Sir K. Joseph: If councils choose to be unpopular with the ratepayers in order to be popular with their tenants, by charging less than a reasonable rent, that is their own affair.

  WILLIAM JOHN VASSALL (TRIBUNAL OF INQUIRY)
  Mr. Marshasked the Prime Minister if he will issue instructions to Ministers that they should cause inquiries to be made when they are made aware that junior employees who have access to secret information are able to spend considerably more than they earn.
  Dame Irene Wardasked the Prime Minister whether he will give an assurance that all papers in the flat of Vassall were impounded by the security services, and that they have been made available only to the Committee of Inquiry and to those who have a prescribed responsibility.
  Mr. Dugdaleasked the Prime Minister if he will now ask the First Lord of the Admiralty far his resignation.
  Mr. Shinwellasked the Prime Minister if he will make a statement on the allocation of Ministerial responsibility in his administration for security.
  The Prime Minister (Mr. Harold Macmillan): I told the House on Thursday why I was satisfied that the Committee of senior experienced civil servants whom I had appointed were the appropriate body to investigate the facts of this case and report on them to me. Right hon. Gentlemen opposite have argued that what is needed is an inquiry undertaken by an independent person, such as a High Court Judge. In my view, an inquiry of the kind asked for by right hon. Gentlemen opposite is
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  wholly inadequate to meet a changed situation, which has arisen since I answered Questions arising out of the Vassall case last Thursday.
  There have been a number of developments which have led me to decide that it is now appropriate to set up a tribunal of inquiry under the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act of 1921.
  A Motion asking the House to set up a tribunal of inquiry will be tabled today and moved as first order tomorrow. I shall tell the House then why I believe it necessary that the tribunal inquiring into this should be armed with all the powers conferred upon it by the 1921 Act.
  Mr. Marsh: Would the Prime Minister not agree that his frequent changes of attitude on this is reducing the whole matter to a farce? Would he not further agree that there is a widespread feeling that these changes result either from his inability to recognise the serious implications in the beginning or, alternatively, from his desire to cover up?
  The Prime Minister: No, Sir. I would suggest to the hon. Member that he might perhaps wait until I try to explain to the House tomorrow why I have decided that the powers conferred in the Act are essential, and what it is the tribunal will be asked to inquire into.
  Dame Irene Ward: May I ask my right hon. Friend to accept the thanks of all those who agree that this alteration in policy is very wise? In view of the fact that he has now made this statement, for which I am sure many people will be profoundly grateful, I will not pursue my supplementary question to my Question which really has nothing to do with setting up the tribunal.
  The Prime Minister: Without pursuing quite the logic of that, I will explain What in my mind are the new circumstances and new conditions, which I shall explain in detail, which make me feel that a tribunal of this kind, which has power of subpoena, which has power of examination on oath, and the power of examination and cross-examination, as well as privilege, should be set up in the situation as it has now arisen.
  Mr. Dugdale: Is the Prime Minister aware that we on this side of the House are profoundly thankful that he has

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  taken our advice and particularly the advice of my right hon. Friend the Member for Smethwick (Mr. Gordon Walker)? Is he also aware that it is not in the best traditions of British public life to accept the resignation of a junior Minister and refuse the resignation of a senior Minister responsible?
  The Prime Minister: I shall try to deal with that matter tomorrow. I have not accepted the advice offered to me, which was to set up an inquiry with a judge, but I wish the tribunal now, in circumstances which I shall explain, and which no doubt hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite will appreciate, to have all the powers of a tribunal under the Act.
  Mr. Gaitskell: Is the Prime Minister aware that there will be general satisfaction on this side of the House that he has accepted our proposal for an independent inquiry and that my right hon. Friend the Member for Smethwick (Mr. Gordon Walker) proposed, as one of the possibilities of such an independent inquiry, an inquiry under the Tribunals Act? Can the right hon. Gentleman also say when the membership of the tribunal will be announced?
  The Prime Minister: As I have explained, what was suggested to me was an inquiry on the lines of the Romer Inquiry.
  Mr. Gaitskell: No.
  Mr. Gordon Walker
  The Prime Minister: All right, the right hon. Gentlemen will have an opportunity no doubt of giving evidence before this inquiry.
  Mr. Callaghan: What does that mean?
  The Prime Minister: As they did at the previous inquiry. As regards the question asked, I think that in accordance with precedent it would be right, first, for the House to pass the Motion, although I am ready to indicate to the House the gentlemen wham I think will be willing to accept this task.
  Mr. Shinwell: In view of the right hon. Gentleman's recent statement that there is no imputation against the hon. Gentleman the Member for Glasgow, Hillhead (Mr. Galbraith), and since, obviously, the hon. Gentleman could not be charged with having full Ministerial
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  responsibility, will the Prime Minister, as he himself has full Ministerial responsibility for matters of security, be good enough, when he makes his statement tomorrow, to tell us why he should not resign?
  The Prime Minister: I shall try to give the House an account of certain new things which happened over the weekend and just before which have led me to make the decision to ask the House to approve this proposal. Perhaps, when the debate takes place, that would be the most convenient opportunity for explaining why I have reached this conclusion.
  Mr. Gordon Walker: Does this mean that the Committee of three civil servants is being disbanded and that this inquiry will go into all aspects which arise out of the Vassall case?
  The Prime Minister: I hope to have the Motion tabled in a few moments, and the terms of reference there, perhaps, will govern the tribunal. The Committee of three civil servants will, if the Motion is approved, hand over such work as it has done. One member of the Committee, of course, the Treasury Solicitor, would not be able to operate because he will be occupied, in accordance with practice, as adviser to the tribunal.
  Mr. Wade: Can the Prime Minister explain how it comes about that the decision which he has just announced to the House was, apparently, known to the Press before it was announced to the House?
  The Prime Minister: I think that that can hardly be so except by speculation, because it is a decision which we have only just reached.
  Mr. S. Silverman: The Prime Minister's decision to have an inquiry of a more serious and independent kind than he had announced previously is welcomed, but will he explain why he has chosen this particular form of tribunal of inquiry under the 1921 Act? Is not he aware that, from investigations in the past by tribunals of this nature, it is clear that it is possible to do a great deal of injustice, without being able to protect witnesses from innuendoes of every kind?
  The Prime Minister: I have chosen it because I hope to be able to persuade

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  the House that, in view of certain statements which I shall have to reveal to the House tomorrow and certain positions, the inquiry must be armed with these powers if it is to be effective.

  DEVELOPMENT DISTRICTS (UNEMPLOYMENT)
  Mr. P. Williamsasked the Prime Minister whether he will appoint one Minister, already holding Departmental responsibility, to be responsible for reducing unemployment in the development districts.
  The Prime Minister: No, Sir. This important matter involves many aspects of national policy in which a number of Ministers are concerned. These Ministers are working in the closest co-operation.
  Mr. Williams: I accept that Ministers are working in close co-operation, but will my right hon. Friend recognise the parallel with Central African affairs where it was found necessary to bring together under one very senior Minister direct and final responsibility? Is he aware that, in the realm of providing employment for the development districts, there is often a conflict of interest between separate Ministries and that, if it could be known that one Minister was primarily responsible for co-ordinating all that is done, this would help the work of the Ministries and assist hon. Members when they wish to put a point of view?
  The Prime Minister: I quite understand my hon. Friend's anxieties but the parallel which he suggests is not a real one. In the case of Central Africa the responsibilities previously with the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and the Colonial Secretary were removed altogether from them and placed under another Minister.

  SPACE COMMUNICATIONS
  Mr. P. Williamsasked the Prime Minister whether he will appoint one Minister, already holding Departmental responsibility, to be responsible for co-ordinating action on space communications.
  The Prime Minister: No, Sir. Several Departments are involved. The arrange-
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  ments for co-ordinating their respective interests have recently been reviewed.
  Mr. Popplewell: Will not the Prime Minister look at the matter again? Is not he aware of the general dissatisfaction with the split responsibilities of Ministers towards the people in the areas where there is very little new work going? [HON. MEMBERS: "Wrong Question."] I do not know what the hullabaloo is about. This is too serious a matter to be shrugged off in that way.
  Will the Prime Minister have a word with others of his Ministers and suggest, for example, that part of the housing problem in London might be eased if more work were give to the North-East, Scotland and the West?
  The Prime Minister: I shall, of course, take into account what the hon. Gentleman has said. I know his anxieties. I hope that he will not think it discourteous of me if I point out that we are now dealing with a Question relating to space communications.

  ARMAMENTS (PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER)
  Mr. A. Hendersonasked the Prime Minister what reply he has received from Mr. Khrushchev to his letter of 28th October containing his proposals for working towards a more general arrangement regarding armaments.
  The Prime Minister: I have not yet received a reply to my message.
  Mr. Henderson: Did not the Prime Minister in his letter urge the early conclusion of a test ban treaty and a new determination in resolving the disarmament problem? Is not his initiative neutralised by the fact that the Government have announced their decision to embark on new tests after Mr. Khrushchev had announced that all Russian tests would be ended by 20th November? Does not this make a mockery of the Prime Minister's letter, and will not he, at least, consider postponing this test until a further attempt has been made to obtain a test ban agreement, as suggested in his own letter?
  The Prime Minister: I understand that the Russian atmospheric tests are likely to end on 20th November, although I

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  am informed that other of their tests may continue until the end of the year. There is a Private Notice Question down on this subject which I do not wish to anticipate. The American underground tests also are continuing.
  Mr. Gaitskell: I appreciate that there is a Private Notice Question to be asked, bust may I put this specific question to the Prime Minister now? At the time the right hon. Gentleman wrote his letter to Mr. Khrushchev, had the British Government already taken a decision to hold another nuclear test?
  The Prime Minister: Yes, Sir; this particular test following the one in March, as I shall explain, had been arranged. I hoped to have concluded it earlier but, owing to technical and other difficulties, it was not possible to conclude it until within a short period from now.
  Mr. Gaitskell: Is it not very surprising that the Prime Minister should write his letter without giving an indication to the Russians that, in fact, we were going to make another test?
  The Prime Minister: No, Sir; any idea that the whole problem of working out a complete treaty can be settled in a few weeks or a few days is quite unrealistic.

  EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
  Mr. Stonehouseasked the Prime Minister what steps he is taking to coordinate the work of Her Majesty's Ministers in devising alternative plans for Great Britain's economic relations with the Commonwealth, the European Free Trade Association countries and the rest of the world in the event of Great Britain not joining the European Economic Community.
  The Prime Minister: I have nothing to add to the reply given by my right hon. Friend the Lord Privy Seal to the hon. Gentleman on 6th November.
  Mr. Stonehouse: Is the Prime Minister aware that that reply rather facetiously said that the Minister concerned did not want to be diverted from the negotiations in which he was engaged? Even within the context of those negotiations,
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  is it not important to know what the alternatives are? If Lord Boothby is proved right, as, no doubt, he will be, is it not important for the sake of Britain that the alternatives should be worked out?
  The Prime Minister: Of course, I hope that the economic and other ties with the Commonwealth will continue to develop, as I have no doubt they will, quite apart from what will be the final decision about the European Economic Community.
  Mr. Stonehouse: Why was the reply of the Lord Privy Seal last week so evasive? If the Prime Minister is correct in what he now says, why did the Lord Privy Seal give me that evasive reply?
  The Prime Minister: The hon. Gentleman asked this Question. I think that the Lord Privy Seal gave a perfectly practical reply, but I add to that that all the developments with the Commonwealth will go on and, I think, may in fact be enhanced if we are able to make satisfactory arrangements for the Community.
  Mr. Stonehouseasked the Prime Minister what further consultations he is proposing to have with Commonwealth Prime Ministers before agreeing to Great Britain's entry into the Common Market.
  The Prime Minister: The final communiqué issued after the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' meeting in September recorded that
  "The British Government undertook to continue to arrange for the closest consultations with other Commonwealth Governments during the remainder of their negotiations with the European Economic Community."
  This undertaking is, naturally, being fulfilled and will include, when necessary, direct communications between other Commonwealth Prime Ministers and myself.
  Mr. Stonehouse: Are direct communications enough? If all the Prime Ministers except two or three are opposed to Britain going into the Common Market on the terms which have so far been negotiated, is it not important that there should be a Commonwealth Prime Ministers' conference when the final terms are known?
  The Prime Minister: That is another matter. What we agreed upon in the communiqué we are carrying out faithfully. Since all the Commonwealth countries have representatives at Brussels and since there are almost daily communications with the High Commissioners, we have always, from the start of the negotiations, carried it out. We shall continue to do so.

NUCLEAR TESTS
Mr. Grimond(by Private Notice) asked the Prime Minister whether he would make a further statement on the arrangements to carry out an underground nuclear test; and why it is necessary for the test to be held in the near future.
The Prime Minister (Mr. Harold Macmillan): An underground nuclear test in connection with the British nuclear deterrent took place in Nevada by the courtesy of the American authorities last March. We have for some months been planning another test which is necessary to develop the results of the scientific experiment in March. Owing to the heavy pressure upon the facilities at Nevada we have not been able to arrange this as I had hoped in the early months of the autumn. It will, however, take place in the next few weeks.
As the Minister of Defence pointed out, this is in no sense of the word the beginning of a new series. The House will recall that, together with the American Administration, we observed a voluntary nuclear moratorium for a period of nearly three years. The Russians resumed testing in the autumn of 1961 and, after careful discussion with the President during my visit to Bermuda, I agreed both that the American tests were necessary to defend the strength of the free world and that we would put Christmas Island at their disposal.
The Russians have announced that they will end their series of atmospheric tests on 20th November. The President of the United States announced on 4th November that the present series of atmospheric tests in the Pacific were ended, but that underground nuclear tests free from fall-out were continuing in Nevada.
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During the whole of this period we have made one underground test and we propose to make one more in Nevada, both in connection with our deterrent. I am only too anxious, as is the President of the United States, to enter into an agreement either for the banning of atmospheric, underwater and outerspace tests, or, still better, for a complete banning of tests, including underground tests, under effective international control and verification.
Mr. Grimond: Is not this a quite inadequate explanation of an untimely and irresponsible decision'? Does not the Prime Minister agree that this test can make very little, if any, difference to the deterrent power of the West— [Laughter.] Hon. Members may laugh, but this is a quite serious matter—and that the main rôle that this country can play is to try to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and not to make a test ban more difficult? Does the right hon. Gentleman think that his failure to postpone this test, which he could easily have done, or to cancel it, will make negotiations any easier?
The Prime Minister: I say quite seriously that I do not think anybody in my position, except those who wish not only to abolish the British deterrent but to make it ineffective, could have failed to be convinced of the need for this test following on the one in March.
We are told that the Russian atmospheric tests will be completed by 20th November, and probably all by the end of the year. If there was any question of a new series, it takes, as the right hon. Gentleman probably knows, very long preparation. This test of ours is necessary. It should have taken place before. I regret that it was not possible to do so, but I think that it is necessary now to complete it.
If, of course, it were possible to make a complete ban immediately, and sign all that up in a few days, that would make it necessary for us to reconsider our position. But I believe, from such knowledge as we have and on what we are advised, that the Russians will decide whether or not to go in for a complete ban not on the basis of this incident, but on the great questions of what suits their requirements and their needs.
Mr. Gordon Walker: Does not the Prime Minister realise that this was timed in the most stupid way at a time when the world is sighing with relief that these great sets of tests are coming to an end? Does not it create the impression that the Government just want to get a quick one in before Russia and America—it looks very much like this—come to an agreement? The right hon. Gentleman said that no one in his position could have failed to agree to this test in order to preserve the independent British nuclear deterrent. But does he really think that there is in any true sense of the word an independent British nuclear deterrent?
The Prime Minister: There might be an argument for abolishing the whole bomber force and the whole deterrent, but, having reached this point, it would be very wrong not to make this test, which is necessary to make it effective.
With regard to what the right hon. Gentleman says about our getting in a quick one, I have explained that it was planned that this test should have taken place before. I am sorry that it was not possible to finish it, as I had hoped, during the end of the summer or early autumn. It will now be completed. But I do not honestly think, and I do not believe that anyone in the House can think, that it will be on this incident that will depend whether we are able, with the Russians and Americans, to make a comprehensive test ban.
Mr. Biggs-Davison: Is not the maintenance of an efficient, up-to-date British nuclear deterrent——
Mr. G. Brown: We have not got it.
Mr. Biggs-Davison: —both helpful to world peace and necessary to the independent foreign policy for which the Opposition voted the other night?
The Prime Minister: Those are all considerations of the greatest importance, but I do not believe that anybody could have resisted—and I certainly did not resist—making this test in March. I only regret that it was not possible to finish the second test arising out of it earlier than now.
Mr. Reynolds: Could the Prime Minister explain the discrepancy between his statement on 8th February and what he
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has just told the House? On 8th February, he referred to the testing of "one particular British nuclear device." He referred to "this test", to "the British test" and to "the underground test". Today, he has given the impression that we intend to carry out several tests, yet he assured us in February that there would be only one. Does not the right hon. Gentleman realise that if the statement in February was intended to cover this one as well this sort of excuse about its being part of a long series can be carried on throughout the years by more than one Government?
The Prime Minister: No, Sir. First, there is no reason to suppose that as things are now either the Americans or Russians will cease underground tests. They have ceased atmospheric tests of which we have made none during this period. Secondly, this test was made in March, and it is necessary, in order to perfect the knowledge that we have, to hold the second one arising out of what we have learned from the first.
Mr. A. Henderson: Are we to understand that the Government have decided that after this test in no circumstances will they resume testing of any kind?
Hon. Members: Answer.
The Prime Minister: We have never made any pledges. What we have hoped to do is to get a test ban. The President of the United States and I made an offer, and repeated it several times, to agree to a ban on atmospheric, underwater and outer space tests. That has not been accepted. Then we suggested—and we are working at it—the possibility of so perfecting these scientific instruments as to get, with the minimum of inspection and verification, a complete ban. That takes a considerable amount of extra discussion and work, which is going on. If that is successful, we shall get a complete ban. All that I am saying is that I do not believe that great issues will be settled by this second test.
Mr. W. Yates: Is the Prime Minister telling the country that for national security this test must be conducted and that the information could not have been obtained from the United States, or that the United States has not carried out identical tests? If so, it is nothing but a squib in a bucket.
The Prime Minister: I think that that is a quotation from an article in a newspaper this morning. All I can say is that it is necessary under the terms of our agreement on the amendment of the McMahon Act.
Mrs. Castle: Is it not a fact that the Americans have already made it clear that they think that the British nuclear deterrent is ineffective? Is this decision to press ahead with the test part of a plan to turn the British nuclear deterrent into a European H-bomb as part of the deal for getting Britain into the Common Market?
The Prime Minister: I cannot enter into the fantasies of the hon. Lady's thought. There are great arguments whether we should have started the A-bomb under Lord Attlee and whether we should have continued it; all that can be argued. All I can say is that, with the particular instruments we have, it is necessary to make this additional test.
Mr. Gaitskell: If this test is so unimportant that the Russians do not bother about it, will the Prime Minister explain why it is sufficiently significant to be made at all by us? Can he also explain whether it is relevant and in what way it is relevant to the defence of the West?
The Prime Minister: It is important to us to finish this experiment. All I was saying was that considering the enormous size of the experiments on both sides in the last year, I do not believe that the ultimate decision whether we can get a complete ban will rest upon this matter.
Several Hon. Members Several Hon. Members rose——
Mr. Speaker: We cannot debate this matter without a Question before the House.
Mr. Gordon Walker: I beg to ask leave, Mr. Speaker, to move the Adjournment of the House under Standing Order No. 9 for the purpose of discussing a definite matter of urgent public importance, namely,
the decision of Her Majesty's Government to proceed in the near future with the testing of a British nuclear device, thus endangering the prospects of an early international agreement to ban nuclear tests.
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The Government have announced their intention to carry out this test in the near future, and as there is great public disquiet about whether this would endanger an international agreement, and the test might occur tomorrow or before the House has any other opportunity of raising the matter, this is the reason of urgency why I am seeking leave to move the Motion.
Mr. Speaker: I am obliged to the right hon. Member for Smethwick (Mr. Gordon Walker), who asks leave to move the Adjournment of the House for the purpose of discussing a definite matter of urgent public importance, namely,
the decision of Her Majesty's Government to proceed in the near future with the testing of a British nuclear device, thus endangering the prospects of an early international agreement to ban nuclear tests.
The House knows that my course is governed by precedents. This is like an occasion we had in, I think, February, and my decision must depend upon the timetable. If I rightly heard the Prime Minister's words just now they were that it was designed that this test should take place within the next few weeks. On the face of those words—[HON. MEMBERS: "Tomorrow?"]—I will ascertain the accuracy of what I am saying. If I heard the Prime Minister's words aright, they were "within the next few weeks". If that means at a distance from today of not less than eight days, for instance, then, for obvious reasons, I could not find this application to be within the Standing Order.
I therefore want clarification from the Government, if they will be kind enough, as to the—[Interruption.] I hope that I may discharge my duty in relative peace. I want to find out what "within the next few weeks" means in terms of minimum time from today.
The Prime Minister: I used the phrase which you have quoted precisely, Mr. Speaker——
Mr. Wigg: On a point of order. As your actions, Mr. Speaker, are governed by precedent, would you be good enough to tell the House on what precedent, you have the right to cross-question the Prime Minister before, coming a decision?
Mr. Speaker: I have not the remotest idea, but I must Worm Myself of facts,

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which I do not know because they have not been stated to the House. The only way I can get them is by asking Ministers in the presence of the House.
The Prime Minister: I used the phrase "within the next few weeks" as you, Mr. Speaker, have rightly stated. I cannot give a precise date, but I am informed that it would not be possible to arrange this, at any rate, within the next ten days.
Mr. M. Foot: Further to the point of order raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg). To make the matter absolutely clear and since, Mr. Speaker, you have already asked the Prime Minister one question, could you not ask him another? Could you not ask whether he would give a guarantee that there will be a promise that no nuclear explosions will be conducted by Her Majesty's Government until there has been a full debate in the House of Commons?
Mr. Speaker: I cannot do that, but as we proceed further we may learn. The point is that in connection with the Standing Order I must have regard to the fact of whether or no there would be an opportunity for the House to discuss the matter should it so please, because if that were so it would remove the necessity of debating it today. On the answer that I have so far been given, I cannot see the need to debate the matter today, because there would be time for the House to discuss it, if hon. Members so wished, before anything could happen.
Mr. S. Silverman: Unless the Prime Minister is prepared to say that this experiment will not be carried out unless it has been previously announced to the House that it is about to be carried out, is not this the last opportunity that the House can hope to have before the carrying out of the test? On that view of the matter, is it not immediately urgent? Of course, if the Prime Minister will say that that the Government will not allow the test to be carried out until a further statement has been made to the House, that might alter that matter. As, however, we have had no such assurance, is it not urgent that the House should consider the matter since the Government have said that they intend
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to carry out this experiment in the near future without any further statement to the House?
Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) knows all about these things. He must be persuaded that in the face of a minimum of eight days of opportunity I could not, without defiance of precedent, say that the matter came within the Standing Order.
Mr. M. Foot: Further to that point of order. Is not the matter now before the House an attempt by you, Mr. Speaker, to elucidate from the Government the exact position about the possibility of the explosion of this bomb? [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] Was not the whole discussion governed by the question which you put to the Prime Minister? Is it not possible, therefore, for other hon. Members to suggest that the answer given by the Prime Minister to you, although it goes some way to elucidate the matter, does not go far enough?
Is it not perfectly proper for us in this House, or for you, Mr. Speaker, to ask the Prime Minister, so that you may reach your decision about the Motion which it is sought to move for the Adjournment of the House, whether he can go further and give a clear assurance that this matter is not urgent in the Parliamentary sense, in the sense that nothing will happen before the House has an opportunity of debating the matter? Surely, that is the precise issue raised by the Motion which it has been sought to move from the Opposition Front Bench.
Mr. Speaker: I do not know that I can assist about that. I can only assess the fact of eight days and I cannot help knowing that if the House wants to discuss something within eight days, it can. That is our way.
Mr. Brockway: Is it not clear that the Government have already made a decision to proceed with this bomb test? Even if it is not to take place for eight days, will not decisive preparations have to be made immediately for the test? In these circumstances, have we not the right to debate the matter immediately?
Mr. Speaker: I considered—does the Leader of the Opposition wish to add something?
Mr. Gaitskell: In view of your Ruling, Mr. Speaker, I give notice that we shall put a Motion on the Order Paper so that the House can deal with this matter within ten days.
Mr. Wigg: On a point of order. Will you be good enough, Mr. Speaker, to inform the House whether your Ruling today is an entirely new one? Would it not be as well to amend Standing Order No. 9 to make quite clear that future Speakers of the House—which, naturally, excludes you—will be limited to the decision of eight days on all matters of this kind?
Mr. Speaker: No. These decisions must rest upon the precise circumstances of each particular case. They always have done and I would not deviate from that. Suspecting, however, merely from the words "within the next few weeks" that we might be able to limit the period to eight days, which would appear to be sufficient, I have thought it right in this context to ascertain that fact.

ORDERS OF THE DAY

  FOREIGN COMPENSATION BILL
  Order for Second Reading read.
  3.50 p.m.
  The Joint Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Peter Thomas): I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.
  This Bill is, in essence, a technical enabling Measure which gives powers in relation to the Foreign Compensation Commission in respect of three matters. First, it enables the Commission to be used for the distribution of money which Parliament will be asked to provide to supplement the Egyptian Compensation Fund. Secondly, it enables the Commission to pay into the Exchequer sums which the Commission was directed, when paying compensation under the Egypt (Interim Distribution) Orders, to deduct in respect of loans. Thirdly, it enables provision to be made for pensions and other benefits for members of the Commission and officers and servants of the Commission in appropriate cases.
  The House will remember that the Foreign Compensation Commission was set up under the Foreign Compensation Act, 1950, and since that date it has been employed in distributing compensation received from a number of foreign Governments, and in particular, since 1959, from Egypt. It has had to deal with over 15,000 claims since 1950, under all these various distributions. But the Commission can only distribute moneys received from foreign Governments and can only pay claimants who show that they are eligible under the relevant Orders in Council, and establish to the satisfaction of the Commission that their losses fall within the Orders in Council.
  The Commission at present consists of seven Commissioners and a staff of about 88, and the majority of this staff are engaged in dealing with claims arising out of Orders in Council relating to the Agreement between Her Majesty's Government and the United Arab Republic. This Agreement was made on 28th February, 1959. Under it £27½ million was received from the United Arab Republic as compensation for the Egyptianisation of some British property and injury or damage suffered by other

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  British property which was sequestrated following the Suez incident in October and November, 1956.
  Although the Agreement of 1959 was the best that could be made in the circumstances, it was realised that the £27½ million would be insufficient. The Prime Minister, on 16th March, 1959, undertook to ensure a reasonable and fair settlement, and he said that he did not exclude a further contribution from public funds over and above the sum of £27½ million provided in the Financial Agreement. In another place, on 26th July, 1962, my noble Friend the Secretary of State said that
  "the Government accept that more money will have to be found".—[OFFICIAL REPORT, House of Lords, 26th July, 1962, c. 1187.]
  I appreciate that the House will wish to know the amount which Parliament will be asked to provide to supplement the Egyptian Compensation Fund, and I greatly regret that I am not in a position to give a figure today. A statement will be made to the House soon—I hope within the next few weeks—outlining the Government's proposals in regard to all Egyptian claims. This will be followed by an Order in Council specifying the scope of claims which will be dealt with by the Commission and new rates of compensation.
  This Order will be laid before the House. Parliament will be asked to provide such funds as may be needed for the purpose under the usual Estimates procedure. This Bill, in particular, Clause 1 of the Bill, will have to become law before the Foreign Compensation Commission can distribute additional money to the Fund from Parliament, and, therefore, although I would like to have been able to announce to the House today the Government's proposals, nevertheless, it was felt that the House would wish the passage of the Bill not to be delayed.
  Perhaps it will be of assistance to the House if I now deal with the bill briefly Clause by Clause.
  Mr. G. R. Mitchison: Before the hon. Gentleman leaves that, can he tell us whether the Order in Council will be debatable—whether it will be in the form of an affirmative or negative Resolution, or in any other way?
  Mr. Thomas: Subject to correction, I should say that the Order in Council will be subject to the negative Resolution procedure, which can be prayed against, and, therefore, would be debatable.
  Clause 1 gives effect to the main purpose of the Bill. It is to enable the Commission to be used to distribute money which may be provided by Parliament to supplement the existing fund. The 1950 Foreign Compensation Act deliberately limited the powers to use the Commission to money received from a foreign Government, because it was not desired or intended to remove that limitation, but only to make a strictly limited exception to it so as to take account of the special circumstances of the present case.
  The effect of the Clause is that the money provided by Parliament is treated as though it were money received from the United Arab Republic under the Anglo-United Arab Republic Agreement of 28th February, 1959, thereby bringing it within the provisions of the Act of 1950.
  It is intended that part of this money should go to some categories of claims arising out of the Suez incident, but not eligible under the present Orders in Council. If these categories were defined precisely in the Bill it would mean that if a fresh category arose not covered by the definition, but equally deserving of compensation, it would not be possible to admit it without further amending legislation. To guard against this, the Bill leaves the claims in respect of which the money is deemed to have been paid by the Government of the United Arab Republic, to be defined by Order in Council.
  The claims eligible at present are, broadly, (a) those arising out of Egyptianisation of property; (b) losses sustained while property was under sequestration. In addition, a number of cases where furniture and personal effects were sold under duress, but not as a result of Egyptian measures, were registered by the Commission, but have not been compensated. Claims of this kind could be compensated under a new Order in Council.
  The background to Clause 2 is, I regret to say, perhaps a little complicated. The House will remember that when British

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  property in Egypt was sequestrated, and the owners returned to this country, Parliament voted certain money to be advanced to them as repayable ex gratia loans to help them to make a fresh start. These were loans, not grants, which the recipients were assured they would not be called upon to repay till they had received some return from Egypt. As soon as that happened the Department responsible—which happened to be or came to be the Foreign Office—was obliged to recover the loans.
  The most effective way of doing this was, when a recipient established a claim before the Foreign Compensation Commission, to have a suitable amount in respect of his loan deducted from the compensation due to him, and to treat this as being partial or complete liquidation of his loan. The Interim Distribution Order of 1959 therefore authorised the Foreign Secretary, acting on the advice of a Board, to notify to the Commission appropriate deductions in respect of loans.
  This was duly done in a large number of cases, but, owing to the fact that the Foreign Compensation Act, 1950, does not give the Commission power to pay foreign compensation money over to the Exchequer, the sums deducted remained in that fund. Up to date, the amount deducted is £1,309,749. The Committee of Public Accounts, in paragraph 8 of its Third Report for 1961–62, has criticised the practice of retaining these deductions in the Fund, and recommended that parliamentary authority should be sought for the payment of these sums into the Exchequer.
  The opportunity was, therefore, taken of the present Bill to include a Clause to give effect to that recommendation. Since deduction from compensation payable by the Commission is much the best and simplest method of ensuring equality of treatment among claimants in respect of liquidation of their indebtedness in respect of these ex gratia loans, the power given by Clause 2 to the Secretary of State, to direct the payment of these deductions into the Exchequer, is expressed in general terms to cover future as well as past deductions.
  These deductions, in complete or partial liquidation of the claimants' debts to Her Majesty's Government, will
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  now be treated as recoveries of loans. This will not affect the rates at which compensation payable to the claimants are or will be calculated.
  I now turn to Clause 3.
  Mr. Mitchison: May I ask one question before the hon. Gentleman leaves Clause 2? This money has been in the fund, it has been invested in accordance with the provisions of the 1950 Act, together with other money in the fund, and it has earned interest. What is to happen to the interest?
  Mr. Thomas: The hon. and learned Gentleman has asked me a question which I cannot answer. I will try to find the answer to that one. The position will be, of course, that the sums deducted, which at the moment amount, as I said, to over £1¼ million, will have to be paid to the Exchequer, but whether they will have to be paid with interest I could not tell the hon. and learned Gentleman at the moment. I will find out. I do not think—again, I am speaking subject to correction—that the Exchequer will demand more than the exact amount of the money lent.
  The only connection which the subject matter of Clause 3 has with the rest of the Bill is that it, too, concerns the limitation of the powers in relation to the Foreign Compensation Commission under the 1950 Act. Unlike Clauses 1 and 2, however, it is not restricted to the Egyptian distribution, but is of general application. Again, it is purely an enabling power.
  When the Foreign Compensation Commission was created in 1950 it was for the immediate purpose of distributing compensation payable by Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia respectively under Agreements of 1948 and 1949 in respect of British property which had been nationalised by those two countries. It was realised at the time that there was a possibility of similar agreements being negotiated with other Governments, and, therefore, instead of providing for the Commission to be wound up as soon as it had completed the Yugoslav and Czechoslovak distributions it was accepted that it should continue in being for an indefinite period, and provision was made in Section 3 of the 1950 Act whereby it could exercise its functions in relation to future compensation agree-

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  ments. It was not, however, expected that it would be necessary to retain the services of the members and staff of the Commission long enough to make necessary the payment of pensions or retirement benefits to the members of the Commission or to its officers and servants.
  They are not civil servants and, consequently, they are not entitled to retirement benefits provided under the Superannuation Acts. The Commission has been in existence for twelve years, and its present work, of which the Egyptian distribution is only part—there are six others—will necessarily continue for several more years. Most of the agreements provide for instalments to be paid over a number of years, in one case up to nineteen years, and the job of distribution will accordingly be prolonged. In addition, it is possible that further agreements will be made, in which case the Commission must both register and consider claims and distribute the compensation. Of course, it is, impossible to say at present exactly how long the Commission's life will last, but I hope that the House will agree that to deprive its members and staff entirely of all retirement benefits is, in the circumstances, plainly an injustice which should be remedied.
  Clause 3 of the Bill does exactly that. Subsection (1) deals with the members of the Commission—that is to say, the Commissioners themselves. They are appointed by the Lord Chancellor, and their remuneration is fixed with the approval of my noble Friend the Secretary of State and the Treasury. Accordingly, provision for retirement benefits is made by authorising payments determined by the Secretary of State with the approval of the Treasury. Subsection (2) deals with the officers and servants of the Commission. They are appointed and their remuneration and allowances fixed in accordance with Orders in Council, and, accordingly, the power to make provision for their retirement benefits is to be exercised in a like manner. Provision, I am told, will not be made for part-time members of the Commission or for members of the staff who serve for short periods.
  It is intended that these arrangements will be in accordance with those gener-
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  ally made for public service employees and members of public boards and authorities. Before they are finalised they will be discussed with the Commission and its staff. It is expected that the cost of providing such benefits will amount to approximately £7,000 a year. This would be defrayed initially out of moneys provided by Parliament, but Clause 3 (3) will enable an appropriate part of this cost to be recovered out of the various compensation funds administered by the Commission.
  I hope that I have said enough to explain the nature and purpose of the Bill.
  Mr. Sydney Silverman: Before the hon. Gentleman leaves dealing with the actual provisions, will he answer a question? They do not seem to cover one unusual, but, nevertheless, not infrequent case. In some cases, where refugees were deported without notice, they made some effort to protect some of their assets by depositing liquid cash in various consulates, which ultimately reached, in some cases, the hands of the consular authorities in Cairo. The attitude taken is that they cannot be paid, even where we hold them ourselves, to the refugee by reason of the Egyptian laws about the export of currency. Where these moneys are held by British diplomatic authorities, is there anything in the Bill or anywhere else to enable the moneys to be paid to the expelled refugees?
  Mr. Thomas: This is rather a different point. This Bill just deals with the £27½ million which was paid over by Egypt—this is Clause 1—to the British Government as a result of the Agreement in 1959. This £27½ million was to compensate those British subjects whose property had been Egyptianised, which had been, in effect, nationalised or sold to Egyptian concerns between certain dates, and also to compensate for damage to and loss of property which had been sequestrated but returned to its owners.
  There is the separate problem of the property which is in Egypt, and that is sequestrated property which belongs in law—and under Egyptian law—to British subjects, but they cannot get it out of Egypt. The liquid assets to which the hon. Gentleman referred are in the same category, and they do not come within the Bill. The Bill is concerned

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  with the distribution of compensation or claims for property which had been Egyptianised and/or for loss or damage to sequestrated property.
  Mr. S. Silverman: I am much obliged to the hon. Gentleman, but would it not be possible to make a slight amendment to the Bill to deal with this very practical point where the British authorities themselves are holding money which is recognised to be the property of other people but find themselves, or hold themselves, to be incompetent to part with it?
  Mr. Thomas: I should have to look into that. I do not think that the Bill would be the proper instrument for doing that, but I will certainly look into it, and, if it is possible, I will try to give the hon. Gentleman some information at the end of the debate.
  Mr. William Yates: Did not my hon. Friend say that the appointment of the members of the Commission was at the wish of the Lord Chancellor? Is this the normal procedure, and have all other people been so appointed previously?
  Mr. Thomas: The Commissioners are judicial people, being in the position of judges, and I should have thought it very appropriate that the appointment should be in the hands of the Lord Chancellor.
  I said I hoped that I had explained sufficiently the purposes and aims of the Bill. It aims solely at providing machinery to give effect to objectives with which I am sure the House will be in full accord. I therefore commend the Bill to the House and hope that it will be given a Second Reading.
  4.12 p.m.
  Mr. G. R. Mitchison: I reassure the hon. Gentleman the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, on behalf of myself and my right hon. and hon. Friends, that we have always adhered to the views that we took in the debate on 16th March, 1959, that the people who suffered in Egypt were an exception to the usual rule that the British Government does not in cases of this kind compensate property damaged or lost by reason of the action of a foreign Government, because they were the victims of the Suez adventure by the
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  Government and the bill which we are being asked to foot in part today is only part of a whole series of losses incurred by the country and its inhabitants in the it-fated mistimed, unfortunate and wicked Suez adventure.
  We agree with what was said by Lord Salisbury in another place during the last few days of the last Session of Parliament, that the people who suffered this loss or damage in Egypt were casualties in the war just as much as if they had suffered damage to their bodies on a battlefield, though, of course, the results are a very, very different matter. Therefore, the hon. Gentleman can be assured that we start by welcoming any steps that the Government may take properly to compensate those who suffered in this way.
  Having said that, I regard this as a singularly confused and somewhat premature Bill. As I understand it, the object of Clause 1 is to give money of an uncertain amount to people whose identity is uncertain for reasons which are not disclosed to us. We were told that they were no doubt in some ways sufferers from the Suez adventure, that they had suffered some form of property damage in Egypt, but it was not any kind of property damage that was covered by the agreement made with Egypt; it was something new, and yet we were not told what it was.
  I regard it as distinctly premature, in those circumstances, to ask the House to provide money to compensate people for something the nature of which cannot yet be disclosed. We shall no doubt discover it in time. Meanwhile, the Parliamentary control over expenditure of that kind is, to say the least of it, somewhat thin.
  We were told, moreover, that no figures could be given. If one introduces compensation for some new cause and does not say what the cause is, it may make it a little more difficult to give any figures relating to it. I would rather look for a moment at the Financial and Explanatory Memorandum, which says, at the end of the reference to Clause 1:
  "The amount of moneys which Parliament will be asked to provide in respect of losses in Egypt has not yet been determined. It depends on the categories of claims to be compensated, …"

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  We have just been talking about that. It is very much to the point
  "… the assessment of claims many of which have not yet been established …"
  That is fairly obvious if the categories are unknown.
  "… and the future scale of compensation."
  On all this we can say a little, but we can say it only with reference to what has already been decided by way of compensation.
  Let us remember for a moment the history of this business. On 2nd March, 1959, the then Chancellor of the Exchequer enunciated to the House the general principle I have just stated, that in cases of compensation for foreign action normally the British Government does not foot the bill—to put it very shortly—and he more or less repeated this at the beginning of the debate on 16th March, 1959.
  That debate was on a Motion moved from this side of the House and pressed to a Division, and the subject of the Motion was the Suez adventure, its cost and its unfortunate consequences. The Motion was moved very forcibly indeed, and at the end of the debate the Prime Minister produced the rather vague assertion that something would be done by the British Government to supplement the £27½ million which was to come from the United Arab Republic.
  That sum has been forthcoming; and we were told the other day, in language so vague as perhaps to be characteristic of much of this business, by the Foreign Secretary in another place, last Session:
  "I think we are approaching the point of very nearly exhausting the £27½ million."— [OF FICIAL REPORT, House of Lords. 2nd August, 1962; Vol. 243, c. 416.]
  That is not what one might call a very definite statement about money, is it?
  But we can go a little further than this, because we have in the reports of the Foreign Compensation Commission, which has been administering this business, some figures as at the end of March, 1962. These give us the total of claims submitted, the total of claims assessed and the total payments. The total of claims received at that date under the heading of Egyptianisation was about £65 million, in round figures, and, under the heading of damage, the
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  second heading to which the hon. Gentleman referred, between £7 million and £8 million, and out of the first category, just about two-thirds having been assessed, and out of the second, one-third.
  I should have thought that that would give us some indication of the amount outstanding in relation to the type of claim which we supposed we should be asked to consider today. I was somewhat surprised to hear that there were not only those claims, but some others. If I have misunderstood the hon. Gentleman, I hope that he will correct me. I understood him to say that in addition to these claims there were others which were not within these categories, and, therefore, could not yet have been made, let alone assessed.
  Mr. P. Thomas: Yes. The Foreign Compensation Commission is allowed to adjudicate on claims of Egyptianisation and loss and damage due to sequestration committed between certain dates as a result of Egyptian action. It has been found that there are certain cases—and I instanced one Where someone was forced to sell property at a loss under duress—which could not be said to be due to Egyptian action, but which happened in the context of the Suez incident between those dates. There are quite a few cases of that sort which have not been allowed to claim in the normal way, but have been permitted to register.
  It is this class of claim that we are considering in the Bill. It was felt that it would be wrong to define broadly in the Bill what sort of claim it must be, because that would be restrictive. We felt that it would be better to provide for this by Order in Council. A few claims run into many millions of pounds and that makes a great difference.
  Mr. Mitchison: I am obliged to the hon. Gentleman. It is very kind of him to tell the House of Commons, which is principally concerned with money, what the Foreign Secretary has already told another place, when he quoted figures of large claims. This is a curious procedure. We are still being asked to provide money for claims which are so uncertain in character that we cannot even have an indication of what they are, although we are given an instance or two.

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  Has the hon. Gentleman no idea of the total amount involved in these claims? What, in effect, he is doing is to leave to the Commission, or to the Foreign Office, or to the Exchequer, or to somebody or other, the power to decide upon what grounds compensation should be paid out of public money.
  It would have been better to have considered what claims required to be met and then to have asked for authority to meet them properly. Instead, the Government say, "There are some claims which we think, on equitable grounds, should be met"—I think it highly probable that I should agree with the hon. Gentleman if I knew what the claims were—and then ask for an indefinite sum of money in order to meet claims of a wholly indefinite character. It really removes any parliamentary control over the objects for which public money is being spent and the amount of public money involved.
  Mr. P. Thomas: I do not think that it is right for the hon. and learned Gentleman to say that we are asking for an indefinite sum of money. As I said, we hope to make a statement very soon as to what proposal we would like to put before the House to deal with claims, including an assessment of what it will cost. The House will have the opportunity to consider it and, indeed, to vote money in the future.
  Mr. Mitchison: I am glad to hear it, but surely a statement should have been made before and not after the Bill was brought forward. Surely the claims are not so sweeping in character that a definition of them could not have been given in the language of the Bill. I have looked at this Clause. It is exceedingly vague. The difficulty about the Bill is that all three Clauses are really money Clauses and no amendment is likely to be possible. They will be put before us to take or to leave, and when we have given Parliamentary authority for the expenditure of the money someone is kindly going to tell us what it is for.
  The usual procedure is to tell us what the money is for first and then ask for it. In this case, the Government are asking for the money first and then saying what it is for. This seems to me to be going much too far.
  Mr. P. Thomas: I am obliged to the hon. and learned Member for giving way again. I do not like to interrupt too much. He has been very tolerant. Would not he agree that the Bill really asks for powers and not for money? It is very much a technical Bill. Unless this enabling Bill is passed by both Houses of Parliament public money cannot be administered by the Commission for this purpose.
  Mr. Mitchison: I should hesitate to tell so courteous a person as the hon. Member that that is rather nonsense. There are three Clauses in the Bill and the effective part of each is in italics in the ordinary way, because it is a money provision. No doubt, power to spend money is power, but it is power to spend money, and it is money that we are talking about.
  I do not want to press this aspect any further but it is clear what the matter is. A White Paper could have been laid, a statement made, and a report called for and given by the Commission. There are many ways in which the matter could have been brought before the House so that we could be told for which purpose the money was required before being asked to sanction this expenditure in a Bill.
  My second point is one which the hon. Gentleman has helped me about already, and I am grateful to him for that. As I read the report of the Commission and the statements that have been made, mostly in another place, the case is that the minor claims—the claims of the small people, so many of whom were hurt by the Government's action and the action of the Egyptian Government in this matter—have, on the whole, been mainly met.
  It was said in another place the other day by the Foreign Secretary—and I am sure that the hon. Gentleman will not dispute it—that nine-tenths of the claims of four-fifths of the claimants had already been met and that what was outstanding was, as the hon. Gentleman has indicated, a few large claims. I do not say that there is not something still due on other, smaller claims, but most of the outstanding claims are large. The largest is a claim of over £l7 million, on behalf of the British-American Tobacco Company. That was one of the three

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  companies mentioned by the Foreign Secretary in another place, and it is a very considerable sum considering the other figures we are dealing with in this connection.
  Therefore, what we are being asked to do is to provide money to meet additional categories of claims and to see that the British-American Tobacco Company is paid something. I should like to know whether there is any connection between these two things. Are these supplementary claims for matters not covered by the original Order, thus extending the claims of these large claimants? Or are they intended, and are they to be so defined and decided upon, to deal only with the type of small case of which the hon. Gentleman gave an instance? I should view with rather less sympathy an extension of the grounds of claims if it were materially to alter the already large claims of some of these companies which are concerned.
  There is another aspect. Leaving out these supplementary claims for the moment, it looks to me, on a rather close examination of the figures, with which I need not trouble the House, that the majority of these claims not only in number but in amount have certainly been met. Figures have been given and perhaps I need not repeat them or go into them, although I must say that I regret that they were not represented in the Financial Memorandum. It looks as though the amount now likely to be involved on the original grounds of claim is between £15 million and £20 million. Is that right? Can we have no indication whatever of what more is to be paid out?
  I ask this because a time limit has been set, at any rate to the main categories of claims, the Egyptianisation claims, and the figures given in the last Report of the Foreign Compensation Commission, which I have quoted already and will not repeat, show that even by the end of the last financial year the majority of the cases had at least been assessed.
  When we turn to the deductions, to which I shall refer in a minute, the Financial Memorandum gives a figure, a recent figure. The last Report of the Commission shows a much smaller figure as at the end of the financial year, 1961–62. I
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  therefore infer that since the end of the financial year, that is to say, since 1st April, 1962, there has been a considerable paying out of claims.
  I do not in the least deplore it, but it seems to show that most of the original claims must have been met already, and it ought to be possible to give some sort of figure for what remains to be paid out on the original grounds. I cannot tell what remains to be paid out on grounds the nature of which has not been disclosed to us, but on the original Egyptianisation and damage heads, the terms of reference to the Commission, the figures up to 31st March, 1962, for assessment and payment and claims made have been given, and it ought to be possible from those figures, brought up to date, to give some idea of what now remains to be paid out. After all, it is not a very complicated matter and I cannot understand why it has not been done. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will have another look at this and see whether he cannot give some better estimate.
  Mr. P. Thomas: I am not quite clear about what figures the hon. and learned Gentleman wants. We can certainly give figures for the number of claims, the number of claims assessed and those which have not been assessed, and we can give a close approximation of the amount it would probably cost if the claims were met on the present scales. I am not sure whether the hon. and learned Gentleman is asking for an estimate of how much it would cost if the claims were paid in full.
  Mr. Mitchison: What I want to know is what amount of claims is now outstanding, how many of those claims have been assessed and are, therefore, payable sooner or later, and how much has, in fact, been paid. What we want to know is what this is to cost. If we know the claims, having regard to the time limit, the difference between the claims and what has been paid, less any amount remaining out of the £27½ million, will show us the maximum figure. The assessment less the amount paid, less any remains in the fund, will show us the sum which certainly has to be paid. We can so arrive both at a maximum and at what might be called a minimum, the certain sum which has to be paid.
  Neither of those figures has been given. They have been asked for repeatedly in

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  another place, and I think that they have been asked for here. I can see no reason why they should not have been put into the Financial Memorandum and I hope that the omission will be rectified. Whether we can be given any figure about the additional categories is another matter—I do not know enough about it to say—but we ought to be given it if it is possible.
  I next come to the scales of compensation, a matter different from the grounds of compensation. The Government have carefully avoided saying that they will pay 100 per cent. of the Egyptianisation and damage categories, that is to say, the two categories which have been before the Commission. The last statement about this was again made in another place by the Foreign Secretary on 2nd August at the end of the last Session. It was one sentence:
  "… the next point will be how far the Government should 'top up'".—[OFFICIAL RFPORT, House of Lords, 2nd August, 1962; Vol. 243, c. 416]
  The phrase "top up" had been used in the course of the debate to indicate the additional amount which would be put in by the Government in supplement of the £27½ million received from the United Arab Republic, and there is no doubt that it is likely to be a good deal more than the £27½ million if it is to be a 100 per cent. top up. If it is not to be a 100 per cent. top up, how much is it to be? Is there any reason why we should not be told? Why are we told that the future scales of compensation are uncertain, yet, at the same time, we are asked to provide money for them?
  Why should we not be told what the intended scales of compensation are? Are they to be 100 per cent., or 100 per cent. in small cases and 50 per cent. in large, or something between the two? What sort of figure are they? There is not a word about them and yet we are asked to provide money not only on grounds unknown, or amount unknown, but on scales which are to be disclosed at some time in the future. This is a remarkable way of treating the House on a money Bill.
  I turn from that to the second point, this was one on which the Foreign Office slipped up. It received the sums of money, these deductions which, in effect, were in repayment of loans made.
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  Nobody is disputing the rightness of making the loans. It was surely right to make them. What went wrong was that the Foreign Office directed the money to go into the Foreign Compensation Fund instead of handing it over to the Exchequer. This was what the Public Accounts Committee grumbled about, but the Committee was not the first to grumble.
  Towards the end of 1959, the Treasury had already pointed out to the Foreign Office that this money ought to go into the Exchequer and not be kept in the Foreign Compensation Fund with the £27½ million which had been received from the United Arab Republic. It was included to be used as a supplement, unauthorised by Parliament, to add to the £27½ million. It was lack of control of public expenditure and it ought never to have been done and the Public Accounts Committee said so; and the Treasury, I repeat, said so as long ago as late in 1959.
  For about three years, by the time the Public Accounts Committee came to it, the Foreign Office had been doing this. It was not that the Treasury said it once and then everybody forgot about it. The Treasury repeated it, but that would not do. I have always understood that in this country questions of that sort, in so far as they are questions of administration, are a matter for the Treasury. I do not know, any more than the Public Accounts Committee did, what the Foreign Office thought it was doing with the money all this time.
  I have already indicated that one thing that happened was that, in accordance with the 1950 Act, this and other funds in the possession of the Commission could be and were invested, and the Commission mentioned in its twelfth annual report that interest on invested funds amounted to about £1½ million. Same of that was interest on this money. Now it comes along and, having "borrowed" the money without authority for three years, it is supposed to get the usufruct on it for that time and dish it out again, because that is all that the Commission can do with it.
  When we remonstrate with the hon. Gentleman, all he says is, "We shall see what can be done"; but he cannot do anything without altering the Bill,

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  the Money Resolution, and so on. He ought seriously to consider whether something ought not to be done to give effect to that small but logical point.
  I turn now to the last Clause of the Bill. I agree—nobody would dispute it—that there should be pensions for people who served as members, officers, or servants of the Foreign Compensation Commission. This Commission was set up in 1950. As the hon. Gentleman pointed out, it has now been functioning for many years, principally on matters of Egyptian claims. My complaint is—I am a little surprised that nobody thought of this before. The Act itself provided for the emoluments of these people in the ordinary way, and surely it might have occurred to anybody even then that there were likely to be long outstanding claims?
  The twelfth Annual Report is still, I think, concerned with the very matters which were the original occasion for the setting up of the Commission, but there is such a sweeping selection that I am not certain of the position. We see such headings as: Yugoslavia, Czechoslovak Instalments, Polish Instalments, Bulgarian Instalments, Hungarian Instalments, Agreement with Roumania, Roumanian Instalment, then a few more, and, finally, quite a long passage about Egypt. Surely it must have occurred to someone before now that these people would be going on for a long time and would want pensions.
  When we come to the question of pensions, the Minister ought to be able to say either that there has been some agreement with the unions or others concerned in cases of this sort, or with the individuals concerned if there are no representative unions, or be able to give some indication of what the scale of pensions will be. I understood him to say that it was the usual scale in cases of this kind. He may be wiser than I am, and be able to say offhand what sort of usual scale there is, but I think that we ought to know, because, in the language of the Bill, and like so much else in it, this is left entirely to the discretion of the executive authorities.
  I have grumbled, I hope sufficiently to satisfy the hon. Gentleman and the House, about a Bill which seems to me to arise out of some sloppy procedure
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  and to be itself sloppy as a financial Measure. I feel very much inclined to say to the hon. Gentleman, "I hope that you will not do it again", but I hardly dare go as far as that. Nevertheless, I seriously fail to see why much more could not have been told to the House before we were asked to vote the money, instead of being asked to vote it in this way and told that we shall hear afterwards what it is for. It is not good control of public finances to do that, and I regret it.
  We on this side have always been in sympathy with the main object of the Bill, that is, full compensation for the unfortunate victims of the Government's mischievous folly over Suez and of the action which resulted on the part of the Egyptian Government.
  4.43 p.m.
  Sir Hugh Lucas-Tooth: Some of the unfortunate people who had to leave Egypt at the time of, or after, the events of 1956 came to my constituency, and I saw quite a number of them. I think that every hon. Member is aware that many of them were in desperate situations. One could not fail to be other than sympathetic towards them. In a number of cases I approached the Minister, and I should like to say straight away that as a result of such approaches I always found the Foreign Office extremely helpful, and I think that it would not be an exaggeration to say generous, though sometimes somewhat slow.
  For that reason I welcome the Bill, and I do not complain of the form that it takes because I do not believe that it would be possible to do what the Bill does in any other way On the other hand, the fact that it takes this awkward form invites, I think, those who are interested in this subject to put questions to the Minister in charge.
  I have a letter from my hon. Friend, signed as recently as yesterday, in which he says:
  "As you say, the Foreign Compensation Bill is at present before Parliament, and no Order involving the expenditure of public funds (as this one would) can be made until the Bill becomes law. Nevertheless, we have claims like"—
  my constituent's—
  "very much in mind, and I hope it will be possible to make an announcement soon."

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  That is in somewhat vague and general terms. Would not it be possible to say something about this before the Bill finally leaves this House?
  The hon. and learned Member for Kettering (Mr. Mitchison) referred to the Financial and Explanatory Memorandum and particularly that part of it referring to Clause 1. It says:
  "The amount of moneys which Parliament will be asked to provide in respect of losses in Egypt has not yet been determined. It depends on the categories of claims to be compensated, the assessment of claims many of which have not yet been established and the future scale of compensation."
  There are three separate items. On two of them I appreciate that it is probably impossible for the Government at once to say anything, but, on the other hand, I cannot see why the Government should not tell us what they propose by way of categories of claims to be compensated. I imagine that these will have to be defined in an Order to be made under the Bill, and I suppose that the Order will have to be made separately from the Order dealing with the other matters, because until the categories of claims have been defined it will be impossible to get the claims in or to assess their amount, and presumably it is only when the total amount has been assessed that the Government will decide on the scale of compensation to be given.
  Would not it be possible for us to have fairly soon, if not the Order itself, because I know that there is no power to make that, at least a draft of the Order which it is intended to make in the first place as a result of the passing of the Bill?
  I should like to go a little further and ask the Government what their intentions are regarding the making of these Orders. Is it intended that the total sum of money is only to be arrived at as a result of ascertaining the total amount so outstanding, or have the Government in mind the sort of sum which they are prepared to provide, and do they intend to work out their scheme so as to suit that sum? I am not asking for any figures. I am simply asking the Government what is their approach to this problem, because I think that we ought to know that at this stage.
  I am not certain which is the more generous approach. It may well be that if the Government choose one they will
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  find that they have chosen the loser from their point of view, but I should like to know which it is they have in mind, or whether they have in mind some other scheme.
  If we can have a statement about that before the Bill goes to Committee, so that we can form some idea of the procedure under which the Government intend to act when giving effect to Clause I, it will be very helpful, and it will facilitate the Bill's passage. I very much hope that the Bill will become law as quickly as possible, and that the Government will take as generous a view in this matter as they have hitherto taken in dealing with cases of hardship.
  4.50 p.m.
  Mr. Geoffrey Hirst: Over the years I have taken a considerable interest in this subject. I hate to think of the number of Questions that I have put down to the Lord Privy Seal on this matter.
  I, too, welcome the Bill, but it has its limitations. I cannot be quite as comforting as my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon, South (Sir H. Lucas-Tooth), because in my opinion the Government have been very dilatory in this matter. As the hon. and learned Member for Kettering (Mr. Mitchison) said, it would have helped if we had been given a little more information. Then we could probably have got through these proceedings very much more quickly. Nobody disputes the fact that the Bill is very welcome, and nobody misunderstands its technical character.
  As my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon, South has said, this is an enabling Bill, and I accept and welcome it as such. But we are spending a lot of time on it solely because we have not been given the information which, on an enabling Bill of this character, we should have been given.
  I realise that the figures cannot be put into the Bill. There are a hundred and one reasons for that. But we could at least be given some idea of the Government's intentions. Generally speaking, I am a fairly good friend of the Government, but I am not over-fond of giving them enabling powers about which I know nothing, and which do not even mention what categories are concerned. I could probably tell the House what the categories are, but I could not give it

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  the rest of the information. At least I have a good idea about Egyptianisation. That was substantially settled a long time ago.
  There are certain distinct and separate difficulties which arise in the case of sequestration, because in such cases the damage is not known until the property is handed back, but a good deal of that process has taken place already, and I should have thought that some estimate in this connection could have been made. During the course of my contacts and researches I have, through my right hon. Friend, had the pleasure of meeting officials of the Foreign Compensation Commission, and I want to pay them a tribute, because they have been extremely helpful to those back benchers like myself who have met them.
  I recognise the impossible position that they have been put in over the years by Her Majesty's Government, largely because the original bargain was a thoroughly bad one—and I realise that my hon. Frend is not responsible for this. There was about £120 million blocked in the sterling account in Cairo, and the best that we could get in the circumstances was £27½ million. From that day everybody Who could do simple sums of arithmetic—even if they were addition sums and nothing else—realised that that sum of money would be quite inadequate to compensate the various categories that were known at the time.
  In those circumstances I welcomed the statement made by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister on 16th March, 1959, which I have read out very often to the House, and which my hon. Friend kindly read cut again today. I have been waiting for the glorious day when that statement would achieve some meaning within the understanding of the House. We have not got that today. I do not mean to be difficult about it, but I hope that my hon. Friend will realise that it would help if, before the debate is finished—and we might even be agreeable to my hon. Friend's intervening at a convenient moment to save the debate going on too long into the night—he could tell us what the figures mean.
  But far more important than that is the question of the Government's intentions. I have no interest to declare in the matter. The reason why I have been
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  so interested, apart from the interests of a few constituents of mine, is that the Bradford Dyers Association, which is a very large organisation, with many mills in the West Riding, has a substantial dye works in Egypt. This firm is in the million pounds class in respect of its claim under Egyptianisation.
  It is sometimes thought that in the case of a large company it does not matter so much, but if this company's shareholding is analysed it will be found that it consists of a great number of very small shareholders. A vast number of people of quite modest means are interested in the payment of its claim. A certain amount has been paid off, but about £1½ million remains, and I should like to know what are the Government's intentions in respect of such a claim. The category is quite clear; it was Egyptianised property. The firm is also interested in the sequestration aspect, but I will leave that for the moment.
  What are we enabling the Government to do in this matter? It is difficult to deal with it by way of an Order in Council. Prayers in the House are not the best way of obtaining satisfaction from Her Majesty's Government. One makes a speech, and then somebody else makes a speech, and then the thing goes through, and cannot be prevented. This is the wrong way of doing business. I would rather not cause any trouble to my right hon. and hon. Friends on the Front Bench, whom I respect so much. I would prefer to have the information today, so that we can judge where we are going, and whether, at long last, after all these years, we are to give these people justice. What happened was no fault of theirs.
  In his statement in 1959 the Prime Minister led these people to believe that something would be done. They have waited for a very long time to have the pledge honoured. Honoured it should be, and we should be told today whether it will be.
  4.57 p.m.
  Mr. William Yates: I have followed with interest and anxiety the problem of compensation for those who lost their property during the Suez crisis. In the early days a former Chancellor of the Exchequer—Mr. Heathcoat Amory, as he then was—gave me an undertaking that if the £27½ million was

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  not satisfactory further funds would be found. Thereafter, discussions took place with Lord Killearn and the Marquess of Salisbury, and many hon. Members began to feel some anxiety whether the Government intended to honour their obligation, first admitted by a Chancellor of the Exchequer and then reinforced by the Prime Minister.
  Like other hon. Members, I believe that the Foreign Compensation Commission and those who are dealing with the question of returning property in Cairo have done the best possible job. Anybody who examines the cases that have arisen, both in Cairo and London, will agree that they can be of great complexity.
  I accept this as an enabling Bill, but I agree with the hon. and learned Member for Kettering (Mr. Mitchison) that it would have been very much better if there had been attached to it a statement showing exactly what was happening and what was required, together with a final statement of the Government's intentions. Nearly all of us must have realised that £27½ million would hardly meet the total loss sustained; in fact, in another place Lord Killearn said that the outstanding amount must be about £52½ million. I do not dispute his figure, because he should know a great deal about it.
  That being the case, I cannot understand why Her Majesty's Government decline to tell the House the full truth, and the whole story. It would be much better if everybody knew exactly what was required to settle the matter, because it continues to cause us a great deal of anxiety. I am waiting for the Minister to tell us exactly what is the total sum outstanding and how it is proposed to deal with it. We should be grateful if my hon. Friend would do that.
  5.0 p.m.
  Dr. Alan Glyn: We are all agreed that the question of foreign compensation in the case of Egypt is exceptional, because of the relationship between this country and Egypt which existed before the Suez incident. I sympathise with my hon. Friend in being unable to produce the figures today and I agree that the most important thing is that this Bill should be passed. It is an enabling Bill. It is unfortunate
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  that the sum may well be larger than my hon. Friend would like to say today. But many hon. Members are not so much interested in the figures as in bringing justice to a large section of the community which has suffered through no fault of its own.
  We want to know what sort of approach will be made by the Government. Will they add up the figures and announce that it will cost £70 million, for example, and that they will pay 40 per cent., or 50 per cent., or whatever the sum may be? Or will a sum of money, such as £100 million, be put aside and be apportioned out? This is an important matter, about which the House has a right to be given information. We are being asked to approve an enabling Bill and I do not think it unreasonable to request that my hon. Friend should say exactly how he thinks that the compensation will be made. Will it be assessed and scaled down, or will the Treasury announce that a sum of money will be made available which can be divided out?
  Is my hon. Friend satisfied that all the people who should be compensated will be compensated? Has he considered a category of individuals referred to earlier by the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman), who mentioned an isolated incident? There may be other incidents where compensation should be made which may be discovered later.
  I consider that we have gone about this matter in entirely the wrong way. It may be too late now to do anything about that, although I am not sure that it is too late. At the time of Suez there was in this country no less than £80 million in the Egyptian A account and £60 million in the B account. In my opinion, the Government had no right to unfreeze that money until such time as compensation for losses in Egypt had been settled. There were those two accounts in London in blocked sterling, £80 million of which was not transferable and £60 million was. From the A account so much could be transferred each year. But there was £140 million in London which would have been almost enough to satisfy all the claims.
  Hon. Members know the terms which the old Suez Canal Company, now the

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  Suez Finance Company obtained; £28·3 million as compensation, which included £5 million arrears in dues. That is a separate issue. I put it to my hon. Friend and to the Government that When we pass this enabling Measure we must not forget that the Government made a mistake in allowing——
  Mr. W. Yates: I think it fair to say that there were hon. Members who went in a deputation to the Foreign Secretary and implored him not to part with that money until we were certain that those who had lost their property were in a secure position. But the Foreign Secretary would not accept that.
  Dr. Glyn: I am grateful to my hon. Friend. But I think that we should again voice our feelings on this matter, because a similar thing could happen in the future.
  My hon. Friend may say that we should have lost a great deal of "face" in the City had we taken this money. I do not think that that argument will wash. We failed to take the money which was deposited in this country and use it for compensation, and that is why the House is now asked to foot a bill for an unknown amount. If any of these balances is left over, have the Government any intention—I do not wish to say anything to spoil the relationship between ourselves and Egypt—of taking any steps to secure that money which is in the possession of the Bank of England will be made use of?
  I ask my hon. Friend to deal with this point, because Parliament is being asked for money under circumstances which need never have arisen as there was money available in the "kitty" at the time which could have been used to settle this matter.
  5.6 p.m.
  Mr. R. J. Maxwell-Hyslop: I agree entirely with my hon. Friend the Member for Clapham (Dr. Alan Glyn), but there are other points which, I think, ought to be made.
  In Clause 2 of the Bill there is a heading:
  "Deductions in respect to loans to claimants."
  This puts me in mind of an important consideration which is not always borne
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  in mind by the Treasury. If someone depends for his income on a capital sum which is invested, and this is sequestrated, and he is paid out a small loan, in many cases that money must be employed not as a capital sum which may be invested to yield an income but to pay off debts, as it were, on his current account which had already been incurred. Anything left of the loan may have to be spent as income.
  This happened to the 168 unfortunate people who lost their jobs in Egypt in 1951, and who, after a lapse of time of approximately seven years, received amounts which were distributed among them and totalled £100,000. That has been treated as a loan. It is not good enough to pay out occasional drips of money in that way and to add all those drips together and to say that the total represents capital reimbursement. It is something very different. In many cases it is an alternative to National Assistance.
  I recognise that sometimes it is necessary to make Orders in Council. But I take exception to the making of Orders in Council rather than writing into the Bill the actual rules which determine the compensation to which some people and some bodies are entitled. We are entirely at the mercy of the good faith of the Government. Although, naturally, I am happy about the good faith of my hon. Friend on the Front Bench, if we "judge the horse on form" the record of the Government's attitude towards the ex-British officials who were in Egypt in 1951, and towards the Suez claimants, has been one of parsimony rather than generosity or equity. If we judge on form, we may expect the Orders in Council which are submitted to the House to be totally inadequate and void of equity.
  If that be the case, what is the House to do? We can reject the Orders in Council, in which case the whole machine will come to a halt. Or we can accept them with their defects, and that causes me grave anxiety. That is why I should like to see far more detail in the Bill defining the manner in which the money would be distributed. I realise that the total value of individual and complicated claims may not have been ascertained, and I accept that such details could not be embodied in the Bill. But, as time passes, many of these people have had to

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  spend all their capital as income and the damage which they suffer increases with the delay in payment.
  I must also refer to what is not in the Bill and ask my hon. Friend, when winding up the debate, to tell the House whether the position of 1951 officials will also be covered by Orders in Council under the Bill. Will Orders in Council cover the case of compensation to the 1951 officials, or will another Bill have to be introduced?
  Mr. P. Thomas: I do not think that the 1951 officials are anything whatever to do with the Bill. They will be dealt with separately, and have been dealt with separately.
  Mr. Maxwell-Hyslop: They have not been dealt with separately. At the moment they have not been dealt with. After eleven years they have had less than one-third of the total capital sum due in 1951.
  Mr. P. Thomas: I appreciate that my hon. Friend feels strongly about this; I know he does. When I said that they have been dealt with in the past, I did not mean that they had been adequately dealt with, but, as he knows, some £200,000 has been given by Egypt towards the 1951 officials and there have also been advances made by Her Majesty's Government. That is what I meant when I said they had been dealt with in the past. They had been dealt with outside the ambit of the Bill and of Orders in Council. As he will appreciate, they will have to be dealt with in future by Her Majesty's Government. As he has been told, this matter is being considered at the moment.
  Mr. Maxwell-Hyslop: I was already aware of that. The Egyptian Government have, in fact, paid 180,000 Egyptian pounds altogether in final settlement of claims totalling £660,000. That is the stage reached at the moment.
  I mention the analogy of the 1951 officials, because if the manner in which they have been treated is to be taken as a prediction of the manner in which the 1957 people are to be treated under the as yet unspecified powers given by this Bill, that will not satisfy many hon. Members on this side of the House, although I am aware that negotiations are under way at the moment to bring the
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  unhappy case of the 1951 officials to some form of settlement which, I hope, will be a not ungenerous one.
  A number of us on this side of the House will watch very carefully indeed the Orders in Council when they are made under the Bill. If I may give an example of the situation as I understand it at the moment, I believe that one can claim as part of damage suffered the charges made by the Egyptian Government for sequestrating property, but one cannot make as a charge the cost of desequestrating property. As it would not be necessary to desequestrate unless the property had been sequestrated, I cannot see why the charge should be allowed in the one case and not in the other.
  I give that as an example of the case of a constituent. It suggests that the rules in existence at the moment are extremely complicated. I should like to encourage my hon. Friend to ensure that after the Bill has been passed by both Houses, and has received the Royal Assent, Orders in Council that are made will not take advantage of the fact that the House is unable to amend them.
  5.14 p.m.
  Mr. James Dance: My hon. Friend the Joint Under-Secretary will be well aware that, like many of my hon. Friends and many hon. Members opposite, I have taken a keen interest in this matter, chiefly for the same reasons as other hon. Members who have constituents or friends who have been affected by their property being confiscated at the time of the Suez crisis.
  What worries me particularly is that some of the people concerned were not young when they got out of Egypt and they are getting older. I have in mind a very reputable bank manager and his wife, who were married in Egypt. They set up house there and all their wedding presents went there. They had to get out and they now know nothing about their property. I believe that misunderstanding and lack of information is worrying people even more than the actual question of compensation. That is why I have been pushing the question whether we can find out about the condition of their property. The firm of Topliss and Harding is chiefly concerned, and is inquiring into this. Could information be obtained from that firm? If we could it

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  would ease the minds of many people who are affected in this way.
  Then there is anxiety about the outstanding Egyptian tax demands on these people. This problem appears to be equally muddled. What outstanding taxes do they owe? I have spoken to people in my constituency who are prepared to pay these taxes if they can be told what they owe, but they are completely in the dark. In the whole of life it is being in the dark and not knowing where we are that causes so much anxiety. Can we be told how this matter is to be settled finally, whether the property is still there, whether it is useless and has to be bought anew? Can people's minds be sot at rest by their being informed of their future liabilities under Egyptian tax demands?
  5.17 p.m.
  Sir Peter Roberts: I rise to support the Bill and to ask for further clarification of its provisions. As I understand the Bill, the amount of money paid by the Egyptian Government does not go anywhere near far enough to compensate the claims which have been already received from the various offices in this country. Have we any indication of how much this amount of money will be?
  I apologise if the Minister has answered this earlier when I was not present in the Chamber. So far as I see, under Clause 1 there is no limit of money provided as to the extra compensation which is to be paid out of Treasury funds. I ask this question particularly because, although to a certain extent we are looking back to the past, I am sure the House must take cognisance of future trading.
  As hon. Members will be aware, there are a number of projects in Egypt at present dealing with irrigation, dams, excavations, and so on. Various consortia and expeditions have gone to Egypt to see whether it would be right and proper to invest further capital sums in Egypt at present. The Bill therefore is important in helping to lay some sort of foundation for the future.
  The first question I ask my hon. Friend the Joint Under-Secretary is the amount of money that we are passing by this Bill and whether or not this is a blank cheque. There is some amount above
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  £27 million which we are being asked to pay. I imagine that there would be a certain sense of satisfaction—not entire satisfaction but some satisfaction—for those owning property out there and also a certain sense of satisfaction for the Egyptian Government if we could be told that.
  Have we an assurance that, if we ask taxpayers in this country to provide funds to make up the deficiency which apparently the Egyptian Government have not been prepared to make up, that will create a satisfactory atmosphere for future negotiations? This is very important. Russian technicians and Russian plant are being taken into Egypt, and we know the terms of repayment and credit conditions which are being applied, but we are also under pressure in this country to participate to some extent in this redevelopment of Egypt. If we are to be told by the Government that the Bill and the extra money which our taxpayers will pay will still not satisfy the authorities in Cairo, and that they may have some come-back in the future about compensation—they may make some demand for a refund of money which they have already paid—then the atmosphere of ill-feeling and ill-will which is slowly being dissipated in that part of the world may revive.
  I look upon the Bill primarily as some sort of assistance for the development of Egypt in the future. I appreciate that anybody going into Egypt in future will have to risk the same sort of expropriation as that which the Government in Egypt have already exercised. Surely before bringing forward a Bill of this kind Her Majesty's Government have had close and careful talks with the Government in Cairo to find out what the future status will be.
  I hope that, as a result of the Bill and of asking my constituents to pay money which properly should have been paid by the Egyptian Government, we shall get some compensation in return by way of goodwill, if that is the right term, and by way of future stability. It would be unfortunate if we in this country were to subsidise the Egyptian Government by taking over their right and proper debts and then the Egyptian Government were to use the money which they had retained in order to stir up trouble in other parts of the Mediterranean.

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  We have seen only recently what has happened across the Red Sea. Some of us have some idea of what happened in Algeria and elsewhere in the past. We have a very careful balance to consider. If we are to bail out the Egyptian Government from their debts, then we should have a clear-cut understanding with them that this is a quid pro quo between the two countries and that they are prepared not to do this sort of thing again by nationalisation or expropriation. Have we had such discussions and such undertakings from them?
  If not, I point out that there are considerable Egyptian assets in this country. The second question which I want to ask is, what are the Egyptian assets in this country which have not been sequestrated or had a garnishee put upon them in respct of payment for debt? Are we taking any action to earmark this money or to prevent it from being taken out of the country. How much are we being asked to pay under Clause 1 above the £27½ million? Is this a fixed, ceiling amount?
  Finally, when all this has been done and the money has been paid, have we an assurance from the United Arab Republic that it wild look upon this as a final settlement of the past and is prepared Ito honour undertakings and contracts in the future?
  Subject to being given some explanation on those points, I feel, on behalf of my constituents, that it is right and proper that the House should pass the Bill to alleviate some problems which we know have been going on for a long time. These things always take a long time. It has been said with some justification by some of my constituents who have written to me about the matter over a number of years that it has been dragged out for rather a long time and that a Bill of this kind could have been introduced a little earlier. Nevertheless, we welcome it. We hope that we shall be laying the foundations for the future so that we may again help to build the prosperity of Egypt on a sound basis of good will for the future.
  Mr. W. Yates: On a point of order. May I have the leave of the House to declare an interest which I should have declared during my speech? Is that in order?
  Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Major Sir William Anstruther-Gray): I think that that is in order. I will allow it.
  Mr. Yates: I apologise to the House. It is customary, when an hon. Member has an interest in a country or is connected with a firm, for him so to inform the House. I am connected with an insurance broking firm which was in Egypt and which has received some compensation under the terms of the agreement. In due course it will probably receive fuller compensation. It therefore would not have been right for me to have spoken to the House without having made this statement to the House, and I apologise for not having done so earlier.
  5.27 p.m.
  Mr. Mitchison: May I have the leave of the House to make a short suggestion to the Government? Can a Minister ever previously have come to the House with such a short Bill, in his eyes seemingly such an innocuous Bill, and have been met with so much criticism, not directed to the object of the Bill but directed to the way in which it was brought forward and the vagueness of some of the statements which had to be made about it?
  We all feel that much more could and should have been said about the existing claims—claims which have been made and assessed and paid out, and all that part of the financial picture. It should have been put into the Financial Memorandum. Hon. Members on both sides of the House have felt that it was very unsatisfactory having to provide money for purposes the nature of which could not yet be disclosed. An enabling Bill is all very well, but an enabling Bill to spend money for purposes not yet disclosed is something a little new and startling even in the records of this highly autocratic Tory Government.
  The Joint Under-Secretary of State said that it will all come out all right, that an Order in Council will be laid and that this Order will be subject to annulment—as it will be under the provisions of the 1950 Act—and that therefore we can discuss it all then. But by then authority will have been given to spend the money. Surely it would be much better if the hon. Member not only answered verbally today but issued in

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  some form a statement a little more elaborate than that which we may expect from him at the moment. Best of all, he could put it into the Bill in order to make the picture a little more definite and the objects a little clearer. That is the right way to treat Parliament in a financial matter of this kind.
  I therefore suggest to the hon. Member that, because it is right—although frankly I do not for one moment think that he will accept the suggestion, so hard-headed are the Government in matters of this sart—that be should not press the Motion before the House but should withdraw it or adjourn it. Before the House is asked to vote this money, he should put before it a proper statement of the amounts likely to be required, the purposes for which they are required and the claims which are to be met, as well as the terms.
  Taking the next part of the picture, he could tell us what he intends to do about the interest on the foreign compensation fund which he has put into his pocket for three years. Turning to the last part of the picture, what does he intend to do about pensions for the officers and servants of the fund? This Bill is too narrow, and a courageous and broadminded Government—which, of course, this Government is not—would immediately withdraw the Bill and put before the House a Bill in a proper form.
  I make that suggestion. I know the Government. I judge a horse on its form, as we have been invited to do in another connection, and I therefore do not for one moment expect the Government to accept the suggestion, which appeals only because it is so obviously right and so obviously sensible.
  5.30 p.m.
  Mr. P. Thomas: By leave of the House, I will reply to one or two of the points which have been raised during this very interesting debate. First, I do not think that the last suggestion of the hon. and learned Member for Kettering (Mr. Mitchison) accords with the feeling of the House, as I judge it from having heard the debate. It appeared that all speakers, including the hon. and learned Gentleman, until he spoke at the end, thought that this was on the whole a useful Bill, but they criticised the presentation of the Bill, and I quite understand that.
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  As I said in opening, I had hoped that some statement would have been made to the House by now setting out in detail the Government's proposals to the House in respect of Egyptian compensation as a whole. Unfortunately, we were unable to do that. These are very complicated matters, as I know the hon. and learned Gentleman, who obviously has studied them, will appreciate. It is taking some time to finalise the proposals which the Government would like to bring before the House.
  However, I have been able to tell the House that we intend and hope to make a statement within the next two or three weeks. The Government having made a statement to the House, setting out not just the restricted claims which are contained in the Bill but the whole of the Egyptian Compensation claims, including the 1951 officials—who could not be further away from the Bill but about whom my hon. Friend the Member for Tiverton (Mr. Maxwell-Hyslop) asked—the House will be able to judge exactly whether it can accept the proposals, whether it can support the Order in Council which will have been laid before the House, and, indeed, whether it is prepared to vote the money. I suggest that it would not have been in accordance with the wishes of the House if we had delayed the Bill, because this is an enabling Bill. If the Bill goes through the House and if the money is forthcoming from Parliament, then it can be administered by the Foreign Compensation Commission.
  Mr. Mitchison: What money?
  Mr. Thomas: Whichever money Parliament decides to vote to top up, to use the hon. and learned Gentleman's expression, the £27½ million agreed between the United Arab Republic and the British Government by the Agreement of 1959.
  I will now briefly answer some of the questions which were put to me. I hope I shall be forgiven if I do not answer them in great detail. The hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) asked me a question about cash and other deposits left in Egypt by refugees. I am informed that these deposits were mostly made with the Swiss Consular Authorities and were later handed over to Her Majesty's Government's Embassy at

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  Cairo. I am told that the question of their return to their owners is a rather complex one which is being actively examined It is, however, an administrative matter which could not be facilitated by legislation. Moreover, the question of liquid assets, not Egyptianised, in Egypt is not a matter for the Foreign Compensation Commission and is therefore outside the scope of the Bill.
  Mr. S. Silverman: If I correctly understand the Joint Under-Secretary, he tells the House that no legislation is required to deal with this matter but that it can be dealt with administratively. It is a great pity that it has not been dealt with administratively already, because the money has been held by our authorities in Cairo for quite a long time. They know whose money it is. They know where the people are. They know that in most cases the people could not return to Egypt to get it. If it can be dealt with administratively, I hope that it will now be dealt with administratively without further delay.
  Mr. Thomas: I appreciate the hon. Gentleman's anxiety, but within the ambit of this Second Reading debate I am sure that he will appreciate that I cannot deal with this point, as it is outside the scope of the Bill.
  The hon. and learned Member for Kettering asked whether, when the amounts in respect of loans are paid to the Exchequer, the interest on these loans will also be paid. The Bill as drafted does not provide for the payment of any sum by way of interest into the Exchequer. The loan deduction money alone will be repaid. The loans did not carry interest, nor will interest accruing on repayments from the Fund be paid to the Exchequer.
  The hon. and learned Gentleman also asked what would be the possible pension scheme. The pension scheme has to be discussed with the members and staff of the Commission after the enabling legislation has been passed. Therefore, it is not possible to give any precise details of the scheme at this stage, but in general it is hoped to agree something which may be either contributory or non-contributory and which will provide benefits similar to those available to other public service employees.
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  The hon. and learned Gentleman asked me to give some figures as to the amount of claims unsettled, what amount has been assessed, and how much has been paid. As at 31st October, 1962, the Commission had assessed or determined 722 Egyptianisation claims out of a total of 1,010. This leaves 288 claims outstanding, of which the claimed amount is £12,661,178. Up to the same date the Commission had received 2,292 applications in relation to sequestration losses for a total amount of £12,172,189. Of these the Commission had disposed of 1,939 claims, leaving a balance of 353 sequestration claims, amounting to, I think it is, £6,570,039 outstanding. The actual amount paid out by the Commission up to 31st October, 1962, was £13,875,596.
  Mr. Mitchison: Therefore, the maximum that can be paid under the existing grants obtained is about £23 million—that is, the £16 million Egyptianisation money and £6 million-odd damages money, if I may put it in that way?
  Mr. Thomas: Yes. I have only just received these figures and I have not gone into the matter in detail, but it appears that that would be about right.
  My hon. Friend the Member for Hendon, South (Sir H. Lucas-Tooth) asked if it were possible for us to say something about what the Government's proposals are in regard to Egyptian claims, before the Bill leaves the House. I am afraid I cannot tell my hon. Friend that with any degree of certainty. All I can say is that we hope that we will be able to make a statement to the House in about ten days tme. I am sure that my hon. Friend will appreciate that it is terribly difficult at the moment for me to be more definite than that. I hope that it will be within about ten days. I cannot say whether the Bill will have left the House by then.
  My hon. Friend the Member for Shipley (Mr. Hirst), who I know has paid particular attention to these matters and, indeed, has been a redoubtable advocate on behalf of the many claimants, asked this question—"What are we enabling the Government to do?" That criticism came from several hon. Members during the course of this short debate. The Bill is a simple one and I think that all these

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  questions are directed to Clause 1. If in fact we do not have any legislation such as is contained in Clause 1 and if Parliament votes money to add to the existing £27½ million for Egyptian claims, that money cannot be distributed by the Foreign Compensation Commission.
  That is all the Bill really is. It does not ask for any money; it says that if Parliamentary money is available that money can be administered and distributed by the Foreign Compensation Commission. I would therefore suggest that the proper thing to do is to look at the Bill as a Measure that seeks powers, not money.
  Admittedly, if Parliament decides that the Government's proposals, when they are announced to the House, are good, and votes the money, that will be the money that will be administered by the Foreign Compensation Commission, but that is all there is in Clause 1, and I ask my hon. Friends to say that it is something that is wholly acceptable to them, something they welcome, and something that indicates that the Government are trying to find a solution to this long drawn out problem.
  I can assure my hon. Friends that the Government hope that when they make their proposals known the House will feel that a fair and reasonable settlement is proposed of the many claims relating to the Egyptian incident. I do not think that I need say anything more. I am grateful to those hon. Members on both sides who have contributed to the debate, and all their remarks will certainly be noted.
  Mr. Hirst: Before my hon. Friend sits down, I assume that my reading of the Bill is right and that if the suggestion made in due course in the Order in Council is not full or satisfactory this enabling Bill will still stand in regard to asking Parliament for further money at a subsequent date if the first allocation is not sufficient?
  Mr. Thomas: That is quite so. While this Measure is on the Statute Book, if a Government decides to vote sums of money to add to the £27½ million Egyptian fund, that money can be administered by the Foreign Compensation Commission.
  Question put and agreed to.
  Bill accordingly read a Second Time.
  Bill committed to a Standing Committee pursuant to Standing Order No. 38 (Committal of Bills).

  FOREIGN COMPENSATION [MONEY]
  [Queen's Recommendation signified.]
  Considered in Committee under Standing Order No. 84 (Money Committees).
  [Sir WILLIAM ANSTRUTHER-GRAY in the Chair]
  Motion made, and Question proposed,
  That, for the purposes of any Act of the present Session to provide for the payment out of moneys provided by Parliament of additional compensation in respect of claims arising in connection with certain events in Egypt, to require the Foreign Compensation Commission to pay sums into the Exchequer in respect of deductions made in meeting such claims, and to make provision in relation to pensions and other payments to or in respect of members, officers and servants of the Commission, it is expedient to authorize—

  (a) the payment out of moneys provided by Parliament of sums required for the making of payments to the Foreign Compensation Commission under the said Act in respect of claims arising in connection with events in Egypt;

  (b) the payment into the Exchequer under the said Act of amounts which, in making payments in respect of claims so arising, the Foreign Compensation Commission has deducted in respect of loans made by Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom;

  (c) any increase attributable to the said Act in the sums which, in respect of the expenses of the Foreign Compensation Commission, are to be or may be paid out of moneys provided by Parliament or paid into the Exchequer under Section 7 (2) of the Foreign Compensation Act, 1950.

  5.42 p.m.
  Mr. G. R. Mitchison: I want to make one protest. This Money Resolution follows the language of the Bill almost exactly. The Government forgot entirely about the interest on the deductions, and if the Money Resolution remains as it is they will be unable to correct their error. It shows that they should not have Money Resolutions drawn as tightly as this, but should allow for the possibility—indeed, the probability—that the Government will make a mistake.
  Question put and agreed to.
  Resolution to be reported.
  Report to be received Tomorrow.

  ADEN
  5.45 p.m.
  The Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr. Duncan Sandys): I beg to move:
  That this House approves the policy set out in the White Paper on the Accession of Aden to the Federation of South Arabia (Command Paper No. 1814).
  In their letter of 16th August, in page 5 of the White Paper, the Ministers of the Federation and of Aden stated that they were
  "… convinced that the ending of the unnatural division between them, which is due to the accident of history, would be in the true interests of all who live in this area, and would contribute greatly to their prosperity and safety."
  I have no doubt at all about that.
  The area of Aden Colony is about half the size of the Isle of Wight. Its population is about 200,000, of which over one-third consists of migrant workers who come and go. Aden is now enjoying considerable prosperity, but this is not, I believe, very firmly based. Aden's old entrepôt trade is declining, and its economy is now largely dependent upon oil. Two-thirds of the working population are employed directly or indirectly by the oil refinery, on the oil bunkering installations or on work for the British Forces. It is therefore difficult to see how Aden could hope on its own to become politically independent and remain in the long-term, economically viable.
  As the House will see, the proposals in the White Paper are embodied in three main documents. The first document is the draft Treaty, which provides for the accession of Aden to the Federation, the second deals with the Federal Constitution, and the third with the scheme for constitutional advance in Aden. If the House approves this Motion, we shall conclude a Treaty with the Federation on the lines of the draft in the White Paper. Most of the Treaty is, I believe, self-explanatory, but I should like to say a word about one or two of its Articles.
  Much thought was given as to whether Aden should have the right to secede from the Federation, a right which is not enjoyed by the existing member States. In view of the commercial importance of Aden and of the dislocation which its
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  withdrawal would cause, it would be undesirable to leave its relationship to the Federation in a permanent state of uncertainty. On the other hand, we felt that some arrangement should be made for separating Aden from the Federation if it were found that the merger could not be made to work fairly.
  Article 10 in the draft Treaty accordingly provides for a trial period of about six years. If, after that, the Legislature of Aden complains that its legitimate interests are being unfairly prejudiced by the Federation, the matter can be referred to the British Government, which may ask the Federal Government to redress the grievance. Failing that, we can withdraw Aden altogether from the Federation. Apart from this provision in the Treaty, the British Government will have a separate opportunity to review the working of the arrangement when the time comes to grant independence to the Federation. We feel that these safeguards, taken together, strike a reasonable balance between indissoluble union and over-easy divorce.
  Those who criticise the merger plan sometimes suggest that the inhabitants of Aden are being handed over to the arbitrary rule of mediaeval potentates. As regards the individuals concerned, I think that anyone who, like myself, has mot the Ministers of the Federation will know that they are every bit as enlightened as the political leaders in Aden Colony.
  Those functions which can most efficiently be administered by the central authority will be entrusted to the Federal Government, but by reason of our treaty rights and by reason of the Budgetary support which we give to the Federation the British Government will continue to exercise a considerable influence over the whole field of administration.
  Since much interest has centred on labour matters in Aden, the House will, I think, be glad to see that this is one of the important functions which will remain wholly under the control of the Aden State, but, apart from the reservation to Aden of specific functions, a number of valuable safeguards have also been provided. A Code of Human Rights has been embodied in the new Aden Constitution, and any Federal law or State law which contravenes this Code of Human Rights will be invalid.

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  The present judicial system of the Colony is specifically retained together with the right of appeal to the Privy Council. With regard to personal liberty, the control of the police is, of course, of cardinal importance. That is why the Governor, who will be re-styled High Commissioner, will retain overriding authority in all matters concerning internal security in Aden, including the control of the security forces.
  Much has been said about the interests of the people of Aden Colony, but I think that surprisingly little attention has been paid to the interests of the people of the Federation. Although one is a Colony and the other a Protectorate, we consider that we have the same duty towards their inhabitants. The proposed merger will, I am sure, benefit the Federation as much as it will benefit Aden.
  The separation of the Federation from its natural port and commercial centre has been an obvious disadvantage, and the merger will bring economic benefits to both. Not only will it create a free trade area embracing Aden and the Federation, but it will also abolish the present Customs barriers between individual Federal States which have hindered commerce and economic development.
  The Federation, whose population is more than twice as great as that of Aden, may well be able in time to achieve independence on its own, but with the addition of Aden it will certainly constitute a much more balanced unit and should, as a result, be able sooner to shoulder the responsibilities of separate nationhood.
  In statements on colonial policy, it has become fashionable to mention everybody else's interests except our own. Some people seem to think that it is almost improper to suggest that Britain, too, may at times have interests which ought to be safeguarded. Our military base at Aden is a vital stepping stone on the way to Singapore. It is also indispensable for the safety of the States within the Arabian Peninsular whom we are pledged by treaty to defend.
  The House will see from their letter in the White Paper that the Federal and Men Ministers specifically recognise that Britain's military presence in Aden is essential,
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  "for the protection of the inhabitants of the area".
  With this in mind, Article 9 of the draft Treaty gives us the right to exclude from the Federation, before or after merger, any areas in Aden Colony which, for defence reasons, we may think it desirable to administer separately.
  Since we are retaining—I should like to emphasise this—sovereignty over the Whole of Aden Colony, even after its accession to the Federation, and since the Governor will continue to be responsible for the defence of the entire Federation, the administrative separation of the base areas would, in practice, make little difference. I do not know whether we shall wish to exercise this right, but it is, perhaps, a wise precaution to possess it.
  The proposals in the White Paper for political advance in Aden, as the House will see, follow the usual pattern of constitutional development in our Colonial Territories. With the exception of the Attorney-General, all the official members of the Legislative Council and of the Executive Council will be replaced by elected members. A Chief Minister will be appointed and the Governor, except in respect of his reserve powers, will act on the advice of Ministers responsible to the Legislature.
  I should, perhaps, explain that these new constitutional proposals do not deal with the franchise, since this is a matter which is already within the competence of the existing Legislature. All parties are agreed that the next election should be held on a revised franchise, but they are very much divided on what changes need to be made. It would be quite impossible for these differences to be resolved and new legislation to be passed by the Legislative Council before its present term runs out in two months' time. That is why it was necessary to extend the term of the Legislative Council for another twelve months.
  Mr. Denis Healey: This is an extraordinary argument. Why should not the next Legislative Council also consider these proposals?
  Mr. Sandys: I said a moment ago that all the parties were agreed that the present franchise was unsatisfactory and

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  that the next election ought to be held under a new franchise, but there are, as the hon. Gentleman knows, very considerable differences as Ito what principle should be adopted in regard to the amendments to be made. The controversy centres on the question of nationality and residential qualifications.
  The Legislative Council in Aden, as the House knows, has passed a Motion, in the same way as we are doing at this moment, approving the White Paper proposals. The Opposition group likewise favour the idea of a merger, in fact their amendment to the Government Motion opened with these words:
  "While wholeheartedly endorsing the principle of unity between Aden and the Federation."
  These were the opening words of the amendment to the Government's Motion approving the White Paper in the Aden Legislature. The main difference between the two groups is that the Opposition group would like to hold elections first, after which they believe that they would be able to negotiate more favourable terms with the Federation. As we know here, in another context, it is not altogether unusual for a party in opposition to believe that they could negotiate better.
  There is a third political group, the People's Socialist Party, which is based on the Aden T.U.C. It is not at present represented in the Legislative Council because the T.U.C. boycotted the last general election. But we really cannot accept the principle that by boycotting an election a party thereby acquires the right to question the validity of the decisions which may subsequently be taken by the Legislature. In any case, the policy of this party is perfectly well known. In a recent statement, it declared unequivocally that it was not opposed to the accession of Aden to the Federation. In fact, it said:
  "Aden has to accede and should accede."
  But that party, of course, wants to go very much further. It demands that Aden and the Federation should not only be united with one another but should together be incorporated in the Yemen, which claims the whole of South Arabia as part of its territory.
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  It will be seen, therefore, that while all three groups favour a wider association, they differ on two main points: the first relates to the question of whether fresh elections should be held before a decision is taken and the second is whether Aden should be incorporated in the Yemen. I should like to examine frankly with the House the advantages and disadvantages of holding elections before the merger because that is the main issue in the Opposition's Amendment.
  If the present Government group won the election in Aden and if the Federal Government kept open their offer, then merger would, presumably, take place on the terms set out in the White Paper. Alternatively, the election might produce a majority for the opposition group in the present Legislature. As I have explained, that group, too, is committed to a policy of merger, though it seems to believe that it could secure more favourable terms. In my opinion, it is most unlikely that the Federal Government, which have already made important concessions, would be willing to reopen these difficult negotiations. In the delay and confusion which would result the opportunity for merger on any terms might well be lost.
  The third possibility is that the election might be won by the People's Socialist Party, a substantial proportion of whose members are temporary immigrants from the Yemen. As I explained, this party is asking that both Aden and the Federation should be incorporated in the Yemen. The Federation would, I am sure, have nothing to gain and much to lose by joining the Yemen, not to mention the fact that many of the tribes on either side of the border have been fighting each other for years. There is no doubt that any suggestion of union with the Yemen would be totally unacceptable to the overwhelming mass of the population of the Federation.
  Those who object to joining the Federation on the ground that it is not sufficiently democratic cannot, I think, seriously be attracted by the prospect of joining the Yemen. No one can have anything to say in favour of the rule of the old Imams, but neither does the

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  behaviour of the new military leaders and their Egyptian allies encourage much hope that under their rule the Yemen would be either democratic or independent. I cannot, therefore, believe that any substantial section of opinion in Aden can genuinely want union with the Yemen under present conditions. One must regard this cry as no more than an emotional expression of Arab nationalism by people who know that there is no risk of Britain agreeing to their demand.
  Quite apart from the general political objections to the holding of immediate elections, I regret to have to tell the House that organised political intimidation, which has for long existed in Aden, has increased to a point where it would be quite impossible to secure a free and fearless expression of opinion at the polls. Before the recent debate in the Aden Legislature on the White Paper proposals, Aden Ministers and Members were threatened with death and their children with kidnapping if they voted for the White Paper.
  Outside the Legislature many who were known to support the merger have been forced by intimidation to hoist the Yemeni flag over their shops or dwellings. I am sure that the whole House will utterly condemn these despicable methods and will share my admiration for the courage and steadfastness with which Aden Ministers and Members of Parliament have ignored threats and have stuck to their opinions. I hope that they will be able to continue to resist the pressures that are still being put upon them. Intimidation makes a complete mockery of democracy and I am sure that the House will agree that it cannot and must not be tolerated.
  With the help of the Governor, Aden Ministers and officials, I intend to do all in my power to stamp out this vile practice between now and the elections in a year's time. I trust that the House will give me its support in any measures which may be necessary to enable the people of Aden to express their opinions openly and without fear.
  I wish to thank all those who are serving the Government in Aden for the devotion with which they are carrying out their duties in extremely difficult
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  circumstances. Their services are highly valued and will continue to be needed as much as ever after Aden's accession to the Federation. So far as I know, the party opposite recognises the desirability, at any rate in principle, of a union between Aden and the Federation, but considers that elections should first be held to make sure that this is what the people of Aden really want.
  Naturally, I entirely understand the attitude of hon. Members opposite. When I became responsible for the affairs of Aden a few months ago, my inclination was to put the issue to the people by means of an election. That was the obvious and the easy course and, apart from any constitutional considerations, it was crystal clear that any other course was certain to involve me personally in a lot of trouble and criticism. But I must say that the more I studied the problem, the more I became convinced that the British Government could not escape responsibility for this important decision and that in view of the present internal situation in the Colony it would not be fair or possible to shift that responsibility on to the shoulders of the electors. If elections were held now they would be held under a franchise which all regard as unsatisfactory. Moreover, the prevalent practice of intimidation would prevent a free expression of opinion, and in consequence invalidate the result. We could, of course, postpone the merger until elections could be held under more satisfactory conditions, but in the present unsettled situation, it is I think unlikely that the Federal Government would feel able to maintain their offer for any appreciable time.
  Mr. William Yates: This is a very important point. In view of the fact that a new Government of the Yemen is hardly established and, presumably, according to the Foreign Office, we want to establish good relations with them, may I ask my right hon. Friend whether he does not think that these elections should be postponed to see whether we cannot get on better terms with the Yemen?
  Mr. Sandys: We are talking about elections in Aden. We are concerned with our own affairs and not with the affairs of the Yemen. I do not think that the House or anybody in the country

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  would want to have the timing of elections in a British Colony determined by what is going on in a civil war, a revolution, in some other country. Perhaps my hon. Friend will have an opportunity to explain his point later in the debate.
  I do not believe that if we were to postpone the merger by waiting for elections the Federal Government would be willing to reopen these difficult negotiations with any new Aden Government. Therefore, by postponing a decision now, Aden would stand to gain nothing. It would merely risk losing altogether the opportunity for union with the Federation which I believe most of its people truly desire.
  In any case, this constitutional controversy—and here perhaps I am more in harmony with my hon. Friend the Member for The Wrekin (Mr. W. Yates)—has been completely overshadowed by recent events in the Yemen. Over Sana Radio last week Brigadier Sallal called upon the people of Aden to prepare for "revolution" against the British. He added that Egypt and the Soviet Union were ready to help if needed. This serious new development has widened the whole issue and has lent added urgency to our decision.
  The main issue is no longer whether or not there should be elections before merger. The central issue now is whether Aden and the Federation should, by union with one another, be strengthened and consolidated in the face of open incitement to rebellion. The alternative is to yield to intimidation from within and without and to postpone the merger, which we know to be right, and thereby dispirit and discourage all who believe in ordered progress in partnership with Britain. That is a course which we are not prepared to take.
  I sincerely believe that the plan proposed in the White Paper is the one best suited to the internal and external problems which confront the peoples of this area. It effectively protects the legitimate interests of all concerned and, by uniting Aden and the Federation, it offers them together a prospect of political and economic progress which neither could hope to achieve alone.
  6.14 p.m.
  Mr. Denis Healey: I beg to move, to leave out from "House", to the end of the Question and add instead thereof:
  "regrets the decision of Her Majesty's Government to compel Aden Colony to accede to the Federation of South Arabia without first obtaining the consent of the colony's inhabitants"
  The Secretary of State opened his defence of the Government's decision as mild as milk. I must confess that as he got deeper into it, and particularly in his concluding passages, we were treated to the extraordinary spectacle of seeing a dinosaur, living and breathing, before our eyes. I cannot believe that a British Secretary of State, in 1962, can be so insensitive to the forces now sweeping the world, and above all the British Commonwealth, as the right hon. Gentleman appeared to be in his closing passages.
  As the right hon. Gentleman said, all of us in the House and all the inhabitants of Aden Colony recognise that there is a strong case for joining Aden before independence to the territory in the hinterland behind it, however we define that, whether it is the Federation alone or the Yemen as well.
  It would be extremely difficult for a Colony of about a quarter of a million inhabitants to survive on its own, though, frankly, not very much more difficult than for Trinidad with 100,000 more inhabitants to survive on its own. But it is clearly desirable, in principle, that when this part of the world achieves independence it should achieve it as a single State and that what the Aden Ministers in their letter to the Secretary of State describe as the one people inhabiting Aden and the Federation should have one society and one State din which to express their identity.
  But, as we know to our cost, from our own experience in other parts of the Commonwealth, if we are discussing the union of peoples and States everything depends on how and when we do it. This, after all, is the whole issue of debate between my hon. and right hon. Friends on this side and those on the Government benches opposite on negotiations for Britain's accession to the European Economic Community. I do not think that the Secretary of State would deny

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  that the success of any union of peoples, whether it is federal or unitary, depends, above all, on the freely given consent of all concerned.
  We learned this to our cost when the Caribbean Federation broke up earlier this year, despite the many economic advantages which many of us had seen in it and many of us still see in such a link between the territories concerned. We are learning it at even greater expense to ourselves and those concerned in the break-up of the Central African Federation which all of us know, whether we applaud or deplore the fact, is bound to come some time in the next twelve months. Unless the people concerned freely give their political consent to this type of union, all the potential economic advantages which might flow from it are bound to be swept away in violence and anarchy. We have learned it in the Caribbean and are learning it in Central Africa, and we also know that it is true of our relations with continental Western Europe.
  Her Majesty's Government refused to consult the people of Aden Colony on their views about the Federation, and in refusing to have an election before this decision was taken I suppose they are in a sense following the same line of argument as in refusing to let the British people express their views on our own relations with the Common Market before the Government take their decision. But however similar these two issues may appear to be on the face of it, there are tremendously important differences in practice.
  In the first place, the Government are not proposing, or at least I hope not, as far as the United Kingdom is concerned to postpone the elections due by October, 1964, until October, 1965, if they have not already concluded their negotiations with the European Economic Community. But that is what they are proposing for Aden. Under the existing Aden Constitution, elections are due next January. There was no question but that they would be held next January until, in the summer of this year, this new proposal for federation came forward.
  Now the Government are trying to "cook up" all sorts of arguments which
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  they never used at all in the earlier half of this year to explain—certainly not to justify—their decision not to hold elections when they are normally due, but to hold them a year later, nine months after Aden Colony has been compelled to join the proposed new Federation. In the meantime, the existing members of the Aden Colony Legislative Council will co-opt four new members without consultation with the public, and new changes in the franchise will be made, though we have not the slightest idea what they will be.
  It was interesting, and, I think, rather depressing that, although the Secretary of State made much of this point—we all know that the existing franchise is most unsatisfactory—he gave no hint of what changes in the franchise the Government or the Aden Legislative Council propose to introduce before the elections are held in January, 1964.
  It is very important to note that, once Aden Colony has joined the Federation on 1st March next year, if the Government's intentions are carried out, there will be no Chance whatever of changing its relationship with the Protectorates and taking it out of the Federation until six years have passed, and then it will be very difficult indeed, for reasons to which I shall come later. I do not think that anyone can be surprised that even newspapers, which were initially sympathetic to the idea of this Federation, newspapers such as the Economist, should be talking of "fast practice" on the part of the Government in refusing to give the Aden people their natural and constitutional opportunity of expressing their views about it when the date came along in two months' time, that is, in January of next year.
  I honestly cannot accept the Secretary of State's argument that we cannot have an election before the franchise is changed and we cannot wait till the franchise is changed before the Federation is set up. If the readiness of the Emirates in the Protectorates to accept union with Aden is so fragile and delicately poised that a delay of three, four or six months would wither their enthusiasm for union with the Colony, then there is not very much ground for believing that this Federation has any reality in it whatever.
  There is no doubt at all that, when elections finally are held in Aden Colony

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  —especially if the franchise is then more representative—the views expressed in the election campaign and represented in the following Legislative Council will be a great deal less satisfactory to the rulers of the Sheikdoms and Emirates in the Protectorates than the views which were expressed six months ago by the existing Ministers in the Aden Colony Administration.
  The only possible justification which the Secretary of State can have for refusing to hold elections at the normal time, before the Colony is forced to accede to the Federation, is that the existing Legislative Council in some sense represents the people of Aden and is, therefore, fully fitted to take this enormously important decision for them. But what are the facts?
  In the first place, the question of federation between the Colony and the Protectorates was not an issue in any way in the election in 1959. Of course, the Government can argue that joining the Common Market was not an issue in the 1959 election in Britain and this does not prevent the Government from taking a decision on a new line of policy without an election. But there is this big difference, that the existing elected Members of the Legislative Council, and still more the Legislative Council as a whole, cannot be regarded as in any way representative of the inhabitants of Aden of whose unity as a people so much is made in the letter from the Ministers to the Secretary of State earlier this year.
  The existing elected Members of the Legislative Council received 5,000 votes in a Colony which has 220,000 inhabitants. The only analogy I can dredge out of my memory is Sir Roy Welensky's wonderful total of 10,000 votes in the Federal elections in Central Africa earlier this year. As we all know, the major opposition party in Aden refused to contest the election on the ground that the franchise was so restrictive as to forbid all unskilled workers from taking any part in it. Only 27 per cent. of the population voted. On what grounds can the Secretary of State maintain that persons elected by 5,000 votes in a Colony of 220,000 inhabitants can in any sense be said to speak for those people?
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  Let us look further. On 26th September last, the Legislative Council of Aden did vote on these proposals. As the Secretary of State said, it passed them. But only four of the 12 elected Members of the Council—elected on that tiny majority vote on a very restricted franchise—actually voted for the proposals. The other eight elected Members abstained. This is fantastic. I cannot imagine how the Secretary of State can have the gall to pretend in this situation that in any sense the popular view was expressed by the decision taken by the Legislative Council on 26th September this year.
  Since that date, of course, public opinion in the Colony has moved even faster and more unanimously against the Government's proposals. As the Secretary of State pointed out, there has been a revolution in the Yemen. With all respect to him, a very large number of Aden inhabitants who are not themselves Yemeni believe in Arab unity and would like union with the Yemen, and the only thing which has held them back from proposing it in the past has been the knowledge that the régime in the Yemen under the defunct Imam——
  Sir Peter Agnew: Not defunct.
  Mr. Healey: Yes, under the defunct Imam—I am talking now of him, not of his son, who, we are told, is still alive—was notorious even throughout the Arab world as being the most cruel and barbarous of all régimes in the Middle East. And that is saying something. We do not know precisely how the new régime will turn out. I venture no predictions about that at the moment. I only repeat what The Times said in its editorial, that any change in the Yemen was certain to be a change for the better. This was certainly how it was seen by the overwhelming majority of the population of Aden itself.
  In this situation, I should have thought that Her Majesty's Government had a wonderful opportunity to win the confidence of the people of Aden in showing some enthusiasm, or, at least, sympathy, for the new régime in the Yemen. Instead of that, a Government who recognised the murderers of Nuri es Said a few hours after his body was being dragged through the streets are still dithering and hesitating on the edge of deciding whether or

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  not to recognise the new régime in the Yemen. Of course, the result is that any lingering sympathy of which the British Government might have disposed in Aden Colony has now disappeared.
  A few weeks ago, municipal elections were held in Aden. The only party prepared to contest them in these conditions was the party of Mr. Bayoomi, the leading Aden Minister in favour of the Government's proposals. Mr. Bayoomi's party put up candidates in all 20 of the seats. All the other parties boycotted the elections. The only other people fighting them were a handful of independent candidates without party backing. Not one of Mr. Bayoomi's candidates was elected in that election, which took place only a few weeks ago.
  There is not the slightest doubt that the people now in the Legislative Council who are still supporting the Government's proposals are totally unrepresentative of the population of Aden Colony whose fate is now in their hands.
  It seems to me that, in face of these obvious facts—the Secretary of State cannot deny any of the facts which I have quoted—there is an overwhelming case to test public opinion in Aden by a vote. Otherwise, we are rushing headlong into a disaster in which British interests, which the Secretary of State was so anxious we should protect—and I agree with him—would be the first to suffer.
  The Yemen revolution gave the Secretary of State a wonderful opportunity to withdraw from the extremely untenable position in which he found himself by putting these proposals forward in the first hectic days of assuming his new responsibilities for Colonial as well as Commonwealth affairs. But, with the impeccable sense of timing which the Government so often show nowadays—as in deciding to hold an underground test at the moment when a test ban agreement seems to be in sight for the first time—these were the considerations which the Secretary of State told us this afternoon made him determined to push this proposal through no matter what the opposition on the spot.
  The excuse which the Secretary of State gave was that there is a great deal of intimidation going on in Aden Colony. I can believe it, and, like the right hon.
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  Gentleman, I deeply deplore it. But the intimidation of which he complains started after the refusal of elections. Frankly, we have seen this all over the world, above all in British Colonies. If people are refused the right to express their views through the ballot box they are tempted to express their views with the fist, with the petrol bomb or with whatever it may happen to be.
  I do not know—very few of us have had the opportunity to visit Aden—precisely how much truth there is in these tales of intimidation. I have no doubt that there is some, but I cannot help remembering that there were exactly the same stories about intimidation distorting the public's view before the elections in Nyasaland. There were stories about a Murder Incorporated. We all know what happened. When the Nyasaland Malawi People's Congress won the election by an overwhelmingly popular vote, the stories of intimidation were immediately dropped, and now Dr. Banda is negotiating with Mr. Butler on equal terms. This will happen with Mr. Al Asnag. All this stuff will be dropped if the moment ever comes that the Aden people are free to express their own views and the British Government find themselves forced to negotiate with people who really represent the local population.
  We cannot ignore the fact that there is a great deal of counter-intimidation, too. Most of the newspapers in Aden Colony have been banned. Hundreds of trade unionists have been thrown into jail. My hon. Friend the Member for Dundee, East (Mr. G. M. Thomson) had a telegram yesterday saying that 14 trade unionists had been flogged in jail. I hope that the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies will comment on this report when he replies. I hope that this is not a true story and that this is not what the Secretary of State meant when he said that he would ensure that intimidation stopped.
  Incidentally, let me say to the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies how much I appreciate the predicament in which he finds himself. I think that Sir Hugh Foot's position at the United Nations was a bed of roses compared with the hon. Gentleman's tonight.
  The final blow is that these Ministers who voted for the Federation earlier this

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  year are now all beginning to resign. Mr. Husseiny has announced his intention to resign today. It is likely that two more Ministers will join him. It is likely that seven of the twelve elected members of the Legislative Council, who were elected under these extremely unrepresentative conditions, will boycott the Legislative Council from now on.
  There is no denying—and, frankly, the Secretary of State did not really try to deny it—that opinion in Aden at the moment is overwhelmingly against the right hon. Gentleman's proposals. It is worth looking for a moment at the proposals themselves to see why people in Aden are so strongly opposed to them when all of them recognise in principle the desirability of some constitutional link between Aden and the hinterland. First, there is the provision in the new proposals that the United Kingdom will be free to remove any part of Aden Colony from the Federation at any time that it likes without consultation. This is a quite extraordinary provision to introduce into what the right hon. Gentleman describes as a progressive colonial Constitution in this day and age.
  Secondly, there is no chance whatever of the Colony being able to withdraw from the Federation in anything under six years, and even then the conditions under which it can withdraw are so stringently drawn that it is difficult to see it happening. The Legislative Council has to ask for secession by passing a resolution with a two-thirds majority, and, if no agreement is reached after talks between the colony and the Federation, if the British Government are satisfied that the Aden claim of unfair prejudice of its interests is justified and if the Federal Government has not subsequently taken remedial measures, then the British Government may, but not must, agree to winding up the Federation or at least withdrawing Aden Colony from it.
  Aden Colony has half the population of the Emirates which are coming into the proposed Saudi-Arabian Federation but is only being offered a quarter of the seats. It is proposed to change the proposals for a quorum in the Federal Council, which is the Parliament of the Federation, from two-thirds to a half so
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  that it could go on working even if the whole of the Aden Colony representatives decided to boycott it.
  The revenue of the Aden Colony depends very largely on the excise duties which it gathers as a port. But control of the excise duties is 'transferred from Aden Colony to the Federation as a whole in which the Colony has only a quarter of the representation. Financial arrangements between the Colony and the Federation are left for later agreement between this unrepresentative colonial administration and the emirs in the Federation. There is no doubt that many people otherwise sympathetic to the idea of the union believe that this means that Aden Colony will be compelled permanently to subsidise the backward states of the protectorates.
  But outstanding among the reasons why local opinion opposes these proposals is that they mean tying Aden Colony, which is by far the most politically advanced territory in the whole of Arabia, to the reactionary sheikdoms in the Federation. As Mr. Al Asnag said in a good phrase, "People blame us for saying that we do not want to go under the Yemen while there is an Imam there, but this Federation means going under eleven Imams at once". And so it does.
  In terms of political status—I will not talk about brutality and cruelty, because I do not believe that there is as much of that in the Emirates as there was under the Imam—these Emirates are among the most backward States in the world. This is very much like the situation in Central Africa. One of the reasons why Africans in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia objected to the Federation was that it meant tying their political advance to the will of the white minority governing Southern Rhodesia. One of the reasons why the inhabitants of Aden Colony object to this Federation is that they believe that their own political advance inevitably will be tied to the readiness of the backward Emirates in the Federation to accept them.
  For a generation now we in this House have talked about the need for Britain to deal with peoples and not pashas in the Middle East. Successive British Governments have explained honestly and sincerely to the House the difficulty of dealing with peoples when pashas are in

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  power. Thank goodness, we have a different situation in Aden at the moment. Aden is infinitely more advanced politically than any other part of Arabia. The trade union movement in Aden, which is the backbone of opposition to the Federation and which has now produced its own political party, was described by the British Trades Union Congress and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions as by far the best in the whole Arab world. Yet, Aden is being treated worse than any other part of the proposed Federation in terms of representation in it and of political advancement.
  Normally, when a step like this is taken, the British Government take pains to see that political conditions in the backward areas are brought forward to resemble those in forward areas. But there is no hint whatever in the Government's proposals of any constitutional advance in the emirates. Of course, the Secretary of State gave the game away when he said, "We had an awful job jollying them along to agree to go in with Aden." Now he feels that he can put no pressure on them to become more representative, in case they shy away altogether.
  The right hon. Gentleman is prepared to push the advanced Arab population of Aden into the Federation, while not doing anything about the fourteen other Emirates the British Protectorates of East and West, which have refused to join the Federation. This he is doing at a time when the whole of the people of the Middle East are in a state of ferment, of which we get new evidence almost every time we look, at a ticker tape or open a newspaper.
  What is so tragic about this situation is that just when there is a fundamental shift in the balance of social and political power in the Middle East, Britain finds herself on the wrong side in every country. If Her Majesty's Government are concerned with the welfare of the people of Aden, as they claim they are, they would not be pushing Aden into this ill-starred Federation at this time, but would be first pressing forward towards self-government for Aden Colony and pushing the emirs in the Protectorates towards social and political reform.
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  The Secretary of State gave a hint of the real power which Britain has in the emirates when he said that we will continue to exercise our influence in the Federation as we have done in the past; as he knows, 85 per cent. of the budgets of these anachronistic emirs comes from Britain. We have an overwhelming means of pressure if we choose to exercise it but instead we are submitting the one advanced part of Southern Arabia Into a position of permanent subjection to one of the most backward areas in the world.
  Why have the Government, instead of following the normal line of British colonial policy over the last fifteen years, of moving steadily toward self-government in the more advanced areas and towards same form of representative government in the less advanced areas, come forward with this proposal? The reason is that the Secretary of State is quite rightly concerned with British interests. There is nothing wrong about that; indeed, there is everything right about it. It is the job of a British Government, I agree with the right hon. Gentleman, but the trouble with him is that he has not learned any of the lessons of the last fifteen years on how to protect British interests in the Middle East, in the colonial areas and in the Commonwealth.
  The right hon. Gentleman talked much about the opposition to the British base in Aden, but this is a comparatively new thing, and what created the opposition to the base, above all, is the feeling among the population of Aden that it is British determination to maintain her present position in the base which is responsible for the lack of political advancement in the Colony. There is not the slightest doubt about this. Opposition to the base was not a real factor until the last year or two, but it has become a hurricane in the last few weeks and months. It could change equally rapidly if the British Government would only meet real and justified demands of the local population. This change came about in Malta, in Cyprus and in Singapore.
  Dr. Banda made a very wise remark, which, at first sight, may seem a little comic, when he said the other day, "You cannot expect me to behave like a statesman when I have not got

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  a State". There is a lot of truth in that, and an immensely encouraging lesson in the fact that when a man is given political responsibility, he responds to it. We have seen it again and again while the British Empire has been in the course of its transformation into the Commonwealth, and we have also learned that a military base is worthless, whether in Aden, Cyprus or Suez, without the support of the local population.
  For the present Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations to take this step when he himself, as Minister of Defence, almost abolished our Armed Forces and left us in a position in which we could not both defend the base and use it, is quite extraordinary to me. The situation which he has created in Aden at present will tie down British troops for a long time in defending their own base so that they can no longer operate from it.
  I should like to ask the Secretary of State a serious question and perhaps the Under-Secretary will answer it when he replies. It is always said that the military function of this base is to protect the Gulf Sheikdoms, to which we have treaty obligations. If this is really the case, why do not the Sheikdoms provide a base themselves and pay for it? It is an extraordinary situation in 1962 that we should feel ourselves under an obligation to spend treasure and men in producing a base in Aden in order to defend the Sheik of Kuwait, the richest man in the world, and the Sheik of Abu Dhobi, who is hoping to become even richer than the Ruler of Kuwait. If these men really want British protection, let them make the concessions necessary to obtain it. There is not the slightest reason why we should ruin ourselves in regard to the whole of the Arab world because of these rulers in the Sheikdoms.
  The most extraordinary thing about all this is that this is the policy of the British Government. It is not only the Secretary of State himself who is responsible here, but this is the policy of a Government who are now going round the country and claiming that they welcome change. The wind of change has been blowing even more powerfully in the Middle East than it is blowing in Africa. If the Government cannot bring themselves to identify themselves with
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  the new forces in the Middle East, at least let them recognise their existence. Yet the fact is that we are identifying ourselves with all the most backward and feudal régimes in the whole area—régimes which recognise slavery, and the judicial systems of which are a mockery of human as well as of legal justice.
  It seems to me, and I thought that the Secretary of State revealed this in the closing passages of his speech, that in a sense this extraordinary policy of his, which makes such a miserable contrast with British policy in the rest of the Colonial Empire, is really the death agony of the Suez spirit. It seems to me that the Secretary of State has learned nothing and forgotten nothing.
  The right hon. Gentleman is a courageous man, and he patted himself on the back for it at the end of his speech. We respect his courage, and we have always respected him in being able to take decisions rather than let things slide. That is what he has done in this case, but what we deplore is the fact that the decisions which he takes are almost invariably wrong and it takes up to ten years for Britain to recover from them. In fact, we are still trying desperately to recover from the decisions which he took when he was Minister of Defence.
  The right hon. Gentleman betrayed his real unsuitability for his present responsibilities when he said that he could not believe that the people of Aden really wanted union with the Yemen. He could not believe it. It is this incapacity to understand the real forces at work in the Middle East at present which is at the root of his error on this issue. Once he takes a decision, he is as stiff-necked and insensitive as any Bourbon. I believe that if he persists in this dangerous course, in face of the clear evidence of public feeling, it means exposing the refinery and the base, which are real British interests, to unnecessary and perhaps fatal risks.
  It means ranging Britain with all that is most backward and anachronistic in the Middle East, and alienating all the more progressive forces, which certainly, whether we like them or not are the real hope for the future in that great area. It means staining our reputation in the world with a type of colonialism for which there has been no precedent in British policy at any time since 1945.

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  I pray that the Secretary of State will think again about these proposals in the light of this debate. I appeal to all Members present, on both sides of the House, in the hope of influencing the Government's decision, to support the Opposition Amendment.
  6.50 p.m.
  Mr. Neil McLean: The hon. Gentleman the Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) said at the beginning of his speech that he, and, I understand, his hon. and right hon. Friends with him, agreed in principle that the merger between Aden Colony and the Sultanates was a good thing for the future of those peoples. He went on, however, to spend most of the rest of his speech pointing out how in detail he disagreed with the methods which the Government proposed and the timing for the carrying out of this merger.
  Mr. Healey: I am sure the hon. Gentleman does not want to misrepresent me. What I said was that it would not be right that Aden should obtain independence without some sort of relationship with the hinterland. I thought I made it absolutely clear that it was wrong to link up with the Protectorates before the existing régimes in the Emirates were reformed.
  Mr. McLean: I am sorry if I misunderstood the hon. Gentleman. I thought that he and the party opposite were prepared to see some sort of union between the Colony and the other parts of the hinterland and did not wish to put through all the changes which they desire among the Sultanates before that unity was accomplished.
  I am not sure whether I shall misrepresent the hon. Gentleman when I accuse him, let us say, of accepting the importance of the Aden base remaining in British hands for a number of years to come in order to ensure stability in the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf. I do not know whether he would agree with that or not.
  Another point I would take him up on is this. He said that if those sheiks and Sultanates in the Persian Gulf with which we have treaty relations need to be protected, why should they not let us have bases in their own territory? I do not know what he would imagine the
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  kind of base we should have to have in Abu Dabhi. The truth, I think, is that almost the only suitable base we can have to enable us to honour these obligations is in Aden, and all our treaty obligations depend on the base in Aden, from the communications and strategic points of view.
  The hon. Gentleman also said that the trouble in the past had been that the British Government were always prepared to ignore the peoples of the Middle East and thought in terms of the pashas. I do not know whether, when he talks of the advance and progress, he thinks in terms of colonels—such as Colonel Kassim in Iraq, and Colonel Nasser in Egypt, but I am sure that if he follows conditions existing in Iraq today, and the conditions of the people of Iraq, he will find that there are many who, perhaps, although critical of the old-fashioned approach of Nuri es Said and the Hashemites, look back all the same on those days with a certain amount of regret, when they see their country today torn by civil war, with the whole of Kurdistan in revolt, on a larger scale than, perhaps, ever before.
  In his speech, the hon. Gentleman did make a lot of points, which I must say I myself, when recently in Aden, have heard people there say they were definitely worried about—the influence, for instance, if this merger took place, of the traditional rulers upon the trades unions in Aden. I believe that this matter is exercising opinion in Aden, but I personally agree with what my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State said in his speech and in the White Paper, that there are in fact sufficient safeguards there to protect those people and the trades unions in Aden.
  It is very difficult for the Government to find the right balance in this merger and in its timing. There are those in the Government in Aden, and in the Governments of the various Sultanates in the Protectorate, who wish for this union to take place now. There are those—and there are many in this House, especially on the benches opposite—who feel it would be wrong, before an election has taken place in Aden to associate the people of Aden with that decision. The hon. Gentleman the Member for Leeds, East gave examples in other parts of the world where federation has been put

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  forward and forced through without the consent of the local people. I believe there is a certain amount of validity in the arguments which have been put forward. At the same time I would ask them, if they wish to have those elections before the merger takes place, would they, for example, insist upon votes for all the immigrant Yemenis working temporarily in Aden? Because, after all, that is where the maximum opposition to the merger comes from. It is the People's Socialist Party where most of its members, whether they have votes, or will not have votes, will lead, and are leading, the campaign against this merger. If there is violence and intimidation and so on, it would probably stem from this party and this organisation. I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman and his hon. Friends would recommend that before this election takes place all these people should be given votes or not, because if they are not given votes they will undoubtedly continue to use intimidation. If they get votes they may win the elections, in which case they will opt for union, I presume, with the Yemen.
  Mr. G. M. Thomson: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that about 60,000 of the disfranchised people of Aden come from the Protectorate and are being backed by their fellow citizens of the Yemen? Would he not agree that they ought to be enfranchised?
  Mr. McLean: I would agree that they ought to be enfranchised, but the question of the franchise will be a bitter and controversial matter, and in the process of working it out and in the election it may well be the question of having the merger will become so confused and that there will be so much harm and prejudice against it that it may never happen.
  It strikes me, therefore, that one has to decide whether it is in the long-term interests of the people of Aden and the Protectorate that they should come together in a close union as soon as possible. If that is so, then I believe that the Government are right, and the Governments of Aden Colony and of the Southern Arabian Federation are right, in trying to push it through as quickly as possible, under certain safeguards, which will allow people to express their
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  feeling afterwards, as to whether they are contented or discontented about it.
  Mr. R. W. Sorensen: Assuming for the moment that the hon. Gentleman is right, that the great majority of the inhabitants of the Colony come from Yemen or the Protectorate, would he agree that many have actually been born in Aden and that the overwhelming majority are against the Government's proposals?
  Mr. McLean: I would doubt that. I think it difficult to judge these matters. I think the more vociferous element are against it, but the representatives in the Government have taken their stand and, in spite of the intimidation which has been put upon them, I believe they will stick to that decision and go ahead with the merger.
  I refer to the remarks of my right hon. Friend and those of the hon. Gentleman the Member for Leeds, East when they said that the whole manner in which a merger may take place, and the climate of opinion in Aden, have been affected by recent events in the Yemen. Whatever may be the merits of the merger, and the timing of the election, I believe these are comparatively insignificant compared with the effect that the establishment of Egyptian military power in the Yemen may have upon events in Aden.
  I want for a moment to analyse what has happened in the Yemen; the extent to which the Egyptians have established their power there, or are likely to establish their power, and the effect that this may have upon events in the South Arabian Federation and in Aden. Fairly recently I was in the Yemen, and there I met a wounded Egyptian soldier who had been captured by the Imam's farces. The tribesmen asked him, "Why have you come to the Yemen to fight against your brother Arabs?" The soldier replied, "Colonel Nasser lied to us when he sent us to the Yemen, because he told us that we were coming here to fight the British." Whatever Colonel Nasser may say, his past record of broken promises and pledges leaves one in grave doubt about his intentions in the Yemen and in this part of the world. The announcements and statements over Cairo Radio and from Sana Radio are not reassuring; in fact, they are openly hostile to the British in Aden.

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  It is difficult to judge the degree of Egyptian interference in the Yemen. Estimates of the number of Egyptian soldiers vary from 3,000 to 15,000, and there is much talk about more reinforcements coming from Egypt. When I was in the Yemen—and I was not in the towns and, therefore, did not see the Egyptians, except the captured ones—the nearest figure that I could guess at was about 3,000, but further reinforcements may have come since then or be on the way. The Egyptian aeroplanes, originally said to be based on Aswan, with extra fuel tanks, were bombing and machine-gunning Yemenis who resisted all the Egyptians and Colonal Sallal troops. Since then a new airfield has been constructed at Sana, about 14 kilometres to the north, so that now the Egyptian Air Force has established itself in the Yemen. I flew by Hodeidah, and there I saw three Egyptian warships, although they were not very large, moored in the Bay, just north of Hodeidah. The Egyptians themselves have admitted, over their own radio, that they have had quite heavy casualties among their parachutists, who have been fighting in the eastern part of the Yemen. The Deputy-Prime Minister of the Yemen, Ahmed Sigaghi, whose headquarters in East Yemen I visited, showed me about 35 identity cards of Egyptian parachutists who had been killed, and I was told that the remainder of the company—about 100—had all either been killed or disarmed by the tribesmen and that a further 100 Egyptian parachutists had been surrounded in Sirwa, a town about 60 miles from Sana, and I believe that it has since been captured and the Egyptians there either killed or disarmed.
  There is at any rate a considerable degree of Egyptian intervention in the Yemen. The Egyptian planes are bombing the villages and machine-gunning the Yemenis. Their troops are in action, and with armoured cars, tanks and guns, they are pressing their intervention on that country. This has been done under the Treaty of Jeddah, which Colonel Nasser signed with the late Imam. He has used this Treaty to intervene on the side of the rebel colonel, who siezed power in the capital. He has now signed a new treaty—a joint defence pact—with Colonel Sallal, so that we have the
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  two colonels, Nasser and Sallal, whom the hon. Member for Leeds, East obviously regards as far more acceptable to him than would be the case if they bore the title of Pasha or Imam. Although I hold military rank myself, I believe that some of the people who held the titles of Imam and Pasha were a good deal more civilised, and have done a great deal mare for their countries, than these upstart colonels who are now ruining them.
  One can well appreciate that from Colonel Sallal's point of view the Egyptian intervention is most welcome. Without it there is little doubt that he would by now have been driven from Sana, the capital, by the tribes, most of whom have turned or are turning against him. I travelled through most of the eastern part of the country, where practically all the tribes have turned against Colonel Sallal, or are fighting against him and the Egyptians, and have made common cause with the Imam. In the North of the country, the tribes are opposed to Colonel Sallal and the Egyptians, and for that reason have joined the Imam. I do not say that they were inspired by any particular liking for the Imam, but they found that Sallal and the Egyptian interference were utterly unacceptable to them. The Yemenis dislike the Egyptians as foreigners and despise them as soldiers.
  In a surprise attack Colonel Sallal carried out a coup d'etat and seized Sana and the main towns, which he still holds. He also controls the main communications between these towns, with the help of Egyptian soldiers and the Egyptian air force. On the announcement of the Imam's death the loyalists were disheartened and disorganised, but since then they have discovered that that announcement was a lie, put out by Sallal over the radio, with the obvious intention of putting his loyalist opponents in despair. The Imam is alive in the north of the country, trying to raise the tribes there. Since then there has been a turn in the tide. Many tribes are joining the Imam's standard. One of the reasons why the tribes dislike Sallal so much, some of them told me, was that, although they did not like the Imam or his rule, they regarded it as no disgrace to accept his rule on religious grounds

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  provided the Iman was strong enough to impose it. The Imam is the religious leader of the Zeidi Shia sect, of which the majority of the country are followers, and they respect him for that reason. Even the Shafais, who are a Sunni sect, have respect for the Imam as a religious leader. On the other hand, Sallal is an unknown upstart from the town—the son of a blacksmith.
  Mr. Healey: A crofter's son.
  Mr. McLean: He is not a crofter's son. He would be much better if he were. To these Yemeni tribesmen who are living in the Middle Ages he is unacceptable for this reason. One may laugh about it, but that is the situation as they see it. In the Yemen power does not lie in the towns. Damascus may be the key to Syria, as Cairo is the key to Egypt, but Saana is not the key to the Yemen. In all the towns in the Yemen put together there are probably not more than 150,000 unarmed people, whereas in the country, mainly in the centre and north, the tribes can raise anything from 100,000 to 200,000 armed men.
  In 1948, when the last Imam was assassinated, a man called Abdulla Wazir, a member of the second greatest religious family in the Yemen, seized all the towns, but he was driven out by the tribes and, in the usual way, was executed. He was a wiser and much more popular man than Sallal, and I am sure that the same fate will befall Sallal.
  Colonel Sallal's support lies mainly among the officers, especially those whom he selected himself, when he was adviser to the Crown Prince, to go to the military, police and air force academies. He selected those whom he felt to be loyal to himself, and he is also supported by those who have been trained in Egypt. But the soldiers are tribesmen, and there is no guarantee that Colonel Sallal's army of about 11,000 men will remain loyal to him.
  Colonel Sallal also depends upon the support of the Free Yemen Committee, which for ten years has been stationed in Cairo and was under the chairmanship of Dr. Baidany, who is now Sallal's Vice-Prime Minister and Deputy in most departments. Most of the Yemenis regard Baidany as more of an Egyptian than a Yemeni. Colonel Sallal's relations
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  with the Free Yemen Committee are very strained. Sheikh Noman and a well-respected Shafái leader, have been removed from the Yemen to Cairo—two of the most able soldiers there have been exiled to Cairo.
  Lastly, Colonel Sallal depends on the support of the Communists, who are well organised but not very numerous; otherwise Sallal has little support. So it is clear that he welcomes the support of the Egyptians. Without it I do not believe that he could survive long in his own country.
  Why do the Egyptians give that support? What is the reason for the Egyptian intervention in the Yemen? After all, the Yemen is a poor, rather barren and mountainous country with a warlike and unruly population and there does not seem to be a great deal of profit in the matter from the point of view of the Egyptians. We may rule out the idea that Colonel Nasser would be prepared to send troops and incur the expense of fighting in a far away country for the sake of altruistic ideals. It is far more likely that he has a very good reason of his for going there. Apart from the obvious one, that by establishing his puppets in the Yemen he can overcome the loss of prestige which he suffered from the breakaway of Syria, he believes that if he can establish himself in the Yemen it would give him an excellent base from which he could extend the Arab socialist revolution into Saudi Arabia, perhaps through a military coup d'etat in that country, and then perhaps later into Jordan and the Persian Gulf. Also he would be in a position to turn the heat on us in Aden. Indeed the hon. Member for Leeds, East and the Minister have admitted that the present set-up in the Yemen could be very dangerous for Aden, that is a revolutionary colonel supported by Egyptian military and political power.
  Of course, the establishing of Egyptian power in the Yemen is only the first phase in this wider plan which would commend itself to the Russians. After all, any weakening of the ties between the Arab States and the Western world must be to the interest of the Communist Powers. I do not think that Russia is yet involved, but I believe that from the Russian point of view it would be well worth while to support and encourage

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  this trend. It would make a larger gap between the Western Powers and that part of the Arab world.
  The aim of Colonel Nasser in the end must be to get his hands on some of the money coming from the oil wells in the little States of the Persian Gulf and Kuwait. If our position in Aden were destroyed and our treaty obligations could not be honoured, Colonel Nasser would be heir to the power in the Arabian Gulf and to a certain extent, could dispose of the oil money. The threat to Aden from the Yemen, should Colonel Nasser and the Egyptians estabish their power there, would, I believe, be very grave. He could operate through military methods, such as sending guerilla bands or groups of armed saboteurs into Beihan, Dahla and Mukarra, or even better into the upper Allaki and lower Yafai. Thus, combined with the gift of money and arms to dissident tribesmen, he could make the position of the Federal Government and the British Administration in Aden and the Protectorate an extremely difficult one.
  I believe that through propaganda and various other methods the Yemeni workers in the Aden Colony could also be incited to cut up rough and make it difficult for the Aden Government to continue their work. These are all weapons in the use of which Colonel Nasser and the Egyptians are extremely expert. One must admit that Radio Cairo in general has made all other propaganda machines look extremely inefficient. Colonel Nasser spends a great deal of money on this kind of activity.
  When one regards his rôle in the Arab world, one asks what he has done with all the money he has obtained from the Americans and the arms which he has obtained from Russia. For the most part he has used the money and arms against other Arab States. He takes the money and the arms nominally to strengthen the hand of Egypt in the fight against Israel. But I do not think that he has killed one Israeli soldier. Instead, he has turned the rifles against his neighbouring Arab States. Colonel Nasser is probably wise not to attack Israel, because he knows full well that if he did he would quickly get a bloody nose.
  The interesting thing about the Egyptian operation in the Yemen is that
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  it is the first phase in establishing their power in the Yemen which is most difficult. Once they have done that in the Yemen, or in part of it, the rest will follow rather more easily. The actual job of establishing their power over the Yemenis, who are armed and dislike them, is not an easy one. I believe that Colonel Nasser has learned a great deal from his experiences in Syria, and even if his military intervention in the Yemen is successful he will realise that to hold the country for long will not be an easy task. The Turks never occupied the whole of the high Yemen, and they were a good deal better soldiers than the Egyptians.
  If Colonel Nasser is able to establish himself in the Yemen through his puppets, I believe that he will strike fairly quickly, because he will know that he cannot stay there indefinitely but perhaps for only a year or two years. He will have to strike at Saudi Arabia and at us in Aden as soon as possible. In the end, I believe that he will be thrown out of the Yemen anyway. But, in the meantime, he could do immense harm to that part of the Arabian Peninsular. We are faced not with what one might term a Khrushchev Castro, but with Nasser's little Castro who will give a great deal of trouble, not only to us but to the whole of that area, unless this process is stopped as soon as possible.
  For these reasons, I believe that it would be wise of the Western countries to formulate a united policy so far as possible regarding their dealings with the Egyptian intervention in the Yemen. Priority should be given to putting pressure on the Egyptians to withdraw their troops and aeroplanes from bombing and fighting in the Yemen. When countries intervene elsewhere a tremendous cry goes up in the United Nations. But one has not heard a word spoken against the bombing of villages and the killing of women and children, as well as of men, which is being done by the Egyptians. All remain silent on that subject.
  I also believe that it would not be wise or right for us to recognise the régime of Colonel Sallal until he has proved that he can control the majority of his country without the help of the Egyptian Air Force and Army. Were the Egyptians to leave, the Yemenis themselves, by their own methods—one

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  hopes those methods would be as peaceful as possible—could decide what form of Government they wished to have, the Imam or a military dictatorship. But I do not think it right that such a decision should be made by Egyptian troops and aeroplanes.
  Lastly, I do not see why, if it is right—or people consider it right—for the Egyptians to help an illegal Yemen Government which they recognise, that other countries who recognise the Imam Government as the legal Government should not help him if he demands help from outside Powers. Probably if he were helped, or even without help, the Imam may succeed in beating Colonel Sallal and the Egyptians, although it is vary difficult for tribesmen, however brave they are, to stand up against the aeroplanes and tanks of the Egyptians.
  I believe that if the Imam gets into power again he will have learned his lesson from the Egyptians and the Communist bloc who tried to kill him and that he will prove a reasonable neighbour. Our relations in the past with the Yemen have not always been happy, but one hopes that the new Imam may have learned his lesson. In any case, if he were in power he would be a good deal more reasonable than Colonel Sallal backed by the Egyptians judging by their present tendencies.
  This situation in the Yemen is the background to the merger we have discussed today. Whether the merger goes through easily or with difficulty, the future of the Aden Colony and Protectorate will to a great extent be influenced by what happens in the Yemen. If the Egyptians can establish themselves with military power there they can do great harm for the future progress of the South Arabian Federation and the Colony.
  If the Egyptians remain in the Yemen and if we still wish to maintain our base in Aden and to help forward the independence of the Colony, we shall find ourselves forced to make far greater efforts. We shall have to increase the amount of men, money and materials in order to maintain our base there and to help the people in the Federation to become an economically viable state.
  7.21 p.m.
  Mr. John Dugdale: The House always listens with the greatest respect to anyone who has just returned from a country and can give first-hand evidence of what is going on there. I am bound to say, however, that the views of the hon. Member for Inverness (Mr. N. McLean) are not those of most of us on this side of the House, though, generally speaking they are probably the views of the Conservative Party.
  The hon. Member derogated colonels—a surprising thing for him to do—and preferred monarchs. He preferred King Farouk to Colonel Nasser. I prefer Colonel Nasser to King Farouk in spite of anything that has happened. His régime is a great improvement on the régime which went before.
  Mr. N. McLean: And Colonel Kassim?
  Mr. Dugdale: I am not sure whether he is an improvement or not. In many ways he is, and in many ways he is not.
  I have not been to Iraq and I am not prepared to commit myself on that, but I think that Colonel Nasser is a considerable improvement on Farouk in spite of the fact that most hon. Members opposite supported Farouk and preferred his régime. The party opposite has never said anything remotely derogatory to the régime of the late Imam. He might have been the most democratic of monarchs.
  The Times hoped that "the worst excesses" in the Yemen have been removed since the Imam died. I have met the new Imam and I certainly think that he is an improvement on his father. Goodness knows whether he is a big improvement and would modernise the Yemen and make it anything remotely resembling a democracy. That is highly improbable. I put my faith in the colonels rather than in the monarchs. They, at any rate, are more up to date. The kind of régime there was in the old days, in which if a man stole the smallest thing he had his hand cut off and if he committed adultery his eyes were put out, first the left eye and then the right eye, has been supplanted by the colonels, who seem to have a better régime.
  I turn now rather more directly to the subject of the debate and wish to say

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  how much I appreciated the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) and the line he took in his general attitude to the Government's approach to this problem. The Secretary of State said, "Some say that Aden is being handed over to the arbitrary rule of medieval chiefs". He said that he did not know whether those chiefs were medieval people, but believed that they were fine, noble people. Of course many of them are very fine, but they are not democrats. Members of the Tory Party over and over again, when faced with the choice, choose the medieval rather than the modern and democratic.
  They have always done so, back to the old days of Lord Lugard, who built up the system of indirect rule and planted and held chiefs in positions of power in Nigeria. The Tory Party supported the Native States in India, with their despotic rude. Some may have been good, but some were appallingly bad. But they were all right for the Tories, because they were the old monarchs and despots. That is what we should like to change in Aden. We cannot think that a Constitution which will give more help and votes to the States which have fewer people in them can be a right and justified method of procedure. We do not think that the right way to make a Constitution. The Constitution should give more power to more people and not more power to fewer people.
  There is a very strong case for delaying action until these points can be thrashed out. The Secretary of State referred to the fact that there had been intimidation. Of course, we do not like intimidation, but we know that so-called intimidation can be used as an excuse over and over again by Her Majesty's Government, as it has been in Rhodesia and Nyasaland. It is used as an excuse for putting off having a good Constitution, for preventing people from voting as they might in an ordinary democratic system. So far as I see, it is going to be used if we adopt this Constitution today and if it goes forward without another election being held.
  The Secretary of State laid great stress on the importance of looking after our own interests. Of course we want to look after our own interests; of course we want to see British interests looked after,
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  but time and time again we have found that the best method of looking after British interests is to get friends in the country which previously has been ruled by Britain—not to force it into the hands of reactionary people. Right hon. and hon. Members opposite did their best to prevent the advance of the people of Cyprus for as long as they could, but eventually they had to give way. I think that today we find that in Cyprus, from the point of view of the defence of Britain alone, we are in a much better position than we were when the people of Cyprus opposed us. If we go on with this new Constitution we may well find that a large number of people in Aden will be against us. We may find them opponents rather than friends.
  The right hon. Gentleman wants to see Aden as a stepping stone on the way to Singapore. The best method of making it such a stepping stone is to support the forces of advance, the liberal-minded forces and not the reactionary forces. If this is done it may be a base for our defence.
  7.30 p.m.
  Mr. Neil Marten: I wish to make a small contribution to the debate, because in September I was in Aden, together with my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud (Mr. Kershaw), and the hon. Members for Lewisham, South (Mr. C. Johnson) and Rochdale (Mr. McCann).
  I do not wish to deny my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State the pleasure of answering the points made by the hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey), but I should like to comment on some of them. The hon. Member for Leeds, East said that the existing franchise is in need of revision, and he asked whether we could not wait for six months or so before going ahead with the present proposals. I believe that it will take a year or a year-and-a-half to put the franchise right, and I wonder what would happen in the meantime.
  As far as I could understand it, he said, in an intervention in the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Inverness (Mr. N. McLean), that he did not like this Federation going ahead until the pashas or sultans in the Federation had been more "de-feudalised". I do not know how long he expects that to take. I feel that we must get on with this proposal and not wait for a year or two years

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  over the franchise, and then make the sultans more democratic, or whatever it is, before we take action. The time has come when we should press ahead with this Federation.
  The hon. Member asked why we did not recognise the Yemen Government. After what my hon. Friend the Member for Inverness said, I think that the Government are quite in order in not recognising the Yemen Government at this stage, because it clearly does not control a substantial part of the country. I understand that a qualification for our recognition is that a Government should control most of the country and that we are not withholding recognition merely because of the political implications of the new Republican Government which rules over part of the country.
  Questions were also asked about the population. I think that the population of Aden is 200,000 and that of the Federation nearly 600,000. Perhaps the hon. Member for Dundee, East (Mr. G. M. Thomson) has the figures in front of him.
  Mr. G. M. Thomson: If the hon. Member would care to have the exact figures, the population of the Federation is about 480,000. The population of Aden is uncertain, but is probably over 200,000.
  Mr. Marten: With great respect, I think that the population of the Federation is probably even more uncertain. When I was there I put the question, and I had the population placed between 500,000 and 600,000. That affects the point which the hon. Member made about unfair representation.
  I welcome the White Paper. The hon. Member for Leeds, East spoke of my hon. Friend the Member for Inverness as being a member of the Suez Group. I was not a member of that group; first, I was not here at the time; and, secondly, had I been here, I certainly should not have been a member of the Suez Group. Nevertheless, I, too, welcome the White Paper and the proposals in it for the Federation. I also welcome the Government's determination to press forward these proposals at this stage, because I believe that in so doing they are facing the facts of political life as they exist in the Middle East. I believe that in the end they will give great benefit to
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  the people of that part of the world—and we are primarily interested in the people.
  Mention has been made of defence, and I believe that these proposals will greatly increase the stability of our base there. This is the vexed question which the Opposition are posing. But I believe that it will increase the stability of that base and increase the potential stability of the Middle East.
  Having said that, I would add that I do not pretend that the situation is entirely satisfactory. I do not think that anybody regards it as entirely satisfactory. What I am saying is that, on balance, unlike the professional pessimists, I believe that the decision to go ahead now is right as being basically what the people out there want and basically what they need.
  I am interested in the Middle East; I lived there, in total, for about three years, I have watched the ebb and flow of events there and I always have great interest in the Arab question. There are people who express grave doubts about the timing of the merger in the light of the revolution in the Yemen. The Yemen is a very primitive country, much more primitive than the Federation. The fact that it is now partly—I stress the word "partly"—under republican rule will not make it any less primitive for a great many years. The fact that a territory becomes partly or wholly a republic does not seem automatically to improve the situation of people in that country: we have seen this in places such as Iraq.
  I should have liked Britain to have been able to offer help to the Yemen for the benefit of the people there who, after all, are fellow Arabs of the people in the Federation. Personally, I have great sympathy with the movement to uplift the lot of the Arabs. Unfortunately, Colonel Nasser's action—and not only his action but the way in which he has taken advantage of the situation—has made it quite impracticable for Britain to give the Yemen any help at the moment.
  President Nasser saw his opportunity at this moment to extend what I say is nothing more or less than Egyptian imperialism. He is trying to extend it under the guise of Arab Socialism. I think that we must all face this fact, because if we do not take it in we get

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  the wrong impression of what Colonel Nasser is doing in the Yemen. Having established himself there, he would like to go on to Saudi Arabia and to Jordan, and that would put in peril the whole of our position in the Middle East and particularly that of our oil supplies.
  We are witnessing a fresh outburst of Egyptian imperialism. But we have seen it before, and we have seen it fail before. We saw it over Israel. Nasser tried it in Iraq and he tried it in Syria. On all three occasions it failed. I cannot help wondering how long it will be before the Egyptians fail in the Yemen and are forced to withdraw.
  One can see this Egyptian imperialism working very clearly. When Colonel Sallal first came into power he said that there was so much to do in the country that he would not press his claims over Aden, but would put them into cold storage. A matter of only weeks after that, an Egyptian called Mr. Rifaat arrived in the capital of the Yemen, and very shortly afterwards the Yemen started proclaiming once again its claims over Aden. There we can see the effect of Colonel Nasser's emissary upon Colonel Sallal.
  About that time there was the bombing of the village Asseilan, 20 miles inside South Arabia. Had we done that 20 miles inside another country, we should have been arraigned before the United Nations straight away. Here we are seeing to our disadvantage the double standard of which the Foreign Secretary spoke recently.
  May I make a suggestion to my right hon. Friend? Under the Treaty of Sana of 1934, we are bound to agree the frontier between the Yemen and the Federation before 1974. In such a situation as the present, it might be a good thing if we got on with that a little earlier. It would be particularly helpful if it succeeded, and it would keep relations between the Federation and the Yemen going over something positive.
  When I was in Aden one could see Colonel Nasser's supporters and one could see his picture displayed in the small shops around the bazaar or behind the main street. I had the impression, if I might use a term which we used a lot in 1939, that these people were Nasser's fifth column. Why should South Arabia be allowed to become a province of
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  Egypt? And that is what this is all about. Federation holds out a great hope of ordered economic, ordered social and ordered political progress, but Nasser holds out only uncertainty, chaos and the grave chance of bloodshed. I admit that all is not perfect, but against that background I believe that the putting into operation of these proposals now is realistic and right.
  It has been said in the debate that some of the rulers in the Federation are feudal. In comparison with Britain that is so. Indeed, it might be said that Aden is considerably more progressive than the rulers up in the Federation. However, the House should recognise that progress is afoot in the Federation. In some places very great progress indeed is being made. It often goes unrecognised.
  Some people say that these sultans are merely hereditary rulers. That is not so. When a sultan dies the next sultan is not necessarily his son. There is an election under the Dola, together with the tribal chieftains. They select the most suitable man. It may be the son, but it is just as likely to be anybody else. There is, in a Middle Eastern way, some element of democracy about that, anyway democracy from the tribal chieftains' point of view working upwards.
  My hon. Friends and I met the Federal Council comprising some of the sultans. I was greatly impressed by many of the progressive ideas about which we talked. In the State of Lahej, for example, elections for municipal councils are to be held early next year. That is a step in the right direction. In the State of Fadhli great strides are already being made in irrigation in the Abyan scheme. A new hospital has been put up there with eight health stations. Two intermediate grade boarding schools are being set up. There are 16 primary schools in that one State.
  This sort of thing is not mentioned and is not recognised, but I believe that it is some measure of progress in defeudalising in what people imagine are totally feudal States. Further, roads, electricity and water are being brought to the people up there and light industry is coming along. Therefore, the beginning of the process of defeudalising the Federation is apparent, but everyone recognises that it must go faster and faster.

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  This area is in that part of the world which is blown by the sandstorms of nationalism which has swept through the area so often, but I hope that it will be our policy to harness this nationalism in the Federation to the good of the Federation and not to the good of outside countries.
  As to the future, if the Federation goes through, as I hope that it will, it would be an awful mistake if we sat back and said, "That is now through. Now we can just coast along cosily and let it develop". That would be a ghastly mistake. We must see this Federation as a modern concept and not link it in our minds with Federations elsewhere in the world, because, with respect to those suggestions, I do not think that they are particularly relevant. To me it is an exciting concept. Anyone who has been out there and thought about the matter sees what we are trying to do out there as an exciting concept.
  There is great scope for expanding the social services—schools, hospitals and particularly the maternity service. I gather that the rate of infant mortality is higher than it is in most places in the Commonwealth. We must make the people who are working there more conscious of civic responsibility in life. There is much to be done in this field.
  It is apparent to anybody who has been there, as I am sure many hon. Members have—that there is great scope for slum clearance and rehousing. I say this without being emotional about the Middle East. Some of it has started. Considerable rehousing is going on and this must be carried out more quickly. We must get rid of many of the old factories in Aden and build new ones with better conditions for the work people.
  On the positive side, we should bring new industries into Aden and into the Federation. One thinks of such industries as tanning, printing, furniture making, perhaps light engineering, canning of fish, and so on. Tourism could well be exploited because the Federation, up in the mountains, has great attractions.
  We should also try to harness—I will not say the middle classes, because that is not an applicable expression, but what I will call the trading classes, who are now increasing in numbers in Aden and
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  in the Federation. They should be harnessed to this great civic effort. We have a long way to go to improve roads and communications, to help them with agriculture, to help them with water, and to help them with electricity. This is just the sort of place where an organisation like Voluntary Service Overseas could place a number of school leavers of suitable type up in the Federation. They would help these people as people.
  If we go on in that way we shall get a balanced economy in the area. There is much to do. I only wish that the leaders of the Aden Trades Union Congress would concentrate much more on this sort of thing and on the conditions of the people and less on trying to place Aden closer to the archaic Yemen.
  From the British point of view, we must rout out foreign trouble-makers quite ruthlessly. I stress "foreign trouble-makers". I am not talking about local Aden-born politicians. We must rout out the foreign troublemakers.
  Mr. S. O. Davies: Put them in gaol! Lock them up!
  Mr. Marten: I will settle for "rout them out". Is my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary satisfied with the security arrangements and with our intelligence organisation? Are we able to identify the trouble-makers from overseas? In our approach to other people out there we must destroy the image that we are propping up out-dated feudalism.
  Mr. S. Silverman: We are.
  Mr. Marten: I have tried to explain, but perhaps I have not made much impression on the hon. Gentleman, that the feudalism in the States concerned with the White Paper is not too bad and it is our hope that it will be developed in the right way. We are not propping up outdated feudalism just for the sake of it. That is not our policy. We believe in ordered progress. We do not believe in progress by revolution and bloodshed.
  We must make Aden a viable State. I think that is accepted by everyone. Two things loom large on the horizon. First, Aden receives about 500 ships a month which call for oil from the B.P. refinery. In due course, as coal gave place to oil, oil will give place to nuclear power. In due course, if ships do not

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  need to call at Aden at the rate of 500 or even 700 a month to get oil from the B.P. refinery but sail past under nuclear power, the economy of Aden is in for quite a shock. Likewise, a large part of the economy is based on the spending of the British Forces, and with the ever-changing pattern of defence the time will come when we shall not want that base. It is our duty before we leave, and before Aden becomes fully independent, to make Aden and the Federation a totally viable State.
  I gather from what one has heard this evening that some of the Ministers of Aden will resign either tonight or tomorrow. If they do resign, I shall recognise that part of the reason is intimidation, which I understand and fully appreciate, particularly when those concerned have wives and children. Nobody, of course, will say, "I am resigning because I am being intimidated." I hope that they will stick it out. They will gain in respect for their courage, and in Aden they have to work with them a first-class Governor in the person of Sir Charles Johnston—I am only sorry that his charming wife is unable to help him much at present because of her temporary illness; we all wish her well, and a speedy recovery—and an excellent Commander-in-Chief in Air Chief Marshal Elworthy. Ministers, with the others, and many of the people of the Colony, they could make things work quickly and well.
  By accepting this White Paper, we will show Britain's determination to support an enlarged Federation, to resist aggression from outside, and to remain loyal to her obligations. I only wish that the Opposition would join in supporting what I think is the beginning of a bold and realistic development which could be of great advantage to the people of the area.
  7.54 p.m.
  Mr. R. W. Sorensen: The hon. Member for Banbury (Mr. Marten) reminded me very much of someone trying to read an academic essay in a whirlwind. His speech was no doubt urbane and informative, but it showed no consciousness at all of what is happening in the Middle East. Much of what I have heard tonight has seemed to echo speeches made in the distant days when we had a British Empire,
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  when we still governed India and important Colonies. I am sure that a reference to past HANSARDS would reveal, in essence and spirit, many apparent paraphrases in the speeches of hon. Members then of those delivered tonight. In other words, although expediency has caused hon. Members apposite to move, the psychology of many of them has remained static.
  When I read in the White Paper the description of the proposed accession of Aden to the Federation of South Arabia, and when I read the draft Treaty, I thought that I was suffering from an optical illusion because, although it seems complete as a document, my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) tore it to shreds. Yet the assumption of hon. Members opposite is that the proposals put forward by the Government are the most appropriate in the circumstances. We believe that they are inappropriate and irrelevant.
  No one has yet referred to the history of Aden Colony and the Protectorates, and although I do not intend to wander far in that direction, it is as well to remind ourselves that Aden Colony was acquired as part of the British Empire in 1839, as the result of the landing of a number of ship-wrecked sailors on that rocky coast. The allegation that they were ill-treated led to military action and the ceding of a large part of the territory by the then Sultan of Lahej to the British Government of the day. Further development followed when it was realised we should have the hinterland to act as a kind of buffer State between the Colony and the Yemen. A number of treaties were signed, and are still maintained, between ourselves and the native rulers, or emirs and sheiks, in the area lye now call the West and Eastern Protectorates.
  At that time, this acquisition was valuable as a coaling station and commercially, but it also had implicitly a strategic military and naval advantage which was increased when the Suez Canal was cut and we were able to control both ends of that waterway, from Aden at one end and from Egypt at the other. This enabled us to guard the new and quicker sea route from India, through the Suez Canal, into the Mediterranean, and so to our own country.

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  Later, the commercial value of Aden declined somewhat, though it still had, and has, considerable commercial importance. That commercial importance was supplemented by an increased strategic value. We all recognise that one reason why we are so interested in Aden is that it acts as a most valuable military and naval base for the protection of our interests in the Persian Gulf, including Kuwait. There is nothing discreditable in that. It is part of the natural process of nations and peoples. All engage in it in one way or another, and even those who criticise the expansion of British imperialism have themselves acted likewise when they had the opportunity.
  In passing, we should all bear testimony to the remarkable work of many British pioneers in the protectorates, including Mr. Ingrams, who gained the admiration and respect—indeed, the affection—of the people there. But that does not alter the fact that here we have a kind of museum piece—a remnant of feudalism. I agree with one of my hon. Friends and submit that although many of the native rulers might be intelligent, high-minded and full of devotion to their people, the same could be said of barons of the Middle Ages in this country. The barons were possibly often men of admirable personality, but they were still feudal barons. That is true also of this territory, which I have visited.
  We must, therefore, be frank in recognising that in attempting the federation of the Colony and the Protectorates we are trying to associate a relatively democratic area with one that is not democratic——
  Mr. Marten: What would the hon. Gentleman do in the Federation to make them democratic?
  Mr. Sorensen: I will come to that in due course. I have my points, and I will deal with them seriatim. I thank the hon. Gentleman very much for reminding me, and if, later, he thinks that I have omitted what I had intended to say, perhaps he will remind me again.
  We cannot consider this complex and important issue without referring to the Yemen. I shall deal with that country
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  although hardly as exhaustively as did one hon. Member opposite, for I, too, have been to the Yemen, and had a very interesting and fascinating time there. Every time I go into what I impresssively call my study, I look at a belt—given to me personally by the late Imam, who died a few months ago—embroidered with gold braid and complete with dagger, and remember the experiences I had, many of them quite exciting, in my short time in that country.
  I assure the House that I do not intend to wear that belt when I come here, but it would certainly sartorially liven things up if I did. But the opportunity that I had together with a colleague of mine on this side of the House was certainly most revealing. Although I do not intend to engage in a travelogue tonight, which would be entirely out of place, I would say this: in wandering around and talking to all sorts of people, religious and political leaders of all kinds, although, of course, at first, they were most careful and reticent in what they said, I discovered that after some time, once one gained their confidence, and they were certain that one was not a spy and was talking to them in confidence they would reveal the alarming hatred that they possessed for the Yemeni régime of that time. I mention that because we must appreciate that something striking has happened in the history of the Middle East in the passing of the old Yemen and the upheaval that has occurred in that extraordinary mediaeval country.
  We have to be objective in these matters. I, like everyone else in the House, abhor violence as much as I do intimidation, but we have to realise that great social and sociological movements occur from time to time, which change the whole outlook, and this is what has taken place, I submit, in the Yemen. I said earlier that some of the speeches tonight and some of the observations made seem to be echoes of past speeches made in the days of old regarding the Colonies and India. I would apply it in a rather different way.
  We forget when we denounce the violence, the revolution and the insurrection that is taking place in the Middle East that at one time we did exactly the same thing regarding the French and the American Revolutions. After all, those

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  who now dwell in the United States are either distant or recent descendants of rebels against this country. No one suggests now that we should treat America on any other terms than that of equality.
  Let us recall again many of the forebodings and warnings that we have heard tonight about the Yemen were uttered in almost precisely the same terms about India and what is now Pakistan and Ceylon and Burma. Some of the warnings were justified, because violence has occurred, which we all deplore. But looking beneath the violence, the excited propaganda and agitation and beneath the barbaric things that do occur when emotions are aroused, surely we can appreciate that what is happening today in the Middle East, including the Yemen, has happened elsewhere. It has been the breaking of old ties, and the liberation of the human spirit for new efforts in social reconstruction, even though sometimes, unfortunately, those engaged in the reconstruction fall by the wayside or misdirect their energies.
  I just mentioned the Yemen because this has obviously a relationship to what we are considering tonight. First, we have to appreciate that running right through the Aden Colony itself is this tide of nationalism or racialism. I know, of course, that many of the Arab inhabitants of the Colony come from the Yemen. In some cases they are from the Protectorates and in some cases they are Aden born, and it is difficult to sort them out in order to find a proper basis for a franchise. That I fully appreciate.
  But whether they come from the protectorates or from the Yemen, whether they are Aden born or whether they are not we know that although from time immemorial they have been engaged in strife in one way or another those in the Colony appear to be entirely at one in the rejection of these proposals, on the one hand, and, on the other, for ultimate union with the Yemen. I say this because that demand has been muted and modified for some time because of the abhorrence of the régime which one hopes has passed away with the death of the late Iman. Many of those I contacted told me that ultimately they wanted unity with the rest of their brethren. Many asserted that they agreed with
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  those in the Yemen who referred to the protectorates and Colony as Southern Yemen.
  There are those in the Colony who say, "Of course, we have always wanted union with our brethren. We are one people, and we should be one people, but not under this present Imam". They referred, of course, to the Imam who has now died, and not to the Crown Prince, who succeeded him. But now we see that that restriction and impediment has passed away and they feel that a new start can be made. They now feel that with a republic in the Yemen they can expect at some time that all the barbarities, oppression and cruelties associated with the past Yemen will come to an end. Indeed, the present head of the Yemen, whether he be President or not of the alleged new Republic of the Yemen, has announced the abolition of the cruel punishments and of all the infamies associated with the Yemen during past centuries.
  That being so, one can expect increased pressure for fusion of Arabic forces in the Colonies and Protectorates, on the one hand, and of the Yemen, on the other, wild recede. It is merely a question of time before the people in the whole of that peninsula will unite in demanding that their land shall become one.
  In the past, I have denied the arguments of the late Imam and his Government that what he called Southern Yemen had been annexed by the British Government from the Yemen proper. On the contrary, I have said that the Sultan of Lahej was responsible for the agreement in 1839, an agreement which led to the transfer of a large portion of that territory to British possession, and, therefore, the annexation is not from the them of the Yemen but from the then Sultan of Lahej who, possibly under duress, agreed to the transfer of that territory. I mention this because all this is bound up in consideration of the proposed Federation.
  Of course, a previous Federation has been attempted when a few years ago a Federation of East and West Protectorates was brought into being. Much was done to try to integrate and implement this, but only a minority of the rulers of these Protectorates acceded to that Federation. It may have had a certain

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  political, economic and educational advantage, but, broadly speaking, a large number of the rulers and possibly their peoples themselves refused to join in; they remained outside. Therefore, I wonder why we could not have waited a little longer to secure success of federation in the Protectorates before we started absorbing the Colony, also.
  Like my colleagues on this side, I am not against the principle of federation. Quite the contrary. It is absurd that there should be some 220,000 people in the Colony while there are three times that r umber in the Protectorates. This small entity is not economically viable and, therefore, I am all in favour of federation under the right circumstances. Here I agree with my colleagues on this side of the House that as a prerequisite and necessity for successful proposals for federation there must be the consent of those who are to be affected. Without that we cannot succeed. Surely we have enough experience by now to realise that, however desirable something may be, unless the people to whom we are presenting it accept what we offer it will be fruitless. Thus, we must win their consent and secure their agreement.
  I now come to the question asked me by the hon. Member for Banbury. The answer is that I would not compel or coerce these Protectorates, which would rather live as they are at present. I would, rather, make it quite clear to them that until and unless they change their ways and introduce the beginning of a new Constitution and pattern of life, the peoples in Aden Colony would be left where they are. It can truthfully be said that they at least enjoy a certain measure of democracy. It is by no means perfect, but it is a certain measure.
  After all, only 27 per cent. of those on the electoral roll voted in the last elections, partly because there was the boycott to which reference has been made. Nevertheless, the franchise was confined to only a minority and while it was an instalment in gaining a democratic pattern of life, those on the Legislative Council in Aden have learned a great deal by their experience. Why should they now and the electorate against their wishes be linked up with emirs and their peoples who still belong to an age which existed a thousand years ago?
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  That is the answer to the hon. Member for Banbury. I would certainly not coerce or force the Protectorates to do anything, but would leave them if they so wish in their medieval atmosphere. By all means help them to be different so that they may discover better ways of living, politically and economically, but certainly not force them. Both political and economic changes are vitally necessary because a good deal of resistance still exists on the economic side as well as that against political change. One thing, however, is certain; we should not on any account forcibly compel the relatively democratic Colony of Aden to be linked up and integrated in large measure with the peoples of the protectorates.
  Mr. Marten: I know that this sounds rather like a Common Market debate, but would the hon. Gentleman not agree that if the Federation comes about the opinions of the 24 members going into the new legislative bodies would expedite the sort of situation he is trying to bring about?
  Mr. Sorensen: It may do so, but that is not for us to decide. We may offer certain proposals which we consider to be excellent—they may, intrinsically, be excellent—and we may be sincere about them, as I am sure the Secretary of State is sincere.
  However, that is not the issue. The point is that the people themselves must decide if they want the proposals. We must consult them to discover fully how they want to go about formulating a new Constitution, and anyone who has studied the scene in this part of the world would admit that the overwhelming majority of the people in the Colony, including those actually born in Aden, reject this proposal.
  In all these circumstances the right thing to do would be to call the people together, perhaps at a constituent assembly, and thrash the matter out. If they refuse to attend such an assembly we should go on until they are ready to attend, but we certainly should not, in their absence, use that absence as an excuse to do anything. Meanwhile, I would not deny—nobody would—that there has been considerable economic progress in the Colony in the last few years. Everything said by the hon. Member for Banbury in this respect is

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  true. Housing has improved, there are better water supplies, there has been the diminution of disease and better hospitals. It is equally true that a large percentage of those who attend hospital come from the Yemen.
  Admitting all this one, must equally admit that man does not live by bread alone and that the economic factor is not the only one. Any idea of projecting the "economic man" is pure fiction because many other elements along with economics, go to make up man. Ireland is just one place where economic advantages do not mean as much as what is considered to be the value of being able to live one's own life. That may be true of the Aden Colony. Undoubtedly, there are the docks and the economic byproducts of British settlement, including the refinery. These are all British economic enterprises or by-products of our occupation. I realise that there are thousands of Yemenis in Aden Colony and that there are thousands of Aden-born Adenese who would be worse off if these things did not exist.
  Nevertheless, just as we would retort to anyone who tried to seduce us from our way of life by a substantial material offer—we do not intend to sell ourselves for thirty pieces of silver—so the people in Aden may say the same and prefer to live in their own way. They have a certain background, and historical circumstances enter into this, and while they will readily say, "We have a long way to go to catch up", they also say, "We, with our brethren in the Yemen, want to work this out for ourselves." We must accept this fact and realise that it comes to us out of their history as basically a spiritual fact of their expanding experience.
  The only way to meet this is not to ignore its significance, but rather to find opportunities by which we can persuade them to gain further experience and learn the responsibilities of democratic administration. While much has been said about British interests, I think that the Secretary of State was somewhat unfair when he declared that many people were ready to consider everyone else's interests but our own——
  Mr. W. Yates: Cheap.
  Mr. Sorensen: Perhaps the Secretary of State may not have meant it in that
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  way, but I would ask, "Are we considering this question of the Federation from our own standpoint or from that of the people in the Aden territory?" This is a simple issue. We are entitled to ask ourselves, "How does it affect our interests?", but we must be honest about it. If these proposals are to serve British interests, let us say so and not pretend that they are in the interests of some noble principle.
  It is possible to serve both interests. The Arabs in the Colony require our enterprise, our economic expansion and our aid, but they also require it in the Protectorates. Something has been done in this direction, including the new dams which fertilise and irrigate the territory. I realise that we need to preserve certain things for our interests, but how are we to do this? There can be no doubt that the base is a real factor in our minds and I submit that just as it was possible to secure bases in Malta and Cyprus—and yet concede to the right of Cyprus to govern herself—so it should be possible to do likewise in Aden.
  If we transferred the responsibility for self-government to the Adenese peoples themselves, they would, in turn, recognise our military and economic needs and grant us a long-term lease, or even more, for a base so that we could still carry on our military and naval operations. Why can this not be done in Aden since it has been done elsewhere, in Cyprus in particular? Such a move would not only safeguard our interests, but would promote the interests of the Adenese.
  I hope that the Under-Secretary will explain why the British Government cannot consider this alternative. I may be asked, "How do you propose to transfer power to the people of Aden?", and I agree that this would be a complicated exercise, especially since so many people have slipped over the border, have settled in Aden and have then gone back backward and forward to and from the Yemen. Nevertheless, it would be a simple matter to lay down two principles: first, franchise by birth in the Colony and—although this might be difficult it should not be insuperable—residence for a number of years, say, five, seven, or even ten years. On the basis of these two a franchise could be granted plus an agreement on the part of those who

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  acquire residential qualification that they desire to be citizens of Aden and, therefore, have their names placed on the electoral roll. I agree that certain difficulties are involved, but such a step should prove insuperable. The number of years for residence could be three, five, seven or ten, but, whatever is decided, the people themselves should be taken into consultation. I am sure that, perhaps after some protracted negotiations, agreement could be reached. On this simple basis of residence for a number of years, plus a signed willingness to be a citizen of the country, or on the basis of birth we could proceed to have an election on a sound democratic basis so that those elected representatives, of their people with complete responsibility initially for internal self-government, could start to develop their country in an atmosphere of friendship with us which unfortunately does not now exist.
  I therefore ask hon. Members opposite, including Government representatives, to think again most seriously and to realise that it is no good delivering speeches in the House which start by bleating like a lamb and end with the roar of a lion, even if it is a British lion. We must be realists. I am not suggesting that we should be wildly idealistic, but that on the basis of common sense, of objective facts and realism, we have to accept that a wind of change has blown through this part of the world as much as it has blown through South Africa.
  If we want to begin to establish friendly relations with the Arab world, which today is so suspicious of us, we must postpone the elections, consider means of establishing the basis of fair franchise and on that have an election and with sound realism make a truly effective body which can consider what is best not only for ourselves, but for the people of that part of the peninsula.
  8.22 p.m.
  Mr. David Walder: I cannot approach the eloquence of the hon. Member for Leyton (Mr. Sorensen), but he seemed to me to put a lot of words in the mouths of the populations of both Aden and the Federation, words which I certainly did not hear when I was in both places recently. Some of his speech to my mind was just a little exaggerated.
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  Three assumptions seem to run through the speeches of hon. Members opposite. One is the rather curious one that any Government should be able to see below the surface of another State. In other words, "Do not deal with Farouk but see Nasser in embryo behind him" or "Do not deal with the pashas because the Tories are notoriously snobbish and like pashas, but see behind the pasha the colonel who is rising to power." If I may use an analogy, hon. Members opposite, with certain exceptions, might raise their eyebrows if I started addressing the Leader of the Liberal Party as the Leader of the Opposition.
  Mr. W. Yates: That is a good analogy, but if the hon. Member turns to the nineteenth century he will remember what Palmerston did when he was Foreign Secretary.
  Mr. Walder: Neither my memory nor my historical knowledge will recall what Palmerston did at that period, and I do not think that my hon. Friend has identified sufficiently for me the incident to which he refers.
  Mr. Yates: Palmerston was one of our greatest Foreign Secretaries and when he saw all the crowns of Europe tumbling he paraded himself with the democratic people, most successfully at Palermo and elsewhere, because he was a far-seeing Foreign Secretary.
  Mr. Walder: I am sorry but I think that one of the lessons of the nineteenth century is that revolutions did not necessarily solve the problems of a State. One of the mistakes which the British made then was to think that if a revolution occurred in a State that State was ready for the export of the Parliament of Westminster, model number 1.
  The assumption that a Government should necessarily see beyond and behind the status quo and find out by some magical process what is happening and what the next régime will be and deal with that is quite a false assumption. The Opposition no doubt will make great play of this, but I think that it boils down to the question of saying what one would do and how one would see beyond an existing régime to what it might be in ten years' time. There is also the assumption that the Yemen, by going through the processes of revolution, by

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  which the then ruler, who had no time to prove himself one way or another, was bombarded in his palace, and the revolution still continues—that by that process the Yemen has automatically become democratised and civilised and that from now on all will be sweetness and light in the Yemen.
  It was the assumption of the hon. Member far Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) who referred to the backward States of the Protectorate. One hears very little mention of the backward state of the Yemen. The assumption is that it is very wrong for Aden Colony to be linked with the backward States of the Protectorate, but if the inhabitants of Aden go round and say that they would like to be linked to the Yemen, when one has no proof that the Yemen has been improved by revolution, that is all right. I think that that is illogical.
  I have recently had some experience in the Protectorate. I saw these very States 14 years ago and I cannot but contrast the conditions then with the conditions now and the vast improvements in areas such as Abyan and Lahej, with the cotton boards and the improved agricultural and fishing industries. One is dealing largely with a nomadic agricultural population. Only about 90,000 live in the towns. It is difficult to organise them, not only economically but politically. A great future may lie ahead for these States. The Federal Government carried out a geological survey last year which revealed certain mineral deposits and one cannot say at this stage whether these will offer alternative industries.
  Enormous advances have been made in education. Ten years ago only the Arab Q'uranic schools were in existence. Now over 8,000 boys and about 800 girls—very significant in an Islamic community—are being educated in primary schools. Two thousand pupils are being educated in secondary schools, with opportunites of going to Aden College and even to universities abroad. This is a tremendous advance.
  The next question is how we should encourage all this. Again I should like to go back to the speech of the hon. Member for Leyton. If one does not bring about federation, is not one, if
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  not condemning the States of the Protectorate, saying to them, "You have a rather feudal, antiquated system. You had better keep that and, unfortunately, deprive yourselves of the economic advantages so necessary for your advance"? It is a difficult question and a 50–50 striking of the balance, but I feel that, as in the Federation suggested in the White Paper, it is logical that these States should combine with Aden which is the obvious port and market for the hinterland. The Government party in Aden is in favour of federation, and so is the official opposition party. They seem to think that they might get better terms. But we have had references to that in another context in the House, and perhaps I had better say no more about it. The only party which objects to federation is the one which boycotted the last Aden elections. This party looks to the Yemen.
  In this connection one should remember that the States of the Federation have had two neighbours, British-controlled Aden and the Yemen. For many years, going back to the 'thirties, the Yemen carried on a campaign of aggression on its borders, hiring outlaws, thugs and roving bands to prey on its neighbours. The Yemen has never been a friendly neighbour. I need a great deal of convincing, especially in view of what is happening at present in the Yemen, to believe that the Yemen has now suddenly become a friendly neighbour of the Federation. Those Arabs in the Federation to whom I talked had a fear and distrust of the Yemen which has not, I think, necessarily been dispelled by the revolution which has taken place there. It is all very well to talk about pan-Arabism. In my experience, pan-Arabism is divided by tribal loyalities and also by religious loyalties in the sense of loyalty to a particular sect of Islam.
  The Yemeni actually in Aden, about 80,000 who work there, would undoubtedly agitate—they are doing that at present—and intimidate if they thought that there was a chance of persuading their fellow Arabs to vote against federation. I regard those Yemeni as being entirely out of court in this matter. They have an obvious interest. They would like to see union with the Yemen. I do not think it right

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  that they should express their opinion on this matter. The same applies, in my view, to the large foreign migrant population which comes into Aden. At one stage in the debate the question was asked: should the inhabitants of the Federation living in Aden vote? That would produce a curious situation, as though German residents here were asked to vote on whether Britain should go into the Common Market.
  Speaking realistically, one can only say that, for the population of the Federation and of Aden, all the material benefits and the social and educational benefits quite obviously depend on peace, especially now when the Middle East is in a little more than its usual state of ferment. In my view, the real question here is the question posed originally by Milton: how tolerant should one be of the intolerant? To what extent should one listen to the voices of those who patently wish to destroy British influence and destroy the possibility of this federation ever coming about?
  Hon. Members opposite have referred to our defence policy. Of course, we have world-wide commitments, and Aden is the logical base for our forces. It can be added that the presence of British forces in Aden has guaranteed peace in that area and in the States of the Federation. One sometimes loses sight of that fact. Not only have we our outward-looking interests but we have preserved peace in the area. Those Arabs to whom I recently spoke took the view that, if it were not for the presence of British forces in Aden, some of the States neighbouring on the Yemen might well have been overrun already.
  I have already expressed my opinion about the assumption that, whenever a feudal despot dies and there is a revolution, that State automatically becomes a model of democracy and progress. Brigadier Sallal has got to go a considerable distance to prove that for me in his case. Until then, it is, I suggest, a logical necessity that the Aden Federation should come about. If it did not come about, we should leave a political vacuum in that part of the world which could very swiftly be filled by those who bear us no good will.
  To protect our own interests and those of the population of the Federation, I
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  should be in favour of speed rather than hesitation and the waiting which hon. Members opposite suggest. This is the moment to press on with federation. Not to do so would be dangerous to British interests and, ultimately, I think, the interests of the population of both the Federation and of Aden Colony itself.
  8.36 p.m.
  Mr. Donald Wade: I am tempted to follow the hon. Member for The High Peak (Mr. Walder) in his references to Milton, but I shall at this late hour refrain from doing so. Earlier in the debate, the hon. Member for Inverness (Mr. N. McLean) gave us a very interesting discourse on the present situation in the Yemen, but I did not think that it really helped us much to solve the problem arising out of the White Paper now before the House.
  There are two questions before the House. First, what is, or what should be, the aim of British policy in Southern Arabia? Secondly, how should Britain set about achieving it?
  The aim of creating a federation embracing the Colony of Aden and the Federation of South Arabia seems both reasonable and sensible as a long-term aim. I do not criticise it as the ultimate objective. I agree in some respects with the spirit, at least, of the letter set out on page 5 of the White Paper, Cmnd. 1814. I agree that
  "The inhabitants of Aden and of the Federation are predominantly of Arab race and Muslim religion."
  It may well be that
  "the economic interests of both are closely interwoven".
  I agree that ultimate federation might well increase the economic strength and political stability of the area. However, the serious question is whether the policy which the Government are pursuing will help to bring about this desired end. I fear not.
  It is only natural that on occasions such as this we should hark back to the debates on the creation of the Central African Federation. It is perhaps ironical that at the precise moment that we are discussing this White Paper discussions elsewhere should be taking place which, in effect, amount to the break-up of the Central African Federation. I took an active part in the debate on the Bill when the Central African

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  Federation was formed, and I think that I can claim that my colleagues and I are consistent, because even earlier, when this proposal was contemplated by the Labour Government, we were opposed to the suggestion that federation should be forced through against the wishes of the majority of the people.
  During the long debates on the proposal to set up the Central African Federation the Government spokesmen time and again said that it was in the economic interests of the people that it should be carried through whether they approved of it or not and that if it was not done at that time the opportunity would be missed and might not come again. We were also told that if it was tried the people would in time realise what a good idea it was.
  Unfortunately, it has not worked out that way. The Government refused to listen to the arguments of myself and of others. We said that we could not hope to make a success of that federation if we did not gain the consent and good will of the majority of the people. Very similar considerations apply to the proposal with which we are faced tonight.
  I do not challenge the desirability of this ultimate objective. Moreover, I recognise the importance to Britain of Aden as a base. I can see the advantages of creating a closer link between the peoples of the Colony of Aden and of the Protectorates. The question is whether the Government are setting about this in the right way.
  I fear that the British Government are only asking for trouble. Worse than that, I fear that their policy may well lead to disaster. What exasperates the nationalists, including some very moderate people, among the people of the Colony is the fact that the Government appear to be forcing this on those whose views are unknown, or, at any rate, have not been ascertained by anything that one could call a democratic test of public opinion. One wonders why this is being done. We are bound to ask whether the Government seriously expect a federation set up in this way to last. Do they really think that it will continue in spite of all the warnings that have been given about the future consequences of overriding opinion in this way, or is this being done merely to gain time?
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  I have many quotations and a number of telegrams here, but, since time is short, the only quotation that I wish to make is from the Observer. I realise that some hon. Members opposite do not accept everything that is said in the Observer as gospel, but this quotation from an article of 19th August this year illustrates the point that I wish to stress:
  "It is amazing that the British Government should have been persuaded to take this course even after its experience in Central Africa and in the face of the warning of Mr. Harold Ingrams, a former colonial adviser who did so much to produce order in that part of the world. In a recent issue of New Commonwealth Mr. Ingrams warned that if the British 'force a combination of Aden and the Protectorate as an independent State, the end will come more quickly than it did in Egypt'. What the British Government—with its commitment to a larger and better base in Aden—is primarily interested in is to gain a few useful years and to keep the Arab nationalist forces at bay. But it would be remarkable if from now on the pace and temper of Arab nationalism in Aden did not increase. This is precisely what happened to black nationalism in Central Africa after the imposition of federation 1953."
  The words
  "to gain a few useful years"
  are ominous. Is this just another holding operation in a long rearguard action?
  If one considers what has happened in the last seventeen years and if one studies the map of the Near East and Middle East and compares the position in 1945 with the position today, it looks all too much like a rearguard action.
  From time to time Britain has made a stand and said, "Here are vital interests which on no account will we give up. There will be no further retreat" and then in a few years' time Britain, under pressure, has done the very opposite.
  Mr. Brian Harrison: Does not the hon. Gentleman think that "months" is probably more appropriate than "years"?
  Mr. Wade: It may be a case of months in this instance. I hope not. What I am saying is that so often, as the Minister in opening the debate said, Britain has referred to vital interests but has failed to appreciate the effect of the popular feedings of the people in the territory concerned, and then, alas, in time there has been a retreat.
  More serious is the fact that all too often in the post-war years, Britain has

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  given the impression of being on the side of autocratic rulers whose thoughts and ideas are centuries behind the times and who seem to others to be standing in the path of progress. This impression may be unfair, but there is no doubt that it is being created and it plays inevitably into the hands of those who wish Britain ill. The Government surely must be aware of this. Are we taking this action regardless of these effects? Is this merely a temporary expedient to gain a few years or months in face of Arab nationalism? If so, it is not a cheerful prospect. And yet I cannot explain this action in any other way except as a rearguard action.
  I am not opposed to stating clearly to the people of the Colony of Aden that we are prepared to stand by them. There is a strong case for the maintenance of a base so long as it is acceptable to the people of Aden. Furthermore, I recognise that if Britain were to quit the area the alternative would not necessarily be freedom for the people of that part of the world. It might well be Egyptian domination, and I am not so naïve as to regard Egyptian penetration as progress and protection by Britain as the worst form of colonialism. I am not suggesting that, but it might be so regarded if Britain forces through this Measure without waiting until Aden has become a self-governing territory and without waiting until at least some move towards responsible government has taken place in the Western Protectorate.
  Surely, all the lessons of past years point to the same conclusion, namely, that it would be unwise in our interests as well as those of the people in Aden to force this measure through, particularly having regard to the fact that the Colony of Aden will have no absolute right to secede should she so wish in the future. I recognise that there may be risks in deferring this new Federation, but there are greater risks in pressing on regardless. One must have sound foundations of popular support if any Federation is to succeed and I would say that the foundations here are as insecure as the shifting sands of the Arabian desert.
  It may be that we have to choose between two evils, but I believe that the lesser of the two evils is to defer this proposal until it can be proved to be
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  acceptable to the people concerned. Therefore, I say to the Government, whom one hon. Member has told to think again, that they should think again and think hard. Otherwise, Britain may take a step which will prove to be a grave political error.
  8.48 p.m.
  Mr. William Yates: I am delighted to have heard the speech of the hon. Member for Huddersfield, West (Mr. Wade). For the last few moments of the debate, I want to plead with the Government with all the power that I possess, and I hope that the country as well as the Government will listen. The present proposal is so dangerous that it might even imperil the whole of our position in the Persian Gulf. I must make these facts absolutely clear.
  The House bore with me when I spoke about my visit to both Aden and the Yemen last year. My hon. Friend the Member for Inverness (Mr. N. McLean) visited the royalist forces on the outskirts of Narad and other places, but not into the Yemen. I know that the Government are in a dilemma. I know that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State is a man of great courage, and he, too, realises the drama which faces him. If the popular will is carried out in Aden, there is a danger, which my right hon. Friend sees, that the people of Aden will first demand unity with the Republic of the Yemen, whereas my right hon. Friend understands the position of the emirs, who are not in any way and never have been very keen on the Yemen or on Yemeni rulers. Take, for example, relations between the Sultan of Lahej and the Yemeni tribes.
  Therefore, the Government are in a real dilemma, and on occasions like this one ought to speak with care and with a certain amount of calm. I am not, in the long-term view, opposed to some form of federation for the Emirates as a long-term policy, but to force through this Aden federation now without taking into account what has occurred in the Yemen must be a very grave mistake. I say that the Government have to go right back and realise that the future of Aden and the Persian Gulf will depend upon our relationships with the new rulers of the Yemen, and, if necessary, with the United Arab Republic, and that seems to me the fundamental base

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  of it all. What is the good of having a base there, with destroyers and our Army in Aden, with the hostile Yemenis all round? Good gracious, we went through all that in Cyprus. For heaven's sake, let us not repeat it all over again.
  It is certainly a difficult problem. We are not disposed to recognise the new régime in the Yemen, and there must be quite sound grounds for doing this. Certainly, there are some other manoeuvres in foreign policy which might be unwise. However, we must be on the side of the forces of advance in the Middle East and not always seem to be following what is said by Radio Amam. People complain about Radio Cairo, but some of the stuff that comes out from Radio Amam in Jordan is just as bad.
  The Government have to take a very difficult and dangerous decision in Middle East policy now, but I suggest to them that before they make any move in the Aden area at this time they should honestly do their best to see if they can come to an arrangement with the new rulers of the Yemen once they are established. People say, "What do you suggest? It is all very well being critical, but what do you suggest?" Bearing in mind the feelings of the rulers in the Emirates outside Aden, Aden itself and the Yemen, I cannot at this moment see what could be arranged, but it does occur to me that the Government will have to call some form of conference in that part of the world and, openly and without fear or favour, invite whoever controls the new State of the Yemen, the emirs and the people in Aden to work out a sensible policy for the salvation of Southern Arabia. I say to the Secretary of State that I see very little hope for our base in Aden—unless it is to be held by brute force. And really, that cannot be a good long-term policy.
  I hope I have made my plea to the House reasonably and in moderation, as I have tried so to do. I do honestly try to appreciate the Government's difficulties. I have studied them. But please, I implore the Government, drop any move as contained in this White Paper for the time being. That is really all I wanted to say.
  8.55 p.m.
  Mr. Robert Edwards: I find it very difficult to participate in this debate without some emotion. I have just
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  handed to my hon. Friend the Member for Dundee, East (Mr. G. M. Thomson), who will wind up for the Opposition, a summary of the report of a London solicitor who has just returned from Aden and who, in the district prison yesterday, witnessed the indignity of an Arab trade union leader being stripped naked and beaten, without any medical examination before the beating took place.
  My hon. Friend and I know these Arab trade union leaders. We know them to be cultured men, clerks, technical assistants, school teachers and scientists, and this terrible indignity, committed against these cultured men in a prison over which we have some control, makes it extremely difficult for hon. Members like me to speak without this kind of emotion. However, I will leave this report to my hon. Friend.
  I hope that the Government will still have second thoughts about this panic proposal to link the Colony of Aden with this feudal federation of South Arabia. I have been to South Arabia, I have been to the Yemen, I have been to Aden. I talked with a journalist in June of this year who was sentenced to five years' imprisonment and who received 80 strokes of the birch in one of those Arab States for drinking beer in his hotel. There is no doubt about this. I discussed this case with the sultan concerned. I discussed with one of the sheiks at the head of one of those Arab States a case where a small farmer whose land had been confiscated was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment merely for taking the sultan into the civil court in Aden.
  This is the kind of feudalism, the kind of dictatorship, which, apparently, we want to impose upon the developing democracy of the Colony of Aden. I make this prophesy. Not merely shall we have to withdraw the British base from Aden in ten years if this proposal goes through. I make this prophecy, that in ten years we shall be swept out of the Middle East, and we shall lose all the oil throughout the whole of the Middle Eastern lands.
  Here we are dealing with Arab nationalism, we are dealing with the development of a great sweep of nationalism. It is part of the conditions of the era in which we live. We cannot resist this sweep of Arab nationalism. We have

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  got to make our peace with it. We have got to help it along peacefully and constructively, and the very last way of doing this is to force the articulate, politically educated 250,000 people in the Colony of Aden into a Federation which they do not want, into a Federation of 400,000 backward people, where there are no elections, where there are no registered trade unions, where there are no elections even for local councils, where there is not any kind of democratic accountability. To force 250,000 people into this Federation against their will is really asking for trouble, and that is the kind of trouble which we are provoking because of the panic situation which has developed over the Yemen.
  I have had to speak briefly because I promised to finish by nine o'clock, but I beg the Government to have second thoughts about this matter. Do not let us thrust this through until elections have been held in the Colony of Aden. Let the people decide whether they want to go into this Federation. If they decide that they do, all right, but if we force this through not merely shall we jeopardise our interests in the whole of the Middle East; we shall create great difficulties for the 8,000 British troops in the post at Aden.
  9.0 p.m.
  Mr. G. M. Thomson: My hon. Friend the Member for Bilston (Mr. R. Edwards), with whom I visited the Colony of Aden and the Federation of South Arabia in June, has spoken briefly but with deep emotion and passion. This is understandable, in the light of the information that he sought to convey to the House in the few minutes for which he addressed it.
  The House would probably prefer it if I went straight ahead and conveyed to the Minister the information that has just been handed to us concerning the allegations of flogging in the prison at Aden yesterday. My hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) raised this matter in his opening speech and said that the Opposition expected a reply. Yesterday, I received an urgent cable making these allegations, and I sought confirmation of them as far as I could. The report I have before me now. It has been impossible for either
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  my hon. Friend or myself to verify the details. The best thing that I can do is to read the relevant extracts into the record for the information of the House. After the allegations have been heard, I am sure that the House, with its strong conscience on these matters of prison administration, especially in the case of political offences, will expect a full reply from the Minister before it can be satisfied.
  The report is made by a London solicitor, a Mr. Hostettler, who has been in Aden assisting in the defence of certain members of the Aden T.U.C. who have been charged with various offences arising out of the political unrest there. I quote directly from the report. It says:
  "Mr. Hostettler was in Aden District Prison yesterday morning about 11 a.m. to see his clients. In the office of the superintendent … he heard discussions between superintendent and 11 men outside and decision taken to flog them at 11.30. The floggings took place at 1140. No time for medical examination. Five flogged, of which he witnessed three. Then could stand no more and left. The window of the superintendent's office over looked yard where floggings took place, distance 20 yards. Men stripped completely, tied to large rack bound by hands and feet, piece of muslin placed over buttocks … Screaming was terrible to hear."
  A note is added:
  "Prison Regulations say twenty-four hours must elapse before canings take place to allow medical examination. Only ten minutes elapsed with first five men. … No examination, and breach of this rule. Eleven men were not criminals but all had been sentenced for demonstrating. Twelfth man who was president of the Forces Employees Union"—
  I know this man personally and can vouch for his character—
  "was sentenced to solitary confinement for four days on 'penal diet' for complaining of toothache. Then other 11 decided to fast in protest. Argument arose with prison superintendent and sentence of caning imposed."
  I will pass this document to the Minister so that he has the full facts in front of him. I would only add in confirmation—so far as I can confirm them—of the serious allegations made there, that both my hon. Friend and I visited this prison and it seemed to me a prison which was a disgrace to the good name of Britain. It was a squalid, old building in which men and women prisoners were herded together with caged lunatics.
  During our visit there to meet some of the political prisoners of the Aden

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  T.U.C. the question of corporal punishment in the prison was raised, and I can confirm one detail in that document, that it is possible to see the prison yard from the superintendent's office. My inquiries of the prison authorities, for what they are worth, indicated that flogging was rife as a prison punishment. Indeed, the officials to whom I talked made no secret of it. I gathered that it took place arbitrarily on the authority of the prison superintendent without any of the usual safeguards, such as visiting committees, that we expect in this country, and ought to have in colonial prisons for which this House has a direct responsibility.
  As has been emphasised, these men were not criminals in the ordinary sense of the word. Far from being criminals they are in prison because they are trade unionists. Their crime is the crime of going on strike. In a very real sense they are the "Tolpuddle Martyrs" of the Middle East. This kind of incident does us immense and quite unnecessary harm throughout the whole world when it gets publicised. This situation is one of the results of the kind of policies that the Executive Council under Her Majesty's Government in London has been carrying out in the Aden Colony.
  One of the things which has been done to try to curb the Aden T.U.C., a young and very impressive trade union movement—and a rather turbulent mouthpiece of Arab nationalism in the Colony—has been to declare strikes illegal. That is the practical effect of the labour ordinance which has been in operation in the Colony. It has led to the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, a staunchly anti-Communist body and very moderate in the kind of comments that it would make on this kind of issue, to launch an official corn-plaint against Britain at the International Labour Office.
  Opening this debate, the Secretary of State spoke strongly about the existence of intimidation in the politics of Aden Colony, and certainly every hon. Member in this House would deplore the existence of any form of physical intimidation. When I was in Aden only a few months ago there were very few allegations made by people in official quarters of intimidation at that time or in the immediate past. If intimidation has
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  increased, it is because of the kind of policies which the British Government have been pursuing since the Aden Conference took place in London.
  There are different kinds of intimidation in a colonial situation like this with which we are only too familiar. There is the intimidation of a political movement which finds itself without a constitutional outlet. Although it is understandable, it is to be deplored. But there is also the intimidation used by an official régime unwilling to put forward constitutional means of encouraging political advance, and I submit that the incident which apparently took place yesterday in Aden prison is an example of that kind of action.
  The Secretary of State said that what he sought was conditions in which everybody could conduct their political activities in Aden openly and without fear. Hon. Members on this side of the House would strongly support him in bringing about that situation. But I hope that the Minister will understand that when that happy stage is reached, and political activities can be carried on without fear, it will be the first time for many years that that has been so; because the political aspirations of the young Arab nationalist movement in Aden have met with constant repression and prohibition from the Government in the Colony.
  When my hon. Friend the Member for Bilston and I were there in June, we took part in political meetings. They were among the few political meetings which had been permitted for some time. There have been repeated bans on meetings and processions. The newspapers of the Aden T.U.C. have been suspended and suppressed. A large number of trade unionists have been deported either out into the Protectorate with which it is now proposed they should federate, or to the territory of Yemen itself, and there has been imprisonment of the trade unionists of whom I have been speaking.
  The tragedy of this situation is that I did not find during the discussions I had with leaders of many political movements in Aden that the leaders of the Aden T.U.C. were fanatically anti-British. I did not find that the leaders of the smaller middle-class bourgeois parties in Aden were fanatically anti-British. They learn their politics and their desire for self-determination from us—why should they

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  be anti-British? I was encouraged to see in the Economist the other day that its correspondent in Aden took the same view. He said that:
  "Violent anti-British sentiment is not common here and among the Opposition there is plenty of Ministerial timber."
  That was the impression I brought back. It makes it all the more tragic that the policies of Her Majesty's Government through the Legislative Council in Aden should be widening this gap instead of closing it.
  All that has been said during this debate, certainly from this side of the House and in more than one speech of hon. Members opposite, has fully justified the Opposition in moving the Amendment. I would summarise the indictment we make, and which many hon. Members on both sides of the House have made, against the Government in this way. They have completely failed to learn the lessons from their own bitter experience in places such as Suez, Cyprus and Central Africa, or indeed the much more pleasant lesson of what happened in the politics surrounding the base in Singapore.
  An additional charge against the Government is that they have failed to adapt themselves to the facts of modern Arab nationalism. The Secretary of State in his opening speech used a very revealing phrase. Speaking of the desire in various political quarters in Aden for union with the Yemen, he said—I think I am quoting him correctly—that this was no more than the emotional expression of Arab nationalism. If we take the emotional expression of Arab nationalism out of the Arab peninsula, what on earth is left of the politics of the Middle East?
  We pay a big price for the kind of romanticism of the traditional British ruling groups of which we had such vivid expression from the hon. Member for Inverness (Mr. N. McLean). When are we to stop playing at being Lawrence of Arabia in the Middle East and get down to the job of serious politics with the young and new political leaders who are rising there? They may often enough be difficult to deal with, but this is the way the world is moving.
  No one on this side of the House says, although one hon. Member opposite suggested we did, that the revolution in the Yemen has produced a new model of democracy. The most he would say
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  about the Yemen—and I had the opportunity of getting a glimpse of it during my visit—is that it is being dragged reluctantly out of the thirteenth century. I do not know what the future developments may be there, but I am sure that the British Government would have been wise to have shown an instinctive sympathy with the revolution in the Yemen instead of cold-shouldering it in the way they have.
  I cannot understand why we allow ourselves to appear in the eyes of the young Arab leaders, coming up all over the Middle East, as identified with the sheiks of the Aden Protectorate rather than feeling a sympathy with the trade union movement and the Arab Socialist movement which are growing up in Aden.
  What I find particularly sad about this is the fact that this wrong policy by the Government spoils what in general is an extremely good record on the part of successive British Governments in granting independence and freedom to Colonial Territories. Successive Governments since the war have carried out major acts of independence. The trouble is that Conservative Administrations have always had two blind spots which have resulted in major blunders of policy. The first has been to believe that one can prolong the life of military bases by denying or slowing down progress towards self-determination. We found out how wrong that was in Cyprus, but we do not seem to have learned.
  The second mistake has been to believe that one can impose a federation on territories against the wishes of the inhabitants and that, once they have been presented with a fait accompli, their hostility will wither away because, it is believed by the Conservative Party, this hostility in the first instance was fomented by a minority of unrepresentative agitators. We are still discovering in Central Africa how wrong that was.
  But the Government are now proceeding in Aden to commit both these blunders at once. It seems incredible to me that at a time when the First Secretary is in the process of politely conceding secession to Nyasaland we should be seeking to repeat almost exactly the same mistake in Aden. I await with interest, and with some personal sympathy, the reply of the Under-Secretary

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  of State, who from the back benches has made such excellent and courageous speeches defending the rights of self-determination in Central Africa and the West Indies. I wonder how he justifies his Government doing exactly the opposite in Aden.
  I ask the House to remind themselves of the enormity of what the Secretary of State proposed to the House in a quiet and characteristic speech. My hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East analysed, in what seemed to me a devastating way, the unrepresentative nature of the present Legislative Council which is carrying this merger through, and the fact that all the evidence has been that opinion in Aden Colony, not only of the People's Socialist Party or of the Aden T.U.C., although that is entitled to respect, but also of the moderate middle-class parties, appears to be against this merger.
  The Government have tried to stiffen the unrepresentative Legislative Council into support for the merger by the offer of constitutional developments in the Legislative Council itself. In one of his blander phrases the Secretary of State said that this was the usual pattern, but this proposal is one of the most unusual features which I recollect in some years of arguing about constitutional development in Colonial Territories in the House.
  What the Government are proposing is that this Legislative Council, which is carrying through such an unpopular proposal, is to be protected from facing even the present restricted electorate by the suspension of election's which were legally due to take place next month or at the beginning of the year. Then, with democracy in cold storage, the minority Ministers are to force their proposals though. As a reward, Ministers are to be given greater power and four new members of the Legislative Council are to be chosen by the electorate, consisting of the present time-expired Legislative Council. I have never heard of a more ludicrously undemocratic electoral college. No doubt the Secretary of State felt that the Legislative Council voting for itself was just about the only electorate he could find in present circumstances that could be sure to support the merger.
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  As my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds has indicated. it seems that even that hope may be dashed, because with the unexpected development of the revolution in the Yemen even present Ministers of the Legislative Council, despite the Secretary of State's efforts to stiffen them this evening, look like deciding that there ought to be a further delay.
  I hope that the Secretary of State will take to heart the expressions of view of his hon Friend the Member for The Wrekin (Mr. W. Yates), of the Liberal Party and of some of my hon. Friends, that he should think about this again and think about having some delay. The folly of creating this situation in Aden was mentioned by the Secretary of State himself. He said that he could not find any political group in Aden that disagreed with his professed aim of bringing about some sort of association between Aden Colony and the Territories of the Protectorate. It is the method of doing so, the form of it and particularly the timing of it, that are objected to. The people of Aden Colony insist that Aden should enjoy a greater degree of self-determination first and that a representative Adenese Government should negotiate the most suitable kind of links. We think that this is the proper way to go about it.
  Why are the people in Aden Colony so insistent on doing it according to a different timing and by a different method if they agree with the same long-term aim as the Government are putting forward of association between Colony and Protectorate? The fact is that this is one of the most difficult proposals of marriage between two communities that can be imagined in a colonial situation. What the Government are trying to do is to join a British Colony, which has all the usual aspirations which we teach it of seeking one man one vote, with a series of feudal Sheikdoms where political power still rests somewhat uneasily on one man one rifle.
  The hon. Member for Banbury (Mr. Marten) said that it was unfair to call the communities of the present Protectorate an out-of-date feudalism, that feudal they might be, but they were not out of date. An up-to-date feudalism is a new concept. Perhaps it is a new definition of contemporary Tory philosophy. The fact is that the Colony of Aden, with nearly half the population and very

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  much more than half the resources of the proposed Federation, is to be given about one-quarter of the seats.
  It is rather difficult to find out exactly what the proportions are, because I have seldom seen a constitutional White Paper that gave the House of Commons less information about the details of what is being proposed than the present one. In any case, the overwhelming majority from the Sheikdoms are going to be completely unelected by any normal definition of the term "election" as we in this House understand it. Nor is there any proposal anywhere in the White Paper for any democratisation of the territories of the Protectorate. My hon. Friend the Member for Leyton (Mr. Sorensen), who is an authority on this area, said that Her Majesty's Government ought to have insisted on measures of democratisation as part of the price that should be paid for any form of association.
  The White Paper contains an unspecified code of human rights for the Colony but no code of human rights is mentioned for the Sultanates, where the autocratic whim of the ruler is still the absolute law. The very least in the way of progress that ought to have been sought here was that the arbitrary and sometimes savage justice of some of the more backward rulers should come under the rule of an independent federal justiciary. There is no mention of that in the White Paper.
  I found during my visit to the present Protectorate Federation that same of the more enlightened rulers were encouraging the grass roots of democracy. There are co-operative experiments in cotton growing. They were very keen on encouraging the spread of education. I echo what the Secretary of State said, that they should be helped in this. I hope that Her Majesty's Government will give them full financial help and political encouragement. The links between the Colony and the Protectorates would make sense both politically and economically as long as they were acceptable to the Aden people, which is the crux of the matter.
  Why have the Government resisted this so constantly? I suspect that the main reason is that the Government
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  believe that by submerging the political nationalism of the Colony in the feudal backwater of the Protectorate's they will be buying time for the military base and the other interests in that part of the world. I simply do not believe that is so. I think that this is the best way to make the life of the base more precarious, to endanger our legitimate interests in that part of Arabia, and to embarrass us politically at the United Nations, and elsewhere.
  My impression is that as recently as June there was little steam behind the campaign against the base but that the campaign has intensified since the Government have insisted on going ahead with the merger. The lesson of both Cyprus and Malta is that, given political advance, the opposition to a military base as a symbol of political status disappears. In fact, in Cyprus we are discovering that it has been converted into a preoccupation with the possibility of the base as a potential provider of employment.
  Before it is too late, I beg the Government to delay proceeding with this merger until new and more democratic elections have taken place in the Colony of Aden. I should have thought that the occurrence of the revolution in the Yemen, which happened after the conference and after the Government had published the White Paper, and which created an entirely new situation, would have given the Government ample opportunity without loss of face to delay matters in order to take second thoughts.
  I do not deny that there are risks whatever course we pursue in the matter, but the risks in the kind of course recommended by the Opposition in their Amendment are a great deal less than the certain dangers of forcing this Measure through against the clearly expressed will of so many of the people in the Aden Colony. It would be altogether better for the Government, even at this late stage, to have second thoughts, and to say that they will allow the people of the Aden Colony a new and more democratic election and then, with a new and more representative Government, to decide for themselves, in consultation with the British Government, what kind of links they want with their brother Arabs in the territories of the Protectorate.
  9.27 p.m.
  The Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr. Nigel Fisher): I feel rather sorry that my arrival at the Colonial Office should have coincided with an interruption—I hope only a very temporary one—in the relatively harmonious and almost bipartisan atmosphere that has prevailed in our colonial affairs debates for the last three years. I hope, and the hon. Member for Dundee, East (Mr. G. M. Thomson) was generous enough to make some reference to it, that in the light of my own past contributions to those debates hon. Members opposite will acquit me of any unprogressive or illiberal tendencies.
  I would not be defending the Government's policy now if I had any doubts at all about its wisdom, or if I thought it inimical to the best interests of the people of Aden Colony and of the protectorate States, for whom we have equal responsibilities. On the contrary, I think that it is very much in the interests of both those sections of people.
  As my right hon. Friend and other hon. Members have pointed out, the division of these areas has been historical, artificial and unnatural. After all, the people speak the same language; they are of the same race and religion. Geographically, they are contiguous, and their economies are complementary. Without Aden, the protectorate States are a Federation which has no capital, no seaport and no airport. Without the States, Aden is a capital without a country. There really cannot be any doubt, and I do not think that any hon. Member has controverted this, that the abolition of the customs barriers between these two areas—and, indeed, between the States themselves—will be greatly to the economic advantage of both Aden and the States.
  Politically, Aden, in a tiny area, with a population of about 220,000 people—which is about the size of the Borough of Lambeth—one-third of them Yemenis, and most of those only transient residents in the Colony, has very poor prospects of independence in isolation.
  The protectorate States, with, of course, a much larger population in a much larger area, have nevertheless only an agricultural economy and they are dependent, as hon. Members know, upon British subsidies. But union with Aden,
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  which is their natural port, would much improve their economic potential without the least damage to Aden itself, and would thus bring nearer their own independence.
  Together, I believe that these two territories make a natural and a complementary unit. Together, they can reasonably look forward to an independent nationhood which neither could nearly so readily achieve on its own. This has been the consideration—I ask hon. Members to believe this—uppermost in my mind in looking at our Aden policy.
  Mr. Wade: Is not the hon. Gentleman arguing in favour of some sort of economic union? He is not giving adequate ground for this political step.
  Mr. Fisher: I am going to develop this argument a little further. I am only in my opening passages at the moment and the hon. Gentleman must be a little patient with me. That has been the consideration uppermost in my mind, because I feel that without merger the prospect of independence for either of these two territories does not seem very bright.
  The hon. Member for Dundee, East quoted my attitude in the past to the other Federations—the Central African Federation and the West Indies Federation. That was quite fair and I make no complaint at all because, of course, I have often said 'that federations should grow up from the grass roots—I can almost hear my own words—of public consent and should not be imposed from the top.
  The hon. Member for Leeds, East made the same point and also the hon. Member for Huddersfield, West (Mr. Wade). But the circumstances here, I suggest to the House, are quite different. In Central Africa, as we all know, we have an acute racial problem which does not exist at all in Aden—it simply does not arise. In the West Indies we have 1,000 miles of the Caribbean Sea separating Trinidad from Jamaica, and that, again, is a geographical factor quite absent in Aden. I do not think—and I say this with complete sincerity—that hon. Members can fairly and accurately compare those Federations with the one that we are considering today.
  Mr. Healey: Would the hon. Gentleman agree that there is a gap of five

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  centuries between the Protectorates and Aden Colony and that social development is as important as a gap of 3,000 miles of sea in the Caribbean?
  Mr. Fisher: I do not think so, and I do not think that the hon. Gentleman is right about five centuries. I think that a number of hon. Members have been curiously out of date themselves when they have referred to feudalism in the Protectorate States. I want to deal with that in a minute. I think that it is a little unfair and, on the advice that I am getting all the time, I can say that the situation has changed a great deal in the last few years. Hon. Members have referred so often to this matter that I should like for a moment to try to make some defence, which I think we owe to them, of the so-called feudal rulers who have been much criticised by the right hon. Member for West Bromwich (Mr. Dugdale), the hon. Member for Leeds, East and the hon. Member for Leyton (Mr. Sorensen). In fact, there has been practically nobody who has not been very rude to the feudal rulers, except my hon. Friend the Member for Banbury (Mr. Marten), who somewhat redressed the balance. It is only fair to our friends in the Protectorate States to explain their position. And, of course, these people are friends of this country. It is not a bad thing some-time's to support one's friends.
  Any hon. Member, and I say this seriously, who has got to know these so-called feudal rulers, as my right hon. Friend and I did in August—and we have seen them since—could not fail to be impressed by their calibre and character. They are not nearly as feudal as hon. Members opposite would like to pretend. At the top, in the Supreme Council, which is the Government of the Federation, they are democratically elected for five-year periods by their fellow-Members in the Federal Council. There are nine Federal Ministers elected in this way, only four of whom are "rulers".
  At the other end of the scale, the leaders are elected by their own tribal customs. They are not necessarily hereditary rulers, but are elected by the tribal leaders, who are themselves elected by their tribes in their own way. In many of the States Legislative Councils have already been established and they
  322
  are representative of all sections of the community. Lahej, for instance, is a constitutional Sultanate, with its own Legislative Council and municipal councils. I believe that they will have their municipal council elections very early in 1963.
  Everywhere throughout the Federation money is being spent on new schools, new hospitals, and new roads, on irrigation, and agriculture, electricity and piped water. These developments are for the benefit of the ordinary people, and not for the benefit of the so-called feudal rulers. I rather regret having taken up the time of the House on this matter, but I feel that the Opposition might have done better had they referred rather less often to feudalism and more to facts.
  Mr. Dugdale: Speaking for myself, and possibly for some of my hon. Friends, I would make it clear that no one has said anything which should be taken as being against the integrity or courage or, indeed, the friendliness of these people when it has been said that their rule was feudal.
  Sir Kenneth Pickthorn: Before my hon. Friend replies, I wonder, as one who has spent a great deal of time trying to understand what "feudal" means, if he will explain what he considers to be the meaning of the word?
  Mr. Fisher: I would never dare embark on a discussion of that sort with my hon. Friend the Member for Carlton (Sir K. Pickthorn), particularly when I have only a short time in which to reply to the debate. The last point I would make on this aspect is that there can be no doubt that the accession of Aden to the Federation will quicken the democratic processes which are already taking shape in the Protectorate States now.
  I pass to one or two of the points which have been raised, not to the main argument but to individual points, particularly those made by the hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey). He said that only four elected members had voted in the Aden Legislature for the merger plan. That is not quite accurate. The position was that, on the final vote, the Opposition did not vote at all. They walked out so that the effective vote was on the Opposition Amendment. That was the first vote and, on that, seven

  323
  elected members voted for the White Paper proposals and five voted against. I am told that if one converts that into House of Commons terms it would mean that in a House of Commons of 650 hon. Members there would be an equivalent of a majority of 106, Which is not too bad.
  Mr. Healey: This, of course, is a majority, the hon. Gentleman claims, of seven out of 12, the 12 having been elected by 5,000 votes out of a population of 220,000, but could he say what was the vote when the thing as a whole was put after the Opposition walked out?
  Mr. Fisher: It was 15 to nil.
  Mr. Healey: How many elected members voted in the final vote?
  Mr. Fisher: All the members there were, which was 16, less one who walked out because he had been insulted by a member of the Opposition.
  The hon. Member for Leeds, East said that the Legislature was unrepresentative, because only 5,000 voted rout of a population of 220,000. At the time of the last election the true Adenese population was only 100,000, because one must deduct the 80,000 transient Yemeni workers who have not the right to vote at present and also all the women, because they do not have a right to vote there as in many other Arab countries, and of course the children too. That means about 30,000 adult males, of whom about 21,500 were entitled to vote. Twenty-six per cent.—that is, 6,000—of those voted, which is much the same percentage as usually vote in a local election in my constituency. Although I do not call It very good, I do not call it as bad as some hon. Members make out.
  It is not true that the franchise is unduly restricted. If many people did not exercise their votes they were entitled to do so, and this boycott is entirely their fault and they really cannot complain when decisions were taken in their absence. They did not bother to be there.
  The hon. Member for Leeds, East, asked why there will be six years before there is a chance of secession. This period was chosen because it permits two general elections, one in a year's time and the second five years later, by which
  324
  time it is thought that people will have had a fair experience of the Federation and will be in a position to judge.
  My hon. Friend the Member for Banbury asked whether we are satisfied with our security arrangements and our intelligence. I agree that that is very important. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] It is very important indeed in Aden. My right hon. Friend has recently arranged for the Deputy Inspector-General of Colonial Police to take charge of the security arangements and he has become Director of Security.
  I shall have to deal very quickly with the serious matter which has been raised by the hon. Member for Leeds, East, the hon. Member for Bilston (Mr. R. Edwards) and finally, in some detail, by the hon. Member for Dundee, East, and that is this flogging occurrence in Aden. I shall say at once that my right hon. Friend and I knew nothing about this incident until we read about it in this morning's papers. A telegram was immediately sent to the Governor asking for information. So far, we have received only what I can describe as a short, interim reply. [HON. MEMBERS: "Shocking."] Not at all. I will say why it is not so shocking. It is because five of these canings took place yesterday at noon and the other four this morning. Therefore, it is not really so shocking that we have only just heard about it.
  Mr. G. M. Thomson: Is the hon. Gentleman saying that he heard about it only today, when information reached back benchers on this side of the House yesterday and was on the tape yesterday?
  Mr. Fisher: It came through on the tape last night, I understand, but I heard about it when I read about it in the morning papers. I am giving the hon. Member the facts. There is no need to be controversial about this.
  It seems—this is important—that the punishment was not flogging, but caning, which is a very different thing. I am assured that it was carried out under medical inspection—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] I am just giving the information which I have been given. There was a medical examination beforehand to make sure that the people were perfectly fit to be caned. In fact, one of them was not and so he was not caned,

  325
  but the rest of them were caned. All of this, apparently, was ordered by the Arab Superintendent without any reference at all to higher authority.
  Obviously, this is all we know about the matter at this stage. We are of, course, making further inquiries. I appreciate the concern of hon. Members about it. I recognise, and my right hon. Friend certainly recognises, that it is a very serious matter. I am not trying to minimise it at all. If hon. Members would care to put a Question on the Order Paper, then, as soon as we can get more information about it, we will answer it straight away. I think that that is the way I must leave it this evening, because I have no more information.
  Mr. Healey: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for that much, but may I put this point to him? It was entirely by accident that anyone outside the prison heard of yesterday's canings. It happened that a British solicitor was present in the building at the time and witnessed them. Will the hon. Gentleman inquire not only into the allegations made by this solicitor, but into the frequency of canings, in this prison and in Aden generally, of political prisoners during the past few months? What really disturbs us is that it is possible for these punishments to be carried out under British authority without, apparently, either the Governor of Aden or the responsible British Minister knowing anything about it.
  Mr. Fisher: I take the hon. Gentleman's point. I do not minimise it at all. We are treating the matter very seriously, and we shall make the inquiries, as he suggests.
  I come now to the substance of the Opposition Amendment. As I understand it, most hon. Members opposite are not really opposed to the principle of merger. They are opposed merely to the method—rather like the Common Market. But where does this talk about method and holding elections before merger lead us? I am myself quite satisfied that it would be impossible to hold elections now.
  My right hon. Friend referred, in his opening speech, to intimidation. I must honestly tell the House that this has been happening on a most disturbing scale,
  326
  on a scale so large, I suggest, that there is no possibility that elections today could reflect adequately the large section of moderate opinion which, in fact, supports a merger policy. This intimidation has taken many forms. I will give the House some examples. The trade union leader Al Asnag has made intimidating speeches about destroying the Legislative Council and dragging Ministers in the streets. I should explain that the word "drag" in Arabic has, apparently, a particularly terrifying connotation because it means to murder by dragging the victim through the streets behind a vehicle, as was done to Nuri in 1958.
  Here are further examples: a United National Party official, that is to say, an official of the moderate party in Aden, was beaten up at Sheikh Othman on 21st September. A U.N.P. member was dragged from his car and manhandled. Two members' cars were burnt on 24th September and two Ministers' cars were stoned. There was a threat in writing to kill a pro-merger Member of the Legislative Council which led to a confession and a written apology. Two Ministers' wives have been threatened by telephone calls. In one case, the wife was told that her husband would be murdered. She, poor woman, was at the time in an advanced stage of pregnancy and the incident was a great shock to her. One Minister has told us of threats to kidnap and kill the children of Ministers. He says that he has had no peace of mind owing to this sort of thing for a long time.
  Another and serious aspect of all this, to which my right hon. Friend has referred, has been the boycotting of shops and products if they are owned by supporters of merger. All the shops in Aden now have to fly the Yemeni flag and if they do not they are boycotted and lose all their customers. I could give the House many more examples from my folder here, but I think that I have said enough.
  Mr. Healey Mr. Healey rose——
  Mr. Fisher: I really should not give way. I have very little time left.
  Mr. Healey: Is it not the fact that every single case of intimidation to which the hon. Gentleman has referred,

  327
  which all of us on this side of the House greatly deplore, occurred after the Government announced their decision to prevent elections being held next January and, therefore, is totally irrelevant to the hon. Gentleman's argument?
  Mr. Fisher: No, I do not think so. I gave the dates, and I think that they are important.
  Mr. Healey: All in September.
  Mr. Fisher: The right hon. Member for West Bromwich said that intimidation is an excuse. I assure him that in Aden now it is a reality.
  It is common ground, I think, that there should be a revision of the franchise in Aden Colony. I believe that all political groups in Aden take that view, and, like my hon. Friend the Member for Banbury in his very well-informed speech—he has been there so recently—I am advised that it would take at least a year before elections could be held on a new franchise. Hon. Members say that the change in the franchise should have been made before the merger agreement and that the merger should now be put on ice pending the franchise changes and a new election in a year's time. That could well be done. We could wait a year. But what will be the position when the year is over, when these elections will have been held?
  There can be only two results of a general election: either the People's Socialist Party would win, in which case the merger of Aden with the protectorate States would be off, or one of the more moderate groups would win, in which case the merger would go ahead, with just the same result as our present policy, except that we should have lost a year. If the P.S.P. won, it would at once start agitating for Aden to merge with the Yemen. That outcome would be totally unacceptable both to the Protectorate and to Her Majesty's Government.
  As my right hon. Friend pointed out, we, too, have our interests in Aden, and I really do not see any reason why I should not say this and say it bluntly. It must be perfectly obvious to hon. Members on both sides that Britain is vitally interested in the Aden bases. They are quite essential to us for the defence of our oil interests in the Persian Gulf, for the discharge of our treaty
  328
  obligations in the Middle East and for our whole system of Commonwealth communications and defence.
  As my hon. Friend for The High Peak (Mr. Walder) pointed out, the bases are an influence far peace in this area. They are also essential to the prosperity and well-being of Aden itself. Before we went there 120 years ago Aden was just a little village with a few hundred people. Now the population is 220,000, and they are very prosperous. Their prosperity depends on the British oil refinery at Little Aden, on the oil bunkering which goes with it, and on the presence of the British forces. Without all that—the oil and the forces—I fully agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Banbury—the declining entrepot trade could provide work for only about one-third of those now employed there, and Aden would again be reduced to a small town with a dwindling economy.
  Hon. Members should bear in mind that the British Forces spend £ll million a year in Aden. That is a lot of money by Aden standards. That excludes expenditure on public works and services which already supports a sizeable building boom, and we could not embark on further building projects of that sort, which would be greatly to the advantage of Aden, without retaining the security of the Colony and our sovereignty over it.
  The revolution in the Yemen has, I think, made the retention of our bases more necessary than ever. I agreed with my hon. Friend the Member for Inverness (Mr. N. McLean), when he said in his fascinating account of events in the Yemen that there can be no doubt that Brigadier Sallal and his Government are very much under the influence of Colonel Nasser. Indeed, I doubt very much if they would be in Sana and Taiz today but for the outside military aid that they are getting from Egypt. I do not regard Colonel Nasser as our greatest friend in the Middle East, and Her Majesty's Government would not be happy to see Aden Colony absorbed into a Yemen dominated from Cairo.
  Yet there is no doubt that that is the policy favoured by Mr. Al Asnag and his associates in the Aden T.U.C. There is no question about that. I ask hon. Members opposite to bear that in mind when they align themselves, as I think

  329
  some hon. Members do, with the point of view of the Aden T.U.C., of which Al Asnag is the leader. At an Aden T.U.C. meeting on 17th October, he and others declared categorically that their party's aim was union with the Yemen.
  Meanwhile, as reported in The Times of 10th November—and my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State referred to this—Brigadier Sallal has made a broadcast speech over the Sana radio calling upon his friends in the protectorate States
  "to be ready for the battles we shall wage against colonialism."
  Mr. Healey Mr. Healey rose——
  Mr. Fisher: The hon. Member has interrupted me five times. I have only a few more minutes and I must be allowed to get on.
  Brigadier Sallal said:
  "I call on our brothers in the occupied south to be ready for revolution. They must follow their northern brothers, the republican Yemenis … we have great forces ready to fight on our side when we ask them to do so"
  and he mentioned the United Arab Republic.
  That was a naked threat to the Federation and to Britain. It is nothing more nor less than a Yemeni take-over bid. I can only comment that if any hon. Members were in doubt about our Aden policy before, I am surprised if in the aftermath of the Yemen republican revolution they still hold that same view.
  To sum up, the policy of hon. Members opposite—of elections before merger—would produce three possible results. It could lead to merger with the protectorate States, as at present, but a year later. It could lead to no merger at all if in a year's time the offer of merger was no longer open from the protectorate States, because that is certainly a possibility. The negotiations were protracted and difficult and I do not believe that these States would agree to any substantial variation in the terms, nor would they be at all ready to negotiate with other and less moderate Colony Ministers. If I am right in that, the offer of merger might no longer be open at the end of a year.
  The third possibility is that the policy of hon. Members opposite could lead to heavy pressure for merger with the Yemen, which would not be acceptable to this Government and which, if hon. Members opposite have any regard for the interests of the people of Aden and of this country, which I know they have—[Interruption.]—that sort of thing would not be acceptable to hon. Members on the Opposition Front Bench, either. I do not believe that right hon. and hon. Members opposite really favour union with the Yemen.
  Mr. Healey: Cyprus again.
  Mr. Fisher: I remind hon. Members of a famous speech in Julius Caesar, which is well-known to all hon. Members:
  "There is a tide in the affairs of men,
  Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune …
  On such a full sea are we now afloat;
  And we must take the current when it serves,
  Or lose our ventures."
  It is true that in the case of Brutus, that tide led on to Phillipi, but I do not see my right hon. Friend in the rôle of Brutus. I am certain we will succeed in this venture if we are bold enough to undertake it now. To abandon our course at the first sign of difficulty or danger would not only lack resolution, faith and courage: it would mean the abandonment of our whole merger project.
  I must ask hon. Members opposite this final question, because it is highly relevant to the whole of this evening's debate. Is the abandonment of the merger project the end that right hon. and hon. Members opposite really want? That is the inevitable and logical outcome of their Amendment. If so, let them say so. If not, I ask the House to reject the Amendment with the contempt that it deserves.
  Question put, That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question:—
  The House divided: Ayes 259, Noes 185.

  Division No. 3.]

  AYES

  [10.0 p.m.

  Agnew, Sir Peter

  Atkins, Humphrey

  Barter, John

  Allan, Robert (Paddington, S.)

  Balniel, Lord

  Batsford, Brian

  Allason, James

  Barber, Anthony

  Baxter, Sir Beverley (Southgate)

  Ashton, Sir Hubert

  Barlow, Sir John

  Beamish, Col. Sir Tufton

  Bell, Ronald

  Harris, Frederic (Croydon, N.W.)

  Pannell, Norman (Kirkdale)

  Bennett, F. M. (Torquay)

  Harris, Reader (Heston)

  Partridge, E.

  Bennett, Dr. Reginald (Gos & Fhm)

  Harrison, Brian (Maldon)

  Pearson, Frank (Clitheroe)

  Berkeley, Humphry

  Harvey, Sir Arthur Vere (Macclesf'd)

  Peyton, John

  Bevins, Rt. Hon. Reginald

  Harvey, John (Walthamstow, E.)

  Pickthorn, Sir Kenneth

  Biffen, John

  Harvie Anderson, Miss

  Pike, Miss Mervyn

  Biggs-Davison, John

  Heald, Rt. Hon. Sir Lionel

  Pilkington, Sir Richard

  Bingham, R. M.

  Henderson, John (Cathcart)

  Pitt, Dame Edith

  Birch, Rt. Hon. Nigel

  Hendry, Forbes

  Pott, Percivall

  Bishop, F. P.

  Hicks Beach, Maj. W.

  Powell, Rt. Hon. J. Enoch

  Black, Sir Cyril

  Hirst, Geoffrey

  Price, David (Eastleigh)

  Bossom, Clive

  Hobson, Sir John

  Price, H. A. (Lewisham, W.)

  Bourne-Arton, A.

  Hocking, Philip N.

  Prior, J. M. L.

  Box, Donald

  Holland, Philip

  Prior-Palmer, Brig. Sir Otho

  Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hon. John

  Hollingworth, John

  Profumo, Rt. Hon. John

  Braine, Bernard

  Hope, Rt. Hon. Lord John

  Proudfoot, Wilfred

  Brewis, John

  Hopkins, Alan

  Quennell, Miss J. M.

  Bromley-Davenport, Lt.-Col-Sir Walter

  Hornby, R. P.

  Rawlinson, Sir Peter

  Brooke, Rt. Hon. Henry

  Howard, Hon. G. R. (St. Ives)

  Redmayne, Rt. Hon. Martin

  Brown, Alan (Tottenham)

  Hughes Hallett, Vice-Admiral John

  Rees, Hugh

  Browne, Percy (Torrington)

  Hughes-Young, Michael

  Renton, Rt. Hon. David

  Buck, Antony

  Hulbert, Sir Norman

  Ridley, Hon. Nicholas

  Bullard, Denys

  Hurd, Sir Anthony

  Ridsdale, Julian

  Bullus, Wing Commander Eric

  Hutchison, Michael Clark

  Rippon, Rt. Hon. Geoffrey

  Butcher, Sir Herbert

  Iremonger, T. L.

  Ropner, Col. Sir Leonard

  Campbell, Sir David (Belfast, S.)

  James, David

  Royle, Anthony (Richmond, Surrey)

  Campbell, Cordon (Moray & Nairn)

  Jenkins, Robert (Dulwich)

  Russell, Ronald

  Carr, Compton (Barons Court)

  Johnson, Dr. Donald (Carlisle)

  St. Clair, M.

  Carr, Robert (Mitcham)

  Johnson, Eric (Blackley)

  Sandys, Rt. Hon. Duncan

  Cary, Sir Robert

  Johnson Smith, Geoffrey

  Scott-Hopkins, James

  Channon, H. P. G.

  Jones, Rt. Hn. Aubrey (Hall Green)

  Seymour, Leslie

  Chataway, Christopher

  Joseph, Rt. Hon. Sir Keith

  Sharples, Richard

  Clark, Henry (Antrim, N.)

  Kaberry, Sir Donald

  Smyth, Rt. Hon. Brig. Sir John

  Clark, William (Nottingham, S.)

  Kerans, Cdr. J. S.

  Soames, Rt. Hon. Christopher

  Clarke, Brig. Terence (Portsmth, W.)

  Kerby, Capt. Henry

  Spearman, Sir Alexander

  Cleaver, Leonard

  Kerr, Sir Hamilton

  Speir, Rupert

  Cooke, Robert

  Kimball, Marcus

  Stanley, Hon. Richard

  Cooper, A. E.

  Lambton, Viscount

  Stevens, Geoffrey

  Cooper-Key, Sir Neill

  Langford-Holt, Sir John

  Steward, Harold (Stockport, S.)

  Corfield, F. V.

  Leavey, J. A.

  Stodart, J. A.

  Costain, A. P.

  Leburn, Gilmour

  Stoddart-Scott, Col. Sir Malcolm

  Coulson, Michael

  Legge-Bourke, Sir Harry

  Storey, Sir Samuel

  Craddock, Sir Beresford

  Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)

  Studholme, Sir Henry

  Crawley, Aidan

  Lilley, F. J. P.

  Summers, Sir Spencer

  Critchley, Julian

  Lindsay, Sir Martin

  Tapsell, Peter

  Crosthwaite-Eyre, Col. Sir Oliver

  Linstead, Sir Hugh

  Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)

  Crowder, F. P.

  Lloyd. Rt Hn. Geoffrey (Sut'nc'dfield)

  Curran, Charles

  Lloyd, Rt. Hon. Selwyn (Wirral)

  Taylor, Edwin (Bolton, E.)

  Currie, G. B. H.

  Longbottom, Charles

  Taylor, Frank (M'ch'st'r, Moss Side)

  Dalkeith, Earl of

  Longden, Gilbert

  Taylor, W. J. (Bradford, N.)

  Dance, James

  Loveys, Walter H.

  Teellng, Sir William

  d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir Henry

  Lucas, Sir Jocelyn

  Temple, John M.

  Deedes, Rt. Hon. W. F.

  Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh

  Thomas, peter (Conway)

  Digby, Simon Wingfield

  McAdden, Sir Stephen

  Thompson, Kenneth (Walton)

  Doughty, Charles

  MacArthur, Ian

  Thompson, Richard (Croydon, S.)

  Drayson, G. B.

  McLean, Neil (Inverness)

  Thornton-Kemsley, Sir Colin

  du Cann, Edward

  Macleod, Rt. Hn. Iain (Enfield, W.)

  Tiley, Arthur (Bradford, W.)

  Duncan, Sir James

  Macpherson, Rt. Hn. Niall(Dumfries)

  Tilney, John (Wavertree)

  Elliot, Capt. Walter (Carshalton)

  Maddan, Martin

  Touche, Rt. Hon. Sir Gordon

  Elliott, R. W. (Nwcastle-upon-Tyne, N.)

  Maginnis, John E.

  Turner, Colin

  Emmet, Hon. Mrs. Evelyn

  Marshall, Douglas

  Turton, Rt. Hon. R. H.

  Errington, Sir Eric

  Marten, Neil

  Tweedsmulr, Lady

  Farey -Jones, F. W.

  Mathew, Robert (Honiton)

  van Straubenzee, W. R.

  Farr, John

  Matthews, Gordon (Meriden)

  Vane, W. M. F.

  Fisher, Nigel

  Mawby, Ray

  Vaughan-Morgan, Rt. Hon. Sir John

  Fletcher-Cooke, Charles

  Maxwell-Hyslop, R. J.

  Wakefield, Sir Wavell

  Foster, John

  Maydon, Lt.-Cmdr. S. L. C.

  Walder, David

  Fraser, Rt. Hn. Hugh(Stafford & Stone)

  Mills, Stratton

  Ward, Dame Irene

  Fraser, Ian (Plymouth, Sutton)

  Miscampbell, Norman

  Webster, David

  Gammans, Lady

  Montgomery, Fergus

  Wells, John (Maidstone)

  Gardner, Edward

  More, Jasper (Ludlow)

  Whitelaw, William

  Gilmour, Sir John

  Morgan, William

  Williams, Dudley (Exeter)

  Glyn, Dr. Alan (Clapham)

  Morrison, John

  Williams, Paul (Sunderland, S.)

  Glyn, Sir Richard (Dorset, N.)

  Mott-Radclyffe, Sir Charles

  Wills, Sir Gerald (Bridgwater)

  Goodhart, Philip

  Nabarro, Gerald

  Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)

  Goodhew, Victor

  Neave, Airey

  Wolrige-Gordon, Patrick

  Cough, Frederick

  Nicholls, Sir Harmar

  Woodhouse, C. M.

  Gower, Raymond

  Nugent, Rt. Hon. Sir Richard

  Woollam, John

  Grant-Ferris, R.

  Oakshott, Sir Hendrie

  Worsley, Marcus

  Gresham Cooke, R.

  Orr, Capt. L. P. S.

  Grosvenor, Lt.-Col. R. G.

  Osborn, John (Hallam)

  TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

  Gurden, Harold

  Osborne, Sir Cyril (Louth)

  Mr. Chichester-Clark and

  Hamilton, Michael (Wellingborough)

  Page, Graham (Crosby)

  Mr. Finlay.

  Hare, Rt. Hon. John

  Page, John (Harrow, West)

  332

  333

  NOES

  Abse, Leo

  Griffiths, W. (Exchange)

  Parkin, B. T.

  Ainsley, William

  Gunter, Ray

  Pavitt, Laurence

  Albu, Austen

  Hale, Leslie (Oldham, W.)

  Pearson, Arthur (Pontypridd)

  Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)

  Harper, Joseph

  Peart, Frederick

  Allen, Scholefield (Crewe)

  Hart, Mrs. Judith

  Pentland, Norman

  Awbery, Stan

  Hayman, F. H.

  Popplewell, Ernest

  Bacon, Miss Alice

  Healey, Denis

  Price, J. T. (Westhoughton)

  Baird, John

  Henderson, Rt. Hn. Arthur (Rwly Regis)

  Probert, Arthur

  Baxter, William (Stirlingshire, W.)

  Herbison, Miss Margaret

  Pursey, Cmdr. Harry

  Beaney, Alan

  Hewitson, Capt. M.

  Reynolds, G. W.

  Bellenger, Rt. Hon. F. J.

  Hill, J. (Midlothian)

  Rhodes, H.

  Bence, Cyril

  Holman, Percy

  Roberts, Albert (Normanton)

  Benson, Sir George

  Houghton, Douglas

  Roberts, Goronwy (Caernarvon)

  Blackburn, F.

  Howell, Denis (Small Heath)

  Robertson, John (Paisley)

  Blyton, William

  Hoy, James H.

  Rodgers, W. T. (Stockton)

  Boardman, H.

  Hughes, Cledwyn (Anglesey)

  Rogers, G.H.R. (Kensington, N.)

  Bowden, Rt. Hn. H.W. (Leics. S.W.)

  Hughes, Cmrys (S. Ayrshire)

  Ross, William

  Bowen, Roderic (Cardigan)

  Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)

  Royle, Charles (Salford, West)

  Boyden, James

  Hunter, A. E.

  Short, Edward

  Braddock, Mrs. E. M.

  Hynd, H. (Accrington)

  Silverman, Julius (Aston)

  Bray, Dr. Jeremy

  Hynd, John (Attercliffe)

  Silverman, Sydney (Nelson)

  Brockway, A. Fenner

  Irvine, A. J. (Edge Hill)

  Skeffington, Arthur

  Butler, Herbert (Hackney, C.)

  Irving, Sydney (Dartford)

  Slater, Mrs. Harriet (Stoke, N.)

  Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)

  Jeger, George

  Slater, Joseph (Sedgefield)

  Castle, Mrs. Barbara

  Johnson, Carol (Lewisham, S.)

  Small, William

  Chapman, Donald

  Jones, Elwyn (West Ham, S.)

  Snow, Julian

  Collick, Percy

  Jones, J. Idwal (Wrexham)

  Sorensen, R. W.

  Corbet, Mrs. Freda

  Jones, T. W. (Merioneth)

  Soskice, Rt. Hon. Sir Frank

  Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)

  Kelley, Richard

  Spriggs, Leslie

  Cronin, John

  Kenyon, Clifford

  Stewart, Michael (Fulham)

  Cullen, Mrs. Alice

  Key, Rt. Hon. C. W.

  Stonehouse, John

  Dalyell, Tam

  King, Dr. Horace

  Stones, William

  Darling, George

  Lawson, George

  Strachey, Rt. Hon. John

  Davies, G. Elfed (Rhondda, E.)

  Lever, Harold (Cheetham)

  Stross, Dr. Barnett (Stoke-on-Trent, C.)

  Davies, Harold (Leek)

  Lewis, Arthur (West Ham, N.)

  Swain, Thomas

  Davies, Ifor (Gower)

  Lipton, Marcus

  Swingler, Stephen

  Davies, S. O. (Merthyr)

  Loughlin, Charles

  Taverne, D.

  Deer, George

  Lubbock, Eric

  Taylor, Bernard (Mansfield)

  Delargy, Hugh

  Mabon, D. J. Dickson

  Thomas, George (Cardiff, W.)

  Diamond, John

  MacDermot, Niall

  Thomson, G. M. (Dundee, E.)

  Dodds, Norman

  McInnes, James

  Thornton, Ernest

  Donnelly, Desmond

  McKay, John (Wallsend)

  Thorpe, Jeremy

  Dugdale, Rt. Hon. John

  McLeavy, Frank

  Wade, Donald

  Ede, Rt. Hon. C.

  MacPherson, Malcolm (Stirling)

  Wainwright, Edwin

  Edelman, Maurice

  Mahon, Simon

  Warbey, William

  Edwards, Rt. Hon. Ness (Caerphilly)

  Manuel, Archie

  Wells, William (Walsall, N.)

  Edwards, Robert (Bilston)

  Mason, Roy

  White, Mrs. Eirene

  Edwards, Walter (Stepney)

  Millan, Bruce

  Whitlock, William

  Evans, Albert

  Milne, Edward

  Wigg, George

  Fernyhough, E.

  MitchiBon, G. R.

  Willey, Frederick

  Finch, Harold

  Monslow, Walter

  Williams, D. J. (Neath)

  Fitch, Alan

  Moody, A. S.

  Williams, LI. (Abertillery)

  Fletcher, Eric

  Moyle, Arthur

  Williams, W. R. (Openshaw)

  Foot, Michael (Ebbw Vale)

  Neal, Harold

  Williams, W. T. (Warrington)

  Fraser, Thomas (Hamilton)

  Noel-Baker, Francis (Swindon)

  Winterbottom, R. E.

  Gaitskell, Rt. Hon. Hugh

  Noel-Baker, Rt. Hn. Philip(Derby, S.)

  Woodburn, Rt. Hon. A.

  George, Lady Megan Lloyd (Crmrthn)

  Oliver, G. H.

  Woof, Robert

  Ginsburg, David

  Oram, A. E.

  Yates, Victor (Ladywood)

  Gordon Walker, Rt. Hon. P. C.

  Oswald, Thomas

  Zilliacus, K.

  Greenwood, Anthony

  Owen, Will

  Grey, Charles

  Padley, W. E.

  TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

  Griffiths, David (Rother Valley)

  Pargiter, R. G.

  Mr. Charles A. Howell and

  Griffiths, Rt. Hon. James (Llanelly)

  Parker, John

  Dr. Broughton.

  Main Question put:—
  The House divided: AYES 253, Noes 181.

  Division No. 4.]

  AYES

  [10.11 p.m.

  Agnew, Sir Peter

  Beamish, Col. Sir Tufton

  Bishop, F. P.

  Allan, Robert (Paddington, S.)

  Bell, Ronald

  Slack, Sir Cyril

  Allason, James

  Bennett, F. M. (Torquay)

  Bossom, Clive

  Ashton, Sir Hubert

  Bennett, Dr. Reginald (Gos & Fhm)

  Bourne-Arton, A.

  Atkins, Humphrey

  Berkeley, Humphry

  Box, Donald

  Balniel, Lord

  Bevins, Rt. Hon. Reginald

  Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hon. John

  Barber, Anthony

  Biffen, John

  Braine, Bernard

  Barlow, Sir John

  Biggs-Davison, John

  Brewis, John

  Barter, John

  Bingham, R, M.

  Bromley-Davenport, Lt.-Col. Sir Walter

  Batsford, Brian

  Birch, Rt. Hon. Nigel

  Brooke, Rt. Hon. Henry

  Brown, Alan (Tottenham)

  Hirst, Geoffrey

  Pike, Miss Mervyn

  Browne, Percy (Torrington)

  Hobson, Sir John

  Pilkington, Sir Richard

  Buck, Antony

  Hocking, Philip N.

  Pitt, Dame Edith

  Bullard, Denye

  Holland, Philip

  Pott, Percivall

  Bullus, wing Commander Eric

  Hollingworth, John

  Powell, Rt. Hon. J. Enoch

  Butcher, Sir Herbert

  Hope, Rt. Hon. Lord John

  Price, David (Eastleigh)

  Campbell, Sir David (Belfast, S.)

  Hopkins, Alan

  Price, H. A. (Lewisham, W.)

  Campbell, Gordon(Moray & Nairn)

  Hornby, R. P.

  Prior, J. M. L.

  Carr, Compton (Barons Court)

  Howard, Hon. G. R. (St. Ives)

  Prior-Palmer, Brig. Sir Otho

  Carr, Robert (Mitcham)

  Hughes-Young, Michael

  Profumo, Rt. Hon. John

  Cary, Sir Robert

  Hulbert, Sir Norman

  Proudfoot, Wilfred

  Channon, H. P. G.

  Hurd, Sir Anthony

  Quennell, Miss J. M.

  Chataway, Christopher

  Hutchison, Michael Clark

  Rawlinson, Sir Peter

  Clark, Henry (Antrim, N.)

  Iremonger, T. L.

  Redmayne, Rt. Hon. Martin

  Clark, William (Nottingham, S.)

  James, David

  Rees, Hugh

  Clarke, Brig. Terence(Portsmth, W.)

  Jenkins, Robert (Dulwich)

  Renton, Rt. Hon. David

  Cleaver, Leonard

  Johnson, Dr. Donald (Carlisle)

  Ridley, Hon. Nicholas

  Cooke, Robert

  Johnson, Eric (Blackley)

  Ridsdale, Julian

  Cooper, A. E.

  Johnson Smith, Geoffrey

  Rippon, Rt. Hon. Geoffrey

  Cooper-Key, Sir Neill

  Jones, Rt. Hn. Aubrey (Hall Green)

  Ropner, Col. Sir Leonard

  Corfield, F. V.

  Joseph, Rt. Hon. Sir Keith

  Royle, Anthony (Richmond, Surrey)

  Kaberry, Sir Donald

  Russell, Ronald

  Costain, A. P.

  Kerans, Cdr. J. S.

  St. Clair, M.

  Coulson, Michael

  Kerby, Capt. Henry

  Sandys, Rt. Hon. Duncan

  Craddock, Sir Beresford

  Kerr, Sir Hamilton

  Scott-Hopkins, James

  Crawley, Aidan

  Kimball, Marcus

  Seymour, Leslie

  Critchley, Julian

  Lambton, Viscount

  Sharples, Richard

  Crosthwaite-Eyre, Col. Sir Oliver

  Langford-Holt, Sir John

  Smith, Dudley (Br'ntf'd & Chiswick)

  Crowder, F. P.

  Leavey, J. A.

  Smyth, Rt. Hon. Brig. Sir John

  Curran, Charles

  Leburn, Gilmour

  Soames, Rt. Hon. Christopher

  Currie, G. B. H.

  Legge-Bourke, Sir Harry

  Spearman, Sir Alexander

  Dalkeith, Earl of

  Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)

  Speir, Rupert

  Dance, James

  Lilley, F. J. P.

  Stanley, Hon. Richard

  d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir Henry

  Lindsay, Sir Martin

  Stevens, Geoffrey

  Deedes, Rt. Hon. W. F.

  Linstead, Sir Hugh

  Steward, Harold (Stockport, S.)

  Digby, Simon Wingfield

  Lloyd, Rt. Hn. Geoffrey (Sut'nC'dfield)

  Stodart, J. A.

  Doughty, Charles

  Lloyd, Rt. Hon. Selwyn (Wirral)

  Storey, Sir Samuel

  Drayson, G. B.

  Longbottom, Charles

  Studholme, Sir Henry

  du Cann, Edward

  Longden, Gilbert

  Summers, Sir Spencer

  Duncan, Sir James

  Loveys, Walter H.

  Tapsell, Peter

  Elliot, Capt. Walter (Carshalton)

  Lucas, Sir Jocelyn

  Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)

  Elliott, R.W.(Nwcastle-upon-Tyne, N.)

  Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh

  Taylor, Edwin (Bolton, E.)

  Emmet, Hon. Mrs. Evelyn

  MacArthur, Ian

  Taylor, Frank (M'ch'st'r, Moss Side)

  Errington, Sir Eric

  McLean, Neil (Inverness)

  Taylor, W. J. (Bradford, N.)

  Farey-Jones, F. W.

  Macleod, Rt. Hn. Iain (Enfield, W.)

  Farr, John

  Macpherson, Rt. Hn. Niall(Dumfries)

  Teeling, Sir William

  Fisher, Nigel

  Maddan, Martin

  Temple, John M.

  Fletcher-Cooke, Charles

  Maginnis, John E.

  Thomas, Peter (Conway)

  Foster, John

  Marshall, Douglas

  Thomson, Kenneth (Walton)

  Fraser, Rt. Hn. Hugh (Stafford & Stone)

  Marten, Neil

  Thompson, Richard (Croydon, S.)

  Fraser, Ian (Plymouth, Sutton)

  Mathew Robert (Honiton)

  Thornton-Kemsley, Sir Colin

  Gammans, Lady

  Matthews, Gordon (Meriden)

  Tiley, Arthur (Bradford, W.)

  Gardner, Edward

  Mawby, Ray

  Tilney, John (Wavertree)

  Gilmour, Sir John

  Maxwell-Hyslop, R. J.

  Touche, Rt. Hon. Sir Gordon

  Glyn, Dr. Alan (Clapham)

  Maydon, Lt.-Cmdr. S. L. C.

  Turner, Colin

  Glyn, Sir Richard (Dorset, N.)

  Mills, Stratton

  Turton, Rt. Hon. R. H.

  Goodhart, Philip

  Miscampbell, Norman

  van Straubenzee, W. R.

  Goodhew, Victor

  Montgomery Fergus

  Vane, W. M. F.

  Cough, Frederick

  More, Jasper (Ludlow)

  Vaughan-Morgan, Rt. Hon. Sir John

  Gower, Raymond

  Morgan, William

  Wakefield, Sir Wavell

  Grant-Ferris, R,

  Morrison, John

  Walder, David

  Gresham Cooke, R.

  Mott-Radclyffe, Sir Charles

  Ward, Dame Irene

  Grosvenor, Lt.-Col. R. G.

  Nabarro, Gerald

  Webster, David

  Gurden, Harold

  Neave, Airey

  Wells, John (Maidstone)

  Hamilton, Michael (Wellingborough)

  Nicholls, Sir Harmar

  Whitelaw, William

  Hare, Rt. Hon. John

  Nugent, Rt. Hon. Sir Richard

  Williams, Dudley (Exeter)

  Harris, Frederic (Croydon, N.W.)

  Oakshott, Sir Hendrie

  Williams, Paul (Sunderland, S.)

  Harris, Reader (Heston)

  Orr, Capt. L. P. S.

  Wills, Sir Gerald (Bridgwater)

  Harrison, Brian (Maldon)

  Osborn, John (Hallam)

  Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)

  Harvey, Sir Arthur Vere (Macclesf'd)

  Osborne, Sir Cyril (Louth)

  Wolrige-Gordon, Patrick

  Harvey, John (Walthamstow, E.)

  Page, Graham (Crosby)

  Woodhouse, C. M.

  Harvie Anderson, Miss

  Page, John (Harrow, West)

  Woollam, John

  Heald, Rt. Hon. Sir Lionel

  Pannell, Norman (Kirkdale)

  Worsley, Marcus

  Henderson, John (Cathcart)

  Partridge, E.

  Hendry, Forbes

  Pearson, Frank (Clitheroe)

  TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

  Hicks Beach, Maj. W.

  Peyton, John

  Mr. Chichester-Clark and

  Mr. Finlay.

  NOES

  Abse, Leo

  Awbery, Stan

  Bellenger, Rt. Hon. F. J.

  Ainsley, William

  Bacon, Miss Alice

  Bence, Cyril

  Albu, Austen

  Baird, John

  Benson, Sir George

  Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)

  Baxter, William (Stirlingshire, W.)

  Blackburn, F.

  Allen, Scholefield (Crewe)

  Beaney, Alan

  Blyton, William

  336

  337

  Boardman, H.

  Hill, J. (Midlothian)

  Price, J. T. (Westhoughton)

  Bowden, Rt. Hn. H. W. (Leics. S. W.)

  Holman, Percy

  Probert, Arthur

  Bowen, Frederic (Cardigan)

  Houghton, Douglas

  Pursey, Cmdr. Harry

  Boyden, James

  Howell, Denis (Small Heath)

  Reynolds, G. W.

  Braddock, Mrs. E. M.

  Hoy, James H.

  Rhodes, H.

  Bray, Dr. Jeremy

  Hughes, Cledwyn (Anglesey)

  Roberts, Albert (Normanton)

  Brockway, A. Fenner

  Hughes, Emrys (S. Ayrshire)

  Roberts, Goronwy (Caernarvon)

  Butler, Herbert (Hackney, C.)

  Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)

  Robertson, John (Paisley)

  Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)

  Hunter, A. E.

  Rodgers, W. T. (Stockton)

  Castle, Mrs. Barbara

  Hynd, John (Attercliffe)

  Rogers, G. H. R. (Kensington, N.)

  Chapman, Donald

  Irvine, A. J. (Edge Hill)

  Ross, William

  Collick, Percy

  Irving, Sydney (Dartford)

  Royle, Charles (Salford, West)

  Corbet, Mrs. Freda

  Jeger, George

  Short, Edward

  Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)

  Johnson, Carol (Lewisham, s.)

  Silverman, Julius (Aston)

  Cronin, John

  Jones, Elwyn (West Ham, S.)

  Silverman, Sydney (Nelson)

  Jones, J. Idwal (Wrexham)

  Skeffington, Arthur

  Cullen, Mrs. Alice

  Jones, T. W. (Merioneth)

  Slater, Mrs. Harriet (Stoke, N.)

  Dalyell, Tam

  Kelley, Richard

  Slater, Jo eon (Sedgefield)

  Davies, C. Elfed (Rhondda, E.)

  Kenyon, Clifford

  Small, William

  Davies, Harold (Leek)

  Key, Rt. Hon. C. W.

  Snow, Julian

  Davies, Ifor (Gower)

  King, Dr. Horace

  Sorensen, R. W.

  Davies, S. O. (Merthyr)

  Lawson, George

  Soskice, Rt. Hon. Sir Frank

  Deer, George

  Lever, Harold (Cheetham)

  Sp Iggs, Leslie

  Delargy, Hugh

  Lewis, Arthur (West Ham, N.)

  Stewart, Michael (Fulham)

  Diamond, John

  Lipton, Marcus

  Stonehouse, John

  Dodds, Norman

  Loughlin, Charles

  Stones, William

  Donnelly, Desmond

  Lubbock, Eric

  Strachey, Rt. Hon. John

  Dugdale, Rt. Hon. John

  Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson

  Stross, Dr. Barnett (Stoke-on-Trent, C.)

  Edelman, Maurice

  McInnes, James

  Swain, Thomas

  Edwards, Rt. Hon. Ness (Caerphilly)

  McKay, John (Wallsend)

  Swingler, Stephen

  Edwards, Robert (Bilston)

  McLeavy, Frank

  Taverne, D.

  Edwards, Walter (Stepney)

  MacPherson, Malcolm (Stirling)

  Taylor, Bernard (Mansfield)

  Evans, Albert

  Mahon, Simon

  Thomas, George (Cardiff, W.)

  Fernyhough, E.

  Manuel, Archie

  Thomson, G. M. (Dundee, E.)

  Finch, Harold

  Mason, Roy

  Thornton, Ernest

  Fitch, Alan

  Millan, Bruce

  Thorpe, Jeremy

  Fletcher, Eric

  Milne, Edward

  Wade, Donald

  Foot, Michael (Ebbw Vale)

  Mitchison, G. R.

  Wainwright, Edwin

  Fraser, Thomas (Hamilton)

  Monslow, Walter

  Warbey, William

  Gaitskell, Rt. Hon. Hugh

  Moody, A. S.

  Wells, William (Walsall, N.)

  George, Lady Megan Lloyd (Crmrthn)

  Moyle, Arthur

  White, Mrs. Eirene

  Ginsburg, David

  Neat, Harold

  Whitlock, William

  Gordon Walker, Rt. Hon. P. C.

  Noel-Baker, Francis (Swindon)

  Wigg, George

  Greenwood, Anthony

  Noel-Baker, Rt. Hn. Philip (Derby, S.)

  Willey, Frederick

  Grey, Charles

  Oliver, G. H.

  Williams, D. J. (Neath)

  Griffiths, David (Rother Valley)

  Oram, A. E.

  Williams, LI. (Abertillery)

  Griffiths, Rt. Hon. James (Llanelly)

  Oswald, Thomas

  Williams, W. R. (Openshaw)

  Griffiths, W. (Exchange)

  Owen, Will

  Williams, W. T. (Warrington)

  Gunter, Ray

  Padley, W. E.

  Winterbottom, R. E.

  Hale, Leslie (Oldham, W.)

  Pargiter, G. A.

  Woodburn, Rt. Hon. A.

  Harper, Joseph

  Parker, John

  Woof, Robert

  Hart, Mrs. Judith

  Parkin, B. T.

  Yates, Victor (Ladywood)

  Hayman, F. H.

  Pavitt, Laurence

  Zilliacus, K.

  Healey, Denis

  Pearson, Arthur (Pontypridd)

  Henderson, Rt. Hn. Arthur (Rwly Regis)

  Peart, Frederick

  TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

  Herbison, Miss Margaret

  Pentland, Norman

  Mr. Charles A. Howell and

  Hewitson, Capt. M.

  Popplewell, Ernest

  Dr. Brougbton.

  Resolved,
  That this House approves the policy set out in the White Paper on the Accession of Aden to the Federation of South Arabia (Command Paper No. 1814).

  WEIGHTS AND MEASURES [MONEY]
  Resolution reported,
  That for the purposes of any Act of the present Session to make amended provision with respect to weights and measures it is expedient to authorize—
  338

  (a) the payment out of moneys provided by Parliament—

  (i) of any expenses incurred by any government department under that Act other than expenses incurred by the Postmaster General;

  (ii) of any increase attributable to the provisions of that Act in the sums payable out of moneys so provided under any other enactment;

  (b) the payment into the Exchequer of any sums received by the Board of Trade under that Act.

  Resolution agreed to.

  CEMENT DUST NUISANCE, NORTH-WEST KENT
  Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Campbell.]
  10.21 p.m.
  Mr. Sydney Irving: In my constituency and, I believe, in this House, I have some reputation for moderation, but, despite this, I think it very difficult to find strong enough words to express the exasperation, the resentment and anger that my constituents and many people in North-West Kent feel about the appalling fall-out of cement dust which they have experienced on at least five occasions in the last twelve months.
  In conveying my constituents' very strong feelings, I say two things to the Parliamentary Secretary. There is an ever-increasing demand for action and a feeling that we want no further excuses in this matter. Secondly, there is an increasing demand in many quarters that if Parliamentary action fails to bring this nuisance under control, more unorthodox methods of calling attention to this appalling problem must be devised.
  In June, the Minister's predecessor met a deputation from the Thames-side Joint Committee for the Abatement of Atmospheric Pollution, led by myself. That Committee is a joint committee consisting of the twelve local authorities in North-West Kent whose areas are affected by cement dust. You, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, may have seen by a Question on the Order Paper this afternoon, asked by my hon. Friend the Member for Woolwich, East (Mr. Mayhew), that the pollution of the atmosphere caused by cement dust extends even further than the areas of the local authorities which are members of the joint committee.
  While protesting most strongly about the serious deterioration last winter, the deputation made eight recommendations to the Minister. The first was that a plan should be formulated whereby within a prescribed period all kilns should be provided with modern precipitators. The second was that no works should be operated without effective electrostatic precipitators, and the third that all precipitators should be provided with auto-
  340
  matic "continuity of operation" recording apparatus. The fourth recommendation was that the Committee should be in a position to know that continuous attention to maintenance and supervision is being provided.
  The fifth recommendation—and this is very important—was that throughput should be related to precipitator efficiency. The sixth recommendation was that if legislation did not provide this at the moment, then new legislation should be introduced as soon as possible to provide it. The seventh recommendation was that an experiment should be undertaken with automatic equipment for recording the burden of flue gases. Finally, it was recommended that a project should be undertaken on Thames-side by the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research on the lines of that undertaken in Scotland at the request of the Department of Health for Scotland. The terms of reference were to be—
  "to find out what total emission is to be expected from day to day from a variety of industrial processes and what scope there is for improvement."
  I and my constituents would like to know tonight what progress has been made in implementing the recommendations put forward by that deputation when they met the Minister in June. The Minister gave the deputation some assurances. He announced that planning permission had been granted for the use of Essex clay in place of the Cliffe clay which was undoubtedly a major factor in the deterioration which took place last winter. Since that time we have had another very heavy fallout.
  Will the Minister say tonight what progress has been made in securing supplies of Essex clay and how long it will be before enough is available for all the Thames-side works which require it? Will he also say what progress has been made in securing the installation of special recording equipment? It was felt that it was wrong for the inspectorate to have to rely on combines for information so that they could supervise the process for which they were responsible.
  One firm, Evans Electroselenium Ltd., which has had experience in work for

  341
  the Central Electricity Authority, was prepared at its own expense to install equipment for monitoring flue gases for an experimental period of three months. Will the Minister say what advantage has been taken of this offer? If expense is the difficulty, may I draw attention to a simple, cheap and efficient method of sampling the flue gases which is described in an article in the Institute of Fuel Journal of February, 1960, by Mr. B. Lees.
  Having said this, I would point out that the Alkali &c. Works Act, 1906, lays upon the Minister a clear obligation to ensure that the best practicable means are employed to prevent this nuisance. In my view, the public are entitled to a clear statement from the Minister whether the best practicable means are being employed by the cement manufacturers to prevent this nuisance. If the Minister is insisting on improvements in the dust arrestment equipment, the public are entitled to know, first of all, what these are, and secondly, the timetable which he has set for these improvements. Thirdly, if for any reason this time-table cannot be carried out, they should have a clear indication of the reasons why.
  So far we have had no such statement, and in its absence it is not surprising that local people feel that all they get from the Ministry are excuses and think, in view of the high profits which the manufacturers are making, that they are proceeding without proper care for the health, welfare and amenity of people living in the area.
  There can be no doubt about the seriousness of the nuisance. In parts of my constituency the dust falls at the rate of 100 tons a square mile per month, and the gauge readings last winter showed the highest deposits of dust since readings were commenced in 1954. But one does not need to take a gauge to measure the dust in North-West Kent. Those people who have lived there for at least a quarter of a century say that conditions are worse now than they have ever experienced in that long period.
  Local doctors believe that it aggravates bronchitic and asthmatic conditions. Farmers and growers have protested to the Minister about the effects it has for them. Only last month the
  342
  North-West Kent Growers' Branch of the National Farmers' Union passed this Resolution:
  "That this North-West Kent Growers' Branch of the National Farmers' Union views with grave concern the ever increasing quantity of cement residue covering their glasshouses and crops, causing considerable financial loss and expense, and threatening the members' very livelihood, and requests the Minister and all concerned to take some urgent positive action to alleviate the nuisance."
  Private individuals have shown their disgust in the thousands of cards which have showered on the Minister's desk in the last few weeks. The figure he gave me on 24th October was 13,500 cards. The figure has probably risen since then. Perhaps he will give me some more up-to-date information. If I read a paragraph from a letter which two housewives enclosed with a petition recently, after they had visited many houses, it will sum up the nuisance effectively. They say this:
  "The cement dust comes over in billowing grey clouds, descends like a fog, coating pavements and cars and smothering gardens and fields. We have heard the same story, not only from housewives, but also from the staff of four local hospitals, shopkeepers, café and public house proprietors, who all complain bitterly about the unceasing struggle to keep food and premises free from cement dust. It creeps into food and crockery cupboards, smothers vegetables, flowers and trees in the gardens, ruins paintwork and soft furnishings, fills gutters and clogs the drains, and spoils the housewives' family wash. It is accompanied by a vile sulphurous smell, and at night windows have to be kept closed—but still the dust and smell penetrate."
  Will the Minister therefore give us a clear assurance tonight that the best practical means are being employed? Will he publish a plan of the improvements he is insisting upon? Above all, will he give us a categorical assurance that at all times the throughput of gases will be related to the efficiency of the precipitators?
  In my view, the worst of this nuisance could be remedied if the Minister was willing to act resolutely enough. The new precipitators fitted recently at Bevan works are capable, according to the manufacturers, Messrs. Lodge Cotterell, of a working efficiency of 99·9 per cent. If plant of this standard of efficiency with proper provision for maintenance while giving continuity of performance were to be installed, the dust nuisance could be virtually overcome. No one wants to interfere with

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  the manufacture of cement in which the industry is undoubtedly doing a valuable job, but I am certain that the public wants to know and is entitled to know that proper steps are being taken to prevent this nuisance.
  The members of the Thames-side Joint Committee are meeting next on Friday evening of this week. I am certain that they will once again wish to come and see the Minister. I hope that, if they do, the Minister will agree to see them at the earliest possible moment.
  Finally, if the Minister cannot give the assurances for which I have asked tonight and there is another heavy fall of dust, these twelve authorities will be justified, in my view, in making an application to him for his consent under Section 92 (1, d) of the Public Health Act, 1936, to take action in the courts to secure an abatement notice. I must warn the Minister that in the present state of public feeling they are very likely to decide to do just that, as well as also considering other forms of legal action. In this modern age when we are concentrating on smokeless zones and clean air, it is incredible that this pollution of the atmosphere should be allowed to continue. I hope that the Minister will be able to give us some hope of an early improvement.
  10.35 p.m.
  The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Housing and Local Government (Mr. F. V. Corfield): I should like to say at once that my right hon. Friend fully accepts as justified this public complaint about the heavy fall of dust last month in North-West Kent, and I can assure the hon. Member for Dartford (Mr. Sydney Irving) that emergency measures have been taken which should prevent the same thing happening again. I appreciate the hon. Member's feelings in the matter, and I appreciate his moderation, even though he was not, perhaps, quite as moderate as usual tonight. The hon. Member suggested that he was certain that this matter could be met by really resolute action on the part of my right hon. Friend. I can assure him that my right hon. Friend is taking that action, and I hope that by the time I have finished I shall have been able to give him the assurance he seeks.
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  The House will certainly want to know what went wrong, and what has been done to prevent it going wrong again, and I am glad to have the opportunity of explaining. I must apologise particularly to those hon. Members who are concerned, and they include my right hon. Friend the Lord Privy Seal, all of whom have been naturally worried about the effect of this dust fall-out on their constituencies.
  As the hon. Member has stated, the most effective device for trapping dust from cement manufacture is the electrical precipitator. Incidentally, this is a device that has been pioneered in this country in large-scale use in cement factories. Under ordinary circumstances, and I think that the hon. Member agrees with me here, it is a remarkably efficient device and traps a very high proportion of the dust in the flue gases. The works which caused last month's troubles are fitted with these devices, but they were not working properly. I will tell the House why, though here I have to be a little technical.
  As the hon. Member no doubt knows, chalk and clay are the two basic raw materials from which cement is made in this area. The clay pits from which the two companies concerned—The Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers and the British Portland Cement Manufacturers—have been drawing their supplies for many years for their south bank works, are very near to exhaustion, and these works not long ago started to use a very considerably increasing amount of clay from the Cliffe marshes, which the hon. Member mentioned.
  The reason why this clay is so unsatisfactory is that it has been affected by salt water from the big floods in the early 'fifties. That was not realised at the time the decision was taken to use this material, and I must say that I think that, looking hack, nobody can be blamed either for that lack of realisation or for the failure to anticipate the effects. As a result of this flooding, the alkali content of the clay is much higher than could have been reasonably anticipated, and its use has resulted in a very substantial increase in the dust content of the waste gases which, in turn, has caused blockages and erratic operation and failure of the precipitators. This dust, as I am sure the hon. Member is

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  aware. is very light and, in some cases, resembles fluff more than dust as it is generally understood.
  As soon as the unsuitability of the clay was appreciated, I can assure the House that the companies took energetic measures to find an alternative source of supply. Such a source was found across the estuary in Essex, planning permission has been obtained, and orders placed for the necessary excavating machinery.
  There was a further serious failure of the precipitators in two works in October while this high-alkali clay was still being used, at a time when the weather was foggy and prevented the rise and dispersal of the chimney gases. This was the direct cause of the recent particularly heavy fall to which the hon. Member has referred. I am afraid that it will be about twelve months before the Essex clay can be worked and brought across the river in sufficient quantity to supply all the works where it is needed. But the Chief Alkali Inspector of my Department has impressed on the companies the extreme importance of cutting out any avoidable delays, and I can assure hon. Members that he will keep the closest watch on the progress being made. He has made it clear to the companies that any avoidable delays in getting this new clay to the works cannot be tolerated.
  The excavating machinery cannot, I understand, be delivered for some time, and it cannot be much less than a year, as I have indicated, before full-scale delivery of the clay is possible. Meanwhile, other measures have been taken to keep the use of this high-alkali clay to a minimum until the Essex clay becomes available.
  One of the works most concerned is already back on suitable clay, and I am told that reversion to high-alkali clay is unlikely. A second works is back on its old source of clay, but here the clay may possibly not last out the full twelve months. I am afraid that, at this stage, I cannot go beyond a firm assurance that the barrel really will be scraped before there is a change over to the tse of high-alkali clay. At a third works, three of the four kilns are likely to have to stay on the high-alkali
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  clay for the present, but here a new chimney has recently been commissioned and the Chief Inspector's preliminary view is that if the utmost care is exercised—and he will make it his business to see that it is—the dust lust emission can be kept low enough to avoid grounds for complaint. At the fourth works there has been little, if any, use of high-alkali clay and its clay pit should be adequate until Essex supplies are available.
  That is the position with regard to the recent troubles. It is undeniable that in recent months there has been a regrettable tendency towards increased dust emission from three of the four works on the south bank, culminating in a major fall of dust last month. I should like, on behalf of myself and my right hon. Friend, to express my sympathy to everyone who was inconvenienced, and I can give them an assurance that he is keeping this matter under the closest possible scrutiny.
  The root cause of the new trouble has been discovered, and it should be permanently cured within twelve months. Meanwhile, there are good grounds for hoping that the emergency measures agreed with the companies will prevent another dust fall such as we have had recently. Up to the last few months the record of complaints had been improving greatly. Something like 4 million tons of cement are made annually in an area of eight square miles—probably the greatest concentration in the world—and I am afraid that we must face the facts and accept that this concentration rules out the possibility of ever being able to give a complete guarantee of entire freedom from dust nuisance in this area.
  However, an enormous amount has been done since the war. The installation of an electrical precipitator at today's prices costs about £100,000, and no fewer than eleven new precipitators have been installed since 1948 while, at the same time, as many of the pre-war precipitators have received a major overhaul or have been rebuilt in the same period. In addition, there has been the new 350 ft. chimney stack at the Bevan works in 1960 and the 400 ft. chimney at the Swanscombe works completed this year. This is the one to which I referred and which is in use.

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  I am glad to have had this opportunity of making it clear that the Alkali Inspectorate does not merely sit back and do nothing. Our inspectorate has been active and has found the industry co-operative, and there is no doubt that the industry has expended considerable sums of money in trying to overcome the difficulty we have been discussing.
  I can definitely say that the standards which the Inspectorate set are second to none in the world, and the companies have, as I have said, met the requirements and spent a very large sum of money on these installations. However, even apart from the recent particularly bad outbreak, there is no doubt that there was too much dust in this area and some of these measures were necessary in any case. I believe that they will lead to a very substantial improvement as soon as we have a complete return to the proper raw material.
  At this stage, because there have been references to health hazards, I should explain that the dust is not really cement dust in the true sense. It is a dust arising from the dried raw materials, namely, chalk and clay. I am assured that there is no health hazard, though this is not to deny for a moment that there is a nuisance.
  The hon. Gentleman asked about instruments for measuring the dust fallout. I am advised that instruments for steady measurement of the flue gases are still very much in the development stage, but I will look into the matter further.
  The hon. Gentleman said that he had accompanied a deputation which discussed this nuisance with my right hon. Friend's predecessor, and he referred to the assurances which he was given. I assure him again that my right hon. Friend stands absolutely four-square by those undertakings and assurances. Our Chief Alkali Inspector's objective is to agree with the companies a firm programme for ensuring that all the Thames-side kilns are fitted with precipitators of the highest efficiency. With this end in view, we are arranging for further tests to be carried out on the performance of the devices which are now in use. As soon as these tests are completed, he will discuss with the industry
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  what further steps he considers necessary. Meanwhile, immediate steps are in hand to order a modern type of precipitator for the only kiln now working which is without one. Perhaps I should explain why this kiln is without a precipitator. It was expected to close. Now that its future is assured, it will be brought up to the required standards and provided with the most modern type of precipitator.
  As the hon. Gentleman fully realises, the contribution which the industry makes to our economy is essential, and no one would suggest action which would lessen that contribution. On Thames-side there is this concentration. It could, I think, with truth be regarded as the birth-place of the cement industry in this country, if not in the world. It was there well before the First World War, and some of it goes back, I am told, even to the 1820's when the process was first thought of. That development preceded the development of the modern cleaning devices we have been discussing. I think it should be borne in mind also that it, no doubt, preceded a great deal of the present residential development in the area, though I do not for a moment suggest that that means that we should tolerate a nuisance which can be avoided.
  My right hon. Friend is determined that all the practical steps which can be taken shall be taken, and he is confident that in this he will continue to have the willing co-operation of the industry. I stress again that neither he nor I are in any way lacking in sympathy for the nuisance which has been suffered by the local residents in the constituencies of the hon. Member for Dartford and other hon. Members.
  I have been into this matter with a good deal of care, and I feel that I can honestly give the assurance for which the hon. Gentleman asks, namely, that everything reasonably possible is being done to ameliorate the nuisance. We shall definitely continue to keep the position under review and do everything possible to expedite the various measures to which I have referred.
  Question put and agreed to.
  Adjourned accordingly at ten minutes to Eleven o'clock.