FOREIGN AFFAIRS

HC Deb 11 February 1960 vol 617 cc679-805

Order read for resuming adjourned debate on Amendment to Question [10th February]: That this House, deeply concerned to ensure that the disarmament negotiations and summit talks shall result in real progress towards stopping the arms race and ending the cold war, regrets the failure of Her Majesty's Government to advance and sustain practical proposals to this end and, in particular, calls upon Her Majesty's Government to press for the limitation and control of forces and weapons in Central Europe as a first step towards a wider political settlement in that area and as a means of relaxing tension over Berlin; and further deplores the fact that Her Majesty's Government has consented to the steps that are being taken towards the arming of West German forces with nuclear weapons before the summit talks have been held, thereby prejudicing their prospects of success.—[Mr. Healey.]

Which Amendment was, to leave out from "House" to the end of the Question and to add instead thereof: approves the steps taken by Her Majesty's Government to reduce international tension and make possible a summit meeting; expresses its earnest hopes for the success of this meeting and of the disarmament negotiations; and, while re-affirming its support of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and of the policy approved by the House on 18th November, 1954, for obtaining an effective German contribution to Western defence, welcomes the outline plan for comprehensive disarmament put forward by Her Majesty's Government in September, 1959".—[Mr. Selwyn Lloyd.]

Question again proposed, That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question.

4.14 p.m.

The Minister of Defence (Mr. Harold Watkinson)

Perhaps I might start with an initial response to the speech made last night by the right hon. Member for Derby, South (Mr. P. Noel-Baker) and say that I am quite certain that on one thing at least in this debate the whole House can agree. We all want to see a more peaceful world, as he said last night. We all recognise—at least I hope we do—that disarmament, under proper safeguards, is the best means of achieving that end, and we all hope that progress will be made in the Disarmament Sub-Committee and at the Summit talks.

However, the Opposition Motion, I presume, is not to try to find common ground, but rather to show that there is some great difference between the Opposition and the Government on these issues on which the peace of the world depends. I quite accept what the right hon. Member said last night about the dangers of a world ever more highly armed with weapons of great complexity and destructive power. However, I think it is fair to say at the opening of my remarks that, having listened to the debate yesterday, it did not appear to me that most speeches from the benches opposite were in terms that might be held to support a major Motion of censure. I do not complain about that. I think this issue ought to be treated as factually and as plainly as we can treat it. Therefore, I propose to restrict my remarks today primarily to the defence aspects of the case, particularly to the question of German rearmament, which I think ran through the speeches of almost every hon. Member who spoke yesterday.

A Minister of Defence, especially a new one who has had carefully to examine his responsibilities, probably knows better than most hon. Members the amount of world-wide destruction that would follow any extensive use of the modern weapons of war. I am not in any doubt, therefore, of the importance of this issue, but the first point I want to make is that this is not a new issue. It is something that we have lived with for a number of years. I think it only fair to the general balance of this debate to point out that, for example in the speech of the right hon. Member for Derby, South and in the speeches of other hon. Members in this debate, the Opposition Motion of censure has been presented in terms—particularly the last portion of it—that would seem to imply that there is some new decision recently taken, or perhaps about to be taken, that completely alters the position on the supply of nuclear weapons to Germany.

Of course, that is not so and speech after speech by my right hon. Friends, including my right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary, has made it quite plain that what is happening in Germany—and I propose to give the House as many facts on that as I properly can—is a decision of 1957, a decision plainly known at the time and presented to this House in the form of a White Paper. It is not a new fact; there is no sudden drama in this issue. Therefore that part of the Opposition Motion as interpreted by hon. and right hon. Members opposite is not quite a correct picture of the facts, because we are dealing with a decision taken in 1957.

If this Motion of censure is to be applied in the terms the Opposition appear to wish it to be applied, the first question to which I must address myself is, is this only a Motion of censure on Her Majesty's Government, or is it not really a censure of the whole present conduct of the N.A.T.O. Alliance? [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] Some hon. Members say that is so. That is a point of view. I do not know whether it is a point of view shared by the whole of the Opposition. Perhaps that is a matter to which the right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown), who I believe will follow me in this debate, will address himself, because the Government believe and I believe that the N.A.T.O. Alliance is, and must remain, the core of our defence strategy. I hope that is the general view of the Opposition. If that is so, then I should say that there is no action contemplated with regard to Germany that is not clearly within the policy clearly defined in December, 1957, at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council.

That is an issue which must be made quite plain. I shall develop it in greater detail during my speech. I say again that there is nothing new in this issue. It is clearly within the N.A.T.O. decisions, the N.A.T.O. strategy, laid down in 1957 and it is even more clearly the wish of the N.A.T.O. Ministerial Council that what is now being done should be done.

If the Opposition feel that there is something new, then, so far, they have not produced evidence to show what it is. Therefore, while I do not question for a moment the sincerity of hon. Members opposite on this whole question—or indeed those who would wish to go further and regard N.A.T.O. as something which has either served its turn or should never have existed—nevertheless, the point that I would make is that it was never more important to maintain the unity and cohesion of the N.A.T.O. alliance that it is today.

I wonder what is the intention behind the Opposition Motion. As I have said, it censures the Government for consenting to steps which are being taken within the N.A.T.O. alliance. That is what the Motion says. These steps are being taken with the full approval of the alliance. I wonder if hon. Gentlemen would consider for a moment what my position would be when I go to the N.A.T.O. Defence Ministers' meeting, which I hope will take place late in March, if I accepted this doctrine. This is somewhat of a new departure in N.A.T.O.—that Defence Ministers should meet on their own, apart from the Foreign Ministers and apart from the panoply of the annual meeting of N.A.T.O., and should try quietly to take up among themselves the problems which they have to face.

If I were to accept the provisions of this Motion, if I were to accept some of the arguments put forward yesterday by hon. Members opposite, I should have to go at the end of March and propose a complete reversal of the present N.A.T.O. policy. [HON. MEMBERS: "Why not?"] Hon. Members will no doubt have their chance to give their own reasons why not. I am merely pointing out what the consequences would be if I were unwise enough to follow them.

Mr. Hugh Gaitskell (Leeds, South)

Is the right hon. Gentleman suggesting that because we support the N.A.T.O. alliance, which we do, we are debarred from criticising any of its decisions?

Mr. Watkinson

Certainly not; I would agree with that. What the right hon. Gentleman's Motion is asking the Government to do, or rather, to put it in its correct form, is censuring the Government for doing, is consenting to the re-armament of Germany with nuclear weapons. I am merely drawing the perfectly proper conclusion that if I were to accept that doctrine, I would have to propose at the next N.A.T.O. meeting, not only that Her Majesty's Government should reverse their policy, but that the whole of N.A.T.O. should reverse its policy. [HON. MEMBERS: "Why not?"] Well, I go on and say that I think the consequences would be very remarkable. I should find myself in a minority of one, and, presumably, I should then have done the maximum to weaken the alliance. A logical conclusion, presumably, is that, having done so, I should take no part in that meeting.

The fact is that the Opposition are asking for a course to be taken which would do the maximum damage to the unity and strength of the N.A.T.O. alliance. I think that that should be clearly on the record. I am not trying to question whether this is a proper matter to debate in this House, or that hon. Members are not sincere in what they believe, but I think I have the right to say what would be the consequences on this Alliance, which forms the core of our defence strategy.

Mr. J. J. Mendelson (Penistone)

Surely, the right hon. Gentleman would agree that if he himself and the Government were convinced that their present policy was right, the fact that he might be alone would not debar him from putting forward that view?

Mr. Watkinson

Perhaps, fortunately, it is the view of N.A.T.O. The Government are completely convinced about this, and I will give the reasons why we continue to support the present N.A.T.O. policy. [HON. MEMBERS: "Answer the question."] I know that this is not an attractive argument to the Opposition, but none the less, it is right that the House of Commons should face the possible results of the policies which have been put forward in the speeches yesterday.

Supposing, then, for the moment, that we leave that aspect, which is clearly written down in the Opposition Motion of censure, and we look at the question whether N.A.T.O. could pursue any different policy from its present policy. It was laid down in 1957 that Germany should have access to the means of delivery of nuclear weapons, although the nuclear warheads themselves would be under very strict control, which I will describe in due course.

I think there are some possible alternatives and that the House should study them. The first alternative would be that Germany, although within N.A.T.O., should have no significant armed forces at all. Several hon. Members yesterday put that point of view. Another possibility is that German forces should be equipped only with conventional weapons, and should not have any nuclear capacity. That, too, is the view of at least some hon. Members. Another possibility is that Germany should be left to develop and produce her own modern weapons entirely from her own resources. There is the fourth possibility that German forces could be supplied with modern weapons by other Western nations, but not by this country.

As to the first alternative of an unarmed Germany or a poorly armed Germany, that would leave a dangerous gap in the defences of the West, and that gap would have to be filled, at least in part, by an additional British military contribution. That would mean that we should have to pour out yet more of our resources into our Armed Forces, while German industrial power would be left free to concentrate on exports and to build up its own strength at home. That does not seem to me to be a very attractive proposition for our country, and I think it is fair to say again that those who propose that Germany should be kept either without arms or on a very low level of arms should realise that British soldiers and the British taxpayer would at least have to bear some additional annual burden.

Mr. George Wigg (Dudley)

Does the right hon. Gentleman accept the corollary of that argument—that the reason why Germany is now to have nuclear weapons is that we have failed to implement the obligations of the Paris Agreement to keep four divisions or a force of similar striking power in Germany?

Mr. Watkinson

If the hon. Gentleman will allow me to get on with my speech, I will come to that point later.

The second possibility is to keep Germany without any nuclear weapons. Again, that means the difficulty that German troops would be armed less effectively than those of their Allies, who will not only stand alongside them, but will be closely integrated with them. It means again that SACEUR's own policies and the unanimous decisions of N.A.T.O. would be set at nought, and I do not imagine that the authors of this Motion would wish Germany to be left free to develop her own armaments industry extensively, and certainly not her own nuclear armaments industry. That, of course, would be another alternative, but the Government of the West German Republic have repeatedly themselves made clear that they do not want a large armaments industry, and have no intention of going back on their voluntary renunciation of the right to manufacture atomic weapons.

The fourth possibility is that somebody else should build up the necessary strength of the German forces and that this country should play no part in it. We should lose our influence on the course of affairs in Europe, and should also lose our very considerable influence on the development of the European armaments industry, because we play our part in these joint projects. Therefore, I do not find that there is any possible or practical alternative to the course which the Government are rightly taking.

We rest our policy firmly on the assumption, which the House has often debated and very rarely questioned in this sense, that the adequacy of the defence of the United Kingdom depends on the strength of the N.A.T.O. alliance, that Germany should make her proper contribution to that alliance, that she can best do so as a member of N.A.T.O. and that she can do so efficiently only if her forces are deployed and equipped in accordance with N.A.T.O. military planning and the specific requirements of SACEUR.

I know that the right hon. Member for Belper has taken great pains to study N.A.T.O., but I wonder whether all hon. Gentlemen realise that the Supreme Commander is an American, his deputy is British, under him serves a French general, and under them serve a German general, a Dutch admiral and a British air chief marshall. I could go on in the same way through the command structure to show that officers of all nations work together and command one another. The whole of this N.A.T.O. alliance is completely integrated and completely multi-national.

Is not that a great safeguard? Is it not better to have Germany built into the West in that way? Is it not wiser on the whole to try to maintain this great alliance and to hold Germany within it in a position of equality and thus of full partnership? These are the questions to which the House must address itself.

Last night the right hon. Member for Derby, South painted in sharp colours, as perhaps only he can, the dangers of an armed world. He said, "Promises must be turned into treaty clauses." He also quoted a description of the Ministry of Defence as a "gaunt, grey giant". Whatever he may feel about that, no one will be happier than the present Minister of Defence and his colleagues, the Service Ministers, and their advisers if promises to disarm can be turned into treaty clauses, but I think the right hon. Gentleman will admit that that has not yet been done. Is it wise, therefore, until we have some practical results, some achievements, written into the treaty clauses, to diminish the strength of N.A.T.O.? At the N.A.T.O. Defence Ministers' meeting last December, when the whole matter was fully debated, it was the unanimous view of the N.A.T.O. Defence Ministers that N.A.T.O. must keep up its defensive guard and must hold the firm position which it holds today until promises can be turned into treaty clauses. Here in my view is a clear example of how important it is to hold N.A.T.O. in the position agreed in 1957 and developed thereafter.

Perhaps I may remind the House of the non-aggressive nature of the N.A.T.O. alliance. The Articles state clearly that forces are to be maintained and developed only to resist armed attack. It says in line after line that N.A.T.O. is there only to resist aggression, and that it is in no sense an aggressive alliance. It is a good thing to have Germany fully integrated in an alliance so pledged never to conduct an aggressive act, or is it better to keep her outside it or to keep her in a position of marked inferiority inside it? Those are questions which have to be considered by all people who want peace and who believe that we must get results before we unilaterally throw away our strength.

The House knows that it is still the view of the N.A.T.O. military experts that, despite our unity and our desire to stand together, there are still gaps in the N.A.T.O. defence system. The necessity for Germany to have modern weapons and the means of delivering nuclear warheads is based on the advice of the N.A.T.O. military planners and is a means of maintaining the total defensive strength of N.A.T.O. If the Germans do not do this, the British taxpayer will have to bear at least part of the additional burden.

If the Opposition do not agree with this policy, I hope that they will at least say in what way and for what reason they would like to see it amended. I gather from the right hon. Member for Belper that he will deal with that when be speaks. May I make one other request to him? I should not be so unreal as to suggest, that perhaps the best response to the tenor of this debate would be to withdraw the Opposition Motion and our Amendment and to call it a debate on the Adjournment. I know that the right hon. Member is a supporter of N.A.T.O., and at least I hope that he will make it plain that the broad Opposition policy is the support of N.A.T.O. I do not question the issue whether the Opposition think the Government pursue the right policies within N.A.T.O., but I ask him to make it plain whether the broad and solid support of N.A.T.O. remains the Opposition's policy, as I trust it does.

Mr. George Brown (Belper)

Would the Minister like to make it plain that, contrary to that of his predecessor since 1957, his policy is to support N.A.T.O.?

Mr. Watkinson

Certainly. I thought that the general burden of my remarks had been in support of N.A.T.O. I am glad that the right hon. Gentleman agrees.

Mr. R. H. S. Crossman (Coventry, East)

Three times the Minister has advanced the argument that the British taxpayer's burden is the decisive element in his thinking. Is he telling us that the existence of twelve German divisions armed with nuclear weapons is primarily conditioned by the hope of getting defence on the cheap? That is an extraordinary argument for a responsible Government to use.

Mr. Watkinson

If the hon. Member will possess himself in patience until the Defence White Paper is laid before the House, he will see that this country is not getting its defence on the cheap. It is certainly bearing its full burden with its Allies and taking its full share of the burden of the defence of the free world. I am glad that the right hon. Gentleman accepts that I have strongly defended and supported N.A.T.O. That is certainly the Government's policy.

It might help the Opposition in their future talks if I next dealt with two misconceptions which I think persist on the questions of the weapons themselves in German hands. The first is the question of putting nuclear warheads into German hands or under German control. Any nuclear warheads required for weapons in German hands will be held firmly under the personal control of SACEUR—and I say again, under the personal control of SACEUR. They are not under a body of commanders. They are not, as one hon. Member suggested last night, embarked on a ship or put into some regiment for training purposes. They are under lock and key and under the personal control of SACEUR. They can be released only by his personal order. That needs to be said again, because it is an immense safeguard. It does not mean that the Germans have access to nuclear weapons, but only to the means of delivering nuclear weapons.

Viscount Hinchingbrooke (Dorset, South)

Will my right hon. Friend make one point clear to the House? If we take SACEUR to be personally an American, and if we assume that in such a calamitous situation he might have to discharge this responsibility, would it be discharged within the context of N.A.T.O. and Western European Union or within the context of his being American and responsive to American policy?

Mr. Watkinson

Of course SACEUR is responsible to N.A.T.O. and to the N.A.T.O. Political Committee. All that I would say on the drill, which is perhaps behind my noble Friend's remark, is that I have no intention of disclosing it in the House or anywhere else, but I have naturally satisfied myself and gone into it very carefully to be sure that the arrangements are foolproof and that the personal control of SACEUR is assured. I certainly give my noble Friend that undertaking.

Mr. E. Shinwell (Easington)

This is extremely important. I listened carefully to what the right hon. Gentleman said. I understood him to say that these weapons—these warheads—would be released only on the personal responsibility of the Supreme Commander. Is that really the position—his personal responsibility, without any political consultation?

Mr. Watkinson

I am glad that the right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) made that intervention. As a previous Minister of Defence he will know how important it is to be exact and precise on these subjects. I am very grateful to him, because what I wanted to make plain was that no commander or authority subordinate to SACEUR could possibly take this decision. I must now say, as the right hon. Gentleman well knows, that SACEUR himself cannot take it without getting clear political permission and clearance. The point I wanted to make to the House is that no subordinate commander or authority in N.A.T.O. can release these weapons—only the Supreme Commander himself, and he has to obtain the proper authority so to do.

The second point is the question of the missiles. There are two aspects here. First, there are the conversations which the Government have entered into with the Germans, as with the French and other nations, for the joint production of missiles of one kind or another. Secondly, there is the actual availability of missiles, both to the Germans and in Europe. Again, I obviously cannot and should not go into too great detail, but I think that it will help the House, and prove what I said in my opening remarks that there is no sudden new issue here, if I make it plain that, for example, our own forces have the weapon called Corporal. That is a short-range artillery substitute missile, with a range of about 75 miles. The Germans are notably inferior to us in this respect, because at the moment they only have the weapon called Honest John, which is a very short-range artillery substitute weapon with a range of something under 20 miles.

The House would like to know that I have made careful inquiries and, as far as I can ascertain, no other types of operational missiles will be in German hands for at least the remainder of this year. That certainly meets the point in the Opposition Motion of censure that there is some sudden new development here that will arm the German forces with some new type of missile. I understand that the United States forces in Europe have the Mace missiles which have been much talked about, but I understand equally that those are not available to the German forces at the moment, nor are they likely to be for a very considerable time, if at all. In all this maze of missilery it is quite understandable that hon. Members should become confused. I sometimes do myself, but I have at least tried to give the House the factual position of the present disposition of three weapons in Europe.

I will now say a little about our own weapon which is called Blue Water, which the right hon. Gentleman asked me about at Question Time recently. This is a surface-to-surface missile which is intended to replace the Corporal as the weapon for the support of armies in the field. It is a short range weapon, with a range of at least 30 to 40 miles at the moment. The countries of W.E.U. have agreed that there is a need for such a weapon, and they consider that its military characteristics are right for the purpose. It now remains for N.A.T.O. to decide whether it sees within its forces a use for this type of weapon. Until that decision is taken there can be no question of any production taking place either between the Germans and ourselves or between the French and ourselves or on a tripartite or any other basis. Therefore, again there is no new factor here and no immediate possibility of some new element in the forces in Europe.

I believe, and the Government believe, that it is the right policy to try to build up slowly a N.A.T.O. family of weapons. I believe that it is much better that the German armaments industry should be closely integrated with a European project rather than that it should be building armaments entirely by itself. That goes, too, for our own armaments industry and that of the French and other countries. There is a great safeguard to us all if these weapons can be made as joint projects. It is very difficult to achieve, but I hope that we shall go on trying to see what we can do in the way of producing joint projects.

Mr. William Warbey (Ashfield)

The right hon. Gentleman has indicated that the time will arrive when Germany will probably engage in joint production of the Blue Water missile. Will he now agree that this will involve a further breach in the limitations of the Brussels Treaty?

Mr. Watkinson

I have already clearly covered the answer to that question. The first thing to establish is whether there is a use for the weapon. That is not established at the moment. The decision lies not with this country or with Germany, but with N.A.T.O.

I will now bring my remarks to a close, because we had a fairly late start to our debate. I wish to say one thing about the position of Germany as a whole. I do not disagree with many hon. Members whose speeches I listened to yesterday that most of us in the House have very good reasons for hating the old Germany and for feeling that it could never be anything else but a disruptive element in Europe. I do not myself profess to be an expert on Germany, but at least I have made a good many visits there since the war. I was able to go there as Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Labour and see something of the labour relations there fairly soon after the war. I have been there to look at the transport and aviation systems. Not very long ago as Minister of Defence I went there to see something of their defence problems.

We all hate and loathe the things that were done by the Nazis. One listened with horror to the speeches made from both sides yesterday of what happened in the concentration camps and, indeed, what could happen again if there was ever a recrudescence of Nazism. We are all agreed on that, but may I put one supposition to the House? It is not I or the Government who are supposing. Hon. Members have posed this problem. Supposing there was some danger of the recrudescence of a militant Germany once again, would Germany be safer bound within N.A.T.O. and held to our democratic way of life by close ties, or would it be wiser to have Germany on her own either forced out of N.A.T.O. or given an extremely subordinate status in N.A.T.O. and kept down as a kind of junior member of the club?

Mr. Sydney Silverman (Nelson and Colne)

I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman realises that a great deal of anxiety has been caused by a recent speech by Dr. Adenauer in which he described the special mission which Germany had to protect Western civilisation from the East, saying that they were the last bastion of civilisation, that German soldiers attacking in the East were the soldiers of God. The right hon. Gentleman will have noted the frightening similarity that this kind of sentiment bears to the speeches made by Hitler before and during the war. If Germany's soldiers fighting the East were God's soldiers, whose soldiers were ours?

Mr. Watkinson

The hon. Gentleman made a long speech yesterday. I listened to him and had great sympathy with him. If he wants to raise other points and political points of that nature, my right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary will answer at the end of the debate.

Whatever view one takes, the right answer is to maintain the strength of N.A.T.O. and to allow the N.A.T.O. decisions to be applied to Germany as they are applied to us and to the other allies. The right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) quoted yesterday in a supplementary question to me the Attlee conditions. One of the Attlee conditions was contained in these words: … the arrangements must be such that German units are integrated in the defence Forces in a way which would preclude the emergence again of a German military menace."—[OFFICIAL REPORT. 12th February, 1951; Vol. 484, c. 67.] I think that that is right, and that is why it is so important to keep N.A.T.O. together, and to allow N.A.T.O. decisions to run.

Perhaps I may also quote some words of the late Mr. Ernest Bevin, who said: If Western Germany is to be defended it seems to us only fair and reasonable that the people of Western Germany should help in their own defence. I think that that is right, too.

I only say that one cannot have it both ways. If we are to have Germany a full member of the alliance, playing her proper part, closely held in N.A.T.O.—a non-aggressive alliance—bound to our democratic way of life and thereby helped to maintain her own emergent democracy—which I believe today can be perpetuated if we help Germany so to do—it is right, in my view, that the present N.A.T.O. policy laid down in 1957 should be continued, and that this House should clearly reject the Opposition Motion which seeks to enjoin an entirely different policy. That Motion is utterly unrealistic, and its acceptance would, I believe, be perhaps the most dangerous action that could be taken in Europe at this present moment.

4.52 p.m.

Mr. George Brown (Belper)

It would be proper and certainly agreeable to my own wishes to start by associating myself with yesterday's references to the absence from this debate of my right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) and to the more permanent absence from our debates of the late Mr. John Edwards—

Mr. Watkinson

I am sorry to interrupt the right hon. Gentleman. I do so only to say that I did not associate myself with those references only because I believed that my right hon. Friend had done so. But I certainly do associate myself with them.

Mr. Brown

Had my right hon. Friend been here, it is very unlikely that I should be fulfilling this rôle now. Much as I enjoy being on my feet in this Chamber and giving the House a piece of my mind, I would be more than happy were my right hon. Friend able to do so and I did not have the stint to do. I feel very much the loss of John Edwards, particularly when we are discussing European matters, in which he played such a very remarkable and noble part in recent times.

We have heard two rather remarkable speeches. Three days ago, the Minister of Defence bailed out the Foreign Secretary rather notably from a ditch into which the right hon. and learned Gentleman had got himself. I rather thought I might have to warn the Foreign Secretary against letting it happen too often, because after what I may perhaps be permitted to call the Foreign Secretary's silly little speech, inadequate little speech, of yesterday, I thought the Defence Minister was bound to do it again. Having heard the Defence Minister today, I must say that that is impossible. Nor can I say that the right hon. and learned Gentleman bailed his right hon. colleague out yesterday in return, although, perhaps, he will do so tonight.

The Defence Minister's speech—one says it in all charity, because he has only been at the job a very short time—was a very remarkable concoction of inaccuracies, downright inaccuracies, about N.A.T.O., about SACEUR, about S.H.A.P.E., about nuclear policy, and some rather half-hearted attempts to say that if something was done years ago it meant that anything done today should not be criticised. Most of what he said I will take up as I go along, but let us first get the position of SACEUR quite clear.

As I understand it, and if I am wrong I am sure I shall be corrected, the Supreme Commander Allied Forces Europe has the nuclear weapon under his command by virtue of his American hat and will get his instructions about the use of the weapon, by virtue of his American hat, from the American President. That is as I understand it.

If not, if he got them by virtue of his N.A.T.O. hat, the next question is: from whom does he get his political direction? For years, the Opposition have said that there was no provision in the N.A.T.O. set-up for effective political control over the commanders and the weapons. This and other issues we will be able to discuss in about a fortnight's time in the defence debate, but I got the impression that the answer the Minister gave to his noble Friend was wrong. The position should be cleared up from the Treasury Bench, or I should be put right, so that we all know where we are.

The right hon. Gentleman made the point about the 1957 decision at great length, and although I will deal with his argument later, I should like to deal with one thing at once. The Opposition—my right hon. and hon. Friends and myself—opposed the 1957 switch of policy by this Government. We opposed the present Minister of Aviation when he took this country, unilaterally, away from its obligation to maintain four divisions and a tactical air force in Europe, and when he turned us over to that exaggerated and rather foolish dependence on the weapon of massive retaliation, the great deterrent.

If the right hon. Gentleman's argument is that because that was done then we cannot oppose it today, I must remind him that we did oppose it then. If he will read the defence Motion then put down from this side, which I had the honour to move, he will find that we opposed that decision and invited the Government to oppose it. We are not in any way being inconsistent. We can say, as I shall seek to demonstrate in a moment, that this is not a question of whether one believes in N.A.T.O. and wants N.A.T.O. or S.H.A.P.E. to be strong, and whether we want military strength and political cohesion.

All the way through, our position has been and is now that this Government, by their successive policies and their concurrence in other policies, have themselves militarily and politically weakened the alliance which the right hon. Gentleman says means so much to us; and that the announcements that have been made of new weapons which, it is said, the Germans are to have, far from being designed to strengthen, are designed, in our view, to weaken the whole strategic concept and the power of the alliance to follow out.

Incidentally, I was interested when the Defence Minister seemed to complain that we have put down this Motion before the weapons had actually arrived. Earlier, he complained that we were attacking too late, because the decision was made in 1957. We cannot be wrong because we are both too late and too early; somewhere, we must be about at the right period. Apart from its inconsistencies, I thought that the right hon. Gentleman's speech was a collection of Aunt Sallies set up merely to be knocked down, and that it left the real issue still to be dealt with.

That was a large part, too, of the Foreign Secretary's performance. It had two characteristics that I was sorry to observe in him. The first was deliberate distortion—this reference to a deliberate campaign to destroy N.A.T.O. by detaching Germany which, of course, made all the newspaper headlines this morning. He went on to let the Opposition out, but having made the attack, the affirmation, he went on to deal with the Motion as though it were part of this.

This is straightforward smear technique. It is taken straightforwardly from the late Joe McCarthy. One makes a great, sweeping denunciation, one says, more or less sotto voce, "Perhaps it does not involve you," but one knows that everyone outside thinks that it is so. That is a downright distortion. Nothing in the record of the Opposition, of my hon. and right hon. Friends and myself, and of the party, in the main, supports any such declaration—

Mr. F. M. Bennett (Torquay)

In the main.

Mr. Brown

Yes, in the main. We are not running a Nazi monolithic group. People have the right to take individual views, but the party, as a party, the Opposition, as an Opposition, ourselves as people having to take responsibility in it, and sometimes face unpopularity for it, are not susceptible to the kind of distortion that the Foreign Secretary sought to apply.

The second characteristic was the right hon. and learned Gentleman's wilful refusal to deal with the Motion. He had a silly little pillow fight with his own Aunt Sally when he put up his ridiculous version of what he thought disengagement was, and then he got a little Don Quixote victory over it. I asked him, he will remember, to deal with the Motion at that stage. In answer, he said, "I will deal with what I like"—a real, tough little Napoleonic reply. The right hon. and learned Gentleman went on to deal with what he liked, but it was not, of course, what was in the Motion. The whole point was that he distorted, he avoided, and he dealt with something else, as did the Minister of Defence.

Today, rather late, on the second day of the debate, we have no answer from the Ministers about any of the major issues we have raised in the Motion. The Motion is a Motion of censure, censure of men, censure of methods and censure of policies. Both Ministers, by the way, complained, or, at any rate, noted, that my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) in moving the censure Motion was not sufficiently violent. I trust that I have not so fait given them any reason to think that they will be disappointed today.

The Government share responsibility in full measure for all the appalling delays and all the shilly-shallying which has taken place in getting to the Summit and reaching the point of real discussion and decision on vital international matters. They have been most inadequate in campaigning even for their own views. They have changed positions so often that momentum has been lost even on their own views and comprehension has been lost. Thirdly, they have concurred in policies which, in our view, are dangerous to the alliance—this is the point that the Minister of Defence did not grasp—dangerous to the West and dangerous to the world, policies which are unnecessary and which are likely to weaken the alliance as well as prejudice the chances of real political agreement in the talks which we are so glad are about to open. Let us remember that the alliance must have both political and military strength. Either one or the other can be weakened, and to weaken either is very dangerous.

Contrary to the view of the Minister of Defence, my view about the Motion is not so much directed to whether it is right or whether the case does justice to the Motion but whether we are straining the quality of mercy a little in taking such a formidable indictment to Ministers of the stature of these.

Before I take the House through the Motion point by point, I should like to make one or two background observations. I cannot help feeling that the whole matter of foreign affairs is becoming much too learned. There is far too much expertise about it. One is expected to remember all about a large number of bodies, where they meet, what goes on there, what different people say about this and that, and an extraordinary collection of details of one kind and another. Foreign affairs seems to be passing almost out of the reach of ordinary simple people. One needs to pass a professional examination, almost, before one dare exercise any right to pass judgment on policy. I have sat very few examinations in my life and I hold very few certificates. I do not propose to sit for this one.

I shall set out three simple propositions. I am quite sure that they will be knocked down by some people on the ground that they are platitudinous and by other people on the ground that they are ridiculous over-simplifications. I warn anyone thinking of doing it that both opinions cannot be right. He had better suspend judgment, perhaps, about which side of the count they fall down on.

My first simple proposition is this. Life and the prospect of living are not becoming safer or surer. Even without an actual war, the risks are increasing and so is the number of victims of peaceful preparation for wars which may never happen. Anyone who heard my right hon. Friend the Member for Derby, South (Mr. P. Noel-Baker) last night give his very moving examples must surely appreciate that that is so. As things stand, life is not becoming surer.

Secondly, the security of Western defence is not increasing. One has only to look at our military situation and compare it with what it was a few years ago, one has only to look at the provisions which are made, at the strategic policy which is aimed at, to see that that is so. One has only to look at our economic situation to see that it is so. Our military security is not increasing.

Thirdly, the Western political alliance is not growing in unity, understanding or integration. That hardly needs proving. One has only to look at relations within Europe and Europe's relations with North America to see that that is so.

I make those three simple propositions because there was something not understood yesterday which I believe must be understood. Contrary to what some people may say, our position is not exactly a position of strength. I do not say that it is so bad that nothing could be worse, but it is not a status quo so good that all movement from it is to be deprecated. Yet, yesterday evening, when I interrupted the hon. Member for Oxford (Mr. Woodhouse), who is one of the learned practitioners in this subject, and drew his attention to that fact, he promptly apologised, very nicely, for having given the impression that he did not realise that things could be disturbed in other ways and then proceeded as though the point did not really matter. We have a very weak situation at the moment, or, rather, a situation much weaker than we should like it to be. Moreover, it is a situation which is weakening.

Whatever the case for what military alliances and forces have done and do—and I accept it—the only effective way we can put right the wrongs I have set out in my three propositions is to achieve some degree of multilateral disarmament as a step on the road to all-round disarmament and to achieve some political agreement as a step on the road to a wider political settlement.

Listening to the debate yesterday, it was to me quite terrifying to hear the way hon. Members exaggerated or, at any rate, gave very full weight to all the risks involved in any movement towards achieving those ends, while ignoring completely that there are risks in the present situation. The argument was put as though one runs a risk if one makes a move but if one stays where one is one is safe—and is not that a good thing? In fact, of course, we are not safe even if we stay where we are, and we are steadily becoming a little less safe.

In our view, all that leads us to the issues we set out in the Motion. The real distance between the Opposition and the Government, which somebody in one of this morning's newspapers could not see, is here to be found in the background of our approach to the way in which we can make life safer, in which we can secure the security of democracy and the Western way of life and more surely move to a happier arrangement, a better, genuine, and real measure of co-existence in the world. It is against that background that we must consider the terms of the Motion.

The first issue is the tremendous importance today of securing a breakthrough at the coming Summit. We have had such a build-up of ambitions, hopes and propositions that people are almost beginning to lose faith in the possibility of any break-through being made. That is a disastrous situation in itself. It is important that we do have a break-through. It is important also—I say this directly to the Foreign Secretary—that the fact that we are approaching Summit talks now should not be allowed to smother and weaken the need to proceed to successful conclusions on specific points. Five years ago, exactly that happened. Five years ago, the disarmament discussions got smothered under Summit emotion. It would be disastrous, in my view, important though the Summit is, if the test discussions or the Disarmament Commission failed to make progress because attention was directed to other and much more general things.

The first issue, very clearly, concerns nuclear tests. The importance of this concerns the disastrous things which will happen as a consequence of resuming tests, and if an agreement cannot be established which involves control machinery there will be the beginning of the very thing that bedevils any progress on the subject of disarmament.

I interrupted the Foreign Secretary yesterday about this matter, and either I did not make myself clear or he did not understand what I was saying, but no one interested in defence could not be well aware of the reasons behind the attempt to exempt the area of small underground explosions from the general ban in the absence of control machinery effectively covering the lot. I understand the fears in the minds of those carrying responsibility that without that we might be cheated in the area of these weapons, and I understand, top, the significance of these weapons for defence. But it did not seem to me yesterday that the Foreign Secretary, when speaking on this subject, showed that he was conscious of the urgency of it or the dangers of continuing as we are as strongly as I would have wished.

In col. 494, the Foreign Secretary said: I am certain that we could, if we wanted, get straightaway a ban on tests in the atmosphere up to a feasible height of control. We could get a ban on underwater tests and a ban on all larger tests underground. The control machinery exists for that. But there is still the difficulty about the smaller range of underground tests, and that is a matter about which we must have further discussions in the meetings in Geneva."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 10th February, 1960; Vol. 617, c. 494.] Perhaps the right hon. and learned Gentleman will say that that is all he could be expected to say in public. On the other hand, it should be said that it is clear from that that a very wide area—certainly covering all the danger area from the point of view of radiation and health—can already, in his view, be covered with adequate control machinery. There is a very small area where we would take a chance on the control machinery being sufficient.

I should have thought that our position as a nation—we may have difficulties with other nations—ought to be that, even although we know that an agreement cannot be foolproof the whole area over, it will be so dangerous if we do not get an agreement setting up some form of control machinery over as much of the area as possible that we shall run into grave danger of the whole thing breaking up, of tests being started all over again and the whole thing collapsing about our ears. Would it be worth while to risk all that—and this is clearly hinted at in President Eisenhower's statement, which we deplore very much—because we are not all that happy about the control machinery in one area? We urge the Foreign Secretary to show much more vigour and determination than he is showing, or seemed yesterday to be showing, in that matter.

The same thing applies to the work of the Disarmament Commission. We must recognise that this is a matter of tremendous urgency, where we must make some agreement as soon as we can. But, unfortunately, it is precisely in this area where the record of the Government, of these Ministers, seems to the Opposition to inspire very little confidence. Yesterday, in reply to my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey), the Foreign Secretary gave a fresh description of the first stage of his package plan. He said: I agree with the hon. Member that in the fiat stage there should be some action as well as the collection of information. I think the action in the first stage should be reduction in armed forces and, what is more important, in the level of conventional armaments."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 10th February, 1960; Vol. 617, c. 496.] We are very glad that my hon. Friend got the Foreign Secretary that far, but that is much further than he has been before. I have with me the Report of the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, Fourteenth Session, Item 70, dated 16th October, 1959, which sets out the United Kingdom's declaration on comprehensive disarmament. It is said that the declaration was made by the principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, which must be the right hon. and learned Gentleman. In the part headed "First Stage", there is no reference at all to reduction either of forces or of armaments. The first mention of reduction is in the part headed "Second Stage" at the bottom of the page overleaf: (a) there should be progressive reducation of conventional armaments". Our complaint is that it was not mentioned in the first stage. We cannot expect a start to be made by anybody if all that is being done on the first stage is to collect information.

I beg the right hon. and learned Gentleman, in view of what he has done in the past, not to retreat from that position again. The Government's proposals should leave no one in any doubt at the Commission that that is our policy and that we shall not propose higher limits than have been discussed already.

I now come to the words in our Motion, the limitation and control of forces and weapons in Central Euorpe as a first step towards a wider political settlement. It is on these words that so much of the attack by the Government has been based and so many of the Aunt Sallies raised. I think that we have a serious complaint here. In choosing these words, we thought that we were being magnanimous. They are the Prime Minister's own words, taken from his communiqué which was agreed between him and Mr. Khrushchev and issued at the end of the meeting. It is true that the words "towards a wider political settlement" are our own, but I cannot imagine that the Prime Minister meant to stop at the limitation of arms in Central Europe. That must be the first step to something else, even in the Prime Minister's mind. As I say, we used the words of the Prime Minister. We do not censure. We call on the Government to press on with the declaration of the Prime Minister.

How were we met—with thanks for our help, our co-operation and our support? Not a bit of it. The Foreign Secretary got himself into a first-rate "tizzy". He misquoted the Motion and said that it was all scandalous and outrageous and that nobody in the world supported it. He quoted the people against it, but he forgot the Prime Minister, or deliberately did not think, since the Prime Minister was away on the high seas, that he mattered. When I asked him to deal with what was in the Motion, he tossed it all aside.

May we have the matter clear? The Prime Minister signed his name to this.

Mr. K. Zilliacus (Manchester, Gorton)

Before the election.

Mr. Brown

This was what the Government were supposed to be after. They have gone back on it and it is a great disaster. My hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Zilliacus) need not have any competition with me as to who suspects the Government the most. He and I may not be sure about what we think of each other, but there is no doubt about what we think of them.

The package agreement, when the Government produced it, went back on what the Prime Minister said when he came back from Moscow. We thought that it was not a bad idea to table the words of the Prime Minister in this House for approval by the House in order that it might throw the Foreign Secretary down in this House. That it has done, and it is not a bad thing. There was a piece, alleged to have been inspired, in The Times a little while ago. If he goes on as he is at the moment, there might be another piece in The Times about him. He will have to go jolly carefully.

I now turn to the question of nuclear weapons for Germany. This is the final matter with which I want to deal. First, let us be clear about what the Motion says. It does not say that we are against German rearmament. It does not say that we are against Germany. It does not say that we are against N.A.T.O., or anything like that. It is not my view that there should be a deliberate campaign to treat Germany, the nation or the people, as a second-class or inferior Power. It is not even my view—and this I share with many of my more distinguished right hon. Friends; my right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale made a moving declaration of this the last time he spoke in the House on Foreign Affairs—that one should ever try, or seek to try, to indict a whole people and certainly not to try to indict them for ever.

The Germans have made a brave attempt to fashion and to get going a democracy out of their ruin and out of their shame. It is silly not to say so. This is the view of nearly all of us. Of course, I know S.P.D., Socialist party and trade union leaders better than I know other Germans in public life, but I do know some others who are not in those groups and I do not exempt them as far as I know them. I know others about whom I would not be quite so forward with admiration.

I was moved, as, I imagine, everyone who heard it was moved, by the remarkable maiden speech last night by my hon. Friend the Member for Dunfermline Burghs (Dr. A. Thompson). It was remarkable for its manner, but it was also remarkable and moving for its content and for the moderate way in which my hon. Friend dealt with the subject. He made a great point which the German Government or our own Government, or, indeed, anybody in public life, would be foolish not to listen to and not to try to act upon.

Perhaps, however, my hon. Friend will let me say this. The point occurred to me as he was mentioning the cases which he referred. At least I can say for myself that I quarrelled with some of the men I know in Germany years ago when I thought that country was bad. I remember my only meeting with Professor Oberlander. I felt very offended then, as I do now. What occurred to me is that when one mentions, as we often do, the Nazis with dubious records, if not downright bad records, who still hold office, one of the pities is that we do not mention as often our own friends who died in camps and in the resistance and who were as brave as they were in circumstances in which none of us can be sure that we would be equally brave. We should mention them a little more often.

In the same way, to mention a few, I remember speaking to Schumacher, Brandt, Ehrler, Richters and Burgomaster Reuter, men whom I have known and with whom I have worked since the war. They are all courageous, brave men trying to build a democracy in extremely difficult circumstances in their country. It is because I have all this in mind that I thought the House might permit me to say this, at the expense of a little time, to defend us against the charge that there is something anti-German about all this. The strictures that the Foreign Secretary applied to us yesterday do not apply to me or to us on this side and ought not to be made, because they simply do not help.

Because I feel like that, I still feel that the last part of the Motion is right, for reasons which not only I feel and will now try to develop, for reasons which not only my hon. Friends feel, but for reasons which many Germans feel, too. It is not only outside of Germany that it is felt that there is grave danger in rushing on with the nuclear armament of Germany. This is felt by very large numbers of Germans themselves who are also entitled to be heard.

Let me now deal with the points which have been made. First, despite the constant repetition, there is nothing logical about the Government's decision. The argument that because in 1954 we decided by a vote in this House, with only four or six Members voting against, to go forward with the rearmament of Germany and her entry into N.A.T.O. does not mean that all these subsequent issues were there and then settled. The Foreign Secretary, before he came into his present distinction, was a lawyer. I would have thought that this was an argument around which he could make rings in any court of law when anybody tried to put up such a silly defence.

The Foreign Secretary did something more than put up a silly defence. He was most disingenuous in the quotations he chose to take from HANSARD. He quoted my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) and what he said in the debate as evidence that all these subsequent issues were settled. My hon. and learned Friend is one of my dearest friends in the House. We work closely together. I am sorry that, for reasons we all understand, he is not able to be with us today. My hon. and learned Friend would, however, be the last to claim that he was one of the orthodox authorities in the House on foreign affairs or defence. What I could not understand was why the Foreign Secretary, if he was trying to deal with the substance of the argument, did not go on to quote the next paragraphs.

Let me tell the House what happened. The issue of nuclear arms was raised first by my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition in that debate, speaking then mainly on the financial side. My right hon. Friend asked what was the relevance to the twelve divisions, what the intentions were and whether these things linked up and were connected. The Prime Minister, then Minister of Defence, replied. After a reply which was, as we might expect, not exactly clear, he was subjected, as is reported in c. 597 for 18th November, 1954, to a number of interjections by my hon. Friend the Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes), my hon. Friend the Member for Merthyr Tydvil (Mr. S. O. Davies) and others, and he said: I thought the hon. Gentleman was referring to … something else. The matter that he raised"— that is, of nuclear weapons— is one which will have to be taken up directly between the Governments. It is not control by these precise agreements. The present Prime Minister was then further questioned by my right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale, who asked whether anything in the Agreements excluded nuclear weapons. The Prime Minister replied: That was the suggestion, and I should have thought that that was not a matter suitable for these Agreements, but a matter to be taken up between Governments. It does not seem to be germane to this set of Agreements."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 18th November. 1954 Vol. 533, c. 597–8.] The Government cannot argue that we were committed to it. The Foreign Secretary used words that were more direct and forceful when he said that we ought to have had our eyes open and faced the obvious implications. He cannot say that when we repeatedly questioned the then Minister of Defence, now Prime Minister, and were repeatedly told that it was not a matter that was being settled by those Agreements—in fact, that it was not even germane to them—and was a matter to be dealt with later between Governments.

I must ask the Foreign Secretary to be a little more open and honest. He can, of course, say that we were fools. He can say that one or two right hon. and hon. Members on this side with more perspicacity than the rest saw through what they were being told by the Minister of Defence and refused to accept it. Then he can say to the rest of us, "Well, you were a lot of fools. Fancy being taken in by what you were told on that occasion. You should have known what was being done." The right hon. and learned Gentleman can score that one. But if we were the fools, who was the villain? If we were foolish to fall for what was a lot of claptrap, who dealt out the claptrap? It was the Prime Minister. If he said it expecting us not to be taken in thereby, knowing it to be wrong and untrue, I am bound to say that whatever the burden that falls on us today, a much heavier burden falls upon the Prime Minister. The Foreign Secretary is entitled to be asked to clear this up. In my view, it is not logical.

We can stand for German rearmament, as I did. Although everything—I will be frank about this, as I have been elsewhere—has not gone as I then hoped or as I thought it was reasonable to expect it to go, twelve German out of fifty Atlantic divisions is one thing. Twelve out of thirty is one thing. But twelve out of twenty-one is altogether different. I do not pretend that it is not quite the same as it appeared originally. Nevertheless, looking back on it, I still think that if I had to take the decision I then took, I would take it today in the light even of what has happened in between. Having taken that decision, however, I am not thereby committed to the proposition that nuclear weapons, certainly particular kinds of nuclear weapons, should necessarily be in German hands.

The issue here in this debate is whether this is the time to settle the matter. Are these weapons the right weapons and is the decision necessary to strengthen S.H.A.P.E.? May I say why I think that the answer to all these questions is "no". This is not the time and these are not the weapons necessary to strengthen S.H.A.P.E. I say that as one who cares very much about the strength of S.H.A.P.E., and I have spoken my mind repeatedly on the subject.

Certain things to me are clear. One is that the weapons referred to do not, in the main, exist. It was part of the right hon. Gentleman's case that they did not exist. Therefore, we were kicking up a row unnecessarily. I cannot myself understand why, before impending political talks of great importance and on which vast hopes rest, the Government have announced in advance that weapons which do not exist, but which will be in the main strategic weapons, aimed at the heart of Russia and her allies, are to be given to the Germans.

Why is this announcement made at a time when the weapons do not exist and the issue does not have to be faced? By doing so, we incur the maximum opprobrium and disadvantage. Even if we thought, which I do not accept, that there is an advantage in Germany having these weapons, it does not compensate for the disadvantage in making the announcement at the time when the Minister himself knows that they do not, in fact, exist, or cannot exist this year at least, or, to use his own words, "if ever". Why the Government should have to say this just before going to the Summit, and why they should say that our words are so wrong, I am hanged if I can understand.

Secondly—the Minister had notice of this question when I intervened during the speech of the hon. Member for Stroud (Mr. Kershaw) yesterday and I was annoyed afterwards, because I thought that I had rather tipped my hand too readily to the right hon. Gentleman, in case I gave him the answer, but he did not deal with it and he did not give me the answer—the weapons we are talking about are not weapons that other allies have ordered or, as far as I know, have any intention of having. These are weapons to go, in the main, to the Germans alone. The Minister said that the Germans are in an inferior position to us because they do not have Corporal missile. When I was in America, not so long ago, I had the inestimable advantage of seeing Corporal manoeuvred and fired. I doubt whether anybody who does not have it is at much of a disadvantage. When I saw the whole trail of caravans that have to be used to get this thing into place, and what has to be done with it—and I am not all that sure about how nuclear it is, either—I doubt whether it is an advantage to anybody.

The Sergeant, of course, we are not to have. The Sergeant, the weapon which the Minister was so strongly sure the Germans should have, we are not to have. A great deal was made in the debate yesterday, by every hon. Member who spoke, about putting the Germans in an inferior position. Who has been discriminated against? If the weapon is so good, and we are not to have it and none of the other Continental allies are to have it, the answer must be that the Germans will be in a superior position, discriminated in favour of and not discriminated against. I see no point whatever in this discrimination argument.

Mr. Watkinson

I did not mention the Sergeant weapon at all.

Mr. Brown

Would the right hon. Gentleman like to say why he did not mention it? This business of jumping up on the spur of the moment is extremely tricky. If he did not mention Sergeant, that means to say that he mentioned only the weapons that the Germans are not to have and left out the one weapon which, according to Press reports, they will have. This is the one weapon which we are not to have. That strengthens my case that the discrimination argument is on the Germans' side and not on ours.

The Minister talked about putting the Germans in an inferior position. The hon. Member for Stroud talked about colleagues in arms, fellows in arms, being armed with inferior arms. When we are talking about the Matador and the Mace, especially when we are talking about the Mace, we are talking about a weapon with nearly a 1,000-mile range. We are not here talking about weapons that soldiers fight with. We are not even talking about weapons that are controlled at corps headquarters to support them. We are talking here about strategic weapons roughly equivalent to our Thor. I know that the range is different, but the purpose is the same. It is to deliver a weapon of mass destruction on the heart of the homeland of one's enemy.

I took the view in 1957, and I have taken it ever since and in this House and at S.H.A.P.E., that this is wrong, that it is confusing the sword and the shield concept of S.H.A.P.E. that the Supreme Commander should have strategic weapons of mass destruction included in his responsibility at all. I do not think that that is his business. It only messes the whole strategy up, as, indeed, it has done. It has made defence planning very difficult that he should have been led to believe that he would be able to decide when to loose strategic long-range weapons of mass destruction. It alters the whole concept of the importance one gives to the holding operation, to securing the base that my hon. Friend talked about and, indeed, of any military strategy at all.

Thors in this country are not under his control and I see no reason why the Mace should be. If they are not to be, there is clearly no reason for putting them in Germany. On the ground of the weapons themselves the Foreign Secretary's argument falls down. I see no defence case for these weapons, or for the announcement made about them at this time. I can be wrong—that would not be unusual—but so far nothing has been said by either of the Ministers or by anybody outside to shake me in my view that on this issue I may well be right. There is a very considerable political case against it at this time.

Further, nothing in the past, from all the evidence on paper, has made this decision inevitable at this time. Even if it were proved to be logical, and that it logically followed from the first decision, that is not the only test that a political decision has to face. Otherwise, we would reduce all politics to a fifth form exercise in geometry or algebra. One also has to prove the political feasibility, desirability and necessity, and nothing in that does that.

Therefore, I conclude that there is nothing at all in the discrimination against the Germans argument of which so much was made. But even if there were, it would not be new. The whole spirit of the Chancellor's abdication of the right to manufacture this weapon, of W.E.U. and of the Paris Treaties is full of discrimination against somebody for some reason. There is nothing new about it even if it were true, but I do not think that there is anything in that case at all.

While all this may have to be faced some day, that can only presuppose the complete and utter failure of the Summit talks and of the other talks on tests and disarmament. It seems to me that to assume that failure now, to publicly act as though we were counting on failure now is plain downright folly by any test for any Government to pursue at this time. It is the negation of statesmanship. Even if, in one's innermost heart, one felt that it might happen, to say so publicly and to act publicly as if it had already happened is folly.

In the light of what I sincerely believe to have been a very hopeless and inadequate performance in the past, and of two disastrously and disgracefully inadequate speeches yesterday and today from Ministers trying to answer this case, I confidently ask the House to agree to our Motion tonight.

5.40 p.m.

Mr. Anthony Royle (Richmond, Surrey)

Realising the importance of this debate, and after hearing the two very powerful Front Bench speeches to which we have just listened, I must apologise for guiding the House into the calm of a maiden speech. I hope that the House and hon. Members will bear me with their usual tolerance, and I apologise to hon. Members with more experience and greater knowledge than myself who are waiting to make far more worthwhile contributions.

Some years ago—and this is perhaps appropriate as my right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence started the debate today—I went through the nerve-racking agony of doing a series of parachute jumps. I thought then that perhaps it would be the most anxious period—waiting before leaping from an aeroplane—that I would ever have to undergo, but I assure you, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, that the ordeal I have just gone through today has been far worse.

Although this is a maiden speech, I feel sure that the constituency of Richmond, which I have the honour to represent, would wish me to come straight to the point and to the Motion and the Amendment before the House. I chose this debate to make my maiden speech because I had the opportunity to spend some months in Berlin and I felt that perhaps I might have a personal contribution, of, I hope, a non-controversial character, to make to the discussion.

The right hon. and learned Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. A. Henderson) yesterday produced some very interesting suggestions for solving the Berlin problem. Amongst them he included the association of the United Nations in a reunified Berlin. I am sure that these ideas will be very closely looked at, but a suggestion was made last year that perhaps one method of solving the Berlin problem might be to internationalise the three Western sectors of the city and form them into a free city under the United Nations.

In my submission, this must never be accepted, because if the three Western sectors were put under officials of the United Nations, and a crisis arose, those officials would have no power to deal with it. The only power that they could fall back on if there were a serious crisis would be the moral authority of the United Nations. I served for two years in the Middle East, and I think that all hon. and right hon. Members know the difficulties which face the United Nations observers and officials on the borders of the Arab countries and Israel. I think that many people would be appalled at the graver possibilities if a crisis should occur in this suggested island in the middle of Soviet-controlled territory.

The idea of a free city of West Berlin must mean inevitably that the Western sectors would get sucked into the East German maw in a matter of months. West Berlin is not viable. It has no raw materials, there is no agricultural hinterland, and geographically and economically it is impossible for the Western sectors to exist as a separate entity without profound consequences as a result of the separating of the legal, economic and financial links with Western Germany. Perhaps, however, a United Nations rôle could be provided. I am sure that my right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary will not be rigid in considering this matter, but any United Nations rôle that is produced must be in addition to, and not in replacement of, the troops who are already stationed in the city.

The former Member for Bournemouth, East and Christchurch, Mr. Nigel Nicolson, put forward and discussed in a foreign affairs debate last summer the suggestion that perhaps United Nations officials could be used in conjunction with Western troops at Helmstedt, at the end of the autobahn in the Western sectors of Berlin, in the control tower at Tempelhof, or in the airfield at Gatow. All these suggestions are possible, but they must always be carried out in close co-operation with Western troops and the Western allies who are in the Western sectors of Berlin at present.

The Foreign Secretary made great efforts to reduce the differences between the East and the West during and throughout last year, and through his efforts these differences have narrowed very considerably. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister's efforts have eased tension between the Western nations and the Eastern bloc. Because of that, and because I think that we and the Government are doing everything in our power to reach agreement with the Eastern bloc on the future of Europe and disarmament, I welcome the Government's Amendment to the Opposition Motion. I think that, remembering the efforts made by the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister last year, and bearing in mind the comments and suggestions that have been put forward for calling 1960 "Africa Year", perhaps we might name 1959 "Initiative Year".

I think that all hon. Members here today are rightly agreed that the long-term aim of this country must be finally to seek the reunification of Germany. On this side of the House, however much some of us may dislike it, we agree that we must rearm the Federal Republic of Western Germany if N.A.T.O. and the treaties which we have signed are to mean anything at all. But in my submission, we do not give sufficient recognition to the real underlying fears of the Soviet people and of the Soviet Government who have suffered devastation twice in twenty-five years as the result of aggression by the German nation. Indeed, Belgium and France, Denmark, Norway, and Holland, as mentioned previously in the debate by hon. Members, have also suffered invasion.

The Russian Government and people are reasonably worried that a reunified and a rearmed Germany might again become a threat to the peace of Europe and that the Germans might obtain a nuclear potential. Many people in this country are also uneasy. This fear would be damped down by a disarmament agreement which included inspection and control. I believe that there is no future in pursuing the disengagement line at present, because at the moment it is not a practical political proposition; but perhaps I am being too controversial.

We can damp down this real fear, of Germany being reunited, by a disarmament agreement. Disarmament, like justice, must not merely be done, but must be seen to be done. Therefore, we must have effective international control of the ability to make nuclear arms and also control and inspection of other weapons and forces. Agreement on disarmament at Geneva can have no serious chance of success unless it gives neither side the advantage, either in appearance or in reality.

The differences that now separate the two sides at the three-Power nuclear test conference in Geneva, it seems to me, as a humble new Member of this House, are partly questions of confidence of each in the other's good faith, and partly merely tactical and technical questions. Surely these are not impossible to bridge. Agreement will require hard, slogging negotiation. There are not any panaceas or shortcuts. If this is achieved—and this is the main point with which I shall end my speech—and the Soviet fear of a reunited and rearmed Germany is removed, I am sure that wider agreement with Europe should follow.

Therefore, I believe that the greater hope in the months ahead lies in reaching agreement on comprehensive, controlled disarmament at Geneva than in even the Summit Conference. I have heard it said that the night is darkest before the dawn, and what this actually proves is the difficulty of predicting when the dawn will break on the international landscape. When it occurs, wise statesmen are those who are ready to take advantage of the impending change, and what has proved literally to be impossible suddenly proves to be miraculously easy.

5.53 p.m.

Miss Jennie Lee (Cannock)

Every good soldier is willing to admit that before going into action he is often afraid. The hon. Gentleman the Member for Richmond, Surrey (Mr. A. Royle), in making his maiden speech, put himself in line with a great tradition when he said he was a bit scared before facing this House. He also maintained that same great tradition by showing a complete conquest of his nervousness when he addressed himself to his subject. I am sure that I am expressing the sentiments of the whole House when I say that we look forward in future debates to having his contribution, and that we hope that he will be ready then, as some of us always are, not only to have an argument with hon. Members opposite but to have a go sometimes at members of his own Front Bench.

All of us, indeed, should approach the subject of the debate today with a great deal of fear. Ultimately, it is not the soldiers or the generals, but the political leaders of our various countries who decide the fate of their people; although, unfortunately, there are some generals—General Norstad being no exception—who sometimes forget that it is for the soldier to carry out commands and that it is for the civilian heads to give the commands. We in this House are Members of one of those legislative assemblies that have to address themselves to the problem of how best in this dangerous world we can reduce tensions, how best we can bring our peoples into an atmosphere where they can be less afraid.

It was just what one would expect from the Foreign Secretary yesterday that he should have a bit of fun with the fact that in 1954, and at other times, there had been divisions on the Opposition benches on the question of German rearmament. If the right hon. and learned Gentleman wants to score that point he can have it. It is not worthy of the seriousness of the problems that we now have to face. What, no doubt, he was trying to do was to obscure the fact that Her Majesty's Opposition are absolutely united at this moment in their abhorrence of the notion that German troops should be trained for nuclear warfare and that nuclear weapons should be put in their hands. It is very hard to realise how the Foreign Secretary of Great Britain can be so blind to the dangers he is inviting.

Again and again in the House we have agreed that the two Power blocs in the world—the Soviet Power bloc and the Western Power bloc—already have enough nuclear weapons to destroy the whole world. That is not disputed. Then who will feel safer if one more Power—and a Power with the history, with the frustrations, with the avowed intentions of Western Germany—is entrusted with nuclear training and with nuclear arms? What a poverty-stricken response it is to say, "We do not mind West German troops being trained to use nuclear arms. We do not mind German generals being given nuclear equipment. There is nothing to worry about because the ultimate decision whether they may ever be used will lie not with German generals but with the Western Command. It will lie with the leaders of the Western nations".

Let us not fool ourselves on this score. I agreed very much with the hon. Member for Richmond, Surrey, when he said that he was not prepared to leave the Western sectors of Berlin entirely to the control of the United Nations. I agreed with him and I disagreed with my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. A. Henderson), for while all of us want to build up the power of the United Nations, while it lacks sanctions to enforce its decisions it would be a betrayal of the people of Berlin if we did not make it absolutely clear that we are not prepared to see Berlin become either a city controlled by the Communist East entirely, or to see an attempt made to control it by the West entirely.

Let us be adult in our approach. We are all over 21 years of age. We are involved in power politics and we know perfectly well that decisions affecting Germany—whether it is the security of Berlin, developments in Communist Germany or Western Germany—will not be decided by Germans this year or for several years to come. So now is our moment of opportunity. Now is the time when it can be a benediction not only for the rest of us, but for the German people, if we can save them from the type of blindness that was illustrated in the speech of the Foreign Secretary yesterday.

I agreed with my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper when he said that the Foreign Secretary was utterly defeatist, that he was throwing away any hopes that might be centred on the Summit Conference before it starts. The Foreign Secretary was saying to the whole world that the British Government are willing that Dr. Adenaeur's Germany should become the second military Power in the Western world. It is that and nothing less than that which the Foreign Secretary was willing to concede.

Why are we on these benches so passionate and united in our opposition to a proposition that, apparently, Her Majesty's Government are willing to accept? All hon. Members will have found in their postbags a little brochure, a copy of which I have in my hand, sent out by the German Embassy in London. This is the official German view. If hon. Members put it in the wastepaper basket without first studying it, I hope that they will salvage it, or send to the German Embassy for another copy.

A study of the map on the front page shows that the same kind of territorial ambition which led Hitler on from one disastrous demand to another is now the official policy of Dr. Adenauer's Government. Here, for all the world to see, is an official declaration that Dr. Adenauer's Germany is not thinking in terms of a united Germany some day with its present frontiers. He is issuing an ultimatum to Poland and to other surrounding countries—and to Russia behind Poland—that, if the Germans get their way, they will massacre Poland. There will no longer be an economically viable Poland.

Some of us think that our objective ought to be not only to make Soviet Russia and America feel more secure—the larger the country, the more frightened it seems to become—but that we should want the smaller Powers surrounding America and Russia to begin to feel that they, too, could be more secure and become part of the comity of nations.

Poland is a country with a people of very independent thought and character. Most of us have Polish friends and we have great admiration for their courage and their wit. What is Dr. Adenauer's Germany doing to them when it issues official propaganda of this kind? It is saying to every Pole, "There is one thing and only one thing you can do if you are concerned about the survival of your country, and that is to hold fast 101 per cent. to the Soviet alliance".

In their infinite wisdom, Her Majesty's Government are willing to have the soldiers of Dr. Adenauer's Germany trained in the use of nuclear arms and his generals given nuclear arms, for they tell us we need not worry as there is sufficient wisdom among the leading statesmen of Great Britain and America to save us from further disaster. Is there? They cannot make up their minds and stand by their point of view for five minutes at a time. They told us that we could depend on their point of view, that they would go so far and no farther with Germany. I have with me a quotation with which we are all familiar, the promise given by Sir Brian Robertson. He said: The British Government will never allow German industry to return to its former owners. Again and again he repeated that promise, but the language of our British generals and of our British statesmen has been mild compared with that of American generals and statesmen. Some of our finest lawyers were shocked by some features of the Nuremberg trials. They thought that this went too far, that it was revenge and not justice we were meting out to Germans.

If they have not already done so, I ask hon. Members to read the history of the Krupps dynasty. I have it here and I can give them further particulars if they want. I should like them to refresh their memories about what has been British and American policy towards Germany. They will find that at the end of the war, one by one the great German industrialists were indicted and proof brought forward to show that they knew what Hitler was doing and that they financed him and approved of his policy before the war. Adolf Hitler was as popular in the ranks of British Tories before the war as Dr. Adenauer now is. It is a disquieting fact that we are now apparently pursuing the same policy of appeasement towards Dr. Adenauer as we did then towards Hitler.

Let us examine those who made Hitler's success possible. Some of us spoke against Hitler before the Second World War, but there were some hon. Members who were not very much upset about the "brown houses" where Liberals and trade unionists were beaten up. While Herr Ribbentrop and his champagne were the success and the toast of many London circles. Liberals were persecuted and beaten up in Hitler's "brown houses" and anti-Jewish campaigns in Germany were rampant. We warned hon. Members opposite at that time. They had all the evidence produced during the Nuremberg trials. Yet they are now supporters of Dr. Adenauer's dangerous claims.

Many ordinary Germans did not know what was going on in Hitler's Germany. Before the war they did not know of the "brown houses" and the persecution of Hitler's opponents. During the war, they did not know about the gas chambers. But no one would say that the great industrialists who backed Hitler, the Krupps dynasty, for instance, who were his most intimate counsellors, did not know. It was because they knew the whole awful, awful story, because they knew what they were doing when they employed slave labour, because they knew what they were doing when they followed the Panzer divisions into France and wherever else they went to establish the Krupps dynasty in the conquered areas, doing it all with the blessing of Hitler and in alliance with Hitler, that the British, Americans and others, who at the Nüremberg trials were so revolted, said that never again must property be entrusted to such people, that their great industrial empires should never go back into their hands.

It is not surprising that the "king" of the Krupps dynasty was sentenced to twelve years' imprisonment. That was on 31st July, 1948. But, on 31st January, 1951, such is the irrational turn round which, again and again, we have made in these post-war years, that not only was Alfred von Bohlen, the head of the Krupps family, released from gaol, but the law which confiscated his property was rescinded. We then had a nice merry-go-round trying to decide who was to own these great industrial empires, and that merry-go-round is still going on. We are fooling ourselves if we do not realise that, just as some of those great industrial overlords of Germany backed Hitler, so they are now backing Dr. Adenauer. They supplied his funds at the last election. Now we are faced with the same thrusting, arrogant Herrenvolk in charge of Western Germany as we had in the days when Hitler was rising to power. The same old economic situation is being developed and if we permit that to happen the same consequences may follow.

It has already been said by several hon. Members that they are not anti-German. In the middle of the blitz on London I remember sheltering alongside a very distinguished German Jewish refugee. It was natural that he was bitter. Out of 26 members of his family he had only one sister left. The rest had been murdered by Hitler. It was natural that in those circumstances he was bitter, yet I said to him, "Look here, if you can make me anti-German you can make me anti-Jewish". I will give hon. Members opposite time to think that one out. To me it amounts to illiteracy to be against any race, to be against any nation, or to be against any people.

There are millions of Germans who share our views about German rearmament. They do not want those Herrenvolk again commanding not only an industrial but a military empire. It may be said that an apology has been made for some of them. They could not help themselves. They had to do what Hitler told them to do. Both in yesterday's debate and today tribute has been paid to simple Germans who did not have fortunes and power who had to earn their daily bread and look after their homes and families. Many of them stood up to Hitler. If some of those great Herrenvolk who are now supporting Dr. Adenauer, who are now supported by our Foreign Secretary, and who now have such important support in America and elsewhere, had had any true democracy in their souls we might have been saved from the Second World War.

I remember stories coming back to our miners' union about attempts that were made to save men who were being taken to the end of the line of cottages where they lived and shot. In the Ruhr Valley workers' leaders were taken away, their jobs were taken away, and their families were punished. We must not talk as though there was one monolithic block called Germany, as if all Germans are bad, while other people are good or less bad. That is not our case.

Our case is that in the fight against all that Hitler stood for many Germans gave their lives, as did many of our own folk, and the peoples of other nations. When we were fighting Hitler we did not hesitate to enforce conscription, but I think that we would all agree that there was very little conscription of the spirit needed. We were too passionately united in opposition to Hitler. All the same, we did conscript life. In this post-war world are we saying that the lives sacrificed were cheap, but that property, and the Nazis, are sacred? This is the result of the hysterical fear of Communism which has dominated sections of America and led them to turn round completely in their attitude towards the Germans, in particular in their attitude towards the German industrialists who built up Hitler before the war and who are assisting Dr. Adenauer at present. Let it be noted, those industrialists do not assist our German friends, the Democratic Socialists.

We are a passionately united party on this issue of not making a bad situation worse by encouraging any ally inside N.A.T.O. to believe that we are helping the world by allowing nuclear arms to go to Western Germany. Mr. Khrushchev is a realist who plays power politics all the tame. He has made it quite, clear that although his satellites in Eastern Germany may threaten the West he has no intention of giving them nuclear arms or nuclear training. One can sneer at that, but it could turn out to be a fatally expensive sneer.

If Soviet Russia is prepared to consider an area of reduced tension in the heart of Europe, the best place to begin reducing tension is surely in Germany. The way to reduce tension is for us to stop this pretence that it is the Germans who are making the decisions today. The issue ought to be discussed in London. Washington and Bonn and the only thing to do is to make it quite clear that, if Soviet Russia has sufficient confidence in its economic future to want to shepherd its resources for peaceful economic expansion, we can do likewise.

I read a report in the Economist of last January. That paper is not my bible. It is usually very good at collecting statistics, but very bad at forming opinions once it has collected them. But on this occasion I agreed with the report which said that if East Germans claim that in the next seven years they can increase industrial expansion at the rate of 9 per cent. or 10 per cent. per year, we do not see any reason for disagreeing. In that direction lies the beginning of hope. We should all want to reduce the burden of arms on both East and West. We should all look forward to a reduction of tension as the people of East and West Germany together build up their standards of life.

The House of Commons has never faced a more serious subject than it faces this evening. We do not pretend that we ourselves can dictate either to the Soviet bloc or to our Western allies, but we have a duty to speak out, and to speak out plainly, and say that before, during, and after the Summit Conference, we are wholly against Western Germany having any concessions at all in the field of nuclear arms. I am convinced that if we take that line we shall be surprised by the momentum and volume of support which we will receive not only in this island, not only throughout the Commonwealth, but in America and in Germany, wherever civilised people are putting human lives above property interests and are genuinely trying to find a solution to the world's difficulties.

6.17 p.m.

Lieut.-Commander S. L. C. Maydon (Wells)

It is all very well for the hon. Lady the Member for Cannock (Miss Lee) to wax emotional on the difficult subject which we are debating today. I know that from time to time emotion is likely to come to the top, but this is a serious political and military problem. It is a highly technical problem and emotion is always apt to cloud important issues.

I am sure that the hon. Lady will correct me if I am wrong, but I thought that in the earlier part of her speech she said that she did not mind West Germans being trained to use nuclear weapons.

Miss Lee

I must contradict that. I am wholly opposed to their being trained to use them, and I am wholly opposed to their having them. I am wholly opposed to reducing our margin of safety by the caprice of political leaders either in London or New York.

Lieut.-Commander Maydon

I am sorry that I misunderstood the hon. Lady, but she has done something to clear my mind about her speech.

The main burden of her speech seemed to be an attack on the present régime in Western Germany, an attack on Chancellor Adenauer, and a comparison between him and Adolf Hitler, all of which I think fair-minded Members in the House will recognise as unfair and unjustified. I regret that I should have had to sit and listen to such remarks.

If it is possible to simplify history, I think that it might be said that the root cause of the First World War was that Germany in those early years of this century was treated as a second-class nation when she had ambitions. Whether the ambitions were justified or not is a matter of opinion, but Germany was treated as a second-class Power. I do not say that there were not good reasons for doing so. But that undoubtedly was partly the cause of her attitude to the rest of the world. Similarly, before the Second World War both militarily—

Mr. Mendelson

rose—

Lieut.-Commander Maydon

If the hon. Gentleman will allow me, I will finish my sentence and then I will give way to him.

Similarly, before the Second World War, both militarily and economically, it was attempted to keep Germany a second-class Power purely for motives of fear.

Mr. S. Silverman

We were wrong.

Lieut.-Commander Maydon

The hon. Gentleman is quite right for once.

We made two grave mistakes during those years and I think that it is time for us to learn the lessons which may be drawn from them.

If the hon. Member for Penistone (Mr. Mendelson) would like to intervene now, I will give way to him.

Mr. Mendelson

I wanted to suggest that the hon. and gallant Gentleman should submit his reading of history to his right hon. Friend the Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill).

Lieut.-Commander Maydon

As the hon. Lady the Member for Cannock has said, there is plenty of room for disagreement on matters of politics and history, even between those who sit on the same side of the House.

I think that we can learn from those mistakes, and that is what I am sure Her Majesty's Government are trying to do at the present time. Western Germany is in an extraordinarily critical position both geographically and politically in the centre of Europe, in the centre of an area which, for some time since the end of the last war, was likely to be the brewing pot where trouble might break out. I think that it would be quite illogical to arm the main body of the N.A.T.O. divisions with one sort of weapon and to arm the German contribution with another.

I intend to devote the major part of my speech to the question of disarmament and not to armaments, but I wish to preface my remarks by asking two questions of my hon. Friend the Joint Under-Secretary of State. When the Foreign Secretary replies to the debate may we be told whether, during the period of suspension of nuclear tests which has lasted since November, 1958, there is conclusive evidence that the Russians have honoured the agreement fully both in the spirit and in the letter, or, conversely, is there any evidence to the contrary?

One of the greatest anxieties of the Americans regarding the control of nuclear explosions is one which undoubtedly ought also to worry us. It is their discovery during research into the scaling down of the extent of nuclear explosions and perfecting the control of tactical nuclear weapons, that the smaller nuclear explosions—which, very properly have been tested underground to avoid the dangers of fall out—can be made indistinguishable from the minor earth tremors which are constantly occurring and are perceptible only by sensitive seismographical instruments.

Further, some scientists tell us that these explosions can be completely concealed, and be made undetectable. I think that that is the reason underlying our insistence with all our allies that only a truly foolproof system of inspection within all the countries concerned is likely to be successful. Inspections and spot checks on the evidence of external seismographs is quite insufficient for the control of nuclear test explosions.

It would be very difficult, I think almost impossible, for any of the democratic countries to carry out underground tests, even of the smallest kind, in territories under their control in time of peace without such test being detected. The very nature of a democracy, with free speech, freedom of the Press, freedom of travel and free access to all except the clearly defined military areas would preclude the covering up of any activities of this kind. Had the French wished to carry out clandestine tests, even in the middle of the Sahara, I do not believe that they would have succeeded in making even very small tests without someone detecting them; not because of scientific instruments, but because some tongues would have been bound to wag, somebody would have seen or heard something which it was not intended that they should.

Not so in the vast, sparsely populated areas of Russia where, for generations, the writ of the secret police has run and where Beria's ghost stalks abroad; where it is doubtful whether the few people who inhabit the area even know of Beria's death, so restricted are the communications—[HON. MEMBERS: "It was in the papers."] It may have been in the papers, but how many Russians in those regions read those sort of papers, or are permitted to?

The knowledge that some of your own intimates may be Government spies, and that death is the penalty for infringement of official secrets, keeps tongues from wagging in Russia. No one has ever attempted a march on one of the many Russian equivalents of Aldermaston. No half-baked Russian flappers have attempted to instigate passive resistance towards the authorities at Russian rocket-launching sites. Nor are they so naïve as to believe that all those sites are for Sputniks probing the secrets of space for peaceful humanitarian purposes.

If we are to get real disarmament—and I believe that it is possible—we shall be driven to it by fear and by expediency, if by nothing else, for continuing arms competition is too dangerous and far too expensive even for the great nations to afford. If we are to achieve this, inspection must go with it. That brings me to the point of looking a little further into the future, assuming that before long the Disarmament Conference will come to some agreement on the terms of inspection.

Even if we can trust the present Russian leaders—and in recent months I think it fair to say that Mr. Khrushchev has given us some reasons to believe that he is a man of his word—there is so much uncertainty. Mr. Khrushchev may be succeeded by another Stalin and not even the Russians could trust Stalin, if we believe what they now say. I have no doubt that Mr. Khrushchev thinks the same. He might be saying today to his colleagues, "I believe that we can trust that man Macmillan in Britain, but Britain claims she is a democracy and we just dare not contemplate who would be the leader, or what would be the reliability of leadership, of an alternative Government." That may well be said in Moscow today. I think hon. and right hon. Members opposite would do well to turn that point over in their minds.

Mr. Denis Healey (Leeds, East)

Tell it to the Foreign Secretary.

Lieut.-Commander Maydon

Disarmament must be accompanied by complete, free and foolproof—as foolproof as can be with present-day scientific methods—inspection within the contracting parties. I do not often read the flood of literature issued by the Soviet Embassy in London. Whatever its content, most of it is particularly uninviting in appearance and rather unreadable. Many say that they are good propagandists, but the psychology of public relations of the Russian Embassy is certainly not good, or at any rate not in line with the minds of ordinary people in Britain.

However, from time to time I do pick out those documents which deal with disarmament. I have one here, Soviet News for 1st February, 1960, the beginning of this month. It caught my eye because it appears to be relevant to what I have said about foolproof inspection and being able to trust the other contracting parties. It describes an interview in question and answer of Mr. Khrushchev, by M. Pierre Cot, a well-known French publicist. M. Cot questioned Mr. Khrushchev on the subject of his famous disarmament speech in the United Nations on 18th September, 1959. He asked the Russian leader whether international control would be implemented, that is to say, inspection, from the start of the arms reductions. The answer that Mr. Khrushchev gave was as follows: It is the Soviet government's view that the extent and nature of control in each phase of disarmament must correspond to the disarmament measures being carried out. If, for instance, the first stage of our programme provides for the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments, control must cover only those spheres. In the subsequent stages of disarmament, when measures for the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments are supplemented by such steps as the complete elimination of foreign bases on the territories of other states, and the complete prohibition of nuclear and rocket weapons and their exclusion from armaments, control will be carried out only to ensure the fulfilment of those measures. That answer, I feel, leaves plenty of loopholes for dodging. For instance, while disarmament or reduction takes place in conventional aircraft, inspection can cover only that branch of the armed forces; rockets would go unheeded, or vice versa. This is no outline of a comprehensive inspection plan; it is a foundation for a labyrinth of evasion. Later M. Cot asked about the Soviet fear of the use of inspection teams for espionage. The answer was given: Control is not a goal in itself, but an instrument for checking the fulfilment by states of their disarmament commitments. We are not planning to attack anyone. That is why we do not need to engage in intelligence activity. I stop there because it becomes patently obvious that this broadsheet is pure propaganda and not to be taken seriously. I said that the date was Monday, 1st February, 1960, and the last quotation, which I shall repeat—this is Mr. Khrushchev speaking on behalf of the Russian Government—reads: That is why we do not need to engage in intelligence activity. That was at the very time that a German naval officer and others were under trial in Hamburg for intelligence activities on behalf of the Soviet. In view of all this, I think we have to be cautious. We are dealing with a subject which the right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown), in his earlier remarks, said was constantly in the minds of all of us as a menace to our safety and to the sureness and certainty of life on this earth.

If we go too fast and too incautiously, in view of the slippery nature of some of the people with whom we deal, it may be equally dangerous and equally unsure, but that is no reason to halt in our tracks and do nothing. We have to proceed step by step, each step being covered by guarantees of the safety of ourselves and our friends. Unless we do that, and unless real inspection and control is part of that step-by-step method, we are only storing up even greater trouble for ourselves than we have known in our past dangerous history.

I should like to repeat to my hon. Friend on the Front Bench: could we have an answer to these two questions? Are we certain, is there conclusive evidence, that during the suspension of nuclear tests since November, 1958, the Russians have played their part fully and honourably, or is there evidence to the contrary?

6.42 p.m.

Mr. E. Shinwell (Easington)

I never quite understand why hon. Members who profess anxiety about the present state of affairs and the mounting tension, and who are desirous of promoting peaceful co-existence, if not complete disarmament, should occupy all their time in disparaging, indeed going so far as to abuse, those people with whom they seek agreement. What does the hon. and gallant Member for Wells (Lieut.-Commander Maydon) think he has achieved by his observations? He has indulged in a narrative of events, of speeches and observations for which Mr. Khrushchev is responsible, and on that basis, and on such data as he possessed, which he has related to us, he comes to the conclusion that we must be cautious and prudent. Indeed, the implication of what he says is that we cannot trust the people with whom we wish to come to terms. That is of no value whatever.

Lieut.-Commander Maydon

I hope the right hon. Gentleman will do me justice, and will recognise that I said that the converse was probably equally true. I said that very probably Mr. Khrushchev and his advisers in the Kremlin were saying exactly the same things about us.

Mr. Shinwell

I do not regard that as any effort to remove misunderstanding. The hon. and gallant Gentleman cannot have it both ways. Whatever our views may be about the people with whom we wish to enter into agreements, we must recognise certain facts, and must seek by peaceful means, by a process of negotiation, conciliation, argument and persuasion to come to terms. To attempt to strike a balance, such as the hon. and gallant Gentleman sought to achieve, seems to be of no value. However, I do not propose to deal with him; I have other fish to fry.

Both the Foreign Secretary and the Minister of Defence are, I presume, unable to be present at the moment, for which I express my regret. I should like them to have heard what I had to say, not that I flatter myself that I have anything more intelligent to say than any other people, but, nevertheless, I think it would be an advantage to have had them present. However, no doubt the Joint Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs will convey my observations to both right hon. Gentlemen.

If it is any satisfaction to them, I admit at once, quite freely, unreservedly and without any qualification whatever, that there are occasionally differences of opinion in the Labour Party on the subjects of foreign affairs and defence. That has been the position for a very long time, but on the subject which we pinpoint during this debate, the provision of weapons of nuclear capability—or full-strength nuclear weapons—to Western Germany, there is complete unanimity in this party. I propose to give the reasons why.

First of all, the very concept is repugnant not only to the Labour Party, but I believe to millions of people in this country. Apparently, it is also repugnant to many people in Western Germany. Moreover, and this is a point which it seems to me we cannot possibly ignore, as long as there are Germans in high places who retain their ambitions about the return of the old German provinces now in the possession of Poland, there is great danger.

One of the most pregnant arguments I have heard in the course of the debate was presented by the hon. Member for Richmond, Surrey (Mr. A. Royle), who made a maiden speech this afternoon. What did he say? He expressed the fears of the Russians about a remilitarised Germany. Of course, the Russians have been scared for many years about that possibility. It constitutes a great menace, not only to Soviet Russia, but to Poland, the so-called satellite countries, to East Germany, and it may well be to the world itself. It is not because we fail to trust the Germans. It is because there are certain political events which are unsettled, for which at the present time it is impossible to find a solution, that the Germans are calculated to be in a mood which may lead to unhappy events.

How are we to reach a solution? The Foreign Secretary said yesterday—and this is one of the reasons why I sought to intervene in the debate—that what is happening now about the provision of nuclear weapons to Western Germany, was the logical consequence of a decision reached by the Labour Government in 1950. That is what the right hon. and learned Gentleman said; indeed, that was his case. What are the facts about it? What he said was quite incomplete. To begin with, in 1949, when the subject was raised, not in this country but in the United States of America, the Labour Government categorically and emphatically refused to countenance the proposal at all. I have all the material here. As hon. Members know, I very rarely trouble myself with documents, but I thought it might be appropriate to have the relevant passages available, in case I happened to be challenged.

That was away back in 1949, and there was a Foreign Office statement on 21st November, saying: The British Government have not contemplated and do not contemplate any such development as the rearmament of Germany. There was a defence debate in the House on 26th and 27th July, 1950, when I had to present the case on behalf of the Government. I said: We recognise the natural anxiety of the German people about the defence of their country. … H.M. Government have repeatedly, and in conjunction with their Allies, declared their opposition to the rearmament of Germany."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 26th July, 1950; Vol. 478, c. 470.] An equally categoric statement was made by the late Mr. Bevin, then Foreign Secretary, in March of that year. What ensued upon those statements? This is the whole crux of the problem, and I am sorry that many hon. Members fail to understand how this situation arose. Mr. Bevin was requested to go to New York to meet Mr. Dean Acheson, then Secretary of State, and M. Schuman, who was the Foreign Minister of France. During their conversations in New York, Dean Acheson said that because of the weakness of the French contribution, both in forces and in weapons, it was essential to have a German contribution. That is how it arose. I hope that I am not violating the Official Secrets Act when I say that Mr. Bevin sent a telegram to the Cabinet in the course of which he expressed great reluctance to accept the proposition which Dean Acheson had made but asked the Cabinet to agree in principle; and that was done.

Thereupon it was agreed that the three Defence Ministers and the three Foreign Ministers should meet in New York. I went to the conference. At that conference there was considerable disquiet about the proposition. The French were definitely opposed to it. So were we. What was eventually agreed was not the creation of military forces. I will quote the exact description of the kind of forces which were suggested. A statement was issued on 19th September which announced permission for the establishment of new mobile police formations. We then added—and this is very interesting, I am sure, to many hon. Members— and modifications to the agreement on prohibited and limited industries in Germany. That arose out of the Krupps affair, which had taken an untoward turn.

Even the proposal for the creation of mobile police forces was, to begin with, rejected by M. Jules Mach, the French Defence Minister, and I was asked to negotiate with him and to persuade him to accept this modest proposal.

Eventually, when we were out of office and when the Tory Government came into power, they proceeded to create not mobile police forces in Western Germany but military forces. There were two causes. One was the defection of the French. There were great troubles with the French, who were preoccupied in Indo-China. We tried our best to induce them to make an effective contribution. They made contributions on paper but these never materialised. Indeed, there has been trouble with the French in N.A.T.O. ever since. There is trouble now. That is nothing new. What has happened in connection with the de Gaulle philosophy—and I do not want to deal with that—is an example.

That was one of the reasons. The other reason has persisted all the way through—and that is the reason we are having this debate, although many hon. Members may not know it: the Americans had made up their minds that German forces had to be created in considerable strength—they talked about twelve divisions—and that at the same time they had to be provided with suitable weapons. At that time there was no question of nuclear weapons.

For what it is worth, I will venture an opinion about this. If I were asked for evidence I should have to indulge in a great deal of research. Perhaps it is intuition, but I will venture to express it. I believe the reason that General Norstad has been seeking to persuade his colleagues in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation to agree to the provision of weapons with nuclear capabilities for Germany is that the State Department and the Pentagon have been pressing it upon him all the time.

That is what has happened. We ought not to be a stooge to the United States. I sometimes think that we are pretty much in their hands. We disagree with them about China and we disagreed with them about Suez, but when it comes to the defence organisation in Europe, to N.A.T.O., and to the kind of weapons that ought to be provided, if not used, then I think the Americans decide what is to be done. They have the sole and exclusive determination in the matter.

The Foreign Secretary yesterday made a remarkable statement. He may not have intended to say this, but I must ask him a question about it, and perhaps the Minister of Defence will convey it to him. He was dealing with the provision of weapons to Germany and contesting the issue with my right hon. Friends. He said: … the decision was taken art the N.A.T.O. Council meeting on nuclear stockpiles. … In my view, it is impossible and unwise to exclude the German armed forces from the consequences of that decision. That is the decision to build up nuclear stockpiles. For these weapons to be available to the Turks, the Greeks, the Italians and the Dutch, for example, but not for German units is not the way to build an alliance or a partnership."—[OFFICIAL REPORT. 10th February, 1960; Vol. 617, c. 503.] I want to put the question to him categorically. Have the Turks, the Greeks, the Dutch and the Italians got these weapons? If not, what did he mean? He was using this as an argument to convince us that the Germans ought not to be placed in a position of inferiority. He implied that the Turks and the others have these weapons and asked, why should they have the weapons and not the Germans? Have they the weapons? Will the Minister of Defence be good enough to state whether they have? Either he knows or he does not know. We certainly ought to know. This is quite new. We were never told before that the Turks and the other nations had these weapons and that consequently we must not impose inferiority on the Germans.

I turn to the Minister of Defence, who deployed an interesting and ingenious argument. I thought that I had better write it down, but perhaps he will correct me if I am wrong. He gave a reason why he rejects the latter part of the Motion, in which I am particularly interested. He said, "If Germany is not adequately armed"—he meant with nuclear weapons—"the gap will have to be made up by us". He wanted to know whether we were prepared to foot the bill. It is very ingenious to say to the British taxpayer, "You must let the Germans have these weapons and make their contribution, because if you do not you will have to provide a bigger contribution."

I put a question to him following what he said and in no unfriendly fashion—because I know he has a very difficult task: did he mean that we should be required to produce more nuclear weapons and place them at the disposal of N.A.T.O. in order to fill the gap, or did he mean that in order to fill the gap we should provide more conventional weapons?

Mr. Watkinson

I can give the right hon. Gentleman a small piece of news which I could not give in my speech. We have to retain further elements of our Air Force in Germany at the request of the Supreme Allied Commander because of the gap in the air defence there due to the slow build-up of the German Air Force. What I meant was that if Germany were not adequately armed to play her full part in the alliance, we should have to bear our share of making up the gap.

Mr. Shinwell

I do not take exception to that and there may be justification for it, but that is not what the right hon. Gentleman implied. I am sure that other hon. Members will agree when I say that we understood him to imply that a gap had to be filled. What kind of a gap? In nuclear weapons? We are in no position, anyway, to contribute more nuclear weapons. Indeed, I question whether we ourselves have an effective supply of nuclear weapons.

I attach some importance to this. The right hon. Gentleman said that the purpose of N.A.T.O. and our purpose conjointly is defensive and that we have no aggressive designs. Of course we have not. From the very inception of N.A.T.O. we had no aggressive designs. It was purely defensive. That was the character of N.A.T.O. If that is so, can we make a contribution in more conventional forces and weapons, or could Germany, and would not that suffice? Or is the idea that in order to strengthen the so-called deterrent—the largest contribution being made by the United States of America, we making a modest contribution, France and the other N.A.T.O. countries making no contribution—Germany has to have nuclear weapons? That will not do. It will not wash, because the whole purpose of N.A.T.O. was to construct a defensive shield. The deterrent, in the words of the right hon. Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill), was to be provided almost exclusively by the United States of America. That was what he said, and the understanding was that our contribution was to be of very little consequence.

Therefore, what is all this nonsense about providing West Germany with weapons of nuclear capability and all this quibble about who is to control the warheads and all the rest of it? What will happen if it is no longer a deterrent but is to be effective, that is to say, is to become retaliatory? What happens if the Russians attack, perhaps with limited forces, and we find ourselves in a situation of imminent defeat? If we use tactical atomic weapons and find them not quite effective, do we deploy the whole nuclear balloon? Do we understand that the Germans will contribute to that? Is that the purpose of it? I think that we should know.

I do not believe that this will lower tension in Europe, and that is why I protest against it. After all, we have a purpose. It is not merely the purpose and objective of the Labour Party. I am sure that every right hon. and hon. Gentleman wants to lower tension in Europe, the Far East, the Middle East, indeed throughout the whole world. That is our purpose. How is it to be done? I should like an answer to it and perhaps the Foreign Secretary will give me one at the end of the debate. Does he sincerely believe—is it his honest conviction, nothing to do with politics and not under the persuasion of the United States of America—that providing the Germans with even a limited amount of arms of nuclear capability will lower tension in Europe? On the contrary, it is likely to increase it.

One can ignore Mr. Khrushchev's statements if one likes, but it is sometimes better to take note of them. He has said, "If that is the sort of thing you are going to do, we will provide East Germany with nuclear weapons or weapons of nuclear capability". Will that lower tension in Europe? Will it lead to a solution of the Berlin problem, which everyone knows is crucial? If one can solve the Berlin problem and at the same time solve the problem of atomic tests, one will be on the road at any rate to partial disarmament if not to complete disarmament. How is that to be done?

If we are to reach some solution of our problems certain risks must be taken. The first risk is this. I do not suppose that hon. Members will agree with me but we should face the fact—it is a fait accompli—that the German Democratic Republic exists. I will recount one or two incidents arising from my visits to West Germany and East Germany. I went to West Germany and attended a conference. I spoke to many Germans—some from the Social Democrats, some from the Christian Democrats, some from probably no organisations at all. I interrogated them. I wanted to know if they believed in German reunification. I do not know whether they were telling the truth, but their answer was, "We want reunification, but we will have nothing to do with the Communist stooges in East Germany. Get rid of them and we will consider it".

I went with my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) to East Germany. We went to examine the defence organisation there. Indeed, we stipulated that we would not go otherwise. We were not concerned with housing, factories and such things. We were concerned with defence. We had discussions with the directors of defence and with the ministers of defence. We talked to soldiers. We were allowed to roam where we pleased. We saw a great deal and saw many weapons. We did not see any nuclear weapons, but no doubt they were concealed underground somewhere. We also asked questions there. That is a practice in which we indulge in the House, and we employed it elsewhere. We asked the East Germans whether they wanted reunification. Their answer was, "Of course we do". Their reservation was precisely the same as we had heard in West Germany. They added, "But not with those Nazi elements in West Germany". As we say in mining circles in Durham, "You may shove it off the board".

It is not practical politics, but a solution of the Berlin problem probably is. I suggest to the Government that we should recognise the German Democratic Republic. What would the consequences be? Dr. Adenauer would be furious. The Americans might be furious. Why can we not take a line of our own occasionally? What are we afraid of? I take great pride in this country. Wherever I go I speak in terms of eloquence about it. It has courage, dignity and enthusiasm. Those qualities are not always to be found in Government circles, I admit, but they exist and are characteristic of our people. Why have we to be beholden to people elsewhere? Of course we should co-operate with them, but on equal terms. We should not be subordinate to them. It is about time that the British Government stood on their own legs and took a line which they thought was right as regards East Germany.

There is the possibility of building up a great volume of trade. I believe that there is the possibility eventually of reaching a satisfactory conclusion which may lead to an understanding about Berlin by telling the West German Government that they must come to some arrangement. All that they are doing just now, hypocrites that they are—there are hypocrites on both sides—is trading with each other. They are making profit out of each other and they boast about it. They said to us, "Yes. Trading is going on all the time. We make a bit of profit out of it". Instead of reaching agreement I sometimes suspect that there are people who want this problem to remain because they have a scapegoat. They have an alibi which enables them to say, "There are great problems. We want disarmament, but that cannot be secured as long as these problems remain". There are people who use problems as alibis.

My last point brings me back to the subject of the Government. Many years ago we agreed—the Labour Government agreed then and Conservative Governments have agreed since—about the recognition of the Chinese People's Republic. Why do not we tell the United States that we are sick and tired of their intransigence? After all, the Chinese People's Republic is a fait accompli. There is no denying that. Does anyone really believe that Summit talks, as they describe them, will solve any kind of problem and lead to anything worth while unless the Chinese are consulted? There is very great danger in the Far East. I know that the Americans are making a contribution to Japanese militarism—that will not avail them very much.

That being our declared policy, repeatedly stated, it is about time that the British Government said to the United States Government, to the State Department, "Come off your perch"—good, straightforward, forthright language—" "Come off your perch, and come to some agreement with the Chinese People's Republic and try for a solution of the Far East problem".

I have said that I prefer the latter part of the Motion. For the rest—well, I have been long enough in politics to know a bit about the flannel and the fluff. They do no harm. We get them in all kinds of Motions—Government Motions, too. I have written some of them myself. My concern in supporting the Motion is to pinpoint what really matters. In order to lower tension in Europe, we should just say to General Norstad and to the Ministers' Council of N.A.T.O. and to all the military experts, "Better stop this. Let the Germans build up their conventional forces. They might be necessary for some purposes—say for defence—but let us not instil aggressive designs into the minds of the Germans by providing them with weapons of great destructiveness."

That is the line we should take, and that is why I support the Motion. If the Foreign Secretary, who is not present at this moment, is disturbed because we criticise the Government, let me assure him—his colleagues can tell him what I say—that is the only way to keep this place going. How would he like us always to agree with the Government? What kind of place would this be?

Mr. Watkinson

Hear, hear.

Mr. Shinwell

I am glad that I appear to have the consent of the Government in that. I hope we have their support for the Motion.

7.12 p.m.

Commander Anthony Courtney (Harrow, East)

It is daunting to follow the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) in debate, particularly on only one's third occasion to speak in the House, but, despite the last part of his remarks, I would venture to say, having followed the debate closely, that there is a fundamental measure of agreement on both sides of the House on the nub of this difficulty.

I followed with interest the speech made yesterday by the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman). I can assure him that strength of feeling on the matters he raised is not confined to his side of the House. He mentioned his recent visit to Auschwitz. I myself have been to Dachau. There are points of similarity beween the two establishments on which I shall not dwell. I was also in Moscow, when we were allies of the Soviet Union, and heard the German guns firing outside the city. I know something of the devastation of East Europe caused by the advance of the German armies towards the East.

We all hate the prospect of the rearmament of anybody, and we all have good reason, in our memories, for disliking it particularly in the case of Germany. We share with the Russians the fears of German rearmament and of all that that entails. We know that the deep mistrust of the Russians for countries of the East and West brings also a similarity of view into our way of looking at these problems. The fears of the Warsaw Pact countries are well known. We all have this fear, and we are now deciding what to do about it.

As the right hon. Member for Easing-ton has said, the nub of the debate is German rearmament, but neither he nor any other right hon. Gentleman today or yesterday—and, to my knowledge, only my hon. Friend the Member for Oxford (Mr. Woodhouse) on this side—has mentioned anything about the original cause of rearming Germany, and who did it first.

I think that, in this sense, the attention of hon. Members has been diverted too much to Western Germany rather than to the Soviet Zone of Germany—now the German Democratic Republic. I should like to refresh the right hon. Gentleman's memory, and follow on his revelation of matters for which he was so responsible in the days of 1949 and 1950. I was in Germany at that time, and one of my duties was to interest myself in happenings in the Soviet Zone of Germany.

I clearly remember, as I am sure the right hon. Gentleman will now himself remember, those first reports that came in of the arming of the Volkspolizei and the equipping of the Bereitschaften, or "readiness battalions" in 1950 in the Soviet Zone, long before a single soldier in Western Germany had a rifle in his hands. I believe that the right hon. Gentleman will agree with me there—I see him nodding.

This has been part of a continuous process east of the Oder-Neisse Line, and somewhat west of it in the Soviet Zone of Germany; a continuous process, not of rearmament but of the maintenance of armaments retained after the end of the war. I believe that the existence of 29 divisions—not 22, as one right hon. Gentleman said yesterday—poised in Eastern Germany can perhaps be considered as a reflection of Russian fears of the German rearmament that we are discussing today. But I do not believe that the presence of 500 operational submarines in the Soviet fleet can be considered in the same context, observing that the only possible wartime use of such an operational fleet is that which we ourselves have experienced twice in my own lifetime.

As against this, we have established the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Despite the fears of right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite, I think that it is demonstrated that there is proper political control of the weapons deployed by that defensive organisation. Here we have some common ground because, although we have increased the N.A.T.O. forces to balance the massive armament of the East, on both sides of the House we seek for any possible method of reducing those armaments.

Shortly after the declaration of disarmament proposals by Mr. Khrushchev I had the pleasure and privilege of broadcasting on Moscow Radio, in company with the hon. Member for Gorton (Mr. Zilliacus). Having expressed my own views on the disarmament plan, I must admit to a little disquiet at what I may fairly call the uncritical acceptance of the Soviet disarmament proposals by my colleague, and his forgetfulness—if I may say so, amounting, perhaps, to discourtesy—in not mentioning that comprehensive disarmament proposals had been made by my right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary on the day previous to Mr. Khrushchev's announcement of his own proposals.

Disarmament is not a subject on which we can reproach ourselves. We are in the midst of very tortuous and complicated discussions with members of one of the most suspicious nations in the world. This Motion of censure, if pressed home, will serve merely to weaken the front which this country, through our representatives, will present at the forthcoming Summit talks.

It is no use speaking to the Russians with anything but a united front, and from strength. Let it never be said by Mr. Khrushchev or anyone else in the Kremlin—to paraphrase Emperor Napoleon—that, "It has always been my good fortune to negotiate with allies."

I was struck by the speech of the right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) and his three propositions. I could not follow his argument, and I do not think that one could convict him of oversimplification of any of it. But he made an aside at the end which was both amusing and, I think, significant. He turned to one of his hon. Friends and said, "I do not know whether you and I agree, but I am quite certain that neither of us agrees with the hon. Gentleman opposite".

If that is the spirit in which this Motion of censure is moved by the Opposition, if it is simply a party matter, I would ask them, in the wider interest of the common front in N.A.T.O. discussions about these vital problems and in the negotiations shortly to take place at the Summit, to withdraw it.

7.22 p.m.

Mr. George Wigg (Dudley)

I pay the hon. and gallant Member for Harrow, East (Commander Courtney) very sincere tribute for believing what he says. But, of course, if he argues that his right hon. and learned Friend shall speak for this country only from strength, he condemns him to eternal silence because, in my judgment, this country has never been weaker in real terms than it is today.

During the Christmas holidays, I happened to pick up a copy of the Spectator in which was published an illuminating article written by Mr. Christopher Hollis, who was for some years a Member of this House. Discussing our defence contribution, Mr. Hollis said he doubted that we could put five men on an uninhabited island. Recently, of course, we have had the memoirs of Sir Anthony Eden who, in 1960, has said some of the things that I was saying in July, 1956—that we lacked the ability to carry through the Suez operation for we had neither the air cover nor the tank landing craft. He now admits that to be true. I assert that, true as it was then, it is infinitely more true today.

I know a good deal about what my right hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) has told the House, because in all the adventures he has been describing I had the very great good fortune to be with him. At the first conference of Defence Ministers at Washington I attended as his P.P.S. and, again. I was present at the historic meeting in Brussels on 19th December, 1951, which brought General Eisenhower to Europe as Supreme Commander. I know from hearing discussions there and from meeting people who were living with these problems from day to day that the issue of the German contribution came up in the first instance because of the French failure to face their obligations. Since then, it has been not only a French failure but a British failure, too.

If the hon. and gallant Member for Harrow, East will undertake the discipline of reading the debate on 17th and 18th November, 1954, he will appreciate that the arguments there were driven home because of the weakness of N.A.T.O. as a shield. The Supreme Commander was thinking in terms of 30 divisions. It was not long before people were thinking in terms of 50 divisions. We quelled the fears of the French—this is, to some extent, justification for French doubts about "perfidious Albion"—by undertaking to commit four British divisions and the Second Tactical Air Force. That is what we undertook to do.

In 1957, the present Prime Minister tore up the old defence policy which was based upon the N.A.T.O. shield. For the best of reasons, perfectly honourable reasons, he thought he could run defence on the cheap. So we had the Defence White Paper which was based upon a nuclear strategy. Again, if the hon. and gallant Member is interested, he should read the Prime Minister's speech when, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, he thought that he had a way of cutting defence costs by £700 million. He really thought that this new concept could be run on the cheap. If there is one thing at all which is true about it, it is that one cannot run it on the cheap.

I was greatly interested in what the Foreign Secretary said yesterday and what the Minister of Defence said today. They both made the same point, that we—the House of Commons and the British taxpayer—had to face what the bill would be if the Germans did not bear their share. That is a very revealing argument but, if I may say so, it is, in my judgment, an illiterate argument because, ultimately, we have to think in terms of power. If we have not got it, we silence ourselves at the conference table. To that extent, I agree with the hon. and gallant Member for Harrow, East.

What are we doing? We undertook to commit four divisions in Germany. Is there any hon. Member who thinks that we have got four, three or two divisions there? We have seventeen infantry battalions in Germany at the present time, and there is not a handful of them up to standard. We have thirteen armoured battalions in Germany now. These are not secrets. The facts are very well known. I am quite sure that the order of battle is known in the Kremlin. That is the total of what we have there.

The twelve German divisions have not come forward. There are only five of them. The Foreign Secretary yesterday gave the figures—a hoped-for 300,000, but we have 150,000. There is an enormous gap which the Supreme Allied Commander could fill, if the worst came to the worst, only by action by the Strategic Air Command.

We must also face the consequences of our long-term policy, or lack of it. This is something not properly understood in many quarters of the House, and perhaps I may for a few minutes give the version of the story as I see it. The argument about whether the Germans should have atomic tactical weapons or atomic strategic weapons is beside the point. The decision taken in 1957 by Her Majesty's Government to cut back our forces in Germany to 55,000 regardless of either the political or the military consequences forced a reappraisal by N.A.T.O. This was included in a very secret N.A.T.O. paper, M.C. 70, which, of course, has been leaked in all the Press, especially the American Press.

Quite clearly, if Germany was to come in as a member of N.A.T.O., there could be no differentiation in terms of her training. This was very badly expressed by the Foreign Secretary yesterday—and called forth a crushing retort from my right hon. Friend the Member for Easington—when he spoke about Turkey, Greece and the like. The truth is that, in 1957, the N.A.T.O. Council took the decision that all N.A.T.O. countries, with the exception of Luxembourg and Portugal, should undergo training in atomic weapons, in missiles. Of course, what the Germans have at the present time in missiles, their Honest Johns and their Corporals, they have in terms of training because, sooner or later, the Supreme Allied Commander hopes to have 129 missile battalions. Where he hopes to get them from or when they will come, goodness only knows, but that is the object of the policy. The real objection, if there is an objection to an atomic potential for the Germans, was to their having an Air Force. The easiest and, perhaps, the only way open to them is to put an A-bomb on one of their fighter bombers, of which they hope to get 800.

N.A.T.O. was originally devised, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Easington said, as a defensive force. It was not only the shortcomings of the French, for whom we have no responsibility, but also the shortcomings and vaccilations of the Government, who are answerable to the House of Commons, and the fact that they welshed on their N.A.T.O. obligations without consulting their allies, that led the Supreme Allied Commander to urge that, if he was to face up to the task placed upon his shoulders, he had to have an atomic potential. There is no escape from that dilemma, unless one holds the view that sooner or later N.A.T.O. must disrupt, which would be a great blow to the peace of the world.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Easington referred to our visit to Germany. I am completely convinced, as he was, that the East German forces are defensive in character. The East Germans are afraid of the West Germans and the West Germans are afraid of the East Germans. But if both sides were prevented from having atomic tactical weapons, if they had no more than the forces necessary for internal security, the question we should have to ask ourselves is: would that add to or detract from the stability and peace of Europe? My view is that the recognition of East Germany by the West and the recognition of the Chinese Republic by the Americans would be two major contributions to the peace of the world. I believe that any talk of settlement at the Summit which does not include those two propositions is a complete and utter waste of time.

What can we do? It is idle to think, like the hon. and gallant Member for Harrow, East, that this country can make any contribution in terms of power. It is absurd. This week, we have had discussions on defence. We had a discussion on Cyprus. I am astonished that my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey), who has been a soldier, has not asked the Government what we have in Cyprus. We have three infantry battalions in Cyprus, yet we are arguing about Cyprus as a base. What absolute nonsense.

The truth, if I may put it in Army terms, is that the defence bill will be nearer to £1,700 million than £1,600 million. If I were asked to guess I would put the figure at £1,675 million. We shall get a defence bill for that next week—and we could not knock the skin off a rice pudding! Year after year, defence debate after defence debate, and Army Estimates debate after Army Estimates debate, I have said the same thing. I have often found myself at variance with my hon. Friends. We are not an atomic Power. We cannot afford an atomic strategy. We can never be an atomic Power, any more than the French. We can pretend to be one, but if we do we shall welsh on the insurance contribution that we ought to pay.

If the worst comes to the worst, the Strategic Air Command is the deterrent. There is nothing that we can do. If the worst does not happen, we must make our contribution to N.A.T.O. and be in a position to maintain our own interests in different parts of the world. That means conventional forces and mobility. But what is the use of the Minister of Defence coming to the Dispatch Box and talking about our position of strength? Whom does he think he deludes? He does not delude me; he certainly deludes many of his hon. Friends. We have seventeen infantry battalions in Europe. That is the sum total. Many of them could not move their own baggage. This is a blatant fact.

What is the use of the Government coming to the House and talking about defence policy in those terms? It adds nothing to our strength. Our strength lies in the moral sphere—not in guns, aeroplanes, or atomic and nuclear potential, but in giving a lead and standing up for the things that are right and the things in which we believe. One day, the world will come to recognise the things in which we believe, which are not things that rely on power and the recognition of the East German Republic. That can be done without a man or a gun. This would certainly offend the West Germans, but they, poor souls, will be offended anyway. If I were Dr. Adenauer, one of the most sinister things to me in this debate would be the praise dished out in my defence by the Foreign Secretary. The prelude to a British sell-out is praise from the Government Front Bench and the final thing is praise in a leading article in The Times. When that happens, all is lost.

7.36 p.m.

Mr. F. M. Bennett (Torquay)

The hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) nearly always endears himself to the House by going off at the most unexpected tangents, but I am sure that at least we all admire the sturdy British attitude which the hon. Member and the right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) always adopt. Yet I have been a little baffled by the former's speech, because, in a debate censuring us for not having enough disarmament, the hon. Member for Dudley seemed to be arguing rather in favour of more armaments. Towards the end of his speech, the hon. Member for Dudley dropped that line and said that what he was thinking of was not of more armaments but of more power. But, as the hon. Member had said earlier that the only way to get anywhere in the conference room was to have physical power, I was left, after having got to point Z, back at point A in his argument.

Hon. Members opposite, including the right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown), made great point of the fact that, although the Labour Party might well be split on a lot of things, the one thing on which it is completely united is the subject matter of this debate. I sat through nearly all yesterday's speeches and certainly through all today's speeches. If what we have heard today from hon. Members opposite shows, as the hon. Lady the Member for Cannock (Miss Lee) said, how desperately united the Labour Party is, that word has taken on a new and strange meaning.

Let me quote one or two examples. The right hon. Member for Belper was particularly careful to pay tribute to the German Government. He said that he did not know all of them as well as he knew the members of the German Opposition, but, generally speaking, although there might be exceptions, he paid high tribute to the German Government. I know that there are other right hon. and hon. Members opposite—I am sure that the right hon. Member for Bassetlaw (Mr. Bellenger) would agree if he were here—who take a similar view. On the other hand, the hon. Lady the Member for Cannock entered into a diatribe against Dr. Adenauer and his colleagues, placing them in almost the same category as Hitler, except that they had not got quite so far on his wicked road yet. If that is a sign of how desperately united the Labour Party is, the word has a slightly different meaning from that which we generally accept.

So, as some questions have been addressed to my right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary, perhaps, when the official Opposition spokesman winds up, we might be told on this matter on which hon. Members opposite are so desperately united, whether they regard Dr. Adenauer and his colleagues in the same way as the hon. Lady the Member for Cannock. That is one question which the party opposite, in its turn, should answer.

The hon. Lady the Member for Cannock, just before she spoke about the Labour Party being so desperately united, said that she did not want the Germans to have nuclear weapons or nuclear capacity before, during or after a Summit, whatever happens. That may be an understandable viewpoint. It is certainly not the one put forward by the right hon. Member for Belper as Opposition policy, because he said that what was wanted was a much more limited objective. The Labour Party, he said, only thought that the timing was wrong and that this was a tactless moment to do it, because it was wrong to spoil the chances of success at the Summit although this should not prejudice the situation as it might be afterwards. That was exactly the opposite to what was said by the hon. Lady the Member for Cannock, who spoke after the right hon. Gentleman.

I am not intending to embarrass the right hon. Member for Easington by compliments, but I found his speech to be the most enjoyable of the whole day. I am not sure whether I am interpreting the right hon. Gentleman correctly, but I understood him to accept that the Labour Party had an initial responsibility in principle for the creation of a German contribution to N.A.T.O., even though initially the decision was only in terms of one of those nice phrases about mobile police. We all knew exactly what was meant, both then and afterwards. Since the right hon. Gentleman has not interrupted me, I assume that he accepts his and his party's full share of responsibility for the German contribution to N.A.T.O.

We are having a strange debate, because it is difficult to find any substance in principle to warrant this attack of censure that is being made against the Government. If it is true, as it is, that the principle of German rearmament was faced and accepted when the Labour Party was in office, we are at least clear on that point. From that moment on, we go to the implications that it entailed in the years that followed.

Also, the hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) spoke yesterday about Britain giving up the nuclear capacity—in other words, a reversion to the non-nuclear club. I took it that that was the idea that the hon. Member was reviving. I assume we are also in agreement that the Socialist Party does not try to hide from the fact that it was by its decision in principle that Britain originally had a separate nuclear deterrent.

Moving on to the question of German rearmament with nuclear or any other modern weapons, since I said that it was only in principle that the Labour Party agreed initially on a German contribution, it is fair to consider whether the present proposals of N.A.T.O. do or do not follow directly from that original decision. I submit that they do. What the Socialist criticism amounts to is that we say to the Germans, "We want you as our allies. We want you to make your full contribution, but, because of your record, you are not to be trusted with certain weapons. The argument of whether Turkey or Greece or Iceland is to have nuclear capability on strategic grounds is immaterial to the German question. It is the motive of discrimination that counts.

If we say anything like that to the Germans, it is not on strategic grounds. For example, there are reasons why an island Power like ourselves might make a bigger naval contribution and other nations might make a bigger aerial contribution. It is not in that direction that we are thinking in terms of discrimination. If the speeches from the Opposition benches mean anything, every speaker from that side of the House has seized upon the record of what has happened in Germany in the past and said that the Germans are not to be trusted with nuclear weapons because of what they might do to recover their eastern territories.

Mr. Shinwell

That might be a reasonable argument, but that is not the gravamen of our charge. What we postulate is that provision of weapons of this character would not succeed in lowering tension in Europe. It would not help to achieve a solution of the Berlin problem. If the hon. Member would address himself to that argument and prove to us that to provide the West Germans with these weapons would lower tension in Europe, I should be glad to hear what he has to say.

Mr. Bennett

Of all the arguments adduced by the Opposition, the right hon. Gentleman can choose whichever he wishes to put forward, but he cannot (noose for me which ones I should answer.

Mr. Shinwell

I am only trying to help.

Mr. Bennett

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman, but I am just capable of dealing with one or two of the other arguments as well. Other hon. Members have clearly made out that one of the reasons why we are reluctant to let the Germans have the nuclear deterrent is not intrinsically because it will Or will not reduce tension, important though that issue may be, but is because of the Germans' record and because it is alleged, as the hon. Lady the Member for Cannock indicated when she produced the pamphlet sent out by the German Embassy, that they are not to be trusted that if they are given the opportunity, they will not try to get back their Eastern territories by force. It is, therefore, a question of motive, and not of strategy or tactics, in which we are discriminating against the Germans.

Mr. Crossman

Since my hon. Friend the Member for Cannock (Miss Lee) is not present, may I say that what she produced was a map showing the Eastern Zone of Germany called, not the D.D.R., but Mitteldeutschland, then the eastern areas of Poland marked as Ostdeutschland and, further east, a large area called Ost Preussen, which is now part of the Soviet Union. All these were shown as Deutschland. What my hon. Friend pointed out was that this was imprinted in an official document called, "The German Point of View". If a map is officially printed committing the Bonn Government to these frontiers, it is a question not of motive, but of policy. My hon. Friend was pointing out that the ally whose policy is to destroy the existing frontiers is the kind of ally to whom it is dangerous to give nuclear weapons and that it would not relax world tension by doing so.

Mr. Bennett

The hon. Member has put clearly the point I was trying to make, that because of the distrust of Germany's motives—

Mr. Crossman

Because of her policy.

Mr. Bennett

It is not because of her policy, because at no stage has the German Government said—it has, in fact, said the opposite—that it intends to regain those territories by military force. It is not, therefore, a question of policy. It is because the hon. Lady the Member for Cannock and others believe that a present or future German Government may one day resort to policies of which we would all disapprove on the ground that force is used. It is for that reason, therefore, that the Opposition are unwilling to allow the Germans, as several hon. Members opposite have said, to have the nuclear weapons, because we do not trust them in what they will do with them in the future.

Mr. S. Silverman

That is one of the reasons.

Mr. Bennett

That is the principal reason put forward. I do not believe that we can expect an alliance and unity in Europe to continue, we cannot expect an equal contribution, democratic progress or genuine trust and confidence to be built up, and not expect the Germans not to revert to what they have done in the past, if we say that we do not trust them in the same way as we trust the rest of the alliance. If hon. Members opposite think that that is the way to make friends and influence people, I am not surprised at many troubles we had to endure when they were in office.

Yesterday, the hon. Member for Leeds, Fast raised the conception of the non-nuclear club, an idea which, I thought, was buried in the ruins of the last election, but which, strangely, has been revived once again. Another question, therefore, which I should like to be answered officially in the winding-up speech by the Opposition tonight is whether the hon. Member for Leeds. Fast yesterday was speaking for himself or whether the non-nuclear club is once again the policy of the Opposition. If it is official Opposition policy, it is pertinent for us to ask one or two other questions, which, incidentally, we asked successfully at die time of the election, so successfully as the results showed, when this idea was treated by the public with the contempt that it deserved.

Why should we expect that any other countries should accede to the non-nuclear club? The hon. Member for Leeds, East yesterday spoke of the dangers that would follow present trends because he was sure that the development of nuclear military power would not stop at France but that we could expect China shortly to follow and that once China had followed, Japan and India inevitably would develop nuclear power to defend themselves and would have their own deterrents. Is there really any hon. Member opposite who believes that if Great Britain were to renounce her nuclear power—which the hon. Member for Dudley said anyhow hardly existed—that would stop the Chinese Republic in its tracks, simply because Britain had said that she would not be a nuclear Power? If in fact that is nonsense, as I think we all know that it is, what possible influence on the course of whether Japan and India later have it could our contribution be in saying that we would not do it even if we could induce other European powers to follow our lead?

On a wider aspect we always assume that it would be entirely wrong and increasingly dangerous for other countries to have the deterrent power which we possess ourselves and which the Americans and Russians have. I have never been able to see why we should imagine that other Powers want to lead to their own extinction and that of the world any more than we do, by resorting to nuclear aggression.

One of the Powers mentioned which may get nuclear weapons in the next ten years is Sweden. Does anyone think that the nuclear deterrent in the hands of Sweden is more dangerous than it is in the hands of the Soviet Union? And so it might be with any other Power that we care to name.

I do not believe that the Soviet Union, or America, Britain or France have any special virtue when it comes to a wish not to be blown up and the world with them. So I have never been able to follow the argument why necessarily it should be bad if other countries possess the deterrent to prevent other hostile countries from attacking them.

During the two days' debate we have seen that far from being desperately united, which was the claim put forward earlier, the Socialist Party is today more disunited than we have seen it for a long time past. It will not be disunited in the way in which hon. Members opposite vote in the Lobbies tonight, but disunited because once again they are showing their reluctance to support policies which they approved in principle several years ago.

Many hon. Members opposite then opposed those policies. [An HON. MEMBER: "Where was the hon. Member then?"] Someone asked where I was then. I did not have the good fortune to be in the House then, but I had the good fortune to have a seat in the Gallery upstairs where I could see a little of what was going on, and it was common knowledge in the House of Commons at that time that the vote in favour of German rearmament was only got through the Labour Party by three or four votes, and only by dragging in a few elderly peers. Other members of the Socialist Party have never forgotten what was done to them at that time.

The Socialist Party has also never forgiven the decision to have our own nuclear deterrent and hence when they go into the Lobbies tonight they will not be voting against the British Government of the day but will be voting against the political shades here of Mr. Clement Attlee, as he then was, and the late Mr. Ernest Bevin.

7.53 p.m.

Mr. Harold Davies (Leek)

It is pathetic. Here we are stuffed with facts and completely lacking in wisdom. We have the debate presented to us at this moment—on the one hand, there was this, and on the other hand there was that and here is the world on the fringe of its own destruction, with the destiny of mankind at stake. The sociological imagination of the hon. Member for Torquay (Mr. F. M. Bennett) is reduced to fiddling little disagreements between human beings and petty party issues. I challenge the hon. Member. The foreign policy of the group sitting opposite me and their defence is a bubble and squeak policy, bubbling with enthusiasm during the General Election and squeaking to the Americans when they are in power and agreeing with all that they say. Why have not they the courage on their side to speak at this juncture for Britain? There is no Churchill among them today.

Mr. Bennett

rose—

Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Major Sir William Anstruther-Gray)

Order.

Mr. Davies

I am not giving way.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker

Order. The House knows that only one hon. Member can be on his feet at once. Mr. Harold Davies.

Mr. Bennett

On a point of order, Mr. Deputy-Speaker. The only reason that I rose was because the hon. Gentleman himself said, "I challenge the hon. Member" When I rose he did not allow me to respond to the challenge.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker

Mr. Harold Davies.

Mr. Davies

A number of hon. Members want to speak and I propose to sit down in six or seven minutes' time to give them a chance to do so.

On the debate itself, most of the arguments have been deployed but there are two or three things which I think that I can add to the debate. One subject which I want to go into more deeply is the question asked by my right hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) and my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg), when we had a statement yesterday from the Foreign Secretary. If the Greeks, the Turks and the Dutch have these weapons, can we withhold them from the Germans?

Here is my question to the Foreign Secretary and to the Minister of Defence. If we rearm the Germans with nuclear weapons what are the planks for negotiation afterwards? What do we have to negotiate with if West Germany has nuclear arms? I was against German rearmament, but it showed the courage of our party that in broad daylight we debated this life and death issue for the nation. We did not go like a lot of sheep into the Lobby as the crowd opposite will do tonight. What did we do? We discussed the question. When we had arguments such as have been revealed in the debate tonight, the then Prime Minister of the Tory Government said that the policy which we are discussing tonight did not imply the nuclear rearmament of Germany.

We at this moment believe—and I have believed it for a good many years—that unless we can get both Pekin and Pankow together, unless we can get China and the D.D.R. into some of these discussions in a world sphere so far as the United Nations is concerned, and in the European sphere, there is no hope of a settlement.

When hon. Members opposite talk about realities let it be remembered how the realities of politics in the last few years have escaped them. The realities of politics have been shown today unitedly by the party on this side of the House. The D.D.R. exists and China exists and if the party opposite are realists they will insist that these realities are recognised by the United States, that China comes into the United Nations and that the D.D.R. in this transition period must have de facto recognition so that we can create a new type of organisation in Europe.

We have been saying for years that we would talk when we were strong. Logic is mixed up with politics. If politicians were logical the world would be back in the caveman era. It is necessary sometimes to cut the Gordian knot of logic with the realities of sociological advances. [An HON. MEMBER: "A wonderful phrase."] Well it is certainly more realistic than the stuff I have been lisening to from hon. Members opposite.[An HON. MEMBER: "What does it mean?"] I will see the hon. Gentleman outside. I will send him up to the next class and explain it to him in detail tomorrow morning.

Mr. S. Silverman

Down to the next class.

Mr. Davies

I would ask my hon. Friend not to interrupt me. I am enjoying this just as much as hon. Members opposite are enjoying it.

We must realise, first, that the de facto recognition of East Germany will come, that China will be a member of the United Nations and that China is more and more entering into the Afro-Asian world. Chinese representatives were in Poland the other day negotiating, and if there is a Summit Conference China must be taken into consideration.

The last point I want to make is a very simple one about this "sword and shield" concept. What are we driving at? I have tried to understand this concept. The shield was to be able to hold out for a short time if there were an advance from Russia until the sword came into action. Now, if we give nuclear weapons to Germany, there will be no time to draw the sword out of its scabbard, and we might be plunged into world war.

Can we guarantee that Western Germany will always point its weapons towards the East? There is no guarantee of that at all. We have had this same foolish idea before, and against it there was only a lone Churchillian voice which the Tory Party, in its arrant idiocy, pushed aside into the shade. Hon. and right hon. Members opposite at that time talked about the Russian threat and they were told that there was no guarantee that the German troops would go the way some of them wanted them to go.

It is the duty of the Government to speak in this matter not just as a party. At this juncture in history, they should, for God's sake, speak up from the British point of view and have the courage for once to direct United States policy instead of having their own policy engineered, managed and controlled by the United States. Then we might have a little more tranquillity—though not perfection—so that the hopes of mankind in this space age might be realised. This is the duty of the Government and this is why tonight we on this side of the House will go united into the Lobby against what I described last night as this damnfool policy of nuclear arms for Western Germany.

8.2 p.m.

Mr. Michael Noble (Argyll)

It is a little difficult, at the end of the second day of the debate, to add anything that is new or perhaps exciting to what has already been said. I have listened to much of the debate and there have been times when I have felt that the speeches of hon. Members opposite were directed rather more towards the statesmen or politicians in other parts of the world than against the speeches made in the debate from the Government Front Bench.

During the last twenty or thirty years I have had a good deal of opportunity of studying the German problem. I must be frank with the House and say that since the war I have not been in Germany and I do not know the present technical problems of German defence or the present feeling in that country. My right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary, in a speech which I found very quiet and very sensible, made one remark yesterday which, I think, was true but perhaps went only half of the way to a proper understanding of the position in Germany.

My right hon. and learned Friend, speaking about the third part of the Opposition Motion, said that it was based on an emotional view of the situation. It is perfectly true that it is simple and easy to work up emotions on the question of German rearmament. It is also true, and a point which every hon. Member should remember, that the facts of the last 100 years, and even 1,000 or 2,000 years, of German history and philosophy show quite clearly the great dangers any country faces in trying to deal with that nation.

I do not say for a moment that the Germans have not many great qualities. They have, but whether one is trying to judge one's allies or one's enemies it is a great mistake to underestimate both their qualities and their faults, and there is no doubt that the German people have shown very clearly over a great many years that their biggest weakness is their inability to understand democratic principles, and their biggest danger that in moments of crisis or emergency they deny the most elementary human rights to the individuals who make up their State.

This policy of rearming the German people is one which has called for a great act of faith, both on the opposition side and on the Government side in this House. It is not based on emotion and it is not based on logic or reason. It is based on faith that the German people, in due course—and it will not happen overnight—may overcome the weaknesses which they have shown for many hundreds of years.

Mr. Zilliacus

Would it not be fairer to say that the whole of this policy is based not so much on faith in the German people as on fear and hatred of the Soviet Union, exactly as the parallel policy of supporting Hitler's rearmament before the war was based?

Mr. Noble

I do not entirely accept the hon. Member's view, although no doubt he holds it quite sincerely, but I will say a few words about it later in my speech.

The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Derby, South (Mr. P. Noel-Baker) said last night that today the great majority of the people in Germany are very much against any idea of armaments or of war. It may well be true. Exactly the same thing could have been said in the 1920s. The right hon. Gentleman and I were both in Geneva in the 1930s and we saw how quickly that picture could change and how the people whom we thought from our previous experience were reliable could change under the influence of the Nazi régime to what we found them to be when we were reduced to fighting against them in the 1940s.

Therefore, it is important for both sides of the House to realise that this is an experiment in faith and is not something which we can afford to take risks about without remembering the past history and past philosophy of the German people.

Mr. Philip Noel-Baker (Derby, South)

The hon. Member will remember that the choice in 1932 for the Western Governments was whether they would disarm or allow Germany to rearm. They were pledged to disarm under the Treaty of Versailles. They failed to do it. Is not the present situation in some ways all too similar to that, and is it not wise to try for all-round disarmament before we spread nuclear arms around the world?

Mr. Noble

I think that in many ways the right hon. Gentleman is quite right. If he will allow me to develop my argument he may find himself in some agreement with what I shall say.

I felt that the hon. Member for Salford, East (Mr. Frank Allaun) made a rather typical appeal to emotion last night when he told us that if we went round our constituencies and said to any group of people "Would you like to rearm the Germans or not?" we should have the almost universal reply, "No, not even with peashooters". It is easy to pose a question of that sort and get the answer one wants, as I think hon. Members on both sides of the House know.

We have had a clear-cut expression of opinion from the right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) today that we are at least at one in thinking that the German people should have a certain level of armaments, because we think that they should play their part in the defence of Europe. Yesterday, the hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) complained that the party on this side of the House suffered from schizophrenia in its defence and foreign policy ideas.

The hon. Gentleman did not develop that argument far. Perhaps it is one that is difficult to maintain, and he may have had some slight feeling that on his side of the House, also, there was some schizophrenia on this problem. I ask all hon. Members to realise that it is not a simple one. If they look back to the 1930s they will remember exactly the same worry, the same problem: should we disarm completely, should we talk to Hitler from weakness or from strength? The failure to solve these problems caused a great deal of trouble to the whole world.

I share the view of many people in this country that we do not want to see the Germans, the Turks, the Greeks, or any of the small countries given a free hand to use nuclear weapons, whether tactical or strategic—the division is now small—with the possibilities of those dangers being thrown on to the world.

We are united in hoping and praying that disarmament will come. Let nobody think that it will be easy. Anybody who spent any time before the war listening to the League of Nations disarmament debates will have a fair idea of the problems that inevitably confront us. I felt that there was a basic idea in many of the speeches from the other side of the House to which I listened that we would have a better chance of getting to terms with our Russian colleagues if we said that we would have nothing to do with nuclear weapons either in German hands or in any others.

I honestly believe that there is no evidence that Mr. Khrushchev, or any other Russian leader we know, is impressed by an approach from weakness. I do not believe for a moment that we are likely to frighten him by rattling the scabbard. Neither is it the answer to say, "Let us denude ourselves of all our weapons and then they are bound to accept what we say."

The hon. Lady the Member for Cannock (Miss Lee) spoke with great truth when she said that we cannot dictate to the Russians or to our allies. We must try to work with the French, the Americans, the Germans and anyone else in our alliances, whether it is easy or difficult. We are not in a position to dictate and we must make the best we can out of what are basically extremely difficult problems. I firmly believe that Her Majesty's Government have performed a remarkable task during the last twelve months in breaking tension in the West. We all agree about that. I think that when the Division tonight is over we shall still wish our Prime Minister and our Foreign Secretary the best of luck in continuing the work that they have started.

I was particularly pleased when the Foreign Secretary said, at the end of his speech, that he hoped before long that we should get back to the idea of an international security force. Hon. Members may remember that I spoke about this in my maiden speech on foreign affairs, eighteen months ago. It is something which, I believe, will come. It is something which, I hope very much, will come soon. It can only be effective if we work together to create genuine disarmament throughout the world.

8.14 p.m.

Mr. F. J. Bellenger (Bassetlaw)

There is one point on which I agree with the hon. Gentleman the Member for Argyll (Mr. Noble) about the German people. I have known them since the end of the First World War, when I was a member of the Army of Occupation, and since then I have been in close touch with the Germans because of domestic reasons.

I am bound to say that all classes in Germany are much more temperamental, perhaps emotional and sentimental, than we are. We are much more reserved in this country. That may be a fault in their make-up, but it is something on which we should build our policy in trying to inculcate in them a feeling of democracy, as we have done in our trade unions, in the members of the Labour Party, and in the members of the Social Democratic Party, many of whom were here during the war.

I can say confidently, in view of my contacts with Germans, Social Democrats and others, that they are trying to work their passage home.

Mr. Ellis Smith (Stoke-on-Trent, South)

They have a lot to do.

Mr. Bellenger

I also, fought against the Germans in the Second World War and I believe that Britain should give them every encouragement. I regret any speeches which harp upon the past.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Dunfermline Burghs (Dr. A. Thompson) said yesterday, everybody knows of the Nazi atrocities, but why not give the Germans a chance if they are trying to make good? The British people are a generous folk and, certainly, those who fought against the Germans, whether in the Army or the Air Force, can be generous because they met them face to face in both world wars. Those people are the last to bear animosities and be bitter at heart.

Mr. Ellis Smith

What my right hon. Friend is saying confirms my own view and experience. Has he read Mr. Wheeler Bennett's History of Germany? If so, does he agree, as the result of his analysis of that book, that the Germans have never had democracy, that the German people have been "kidded," that the officer corps has determined policy? Some of us are suspicious that there is a certain amount of that going on today.

Mr. Bellenger

Yes, I can assure my hon. Friend that I have read the book, which is a learned exposition of a certain period of German history, although the author goes far back into ancient history. To that extent, I agree with my hon. Friend: the military power and the leading industrialists were concentrated mainly in Prussia and were certainly responsible for both world wars.

In that respect, I will go back a little further than many hon. Members have done today. I think that we are viewing the matter in a narrow perspective and I shall try to expand the proportions of the picture which has been painted sometimes in most glaring colours by some hon. Members. This matter goes back as far perhaps as Bismarck, when he was insistent on trying to get the reinsurance treaty with Russia. If we examine the history of Germany we shall find the closest connection between Germany and Russia, particularly between Hitlerite Germany and Stalinist Russia. I shall make some remarks in that context presently.

My mind goes back to the earlier part of this century. The hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Wells (Lieut.-Commander Maydon) told us earlier that Germany was considered to be a second-class Power before the First World War. He was entirely wrong in his historical facts. Everybody knows that the Kaiser Reich was a proud country. It was proud in its economics, proud in its military force and, if one is to judge by victories, it had good reason to be so, because during the last century three times it beat three countries, last but not least, France, in 1870.

What did it produce? It produced two main blocs in Europe and Russia which precipitated the First World War—the Triple Entente between France, Britain and Russia—the Triple Alliance between Germany, Austro-Hungary and Italy. Germany was defeated in that war, after the defection of Italy, in the Treaty of London, I think it was. Germany was defeated, but did not have to surrender unconditionally. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) that that was a mistake, but, as you yourself will remember, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, many of us protested against a policy of unconditional surrender. Nevertheless, in the Second World War we got unconditional surrender and the Germans were beaten to their knees.

It was then up to the victors to find a solution, not the Germans, who had been devastated. Many of the complaints made by my hon. Friends against Germany are about things which are due to British, American and French intransigence in their dealings with Germany after the Second World War.

Let us consider what caused the rise of Hitler. My memory goes back to the beginning of the century—and this is not history that I have read, but history that I have lived. The rise of Hitler was due to the Versailles Diktat, as the Germans call it. It is a great mistake to impose a peace upon the vanquished, as Russia will see if she is adamant at the Summit Conference.

Do hon. Members remember Rapallo? My right hon. Friend the Member for Derby, South (Mr. P. Noel-Baker) will remember it vividly. After the First World War, Germany was allowed 100,000 all ranks—more than 100,000, in fact—and some of those forces were trained in Russia. The connivance between Russia and Germany, particularly between Molotov and Ribbentrop, precipitated the Second World War and cut up Poland between them as any two horse dealers might have done. We must never forget that, especially on this side of the House, when we are aiming our criticisms at Her Majesty's Government and shafts at Germany. We have a chance to integrate Germany into the Western Alliance and, whether it be for rearmament or nuclear weapons, so long as N.A.T.O. exists, all those modern weapons will exist in Russia, too—hon. Members must not make any mistake about it.

Streseman, in the mid-1920's and 1930's, tried to bring Germany round to a conception of democracy. The Western Powers broke that idea, particularly the French when they marched into the Ruhr in 1924 thinking that they would collect their reparations—"squeezed to the last pip" as the Coalition Government of 1918–22, with Tory supporters, loudly proclaimed.

There have been too many unreal speeches in this debate. It is not entirely a question of isolating Germany in this matter of nuclear rearmament, as our Motion proposes. It is a question whether Germany is to be accepted into the Western concept of democracy, which I believe is the only concept of democracy, or whether she is to be spurned, as she was once before. Hitler did not arise as a mere accident. Hitlerism arose and developed from 1924 onwards because of two factors: first, the major economic problem in Germany, unemployment and, secondly, what the Germans call the Versailles Diktat.

What are we to do for the future? It depends not only on Germany, but on Russia. Russia has the keys to many doors and she can open them. I only hope that when the Prime Minister goes to Moscow he will be able to persuade Russia to turn some of those keys in the locks.

The other day, along with many other hon. Members, I was sent a booklet by the official Soviet office in London. It was called "Disarmament—the way to secure peace and friendship between nations." It was a report of a speech which Mr. Khrushchev had made to the Supreme Soviet. When we discuss German rearmament, we should consider the picture in a slighly different perspective. This is what Mr. Khrushchev said: The central committee of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government are able to inform you, Comrades Deputies, that although the weapons we now have are formidable weapons indeed, a weapon we have today, about to be hatched,"— do hon. Members remember Hitler's secret weapon?— is even more perfect,"— let us consider the word "perfect"— even more formidable. The weapon which is being developed and is, as they say, in the portfolio of our scientists and designers, is a fantastic weapon. I ask hon. Members to keep in mind that speech of Mr. Khrushchev when they are talking about nuclear rearmament or disarmament.

Some hon. Members have been disparaging about Dr. Adenauer, the German Chancellor. In certain respects, I disagree with some of his policies, particularly his topsy-turvy policy of last year which, at one moment, almost precipitated him into the Presidency and the next retained him as German Chancellor. That is not our conception of democracy. We and many people in Germany, even in Dr. Adenauer's own party, felt that that was something which did not conform to our concepts of democracy.

But who can deny that the German Chancellor has brought Germany to an economic position from which she is able to look her neighbours in the face?

Mr. Ellis Smith

Private enterprise.

Mr. Bellenger

I would disagree, but the fact remains that Germany, without a chip on its shoulder in that respect, is able to say to the world, "We are able to pay 20s. in the £ and we are able to help the under-developed countries". Is not that one reason why we should incorporate Germany into the Western system?

Mr. Ellis Smith

Who financed the Germans after the war?

Mr. Bellenger

It would be easy for me to develop my argument at some length and thus deprive other hon. Members of a chance to speak. In the short time available, I am trying to present certain factors which have not been presented.

What are we to do about the threat which exists and about which Mr. Khrushchev spoke in such dangerous terms? The "perfect weapon" and the "secret weapon", are words that Hitler used during the last war. What are we to do? Unless we want to be submerged like Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and other countries within the Communist orbit, we will have to do something. What are we to do? Are we going to face the problem as we faced the Hitler problem? As my hon. Friend the Member for Cannock (Miss Lee) said, we were all united in defeating Hitler. Are we again to be united, or are we to lie flat on the ground and let whoever will walk over us?

What does that mean? As far as I know—and my right hon. Friends on the Front Bench, including the Leader of the Opposition, have agreed—we believe in N.A.T.O. If we believe in N.A.T.O., what will it mean in terms of military armaments, which is all that N.A.T.O. is for the moment? With all its deficiencies, it has kept the peace in Europe for some years. So long as it is necessary to use military weapons to protect the West, I ask: what weapons? We are not living in the days of 1954.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) said that when many of us agreed to German rearmament the question of nuclear weapons was not so urgent, but we have them. Russia has them. Russia may not have armed her satellites with them, but anybody with any military experience knows that already there are rocket bases in Poland, even if there is none further west than that.

If we are to accept Germany, which is right in the middle of Europe, both strategically and geographically—whatever one does with the German people—as important to the defence of the West we must consider the proposition of the nuclear rearmament of Germany in its proper context.

I now come to the Opposition Motion. Many hon. Members may say, "Having expressed your views in that fashion, what are you going to do when it comes to a Division?" I shall vote for the Motion. I will explain why. I am not one of those Members—and my hon. Friends ought to know this by now—who simply goes through the Lobby as Lobby fodder merely because the Whips are on. I hope that my hon. Friends, many of whom have been with me in this House for a long time, will respect my views even though they do not agree with them.

It is the duty of the Opposition to keep the Government on their toes. We feel that since the General Election—we may be wrong, but, nevertheless, that is our view—the Government have assumed a slightly more recumbent position. Their step is not so springy as it was when, before the election, the Prime Minister said that there would be a Summit meeting within a few days, or that we should get the (late of the Summit meeting in a few days.

We feel—and my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper expressed the view—that in view of the Summit meeting the Government should be more alert and take the initiative, as they did before the election. As my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) said, the Prime Minister was the initiator of the attempt to reach the Summit. All we ask is that his step is as energetic when he gets to the Summit as it was when he was trying to get there.

Everybody knows that the Prime Minister's efforts were viewed with a good deal of suspicion in Germany, in France, and in America. If the Prime minister and the Government want credit for their efforts in the past, let them have it. I am prepared to go further. So dangerous is the situation in which we live that I would give full credit to the Government if they bring something concrete out of the Summit meeting, but they will have to make great sacrifices to do that.

The Government are dealing with a tough bargainer in Mr. Khrushchev. He is a man who still has his Imperium round him, as did the Czar of Russia before the First World War. If it is a question of the genuineness of Mr. Khrushchev's protestations and propaganda for peace, let us call his cards. Let us put the cards on the table so that we can see them. If he means what he says about disarmament, we can go on from there.

I hope that that will be the policy of Her Majesty's Government. If by any chance Her Majesty's Government should be successful in that, they need not worry about anything else. The next election is a long way off. The people of this country are not fools. They may not understand foreign affairs—unlike many hon. Members in the House—but they do understand that the target for tomorrow is peace and the reduction of tension between East and West.

I feel that I ought to say this to the Government. They may have considerable difficulty with their allies. They may have difficulty with France. Certainly, they have had difficulty in N.A.T.O. and they may have difficulty with America, especially about nuclear weapons. They may also have difficulty with the Federal Republic of Germany. But I believe that so long as the Government do not betray Germany over West Berlin, they will have the support of the German public to a far greater extent than did Mr. Chamberlain did when he went to Munich.

It may be that the Oder—Neisse line, the present boundary—never let us forget that a decision on this matter was reserved for a peace conference and is not settled yet—is not the final one. Nevertheless, from what I know of the German people and some of the high politicians—perhaps not Dr. Adenauer, but we are all mortal, and there may be others—they may acquiesce in a settlement which does not push their boundaries further to the east so long as we do not betray them over Berlin.

Finally, may I say to my hon. Friends that they should never forget that we have millions of comrades in West Germany. They are the members of the Social Democratic Party—the S.P.D.—and the members of the German trade unions which have a membership almost as large as our own. Do we pay no heed to what they say? If we are true comrades and a democratic party, obviously, whatever we may say about the German Federal Government, we should pay some attention to our comrades in Germany, who have spoken in no uncertain terms about Berlin. But we get this strange situation, with the Social Democratic Lord Mayor of Berlin agreeing with the Christian Democratic Chancellor of West Germany.

We may call that what we like, a coalition or not. But the Berliners, who are right in the front line, are under no illusions whatever, as some of my hon. Friends may be. They know that they must have a sure defence and they depend on N.A.T.O. and the Western Alliance to provide that for them. After all, Berlin is a democracy, as is known by anyone who has been there, and it needs economic and political security. I say that we ought to be very careful before we prejudge these issues on the narrow basis of the rearming of Western Germany with nuclear weapons.

I am quite prepared to support my party's Motion on one item in it, and never mind about anything else, and that is the statement that the arming of West German forces with nuclear weapons may prejudice the success of the Summit talks. I do not know whether it will, but if there was any guarantee—I do not say that we have got it—that we might be able to do business with Russia if we refrain from rearming Germany with nuclear weapons, so long as we have other guarantees I should not be averse—and nor, I think, would the Germans—to doing without those weapons. Make no mistake about it, once we adopt that attitude we shall have to watch our step with N.A.T.O.

The strongest Power in N.A.T.O. is America. She is the only Power with the key to the nuclear weapons and we have to keep in step with America and try to obtain a mixture of military security and political security. That is why I think that in this debate we have concentrated too much on what I might call the military aspect—with speeches from my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) and the Minister of Defence—but we cannot separate defence from politics, as so many of my hon. Friends and hon. Members opposite have said tonight.

8.40 p.m.

Viscount Hinchingbrooke (Dorset South)

This debate is concerned almost wholly with thoughts and actions surrounding the diplomatic preparations for the Summit Conference. Tempting as it is to follow the right hon. Member for Bassetlaw (Mr. Bellenger) in a debate on the historic past of Germany, or to take on the hon. Lady the Member for Cannock (Miss Lee) on the question of her total disbelief in the quality of the present West German Government on the grounds of past Nazi associations, I will desist and try to concentrate on some of the themes which have been principally generated in the debate so far.

The hon. Member for Leek (Mr. Harold Davies) said just now that the world was on the fringe of its own destruction, and the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) said last night that the arms race must end in war. I want to start this evening by saying something about the nuclear weapon, both from the supreme weapon aspect and from the tactical weapon aspect as it is employed, or may be employed, in Germany. I think that I have referred in previous debates to my belief—I hope it is an optimistic, robust belief which we on this side of the House all share—that the hydrogen bomb, or rocket, is a guarantor of world peace. On the other side of the House, and to a very large extent throughout the country, people—as they are quite entitled to do—take the wholly pessimistic view that this is a weapon not different in kind but different only in degree, from past weapons.

In that context, the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne is quite right, by his arguments from past history, in saying that every time a country has stepped up its armaments in competition with another combination of Powers that has ultimately, between the two of them, produced disaster. But, as I see it, this is a different weapon altogether and I think all of us on this side of the House share that view. If we had known in the middle of the last war that half London would be destroyed by mass bombing, if the Germans had known at the beginning of the last war that their major cities would be knocked out, would we have started it, would they have started it?

Mr. Ellis Smith

Yes; we knew it.

Viscount Hinchingbrooke

I do not think so. We now know that the end of the war does not secure what it was thought that all wars previously would secure—a higher condition of peace. The scientists, it may be through some great divine act, have put into men's power today a weapon which is so devastating that, if used, it must mean that a far lower state of civilisation will supervene than existed before. In those circumstances, I regard this weapon as guaranteeing the impossibility of a return to major conventional war.

Until a short time ago I did think that the rearming of Western Germany with tactical nuclear weapons was a profound error. It seemed to me that, with the state of hatred on both sides of the Iron Curtain, there would be an action and counter-action and, if anything like tactical weapons were put into the hands of West Germans they would be used, the conflagration would spread immediately backwards from those weapons to strategic weapons in the United States and the Soviet Union and disaster would occur. I have changed my thinking on that and, if I may say so very humbly to this House, I think the reverse is true. It seems to me that these tactical weapons existing on the ground are so automatically linked with the major strategic weapons that there is a guarantee that no frontier incident of any sort will take place. In that context, it seems to me to be safe to arm the West Germans with tactical weapons.

This leads immediately to a growing disbelief in any form of disengagement as serving any useful purpose whatever. The last time I spoke in a debate on foreign affairs, last April, I suggested that there should be a partial military withdrawal, though nothing like the Labour Party's plans and nothing like the Rapacki Plan, but some sort of token disengagement in Europe. At that time, I felt that there was some political advance to be made from it, but from what I have just said it will be apparent that that idea is obliged to be discarded.

Mr. S. Silverman

I would ask the noble Lord whether his argument involves, as a necessary logical consequence, that the East Germans must have these tactical weapons, too, so that we preserve this balance which is the guarantee of peace?

Viscount Hinchingbrooke

It may be that they will decide to do so. It may be that the Russians are going to stay in East Berlin—I will come to that in a moment—and in East Germany, and go on with rearmament. I do not know. I am talking about N.A.T.O. as a part of Western Europe for which we are primarily responsible.

This conviction helps me very greatly with my anxiety about arming the West Germans with nuclear weapons. What I find so very strange in that context is something which the hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) said in the debate yesterday. I think that this is fundamental to the Labour Party's view and that it is a good thing to have it out. The hon. Gentleman said: As I understand—and perhaps the Minister of Defence can enlighten us on this tomorrow?—the main purpose of N.A.T.O.'s ground forces in Central Europe, in case of a substantial Soviet attack, is to enforce a pause, so that during the pause the Russians have to decide whether on not to make it all-out war or to call the thing off. What kind of pause can N.A.T.O. hope to enforce if the German forces, on whose territory the battle is being fought, possess weapons which can drop a hydrogen bomb on Warsaw, which can drop a hydrogen bomb on Moscow?"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 10th February, 1960; Vol. 617, c. 480.] That is to say, a pause in which— —the Russians have to decide whether or not to make it all-out war or to call the thing off. Is that an agreeable proposition for the West Germans, who are our Allies in N.A.T.O.? Is it the right conception that the West Germans are to be considered as a theatre sister with cotton wool mopping up the blood of Europe, while the surgeons in the United Kingdom and America and in the Soviet Union decide which atomic lancet they are to select?

Mr. Healey

It may be a very undesirable rôle for the Germans. It may be bad strategy, but it has been the strategy which has been adopted by N.A.T.O., with the support of Her Majesty's Government, and if the noble Lord disagrees with that, he must argue it out with his own Front Bench.

Viscount Hinchingbrooke

I do not think that is the case at all. As I understand it, my hon. Friends are acquiescing in the arming of West Germany with nuclear weapons, so as to get rid of this absurd area through which the Russian forces may pour, doing the utmost damage, spilling the maximum of West German blood, in order to give us the opportunity to see whether it is real or not. It is a disgraceful thing to ask of any Ally of ours in a military alliance. I am, therefore, firmly of the view that the leaning-up theory—full armaments on both sides bearing on each other is the one which best serves the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the United Kingdom, and this disposes entirely of all ideas of disengagement.

May I say a word about disarmament? Here I quarrel with the Government, as I have said in past debates. I have no faith in these propaganda exercises of securing international disarmament, inspection and control. If we could not, at the end of the last war, arrange mutual inspection of a city the size of Berlin, how on earth, after all this adverse propaganda and the menace of the cold war for ten years, are we to produce Russian inspection units over here and American inspection units in the heart of the Soviet Union? It seems to me to be quite incomprehensible. If we cannot devise a disengagement technique for a few hundred square miles of Central Europe, how can we plan for the mutual inspection of the great atomic bases of the world? The thing is simply not "on".

I very much hope that the British Government will not lose sight of some-thing which is vital to this country, as a comparatively small Power—namely, the irrevocable link between any nuclear weapon pact which is agreed and conventional disarmament. We must not fall into the situation in which we agree to abandon the testing and later, possibly, the manufacture of nuclear weapons, and in which other countries do the same, leaving our comparatively small conventional forces at the mercy of very much larger nations. I believe that the hydrogen bomb and the means to deliver it are of paramount importance to this country, and we ought never to let it go without massive conventional disarmament all round.

I do not want to keep the House for more than a few more minutes from hearing the Leader of the Opposition, but I have one warning to utter to the House, and it is against complacency. Khrushchev issued the threat to the world in November, 1958, that he would withdraw from East Berlin and create a free city of West Berlin. That has been somewhat discarded because of the approaches to the Summit and all the international comings and goings which have taken place, but let us not think for a moment that he may not be quite capable, one month or two months before the Summit talks take place, of throwing some tremendous new propaganda exercise into the scene. He might withdraw from East Berlin and confront us with that situation to discuss at the Summit. Unless the British Government can bring forward some ideas and have some preparatory techniques in mind to meet that situation, we may find ourselves greatly at a disadvantage.

I agree heartily with what the right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) said about the recognition of East Germany. It may not be politic to take overt measures to recognise East Germany before our Allies are ready for it and before the Summit Conference has taken place, but we might give some sign of our intention, such as to send a consul forthwith to Leipzig for trade and commerce.

I hope that the British Government will show that our association with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation will not deprive us of all flexibility. The Prime Minister has shown tremendous flexibility of mind in the Soviet Union and tremendous flexibility of mind in Africa. He has not shown any flexibility of mind in Europe so far. I hope that on his return he will do so.

The great advantage which we have over Communism is the independent aspect of Western democracy, the rule of law, fair play and respect, material prosperity created at a far faster rate than anything the Communist world can imitate, and Christian good fellowship and good feeling. Western democracy, whether exercised by the United Kingdom or through the organisation of the North Atlantic Treaty, is far more powerful than Communism. We have nothing to fear from the heart of the Soviet Union or even from the heart of China, if only we keep that prospect on the march. I beg Her Majesty's Government to keep this flexibility foremost in their considerations.

8.55 p.m.

Mr. Hugh Gaitskell (Leeds, South)

We have had three admirable maiden speeches in this debate and I should like to extend my congratulations to all three of our colleagues. I may, perhaps, be allowed particularly to single out my hon. Friend the Member for Dunfermline Burghs (Dr. A. Thompson), whose speech, I thought, was deeply moving and impressive, extremely fluent and very well documented.

The noble Lord the Member for Dorset, South (Viscount Hinchingbrooke) is a man of independent mind and tongue. Usually when he speaks we can all agree with something that he says. I found myself in that happy position tonight when he gave his warning about complacency. I am not sure whether it is the same kind of complacency as I have in mind, but I certainly think that it is a danger. Some of the speeches we heard seemed to reflect a point of view which I cannot share at all. It was not so much that in the forthcoming conferences we shall easily achieve a lot—very few people have suggested that—but that it did not matter even if we did not. That is a profoundly dangerous point of view and underestimates the threats which at present hover over the status quo.

I draw attention to three particular dangers. First, unless we can get some all-round disarmament, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Derby, South (Mr. P. Noel-Baker) pointed out with great cogency last night, the qualitative arms race between the United States and Russia, in particular, becomes more and more desperate every year. Secondly, there is the danger, to which many hon. Members have drawn attention, of the spread of nuclear weapons. I confess that I was astonished to hear one hon. Member say that it did not worry him; he did not think that it mattered very much if other countries became possessed of nuclear weapons.

Yet there are now, as my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) pointed out, no less than 42 countries either possessing nuclear reactors or with plans to produce them, and we know very well that, unless some kind of international control or effective control can be established to see that the products of those reactors are used for purely civilian purposes, they will be well on the way, if they so desire, to making atomic weapons. That is a most terrifying prospect. We know that 12 countries are certainly in a position to start at once the process of making nuclear weapons of their own. We know that France, in the very near future, is likely to become the fourth atomic Power and explode her atom, or, for all I know, hydrogen bomb.

One of the most pressing problems facing the world, as we from these benches have so often pointed out, is how we are to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. To say that it does not matter is to overlook a whole series of consequences. First, there is the repercussion which the testing of nuclear weapons by different powers will have on any test agreement which may be made: it may be completely undermined. Then there are the effects of the tests in the atmosphere. Then there is, as my hon. Friend pointed out, the enormously greater difficulty of ever establishing effective disarmament once stocks of nuclear weapons exist in the hands of many different countries.

Worst of all is the prospect that these weapons may come into the hands of countries and Governments which have not the same sense of responsibility, the same realisation of the prospect; who are not, as it were, held in a certain balance of terror. However appalling that balance of terror may be, it is certainly better than the situation in which a country may decide to use a nuclear weapon without fear of the consequences to itself. All these things are not. I agree, imminent. They are not likely to happen next month or next year, but it really is possible that they may happen in the next decade.

The fourth danger is that little or no progress has recently been made in solving the disputes that exist in various parts of the world and which, therefore, always may threaten the peace. I do not think that anybody could say that any advance has been made in solving the problem of Berlin, or the problem of the reunification of Germany. We are threatened, as we all know very well, with further trouble in the Middle East—perhaps in the Far East, also, in Laos. There are these dangers, and they cannot be denied.

What is the prospect of our achieving some results from these conferences? I welcome the statement of the Foreign Secretary on his own disarmament proposals. That was easily the most satisfactory part of his speech, because he very definitely added to the proposals he put forward to the United Nations. In particular, he said that he was now ready to put into the first stage the imposition of a limit to conventional forces, to actual manpower in the major countries.

I should like to ask him just this: is he prepared to go further than that? Is there any reason why we should not say what our proposed limits are? Mr. Khrushchev has put in his figures—1.7 million for the United States, for Russia and for China, and 650,000 for France and Britain. I would hope that the right hon. and learned Gentleman might be prepared to say that he would at least accept that, and go a little further back to the lower figures he himself proposed a few years ago, of only 1½ million for the United States and Russia.

I do not propose to say very much about nuclear tests—my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) dealt with that in detail this afternoon—except to point out that the progress of the Ten-Power Disarmament Conference will at first be very largely dependent on whether we get the test agreement. If we do not get the test agreement, I am afraid that that disarmament conference will be seriously delayed.

Nothing, as I have already said, has been advanced, or is, apparently, in the offing to deal with the spread of nuclear weapons, nor have the West even agreed on any clear or new policy on the Berlin and Germany problems, beyond the package deal which is clearly unacceptable to the Soviet Union and which I do not think is any longer a live issue.

The two major issues of the debate feature, of course, in our own Motion. The first is the question of nuclear weapons for Germany. I must say that I thought that the Government's defence of their policy on this was one of the weakest I have ever heard. What did they say? First, they claimed, in the words of the Foreign Secretary that this was a natural development a kind of natural law—night following day; that because we had agreed, reluctantly, to the rearmament of Germany in 1950, because there were Paris Agreements in 1954, we had to accept that Germany must have nuclear weapons today.

Frankly, that is nonsense. In 1950—I remember it very well, when Mr. Bevin, on behalf of the Labour Government, eventually agreed, because the Americans made it a fairly clear condition of their participation in the defence of Europe, to bring in Germany—nobody was thinking at all of nuclear weapons. The only nuclear weapons then were the bombs which had been exploded in Japan. In 1954, as my right hon. Friend pointed out, after the Paris Agreements it was not the view of the Minister of Defence then—the Prime Minister as he is today—that there was any connection.

I will venture to quote again what he said in that debate. When he was pressed, originally by me and subsequently by some of my hon. Friends, to say whether the Paris Agreements implied that Germany would have nuclear weapons, he answered: The matter that he raised is one which will have to be taken up directly between the Governments. It is not control by these precise Agreements So it was not implied. It was something which the present Prime Minister said would have to be dealt with later on. There was no natural development, no natural law.

Again, he said. … I should have thought that that was not a matter suitable for these Agreements, but a matter to be taken up between Governments. It does not seem to be germane to this set of Agreements."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 18th November, 1954; Vol. 533, c. 597–8,] How the Foreign Secretary, who is, presumably, familiar with these statements, can come to the House and claim that it is a natural development, after that statement by his own boss, I do not know. Incidentally, I must remind the Foreign Secretary of the background to the Paris Agreements. There was, of course, the long negotiation about the European Defence Community. Why was the European Defence Community proposed? Because of the fear of the other nations of Europe of rearming Germany alone.

Now we are told that we must not discriminate. As many hon. Members have said, we do discriminate against Germany in the Paris Agreements themselves. She is not allowed to make the A, B and C weapons. If we can discriminate against her in that sense, what is wrong with discrimination against her in the use and possession of nuclear weapons?

So far as I know, it has not yet been proposed that Germany should have the hydrogen bomb. Is that a deliberate act of policy? Let us suppose that she were to be given, or it were to be proposed in N.A.T.O. that she have, this strategic weapon, would Her Majesty's Government say, "Yes, of course, she must have it. We cannot discriminate against her. It would be dangerous to discriminate, and it would mean distinguishing between different Allied Powers"? Incidentally, I hope that the Foreign Secretary will say something about the long-range weapons to which my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper referred this afternoon. Apparently, Mace, as it is called, is a rocket designed to travel about 900 or 1,000 miles. What conceivable justification can there be for allowing that kind of thing to be in the possession of the Germans?

In any case, I cannot really understand what is so wrong about a little discrimination here. The Foreign Secretary appeals to us and says, "Do not make the Germans into outcasts. Do rot treat them as third-class people". The hon. Member for Hertfordshire, South-West (Mr. Longden), who wound up the debate last night, said that it would be quite wrong to give any part of the allied Forces—including the Germans, he meant—anything less than the best. That was a wonderful phrase with which to describe nuclear weapons. It might be a pair of good boots or good food rations—"Nuclear weapons are the best, so the Germans must have them."

This whole picture of the Germans as a people who might become filled with hatred and feelings of inferiority because they were denied nuclear weapons is really wide of the mark. There is not the slightest evidence for it at all. I suppose that I can claim, as many hon. Members can, to have been to Germany a good many times since the war. I have several friends in Germany. These friends do not strike me as suffering from an inferiority complex.

I will say something else about them. What worries them most is the prospect of a return to militarism in Germany, and they are not in favour of Germany having nuclear weapons. The idea that the German people as a whole are clamouring for them and that if we do not give them they will get very angry, or will sulk or go over to the Russians, is nonsense. I ask the Foreign Secretary: have the Germans ever asked for nuclear weapons?

Mr. S. Silverman

Did they ever ask for any weapons?

Mr. Gaitskell

Or for any weapons; but we are not discussing all weapons now. I do not want to pick another quarrel with my hon. Friend. I accept that I was in favour, and I am still in favour, of the rearmament of Germany. It was necessary to get the Americans to accept their responsibilities in Europe. But that is a very different thing from arming the Germans with nuclear weapons.

The situation is becoming rather ridiculous. We are told that we must not say anything against the Germans. I am not against them at all. I have already said that I have many friends there. But it is permissible occasionally to refer to the past. It is not unreasonable to refer to the past, because people, through the past, have fears of the future. We must recognise this. Many speeches have deployed the reasons for it. It would be utterly foolish of us not to recognise, as I know many hon. Members opposite do, the fears of the Poles, Czechs and Russians of Germany. When we went to Leningrad this summer, I was told that no fewer than 600,000 people in Leningrad had died of starvation alone during the seige. Is it surprising that the Russians are afraid of and worried about Germany? We must consider the repercussions which giving Germany nuclear weapons may have upon the Eastern countries.

The other argument is that it is perfectly all right to give the Germans nuclear weapons, in the sense that they will be trained to use them, because the warheads will be kept under American control or under the control of SACEUR. Can the Foreign Secretary clear up the confusion about this? Exactly what is the position? Does the Supreme Commander have sole responsibility for deciding when nuclear weapons are to be used by the Germans and by other people as well? Or does he first have to obtain the consent of the American Government? In other words, is his position of control in relation to his job as Supreme Commander of N.A.T.O., or is it in relation to his job as a senior American officer responsible to President Eisenhower? The noble Lord the Member for Dorset, South asked that question, and we must have a clear reply.

We cannot help having some doubts about how long the present situation will go on, in which the Americans or N.A.T.O. keep the key of the cupboard. Reference has been made already to the President's statement. Even the day before he made his statement, there was a report of a meeting of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy—a meeting in secret, but, nevertheless, leakages occurred—stating that there was an important change in nuclear weapons policy … under discussion by the Administration. The Administration were said to be considering placing the weapons in the possession of certain allies. The report adds, "such as Britain."

I must ask the Government this question. Suppose there is a change in American policy. Suppose the British are given complete control over nuclear weapons provided by the United States. Suppose the French are given them as well. This might easily be done to try to discourage the French from going further with the production of their own nuclear weapons. Suppose the Germans are not given these weapons. Are we then to be told by the Government that this is an impossible situation because we cannot discriminate against Germany? Can the Foreign Secretary tell us what the discrimination position would be in that instance?

Another argument is that this is essential for defence. I think that my right hon. Friend dealt with that. The truth is that there is no overriding military case for Germany possessing nuclear weapons. Quite apart from the tactical arguments, which I will not traverse again, I remind the Foreign Secretary that he has given the case away when he boasted that the extent of the nuclear weapons that go to Germany was minute. If they are minute, they certainly cannot have any military significance. But what they have, unfortunately, is a considerable political significance.

When approaching the question of how to reach agreement, we cannot avoid the issue of confidence. The extent of the confidence between the great Powers is of major importance as to whether they may reach agreement. It is precisely because we think that the arming of Germany with nuclear weapons in advance of the Summit Conference undermines that confidence that we have been so critical and continue critical of the Government's policy. The truth is that any military considerations which there may be are, in our view, far outweighed by the political disadvantages. No spokesman has yet indicated why the Government want to hurry with this process of rearming Germany with nuclear weapons.

At the same time, one of the arguments for our proposals for a disarmament zone in Central Europe is that it would deal with this problem. The Foreign Secretary tried to ride off this part of our Motion by bringing in the broader proposals for disengagement that we have made. I do not propose to argue them tonight—I have argued them on many occasions. When hon. Members opposite speak of reunification as still being their aim, as some of them have done, I simply ask precisely how they think they will get reunification of Germany while Germany is still free to remain in N.A.T.O. It is impossible. The Russians would never agree to it.

That is why we came to the conclusion that we had to consider seriously Germany being allowed to go outside N.A.T.O. in return for unification. But because that would have upset the balance of power against the West, we said that that was not enough and that we must bring in Poland, Czechoslovakia and, if possible, Hungary as well. That is the logic of our argument.

I again ask the Government, as my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-upon-Tyne, Central (Mr. Short) did yesterday, how they propose to deal with those problems. They have spoken about the desirability, as we all want to see it, of more political evolution in the satellite States. I know of no other way of achieving it.

We are not, however, proposing it in full in this debate. What we have proposed is a much more limited plan. It is the first stage, I admit, of our disengagement proposals. I cannot see the arguments against this. First, we could easily achieve the maintenance of the balance of power or security on both sides—there is no difficulty about that; we can agree on what would maintain the balance, starting, say, with the ceiling and then agreeing to reductions.

Secondly, there would be the enormous advantage of having a control system established in Central Europe. Has it not occurred to the Government that while the Soviet Union may be, and is, extremely difficult in accepting controls over disarmament on Soviet territory, it is likely to take a much more reasonable view of controls within the satellites? We therefore have the great advantage of a pilot disarmament scheme. Thirdly, we would have the immense advantage of reducing the dangers of friction and if East Berlin was in this area, as it would be, at least we would be getting rid of some of the dangers from that part of the world.

The story of the Government's attitude on the disarmament zone in Central Europe is remarkable. It was originally proposed by Sir Anthony Eden. When Sir Anthony Eden proposed it, he made it perfectly plain that there was no question of making this dependent on plans to unify Germany. He said: It has nothing to do with any plans to unify Germany or to build a European security Pact."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 27th July, 1955; Vol. 544, c. 1217.] When the present Prime Minister was Foreign Secretary he had already shifted, and the proposal now comes forward as a proposal for a reunified Germany and Eastern European countries, obviously to the disadvantage of the Soviet.

After that, we had the Rapacki proposals. I have never been able to understand why the Government turned them down. Here was a proposal for not only an atom-free zone in Central Europe, which would solve the problem concerning Germany, but, in its second version, a proposal for the control of conventional forces. But it was never discussed. The Government simply found objections to it. Can the House be surprised if we claim that they have never sustained any practical proposal in this field?

But, of course, when 1959 comes along, and the Moscow visit takes place, there is a slight improvement and we have the Moscow communique which speaks of further study usefully being made of the possibilities of increasing security by some method of the limitation of forces and weapons, both conventional and nuclear, in an agreed area of Europe.

What happened after that? The Prime Minister comes back from Moscow. He goes on his European tour. He goes to Bonn. After he has left Bonn, Dr. Adenauer says about this particular proposal, of which the Government claim to be in favour: This theme has always been mentioned in a very vague manner, so that discussion of it was not at all possible. It then appears, by May, in the Western package deal not as a proposal on its own at all for reducing tension and achieving other objects; it appears as something dependent on the prior reunification of Germany under conditions obviously quite impossible.

Then we had the Conservative General Election manifesto, and we are back again on something a little more hopeful although extremely vague: In Europe … we will work for the inspection and reduction of armaments in areas to be agreed. Even this upset the Germans. The Federal Government's Press Officer says: This is not the language of the Conservative Government, but of those responsible for the election campaign. That is sufficient to do the trick, because now that the question is brought up again in the House here the right hon. Gentleman the Minister of State says: The Western plan for Germany put forward at Geneva in May contained provisions for controlling armaments in an agreed area of Europe. … No other joint study is contemplated. Is he really saying that when the Prime Minister agreed that communiqué in Moscow, Mr. Khrushchev thought it meant an agreement between the Western Powers to make a package deal at Geneva? I never heard such utter nonsense in my life. Just to finish it, when Dr. Adenauer came over here he said that his London talks had eliminated ideas of a zone of reduced armaments or a control zone in Europe, and added The problems of such a zone could have been damaging to us, but the question has been solved in our favour. The clouds in British West German relations have been eliminated. It was not very surprising when, after that, the Foreign Secretary was asked about this question in Paris in December, he restated his belief that there are geographical areas where limitations and inspection of armaments are feasible. What was his example? Antarctica. Not a word about Europe, not a word about the danger zone here, or about a realist plan as far as a zone of this kind is concerned, which, I would hope, would cover East and West Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia and the Rapacki area or whether, when it is put forward by the West, it is to be hedged round with impossible political conditions or is to be put forward as a first step towards a real settlement in Central Europe.

I ask the Foreign Secretary this question. Since half the time the Government are saying that they favour this proposal, will he now say whether they are prepared to put forward specific proposals independent of political conditions for the establishment of a limited zone of arms and forces in Central Europe? The trouble, of course, is that this kind of thing is exactly what we get from the present Tory Government. My right hon. Friend the Member for Belper, during his powerful speech, criticised the Government not only for their policies but for their methods and their men and, indeed, we could not have a better example of the kind of methods we object to than the way in which the Government have handled this question of the zone of controlled disarmament in Central Europe. Evasion, dodging, confusion; and when one is really in desperation one misrepresents one's opponents and talks about something else entirely.

It is all very slick. It is all very clever, but I dare say that it appeals to hon. Members opposite. The right hon. and learned Gentleman will get away with it by just avoiding the issue. But I would say to him that this kind of behaviour and this lack of clarity will certainly not solve the problems of the world. It does not really even suffice to stand up to Dr. Adenauer.

In the course of his speech yesterday, the Foreign Secretary said: For either side to go to the brink in the belief that concessions will be made by the other side at the last moment to avoid war is highly dangerous. It is highly dangerous for us to put ourselves in that position in relation to others; and highly dangerous for others to put themselves in that position in relation to us."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 10th February, 1960; Vol. 697, c. 506–7.] Well, well, well! What a pity that he did not think on those lines three years ago, at the time of Suez. Or perhaps he did. Perhaps he is going to let us have his memoirs as well, showing that with one or two of his hon. Friends he turns out to be one of the weaker sisters.

But I think that it was at the time of Suez that the rot really set in in British foreign policy. It was at the time of Suez that the values were really changed and we had something which I do not think that we had had before then, not even—I would not put that first and foremost—contempt for the United Nations, but contempt for truth. That is what we had. We had the idea that one can justify anything as long as one can get away with it, that the only thing that matters is being slick and successful, and that the fact that what one says has no relation to reality does not really matter. We have gone on having that ever since.

The problem is that the Suez mentality is stilt there on the benches opposite. It came out very easily and naturally when the Foreign Secretary made his statement on Cyprus the other afternoon. We could see the rejoicing in the ranks opposite that we were to stay there after all and that might, after all, was right. That is there on the benches opposite, just as much as the contempt for truth of which I have spoken.

In relation to Cyprus it is, I know, only a last flicker, but it is a last flicker which justifies the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies being sent out there, although, of course, his record on Cyprus is well-known. He has been against any independence at all. That is why he has been sent out to negotiate with Archbishop Makarios. And the Government ask us to give them their trust and confidence and to allow them the benefit of the doubt. [Interruption.] I am not sure whether the gentleman who is throwing leaflets from the Public Gallery is in favour of the Colonies or not. I understand that it is a protest against the Cyprus policy.

As I was saying, the Government have asked us to give us their confidence. They have asked us to trust them. They have said many times, "We cannot really disclose what is going on". In the face of their record, in the face of their policies, with which we disagree, in the face of their philosophy, we cannot give them that confidence; and because of their record and because of their philosophy we shall divide the House tonight.

9.30 p.m.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Selwyn Lloyd)

I wish to indicated join the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition in extending our congratulation to the three maiden speakers: the hon. Gentleman the Member for Dunfermline Burghs (Dr. A. Thompson) and my hon. Friend the Member for Clapham (Dr. A. Glyn) and Richmond, Surrey (Dr. A. Royle) for their excellent and interesting speeches.

The latter part of the right hon. Gentleman's speech evoked the measure of support which it precisely deserved—the Bulletin of the Society of Labologists. [An HON. MEMBER: "What does that mean?"] The first three letters may mean something.

During this debate there have been many speeches of deep sincerity, and many anxieties have been expressed. I make no complaint about the frankness or the tone of the debate, because we are considering issues of tremendous importance and I will try to deal with most of the points which have been raised in the course of the two days.

First, there is the question of the Conference on Nuclear Teats at Geneva. Last April the United States proposed ceasing tests in the upper atmosphere at once, and extending the ban to high altitudes and extending the ban to high altitudes and to underground tests as soon as control could be agreed. Now, this afternoon, new United States proposals have been put forward in Geneva suggestions the end of nuclear weapons tests in all environments that can be effectively controlled—the oceans, the greatest heights to which effective control can be applied, and major tests underground. I support those proposals which have been put forward.

Certain smaller tests underground would not be covered because they are not yet controllable. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Derby, South (Mr. P. Noel-Baker) mentioned the health hazard. If agreement reached on the basic which has been proposed this afternoon in Geneva, this would mean that the world-wide concern over radiation would be allayed and all tests which can release radioactivity into the atmosphere would be discontinued.

The point is that the smaller range of underground tests would not be covered, but my view is that partial agreement is better than no agreement at all. As I indicated yesterday, the science of seismology is making progress and it may be possible to lower the threshold. These proposal have ben made only this afternoon and negotiations will now go on to see whether agreement can be found with regard to this lower range of underground tests. However in that, under these proposals now, in addition to the tests in the atmosphere, the major tests underground would also be banned.

Mr. P. Noel-Baker

Can the Foreign Secretary say what will be the kiloton level that will be allowed? The Berkner Report stated that they could be controlled down to 2 kiloton. Is that right?

Mr. Lloyd

I cannot give that figure tonight because there are some difficulties, even among the scientists, about the method of working this out, but if the method of working this out, but if the right hon. Gentleman will put down a Question, I will do my best to see that it is answered.

With regard to the wider disarmament talks, I entirely agree with the right hon. Gentlemen the Leader of the Opposition that we do not want the meetings of this Ten-Nation Group to get into a slanging match or be used for propaganda purpose. As regards my outline plan, to which he did not refer altogether with disapproval, I would point out that it was made clear during the debates in the Political Committee of the United Nations last October that we mean in the first stage to reduce armaments and to limit armed forces.

My noble Friend the Member for Dorset, South (Viscount Hinchingbrooke) put forward interesting views on disarmament. I am afraid that I do not agree with him in toto, bur I do agree that he is right in saying that conventional disarmament must proceed pari passu with nuclear disarmament. As regards the figures for our reductions, I was challength to produce a specific figure for the United Kingdom. I say frankly that this is a comparatively easy problem for us, because we have stopped compulsory National Service and have gone on to all-Regular Forces. The figure of 400,000 at which we are aiming puts us in a fairly easy position to state a figure, but we have not, quite deliberately, stated a figure for other Powers yet, because we consider that this is a matter for negotiation.

The next heading under which we have been attacked in this Motion of censure is with regard to our efforts to end the cold war. We were accused today of appalling delays and of shilly-shallying. There was a rather odd criticism, that we must not pin everything on the Summit, that we had to keep other negotiations going and not rely on the Summit to settle everything. Who has done more than the Opposition to make out that everything depends on the Summit?

Our view of the Summit has always been that we will not get out of a single Summit meeting some magic formula which will settle all the problems. We have always regarded this as one of a series of meetings and I think that we are much wiser not to build up world opinion to believe that something wonderful is to happen at the first Summit meeting. What we hope is that it will make a definite and positive contribution to the solution and the reduction of world tension. We think that during this first Summit meeting we should discuss East-West relations, disarmament and the problem of Germany, including Berlin.

We have gone steadily on our way trying to get a Summit meeting called, pulling and pushing, but I think that fair-minded people—and I still believe that there are fair-minded people in the Opposition—will agree that it is primarily due to the actions of Her Majesty's Government that the Summit meeting is to take place.

Now we come to the problems of Central Europe and the criticism of what has been our attitude towards them. The Moscow communiqué said of conditions in Central Europe: The Prime Ministers exchanged full explanations of the views held by their respective Governments on questions relating to Germany including a peace treaty with Germany and the questions of Berlin. They were unable to agree about the juridical and political aspects of the problems involved. At the same time they recognised that it was of great importance for the maintenance and consolidation of peace and security in Europe and throughout the world that these problems should be urgently settled. They therefore acknowledged the need for early negotiations between the interested Governments, to establish a basis for settlement of these differences. They considered that such negotiations could lay the foundations for a stable system of European security. In this connection they agreed that further study could usefully be made of the possibilities of increasing security by some method of limitation of forces and weapons, both conventional and nuclear, in an agreed area of Europe, coupled with an appropriate system of inspection. That is what the communiqué said, which is not quite the gloss which has been put upon it.

We stand by the proposals which we have supported; those contained in the peace plan of last May and those contained in the anti-surprise attack proposals put forward in 1957. I maintain that those are positive proposals. I admit that the first are contingent upon a major political settlement, but the second are not and I think that they are positive proposals consistent with that statement. At the same time, we have been studying and discussing this problem.

The Opposition say that in their Motion of censure they have not put forward their own plan of disengagement, but only what might be the first step towards it. I maintain that one must consider what is to happen next when one puts forward a proposal and with disengagement it is of the essence that if something has been put forward as the first stage of disengagement, one must consider what is to be its probable consequence. I still believe that the plans put forward by the Opposition in regard to disengagement will, and are intended to, lead to the neutralisation of Germany, and the case against the neutralisation of Germany has been well put. I merely wanted to say that, in present circumstances, the policy for the neutralisation of Germany would give us the greatest risks of incurring the two major dangers which I mentioned. Certainly, it would be quite unacceptable to America, and the consequence of that might be the withdrawal of America from Europe. The second reason I oppose it is that I can think of no greater opportunity for Russia to get control of Western Germany. The truth is that to create that kind of vacuum in Central Europe would be to increase the uncertainty and anxiety everywhere. All of us—ourselves and the Russians—would be increasingly nervous that, as the result of the isolated situation that she was in, Germany would be won over or swung over to one side or the other."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 18th November, 1954; Vol. 533, c. 587.] That is a wise statement of the danger and it was made by no other person than the Leader of the Opposition.

Mr. Gaitskell

rose—

Mr. Lloyd

Perhaps I might be allowed to finish my sentence. To be quite fair, that statement was made by the right hon. Gentleman in November, 1954.

Mr. Gaitskell

As a proposal for the neutralisation of Germany alone, it is a totally different proposal from the disengagement proposals for the whole of Europe. If hon. Members do not understand that, they ought not to be in this debate at all. Will the Foreign Secretary tell me this? Since he is now saying that our proposals for a zone of controlled disarmament in Central Europe are so dangerous because they might lead to disengagement, are the Government in favour of those proposals?

Mr. Lloyd

I was only saying that—[HON. MEMBERS: "Answer."]—I was saying that the right hon. Gentleman's proposals are expressly designed to lead to the neutralisation of Germany. That was his statement in Scarborough and in the "Glossy", and the proposals are designed to lead to the neutralisation of Germany. I cannot understand the sensitiveness of right hon. Gentlemen opposite about this. Why should they be frightened of their proposals?

The next point put to me was about Berlin. We were asked about our policy for Berlin. I can only refer right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite to the speech which I made at Geneva on 5th August last year which is reported in Command 829. The hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) asked me certain questions about Berlin. He asked me whether I agreed with Herr von Brentano that the Summit Conference must start negotiations on the Berlin problem from the position which existed before the Geneva Conference took place. Herr von Brentano did not express such a view. What he said was that the Western side should be free to follow such tactics as they thought best when the Summit Conference met and that they were not bound to repeat what had already been said at Geneva. I do not see how anyone can complain of that position.

We were asked about the Government's position on the desirability of negotiating a so-called interim settlement with regard to Berlin. I still think that it would be both possible and desirable that we should negotiate an agreement which would improve the situation in Berlin, but if this was of an interim character it would have to be clear, as I said in the speech to which I have referred, that our fundamental rights and those of the people of West Berlin would not be affected by such an interim agreement.

The third question was with regard to the legal status of Berlin and whether we regarded it as an integral part of the Federal German Republic. We do not regard it as part of the Federal German Republic. It is true that the basic law of the Federal Republic refers to Berlin as one of the "Lands", but the three military Governments when they approved this law emphasised that the powers vested in the Federal Republic were subject to the provisions of the Occupation Statute. Our right to station troops in Berlin and so ensure the freedom of the West Berliners derives from the Occupation Statute of Berlin and we are wrong to subtract anything from that.

I think it is agreed that the main issue is that of making nuclear weapons available in certain circumstances to Western Germany.

There are two specific questions that I want to deal with. The first was that of President Eisenhower's statement at his Press Conference. The question is whether there should be changes in the United States position with regard to nuclear knowledge and weapons. I believe that the United States President, the Administration and Congress are well aware of the dangers of the unrestricted spread of nuclear weapons, and any change in present arrangements would require legislation. No legislative proposals have been put to Congress in this connection and there are none in preparation.

The next point about which I was asked was with regard to the control of nuclear weapons. I think it was my noble Friend the Member for Dorset, South who mentioned this matter. I think General Norstad put it very clearly: All of the N.A.T.O. forces, conventional as well as atomic, are controlled ultimately by a political authority which is in fact the Council of our Governments. They are the higher political authority; and that applies to tactical atomic weapons wherever they may be deployed and in whosoever hands they may be located. In addition to that, in order to ensure the control of this very important weapon and I must say, to keep faith with the Governments of N.A.T.O., I keep in my own hands under a very tight centralised control the units that are equipped to use nuclear weapons. That makes perfectly clear who it is that has the control of these nuclear weapons.

Regarding the general question of German rearmament, the right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) made reference to what were called the Attlee conditions. They were that the rearmament of other democratic countries should come first, the building up of forces of other democratic countries first; that there should be an integration of German forces precluding the emergence of a German military menace and finally there should be agreement with the Germans themselves. I believe that those conditions have been fulfilled and in fact Lord Morrison in a debate in this House in 1954 said specifically: I think it can fairly be said now that the conditions which were stipulated by my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition, when he was Prime Minister, have been fulfilled."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 17th November, 1954; Vol. 533, c. 417.] I believe that is the case. That brings us up to the 1954 position. It was said that I had misled the House in some way by suggesting that nuclear rearmament in Germany was approved on that occasion. I never said it was decided then. I said it was the natural and probable consequence of the decisions then taken. I referred to the speeches of the right hon Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) and the intervention of the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget), and my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister in his answer to the intervention of the hon. and learned Member for Northampton's interruption, said that was the position.

I agree it was said that it was a matter for Governments and that was why I did refer to the decision of the N.A.T.O. Council in 1957. It was given, as I said in my speech yesterday. It was opposed by the Opposition, but the implementation of it has been pretty slow and there is nothing very new about it now.

I was told that I was engaged in some kind of smear technique because I was accusing the Opposition of attacking German membership of N.A.T.O. I did no such thing. I specifically excluded members of the Opposition. What every one must know is that there is a major Soviet propaganda campaign which has been taking place against German membership of N.A.T.O. and there has been a series of attacks on the German Chancellor with which we are all familiar.

We come, therefore, to the kernel of the debate, which is our attitude towards Germany. I fully admit that there are dangers or risks in any policy and we have to ask ourselves which is the way to avoid a recrudescence of German military ambition. The hon. Lady the Member for Cannock (Miss Lee) made a speech about Germany. She attacked Dr. Adenauer's Germany and referred to soldiers trained in the use of nuclear weapons; to German generals being given nuclear weapons; to Germany becoming the second military power in Europe; to her dreams of changing her boundaries; to the appeasement of Dr. Adenauer; to history repeating itself—"brown houses," gas chambers and the same arrogant Herrenvolk and an industrial and military empire and to there being no democracy at all in their souls. I think that is the way to reproduce that pattern in German thinking. The right hon. Member for Bassetlaw (Mr. Bellenger) made a remarkable speech in which he dealt with that. I think that is precisely the way to reproduce the pattern in German thinking which the hon. Lady fears most.

I can assure hon. Members that we have deep feelings about Germany and about the past in Germany. I myself, if I might mention a personal thing, went into Belsen within a few hours of it being uncovered by the Second British Army. I saw the conditions there, the huts with the dead, the dying and those just living. There were 10,000 unburied corpses. One of the most terrible things about it was that they were so emaciated that there was hardly any of the smell of putrefaction which is usual in such cases. That was a sight and experience I shall never forget to the end of my life; but is that the end? I do not think it is. I believe the way we have to tackle this situation is to try to create a new Germany in a Western partnership, treated as equals, with troops, not under German command, but distributed throughout the allied armies, with her economy tied into the community of the Six and renouncing the manufacture of nuclear weapons.

I think this lesser risk is the way to avoid the dangers of the past and a positive way to avoid a repetition of what took place. I think it also strengthens the framework of Western security. I believe that people do not sufficiently realise the danger of a neutralised Germany in the centre of Europe trying to play East off against West. The important thing is on whose side is Germany? I think that on whose side is Germany, with whom is Germany going to be associated and what will be her military potential in the world today, are things about which people have not got a realisic impression. If anyone thinks it is open to the Germany of today, with her compressed industrial areas, to emulate the continental countries of the past, they should remember that power now lies in the Soviet Union and the United States. The capacity of Germany for destruction is smaller than many people think, and it is much safer to have Germany in a free alliance of Western partners. The great danger is to have a neutral Germany trying to play off East against West and, as the right hon. Gentleman said, being won over or swung over to the other side.

The Opposition have suggested that the Government have not been agitating themselves sufficiently energetically to deal with the cold war and tensions. This is very curious. All I can say is that the United Nations Assembly has agreed to send our new disarmament plans to the new Committee. That body will soon sit. The Russians have come into the committee for studying the peaceful uses of outer space. There was a certain amount of mocking laughter about the Antarctic Treaty, but it is a pattern for treaties elsewhere because it means the neutralisation of the Antarctic and that is of great importance. If we could do the same with the Arctic, that would make a great step forward. There has been agreement on the Summit.

Mr. Healey

rose—

Mr. Lloyd

I am afraid I have only five minutes left in which to finish my speech. There has been agreement on the Summit and on a series of Summit meetings and there have been the visits to which reference has been made, which I think have improved the atmosphere between countries of the West and the East. There has been a promising development in Anglo-Soviet contacts, an increase in our trade and an increase in our cultural arrangements. One byproduct of better understanding has been the ending of jamming of B.B.C. broadcasts. There have been no nuclear tests by the United States, the United Kingdom or the Soviet Union since November, 1958. This is what the hon. Member called paralysis, but I think any fair-minded person must accept that it is progress. The attempt all the time to manufacture a feeling of crisis and of impending doom I do not believe serves the cause of reducing tension and procuring relaxations.

The most important fact of all, and this is a matter to which I referred towards the end of my speech yesterday, is that we realise the mutual suicide that world war would mean. We realise also that if we continue the conditions of the cold war by the old methods that I described yesterday—the methods of propaganda, incitement to insurrection and revolt, industrial strife and all the rest—we are still going to have a very unsettled and unstable world. We believe, and I say this to the House with all sincerity, that we are making progress with the Soviet Union, and I think that is very largely due to the personality of Mr. Khrushchev himself. I think we are making progress in trying to work out a system of peaceful co-existence which will not involve all these risks, and there have been very significant developments, such as the way in which the Soviet Union handled the Algerian problem.

That kind of reticence, the denying of opportunities to take advantage of difficulties, is the most promising feature of this new phase. We are going stage by stage, and the idea of the mutual suicide of a world war is accepted. We must have no more brinkmanship. The second thing is that we must work with our allies towards peaceful co-existence, and I think we are making progress on these lines. On the basis of the Summit and series of meetings, I am confident that we will continue slowly but steadily to make progress towards that sort of world which I believe is the profound hope of all of us. I ask the House to reject the Motion.

Mr. Healey

May I ask the Foreign Secretary the one question which he said he had not time to answer two minutes ago? The whole burden of this debate has been that the supply of atomic missiles which can reach Moscow from

Germany will not contribute to the sort of Germany that the Foreign Secretary wants. The Foreign Secretary refused to deal with that question. Will he now, in the two minutes left, give us one reason why he thinks this will contribute to peace?

Mr. Lloyd

I explained in my speech the course of German rearmament, and the reason why I thought it was right. In my speech yesterday, I said that we had to treat Germany as an equal with her allies, and I suggested that she should have made available to her the weapons which are available to her allies.

Question put, That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question:—

The House divided: Ayes 233, Noes 322.

Division No. 39.]	AYES	[10.0 p.m.
Abse, Leo	Ede, Rt. Hon. Chuter	Jones, Dan (Burnley)
Albu, Austen	Edelman, Maurice	Jones, Elwyn (West Ham, S.)
Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)	Edwards, Robert (Bilston)	Jones, J. Idwal (Wrexham)
Allen, Scholefield (Crewe)	Edwards, Walter (Stepney)	Jones, T. W. (Merioneth)
Awbery, Stan	Evans, Albert	Kelley, Richard
Bacon, Miss Alice	Fernyhough, E.	Kenyon, Clifford
Baird, John	Finch, Harold	Key, Rt. Hon. C. W.
Baxter, William (Stirlingshire, W.)	Fletcher, Eric	King, Dr. Horace
Beaney, Alan	Foot, Dingle	Lawson, George
Bellenger, Rt. Hon. F. J.	Forman, J. C.	Ledger, Ron
Bence, Cyril (Dunbartonshire, E.)	Fraser, Thomas (Hamilton)	Lee, Miss Jennie (Cannock)
Benn, Hn. A. Wedgwood (Brist'l, S. E.)	Gaitskell, Rt. Hon. Hugh	Lever, Harold (Cheetham)
Benson, Sir George	Ginsburg, David	Lever, L. M. (Ardwick)
Blackburn, F.	Gooch, E. G.	Lewis, Arthur (West Ham. N.)
Boardman, H.	Gordon Walker, Rt. Hon. P. C.	Lipton, Marcus
Bowden, Herbert W. (Leics, S. W.)	Gourlay, Harry	Logan, David
Bowles, Frank	Greenwood, Anthony	Loughlin, Charles
Boyden, James	Grey, Charles	Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson
Braddock, Mrs. E. M.	Griffiths, David (Rother Valley)	McCann, John
Broughton, Dr. A. D. D.	Griffiths, Rt. Hon. James (Llanelly)	MacColl, James
Brown, Alan (Tottenham)	Grimond, J.	McInnes, James
Brown, Rt. Hon. George (Belper)	Gunter, Ray	McKay, John (Wallsend)
Brown, Thomas (Ince)	Hale, Leslie (Oldham, W.)	Mackie, John
Butler, Herbert (Hackney, C.)	Hall, Rt. Hn. Glenvil (Colne Valley)	McLeavy, Frank
Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)	Hamilton, William (West Fife)	MacMillan, Malcolm (Western Isles)
Callaghan, James	Hart, Mrs. Judith	MacPherson, Malcolm (Stirling)
Castle, Mrs. Barbara	Hayman, F. H.	Manuel, A. C.
Chapman, Donald	Healey, Denis	Mapp, Charles
Chetwynd, George	Henderson, Rt. Hn. Arthur (Rwly Regis)	Marquand, Rt. Hon. H. A.
Cliffe, Michael	Herbison, Miss Margaret	Marsh, Richard
Collick, Percy	Hill, J. (Midlothian)	Mason, Ray
Corbet, Mrs. Freda	Hilton, A. V.	Mellish, R. J.
Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)	Holman, Percy	Mendelson, J. J.
Cronin, John	Holt, Arthur	Millan, Bruce
Crosland, Anthony	Houghton, Douglas	Mitchison, G. R.
Crossman, R. H. S.	Howell, Charles A.	Monslow, Walter
Darling, George	Hoy, James H.	Moody, A. S.
Davies, Rt. Hn. Clement (Montgomery)	Hughes, Cledwyn (Anglesey)	Mort, D. L.
Davies, G. Elfed (Rhondda, E.)	Hughes, Emrys (S. Ayrshire)	Moyle, Arthur
Davies, Harold (Leek)	Hunter, A. E.	Mulley, Frederick
Davies, Ifor (Gower)	Hynd, H. (Accrington)	Neal, Harold
Davies, S. O. (Merthyr)	Hynd, John (Attercliffe)	Noel-Baker, Francis (Swindon)
Deer, George	Irvine, A. J. (Edge Hill)	Noel-Baker, Rt. Hn. Philip (Derby, S.)
de Freitas, Geoffrey	Irving, Sydney (Dartford)	Oliver, G. H.
Delargy, Hugh	Janner, Barnett	Oram, A. E.
Dempsey, James	Jay, Rt. Hon. Douglas	Oswald, Thomas
Diamond, John	Jeger, George	Owen, Will
Dodds, Norman	Jenkins, Roy (Stechford)	Padley, W. E.
Donnelly, Desmond	Johnson, Carol (Lewisham, S.)	Pannell, Charles (Leeds, W.)
Driberg, Tom	Johnston, Douglas (Paisley)	Pargiter, G. A.
Dugdale, Rt. Hon. John	Jones, Rt. Hn. A. Creech (Wakefield)	Parker, John (Dagenham)
Parkin, B. T. (Paddington, N.)	Slater, Mrs. Harriet (Stoke, N.)	Wade, Donald
Paton, John	Slater, Joseph (Sedgefield)	Wainwright, Edwin
Pearson, Arthur (Pontypridd)	Small, William	Warbey, William
Peart, Frederick	Smith, Ellis (Stoke, S.)	Weitzman, David
Plummer, Sir Leslie	Snow, Julian	Wells, Percy (Faversham)
Popplewell, Ernest	Sorensen, R. W.	Wells, William (Walsall, N.)
Prentice, R. E.	Soskice, Rt. Hon. Sir Frank	Wheeldon, W. E.
Price, J. T. (Westhoughton)	Spriggs, Leslie	White, Mrs. Eirene
Probert, Arthur	Steele, Thomas	Whitlock, William
Proctor, W. T.	Stewart, Michael (Fulham)	Wigg, George
Pursey, Cmdr. Harry	Stonehouse, John	Wilcock, Group Capt. C. A. B.
Randall, Harry	Stones, William	Wilkins, W. A.
Rankin, John	Strachey, Rt. Hon. John	Willey, Frederick
Redhead, E. C.	Strauss, Rt. Hn. G. R. (Vauxhall)	Williams, D. J. (Neath)
Reid, William	Summerskill, Dr. Rt. Hon. Edith	Williams, Rev. Ll. (Abertillery)
Reynolds, G. W.	Swain, Thomas	Williams, W. A. (Openshaw)
Rhodes, H.	Swingler, Stephen	Willis, E. G. (Edinburgh, E.)
Robens, Rt. Hon. Alfred	Sylvester, George	Wilson, Rt. Hon. Harold (Huyton)
Roberts, Albert (Normanton)	Symonds, J. B.	Woodburn, Rt. Hon. A.
Roberts, Goronwy (Caernarvon)	Taylor, Bernard (Mansfield)	Woof, Robert
Robinson, Kenneth (St. Pancras, N.)	Thomas, George (Cardiff, W.)	Wyatt, Woodrow
Ross, William	Thomas, Iorwerth (Rhondda, W.)	Yates, Victor (Ladywood)
Royle, Charles (Salford, West)	Thompson, Dr. Alan (Dunfermline)	Zilliacus, K.
Shinwell, Rt. Hon. E.	Thornton, Ernest
Short, Edward	Thorpe, Jeremy	TELLERS FOR THE AYES:
Silverman, Julius (Aston)	Timmons, John	Mr. J. Taylor and
Silverman, Sydney (Nelson)	Tomney, Frank	Mr. G. H. R. Rogers.
Skeffington, Arthur	Ungoed-Thomas, Sir Lynn
NOES
Agnew, Sir Peter	Cleaver, Leonard	Gower, Raymond
Aitken, W. T.	Cole, Norman	Grant, Rt. Hon. William (Woodside)
Allan, Robert (Paddington, S.)	Collard, Richard	Grant-Ferris, Wg Cdr. R. (Nantwich)
Allason, James	Cooke, Robert	Green, Alan
Amery, Julian (Preston, N.)	Cooper, A. E.	Grimston, Sir Robert
Amory, Rt. Hn. D. Heathcoat (Tiv'tn)	Cooper-Key, Sir Neill	Grosvenor, Lt.-Col. R. G.
Arbuthnot, John	Cordeaux, Lt.-Col. J. K.	Gurden, Harold
Ashton, Sir Hubert	Cordle, John	Hall, John (Wycombe)
Atkins, Humphrey	Corfield, F. V.	Hamilton, Michael (Wellingborough)
Balniel, Lord	Costain, A. P.	Hare, Rt. Hon. John
Barber, Anthony	Coulson, J. M.	Harris, Frederic (Croydon, N. W.)
Barlow, Sir John	Courtney, Cdr. Anthony	Harris, Reader (Heston)
Barter, John	Craddock, Beresford (Spelthorne)	Harrison, Brian (Maldon)
Batsford, Brian	Critchley, Julian	Harrison, Col. J. H. (Eye)
Baxter, Sir Beverley (Southgate)	Crowder, F. P.	Harvey, Sir Arthur Vere (Macclesf'd)
Beamish, Col. Tufton	Cunningham, Knox	Harvey, John (Walthamstow, E.)
Bell, Philip (Bolton, E.)	Curran, Charles	Harvie Anderson, Miss
Bell, Ronald (S. Bucks.)	Currie, G. B. H.	Hay, John
Bennett, F. M. (Torquay)	Dance, James	Head, Rt. Hon. Antony
Bennett, Dr. Reginald (Got & Fhm)	d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir Henry	Heald, Rt. Hon. Sir Lionel
Berkeley, Humphry	Deedes, W. F.	Henderson, John (Cathcart)
Bevins, Rt. Hon. Reginald (Toxteth)	de Ferranti, Basil	Hendry, A. Forbes
Bidgood, John C.	Digby, Simon Wingfield	Hicks Beach, Maj. W.
Biggs-Davison, John	Donaldson, Cmdr. C. E. M.	Hiley, Joseph
Bingham, R. M.	Doughty, Charles	Hill, Dr. Rt. Hon. Charles (Luton)
Birch, Rt. Hon. Nigel	Drayson, G. B.	Hill, J. E. B. (S. Norfolk)
Bishop, F. P.	Duncan, Sir James	Hinchingbrooke, Viscount
Black, Sir Cyril	Duthie, Sir William	Hobson, John
Bossom, Clive	Eccles, Rt. Hon. Sir David	Holland, Philip
Bourne-Arton, A.	Eden, John	Hollingworth, John
Box, Donald	Elliott, R. W.	Hope, Rt. Hon. Lord John
Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hon. John	Emery, Peter	Hopkins, Alan
Boyle, Sir Edward	Emmet, Hon. Mrs. Evelyn	Hornby, R. P.
Braine, Bernard	Errington, Sir Eric	Hornsby-Smith, Rt. Hon. Patricia
Brewis, John	Erroll, F. J.	Howard, Gerald (Cambridgeshire)
Bromley-Davenport, Lt.-Col. W. H.	Farey-Jones, F. W.	Howard, Hon. G. R. (St. Ives)
Brooke, Rt. Hon. Henry	Farr, John	Howard, John (Southampton, Test)
Brooman-White, R.	Fell, Anthony	Hughes Hallett, Vice-Admiral John
Browne, Percy (Torrington)	Finlay, Graeme	Hughes-Young, Michael
Bullard, Denys	Fletcher-Cooke, Charles	Hulbert, Sir Norman
Bullus, Wing Commander Eric	Foster, John	Hurd, Sir Anthony
Burden, F. A.	Fraser, Hn. Hugh (Stafford & Stone)	Hutchison, Michael Clark
Butcher, Sir Herbert	Fraser, Ian (Plymouth, Sutton)	Iremonger, T. L.
Butler, Rt. Hn. R. A. (Saffron Walden)	Freeth, Denzil	Ivine, Bryant Godman (Rye)
Campbell, Sir David (Belfast, S.)	Galbraith, Hon. T. G. D.	Jackson, John
Campbell, Gordon (Moray & Nairn)	Gammans, Lady	James, David
Carr, Compton (Barons Court)	Gardner, Edward	Jenkins, Robert (Dulwich)
Carr, Robert (Mitcham)	Gibson-Watt, David	Jennings, J. C.
Channon, H. P. G.	Glover, Sir Douglas	Johnson, Dr. Donald (Carlisle)
Chataway, Christopher	Glyn, Dr. Alan (Clapham)	Johnson, Eric (Blackley)
Chichester-Clark, R.	Glyn, Col. Richard H. (Dorset, N.)	Johnson Smith, Geoffrey
Churchill, Rt. Hon. Sir Winston	Godber, J. B.	Joseph, Sir Keith
Clark, Henry (Antrim, N.)	Goodhart, Philip	Kaberry, Sir Donald
Clark, William (Nottingham, S.)	Goodhew, Victor	Kerans, Cdr. J. S.
Clarke, Brig. Terence (Portsmth, W.)	Gough, Frederick

Kerby, Capt. Henry	Nicholls, Harmar	Stanley, Hon. Richard.
Kerr, Sir Hamilton	Nicholson, Sir Godfrey	Stevens, Geoffrey
Kershaw, Anthony	Noble, Michael	Steward, Harold (Stockport, S.)
Kimball, Marcus	Nugent, Sir Richard	Stodart, J. A.
Kirk, Peter	Oakshott, Sir Hendrie	Stoddart-Scott, Col. Sir Malcolm
Kitson, Timothy	Orr, Capt. L. P. S.	Storey, Sir Samuel
Lagden, Godfrey	Osborn, John (Hallam)	Studholme, Sir Henry
Lambton, Viscount	Osborne, Cyril (Louth)	Summers, Sir Spencer (Aylesbury)
Lancaster, Col. C. G.	Page, Graham	Sumner, Donald (Orpington)
Langford-Holt, J.	Pannell, Norman (Kirkdale)	Talbot, John E.
Leavey, J. A.	Partridge, E.	Tapsell, Peter
Leburn, Gilmour	Pearson, Frank (Clitheroe)	Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)
Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)	Peel, John	Taylor, W. J. (Bradford, N.)
Lindsay, Martin	Percival, Ian	Teeling, William
Linstead, Sir Hugh	Peyton, John	Temple, John M.
Litchfield, Capt. John	Pickthorn, Sir Kenneth	Thatcher, Mrs. Margaret
Lloyd, Rt. Hn. Geoffrey (Sut'n C'dfield)	Pike, Miss Mervyn	Thomas, Leslie (Canterbury)
Lloyd, Rt. Hon. Selwyn (Wirral)	Pilkington, Capt. Richard	Thomas, Peter (Conway)
Longbottom, Charles	Pitman, I. J.	Thompson, Kenneth (Walton)
Longden, Gilbert	Pitt, Miss Edith	Thompson, Richard (Croydon, S.)
Loveys, Walter H.	Pott, Percivall	Thorneycroft, Rt. Hon. Peter
Low, Rt. Hon. Sir Toby	Powell, J. Enoch	Thornton-Kemsley, Sir Colin
Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh	Price, David (Eastleigh)	Tiley, Arthur (Bradford, W.)
McAdden, Stephen	Price, H. A. (Lewisham, W.)	Tilney, John (Wavertree)
MacArthur, Ian	Prior, J. M. L.	Turner, Colin
McLaren, Martin	Prior-Palmer, Brig. Sir Otho	van Straubenzee, W. R.
McLaughlin, Mrs. Patricia	Profumo, Rt. Hon. John	Vane, W. M. F.
Maclay, Rt. Hon. John	Proudfoot, Wilfred	Vaughan-Morgan, Sir John
Maclean, Sir Fitzroy (Bute & N. Ayrs.)	Ramsden, James	Vickers, Miss Joan
Macleod, Rt. Hn. Iain (Enfield, W.)	Rawlinson, Peter	Vosper, Rt. Hon. Dennis
MacLeod, John (Ross & Cromarty)	Rees, Hugh	Wakefield, Edward (Derbyshire, W.)
McMaster, Stanley	Rees-Davies, W. R.	Wakefield, Sir Wavell (St. M'lebone)
Macmillan, Maurice (Halifax)	Renton, David	Walker-Smith, Rt. Hon. Derek
Macpherson, Niall (Dumfries)	Ridsdale, Julian	Wall, Patrick
Maddan, Martin	Rippon, Geoffrey	Ward, Rt. Hon. George (Worcester)
Maginnis, John E.	Roberts, Sir Peter (Heeley)	Ward, Dame Irene (Tynemouth)
Maitland, Cdr. J. W.	Robinson, Sir Roland (Blackpool, S.)	Watkinson, Rt. Hon. Harold
Manningham-Buller, Rt. Hn. Sir R.	Rodgers, John (Sevenoaks)	Watts, James
Markham, Major Sir Frank	Roots, William	Webster, David
Marlowe, Anthony	Ropner, Col. Sir Leonard	Wells, John (Maidstone)
Marples, Rt. Hon. Ernest	Royle, Anthony (Richmond, Surrey)	Whitelaw, William
Marshall, Douglas	Russell, Ronald	Wills, Sir Gerald (Bridgwater)
Marten, Neil	Sandys, Rt. Hon. Duncan	Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)
Mathew, Robert (Honiton)	Scott-Hopkins, James	Wise, Alfred
Matthews, Gordon (Meriden)	Seymour, Leslie	Wolrige-Gordon, Patrick
Maudling, Rt. Hon. Reginald	Sharples, Richard	Wood, Rt. Hon. Richard
Maydon, Lt.-Cmdr. S. L. C.	Shepherd, William	Woodhouse, C. M.
Milligan, Rt. Hon. W. R.	Simon, Sir Jocelyn	Woodnutt, Mark
Mills, Stratton	Smith, Dudley (Br'ntf'd & Chiswick)	Woollam, John
Montgomery, Fergus	Smithers, Peter	Worsley, Marcus
Moore, Sir Thomas	Smyth, Brig. Sir John (Norwood)	Yates, William (The Wrekin)
Morgan, William	Soames, Rt. Hon. Christopher
Morrison, John	Spearman, Sir Alexander	TELLERS FOR THE NOES:
Nabarro, Gerald	Speir, Rupert	Mr. Redmayne and Mr. Legh.

Question put, That the proposed words be there added:—

The House divided: Ayes 319, Noes 299.

Division No. 40.]	AYES	[10.12 p.m.
Agnew, Sir Peter	Biggs-Davison, John	Carr, Compton (Barons Court)
Aitken, W. T.	Bingham, R. M.	Carr, Robert (Mitcham)
Allan, Robert (Paddington, S.)	Birch, Rt. Hon. Nigel	Channon, H. P. G.
Allason, James	Bishop, F. P.	Chataway, Christopher
Amery, Julian (Preston, N.)	Black, Sir Cyril	Chichester-Clark, R.
Amory, Rt. Hn. D. Heathcoat (Tiv'tn)	Bossom, Clive	Churchill, Rt. Hon. Sir Winston
Arbuthnot, John	Bourne-Arton, A.	Clark, Henry (Antrim, N.)
Ashton, Sir Hubert	Box, Donald	Clark, William (Nottingham, S.)
Atkins, Humphrey	Boyd-Carpenter. Rt. Hon. John	Clarke, Brig. Terence (Portsmth, W.)
Balniel, Lord	Boyle, Sir Edward	Cleaver, Leonard
Barber, Anthony	Braine, Bernard	Cole, Norman
Barlow, Sir John	Brewis, John	Collard, Richard
Barter, John	Bromley-Davenport, Lt.-Col. W. H.	Cooke, Robert
Batsford, Brian	Brooke, Rt. Hon. Henry	Cooper, A. E.
Baxter, Sir Beverley (Southgate)	Brooman-White, R.	Cooper-Key, Sir Neill
Beamish, Col. Tufton	Browne, Percy (Torrington)	Cordeaux, Lt.-Col. J. K.
Bell, Philip (Bolton, E.)	Bullard, Denys	Cordle, John
Bell, Ronald (S. Bucks.)	Bullus, Wing Commander Eric	Corfield, F. V.
Bennett, F. M. (Torquay)	Burden, F. A.	Costain, A. P.
Bennett, Dr. Reginald (Gos & Fhm)	Butcher, Sir Herbert	Coulson, J. M.
Berkeley, Humphry	Butler, Rt. Hn. R. A. (Saffron Walden)	Courtney, Cdr. Anthony
Bevins, Rt. Hon. Reginald (Toxteth)	Campbell, Sir David (Belfast, S.)	Craddock, Beresford (Spelthorne)
Bidgood, John C.	Campbell, Gordon (Moray & Nairn)	Critchley, Julian
Crowder, F. P.	Johnson, Dr. Donald (Carlisle)	Prior-Palmer, Brig. Sir Otho
Cunningham, Knox	Johnson, Eric (Blackley)	Profumo, Rt. Hon. John
Curran, Charles	Johnson Smith, Geoffrey	Proudfoot, Wilfred
Currie, G. B. H.	Joseph, Sir Keith	Ramsden, James
Dance, James	Kaberry, Sir Donald	Rawlinson, Peter
d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir Henry	Kerans, Cdr. J. S.	Redmayne, Rt. Hon. Martin
Deedes, W. F.	Kerby, Capt. Henry	Rees, Hugh
de Ferranti, Basil	Kerr, Sir Hamilton	Rees-Davies, W. R.
Digby, Simon Wingfield	Kershaw, Anthony	Renton, David
Donaldson, Cmdr. C. E. M.	Kimball, Marcus	Ridsdale, Julian
Doughty, Charles	Kirk, Peter	Rippon, Geoffrey
Drayson, G. B.	Kitson, Timothy	Roberts, Sir Peter (Heeley)
Duthie, Sir William	Ladgen, Godfrey	Robinson, Sir Roland (Blackpool, S.)
Eccles, Rt. Hon. Sir David	Lambton, Viscount	Rodgers, John (Sevenoaks)
Eden, John	Lancaster, Col. C. G.	Roots, William
Elliott, R. W.	Langford-Holt, J.	Ropner, Col. Sir Leonard
Emery, Peter	Leavey, J. A.	Royle, Anthony (Richmond, Surrey)
Emmet, Hon. Mrs. Evelyn	Leburn, Gilmour	Russell, Ronald
Errington, Sir Eric	Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)	Sandys, Rt. Hon. Duncan
Erroll, F. J.	Lindsay, Martin	Scott-Hopkins, James
Farey-Jones, F. W.	Linstead, Sir Hugh	Seymour, Leslie
Farr, John	Litchfield, Capt. John	Sharples, Richard
Fell, Anthony	Lloyd, Rt. Hn. Geoffrey (Sut'n C'dfield)	Shepherd, William
Finlay, Graeme	Lloyd, Rt. Hon. Selwyn (Wirral)	Simon, Sir Jocelyn
Fletcher-Cooke, Charles	Longbottom, Charles	Smith, Dudley (Br'ntf'rd & Chiswick)
Foster, John	Longden, Gilbert	Smithers, Peter
Fraser, Ian (Plymouth, Sutton)	Loveys, Walter H.	Smyth, Brig. Sir John (Norwood)
Freeth, Denzil	Low, Rt. Hon. Sir Toby	Soames, Rt. Hon. Christopher
Galbraith, Hon. T. G. D.	Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh	Spearman, Sir Alexander
Gammans, Lady	McAdden, Stephen	Speir, Rupert
Gardner, Edward	MacArthur, Ian	Stanley, Hon. Richard
Gibson-Watt, David	McLaren, Martin	Stevens, Geoffrey
Glover, Sir Douglas	McLaughlin, Mrs. Patricia	Steward, Harold (Stockport, S.)
Glyn, Dr. Alan (Clapham)	Maclay, Rt. Hon. John	Stodart, J. A.
Glyn, Col. Richard H. (Dorset, N.)	Maclean, Sir Fitzroy (Bute & N. Ayrs.)
Godber, J. B.	Macleod, Rt. Hn. Iain (Enfield, W.)	Stoddart-Scott, Col. Sir Malcolm
Goodhart, Philip	MacLeod, John (Ross & Cromarty)	Storey, Sir Samuel
Goodhew, Victor	McMaster, Stanley	Studholme, Sir Henry
Gower, Raymond	Macmillan, Maurice (Halifax)	Summers, Sir Spencer (Aylesbury)
Grant, Rt. Hon. William (Woodside)	Macpherson, Niall (Dumfries)	Sumner, Donald (Orpington)
Grant-Ferris, Wg Cdr. R. (Nantwich)	Maddan, Martin	Talbot, John E.
Green, Alan	Maginnis, John E.	Tapsell, Peter
Grimston, Sir Robert	Maitland, Cdr. J. W.	Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)
Grosvenor, Lt.-Col. R. G.	Manningham-Buller, Rt. Hn. Sir R.	Taylor, W. J. (Bradford. N.)
Gurden, Harold	Markham, Major Sir Frank	Teeling, William
Hall, John (Wycombe)	Marlowe, Anthony	Temple, John M.
Hamilton, Michael (Wellingborough)	Marples, Rt. Hon. Ernest	Thatcher, Mrs. Margaret
Hare, Rt. Hon. John	Marshall, Douglas	Thomas, Leslie (Canterbury)
Harris, Frederic (Croydon, N. W.)	Marten, Neil	Thomas, Peter (Conway)
Harris, Reader (Heston)	Mathew, Robert (Honiton)	Thompson, Kenneth (Walton)
Harrison, Brian (Maldon)	Matthews, Gordon (Meriden)	Thompson, Richard (Croydon, S.)
Harrison, Col. J. H. (Eye)	Maudling, Rt. Hon. Reginald	Thorneycroft, Rt. Hon. Peter
Harvey, Sir Arthur Vere (Macclesf'd)	Maydon, Lt.-Cmdr. S. L. C.	Thornton-Kemsley, Sir Colin
Harvey, John (Walthamstow, E.)	Milligan, Rt. Hon. W. R.	Tiley, Arthur (Bradford, W.)
Harvie Anderson, Miss	Mills, Stratton	Tilney, John (Wavertree)
Hay, John	Montgomery, Fergus	Turner, Colin
Heald, Rt. Hon. Sir Lionel	Moore, Sir Thomas	van Straubenzee, W. R.
Henderson, John (Cathcart)	Morgan, William	Vane, W. M. F.
Hendry, A. Forbes	Morrison, John	Vaughan-Mergan, Sir John
Hicks Beach, Maj. W.	Nabarro, Gerald	Vickers, Miss John
Hiley, Joseph	Nicholls, Harmar	Vosper, Rt. Hon. Dennis
Hill, Dr. Rt. Hon. Charles (Luton)	Nicholson, Sir Godfrey	Wakefield, Sir Wavell (St. M'lebone)
Hill, J. E. B. (S. Norfolk)	Noble, Michael	Walker-Smith, Rt. Hon. Derek
Hinchingbrooke, Viscount	Nugent, Sir Richard	Wall, Patrick
Hobson, John	Oakshott, Sir Hendrie	Ward, Rt. Hon. George (Worcester)
Holland, Philip	Orr, Capt. L. P. S.	Ward, Dame Irene (Tynemouth)
Hollingworth, John	Osborn, John (Hallam)	Watkinson, Rt. Hon. Harold
Hope, Rt. Hon. Lord John	Osborne, Cyril (Louth)	Watts, James
Hopkins, Alan	Page, Graham	Webster, David
Hornby, R. P.	Pannell, Norman (Kirkdale)	Wells, John (Maidstone)
Hornsby-Smith, Rt. Hon. Patricia	Partridge, E.	Whitelaw, William
Howard, Gerald (Cambridgeshire)	Pearson, Frank (Clitheroe)	Wills, Sir Gerald (Bridgwater)
Howard, Hon. G. R. (St. Ives)	Peel, John	Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)
Howard, John (Southampton, Test)	Percival, Ian	Wise, Alfred
Hughes Hallett, Vice-Admiral John	Peyton, John	Wolrige-Gordon, Patrick
Hughes-Young, Michael	Pickthorn, Sir Kenneth	Wood, Rt. Hon. Richard
Hulbert, Sir Norman	Pike, Miss Mervyn	Woodhouse, C. M.
Hurd, Sir Anthony	Pllkington, Capt. Richard	Woodnutt, Mark
Hutchison, Michael Clark	Pitman, I. J.	Woollam, John
Iremonger, T. L.	Pitt, Miss Edith	Worsley, Marcus
Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)	Pott, Percivall	Yates, William (The Wrekin)
Jackson, John	Powell, J. Enoch
James, David	Price, David (Eastleigh)	TELLERS FOR THE AYES:
Jenkins, Robert (Dulwich)	Price, H. A. (Lewisham, W.)	Mr. Legh and Mr. E. Wakefield
Jennings, J. C.	Prior, J. M. L.

NOES
Abse, Leo	Herbison, Miss Margaret	Plummer, Sir Leslie
Albu, Austen	Hill, J. (Midlothian)	Popplewell, Ernest
Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)	Hilton, A. V.	Prentice, R. E.
Allen, Scholefield (Crewe)	Holman, Percy	Price, J. T. (Westhoughton)
Awbery, Stan	Holt, Arthur	Probert, Arthur
Bacon, Miss Alice	Houghton, Douglas	Proctor, W. T.
Baird, John	Howell, Charles A.	Pursey, Cmdr. Harry
Baxter, William (Stirlingshire, W.)	Hoy, James H.	Randall, Harry
Beaney, Alan	Hughes, Cledwyn (Anglesey)	Rankin, John
Bence, Cyril (Dunbartonshire, E.)	Hughes, Emrys (S. Ayrshire)	Redhead, E. C.
Benn, Hn. A. Wedgwood (Brist'l, S. E.)	Hunter, A. E.	Reid, William
Benson, Sir George	Hynd, H. (Accrington)	Reynolds, G. W.
Blackburn, F.	Hynd, John (Attercliffe)	Rhodes, H.
Boardman, H.	Irvine, A. J. (Edge Hill)	Robens, Rt. Hon. Alfred
Bowden, Herbert W. (Leics, S. W.)	Irving, Sydney (Dartford)	Roberts, Albert (Normanton)
Bowles, Frank	Janner, Barnett	Roberts, Goronwy (Caernarvon)
Boyden, James	Jay, Rt. Hon. Douglas	Robinson, Kenneth (St. Pancras, N.)
Braddock, Mrs. E. M.	Jeger, George	Ross, William
Broughton, Dr. A. D. D.	Jenkins, Roy (Stechford)	Royle, Charles (Salford, West)
Brown, Alan (Tottenham)	Johnson, Carol (Lewisham, S.)	Short, Edward
Brown, Rt. Hon. George (Belper)	Johnston, Douglas (Paisley)	Silverman, Julius (Aston)
Brown, Thomas (Ince)	Jones, Rt. Hn. A. Creech (Wakefield)	Silverman, Sydney (Nelson)
Butler, Herbert (Hackney, C.)	Jones, Dan (Burnley)	Skeffington, Arthur
Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)	Jones, Elwyn (West Ham, S.)	Slater, Mrs. Harriet (Stoke, N.)
Callaghan, James	Jones, J. Idwal (Wrexham)	Slater, Joseph (Sedgefield)
Castle, Mrs. Barbara	Jones, T. W. (Merioneth)	Small, William
Chapman, Donald	Kelley, Richard	Smith, Ellis (Stoke, S.)
Chetwynd, George	Kenyon, Clifford	Snow, Julian
Cliffe, Michael	Key, Rt. Hon. C. W.	Sorensen, R. W.
Collick, Percy	King, Dr. Horace	Soskice, Rt. Hon. Sir Frank
Corbet, Mrs. Freda	Lawson, George	Spriggs, Leslie
Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)	Ledger, Ron	Steele, Thomas
Cronin, John	Lee, Miss Jennie (Cannock)	Stewart, Michael (Fulham)
Crosland, Anthony	Lever, Harold (Cheetham)	Stonehouse, John
Crossman, R. H. S.	Lever, L. M. (Ardwick)	Stones, William
Darling, George	Lewis, Arthur (West Ham, N.)	Strachey, Rt. Hon. John
Davies, G. Elfed (Rhondda, E.)	Lipton, Marcus	Strauss, Rt. Hn. G. R. (Vauxhall)
Davies, Harold (Leek)	Logan, David	Summerskill, Dr. Rt. Hon. Edith
Davies, Ifor (Gower)	Loughlin, Charles	Swain, Thomas
Davies, S. O. (Merthyr)	Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson	Swingler, Stephen
Deer, George	McCann, John	Sylvester, George
de Freitas, Geoffrey	MacColl, James	Symonds, J. B.
Delargy, Hugh	McInnes, James	Taylor, Bernard (Mansfield)
Dempsey, James	McKay, John (Wallsend)	Thomas, George (Cardiff, W.)
Diamond, John	Mackie, John	Thomas, Iorwerth (Rhondda, W.)
Dodds, Norman	McLeavy, Frank	Thompson, Dr. Alan (Dunfermline)
Donnelly, Desmond	MacMillan, Malcolm (Western Isles)	Thornton, Ernest
Driberg, Tom	MacPherson, Malcolm (Stirling)	Thorpe, Jeremy
Dugdale, Rt. Hon. John	Manuel, A. C.	Timmons, John
Ede, Rt. Hon. Chuter	Mapp, Charles	Tomney, Frank
Edelman, Maurice	Marquand, Rt. Hon. H. A.	Ungoed-Thomas, Sir Lynn
Edwards, Robert (Bilston)	Marsh, Richard	Wade, Donald
Edwards, Walter (Stepney)	Mason, Roy	Wainwright, Edwin
Evans, Albert	Mellish, R. J.	Warbey, William
Fernyhough, E.	Mendelson, J. J.	Weitzman, David
Finch, Harold	Millan, Bruce	Wells, Percy (Faversham)
Fletcher, Eric	Mitchison, G. R.	Wells, William (Walsall, N.)
Foot, Dingle	Monslow, Walter	Wheeldon, W. E.
Forman, J. C.		White, Mrs. Eirene
Fraser, Thomas (Hamilton)	Moody, A. S.	Whitlock, William
Galtskell, Rt. Hon. Hugh	Mort, D. L.	Wigg, George
Ginsburg, David	Moyle, Arthur	Wilcock, Group Capt. C. A. B.
Gooch, E. G.	Mulley, Frederick	Wilkins, W. A.
Gordon Walker, Rt. Hon. P. C.	Neal, Harold	Willey, Frederick
Gourlay, Harry	Noel-Baker, Francis (Swindon)
Greenwood, Anthony	Noel-Baker, Rt. Hn. Philip (Derby, S.)	Williams, D. J. (Neath)
Grey, Charles	Oliver, G. H.	Williams, Rev. Ll. (Abertillery)
Griffiths, David (Rother Valley)	Oram, A. E.	Williams, W. R. (Openshaw)
Griffiths, Rt. Hon. James (Llanelly)	Oswald, Thomas	Willis, E. G. (Edinburgh, E.)
Grimond, J.	Owen, Will	Wilson, Rt. Hon. Harold (Huyton)
Gunter, Ray	Padley, W. E.	Woodburn, Rt. Hon. A.
Hale, Leslie (Oldham, W.)	Pannell, Charles (Leeds, W.)	Woof, Robert
Hall, Rt. Hon. Glenvil (Colne Valley)	Pargiter, G. A.	Wyatt, Woodrow
Hamilton, William (West Fife)	Parker, John (Dagenham)	Yates, Victor (Ladywood)
Hart, Mrs. Judith	Parkin, B. T. (Paddington, N.)	Zilliacus, K.
Hayman, F. H.	Paton, John
Healey, Denis	Pearson, Arthur (Pontypridd)	TELLERS FOR THE NOES:
Henderson, Rt. Hn. Arthur (Rwly Regis)	Peart, Frederick	Mr. J. Taylor and
		Mr. G. H. R. Rogers.

Main Question, as amended, put and agreed to.

Resolved, That this House approves the steps taken by Her Majesty's Government to reduce international tension and make possible a Summit meeting; expresses its earnest hopes for the success of this meeting and of the disarmament negotiations; and, while reaffirming its support of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and of the policy approved by the House on 18th November, 1954, for obtaining an effective German contribution to Western defence, welcomes the outline plan for comprehensive disarmament put forward by Her Majesty's Government in September, 1959.