Commons Sitting of 3 March 1959

Preamble
The House met at half-past Two o'clock
PRAYERS
[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]
NEW WRIT
For Norfolk, South-West, in the room of Sidney Dye, esquire, deceased.—[Mr. Bowden.]
ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
  LOCAL GOVERNMENT

    Manchester and Salford (Air Pollution)
    Mr. Frank Allaunasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government and Minister for Welsh Affairs if he is aware that workers engaged in Trafford Park, Manchester, on night shift are complaining of noxious fumes; what inquiries he has made; and what steps he proposes to prevent these emissions.
    The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Housing and Local Government (Mr. J. R. Bevins): My right hon. Friend is aware that there have been complaints, but he understands that these arise from processes which are not registered under the Alkali Act. The matter is therefore one for the local authority.
    Mr. Allaun: Is the Minister prepared to consider letters which I have received from very big trade union branches at Salford on this matter? Secondly, does he feel satisfied that the limits imposed by the Alkali Act on the emission of sulphur dioxide and other acid fumes are being adhered to in Trafford Park, both by day and by night?
    Mr. Bevins: The answer to the first part of the hon. Gentleman's supplementary question is certainly "Yes". On the second part, there are, I think, 12 works out of a total of about 150 at
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    Trafford Park which fall within the jurisdiction of the Alkali Inspectorate. I assure the hon. Gentleman that we are doing all we possibly can to keep down the emission of sulphur dioxide fumes.
    Mr. Storey: Is my hon. Friend satisfied that there are sufficient powers to deal with emission of sulphur dioxide fumes?
    Mr. Bevins: Yes, Sir.
    Mr. Frank Allaunasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government and Minister for Welsh Affairs if he is aware of the unusually large number of hospital cases resulting from the recent fogs in Manchester and Salford; and what steps are being taken in conjunction with the Alkali Inspectorate and the Clean Air Council to reduce atmospheric pollution.
    Mr. Bevins: My right hon. Friend is informed that there has been a heavy demand for hospital beds in Manchester and Salford as elsewhere due mainly to the incidence of acute respiratory infections. Manchester and Salford City Councils have in mind the early establishment of substantial smoke control areas in addition to the existing smokeless zones, and the Alkali Inspectorate are dealing as vigorously as possible with air pollution from processes registered under the Alkali Act. My right hon. Friend has not so far consulted the Clean Air Council about the problems of particular areas.
    Mr. Allaun: Is the Minister aware that the Medical Officer of Health for Salford stated that on 30th January the amount of sulphur dioxide in the atmosphere was the highest ever recorded for Salford, which is saying something? It was considerably higher than the figure in the 1952 London disaster, which killed 4,000 people. Since it is possible to wash acid fumes out of effluent gases, may I ask the Minister whether he feels that industrialists are spending the money necessary to do so?
    Mr. Bevins: This is a difficult question. I understand the anxiety of the hon. Gentleman and indeed of my hon. Friend the Member for Stretford (Mr. Storey) about the conditions in the Manchester and Salford area, but it is a fact that one of the worst days for pollution in that district was Sunday, 25th January, when the only possible cause of the pollution was emission from domestic fires.

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    Manchester City Council is proposing to introduce a further smoke-control area at Wythenshawe, and Salford Council is preparing four more smoke-control areas. On the industrial aspect of the matter the Alkali Inspectorate is vigorously pursuing this matter all the time. If the hon. Member for Salford, East (Mr. Frank Allaun) has any suggestions that he would care to put to my right hon. Friend at any time we should welcome them.
    Sir A. V. Harvey: Would my hon. Friend undertake to consult the Clean Air Council on this question, because many firms in Manchester have gone to a lot of trouble to comply with the regulations? It is just a few firms who have not even bothered to look into the matter with his inspectors. Much could be done to improve conditions.
    Mr. Bevins: Yes, Sir.

    Factory, Prescot (Noxious Fumes)
    Mr. H. Wilsonasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government and Minister for Welsh Affairs, in view of the fact that the Prescot Urban District Council has been informed that it has no powers, under the Clean Air Act or otherwise, to deal with the problem of noxious fumes emitted from a local factory, what Departmental action he proposes to take in the matter.
    Mr. H. Brooke: The problems at this factory involve certain processes now registered under the Alkali Act, as regards which the alkali inspectors are responsible, and also certain unregistered processes, as regards which the council is responsible under the Clean Air Act. I can assure the right hon. Gentleman that every effort will be made to secure a reduction in air pollution from the registered processes, though there are technical difficulties which cannot be quickly overcome. The district alkali inspector, recently paid a visit to the factory in company with the council's chief public health inspector, and will be prepared to assist with his informal advice as to the unregistered processes if the council wishes.
    Mr. Wilson: Is not the right hon. Gentleman aware that the Prime Minister, when Minister of Housing and Local Government five years ago, gave me a
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    precisely similar Answer, except that he said on that occasion that the council had all the powers necessary to cope with this nuisance? Further, is he aware that over those five years householders in the area—I can send him evidence of this—have had to face a situation in which nothing will grow in their gardens, privet hedges have died, washing put out has turned green as a result of these fumes and there is corrosion of all metal properties? Will the Minister take some urgent action in view of the failure of the Government over the last five years to do anything about this nuisance?
    Mr. Brooke: There has been no failure of the Government. Until 1st July last year my Alkali Inspectorate had no powers to deal with this matter but, since then, we have had powers over certain of the processes and we have been working in close co-operation with local authorities. I can assure the right hon. Member that I take this matter very seriously. These copper processes are difficult to control and technical problems are involved which cannot be solved easily.

    Open Coal Fires
    Mr. Wadeasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government and Minister for Welsh Affairs what advice he has received from the Clean Air Council, in connection with abating the pollution of the air, as to the effects of advertising open coal fires; whether he is satisfied with the present position; and if he will make a statement.
    Mr. Bevins: The Clean Air Council will meet in a few days time and my right hon. Friend hopes to discuss the matter then.
    Mr. Wade: Is the Minister aware that the Coal Utilisation Council, in its advertising campaign, is urging people to burn coal in open fires? Is there any co-ordination of policy between his Ministry and the Ministry of Power and between the Coal Utilisation Council and the Clean Air Council? Will he suggest to the Minister of Power that it would be better to spend money advertising smokeless fuel and at the same time to make sure that it is available for those who want it?
    Mr. Bevins: There is, of course, close co-operation between my right hon.

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    Friend and the Minister of Power. As I said, this matter is to be discussed with the Clean Air Council very shortly. In general, the Coal Utilisation Council is helpful to the cause of clean air, although I agree with the hon. Member that it is undesirable that sales of ordinary coal should be pushed in the "black areas" and particularly in smokeless zones, but this is a many-sided business.

    Public Inquiries (Reports)
    Mr. Houghtonasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government and Minister for Welsh Affairs why the new procedure for public inquiries announced on 28th February, 1958, relating to reports of inspectors on public inquiries covering disputed planning permission applies only to inquiries held after 27th February, 1958; and whether he will make available to objectors and others concerned reports of inspectors on public inquiries held prior to that date, upon which his decisions have been given since that date.
    Mr. Bevins: The decision to publish reports, which was announced on 27th February, 1958, applied to any inquiries held from that date on. Previously, the reports made to my right hon. Friend by his inspectors were written as confidential documents not intended for publication. The answer to the second part of the Question is, therefore, "No, Sir".
    Mr. Houghton: Is the hon. Gentleman suggesting that there is any difference in the nature of the inspector's report if it is made confidential or if it is made available to those concerned in a particular inquiry? The underlying situation there is surely undesirable. Is the hon. Gentleman aware of how unsatisfactory it is that, when a change in procedure has been announced, twelve months afterwards there should be decisions taken in his Ministry governed by the old and obsolete procedure?
    Mr. Bevins: I am afraid I do not agree with the hon. Member. It is quite clear that reports written before 28th February were written as confidential reports. In certain cases they contained information about the personal circumstances of appellants and so forth. I think it would be quite wrong to publish those reports.
    Mr. Houghtonasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government and
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    Minister for Welsh Affairs whether he will place in the Library a copy of the report of his Department's inspector on the public inquiry heard in December, 1957, into the appeal of the Standard Brick Company Limited for planning permission to excavate sand at Godstone, Surrey, and upon which he has given his decision only recently.
    Mr. Bevins: Reports of planning inquiries held by my right hon. Friend's inspectors before 27th February, 1958, are not published in any form, and my right hon. Friend regrets that he cannot see his way to complying with this request.
    Mr. Houghton: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that I am presuming to give some support to my own Member of Parliament, the hon. Member for Reigate (Mr. Vaughan-Morgan), whose views I understand coincide with my own? Will the Parliamentary Secretary give a more conciliatory answer for his sake, if not for mine?
    Mr. Bevins: I have already said that we are not prepared to publish the report, but, if it would help the hon. Gentleman, I am willing to let him have a copy of my right hon. Friend's decision letter, or, if need be, to place a copy in the Library.

    Sewage (Treatment and Disposal)
    Mr. Beswickasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government and Minister for Welsh Affairs what experiments are taking place in this country in the treatment and disposal of sewage by new methods, including the sonic vibration method now installed at works near Cologne.
    Mr. Bevins: Experiments are constantly in progress at the Water Pollution Research Laboratory and at sewage disposal works. One authority has had tests carried out in connection with the sonic vibration method. The results are not yet available.
    Mr. Beswick: Will not the Parliamentary Secretary agree that we are faced with a very real and growing problem in the disposal of sewage? Does he agree that we should do everything possible to devise some means of dealing with sewage, instead of simply putting it into the rivers? Can he say whether his

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    Department accepts any national responsibility for trying out these methods, apart from the laboratory work, or are we leaving it to the different sewerage boards?
    Mr. Bevins: This is primarily a matter for the local sewerage boards. My right hon. Friend accepts an overall national responsibility. That is why I say that work is constantly being carried out at the Water Pollution Research Laboratory. The hon. Gentleman might also like to know that the method referred to in his Question has been the subject of tests carried out for Bracknell Development Corporation and that the Derby County Borough has recently applied for approval to instal this sort of installation. We are considering the application favourably.
    Mr. Beswick: Is there any possibility of applying this or other methods on a wide scale? Can we get beyond the laboratory scale?
    Mr. Bevins: So far, this experiment is being carried out for a local authority in the Ruhr in Germany, which has a population of about 20,000. The trouble at the moment is that it is not yet established, either in Germany or this country, that it would be effective in a large city.
    Mr. Beswickasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government and Minister for Welsh Affairs if he is aware that the sludge disposal at the Maple Cross works is now out of control and that the matter is one of urgency; and what action he proposes to take in these circumstances to expedite the construction of works already planned and the further expansion which is now needed.
    Mr. Bevins: I think it is going too far to say that the matter is out of control, though I agree that serious difficulty is being experienced. A public inquiry into the Colne Valley Sewerage Board's proposals has been provisionally fixed for 7th April.
    Mr. Beswick: Is the Parliamentary Secretary aware that the words I use in the Question are taken from a report by the Clerk of the Collie Valley Sewerage Board, in which he says that sludge disposal is out of control? Moreover, he threatens that, unless some help is given, he will simply open the sluice gates and let the whole of the sludge
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    go untreated down the river. In those circumstances, is it not a most serious situation which faces us? Can the Parliamentary Secretary tell the House when we are likely to have extensions to the work, other than those that are proposed simply to cope with the increased sewage that has to be dealt with?
    Mr. Bevins: I agree entirely that the existing plant has failed badly. This is a very serious local problem. The public inquiry has been brought forward to an early date in April. I assure the hon. Gentleman that, once that Report is in, it will be considered as a matter of extreme urgency.
    Mr. Ronald Bell: Does my hon. Friend know that, as an alternative to letting the sludge run down the river, the sewerage board is proposing to dump it on my constituency? Will he ensure that the board installs some proper machinery at its works in order to avoid recourse to either of these highly objectionable expedients?
    Mr. Bevins: We will consider what my hon. Friend has said.

    Smoke Control Areas
    Mrs. Butlerasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government and Minister for Welsh Affairs whether, in the interests of clean air, he will ask local authorities which have established smokeless zones to report to him the principal difficulties they experience, including any local shortage of the smokeless fuels which householders wish to burn, in order that the difficulties may be considered and removed and the establishment of smokeless zones greatly extended.
    Mr. Bevins: I am sending the hon. Member a copy of a circular issued on 26th January which invites local authorities in the "black areas" in England and Wales to consider a five-year programme for smoke control areas in their districts and to let my right hon. Friend know their conclusions. I expect that local authorities which already have smoke control areas will tell him of any difficulties they foresee as a result of their experience so far.
    On the availability of smokeless fuel supplies locally, my right hon. Friend is guided by the views of regional advisory

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    committees under the chairmanship of the regional directors of the Ministry of Power. An officer of the Department who recently visited a number of smoke control areas reported that the changeover to smokeless fuels has so far proceeded reasonably smoothly, but my right hon. Friend will continue to watch the position closely.
    Mrs. Butler: Can the Parliamentary Secretary say whether the circular that he has issued to local authorities on this point makes provision for the information, when it has been received by the Minister, to be co-ordinated and disseminated to local authorities which have not yet introduced smokeless zones? Some action of this kind will be necessary to spur them on, because I believe that there were only twenty-eight smoke control orders in operation at the end of last year.
    Mr. Bevins: When the replies to the circular are received, they will be collated and my right hon. Friend, in conjunction with the Clean Air Council, will decide what the next policy steps ought to be.

    Shop Premises (Car Sales)
    Mrs. Butlerasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government and Minister for Welsh Affairs what consideration he has given to control of the location of premises used for car sales by removing such premises from the Town and Country Planning (Use Classes) Order; and if he will make a statement.
    The Minister of Housing and Local Government and Minister for Welsh Affairs (Mr. Henry Brooke): The effect of this Order is that if shop premises previously used for some other trade are used for the sale of motor cars, this change of use does not require planning permission. On the evidence before me, I do not consider that I should be justified in amending the Order so as to make planning permission necessary in such cases.
    Mrs. Butler: Since the sale of cars invariably involves as much disturbance and traffic nuisance as, say, a petrol filling station or a garage, is not it desirable that car sales showrooms should be taken out of the Town and Country Planning (Use Classes) Order so that planning permission is necessary before they come into operation?
    Mr. Brooke: We have had very few complaints in this matter. I am always ready to watch it. An access to the highway to enable cars to get on or off shop premises would require authorisation. I can say to the hon. Lady in all sincerity that at present I am not convinced that we need to make a change.

    Home Safety (Scottish Booklet)
    Mrs. Mannasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government and Minister for Welsh Affairs if he has considered the publication issued by the Department of Health for Scotland entitled "Design for Safety in the Home," a copy of which has bean sent to him; and if he will issue a similar one for use in England and Wales.
    Mr. H. Brooke: I have not in mind to issue a separate booklet to housing authorities in England and Wales, because safety in the home will be dealt with as part of a general review of housing standards about to be made by a subcommittee of the Central Housing Advisory Cotnrnittee. Meantime, however, I shall be glad, with the concurrence of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Scotland, to send copies of the Scottish booklet to English and Welsh authorities for information.

    Trowbridge Barracks Site (Development)
    Sir R. Grimstonasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government and Minister for Welsh Affairs when the Trowbridge Urban District Council can expect a decision on its appeal relating to the development of the Trowbridge Barracks site, having regard to the fact that nearly four months have elapsed since a public enquiry was held.
    Mr. Bevins: This is an exceptionally difficult case, and my right hon. Friend is still not quite ready to take a decision. He expects to do so very soon, and I will inform my hon. Friend.
    Sir R. Grimston: Would my hon. Friend say how soon?
    Mr. Bevins: In a week or two.

    New School, Otley
    Sir M. Stoddart-Scottasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government and Minister for Welsh Affairs why he did not revoke the consent given by the planning authority to the erection of

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    the unsightly school building in brick, plaster and glass in proximity to the ancient Otley Bridge, where all the surrounding buildings are in stone; whether he satisfied himself that the local authority had been consulted and agreed to this bad building; and if he will take steps to prevent the erection of structures in such bad taste.
    Mr. Bevins: My right hon. Friend was not consulted on the design of this school, and he thinks that such matters should be left to local planning authorities. I am told that Otley Urban District Council was consulted, and offered no comments before the plans for the school were approved by the West Riding County Council as both local planning authority and education authority.

    Vale of Health, Hampstead (Development)
    Mr. Anthony Greenwoodasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government and Minister for Welsh Affairs when he expects to announce his decision on the application of Mr. Erno Goldfinger for planning permission to develop a site in the Vale of Health, Hampstead, in view of the fact that a public inquiry was held in November, 1958.
    Mr. H. Brooke: I have given permission for this development. I am sending the hon. Member a copy of the letter notifying the applicant of my decision.

    Petrochemicals, Limited, Partington (New Chimney)
    Mr. Storeyasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government and Minister for Welsh Affairs what decision he has taken upon the inspector's report upon the public inquiry into the application of Petrochemicals, Limited, for planning permission to erect a 300-feet chimney at Partington.
    Mr. Bevins: The application raises difficult issues, which my right hon. Friend is still considering. He will reach his decision as soon as he can, and I will let my hon. Friend know when he does so.
    Mr. Storey: Is my hon. Friend aware that the overwhelming medical opinion in the district is against this chimney, as it will throw out large quantities of sulphur dioxide over a residential area that is already suffering from severe atmospheric
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    pollution? If he does agree to the putting up of this chimney, will he—in view of the somewhat surprising statement he made earlier this afternoon that he has ample powers to deal with sulphur dioxide—give an assurance that those powers will be used to the full?
    Mr. Bevins: The main issue here is whether this boiler plant and chimney, which is likely to discharge about 36 tons of sulphur dioxide a day, should be built in an area already badly polluted. The report now before my right hon. Friend deals with such considerations, and, of course, the alternative possibility that the sulphur should be removed by gas washing. I assure my hon. Friend that all those considerations will be taken into account.

    Noise Nuisances
    Mr. Storeyasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government and Minister for Welsh Affairs what action he proposes to take upon the representations he has received from the Urban District Councils' Association upon the need for additional powers to deal with noise nuisances.
    Mr. H. Brooke: The Association has been notified that, when opportunity permits, legislation will be introduced which will propose, among other things, that excessive, unreasonable or unnecessary noise should be made a statutory nuisance for the purposes of the Public Health Act, 1936. A provision on these lines is already included in many local Acts.

    Rivelin Valley, Sheffield (Planning Appeal)
    Mr. Darlingasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government and Minister for Welsh Affairs the cost to his Department of the inquiry into the appeal against the Sheffield Corporation's decision not to allow building developments in parts of the Rivelin Valley in Sheffield
    Mr. Bevins: About £40.
    Mr. Darling: Will the hon. Gentleman ask his right hon. Friend to look at the question of protecting the public from frivolous appeals such as this one? We must ensure that everyone has the right to make a legitimate appeal, but is he aware that, in this case, the solicitors must

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    have known that every political party, every civic organisation and all the Government Departments concerned were utterly opposed to any idea of building development in this valley, and that any appeal was bound to be frivolous?
    Mr. Bevins: That is a point of view, but applicants for planning permission do not always regard their own applications—or, indeed, their appeals—as frivolous. I think that it would be quite wrong for my right hon. Friend to use his powers in a case like this to try to fetter the effective right of appeal of the citizen.

  HOUSING

    Rent Act (Decontrolled Houses)
    Mr. Frank Allaunasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government and Minister for Welsh Affairs if he will institute an inquiry in Salford, in some other industrial city, or nationally, into the number of houses which have become decontrolled through a change of tenancy since the Rent Act became law and into the rent increases which have followed decontrol.
    Mr. H. Brooke: I am not sure what purpose the hon. Member thinks that such an inquiry would serve.
    Mr. Allaun: Would not the purpose be to reveal a very large number of such houses which are becoming decontrolled in this way despite the protection which was supposed to be given in the Rent Act to tenants in houses of under £30 a year rateable value? Does not this mean that new tenants, because of the terrible housing shortage, are being grossly overcharged when they go into their new homes?
    Mr. Brooke: No, Sir, I do not think there would be any evidence of that. There would be evidence of the fact that not nearly so many of these decontrolled houses have been relet as the Government hoped. That is because the effect of the Opposition's pledge to repeal the Rent Act has operated severely against tenants and would-be tenants.
    Mr. Mitchison: Does not the Minister think that decontrol and its effects are matters of importance and of concern
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    to him in relation to the housing situation generally? Why does he not answer the Question he has been asked?
    Mr. Brooke: I was anxious to know what was in the mind of the hon. Member, because I thought the effect of an inquiry such as he contemplated would certainly not satisfy him.

    Mortgage Loans (Women Applicants)
    Miss Burtonasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government and Minister for Welsh Affairs whether he is aware that some corporations, empowered to advance money on mortgages under the Small Dwellings Acquisition Acts, 1899 to 1923, to assist the purchase of existing houses or the construction of new houses, demand that women applicants supply a guarantor; and if he will introduce amending legislation to prohibit such restriction.
    Mr. H. Brooke: I have no evidence that local authorities in granting mortgages require women borrowers to supply a guarantor. I propose, however, to send a circular to local authorities making it a condition of schemes under the Housing Act that loans be given without distinction of sex. I cannot do this in respect of loans made under the Small Dwellings Acquisition Acts, as the conditions governing loans under these Acts are embodied in law; but most loans for house purchase are now made under the Housing Acts, and use of the Small Dwellings Acquisition Acts is steadily declining.
    Miss Burton: While I was glad to hear the last part of that Answer, may I ask if the Minister is aware that I have with me the printed form for the scheme and general conditions of the County Borough of Hastings under these Acts, and that paragraph 9 says:
    "The council will require to be satisfied that the applicant for the loan is capable of meeting his repayments, and where the applicant is a female, and in certain other cases, a guarantor of the repayments will be required."
    Would not the Minister agree that such language is both outrageous and indefensible today? Could he find whether the County Borough of Hastings, following our debates in this House, is still using such out-of-date words?
    Mr. Brooke: I recognise that it is not only the building societies which the hon. Lady is up against, but certain local authorities. I have no evidence from Hastings and there is no reason why I should have because it is not obligatory on the council to tell me exactly what it is doing, I repeat my assurance that I shall tell all local authorities that in future it will be an important condition of my approval of schemes under the Housing Acts that there must be no discrimination such as that to which the hon. Lady objects.
    Mr. Mitchison: If the right hon. Gentleman has not the necessary power under the Small Dwellings Acquisition Acts, could not he put down an Amendment today to be taken on the Report stage tomorrow of the House Purchase and Housing Bill?
    Mr. Brooke: No, I think it would be outside the scope of that Bill and, in any case, as the number of loans under these Acts is steadily declining in relation to the Housing Acts, I do not think that is really necessary.
    Miss Burtonasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government and Minister for Welsh Affairs if he has considered the evidence supplied to him by the hon. Member for Coventry, South, on 17th December last relating to the demand for male guarantors in the case of women applicants for mortgage loans t and if he will make a statement.
    Mr. H. Brooke: I would refer the hon. Member to the Answer I gave to my hon. Friend the Member for Tynemouth (Dame Irene Ward) on 22nd January, and to the debate on the Committee stage of the House Purchase and Housing Bill on 4th February.
    Miss Burton: The Minister will not mind if I prefer the Answers given to me on this matter. Is he aware that since those Answers and the statement by the Building Societies Association that no such discrimination is made, many people, including several of his own party, say that the association is not telling the truth? Will he look into the matter of further evidence?
    Mr. Brooke: I should be prepared to look into further any evidence, but what the Building Societies Association has done is to inform me that, as regards
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    eleven societies which I thought the hon. Lady had in mind, it is the practice of those societies not to discriminate and not to demand that a woman shall have a guarantor. It is against the policy of the association as such to do that.

    Building Land, Sunderland
    Mr. Willeyasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government and Minister for Welsh Affairs whether, in view of the requirements of the Sunderland County Borough Council for new housing, he will reconsider his refusal to confirm the report of his inspector recommending the compulsory purchase of 53 acres required by the council for building purposes.
    Mr. H. Brooke: I have no power to review or alter my decision on a compulsory purchase order once it has been given, as it has in this case.
    Mr. Willey: Is the Minister aware that his action is bound to disurb confidence in public inquiries and to import a suspicion of bias on his part? Is he further aware that the Sunderland County Borough Council believes that his action will seriously prejudice its present housing programme?
    Mr. Brooke: No. I do not think that it is right that a Minister should be absolutely bound to endorse the view his inspector expresses as a result of any inquiry. The Minister is responsible to Parliament, and he must reach his own judgment. In this case it was clear that, apart from this land, Sunderland had enough building land available for live years' council house building. In those circumstances, it did not seem to me that it was incumbent upon me to confirm the compulsory purchase order for further land.
    Mr. Wiley: Does the right hon. Gentleman realise that it is most unsatisfactory if he reverses a decision taken by an inspector at a public inquiry and then his decision is not challengeable in the House? It is very unsatisfactory that there is no procedure to enable a further review to take place of the Minister's reversal of an inspector's decision.
    Mr. Brooke: The inspector does not reach a decision. He makes a recommendation. I am answerable to the House and I must, therefore, be left free to reach my own decisions.

    Walsall Borough Council (New Rent Scheme)
    Mr. W. Wellsasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government and Minister for Welsh Affairs why he has refused to grant a dispensation to members of the Walsall Borough Council who are tenants of council houses to vote on the proposed new rent scheme.
    Mr. H. Brooke: Members of a local authority are debarred by law from speaking or voting on matters in which they have a pecuniary interest, unless I give a dispensation under my statutory powers. The power relevant to this case requires me to be satisfied that dispensation is in the interests of the inhabitants of the area.
    I am prepared, in the exercise of this power, to consider sympathetically any application for a dispensation allowing councillors to vote on a particular issue when their inability to do so might lead to the adoption of a policy contrary to that of the party group which had been given a majority by the local electorate.
    At the last election in Walsall, an equal number of councillors was returned in each of the two groups, and, in these circumstances, I was not satisfied that the councillors who applied for a dispensation had discharged the onus of showing that the interests of the inhabitants required the setting aside of the normal rule that members with a pecuniary interest should not vote.
    Mr. Wells: Does not the right hon. Gentleman recognise that by his decision in this case he has altered the composition of the voting power of the council as established, and is it not most undesirable that his Ministry should act as a means of assessing the value of individual votes on the council?
    Mr. Brooke: No, Sir. This jurisdiction that is given to me is a very difficult one. In this case, as the result of the last election had been to produce a dead-heat of councillors—a situation with which I am not unfamiliar—it did not seem to me that it would be right to give a dispensation. I can say to the House that in discharging my responsibilities I get criticised, now by Conservative councillors, now by Socialist councillors. That being so, I think that it is fair evidence that I am trying to act impartially.
    Sir H. d'Avigdor-Goldsmid: Is my right hon. Friend aware that, in Walsall, his decision has given very great satisfaction to fair-minded people of all political parties who value political consistency and despite the sort of chicanery that has given rise to the present position?
    Mr. Brooke: I am grateful to my hon. Friend. I just try to do my best.
    Mr. Mitchison: One cannot deny that there was an element of political consistency in the Minister's decision, but did not it go against his own Departmental circular? Is not this a case in which the inability of even a small proportion of councillors to vote might possibly lead to the adoption of a policy to which the majority of a council were opposed? Is not that the very case to which his predecessor undertook to give sympathetic consideration? Is not the result of the electoral position in Walsall that he is, in fact, by refusing this dispensation, going against the views of the majority of the council and of the electors, and ought not this Section to be amended, and the inability of councillor tenants to vote withdrawn?
    Mr. Brooke: I think that we must look, not at he number of aldermen or anything like that, but at the result of the last election in terms, not of votes, but of councillors. The underlying suggestion in the circular issued by my predecessor is that the will of the local electorate should prevail. It is in the light of that that I seek to exercise my jurisdiction, but I am having discussions with the local authority associations to see whether there is a prevailing view that I should submit to Parliament that Section 76 should be amended. So long as that Section stands as it does on the Statute Book, I submit to the House that I am acting impartially in my application of it.
    Mr. Wells: In view of the unsatisfactory nature of the reply, I beg to give notice that I shall seek to raise the matter on the Adjournment of the House.

    Newcastle (Building Programme)
    Mr. Blenkinsopasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government and Minister for Welsh Affairs whether he

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    has yet replied to the request of the Newcastle housing authority for an increased allocation of houses to be built in the city.
    Mr. H. Brooke: I told the council three weeks ago that it could expect to get approval for an increase in its 1959 house-building programme, and asked it for information about sites and projected contracts to show that it is likely to be able to fulfil an enlarged programme during the year. I am awaiting the council's reply.
    Mr. Blenkinsop: As I understand that the reply that the Minister has requested is in course of being sent to him, could he say that, provided he is satisfied with the reply, he will allow the city council to build 2,000 houses instead of the 900 he has allocated?
    Mr. Brooke: As I have asked for certain information and have not yet received it. I think that it would be unreasonable for me to reach a decision now—before the information is available.
    Mr. Blenkinsop: But all I ask is whether the right hon. Gentleman is willing, provided that he is satisfied with the information he receives, to agree to the allocation of the 2,000 houses that are urgently needed in the city?
    Mr. Brooke: I will say that, once I receive the reply, I will let the council know my decision as soon as I possibly can.

  ASCENSION ISLAND

    Water Rationing
    Mr. C. Hughesasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies if he will give details of the system of water rationing now in force on Ascension Island.
    The Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr. Julian Amery): Each member of the English or St. Helenian community gets 8 gallons a day and, in addition, each household gets another 8 gallons.
    Mr. Hughes: Is it not the case that European employees on the island get 8 gallons of water a day each, and 8 gallons for use in their houses, but that the St. Helenians get only 1½ gallons, and one-quarter of a gallon of hot water, if available? If so, why should there be
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    this differentiation between one section of the community and the other? Would the Under-Secretary look at this question again, as it is giving rise to considerable resentment?
    Mr. Amery: My information is that there is no such discrimination; that each member of the English or St. Helenian community gets 8 gallons a day, and, in addition, each household, whether English or St. Helenian, gets 8 gallons a day.
    Mr. Hughes: But is not the hon. Gentleman aware that when I visited this island last August the situation was as I have described it? Has there been a change since then?
    Mr. Amery: I have given the information, as I have it.
    Mr. Shinwell: Will the hon. Gentleman reply to the Question? Is there any inequality at all in the provision of a water supply to the people on this island, whether English or otherwise?
    Mr. Amery: I have tried twice to tell the House that, according to the information in my possession, there is no discrimination.
    Mr. Reynolds: Whilst it may be true that the ration for the British population is 8 gallons a day each, is not the hon. Gentleman aware that there has been a British base on the island for over 60 years and an American base there for only 5 years, yet the American ration is 50 gallons a day? Will he look into this situation, and see if we can at least do as well as the Americans?
    Mr. Amery: The American ration is supplied by an evaporation plant.

    St. Helenians (Curfew)
    Mr. C. Hughesasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies why a curfew is imposed on St. Helenians employed on Ascension Island.
    Mr. J. Amery: The curfew which is of long standing is enforced rarely and then only for special reasons. For example, on the last occasion—four days in January, 1958—it was the means of apprehending a night prowler who had been entering the homes of staff out on night duty. Until recently, lights were put out in the quarters of the St. Helenian staff of Cable and Wireless at 11 p.m. but. following an

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    improvement of the electricity supply, the time is now 11.30. This restriction is relaxed for all social occasions.
    Mr. Hughes: Why should there be a curfew at all for these British subjects? Why should there be these disciplinary measures on this British island? Will the hon. Gentleman look at the matter again? To differentiate between one set of British subjects and another really does give rise to the greatest resentment on the island. I should be very grateful if the hon. Gentleman would consider the question from that point of view.
    Mr. Amery: As I tried to explain at the beginnning of my reply, the curfew is very seldom used. The last occasion was just over a year ago.

  MAURITIUS

    Economic Survey
    Mr. Wallasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies when an economic survey of Mauritius will be carried out.
    Mr. J. Amery: This matter is under consideration by the Government of Mauritius, and I am not yet in a position to make a statement.
    Mr. Wall: As my hon. Friend has previously stated that emigration is no solution to the problems of Mauritius, will my hon. Friend agree that economic development becomes of increasing importance, and can he say whether the World Bank has been asked to carry out or will be asked to carry out any special survey?
    Mr. Amery: I will certainly look into the point my hon. Friend has made.
    Mr. J. Johnson: Is the Minister aware that the Luce Committee found over 20,000 unemployed in the island, which is almost ten times the number given to me in answers by Ministers during the last year or two? In view of this unemployment, does not the hon. Gentleman think that we need an economic survey and that there should be diversification of the economy in order to mop up the unemployment?
    Mr. Amery: Yes, Sir; we consider, and so do the Government of Mauritius, that an economic survey is of the greatest importance, more particularly for the longterm economic development of the island.

    Election (Broadcasts)
    Mr. Wallasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether he will ensure that the opposition parties in Mauritius have a fair proportion of broadcasting time over the local radio compared with Government Ministers prior to the election on 9th March.
    Mr. J. Amery: The Mauritius Broadcasting Service will not be made available for party broadcasts by Ministers or anyone else before the election on 9th March.
    Mr. Wall: Is it not a fact that Ministers have broadcast in support of the five-year plan? If that is so, should not the opposition parties be allowed to broadcast their views on this matter?
    Mr. Amery: I understand that Mr. Guy Sauzier, who was a nominated member of the Executive Council, made a broadcast. I am informed that this was not a party political broadcast but a Ministerial broadcast. It was also something in the nature of a farewell broadcast, because Mr. Sauzier is leaving Mauritius and retiring from political life.

  KENYA

    Africans, Nairobi (Houses)
    Mr. Wallasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether he will make a statement about the progress of urban African house building in Nairobi.
    Mr. J. Amery: With the completion by the Kenya Government of 1,400 houses this month, the first stage of the city council's plan to provide 5,000 houses will have been achieved. Finance for some 500 more houses, to house 2,500 Africans, has been advanced to the council by the Central Housing Board, and construction is likely to begin in two or three months' time.
    The Government propose to invite contractors to tender for a further 3,000 family type houses, on the understanding that in the first place the contractors will provide the capital, which will be repaid over a period of years after an initial moratorium.
    Mr. Wall: Does not that reply reflect very great credit on Mr. Amalemba who has stood up to political intimidation and has now proved his ability as Minister?
    Mr. Amery: Yes. I am very glad that Kenya has found a Minister who can devote his whole time and enthusiasm to this most important service and give real proof to the Africans of the real value which they gain by participation in the Government.

  SINGAPORE

    Trade Unions
    Mr. Awberyasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies how many trade unions were dissolved in Singapore in 1958; how many have appealed against the dissolution; what were the reasons for dissolving the Malayan Seamen's National Union and the Harbour Board Workers' Union; and how are the rates of wages and conditions of employment of these men negotiated.
    The Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr. Alan Lennox-Boyd): Two voluntarily and fifteen by withdrawal of certificates of registration. Of the latter, three have appealed. The Harbour Board Workers' Union was dissolved at its own request. The certificate of registration of the Malayan National Seamen's Union was withdrawn for continued contravention, after notice, of the provisions of the Trade Union Ordinance relating to the preparation of annual returns.
    On the last part of the Question, an agreement applying to all seamen irrespective of union membership and negotiated in 1957 between four seamen's unions—of which the Malayan National Seamen's Union was then one—and the Singapore Maritime Employers' Federation is still in force. Harbour Board workers are catered for by a joint consultative and negotiating committee on which six trade unions are represented.
    Mr. Awbery: I am much obliged to the Secretary of State for that reply, but is he aware that, when a trade union secretary becomes a little pugnacious and puts up a good fight for his members, he is immediately dubbed a Communist and that is made an excuse for dissolving his union? Will he ensure that this is not made an excuse in the future.
    Mr. Lennox-Boyd: The hon. Gentleman cannot have it both ways. He cannot both press for things to be made a matter of concern and responsibility
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    for local Ministers and then get angry at the use they make of their responsibility.

  ZANZIBAR

    Administrative Department (Africans)
    Mr. J. Johnsonasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies what progress is being made in appointing suitable Africans to the Administrative Department of Zanzibar; and if he will state the number of Africans employed in the information section of this Department.
    Mr. J. Amery: Four Africans now hold senior posts in the Provincial Administration. A total of eleven Africans are employed in the information section.
    Mr. Johnson: Does not the Minister think that, on an island of this racial composition, there are far too few Africans employed in this Department? Further, is he aware that, among the people of the island, the wireless is now named the "Voice of Aden" because of its predominantly Arab composition? Is not this an unhappy situation in view of the island's population?
    Mr. Amery: I think that the expansion of African staff in the posts to which the hon. Gentleman is referring depends upon the expansion of education facilities. We are concentrating on that at the present time.

    Secondary Education
    Mr. J. Johnsonasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies what consideration lie has given to the plans for expanding secondary education in Zanzibar, particularly for African girls; and if he will state the numbers of African boys and girls who completed their school certificate course in 1958.
    Mr. J. Amery: This was one of the matters considered by a local committee on education problems, the report of which should be available shortly and will then be considered by the British Resident. Eleven African boys and one girl completed the 1958 school certificate course.
    Mr. Johnson: Can the Minister give an assurance that he will give his special

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    attention to the matter of secondary education? Is he aware that the African Party won all the seats at the last elections in 1957, and, in view of this, there is much complaint by these members of the Legislative Council and their supporters about the lack of African secondary education?
    Mr. Amery: I have no doubt that the Committee will have taken full account of this plainly very important problem.
    Dr. Summerskill: Can the Minister say why it is not generally recognised that it is most important to educate the potential mothers of Africa?
    Mr. Amery: I think that the right hon. Lady is quite wrong in thinking that it is not so recognised.

  ADEN

    Legislative Council Elections
    Mr. Bennasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies if he will make a statement on the disturbances in Aden that preceded and followed the elections to the Legislative Council in January.
    Mr. Lennox-Boyd: There were no disturbances immediately before or after the elections on 4th January.
    Mr. Benn: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that many complaints about these disturbances have been received from people in Aden? Were none of them transmitted to him by the local authorities?
    Mr. Lennox-Boyd: No, Sir; there were none at all. There were about six cases of a minor character, the details of which I will send to the hon. Gentleman, but they certainly can in no way justify the description "disturbances".

    Industrial Situation
    Mr. Bennasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies what representations he has received from the Aden Trades Union Congress, the International Confederation of Free Trades Unions, and the British Trades Union Congress about the industrial situation in Aden; and if he will make a statement.
    Mr. Lennox-Boyd: I received in Aden a letter from the Aden Trades Union Congress dated 14th February which included
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    representations on a number of matters related to the industrial situation in Aden. These are being carefully studied. No formal representations have been received from the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions on this subject, but before I went to Aden I had a talk with a delegation from the British T.U.C. about industrial relations in the territory.
    Mr. Benn: Since the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions has expressed concern at the industrial situation in Aden, will the right hon. Gentleman agree to meet it to discuss the situation?
    Mr. Lennox-Boyd: If it makes a request to me I will certainly consider it.
    Mr. Biggs-Davison: While fully recognising the interest of the British Trades Union Congress in industrial matters in Aden, may I ask my right hon. Friend to resist any attempt by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions to interfere in the internal affairs of British territories?
    Mr. Lennox-Boyd: I think that it is to the British Trades Union Congress that the unions in Aden should most wisely look for guidance in their difficulties.
    Mr. Bennasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies what consultations have taken place in Aden between the Government and the trade unions for establishing better machinery for industrial relations.
    Mr. Lennox-Boyd: There have been no formal consultations recently, but the Aden Government have had regular informal discussions with representatives of the Aden T.U.C., the unions and employers with the object of improving the negotiating machinery. I understand that the Aden T.U.C. is now ready to consider co-operating in setting up a joint industrial council for the port.
    Mr. Benn: Is the right hon. Gentleman willing to sponsor the plea of the Aden T.U.C. that there should be consultation in all the main industries in the port before redundancies and dismissals take place?
    Mr. Lennox-Boyd: I gave the Aden T.U.C. an opportunity of meeting me when I was there last week. I am sorry to say that it did not take it.

  NYASALAND

    European Agriculture
    Mr. J. Johnsonasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether any decision has yet been reached by the Nyasaland Government regarding the future of European agriculture.
    Mr. J. Amery: No, Sir.
    Mr. Johnson: Is the hon. Gentleman fully aware of the genuine fears felt by Africans in Nyasaland about the future of agriculture. Is he aware that they fear that this will be one more portfolio which will go over to the Southern Rhodesians in the Federal Parliament? Are not these factors one of the most important causes of the present physical disturbances in the Protectorate? Will the Minister pay careful attention to this matter when he is considering the future?
    Mr. Amery: We shall certainly try to inform ourselves of the different currents of opinion in Nyasaland, but we must await the outcome of the Governor's discussion with the authorities.

    Situation
    Mr. Brockwayasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies if he will make a further statement on the situation in Nyasaland.
    Mr. Lennox-Boyd: I should be grateful if the hon. Member would await the statement which I am to make at the end of Questions.

  HONG KONG

    Educational Text Books
    Mr. Rankinasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies the value of educational text books imported last year into Hong Kong from Taiwan and China, respectively.
    Mr. J. Amery: I am asking the Governor of Hong Kong if the information is available and shall write to the hon. Member as soon as possible.
    Mr. Rankin: When the hon. Gentleman is seeking those figures, will he impress on the Governor the need to keep a fair balance in the type of educational text books now being used in the schools in Hong Kong?

  KENYA

    K.K.M. Movement (Arrests)
    Mr. F. M. Bennettasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies how many Kenyan Africans have been arrested, up to 31st December, 1958, for offences connected with the newly-formed K.K.M. movement; and, of those arrested, how many were former Mau Mau adherents.
    Mr. Lennox-Boyd: Of the 1,777 Africans arrested up to 31st December, 1958, for K.K.M. activities, 1,672 or 94 per cent. were former Mau Mau adherents.
    Mr. F. M. Bennettasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies how many of those Kenyan Africans, arrested up to 31st December, 1958, for offences connected with the newly-formed K.K.M. movement, have been convicted and detained; and how many of such convicted and detained persons, respectively, are former released Mau Mau convicts and detainees.
    Mr. Lennox-Boyd: Of the 1,777 Africans arrested up to 31st December, 1958, for K.K.M. activities, 1,315 were convicted in the courts and 326 were detained. Some 50 of the latter had previously been detained during the emergency. I am asking the Governor how many of those convicted were former Mau Mau convicts and detainees and I will circulate a further reply in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
    Mr. Bennett: Would not my right hon. Friend agree that these Questions and Answers indicate how right Her Majesty's Government and the Kenya Government are to resist political agitation for the premature release of Mau Mau detainees?
    Mr. Lennox-Boyd: Yes, Sir.

  JAMAICA

    Banana Industry (Commission of Inquiry)
    Mr. Royleasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies what support is being given by Her Majesty's Government to the commission appointed by the Jamaican Government to consider the marketing of bananas.
    Mr. Lennox-Boyd: In instituting this inquiry the Jamaican Government have not sought the advice of Her Majesty's Government, although they did inform me that the Commission was being set up. The Commission will investigate every aspect of the banana industry and not only marketing.
    Mr. Royle: is the right hon. Gentleman aware that there is great concern in Jamaica about the price of £50 15s. a ton, which is the lowest for very many years? Is the right hon. Gentleman also aware that I put this Question down to the President of the Board of Trade, but it was transferred to his Department? Should not someone be responsible for ensuring that trade relations with Jamaica are better than they are, particularly with regard to price?
    Mr. Lennox-Boyd: This Commission is purely an internal Jamaica matter. I am naturally extremely interested in the problem in Jamaica, the Windward Islands, and the Federation as a whole. Matters are not finally settled, but it is expected that a joint delegation from Jamaica, the Windward Islands and the West Indies Federal Government will come to London in the summer for talks on certain aspects of the price assistance scheme. That has nothing to do with the purely Jamaican commission of inquiry.

  MALTA

    Constitution
    Mr. Brockwayasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies if he will make a statement on developments in Malta following the suspension of the constitution providing for the election of a Parliament; and which Maltese citizens have been selected to serve on the Governor's Council.
    Mr. Lennox-Boyd: The 1947 Constitution is still in force, but a new Constitution is being prepared and will be introduced in the near future. An important and serious development was a not last Friday at the dockyard, on which I am circulating a statement in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
    As regards the second part of the Question, the membership of the Gover-
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    nor's Council will be announced when the new Constitution is ready.
    Mr. Brockway: What is the use of the Prime Minister in Moscow saying that British imperialism is obsolete when he destroys democratic institutions in Malta in this way? Is not the right hon. Gentleman yet able to say whether "stooges" have been found in Malta to sit on the fatuous Council which he is establishing?
    Mr. Lennox-Boyd: The hon. Gentleman's supplementary question, perhaps not surprisingly, is a travesty of the facts.
    Mr. Wall: Is not the future of Malta entirely dependent on its economic prosperity, and are the present activities of the late Prime Minister conducive to the future prosperity of Malta?
    Mr. Lennox-Boyd: No, they certainly are not.
    Following is the statement:
    There were disturbances in the Naval Dockyard last Friday at noon which lasted until 2.30 when the situation was brought under control. During these disturbances, some damage was done and I regret to say that the Admiral Superintendent and the Captain of the Dockyard, when they attempted to intervene, were first stoned and then assaulted. It is thought that the trouble was started by a number of apprentices and young workers, including members of the Young Labour League. They seem to have used as their pretext the issue on Friday morning of an Admiralty notice, the text of which was as follows:
    "H.M.G.'s Dockyard in Malta will be transferred to the management of Messrs. Bailey on 30th March. The Admiralty regret that they will not be able to retain your services after the 29th March and that you will be discharged on Admiralty books on that date.
    Arrangements have been made for you to enter the service of Messrs. Baileys if you wish as from 30th March. The wages and conditions of your employment will be those offered by the firm.
    The Admiralty take this opportunity of thanking you sincerely for your past services and of wishing you all good fortune in your new job."
    A number of rioters have been taken into custody and investigations are proceeding. Precautions are also being taken against the possibility of further disorder. Although riots of this character damage facilities and must inevitably endanger confidence, what has happened does not in any way affect the decision to transfer the dockyard to Messrs. Bailey, with whom it is hoped to agree final details in time for the transfer to take place on 30th March. as announced.

  CYPRUS

    Political Organisations and Trade Unions
    Mr. Brockwayasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies when the bans on the activities of political and other organisations in Cyprus will be lifted; and when trade unions will be permitted to function freely.
    Mr. Lennox-Boyd: As regards the first part of the Question, I cannot at present add to the Prime Minister's statement of 19th February, but it is our intention to bring the state of emergency to an end as soon as possible. Trade unions are, and have been throughout the emergency, allowed to function freely.
    Mr. Brockway: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that a number of political, ecclesiastical and other organisations—and, despite what he has said, trade unions as well—have had their functions restricted during the period of emergency? Will he take urgent steps to lift these restrictions?
    Mr. Lennox-Boyd: No. Action has been taken against trade union leaders in their individual capacity. The trade unions have been allowed to function normally. Under the agreed conclusions of the London conference, two bodies will he set up--a joint commission in Cyprus and a transitional committee. The removal of bans on any organisation can best be considered in these connections.

  BRITISH SOMALILAND

    Education
    Mr. Sorensenasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies how many students of British Somaliland are receiving secondary school and university education, respectively, in the United Kingdom, Somaliland, or elsewhere; and what proportion of Somalis are now filling Government administrative posts in British Somaliland.
    Mr. Lennox-Boyd: Students receiving secondary education in the United Kingdom, the Somaliland Protectorate and elsewhere number 39, 81 and 26 respectively. There are 12 students at universities in the United Kingdom and 4 else-
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    where. A further 42 students are undertaking various courses of higher education and practical training in the United Kingdom. Higher education is not available in the Protectorate. All those students are government sponsored. Eight Somalis hold Government administrative appointments out of a total of 33.
    Mr. Sorensen: Does not the right hon. Gentleman feel that the number of students receiving secondary and university education is quite inadequate in view of the very great responsibilities which Somalis will have to exercise next year when they have responsibility for their own Government?
    Mr. Lennox-Boyd: It is certainly not enough, but it is a very great improvement on what it was before.

  UGANDA

    Buganda
    Mr. Sorensenasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies what further developments have taken place in Uganda in respect of the political claims of Buganda.
    Mr. Lennox-Boyd: A resolution passed by the Buganda Lukiko on 5th December, 1958. seeking termination of the Buganda Agreements and the surrender of the powers of protection was not approved by the Governor. A memorandum addressed to Her Majesty The Queen by the Lukiko, with a covering letter by the Kabaka, has been received, and I am consulting the Governor about it before tendering advice to Her Majesty.
    Mr. Sorensen: Is anything being done to try to reconcile the rival claims of Buganda on the one hand and the rest of Uganda on the other?
    Mr. Lennox-Boyd: We always try to do that.

  NORTHERN RHODESIA

    Kariba Lake
    Mr. Rankinasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies how many applications for land on the shore of the new Kariba Lake have been received by the Kariba Lake Co-ordinating Committee; and, of these, how many are from Africans.
    Mr. J. Amery: Twenty-two, none of which is from an African, but it is expected that when the lake is full a number of African villages will move down to the shore.
    Mr. Rankin: Do not those figures enforce the view that Africans are now gravely worried by the fact that the new Kariba Lake will become a great commercialised venture for Europeans only in which they will lose existing rights which they may now have in fishing, and so on? Will the hon. Gentleman say whether the fears of the Africans will prove to be true?
    Mr. Amery: First, the interests of the Africans are predominent in our mind. Secondly, as I tried to explain in my Answer, we expect that a number of African villages will move down to the shore.
    Mr. Rankin: That is not an answer.
    Mr. Rankinasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies how much Crown Land lies along the shore of Lake Kariba.
    Mr. J. Amery: I have consulted the Governor, and when his reply is received I shall circulate the information in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
    Mr. Rankin: Why does the hon. Gentleman need to consult the Governor on a matter like this? He has only to look at the map to see that on the north shore there is no Crown land whatsoever. Therefore, the only land which will be lost is the native trust land, the reserve land, which now belongs to the Africans. Is it the case that that land will not pass into the hands of the Europeans in the development of the new Kariba Lake?
    Mr. Amery: I am afraid that the hon. Gentleman is misinformed. As I understand it, there is a strip of Crown land on the north bank of the Zambesi which is about ten miles long and two miles deep. I await details of the area upstream from the dam which will be on the shore of the lake. It is because I have not those details yet that I did not want to give the hon. Gentleman a false answer.

QUESTIONS TO MINISTERS
Mr. Royle: On a point of order. May I have your advice, Mr. Speaker, on a matter of procedure on Questions? On
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Wednesday of last week I submitted two Questions, one to the President of the Board of Trade and one to the Parliamentary and Financial Secretary to the Admiralty. Both were transferred to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. The first Question has been answered today, but the second has been put on the Order Paper for tomorrow, a day on which the Colonial Secretary does not normally answer Questions. Is it possible that arrangements might be made so that when a Question is transferred it is put down for reply on a day appropriate to the Minister?
Mr. Speaker: I have often said that the transfer of Questions has nothing to do with me and I repeat it again, but I hope that Ministers and Departments, in transferring Questions, will consider the convenience of hon. Members as much as possible.

FEDERATION OF RHODESIA AND NYASALAND (HON. MEMBER FOR WEDNESBURY)
Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas: On a point of order. I submitted to you, Mr. Speaker, a Private Notice Question—
Mr. Speaker: I have ruled that for an hon. Member whose Question has been refused to read it out to the House is an abuse of the rules of the House, because he gets his Question before the House on a point of order.
Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas: I was merely going to ask whether you would be so good, Mr. Speaker, as to state why the Question, of which I gave you Private Notice, has been rejected by you?
Mr. Speaker: I remember the hon. and learned Member's Question. He asked about the hon. Member for Wednesbury (Mr. Stonehouse) and what had happened to him. I would preface anything that I say by reminding the House that I am as much bound as is any hon. Member by the rules on Questions. When considering a Private Notice Question, I have to see whether it conforms to the general rules on Questions. One of the most important is that the Question relates to the Departmental responsibilities of Ministers.

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Yesterday, in the exchanges that took place, it was made clear that in the Government's view, and on the documents as I was able to understand them, the matter of immigration and the making of an order that the hon. Member for Wednesbury was a prohibited immigrant was entirely a Federal responsibility, on which the Federation was not obliged to consult Her Majesty's Ministers here in the United Kingdom at all. Therefore, I was bound to rule that the hon. and learned Member's Question was not in order, as being deficient in the responsibility of a Minister.
Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas: In view of your Ruling yesterday, Mr. Speaker, on the facts as they existed yesterday, I would not, of course, have sought to trouble you further today, but the position now is that a deportation order has been made and carried out, and the information on the tape is that the Northern Rhodesia Government agreed to the action taken and there is a report in a newspaper, from a correspondent in Lusaka, that the Northern Rhodesian police were also there to support Federal officers, if necessary, but were not called upon to do so. It looks, in that case, as if the Colonial Secretary is aware of it and has responsibility for it, and it was in those circumstances that I sought to put my Question.
Mr. Speaker: The hon. and learned Member has produced a lot of facts of which I do not know, but the Question which he put to me, and put in at the very last minute—in fact, it was not submitted in writing until after 12 o'clock—seemed to me to be a matter entirely of the responsibility of the Federal Ministers. The hon. and learned Member may take a different view of the law on the subject from the view I take, but I understand that there is to be a debate on this subject tomorrow, when all that can be gone into.
Mr. Gaitskell: It is surely not necessary for an hon. Member, or a right hon. Member, who submits a Private Notice Question to you, Mr. Speaker, to give you a full account of all the facts which have been published in the newspapers. It is reasonable to assume that, naturally, you would ascertain what had taken place. My hon. and learned Friend the Member far Leicester, North-East (Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas) has made it plain that, according
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to the reports received from Lusaka, not only were the Government of Northern Rhodesia aware of this but also apparently concurred in this action.
With great respect, whatever personal views there may be about my hon. Friend the Member for Wednesbury (Mr. Stone-house), it is surely the duty of the House to consider very seriously a situation in which Her Majesty's Government have some share of responsibility for deporting an hon. Member from a Colonial Territory.
Mr. Speaker: As I understood the matter, and still understand it, the hon. Member for Wednesbury has been removed from the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland by virtue of an order declaring him to be a prohibited immigrant. That order was made by the Federation authorities, for whom this Government in that sphere has no responsibility. I understand that the hon. Member was transferred from Lusaka which is in Northern Rhodesia and, by virtue of that order, the action of removing him was entirely that of the Federal Government and nobody else.
The action which the hon. and learned Member for Leicester, North-East (Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas) says was taken by the local police in assisting there was, I presume, under the orders of the Federal Government, because it is the Federal Government who made the order declaring the hon. Member for Wednesbury a prohibited immigrant.
Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas: Further to that point of order. I must have put the matter a little confusedly, Mr. Speaker. The report is that the Government of Northern Rhodesia agreed to the action taken. If they agreed to the action taken, then the Colonial Secretary here is answerable for that action.
Mr. Speaker: If the hon. and learned Member's Question to me had been whether, in view of the fact that the Northern Rhodesian Government had agreed to this, he could put a Private Notice Question, that would have been a different matter, but that was not the Question that reached me.
Mr. Gaitskell: This is a very grave matter. An hon. Member of the House has been arrested and deported from a British Colonial Territory and I would

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hope that the whole House would consider this as a serious matter.
We fully understand that, as the situation was yesterday, the order had been made by the Federal Government and, although there was some disagreement about their rights in this matter, nevertheless you, Mr. Speaker, took the view, and we have to accept it, that you could not accept a Motion for the Adjournment of the House on those grounds. But now we have two particular reports, first, that the Government of Northern Rhodesia agreed to this and, secondly, that the police of Northern Rhodesia, in Northern Rhodesia, indirectly under the control of the Colonial Secretary, took some part in the act of deporting an hon. Member of this House.
I submit to you that it was reasonable that a Question on this matter should have been accepted so that the Colonial Secretary could have given some explanation.
Mr. Speaker: If the Question had been confined to a matter which included only the responsibility of the Northern Rhodesia police, and if I had been satisfied that the Northern Rhodesia police were on this occasion acting under the orders of the Colonial Secretary, or that the Colonial Secretary was responsible for their action there, it would have been a different story, but that was not the Question as it came to me. I suggest to the right hon. Gentleman, also, that this is a matter which I understand—and as soon as I can I shall call the Lord Privy Seal to make a statement on tomorrow's business—which can be fully debated tomorrow. We must not debate it now.
Mr. J. Hynd: May I seek your guidance, Mr. Speaker, on procedure? Your Ruling was based on the responsibility of the Federal Government, but is it not the case that frequently over the years, and even up to a few days ago, Questions have been put to Her Majesty's Government about the arrest, deportation or expulsion of British subjects whether in Russia, or Egypt, or anywhere else in the world, and that it has
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been the practice of the House that Her Majesty's Government are responsible for making inquiries on these matters, even if they are entirely within the jurisdiction of the countries concerned? Are we not entitled, therefore, to ask questions on a matter more directly under the jurisdiction of Her Majesty's Government?
Mr. Speaker: The question which the hon. Member raises assumes that the hon. Member for Wednesbury is under arrest. I have made inquiries about that, and I find that he is not. He has been transferred to another part, to Dar-es-Salaam, where he is perfectly free to do what he likes—to come back to this House, if he wants to.
Mr. Benn: On a point of order. I wish to raise a complaint of breach of Privilege concerning the hon. Member for Wednesbury, and—
Mr. Speaker: If the hon. Member will await the proper time, I will call him to make his point on privilege.
Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas: Further to the original point of order. All I was seeking to get was a statement from the Colonial Secretary on the deportation. The deportation means that somebody has pushed the hon. Member for Wednesbury out of Northern Rhodesia. That has been done with the co-operation of the local Northern Rhodesian forces, and with the approval of the Northern Rhodesian Government.
For that, the Colonial Secretary is responsible, and all we are asking is that a statement about that should be made by the Colonial Secretary in this House as an urgent matter of public importance. All we are asking is for a factual statement, and the fact that there is to be a debate tomorrow, in my respectful submission, does not touch it at all. What we want to have is factual information upon which we can base our debate.
Mr. Speaker: I am afraid that that does not alter my decision. As I said before, the Question as submitted to me related entirely to the responsibility of the Federation Government, and not anybody else.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
The Secretary of State for the Home Department and Lord Privy Seal (Mr. R. A. Butler): I have a short statement to make on business.
Arrangements have been made, following discussions through the usual channels, for the Opposition Motion relating to the Prohibition of Entry into a British Protectorate to be debated tomorrow, Wednesday, at 7 p.m.
We hope to make good progress with the House Purchase and Housing Bill until that hour, and it has been agreed to complete the remaining stages of the Bill in one further day.
Mr. Gaitskell: We are glad to have made available Opposition time for this debate on the understanding announced by the right hon. Gentleman, but may I now ask him whether, in view of this debate, the Government will make a statement on the deportation of the hon. Member for Wednesbury (Mr. Stonehouse) from Northern Rhodesia?
Mr. Butler: No, Sir. The hon. and learned member for Leicester, North-East (Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas), who intervened with you earlier, Sir, on a point of order, brought up certain evidence which is in process of being examined. I think that it would be a far more sensible course for the House if we were to adhere to the debate tomorrow, when the Government will be only too pleased to answer the challenge of the Opposition and give all the latest information. I think that that would not only be the most appropriate course, but would also be the more efficient course. We shall be perfectly ready to give full information on that occasion.
Mr. Gaitskell: Is the reason why the Government are unwilling or unable to give the information today that they are not sure of the facts at the moment, but that, as soon as they have the facts available, they will make a statement to the House?
Mr. Butler: No, Sir. Perhaps I was being too modest. In my opinion, at least one of the facts given by the hon. and learned Member for Leicester, North-East is untrue, but I do not want to say that until I have verified it. Therefore, I think that it would be very much better that
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my right hon. Friend the Colonial Secretary should make an authoritative statement after checking the facts which the hon. and learned Member has brought to our attention; otherwise, we cannot make an authoritative statement which we can be sure is correct. I am quite sure that it would be wrong to make any imputations or statements which cannot be verified. As we have a debate tomorrow, it is far more sensible that the whole interchange should take place tomorrow.
Mr. Shinwell: As there appears to be some confusion—at least, I confess that I am confused myself on the legal and constitutional position—would it not be advisable for those of us who are not familiar with the subject, if the Government issued a statement, perhaps a short White Paper, before the debate tomorrow, setting forth what they regard as the legal and constitutional position so that those of us who are not fully informed on the subject, and who are certainly not experts on it, will be able to assess the position correctly?
Mr. Butler: I sympathise with the right hon. Gentleman in that the Acts, particularly the Act of 1953, followed by certain actions of the Federal Legislature, when read together, are very complicated. They have to be read with a Schedule to understand the full implications of this matter. I have done my best, with the aid of my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General, to understand the matter.
If I may be permitted to discuss the practicability of a short statement with my right hon. Friend the Colonial Secretary, may I say that he has already said to me that he will do his best to meet the wish of the right hon. Gentleman and the House? If we find it impossible, I cannot go further, but I will do my best to see that there is something available which will make the debate a little dearer.
Mr. Gaitskell: May we take it that the Government will be prepared to make a short statement at the end of Questions tomorrow, both on the legal position as they see it, and on the question of the hon. Member for Wednesbury, before the debate is opened from this side of the House?
Mr. Butler: I am not so sure whether we should adopt that procedure or

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attempt to put something on paper. I think that it is probably better to put it on paper, because the House has a natural inclination to extend its discussions following upon a Government statement, especially on such a controversial matter. If we are to have the debate at seven o'clock in the evening, I think that it would be better to reserve most of this debate until then, but if we can set out anything that will clarify the position it will be to the advantage of all concerned.
Mr. Shinwell: May I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he will seek to implement the promise which he has just made, because it appears to me that if there is no statement on paper which hon. Members can examine, and about which they can come to a conclusion, and if it is left entirely to the Attorney-General's statement, there may be more confusion? Will he see that there is something on paper?
Mr. Butler: I have said that I will do my best to meet the wishes of the right hon. Gentleman and the House. I have already had consultations with my right hon. Friend the Colonial Secretary on this subject.
Mr. P. Noel-Baker: In the statement which the Government are to prepare, Will they include information about any hon. Members of this House who have been deported, either from foreign countries or British Colonial Territories, and show what action has been taken by the Government in such cases?
Mr. Butler: No, Sir. I would confine my compliance with the request of the right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) to the point which he raised about the need for clarification of the legal position. Then, opinions, precedents and other matters can be raised in the debate.
Mr. Biggs-Davison: To clarify the whole situation, will my right hon. Friend consider with his right hon. Friends whether it might be possible to include in the information made available to the House the text of the speeches which the hon. Member for Wednesbury (Mr. Stonehouse) made overseas?
Mr. Butler: No, Sir. No doubt, reference can be made to these speeches from
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the published extracts which are available in the House to anybody who is interested, but I really must confine my understanding to the point raised by the right hon. Gentleman; otherwise, we shall have confusion.

NYASALAND (STATE OF EMERGENCY)
The Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr. Alan Lennox-Boyd): Since the statement of my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, on Friday, 27th February, the situation in Nyasaland has continued tense. The airstrip at Fort Hill was recovered with the aid of a detachment of Tanganyika police; it is now in use again for light aircraft.
The presence of the reinforcements from other parts of the Federation had the effect of preventing major disturbances in the last few days; but the situation continued to be so dangerous and there was such clear indication of the intention of the Congress to stir up further disturbances, involving widespread violence and murder of European, Asian, and moderate African leaders, that the Governor was compelled this morning to declare a state of emergency.
Leading members of the Congress, including Dr. Banda, have been detained and removed out of the Protectorate to Southern Rhodesia, where they will be held as long as the Governor of Nyasaland thinks it necessary. It would be clearly impracticable, in present circumstances, to detain them in Nyasaland.
I am now awaiting a full report from the Governor, and will give the House further information as soon as it is available.
I am sure that this action was necessary in the interests of people of all races in Nyasaland, including the great majority of peaceful and law-abiding Africans whose lives and property have been threatened by the violence instigated by the Nyasaland African Congress.
When order has been restored, Her Majesty's Government will certainly resume with the Governor consideration of what constitutional reforms may be appropriate.
Mr. Callaghan: Did the Colonial Secretary see in The Times this morning that the Governor of Nyasaland said at his Press conference yesterday afternoon—that is, barely 24 hours ago—that
"… no state of emergency was needed in Nyasaland to act against dissidents."?
Is not this the most extraordinary state of emergency that has ever been declared? Have we ever had such a categorical statement made by a Governor about the absence of a need for a state of emergency so soon before one has been declared? Is not the reality of the position that the Governor is not acting freely, that the Colonial Secretary has to support what is done, whether he agrees or not, because he is abdicating his responsibilities to the Central Government?
Is not this exactly what was asked by the Federal authorities a week ago, and refused by the Governor of Nyasaland at that time, and is not the Colonial Secretary ashamed to come here and camouflage the real position in Nyasaland, which is that a few panic-stricken people are now precipitating trouble, and that all the poison gas of propaganda against the Africans, all the smears, all the denigrations, will now be used to justify an act that has no responsibility behind it and will merely foment further trouble in this territory?
Mr. Lennox-Boyd: At his Press conference yesterday the Governor said he was not prepared to make any statement about the state of emergency—[HON. MEMBERS: "No."]—about the imposition of a state of emergency, and what his intentions were in that matter. The general action has certainly not been taken because of outside pressure. It has been taken freely by the Governor of Nyasaland with the full support of Her Majesty's Government.
Mr. Callaghan: Is the Colonial Secretary saying, then, that the report in The Times this morning from Blantyre, dated 2nd March, is inaccurate, and that the Governor did not say what he is reported in that newspaper to have said? If that is so, surely there is something radically wrong either with the reporting from there or the information that has reached the Colonial Secretary.
Mr. Lennox-Boyd: As the hon. Gentleman read that quotation, it was to the
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effect that a state of emergency might make it necessary to take one particular action that the Governor has taken in Nyasaland. As far as I can make out from the quotation which the hon. Gentleman read, the Governor has to take other actions as well as the deportadons consequent on the state of emergency. The Governor, when asked whether he intended to declare a state of emergency, refused, for natural reasons, to be drawn on this matter.
Mr. Callaghan: I will read the quotation again:
"Sir Robert Armitage, the Governor of Nyasaland, said at his Press conference this afternoon that no state of emergency was needed in Nyasaland to act against dissidents."
Is not this in line with the whole attitude of the Governor of Nyasaland throughout the past week? Have not all his expressions of opinion, as they have came here in the Press, been against the state of emergency which has now been declared, and is not the Colonial Secretary aware that we shall need far more than his assurance before we believe that the Federal authorities have not been responsible for this?
Hon. Members: Answer.
Mr. Brockway: May I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether it is not a fact that up to three days ago any disturbances in Nyasaland were of a minor character; that if they have become more serious it has been since the Federal Government have sent troops into the territory? Is it not also the fact that the Governor of Nyasaland has resisted up to the last moment the extreme courses which have been pressed upon him by the Federal Government?
Is this not a disgraceful surrender on the part of our Government to the conspiracy of the Prime Minister of the Federation—[Hon MEMBERS: "Oh."]£a conspiracy on the part of the Prime Minister of the Federation and of Southern Rhodesia to have a showdown with the African population before Labour is returned to office in this country?
Mr. Lennox-Boyd: The statements made by the hon. Gentleman are quite untrue from first to last. The Governor of Nyasaland was himself anxious, naturally, to avoid having to establish a state of emergency and he delayed quite

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a time before doing so. It was certainly not the arrival of troops from Southern Rhodesia which worsened the situation. The troops came at the request of the Governor of Nyasaland, who asked for that support to maintain law and order.
May I point out a curious fact, that there was an announcement that my noble Friend, Lord Perth, the Minister of State for the Colonies, was going out to Nyasaland merely to help to bring to a head the constitutional talks that have been going on for some time. The Chief Secretary told Dr. Banda this and pointed out the utmost need for those talks to be carried on in a state of tranquillity. Despite this appeal violence rose to a high pitch, and I cannot refrain from thinking that there may have been some friction between the two, and a desire not to allow the constitutional talks to take place in a calm atmosphere.
Mr. Gaitskell rose—
Sir J. Duncan: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. You will have heard the hon. Member for Eton and Slough (Mr. Brockway) say that there was a conspiracy on the part of the Prime Minister of a friendly State. Is it in order to make such allegations against the head of a friendly State, and if it is not in order, should not the hon. Gentleman be asked to withdraw that statement?
Mr. Speaker: I did not think that the word in itself, though not agreeable, was out of order. I put the most favourable construction I can upon the utterances of hon. Members, which is sometimes not very easy. I took it in the sense that it was some sort of compact or agreement. I did not think that it carried with it any sinister significance.
Sir J. Duncan: Further to that point of order, Sir. The hon. gentleman specifically referred to the Prime Minister, not to the Governor or to any particular party, but to the head of the Federation. If it is not in order, is it not right that the hon. Gentleman should be asked to withdraw that accusation?
Mr. Speaker: Mr. Gaitskell.
Mr. Gaitskell: May I ask the Colonial Secretary for a reply to the question put to him by my hon. Friend: why the Governor of Nyasaland changed his mind within 24 hours, between making a state-
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ment in which he said that, in his opinion, there was no need for a state of emergency—[HON. MEMBERS: "No."] Yes, the quotation was read—to deal with dissidents, and the declaration of a state of emergency? Will the Colonial Secretary say whether he agrees that the Governor made the statement, or does he say that he denies it? If he made it, why has he changed his mind. Will the Colonial Secretary say whether, during the last few days, any representations have been received from the Federal Government urging upon Her Majesty's Government that a state of emergency should be proclaimed in Nyasaland?
Mr. Lennox-Boyd: The Governor certainly did not change his mind. Up to almost the last moment he hoped, as we all did, that the state of emergency could be avoided. He came to the conclusion yesterday that it could not be avoided and it was imposed early this morning. [HON. MEMBERS: "Why?"] It was imposed solely by the act of the Governor, with the full authority of Her Majesty's Government.
Mr. Gaitskell: Will the right hon. Gentleman answer my second question? Was any representation received from the Federation urging Her Majesty's Government to impose a state of emergency in Nyasaland?
Mr. Lennox-Boyd: Approaches were made by the territorial Government to the Federal Government for military help. That was the nature of the representations made.
Mr. F. M. Bennett: Does not my right hon. Friend agree from his reading of The Times—if he has read it, as I have—that there seems to be some misunderstanding? Does he not agree that the Governor said something quite different from what has been suggested, that a state of emergency was not necessary to take a certain action of the sort he described, to deal with dissidents, that he did not say that a state of emergency was not needed and would not be needed, but that he merely said that it would not be needed in a certain context?
Mr. Lennox-Boyd: That is what I said earlier.
Mr. Gaitskell: Will the right hon. Gentleman answer my question? Were

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any representations received from the Federal Government urging Her Majesty's Government and the Governor to impose a state of emergency in Nyasaland? Is not that a straight question?
Mr. Lennox-Boyd: It is not for me, as Colonial Secretary, to give information as to what may pass between Governments for which Her Majesty's Government are not responsible. All I can say, speaking for the Governor, for whom I am responsible, is that the representations concerned the dispatch of troops. Needless to say, the declaration of a state of emergency is regarded by the Government of the Federation as a wise move, just as we regard it as a wise move.
Mr. Callaghan: Can we not take it that the Federal Government did make representations and that it was those representations which caused the Governor of Nyasaland to change his mind?
Mr. Lennox-Boyd: The hon. Member can take no such thing.
Mrs. Castle: Is not evidence now accumulating to show that the Colonial Office has brought pressure to bear on the Nyasaland Government, overruling the judgment of the Governor on the spot, to take action in obedience to pressure from the Federal Government?
Is the Colonial Secretary aware that in his report in The Times of yesterday, its correspondent, referring to the introduction of Tanganyika police into the Fort Hill area of Nyasaland, said that he understood that the Tanganyika Government had insisted that their police should go in and were backed in their demand by the Federal Government and that they were concerned at the indecision of the Nyasaland Government in curbing the rioters?
Can the Colonial Secretary say on whose instructions the Tanganyika Government insisted on sending police into Nyasaland, apparently not at the invitation of the Governor of Nyasaland? Was it on his invitation?
Mr. Lennox-Boyd: The assumptions and innuendos in the hon. Lady's question are not true. What is in a newspaper cannot be regarded invariably as gospel, as the hon. Lady has herself pointed out from time to time. The
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movement of troops to Fort Hill was at the request of the Government of Nyasaland. There was no pressure from outside.
Mr. Gower: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the Opposition would be the first to complain if an ugly situation developed in Nyasaland without proper steps being taken?
Mr. Paget: Are not Dr. Banda and his colleagues British-protected persons? Is it not a breach of our moral obligations, our treaty obligations, and our constitutional obligations to move them out of our protection into an area where we have no jurisdiction?
Mr. Lennox-Boyd: I regard the duty of the protecting Power as being far more applicable in the case of our responsibilities to the vast number of Africans who want to live in peace.
Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas: Does the Colonial Secretary consider, then, that he has no duty towards protected persons of whom he disapproves, and that he can disregard their individual rights in favour of his conception of the general interest?
Mr. Lennox-Boyd: No, Sir. I believe no such thing, but I think that the protecting Power, apart from its duty to individuals, also has a very great duty to the country which it protects. That is all I say. The reason for moving them out of Nyasaland was that it would clearly be impracticable, in present circumstances, to detain them in Nyasaland. I remind the House of a number of recent incidents when members of the Nyasaland Congress, which is Dr. Banda's party, attacked gaols in Nyasaland to try to release prisoners. I am satisfied that the action taken by the Nyasaland Government is right.
Mr. Gaitskell: The right hon. Gentleman has not explained why, if it was impracticable to keep them in Nyasaland, it was necessary to move them to Southern Rhodesia, a territory over which we have no jurisdiction. Why were they not moved to Northern Rhodesia, Tanganyika, or some other British Colony?
Mr. Lennox-Boyd: This is a matter in which local judgment must obviously play a large part. I remind the right hon. Gentleman that prisons and the running of prisons are a Federal responsibility. Whether they have been

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imprisoned in Nyasaland, Northern Rhodesia, or Southern Rhodesia it would equally have been a Federal prison.
Mr. Callaghan: In view of the most unsatisfactory explanation which we have just heard, I beg to ask leave to move, under Standing Order No. 9, the Adjournment of the House for the purpose of discussing a definite matter of urgent public importance, namely, the declaration of a state of emergency in Nyasaland.
Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member asks leave to move, under Standing Order No. 9, the Adjournment of the House for the purpose of discussing a definite matter of urgent public importance, namely, the declaration of a state of emergency in Nyasaland. Does the hon. Member have the support of the House?
The pleasure of the House having been signified, the Motion stood over, under Standing Order No. 9, until Seven o'clock this evening.

FEDERATION OF RHODESIA AND NYASALAND (HON. MEMBER FOR WEDNESBURY)
Mr. Wedgwood Benn: Mr. Speaker, I rise on a separate point, namely, to call your attention to a breach of Privilege, which, in my submission, has taken place owing to the arrest of my hon. Friend the Member for Wednesbury (Mr. Stonehouse). If I may, I will briefly refer you to the authorities on this matter in Erskine May. To some of them I have already drawn your attention.
I base my complaint on the official statement which appears in the Star of this evening's date. It is a statement from the Chief Secretary of Northern Rhodesia and refers to
"The arrest of Mr. Stonehouse"—
Mr. Speaker: Order, order. I cannot hear the hon. Member's submission.
Mr. Benn: It refers to
"The arrest of Mr. Stonehouse and his subsequent placing on an aircraft for Dar-es-Salaam".
May I refer you first to page 120 of Erskine May, in which it is stated quite specifically:
"It is a contempt to cause or effect the arrest, save on a criminal charge, of a member of the House of Commons during a session of Parliament".
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Lest there be any question that this might not be a criminal charge, I also refer you to the reference in Eskine May which says that where a Member is arrested on a criminal charge, the Speaker of the House of Commons must be so informed. Unless you have received official notification from the Federation that such a thing has occurred, I do not believe that we can accept it in those circumstances.
I also refer you to page 43 of Erskine May, which lays down that certain rights and amenities, such as freedom from arrest or of speech, belong primarily to the individual Members of the House and only secondarily and indirectly to the House itself. Therefore, the hon. Member for Wednesbury is entitled in his own person to freedom from arrest, save on a criminal charge, during a Session of the House.
Now I come to the question of jurisdiction which arose yesterday on the duty and responsibility of the Government. There is no doubt, and the Government have made it clear both yesterday and today in answer to questions in another place, that in their view the control of immigration and emigration was conferred on the Federal Government by the 1953 Act and, therefore, administratively the Government have no authority for the actions of the Federal Government.
However, the privileges of the House do not depend on the administrative writ of the Government of the day. They depend on a very different thing. They depend on the legislative authority of the House of Commons. The legislative authority of the House of Commons was quite unaffected, if anything it was reinforced, by the 1953 Act. In the Act under which the Federation was set up this House stated, by implication, and subsequently confirmed its view, that it was itself the supreme law-making and constitution-making body for the Federation of Central Africa.
If I may refer you, Mr. Speaker, to page 28 of Erskine May you will find that Sir Edward Coke is quoted as saying that the power of Parliament
"'is so transcendant and absolute, as it cannot be confined either for causes or persons within any bounds'."
Should any doubt be expressed on this, Erskine May, in subsequent pages, says:
"As regards the Colonies, the legislative competence of Parliament is absolute."

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and, further:
"The legislative authority of Parliament also extends over Protectorates and over the territories administered by His Majesty's Government of the United Kingdom under the trusteeship system of the United Nations."
Therefore, I submit that two quite separate questions arise here. One is: have the Government any administrative responsibility over the actions of the Federal Government in Central Africa? You have ruled, Mr. Speaker, that they have not, and it is not my purpose to dispute or challenge that in any way today. Secondly, as to the legislative authority of this House from which we derive our privileges, there is no doubt whatsoever that it would be in order for the Government tomorrow to present a Bill to dissolve the Central African Federation and that if that Bill were passed by the House, and received the Royal Assent, the Central African Federation would come to an end.
While the House retains its absolute supreme legislative authority, the privilege of hon. Members to go and travel about the area where this legislative authority exists must also be absolute. It is my submission that the arrest of a Member of Parliament, not on a criminal charge, not reported to the House and to you, Mr. Speaker, in a territory over which the House has absolute legislative authority, raises a question of the Privilege of Parliament so serious that it deserves reference to the Committee of Privileges.
Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member asks me whether I would say that there was a prima facie case in what he said was a breach of Privilege, I suppose by the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, or by its servants, in what has happened to the hon. Member for Wednesbury (Mr. Stonehouse). The hon. Member for Bristol, South-East (Mr. Benn) referred me to a number of instances and passages in Erskine May.
It is not my duty to declare whether or not there has been a breach of Privilege. That is a matter for the House. I am only engaged in discharging the procedural duty of saying whether there is a prima facie case so as to give the hon. Member's Motion priority over the Orders of the Day. It is to that matter that I am confining myself.
In my view, there is not such a prima facie case and I shall give my reasons in
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brief. The origin of the doctrine of freedom from arrest which attaches to all Members of Parliament during a Session of Parliament lies in the fact that this House is entitled to have a first claim upon their services and that any person who, by any action of arrest or hindrance prevents a Member from attending in his place to do his duty is guilty of contempt of the whole House.
I made inquiries to find out whether or not the hon. Member for Wednesbury was under arrest because I am concerned, naturally enough, in what happens to any hon. Member of this House—and I am told that he is not. He has been deported, if that is the proper word in consequence of non-compliance with an order declaring him to be a prohibited immigrant. I am told that he is now in Dar-es-Salaam and free to go wherever he likes. I cannot see that the Federal Government have done anything to prevent or hinder the attendance of the hon. Member for Wednesbury in his place here. On that ground, I should say that they have not acted in contempt of Parliament.
The hon. Member for Bristol, South-East put the matter a little too wide, I think, when he said that the only exclusion from prohibition from arrest was in the case of a criminal charge. If he reads further the passage of Erskine May to which he has referred me, he will find that it also says that, similarly, an order made by the Secretary of State for Home Affairs detaining a Member of Parliament in pursuance of the Defence of the Realm Regulations is not a breach of Privilege. That is really an administrative act and I see very little difference.
It is true that there is no criminal charge against the hon. Member for Wednesbury, but neither was there in the case of that hon. Member which gave rise to the Privilege Motion under Regulation 18B. So I do not think that I am at liberty to judge that here a prima facie case of breach of Privilege has been made out so as to give the hon. Member's Motion priority over the business of the day. But that does not debar him, if he holds a contrary view, from putting a Motion on the Order Paper for the judgment of the House. It is really a matter for the House, and not for me, to decide.
Mr. Benn: May I point out, Sir, that there is no state of emergency in the

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Federation of Central Africa and Rhodesia? There is a state of emergency in Southern Rhodesia and in Nyasaland, but there is no Federal state of emergency and the parallel which you, Mr. Speaker, draw concerning the detention of Captain Ramsey under Regulation 18B does not, I submit, apply.
If, in your view, only arrests which affect the attendance of a Member in the House are to be held to be breaches of Privilege then it would be in order for people to wait outside the House and detain Members at night and release them in time to ask Questions on the following day. I submit that since the protection of Parliament extends from 40 days preceding to 40 days following the Session your interpretation of the purposes of it does, therefore, need some further clarification.
Mr. Speaker: It possibly does. Like all statements made on the spur of the moment it may need further clarification, but I am perfectly certain that the gist of the matter is what I have said.
The hon. Member points out that there is no state of emergency in the Federation as a whole. I was not basing the argument that I put to him upon the question of a state of emergency. I was saying that this House has ruled that where a Member is detained under an administrative action which has the sanction of law in the place concerned, that, also, is not a breach of Privilege. I think that that is what has happened here. The House takes a very broad view—and I hope that it will always take a broad view—of what is likely to prejudice the attendance of a Member of this House, but I see nothing here which would enable me to give the hon. Member the priority which he seeks.
Mr. Benn: Is it your view, Mr. Speaker, that the arrest of a Member of Parliament in circumstances not reported to you personally does not raise the question of Privilege appropriate to immediate action?
Mr. Speaker: I would make no such pronouncement as that.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
Ordered,
That this day the Business of Supply may be taken after Ten o'clock and shall be exempted from the provisions of Standing Order No. 1 (Sittings of the House) for Two Hours after Ten o'clock.—[Mr. R. A. Butler.]

SUPPLY
[4TH ALLOTTED DAY]
Considered in Committee.
[Sir CHARLES MACANDREW in the Chair]

ARMY ESTIMATES, 1959–60

  VOTE A. NUMBER OF LAND FORCES
  Motion made, and Question proposed,
  That a number of Land Forces, not exceeding 351,000, all ranks, be maintained for the safety of the United Kingdom and the defence of the possessions of Her Majesty's Crown, during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1960.
  4.20 p.m.
  The Secretary of State for War (Mr. Christopher Soames): In the course of the defence debate last week the right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brawn) asked why it was that the gross expenditure in the Army Estimates for this year was £4 million down compared with those for last year. In fact, the net estimated expenditure is almost the same this year as it was last year. Out of a total of £431 million there is a difference of only £50,000. In asking his question, the right hon. Member could not have taken full account of the fact that between the beginning and the end of the two financial years concerned the size of the Regular Army would have decreased by about 80,000 men. I should have thought that it would be more understandable to put the question the other way round, and ask why the considerable reduction in manpower has not led to a more notable decline in expenditure.
  The Motion before the House concerns Vote A, which deals with the number of all ranks in the Army. The decrease in numbers has not been matched by a decrease in expenditure for three reasons. First, the proportion of higher-paid Regular soldiers compared with National Service men is steadily rising, so that the saving in pay and allowances cannot be proportionate to the run-down of the Army. Secondly, £3½ million is included in this year's Estimates for increases in allowances, pensions and other improvements recommended by the Grigg Committee. These measures, coupled with

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  last year's increases under the pay review, have considerably improved the financial position of the soldier, and it is broadly agreed that his remuneration now compares well with that of his civilian opposite number. Thirdly, our re-equipment and building programmes still demand very substantial expenditure.
  The Motion provides for a maximum force of 351,000 all ranks. As the Committee knows, this figure of Vote A strength includes, for constitutional reasons, Gurkha, Colonial and Commonwealth troops, and also women in the Army. The figure which has generally 'concerned the House in debates on the Army during the last few years is that of the actual strength of United Kingdom adult males. In this respect, we shall be running down by 38,000 during the year, from a strength of 290,000 to 252,000. This means that the run-down in the Army, from a strength on 1st April, 1957, of 365,000, to a strength of about 180,000 on 1st April, 1963, will move past the half-way stage in the coming year.
  The Committee already knows of our decision to raise the Army's recruiting target from 165,000 to about 180,000. By taking in about 15,000 more recruits the Army, and particularly its fighting units, will obtain a welcome increase in strength. I want to emphasise that this decision does not affect the structure of the Army as it was settled in 1957. The number of units and the arms to which they belong remains the same.
  The second phase in the amalgamation of units will continue as we had planned, but the addition will enable us to keep our fighting units abroad and in the Strategic Reserve at a higher strength. In respect of the infantry, upon whom falls the greatest burden in the cold war, the plan for the 165,000 Army was drawn up on the basis of the majority of infantry battalions being at a strength of 635, which was the establishment of an infantry battalion at the time the re-organisation was decided upon. Experience in working with this figure has shown us that there are certain circumstances in which a higher strength would be better. This was most noticeable in Cyprus, when things were at their worst, and when units were at full stretch day and night. It
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  was then necessary to keep battalions at a strength of over 700.
  If the Army were at a strength of 165,000, we would increase the strength of such a battalion, in such circumstances, by cross-posting from another battalion. This is manageable, but it has its drawbacks, and it would be more comfortable if all battalions, whether abroad or in the Strategic Reserve at home, were at a strength sufficient to meet the most onerous peace-time commitments. By and large, we will be able to do this within an Army of about 180,000. The same principle applies, to a greater or lesser extent, to other fighting arms. The increase of strength of units within the fighting arms will take up 11,000 of the 15,000 increase, and the remaining 4,000 will go to improve the administrative support of the Strategic Reserve.
  I do not intend to go over yet again in detail the well-worn ground of recruiting figures. I will merely say that they continue to be better than most of us had hoped, and considerably better than some had feared. I gather that no one is more glad that that is so than those who originally doubted. The progress continues. In January, the number of recruits was 2,543, as compared with 2,250 in the same month a year ago. It now seems quite clear that the improvement in recruiting which began last spring is quite different in kind and character from any of the short-term spurts which have occurred from time to time in the post-war years. If we can maintain the momentum we will surely reach our target.
  In the course of this speech I shall be dealing with many aspects of Army organisation, but we must never lose sight of the fact that manpower is the Army's first concern. We may remember the words spoken by the Duke of Wellington to Mr. Creevey, on the eve of the Battle of Waterloo.
  "There,"
  said the Duke, pointing to a private soldier,
  "it all depends upon that article whether we do the business or not. Give me enough of it and I am sure."
  Basically, it is the same today, but with the difference that we now have to lay a greater emphasis on quality. Time was when any fit young man could do a

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  soldier's job. Today, many aspects of soldiering are highly skilled. The great cry being raised by all our industries today is for more highly trained technicians, and the recruiting sergeant must join in that chorus. We have to convince the youth of this country that there is a satisfying job in the Army which is suited to their particular talents.
  Before leaving the subject of recruiting I must draw the attention of the Committee to the remarkable growth of the Territorial Army in the last twelve months. On 1st January, 1957, the volunteer strength of the Territorial Army stood at about 76,000, and at the beginning of 1958 it was 78,000—a gain of about 2,000. By the beginning of this year there had been a further gain of 23,000, bringing the total number of volunteers on 1st January to over 100,000. It is most encouraging to see this revival of the volunteer spirit in the Territorial Army. There is not much financial reward in it, though we do our best to ensure that people are not out of pocket as a result of their training, and the growth of the Territorial Army has been a heartening feature of the last two years.
  I now turn to the question of accommodation. The building programme is gathering way. We have under construction today barrack accommodation at home and abroad for about 5,000 soldiers and 1,100 married quarters. We plan to start on accommodation for a further 8,000 soldiers and 2,000 more married quarters here and overseas in the coming financial year. Against the strength of the all-Regular Army which we shall have in four years' time these figures are at last beginning to assume a reasonable proportion. Taking into account buildings erected just pre-war and the good accommodation we have in Germany, 117,000 soldiers—82,000 in barracks and 35,000 married men with their families—now enjoy accommodation of the standard at which we are aiming for the whole Army, and I am determined that the building programme shall continue to be driven forward with all the urgency which it deserves.
  As I said in my Memorandum, our building projects in Cyprus for the coming year were to concentrate on further improvements to the temporary camps scattered over the island. Happily, events
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  have made this unnecessary. As we reduce the number of units in Cyprus, so will the temporary camps be closed down, and we will now be concentrating our efforts on accommodation within the British base areas.
  I take this opportunity to pay tribute to the notable part played by the security forces in Cyprus. Since the war the British Army has been involved in many unpleasant situations, varying from minor internal security troubles in the West Indies to a considerable war in Korea, but the situation in Cyprus was, for the Army, the most delicate and most difficult of all. The security forces knew full well that the final solution had to be not a military but a political one. For four long years their efforts were devoted to maintaining law and order among a population a proportion of which were intent on disorder. It was a hard and thankless task, and I feel that the Committee will agree that the units who served in Cyprus in those four difficult years have maintained the British soldier's reputation for steadiness in the face of great provocation, and that we owe them much for the part they played.
  A feature, if not the main feature, of last week's defence debate was criticism of the state of the Army's equipment. I got the impression, listening to the speeches on that subject, that the background of the problem was not fully appreciated. The war ended with the Army holding large stocks of equipment. In the immediate post-war years it was on this that the Army lived. For that reason, between 1945 and the outbreak of the Korean War, little of our research and development effort was devoted to Army equipment. When the Korean rearmament programme was launched there was precious little modern equipment available for the Army. The right hon. Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey), urged on, I have no doubt, by his right hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell), set about his programme of building up the Army's equipment with a will. That was followed by my right hon. Friend the Member for Carshalton (Mr. Head).
  They could only buy what was available at the time and that, with a few exceptions, represented equipment of last-war types. At the end of the rearmament programme, which lasted, broadly, from 1950 to 1954, the Army

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  was left with a large quantity of equipment which was needed, but was still predominantly of wartime types. It was during this period that greater emphasis was placed on research and development into modern types of equipment, and it is only now that this programme of research and development is bearing fruit. It is against this background that I would give a detailed report of the progress of re-equipment of the Army, taking it arm by arm.
  First, vehicles, which are common to all of them. Here, the position, I am happy to report, is now quite satisfactory. The vast majority of vehicles are in the quarter-ton, the one-ton and the three-ton ranges. Of the quarter-ton and one-ton trucks, all are modern types and there is no problem with them. Most criticism is centred on the three-ton lorry, of which, until recently, there had been a large number of old types with units. This has been commented on, particularly in B.A.O.R., but there have been great improvements in the last year. Whereas twelve months ago in Germany only 18 per cent. of the three-tonners were modern, today the figure is 84 per cent. By the end of the coming financial year all units will be entirely equipped with modern three-ton lorries.
  In the air, the equipment of the reconnaisance flights of the Army Air Corps with the Saunders Roe Skeeter helicopter is continuing. Various types of four- and five-seat fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters have been under examination during the past year, with a view to issue in a year or two's time to the liaison flights of the Army Air Corps.
  I turn now to weapons and, first, to the infantry. The F.N. automatic rifle has been issued in large numbers, and this year the issue to teeth-arm units of the Regular Army will be complete.
  Mr. E. Shinwell: It has taken a long time.
  Mr. Soames: At the same time, several thousand Bren guns will have been converted to take the same round as is fired from the F.N. rifle, the 300. In the next twelve months, all the infantry should also have the converted weapon. Both the Vickers medium machine gun and the converted Bren will remain with the infantry for a few years yet, but a
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  new sustained-fire machine gun is undergoing trials. We think that this might take the place of both the Vickers and the Bren in time.
  The battalion anti-tank gun, the Mobat, which is a much lighter and more accurate version of the original Bat, is now being issued in quantity, and the whole of the Regular Army will be equipped with it this year. Our order for the Saracen armoured personnel-carriers has been fully met and all the infantry serving with armoured brigades now have it. This year we shall be getting the new pattern of web equipment for the infantry, which is much less cumbersome than the old, and far more comfortable, and I am told that it is impossible to polish it.
  For the Artillery, the important items are a new field gun and new anti-aircraft weapons. For the field Artillery we need a gun which can be readily airportable and can if necessary be dropped by parachute. For this purpose we are trying out the Italian 105 mm. howitzer. Where anti-aircraft guns are concerned, the L70 Bofors, with modern fire-control equipment, is a great improvement on its predecessors for dealing with low-level attack. For the higher level, we have coming into service this year the Thunderbird mobile surface-to-air guided weapon. This has a considerably higher ceiling than any gun. There is a great deal of development to be done yet, but it will be developed and improved, I have no doubt, in the years ahead. I turn to the Armoured Corps.
  Mr. George Chetwynd: Could the right hon. Gentleman say something about the Sterling submachine gun?
  Mr. Soames: I think that it is issued throughout the whole Army now. If it is not, it will be, during the course of this year.
  Armoured car regiments are being equipped with the Saladin armoured car and the Ferret scout car. Many units have had them for some time now, and deliveries will be completed to all the armoured corps during the next twelve months. The Centurion, which has proved such an outstanding tank, is being converted to carry heavier armour and a gun of greater power and accuracy.
  Mr. Shinwell: Are we still going on with the heavy tank?
  Mr. Soames: I am referring to the Centurion. As the right hon. Gentleman knows, because he had something to do with its inception, it is a medium tank. We are certainly going on with it.
  In the present stage of tank development the Centurion has the edge over every medium tank in the world. It has been widely sold to foreign countries. By putting in this gun, with greater tonnage, and by armouring it up slightly in certain places, we believe that it will continue to have that edge over any other tank which we know of coming in the future for many years yet.
  Mr. R. J. Mellish: What about the tank of which there have been trials in the past two years?
  Mr. Soames: Trials that have been going on for two years? I seem to remember telling the hon. Gentleman, in an Answer before the Christmas Recess, that we would be doing trials with the prototype of a new medium tank which will come in, years ahead, to succeed the Centurion. Preliminary trials will take place some time this year of this new tank, which, if successful, may be the successor to the Centurion.
  Mr. Shinwell: In view of the need for greater mobility, does the right hon. Gentleman think that there is any future for the tank at all?
  Mr. Soames: Wherever there is a major battle fought, as far ahead as the right hon. Gentleman or I can see, there will be the need on the battlefield for the tank. I am absolutely convinced of that.
  Now I will move on from armour. I have been paying particular attention, in conjunction with' my right hon. Friend the Minister of Supply, to the production of the Army's new range of wireless sets. Here, the best has tended to be the enemy of the good and as successive improvements have been made in radio communication in the last few years there have been many modifications in design which have delayed production. The programme of re-equipment is now well under way. Its total cost is about £20 million for the wireless sets. More than £11 million worth has already been bought and there is a further £3 million provided for in these Estimates.
  A number of these sets is already with units in Germany, and B.A.O.R. will
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  have the great majority of the sets it needs in the next twelve months. The Army, world-wide, from headquarters down to the forward troops, will be equipped with the new range of wireless sets by the end of 1961. That is also the date by which the Royal Engineers well be re-equipped with a new range of plant and machinery and most of the bridging equipment which will replace the Bailey bridging.
  In view of the concern which has been expressed, I have given the Committee a rather detailed catalogue of equipment now coming into service. Re-equipment will not cease on 31st December, 1962. It is a continuing process. There will be other weapons to come. There are weapons now in the stage of research and development which will come in in the 1960s. I believe the hard facts and dates which I have given to the Committee show that weapons and equipment which are now going into service are of a standard which will match the prowess and be the pride of those now serving and of the recruits who will be joining them.
  An aspect of equipment which was referred to by a number of hon. Members in the defence debate was standardisation within N.A.T.O. We are doing all we can from the point of view of the Army to promote this. Our policy is to go for the best weapon we can find in its particular field, wherever it is produced. For example, the F.N. rifle is from Belgium, the Corporal has come from the United States and we have our eye on developments in anti-tank weapons in Canada and Australia. The 105 mm. airportable gun which we are trying out is Italian in origin. It is possible that the eventual sustained-fire machine gun will be Belgian.
  On the other side, I am pleased to say that many of our N.A.T.O. Allies are using British equipment. For instance, the Centurion has been widely accepted as the outstanding tank of its generation and has been bought in large quantities by three N.A.T.O. countries. The Ferret scout cars are also finding a considerable market within N.A.T.O. We are providing facilities for our Allies to test our new equipment and we are always prepared, in consultation with them, to consider modifications which will make any

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  particular piece of equipment more acceptable for general N.A.T.O. use.
  We gave a demonstration of Army weapons last summer to senior military representatives of N.A.T.O. and Commonwealth countries. This demonstration showed that we had drawn not only from our past experiences, but also from a great deal of data gained from work done at Ministry of Supply research establishments and War Office technical schools. I know that our visitors were impressed with the quality of the items coming into production and that, as a direct result of the demonstration, we have had a number of inquiries about weapons and equipment from our Allies.
  One of the great advantages which the Soviet bloc has over the Western Powers is the monolithic character of its development and production. National interests and independence, which are a feature of life in the Western world, militate against such a monolithic war machine. If we are to sustain the long haul of competitive co-existence without placing too great a strain on our economies, a high degree of interdependence among Western countries in research, development and production is the only policy which makes sense for an Alliance with a number of national armies, many of them quite small. As my right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence said in the defence debate, we have not made the progress in this respect within N.A.T.O. that we would have liked, but we intend to continue to do all we can to improve it.
  This year, we arrive at the half-way mark of the vast reorganisation of the Army foreshadowed in the Defence White Paper of 1957, and in the debates held in the spring and summer of that year. The amalgamations and redundancies announced in 1957 came as a considerable shock to the Army. The Army as a whole and the individuals directly affected by the changes—that means the majority of Regular soldiers have faced them with a will and with exemplary loyalty. For some time after the announcement of the reorganisation, the Army had to take on trust the promise of better things to come, but now there is evidence in the form of improvements in conditions of service, new equipment and the building at home and abroad of new accom-
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  modation, to show that the hopes held out two years ago are being fulfilled.
  I do not mean to imply by this that all the problems of an all-Regular Army have already been solved. Although I think that the main objectives we set ourselves are within our grasp, there is plenty yet to be done. One particular problem which we still have to overcome is the recruitment of officers. We are not getting enough young men of suitable quality to offer themselves as candidates for Sandhurst. On this, I have taken note of all that the Grigg Committee has said, of what has been said by hon. Members on both sides, and of the views of many other people. This year, we are starting with a scholarship scheme whereby a boy receives a bursary for his two final years at school before entering Sandhurst. We have hitherto regarded Welbeck College as our alternative to such a scheme. We are very pleased now to have both. That should help.
  I do not think that it is widely understood how much the scope and interest of the average Army officer's career have increased in recent years. That is one of the facts that we have got to get across to headmasters and parents. Science is becoming yearly more important to the Army and we intend that not only specialist officers but also a large number of those serving on general duty should be well informed on scientific matters. With the growing complexity of modern equipments, the Royal Military College of Science, at Shrivenham, is now assuming a greatly increased importance in the education of the officer. It is our intention that the career opportunity for the technically educated officer should expand, so as to ensure that a sufficient degree of technological awareness is maintained at all levels in the Army. The qualification Passed Technical Staff College will be for officers required to fill primarily technical appointments, but our aim is to produce the "Double Blue", P.T.S.C./P.S.C., to whom every senior appointment in the Army will be open.
  But officer recruitment is a many-sided problem to which there is no single solution. No one of the alternatives put forward at different times—alter the Regular Commissions Board system, increase the intake from the ranks, get more boys from the grammar schools, provide more security for the officer—

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  will produce the answer. In 1951, a Committee, under the chairmanship of General Sir Montagu Stopford, rendered a Report which resulted in the founding of Welbeck College, which is proving such a great success in producing officers for the technical arms of the Service. There have been many changes since then and it is time this problem was again put under the microscope. So I have recently set up a Committee, under, General Sir Richard Goodbody, to report on all the ramifications of the problem of officer recruitment.
  Simultaneously, we are having a thorough review of the career which the Army offers to its Regular officers to see what we can do to make it more attractive both as regards offering a longer career to some, and enabling those who have not a long-term future in the Army to leave at an age when it is easier to start afresh in civil life. We have broken the back of the other rank recruiting problem and we are certainly not going to fail in the related question of seeing that the Army is well officered.
  Mr. R. T. Paget: Could I put one point for consideration while the right hon. Gentleman is considering these matters? The great source of officer recruitment in the old days used to be the military families who went into the Army from generation to generation. It is that source in which there has been the largest falling off. Is not the reason for that falling off the fact that the older pensioners and retired officers are labouring under a feeling of great injustice and are saying to the boys, "Do not go into the Army. You will be treated like I am"? Is not perhaps the best recruiting we could do to give justice to people who have suffered in that way?
  Mr. Shinwell: Before the right hon. Gentleman replies, may I add this? It seems to me, from my experience at the War Office and viewing the officer recruitment problem, that perhaps the most important assurance that the potential officer requires is that when he leaves the Army, or is compelled to leave the Service, he should have some assurance of profitable employment. That is the real problem as I understand it. Unless something is done about that, either so that the officer has a longer career or, if he goes out at an earlier age, he should be assured of some profitable
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  employment, the problem of officer recruitment will not be solved.
  Mr. Soames: Those two interjections show the wideness of the scope of the problem. There is a great deal in the points made by the right hon. Member for Easington and the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget). Those are the sort of problems—I assure hon. Members opposite, and there are numerous others—which will be taken into consideration by this Committee.
  On all this I and my colleagues on the Army Council are keeping open minds, except for one principle, to which we hold fast. The standard of leadership to which the British soldier has been accustomed in the past must not be lowered. A regiment is as good as the officers in it and the British soldier deserves the best. On that, we will not compromise.
  There is another issue in the forefront of our thoughts. That is mobility of the Army in all its aspects. The Committee knows of our plans for strategic air mobility between home and overseas and between theatres—the Britannia for troops and the Britannic for freight—and of our plans for tactical mobility within a theatre with the Beverley and later the Armstrong-Whitworth Argosy; but mobility does not end with the provision of aircraft. This basic concept of flying to the scene of operations with equipment that allows units great battle mobility must be a primary consideration both in our training and in the design of new equipment, whether fighting vehicles, guided and electronic devices, personal weapons, or administrative support.
  This goes right back to fundamentals; for instance, the weight of equipment which the ordinary unit has to carry around with it. Not counting vehicles, the weight of the G1098 of an infantry battalion today is of the order of 56 tons. This is too heavy, and we have this year been carrying out experiments to see in what ways it can be lightened, both by the production of new and lighter articles and also by cutting out certain items of equipment. The Parachute Regiment has already done a lot in this respect. The G1098 of a Parachute battalion used to weigh 45 tons and it has succeeded in reducing it to 32 tons. This year our experiments, which hitherto have been confined to battalions, will take place at brigade group level, and I believe that they will lead to satisfactory results.

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  The transformation which is now taking place in the Army is unparalled in time of peace. When I say that, I do not forget the great changes made at other periods, but we are at one and the same time not only changing the Army's operational and regimental structure, its weapons and its order of battle, but, simultaneously, we are putting into effect revolutionary changes in the soldier's whole circumstances and conditions of service. Moreover, this is all being done at a time when, as never before in peace, the Army has been fully extended on cold war and internal security tasks throughout the world.
  I am sure that right hon. and hon. Members of the Committee will join me in paying tribute to the way yin which these tasks have been sustained throughout this period. I have had the opportunity, in the last year or so, of seeing the Army in all major theatres, other than the Far East, and on each occasion I have gone away with the abiding impression of high efficiency and high morale, of a growing belief, which I am sure is well-founded, that at the end of this transition period we will have a well-balanced Army which is up to date in its equipment and, every bit as important, up to date in its outlook.
  5.1 p.m.
  Mr. John Strachey: Once again it is a pleasure to congratulate the Secretary of State on the most interesting survey which he has given us. As he said, a great deal is being done in the Army. There was never a time when there has been a greater transition going on. Therefore, he had a lot of interesting things to tell us. In the earlier part of my speech, I shall follow the order of subjects which he took.
  The right hon. Gentleman began with the subject of manpower, and there again we congratulate him, the Army and all those who had confidence in the rate of recruiting and in the building up of an all-professional Army. We are very interested in the change of target from 165,000 men to 180,000 men. We think it right; but I could not help noticing that the Secretary of State gave us a totally different reason for this change than the one put out in the Defence White Paper. The right hon. Gentleman said it was to bring units to a higher level of establishment. That obviously is very desirable,
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  but the Defence White Paper gives us quite a different reason. It says:
  "While the Government are satisfied that their present plan for an all-regular Army is soundly conceived, they consider it desirable to ensure that its strength shall not fall below the planned figure of 165,000. Since in any voluntary force fluctuation in the levels of recruiting are inevitable, it has been decided to accept recruits in excess of this figure, up to an overall ceiling of about 180,000."
  Mr. Soames: I am sorry to interrupt the right hon. Member so soon, but I want to make clear that I was not endeavouring to give the Committee the reason why the ceiling had been raised. What I thought the Committee would be interested in was what we would do with the 15,000 and an explanation of where we would be putting them.
  Mr. Strachey: I thought the right hon. Gentleman was saying that it would be nice to have 180,000 because then establishments could be raised to a higher level and generally strengthened. That is eminently sensible, much more sensible than the reason in the White Paper.
  I should not necessarily go so far as The Times, whose comment on that passage in the White Paper was that it was particularly silly. That is harsh, but I think it is a pity that that excuse was put in because, if we need to have a target of 180,000 in order to be sure of getting 165,000, clearly if we had a target of 165,000 we would have to be sure of getting 140,000, and everyone would agree that that would be on the small side. It would have been much more sensible to admit that 165,000 was what was thought possible and that now it was found there was a good prospect of getting 180,000. That really is all there is in it.
  There is one more thing I should like to say about recruiting, and that is to utter a word of warning. We have all studied the interesting answer which the Secretary of State gave to my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) on 24th November in which the right hon. Gentleman broke down the increase in recruiting to the different recruiting centres. It is very difficult to be dogmatic on the result of that, but on the whole, it suggests that the main and most important increase in recruiting has, at any rate, some correlation to the increase in unemployment throughout the country. If that is so, we must remember that the

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  present level of recruiting may be connected with the present level of unemployment.
  Mr. George Wigg: I should like to clear up this point. I am doubtful whether there is a direct correlation between recruiting and unemployment. I think there is a correlation between recruiting and the incidence of unemployment. If I had had the opportunity to speak, I would have made the point. It is the availability of jobs rather than the specific movement of unemployment. It is the same pattern as before the war.
  Mr. Strachey: Yes, but, for instance, in towns and districts where there is a shortage of jobs today there is, on the whole, the most marked upward movement in recruiting. There is some evidence of that, at any rate.
  We ought to be warned that, as and when a future Government bring unemployment under control again, further inducements may be necessary to maintain the level of recruiting. We ought not to take it for granted that recruiting efforts will continue to be so successful. When one has made that caveat, the fact remains that the recruiting figures are better than almost any of us imagined they would be. Both for the Regular Army and, as the Secretary of State said, for the Territorial Army they are very encouraging. I wish to join with him in congratulating the Army as a whole on the wonderful resilience, patience and good sense that they have shown in accepting the profound reorganisation which has been necessary in this transition from a National Service Army to a full professional Army.
  The House was very much concerned with equipment in the defence debate last week. The Secretary of State was very wise to devote a great deal of attention to this matter in his speech and to attempt to reassure the Committee on it, because a very great deal of concern was expressed in the defence debate on this matter, and quite as much from the other side of the House as from this side.
  It was good to hear the list of new equipment which we were assured by the Secretary of State would reach the Army in the near future. All it amounted to was a promise from the Secretary of State that all would be right from now on. If
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  we accept that promise completely at its face value, it does not mean that we can pass over the situation as it has been for the last few years and as it is, to a considerable extent, today. We think, in common with Members from all parts of the House, that, for whatever reason, the state of Army equipment has been deplorable and that the Grigg Committee, a completely non-political body whose Report is accepted by the Government, was justified in making its particularly severe strictures on this subject.
  It may be held that the House, the Grigg Committee or anybody else ought not to say too much on this subject, because it affects the morale of the Army or affects recruitment, but one must probe this matter precisely in order to remedy it. I have not the slightest doubt that it will be remedied. If it is not remedied by the present Secretary of State, I can assure the Committee that it will be remedied by the successor Government which we believe will come into office in a fairly short time. No potential recruit need be discouraged in the very least from joining the Army by the state of things which we are bound to reveal and re-emphasise, as has been done again and again in these debates.
  The explanation which the Secretary of State gave us was that the great Korean spurt in production was necessarily all of equipment which is now out of date. No one can deny that. When we made the spurt in arms production at the time of the Korean war, we could obviously produce only the items of equipment then in existence. That was eight years ago. Therefore, it was equipment of that vintage. I re-emphasise that that was eight years ago.
  Mr. Shinwell: The right hon. Gentleman must not be too modest about it. In paint of fact, it is eight years since we negotiated at Washington on the British rifle. If when the Tory Government came to power in 1951 they had rejected the advice of the right hon. Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill), we should have proceeded with the manufacture of the British rifle, which was regarded by the War Office technical experts as the best in the world, and we should have been able to supply every arm of the Service with the best rifle in the world, instead of which we went on to the Belgian rifle.
  Mr. Strachey: I agree entirely with my right hon. Friend. The rifle is a good example of a piece of equipment which was not of last war vintage, but a new post-war weapon which we proposed to go into production with at once. That also applies to the Centurion.
  Mr. Soames: Would the right hon. Gentleman forgive me for a second or two? Am I following his thought aright if I understand that, looking back on it, he would have advocated us adopting a rifle of a different bore than that which other countries in N.A.T.O. were adopting?
  Mr. Strachey: No. It is a very much more complex business than that.
  Mr. Wigg: May I help my right hon. Friend? The Secretary of State should not come across with that one. The E.M.2 rifle had a bore of ·282 inch, but it could easily have gone into production to take the ·300 inch round.
  Mr. Strachey: I think that is the case. I continue to deplore the change-over from the Enfield-produced rifle to the Belgian rifle. The Belgian rifle is an incomparably better weapon than the one it has succeeded, but we have re-equipped the British Army with the second-best rifle in the world and not with the best. That is a great pity. The Secretary of State states simply that the re-equipment with the Belgian rifle eight years ago was re-equipment with the best weapon of its kind. Of course it was. That does not excuse the failure year after year to move forward. The fact is that it is still in the future—we are told now in the immediate future—when this new weapon will come into operation.
  I must call the attention of the Minister to statements in the Grigg Report, which, after all, are much more ex parte than anything I can produce. Paragraph 64 of the Grigg Report says:
  "The Navy and the Royal Air Force, are on the whole, reasonably well equipped; but this is by no means so of every Army unit."
  The Committee goes on to describe the situation in one unit after another.
  This is not something which the Opposition is inventing. It is something which is common ground for students of the matter. Paragraph 138 of the Grigg Report explains why that is so. It must be so if one looks at the financial con-
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  siderations which have gone to making the Army Estimates over the past five years. They state:
  "The amount allocated by the Army to production has declined by 65 per cent. over the past five years."
  The consequence of that is that the Army is now receiving only 15 per cent. of the total given to production for the three Services, as compared with 30 per cent. five years ago. There can be no doubt that the Army has fared very badly in comparison with the other two Services. It is not a question of the total. It is the proportion that the Army has received.
  The real point to which I should like to draw the attention of the Committee is this. As I read the present Estimates—and the Secretary of State will correct me if I am wrong—that process is still continuing. The expenditure of the Army on the production of new weapons and warlike stores generally is still dropping. To take another set of figures which we have calculated, for production and research as a whole in 1953 the Army was receiving just about one-third as its share. In 1959 it will be receiving rather less than one-tenth of the expenditure on production and research over the whole field. That is a very severe drop.
  Mr. Soames: On production or services?
  Mr. Strachey: That is the two taken together. That is a drop of such a magnitude that it needs some explanation. The Secretary of State explained it partly by saying that at the same time the number of men in the Army has gone down sharply and, therefore, the provision of weapons and the like per man has gone down to the same degree. That is true. It is an offset on one side. The Secretary of State forgets that at the same time the value of money has gone down. Those two factors are bound to offset each other. It remains true that the proportion of effort on military production which has gone to the Army has been, right up to now—and, as I shall show in a moment, will be over the year for which we are estimating—lower and lower.
  Vote 7 is the critical Vote in the Army Estimates. The essential subheads are E. Mechanical Transport and Aircraft. and F, Technical Stores. Once again, the amount is still dropping. It is true that

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  mechanical transport and aircraft are up by £111,000; but technical stores, which is the Vote under which weapons come, are down by £2¼ million. Therefore, the process of decreasing the money spent for arming the Army continues.
  When I look at the breakdown of Subhead F, Technical Stores, I see a very strange factor which I do not understand. The Secretary of State tells us that re-equipment in signals and wireless is going very fast and very well, but we find that the amount of money provided for signals and wireless equipment drops from nearly £7½ million to just over £4 million. Once again, the actual amount being provided seems still to be going down rapidly—
  Brigadier O. L. Prior-Palmer: Does not the right hon. Gentleman consider it is at least possible that the reason for this does not lie in the hands of the Secretary of State for War but in the hands of the Minister of Supply, who is not, in fact, meeting the orders he has been given? If the Ministry of Supply is not meeting those orders, then, of course, the money is not spent. That may well be the reason, although I do not know that it is.
  Mr. Strachey: Far be it from me to allocate blame between two Government Departments. The hon. and gallant Member must do that for himself. I myself put the blame on the shoulders of the Government, whichever Department it may be—and I could not say which Department it is—
  Mr. E. Fernyhough: Is my right hon. Friend's argument that the Estimates are not big enough?
  Mr. Strachey: Yes.
  Mr. Fernyhough: That they should be higher?
  Mr. Strachey: Yes.
  Mr. Fernyhough: This is a new one on me. If every one is to have his pet theory advanced the total bill must be largely increased.
  Mr. Strachey: The next page of my notes deals with that very matter, as I was quite sure that some hon. Friend would ask me that very question. We are asked: are we proposing to spend more money? In this field, we certainly
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  are. These two subheads of Vote 7 amount to £50 million. Out of that sum has to come all the equipment for the Army, and, be it remembered, that £50 million appears in Defence Estimates of £1,500 million. It is therefore a very small part of the general Defence Estimates.
  I think that the Secretary of State would agree that if those two subheads were £10 million higher the re-equipment of the Army in any given year would be transformed. And £10 million is well within the margin of error of the present Defence Estimates. It is a matter of fact that that error was more of the order of £30 million this year. Therefore, the actual amount spent on the earlier re-equipment of the Army would be well within the error that there must be in Defence Estimates of this size.
  Cheeseparing or delay, whatever the reason—I do not pretend to know—in this particular aspect of arming the Army has been really bad economy, and I must reinforce the pleas that came from all sides of the House last week that it should end.
  During the defence debate we were given a lot of reasons for this having happened. We were told, and I think the Secretary of State repeated it, that it was because of having to use up stocks. That is an understandable reason, and to some extent we accept it. What we could not accept—and I must refer to them again as I see them in HANSARD—Were the reasons given by the Minister of Supply.
  He gave two reasons, and they were extremely strange. One of his reasons for not re-equipping the Army had nothing to do with costs or technical difficulties. According to him, it could not be done because of tradition. He said:
  "There is something here which is deeply embedded in tradition. The weapons of the Army, by tradition, change but slowly."
  He gave examples of how far back some of the existing weapons of the Army date. He mentioned the rifle, dating back to the First World War—it would be almost true to say that it went back almost to the Boer War. He went on to say that this was because:
  "… the weapons of the Army, to a much greater degree than those of the Navy and Air Force are either personal weapons of the individual soldier, or are introduced on a considerable scale and are made universal for

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  the entire Army, with the result that the process of re-equipment is expensive and protracted. That is traditional …"
  He went further. He became almost philosophic, and said:
  "I am suggesting that there is latent in things a slowness of change …"
  That, indeed, is a very broad way of putting it.
  Frankly, this is nonsense. We know that the Army is crying out for new, efficient and up-to-date weapons and equipment, and it does not do for the Minister of Supply to say that if we furnished these weapons the soldiers would not use them because they are so traditionally minded. I invite some Minister lo correct that statement.
  That was not his worst reason for not re-equipping the Army. His worst reason was this. He said:
  "The question which right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite are really seeking to ask is: why has this happened now and not before? The answer is that the prompting factor is the change from National Service to a volunteer force.… Yes, the very size of a conscript force makes the question of equipment very much more expensive and holds it up. With the removal of that impediment, the opportunity of change is being seized."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 26th February, 1959; Vol. 600, c. 1317–20.]
  If those words mean anything at all, it is that we could not re-equip the National Service Army but could do so when it became a volunteer Army. That was a most unfortunate thing to say. To say to the wretched National Service man, who is forced to go into the Army, that he must be given inferior equipment because it is too expensive to equip him properly is a dreadful thing. Someone should withdraw that statement and make it clear that that is not why the re-equipment has been held up.
  Frankly, I do not believe that these are the reasons. The real reason comes out of what we discussed in the defence debate. It has been the false military doctrine of the Government as a whole; and the Minister of Defence especially, with his intense nuclear preoccupation or obsession, has really not cared about the equipment with conventional weapons of the land Army. He has not felt that it was of really high priority, or mattered very much. That is why the thing has slipped and has gone on so slowly.
  It does not, of course, mean that the Army will not eventually be re-equipped,
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  but it matters very much this year, and it is a tragedy that it has happened. It arises from this doctrine that has failed to identify what the real rôle of the land Army in the present-day world must be. I do not think that that is easy—it is very difficult—but it is indispensable if we are to agree about the re-equipment of the Army, and re-equip it in the right way. We cannot do that until we know what its jobs are.
  The Army's jobs would seem to be three. I will not repeat what I said last week, but the first is the capability of fighting conventional war in Europe, because unless it has that capability we are back to the Minister of Defence's terrible dilemma of either giving in to any Russian aggression or of blowing up the world as one's only reaction. If the Minister of Defence will expound how he is to avoid that dilemma unless he has an Army capable, as part of the N.A.T.O. force, of fighting a conventional war, I should be very grateful. I myself see no way of otherwise avoiding it.
  Next, the Army must have the capacity to fight with tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons because, obviously, the Russians may have them and might use them. We discussed that last week. Further, there is what might be called the overseas function, which is the distinct one of being able to mount an expeditionary force to some part of the world in some emergency, the nature of which we may not be able to foresee but with which we must have the capacity or the capability to deal.
  It is that third capability that seems most difficult to provide for, because it raises the whole technical question of air transportation, air portability or equipment on the one hand, and of overseas dumps and bases on the other. There is also the possible question of naval portability of transport, to which we have often resorted before, although always on a sort of emergency basis by aircraft carrier or naval vessel. The answer may be, as I suspect, a combination of all three methods.
  I do not think that anybody has really given to the House—they may have thought about it—a rational picture of these three functions of the Army and how it should be equipped to deal with them. The idea of the Army finding its equipment overseas and of the dumps

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  placed about the world for it to go to is an attractive policy, but it means bases all over the world, and that raises very difficult and far-reaching political issues.
  In this connection, the Secretary of State referred, and I refer, advisedly to Cyprus. There, of course, we join with the right hon. Gentleman most heartily in congratulating our troops on their conduct when doing what, as he said,—and I entirely agree—was the most unwelcome and the most ungrateful of all the jobs they have had to do.
  As I understand the right hon. Gentleman, he said that while naturally the expenditure on temporary accommodation for large masses of troops of up to 25,000 or 30,000 men was being scrapped, there was more building work to be done and more expenditure to be incurred on the two bases that we retain at Dhekelia and Episkopi. I was interested in that. It may be right, but I am doubtful about these two bases. I ask hon. Members opposite to recall what has happened. These two bases are to be in an island over which we shall not have sovereignty. Therefore, they will be in exactly the same position as was the Suez base before the Suez operation.
  The Government were abundantly right but appallingly late in making the Cyprus settlement. They could have had that settlement and could have retained bases in an island over which they did not have sovereignty years ago without precipitating any of the protracted trouble, the immense burden on the Army, and the world-wide odium that the Cyprus situation created. All the Government have got is what they could have had at the very beginning—bases in foreign territories.
  For a time, those bases may or may not be useful, but I am rather sceptical—and are not hon. Members also sceptical by now?—of basing a world-wide strategy on bases that, at the very best, turn out to be wasting assets. Therefore, I do not really believe that this principle of obtaining mobility by having dumps over the world will suffice, in the long run at any rate, and I am driven back to the view that an important function of the Royal Navy in the future will be to transport and maintain troops overseas and that part of their heavy equipment which it is not really practicable,
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  and will not be for many years yet, at any rate, to move by air.
  These are the rôles of the Army. We shall certainly want a very versatile and well-trained Army, because, of course, we cannot have three separate armies to perform the three separate roles. I should be the first to agree that a National Service Army is not one which could possibly be trained in the three roles, but I should have thought that, although it is a very difficult one, it is a possible assignment for an all-professional long-service Army which could be trained in the three separate though to some extent related rôles of major conventional warfare, warfare with tactical nuclear weapons, and overseas expeditions.
  I should like to know whether the training authorities and the best training advisers consider that this is a possible task to give to an all-professional Army. If it is not, we shall have to think again very hard. I cannot see that the numbers suggested could possibly suffice unless the Army could be given that versatility and, of course, the very considerable amount of equipment necessary to perform all those three rôles.
  It seems to me that, while we on this side can certainly congratulate most heartily the Army on its performance over the past year, on the way it has tackled the tremendous job of transformation into an all-professional Army, and the way it has done the hard jobs we have given it all over the world—we congratulate the Secretary of State, too, on the efforts he has made for the Army—we cannot congratulate the Government at all on their attitude to the Army. On the contrary, we feel that, within the defence programme as a whole, the Army has been, in the Government's view, a poor relation.
  This is a very profound mistake to make in the world today. It is a profound mistake for the reason which my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) gave, and which I endeavour to repeat, in the defence debate, that, because of the circumstances of the world balance of power today, because nuclear parity is approaching, and because of the appalling character of nuclear war, the capacity of the Army to deal, without recourse to nuclear war, with some outbreak of force in the world is something on which our very lives

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  depend. Therefore, far from the Army being a poor relation among the Defence Forces, it ought today to have something like the very highest priority.
  5.39 p.m.
  Mr. John Hall: The Committee will have listened with its usual interest to the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey). I am very glad indeed to welcome him as a supporter of the Army. Indeed, I welcome support for the Army from whichever quarter it may come. I wish to take up only one point with him. I did not want to make my own speech by way of interventions, but I wanted to comment on his remarks about the relationship between unemployment and the recruitment figures. The right hon. Gentleman will remember that the Grigg Committee dealt with this matter and, in paragraph 5 (a) of Appendix B said:
  "… no correlation between unemployment and recruiting can be established from the figures, although on the face of it one would expect such a relationship to exist."
  I do not think that one should pay too much attention to the coincidence of a certain development of unemployment in some areas and the recruitment figures as they now exist.
  I last spoke in a debate on the Army Estimates in 1956. I then moved what I thought would be the last of the intervening Amendments. Right hon. and hon. Members will remember that those were Amendments which used to interrupt our debates at 7 o'clock and tend to disrupt the debate for the rest of the evening. Now, unfortunately, we are to have another interruption today. I was wrong in thinking that the Amendment I moved on that occasion would be the last intervention in the middle of a debate such as this.
  I referred then to the fact that the defence problem was completely overshadowed by nuclear weapons which had introduced completely new factors into strategical and tactical thinking, and I ventured to call for a comprehensive review of the organisation of the Army, first to decide what its task was likely to be—
  Mr. Paget: That is still wanted.
  Mr. Hall: —and, secondly, to ensure that it was adequate to carry out that task. It is often very salutary, and some-
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  times rather melancholy, to reread old speeches. Reading my own speech on that occasion, I do not think that there is anything I should like to alter in it apart, perhaps, from the grammar. I do wish, however, that I had on that occasion been much more emphatic in the case I then put to the Committee. It is only now that we are beginning to appreciate what rôle the Army will be called upon to play.
  It is generally admitted—indeed, there is no attempt to disguise the fact—that at this moment the Army is not adequately equipped to carry out that rôle. It is not really my purpose to review the mistakes, hesitations and lost opportunities of the years since the last war. I have no wish to make a party speech or party points on this matter. Everybody has to take a certain measure of responsibility for the mistakes which have been made. We must remember that the development of nuclear weapons posed for us completely new strategical and tactical problems the answers to which even now we do not really know. From time to time I have had the opportunity of listening to the discussions of senior Service chiefs from the three Services. When I have heard the very considerable differences of opinion which have been expressed among them, I have had the greatest sympathy for Ministers of both parties who have been called upon to make defence decisions on the advice they have received.
  My purpose is to try to review the rôle of the Army in the defence structure in the type of warfare which it is most likely to have to encounter. I do not wish to discuss the deterrent, because this was very adequately covered in the defence debate, except to express the view that, provided we can take it that any potential enemy is convinced that we will use the deterrent if we are faced with an attack which we cannot meet with conventional forces, we can, I think, assume that we shall not have a world shooting war except by accident. If that accident happens, then the Army of the United Kingdom together with the Reserve Army, or such of them as is left, will be fully occupied with rescue operations purely and simply. I do not think that we should he very much concerned then with how the rest of the Army in other parts of the world might be deployed or operating.

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  In this connection, if I may stray from my main theme for a moment, I want to put two questions to the Minister. In his admirable survey of the Army Estimates, he said that there had been a considerable increase in recruiting to the Territorial Army. This is very much to be welcomed. It is due partly to the understanding that the Territorial Army will play an operational rôle in providing units or divisions for the support of N.A.T.O. Forces. I should like to ask my right hon. Friend whether he thinks that he will still obtain recruits at anything like the same rate when a number of units are diverted to purely Civil Defence operations which, by their very nature, are not very glamorous and are much duller than the operational roles which one may expect in the field.
  Secondly, does my right hon. Friend see any future in the Army Emergency Reserve. The Army Emergency Reserve depends almost entirely upon the supply of National Service men. What will happen to that organisation when National Service comes to an end particularly bearing in mind that the A.E.R. was organised originally to provide Service units for the reinforcement of a Continental or overseas Army?
  I now revert to my main theme. In my view. the main task of the Army is for policing actions and for limited war. I do not think that we can in this country, with all our other commitments, have an Army which is capable of fighting, even in conjunction with its Allies, a major conventional war. I do not think that that is possible; it is certainly not possible without reintroducing National Service. With an all-Regular Army, we must, I am sure, confine ourselves to police actions and limited war. If warfare did spread to a major conflict, we should, in fact, have started a nuclear war then because, without any doubt at all, in those circumstances nuclear weapons would be used.
  For the purpose I have in mind, I think that we should have—I should like to quote here from the concluding words of the speech I made three years ago-
  "… a highly trained, highly efficient and fully mobile Army, free of National Service …"—OFFICIAL REPORT, 1st March, 1956; Vol. 549, c. 1452.]
  We are certainly within sight of the last requirement, but, by the time National
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  Service ends, are we likely to have a highly trained, highly efficient and fully mobile Army?
  I will deal with mobility first. The Secretary of State in his speech referred to air transport and other methods of deployment. We are told that we are likely to have a force of 180,000. The original conception of a force of 165,000 meant that we had battalions at what I might describe as a lower lower establishment. With 180,000, we shall probably have infantry battalions of about 750, still, in my view, too low a strength for real operational efficiency. Indeed, I would say that the curse of the Army for many years, both before the war and since, has been this conception of a lower establishment in peace time which has meant that units have had to be reinforced and brought up to strength by reserves brought in either from other units or by recalling men to the Colours whenever it was necessary for units to act in an operational rôle. That was all right, perhaps, when there may have been time to train and deploy units so that the newcomers would become accustomed to their new command, but I do not think that that is a very effective method now.
  We must face the fact that we shall have this Regular professional Army of 180,000, and that will be less than the United Kingdom enlisted Army as it was in 1937. It is, therefore, all the more essential that this Army should be completely mobile. It is essential also that there should be prior deployment of units and reserves in such of the strategic bases around the world as are still available to us.
  I do not think that it is any secret that, to put it no higher, there has been some delay in providing the Army with the air transport it requires. I wonder how much of this is due to the fact That this air transport is carried on the Air Estimates. It is very understandable that the Royal Air Force is reluctant to give too much of its resources to providing the Army with transport if, by so doing, it must deprive itself of some aircraft which it regards as more important for its own purposes. I am not at all sure that we should not change this method and bring air transport for the Army on to the Army Estimates, even if it happens to be

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  administered, serviced and crewed by the Royal Air Force.
  Whatever the reasons may be, I wish to emphasise something which I feel very deeply. We must do all in our power to ensure that the supply of aircraft now ordered is hurried up as much as it possibly cart be. Everybody will agree that, if we have a small force, it is essential that that force should be taken very quickly indeed to any spot where trouble breaks out, because by so doing it is sometimes possible to put a stop to an outbreak of trouble which. if left, might required ten to twenty times the amount of troops to deal with it at a later date.
  I now come to the other points which I made about training and the efficiency of the force. The efficiency of any force must be dependent to a large extent on its equipment, and I hope, having heard what the Secretary of State said, that by the time National Service ends the Army will be fully equipped with modern and up-to-date weapons, and especially with first-class communications. Communications in the operational Army today are appalling. No army can fight efficiently unless it has first-class communications. I look forward with the greatest interest to the development and issue of new signals equipment to the Army in the next few years.
  Given adequate equipment, the fighting efficiency of an army is dependent on three things: first, the quality of its officers, N. C. O. 's and men; secondly, the standard of training which it receives; and thirdly, the ability to generate among the soldiers themselves pride in themselves and in the army to which they belong, born of some understanding of the cause which they are called upon to defend, and of confidence in their equipment and in themselves as fighting men.
  I am not satisfied that the quality of officers and the standard of training in the Army is all that it should be. I know that it is customary for retired lieutenant-colonels approaching late middle-age to consider that the rising generation of young officers is not what it was in their day. In looking back on one's early career, in one's mind the tail and horns disappear and one finds that in memory one's head is surrounded by a halo. I have no doubt that there is a certain amount of that sort of thinking in one's reflections about the quality of officers today.
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  However, making every allowance for that tendency, I am disquieted by the evidence which I constantly receive that young officers today are much more interested in the social prestige and privilege of their position than in their job and the men they command. There are many exceptions to this and I must generalise, because it is unfair to stigmatise and condemn everybody in the same way. There is, however, a tendency among many young officers to treat their job as a sort of nine-to-five job and to believe that when they are off-duty they should have no further concern or interest in the men for whom they are responsible. That must be bad for the Army as a whole.
  It is said in the Memorandum that there is considerable difficulty in getting candidates of the right quality to submit themselves for commissions. I suggest that there are several reasons for this. Although the question of pay may be incidentally connected, I think that the pay of a young officer, certainly up to the rank of captain, is extremely good, and I doubt very much whether many young men at the age at which they are likely to become captains would do better, if as well, in civil life.
  The really able young man, however, who takes an interest in the career which he has decided to follow looks beyond that. He considers the pay rates above the rank of captain and he finds that they are by no means as good as those for comparable responsibilities in civil life. When a man goes above the rank of major, to lieutenant-colonel or brigadier, the pay and allowances which he receives do not compare favourably with the rewards of men with positions of similar responsibility in civil life. He realises, too, that his chances of promotion are limited very largely by the establishment of the Army, which may be reduced during his career. He knows, too, that if he is not fortunate enough to get promotion beyond the rank of major, he may well come out at the age of 45 or 50, which is the most difficult age at which to obtain other employment.
  Mr. Fernyhough: Would the hon. Member say what jobs in civvy street carry a rate of pay equivalent to that of a major?
  Mr. Hall: I can give the hon. Gentleman any number of positions throughout

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  industry where a man with the responsibility and background training equivalent in civil life to that of a major would certainly get as much and possibly more. Indeed, one of my own responsibilities is trying to find executives in the medium and senior range for various appointments in industry, and I find it extremely difficult to get people to accept anything like the rate of pay which a major receives. A person with commensurate ability who is trained for professional or commercial work could hope to get more than, say, a lieutenant-colonel who is approaching the end of his period of service.
  A lieutenant-colonel, unless he is fortunate, is likely to come out of the Army at the age of 55. Between 55 and 65 is the period of the major earning power of most people in civil life, during which they go on acquiring and accumulating the greater part of their income. That is denied to a lieutenant-colonel in the Army and he has to come out on moderate pension and try to find suitable further employment.
  I should like to suggest some of the remedies which might help to attract young officers. First, we must acknowledge that many officers will leave the Army at the age of 30 and onwards if they have no chance of promotion. We must provide industrial, technical and professional courses and training for them against the time when they leave the Army and we must try to make it possible for them to maintain contact with some of the industrial and professional firms and organisations which might be prepared to employ them when they leave the Forces. In the higher ranks, we must compensate the more senior officers who may have to retire between the ages of 45 and 55 either by giving them increased pay during service or by improving their pensions. I am convinced that we shall not get men into the Army if their career is likely to be interrupted at what should be the peak of their earning power.
  Even when the financial conditions and conditions of service are right, we shall still not attract the right young man unless we build up in the Army a pride in the Service and develop the sense of prestige which it had in the past and which attracted many people who remained
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  loyal to the Army even though they were, by today's standards, grossly underpaid. This is a vital problem, because with mediocre officers we shall have a mediocre Army, which even the most outstanding non-commissioned officers will not be able to put right.
  I now turn to the question of training. My impression from such investigations as I have been able to make is that training in the Army today is not sufficiently constructive and purposeful or filled with a sense of urgency. It is, perhaps, understandable that during the continuation of National Service, and with equipment dating from the last war, it is difficult to give adequate training; but, if we are to have a first-class Army, it is absolutely essential to destroy the sense of boredom which seems almost inseparable from peace-time soldiers and which is summed up by the expressive term of the soldier that he is "browned-off" or "cheesed-off". He has long periods of inactivity between short terms of intense activity. This problem springs largely from insufficient constructive activity and the lack of close personal contact between officers and men. It also springs from the lack of opportunity for training which bears some realistic relation to the task which the Army will have to perform.
  I suggest that there should be far more training in movement by air as well as by road and foot—I stress, by foot. One of the problems that we are likely to be up against is that we may be fighting a physically tough people. If the Army becomes too road-bound or too unaccustomed to be moved by transport, it will come up against great difficulties in certain parts of the world. A few toughening up courses would not only be good for the Army but would be welcomed by many of the men.
  Training is a very big subject and I do not want to go into it in detail. In fact, it would be quite impossible to do so in the course of a speech. It is, however, something which is important enough to be investigated again by the War Office, because I have a shrewd suspicion that there should be a lot of re-thinking, not only about training in general, but about our present training methods.
  On the point about the esprit de corps which should be generated in the Army,

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  I think that we must try to develop a sense of pride, confidence and understanding of the way of life which soldiers may be called upon to defend, to match the sense of personal dedication which we may find in some of the troops who may be opposed to us in a future war. This matter comes under the heading of "psychological warfare" to which my right hon. Friend the Member for Carshalton (Mr. Head) referred during the defence debate. It is essential that we must have complete belief in the cause which we defend if we are to prevail against superior forces and, which is very much more important, if we are to win the war of ideas.
  I believe that we have our priorities wrong. Behind the shield of the nuclear deterrent, to which we make a contribution, our priorities should be, first, defence and counter-attack in the cold war—by that I mean economic and ideological war —and, secondly, in a limited shooting war. I do not believe we can go further than that.
  I think that we are losing the cold war. We are being out-flanked and out-manoeuvred, particularly in what is described as the war for men's minds. It is not a question of pouring more money into underdeveloped countries, as was said in the defence debate. I do not think that money necessarily makes friends. The United States found that out to their cost. Often, in giving money away, one incurs enemies, because one places people under a sense of obligation, which they do not like. It is not a question of getting more students over here as a counter to those going to Czechoslovakia. A lot of students come over here and we educate them. but it is the Communist Party that gets hold of them—
  Mr. Paget: To what item in the Estimates is the hon. Gentleman referring?
  Mr. Hall: Intelligence. It might be out of order to discuss this matter too far and to discuss the White Paper recently issued on overseas information services, although I was grievously disappointed with the very small additional amount voted for that purpose. However. this has a relevant bearing on the subject which we are now discussing. The Army, after all, is only one of the weapons which we must use in the war which we are fighting even at this moment.
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  I am certain that to help the Army in its task we must have an intensive psychological penetration into other countries in all forms—I will not detail them all—and we must have field work by men and women who passionately believe in the cause which they are trying to explain, and the same sense of purpose and urgency which animates Communism. It must be recognised that this form of psychological warfare is our main weapon. If we lose the battle of ideas and the war of the spirit, then in the end, whatever we may do in this debate and whatever we may vote for the Army. we have no other defence.
  6.5 p.m.
  Mr. George Chetwynd: We have heard a very realistic and at times highly critical speech from the hon. Member for Wycombe (Mr. John Hall). I hope that the War Office will pay particular attention to what he said, because he has underlined many points which were made from this side in the defence debate last week.
  I want to deal with the manpower situation. The original intention at the end of National Service was to make do with an Army of 165,000 men. I say "make do", because in view of the expert contributions from a number of hon. and gallant Members in the Committee it was quite clear that the realistic figure was something nearer 220,000 to undertake all our commitments. Nevertheless, the War Office settled on 165,000 men, because it really believed that that was all it would get. But that is not all the story, because in that figure of 165,000 there would be serious gaps in technical arms and in skilled manpower. During the debate on the Grigg Report, I put forward the view that the Army should be allowed to recruit up to whatever number the War Office thought it could obtain. I am particularly pleased, therefore, that the Government have now changed their mind and are establishing a ceiling of 180,000.
  Does the Under-Secretary think that that 180.000 will give him a sufficient number of skilled people to enable him to fill the gaps which he then detailed as existing? If so, does that mean that there will be some spill-over to go into the less skilled arms and so increase their numbers? This figure of 180,000 is not based on commitments at all, but on the

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  assumption of the numbers which the Army is likely to recruit.
  On the question of the relationship between National Service men and the Regulars, the Secretary of State, in his very forthright speech at the beginning of the debate, made it clear that certain new modern arms were going to the Regular soldier. Does that mean that the Regular soldier is now being organised into separate departments and regiments? Otherwise, we shall have in one regiment a Regular armed with an F.N. rifle and a National Service counterpart doing very much the same job with a 303 rifle. Are the Government working towards an organisation which foreshadows the future rôle of the Regular and which will keep him as far as possible in units separately organised from those in which the National Service man will be organised? If this is not done, there is bound to be trouble in the relationship between the Regular and the National Service man. At present, there seems to be a fifty-fifty division between Regular and National Service men in the Army's make-up.
  When the White Paper announced that certain regiments were to be disbanded, many arms were raised in horror at the ending of tradition. It was said that this would affect recruiting. I never believed that. I believe that we overrated the strength of tradition in the Armed Forces, and I think that the new regiments will be just as effective for recruiting purposes as the old ones which they superseded.
  I understand that at the peak of the disturbances in Cyprus 40,000 troops and security people were involved. It was stated in the defence debate last week that the figure was now 25,000 and would be reduced eventually to 6,000. I take it that that reduction must take place within twelve months of the signing of the recent Agreement. The sooner we get that figure reduced the better. If it can be done in six months instead of twelve months, it will be very much better for the political atmosphere in the island as well as from the point of view of expenditure by the United Kingdom.
  When will that reduction take place and how will it be phased? Where will the troops go to from Cyprus? I understand that the bulk may be going to Germany. If that is so, will we be asking for a further contribution from the
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  German Federal Government towards their maintenance? [HON. MEMBERS: "0h."] Well, we can ask for it. Whether we shall get it is another matter. Further, what about the emergency steps which were taken as a result of questions asked by my hon. Friend the Member for Bermondsey (Mr. Mellish) about accommodation in Cyprus? I understand that efforts were made to put that matter right, but it seems now that they will be unnecessary. The Secretary of State has said that we are now to concentrate on buildings in the base areas, and I gather that there will be permanent military installations. Can we have some idea of what that involves by way of provision of married quarters, recreational facilities, and so on?
  We seem to be discussing the Army in a somewhat objective, unrealistic way. without bearing in mind the main theatre in which, if anything happens, they would be involved, namely, Germany. That is where the Army is at the moment playing its fullest role, both in the Berlin garrison and in its contribution to N.A.T.O. forces. If unfortunately something went wrong in May, our troops as now organised and equipped would be out on a limb in Berlin. We have, therefore, particular responsibility for the welfare of our troops in Berlin and in Germany as a whole. Just how competent is our garrison in Berlin to withstand an initial surprise attack? That, obviously, is something which the War Office must be considering, hoping all the time, of course, that it will never come about.
  In view of the critical article in the Manchester Evening News, to which reference was made in the defence debate last week, what action is being taken to organise our troops in Germany on an up-to-date basis? I would refer, in particular, to the remarks made by the author about signal equipment. Mr. Harold Evans said:
  "Perhaps the most shocking deficiency of all, though, is in Signals equipment, the vital equipment that enables an Army to move as an organised unit. Our signals equipment is junk. Indeed, the obsolete, defective, last-war signals equipment in Germany makes our Army almost a 'blind' Army."
  After dealing with tanks and the lack of an adequate, light anti-tank weapon Mr. Evans said:
  "The point is that the general picture is one of equipment quite inadequate for a modern

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  war, equipment that makes ours the Antique Army in the eyes of our Allies. I certainly did not enjoy a German officer telling me how sorry he felt for his British colleagues when they had trouble with their equipment on manceuvres."
  That comment has been made without adequate refutation by the War Office. It portrays a picture of an Army which is armed, to say the least of it, with the secondd-best.
  The idea was put forward in the defence debate that we have not been able to give our troops adequate weapons first, because of some traditional reason in that they like to use old ones and could not be got out of the habit of using them, and, secondly, because it was too costly. We should knock both those ideas on the head at the very start. I should like to quote a disturbing sentence on the first page of the "Memorandum of the Secretary of State for War relating to the Army Estimates, 1959–60", which states, in paragraph 5:
  "A substantial part of the Army's maintenance requirements will again be met from accumulated stocks with a consequential saving in cash expenditure."
  That seems to me to point to the fact that we are still going on in the old way and making the Army do with something less than the best in order to save money.
  The Memorandum adds:
  "The sale of surplus stores is expected to realise £8·5 million."
  Has the War Office calculated in that sum the million pairs of boots which are now littering some store or other?
  This is not good enough. The Army is armed as to 50 per cent. with obsolete rifles in Germany and our Allies are armed with the F.N. rifle, we have no adequate replacements for Sten guns everywhere yet, and no adequate replacements in signals equipment and transport, and so on. It makes one wonder where all the money has gone. It was stated in the Grigg Report that in Germany that it was necessary to employ two cars to make sure that V. I. P. s got to their destination. In which car did the V. I. P. s ride? In the first, or in the second? This is one of the things about which we ought to inquire. If the impression is going abroad that we have to send two cars or two lorries to do a job which one ought to do, it brings the whole of our forces into dis-
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  repute. In the matter of equipment, are we reaching the end of accumulated stock, and can we give our troops long before 1962–63 the best in equipment?
  A question of overlapping and duplication in the Army and the Air Force arises from the Defence White Paper. As I understand, the Army will have the anti-aircraft weapon Thunderbird, but the Air Force will use Bloodhound. Is there any reason why we could not have one of these weapons to do the same job, whether it is the Army or the Air Force which will be using it? It seems to me that there is considerable overlapping and duplication in the production of antiaircraft land-based missiles. I do not know which is the better weapon, but cannot we have only one of them in production instead of spreading our efforts too widely on both?
  I am sure that we are all extremely pleased that National Service is coming to an end and that men born in the last quarter of 1939 will not be needed. They have been put out of their misery, but the nearer we get to the day when National Service will end the less and less reason will National Service men already in the Armed Forces see for their being there. It will not make sense to them in the months nearing the day when National Service ends. As many of them tell me, they are already kicking their heels in this country for long periods; and that does not make any sense to them. either.
  Are the Government wedded definitely to the idea of keeping them there until the end of their time, or would they, if circumstances permitted, be willing to have a general relaxation either by cutting down the period of service to eighteen months or by putting back to the first quarter of 1939 the date on which those who will still be liable for National Service must have been born?
  I wish that the War Office, in particular, would be more generous with its release policy. In my dealings with the three Services I find that in the matter of compassionate release the War Office comes off worst. It is much easier to deal with the Air Force and the Navy. They seem to release people with far less fuss than their counterparts, the Army. I ask the War Office not to hang on to their people if it does not really need them, because they would be doing a much better job in civilian life.

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  On the question of accommodation, I should like to know what is going on at Catterick. I understand that there are large-scale preparations there for the rebuilding of barracks and married quarters, which will take a considerable time and will involve large expenditure. Is it now decided that the home forces will be concentrated in the Aldershot area, in the south, and in the Catterick area, in the north?
  Incidentally, in relation to Cyprus, it must be remembered that a base is only as good as the local population will allow it to be. It may be that now we shall have more co-operation from the people of Cyprus and that we shall be able to use the base there for the accommodation of about 6,000 people. In any case, if the base is to be used for actions further east, it becomes of less and less value, because it entails flying over possibly hostile, or at least neutral, territory to get anywhere where the soldiers are likely to be needed.
  For instance, if they have to go to Aden to reinforce troops there they would have to go over neutral territory. If they have to go to Jordan or Iraq, they can only go by air by permission of the Israeli Government, and that is very doubtful in these circumstances. Therefore, a base on the old lines really ceases to have the same importance as it had a few years ago.
  If I may go on to deal with Malaya, may I say that we have heard about our forces in Cyprus and the job which they have done. We have a number of troops still left doing very unpleasant duties in Malaya. Could we be told something about their activities, to let the people know that they are not part of a forgotten Army, but that we do think of them there, and try to do something to improve their conditions of service while they are there?
  Now I wish to have two "moans", which may be considered trivial, in a way, but which, I believe, are of great psychological importance. The first one concerns the question of dress. I still believe that the Army is at a grave disadvantage in the public esteem because of its antiquated dress, and because of the groundsheet and all the rest of it. We have been told that action is being
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  taken to put this right, but can we be told just what stage has been reached in this direction? I cannot see why the troops cannot be issued with raincoats. There are many firms in this country, in Development Areas and where there is serious unemployment, which would welcome the possibility of large-scale Government contracts to refit the troops with decent, serviceable modern dress. I hope that that can be considered.
  The other point is on the question of batmen and officers' servants. I can see a need and could defend the use of soldiers as batmen in officers' messes in remote areas where no civilian labour is available to do the job, but, for the life of me, I cannot see why a soldier, even if a volunteer, should be asked to do ordinary household duties in an officer's house for the officer's wife. I cannot see why we cannot take the same position as the R.A.F. does in Germany in employing civilians to do that kind of work under a proper contract of service between the soldier and the civilian concerned.
  There is something very undignified in this aspect of a soldier doing a job in a house, polishing floors, minding the baby, and, according to one letter I have had, even doing the washing of the officer's wife's panties. I did not believe that, but, apparently, it happens in some cases. It seems to me that that is a wrong use of manpower in the forces, and that it is something which can be looked at. Instead of providing male servants for officers' wives, we should revert to the old system of giving allowances so that the officer or his wife could make their own arrangements for doing their own household chores.
  Mr. J. Hall: May I interrupt the hon. Member, who is making an extremely interesting speech? On the subject of using soldiers as batmen, did he see the several letters recently published in the Daily Mirror, one of which, in particular, impressed me? It came from a man who said that he enjoyed his service as a batman because it made him a very much better husband afterwards.
  Mr. Chetwynd: I would hardly think that that was the reason why he joined the Army. It does not seem to me to be an effective recruiting slogan, "Join the Army and learn how to wash up."

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  It does not seem to me that, in modern conditions, it is the way to get the type of man which the Secretary of State was talking about. I think that we should look at this matter again.
  come to a plea which, some day, I hope will be realised, and that is the unification of the Services. I am sure that much of the trouble with the Army and the defence priorities, in particular, arises from the fact that we are still looking upon the three Services in watertight compartments, and that unless we get that idea right out of our minds, we shall not get the best and most efficient use of the men we have available.
  Therefore, I hope that some attention will be paid to seeing, as far as possible, that we get common, joint services between at least the Royal Air Force and the Army. I admit that the Royal Navy presents a different problem, but in many of the rôles of the Army today they will be doing the job which the R.A.F. will be doing in guarding missile bases, and so an, and I would have thought that that is something which would repay serious attention.
  The final point I want to raise in the debate is about the Defence White Paper, concerning the use of tactical weapons in Germany. We know that we are now armed with Corporals—at least. I believe one regiment in Germany has them. We know that when necessary it moves from wherever it is to somewhere else for operational purposes, but the real difficulty is: who decides when the Corporal is to be used? After all, we are unleashing something here which, as the hon. Member for Wycombe said, might easily cause a limited war to spread into the major nuclear war. Here again, any decision on the use of this weapon must be a political decision, and not one which is left to the commanders in the field.
  Although I have ranged rather widely over this subject, there are many other points that ought to be raised, but at least I think we can now say that the Army is taking shape and is showing what it is going to be in 1962. I only hope that it will not be called upon to go into action with the kind of equipment that we have got now. Indeed, I trust that it will never be called to go into action at all.
  6.26 p.m.
  Mr. Philip Goodhart: I must congratulate my right hon. Friend
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  the Secretary of State for War on the success of his recruiting drive, and I would also congratulate him on the welcome transformation in the equipment of the Army which he has been able to announce this afternoon. But there is one aspect of this problem which still deeply disturbs me.
  When I last spoke on the Army Estimates, almost two years ago, I drew attention to certain inadequacies in the field during the Suez campaign and again in the fight against Mau Mau in Kenya, of our signals equipment, and today I share with the hon. Member for Stockton-on-Tees (Mr. Chetwynd) a disagreeable feeling that our signals equipment is still inadequate. In Germany, during the past year, I came across a particular "19 set" which had been made almost sixteen years ago—before I joined the Army. This particular set had been rebuilt a couple of times since then, which is more than can be said for myself, but it still seems to me disgraceful that this old-fashioned inadequate and obsolete wireless set should be playing a major role in our Army.
  In Malaya, an adequate and compact wireless set has been produced which functions well in the jungle, but this set was developed not by us, but by the Australians, and our source of supply was very gravely threatened when Australia went television mad and it became more profitable to turn factories over to the production of cathode tubes for television sets.
  Signals equipment provides the nervous system of an Army, and when that Army is a small one, it is all the more important that that system should function quickly and effectively, just as a lightweight boxer needs faster reflexes than a heavyweight. It is most discouraging, therefore, to find that the amount of money that is being spent on new signals equipment appears to have been cut back sharply this year. I am told that the industry itself cannot provide any more sets. but we know that the radio industry of this country, when given its bead, can provide vast quantities of equipment quickly. We know that it is well capable of advanced design, and that it has produced some of the best navigational aids for aircraft in the world.
  What, then, really is the problem? Two years ago, when I raised exactly this same

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  point with the Army, I was given this answer, "Well, you see, it is really the fault of the Ministry of Supply. All their best men are busy designing radar screens or guided rockets, and they really are not capable of looking after the Army as well." Two years later, that is exactly the sort of answer that one gets when one asks the same sort of question, and I think that the Committee ought to know if and when this system of design and production is to be put on a sounder basis than it is at the moment. I cannot help thinking that if this same sort of problem had arisen in Russia, a number of people in responsible positions would henceforth be devoting their energies to the extraction of salt from the mines in Siberia.
  In the whole field of weapon development, there is a tendency to devote more and more effort on weapons which will be used less and less, while we ignore the very real military problems with which we are faced almost every month. For instance, I am delighted to hear that the up-gunned Centurion is doing so well in its tests, and that the ground-to-air missile, the Thunderbird, also seems to be doing well in its tests, but I doubt very much whether these weapons will be used seriously in the foreseeable future.
  On the other hand, we and the whole free world, are frequently faced with the problem of internal security and riots. Very shortly, we will be interrupting this debate to discuss the emergency situation in Nyasaland and the serious riots that have occurred there. We all hope that it will be possible to deter the outbreak of a global nuclear war, but I doubt very much whether any Government, however good and capable, will ever be able to deter riots. The pattern is very familiar. A mob forms, the police are threatened, there is a danger of their being overrun, tear gas is brought up, if there is any in the vicinity, the tear gas does not work effectively, and troops are called in. The troops eventually have to open fire, and people are killed.
  What the Army and the colonial police really need is a deterrent—not a nuclear deterrent, but a mob deterrent. Tear gas is not enough, and bullets are much too much. What we want is a weapon that will temporarily incapacitate, but not permanently injure. It does not seem to me that this sort of development should be
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  beyond the wit of the scientists who now send missiles hurtling past the moon towards the sun. It is a paradox of modern defence that our new weapons are becoming so powerful that they become increasingly irrelevant to the sort of military fracas in which we find ourselves.
  The best possible deterrent against riots and the other internal subversion problem is the man on the ground, and I wish that the new soldiers who will be brought into the Army through my right hon. Friend's successful campaign could be formed into new units, and that Phase II of the reorganisation should be put off rather than being used to reinforce the establishments of existing units. In particular, I would be sorry to see these new men disappear into the military sponge of Western Germany, because it seems to me that another of the paradoxes of modern defence is that in Western Germany, in N.A.T.O., one needs fire power rather than manpower, but in almost all the rest of the world one needs manpower rather than fire power.
  I suppose that no single remark in the defence debate created more attention than the words of my right hon. Friend the Member for Carshalton (Mr. Head), when he suggested that in the struggle against international Communism it would be better to have a £5 million educational programme in Kenya than to have two Blue Streak rockets. This afternoon I would also like to recommend some forms of expenditure that may pay an indirect rather than a direct military dividend to this country.
  During the past twelve months a country on the borders of the Communist world asked this country whether it would be possible to send for training into the Commonwealth two of its police officers who wanted training against subversion and in Special Branch activities. Eventually, those two polce officers were given that training, but it took a great deal of time and effort to find the money to bring those people to the training school, and I cannot help feeling that training those two men was a great deal more useful than having two platoons on the banks of the Rhine.
  Again, there is the problem of the new armies in the emerging countries of the Commonwealth. Often there is a great need and demand for the continued service of British officers and N.C.Os. I

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  would like to see that service continue where possible, because I believe it important that we should try to continue to influence the Armed Forces in these new countries. Yet time after time one hears of arguments about the rates of pay for seconded British officers and N.C.O.s, of arguments as to how much should be borne by the local government, how much should be borne by the War Office at home.
  I suggest that when dealing with this problem we adopt one simple rule of thumb, namely, that Her Majesty's Government should continue to be responsible for the pay and allowances of seconded British officers, and that we should then ask from the new Commonwealth countries, the emerging Colonies, the amount of money they would have paid to a locally recruited officer if such an officer had been available to do the job. In that way employing British officers and other ranks would be no more and, at the same time, no less expensive than employing local officers. Also, the local malcontents, who are only too often anxoius to get British personnel out of the way, would have a convenient stick removed from them.
  Finally, I again congratulate my right hon. Friend on the success of his recruiting campaign. but I wish that he would get some wireless sets quickly.
  6.41 p.m.
  Mr. R. T. Paget: We have just heard a most interesting speech, with which I find myself in general agreement. I shall come back in a moment to some of the points made by the hon. Gentleman the Member for Beckenham (Mr. Goodhart), but I will start by making one or two general propositions which I do not propose to argue now, but which will be the basis of what I have to say.
  The first of those general points is that as the nuclear deterrent increases, so does it neutralise itself. The general deterrent—the massive deterrent—is rapidly reaching the stage where it is a deterrent only to the massive deterrent. As this happens and credibility goes from it, the need for ground forces increases, but it will be highly necessary during the next few years not merely to maintain the 55,000 men in Germany to which we are committed, but largely to increase this force.
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  How are we to do that? There are two questions there. Firstly, in terms of money, where does the money come from? I would reply emphatically—from the other two Services. There is a kind of inter-Service carve-up which, within our present defence needs, means that the Army gets far too little, the Navy far too much and the Air Force a great deal too much. The job of the Army is the job upon which our survival depends if we reach a nuclear stalemate. A large part of the naval activity, and a great part of the air activity, is to deal with contingencies which can arise only after atomic warfare has abolished us.
  These kind of post-mortem activities do not seem to me to be a very worthwhile priority within our defence. A much higher priority should go to the Army. I am glad to see the Leader of the Liberal Party here because in the course of the defence debate he suggested that our contribution to N.A.T.O. should be doubled. I am not committing myself to that precise figure but I remember the Minister of Defence proceeding to think it was frightfully funny of the hon. Gentleman to say that he wanted our contribution to N.A.T.O. doubled and did not want conscription reintroduced. In the eyes of the Minister of Defence that apparently was a self-evident absurdity. That the Minister of Defence can think on such lines fills me with alarm, because it is perfectly practicable to double our commitment to N.A.T.O. on a volunteer system if we are prepared not to waste our Army on a series of tasks for which soldiers are quite unfitted, which is what we are doing at present.
  Cyprus is a classic example of this. The job of soldiers, and the only job of soldiers, is to meet the organised forces of the enemy, to destroy them and to disrupt them. That arises when there are organised forces of the enemy. Nothing of the kind existed in Cyprus. E.O.K.A. never put so much as a platoon in the field and never held an acre of territory. All E.O.K.A. did was to send out odd assassins, who never operated in bigger numbers than two's or three's and, when they were cornered—with only two exceptions—they either started to cry or to sing like canaries.
  That is not the kind of proposition in which troops are properly employed, and

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  the evidence of it was that 30,000 of them did not succeed in catching Grivas. They did not succeed in catching General Grivas—as we must now call him—because he knew what he was dealing with, and he did not give his boys much to sing about. None of them ever knew where any of the other ones were and this prevented them from giving each other away. It also meant that there was no kind of organisation. What kind of an Army is it when no man knows where anybody else is? Yet that is what he deliberately created.
  Mr. Sydney Silverman: All armies are like that.
  Mr. Paget: If in Cyprus we had had 500 trained policemen who understood the police job, they would have been of incomparably more value than 30,000 troops.
  Kenya was a different proposition. There was a period in which the Mau Mau put real forces in the field. The attack on Fort Hall was an attack in rather bigger than battalion strength and they fought well. They were well organised and they provided quite a high level of mobility. At that stage there was a real and valuable use for soldiers, and a very good job they did. As soon as we had disrupted the organised forces of the Mau Mau, and they became gangs in the forest, it became a police job. In the later period the troops became almost useless. The people who succeeded in clearing it up were the trained police who were brought forward and who, frankly, were never developed in Cyprus.
  That is the situation with which we shall now he faced in Nyasaland. It is the pattern of folly which we see developing time after time. The first thing we do is to arrest the leaders, with whom alone we can negotiate and on whom alone we are in a position to bring effective pressure. First it was Kenyatta, then Makarios, now it is Dr. Hastings Banda, and the particular folly of it is that those are three men who like their creature comforts and would not be of much use in the hills. Therefore, while they are available and free and an influence, they are an instrument with which one can produce pressure, but if they are taken away, authority is passed to the chaps who are all right in the hills and the
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  forests. That is what, for the third time with unbelievable folly, the Government are now proceeding to do in Nyasaland.
  Having created a lawless situation in which they have disrupted the only effective command of the enemy with whom they can deal, having created a situation impossible for troops, they call upon troops to pull them out of the mess. The 30,000 men whom we are now releasing from Cyprus will be gradually called on and used as our folly in Nyasaland increases. It is the same old pattern and while the Government continue to do that they will not be able to fulfil our proper commitment which is needed in N.A.T.O.
  What we need for this sort of job is a trained police reserve. That is what we should build up. To give a figure which is purely a spot guess, I should say that we require a force of 4,000 or 5,000 men, of whom about half would be in this country ready to be moved and being trained in the latest police methods, since these are police jobs. The other half would be serving attachments of a relatively short period in all the various Colonies, so that if there were trouble in any Colony members of that mobile reserve would know that territory and its people and would have worked there. A force of that sort would relieve the Army of the sort of commitment which calls for 30,000 troops.
  Brig. Prior-Palmer: I have very great sympathy with what the hon. and learned Member is saying, but he is suggesting that the Army Vote would be relieved of the cost of 4,000 or 5,000 men. In which case, who would pay for that force? On what Vote would it come?
  Mr. Paget: That is the sickening part. The moment one gets to the no-man's land between Departments, one meets the buck-shifting competition. I do not care a sausage out of which pocket of the Government the money comes, whether from the Army Vote or the Colonial Vote. If there is a way of doing a job with 4,000 or 5,000 men where we should otherwise require 30,000 men, and if that way is far better, then it does not matter who pays for the 4,000 or 5,000 men.
  The first essential if we are to make proper use of our troops is the creation of a police reserve, trained and organised on a police basis and doing policing jobs

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  when necessary, instead of having them done by this extravagant method of using troops neither organised nor trained for that work.
  Major H. Legge-Bourke: Before the hon. and learned Member leaves that interesting subject, will he answer a question? We are now finding it difficult to recruit a police force adequate to do what we want done in the United Kingdom. From where will the men whom he requires come? Has he ruled out the possibility of local recruiting?
  Mr. Paget: No. I shall deal with local recruiting. It is unnecessary that all these men should come from this country. It is a job which amounts to seeing the world, it is different from ordinary police work, and I do not think that it would be even competitive with ordinary police recruiting.
  My second suggestion is this. The organisation of the Army which we create for N.A.T.O. is such that we try to provide the maximum possible fire power with the minimum possible manpower. The equipment of the men has to be tremendously expensive and tremendously powerful. The men have to be spread out as thinly as possible. The sort of trouble which may occur in Africa or in the Gulf is one where little fire power is required but where many men are needed. It is the opposite type of organisation.
  It is very extravagant that one should use the tremendously expensive article, the high fire-powered European soldier, when what is required is many men. I urge that to cover our African commitment we should raise African forces. It has always seemed to me to be the oddest sort of folly to have a European reserve in Kenya. It is extremely expensive and it has long communications. The sort of forces which we require in that area could be far better provided by Africans. I have tried hard to get figures of the relative costs of a European brigade and an African division. I would be very surprised if an African division cost as much as a European brigade, and in Africa it is more men that we require.
  Equally, from the African point of view such recruiting would be of tremendous value. The African likes it. It is curious, but the African loves drill. That is an
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  eccentricity which I cannot understand, but which the African does understand. He immensely enjoys soldiering and the ex-African soldier makes a valuable citizen.
  If in Kenya the Wakamba, the other great Bantu tribe, had joined the Kikuyu, Mau Mau would have been a very much more difficult problem, and one with which we should probably still be dealing. The Wakamba is the tribe which provides the King's African Rifles and the ex-soldier of the Wakamba in his village is the man who kept the Wakamba loyal. But for those men, Mau Mau would have spread throughout the Wakamba country.
  Mr. Anthony Kershaw: Will the hon. and learned Member deal with the difficulty that if there is an African reserve in Kenya, when Kenya emerges to self-government, that reserve becomes no longer mobile?
  Mr. Paget: In fact, that reserve would remain very much mobile. The important thing is that it would be not an army of Kenya, but an army which we had raised and for which we paid, thereby putting currency into the Kenya economy, currency which that country urgently needs, and providing security forces at no expense to Kenya. As Kenya develops into a new country, I do not think that she will in the least wish to shoulder that sort of financial burden.
  The other delusion on this subject is that as African nationalism emerges it will make those troops unreliable for dealing with trouble in Africa. I believe that to be exactly the opposite of the truth. Providing that African troops are decently led, their tribal and national instincts can be directed to their regiments. They are tremendously loyal and effective, and I am afraid that there is nothing they like more than beating up a fellow-African for whom they have acquired an enormous contempt. That may be morally desirable or undesirable.
  It being Seven o'clock, The CHAIRMAN left the Chair, further Proceeding standing postponed until after the Proceedings on the Motion for the Adjournment of the House standing over under Standing Order No. 9 (Adjournment on definite matter of urgent public importance).
  [Mr. SPEAKER resumed the Chair.]

NYASALAND (STATE OF EMERGENCY)
7.0 p.m.
Mr. James Callaghan: I beg to move, That this House do now adjourn.
Since our exchanges earlier this afternoon, and the declaration of a state of emergency in Nyasaland, it has become abundantly clear that the powers which the Governor of Nyasaland asked for are necessary. Since the declaration of the state of emergency, but not before, rioting has broken out, tear gas has been used and three Africans killed. [An HON. MEMBER: "Seventeen."] Maybe the number goes up as the news on the tape comes along. Since the declaration of the state of emergency, Africans have attempted to break into the prison at Mzuzu and, at Mzimbe, have placed road blocks to prevent the movement of troops.
The Colonial Secretary can dust off all the phrases which he used about Cyprus and bring them out again. He will have plenty of occasions to use them during the next few months. He will have plenty of opportunity to convince the British electorate that what we are faced with in Nyasaland is a group of power-drunk, mad African leaders desiring only their own power and willing to murder Europeans in the course of achieving it. If he dares to try that explanation once during the next few months he will be convicted of the grossest lie.
Hon. Members: Oh.
The Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr. Alan Lennox-Boyd): Let us calm down.
Mr. Callaghan: The Colonial Secretary invites me to calm down. Frankly, confess that it is difficult to speak without heat about a situation which has been provoked by Her Majesty's Government by their own failure to take action over the last eighteen months and by their cowardice in yielding to the Federal Government of Rhodesia and Nyasaland over a state of emergency which was quite unnecessary. If I speak with heat. I ask the pardon of the House. I will endeavour to contain myself.
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I see the building up there of a classical drama and a situation in which we shall use force against the nationalist movement. We shall use all the arguments that we have used in the past and, in the end, we shall concede to force what we failed to concede to reason. It is the duty of the Opposition to warn the House and the country before this situation reaches the stage where truth cannot be unravelled from lies. That is why it is important that all of us should speak with all the power we can command about a situation which we have seen build up, about which we have warned the Government and about which they have failed to take the appropriate action.
I went to the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland eighteen months ago, with the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association delegation. Our report was unanimous. It was signed by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Labour and National Service—a Minister for whom I have the highest admiration as, I think, most of us here have. It was also signed by the hon. and learned Member for Darwen (Mr. Fletcher-Cooke), by the hon. and gallant Member for Eye (Colonel J. H. Harrison), by the hon. Member for Haltemprice (Mr. Wall) and by my hon. Friend the Member for Widnes (Mr. MacColl), my hon. Friend the Member for Southall (Mr. Pargiter) and myself.
This is what we said eighteen months ago:
"We found that the opposition to Federation was strongest in Nyasaland. Virtually all those to whom we spoke, whether Chiefs. African Members of the legislatures or leaders of Congress, and leaders of Asian organisations, were unanimous in their opposition. To them Federation has become a symbol for the frustrations and dissatisfaction which non-Europeans feel about their status in society. Vocal leaders of African opinion in Nyasaland told us that they were ready to sacrifice the economic and financial advantages that accrued to them from Federation. Indeed, they do not think much of these advantages. They argue that Nyasaland should receive greater financial help from the Federation than she, in fact, does on the grounds that she carries the biggest population and is the poorest of the three Territories. It is quite clear that to the Africans and the Asians the term partnership is not yet a reality."
I ask the Colonial Secretary and the House to note the advice which we gave to the Government at that time.
"In our view, if the races in the Territories are to live together in amity the African

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community must be made to feel that it has a large political stake in the Federation. This would mean a bold increase in representative government in the Territories, together with a substantial widening of African influence in the election of members of the Federal Assembly."
The Government and the Colonial Secretary cannot say that they have not been warned about the situation that has been building up in this territory. Last March, the National Executive Committee of the Labour Party made a public appeal to the Colonial Secretary, asking him to concede substantially increased representation to the Africans in Nyasaland. Last June, the Governor was over here and he, too, pointed out in a public speech the overwhelming opposition of the Africans to federation and what was needed to put it right.
On 17th June last, the Colonial Secretary saw an African delegation from Nyasaland. They went away, if their conversations with me subsequently are to be believed, feeling encouraged by the way in which the Colonial Secretary had received them and the hope that he gave them that there would be a substantial increase in African representation. That was nine months ago. What has he been doing? The whole gravamen of the complaint on the constitutional side lies in the fact that the Colonial Secretary has failed within the last nine months to issue his proposals for reform of the Constitution when 1960, the date on which the fate of this territory is to be decided, is looming ever closer.
Northern Rhodesia has had its new Constitution. It disagreed about it. We had discussions in this House about it and Divisions about it. It has been trying to work it and has been registering for the electorate and for the polls, and polling will soon take place.
Concerning Nyasaland, we on this side have been pressing the Colonial Secretary, time after time, to say what he was going to do, when he was going to publish his constitutional proposals—if I had the time I could build up a formidable dossier against him and we have always been fobbed off with the sort of reply which we all know that the Colonial Secretary can give when he is not anxious to join issue on a particular question. There is a grave charge of neglect to be laid against the right hon. Gentleman in this matter.
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The right hon. Gentleman will say that he took part in consultations and conversations. Consultations about Cyprus did not take all that time when there was a real desire to get down and discuss the matter. No one can convince me and those who have studied this matter that it would not have been possible for the Colonial Secretary to have anticipated a great deal of this trouble if he had himself taken the matter in hand and published the proposals that have been bruited about in the Press and in conversation during the last twelve months.
All of us who follow these matters know that proposals have been put forward, what the counter-proposals of the Africans were and that the Europeans, for many months, failed to come forward with any counter-proposals of their own. All these things seem to be common knowledge in the places where they are discussed. It is time— and long overdue, that the Colonial Secretary came forward and put these proposals before the House and the leaders of opinion in Nyasaland. What a tragedy this is for a territory, which as everyone who has been there knows, has had a record for peaceful and harmonious development. The Church of Scotland played a magnificent part in the early days in the development of the people of Nyasaland.
What has happened to sour and poison the relations? Federation. I have never heard anybody dispute that. The right hon. Gentlemen opposite are responsible for it. Collectively and singly they share responsibility for the unrest which exists in Nyasaland today. They were told about the opposition of the Africans to being forced into this tripartite arrangement, but they said, "No. The Africans do not know what is good for them." We know what is good for them. "Lord Chandos used to say," I can tell you that once federation is an accomplished fact all the reasonable, sensible body of African opinion will settle down. They will be quite happy to accept it."
The Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations (Mr. C. J. M. Alport)The Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations (Mr. C. J. M. Alport) indicated assent.
Mr. Callaghan: The Under-Secretary of State nods. If he has been to Africa to see for himself he must know that it is the unanimous view that over the last six

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years opposition to federation has become more and not less intense in Nyasaland. It did not need Dr. Hastings Banda to go there to whip up the Africans against federation; he was the catalyst which set fire to the agitation which already existed. He was merely the man who happened to be there at the moment. If it had not been him it would have been somebody else.
We are building up in Nyasaland a position in which a Territory is being forced into a constitutional path that it has no desire to follow, and which, indeed, is contrary to the path being followed by similar Territories in other parts of Africa. Ghana, Nigeria, Uganda, and Tanganyika are all following the path to self-government. "Is there any reason," think the Africans in Nyasaland, "why we should not do the same?" There are 7,500 Europeans and 2¾. million Africans in Nyasaland. How can we ever hope that this will become a society in which European domination can remain an accomplished fact? How can we hope to ask the Africans to wait until—if I may use that choice word of Sir Roy Welensky's—they have become "civilised" and have reached the Europeans' standards?
Do we really think that in the light of the movement taking place in Africa—not only in our own Territories, but in the Belgian Congo and other foreign territories—the Africans in Nyasaland are so different from their fellows out there that they will sit quietly and wait until they have attained the standards that we set before they can have responsibility for their own government? People who think this must be living in a cloud-cuckoo-land, in the middle of the nineteenth century. I beg the Government to recognise, before it is too late, that the tide of history has rolled on irresistibly in Africa and that they cannot turn it back—not even though Captain Waterhouse is now living in Southern Rhodesia and begging the British taxpayer to support him in his interests out there.
Mr. Alport: Cheap.
Mr. Callaghan: The hon. Member says, "Cheap", but it will be a dear proposition.
Hon. Members opposite should face the question: what responsibility has the
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British taxpayer to protect the interests of Tanganyika concessions and other organisations which are operating in this territory? If that is to stand in the way of the achievement of self-government by people whom we know are entitled to it, and who should get it, and whom we should bring forward to self-government, what the Under-Secretary of State is saying is that it is cheap to ask the House to face the dilemma that hon. Members opposite should face, namely, that British commercial interests are opposed to the constitutional development of the people of the country. I do not know how far they are our interests.
Mr. Bernard Braine: Is not the hon. Member aware that in the African context British enterprises, large and small, are the means of providing the wealth without which self-government will be a snare and a delusion?
Mr. Callaghan: I am not going to be side-tracked into that argument this evening.
Our case against the Government is simply that they have either allowed themselves to be cajoled by the Federal Government. or agree with them, in the imposition of a state of emergency in a British Protectorate. Up to this morning, when the news came through on the wireless that there was a state of emergency in Nyasaland, there had been consistent denials by spokesmen unnamed. or by the Governor in person, about the need for a state of emergency in Nyasaland.
What has caused the change? We shall give the Colonial Secretary the opportunity to tell us. He failed lamentably to do so earlier this afternoon. We should like to know specifically from him —and the House is entitled to know it—what representations he received from the Federal Government about the need to impose a state of emergency in Nyasaland. This should not depend upon the whim of the Federal Government; it should depend upon the facts of the situation in the Colony.
We know what the attitude of the Federal Government has been, because The Times has set it out. When the Southern Rhodesian state of emergency was declared, the Prime Minister there said:

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"If we only clean up the situation in Southern Rhodesia and nowhere else there is a risk of re-infection. I hope we shall find the other Governments follow the example that Southern Rhodesia has set."
That was their attitude, and it is fair to deduce that since that time pressure has been put upon the Colonial Office and the Governor of Nyasaland to declare a state of emergency, even while he has been publicly saying that there was no need to do so. It is, therefore, right that the Colonial Secretary should tell the House whether that is or is not so, and if it is not he should make it clear that no approach has been made by the Federal Government.
From other published comments of the Prime Minister it seems that this situation has been deliberately provoked by the Federal Government and the Government of Southern Rhodesia. How else do we explain a sentence which, speaking of the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, says:
"He revealed that many weeks' planning had gone into the present operations"?
How else do we explain a situation in which a strike of workers on the Kariba Darn was on one day described by the Minister of Labour as an industrial dispute and the next day found by the Southern Rhodesian Government to be a political conspiracy? We can hardly fail to reach the conclusion that because the Southern Rhodesian Government and the Federal authorities are becoming increasingly alarmed about the growth and influence of the African National Congress they have seized every excuse to provoke a situation in which they could clamp down on that organisation.
Is it not true that the Governor has now had to succumb, against his better judgment, to the views of the Federal Government on this matter? And we now import Southern Rhodesian troops into the territory—the very thing that the Nyasalanders feared. Everybody coming back from Nyasaland says that if there is one thing that the Nyasalanders cannot tolerate it is the thought of being dominated by the racial policies of Southern Rhodesia—and now we allow fuel to be added to those flames by permitting Southern Rhodesian troops to enter a British Protectorate.
I suppose that the crowning folly of all was to deport Dr. Hastings Banda to
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Southern Rhodesia. "When the emergency is over", says the Colonial Secretary, "we shall restart constitutional talks". With whom? With Dr. Hastings Banda? Or shall we try, as in Cyprus, to find someone else to speak for the people of Nyasaland? The Colonial Secretary found that it was much easier to deport Archbishop Makarios to the Seychelles than it was to get him out again, and when he got the Archbishop out he provoked the resignation of Lord Salisbury. I wonder who will resign next time. I do not know; it may be the Colonial Secretary himself.
I believe that the Government have grossly mishandled the whole situation. They have mishandled it either because they have failed to react to the continuous pressure of the Federation, or they believe in what the Federation has done. The Federal Government are endeavouring to create the position before 1960 in which, whoever is sitting on the Government benches, whether it be the present Government supporters or ourselves, it will be impossible for this House to exercise its responsibilities towards this Protectorate.
I appeal to the Colonial Secretary. These people place themselves in the right hon. Gentleman's charge. This is a British Protectorate. Margery Perham asked, in The Times last week, "Is it sedition to want to remain a British Colony?" Have Government supporters, defenders of the Empire, reached the point where they are prepared to push the Nyasaland people into the Federation, to a fate that they do not want, rather than to retain them in the British Commonwealth and bring them forward to self-government? Is this what modern Conservatism means? Hon. Gentlemen and the Government are facing a real crisis of conscience here. History will determine whether they have answered it properly or not.
We have no doubt whatsoever about this on this side of the House. With all the sympathy and understanding for the position of the European settler there—I can understand and sympathise with it —I say that his future will be best safeguarded in Nyasaland, in Northern Rhodesia, and, indeed, in Southern Rhodesia if he could but see it, if he could come to terms with African nationalism and not try to repress it. That is the only way he can ensure a

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long-term future for himself and his children.
Many of these Europeans want to stay in these territories; or course, they do, and, of course, they should have the opportunity of living their lives there. I would like to see them have it. I believe that they can be of great service to the territories if they remain there on the basis of equality with the Africans. If they do not, their future is either bloody for both of them, or, alternatively, African racial nationalism, which can be an ugly feature, will win.
I appeal to the Government now. Will they do two things? First, will they make an early statement of their proposals for constitutional reform? It is vitally necessary that the people of Nyasaland should know that when the 1960 conference comes they will be represented by a delegation which will comprise a majority of their own people. This seems to be absolutely vital if we are to hold the situation there. Secondly, let the Colonial Secretary re-echo once again the pledges that were given so definitely in 1953. Let him put them into his mouth again tonight and say, "We shall not hand you over to the Federal Government until you wish to go. We do not intend to give way either to pressure or cajolery by the Federal Government in 1960 and allow a measure of Dominion status to be conceded."
If the right hon. Gentleman says that, we shall not need the troops. They can go back to their barracks and the road blocks will disappear; provided that the right hon. Gentleman adds one other thing, "It is our belief that in 1959 the rôle that the British Government and Parliament will play in Central Africa is not to thwart the forward march of these people to control their own destinies in their own countries, but to aid and assist them to the best of their ability." If we do that, we shall have the permanent friendship of millions of people in Africa.
The Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr. Alan Lennox-Boyd): An hour or two ago I made known the declaration of the state of emergency in Nyasaland and I answered a number of questions. I think I covered most of the ground. The hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) had no new material, and from time to time seemed to be run-
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ning out of arguments. None the less, I will repeat something of what I said and will add to it wherever I can.
The hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East has stated again this evening, as he did this afternoon, that the declaring of a state of emergency in Nyasaland and the arrest of Congress leaders had been taken by a reluctant Governor of Nyasaland. He said tonight that the Governor has succumbed to pressure and hinted more than once earlier on that it was condoned by a possibly equally reluctant Colonial Secretary, both on pressure from the Federation.
Hon. Gentlemen opposite have shown, in making this grave charge, an indifference to the truth and an utter disregard of the serious consequences of their words on their own future relations, whether in Opposition or in the unlikely event of their being in Government, with the Federal Government. The right hon. Member for Llanelly (Mr. J. Griffiths), whom I do not see here. and I am not surprised—
Hon. Members: Oh.
Mr. Hugh Gaitskell: He is not well.
Mr. Lennox-Boyd: I will tell the House why I am not surprised.
Mr. Callaghan: I do not know whether the Colonial Secretary heard what my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition said, which was that my right hon. Friend the Member for Llanelly is not well.
Mr. Lennox-Boyd: I think my right hon. predecessor knows me well enough to believe that had I known that I certainly would not have said what I did. I cannot refrain from quoting what the right hon. Member for Llanelly said yesterday, for it is very relevant indeed to the argument that I must make. He said that the Federal Government were
"completely untrustworthy … to have responsibility and leadership."—[OFFICIAL, REPORT, 2nd March, 1959; Vol. 601, c. 45.]
That came from the lips of a former Colonial Secretary. The judgment of history upon an observation of that kind must be that a savage charge of that nature applies to the Socialist Party in Great Britain.
As a Government, the Socialist Party favoured the idea of federation. They left

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the Africans puzzled as to what they really thought, and during months and years when the Africans were crying out for leadership neither Ministers here, nor, because of Ministerial orders, officials in the future Federation, were able to give the Africans a lead. Hon. Gentlemen and right hon. Gentlemen opposite completely lacked the courage to carry through what they knew in their hearts was the best thing for the Africans of Central Africa. They gave a miserable demonstration of weakness and indecision.
Now they are determined to try to break up the Federation by any means they can find, despite the assurances that Lord Attlee gave when he was Leader of the Socialist Party that, once federation came, the word of the Federation would become law and the Government of the day would try to help to make it work. The Socialist Party—and in this matter it is not their lunatic fringe but the Front Bench itself—[Interruption.] Perhaps I would not say that altogether, because I am not sure that this is quite an accurate distinction to draw. They put the worst possible interpretation on every word or action of a loyal and true friend of the United Kingdom, like Sir Roy Welensky. and they put the best possible interpretation on all the words and actions of those who would not hesitate to plunge their country into chaos and confusion. Determined to try to break up the Federation, they will use every excuse to do so. Today, the Nyasaland constitution; tomorrow, the affairs of the hon. Member for Wednesbury (Mr. Stonehouse). In this vendetta against the Federation they are quite without scruple.
Needless to say, today's charges are, as usual, utterly untrue. The House will remember that Dr. Banda returned in July, 1958, to Nyasaland after nearly a lifetime spent in profitable work in London, where he was treated as a friend and welcomed by Londoners. His return led to disturbances, but at first they were the sort of disturbance that often happens when large crowds assemble and get out of hand. The Governor and I were both very anxious to give Dr. Banda every chance to help in the many constructive tasks which lie ahead in the Protectorate. However, it soon became quite clear that he was determined to reject any constitutional proposals which did not meet
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the maximum demands of the Nyasaland Congress and then to create disturbances and to court arrest.
As I said earlier today, some days ago information came to the notice of the Government of Nyasaland which was of a very serious kind. I have seen this information. I am not in a position to disclose it—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."]—nor its source. Nor would any responsible Minister do so, nor any right hon. Member opposite who has ever held high office. I commend that thought to the hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East, who has not as yet had that particular privilege. That information made it clear that plans had been made by Congress to carry out widespread violence and murder of Europeans, Asians and moderate African leaders; that, in fact, a massacre was being planned. It was essential for the Governor at the earliest possible moment to strengthen the security forces. The Governor is responsible for the Africans, the vast majority of whom are loyal to the Administration.
Mr. Callaghan: The right hon. Gentleman will believe anything.
Mr. Lennox-Boyd: I am not disputing their opinions, I know their feelings about Federation, but the vast majority are loyal to the Administration in Nyasaland and wish to live in peace in Nyasaland. The Governor is responsible also for 10,000 Asians and 8,000 Europeans who, outside the main centres, live scattered round the country.
It was, as I said, essential for the Governor to strengthen the security forces, so he asked the Federal Government for troops. He asked the Northern Rhodesian and Southern Rhodesian Governments for police reinforcements and the Tanganyika Government for assistance at Fort Hill. It was becoming increasingly clear that the disturbance would make the declaration of a state of emergency inevitable. Had there been disturbances alone it would have been a natural step to declare a state of emergency at an early date. About the time when my noble Friend Lord Perth and the Governor of Nyasaland decided that it would be inopportune for my noble Friend to go to Blantyre for constitutional talks would have been a natural time, in those unfortunate circumstances, for a state of emergency to be declared.

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It was a ridiculous suggestion that the Federal Government said that my noble Friend should not go. That was utterly without foundation.
There were grave disturbances in the Northern Province, and information coming to us showed that a large number of Africans—this has been reinforced this afternoon by further telegrams—were in deadly fear for their own safety and that of their families. The hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East suggested that the state of emergency has caused the outbreak of violence. He recalled the historic words, but I could apply them to him, "If he believes that, he would believe everything." There has been widespread violence in Nyasaland for the last ten days or so. The situation was exceedingly grave in the Northern Province, and there were serious disorders in the Central and Southern Provinces, but it was not the disturbances alone which filled the mind of the Governor. It was essential for the security forces to be strengthened before action was taken or appeals made for reinforcements. and these were quickly answered.
I have been asked a great deal about consultation. If hon. Members opposite chose to consult their former colleagues who have held high office in my Department, or in the Commonwealth Relations Office, I should be surprised to hear if they found those right hon. Members disagree when I say it is not the practice to disclose consultations carried on between Her Majesty's Government and a Government of a country in the constitutional composition of the Federation. This I can say, the Governor of Nyasaland, in arriving at the conclusion that he should ask for troops and declare a state of emergency, did so at his own exclusive discretion and not at the dictation of the Federal Government, given either directly to him or indirectly through me, or through Her Majesty's Government. As I said this afternoon, we approved fully of the action he has taken.
Sir Lynn Ungoed-Thomas: Was there such an invitation?
Mr. Lennox-Boyd: What invitation?
Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas: From the central Government. The right hon. Gentleman has said that he did not exer-
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cise his discretion as a result of an invitation. We want to know whether there was such an invitation?
Mr. Lennox-Boyd: If it will make the hon. and learned Member happy, I will dot the "i" and cross the "t". There was no such invitation.
This afternoon the Opposition made much of a report in The Times newspaper that the Governor had said yesterday that:
"no state of emergency was needed in Nyasaland to act against dissidents."
I suggested to the House that if he was accurately reported the Governor may well have meant that a state of emergency might not be necessary before he could take certain action against certain individuals. I said there were, however, other things for which the declaration of a state of emergency might be necessary. Half an hour ago I managed to get through on the telephone and spoke personally to Sir Robert Armitage, who assures me that that is exactly what he meant. [Laughter.] Hon. Members opposite must really have taken part in a most extraordinary combination when they formed the Government of the day if they think it funny that Governors and Ministers sometimes speak with the same voice
I have spoken of a number of things which it would be necessary to have for a state of emergency to be declared, things which really have nothing to do with specified individuals, like powers of Press control. the control of the use of roads and vehicles, the power to declare certain areas prohibited areas, to ban public meetings and to proscribe organisations. The Governor has in fact today proscribed as illegal organisations the Nyasaland African National Congress, the Nyasaland African National Congress Youth League and the Women's League.
Mr. Elwyn Jones: Would the right hon. Gentleman tell the House by what legal authority protected persons, members of Congress, have been deported out of the Protectorate into a Colony and under what authority they are presently detained in Southern Rhodesia?
Mr. Lennox-Boyd: They are under powers given under the emergency regulations, and as soon as I have received those from the Governor I will put them

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in the Library. I hope that will satisfy the hon and learned Member. Although he might not agree with the policy, I hope it will satisfy him that the legal grounds are right. The Opposition suggested that the Governor had said yesterday that there would be no state of emergency. He emphatically denies this. He said:
"Exactly what we are trying to do I naturally cannot reveal to you and I would not expect you to press me on this."
He told me today that he refused to answer questions on future actions and was really not pressed to do so.
Finally, the hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East referred to the constitutional position and appeared to suggest that if swifter progress had been made as to the various nice adjustments of the numbers of Europeans and Africans in the Legislature there would have been no disturbance at all. I wish the difficult parts of the world were as simple as that. I have spent a great deal of time on an imaginative approach to the Nyasaland constitutional problems. It is not an easy thing, and no one who knows the problem will suggest that it is. I have given a great deal of thought and attention to it and seen a great number of people and had many talks with the Governor about it. The hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East is quite right that the Africans from Nyasaland who saw me not very long ago —[An HON. MEMBER: "That was last June.") I have seen them since. I see them without their having necessarily to go and report afterwards to the hon. Member. The Africans who came to see me from Nyasaland went away hopeful that there would be constitutional changes of an imaginative character.
I must remind the House where we stand in regard to the Nyasaland Constitution. I have repeatedly made it clear in the House that the Nyasaland Constitution, which came into being in 1956, would have to run until May, 1960, when the life of the present Legislature expires. I have also explained from time to time to the House, in particular to the hon. Member for Rugby (Mr. J. Johnson), that I have had considerable discussions, and the Governor has had considerable discussions, with the interested parties with a view to working out a new Constitution suited to the problems of Nyasaland.
It was our intention to bring these discussions to a conclusion this month,
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and for that purpose the visit of my noble Friend Lord Perth was arranged. We wanted to have discussions through him with the Governor and with others, with all interested parties, as is natural and inevitable if they are to be successful, in a calm atmosphere in Nyasaland. Then came the disorders. The disorders in Nyasaland started before the visit of my noble Friend Lord Perth had been announced.
Mr. Callaghan: The reason why the Africans were so pleased after they saw the Colonial Secretary last June was that they thought that he had departed from his previous stand that he could make no changes until 1960. They left him under the impression that there were to be earlier changes.
Mr. Lennox-Boyd: I do not think that that is quite so. What they knew was that we would agree well before May, 1960, on what the changes thereafter were to be. Decisions, binding obligations and promises would have been entered into well before 1960. They were not as confused about that as the hon. Gentleman appears to be.
The disorders in Nyasaland started before the visit of Lord Perth had been announced. As soon as the announcement had been made, the Chief Secretary of Nyasaland interviewed Dr. Banda, told him about Lord Perth's visit and said that it was obviously necessary for the constitutional talks to take place in a calm atmosphere. In spite of this warning, and immediately afterwards, the Congress began to stir up even more widespread disorders, and it is their action which has led to the regrettable action which the Government has had to take today.
As I said this afternoon, I am afraid I cannot rid my mind of the feeling that there is something significant and sinister in the timing of all this in relation to the conclusion of the constitutional talks which the visit of my noble Friend would, I think, have brought about. I am forced to think that there are people in important positions in Nyasaland at the moment who do not want a tranquil atmosphere for talks and do not want the moderates to have a chance, or perhaps it is that they want to be able afterwards, when constitutional changes take place, to ascribe them to the violence that they have themselves created.

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None of this must deflect us from our purpose. When law and order have been restored, we will most certainly resume the constitutional talks. Towards the end of his speech the hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East asked me where we stood about the pledges given to the Africans of the Northern Territories. I say to him, with full truth, that we stand absolutely by those pledges, despite the fact that the Socialist Party has broken in a monstrous way the pledges given to the House by Lord Attlee when the Bill was passed.
7.44 p.m.
Mrs. Eirene White: All of us who took part in the very long debates in the House some years ago on Central African Federation must be distressed, though I think not surprised, at the outcome in Nyasaland. It is some years now since I was in that territory, but I have kept in touch, as have other hon. Members in the House, with events there. It has not been for lack of warning by those of us who have some knowledge of that country that the Government have reached the present deadlock, because ever since federation was imposed upon the people of Nyasaland it has been clear to anyone interested in that country that only the most exceptional imagination and statesmanship, not only by Her Majesty's Government but also by the Government of the Federation, could possibly avoid trouble arising in Nyasaland.
Only a few months ago I had the privilege of going to the United States and meeting a number of people there who were interested in African affairs. [An HON. MEMBER: "Oh."] I do not know why that is thought to be funny. Whenever they asked me to give some appraisal of the situation in East and Central Africa my reply always was that the place in which trouble was likely to occur was Nyasaland, because the conditions in Nyasaland are such that the people there are passionately concerned that they should have assurances which so far Her Majesty's Government have signally failed to give them.
They look round the rest of Africa and ask themselves, "What is it that distinguishes us in Nyasaland from the people of Uganda? What distinguishes us from the people of Tanganyika?
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What"—even more recently—"distinguishes us from the people of Somaliland?"
If ever there were people who are underdeveloped in Africa, it would be fair to say that politically the people of Somaliland are underdeveloped. Yet they have been given a promise that they will be almost catapulted into self-government in the immediate future, but the people of Nyasaland have been given no such pledge. On the contrary, they have failed to elicit from Her Majesty's Government any assurance that, if in 1960 they persist in their wish to dissociate themselves from the Federation in which Southern Rhodesia plays such a predominant part, they will have any consideration for that point of view.
It is quite true that, if one looks at the problem in Central Africa purely from the point of view of economics and finance, there are certain advantages to Nyasaland from being in the Federation. Those advantages are, in the minds of the Africans in Nyasaland, in no way commensurate with the tremendous disadvantage of being tied, as they feel possibly in perpetuity, to a country which, after all, many of them know very well. They may not understand the full constitutional meaning of federation, but there are very few people in Nyasaland who have not either themselves had direct experience of life for an African in Southern Rhodesia or had it second-hand from their relatives, because a considerable number of people from Nyasaland go to work in the Rhodesias and even in the Union of South Africa. Therefore, they know what they are talking about. They know what it means to live in a country in which the African is treated, time and time again, as a second-class citizen. For most of the Africans in Nyasaland it is just as simple as that. They want to be first-class citizens in their own country.
It is because they are so frightened of what may happen in 1960 and because they have had no real reassurance on that point that they have, regrettably indeed, taken matters into their own hands and have resorted to violence, although from such reports as we have been able to receive I find it very hard to believe that there is quite such a widespread conspiracy of such a nature as the Colonial Secretary has suggested. There were echoes in his speech, as my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr.

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Callaghan) quite rightly said, of speeches that we have heard on too many occasions in the House.
I have what I expect is one of the last letters that Dr. Banda sent to this country, not to myself, but to a mutual acquaintance, written precisely one week ago. Writing from his home in Limbe, he said:
"Though Federal and Southern Rhodesian troops are everywhere in Nyasaland and aeroplanes are droning overhead, the Africans are, at least up to the present, calm and even more determined to press their demands for secession and self-government. The only people who seem panicky and jittery are the Europeans, Asians and coloureds."
He added:
"… the spirit of the people here has surprised even me. … Women, if anything, are even more daring than men."
That, I may say, has been a not unusual occurrence in these affairs in Africa.
I have here also the protest that Dr. Banda sent on 23rd February to the Governor of Nyasaland against the sending of Southern Rhodesian troops into that country. That, surely, is one of the major stupidities of this whole situation. I have already said that, to put it at its lowest, trouble was possible in Nyasaland, and that that fact must have been evident to everyone for months past. There was the failure to give the political assurance that was the only way to meet the situation; but, arguing it simply on grounds of administrative and military preparedness, if Her Majesty's Government had had any intention of dealing with this matter in a statesmanlike way they would have made more intelligent preparation for it.
The most provocative thing that they could have done in an admittedly emotional situation was to bring in troops from Southern Rhodesia. That was the final act that would be expected by anybody knowing the territory to inflame things beyond control, and to lead to outbursts of violence which would be probably beyond the control of any African leader. This, I think, is made perfectly clear in Dr. Banda's statement to the Governor, in which he says:
"The sending of troops from Southern Rhodesia … confirms our original fears and suspicions about and against Federation."
He goes on to say that ever since last October there have been discussions between the European politicians in
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Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. They have been talking of a showdown, and it is believed this bringing in of troops from Southern Rhodesia is the showdown they have been discussing.
Whether that opinion of the situation is correct or not, it takes very little imagination to see that from the point of view of the Africans in Nyasaland, to bring in these troops must, to them, have been a signal for despair. The most elementary knowledge of the psychology of revolutionary movements would lead one to realise that if one really wanted to trigger off trouble in Nyasaland, the best way would be to bring in troops from the place that, above all, they feared.
I cannot conceive how any Government with a sense of real responsibility could have failed to foresee that this situation would arise. An hon. Friend whispers the suggestion that perhaps the Government did foresee it, and practised deliberate provocation. I should hesitate to go so far as to suggest that. I cannot believe that, at least, Her Majesty's Government in this country, foolish and misguided as they have shown themselves to be in one part of the Commonwealth after another, would be quite so stupid as to do that. But I should not be entirely surprised if there were not persons in Southern Rhodesia who would do that. Nobody who has followed the relationship between the Federal politicians in the Federal Government, under the influence of Sir Roy Welensky—who, I am afraid, we on this side find far less trustworthy than does the right hon. Gentleman—could be entirely free of a suspicion that there is an element of provocation in the situation.
I want to stress the failure, the abject failure, of Sir Roy Welensky and his colleagues in the Federal Government to do anything seriously to commend themselves to the Africans in Nyasaland. After all, they have had several years in which they might at least have done something. At every point they have said, "Look at what we are paying you out of the Federal Treasury"—and have thought that enough.
One may jeer at simple Africans who say, "We would rather be free and poor." They have had all these arguments about what they get, economically,

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out of the Federation dinned into them time and again. They may not know exactly what they say, but they say it with the kind of conviction that cannot be withstood. They say, "We want to be free of this domination. We realise from what you tell us that we may remain poor, but we would prefer to remain poor."
These people are not entirely stupid. They realise perfectly well that the two Rhodesias are dependent on them for their labour, and it is quite foolish to suggest, as a former hon. Member has suggested in a letter to The Times, that secession from the Federation would mean that there would remain no economic link with the other territories. The other territories are dependent on Nyasaland for their labour. That would not come to an end overnight.
The people of Nyasaland reject the argument that they can be bought into the Federation. It is not just wild Socialist talk to say that the Federal Government have so lamentably failed in trying to win over to a constructive partnership what is admittedly the most emotionally antagonistic part of the population in the Federation. The Economist, a newspaper which is not rabidly Socialist in its outlook but which happens to have an extremely well-informed connection in Central Africa, said last week, in its note on this situation in Nyasaland:
"These events come at a time when Sir Roy Welensky"—
this great statesman—
"has not yet taken an African into his Government, and before he has made a single liberal gesture towards the Africans of either Nyasaland or Northern Rhodesia."
I believe that Sir Roy has made one gesture: Africans can now dine on railway trains if they are first- or second-class passengers. When Sir Roy had the opportunity, with politicians from Nyasaland who have now been discredited by people who are more vigorously inclined—I think particularly of Mr. Chirwa, a man of great ability—he did nothing whatsoever to try to conciliate them, or to co-operate with the African politicians in the Federal Parliament at Salisbury. On the contrary, again and again he jeered at them. He tried to humiliate them. To my mind, and I have followed this with some care, Sir Roy Welensky
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simply threw away the possibility 'if bringing along the moderate opinion in Nyasaland that might have been conciliated and brought into some form of political partnership.
I believe that a considerable weight of responsibility rests on Sir Roy, but Her Majesty's Government here are not entirely free from responsibility, either. I do not wish to go over the recent constitutional discussions—my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East has dealt with that subject admirably—but I would remind the Colonial Secretary that in 1956, when the present Constitution was being discussed, I, accompanied by one or two other hon. Members who were all much concerned about the matter, pleaded with him that the 1956 Constitution was very far from adequate; that it was no sort of preparation.
We told him that with five African members for a country the size of Nyasaland it was ludicrous to expect them to learn the job of being members of a legislature and also to carry out the kind of political education and leadership needed in these politically backward, undeveloped countries. It was putting far too great a burden upon a handful of men. Is it any wonder, therefore, that outside the Legislature there has grown up a large organisation of the character of the African National Congress? A very great responsibility rests upon Her Majesty's Government.
As regards the present constitutional talks, the right hon. Gentleman has just said that it was agreed that there would be changes by May, 1960. That would be too late. What preparation is being given to African representatives who would wish to take part in vital constitutional talks in 1960 if the new Constitution is not to come into effect until 1960? Is it humanly fair to ask people in this situation, which they regard as of vital importance for the future of their people, to plunge themselves into discussions in that way without their being given time to prepare adequate representation?
I am perfectly certain that one of the basic causes of the present unrest in Nyasaland is the conviction on the part of Africans that, as far as they can see at present, they have no hope whatever of being adequately represented at the constitutional talks in 1960. Unless they have the conviction and assurance that they

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will have real spokesmen of their own in a position of standing at the constitutional conference of 1960, no one in the House should be surprised that they take action into their own hands.
I believe that the Federal politicians of Central Africa and Her Majesty's Government in this country also stand condemned. Although we deplore violence and we recognise that violence is not the way in which we wish matters to proceed, we cannot but sympathise with and understand the actions of people who, having no other method to their hand for their salvation, resort, unfortunately, to violence.
8.2 p.m.
Mr. Bernard Braine: I feel sure that all of us in the House who care for Africa and have been there, as I have, on many occasions, are filled with sorrow that this debate is taking place at all. I am filled with sorrow, too, at some of the things which have been said. Merry nights, so it is said, bring sober mornings of reflection. I cannot help feeling that right hon. and hon. Members opposite will soon come to the conclusion that many of the things they have said in the last few days would have been better left unsaid. I except the hon. Lady the Member for Flint, East (Mrs. White) who always makes her points in rational and moderate fashion, but I thought it was a little unworthy of her to refer to the Federal Prime Minister as someone who was untrustworthy, who took every opportunity to slight Africans, in view of the fact that he has only recently won an election in which he was supported substantially by large numbers of African voters throughout the Federation.
I thought it was singularly unworthy of the hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) to talk about a conspiracy instigated by the Federal Prime Minister. One could easily reply that there has been a concerted conspiracy on the part of certain people in Central Africa and in this country to wreck the chance of constitutional talks taking place in relation to the Federation as a whole, and Nyasaland in particular, in 1960. Such charges, I suggest, get us nowhere. They provoke antagonisms which make it difficult for men of good will of both races in Central Africa to press on with
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the task of conciliation and understanding. They make it increasingly difficult for the moderates who are working to establish a conciliatory atmosphere.
Such charges undermine the position of men like Sir Roy Welensky and play straight into the hands of extremists, both black and white. Whatever Sir Roy Welensky's faults may be—they are not great when compared with his virtues—he represents the best hope for Central Africa. It may be that there are people in the House—certainly there are people in Africa—who do not care very much if matters do pass into the hands of extremists. I care a great deal about it. I know that all my hon. Friends care about it, and I suspect that a good many hon. Members opposite care about it, too.
I agree with the hon. Lady the Member for Flint, East on one matter. Minorities in multi-racial territories are, of course, always unduly sensitive. There is the fear of being swamped and over-run. I thought that the great thing about the experiment in Central Africa was that we had set our hands to the task of creating a framework within which it was possible for both races to live without fear, for the African population in that part of the world to he brought to the point where they could take an equal share and, in countries like Nyasaland—let us be quite frank about it—in the course of time, where they could take the predominant share in their Government.
Mr. Austen Albu: Can the hon. Gentleman explain how this will be possible so long as Africans are not allowed to learn skilled trades and there is no technical education provided for them, as there is not in Southern Rhodesia?
Mr. Braine: On the contrary, I should have thought that the hon. Member for Edmonton (Mr. Albu), who has visited the country, ought to know that the pace at which education is progressing in Central Africa is as great as anywhere in Africa today. It is true that a great deal needs to be done, but, after all, we are dealing with a people who, only a generation ago, did not know that the spoken word could be written down or that there were such simple aids to living as the wheel, the loom or the plough. This

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is part of the difficulty of ensuring rapid advance.
Mr. Albu: I think the hon. Gentleman misunderstood me. The point is that, by law, Africans are not allowed to learn skilled trades, so how can they be expected to advance towards equality with Europeans?
Mr. Braine: In this debate, we are discussing primarily the affairs of Nyasaland, and I refuse to believe that the hon. Gentleman's assertion is correct in relation to that territory.
I am a sincere believer in the rightness and good sense of partnership. I believe that the gulf between the races ought to be bridged and can be bridged. For that reason, I say now, as I have said in previous debates of this kind, that all of us ought to weigh our words very carefully to ensure that this great work is not undone.
I have no quarrel at all with the unanimous report of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association to which the hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East referred. I entirely agree that there is in Nyasaland a need for more African representation. But we have already been told by my right hon. Friend that we were at the point of having consultations on the spot, and the Minister of State was on his way to have these consultations, when these disturbances broke out. It may be, since so many suspicions have been thrown about, that they broke out with the object of preventing the consultations taking place. At least, it is clear from the statements of some African political leaders that their object is not constitutional advance within the Federation, but a break with the Federation altogether.
The implication behind everything that the hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East said was that the great mass of the people, the millions in Nyasaland, are behind this movement. I do not know what the source of the hon. Gentleman's information is. The Governor at his Press conference the other day referred to the fact that the African National Congress numbers 3,000 persons. Whether they can be said to be representative of the millions of inarticulate Africans I do not know. They may well claim to be. All I do know is that there are many other Africans, some of them political leaders—Mr.
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Chirwa has been mentioned—who are in fear of their lives as the result of extremists gaining control of this organisation.
The hon. Member for Cardiff, SouthEast—I noted his words—argued that the Federal Government wanted to force the issue. He said that they had seized upon these disturbances as an excuse and wanted to force the issue before 1960. All the evidence points in the reverse direction. The extremist leaders in Nyasaland were seeking to force the issue to make talks now or in 1960 an impossibility.
Before I heard my right hon. Friend's speech I was filled with a number of doubts and misgivings. It is a good thing that a debate of this kind is taking place, because it has enabled my right hon. Friend to sweep away rumour and innuendo and to state the facts of the situation. His speech convinced me, as I am sure it convinced every reasonable Member in the House, that the action taken by the Governor of Nyasaland in declaring an emergency was correct.
There are two questions that we have to decide. The first is: did the extent of the disorders which were taking place in the Northern Province and elsewhere in Nyasaland justify the extreme step of declaring an emergency? The second is: was the build-up of threats, of intimidation—and, to use my right hon. Friend's words, of actual plans for widespread murder—such as to make an out break of violence inevitable? If the answer in either case is. "Yes", then the step taken by the Governor was justified. But it seems from what my right hon. Friend has said that the answer is, "Yes" in both cases.
I have here a copy of East Africa and Rhodesia, dated 26th February. It gives a factual account of disturbances which have been taking place in Nyasaland. This was before the declaration of the emergency. It refers to an African mob smashing communications at Fort Hill and to four Europeans in Fort Hill, three men and a woman, housebound and surrounded by 250 demonstrating Africans, who had to be rescued by the police. It refers to the wife of the local representative of the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association who had been injured earlier and who had to be flown to Lusaka. It also refers to three other Europeans who were removed by road.

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It refers to riots at Karonga. It refers to the seizure of the airfield at Fort Hill. The newspaper says that similar disturbances broke out elsewhere.
This was on Friday, 20th February, only two or three days before the hon. Member for Wednesbury (Mr. Stonehouse) made his remarks to African audiences in Southern Rhodesia telling people to stand up for their rights—no violence, but to stand up for their rights. I would emphasise that several days before the hon. Member for Wednesbury was addressing large numbers of Africans elsewhere in the Federation violent disturbances were already taking place. The paper says:
"On the Sunday a police vehicle was stoned at Ndirande, where a crowd of 700 Africans gathered outside a hall in which there was a meeting of provincial representatives of the Nyasaland African Congress. Mr. H. B. Chipembere is said to have told the meeting—the speeches were relayed by loudspeakers to the crowd—that Africans would fight on, despite the shootings at Karonga. Every European was now an enemy of every Nyasaland African."
Without commenting on that, which is the sole evidence that I have or that any hon. Member has, that seems to add up to a serious situation.
Mr. Callaghan: On Thursday, 26th February, following that, the spokesman of the Nyasaland Government said that there was no question of any need of a state of emergency in Nyasaland. That was after all that had taken place.
Mr. Braine: The hon. Member is quoting, as he quoted before, the report in The Times, in which the Governor said that it was not necessary to have a state of emergency to deal with dissidents. I am not talking about dissidents. I am talking about actual outbreaks of violence. I am talking about a situation of violence in which the lives and persons of various people were at stake.
Mr. Callaghan: Part of my case is that the Government of Nyasaland had said on more than one occasion that there was no need for a state of emergency. One of the occasions on which they said that was Thursday, 26th February. This is a different matter from the one we have been discussing today, as to what the Governor said yesterday afternoon. My point is that right the way through this series of incidents, which have been
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fairly serious, the Government have said, "We can handle the situation. We do not need a state of emergency to deal with it".
Mr. Braine: The hon. Member can put his interpretation on what he aliens the Governor has said from time to time. I am not commenting on that, because I do not know what the Governor has said, apart from what I have seen in The Times.
However, I would remind the hon. Gentleman that the late Sir Stafford Cripps said nine times that the £ would not be devalued before it was devalued. It may well be that one of the worst things that any Governor can do is to talk about taking emergency powers before the situation has built up to the point where it is clearly desirable that he should do so and be in a position to enforce those powers and to ensure the safety of all concerned. I believe that that is what really happened.
The hon. Gentleman and the hon. Lady have objected to the removal of Dr. Banda from the territory to Southern Rhodesia. I can understand something of the argument advanced by the hon. Lady and I should like my hon. Friend to confirm whether I am right in saying that if Dr. Banda had to be taken into custody—I am not saying whether the step was justified or not—there was not a prison in the territory which could hold him and that, in fact, demonstrators had already attacked one prison and had released a number of prisoners confined therein.
Mr. Wedgwood Benn: If there was not a prison in Nyasaland which could hold Dr. Banda, does it not suggest that there is a very large majority of Africans in Nyasaland who support his cause?
Mr. Braine: Not at all. A few hundred determined Malayan Communists kept their country in a state of terror for a number of years, pinning down vast numbers of troops. Cyprus is another example. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] Hon. Members opposite should not cheer too loudly and too soon. The encouragement which is sometimes given, no doubt for the noblest motives, to lawlessness and murder costs our country dear.
Mr. Sydney Silverman: I doubt whether the hon. Member really meant to say what he did, which occasioned ironic cheers. He said that Cyprus was another example. He has perhaps forgotten what it was of which he was citing Cyprus as an example. He said a small minority of people could produce a situation even though the great majority were loyal supporters of the administration. Is he really saying that Cyprus was an example of that?
Mr. Braine: I defy the hon. Member to say that it is not. In a situation over a number of years in which any man who does not agree with the terrorists is rewarded by being shot in the back of the neck, there is no means of ascertaining exactly what the majority of the people feel. The hon. Gentleman is advancing a very stupid argument.
Here was a situation where a relatively small number of people were known to be planning—we have the word of my right hon. Friend for this—a campaign of intimidation and murder, where, in fact, disturbances had broken out, where people felt insecure, and the Governor, on his own initiative, asked for troops.
My memory goes back to what happened when the party opposite comprised the Government of this country, in 1948. A state of emergency was proclaimed in part of Malaya—I think I am right in saying about July of that year. In the period May to June scores of Chinese, Malays and Britons were murdered. Might not this have been saved if the introduction of the state of emergency had not been delayed?
I do not believe that here, thousands of miles away from the scene, we have the right to throw stones at the man who has the responsibility for maintaining order, or to say that this is the wrong time to take this step. I believe that we should send out a message of support for and confidence in this dedicated colonial servant who is facing what Sir Hugh Foot faced in Cyprus and Sir Edward Gent faced in the Federation of Malaya, a situation of the utmost peril.
A great deal of play was made by the hon. Gentleman the Member for Cardiff, South-East about the Governor's statement as reported in The Times. What the Governor did say was that a state of emergency was not needed in Nyasaland
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to act against dissidents. I believe that that was probably at that time a correct and proper thing to say. When the state of emergency was declared the Governor knew that he was in a position to declare it.
In short, we are concerned with the lives of people, not merely Europeans. We are concerned in this case with Africans, some of them leaders and moderates. The Governor has said that the vast majority of the chiefs are loyally supporting the Administration in this present emergency.
Mr. F. M. Bennett: Would my hon. Friend care to recall that the last time there were riots in Nyasaland, back in 1953–54, it was precisely the loyal Africans who were co-operating with the Government who were placed in danger, who were threatened and beaten up. That was the last time when there was trouble. It exactly supports what my hon. Friend has said.
Mr. Braine: I entirely agree with my hon. Friend.
I do not wish to detain the House longer, because a number of other hon. Members may wish to speak, but it seems to me that what is important is that when the Administration on the spot are faced with a serious, threatening situation, in which law and order is breaking down fast, they have a duty to introduce emergency powers as quickly as possible. I do not despair that in the long run we shall find a way through in Central Africa, but we shall not do so if right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite are to seize every opportunity to make the task of those who have the responsibility more difficult. It is for that reason that I support the action which has been taken, and endorse the speech which my right hon. Friend has made.
8.24 p.m.
Mr. John Hynd: I should like to take up the last point of the hon. Gentleman the Member for Essex, South-East (Mr. Braine), when he criticised those who make the task of those on the spot more difficult. The whole point of this debate upon the emergency in Nyasaland is that we are criticising the Government and the Colonial Secretary precisely for creating a situation in which a state of emergency now or in the very near future would have become inevitable.

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I would make this further point about what the hon. Gentleman said. He was arguing that the troubles in Nyasaland are not the responsibility of most of the Nyasaland people, but are the responsibility of a small minority of terrorists, and that the majority of the moderate Africans, as he called them, are afraid for their lives. I ask the Government this question: if this is so, why have they not long since given this great majority of moderate Africans the opportunity of taking control of their own affairs and of the extremists by giving them the opportunity of achieving, adequate representation on their national authority and in the Federation? That is one of the reasons why we are again criticising the Government on this occasion.
I want to remind the Secretary of State that one of the reasons why we are so concerned in this House about this situation, as I hope he will bear in mind, and right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite, too, throughout the debate, is that this is not just another Cuba or another Indonesia, with a civil war going on, or disturbances between peoples for whom we have no responsibility in particular, or in whom we have no special interest. These are territories where there are large numbers of people who are of our own blood and sometimes of our own families.
There are groups of white people and people of other communities throughout the vast continent of Africa and millions of African people as well for whom we have a special responsibility and who look to us for protection, and if any right hon. or hon. Gentleman opposite suggests that we on this side are not concerned with the fate of the white population over there I would say, to correct him, that I for one have relatives in Nyasaland at present and that I am very concerned about them and that I am concerned, also, for the other white settlers and white workers in Nyasaland and throughout Africa.
It is for that reason that the party on this side of the House and, indeed, many responsible journalists all over the world for months have been warning that precisely this kind of treatment of African peoples would lead to a holocaust in the whole of Africa. It had already begun in Algeria and was boiling up in other parts of Africa, and could quite easily
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lead to a situation in which the lives of white people would not be worth a snap of the fingers. It is, therefore, vitally important that we should be extremely careful about the way in which we handle such a situation, which is primarily the responsibility of this Government. It is a responsibility which they have dismally failed to carry out.
The Colonial Secretary showed the weakness of his case tonight when he finished up on that dramatic note about the alleged betrayal by the party on this side of the House to carry out the pledge given in 1951 by Mr. Attlee that we would try to make federation work once it came into operation. He recalled that it was when the Labour Party formed the Government that the idea of federation first arose.
Let me correct the right hon. Gentleman's history. Let me remind him, for the record, that what he described as having happened was not, in fact, quite what happened. What happened, as many hon. Members will remember—I am speaking only from memory and I am open to correction by the Minister if I am wrong—was that the first conversations were opened in Central Africa by my right hon. Friend the Member for Wakefield (Mr. Creech Jones), when he was the Colonial Secretary, to discuss constitutional improvements in those territories.
Federation was not the issue at that time and it was when his successor took office that the question of federation came up. A White Paper was produced, and there was a draft scheme, and my right hon. Friend went to Central Africa to discuss this scheme with the Africans and with the white population as a proposition for consideration, and we supported, in principle, the idea of federating those territories for their mutual benefit. So far, the right hon. Gentleman was correct, but we made this very important stipulation, that there was no intention of forcing federation upon the African populations and that in so far as federation became accepted it would be accepted with their agreement and would be adjusted in its constitutional provisions to meet African wishes.
The House will remember that after these meetings in Africa there were doubts and suspicions, particularly among the people of Nyasaland, because they

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were specially afraid of coming under the domination of Salisbury and becoming another South Africa. My right hon. Friend then suggested that they should go back and discuss with their people the draft scheme for federation. He promised them that there would be a further conference in London within six months when they could come back, having consulted their people, to discuss the issue again to see whether they were more in a mood to accept the general idea and from there to proceed to discuss the details of the scheme.
That was the position when the Labour Government were in office. A General Election intervened, and the Conservative Party came to power. What happened? A conference was not called six months later, in London, to discuss the idea of federation, or to consult African wishes about federation. A conference of representatives from these territories was called for the purpose of completing the scheme of federation and putting it into operation.
It was for that reason that the Africans refused to send their representatives, or, if they did send them, they were sent merely as observers. The situation which arose after the General Election of 1951 was entirely different from that which was visualised when the federation idea was first mooted by the Labour Government. Mr. Attlee, as Leader of the Opposition, then said that if federation came into operation we should have no alternative but to try to make it work.
What we had in mind, however, was a scheme of federation on the basis of the White Paper, which would make adequate provision for safeguarding African interests through the African Affairs Board. What happened? The Under-Secretary of State and his colleagues know very well what happened to the promises which were given to the Africans about the authority of the African Affairs Board and about how the powers and authority of that Board have been completely vitiated since.
That was a further stage towards the disillusionment of the African. Partnership was the inspiring idea behind federation, but ten years have rolled by since it was first mooted. Where is its expression in the present Constitution, or in the statements or acts of Sir Roy Welensky and his colleagues during the operation
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of federation? No attempt has been made to put partnership into operation. We know that the one preoccupation, particularly of the Africans in Nyasaland, who are a very special case, and of the Africans in Northern Rhodesia, too, is that they feared—although they did not know it for a fact until a day ago—that one of the things that would happen through the federal scheme, which has been imposed upon them against their will and without full consultation with them or giving them adequate representation, would be the end of the protection of Her Majesty's Government. The history of the African Affairs Board was one of the evidences which they had in mind.
I am sure that many hundreds of thousands of Africans in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia who know anything about federation did not realise that that protection had gone already. They have always believed that somewhere in the ultimate they would be afforded some protection from Her Majesty's Government and from Her Majesty the Queen. That has been the inspiration of the people in Nyasaland. My hon. Friend the Membor for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) referred to this as a nationalist movement. I question whether that is a correct description of the present position in Nyasaland. It is not yet specifically a nationalist movement. It is rather a movement of loyal colonial peoples against absorption by an authority which will take them outside the protection of the Colonial Office.
We know the threats which Sir Roy Welensky and his friends have made from time to time about their intention to defy the Colonial Office and to get complete control of the African in Central Africa. It is that fear which has now been dramatically confirmed by the gesture made by the Minister this afternoon, when he supported the action of the Federal Government in Central Africa in expelling a Member of this House who had gone there to make inquiries into the situation. That was the dramatic turning point, when it was demonstrated to the whole world that the protection of Her Majesty's Government for protected British persons in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia had already come to an end. Not only are we not prepared to give any protection to our African subject, but we are not even prepared to

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protect Members of Parliament, to whom they look for protection under what they understood was still the constitutional position.
Therefore, my own immediate reaction, when I heard about what had happened to my hon. Friend the Member for Wednesbury (Mr. Stonehouse) and noted the Minister's attitude in supportng the action taken by the Federal authority in Central Africa, was to say to many of my hon. Friends in the Lobby, "This is the one thing which will guarantee that within hours real trouble will begin in Nyasaland and Central Africa. This will be the starting point." That is precisely what has happened. It is since that event that Africans have really begun to get excited. In a matter of a few hours these demonstrations have taken place, the shootings have begun and Africans are dropping in the streets. Under the emergency regulations, deaths have already occurred.
I have reminded the Secretary of State of what the Labour Party's attitude has been to federation from the beginning. It is no good his trying to suggest that the present situation was created because, ten years ago, the Labour Party suggested to the African people that it might be worth their while to consider federation. The whole record of the Labour Party since the war has been one of assisting colonial peoples to build up towards independence, right through from India, Burma, Ceylon, Western Africa and Tanganyika and the rest.
Everyone knows the story, but it is rather sobering to recall that not so many years ago, when the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill) was attacking the Labour Government of those days for giving liberation to India, he was taking precisely the same line as his successors took in Suez, as they took in Cyprus, and as they are now taking in Central Africa, when he advocated that Britain should remain in India at all costs. What those costs would have been we can well imagine. Yet now we find our present Prime Minister, on his recent visit to India, making public statements in which he and his Government were taking credit for having led India to self-government. That is the contrast between the two parties.
Sir Peter Macdonald: The hon. Member forgets that the India
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Constitution was based on the Report of a Royal Commission which sat for several months before India obtained her freedom and that on that Commission all parties were represented, including the Conservative Party.
Mr. Hynd: I am well aware of that, but I was referring to what the hon. Member's own Leader of the Opposition of those days said at the time in the House when we implemented the independence of India and gave her freedom. If the hon. Member is not aware of that, it is time that he was. I recommend him to read the debates and compare what was said then with the boasts of the present Prime Minister about his Government giving India her freedom.
The Government must learn at long last the lesson that only by a policy of assisting these people—whom we can no longer keep in thraldom as we have been able to do for centuries—in their aspirations towards independence and helping them towards effective self-government, and maybe accepting delays in achieving practical steps towards progress which might be achieved in a few months, but which, by compromise and discussion, might take a few years, can we achieve the position in Africa which we have achieved in India.
If we do not take that course and we proceed with the terrible, fixed idea which was represented in Suez and in the Cyprus policy and now is being expressed in Central Africa, nothing will more easily and more fatally guarantee that explosion in the whole of Africa which all enlightened opinion throughout the world fears and has been fearing for a long time and which could bring about the most serious thing that can happen in this world apart from a clash of the great Powers armed with hydrogen bombs. Should this occur as a result of this mistaken and criminal policy on the part of Her Majesty's Government, it will not be right hon. and hon. Members on this side of the House who will have to accept responsibility for the fate of the unfortunate white people who will be left to face the resultant situation in Africa.
8.40 p.m.
Sir Archer Baldwin: Like my hon. Friend the Member for Essex, South-East (Mr. Braine), I feel a great deal of sorrow that a debate of this kind

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should ever have taken place in this House. During the time I have been here it has always been my hope that colonial affairs would be dealt with on a bipartisan policy. Let us quarrel as much as we like about our domestic policies, but what we are having at the moment, a kind of war between two political parties over colonial affairs is really tragic.
Mr. E. L. Mallalieu: May I ask the hon. Gentleman one question? Would he tell the House what is the difference, in his view, between a bipartisan policy and a thorough-going Tory policy?
Sir A. Baldwin: I should have thought myself that a bipartisan policy was a policy agreed by the two political parties, OT indeed all three parties, and it is a matter of great regret to me that that is not so. I think it is also a matter of great regret in the territories affected.
In a small way, I feel a certain amount of liability for the Central African Federation, because I had the privilege of being one of the four hon. Members of this House who went out before the Federation was brought about. We agreed that federation was advisable, and we signed an agreed report. Among the members of that delegation were the hon. Member for Bristol, North-East (Mr. Coldrick), and, ironically enough, Mr. Stanley Evans, who was then the hon. Member for Wednesbury, who has been a great loss to this House—a loss which I regret as much as any which has taken place—because of his rugged commonsense. The other members of the party were my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary and myself.
We travelled throughout the three territories of Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and we had between forty and fifty meetings with all bodies of opinion in those territories, both white and coloured, and we made a pretty good survey. It was after that survey and the discussions which we had after our meetings that we decided that it was advisable to make a recommendation that federation should be brought about.
The hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) said that the inhabitants of Nyasaland had always been peace-loving and had got on well together. That was the impression of the delegation when we went to Nyasaland, which was the last of the territories
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that we visited. We had not had a disagreeable meeting in any of the other territories, and when we got to Nyasaland our impression was that the co-operation and good feeling between the European and the native were really first-class.
All that was shattered at the last meeting that was held. A meeting was arranged by the Provincial Commissioner at Blantyre, when we were supposed to meet local Africans. When we got to the meeting, the Provincial Commissioner said that he regretted that he felt compelled to allow members of the African Congress to come to that meeting. He said, "If I do not agree that they shall be there, there will be trouble." These members of the African Congress were not natives of Nyasaland. They had come over the border from Northern Rhodesia entirely to carry on the mischief which they have multiplied since then. When we had that meeting, we knew that the Provincial Commissioner was right in letting these people come to the meeting and take charge of it, because we saw on the green outside a body of natives who had been brought there in order to create trouble if the Congress leaders had not been permitted to come into the meeting.
The meeting was dominated entirely by those Congress leaders, and the local people had little to say. That has been going on ever since, and if the Nyasaland natives had been left alone and brought on quietly, as we had been bringing them on, there would be no trouble there today. The trouble is entirely due to rabble rousers, and I am glad that the Governor, supported by my right hon. Friend, has taken immediate steps to stop, if possible, any more bloodshed. [An HON. MEMBER: "Started, not stopped."] There has been more bloodshed and there have been more people killed in Nyasaland in the last ten days than were killed in Southern Rhodesia in fifteen years. It is not sufficiently realised that in the fifteen years when Southern Rhodesia had near-Dominion status not one trouble was ever brought to the home Government to settle.
Mr. J. Grimond: May I ask a question for information? If twenty-two people have, as I believe, been killed by the security forces today, how many have been killed by the African Congress?
Sir A. Baldwin: May I say that the security forces have killed only one or two of the natives whereas—
Mr. Grimond: The hon. Gentleman said that more people had been killed in Nyasaland in the last ten days than were killed in Southern Rhodesia in fifteen years. Can he say how many have been killed by the African Congress?
Sir A. Baldwin: I do not know. I know that they are partly responsible and that other people are partly responsible, includine some of the Opposition who are stirring up trouble in those territories.
Mr. A. Fenner Brockway: Will the hon. Gentleman say—
Sir A. Baldwin: I do not propose to give way again. What I have said is correct, that there was no trouble in Southern Rhodesia during the whole of the time of Sir Godfrey Huggins and Sir Roy Welensky. I am sorry to see the vendetta against Sir Roy Welensky, who has clone so much for Southern Rhodesia, which has been carried on in the debate tonight. At least three hon. Gentlemen who have spoken have attacked him. I can understand the hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East doing so, because he and Sir Roy Welensky crossed swords two or three years ago, and the hon. Gentleman takes every opportunity of attacking him in this House when he gets the chance.
It has been said that Sir Roy Welensky was responsible for the troops going into Nyasaland. The fact is that the Governor of Nyasaland, seeing that bloodshed was coming, requested that troops should be sent to Nyasaland to prevent bloodshed, and Sir Roy sent the First Battalion of the King's African Rifles on 20th February. The King's African Rifles, who are there now helping to keep peace, are in the main African natives, including many African warrant officers, and they are helping, as far as possible, to keep down attempts at bloodshed.
Therefore, I do not want it said that Sir Roy Welensky wants to dominate Nyasaland. He has not the slightest desire to do so. Why should he? Nyasaland is a liability to the Federation—[An HON. MEMBER: "Why not let it go then?"] If it were not for the wealth and good will of the Northern Rhodesia
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Territories, the standard of living of the Nyasalanders would be very much lower. That should be remembered because, despite all the criticisms of Southern Rhodesia, one has to admit that the standard of living of the African there is a great deal ahead of that in any of the other Territories in the Federation. I hope that the irresponsible statements made against Sir Roy Welensky will cease, because they will do a great deal of harm. I am sure that when the history of this period is written, it will give little kudos to the Opposition for their attitude.
Hon. Members opposite seem to suggest that my hon. Friends and the Colonial Office want to keep the black man where he has been for the last 2,000 years. The record of what the European has done in the Rhodesias and Nyasaland disproves that. The Europeans have brought the Africans along tremendously, are doing so, and will continue to do so. The agitation from Dr. Banda and his colleagues is an attempt to scotch any social or constitutional advance for Nyasaland in the near future. Those men do not want a fresh constitution for Nyasaland unless it is their constitution and unless they are the leaders. They are rabble rousers. They want the British to go out of that territory, but not because of any feeling of sympathy for the African. They are using the African as a tool and are rabble rousing to magnify the troubles.
I hope that we shall support the Governments of these three Territories and that we shall take firm steps to prevent further nonsense from the African Congress, which is a small body of Africans with one object, leadership of its poorer brethren. There is no anxiety to improve the welfare of the people. They believe that because Ghana has its own leader, they should he in a similar position.
I hope that we will look after the African native and see that he has fair play. If we take a firm line, there are plenty of Africans who will come into the open who are at present intimidated. Only a few days ago there was an attack in Nyasaland when 1,000 Africans threatened the life of a chief. That is the sort of thing that is going on. We shall get the Africans with us much more if we stop intimidation and if the Government here and the Government of the

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Rhodesias take firm steps to see that those people who want trouble are sent away from the territory.
8.53 p.m.
Mr. J. Grimond: I find it very strange that the hon. Member for Leominster (Sir A. Baldwin) should feel that this is not a subject which the House of Commons should debate. It now seems that emergency laws of one sort and another are in force throughout Central Africa and Kenya, and yet, apparently, this is a matter about which Parliament should not feel deeply. [An HON. MEMBER: "He did not say that."] At any rate, he said that there should be a bipartisan policy. The fact is that there is not a bipartisan policy, and no amount of wishful thinking—
Mr. Patrick Maitland: Surely the point made by my hon. Friend so eloquently—[An HON. MEMBER: "He can speak for himself."]—he is a little deaf and he does not hear these remarks—was that a rather tawdry, sordid, partisan quarrel about a man being deported was unworthy of the House of Commons.
Mr. Grimond: It is exactly that conception from which we should get away. It is an exceedingly serious issue and not a tawdry, partisan quarrel.
It astonishes me that hon. Members opposite have learned nothing from the Suez affair. We are to go through the whole process again. Again and again we have had examples of what happens when we continue on this course. Tonight we have heard the argument which we always hear—that this is a matter of a small disaffected minority, that the majority are unswervingly loyal to the Government, that it is a question of intimidation.
I am afraid that that argument has been heard in every similar situation since history began. We now know that the British can no longer bat on this wicket. We are not capable of holding down vast areas of Africa by force. The staggering thing is that throughout vast areas of Africa today the ordinary process of law has had to be abrogated and emergency regulations introduced so that men like Clutton-Brock can be sent to prison without charge and without trial—and it cannot be said that be is a dangerous agitator,
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a disloyal and treasonable man out to make trouble. One cannot say that and hope to be believed.
I am bound to say that I did not find it so when the Colonial Secretary said that the hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) had run out of argument. I thought that his argument was as clear as daylight. It is simply this: are we going on to another Cyprus situation? Are we going in for repression and eventually having to give way to force what we refuse to reason? That is the only argument.
I accept that this is an exceptionally difficult situation, and notoriously so when we have an area in which there are not only native Africans but settlers. Nyasaland up to now has had an extraordinarily calm history, has been pro-British and came under us of its own will. We do not want to give the impression that we are going to hand it over to the settlers who, for better or worse, the Nyasalanders distrust.
I hope the Under-Secretary of State will tell us what is the exact situation. It was alleged by the hon. Member for Leominster that there had been a large number of deaths in Nyasaland—that 20 people had been killed. For the purposes of the record, I would say that so far as I know twenty people were killed today by security forces. Those are the only people so far killed in this territory in the last few days. There may have been all sorts of other troubles; I do not know.
Let us get this matter in proportion. As I understand it, we are taking these measures because it is feared that the whole territory will blow up as a result of some conspiracy. We are apparently not allowed to be told what is the evidence of this conspiracy, but it is sufficiently drastic to make the Colonial Secretary feel that the Governor must take the most damaging steps. Whether we believe in federation or not, the steps taken today will make it almost impossible to proceed with federation.
I hope that we shall be told more about this conspiracy. It is extremely serious that a conspiracy of this type should be discovered at this time. It cannot be said that it has grown up for no reason at all because of one or two disaffected agitators. I understand that the Colonial Secretary reaffirmed definitely the undertakings given. As I understand it, that

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means that Nyasaland will not be forced into a closer federation with Southern Rhodesia against its will; that in fact it means that the British Government will remain responsible for the welfare of the people of Nyasaland.
I think we are inclined to forget in recent years that the first responsibility of a colonial Power is towards its dependent people, and that is not a responsibility which this House should simply wave aside. I agree that the settlers there may have done all they can to improve the standard of life and education of the Africans. I agree that the Africans will not be able to improve their standard of living very greatly unless the settlers help them. All this is true. We know that what matters is the status that people feel, that whether we are treated as human beings or not is all that ultimately matters to all of us, not only to Africans, and that no amount of patriarchy will ever work.
I suggest to the Under-Secretary of State that he should make it absolutely definite once again that we are not going to throw over our responsibility. I feel that one of our great faults in colonial affairs in general is the feeling of indefiniteness and uncertainty about the future that exists and that the strongest power or the strongest will is going to win. I am one of those who believes that ultimately power has to be given to the Africans. We hope that the white settlers will help to form a multi-racial society, but the ultimate power must rest with the Africans in Nyasaland. No doubt it must come gradually, but during the interim period the Government must govern, and they will succeed in governing only if they make it absolutely clear what the end is. The only possible end for a democratic people in the Western world is government by the people for their own ends.
9.0 p.m.
Sir Peter Macdonald: This is a very sad occasion for me. It is over thirty years since, as a young Member of this House, I first visited Central Africa. I remember that when I returned I had a definite idea of what should be the future of Central Africa. I felt that it should be a federation of both the Rhodesias and Nyasaland. Several hon. Members and I—including
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one or two Members of the Liberal Party, which meant something m those days—pressed our views upon the Government of the day. We did not get federation, but we got a Royal Commission, under Lord Bledisloe. That Commission advised against federation at that time, but the reasons upon which I then based my memorandum to the Colonial Office still exist.
The two Rhodesias and Nyasaland involved an administrative responsibility far in excess of what their finances could bear. They were all poor territories. They had great potentialities, but, certainly in the case of Nyasaland, no minerals. At that time there were about 2 million natives and less than 1,000 Europeans there. A few Scots settlers were growing tobacco and cotton, and the rest were civil servants.
It was obvious at that time, and I believe that it is still true, that Nyasaland could not live on its own resources. I believe that that is the view of the leaders in Southern and Northern Rhodesias, and of most people who know the territory. Nyasaland has not been brought into the Federation because it will be an asset. It has a valuable labour force, but that labour force will go to the Rhodesias in any case, because it has nowhere else to go. One sees the Nyasa boy in every household in Africa, and in the mines and other workplaces. Anybody who knows him will agree that he is a very nice African. Everybody likes him. He is a very good citizen if he is brought up in the right way.
Today hon. Members opposite disclaim any responsibility for federation, but a Federation Bill was passed in this House. At that time the Opposition leaders expressed the hope that it would work, but in the last year or so the present Members of the Opposition who are supposed to be responsible for colonial affairs have done nothing but try to disrupt the Federation—and no one more than the hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan). He has done more damage to our relations with the Central African Government than any man I have known since I became a Member. I have never seen such a sense of irresponsibility as has been demonstrated by him, not only today but ever since he has been a Member of the Opposition front bench representing Socialist colonial policy. It

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is the most disastrous thing that has ever happened to the Labour Party.
Everybody says that the Governor of Nyasaland was opposed to force being used, but he has now been obliged to take measures to maintain law and order in his territory. If he did not do that, what would he be there for? We have Governors in these Territories to maintain law and order. Why are there disorder and riots today? It is a long story, which goes back for a long time. I have known these territories for thirty years, and I was over there last year.
In Southern Rhodesia is the finest type of British settler that any country has ever had. Some of them have been there for generations and intend to make their homes there. Their children have been brought up there. They have always been on the friendliest and best terms possible with the African people. [An HON. MEMBER: "As servants."] It is utter nonsense to talk about servants. Go into the industries in Salisbury or in any other part of Southern or Northern Rhodesia and find equal service being given. The labour force is composed of Europeans—the technical people are mostly Europeans because they are qualified—and the best housed and best fed Africans anywhere in Africa. Everything possible is provided for them in the way of educational facilities, hospitals and schools. I have not seen any sign of discontent among them. It is all nonsense to say that these people are discontented. The same applies to Northern Rhodesia, as far as I could see. I have been seeing it for more than thirty years. I was in Nyasaland quite recently.
Why has the emergency occurred? It is because of Dr. Banda, [Laughter.] Yes. Until recently, he has not lived in Nyasaland for more than thirty years, but he carried on his nefarious work from London, from which propaganda was going out all the time. I do not know who was providing it, but in Nyasaland it was causing disturbance, created by people brought in from other territories. That is the situation today, and it is very serious indeed.
Nobody in the House can be pleased at what we see happening today in Central Africa. It casts no reflection on the present Government. The blame can-
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not be put upon them. They have done their utmost to bring about a happier, more peaceful and more prosperous relationship between the various communities in those territories. I beg hon. Gentlemen on the opposite side of the House to realise what they are doing to their own people who are in these territories by stirring up strife—because that is what hon. Gentlemen are doing—and ill-feeling between the Europeans and the native Africans. I deplore it more than anything else I have seen in this House. One day it will react on the heads of the very people who are bringing it about.
9.8 p.m.
Mr. Wedgwood Benn: The greatest case for having this debate is to expose for all to read the views of hon. Gentlemen such as the hon. Member for the Isle of Wight (Sir P. Macdonald). We have listened today to pure fairy tales from the distant past, which bear no relationship to the world in which we live.
We have heard of happy natives working for their masters and only stirred up by agitators from outside. The debate s to be wound up tonight by a rabid British nationalist who himself has been in favour of taking all kinds of wild action on the part of British people against others, so we may get a more sympathetic British viewpoint on nationalism than we have had from some Government supporters.
The whole debate has had a little bit of dust upon it. Dust has gathered on the words as they dropped from the Colonial Secretary. Those who heard about the rumours of immediate massacres being prepared can only have remembered what was said about Dr. Jagan, in British Guinea, where we were told that there were "exceptional purchases of petrol" with a view to burning Georgetown. When we asked how they knew, the Government could not tell us. Then Dr. Jagan turned up in the end as the Chief Minister.
We cannot get rid of the Dr. Jagans, Archbishop Makarioses and Dr. Bandas, because they represent the people of their own countries and the aspirations of their own people.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) said, we are discussing not just the immediate situation in Nyasaland and the anxiety of

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people in Nyasaland for a greater share of responsibility in their own affairs, but, first, the future of federation, and, secondly, the whole future of white settlement in Africa.
I shall take the question of federation first, because there is no doubt that Sir Roy Welensky is anxious about the development of affairs in the Federation. He knows much better than hon. Members opposite that these stirrings of African political movements in the Federation are backed by the people of the Federation. If it were really true that Dr. Hastings Banda was the only cause of trouble in Nyasaland it would not be necessary to deport him. It is necessary just because he represents his own people.
This is the first interest of Sir Roy Welensky. The second is the justified fear, from his point of view, that a Labour Government elected here would stand up for the British-protected Africans in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia. Therefore, it is in the interests of Sir Roy Welensky that there should be a situation in Nyasaland with troops being called in and emergency regulations to cover the whole Northern Territory.
That is the situation we face. But much more important than the situation in Central Africa which we are discussing tonight is the whole future of white settlers in Africa. So long as there were not white commercial interests to hold them back, we have not been worried, even hon. Members opposite have not been worried, about Africans coming to political freedom. In Ghana and Nigeria, all that could have been said about primitive Africans in the backwoods, but it was not used as a reason for delaying political advance. What we are discussing today is the future of the white settler in Africa. That is the hard core of the problem in Africa and the beginning of a great crisis in the second half of the twentieth century.
One way to survive was adopted by the nationalists in the Union. It was the policy of apartheid. It was given its opportunity by this House in 1909 when this House did for the South African settlers exactly what Welensky would like us to do to the Central African settlers in 1960. We have seen apartheid and
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what it means. Under independent settler control the fate of the African has become worse and not better.
I am told by hon. Members opposite that the African must expect first to see his living standards raised before he can be accepted as a civilised person. I ask hon. Members to look at South Africa, where the standard of living is higher than in Central Africa, and to see that when African living standards are raised the fear of their political action by the settlers is so much greater. That is why even the limited franchise given to them in the Union was withdrawn.
The sooner they begin to develop in a highly industrialised society, to develop trade unions and the skills to which my hon. Friend the Member for Edmonton (Mr. Albu) referred, the sooner they become a menace to the white settler minority. It is an absolute travesty of the truth to say that all they want is educated Africans. That is what the ignorant minority of settlers fear; because, without education, Africans can be regarded, as the hon. Member for Leominster suggested, as natives going peacefully about their business not troubled by political ideas from outside.
We were told in 1953 and 1954 that in Central Africa there would be a new look. There was to be the policy of partnership. When Lord Attlee, speaking for the Labour Party, at the end of those debates said that he wished the Federation success, he meant that he wished the ideas of partnership, which we understood were enshrined in that Constitution, success. What we have seen since has been that inevitably, because there is no escape from it, the Central African Federation has been moving towards the same policy of apartheid. The reason for that is that there is a basic dilemma facing the white settlers in Central Africa. They will not state the ultimate object. They cannot say, Welensky cannot say, nor can any other leader of the Europeans in Central Africa say, what the long-term future of the Federation will be.
Sir P. Macdonald: If the hon. Member had read or listened to Sir Roy Welensky's speeches over the years, he would know what he has in his mind as regards the future of Central Africa. All the time he has said that what they want is partnership in Central Africa with the Africans.
Mr. Benn: The hon. Gentleman is quite right that, when Sir Roy Welensky is over here, he makes those sort of speeches. When he is back in Central Africa—[Interruption.] I am very much obliged to the hon. Gentleman, because he has absolutely pointed the dilemma. Because of the Constitution of Central Africa, Sir Roy Welensky is responsible to a primarily European electorate. It is impossible for him to concede what is bound to come in the end, which is that the majority in Central Africa will govern.
This is the basic dilemma of the settlers in Central Africa. My hon. Friend the Member for Wednesbury (Mr. Stone-house) was the occasion for pinpointing it. We do not know the text of his speech. What we do know is that the Declaration of Human Rights would be a subversive document in the Central African Federation. So would be the Sermon on the Mount and quite a lot of other things as well. Therefore, it is the dilemma of the settlers in Central Africa that concerns us today. This is a very serious problem just because of the fact that, in the ultimate analysis, there is a conflict of interests between the white settlers and the Africans, unless it can be resolved by peaceful means. We have the hideous parallel of the Algerian war, which is a much closer parallel to this situation than the parallels given of Ghana, Cyprus or Malta.
What we are discussing today is not whether the Africans ultimately enter into their inheritance in Central Africa. That is decided by history. What we are discussing is how they will enter into their inheritance in Central Africa; whether it is to be by peaceful means, conceded by Parliament and by the settlers, or whether it is ultimately to be the way of violence.
Violence takes place if there is no peaceful alternative. The history of Parliament, this very institution in which we sit and work today, is the history of a revolutionary instrument that lay to the hands of the people of Britain and saved them from the necessity, except on occasions, of resorting to force. Is a developing African community in Central Africa to be denied the same instruments of peaceful progress that lay to the hands of the British people? Even when we in Britain were poor, ignorant, illiterate backwoodsmen and natives, we still had
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this instrument. We used it. That is why when we go to the House of Lords on the opening of Parliament we see an essentially feudal assembly on the surface but underneath the sinewy strength and popular support of the modern democratic state.
This is the only way to solve the problem in Africa. We cannot be impartial in this House on African freedom, because if we do not give freedom to Africa our denial of freedom in Africa will ultimately enslave us and kill the freedom that we enjoy in this country. The events of 13th May in France last year showed that, far from Algeria being controlled by France, France was controlled by Algeria. If we go on in the future trying to pursue a policy of repression in Central Africa we shall ourselves fall victims to the methods that we ourselves use.
Like many of the younger Members of the House I look forward to the end of this century, not just as a period for our children and grandchildren to enjoy, but as a period of my own working life, and I deeply resent the fact that the name of Britain should be associated, because of the policy of the right hon. Gentleman and his right hon. and hon. Friends, with repression, force and violence—all over the world. [Interruption.] When I read the announcement that we are to spend another £1½ million on propaganda to convince the uncommitted areas of the world that we stand for freedom, I thought of a much cheaper way of convincing them. If we do stand for freedom, let us reverse our policy on this and similar issues.
The Opposition tonight, not for the first time, are speaking with the true voice of Britain—[Interruption.] If there is to be friendship between the British peoples—
Mr. Antony Head: When the hon. Gentleman said that he was speaking with the true voice of Britain, I merely ask him whether he, having said what he did about my right hon. Friend, would give Nyasaland independence right away?
Mr. Benn: The right hon. Member for Carshalton (Mr. Head) has not thought Nyasaland important enough to attend the debate upon it. [HON. MEMBERS: "Answer."] He is also, of course, the author of one of the greatest acts of violence we have known in recent years.

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He also ignores the tact that the plea of the people of Nyasaland, which we support tonight, is that Nyasaland should remain a British Colony.
Mr. Head: The hon. Member has let off a lot of rhetoric. I asked a very simple question.
Mr. Benn: The answer is that Dr. Hastings Banda and his colleagues asked, first, that Nyasaland should remain a British Colony, and secondly, that the people there should decide their own affairs. We support that view. But I shall come to the right hon. Gentleman, because he typifies everything about which I wish to speak tonight. If there is to be friendship between Britain and the Arab countries and the uncommitted countries of the world and in the Commonwealth and in Africa, it will be because we spoke up on Suez—[Interruption.]—and also because tonight my right hon. and hon. Friends have spoken up for the cause of freedom in Africa.
9.23 p.m.
Mr. John Arbuthnot: I have, perhaps, been the most recent visitor from this House to Nyasaland. I do not for a moment want to suggest that because I spent what was merely a few days there I begin to know the depth of the problems that exist in that territory, but I am absolutely convinced that the fundamental interest of the people of Nyasaland, whatever may be their colour or their political thoughts, is that peace should be preserved, and that they should be left to get on with the job of bringing up their families, and generally improving their standard of living.
I am also convinced that the ordinary people of Nyasaland will be grateful to my right hon. Friend and to the Government for their determination that peace shall be preserved, and shall not be allowed to be disturbed by rabble rousers, whether they are rabble rousers out there or whether they are in this House.
My hon. Friend the Member for Leominster (Sir A. Baldwin) regretted deeply that this debate should be taking place at all. He was attacked by the Leader of the Liberal Party for saying that, but I am quite sure that my hon. Friend was right in his regret. Many of the things which have been said in the heat of the
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moment during this debate, when they are sent abroad—since they are inflammatory "snippets" they will certainly be sent abroad—will do immense damage to the real interests of the people of Nyasaland and the people of Africa as a whole.
I join with my hon. Friends who have regretted that this debate is taking place. I am sure that, whatever our political views may be, all of us in the House, on whichever side we may sit, have one fundamental interest at heart. We all want to see Africa steadily developing and taking her place, or her series of places, in the great nations of the world, improving her standard of life and playing a full part in the community of nations. I am sure that the kind of debate we have had this evening cannot contribute to the aim which we all fundamentally wish to see achieved.
The hon. Member for Bristol, South-East (Mr. Benn) said that the issue was not whether Africans should gain power in Africa, but how Africans should gain power in Africa. That will have been agreed on all sides of the House, but I feel that, if we start making attacks upon Sir Roy Welensky or anybody else, we shall not really help the attainment of power by Africans in Africa, which we all want to see. [An HON. MEMBER: "What about Dr. Banda?"] I would say the same for Dr. Banda. I hope that hon. Members opposite will bear in mind that the sentiments which have been expressed concerning Dr. Banda have been much more restrained than the words which have been directed at Sir Roy Welensky.
I am sure that I speak for hon. Members on all sides of the House when I say that we want to see a partnership in which we all assist all sections of the community in Africa and in Nyasaland, as a part of Africa, to play their part in improving their standard of life and advancing towards full democracy.
9.28 p.m.
Mr. A. G. Bottomley: The Secretary of State did his high office a disservice when, instead of defending the policy he is pursuing, he spent most of his time today trying to accuse the Opposition of being irresponsible. When I have finished, I think that hon. Members will understand that, if there is any irresponsibility at all, it rests with the Government.

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The Secretary of State referred to the fact that the Opposition gave some support to African Federation. Let us examine this and see exactly what happened. Mr. Attlee, as he then was, said, in 1953:
"I should like the Secretary of State"—
who was then Mr. Lyttelton—
"to give credit to those on this side who believe that this is a dangerous experiment and who, in particular, believe that this experiment … needs to be approached with greater caution".—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 6th May, 1953; Vol. 515, c. 419.]
The Secretary of State himself said something similar when he was questioned in Northern Rhodesia, on 21st January, 1957, when Mr. Chileshe said that there was fear that political pressure might be brought to bear on the Colonial Office and Her Majesty's Government to give up the power as a protective power. The Secretary of State said that would not happen. He went on:
"What I have been saying and what I feel is this, that I am anxious that the loyalties that centre on me now should be transferred to the Federal Government. I want to see that loyalty built up so that people can look with equal confidence to Salisbury as they now look to me as Secretary of State."
The Secretary of State continued:
"I made it absolutely clear here, in Nyasaland and in Salisbury, that until that happens there is no question of severance of the bonds that bind us together or the protectorate status of this Territory. I think I have made the position absolutely clear on innumerable occasions."
Is the Secretary of State following that line now? I suggest that he is not. He is letting down the powers which he has a duty to protect.
The Secretary of State said on another occasion that it was our endeavour to help Nyasaland towards a constitution and that the people in that territory would have free access to the constitution that would be made as a result of the 1960 conference and that there would be an opportunity for them to be fully and well represented. Does the Secretary of State think that at present there is that kind of representation? Is it that in talking to Dr. Banda the Governor was not able to give conditions that enabled him to go to his people and say, "Yes, this is something that we can present as a fair representation for us to go to the 1960 constitutional conference"?
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The Secretary of State ought to tell us what has been happening as the result of that meeting. He has not done so. Perhaps the Under-Secretary of State will be able to tell us something about it. I wonder whether the Secretary of State, or the Under-Secretary, can tell us whether we still stand firmly behind the Constitution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, which says that Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland should continue under the special protection of Her Majesty with separate Governments for so long as their respective peoples so desire. It is obvious by their action in the last day or two that the peoples do not desire it.
Hon. Members: Oh.
Mr. Callaghan: Give them a chance to say.
Mr. Bottomley: The Africans obviously feel let down. They have no alternative but to demonstrate. This demonstration has taken place. I would make a plea to them, as I am sure all hon. Members would do. We hope that in their demonstration they will show no violence. We hope they will demonstrate peacefully. This they have been doing. We have it on the authority of the Governor that there is no fear or alarm, that there would be no outbreaks of violence. What has changed the Governor's mind? Let me give some quotations.
On 23rd February, 1959, the Governor, speaking at Zomba, said:
"The situation has been well contained."
On 26th February a Government spokesman said:
"There is no question of a state of emergency."
That is within the last few days. Why is there now a state of emergency? There is a state of emergency because, as my hon. Friend has said, pressure has been put upon the Secretary of State and the Governor of Nyasaland by the Federation Prime Minister to do precisely this. [HON. MEMBERS: "That is untrue."] Let the Secretary of State say that it is untrue. He has not said that yet. It is not untrue. I repeat that there has been pressure. Perhaps the Under-Secretary will give us evidence that there has not been pressure, not merely say that there has not been pressure but give evidence that that is so.

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Is it not a fact that the Premier of Southern Rhodesia himself said that before Christmas they were preparing for this state of emergency? If he said that, then was it not obvious that if there was to be a state of emergency in Southern Rhodesia it would inevitably spread, as a result of the direction of the Federal Government, to the wider areas? So we have a state of emergency today in Nyasaland stemming directly from the action of the Premier of Southern Rhodesia, and this pressure has been on constantly.
I read in a newspaper the other day that the emergency is alarming. Territorials are being called up. Who knows? Unless something is done immediately the situation may get out of hand. If this is so, I think the Secretary of State has a responsibility, before British Armed Forces from this country, including National Service men, are sent in support, to see that this House should be consulted at least, that it should be told about it.
There was a debate towards the end of last year when we had the opportunity of seeing the Prime Minister of the Federation, Sir Roy Welensky, in the Gallery in this Chamber. I remember asking him, "How is it possible for you to make speeches which are so irresponsible, far more irresponsible than anything which has been said by Africans who have been locked up for daring freely to express their thoughts?"
Sir Roy, during the election last year, said:
"I am going to stop the large element who look over the shoulders of the Federal Government for support from some Members of the House of Commons."
The Members of the House of Commons are the ones who want fairness and who are doing their best to build up British standards. The Secretary of State will, I think, agree with me that what we want to do is to build up these standards, standards of democracy.
Does anybody on the benches opposite really suggest that it was democracy when the Secretary of State said, earlier, that the present Constitution will remain in force until 1960? Under this, six elected European representatives there are representing fewer than 20,000 non-Africans, and there are five nominated Africans
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representing a population of 2¼ million Africans. Is this the basis upon which Nyasaland is to be represented at the constitutional conference? I put it to hon. Gentlemen opposite, if they were asked to accept such conditions as the basis of democratic representation and for expressing their views at a conference, would they accept them? Of course they would not. Neither will the Africans, and we have to face this.
Last night there was a television broadcast in Moscow by our Prime Minister. I am sure that we would all agree with these words used there by the right hon. Gentleman:
"What used to be called the British Empire is now the Commonwealth. This is a free association of 600 million people of every race and creed which stretches right round the world. This is not a military alliance. It has no written rules of membership. It is an association of people who found that they shared the same ideas about the organisation of human affairs. This Commonwealth association is still growing in numbers. Since the war five nations have joined it, and we expect that others will follow. We do not seek to impose our system on anyone."
It is because we have followed that standard that Ghana, Nigeria and other countries have joined this community of nations. If we pursue the policy we are pursuing in Nyasaland we may lose even the support of those countries. We therefore ought to give real consideration to those words used in another land and give them our fullest support. It is because we think that the Government are not doing this, and that they are following a policy leading to nothing other than these disasters, that we shall ask the House to vote against the Government. It is our earnest desire that there shall be peace in Africa. It is our earnest desire that we should not develop in the world a conflict between black and white.
I have just returned from Ghana. I remember that in 1948 there were difficulties in that country and some men had to be detained. But the then Labour Government were wise enough to say, "If we are to settle this, we must examine it on the spot." A Commission went out, the Watson Commission. There is no doubt that as a result of that action Mr. Nkrumah, who was then detained and is today the Prime Minister, is pro-British. I suggest that a similar procedure should be tried again. I put it to the Colonial

335
Secretary that it might even be possible for a Parliamentary delegation to go out at once to Nyasaland. If the right hon. Gentleman accepts that suggestion, he should make clear that whoever went would not be treated as prohibited immigrants.
As I have said, we shall vote against the Government tonight because this is the same Government which has continually followed a policy which led to the Suez incident; that has caused great troubles in Kenya, in Cyprus, in Malta—[HON. MEMBERS: "0h."]—and now in Nyasaland. It is one emergency after another. The speeches which we have heard from right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite have told the same story over and over again.
When I was in Ghana last week I said that we of the working classes in this country—[HON. MEMBERS: "Working classes."]—we of the working classes had the same experience as the Africans. We had to fight for our freedom. We had to fight for the right of association. From the freedom of association stem the other freedoms—freedom of speech, freedom of the Press, and I say—
Hon. Members: Oh.
Mr. Speaker: Order.
Brigadier Sir Harry Mackeson rose—
Hon. Members: Sit down.
Mr. Speaker: I must ask the hon. and gallant Gentleman to resume his seat.
Mr. Bottomley: I say to the Government that if they continue to follow the policy pursued so far they will give greater strength to the totalitarian forces of the world and destroy democracy—
Sir H. Mackeson: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. Is it in order for the right hon. Gentleman to describe himself as a member of the working classes? He is a Member of Parliament, representing a Kent constituency.
Mr. Speaker: That is not a point of order.
9.43 p.m.
The Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr. Julian Amery): The hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr.
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Callaghan) moved the Adjournment of the House earlier today to discuss the declaration of a state of emergency in Nyasaland. Most of the speeches which have been made by hon. Members on the back benches opposite have been on the wider theme of the rights and wrongs of the policy of Central African Federation. The last speech which we heard from the right hon. Member for Rochester and Chatham (Mr. Bottomley) seemed to be on an even wider theme as well. During the few minutes that remain to me I will try to direct my remarks to the definite matter of urgent public importance which is the subject of our debate.
As I understand, four main charges have been made by the party opposite against the Government. We have been told that the major cause of the present crisis was the delay over constitutional discussions. We have been told that there was no real ground for declaring a state of emergency. We have been told that it was wrong to introduce Central African Federation forces into Nyasaland. We have been told that what has happened in Nyasaland has been the result of a conspiracy, or a machination, on the part of the Central African Federation Government. I want to try to deal with those four points.
First, I want to deal with the constitutional issue. Right hon. and hon. Gentlemen who believe that this crisis has been caused in any way by any dilatoriness or delay over constitutional discussions are completely wrong. The truth is—and the reports leave very little doubt about it—that Dr. Banda did not mean to reach agreement on the constitutional issue at this time. He was determined to set very high terms and, when these were refused, to lead a campaign of speeches and then of disturbances with the deliberate purpose of courting arrest.
There is no question of delay here. There was no chance, as it is now clear, of reaching agreement on the constitutional issue. We hoped until the very last minute that it would be possible to reach agreement on that basis. That is why the Minister of State was to go out. The truth is that Dr. Banda did not want it.
There was a still more sinister feature which the House must have in mind. Not only were the African Congress and its

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leaders aiming at a policy of disturbance and civil disobedience after the failure of constitutional talks which they anticipated, but there was the conspiracy of murder. [An HON. MEMBER: "We have heard this before."] An hon. Member says that we have heard this before. The hon. Lady the Member for Flint, East (Mrs. White) said that "this brings up echoes of past speeches." The hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Grimond) said that "we have had this all before, and are we to have another Cyprus?". We have had it all before. Remember Mau Mau. I remember Lord Chandos standing at this box and explaining to the House exactly what was the Mau Mau conspiracy. Hon. Members on both sides had a great deal of difficulty in believing that these things could be. We have heard it before not very far away from Nyasaland—in Kenya.
Let hon. Members with any illusions on these matters have clearly in their minds that if we had not taken appropriate action at the right moment there might well have been a massacre of Africans, Asians and Europeans on a Kenyan scale. The Government have to take responsibility in these matters and to give the House the assurance of the knowledge which they have.
Words have an extraordinary impact on all of us, particularly on an Assembly like ours. The moment the word "emergency" was pronounced some very strange misconceptions flew through the minds of right hon. and hon. Members.
The hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East in opening the debate, said that since the emergency was proclaimed there have been deaths, use of tear gas and attacks on prisons. There were deaths on 20th, 22nd and 26th February resulting from the disturbances. Tear gas was used on 22nd and 24th. There were attacks on prisons on 19th and 20th. These things have been happening for some time.
I think that I made two statements to the House on the subject. The hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East was here and will remember them. This is not a new development. It is not since an emergency was proclaimed that there has been death, use of tear gas and attacks on prisons. These things were happening some time before.
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The hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland said that he understood that no one had been killed until today.
Mr. Grimond: I asked the question.
Mr. Amery: He said that he understood that this was not so. Far be it from me to criticise the hon. Gentleman, but I would have thought that before presuming to intervene in an important matter of this kind he would have briefed himself a little.
The hon. Member for Sheffield, Attercliffe (Mr. J. Hynd) told us that all this had been sparked off by the incidents surrounding the hon. Member for Wednesbury (Mr. Stonehouse). They have been happening since 19th February.
Mr. J. Hynd: Not on this scale.
Mr. Amery: Believe me, it was on this scale. Indeed, some of the worst troubles were on the 24th and the 26th. [An HON. MEMBER: "How many?"] On the 26th, the Northern Province of Nyasaland was isolated. The airfield was no longer under our control. Rioters had put rocks and tree trunks over it. Our convoys could not get through to it.
Mr. Hynd: Will the hon. Gentleman tell us who has been killing whom?
Mr. Amery: There have been riots in which people have been killed—[HON. MEMBERS: "By whom?"]—sometimes by firing from the police, sometimes otherwise.
Mr. Grimond: How many people have been killed by the African Congress? That was the question I asked.
Mr. Amery: That is not the question that the hon. Member asked. [HON. MEMBERS: "Answer."] It is hard to tell, in riots, how people are killed. [HON MEMBERS: "Oh."] There have been deaths. [Interruption.] The hon. Member seems to take pleasure in this matter and to find humour in it. There is not very much humour in it.
Hon. Members: Cheap.
Mr. Callaghan: In his statement last Friday morning, the hon. Gentleman said:
"There were also disturbances at Lilongwe in which tear gas had to be used to disperse a serious riot. The King's African Rifles were compelled to fire four rounds, as a result of which two persons were killed and one

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wounded."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 27th February, 1959; Vol. 600, c. 1459.]
What has that to do with supporting his case that the Congress has been killing people?
Mr. Amery: The hon. Member misrepresents me—[HON.MEMBERS: "Oh."]—in his usual way. I have never said that the Congress killed people. I said there were riots which led to people being killed.
This has not happened only today. It has been happening for ten days. It is complete nonsense to believe that it is incidents of today or of yesterday, since the incident with the hon. Member for Wednesbury took place, that have sparked off the emergency. The situation has been building up over the last ten days and it is a situation which at any stage in the last week would amply have justified the declaration of an emergency. [An HON. MEMBER: "Why did not the Governor declare one?"] The Governor had an extremely heavy responsibility, which the House should have in mind and which my right hon. Friend explained earlier.
The settler community and part of the Asian community are scattered throughout Nyasaland. The moderate African leaders are not always easy to protect from the point of view of the houses where they live. If a state of emergency had been declared before there had been sufficient forces in the country, there might well have been the bloodbath which we feared. The Governor therefore delayed in the proclamation of the emergency and I am sure that the House will agree that he was right. The situation which existed, however, the disturbances both in the Northern Province, the Central Province and in the Southern Province, would abundantly have justified the imposition of an emergency before.
Mr. Kenneth Robinson: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?
Mr. Amery: No, I cannot.
I have heard the accusation that it was unwise to bring Central African Federation troops into Nyasaland. The House will realise that the Army of the Central African Federation is all Federal troops, so that to introduce extra troops meant
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introducing Federal troops. There were not enough troops in Nyasaland to contain the situation. Therefore, new troops had to be brought in. It is true that territorial police were also brought in from Southern and from Northern Rhodesia. This was because, in an emergency of this kind, the essential thing is to have enough forces. That is the important element.
Now we have been told that all that has happened in Nyasaland is the result of some kind of conspiracy on the part of the Central African Federation. The hon. Member for Bristol, South-East (Mr. Benn) said that it was all to Sir Roy Welensky's interest to bring troops into Nyasaland. The charge has been bandied about by many right hon. and hon. Members. I fail to see a single shred of evidence to substantiate it. It was the Governor of Nyasaland who asked for the troops to come into Nyasaland. He asked for troops and for police. It was at his request that both Northern Rhodesian police and Southern Rhodesian police and Federal troops and Tanganyika police came to assist in the situation.
We received unstinted help from the Federation, from Tanganyika and the two territories in the Federation, but it is a travesty to say that they were in any sense creating an emergency or urging the Governor of Nyasaland into the emergency. No doubt there might have been elements of public opinion in Southern Rhodesia who asked, "Why is there not an emergency?" But they were in ignorance of the very serious problem confronting the Governor while he gathered the necessary forces to make it possible to bring the situation under control.
There has been the closest consultation throughout between the Governor of Nyasaland, the other Governors, and the Federal authority. There has been consultation, as I told the House on 20th February, with the Colonial Office, too. [HON. MEMBERS: "The Colonial Office?"] Of course, the Governor has kept us extremely closely informed of what has been happening. It would be a complete travesty to suggest that there has been pressure from Salisbury. It is from Nyasaland that requests have gone for troops to deal with the situation which the Governor was in the best position to diagnose, and I think that the

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whole House will agree that he diagnosed correctly. There was no pressure on us from Salisbury.
Mr. Callaghan: Oh, really.
Mr. Amery: The hon. Member says, "Oh, really". Earlier, he said that he would attempt to restrain the passion which he felt. It is always fairly easy to restrain fictitious emotion.
The attitude of the party opposite, both last week in the short exchanges we had over Nyasaland in connection with the incident concerning the hon. Member for Wednesbury, and in the debate tonight, shows that it has only one aim in view, and that is to wreck the Central African Federation. If it does that it will be
doing a great disservice to Britain, to the Commonwealth and, above all, to the Africans in Central Africa.
We are satisfield that a solution can be found to the problem of Nyasaland—[HON. MEMBERS: "Suez."]—not only through an emergency. This is simply one stage in the process. There will be, in due course, constitutional talks. Through those constitutional talks the problems will be overcome and Nyasaland will find its future within the framework of Central African Federation.
Question put, That this House do now adjourn:—
The House divided: Ayes 201, Noes 259.

Division No. 53.]

AYES

[9.58 p.m.

Abse, Leo

Foot, D. M.

Mann, Mrs. Jean

Ainsley, J. W.

Fraser, Thomas (Hamilton)

Marquand, Rt. Hon, H. A.

Albu, A. H.

Gaitskell, Rt. Hon. H. T. N.

Mason, Roy

Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)

George, Lady Megan Lloyd(Car'then)

Mayhew, C. P.

Allen, Arthur (Bosworth)

Gibson, C. W.

Mellish, R. J.

Awbery, S. S.

Gordon Walker, Rt. Hon. P. C.

Messer, Sir F.

Bacon, Miss Alice

Greenwood, Anthony

Mitchison, G. R.

Baird, J.

Grenfell, Rt. Hon. D. R.

Monslow, W.

Balfour, A.

Grey, C. F.

Moody, A. S.

Bellenger, Rt. Hon. F. J.

Griffiths, Rt. Hon. James (Llanelly)

Morrison, Rt. Hn. Herbert (Lowls'm, S.)

Benn, Hn. Wedgwood (Bristol, S. E.)

Griffiths, William (Exchange)

Moss, R.

Benson, Sir George

Grimond, J.

Moyle, A.

Beswick, Frank

Hale, Leslie

Mulley, F. W.

Blackburn, F.

Hall, Rt. Hn. Glenvil (Coins Valley)

Neal, Harold (Bolsover)

Blenkinsop, A.

Hamilton, W. W.

Noel-Baker, Francis (Swindon)

Blyton, W. R.

Hannan, W.

Noel-Baker, Rt. Hon. P. (Derby, S.)

Boardman, H.

Harrison, J. (Nottingham, N.)

O'Brien, Sir Thomas

Bonham Carter, Mark

Hastings, S.

Oliver, G. H.

Bottomley, Rt. Hon. A. G.

Hayman, F. H.

Oram, A. E.

Bowden, H. w. (Leicester, S. W.)

Healey, Denis

Oswald, T.

Bowen, E. R. (Cardigan)

Henderson, Rt. Hn. A. (Rwly Regis)

Owen, W. J.

Bowles, F. G.

Herblson, Miss M.

Padley, W. E.

Boyd, T. C.

Holman, P.

Paget, R. T.

Braddock, Mrs. Elizabeth

Holt, A. F.

Pannell, Charles (Leeds, W.)

Brockway, A. F.

Houghton, Douglas

Pargiter, G. A.

Broughton, Dr. A. D. D.

Howell, Charles (Perry Barr)

Parker, J.

Brown, Rt. Hon. George (Belper)

Hoy, J. H.

Parkin, B. T.

Brown, Thomas (Ince)

Hughes, Cledwyn (Anglesey)

Pentland, N.

Burton, Miss F. E.

Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)

Plummer, Sir Leslie

Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)

Hunter, A. E.

Prentice, R. E.

Callaghan, L. J.

Hynd, H. (Accrington)

Castle, Mrs. B. A.

Hynd, J. B. (Attercliffe)

Price, Philips (Gloucestershire, W.)

Champion, A. J.

Irvine, A. J. (Edge Hill)

Pursey, Cmdr. H.

Chetwynd, G. R.

Isaacs, Rt. Hon. G. A.

Rankin, John

Cliffe, Michael

Janner, B.

Redhead, E. C.

Coldrick, W.

Jay, Rt. Hon. D. P. T.

Reeves, J.

Collick, P. H. (Birkenhead)

Jeger, George (Goole)

Reid, William

Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)

Jeger, Mrs.Lena (Holbn & St.Pncs, S.)

Reynolds, G. W.

Cronin, J. D.

Jones, Rt. Hon. A. Creech (Wakefield)

Robens, Rt. Hon. A.

Crossman, R. H. S.

Jones, David (The Hartlepools)

Roberts, Albert (Normanton)

Dalton, Rt. Hon. H.

Jones, Elwyn (W. Ham, S.)

Roberts, Goronwy (Caernarvon)

Darling, George (Hillsborough)

Jones, J. Idwal (Wrexham)

Robinson, Kenneth (St. Pancras, N.)

Davies, Ernest (Enfield, E.)

Kenyon, C.

Rogers, George (Kensington, N.)

Deer, G.

Key, Rt. Hon. C. W.

Ross, William

de Freitas, Geoffrey

King, Dr. H. M.

Royle, C.

Delargy, H. J.

Lee, Frederick (Newton)

Silverman, Julius (Aston)

Diamond, John

Lever, Harold (Cheetham)

Silverman, Sydney (Nelson)

Ede, Rt. Hon. J. C.

Lindgren, G. S.

Simmons, C. J. (Brierley Hill)

Edwards, Rt. Hon. John (Brighouse)

Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson

Skeffington, A. M.

Edwards, Rt. Hon. Ness (Caerphilly)

McAlister, Mrs. Mary

Slater, Mrs. H. (Stoke, N.)

Edwards, Robert (Bilston)

MacColl, J. E.

Slater, J. (Sedgefield)

Edwards, W. J. (Stepney)

McKay, John (Wallsend)

Smith, Ellis (Stoke, S.)

Evans, Edward (Lowestoft)

McLeavy, Frank

Snow, J. W.

Fernyhough, E.

MacMillan, M. K. (Western Isles)

Sorensen, R. W.

Fitch, A. E. (Wigan)

MacPherson, Malcolm (Stirling)

Soskice, Rt. Hon. Sir Frank

Fletcher, Eric

Mallalieu, E. L. (Brigg)

Sparks, J, A.

Spriggs, Leslie

Tomney, F.

Wilkins, W. A.

Steele, T.

Ungoed-Thomas, Sir Lynn

Willey, Frederick

Stewart, Michael (Fulham)

Usborne, H. C.

Willis, Eustace (Edinburgh, E.)

Strachey, Rt. Hon. J.

Viant, S. P.

Wilson, Rt. Hon. Harold (Huyton)

Stross, Dr. Barnett (Stoke-on-Trent, C.)

Warbey, W. N.

Winterbottom, Richard

Summerskill, Rt. Hon. E.

Weltzman, D.

Woodburn, Rt. Hon. A.

Swingler, S. T.

Wells, Percy (Faversham)

Woof, R. E.

Sylvester, G. O.

Wells, William (Walsall, N.)

Yates, V. (Ladywood)

Taylor, Bernard (Mansfield)

Wheeldon, W. E.

Younger, Rt. Hon. K.

Taylor, John (West Lothian)

White, Mrs. Eirene (E. Flint)

Zilliacus, K.

Thomson, George (Dundee, E.)

White, Henry (Derbyshire, N.E.)

Thornton, E.

Wilcock, Group Capt. C. A. B.

TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

Mr. Popplewell and Mr. Pearson.

NOES

Aitken, W. T.

Eden, J. B. (Bournemouth, West)

Kershaw, J. A.

Allan, R. A. (Paddington, S.)

Elliott, R. W. (Ne'castle upon Tyne, N.)

Kimball, M.

Alport, C. J. M.

Emmet, Hon. Mrs. Evelyn

Langford-Holt, J. A.

Amery, Julian (Preston, N.)

Errington, Sir Eric

Leather, E. H. C.

Amory, Rt. Hn. Heathcoat (Tiverton)

Erroll, F. J.

Leavey, J. A.

Anstruther-Gray, Major Sir William

Farey-Jones, F. W.

Leburn, W. G.

Armstrong, C. W.

Fell, A.

Legge-Bourke, Maj. E. A. H.

Ashton, H.

Finlay, Graeme

Lennox-Boyd, Rt. Hon. A. T.

Baldwin, Sir Archer

Fisher, Nigel

Lindsay, Hon. James (Devon, N.)

Balniel, Lord

Fletcher-Cooke, C.

Linstead, Sir H. N.

Barber, Anthony

Fort, R.

Lloyd, Maj. Sir Guy (Renfrew, E.)

Barlow, Sir John

Fraser, Hon. Hugh (Stone)

Lloyd, Rt. Hon. Selwyn (Wirral)

Batsford, Brian

Freeth, Denzil

Longden, Gilbert

Baxter, Sir Beverley

Galbraith, Hon. T. G. D.

Loveys, Walter H.

Beamish, Col. Tufton

Gammans, Lady

Low, Rt. Hon. Sir Toby

Bell, Philip (Bolton, E.)

Garner-Evans, E. H.

Lucas. P. B. (Brentford & Chlswick)

Bell, Ronald (Bucks, S.)

Gibson-Watt, D.

Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh

Bennett, F. M. (Torquay)

Glyn, Col. Richard H.

Macdonald, Sir Peter

Bennett, Dr. Reginald

Godber, J. B.

Mackeson, Brig. Sir Harry

Bevins, J. R. (Toxteth)

Goodhart, Philip

Maclay, Rt. Hon. John

Biggs-Davison, J. A.

Gough, C. F. H.

Maclean, Sir Fitzroy (Lancaster)

Bingham, R. M.

Gower, H. R.

McLean, Neil (Inverness)

Birch, Rt. Hon. Nigel

Graham, Sir Fergus

Macleod, Rt. Hn. lain (Enfield, W.)

Bishop, F. P.

Grant, Rt. Hon. W. (woodslde)

Macmillan, Rt. Hn. Harold (Bromley)

Black, Sir Cyril

Grant-Ferris, Wg Cdr. R. (Nantwich)

Macmillan, Maurice (Halifax)

Body, R. F.

Gresham Cooke, R.

Macpherson, Niall (Dumfries)

Bossom, Sir Alfred

Grimston, Sir Robert (Westbury)

Maddan, Martin

Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hon. J. A.

Grosvenor, Lt.-Col. R. G.

Maitland, Hon. Patrick (Lanark)

Boyle, Sir Edward

Gurden, Harold

Manningham-Buller, Rt. Hn. Sir R.

Bralne, B. R.

Hall, John (Wycombe)

Marlowe, A. A. H.

Bralthwalte, Sir Albert (Harrow, W.)

Hare, Rt. Hon. J. H.

Marples, Rt. Hon. A. E

Bromley-Davenport, Lt.-Col. W. H.

Harris, Frederic (Croydon, N.W.)

Marshall, Douglas

Brooke, Rt. Hon. Henry

Harris, Reader (Heston)

Mathew, R.

Brooman-White, R. C.

Harrison, Col. J. H. (Eye)

Maudling, Rt. Hon. R.

Browne, J. Nixon (Craigton)

Harvey, Sir Arthur Vere (Macclesf'd)

Mawby, R. L.

Bryan, P.

Harvey, John (Walthamstow, E.)

Maydon, Lt.-Comdr. S. L. C

Bullus, Wing Commander E. E.

Hay, John

Medlicott, Sir Frank

Burden, F. F. A.

Head, Rt. Hon. A. H.

Milligan, Rt. Hon. W. R.

Butler, Rt. Hn. R. A. (Saffron Walden)

Heald, Rt. Hon. Sir Lionel

Mott-Radclyffe, Sir Charles

Campbell, Sir David

Henderson-Stewart, Sir James

Nabarro, G. D. N.

Cary, Sir Robert

Hicks-Beach, Maj. W. W.

Channon, H. P. G.

Hill, Rt, Hon. Charles (Luton)

Nairn, D. L. S.

Chichester-Clark, R.

Hill, Mrs. E. (Wythenshawe)

Neave, Airey

Churchill, Rt. Hon. Sir Winston

Hill, John (S. Norfolk)

Nicholson, Sir Godfrey (Farnham)

Clarke, Brig. Terence (Portsmth, W.)

Hinchingbrooke, Viscount

Nicolson, N. (B'n'm'th, E. & Chr'ch)

Cole, Norman

Hope, Lord John

Noble, Comdr. Rt. Hon. Allan

Conant, Maj. Sir Roger

Hornby, R. P.

Noble, Michael (Argyll)

Cooke, Robert

Hornsby-Smith, Miss M. P.

Nugent, G. R. H.

Cooper, A. E.

Horsbrugh, Rt. Hon. Dame Florence

O'Neill, Hn. Phelim (Co. Antrim, N.)

Cooper-Key, E. M.

Howard, Gerald (Cambridgeshire)

Ormsby-Gore, Rt. Hon. W. D.

Cordeaux, Lt.-Col. J. K.

Howard, Hon. Greville (St. Ives)

Orr, Capt. L. P. S.

Corfield, F. V.

Howard, John (Test)

Orr-Ewing, C. Ian (Hendon, N.)

Craddock, Beresford (Spelthorne)

Hughes Hallett, Vice-Admiral J.

Page, R. G.

Crosthwalte-Eyre, Col. O. E.

Hughes-Young, M. H. C.

Pannell, N. A. (Kirkdale)

Crowder, Sir John (Finchley)

Hulbert, Sir Norman

Partridge, E.

Cunningham, Knox

Hurd, Sir Anthony

Peel, W. J.

Currie, G. B. H.

Hutchison, Michael Clark(E'b'gh, S.)

Pickthorn, Sir Kenneth

Dance, J. C. G.

Hutchison, Sir Ian Clark(E'b'gh, W.)

Pitman, I. J.

Davidson, Viscountess

Hutchison, Sir James (Scotstoun)

Pitt, Miss E. M.

D'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir Henry

Hylton-Foster, Rt. Hon. Sir Harry

Pott, H. P.

Deedes, W. F.

Iremonger, T. L.

Price, David (Eastleigh)

de Ferranti, Basil

Irvine, Bryan Godman (Rye)

Price, Henry (Lewisham, W.)

Digby, Simon Wingfield

Jenkins, Robert (Dulwich)

Prior-Palmer, Brig. O. L.

Dodds-Parker, A. D.

Johnson, Dr. Donald (Carlisle)

Profumo, J. D.

Donaldson, Cmdr. C. E. McA.

Johnson, Eric (Blackley)

Ramsden, J. E.

Doughty, C. J. A.

Jones, Rt. Hon. Aubrey (Hall Green)

Rawlinson, Peter

du Cann, E. D. L.

Joseph, Sir Keith

Redmayne, M.

Dugdale, Rt. Hn. Sir T. (Richmond)

Kaberry, D.

Rees-Davies, W. R.

Duncan, Sir James

Keegan, D.

Renton, D. L. M.

Eccles, Rt. Hon. Sir David

Kerr, Sir Hamilton

Ridsdale, J. E.

344

345

Roberts, Sir Peter (Heeley)

Storey, S.

Wakefield, Sir wavell (St. M'lebone)

Robinson, Sir Roland (Blackpool, S.)

Stuart, Rt. Hon. James (Moray)

Walker-Smith, Rt. Hon. Derek

Ropner, Col. Sir Leonard

Studholme, Sir Henry

Wall, Patrick

Russell, R. S.

Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)

Ward, Rt. Hon. G. R. (Worcester)

Scott-Miller, Cmdr. R.

Taylor, William (Bradford, N.)

Ward, Dame Irene (Tynemouth)

Sharples, R. C.

Temple, John M.

Webster, David

Shepherd, William

Thomas, Leslie (Canterbury)

Whitelaw, W. S. I.

Simon, J. E. S. (Middlesbrough, W.)

Thomas, P. J. M. (Conway)

Williams, R. Dudley (Exeter)

Smithers, Peter (Winchester)

Thompson, R. (Croydon, S.)

Wills, Sir Gerald (Bridgwater)

Smyth, Brig. Sir John (Norwood)

Thorneycroft, Rt. Hon. P.

Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)

Soames, Rt. Hon. Christopher

Thornton-Kemsley, Sir Colin

Wolrige-Gordon, Patrick

Spearman, Sir Alexander

Tiley, A. (Bradford, W.)

Wood, Hon. R.

Speir, R. M.

Tilney, John (Wavertree)

Woollam, John Victor

Spens, Rt. Hn. Sir P. (Kens'gt'n, S.)

Vane, W. M. P.

Yates, William (The Wrekin)

Stanley, Capt. Hon. Richard

Vaughan-Morgan, J. K.

Stevens, Geoffrey

Vickers, Miss Joan

TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

Steward, Sir William (Woolwich, w.)

Vosper, Rt. Hon. D. F.

Mr. Heath and Mr. Legb.

Stoddart-Scott, Col. Sir Malcolm

Wakefield, Edward (Derbyshire, W.)

SUPPLY
Again considered in Committee.
[Mr. W. R. WILLIAMS in the Chair]

ARMY ESTIMATES, 1959–60
Original Question again proposed.
10.9 p.m.
Mr. Paget: Before the Adjournment intervened. I was discussing the question of an African Army, because I believe that this provides probably the best hope that remains of getting a multiracial society. Drill is something which the Africans greatly enjoy, and they become intensely loyal to their regiments and to those who lead them. When they return to civilian life they establish themselves as the best of citizens. Indeed, the old soldier from the King's African Rifles is the main reason why Mau Mau did not spread to other tribes.
An African army can do something else. It can create a bond of confidence and affection between the Africans and the European officers and N.C.O.s who serve in that force. One of the things which greatly impressed me when I was in Kenya was that young Kenyans born and bred in Kenya and who had taken part in the activities occasioned by the Mau Mau rising did some dreadful things and showed an attitude, which I also met in Rhodesia, which amounted to a total lack of understanding of the Africans whom they have not really met although they had lived in their country.
Some very savage things were done, but in the process of the rising those young men served with Africans. Their lives depended on the loyalty of the men with whom they served. An affection between them grew up, and the staff of the
346
rehabilitation centres was largely composed of young Kenyans who had discovered the Africans through their service and who had gained a genuine love for them and a devotion to their service. That was exceedingly impressive.
For many countries the process of nationhood has been through an army. The first function of a society, the way it comes together, is defence. It is a mutual reliance in service which builds up the bonds which make a society. In Africa that is a function which has yet to be performed. Thus, not merely from the point of view of the Army, but also from the point of view of Africa, it is tremendously important that we relieve the Army—this expensively equipped firepower force which we have created—of its African commitments. The organisation of the modern army is unsuitable to that sort of commitment which requires men but not fire-power.
We want to relieve the Army from being misemployed in that sort of service and to create a force in Africa far cheaper but bringing imense benefits to Africa and capable of relieving the Army of the African commitment, the Aden commitment and, to a great measure, the Gulf commitment. We require troops organised for relatively primitive war when plenty of men are needed. I urge the Government at this time when, with the cuts in the forces, there are plenty of officers who have had to break their careers and with whom the Government have broken faith, and when there are plenty of N.C.O.s, to take this step now, for never again shall we have this opportunity.
Mr. Soames: I am genuinely seeking information. Before the debate was interrupted, the hon. and learned Member was speaking about a police force which he

347
wanted to see in being to take over some of the Army's internal security tasks. I did not catch whether he said that that force should be 45,000, or 4,000 to 5,000.
Mr. Paget: I said about 4,000 to 5,000 as being the sort of size which I visualised. Of that force, half would be regularly stationed here undergoing intensive police training, while half would be on attachment in the various Colonies, so that whenever reinforcements were required they would join people of their own organisation who would have the internal experience and know the job. I believe that a force of that size would relieve the Army of a commitment which in such conditions as Cyprus has run to 30,000. I think that a trained police reserve of 4,000 or 5,000 would have been more valuable than all those troops in Cyprus.
We now have a tremendous opportunity with the African Army, but I am frightened that this opportunity will be lost largely because of the overlapping Ministerial responsibility. The Colonial Office will want the Army to pay for it and the Army will want the Colonial Office to pay for it. Because neither will feel that it is entirely its show, this opportunity will be lost and we shall, at much greater expense to ourselves, maintain a European brigade in Kenya. That will weaken our capacity to strengthen our N.A.T.O. commitment, which must be strengthened as the nuclear stalemate sets in.
Another place in which I feel that the Army is being misused is Hong Kong. It is perfectly plain that in military terms Hong Kong is wholly indefensible. That is not the whole answer. The existence of a force capable of creating a resistance may act as a deterrent, even though that resistance cannot be successful; but I believe that that applies only if the resistance can be in any way prolonged to provide an opportunity for negotiations, or if it is sufficient to force the enemy to make a considerable build-up. If these conditions applied in Hong Kong, I could see a reason for a military force there, but they do not.
Geographically, the Hong Kong positions are utterly and completely indefensible. Even if the Chinese used only almost similar numerical forces they could overrun them. The defence of Hong Kong, as I think will be agreed can only
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be a matter of 24 hours. In those circumstances, I see no object at all in committing military forces to an untenable position in which they cannot provide the resistance which would allow a situation to develop and maybe provide room for negotiation. What we need in Hong Kong is a considerable force able to guarantee internal order. One thing which we must not allow to develop in Hong Kong is an internal situation which invites Chinese intervention. That is the most we can do by force.
The retention of Hong Kong depends ultimately on the fact that our presence there is very useful to China. We must be able to maintain internal order, but I would say that internal order is not the job of the Army. It is a job which it is very ill-fitted and fantastically extravagant to perform. Of course, we cannot do what I suggest tomorrow. Until we have something else we have to maintain troops there.
I would say that the other task which we should set out to do is to build up a Hong Kong internal security force which is permanently there. The tremendous expense of maintaining a military situation at that distance is caused by the fact that as many troops are in the pipeline, going on leave and coming back from leave, as are being employed. An internal Hong Kong force, which could be partly but not necessarily all European, should be built up there to relieve the Army of that responsibility. That would save a brigade.
Another and smaller responsibility of the Army is the West Indies. Again, we could have a West Indian Regiment, which would be exceedingly good for the West Indians. It would help to solve their unemployment problem. Finally, many jobs in the Army are not fighting jobs. They could be performed by West Indians and Maltese. In the Navy the stewards and cooks are often Maltese—and they are far better than the English. I understand that it is precisely in the cooks branch that difficulty has been experienced, and we have heard complaints today about batmen. We ought to be able to get as many Maltese as we want for these jobs, and they would be thankful to provide the service, which they can perform admirably.
I now turn to the rôle of the Navy. It seems impossible to imagine a general

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submarine war with Russia other than an atomic war. We can imagine the Russians seizing Berlin or Denmark, or doing something in respect of which they can present us with a fait accompli and challenge us to do something about it when they have atomic parity. What I cannot imagine them doing is taking an action which depends upon attrition, and which involves the stakes necessarily going up. While we have the atomic capacity, do they imagine that we shall submit to starvation without using that capacity? What sort of people do they think we are? Equally, do we imagine that they will accept defeat upon that scale when it is within their capacity to achieve their object by atomising our ports?
The Temporary Chairman: I hardly think that submarines come under this Vote. I hope that the hon. and learned Member will return to the Army.
Mr. Paget: I shall get to the point in a moment, Mr. Williams. At present, the Navy is being given 88,000 men. A good deal more than half of them will be occupied in this anti-submarine activity, apart from the anti-submarine escort of the Fleet, which seems to be a post mortem activity, and something which could become operative only after atomic destruction. If we cut that out it would be quite easy to raise about 20,000 marine and naval troops, trained for land operations, with light equipment. It is within the capacity of the ships that we have already got in commission and reserve to move that force in two lifts.
Is not that an infinitely more valuable contribution, both to the needs of this country in the non-atomic war and to the general security of the West? A force which could perform an operation like Suez, although I hope not in the circumstances of Suez, would be more valuable than making preparations which would be utterly inadequate for the Soviet submarine. If we provided 20,000 men, a couple of small naval marine divisions, we—
The Temporary Chairman: I am sorry to stop the hon. and learned Gentleman again and ask him to confine his argument to the Estimates before the Com-
350
mittee. I think that he is getting away from them.
Mr. Paget: I do not think you were here, Mr. Williams, at the beginning of my speech, when I explained that the whole speech is directed to the fact that we have to increase on N.A.T.O. commitments. I seek to demonstrate that that could be done without conscription, and at present I am showing how the commitments now carried by the Army could be dispersed elsewhere.
I have demonstrated that they can be dispersed by creating a very much smaller force, a colonial police reserve, and an African division, and by creating also two mobile marine naval divisions. The main commitments of the Army outside N.A.T.O. would then be gone. Even if it were necessary to step up our N.A.T.O. commitments from 55,000 to 100,000, and if in the future the atomic stalemate developed—we may be faced with that sort of necessity—what we produce would be capped several times over by our Allies, if we gave the lead and showed that sort of confidence.
Out of 180,000 men about 100,000 ought to be available. If neither side dared to use the strategic deterrent—and that is where we are getting to—it is very possible that we should have to use conventional weapons. We hear about 200 Russian divisions. They keep that very great number of divisions to a very large extent by economy in the equipment. The Russian army tends far more than ours to be a railway-bound army; not the one in Germany, the armies further back. Those in Russia are rail-bound.
I reckon that on the German front they could not deploy more than fifty divisions, certainly under the threat of atomic attack on their concentrations, with perhaps another 30 to 50 divisions in close reserve. If there were a mobile defence of highly qualified and trained troops, attack would require a superiority of three to one and probably more often a superiority of five to one. If we could bring into being—and it must be a British lead that did this—a N.A.T.O. force of more than thirty divisions, it should be capable not merely of containing but, in a defensive battle, of defeating anything that the Russians could throw against it.

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I believe that that is an objective which it is worth while seeking to achieve, but we can only achieve it if we determined that this Army, which we are arming and equipping with fire power in this sort of modern war—which is immensely expen-
352
sive—and trained for dispersion, is kept for the job for which it is created and not misused in running after brigands in Cyprus or similar areas, which is not its job and which is a fantastically expensive method of seeking to achieve it.
10.31 p.m.
Colonel Tufton Beamish: The hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) has made a provocative and original speech, full of new thinking about problems which, I think the Committee will agree, should exercise all our minds. Particularly has he made some interesting remarks about the extent to which police raised in the Colonies might be able to take over the rôle which, in the past, traditionally has been performed by the British Army.
I was glad my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War interrupted the hon. and learned Member to ask whether he thought 45,000 colonial police should take over the rôle performed by the British Army for its policing duties, or whether it was 4,000 to 5,000. I thought that the hon. and learned Member said 45,000, but I was glad to find that it was 4,000 to 5,000, otherwise I should not have thought he was suggesting anything which would result in economy.
The right hon. Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey) made a very pleasant and quite constructive speech, during the course of which he lapsed occasionally into a degree of propaganda, for which we are quite ready to forgive him, but there was one thing he said on which I should like to comment. I do not suppose that anyone else is likely to comment on it, because it was slightly wide of the debate, although, coming from him, it was, of course, perfectly in order. He said that if all this country wanted from Cyprus was the establishment of military bases we could have had that long ago.
Mr. Strachey Mr. Strachey indicated assent.
Colonel Beamish: The right hon. Member confirms that that is what he said. I cannot resist asking why, if it was really so easy to make an agreement and all we wanted was to leave the Turks and the Greeks to settle their own problems and simply to remain with British enclaves well protected, that was not done when the right hon. Gentleman's party was in power? If that was possible then, I cannot see why it was not done then. It really ought to be obvious to us all, party politics apart, that the reason we have until recently
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found it impossible to make a settlement in Cyprus was that there was no basis of agreement between the Turks and the Greeks. It is very easy to say that we could have come to a settlement with the greatest of ease, but I do not think that that was so. I am sorry the right hon. Member should have spoiled an otherwise pleasant speech by saying that.
Mr. Mellish: Is the hon. and gallant Member happy about Cyprus now?
Colonel Beamish: I should not like to answer that question for a few months, but I think that the prospects are excellent at the moment and I am delighted with the progress being made. I hope that the hon. Member is as well.
Mr. Mellish: The hon. and gallant Member has reservations?
Colonel Beamish: I have reservations at the moment.
I wish to speak about the planned size of the Army, pay and conditions, with emphasis on the shortage of officers, I want to say something about mobility, particularly air mobility, and to make one or two rather random remarks about weapons and equipment.
Everyone who has spoken today has welcomed the fact that it will not be long before we have an all-volunteer, professional Army. Having been a Regular soldier myself, I have always felt, during the time that we have had National Service in peacetime, that it was wasteful, that its disadvantages easily outweighed its advantages.
For example, I believe it to be more or less true, though a slight over-simplification, that for every National Service man who is capable of doing his job as a soldier two men have to be employed—something like that. That is quite clearly a major disadvantage. Therefore, I greatly welcome the fact that the policy of the Government has led us to a position where we can look forward to having an all-professional volunteer Army.
Credit should be given where it is due, to the Government of my party for the way in which they have added to the teeth of the Army and cut down its tail. I have not got the figures in mind at the moment, but I know that, when one looks

355
at them, they are very impressive. When something like this is done, which we welcome, it is always worth while asking whether we have gone as far as we possibly can. Several hon. Members asked whether it is possible to cut down the tail still further and give the Army even more powerful teeth.
Have we cut down far enough on headquarters staffs? I remember that when I was in Singapore, a couple of years ago—things may well have changed since—I could not help noticing the number of senior officers I found there. They were all doing good jobs, but I asked myself whether there were too many of them and whether their staffs were somewhat inflated, because almost the first person I met in Singapore was Professor Parkinson, who happens to be a professor of history in Singapore. I believe that there have been quite substantial changes in Singapore during the last year or two.
t may well be, now that we are coming on to the basis of an all-Regular Army, that we have yet another opportunity to look again at the question of inflated staffs. It may be that further cuts can be made in ancillary services, also. Perhaps the size of the Pioneer Corps, for instance, is greater than is necessary with an all-volunteer professional Army. As one hon. Member opposite suggested, it may be that more civilian labour might be employed in training schools and staff colleges. I think that the coming end of National Service gives my right hon. Friend and his colleagues a golden opportunity for combing the tail even more.
I welcome very much the fact that, because recruiting has gone so well, in view of the inducements which have been given, we can look forward now to a professional Army of 180,000 instead of 165,000, but I cannot help, even now, asking myself whether this will be sufficient in terms of infantry. In 1936, when I left Sandhurst, there were, I think, 138 infantry battalions of the line. That included, I think, 10 Guards battalions. At the same time, there were 90 Indian battalions, of which 29 were Gurkha battalions.
In spite of the fact that, in those days, we had up to 50 British infantry battalions in India, it remains true that 88 British infantry battalions were available for service elsewhere. The fact also remains
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that, in those pre-war days, we were quite often stretched to considerable distances, and it was a common complaint of commanders in different theatres that they wanted more infantry. We now have, I think I am right in saying, 61 battalions, of which three are parachute battalions. I am not counting the Gurkhas in this, although there are eight Gurkha battalions as well.
I wonder, although I cannot be sure about this, whether we can be perfectly certain, bearing in mind the difficulties which we have encountered since 1945—difficulties in Malaya, Kenya, Palestine, Korea, Egypt and Cyprus—that we are absolutely safe with the target figure which we are now setting ourselves. I should like to think that my right hon. Friend has not completely closed his mind, if recruiting goes even better than at present, to the possibility that we might aim at an Army of 200,000. I merely throw out that idea, because it is common ground between both sides of the Committee that we must make quite sure that we can carry out our commitments and that, if possible, we should like to do everything we can to avoid any kind of selective National Service.
I turn now to the question of pay and conditions of service. I do not wish to say a great deal, but I should like to begin by saying that in my opinion, as a Member of the House who, before he was elected to Parliament, served for some ten years or so as a Regular soldier, it is true to say that the Army's pay and conditions of service have never been better. That is a very sizeable feather in the cap of the Government and reflects great credit on them. It ought to be, and I am sure it is, common ground on both sides of the Committee that good pay and conditions are the only possible basis for a really satisfactory volunteer Army.
In the White Paper, Cmnd. 675, of February, 1959, the Government announced yet another step in their acceptance of the recommendations of the Grigg Committee. Both the main decisions announced in the White Paper are extremely valuable in helping to ensure that we get the volunteer Army that we want. The decision that in future pensions will normally vary with the rank held at the time of discharge and the total length of service is an excellent one.

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The decision about the lump sum terminal grants, which will be three times the annual pension instead of being calculated on a different formula, is another very big step forward which I know will be widely welcomed in the Service.
Having said that, I should like to make a brief comment—I do not think that it will be a particularly constructive one, although I wish it could be—on my right hon. Friend's remarks about the shortage of officers. This is something which should cause this Committee grave concern. I do not know the exact figures, but I think I am right in saying that, broadly speaking, we are getting at Sandhurst only about half the officer-cadets that we need. If that is so—I believe it to be so—it is a very serious situation.
It is clear from what the Secretary of State for War said that he regards this as a major problem that has got to be faced. Certain steps have already been taken, such as the scholarship scheme, to attract more suitable young men to Sandhurst to become officers, but the Grigg Committee stated, in paragraph 262:
"The biggest single impediment to the recruitment of officers is the length of career now offered."
It went on to refer to the career-structure.
This is an exceedingly difficult problem. It seems, prima facie, that what we want to do is to make it possible for officers to leave the Army either younger or older. That appears to be a very simple solution, but as soon as we accept that solution we begin to get a gap between the officers who stay on and the young battalion commanders there might be in these circumstances, if we made promotion faster, at 35 instead of about 42 or 43 as now. This career structure is not an easy question to decide, but I was very glad indeed to hear from my right hon. Friend that it is so exercising his mind that a new committee has been set up to consider it. I hope that it will not be long before it reports because, this is extremely important, as my right hon. Friend said. T have no doubt that the matter to which the committee will give most attention is this question of "career structure", as the Grigg Committee called it.
Two other recommendations the Grigg Committee made on this subject are on
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page 52, Recommendations (xi) and (xii). One was about the granting of facilities
"to enable officers to gain professional qualifications or experience of industry while still serving."
I am not sure whether that recommendation has been accepted or not, or to what degree it has been accepted, but it would certainly help to provide a man about 40 to 45, which is the typical retiring age, with an opportunity of finding a useful niche in industry. I hope that that will be considered by the new committee as well.
The other recommendation, Recommendation (xii) was that
"an ex-regular taking up an established job in Government employment should have the option (on repayment of any non-effective benefits earned by service in the Forces) of counting that service as if it were established service for the purposes of Civil Service superannuation."
If there has been an announcement about this I have not seen it, although I keep abreast of these things as carefully as I can. I thought that a very valuable recommendation which would go a long way towards persuading a young man who wished to join the Army, and go to Sandhurst at the age of 18, that he would have a reasonable prospect of gainful employment after leaving the Army.
I said earlier that I felt that the way in which the Government have accepted so many of the recommendations in the Grigg Committee's Report really is most praiseworthy. For example, they have accepted the recommendation about disturbance allowance, which has been a pinprick for officers for many years—this constant business of being uprooted from, say, West Africa, sent home to the Staff College, finishing the course, and being rushed off to Malaya. The recommendation of the Grigg Committee has been accepted and that is very much welcomed.
Another important recommendation which has been accepted is the proposal about education allowances which, again, I think, will make a substantial difference once its implications are fully understood. So I repeat that I really sincerely feel that the generous way in which the Government have dealt with most of the Grigg Committee's recommendations is something which has been widely welcomed throughout the Service and something which is bound to have its effect

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upon the recruiting of officers, although at the moment, unhappily, things are not going nearly so well as we should like to see them going.
Next, I would say something about mobility with special reference to air mobility. Over the past few years I have asked a series of Questions about the number of helicopters available for use by the Army. I cannot help feeling that to some extent the Army has been too shut-minded about the importance of vertical-lift aircraft. I am using the term in its broadest possible sense to include helicopters and all the developments which exclude the necessity for the rotor going round above.
In speaking in these terms I am thinking of much bigger helicopters and the enormous advantages which they can provide in terms of mobility for the Army's normal peace-time law and order role. I am told that the French Army has been using 400 helicopters in Algeria, which is the main reason why they have been so highly successful in a difficult terrain against a strong and well-organised enemy. At Suez—if I may mention the word—I believe that we used about 25 to 30 helicopters with an average man-lift of five men with their light equipment.
There are helicopters beyond the prototype stage, the Westland Wessex, for example, which can lift 14 men for 80 miles, or nine men for 200 miles. I am told that it is likely to be in production by 1960 or 1961, and it could play an important role in the Army. I believe that in the next few years a good many of the road vehicles will be replaced by air vehicles, if I may put it in those simple terms.
Another medium heavy lift helicopter is the Bristol 192B. I believe that it is in the prototype stage. It would be helpful if my right hon. Friend could confirm that during the course of the debate and if, at a later stage, the Committee could be given more information about other vertical-lift aircraft in which the Army is interested. I am not only thinking of helicopters. There is the Fairey Rotodyne and even more advanced forms of aircraft which might well result in the lifting of 100 men for 100 miles, to use round figures, within quite a short time. Within
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five or six years that might well revolutionise the mobility of the Army.
I am sure that my right hon. Friend is air-minded where the mobility of the Army is concerned. There may well be a number of technical points to consider in connection with helicopters and it would be useful if we could be told more about the results which were achieved following the setting up of the Joint Experimental Helicopter Unit which was formed on 1st April, 1955, with a view to examining these problems.
Something said earlier by one of my hon. Friends may be significant, that all the aircraft in which the Army has an interest have a low priority in the eyes of the Royal Air Force. The R.A.F. has no special interest in helicopters, although it is bound to have an interest in vertical-lift aircraft of a more advanced type. I wonder whether it is advantageous to the Army—if it be the case—that the R.A.F. should have such a big say about which helicopters are available for Army use. The position may have changed since, but in reply to a Question in 1956 I was told that orders for helicopters are placed at the request of the Secretary of State for Air, who takes into account the requirements of the Army. That may cover a number of sins. I hope that my right hon. Friend is studying this matter to ensure that if helicopters have a low priority in the eyes of the R.A.F., they have a very high priority in his eyes.
I conclude with a few brief and random views about weapons and equipment. A good deal has been said about them already. I do not share the Opposition's view that things are really very gloomy in this respect. It would have been true twelve months ago, but since then astonishing progress has been made. My right hon. Friend gave figures, for example, showing the progress made in equipping the British contribution to N.A.T.O. with modern vehicles. I think he said that a year or two ago only 20 per cent. of the vehicles in the British Army in Western Germany were modern. Now, about 84 per cent. are modern. That is terrific progress in a very short lime. The vehicles and weapons appear to be coming through the pipeline at increasing speed.
These things are apt to happen. One is always posed the problem, with modern

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weapons, of when to go into production. I have a clear recollection of the sort of mistake that can be made, though I am not entirely sure of the reasons for it. The first weapon on which I was trained when I joined my regiment in 1937 was the two-pounder anti-tank gun. We thought it a wonderful thing, and extremely accurate. I remember impressing several military attachés with a prize exhibition of smashing holes in a moving target 500 yards distant, but I have an even greater recollection of how those shots bounced off German tanks a couple of years later.
Although it was considered a most efficient weapon at the time we had gone into production with a rotten weapon which was out of date when it was produced. I do not know why that happened, but I use it as an illustration of the fact that it is a difficult matter of balance to decide when a weapon has been perfected and when to go into production. An enormous gain might be made by taking a calculated risk and saying that we will go on with an ordinary rifle or an old Vickers gun which has been in production for thirty years and is more or less the same as a weapon that has existed for sixty years. Considerable advantage might be gained by taking a calculated risk resulting in the production of the right weapon in the right quantity at the right time.
My view is that a calculated risk has been taken. I was not greatly impressed by the reasons, given by my right hon. Friend the Minister of Supply, as to why we had not felt it possible to go into production a little earlier with some of these modern weapons, but one can sum these things up by saying that a calculated risk has been taken and major economies made by reason of the fact that we are now in the middle of re-equipping the British Army with the most modern and efficient weapons which science can devise. I believe that to be true.
I mentioned the medium machine-gun because I know quite a lot about it. Since the 1914–18 war and even since the beginning of the century it has been more or less the same weapon, only that previously to the Great War it went round the other way inside. It is very heavy, accurate and efficient, but it should have been replaced a long time ago. I have
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a clear recollection of going on a course at Netheravon in 1937 and being shown an air-cooled weapon, capable of firing on a fixed line, which was to replace the Vickers machine-gun. We are now again told that something of that kind may be coming along soon. I certainly hope so, because lugging round a Vickers gun is hard work. It is time that it was replaced.
There is only one other thing that I would like to ask about weapons, as all the other points that I should have liked to mention have already been raised by other hon. Members. Is there not more than a possibility that there may be an important rôle for a light tank for the Army in preserving law and order and policing, which we have obviously got to be willing to carry out for a number of years? There probably is, and I am thinking in terms of an air-transportable light tank. I believe that the Minister of Defence said something about this question in the Defence debate last week, but it would be of interest to the Committee to know a little more about the thinking of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War on the question of a really light tank which is air-transportable.
Mr. Mellish: The Secretary of State for War has already said that he is committed, as far as the Army is concerned, to the Centurion and that the Army is not to be concerned with a light tank.
Colonel Beamish: I did not understand my right hon. Friend to go as far as that. I understood him to say that it was his opinion, which I know to be shared by many foreign countries and by our N.A.T.O. Allies, that the Centurion is the finest medium tank of its kind in the world. I believe that view to be widely shared, but I did not understand my right hon. Friend to say that because that is a good medium tank, and because it is getting a better gun, he has closed his mind to the opportunity of getting a light tank.
I must apologise for having spoken for so long and if I have rambled from one point to another. I was trying to pick up some of the points which have been mentioned in the debate by other hon. Members, and make some comments and ask questions on them. I trust that my right hon. Friend will think that my remarks, though sometimes critical, have been, on the whole, constructive.
11.0 p.m.
Mr. Roy Mason: I am grateful for having caught your eye, Mr. Arbuthnot. It is late, but nevertheless it is early in the debate. I hope I shall be brief in my remarks, and earn the gratitude of my hon. Friends. The hon. and gallant Member for Lewes (Colonel Beamish) has made four specific points. I hope he will excuse me if I do not follow him on them, because I want to make three specific points of my own.
I notice that in the Defence White Paper and in the Memorandum to the Army Estimates in paragraph 10, the Minister has informed us that this month a British guided weapon regiment is to go into Europe, and that this is to be our first. I am considerably perturbed about this. I am in favour of a tactical nuclear weapon. If we have to have a modern Army and streamline the forces, we have to have up-to-date, effective and efficient fire power and keep abreast with trends, and the tactical nuclear weapon is absolutely essential.
What worries me is the extent to which we now have the absolute political right to control the use of this weapon. The Americans are already in Europe with their atomic artillery, and this is our first unit. Strangely enough, the Minister, in opening the debate, made no reference at all to our nuclear unit. I should have thought that this would be a landmark in the debate. The Minister of Defence skipped around that subject in the defence debate. We are to establish a landmark in military history by putting into the field for the first time a nuclear regiment, and the Secretary of State for War makes no reference to it at all. That amazes me. It also gives rise to suspicion.
Mr. Soames: I assure the hon. Member that there need be no suspicion in his mind. The modern trend in defence and Estimates debates is that weapons are talked about so many years ahead, before they come into service, that when a unit is equipped with them it has ceased to be news.
Mr. Mason: That could have been true about tanks and machine guns, for example, but it is not true about nuclear weapons. In last year's Army Estimates debate the Secretary of State for War, and in the Defence debate last year the
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Minister of Defence, did not deal with this matter in any way which would lead us to believe that they were happy about this unit. The defence debate was overshadowed by the discussion of the use of the strategic weapon, the H-bomb. In the debate on the Army Estimates the Secretary of State for War did not deal with the nuclear unit at all.
Mr. Soames: It is in the Memorandum.
Mr. Mason: The right hon. Gentleman went through the Memorandum almost word by word in his speech but, strangely enough, he did not deal with this unit. It gives rise to some suspicion. Now that we have the nuclear unit and now that the Americans have such units, if we have decided the shades of grey between a massive onslaught by the Russians on the West and the various small types of attack which might take place, to what extent have we delegated responsibility to the commander in the field? In the event of a certain type of military operation, has he the right to use the tactical nuclear weapons?
In introducing the Estimates the right hon. Gentleman ought at least to have mentioned this unit and to have told us whether it will be used at the express wish of the commander in the field, recognising a situation at the time, with no waiting for a political decision. Have we in the House or the Government of the day the right to veto any decision of the supreme commander in the field to us, these tactical nuclear weapons? I should be obliged if the Under-Secretary of State for War, in concluding the debate, would tell us precisely what rôle the unit is to play.
The hon. and gallant Member for Lewes referred to air transport. Will the Minister tell us whether we have sufficient air transport available to move this unit quickly to other theatres of conflict—the Middle East, for instance, or any other theatre where this equipment might be urgently needed? The unit concerned will have the experience of manning the equipment, although not of using it in anger. Can we move it speedily from one theatre to another?
The right hon. Gentleman has some reason to be pleased with the figures which he gave us for the Territorial Army. We now have more than 100,000 members of the Territorial Army. That

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was pleasant to learn, and the right hon. Gentleman is entitled to a measure of praise for it, but he should have told us precisely what rôle the Territorial Army is to play. It is a growing force. The right hon. Gentleman's measures have been successful and he has obtained increased recruiting. Now he should tell us what is the future rôle of the Territorial Army. Paragraph 59 of the Memorandum states:
"The Territorial Army has now taken over those responsibilities for civil defence which were previously entrusted to the Mobile Defence Corps."
I have a little bee in my bonnet about the Territorial Army and the Civil Defence Corps. First, I recognise the need for Civil Defence. Secondly, I appreciate all that local authorities have done to maintain it in being and at its present standard. I am pleased that the Territorial Army is now taking over this rôle of mobile defence. Does not the right hon. Gentleman think that Civil Defence is now a military operation, and that if one thermonuclear explosion took place in this country, particularly over a built-up area, the havoc, the thousands of people killed, maimed, fleeing from the scene panic stricken, the fires caused, would he such as to constitute a military operation?
Town clerks in their cubby holes in town halls cannot possibly command this type of operation. This is something for the Territorial Army. Having started this trend, will the right hon. Gentleman now give more consideration to it and speedily enlarge the rôle of the Territorial Army in this part of defence?
Thirdly, I wonder whether the right hon. Gentleman has paid any attention to the recent Agreement between ourselves and America on the exchange of atomic energy information for mutual defence purposes—I refer to Cmnd. 537. The British Army can gain a great deal of experience from the operation of this Agreement. What training with the Americans has there been on the use of tactical nuclear weapons? Do we envisage any of our forces going to America for training there, or Americans coming here and having joint exercises with our troops? I understand that in Germany we are having great difficulty with this type of manoeuvre and that it will possibly be more difficult still because of the
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amount of ground and space which is required for a nuclear tactical field operation.
We must remember that the Americans have a tremendous amount of experience with this matter, far more than we have, because they have been able to station their troops on the perimeter of atomic test areas and thus give them test experience. As far as I know, our troops have not had that experience. If tests are to be resumed, or, within the pending agreement among the atomic Powers, kept to a certain level below a given kiloton size, it would be a great advantage if troops could be "blooded" to atomic tests, particularly as the Americans have already had that experience in the Nevada Desert. We can benefit a great deal from that type of exchange.
I ask the hon. Gentleman to deal with these points when he winds up the debate: first, the decision, either by the Government or by the supreme commander in the field, on the use of nuclear tactical weapons in Europe; secondly, the future rôle of the Territorial Army; thirdly, how the Army can benefit from the operation of the Agreement which I have mentioned. I look forward to hearing something about those three things.
11.13 p.m.
Mr. Anthony Kershaw: While agreeing with the hon. Member for Barnsley (Mr. Mason) that the Civil Defence aspect must enter into the rôle of the Territorial Army, I hope that my my right hon. Friend will not make the Territorial Army concentrate completely on that rôle. I do not think that the hon. Member suggested that, but that is a dull rôle for the Territorial Army and I do not think that volunteers would he so readily forthcoming to take part in week-end manoeuvres if it were only for a Civil Defence rôle. I hope that my right hon. Friend intends to reserve a purely military rôle for the Territorial Army, because I am sure that that will have the effect of attracting far more volunteers than would be the case with a Civil Defence rôle.
I congratulate my right hon. Friend on increasing the numbers of volunteers for the Territorial Army, which is very important for the future. If National Service had continued for two or three years it would have been the ruin of the

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Territorial Army as we know it. It would have ground to a halt and I am certain that it would have been very difficult to revive the volunteer spirit. The change back to a volunteer Territorial Army came just in time to save it from collapse. So it is perhaps also important that the Territorial Army should have further units.
Some who join the Territorials are not particular what type of unit they join, but the majority pick and choose according to their particular interest. One sort of interest which should appeal to the young people of today is the sort of S.A.S. rôle, which has a glamour to which they would take very easily. It also has some advantage in that it is not an expensive rôle in which to train troops, so long as one does not take them abroad or teach them the parachute part. I should have thought a small unit of the S.A.S. type in each county area might help to get more recruits for the Territorial Army. Light infantry of that type might be useful in the Territorials and lead to recruits for the Regular Army as well.
If I concentrate on some points which are not so satisfactory, I hope that it will not be thought that I do not think the present Memorandum and Estimates are by far the most satisfactory that we have seen for a number of years. On the shortage of young officers, I believe that what the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) said about military families is right, and I would urge my right hon. Friend to bear in mind the question of pensions. I have so often heard fathers discouraging their sons because of their own unhappy experiences regarding their pensions.
I was sorry to hear, in answer to a Question that I put recently, that the projected increase in the number of troops which the Regular recruiting has allowed my right hon. Friend to make has not led to any reduction in the proposed amalgamation of regiments. This is a source of great disappointment to men whose fathers and grandfathers have served in regiments, and who, because they cannot serve in those regiments, are a loss to the Army. If we could avoid those amalgamations it would lead to a larger number of men being available to join as Regular officers.
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It has also been said that the Army pay is more satisfactory today than ever before, and I heartily agree with that. Young men do not normally join the Army for the immediate prospects of pay, but it remains true that if one were to single out any rank that is not overpaid now it is the subaltern. I believe a subaltern of six years' service can, under certain circumstances, be paid less than a corporal in the same unit. It might be worth my right hon. Friend looking at that point.
I should like to congratulate my right hon. Friend on the accommodation progress he is making, and on the agreeable innovation of having photographs in the middle of the Memorandum. But I think that was a little selective with the photographs of barracks, in having the back of some old stables in Windsor and the front of some new barracks by contrast.
Mr. Soames: It is the same site.
Mr. Kershaw: So the stables have gone, and the horses, too. I should also like to know where the troops returning from Cyprus are to go, and whether the plans in the Memorandum take into account the return of those 15,000 to 20,000 men.
The Minister of Supply said in the defence debate last week that a 45-ton tank was being developed. I am sure that so large an expense would not be undertaken without careful consideration, but it seems that such a large and expensive vehicle, suitable only for one theatre of war—and an atomic war—must be a doubtful proposition. With modern atomic and even conventional artillery and anti-tank guns, I should have thought that such a tank would be far more vulnerable than ever before, and that it would be necessary to armour it so heavily as to make it quite impossible for it to move across country with the necessary mobility. If it is possible for the Committee to be told, I should like to hear why so large a tank was developed.
I would also query the wireless equipment. It is well known that the provision of wireless equipment has been held back until the proper set was available, but it is very surprising to see that the amount of money concerned is very much less than it was last year. I would ask my hon. Friend whether he is satisfied that the range of this wireless set will be sufficient to enable it to take care of

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the distances necessary to be covered following upon the dispersion caused by the threat of atomic warfare.
Lastly, I want to refer to a subject which is not often mentioned, and which, at first sight, I thought might be out of order, until I saw from one of the Votes that it was not. I refer to the Army Benevolent Fund. Not long ago I wrote to the Under-Secretary of State for War about this fund, and I understand from him that it was anticipated that the maximum need of the recipients of the Fund would be reached ten years after the war. I cannot think who could possibly have advised my hon. Friend that that would be so. Every charity, Service or otherwise, could have told him that it would not be so. The further we get from the end of the war the greater will become the need of those people who receive pensions consequent upon their injuries, illnesses or misfortunes. Nobody would agree that this need would die down ten years after the end of the war.
I should like to know what case experience the fund has; whether it deals with individual cases or only contributes to other charities, like the War Office itself. I should also like to know whether the very distinguished serving and permanent officers who serve on the fund administer it in detail or just hand out bulk sums to the selected charities mentioned in the Army Estimates. It appears that this fund is being run down, and that contributions to the various other Army and Service charities are being cut back, by about 25 per cent., just when they are most required. This is an astonishing way to administer this fund. I should also like to know whether this Fund has ever asked the public for money, as the R.A.F. Benevolent Fund has. It has apparently collected money during the war from P.R.I.s, but it would seem that it has never asked the public to contribute. I want to know why that is so, and whether it will in the future.
If it is decided to continue to run this fund exactly as in the past its contributions to other funds will be cut by between a quarter and one-third, and will finally disappear altogether. What is being done with the money at the moment? Is it being invested? If so, in what? If it is not, or is invested unsatisfactorily, or only in Government
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stocks in various sorts, would it not be more satisfactory to distribute the whole fund among the various people who are in the habit of receiving money from it? They could invest the money in equities and avoid the diminution of their resources which is about to take place.
The way in which this fund is being administered, and its contributions cut down at a time when it is most important that they should not be, is a matter which should be considered. I am certain that those hon. Members who have experience of the matter will agree that the funds established as a consequence of the First World War are still being very heavily called upon; indeed, those established after the South African War are called upon to the same extent as always because, as they get older, more people come forward wishing to take advantage of them. I hope my right hon Friend will be able to look at this matter. I do not expect to have an answer to these rather special questions about charities at this time of night, but I hope that something will be done about them.
11.26 p.m.
Mr. Frederick Mulley: I hope that the hon. Member for Stroud (Mr. Kershaw) will pursue his inquiries about the Army Benevolent Fund, because he made a prima facie case for more information to be given. I was, however, a little shocked to find after eight years of Conservative Government he should be advocating that money should not be put into Government stock, but transferred to equities. That seemed a rather dismal view to take of the economy—a view I endorse, but which was a refreshing one to come from the other side of the Committee.
Mr. Kershaw: I did not want to raise any party controversy. I very nearly said "Daltons", but I thought that I had better swallow my words.
Mr. Mulley: It is rather surprising, since the hon. Member said that he knew nothing about the investment of this Fund, he should now categorically say that it is invested in a particular gilt-edged stock.
To turn to a point on which there is no controversy, we on this side of the Committee all welcome the increased pay

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and better conditions that the Army enjoys today. We also share the concern that even better conditions should be provided, particularly along the lines, about which the Secretary of State spoke, of careers after the end of Army service. While I am sure that it was not the intention of the hon. Member for Stroud and the hon. and gallant Member for Lewes (Col. Beamish), when they spoke of this problem, they referred only to officers. It is equally important that proper careers and future prospects should be made available for other ranks. I hope that the Under-Secretary, in his reply, will say that any plans the Government have for officers in this respect will apply to other ranks as well.
I wish to say something about equipment, because I was staggered by a recent intervention of the Secretary of State, who said we talk so much in advance in the Army Estimates debates about weapons which do not exist that when some actually get down to the units that is no longer news. I submit that when these weapons get to a unit it is news, because that is something which is almost unique. This year the Government are making a virtue out of past negligence. It is true that in the past year 80 per cent. of the vehicles in B.A.O.R. have been replaced. It is true that this year we hope we shall see half the Army equipped with the F.N. rifle, but these advances in equipment only underline the negligence of the years before. Surely no one would have been bold enough to say that there was no occasion to believe that B.A.O.R. or the British Army would be called upon to defend this country or the N.A.T.O. Alliance over the last seven or eight years?
While the Government may take some praise of doing something about it now, it points to great negligence in the past. I realise that there is a time lag between proving a prototype and getting it to the men in the field, and even longer before the men have actually learned how to use it, but that makes it even more urgent to get into actual service as soon as possible the weapons which are approved.
I hope that B.A.O.R. will be given absolute priority in the supply of the F.N. rifle. While the Secretary of State was a little more encouraging today than the Minister of Defence was recently about
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European interdependence and the desire for standardisation, they know perfectly well that the British troops in Cyprus have the F.N. rifle with standard 300 ammunition, whereas British troops in Germany are the only troops now in the Alliance with a different weapon and different ammunition from others in N.A.T.O. While, on the one hand, people have been trying to plan an interdependent organisation for supplies, the fact that the basic round is different for one country from what it is for others has been the cause of a very great deal of adverse criticism in Europe during the past year or two.
I agree with the point made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey) and other hon. Members during the defence debate, that it was very surprising that the Minister of supply sought to explain the delay in the re-equipment of the Army by the need to get rid of National Service before any decent equipment could be brought in. I have the quotation here if there is any dispute about it. It is very necessary that the Under-Secretary should deny that there was any deliberate intention on the part of the Government to let the National Service boys use up the old weapons without regard to the fact that they were placed in combat zones and theatres of war ill-equipped to do the job they were sent out to do. It seemed to be a shocking revelation, and I hope that the Government will make a clear statement about that tonight.
Another matter which is of very great importance to our troops in Germany is the availability of training areas. I was in Germany last autumn and I had the opportunity of talking about this matter with both British and German military and civil authorities. There is no doubt that there is a traditional hostility in peacetime between any civilian and any soldier on the question of training areas, compensation for damage, and the like. But, of course, it is particularly a problem when two nationalities are involved, and I feel that a great deal of harm has been done to Anglo-German relations by squabbles and difficulties in this respect.
There seems to be a widespread view that foreign troops do not mind how much damage is done because they do not have to pay. That, of course, is

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wrong, although it has not been pointed out clearly enough. I understand that the support costs are reduced by the amount which has to be paid out in compensation. Germany is a densely populated country. The amount of available and suitable land for Army manoeuvres on a large scale is very limited, and I hope that the Government will support other Governments in trying to find alternative areas in some of the other N.A.T.O. countries which could be used as well.
A great deal needs to be done to improve public relations so that the soldier, for his part, understands the civilian's point of view, and, equally, so that the German civilians appreciate that there is not much point in having soldiers—whether they be their own or of the other N.A.T.O. countries—in Germany to defend Germany if they are denied the very necessary opportunities for training and using their equipment. The Assembly of Western European Union passed a resolution on this subject and sent it to the Council of Ministers. I hope that our Ministers there will endeavour to find a solution to what seems to be an extremely difficult problem. I understand that the restrictions are often so severe that mechanised units have the chance to drive their tanks around only perhaps once or twice a fortnight, which has a frustrating effect on the interest of all ranks in acquiring a mastery of their weapons.
I wonder whether the Under-Secretary can say something about the organisation of the Army, particularly in Germany, in the matter of the new formations. We all know that in the new conditions of a possible nuclear war it was desirable that some reorganisation should take place. The traditional division was clearly not the best structure for the nuclear war Army. Wider dispersal was needed, and controlled mobility. I think that the objective was to find the smallest effective self-contained unit. The United States went in for the pentomic division, which has been broadly followed by Belgium, France and the Netherlands. We developed the brigade group structure. More recently, the Germans have developed a rather similar brigade group structure. I understand that the whole question is being studied by General Valluy, for S.H.A.P.E., and I
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hope that we may learn some of the conclusions which have come from the study.
While it is obvious that we cannot expect every nation to have its army organised in exactly the same formations, if we are to serve as Allies under one command there must be sufficient compatibility between the various units for one to know that a Belgian division, a British division, or a series of brigade groups will represent roughly the equivalent fire-power and that if need be there could in emergency be interchangeability of command. I hope that we may have the Government's views about this and the future of the brigade group formation.
I wish to take up the question of the tactical use of nuclear weapons. I should make it clear that I welcome the sending of the Corporal regiment to Germany. The view I have always taken of this is that if we are to have defence it has to be efficient and effective. I was a member of the ill-fated British Expeditionary Force of 1939–40, and I would never wish anyone else to go against an enemy vastly superior in every category of weapon and equipment. If the enemy has these weapons, I believe that we must have them.
At the same time, this raises the very important question of the decision and the authority for the use of such weapons. As I understand the position, the authority in N.A.T.O. is vested in SACEUR personally and that no subordinate commander could authorise the use of the tactical nuclear weapon. I shall be glad to have this confirmed. I should also like to have the Government's views on what seems to me to be a very important distinction between the initial use of such weapons, the very first Corporal to be fired, and the subsequent channel of command if the worst happened and we found ourselves engaged in a nuclear war.
As I said in the defence debate, I believe that it is impossible to compare these tactical nuclear weapons with any kind of conventional artillery. I understand that the smallest of the nuclear warheads is half the size of the bomb which destroyed Hiroshima. Many warheads are two or three times that size. I do not think anyone can suggest that the decision to make the first use of such weapons is one which should be left to

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a military commander in the field, and I ask, therefore, whether the Government have taken any steps to get some political directive or political channel of authority so that the first use of the nuclear weapons, not only of the British Corporal or the American Corporal, but of any other tactical nuclear weapon which may find itself in Germany in the next year or two, should be the result of a political decision or within a framework of a political directive, and not left possibly to a military commander who may decide on the use of such weapons on the basis of inaccurate information.
Obviously, from the purely tactical point of view the best target for a nuclear strike is the concentration of the enemy when he is massing troops prior to an attack. The possibility of a nuclear war starting from an error of judgment seems to me sufficient to warrant the taking of every possible safeguard to avoid it. I take the view that once a tactical nuclear weapon is discharged it would be extremely difficult, considering the size and nature of the weapon, to prevent that from spreading to a complete nuclear conflagration.
In Germany, I was very much concerned by the attitude which I found there to this question of a limited war. The current military theor—no doubt it is current, too, in the War Office—is, or was a few months ago, that the only kind of war to be foreseen is a nuclear war. I was told that the British troops there could hold up an attack of two or three divisions for probably two or three days without resort to nuclear weapons. The whole of the thinking seemed to me to be along the lines of the use of tactical nuclear weapons. That seemed to me to be extremely distressing. The Germans, on the other hand, seemed very aware of the possibility of limited war. In the present conditions of Central and Eastern Europe it seems to me that the possibilities of, at any rate, a local incident or something of that sort creating a limited attack are sufficient not to be ruled out. The Germans were much more realistic about this than our own military commanders.
I know that the objection will be taken, "It is very expensive and we cannot hope to arm our people for two kinds of war." But that is not necessary. If one examines
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in detail the armament of the German brigade group and our own one sees that while they are training and prepared for both conventional and nuclear war and we are training, as far as I can see, wholly for nuclear war, the conventional artillery is, in proportion, the same in each. There is no need, if we face the possibility of limited war, to change the armament of the brigade group. All we need to do is to put in the training, and, in the thinking of our military commanders there, more emphasis on this possibility.
As I said in the defence debate—I do not want to repeat the arguments now—there is a grave danger of a nuclear stalemate. We have reached the position now where anyone in the West who takes the decision to use the strategic nuclear deterrent knows that, as a consequence, several cities in the West will certainly be wiped out. In a sense, it would be a decision to commit suicide. Therefore, I think that there is increasing need for what has been called the N.A.T.O. shield in contradistinction to the sword of the deterrent.
I know that people say it is unrealistic to suppose that 30 N.A.T.O. divisions would be able to cope with over 200 Russian divisions, but that is not the problem. No one envisages that 200 Russian divisions would be brought against our 30 divisions in opposition along a central front. I could never envisage a war starting in which the Russians would summon their divisions in a long line and someone would blow a whistle and off they would go to war. Surely that is completely unrealistic. I do not think that a frontal war of that kind would start. It is more likely, if the Russians decided to start a war, that it would be one of a surprise, strategic attack rather than trying to line up 200 divisions along a front.
I understand that there are 22 Russian divisions in East Germany, 18 of them mobile and armoured; that there are two in Poland and that, in addition, there are seven East German divisions. Even if they have reinforced them by stealth, I do not think that on a central front at the beginning of the aggression we should have to face more than 50 divisions. I think that a ratio of two-to-one, two attackers against one defender, is a quite realistic position. If we get 30 divisions,

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it would be more like a ratio of three attacking against two defending.
It is remarkable how the advantage of the defender has increased over the period of military history. I was reading an interesting paper by Captain Liddell Hart, an outstanding military historian and one of our great military experts, on the ratio of force to space. He calculated that at the Battle of Waterloo the density of the line was about 20,000 men to the mile. In the Franco-German war the figure had dropped to 12,000. In the First World War it was between 3,000 and 6,000 men to the mile. In 1940, we went back a bit, as we generally do at the beginning of a war, to the worst features of the previous war, and the figure was 6,000 men to the mile. As the right hon. Member for Carshalton (Mr. Head) said in his interesting speech in the recent defence debate, it was not the failure of the Maginot Line which caused our defeat in 1940; it was because of the original use of mechanised divisions by the Germans and the new tempo of war which was not appreciated by the Allied commanders, on the one hand, and the complete neglect on the part of the Allied commanders to anticipate an attack in the ArdennesS—
Mr. Antony Head: The hon. Member referred to Captain Liddell Hart as an eminent historian. He will remember that before the 1939 war Captain Liddell Hart was one of the foremost advocates of the fact that the strength of defence was so great that any attack in any future war would be a stalemate.
Mr. Paget: Strictly that is inaccurate. What Captain Liddell Hart said was that if any attack was attempted with infantry the capacity of the defence had become overwhelming. But if an attack was made with armour and parachute drops, there was a great prospect for an attack. And after all, General Guderian said in his book that his scheme was entirely based on Liddell Hart's teaching.
Mr. Mulley: I should trespass too far on the indulgence of the Committee if I went into a lengthy debate on points of view before the last war, but I know from my personal experience in the 2nd Division, the first British troops in Belgium, that we did not see a German until we retired into France again because of the failure to protect our flanks. Whatever may be said about Captain
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Liddell Hart's views on paper before the war, a lot can be said about the strategy of Allied generals in command of operations on the ground. But I think that the point is valid that successful attack needs, both in armour and in numbers, to be very much superior to those in defence and that that general principle still applies even though one might argue about the numbers.
In Normandy, I understand, we rarely attacked successfully unless we had a superiority of five to one. On the other hand, on the Eastern front the Germans were often able to hold Russian attacks where the Russian superiority was seven to one. I make this point to show that it is quite feasible, having regard to the time factor in amassing more than 50 divisions against us on the central front, that we could hold out against a Russian attack by conventional means. Obviously, if there is an out-and-out offensive, our ground troops would be insufficient, but we need to ensure that it is impossible for the Soviet Union or any other aggressor to be tempted by the prospect of an easy gain.
I believe that at present, on the north of the central front, there would be a possibility of an attack across Germany to Denmark and we would be faced with a decision whether to release a strategic nuclear deterrent and commit London and New York to destruction for the loss of certain parts of N.A.T.O. territory. That is an extremely difficult decision for anyone to take. Therefore, it is much better to avoid that decision by having sufficient forces on the ground by conventional means to remove any temptation to any adventure of that sort.
The Government have not done as much as they ought to have done towards strengthening the shield. I agree with my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) that however we do the arithmetic the 55,000 men we have in B.A.O.R. at present are not the four divisions we have promised. I know that these days "a division" is a rather elastic term. There is such a difference between various organisations that it no longer means the same thing to different people, but it is fair to say that the minimum number of fighting men in a division is 13.000. Three brigade groups would be nearer 15,000. If one

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allows for the necessary supply and base personnel, the minimum figure is about 17,500 to 18,000. That means that our 55,000 men in Germany represent only three divisions.
I know the difficulties which the Government face, particularly in the matter of balance of payments. It is on the record that at Western European Union I have done my best to defend the Government against some of the more outrageous charges against them, but here I cannot get away from the fact that we could do very much more. We ought to send a fourth division into Germany and get some element of leadership in Europe. For every extra British soldier we get there we have a strong moral argument to ask that some of the French divisions come back from Algiers and some of the other commitments to N.A.T.O. are maintained.
I should also like to see, as I have advocated elsewhere, all the Western European Union countries committed to place a certain number of troops under SACEUR. I ask the Secretary of State to give serious consideration to this need. I should like him and the Minister of Defence get rid of their obsession that nuclear defence is the only matter of concern and of first priority. As I have said, in a small way, in the re-equipment of B.A.O.R., they are coming round to a more realistic point of view. I would, therefore, ask the right hon. Gentleman not only to give priority to issuing new equipment to B.A.O.R., but to do his best to get four divisions of British troops under the N.A.T.O. shield during next year if at all possible.
11.56 p.m.
Major H. Legge-Bourke: I should like to follow the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) in some of his remarks, but if he wishes to leave the Chamber I will not refer to them in his absence. He made one or two points about the possibility of raising a colonial police force for the purpose of doing jobs which hitherto British troops had had to do with the aid of a civil Power, which I heartily endorse.
I have found this debate to some extent encouraging, as was the defence debate the other day. It appears that if one
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says things often enough other people eventually come to agree with them. My right hon. Friend the Member for Carshalton (Mr. Head) said, in the defence debate, that the battle was in the minds of men. I think that I first said that when there was a Labour Government between 1945 and 1950 and we had a debate on the Christmas Adjournment on the subject.
The hon. and learned Member for Northampton has been urging something which my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Sir H. Mackeson) and I once said in an Adjournment debate. I still believe that there is a great possibility of avoiding British troops having to be used in aid of a civil power if we were to take some positive steps now to raise a colonial police force rather more of the armed police type than as we know the police in this country.
On the other hand, we have to bear in mind what Field Marshal Lord Montgomery said in his book about the Palestine police and the changes which had to be made there before we finally evacuated Palestine. Certainly, I would say that the danger of having a colonial police force is that one is liable to get something which is neither one thing nor the other, such as resulted in Palestine.
What is most important in this context is to get a clear distinction between what are police responsibilities and what are military responsibilities. To attempt to employ police as soldiers results in just as many evils as attempting to employ soldiers as police. One point which the hon. and learned Member overlooked was that in many—I should say in nearly all—of the operations in Cyprus the troops on the ground have been working very much under the orders and instructions of the police. I am sure that that is the right way round when dealing with what is primarily a civil aid problem.
The hon. and learned Gentleman overlooked, too, that if we are to raise police locally for keeping law and order it is important that the police should not be put in the position in which the Greek police were placed by E.O.K.A. in Cyprus. It is known that a considerable number of the police in Cyprus were members of E.O.K.A.

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Not enough tribute has been paid to the British constables who have often been serving in isolated positions, without any fellow countrymen with them, in police stations primarily manned by Greeks and Turks. The rôle which these men have played has been magnificent. They have had far too little credit for it. Although they are not carried on the Army Vote, I think that the Army would be the first to congratulate them on what they have done.
Mr. Head: It may be an unpopular thing to say, but we should also pay tribute to both Greek and Turkish police. My hon. and gallant Friend said that some leaned towards E.O.K.A. The Turks felt very strongly on their side, but—
The Deputy Chairman (Sir Gordon Touche): Order. They are not borne on this Vote.
Major Legge-Bourke: I am sorry, Sir Gordon. I began this, and I apologise. I hope that my right hon. Friend the Member for Carshalton does not imagine that I am not fully aware that there were many police, Greek, Turkish and British, whose conduct was magnificent. I made my comment because I wanted to answer the point made by the hon. and learned Member for Northampton that, with a view to economising in the use of Army manpower, we should use such a police force. I wanted to point out that there is danger of falling into the kind of situation which E.O.K.A. produced if we rely too much on the police in those circumstances.
I thought that my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud (Mr. Kershaw) was a little unfair to my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War in his comments on the illustrations in the Memorandum. A pleasant sense of nostalgia comes over me when I look at the picture of those barracks. It reminded me that in the first months of the war I had to get myself organised and remember that there was "a war on". I am very glad to see that there has been "a war on" against the building at the far end of these barracks. My hon. Friend the Member for Stroud may not realise that the ground floor, designed originally as stables, was occupied by men for many years after the war. The conditions in which the men lived were far from good
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enough. My right hon. Friend the Member for Carshalton may have had some responsibility for having them improved, and I am sure that my right hon. Friend the Secretary State does not claim all the credit for it.
I must make an observation about the building shown at the bottom of the picture. Why is it that British architects seem to have gone "flat-roof crazy"? Of all countries in the world, this is the country in which flat roofs should not be used. There may be some strategic purpose in this decision, although I doubt it. A flat roof gives more trouble than any other type of roof, and I am sorry to see that the Army has to endure what so many education authorities are being forced to endure.
I turn to the main points which I wish to make. The first concerns training areas, which were also mentioned by the hon. Member for Sheffield, Park (Mr. Mulley). I want to raise, in particular, the question of the training areas which will be available to our troops left in Cyprus. I spent some months in Cyprus during the war, and I was there long enough to know that there is no more demoralising place for troops if they have not enough to do. The two base areas at Akrotiri and Dhekelia will not be big enough to keep the troops occupied, if they number several thousands.
In the Annex to the Cyprus Agreement, on page 13 of Cmnd. 679—The Declaration by the Government of the United Kingdom—one of the rights which we reserve is
"to use from time to time certain localities, which would be specified, for troop training."
I do not know what that means. Does it mean field firing ranges, for example, or does it mean that at intervals the troops in Cyprus will be able to do formation exercises across the island? It also depends to some degree on the nature of the arms left there, whether armoured or infantry, or both. To bottle up armoured or mechanised regiments in those bases will make the men very bored.
"Browned-offness" is an experience which is never very happy and if the bases are to be the areas where most of the training is done there will be some trouble. This is a matter of extreme urgency and I hope that before any of

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these areas are specified my right hon. Friend will give this matter his serious consideration. I also note from the Annex that we have the right to travel from one base to another at will, using the roads, and I do not take that to mean that the area between the two bases can be used at whim for training.
I want, finally, to refer to officer recruitment. I have heard some disturbing reports of what certain schools are planning to do with their combined cadet forces. Some public and grammar schools have provided a supply of young officers in the past, and it is obviously desirable that they should continue so to do. If, as I fear may be the case, some schools start cutting down their combined cadet forces, now that National Service is ending, we may lose some potentially good young officers.
I hope that my right hon. Friend will be able to reassure us on this matter. Headmasters tend to have their own views about this subject and I doubt whether my right hon. Friend could get an agreed common policy running through all public and grammar schools, but it is very important that the Secretary of State for War should let it be known beyond all doubt that he intends to rely on combined cadet forces to a considerable extent and that he will try to encourage them.
I see that expenditure has gone up slightly this year, by about £20,000. I wonder whether that is sufficient and whether my right hon. Friend has done enough to ensure that combined cadet forces are not steadily run down over the next few years, which would be a great pity. However much some boys may dislike it, it is very good for them.
I join with others in congratulating my right hon. Friend on his presentation of the Estimates. It is significant that the debate has been badly attended. I can only suppose that everybody is satisfied. Generally, when there is likely to be cause for disgust, dismay or anxiety, the Chamber is crowded out. The fact that my right hon. Friend has been left in peace for much of the time is significant, for it means that the Government's plan is working out. It is a plan which has the general approval of hon. Members. I hope that it is able completely to work itself out and that we shall have a very
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well equipped Regular Army at the end of it.
12.9 a.m.
Mr. James Simmons: My remarks will not be technical, tactical, or profound. They will be the simple remarks of a simple "bloke" asking some simple questions. I want to follow what was said by the hon. Member for Stroud (Mr. Kershaw) about the Army Benevolent Fund. Trying to trace that fund in the Estimates, I came across a reference to artificial limbs—it is curious what one can find in the Army Estimates if one tries.
Being interested in artificial limbs from my experience at the Ministry of Pensions, I wondered how they came to be mentioned in the Army Estimates. I found that I had to refer to page 129 and to Vote 7 C. However, I could find no reference to artificial limbs there, unless they are included in the expression "etcetera" I should like to know from the Under-Secretary whether the Army is trespassing on the preserves of the Ministry of Health, who, since the merger of the Ministry of Pensions and the Ministry of National Insurance, are responsible and, as far as I know, solely responsible, for providing artificial limbs for disabled people.
The Under-Secretary might also have another look at the Benevolent Fund question. How many kinds of benevolent fund have we for soldiers and disabled soldiers and for the dependants of soldiers and disabled soldiers? When I was Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Pensions we had the King's Fund and were able to supplement pensions a little through that fund. There are also the various corps and regimental funds of a benevolent character, and the Ministry used to be able to call on them. Then there is the Soldiers', Sailors' and Airmen's Association, which is also benevolent. Is it not time we got together and tried to get some co-operation between all these funds?
The hon. Member for Wycombe (Mr. John Hall) seemed to suggest for the future Army the rôle of police and scavenging. He said that the British Army in N.A.T.O. would be an ineffective unit. That is an amazing suggestion, because when the "Frogs" and the Yanks had not arrived it was the old

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British "Tommy" who held the line. To suggest that the British Army is not, even with all the modern alterations, capable of taking its full share in any action in which N.A.T.O. is concerned is an insult, because the spirit of the "Old Contemptibles" is not dead, even if the form and structure of the Army have been somewhat changed.
The hon. and gallant member for Lewes (Major Tufton Beamish) referred to the present target of 180,000 Regular serving soldiers to be obtained by voluntary recruiting, and suggested that it should be 200,000 because we had to consider such possible future commitments as we had in Korea, Egypt, Cyprus and elsewhere. Surely, if we had a Government which did not do inflammatory things, we should not have so many Cypruses, Koreas, Suezes, and situations such as we now have in Nyasaland. The size of the Army should depend on the foreign policy of the Government. We on this side of the Committee are content with the figure of 180,000, because we know we are not far from office, and when we are in office the foreign policy we shall pursue will mean that an Army of 180,000 will be sufficient for the defence of our interests.
Before throwing brickbats I want to see how many bouquets I can present. The most pleasing aspect of the Army Estimates is the assurance in the Memorandum that conscription will end on the date formerly agreed, and the fact that there has been a great improvement in voluntary recruitment. We are told that the position of officer recruiting is not so encouraging as it is for recruiting for other ranks. I wonder why there should be two kinds of recruiting. We are told that some officers are to be sent to Sandhurst. How many working-class lads will go there? How would they feel there? They would not have the old school tie to wear, and they would probably feel entirely out of place. They might go to Welbeck, for technical training.
If two castes of officer are to be created, one at Sandhurst and the other at Welbeck, what kind of soldier will we get? It is a great mistake to divide officers into the technical and Sandhurst types. I believe in the comprehensive school for the education of our children, and I want a comprehensive college where the working-class boy with ability can go without
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feeling out of place, and without feeling that undue class distinctions are being imposed.
What is Sandhurst today? Is it the same kind of snobbish place it was between the wars? Must those attending it have university degrees, or a good ancestry, or public school qualifications? The social set-up is a very important factor for the Army of the future. If we want a democratic Army we must create the conditions which will promote one. The lad from the slum or the ordinary working-class home must have an equal chance with the product of the public school.
Some of the age-old aids to recruiting have gone. Massive unemployment was one, and it would be interesting to know what impact the recent rather alarming increase in unemployment had on the recruiting figures. We could find out what effect it had by going to those areas where unemployment has been most prevalent and ascertaining the figures for recruiting there and comparing them with those for the other areas where unemployment has been negligible.
Another aid to recruiting is the fast-disappearing old county regiment tradition. Even such a non-military person as myself has to acknowledge the traditions of my old regiment, the Worcesters, with a cap badge motto of "Firm". It still conjures up nostalgic memories; and the strains of the old regimental march still stir my blood. That county spirit and tradition, which was formerly such an aid to recruiting, is disappearing.
Perhaps we are living in the past and do not realise that the present age has no time for sentiment. Modern youth would rather have the Corporal, Blue Streak, Thunderbird and all the mechanical gadgets of our modern armies than the Colours, the regimental march and comradeship, all of which have contributed to make the British soldier the finest in the world. With a small Regular Army it will be necessary for manpower to be effectively used. One is glad to know that, according to the Memorandum to the Estimates, the process of transferring certain duties to civilians is proceeding smoothly and, as I read it, that is likely to continue. The relation of "teeth" to "tail" is likely to be improved in favour of teeth.

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Is all possible being done to conserve manpower? Is tradition standing in the way here, although it has been swept away in other respects? What about officers' servants? Are officers' wives' housemaid duties still done by soldiers? Recently, there was a report in the Press about an airman who absented himself because he had to wash babies' "nappies." There are two letters in this morning's Daily Mirror about soldiers doing these menial chores. One said that he even had to wash officers' wives' "undies." It is there in print.
Can we have some information on this aspect of the use of manpower before this debate ends? Why officers' servants at all? If there are to be officers' servants, why should there be servants to wives of officers, paid for at public expense and using valuable manpower? If these people want servants, let them go get them through the registry office and not take British soldiers in uniform to do these disgusting duties, make them feel small and so humiliated that they go absent without leave through having these rotten duties imposed on them.
How about the Household Cavalry, the Royal Horse Artillery and the "Debs' delights" in the Guards? I am not suggesting that ceremonial occasions should be eliminated. They are a great contribution to the tourist industry. The Yanks love them. They like to see the changing of the Guard. I am not suggesting that we should stop that. It is an attraction to tourists and a magnet to visitors to London. These gaily plumaged units of the Army are part of our tradition.
Mr. Head: They are in Aden now.
Mr. Simmons: I am not saying where they are; I am saying what I think of them. They are part of our tradition and I am not suggesting that they should be abolished, but that these functions could be performed by smaller numbers of men. The rarer the bird the more attractive it is. If we are to have these rare birds for ceremonial parades, let us see that we keep them to minimum numbers. Why not take them out of the category of the fighting forces altogether and put them on the Vote for the Royal Palaces?
Of course, the "Debs' delights" are in another category. They are part of the
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fighting forces. No one who served in the First World War will dare to question the courage and bravery of the Guards regiments. We pay tribute to their great battle service for their country, but should these fine regiments have to provide escorts for the pampered pets of a decaying aristocracy and an arrogant plutocracy in an attempt to bolster class distinctions?
Mr. Head: The hon. Gentleman has made it up.
Mr. Simmons: Of course I made it up. Why not? I like to be word perfect if I can.
I saw an article in the Press the other day about how Guards officers, as part of their duties, have to take these "debs" out, running them round the town and all the rest of it. Why should an officer of wonderful regiments like that be used for this snobbish, class-distinction kind of operation?
Mr. Head: Operation?
Mr. Simmons: I call it an operation—a nice operation.
Another corps which might be pruned is the Military Provost Staff Corps, which is responsible, according to the Memorandum, for
"guarding, training and rehabilitating soldiers under sentence".
How many, including officers, does this service swallow, and how effective are they? Does the "glasshouse" still exist? I would love to know that. I never quite got there. [Interruption.] I do not mind the hon. Member for Exeter (Mr. Dudley Williams). Perhaps he himself did not get there. If he had been there when we used to sit until about 8 o'clock the next morning on the Army Estimates, he would have something to grumble and growl about. I want to know whether the "glasshouse" still exists, with its futile and inhuman punishments. Do men still have to go out in full pack and carry weights around the square and do all those futile and punishing things which they did while I was in the Army?
Has there been some improvement? If there has been an improvement, for goodness' sake let the War Office take the credit for it. The "glasshouse" was a terrible punishment in the days of my youth, which are now long past, when I was a member of one of Her Majesty's

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regiments. Has rehabilitation any real significance? I do not see how the "Red Caps" could rehabilitate anyone; they do not seem to be the sort of chaps who could help in rehabilitation. They are usually rather cocky; they go about very arrogantly. I do not see how their services could help in rehabilitating soldiers under sentence, as it is stated here. The kind of "rehabilitation" the soldiers would receive would probably be a mouthful from a serjeant-major. What rehabilitation goes on in these penal establishments of the Army?
If the increase of £3,400,000 in the expense on works is mainly due to improved barrack accommodation and married quarters that merits another bouquet, because one of the biggest factors in recruitment is the standard of housing for the soldier, whether he be single or married, in decent and reasonable conditions. The pictures opposite page 6 of the Memorandum are instructive about the outward appearance of the barracks and they show a very welcome improvement. The hon. and gallant Member for the Isle of Ely (Major Legge-Bourke) complained about the flat roof, but I thought that it was probably left flat so that another storey could, if necessary, be put on top. I am not an expert in architecture, but they look better than the old barracks from the outside, anyway. What about the inside? Can we have some information about the facilities and amenities available inside the barracks.
Mr. Soames: The hon. Gentleman should come along and see them.
Mr. Simmons: Do we still have communal sleeping, or is the new Army to be given cubicles? It would not cost much. Privacy is very precious to all human beings at one time or another.
On the whole, the new pensions proposals are good. I have looked closely at them. The Government would not expect me to let them pass without some comment, and I say that, on the whole, the pensions proposals are very good. Some of the terminal grants are most generous. One might suggest that the Tory Government are attempting to create a new capitalist class. With a little imagination one could think of a few success stories based on the possibilities now opened up to retired soldiers. It might even dis-
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courage the literary urge so prevalent among generals and field marshals. "From brigadier to captain of industry" may well be the title of a Press interview in the near future.
Think of what could be done by a brigadier with a pension of £980 a year and a terminal grant of nearly £3,000. That would be a nice variation on the theme of the poor boy who came to London with a few shillings in his pocket and ended up a millionaire. A private with a pension of £95 6s. 8d., plus £85 terminal grant, would not be so advantageously placed in the scramble to become a capitalist, but he would have the odd 6s. 8d. to pay for legal advice on floating his company.
The blot on the scheme is the provision for widows. Widows whose husbands died before 4th November, 1958, do not get any increase. The widow of a private, corporal or sergeant therefore does not get any pension as all, and even those who now qualify get the miserable sum of 15s., 18s. 4d. and 23s. 10d. respectively. The officer's widow gets basically the same rate as existed 100 years ago, and 60 per cent. of these widows cannot qualify for a national insurance pension. Surely the cost of bringing all widows in would not be prohibitive. I am informed that the cost of increasing the pensions of widows of officers would be only £324,000. To bring in all of them would not break the bank.
The Grigg Report said that the present treatment of widows was bad for recruiting. If we want our Regular Army on a permanent basis, this is one of the things that we must deal with. I ask the Secretary of State and the Under-Secretary to look at the widow provision in the scheme—I have said that, on the whole, the scheme is a very good one—and see whether they can do something for widows whose husbands did not die on just the right day or did not retire from the Army on just the right date.
I must again draw attention to the miserly provision for the holders of the Victoria Cross. It is not good for recruiting to read in the Press of the holder of a V.C. dying in poverty, or struggling to keep the wolf from the door while alive. I reiterate that no one can place a value on the Victoria Cross, or name a sum which it would be adequate

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to pay as a pension to the holder, but the £10 pension is an insult. I implore the Secretary of State to consult the Treasury officials, or deliver an ultimatum to them, that something adequate must be done to improve the position of the holders of the Victoria Cross.
Finally, I believe that it would be a disaster if the methods of nuclear war made our Army too weak and ineffective to do the normal job of an Army—if the soldier of the line became defunct. The deterrent is the deterrent only as long as it is held in reserve, held as a very last resort. If we so weaken our striking power in conventional warfare after making it clear that we intend to rely entirely on the deterrent the potential enemy will know that we actually have no deterrent at all. A border incident or the defence of the status quo in Berlin would, in these circumstances, lead to nuclear war straight away. Personally, I have not much faith in the nuclear deterrent in the hands of several nations. In my humble opinion, it is an effective deterrent only if it is within the control of a supranational authority, and I should like to see negotiations begun between all the nations which now have the nuclear weapon to see whether it could be handed over entirely to the control and authority of the United Nations. The threat of its use without the possibility of its counter-use by the aggressor is, in my opinion, the only effective way of deterring the aggressor without destroying civilisation.
12.36 a.m.
Sir Eric Errington: I do not think that I had better follow the hon. Member for Brierley Hill (Mr. Simmons) in all the details with which he has dealt, not even the "Debs' delights" and the "glasshouse," but I would agree with him very much on two matters
The first is that I think it is a great pity that we do not get more of the regimental spirit as manifested with the bands playing and the colours flying and that sort of thing. It is a very impressive sight to see an effective, well-drilled unit marching at its best. Fortunately, in my constituency that does sometimes happen, but only, I regret to say, all too rarely.
It has always been a great pity, I believe, that it has not been possible to
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renew the Aldershot Tattoo, and it is sad to reflect that another tattoo, I think Woolwich, has also fallen by the wayside. It is very sad indeed, but I suppose it is just one of the things which the modern Army has to face.
I wish to say one word about the widows' pensions for the older widows. I do not think that the cost is very great, as the hon. Member has just said, though I think it is rather more than he said, but what seems to me so infernally trying is the fact that no decision has been arrived at. We have been pressing the matter, and it has been before the Government for some considerable time, and still no decision has been made. In my opinion, it is only fair that these old ladies, who suffer through no fault of their own and many of whom are below or on the subsistence line, should know one way or the other, yea or nay, whether or not they are to get an increase in their pensions. It is no exaggeration to say that the matter has been under consideration for four or five months. The amount involved is not great, but the human anxiety is very considerable, and I hope that the Government will make a definite statement upon that matter.
Let me say just a word or two on constituency matters. It is a source of great satisfaction to me that there has been a very great improvement in the Army buildings which have been built in Aldershot, but there is still a lot to be done by way of ordinary accommodation for the soldier, and, I should think, even more in the married quarters. A number of useful steps have been taken and for them I wish to thank the Secretary of State.
It is important that a strong public relations connection should be maintained with the local people in garrison towns. They should not be made to feel that anything they wish to do is being made difficult. Local councils or officials may not feel hampered in their activities, but citizens individually may experience frustration. It had been said that no Army land should be made available for other purposes in the Aldershot and Farnborough district. That is probably correct, but the reason should be made clear beyond doubt to the public. We have had a number of statements about the military importance of training grounds and what is necessary in that regard

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but where a vast amount of land would seem to be available it should be made clear to the people living in the area that the land is necessary for military purposes.
The circumstances of "dilutees" in the Aldershot area are unfortunate. Often they have worked hard at their jobs and trained themselves, but because of an agreement with the trade unions, it is impossible for them to continue in their jobs unless there is a vacancy for them in their particular grade. I have had correspondence with the Under-Secretary on this subject and one person who was a dilutee about whom I wrote was placed in employment and was able to continue in his trade, but I realise that, in law, he has little standing.
In Aldershot, there may be sufficient employment for everyone, but I am afraid that there may be a number of cases of dilutees whose earnings will be reduced. If that is not to happen the reason should be made clear. It may be that there is room for secondary industries which would provide work for those who are not required by the Army. The local authority should encourage industry, if necessary, to come to the area so that in future there will be no more unemployment than is absolutely unavoidable, and the Service should make its position clear. These are points which should be dealt with as matters of urgency so that those who live in Aldershot may have early information of their position.
Two other matters of a different character which I should like to mention deal particularly with equipment. The first is that there does not seem to be any reference in the Memorandum on the Army Estimates to units of armoured personnel carriers. As I understand, in any future nuclear war we shall need a good many of these to enable troops to get about the battlefields safely and quickly. I understand that in theory, in the exercises, it is pretended that these are available. Apparently, there are some one-ton armoured trucks, but there is not a sufficient supply of them to make units of armoured personnel carriers. This matter is of great importance in nuclear conditions and I should be relieved to hear it if my information is not correct.
Mr. Soames: I can set my hon. Friend's mind at rest. I am not sure
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whether it is mentioned in the Memorandum, but I said in my opening speech that all the Saracen armoured personnel carriers we have ordered—which are bigger than the one-ton armoured trucks—have been delivered and all infantry units with armoured brigade troops haw' the Saracen carrier.
Sir E. Errington: I am very pleased to hear that.
The other matter relating to equipment refers to wireless communications. I am told that wireless equipment is not supplied to units below sub-areas in Civil Defence, with the result that it is not possible to practise meeting any emergency at a low level. I should like to know whether it will be possible to supply wireless equipment to Civil Defence units below the level of sub-areas.
Finally, as to recruitment, particularly, though not exclusively, of officers, the Grigg Report was quite clear that there would be an attempt to evolve a two-tier method, whereby some men would continue in service up to the comparatively early age of 45 and some would continue for a longer time, say, to 65. I hope that that policy will be pursued, for the reason that we shall have satisfactory recruitment only if a complete career is provided for those who come forward.
I hope that such a career will not necessarily be limited to the Army. As far as I can see, there is no reason why, in these days, it should not be open to people to serve in the public service for the greater part of their lives, up to the age of about 45 in the Army, and then in some other form of Government service. The experience of the Ministry of Labour committee which has placed in employment men who have left the Services indicates that there is a good deal of room for that kind of practice.
The Grigg Committee's Report is on the right lines, but it is the Government's job to say that if people are prepared to come into the Services they will have a career for the whole of their working life.
If that is so, I am satisfied that we shall get better recruiting, not only of the ordinary rank and file, but also a better type of recruiting of officers, I hope that consideration will be given to that point, because I am sure that it is

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one of the most important factors in determining whether we shall get an adequate supply of the right sort of officers.
12.51 a.m.
Mr. R. J. Mellish: Half-past three yesterday afternoon seems a long way away. Last year, when I had the privilege of winding up the debate on the Army Estimates for the Opposition, the same sort of thing occurred as happened today. We were interrupted for three hours by an Adjournment debate. I remember that I wound up even later than tonight; I believe it was just after 2 o'clock. On that occasion we discussed a Spaniard on the Adjournment Motion. I do not know what subject we shall discuss next year; let us hope that the Army Estimates debate will not be interrupted. Of course, I believe it is right that this debate should have been interrupted at seven o'clock; I merely make the point because one almost forgets what the Secretary of State said at the beginning of this debate, as it seems ages ago.
I should like to begin by saying to the Under-Secretary of State for War, who is to make his maiden speech in his present office in the Army Estimates debate, that I wish him well and I hope that he can answer many of the questions which have been asked today. He has quite a task ahead of him, because many of the questions which have been asked are technical and I suppose that he will find it almost impossible to cover the enormous field which this debate has covered.
It is my sincere belief that the standard of debate, in spite of the interruption for another debate, has been very high indeed. There has been a genuine desire on both sides of the Committee to help the Army, not just to be critical but to try to devise the best way of getting the finest British Army possible.
The debate started with the Secretary of State presenting his Estimates in an excellent fashion, and very clearly. I remember that part of it, at least. My right hon. Friend the Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey) also made a very constructive speech in reply.
I want to deal with the Memorandum of the Secretary of State, with particular reference to the deployment of our troops, and to ask one or two questions. I wish
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to pay a tribute to our troops who are now in Malaya. I am sure that the Under-Secreary will wish to support me in that tribute. I believe that there are 10,000 of our troops in Malaya, and they have done and are doing a magnificent job. I had the misfortune to spend nearly three years in that part of the world during the war, and I know there cannot be a worse climate anywhere. Fortunately, I did not have to undergo some of the hardships which the men are suffering today.
I can only say that the conditions there are very grim. The climate is about the worst in the world, and sometimes we forget the men who are there. We are indebted to them. I should like also to pay a tribute to my own national newspaper, the Daily Herald, for publishing a series of articles calling attention to the fact that we have many men out there and that they are doing a magnificent job.
On the deployment of our troops in the Arabian peninsula, we read, in paragraph 23 of the Memorandum:
"The Sultan of Muscat and Oman requested Her Majesty's Government to assist and to train his armed forces which were occupied in overcoming the resistance of rebel leaders…"
I understand that this war, or skirmish, or encounter, is still going on. We get some indication of this from the Royal Air Force Memorandum. We are told that there were 70,000 sorties out there. We have been told nothing about it in the Committee. What is the position?
Does the reason that we have not been informed lie in the fact that the type of command out there is different from that which used to exist and that the War Office is not receiving the information which it might have received? Our troops are out there, and if fighting is going on, it would not be a bad thing to find out who is winning. [HON. MEMBERS: "It may be a draw."] The only comment in the Memorandum is that we
"successfuly occupied the area held by the rebels".
I am told that the rebels are not satisfied with that and have been making some efforts to get it back. If so, we ought to find out more about it.
I could start a long debate, although at this late hour I do not wish to do

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so, on the deployment of our troops. Cyprus has been mentioned. We know that there has been a settlement in Cyprus, which evidently pleased the hon. and gallant Member for Lewes (Colonel Beamish). I can only say what I said in the defence debate: that I feel that no Englishman can be pleased with the way in which the trouble in Cyprus has been settled. I still claim, as my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition claimed, that we should have had a settlement long ago. At the end of the day we had to negotiate with Makarios, which, in the circumstances, is nauseating for most British people.
We are certain to have trouble in Malta. I hope that we shall at least learn one small lesson from Cyprus and from the troubles we have had there. We may think that Dom Mintoff is a truculent and difficult person, but we can be certain that in the end a British Government will negotiate on the position with him. They will have to do so, because he is the only man of any substance there. At the end of the day we shall have to come to some sort of terms with him. I hope that our troops do not become involved in Malta.
I want to ask a question about our troops in the British Army of the Rhine. My hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Park (Mr. Mulley) mentioned it. In paragraph 11 we read:
"Training has been based on a study of the tactics of the brigade group in nuclear war and unit training has culminated in a series of full-scale brigade group exercises."
In the next paragraph we read that
"divisional headquarters have been streamlined and standardized."
How many brigades have we there? Have we eight brigades with four divisional headquarters or nine brigades with three divisional headquarters? What is the position in respect of our commitment to have four divisions in Germany? Let us have a straight answer to that question. I hope that we shall also be told what the Government mean by a division.
Turning to the recruitment to the Regular Army, I want to congratulate the Government. We are delighted that it seems that the target will be hit. We are as pleased about this as any hon. Member opposite. We argued from this side of the House a long time ago that
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conscription had to be abolished. I want to ask only the sort of questions which are helpful to the Government on this question.
One of the pleasant features about recruitment to the Regular Army, as the Minister himself said, is the recruitment of a larger number of boys. The number of boys entering the Army has risen to 6,000 a year. The recruitment of these young boys, later to become adult soldiers, raises the problem of the promotion prospects which will be available in the Regular Army. The Grigg Report is almost the Bible today on matters concerning the Army, and one turns to it to support any criticism which one may wish to make. Naturally, I, too, have referred to it.
If the Under-Secretary turns to page 33 of the Grigg Report, paragraph 168, he will see that the Committee was itself very concerned about the promotion system in the Army. It is useful to get this on the record. It states:
"The War Office told us that the Army's rules for the promotion of technicians were worse than those in force in the other two Services, since the Royal Navy had a system of time-promotion and the Royal Air Force a trade structure which permitted advancement irrespective of establishment limitations to the equivalent of non-commissioned rank. The War Office believe that this discrepancy of treatment has an adverse effect on prolongation, and if the Army's rules are in fact less favourable, it is something which should be put right quickly".
To that, the Government replied that the matter was being studied. How is that study getting on? What is the hope that some time we will make the promotion prospects in the Army a little more realistic, since, in the long-term, the discrepancy in promotion prospects may be a deterrent?
The important feature of the recruiting figures submitted by the right hon. Gentleman, is the man-year figures. Here again, the Government are to be congratulated on the increases in pensions, allowances, and so on, because those will undoubtedly act as a further stimulus to getting people to stay in the Army. My hon. Friend the Member for Brierley Hill (Mr. Simmons) paid justifiable tribute to some of the pension rates which are now to be paid, especially those applying to men with twenty-two years 'service.

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For example, a sergeant with twenty-two years' service could retire at the age of 42 with a pension of about £4 a week and with a terminal grant of about £700. I know of no private industry which can match that. That is the sort of propaganda we want to get over in a big way if we want more people to stay in the Army for twenty-two years.
I have only one comment to make on the recruiting of officers. That concerns the scholarship scheme. There is a reference to the scheme in paragraph 44 of the Memorandum. The terms are that a maximum of 40 scholarships a year will be awarded to boys and that there will be maintenance grants and tuition fees totalling up to £200 a year. I do not want to start any class antagonism about this matter. I have no objection to public school boys becoming officers. I am all for it. I met a number of them in the Army and many of them were first-class, but I do not see how this scholarship will apply to grammar school boys.
The yardstick should be the income of the parents and the need. The reference to refunding tuition fees means that the scholarship is for boys at boarding schools and that rules out most grammar schools. Grammar schools provide an enormous reservoir of potential officers and we want to encourage the type which conies from a grammar school. The good grammar schoolboy is as good as, and, in many cases, far better than, the public schoolboy.
However, I hold the view that one of the finest types of officer is that type which has had experience of serving in the ranks and who knows something about the men's conditions and outlook and point of view, and even language—which at times can be very useful. Man management is very important and it cannot be learned by a few courses at a specially selected school. One has to live with people and understand them to understand man management. That is an important part of the training of officers and I do not know why we are not more enthusiastic about getting more officers from the ranks than hitherto.
There is another important matter associated with recruitment and seeing that those in the Army have an even better life. I concede at once that pay
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is very much better than it has been in the past and that, in the long term, that must help a good deal. But public relations are also very important. Sir James Grigg devoted a number of paragraphs of his Report to public relations and the importance of that subject for the Army. I do not know whether we do it or intend to do it, but do we have courses for senior officers on the subject of public relations?
I had an interesting experience while visiting Germany just before Christmas, where I saw the extraordinary lengths to which they go to teach their officers something about public relations. They are, incidentally, also teaching them something about democracy, which their senior officers need badly, but public relations is an important part of selling the Army to the local people wherever the unit is, and for dealing with bigger problems.
This is not something we can casually write off. There should be courses on it, and as Sir James Grigg says:
"Although there has been a great deal of progress over the last twenty years, a number of officers forget that public relations is a part of modern life, and that all the great industries pay much attention to the problem of presenting themselves properly to informed opinion and of reducing the amount of uninformed opinion."
He goes on to say:
"The Services have no need to fear the Press."
That is true. The Press are anxious to put over a good story for the Armed Forces—provided that they are given the good stories. But recently the Army decided to copy the Americans in calling up a rock 'n' roll singer. In fact, they tried to do an "Elvis Presley." The reports of that were ridiculous; the whole affair was rather nauseating to the British public. As a matter of fact, this wretched boy should never have been called up. He was in the Army for only two days and was then in a mental hospital. If they had looked at his case history they would have known that his family was so affected.
This is one of the things in which we blunder rather badly. If we are to put anything over on the public relations side, we should not make it cheap or Americanised. We are proud of our Army, and we want something sensible. Do not let us exploit individuals, either.

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On discipline, Sir James Grigg is equally good. He said one thing which I said last year, about military policemen on railway stations. I said that from my experience in the Army these people were an absolute pest and a nuisance. It makes the average soldier feel so annoyed when he is going home when he is asked what right he has to be walking about a railway station, where is his pass, and so on. I experienced it in the ranks and know of many others who feel the same. Sir James Grigg says:
"There is a feeling, too, that military discipline is allowed to obtrude overmuch into the Serviceman's free time. The military policeman patrolling the London railway stations symbolise everything that the Serviceman dislikes on this score; he feels that, unlike men in other walks of life, he is not treated as a responsible adult."
If I were Secretary of State for War, one of the first orders I should give would be to take military policemen off all the railway stations. All I would have on the main stations would be the R.T.O.'s office, where the soldiers could get friendly advice, instead of having these wretched characters walking about with so much arrogance and making the soldier's life a misery.
Again, on discipline—and it is important not to ignore the Grigg Report—there is still so much going on in the Army which should be abolished. The War Office said in reply to Sir James Grigg that it was being studied, but we should like to know how far that study has gone, and whether we have abolished such things as pay parades, making men receive their money as though it is a great honour to do so. Why can they not be paid in a normal way? Why cannot we adopt a system which recognises that when a man leaves the barracks he is free from discipline? We should allow him to wear civilian clothes, and not object to a certain kind of civilian outfit.
One matter upon which the Government have started to claim a lot of credit is accommodation. They have put up some good-looking figures concerning what they are going to do in the future. It is about time. We have already had an argument about the money that has been available for some time with nothing being done with it. I think I remember reading that a total of about 20,000 married quarters was required. I believe that it was said that that figure would break the back of
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the need for new married quarters. Perhaps we can be given the exact requirement in this respect. If what I have read is correct, the Government's figures do not look quite so good; it would appear that we still have a long way to go to bridge the difference between what is needed and what is being provided. We must not be complacent, because unless we provide good married quarters and accommodation we shall have a great deal of trouble and friction in the Army.
In the last paragraphs of his Memorandum the Minister talks about the simplification of Army administration and the introduction of automatic data processing equipment. I am all for the introduction of machines to do some of the stupid jobs which now have to be carried out by men, but no machine can take the place of a man or Department which deals with men's grievances. We should not go too far in this respect, so that we reach a position where letters from men do not get the human treatment they deserve.
Much criticism has been devoted to the shortages of weapons, vehicles and equipment. The Secretary of State has been very unhappy about these criticisms. Some time ago he seemed to convey the impression that they might retard recruitment. I do not agree. It is a healthy thing that Parliament should discuss these matters openly and frankly, and I am convinced that much of the agitation from these benches, and also from some hon Members opposite, has prodded the Government Front Bench—not necessarily the two Ministers who are sitting on it now, but their predecessors—into doing something which at least looks like providing a first-class Army in the future. The more prodding we do in this respect the better it will be.
We have an extremely good case on the question of the way in which the Army has been dealing with new types of weapons, vehicles and equipment. I have been doing some research in this matter by reading some of the previous statements made by Secretaries of State for War in their Memoranda. Let us take the example of the FN rifle, which we now know that we shall get this year. In 1954, the Secretary of State's Memorandum said:
"… it has now been decided to adopt the FN rifle."

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In 1955, the Minister of Defence's White Paper said:
"Large-scale trials of the FN rifle will be carried out."
The Secretary of State for War's Memorandum in the same year said:
"5,000 FN … rifles are now being tried by the troops.… Preparations for production are now being made."
In 1956, the Secretary of State's Memorandum said:
"The FN rifle has passed its trials and production plans have been made."
In 1957, his Memorandum said:
"During the last year troop trials of the FN rifle have been completed … United Kingdom production is due to start this year."
In 1958, the Memorandum said:
"In the coming year a proportion of the Army will be re-equipped with the British version of the FN rifle."
In 1959, it is said that some of our troops are getting these rifles for the first time.
Mr. Soames: Not for the first time. The hon. Member has no reason to say that.
Mr. Mellish: We know that some of our troops in Cyprus had them, but when they went to Germany they had to leave their rifles because there were not enough to go to the troops in Germany. The story given by the several Ministers of Defence and by the War Office is not one for which they should take credit. The FN rifle is only one of many problems with which we have had to deal.
We on this side of the Committee are far more satisfied with the Army Estimates than in previous years. We think that there is an indication that in the not too far distant future we shall get the sort of equipment and weapons that the Army should have had a long time ago. There is a small point about wireless equipment, about which so much fuss is made. I do not blame them for bragging about it—they have little chance to brag in the Army—but they make a great deal of noise about this. One thing which intrigues me is the enormous reduction made under this subhead. Last year under the heading, "Technical Stores", expenditure on signals and wireless equipment amounted to £7,443,000 and this year it is reduced to £4,187,000. I expect the hon. Gentleman will be able to say what that means.
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National Service grants are payable to National Service men whose families are in trouble and, although we are getting fewer National Service men in the Army, it is expected that the grants will go up nearly £½ million. I expect that the answer is that we have been doing a lot of advertising that this grant is available.
This debate has shown that there is a genuine desire to try to make this Army of ours an Army of which we can be genuinely proud. It may be said that in a few years' time that will be so. I hope that the Government will not try to defend the past. Many of our men have gone into combat ill-equipped and badly armed, and of that we cannot be proud; but we can make certain that in the years to come we shall have the sort of Army which, when it goes into battle, will be as good as any army that it might have to face.
1.18 a.m.
The Under-Secretary of State for War (Mr. Hugh Fraser): I think it fair to say that we have listened to a long and sometimes critical debate. I can, however, say with pride on my first appearance to make a proper speech at this Box for the War Department that nothing has been said today that in any way diminishes our conviction—the conviction of the whole Committee—that the British Army will fulfil whatever tasks are laid upon it. It is in this spirit that the debate has been approached on all sides of the Committee.
I think it fair to say that when hon. and right hon. Members look back over their speeches of the last few years and the speeches in this debate—which will be digested by the Department over the next few months—they must note with some pleasure that, if some of their fears have proved dupes, not a few of their aspirations and inspirations have become accepted doctrine. That is the real value, or part of the real value, of these debates.
A very large number of topics has been dealt with today and yesterday. There are certain main topics with which I hope to deal in a more orderly process, but, before I come to them, I should like to turn to some of the special points which have been raised.
One question outside the main stream of argument this evening was asked by the hon. Member for Stockton-on-Tees

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(Mr. Chetwynd). He spoke about a new dress for the Army. Troop trials are being carried out now for a very great variety of clothing, and these trials will be over by May. The trials for the raincoat, which the whole Committee, I think, will agree will be an important item of personal equipment for the soldier, begin in April. We hope to go into production with these coats this year, so that there will be actual distribution to the troops in 1960.
The hon. Member for Stockton-on-Tees asked about the employment of batmen on domestic duties. This question was also raised by a number of hon. Members opposite. I would merely say that a batman is provided to give personal service to his officer. That is perfectly proper. Some do undoubtedly carry out voluntarily duties outside this rôle. If the hon. Member for Stockton-on-Tees or the hon. Member for Brierley Hill (Mr. Simmons) will inform me of any cases where there clearly is not this voluntary arrangement between the batman and his officer, I will certainly investigate them.
Mr. Mulley: When one talks about voluntary agreements, one should also bear in mind the relative bargaining strength of the parties, and I think that a senior officer and a private soldier, in legal language, could not be said to have equal bargaining strength.
Mr. Head: In fact, this has for long been a bone of contention, but any soldier, as far as I know—any hon. Member can contradict me if I am wrong—can, if the bargain is not suitable to himself, apply to go back to regimental duties. Nobody has ever stopped him yet.
Mr. Fraser: I am much obliged to my right hon. Friend. That was a very useful intervention by a former Minister of Defence.
Special points were made by the hon. Member for Barnsley (Mr. Mason) and by the hon. Member for Sheffield, Park (Mr. Mulley) about training with atomic weapons and the control of these weapons. We believe quite clearly—and this has been stated before—that there must be political control of atomic weapons which accepts responsibility for their discharge. That remains the
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doctrine of this country and, naturally, of the War Office.
Questions about the Army Benevolent Fund were asked by my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud (Mr. Kershaw) and by the hon. Member for Brierley Hill. I will endeavour to get in touch with them as soon as I am able to find out the details.
The hon. Member for Sheffield, Park asked about the resettlement of other ranks. The Resettlement Advisory Board, of course, works equally for officers and for other ranks. The Board has had a successful initial year. I have not the exact figures here, but I think that of the 38,000 other ranks coming out of the Army in 1958 about 3 per cent. were unemployed at the end of the year. The organisation, working inside the Army and through the Resettlement Board outside, is proving very satisfactory.
The hon. Member for Brierley Hill asked about Sandhurst. Entry to Sandhurst is for those who can pass the examination and the interviews with the Regular Commission Board. This means that it is open to boys not only from public schools, but from grammar schools or any other school or no school who have the necessary qualifications for getting in. The hon. Member asked whether Welbeck College and Sandhurst were in opposition. That is not so at all; they are complementary.
My hon. Friend the Member for Aldershot (Sir E. Errington) raised various points about his constituency. Aldershot is the Army's sacred city, and we must naturally pay special attention to any representations made by my hon. Friend. I will look into the points he has raised, but I am sure that if there is conflict about the War Department having to give land to the Aldershot local authority it will be an extremely difficult matter. We need our land there. Aldershot's problem is in trying to have its cake and eat it; it wants the Army and it also wants industrial development. Frankly, I feel that there is not room for both in the area.
The dilutees in the area constitute a very large problem. However, when one looks at the rundown of the Army and the need for further civilianisation and the need also for the building programme in Aldershot itself, my hon. Friend may

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find that the problem there may be a diminishing one.
Sir E. Errington: My anxiety is that if that is the case it should be demonstrated to be the case. There is a degree of uncertainty about it. It is not that I deny the need, but I should like to see the need for both land and employment demonstrated.
Mr. Fraser: I should hate to demonstrate for several hours tonight, but I will see what can be done to make this more clear if it is not clear already.
The hon. Member for Bermondsey (Mr. Mellish), in an extremely able winding-up speech, referred to married quarters. As things stand, we have 117,000 in accommodation—barracks and married quarters—which is up to a proper standard. The gap in certain areas is one of about one-third in an Army of 180,000. That does not mean to say that we have not a very large problem still to overcome. Our main objective—and we are spending nearly £500,000 this year on modernising and converting existing quarters—must be new accommodation. That is what we are setting out to do.
I turn now to the speech of the right hon. Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey). Naturally and properly, many hon. and right hon. Gentlemen have raised the question of equipment. The right hon. Gentleman sought to argue that under the Conservative Administration the War Office's expenditure on production and research has been dropping at an alarming rate and that, compared with the other Services, its proportion has been falling rapidly. The right hon. Gentleman chose the figure for 1953 when the production and research of the War Office—these are extremely difficult figures to analyse—was 33 per cent. of the total. The right hon. Gentleman said that by 1959 this had dropped to 10 per cent. My main answer is that he chose an extraordinarily difficult year, for 1953 was a period when the full flood of the Korean production was bursting on us. 1953 was the year in which we were getting almost the consummation of the armaments programme over which the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) resigned; it was part of the £4,700 million programme.
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Indeed, at that time there was a big flood of material coming through.
What we want to do, as my right hon. Friend pointed out today, is to spend more on new equipment, and this year we shall be spending over £3 million more on new equipment than last year
The hon. Member for Bermondsey raised the question of the F.N. rifle. It is only appropriate that I should now give some answer to the points he made about the lag in supply and to his accusation against my right hon. Friend that he was able to produce scarcely any rifles. In the year 1957–58 the production of these rifles was about 9,000; in 1958–59 it was 47,000; and in the year to come it is going to be 60,000. So I think we can say that they are coming forward fairly well.
Many hon. Members referred to the problem of wireless equipment. Of course, this is a major difficulty. As one of my hon. Friends said, the whole problem on this question is so to time our decision that we come up with the right sort of equipment. I think we have made the right decision. By the end of the year the Army in Germany will be largely equipped with wireless equipment some of which, I believe, will be the best in N.A.T.O. Certainly the new tank set is proving a very fine set indeed and almost making possible a revolution in tank tactics.
The hon. Gentleman the Member for Bermondsey raised the question about the difference of £3 million on what we are spending on wireless equipment. Last year we set out to spend about £7 million and managed to spend about £4 million. This year we are setting out to spend just over £4 million which, I believe, thanks to the overcoming of technical difficulties, we shall be able to spend. This figure will be a tranche of the total of £20 million which we plan to spend to improve the whole of our wireless equipment.
We are switching over in general from h.f.—which has nothing to do with Hugh Fraser!—from high frequency to very high frequency. This has great advantages, of course. I am not going into technical detail, but I think it will interest hon. Members to known that the greater proportion of Russian units still use h.f.

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as distinct from v.h.f. sets, which means that they have difficulty in operating at night.
I think I shall leave the wireless question at this point as the hour is late, but I think it would perhaps be useful to give the Committee some figures which are relevant in response to some other equipment criticisms which have been made today.
One hon. Member talked about the Sterling submachine gun. This submachine gun is now in full production, and I think, though I cannot be absolutely certain down to the final unit, that almost all the units in B.A.O.R. have now been issued with it.
I should like to look at some other items. This year we shall be producing well over 1,000 new one-ton armoured trucks. We are improving production of light utility trucks, Ferret scout cars and Salad in armoured cars—in some cases by as much as 80 per cent. That does show that the stuff is beginning to flow off in considerable quantities. We shall be up-gunning and up-armouring the Centurion. We shall be producing this year new light assault bridge units, and also some heavy ferry equipments. We are also introducing a new range of light recovery vehicles. This year we shall be spending six times as much on guided weapons as last year.
I think that, clearly, one of the prime objects over the next years must continue to be this question of equipment. We must, however, get this problem into proportion. Our Army is not equipped with quill pens, carrier pigeons and arquebuses, although the right hon. Member for Dundee, West seemed to suggest that it was. We are not too badly off, and so far we have been able to meet all our commitments. The Army has not fallen short in the tasks which it has been called on to do, and over the next few years it will become as well equipped as any Army in N.A.T.O.
Despite the great progress which has been made, for which my right hon. Friend and the War Office have received bouquets from both sides of the Committee, and despite the success in the building up of the Regular Forces, there are special problems which will have to be met. Two of these problems which face us relate to officer recruitment and
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the recruitment of technicians in the administrative corps. My right hon. Friend has already spoken of the pending Report of General Sir Richard Goodbody, which will deal with all aspects of officer recruitment. I wish to refer to certain steps which we are taking prior to the production of this Report and which may assist in solving the problem of officer recruiting.
We have instituted a direct entry short service commission. Although a start was made only in January, there have already been over 600 inquiries and about 90 firm applications. We are pushing on with the scholarship scheme, about which I should like to write to the hon. Member for Bermondsey. A fair point was made about whether maintenance should be allowable for boys who are not at boarding school. We are studying methods of increasing the rate of intake from grammar and public schools, and we have improved matters considerably. One director at the War Office is now in charge of liaison with the public and grammar schools. A good team of Army lecturers has been formed. Young officers who have had wide and interesting experience in the Army are visiting schools and trying to interest boys in the Army as a career.
I am glad to see a growing interest in the Territorial Army, and the growth of O.T.C.'s is important. At Oxford University there are 20 starters for Regular commissions, which has not been the case at Oxford University O.T.C. for many years. I am glad to say that my sister-in-law has become a WRAC.
On the medical side, we are reverting to the pre-war short-service intake which proved so successful.
The hon. Member for Bermondsey referred to the scheme for the promotion of technicians, and we are getting on with that. We shall have a report in the not-too-distant future. Reference was made to the question of recruiting boys to the Junior Leader and Army Apprentice Schools. It is impossible to exaggerate the importance of this movement in the training of future technicians and, in many cases, future officers. I have not the exact figures, but a remarkable number of young officers have passed through the Junior Leader and Apprentice Schools.

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I will not go into details, but regarding certain technical arms, including the Medical and Dental Corps, we are running into difficulties which are in part a reflection of the difficulty experienced throughout the country because of the shortage of dentists. Through improved recruiting of the Queen Alexandra's Royal Army Nursing Corps other ranks there is a possibility that we shall be able to meet some of the shortages in the Royal Army Medical Corps.
As a background to the subject of recruiting, I should like to say how important are both the Combined Cadet Force and the Army Cadet Force. The year 1960 will see the hundredth anniversary of their formation. A hundred years ago a number of schools formed their own volunteer corps and a number of volunteer units formed cadet companies of their own. The present strength of the Army Cadet Force is 43,000 and of the Combined Cadet Force about 71,000, of whom about 59,000 are in the Army section. I hope that the fears expressed by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for the Isle of Ely (Major Legge-Bourke) that with the end of conscription headmasters will turn away from these cadet forces will be unfounded. They perform a most useful and valuable part in the formation of an interest in the Armed Forces amongst our youth and are of immense value to us as grounds for recruitment for officers, other ranks and junior leaders.
I will not say very much about the Reserve Army and the Territorials. Some mention has been made of them. The important thing is to comment, as did my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud on the remarkable increase which we are seeing in recruitment. Last December we passed the 100,000 mark. We should all be pleased with the progress made.
There are one or two important points in this connection. We are trying to make training as exciting, entertaining and as practical as possible, but with the run-down in the Army we find it necessary to concentrate T.A. formation training in the months of May, June and July. This offers some disadvantages to those units which like their training carried out in the autumn camps, but it has the advantage that they will be certain for four years ahead when their
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camp dates will fall so that it will be possible for them to make arrangements in connection with their businesses. By this concentration we can also give greater help from the Regular Army and civilian organisations so that the camps will have better facilities.
We have also reorganised the weekend training system. This previously was based on an economic calculation, but we have now changed it to the basis of giving each commanding officer a number of days per head which can be spread out as he thinks suitable throughout the unit. This means better opportunities for those specialists who want longer training in individual units.
Reference has been made to what should be the rôle of the Territorial Army. I would simply say that, first, it is home defence in all its aspects and then as need should arise. In this age when war could take so many forms the Territorial Army must remain an essential and basic part of our preparedness. It is impossible to go beyond saying at this stage that these gallant men in it should regard it as a basic and essential part of our preparedness against whatever may come.
I apologise for speaking for so long, but there have been a great many points for me to attempt to answer. I turn now to operations and deployment, which, after all, is what an Army is for. As the right hon. Member for Dundee pointed out last year, when we had a similar debate, immense difficulties faced the British Army during this period when three or four major reorganisations were going on simultaneously. These still continue and will probably do so until 1961 or even the beginning of 1962. In spite of all that, the point can well be made that the Army continues with its essential task in the operational field and in the spheres of military thinking and training.
My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State has already enumerated some of these tasks. They were well done in Cyprus where without them there could have been no political settlement.
The hon. Member for Bermondsey referred to the task of our forces in Malaya, and I should like to add my tribute to the excellent work being done there. In Malaya, working with the troops of the Federation Government the

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British Commonwealth Brigade has made an outstanding contribution. A few years ago there were about 10,000 Communists in the jungle. Now there are under 800, and the whole of Malaya, with the exception of parts of the states of Perak and Kedah, has been declared "white"— that is, free of Communists. That is a very fine achievement. Our contribution has not only helped this vital part of the Commonwealth but has enabled the Federation Government to withdraw troops for training and to build up its new army to greater strength.
In the Memorandum accompanying the Estimates the attention of hon. Members will have been drawn to the airborne operations in the Middle East. In Aden and in the Protectorate our forces have helped to maintain order and prevent incursions across the Yemeni frontier.
The hon. Member for Bermondsey asked if I could say something about operations in Muscat and Oman. As hon. Members will know, a request was received some months ago for help by the Sultan of Muscat in training his troops. That aid was readily granted. Since then, as is well known, there was a continuation of the fighting of 1957, and that had reached a crisis at the end of last year.
At the end of January the Sultan of Muscat's Armed Forces, assisted by two squadrons of the S.A.S. and dismounted elements of the Life Guards, with R.A.F. support, succeeded in forcing their way to the top of the rebel fastness on the Jebel Akhdar, which is a steep and dangerous escarpment. The rebels were caught by surprise and there was little opposition to the assault. It was a great physical achievement, because the Jebel Akhdar is not only precipitous but rises to a height of 9,000 feet. A considerable quantity of rebel equipment was captured, and the rebel leaders are thought to have left the country. The situation, as far as we know, is quiet, but I regret that, although there were no casualties on our side in the final assault, during, the last six months there have been three British casualties in the area through rebel activity. In two cases, I believe—though I could not swear to it—these were due to mines.
We have been carrying on our help to Commonwealth and colonial Govern-
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ments. It is remarkable that with all the burdens and changes that we have had to face, 1,150 officers and nearly 1,200 other ranks are now serving with Commonwealth and colonial forces. Tribute has been paid to this important rôle that our forces are playing and I agree that these men are of the finest type.
Several hon. Members have asked whether the brigade group was superior as an organisation to the pentomic division. We have had nearly a year's experience with the brigade group, and exercises have convinced us that it is and will remain our basic organisation. It also has the advantage for us that in our many commitments outside Europe the brigade group is a more flexible organisation and fits into our conception of a strategic reserve. We are glad we took this decision.
Mr. Mellish: How many divisions are there in Germany?
Mr. Fraser: As to the divisions in Germany, they are organised in a brigade group fashion, and the divisional headquarters does not mean anything. He knows the number of brigade groups there, which I am not going to mention across the Floor of the House.
In one of his profound speeches, the hon. and learned Member for Northampton asked many questions. I am afraid that I shall not be able to answer them now, apart from making a comment on his remarks about Kenya. Kenya is essentially a base for highly skilled and highly trained mobile troops. The hon. and learned Gentleman suggested that the Africans should take over this section of the strategic reserve. Great as is my confidence in and appreciation of the excellence of African battalions, I do not believe that they could conceivably have the training and flexibility to take over this task. Because of the air-sea barrier, we must have a force in Kenya. I think that answers one of the hon. and learned Member's questions, but I should need much more time than is now available to answer his wider questions.
I have been asked about Cyprus. We still have responsibilities there. It will be a year at least before our troops can be finally withdrawn to their base areas. Under the Agreement we have to remain until the new State is set up, but we wish, of course, to withdraw members of

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our Forces to the strategic reserve at home and elsewhere as soon as possible. It is impossible at this stage to forecast, but we have high hopes that we shall be able to make a movement as soon as possible. My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Isle of Ely raised the question of training areas in Cyprus. I think that this will be covered by the Agreement. I will pay special attention to this point.
Many interesting points have been raised in the debate and I wish that I could have dealt with them more effectively. I will try to answer later those which I have not been able to answer today. The debate has been inspired by the will on all sides of the Committee to make a success of the Regular Army.
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That unites us tonight and it is the hope for the future.
Question put and agreed to.
Resolved,
That a number of Land Forces, not exceeding 351,000, all ranks, be maintained for the safety of the United Kingdom and the defence of the possessions of Her Majesty's Crown, during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1960.
Resolution to be reported.
Report to be received this day; Committee to sit again this day.

ADJOURNMENT
Resolved, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Bryan.]
Adjourned accordingly at seven minutes to Two o'clock a.m.