Commons Sitting of 17 April 1957

Preamble
The House met at half-past Two o'clock
PRAYERS
[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]
PETITIONS

  Retirement Pensions
  Mr. Zilliacus: With your permission, Mr. Speaker, I beg to present a humble Petition signed by the officers of the Gorton branch of the National Federation of Old-Age Pensions Associations in the name and at the request of 3,100 of their members. This Petition states that old-age pensioners are suffering great and increasing poverty and hardship because of the high and constantly rising cost of living and the fact that the basic pension remains at only £2 a week.
  Wherefore, your Petitioners pray that steps be taken without delay to grant an increase of at least £1 a week in the retirement pension of men at 65 and women at 60 with provision for adjustment to any further rise in the cost of living.
  And your Petitioners, as in duty bound, will ever pray.
  I beg you, Mr. Speaker, to instruct the Clerk of the House to read the Petition to the House.
  The CLERK-ASSISTANT OF THE HOUSE
  read the Petition, which was as follows:
  The Humble Petition of the Undersigned officers of the Gorton Branch of the National Federation of Old-Age Pensions Associations, on behalf of 3,100 members in the constituency of Gorton, in the City of Manchester.
  Sheweth:
  That the maintenance of retirement pensions at the level of only £ 2 a week in spite of the high and rising cost of living is inflicting severe and increasing poverty and hardship on old-age pensioners who have to suffer privation even in the bare necessities of life, such as food, fuel and clothing and whose position is steadily deteriorating.
  Wherefore, your Petitioners pray that steps be taken without delay to grant an increase of at least £ 1 a week in the retirement pension of men at 65 and women at 60 with provision for adjustment to any further rise in the cost of living.
  And your Petitioners, as in duty bound. will ever pray.
  To lie upon the Table.

  Stag Hunting
  Mr. Brockway: Mr. Speaker, with your permission and the permission of the House, I desire to present a Petition which would have the purpose of making stag hunting illegal. This Petition is signed by 5,000 people, mostly in the neighbourhood of Slough, and it is particularly significant that these signatures were collected in three weeks by Mrs. Mary Suff and her daughter Avril, alone. The signatures include those of priests of the Catholic Church, clergymen of the Anglican Church, ministers of the Free Church, aldermen and councillors, medical practitioners and workers and their wives. The Petition
  Sheweth:
  That we the undersigned, are appalled by the widespread activity of stag hunting in this country and consider it unbefitting a civilised community and entailing extreme cruelty to animals.
  Wherefore, your Petitioners pray that legislation be introduced to prohibit stag hunting, making it an offence punishable by imprisonment.
  And your Petitioners, as in duty hound, will ever pray.
  As I have read out the Petition, I will not ask you to request the Clerk of the House to read it.
  To lie upon the Table.

  Wild Birds
  Mr. H. Steward: Mr. Speaker, with your permission and that of the House, I desire to present a Petition signed by 19,360 of my constituents and others. whereby they pray for the withdrawal of The Wild Birds (Eggs of Common Birds) Order, 1955, on the ground that it is contrary to public opinion in that it renders enforcement of the Protection of Birds Act, 1954, more difficult.
  Wherefore, your Petitioners, as in duty bound will ever pray.
  To lie upon the Table.

  Rent Bill
  Mrs. Butler: With your permission, Mr. Speaker, I wish to present a Petition signed by more than 3,000 of my constituents and persons working in the Boroughs of Wood Green and Tottenham. My Petitioners are concerned about the provisions of the Rent Bill. These will enable landlords to issue notices to quit without alternative accommodation being available. They are also

  1893
  concerned that the permitted increases will inflict hardship on old-age pensioners and on many families with small incomes. They pray that the Bill will be rejected.
  And your Petitioners, as in duty bound, will ever pray.
  To lie upon the Table.
  Mr. E. Fletcher: With your permission, Mr. Speaker, I desire to present a Petition signed by a very large number of residents and workers—[Horn. MEMBERS: "How many?"]—in East Islington desiring to petition against the Rent Bill. My Petitioners are worried about the power of landlords to issue notices to quit when there are no alternative premises for them to occupy. They are also deeply concerned because the increases in the rent allowed will inflict great hardship on families with low incomes, particularly old-age pensioners. They pray that the Bill will be rejected.
  And your Petitioners, as in duty bound, will ever pray.
  To lie upon the Table.
  Mrs. L. Jeger: Mr. Speaker, with your permission I beg leave to present a humble Petition from 700 citizens of the Metropolitan Borough of Holborn. The Petitioners are protesting against the Rent Bill on the grounds that it will enable families to be evicted from their homes without alternative accommodation being provided and that the permitted rent increases will cause great hardship, especially to old-age pensioners, and they pray that the Bill be rejected.
  And your Petitioners, as in duty bound, will ever pray.
  To lie upon the Table.

ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
  MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

    Defence Requirements (Industrial Contracts)
    Miss Burtonasked the Minister of Defence whether he is now in a position to make a statement concerning the proportion of defence requirements which will be met by industry in the United Kingdom.
    The Minister of Defence (Mr. Duncan Sandys): After stags and wild birds, I will answer Question No. 1.
    Almost all of them will be so met.
    Miss Burton: As the Minister knows, Armstrong-Whitworth Aircraft in Coventry was told that skilled men are to be turned off because of defence cuts, and, as there is little prospect of their being absorbed in present production in Coventry, will the Minister, in accordance with what he said yesterday about the skill of such technicians becoming
    "an appreciable addition to the strength of our economy‥"—[OFFICIAL REPORT. 16th April, 1957; Vol. 568, c. 1776]
    lighten our anxieties in Coventry by saying that alternative contracts will be sent to us?
    Mr. Sandys: The original Question dealt with the country as a whole. It never occurred to me that the hon. Lady would wish to raise the subject of Coventry. If she wishes for information about Coventry in particular, perhaps she will put down a specific Question. My right hon. Friend the Minister of Labour will be dealing generally with this subject, but, of course, it does not mean that because a defence contract is cut the Government have to find some other form of expenditure to take its place.
    Mr. Beswick: Yesterday the Minister of Defence said that all sides of the House would be prepared to agree to some compensation for officers who were declared redundant. Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that throughout industry there is a good deal of uncertainty and unsettlement, especially among the skilled staffs, about their future, and will he see whether it is possible, with his right hon.

    1895
    Friends the Minister of Supply and the Minister of Labour, to make some statement as to what the future is for these people?
    Mr. Sandys: My right hon. Friend will, I hope, be giving some information about the general position, but I really think that with the present state of industry and the demand for labour there is not going to be very much difficulty, except in very rare cases, for men with special skills, to whom the hon. Member referred, to find useful alternative employment.

    Recruitment
    Mr. Swinglerasked the Minister of Defence what has been the annual net recruitment of long-service volunteers to the Services in the last three years; and what annual net rate of recruitment he requires to abolish conscription in 1960.
    Mr. Sandys: Since the Answer contains a table of figures, I will circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
    Mr. Swingler: For the benefit of hon. Members interested, could the right hon. Gentleman say what percentage increase in the rate of recruitment of long-service volunteers is necessary, on his calculations, in the next three years in order to avoid the continuance of a selective system of compulsory service, bearing in mind the experience of the last three years? What percentage increase in the net rate of annual recruitment will be required in the next three years to put the forces on an all-Regular basis?
    Mr. Sandys: That is, in effect, the Question on the Order Paper in different words. As I said, the Answer contains a table of figures, and I think that it will be more convenient if I circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
    Mr. Strachey: Would the right hon. Gentleman not agree that it is very urgent that he should bring forward inducements for a higher rate of recruiting at a very early date, because otherwise we shall be in considerable trouble five years hence?
    Mr. Sandys: Yes. The right hon. Gentleman knows as well as I do that that is very necessary and that it was specifically mentioned in the White Paper.
    Following is the answer:

    MALE REGULAR RECRUITS ENTERED IN EACH OF THE SERVICES FOR PERIODS LONGER THAN THREE YEARS IN 1954, 1955 AND 1956

    —

    1954

    1955

    1956

    Royal Navy*

    …

    8,111

    7,582

    7,662

    Army†

    …

    3,070

    2,325

    5,427

    Royal Air Force

    …

    13,099

    11,171

    12,820

    24,280

    21,078

    25,909

    * All Regular recruits enter the Navy for engagements of more than three years.

    † Between May, 1952, and February, 1956, the maximum period for which adult recruits could enter the Army initially was normally three years.

    The numbers of recruits that will be needed in the years ahead must depend on the number of re-engagements of both short-service and long-service men, as well as on certain other factors. It is therefore not possible to give any precise forecast.

    Naval Base, Malta
    Mr. Brockwayasked the Minister of Defence to what extent the naval base in Malta will be used under the new planning of defence.
    Mr. Sandys.: Malta will continue to be used as the Navy's Mediterranean base.
    Mr. Brockway: Whilst thanking the right hon. Gentleman for that Answer, may I ask him whether he will have consultations with the Secretary of State for the Colonies regarding the economic position in Malta resulting from the fact that it is a naval base, particularly in view of the very great service which the people of Malta have rendered to this country?
    Mr. Sandys: I am sure that I do not need to remind my right hon. Friend of those facts.
    Air Commodore Harvey: If there is insufficient work for naval vessels to fulfil the output of the Royal Naval Dockyard, will my right hon. Friend consult

    1897
    his colleagues to see whether some proportion of the output of the dockyard can be used for commercial work? There are great opportunities offering.
    Mr. Sandys: It is my intention to do that, not only in regard to Malta, but in regard to all defence establishments where the volume of work is being reduced.

    Cyprus
    Mr. Brockwayasked the Minister of Defence what proposals are under consideration for the establishment of a base for nuclear weapons in Cyprus.
    Mr. Sandys: I would refer the hon. Member to paragraph 27 of the recent White Paper on Defence.
    Mr. Brockway: I have read that paragraph, but does the right hon. Gentleman really mean that we are going to establish the island of Cyprus as a nuclear base without consultation with the people of Cyprus? Would it not be the last tyranny to impose upon them something which may mean their annihilation in war, without any discussion with them at all?
    Mr. Sandys: I really do not know—the hon. Gentleman need not look so savagely at me—
    Mr. Brockway: I feel savage.
    Mr. Sandys: —what the hon. Gentleman means by "nuclear base". The White Paper says that there will be bomber squadrons based on Cyprus which will be capable of delivering nuclear weapons. That does not mean that they will not be equipped with conventional weapons as well. [HON. MEMBERS: "0h."] The hon. Gentleman must face the reality of the present day, which is that if one has an air base at all anywhere, one is bound to have aircraft there which are capable of carrying nuclear weapons.
    Mr. Strachey: Is it not the Minister of Defence who is failing to face realities in this matter? After what has happened in Cyprus, is it not quite unrealistic, apart from anything else, to suggest that we can make an exclusive British nuclear base there or base some nuclear weapons there? There may be some possibility of a N. A. T. O. base when agreement has been reached with our N. A. T. O. allies about Cyprus, but until and unless that
    1898
    happens, surely the Minister, as in the White Paper also, is simply talking nonsense on the subject.
    Mr. Sandys: If I am talking nonsense, then it accords very closely with what the right hon. Gentleman has just said. If there were to be a N. A. T. O. air base, its aircraft would certainly be capable of carrying nuclear weapons.

    Bath Tattoo
    Mr. Pitmanasked the Minister of Defence his policy in regard to the continuation of the co-operation offered by all three Services in previous years to the Bath Tattoo.
    Mr. Sandys: This co-operation will continue, though on a more limited scale.

    Hydrogen Bomb Tests
    Mr. Liptonasked the Minister of Defence how many Service chiefs will attend the Christmas Island tests of nuclear bombs.
    Mr. Sandys: None of the Chiefs of Staff will be attending the tests.
    Hon. Members: Why not?
    Mr. Lipton: After spending all this money, is it not rather ridiculous, if these tests are necessary, which many people doubt, that the Chiefs of Staff should not be present? After all, is it not likely that they may be called upon to decide where to drop the H-bomb in real earnest? Or is it that their presence will lower the tone of the proceedings on Christmas Island?
    Mr. Sandys: I really think that they have more pressing duties elsewhere. [Laughter.] It is all very well for the hon. Member for Brixton (Mr. Lipton) to laugh, but the Chiefs of Staff would learn absolutely nothing by seeing a big bang. What they want to know is the results. The results will be assessed by scientists with scientific instruments, and that information will be available to the Chiefs of Staff and to the Government here.
    Mr. Lipton: Mumbo-jumbo.

    Bacteriological Weapons
    Mr. Emrys Hughesasked the Minister of Defence if, in view of the need for reducing defence expenditure and the fact that the atom and hydrogen

    1899
    bombs can destroy large cities and devastate great areas, to what extent he proposes to continue his expenditure on bacteriological weapons.
    Mr. Sandys: I am at present reviewing the whole of our programme of military research, including work in this sphere.
    Mr. Hughes: Will the right hon. Gentleman assure us that he will examine this expenditure on bacteriological weapons very carefully? In view of the other weapons of mass destruction, does the right hon. Gentleman think it necessary to continue a programme for poisoning the world as well as blowing it up?
    Mr. Sandys: That is why this work is included in the review of expenditure to which I referred.

    National Service
    Mr. Allaunasked the Minister of Defence if he will immediately reduce the period of National Service for those called up between now and 1960.
    Mr. Sandys: I would refer the hon. Member to my statement on this subject in yesterday's debate.
    Mr. Allaun: Will the right hon. Gentleman agree that since he will have more conscripts on his hands than he will want between now and 1960, the only alternative that will avoid unfairness and resentment is to call up fewer men by advancing the age of call-up between now and 1960?
    Mr. Sandys: I understand the hon. Member's point, but I do not think that I can really add to what I said yesterday.
    Mr. Allaunasked the Minister of Defence what are his intentions regarding National Service if sufficient Regulars are not recruited by 1960 onwards.
    Mr. Sandys: I would ask the hon. Member to await the statement which my right hon. Friend the Minister of Labour and National Service hopes to make in the debate today.
    Mr. Allaun: In the meantime, is the Minister aware that any form of selective compulsory recruitment will cause great bitterness?
    Mr. Osborne: The hon. Member should speak for himself.
    Mr. Sandys: The hon. Member for Salford, East (Mr. Allaun) will not have very long to wait.

  EGYPT (SUEZ CANAL)
  Mr. A. Hendersonasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he will now make a statement on the consultations which have been taking place with other Governments on the draft proposals of the Egyptian Government with regard to the Suez Canal.
  Mr. Sorensenasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what progress has been made in respect of a new international agreement with the Egyptian Government on the future usage of the Suez Canal.
  Mr. E. Flectcherasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what are now the intentions of Her Majesty's Government for arranging for the passage of British ships through the Suez Canal.
  The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Selwyn Lloyd): I regret I am not yet in a position to make a statement.
  Mr. Henderson: In view of the time that these consultations are taking to reach finality, is it not time that the Security Council should be asked to consider the Egyptian proposals in the light of the six principles which they accepted last October? Is it not a matter of great urgency, in view of the fact that the Canal has now been cleared of all obstacles?
  Mr. Lloyd: I quite agree with the right hon. and learned Gentleman about the urgency of the matter. The difficulty is that these proposals have not yet been finalised. I certainly do not exclude the possibility to which he has referred.
  Mr. E. Fletcher: What is the position with regard to British shipowners who want to send their ships through the Canal? Are they free to do so or are they waiting advice from Her Majesty's Government, and are Her Majesty's Government being advised by the Marquess of Salisbury as to what attitude should be adopted?
  Mr. Lloyd: The advice given to British shipowners remains as already stated.
  Mr. J. Eden: Will my right hon. and learned Friend assure the House that no decision will be taken by Her Majesty's Government until every effort has been made to obtain full agreement with other interested countries? Will he also ensure that every effort is made by Her Majesty's Government's representative at the United Nations to bring the whole matter of Nasser's intransigence before the Security Council before we accede to any further demands?
  Mr. Lloyd: We shall certainly remain in close consultation with those who have interests similar to ours.
  Mr. Sorensen: Can the right hon. and learned Gentleman, therefore, at least say that he has been in constant contact with the American Government about the possible emergence of an international agreement?
  Mr. Lloyd: Yes, Sir.

  N. A. T. O. FORCES (ATOMIC WEAPONS)
  Mr. E. Fleteherasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs the policy of Her Majesty's Government with regard to the request of President Adenauer that the West German troops in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation be provided with atomic weapons.
  Mr. Warbeyasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he will state the present policy of Her Majesty's Government regarding agreement to the arming of West German military forces with tactical and strategic nuclear weapons.
  Mr. Selwyn Lloyd: In the view of Her Majesty's Government similar types of weapons should as a general principle be available to all the forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.
  Mr. Fletcher: Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman bear in mind that a great many people in this country endorse the warnings recently issued by 15 of West Germany's leading scientists, to the effect that it would be a danger not only to the Federal Republic but to the peace of Europe if West German forces were
  1902
  armed with nuclear weapons and urging Dr. Adenauer's Government to refuse to accept any such suggestions? Would Her Majesty's Government, therefore, use their influence to ensure that West German forces are not supplied with nuclear weapons?
  Mr. Lloyd: We are not dealing here with the question of manufacture at all. I think that it is quite unreasonable to expect troops of different nations to serve under a unified command and yet have a differentiation in the weapons supplied to them.
  Mr. Warbey: Does the Foreign Secretary not appreciate that public opinion in this country and in Germany is appalled by the present plans to scatter these frightful weapons over a number of countries in Europe, including Germany? Would not the Government now call a halt to this mad nuclear race before it gets completely out of control?
  Mr. Lloyd: I think that the great bulk of opinion in Western Europe realises the continued necessity for an effective deterrent.
  Mr. Younger: In view of the obscurity in which the speech of the Minister of Defence yesterday left the House about the consequence of using tactical atomic weapons in Europe, will the Foreign Secretary give some further thought to the question whether it might not be advisable to concentrate first on the use of conventional weapons in the front lines in N. A. T. O., not only on the part of Germans but on the part of others?
  Mr. Lloyd: I do not, of course, admit the premise of the right hon. Gentleman's supplementary question, but I think that in the course of today's debate there will be more suitable opportunities for elucidating these matters than in reply to a supplementary question.

  TRADE WITH CHINA
  Mr. Swinglerasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs when he expects to be in a position to make a statement on the removal of restrictions on trade with China.
  Mr. Rankinasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at which meeting of the Paris Consultative Group the

  1903
  decision concerning the Government's relaxation of the China trade embargo is expected to be taken; where this meeting is expected to be held; and what is his present estimate of the likely date for this decision.
  Mr. Selwyn Lloyd: As my hon. Friend informed the hon. Member for West Ham, North (Mr. Lewis) in a Written Answer yesterday, following the discussions in Bermuda, the United States Government have made some proposals for reviewing the China Lists. We shall study these proposals in consultation with other members of the Consultative Group.
  Mr. Swingler: What on earth are these proposals? Is it not a fact that the Paris Consultative Group has met fifty times in the last twelve months to discuss the relaxation of controls on China trade? How can there be any new proposals when this has been discussed for more than twelve months? Why this policy of evasion of a simple question?
  Mr. Lloyd: There is no policy of evasion of a simple question. I referred to this matter in answer to a Question recently. We have been awaiting certain proposals from the United States Government, following the Bermuda Conference. Those proposals have now been made. We propose to study them, and to study them urgently.
  Mr. Rankin: Are we to assume from the answer of the Foreign Secretary that America has laid down the limits within which we can act independently, and is that the kind of independence which the Tory Government are going to accept?
  Mr. Lloyd: I thought it was one of the philosophies of the Opposition that we should act in consultation over these matters.
  Several Hon.Members rose—
  Mr. Speaker: Order. Lady Tweedsmuir. Question No. 13.

  THE FAROES (BRITISH FISHING VESSELS)
  Lady Tweedsmuirasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what action he is taking to protect British fishing vessels and their gear from the activities of certain foreign ships, of which he is aware, in the vicinity of the Faroes.
  The Joint Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Ian Harvey): I assume that my hon. Friend is referring to the loss of fishing gear recently incurred by the Aberdeen trawler "Bilsdean". This and other incidents which have occurred in the vicinity of the Faroes are now being investigated. If any diplomatic action is necessary, this will be taken when the results of the investigations are known.
  Lady Tweedsmuir: Is my hon. Friend aware that Russian ships are not only endangering the lives and property of our vessels near the Faroes, but recently off Norway as well, and that yesterday our ships putting into Aberdeen reported the loss of 106 nets due to Russian ships? Can he, therefore, not make immediate representations to the Russian Government, and at the same time also ensure that there should be a fishery protection boat in these areas?
  Mr. Harvey: The reply to the first part of my hon. Friend's supplementary question is that we are also investigating the incidents to which she has referred, and we must, of course, be governed by the outcome of that investigation. The Royal Navy Fishery Protection Squadron is the responsibility of my right hon. Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty, and we shall bear this in mind.

  UNITED NATIONS

    Disarmament Sub-Committee Discussions
    Mr. A. Hendersonasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he will make a statement on the progress of the United Nations Disarmament Sub-Committee discussions.
    Mr. Swinglerasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he is now in a position to make a statement on the progress of the disarmament talks at Lancaster House, with particular reference to Her Majesty's Government's attitude to proposals to stop nuclear tests and to specify maximum levels for the size of armed forces.
    Mr. Selwyn Lloyd: Not today, Sir, but in the meantime I know that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister intends to deal generally with some of the matters

    1905
    which have been discussed in the course of his speech this evening.
    Mr. Henderson: Can the Foreign Secretary indicate whether one of the matters with which the Prime Minister intends to deal tonight is the recent proposal of the United States Government that all nuclear tests and nuclear war production should cease from March next year without waiting for a general disarmament treaty? If not, will the right hon. and learned Gentleman inform us whether Her Majesty's Government accept that proposal?
    Mr. Lloyd: That, I believe, is one of the matters with which my right hon. Friend will deal.
    Mr. Swingler: Can the Foreign Secretary say whether the Prime Minister will reveal tonight what proposals have been put forward by Her Majesty's Government? As other Governments have now made public the proposals which they have put forward, would the right hon. and learned Gentleman now tell the House what proposals have been put forward in the name of the British Government, especially in regard to the stopping of nuclear tests and the fixing of maximum levels of armed forces?
    Mr. Lloyd: I do not think that would help the work of the Sub-Committee. What has been happening in the Sub-Committee is that it has taken a certain agenda item by item, and has been having a general discussion on each item. When that is concluded, which I think will be within the course of a few days, then will come the time when specific proposals will be discussed and considered. I really think that this is an occasion when we can all be not without hope about the work of that Sub-Committee, and I think that it is better to leave it to get on with its work by itself.
    Mr. P. Noel-Baker: Since all the delegations, including our own, have now adopted the practice of telling the Press what they say, would it not be advantageous if we could have the verbatim record at the end of each week, instead of at the end of three months, so that we can judge more intelligently what is going on?
    Mr. Lloyd: I must say that I regret, with the right hon. Gentleman, that there should be these leaks about confidential
    1906
    discussions. It would be better if the nature of the discussions were kept private, and I think that the point which the right hon. Gentleman has made is one to be borne in mind.
    Mr. Noel-Baker: Since, in fact,. it has happened regularly that what is being said by delegations has become known, but that we get a rather unsatisfactory version of it, would it not be better to face the fact, and to publish the minutes at short intervals instead of thousands of pages at a time at the end of three months?
    Mr. Lloyd: I think there is something in the point which the right hon. Gentleman makes. The idea of setting up the Sub-Committee was that it could meet privately, in which I think there is considerable advantage, and of course at least half of the discussions are in private. The informal discussions help very much, but I do not think it is a very satisfactory position in which there are calculated leaks.
    Mr. Zilliacusasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether, in view of the announced intention of the Defence White Paper to reduce the armed forces to 375,000 by 1962, he will instruct Her Majesty's Government's representative on the Disarmament Sub-Committee of the United Nations to propose lowering the maxima for France and Great Britain in the draft agreements under discussion, from 750,000 to 400,000, with proportionate downward revision of the maximum figures for the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and for all other countries.
    Mr. Selwyn Lloyd: No, Sir.
    Mr. Zilliacus: Is it not to our advantage, since we are reducing our own forces, to press for a general reduction all round? What have we to lose by making such a proposal? Have we not got everything to gain and nothing to lose?
    Mr. Lloyd: Of course the year mentioned is 1962 and obviously the manpower ceilings at later stages will have to be negotiated.
    Mr. Sorensenasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs the policy of Her Majesty's Government with regard to the proposals on nuclear disarmament

    1907
    presented to the United Nations Sub-Committee on Disarmament.
    Mr. Selwyn Lloyd: The policy of Her Majesty's Government with regard to nuclear tests was described by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister on 1st April. So far as other proposals are concerned, I would refer the hon. Member to the Answer which I have already given to the right hon. and learned Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. A. Henderson).
    Mr. Sorensen: Is the Foreign Secretary satisfied with his own Answer? Is it not highly desirable that we should have more specific information given to us by Her Majesty's Government of specific proposals put before this Sub-Committee?
    Mr. Lloyd: It all depends on whether the House regards this Sub-Committee as an opportunity for negotiation. I regard it as an opportunity for negotiating with the other people primarily interested, in which case it is not desirable publicly to state at every stage of the proceedings exactly what the position is.

    Atomic Radiation (Report)
    Mrs. Castleasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he will place in the Library a copy of the Report made by Dr. R. M. Sievert, of the Stockholm Radio Physics Institute, to the United Nations Scientific Committee on the effects of atomic radiation.
    Mr. Selwyn Lloyd: Dr. Sievert's paper is attached as Annex 4 to a World Health Organisation Report on the "Effects of Radiation on Human Heredity" dated 24th January, 1957. A copy of the Report was placed in the Library last March.
    Mrs. Castle: Whilst thanking the right hon. and learned Gentleman for that reply, may I ask him whether he is aware of the report in The Times of this document, which has just gone before the United Nations Scientific Committee? Dr. Sievert maintains that the fall-out through nuclear bombs is creating an increasing danger to health in all parts of the world, and in view of the scientific anxiety which he expresses, and in view of the new report just issued by the Atomic Scientists Association on strontium-90 dangers, would the right hon.
    1908
    and learned Gentleman reconsider the policy of Her Majesty's Government on H-bomb tests?
    Mr. Lloyd: No, Sir. My own view of this Report of the World Health Organisation is that it does not justify alarmist conclusions.
    Mr. H. Fraser: Would my right hon. and learned Friend also consider placing in the Library the latest copy of the report issued yesterday by the American Scientific Congress on the question of the clam, which is the animal most subject to radio-active disturbances, passes more than 6,000 gallons of water per annum, and therefore is able to discover far more ably than any scientist the amount of strontium-90 radiation?
    Mr. Lloyd: I will certainly consider my hon. Friend's interesting suggestion.

  INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
  Mr. P. Noel-Bakerasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he will lay a White Paper containing the text of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, together with a memorandum explaining the system of control to be operated by the Agency for the purpose of preventing the diversion of fissile materials to the manufacture of nuclear weapons.
  Mr. Ian Harvey: A White Paper, Command 92, containing the full text of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, was laid before the House on 19th March. The scope of the system of control is set out in some detail in Article XII of the Statute entitled "Agency Safeguards". The method of application of these safeguards will be for the Agency to work out by agreement between its members once it has been established. Article XII of the Statute, when read in conjunction with Article III, is self-explanatory and I do not think that there is much that we could usefully add in any covering memorandum at the present stage.
  Mr. Noel-Baker: Since the control may be the only method of preventing every nation throughout the world from making nuclear weapons for itself, and since Article 12 is extremely obscure, does not

  1909
  the Joint Under-Secretary of State think that we might have a fuller explanation in order that we may understand what is intended?
  Mr. Harvey: No, Sir, with great respect to the right hon. Gentleman, I think that this matter is well in hand. There is the I8-Power Preparatory Commission, of which the Government is a member, working on these proposals for control and, as I have said, if it is necessary to add further explanations we will do so.
  Mr. P. Noel-Bakerasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs when Her Majesty's Government will ratify the Statute establishing the International Atomic Energy Agency which was adopted in a United Nations Conference at New York on 23rd October, 1956.
  Mr. Ian Harvey: I would refer the right hon. Member to my reply to the hon. Member for Ashfield (Mr. Warbey) on 18th March.
  Mr. Noel-Baker: May I ask the Joint Under-Secretary of State whether in the meantime any fissile material which we make available to other nations will be sent through the Agency?
  Mr. Harvey: That is quite a different matter.

  VIETNAM (UNITED KINGDOM POLICY)
  Mr. Warbeyasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to what extent the policy of Her Majesty's Government towards Vietnam is still based on the full terms of the Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference.
  Mr. Selwyn Lloyd: The policy of Her Majesty's Government continues to be based on the Geneva Agreements of 1954, including the Final Declaration, in so far as they remain applicable to existing conditions.
  Mr. Warbey: Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman clarify that last phrase, in view of the fact that a statement made by Sir Robert Scott in January has thrown some doubt upon whether the British Government still support the policy of the reunification of Vietnam through free elections? Will the right
  1910
  hon. and learned Gentleman say clearly that the Government still support that policy?
  Mr. Lloyd: It is still the policy of Her Majesty's Government that the reunification of Vietnam through genuinely democratic procedures should take place. Of course, those procedures must be agreed by the parties concerned.

  PARIS CONSULTATIVE GROUP
  Mr. Lewisasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs how many meetings of the Paris Consultative Group have been held since its inception; and what was the date of the last meeting.
  Mr. Selwyn Lloyd: There have been fourteen meetings of the Consultative Group since its inception; the last one was held in September, 1954.
  Mr. Lewis: Now that we have heard from the Foreign Secretary that the American Government have sent proposals, may I ask him how long he thinks it will take the Government to consider these proposals, when he anticipates putting them before the Consultative Group, and when he thinks that the Consultative Group will meet to discuss those proposals?
  Mr. Lloyd: I cannot say. Of course, so far as the meeting of the Consultative Group is concerned, the committees are in continuous session; but I agree with the hon. Gentleman that this is a matter in which considerable haste must be made.
  Mr. Rankinasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in how many cases, and on what specific issues, he has found himself unable to comply with the decisions of the Paris. Consultative Group and its committee.
  Mr. Selwyn Lloyd: I cannot disclose such particulars. The discussions of the Paris Consultative Group and its committees are confidential.
  Mr. Rankin: Does not the Foreign Secretary realise that, prior to 1939, this country was the leading trader in the world with China; that we have now lost that position, fallen very far back indeed in the race, and that that springs

  1911
  indirectly from the mistaken belief that Chiang Kai-shek counts for something in the Far East?
  Mr. Lloyd: I think that that goes a little wide of the Question on the Paper.

  GERMANY

    Reunification
    Mr. Zilliacusasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether, in view of the intention announced in the Defence White Paper to reduce the British Army on the Rhine from 77,000 to 64,000 in the next twelve months, with further reductions in the autumn subject to consultation with the allied Governments, he will propose to these Governments and the Soviet Government an agreement for the withdrawal of foreign forces from Germany and her neighbours and the unification of Germany within the United Nations and an all-European regional arrangement based on the Charter.
    Mr. Selwyn Lloyd: No, Sir.
    Mr. Zilliacus: Is the Foreign Secretary aware that the alternative to a political settlement is to go on with the arms race in nuclear weapons, with Germany and her neighbours to the east and west all getting these nuclear weapons? In view of that appalling prospect, will he not make a fresh attempt to get some kind of agreement? Is he not aware that the Labour Party and the Social Democratic Party of Germany do accept this basis of agreement, and that there are indications that the Soviet Government also do so? Will he not make the attempt?
    Mr. Lloyd: I think that the hon. Member is in complete disagreement with his right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition, who has stated that he thinks that there is not the slightest chance of the Soviet Union accepting this proposal. I really think that our own proposals for the reunification of Germany are much more likely to produce a peaceful Europe than is any suggestion of this sort.
    Mr. Zilliacus: They have produced nothing but deadlock for years.
    Mr. Youngerasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs how many meetings have been held by the study group which is considering the unification
    1912
    of Germany and upon which Her Majesty's Government is represented; when it will meet again; and whether he will make a statement about its progress.
    Mr. Selwyn Lloyd: The Group met in Washington from 6th to 15th March. The report is now being considered by Governments and is being discussed in the North Atlantic Council. The Group may meet again shortly; the actual date has not yet been agreed with our allies.
    Mr. Younger: Does the Foreign Secretary agree that it would be desirable for some statement to be made fairly soon about its progress? In view of the fact that many Conservative speakers seem to be ready to cast doubts upon any suggestion made from other quarters about the reunification of Germany, does he not think that the Government should make clear any proposals that they are prepared to make on this important subject?
    Mr. Lloyd: Whether or not the right hon. Gentleman is right in what he suggested about Conservative speakers, I think that it is desirable that there should be a restatement of the position of Her Majesty's Government and of our principal allies upon this matter, but I still believe that the proposals that have already been put forward are, in fact, the best basis for an agreement.

    Military Forces (Atomic Weapons)
    Mr. Youngerasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he will give an assurance that the provisions of the Paris Treaties relating to the manufacture of nuclear weapons in Germany and their use by German forces still represent Her Majesty's Government's policy on this subject, and that no proposal for a change will be implemented before Parliament has had an opportunity to discuss it.
    Mr. Selwyn Lloyd: I can certainly assure the right hon. Member that Her Majesty's Government stand by the provisions of the Paris Agreements relating to nuclear weapons. As regards the second part of this Question, any changes in the Paris Agreements would naturally be subject to the usual constitutional processes.
    Mr. Younger: While thanking the Minister for that reply, may I ask him

    1913
    whether he is aware that it has been widely commented that the protest recently made by German scientists would not have been made had they not been afraid that they would be called upon to co-operate in the manufacture of nuclear weapons, which would be contrary to the treaties? Is he further aware that if anything of this kind were connived at surreptitiously, it would have a very bad effect indeed on public confidence?
    Mr. Lloyd: I quite agree. I sought to find out any possible basis for that misconception, and I am quite satisfied, in fact, that this idea has not been put forward.
    Mr. Bellenger: Has the Foreign Secretary noticed that one of these scientists has stated that no approach has been made to any of the German nuclear scientists on the lines suggested in the Question?
    Mr. Lloyd: I think that that is quite right.

    Bonn Settlement Convention (Compensation)
    Mr. Youngerasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he is aware that the compensation due under the Bonn Settlement Convention to persons persecuted by the Nazi regime on account of nationality is still most unsatisfactory, especially with regard to those who are now stateless; and what steps he is taking in the matter.
    Mr. Selwyn Lloyd: Yes, Sir. The question of extending the scope of compensation so as to mitigate shortcomings in the existing German Federal legislation is under discussion between the interested Governments. The Federal Government's reply to the eight-Power proposal referred to by my right hon. Friend on 5th December has now been received and is under discussion among those Governments. I can say no more pending the conclusion of the discussions.
    Mr. Younger: While thanking the right hon. and learned Gentleman for that Answer, may I ask, if I am right in thinking that should there be a dispute about the implementation of that part of the Convention there is provision for arbitration, whether he would consider taking
    1914
    the matter to arbitration if we cannot get satisfaction otherwise?
    Mr. Lloyd: I will certainly consider that possibility.

  GULF OF AQABA (BRITISH SHIPS)
  Mr. A. Hendersonasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether British ships are now exercising the right of free and innocent passage through the Gulf of Aqaba as an international waterway.
  Mr. Selwyn Lloyd: Yes, Sir.
  Mr. Henderson: In exercising that right, do the Government intend to consult the Egyptian Government with a view to securing their agreement to the passage of British ships through the Gulf of Aqaba, by reason of our view that we regard it as an international waterway?
  Mr. Lloyd: I do not think that what the right hon. and learned Gentleman suggests is at all necessary. At the present time, a number of British-registered ships are sailing freely through the straits of Aqaba.
  Mr. Dugdale: Does that include British ships actually bound for the Port of Elath?
  Mr. Lloyd: I do not know of any such ship at the moment, but that is really a matter for shipowners—
  Mr. Dugdale—
  Mr. Lloyd: It is a matter indeed as to whether they have a worth-while cargo, a satisfactory charter, etc., but so far as the legal position is concerned we have stated again and again what we regard as our position.
  Mr. Dugdale—
  Mr. Speaker: Order.
  Mr. Dugdale: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I simply wanted to clear up what the Foreign Secretary meant by his statement. It was not at all clear.
  Mr. Speaker: I thought that I heard him all right.

  JORDAN (SITUATION)
  Mr. E. Fletcherasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he will make a statement on the position in Jordan, in view of the fact that some British Forces still remain in that country.
  Mr. Selwyn Lloyd: According to my information the position of British forces in Jordan has not been affected by the recent internal developments in that country and they have been in no danger. The withdrawal of British Forces from Jordan is proceeding in accordance with the terms of the agreement of 13th March terminating the Anglo-Jordan Treaty of 1948.
  Mr. Fletcher: Can the Foreign Secretary State whether any conversations are taking place, including conversations between Her Majesty's Government and the United States, to preent incidents in Jordan developing into a serious international situation?
  Mr. Lloyd: We are in consultation upon the general situation there. At the moment, I think that things look rather quieter.
  Mr. J. Eden: Would not my right hon. and learned Friend agree that the security of Her Majesty's Forces in Jordan depends on the strength of the position of the King of Jordan? Would he not further agree that the position of the King of Jordan would be immensely weakened if we were now to submit to the demands of Nasser, thereby giving strength to the Egyptian influences in Jordan?
  Mr. Lloyd: However that may be. I think that we must regard recent developments in Jordan as an internal matter for the Jordanians, and I think that we would be wiser not to comment on them.
  Mr. P. Noel-Baker: Does the Foreign Secretary expect that our troops will be withdrawn by the date agreed upon?
  Mr. Lloyd: Certainly.

  NIGERIA

    Constitutional Conference
    Mr. Brockwayasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies when the Constitutional Conference on Nigeria will
    1916
    meet; and if the proposal for adult suffrage for all regional and federal elections will be included in the agenda.
    The Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr. Alan Lennox-Boyd): The Conference is due to open on 23rd May. The agenda is a matter for the Conference itself to decide.
    Mr. Brockway: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware how sincerely all of us hope that this Conference will result in great steps forward to the independence of Nigeria? In view of the unity which has been shown in Nigeria for independence by 1959 and the degree of unity in favour of universal suffrage, may we hope that the Government will support those demands?
    Mr. Lennox-Boyd: I should be very unwise to anticipate the agenda, and I think that I should confine myself to expressing the hope that the Conference will result in the increased happiness and prosperity of the people of Nigeria.

  KENYA

    Nairobi Military Garrison
    Mr. Fernyhoughasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies the number of troops of the Nairobi military garrison who will inhabit the permanent cantonment of 600 acres of Crown land acquired by the Kenya Government; for what purposes the land will be used; and what financial transaction was involved in its acquisition.
    Mr. Lennox-Boyd: About 70 officers, 150 British other ranks and 1,000 African other ranks, with their families, will occupy this land. It will be used as a permanent self-contained cantonment for the garrison of Nairobi, and for the staff of command and brigade headquarters.
    Since the Crown land in question is unallocated, apart from 83 acres already allotted to the Army as a temporary wartime measure, no financial transaction is involved in its acquisition.

    Former District Officer
    Mrs. Castleasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies on what date Mr. Richmond, former district officer in the Government service in Kenya, was employed by the Aberdare County Council, Kenya; and in what capacity.
    Mr. Lennox-Boyd: Mr. Richmond was appointed on 1st December, 1956, as African Affairs Officer.
    Mrs. Castle: Is not this an absolutely incredible piece of information? Is not the Colonial Secretary shocked, as I am, to learn this, which no doubt took place without his knowledge? Is it not a fact that it was owing to his influence that Mr. Richmond was sacked from the Government service because of his unhappy connections with the case of Kamau Gichina, an African flogged to death in his area? Is it not a fact that Mr. Richmond was accused of obstructing justice and the investigations of the police and helping criminals in connection with the police inquiries? Will the right hon. Gentleman have this matter considered?
    Mr. Lennox-Boyd: I think that the hon. Lady should get the constitutional responsibility for these posts and appointments more clear. The post of African Affairs Officer under the Aberdare County Council was created with the approval of the Kenya Government, but the appointment of Mr. Richmond to that post was a matter for the council and not for me or the Kenya Government.
    Having regard to the latter part of the hon. Lady's question, I would say that I made it quite clear in the House at the time that I thought that the activities of certain people in Kenya under discussion at that time were regrettable, but in fairness to Mr. Richmond, it should be made clear once more that he was not himself involved in the brutal treatment of Africans and his offence was limited to what was described as a misguided effort to avoid incriminating other officers. Personally speaking, I am glad that he has now been given another chance in life.
    Mrs. Castle: Is it not a fact that the court records of this case in the Supreme Court, which I have read word by word, show that Mr. Richmond's complicity was much greater than that, that he deliberately misled the doctor who gave the medical evidence and that the magistrate criticised him in court, and will he not take this matter up with the Kenya Government?
    Mr. H. Fraser: On a point of order. Is it not dangerous that the hon. Lady
    1918
    and others should use the House of Commons for character assassination which they would not dare to repeat outside?
    Mr. Speaker: That is not a point of order.

    Out-patients (Charges)
    Mrs. Castleasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies who is responsible for assessing the ability of out-patients at Government hospitals and clinics in Kenya to pay the charges recently imposed.
    Mr. Lennox-Boyd: The medical officers in charge of the individual hospitals and clinics.

  DOMINICA

    Deaths By Drowning
    Sir L. Plummerasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies how many deaths by drowning have occurred in the Carib Quarter and Castle Bruce area of the island of Dominica, British West Indies, during the past three years.
    Mr. Lennox-Boyd: Three, Sir.
    Sir L. Plummer: Is the Colonial Secretary aware that these deaths are very largely caused because road transport is inadequate and that the occupants of the area have to travel 35 miles in canoes? Is that not a sign of the urgent need for some sort of road to the capital?
    Mr. Lennox-Boyd: I am well aware of the need for better roads. Road building figures largely in the C.D. and W. programme, but I am glad to say that only one of these three regrettable deaths could conceivably be attributed to the poor roads.

    School Children, Carib Quarter
    Sir L. Plummerasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies how many children of school age there are in the Carib Quarter of the island of Dominica, British West Indies; and how many of these children attend school regularly.
    Mr. Lennox-Boyd: There are 204 children of school age; an average of 100 attend school regularly.
    Sir L. Plummer: Is the Colonial Secretary aware that many of the children do

    1919
    not attend because they have to walk barefoot over rough tracks? Is not this another argument in favour of having a good road to the capital?
    Mr. Lennox-Boyd: Yes, Sir, I think that it is. Actually, in the Carib Quarter one-half of the children of school age attend regularly and for Dominica as a whole the comparable figure is two-thirds. I agree that roads are very important.

    Carib Population (Taxation)
    Sir L. Plummerasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether the Charter granted by Queen Charlotte of England to the indigenous Carib population of Dominica, British West Indies, exempting them from taxation, is still in force.
    Mr. Lennox-Boyd: I have been unable to trace the charter to which the hon. Member refers. A Commission of Inquiry into conditions in the Carib Reserve (Cmd. 3990 of 1932) found no evidence of Carib immunity from taxation.
    Sir L. Plummer: Is the Colonial Secretary aware that a Colonial Office publication in 1902 said that the Caribs were exempt from taxation? Is he aware that the Caribs themselves believe that they have this exemption through a charter and further believe that they suffer so much unemployment, undernourishment and lack of roads because they do not pay tax?
    Mr. Lennox-Boyd: This matter was exhaustively considered at the time of the first Labour Government in the United Kingdom, and the clear conclusion was that they were not immune from that taxation. I sympathise with their desire, but I am afraid that I can find no justification for their claim.

  COLONIAL TERRITORIES

    United Nations Specialised Agencies (Training Facilities)
    Mr. Rankinasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies, in view of the ruling that applicants in British territories:Ire no longer permitted to accept fellowships offered by the World Health Organisation or the Food and Agriculture
    1920
    Organisation for courses of training available in this country, if he will take steps to ensure that alternative means of finance are made available to any such displaced students so that the territories to which they belong are not handicapped by lack of specialist-trained officers.
    Mr. Lennox-Boyd: Assistance from United Nations Specialised Agencies is not intended as a source of financial aid. Training facilities existing in the United Kingdom are readily available to colonial Governments, and alternative means of finance can be made available by provision in the budgets of the territories concerned or by the use of colonial development and welfare funds.
    Mr. Rankin: Is not the Secretary of State aware that the C.D. and W. funds are very scanty in this respect? Does he not think that it is inconsistent to recognise the existence of malnutrition in some of the dependent territories and to provide courses here for equipping qualified persons to deal with it in the affected areas, and then to refuse them the right to take a fellowship through the W. H. O. or the F. A.O. to make their attendance at the courses possible, their own territories not being financially able to assist them?
    Mr. Lennox-Boyd: It is a misunderstanding to think that people are prevented from coming here for training. Other arrangements can be made for them. These funds are available for technical aid, and if spent on training people who could be assisted in other ways would not be available for the technical aid.

  NUCLEAR TESTS (CONTAMINATION OF FISH)
  Mr. Hector Hughesasked the Prime Minister if he will make a statement, based on scientific data available to him, of the effect of the radioactivity caused by nuclear tests to eels, salmon and other fish which, having become contaminated in the sea by radioactivity, move in the course of nature from the sea to British rivers and streams carrying radioactive contamination with them; and what steps he is taking to protect British rivers and streams and British people from the dangers to which they will be thereby exposed.
  The Prime Minister (Mr. Harold Macmillan): I have nothing to add to the Answer I gave to the hon. and learned Member on 2nd April.
  Mr. Hughes: Is the Prime Minister aware that the extreme gravity of this matter has just been indicated by the Council of the Atomic Scientists Association, which has reported that the explosion of a large hydrogen bomb in Bikini in 1954 is today causing bone cancer in people thousands of miles away?
  The Prime Minister: That matter, if it arises at all, would arise on the next Question on the Paper, With regard to the contamination of fish in the sense used in the Question and the hon. and learned Member's previous Question, I have nothing to add to the reply which I then gave, in which I made it clear that there really was no risk in this connection. If the hon. and learned Gentleman wishes me to give him further detailed information, I should be very happy to do so, either by writing to him, or by seeing him on the matter. I have a very long passage here on the subject with which I will not weary the House, but I will be willing to give it to the hon. and learned Member.
  Mr. Hector Hughes: Will the Prime Minister circulate in the OFFICIAL REPORT the long and detailed statement which he has just mentioned?
  The Prime Minister: I will certainly consider that.
  Following is the information:
  Ocean currents carry some contaminated water, seaweed. etc., for very great distances but there is a natural process of great dilution going on all the time. Moreover, the bulk of the radioactive products of an explosion are comparatively short-lived and soon decay to harmlessness.
  European eels migrate to breeding grounds in the Sargasso Sea from which they never return. The eel larvae are carried back by the North Atlantic drift and reach our coasts as elvers at the age of about three years. Salmon spend their early life in our rivers. They migrate to the North Atlantic and after an absence of from one to four years return to their native rivers to breed.
  Danger of radioactive contamination to human beings from fish, as suggested by the Question, could arise, even in the case of low-level explosion, only if an area declared dangerous during a nuclear test were extensively fished within a short period following an explosion; there is no risk if the area is not fished until it is reopened.
  Any danger of fish which are themselves radioactive contaminating sea, or river, water, plants or other fish is negligible.
  A Committee has been set up under the Chairmanship of Lord Rothschild (who is also Chairman of the Agricultural Research Committee) consisting of representatives of the Agricultural Research Council, the Medical Research Council, the Atomic Energy Authority and the Development Commission (which is primarily concerned with fisheries development) to study all biological problems, other than medical, of nuclear physics. The Committee is pursuing research into the contamination of fish (both sea-water and inland fish) from radioactivity from all sources. The Committee are not yet in a position to make any statement.

  HYDROGEN BOMB TESTS
  Mrs. Butlerasked the Prime Minister the estimated level to which strontium 90 in human bone in the United Kingdom will be raised by the forthcoming British hydrogen bomb tests.
  The Prime Minister: I do not expect our tests to cause any significant increase in the level of strontium 90 in human bone.
  Mrs. Butler: Is the Prime Minister aware that there is considerable difference of opinion upon this question among scientists, and that some of them are taking a very grave view of the present situation, including the Japanese physicist, Professor Doke, who claims that we shall have passed the safe dose within five years without any further tests taking place? In view of the possibility that that might be a correct estimate, will not the Prime Minister agree to suspend our tests so as to try to halt this appalling maiming and slaughter of the innocents by the hydrogen bomb?
  The Prime Minister: That is part of the subject of our debate today. Meanwhile, I must repeat the information which was given to me and which I believe I stated before. The present averages measured in the United Kingdom are 0·67 of a unit for children under five years of age, and much less for the rest of the population. It shows hardly any increase over the past year. The International Commission on Radiological Protection accepted 1,000 units as the maximum allowable level for workers in special occupations, and the Medical Research Council concluded that the

  1923
  maximum allowable concentration for members of the general population should not be greater than 100 units. I must repeat that the present average is 0·67 of a unit.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
Mr. Gaitskell: May I ask the Leader of the House whether he will announce the business for the first week after Easter?
The Secretary of State for the Home Department and Lord Privy Seal (Mr. R. A. Butler): Yes, Sir. The business for the first week after the Easter Recess will be as follows:
TUESDAY, 30TH APRIL—Supply[10th Allotted Day]: Committee.
Debate on Britain's Power Resources.
WEDNESDAY, 1ST MAY—Committee stage of the Ways and Means Resolution relating to National Health Service Contributions.
Report and Third Reading of the National Insurance Bill.
Consideration of the Motion to approve the Representation of the People (Scotland) Regulations.
THURSDAY, 2ND MAY—Report stage of the Ways and Means Resolution relating to National Health Service contributions, when the Bill will be brought in.
Committee stage of the Naval Discipline Bill, which it is hoped to obtain by about 7.30 p.m.
Second Reading of the Naval and Marine Reserves Pay Bill.
Report and Third Reading of the Export Guarantees Bill.
Committee and Third Reading of the House of Commons Members' Fund Bill.
Second Reading of the Church of Scotland (Property and Endowments) Bill [Lords].
FRIDAY, 3RD MAY—Consideration of Private Members' Motions.
Mr. Gaitskell: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that on Tuesday, 30th April, we should wish to raise not only the question of the nuclear energy programme but also that of oil supplies, and that we have put down the Votes of the Departments concerned with these matters?
1924
Can he tell us when the Services Estimates are likely to be debated?
Mr. Butler: I note that the Votes that have been put down are Class IX, Votes 5, 6 and 7, and Class I, Vote 23. I think that they cover the points which the right hon. Gentleman wants to raise. If not, perhaps he will take the necessary steps.
I cannot give an exact date for the Service Estimates, which will be published after Easter, but suitable days will be chosen to discuss them after the business that I have announced.
Mr. Ross: Will the Leader of the House consult the Secretary of State for Scotland and see that if he wishes to repeat the unrewarding experience of keeping the Scottish Standing Committee up all night he will consider the advisability of giving warning, if not to Members of the Committee, at least to the staff of the House?
Mr. Butler: I am sure that nobody could feel that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Scotland is otherwise than most courteous in all matters. I feel sure that he will have all these matters in mind. I would also like to say that progress was made in the course of the discussions, although the sitting was unduly protracted. The responsibility for that cannot be laid at the door of any one Member or any one side of the Committee. Furthermore, I would like to make this appeal. The Scottish Standing Committee has a great tradition for getting through business. I hope that in the future it will make sufficient progress with the Housing and Town Development (Scotland) Bill to maintain its ancient and honourable tradition.
Mr. Shepherd: Will my right hon. Friend consider the desirability of having a debate upon industrial relations, at an early and convenient date, seeing that we all too seldom discuss this issue, on broad principles?
Mr. Butler: Apart from any subject that may be put down by the Opposition. I will certainly discuss this matter with my right hon. Friend the Minister of Labour.
Mr. Emrys Hughes: Is the Leader of the House aware that nobody doubts the courtesy of the Secretary of State for

1925
Scotland? What is in question is his perspicacity. Will not he look at the record of these proceedings to see whether a change is not really necessary in this Department?
Mr. Butler: The answer to that question is definitely, "No."
Mr. Ross: May I press the Leader of the House on this matter? Does he not think that it would be much more expeditious, from the business point of view, if, at its sittings, the Scottish Grand Committee could be told when it was likely to rise?
Mr. Butler: The trouble is that one never knows.
Mr. Hector Hughes: I want to draw the attention of the Leader of the House to a very practical aspect of the flatter which has just been put to him, namely, that no means of transport were provided for Members, who separated at about five o'clock in the morning. Will not the Leader of the House, in consultation with the Secretary of State for Scotland, take steps to obviate such an occurrence in future?
Mr. Speaker: I hardly think that that is a question relating to business for the week after we come back.

COMMONWEALTH PRIME MINISTERS (MEETING)
The Prime Minister (Mr. Harold Macmillan): With your permission, Mr. Speaker, I wish to make a short statement.
I have been in communication with the Prime Ministers of the other Commonwealth countries and we have now arranged to hold a meeting in London, beginning on 26th June this year.
I feel sure that the House will join with me in welcoming this event, to which we all attach the highest importance.
Mr. Gaitskell: On behalf of the Opposition, I should like to give a warm welcome to the announcement made by the Prime Minister, but may I ask him whether, among the subjects to be discussed, will be the question of the Free Trade Area in Europe, and its relationship—as affected by the proposal to include overseas territories—to our own Imperial Preference arrangements?
The Prime Minister: I am sure that the Leader of the Opposition will acquit me of any discourtesy if I remind him—as has been stated before—that it is not the practice to give information of the subjects discussed at Prime Ministers' meetings. I am merely repeating what has been said before when I say that it is thought that that would be to impair the informal character of these meetings. But any Prime Minister can raise any question he wishes during the conference.
Mr. Wade: Is it intended to send an invitation to the Prime Minister of the Central African Federation? If so, may we assume that it does not imply any modification of the safeguards of the interests of the African inhabitants of those territories for which the British Government are responsible?
The Prime Minister: As, perhaps, the House knows, there is a long-established precedent for the invitation, which, after consultation with other Prime Ministers, I have sent to the Prime Minister of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.
Mr. Shinwell: Does not the Prime Minister agree that before the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' conference is held in June it might be desirable to initiate a debate upon Commonwealth affairs in the House, as a result of which the minds of Her Majesty's Ministers attending the Conference may be duly illuminated?
The Prime Minister: Yes, Sir, but perhaps that question might be put to the Leader of the House.
Mr. Shinwell: Then may I put it to the Leader of the House? I am not responsible for "passing the buck."

BALLOT FOR NOTICES OF MOTIONS
  Commonwealth and Empire (Natural Resources)
  Mr. J. Langford-Holt: I beg to give notice that on Friday, 3rd May, I shall call attention to the need to increase the integration and development of the natural resources of the Commonwealth and Empire, and move a Resolution.

  United Nations (Constabulary)
  Mr. Henry Usborne: I beg to give notice that on Friday, 3rd May, I shall call attention to the need to create a

  1927
  directly recruited and effective United Nations constabulary, and move a Resolution.

  Health Education
  Mr. Brian Harrison: I beg to give notice that on Friday, 3rd May, I shall call attention to health education and preventative health work, and move a Resolution.
SITTINGS OF THE HOUSE
House to meet Tomorrow at Eleven o'clock; no Questions to be taken after Twelve o'clock; and at Five o'clock Mr. Speaker to adjourn the House without putting any Question.—[The Prime Minister.]

ADJOURNMENT (EASTER)
Motion made, and Question proposed,That this House, at its rising Tomorrow, do adjourn till Tuesday, 30th April.—[The Prime Minister.]
Mr. Marcus Lipton: I wish to make a suggestion which, I hope, will find favour with the Leader of the House. It is a job that he might find it possible to do before we rise for the Easter Recess. I think it is one which will have the approval of all hon. Members. It is that on our behalf he should send a good will message to Sir Anthony Eden, expressing our hope for his speedy recovery.
Hon. Members: Hear, hear.
The Prime Minister (Mr. Harold Macmillan): I should like to express the gratitude of my right hon. and hon. Friends and myself for the very kind words which the hon. Gentleman has spoken. I shall certainly see that that message is conveyed.
Mr. Hugh Gaitskell: I should like to associate myself with what my hon. Friend has said, and, speaking for the Opposition, to say that we should be very happy if such a message were to be sent to Sir Anthony Eden.
Question put and agreed to.

ORDERS OF THE DAY

  WAYS AND MEANS
  [9th April]
  Resolutions reported,
  Question,That this House doth agree with the Committee in the said Resolutions, put forthwith on each Resolution, pursuant to Standing Order No. 86 (Ways and Means Motions and Resolutions), and agreed to.
  [For particulars of Resolutions, see OFFICIAL REPORT, 9th April, 1957: Vol. 568, c.1001–1007.]

WAYS AND MEANS
[15th April, 1957]
Resolution reported,

AMENDMENT OF THE LAW
That it is expedient to amend the law with respect to the national debt and the public revenue and to make further provision in connection with finance, so, however that this Resolution shall not extend to making amendments of the enactments relating to purchase tax so as to give relief from tax, other than amendments making the same provision for chargeable goods of whatever description and amendments reducing any of the several rates of tax generally for all goods to which that rate applies (and for which the rate is not altered in pursuance of some other Resolution of the Committee of Ways and Means).
Resolution read a Second time.
Question,That this House doth agree with the Committee in the said Resolution, put forthwith, pursuant to Standing Order No. 86 (Ways and Means Motions and Resolutions), and agreed to.
Bill ordered to be brought in upon the said Resolution and upon the other Resolutions reported from the Committee of Ways and Means and agreed to this day, by the Chairman of Ways and Means, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Powell, and Mr. Birch.

FINANCE
Bill to grant certain duties, to alter other duties, and to amend the law relating to the National Debt and the Public Revenue, and to make further provision in connection with Finance, presented accordingly, and read the First time; to be read a Second time Tomorrow and to be printed. [Bill 78.]

DEFENCE
Order read for resuming adjourned debate on Amendment to Question [16th April]:
That this House approves the Outline of Future Defence Policy set out in Command Paper No. 124—[Mr. Sandys.]
Which Amendment was, to leave out from "House," to the end of the Question, and to add instead thereof:
"declines to approve the Outline of Future Defence Policy, Command Paper No. 124, which, despite the waste of money and resources in the past five years due to repeated Government vacillation, still lacks the firm decisions essential to an effective defence policy; further regrets the undue dependence on the ultimate deterrent on which the policy set out in the White Paper appears to be based; and recognising that international disarmament is the only real solution to the problem of defence, and conscious of the dangers to humanity of the continuance of nuclear explosions, calls upon Her Majesty's Government to take an immediate initiative in putting forward effective proposals for the abolition of hydrogen-bomb tests through international agreement, meanwhile postponing the United Kingdom tests for a limited period so that the response to this initiative of the other Governments concerned may first be considered."—[Mr. G. Brown.]
Question again proposed,That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question.
3.47 p.m.
Mr. Geoffrey de Freitas: Except for a part of the speech of the Minister of Defence, yesterday the debate reflected the feelings of the country. In other words, it was a serious study of defence problems. Above all, the debate revealed the genuine wish of all hon. Members to find answers to the baffling questions with which we are confronted. We know that when it conies to defence we are all on the same island and, to put it crudely, if we go down in a thermonuclear death the ashes of a Tory will be just as radioactive as the ashes of a Socialist.
All of us, in the duties we have to perform, have difficult decisions to make, but in the sphere of defence they are certainly more difficult than in any other. One of the reasons is that the factors are changing so constantly. The experts of today are proved wrong tomorrow, and indeed, the suggestion of one day is the commonplace of the next. How many of us who came into this House in 1945 for
1930
the first time thought that, only twelve years later, we should be engaged in a debate one of the premises of which is that the aeroplane as used in war is on the way out?
During the last few years, speaking on things such as housing and capital punishment, I have risen to speak convinced not only of the case I was making but that I knew the answers to the other problems deep inside the subject. Today, I am convinced of the justice of the Amendment, but I am also convinced that in this matter of defence I certainly do not know all the answers. In other words, I am in the same position as most hon. Members.
Unlike nearly all Western Parliaments, we have not a Defence Committee, an all-party body with access to secret information on defence. Therefore, our task is difficult. The Government's passion for concealment makes it even more difficult. Those of us who are most concerned with defence have to rely on American and Dutch journalists to learn that our Canberra bombers, in Germany, were equipped to carry atom bombs. That is a measure of the difficulty that we are up against in dealing with this subject.
I understand that the Minister of Labour is to follow me in the debate. So much of our debate, since the Minister of Defence introduced it, has, naturally, been on guided weapons and press-button warfare that it is right that we should be reminded that men, real living people, are still the most important factor in a defence machine. Fingers, ordinary human fingers, have much more to do than merely polish the press-buttons. No doubt the Minister of Labour will remind us of this, and that there are many operations that can be done mechanically but at greater cost in the long run. Anyone concerned with labour and the production of complicated equipment knows that there is no complicated multipurpose equipment which, without planning, is produced so easily and by such unskilled labour as a human being.
So we have this fact: manpower is still the key to our problems. The Minister is to unlock the door and give us an explanation. I will not repeat what was referred to first by my right hon. Friend and then by my hon. Friend

1931
the Member for Islington, North (Mr. Fienburgh), who wound up the debate from this Box last night—the points in the Minister's speech in July, to which particular attention was directed. All I can say is that it would be sheer repetition to go over it, but I confess that the Minister of Labour has a formidable case to answer. The case that we made was very strong and I hope that whatever the right hon. Gentleman does he will tackle these points himself.
The Minister of Labour and National Service (Mr. Iain Macleod)The Minister of Labour and National Service (Mr. Iain Macleod) indicated assent.
Mr. de Freitas: I see the right hon. Gentleman nodding, so no doubt he will do so.
One of the points which we found very sketchy in the White Paper, and again in the speech of the Minister of Defence, was the control over the Service Departments by the Ministry of Defence. Ten years ago, when the new Ministry of Defence was set up, it never occurred to any of us, even the most junior Ministers in the Departments concerned or anybody else, that it would be possible, ten years later, for the three Service Ministries and the Ministry of Defence to survive almost unchanged.
It never occurred to us, in the discussions at that time, that the Ministry of Defence would remain merely an office round the Minister. It was always thought that, with the passage of time, gradually the three Service Ministries and the Ministry of Supply, having shed its non-military functions, would come together under a Minister of Defence.
During the past 12 months there have been staggering disclosures of the waste caused by overlapping and duplication among the Services. I shall quote the simplest matter of all, the provision of food. We learned during the last year that the Army sends food from Taunton to Plymouth while the Navy sends similar food from Plymouth to Yeovil. We learned that the naval air station at Ford, only about 20 miles outside Portsmouth, was supplied with food that came by lorry from Warrington, Lancashire, more than 200 miles away. That was obviously a distribution designed by Chesterton, the night he went to Birmingham by way of Beachy Head.
1932
If there is such waste in a field of supply where there is such a tradition of co-operation among the Services—the Army and the Royal Air Force have the same food supply system—what must the overlapping and waste be in fields in which there is a tradition of inter-Service hostility, for instance, between the Navy and the Royal Air Force in matters connected with the operation and maintaining of aircraft? No wonder the Select Committee reported a
"complete absence of co-ordination by the Ministry of Defence ".
I was pleased to hear that the Minister of Defence had set up a committee. Will it look abroad at what other countries have succeeded in doing? If so, let it look particularly at India and Canada, countries which have our system of Ministerial responsibility and have had some of our experience.
I am extremely disappointed at what has been done about integration of the Services. Is it not a fact that we are still without a defence manual common to the three Services? Is it not true that there are still three separate war manuals? Should not we really have reached the stage when all officers of the Services, to whatever Service they may belong, if they have passed through the Imperial Defence College and the Joint Services Staff College, should be on a common Ministry of Defence list for reports and promotion?
Ten years ago inquiries were started into the possibility of amalgamating branches within the Services. A mistake was made by starting the inquiries with relatively small and unexciting branches, unimportant so far as military and war services are concerned, like the chaplains' service. It was felt, and, I think, rightly, that it was too early, and that we should wait until a generation of officers grew up who, although loyal members of their Service, thought of defence as a whole.
That generation of officers has now reached positions of authority, but the officers do not appear to have been encouraged or prodded by the Government to think constantly of integration. Again, there is a lot to be learned from other countries—it may seem strange, but I would say very small countries—who have never been able to afford the luxury of three independent Services.

1933
In January I visited the Israeli Defence Ministry and the Army and Air Force in Israel, Gaza and Sharm el Sheikh, on the Straits of Tiran. I was impressed not only by the forces themselves, but with the degree of integration that had been achieved by their Services. Of course, an infantry officer is not expected to fly a Mystère and I believe that a fighter pilot is not posted to an infantry unit; but short of that, there is considerable cross-posting, especially in the technical and administrative branches. An officer may well, for some years' time, have to change from khaki to blue or from blue to khaki, but the point is that it is without complications to his career and promotion
When they consider integration I sincerely hope that the Government will not be frightened to change the traditional interests in the Services. One of the few encouraging things about the Minister of Defence is, I think I am right in saying, that during., the war he shot down an enemy bomber by rocket when the traditional "Ack-ack" people said that it could not he done
On integration, the Government must not accept compromise between the Services when it is not a real compromise. Suppose, for instance, that the Navy, the Army and the Air Force were required to plan to cross a river. Each would try to do it in its own way—to sail across, put a bridge across, or to fly across. The compromise might be to follow the Navy's solution on Monday, the Army's on Tuesday and that of the Air Force on Wednesday. Such a compromise would be acceptable to all three Services, but I am sure that it would be crazy military and economically
It is far better to have a realistic compromise. I apologise for mentioning it again in the House, as I did so a year or two ago when I referred to the Stalin compromise. Mr. Truman recalls that at Potsdam there was an argument between the right hon. Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill)—whom I see in his place today—and Stalin, as to what should be done with the German Navy. For hours they argued. Stalin wanted it to be divided between the United Kingdom and Russia and the right hon. Gentleman said that the German Navy should be sunk beneath the waves because it was stained with infamy. At
1934
length Stalin said, "Mr. Churchill, you are English; you like compromise. Let us compromise; let us divide the German Navy and then you can sink your half.
So far as our Navy is concerned there does not appear to be a compromise of any sort in the White Paper. No attempt is made to harmonise the paragraphs headed, "Europe and Atlantic" and "Seapower." What is the future of the Navy conceived to be? At one moment the Government appear to have been impressed by Admiral Radford's calculation that 92 per cent. of the world's important targets lie within 1,200 miles of the sea. At the next moment the Government appear to regard the naval arm as relatively unimportant
A great deal is made of carrier forces, but if there are to be carriers what aircraft are they to use? Has the Navy any which are even comparable with the Hunter? What is coming to the Navy? What is the use of the many brilliant inventions—all of them British—angled decks, steam catapults, mirror landing aids and the blown flap, if the aircraft are not up to that standard? What about the design of carriers? Will the blown flap, or vertical take-off, lead to the development of much smaller carriers which would be less vulnerable and far less expensive
Yesterday, the Ministry of Defence told us that he foresaw no difficulty in recruiting Regulars for the Navy. Would it not be a good idea to take advantage of the great prestige attaching to our senior Service by expanding the Royal Marines to relieve the Army, which is finding it more difficult to get recruits? I return to this because it is the key to so much of the new look and the central reserve. Both the White Paper and the Minister of Defence have stressed the central reserve
I think it was the Manchester Guardian which referred to the danger of the central reserve of the Army which is to be available in this country becoming "a stationary military absurdity." Certainly, the White Paper talks about its mobility, but is there anything which a White Paper, Service Ministers or the Minister of Defence have said which indicates how mobile it really is? We must return to this as it is the key to the whole discussion. How is it expected that with the transport aircraft that are available these

1935
forces are to be able to be moved? Is it to be a question of fitting it in with B. E. A. or B. O. A. C., probably in the winter, when fares are cheaper, or something like that? We cannot rely on that
Thinking on the point about emergencies, I very much hope that there will be a link between the Service Departments and the Foreign Office. Even in a small operation like Suez the Royal Air Force dropped the wrong leaflets. They dropped leaflets calling for the overthrow of Nasser when the scheme had completely changed and the Foreign Secretary was saying that Britain had gone in to intervene as a policeman to keep peace between the two combatants. This is not a foreign affairs debate, so I will not say much about that, but Suez showed a lack of machinery and links between the Services and the Foreign Office
During December, at Question time, I drew the attention of the Secretary of State for Air to the fact that Israeli aircraft in the attack bore the Anglo-French special invasion markings of yellow stripes on a black background. A week or so later, the Foreign Secretary told me that he did not know Israeli aircraft had our invasion markings. Can it be correct that the Foreign Office did not know what every airman—and, I should imagine, every journalist in the theatre —knew, that in that operation the Israelis, the French and the British all had the same markings on their aircraft
During the last year or so, time and again in debates on supply and air, the role of manned fighters has been increasingly and seriously questioned. Did the Minister of Defence or the Minister of Supply do anything about it? They did not. At the beginning of this year the British aircraft industry was burdened with more fighter projects than the huge United States industry. The much smaller British industry had nearly half as many again imposed on it. Yet it must have been obvious that the role of the manned fighter was certainly being questioned. Surely, if any Minister of Defence had stayed long enough in his job, or if any Minister of Supply had applied himself to the problem, there would have been a gradual slackening off over the last year or so instead of the sudden lurch that we have today
What is the result of this lurch? Obviously, there is a very great waste of
1936
money. We know that Regular officers and men in the Services are faced with sudden violent changes in their careers. Further, there is the dislocation of the industry and the workers therein. Surely the Government should have foreseen these big changes. Those of us without any of their sources of information could foresee them
It was reported on Sunday that several hundred R. A. F. officers had asked to resign. The Government have certainly treated them with little consideration. I have protested before at the way in which senior officers—members of the Air Council, who could have devised plans to ease the transition—were kept in the dark by the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence so that the policy of the Government could be continued to be announced, as it were, in newspaper headlines. These Regulars have served the State well and should have been treated as such. Apart from the human problem, they will certainly be the Government's worst recruiting agency, yet with a little foresight the position could have been completely different
The White Paper does not emphasise enough the important role of research and invention in defence. Of course, it is a truism today that our future defence will be closely tied to the future of our education in science and technology. Until recently we patronisingly thought of the Russians as being technically inferior
In case we should think that now, they give us almost daily reminders that they have the atom bomb, anyway. As late as 1949, when the first Russian atom bomb was exploded, I was told by a well-known atomic scientist that it could not possibly be a scientifically controlled explosion. The Russians were said to be incapable of that, and that it must be accidental, probably caused by a moujik tripping over a wire in far-off Siberia. Now, the mood is different and one hears dismal tales of how far ahead the Russians are
Surely there is a balance in this, that if we work closely with the United States of America, together we have a great contribution to make. The Americans, with their vast resources, are likely to lead us—we would wish it was otherwise—in development and production, but we shall probably lead them in sheer

1937
inventiveness, especially if they, like the Russians, tend in the years ahead to follow a god of conformity, with the resulting suppression of unusual and unpopular ideas. I think that with our inventiveness we will have a very important role to play in this partnership
The White Paper does not give encouragement to the possibility of nuclear defence. Has not considerable work been done already on the possibility of using guided missiles with atomic warheads in a defensive role to destroy attacking missiles? During the next decade this may come, utterly fantastic as such a thing seems today. Again, we must think in terms of such possibilities. As I said earlier, what would have been our reaction if, in 1945, we had been told what the atmosphere of debates here relating to manned war aircraft would be twelve years later
If we are to hold our own in the coming century, we must see that the next generation is not as scientifically illiterate as we are. In no sphere is this as important as in defence. We cannot have any more of the looking down on the technicians. Our officers must be twentieth century officers. I wish that the Government would always show that they had caught the twentieth century mood
It is a considerable achievement for a country to hold, at the same time, the world's speed records for land, sea and air, but I wonder how many members of the Government realise that we hold all these records. When we gained the air speed record last year, Ministers did not go out of their way to boast about it. Records like this are one of the things that are great about Britain in a technical age
Because so much of this technical education and changing mood is required in the future, I do not want to imply that there are not other things that we can do in the Services even before technically-minded officers arrive. We can right away—today—do much more to bring the benefits of modern techniques to the administration of the Services. There must be more computing and mechanised accounting in the Services. The United States Army estimates an annual saving of 100 million dollars from a new computer which will keep running records of
1938
motor spare parts stored in the depots. The savings will come from the reduced stocks required to be held. The cost of the machine is very heavy—millions of dollars—but the savings will be great
Of course, the Americans had their financial arguments, but I beg the Government to consider what I have said. I remember that the Treasury was horrified at the expense when it was suggested that the Royal Air Force should fly out spare aero-engines to forces abroad. The Treasury needed a lot of convincing that it was infinitely cheaper to fly them out than to have a large number of unused aero-engines on the long lines of supply and not seen. For personal records and statistics generally, the computer has a great part to play and I suggest that the Government really should consider this. It can easily be done by the three Services
I think it is generally agreed everywhere that we need a revision of the United States' law relating to the passing of information on atomic matters. Unfortunately, Suez, anti-American speeches and anti-American Motions have all postponed that day. Meanwhile, we are in the humiliating position of having to set up and maintain the United States guided missiles with our skilled manpower while the Americans control the warheads
The Americans make no secret of their policy of using local manpower as far as possible, but keeping the decisive control in their own hands. They have designed a guided missile with a range of 1,500 miles. They do not want it in their own country or in Mexico or Canada—of course not. Where else can they use it except in this country? We are fitting into the pattern of American oriental outposts in Korea and Formosa. There is nothing very oriental looking about a guided missile, but at this rate of assimilation to Formosa it will soon be difficult to tell one Minister from another. The story should be different from this
I have a suggestion to put to the Prime Minister. To have the guided missiles handed to us under the two conditions which I am about to suggest would make all the difference. Although the warhead was stored under United States control it could, in fact, be stored on the end of the missile and, secondly, our forces,

1939
and not the United States forces, could feed the data into the machine—that is to say, the British forces would keep the guided missiles constantly fed with the target and direction information; in other words, we would direct their line of flight. Is there any chance of these conditions being agreed? I hope that the Prime Minister will tell us something about "Thor" and "Jupiter"? Have they had any successful flights? I see in today's newspaper that certainly "Thor" did not do too well. In any case, when shall we have them
During the debate, most hon. Members who have spoken, have referred to N. A. T. O. Next year, N. A. T. O. will face many strains. Surely it should be for us to work to strengthen that alliance. Instead, the way in which our allies were told of the drastic decisions indicated in the White Paper has done a great deal in the other direction. I have spoken to members of defence committees of two different Continental countries. Under the Continental system, details of defence planning are known not only to Ministers, but to members of these defence committees. I was told that the "take it or leave it" manner in which our changes were announced upset our allies very much
We must not underrate the advantage of the alliance. The White Paper is actually based on alliance. More than that, however, technically we depend entirely on the work of our allies for any early warning that we may get. if we are to have the advantages of an alliance, we must develop confidence in each other and this can be done only by consultation. It is no wonder that the Washington correspondent of the Sunday Times could write that everywhere in Washington Her Majesty's Government were being charged —this is a serious accusation—with "the break-up of N. A. T. O." Those were his words
My hon. and right hon. Friends and myself regret very much that a Service Minister is not to intervene in this debate. We are entitled to answers from Service Ministers, particularly because we have to debate the White Paper without having the Service Estimates before us. It is quite an extraordinary position that after five and a half years, with all the professional advice available, the Government are in such confusion that they cannot
1940
even draw up the annual Service Estimates. Why is not one Service Minister to speak? Is it because the Service Ministers have been so much in the dark that none of them knows enough about the White Paper at all? Of course, even if that had been so, we should have had an opportunity of hearing the Minister of Labour on the very important aspect with which he has to deal
Although my party is confident that it is better equipped than the Government to deal with matters of defence, because it feels that in the twentieth century a party born in the twentieth century may have a considerable advantage—although we claim that with confidence, we do not claim to know all the answers to all the problems
Successive Governments have been banking on developing the deterrent. There was the belief that the possession of atomic weapons by both sides would produce a military stalemate and that the way would be open for peace by negotiation. But is this correct? There are men and women everywhere, in all parties, who are worried. For instance, there are some who believe that by concentrating on the deterrent we have left ourselves open to attack in limited local wars and that we cannot afford conventional as well as nuclear forces. I suppose it is a question of balance. We must have some conventional forces, but the point is that we must not lurch too far one way or the other
There are many people, again in all parties, who wonder whether there is any purpose in continuing with the policy of the deterrent now that the smaller countries may become nuclear Powers, too. With all the doubts and worries only one thing is certain; that the world needs a breathing space. In our Amendment we ask the Government to postpone the tests for a limited period and to make a great effort now to reach international agreement
I need no convincing of the awfulness of nuclear war. I saw the devastated waste of what was once Hiroshima. I wish that everyone could realise what total destruction is like, and then we might enter an age in which the rule of law would reign supreme. For the first time, we would reach a stage in which statesmen could go to the conference

1941
table knowing that compromise and concession would not be taken by their people as a sign of weakness but as a sign of realism. For the first time in history, statesmen of great Powers could go before a tribunal knowing that, if they lost their case there, they could not gain their point by a minor war—because between great Powers there could not be a minor war
I believe that there is still a chance that the awfulness of the deterrent may give this world something it has never had before, and that is the rule of law. Paradoxically, it would then be that the scientist would have turned out to be the law River and the lawyer merely the technician.
4.24 p.m.
The Minister of Labour and National Service (Mr. lain Macleod): I found much with which to agree in the interesting, although mild, comments, and the occasional criticism which the hon. Member for Lincoln (Mr. de Freitas) launched at the White Paper. I want to start with a sentence which he used near the beginning of his speech, when he said that manpower is still the key, because what I have to say this afternoon, although essential to our defence planning, is, in some ways, a little way apart from the main stream of the debate.
I want to deal with three matters; first, the effects on employment of the defence economies; secondly, the question of civilian employment for Regulars who leave the Forces; and, thirdly, our detailed plans for the final years of National Service. Of course, the changes of policy announced in the White Paper will mean that the volume of defence work, and particularly of defence production, will be curtailed. It follows from that that many people will have to find new jobs, and that some will have to move.
I am sure that the House would accept this: that we should take this position as an opportunity and a challenge rather than as a calamity. Therefore, I should like to tell the House, as far as one can see at this stage, the broad effect on employment of these policies.
Mr. G. A. Pargiter: In this process of change, has the right hon. Gentleman in mind anything about compensation, in the same way as Army officers will be compensated?
Mr. Macleod: The question of compensation in relation to Regular officers was dealt with yesterday. I will have a specific point to make later on the transfer of workers.
The first thing that we must be quite clear about is that there is nothing very new in the situation that faces us. The volume of defence production has been declining for some years now and, in fact, bigger reductions in the numbers employed have taken place in previous years than are expected this year. Indeed, in the last four years. the numbers employed on defence production have been reduced by 200,000, including a fall of no fewer than 70,000 last year. It is probable that the reduction this year will be a good deal less than that.
In so far as I can give the figures, it is expected that during the next 12 months the numbers employed in the Royal Ordnance Factories may be reduced by about 5,000 or 6.000, and my right hon. Friend the Minister of Supply is conducting a review of the capacity of these factories. In the aircraft industry, about 15,000 workers will be affected in the next 12 months, and the process of reorganisation will, of course, continue. As a result of reductions in Admiralty contracts. about 7,000 further workers will become available.
Our economy, and particularly our export trade, is bound to gain from the reduction in the burden of defence expenditure, but I recognise that there will be concern about the effects on employment, particularly in areas where alternative work is not easy to find. We have, therefore, made arrangements for close consultation between the Supply Departments, the Board of Trade, and my own Department so as to ensure that workers who are released by cuts in the defence programme are, if necessary, absorbed into other employment as quickly as possible; and that, where there is scope for choice in deciding where cuts shall be made, labour considerations shall be given the fullest possible weight.
Mr. Frank Beswick Mr. Frank Beswick (Uxbridge) rose—
Mr. Macleod: I should like to get on with this part of my speech, if I can.
Some workers will, of course, remain at their place of employment even after

1943
they lose their present jobs, depending on the success of their firms in attracting civilian contracts. But where there is no alternative—and to this I attach great importance—except to make significant reductions in the size of the labour force, we are trying to arrange that the longest possible notice will be given by the Supply Departments to the Board of Trade and to my Department so that we can, perhaps, make special arrangements with the firms and find new tenants, if appropriate, for the factories.
Mr. Beswick: Is an attempt being made to assess the number of men within the aircraft industry who will simply turn from the construction of airplanes to work on guided missiles? I wondered whether the figure of 15,000 was net, after allowing for the additional employment in the industry provided by the guided missile programme.
Mr. Macleod: These figures are very tentative but, as I understand it, it would be a net figure in that sense. The figure is not very far from last year's, which was, I think, about 10,000 or 11,000.
Mr. Beswick: The right hon. Gentleman cannot give a figure for the changeover?
Mr. Macleod: I am quite confident that the great majority of these people will be quickly absorbed into other employment. If we start at the top level, a recent report, which I am sure hon. Members will have seen, estimated that employers in the manufacturing industries would need no less than 37 per cent. more scientists and engineers in 1959 than they did in 1956. There are now 4,000 vacancies for draughtsmen—thirteen times the number of those unemployed.
For skilled engineering workers there are nearly 20,000 vacancies—four times the number unemployed—and for metal-using industries over 40,000 vacancies. I know that hon. Members will say that these vacancies are not always in the right places. That is true; I accept that. The pegs never fit precisely into the holes. Also, of course, there will be local difficulties. I would not deny this, because it is a vast operation, but the figures that I have given of production in recent years show that this problem, properly tackled, need not be too formidable.
1944
As the House will know—and Midland Members have been particularly anxious about this—I have been considering arrangements to assist the temporary transfer of workers from areas where there is a redundancy of labour which is not expected to be permanent. I have undertaken to the hon. Lady the Member for Coventry, South (Miss Burton) that when I am ready to announce that scheme I shall do so in response to a Question from her, as she has been particularly active in pursuit of this matter. I am not quite ready to announce the details of the scheme, but I hope to do so soon, and I think it may make a useful, though limited, contribution towards solving the problem of mobility of labour, which is essential.
The last of the points that I want to make on this, the first of my subjects, is this. The prospects for production are good. Opportunities exist for a further expansion of our exports, and the proportion of our resources which has been devoted to investment has increased steadily since 1952. We can, therefore, look forward to further progress in this field, and if this progress is forthcoming the engineering industries are sure to be in the forefront of those activities. It therefore seems clear that there are fairly favourable conditions at this time for the changeover to civilian production.
Mr. James Griffiths: I believe that the right hon. Gentleman's attention has been drawn to the fact that these changes may affect certain ranges which have been established by the War Office and to which people have been attracted. Some are in Wales, and there are others elsewhere. Will the right hon. Gentleman give an assurance that this matter is receiving his consideration?
Mr. Macleod: Yes, if we can help through the sort of machinery which I arranged earlier—consultation between the Departments, including my own—we shall, of course, do so.
I want to turn to the second of my subjects—the question of civilian employment for ex-Regulars of all ranks, especially those who have to be retired from the forces under the plan for reductions announced in the White Paper. My right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence yesterday gave the figures and said something about compensation. I want to fill

1945
in the other side, because it seems to me an essential part of a sound recruitment policy—indeed, it is our only chance of getting the recruits at all—that there should be fair treatment for the Regulars and that, at the end of their service, they should have an excellent chance of a successful second career.
In 1950, under the Labour Government an advisory council was set up to advise on the relationship between Service and civilian life, and it was under the guidance of this Council that the Ministry of Labour negotiated a series of agreements with different industries which secured special arrangements to provide for the employment of ex-Regulars, for example, by allocating a quota of vacancies to them.
Negotiations between the trade unions and the Services have resulted in the recognition of Service training and experience in a wide range of trades as qualifying these men for membership of the appropriate trade unions. I know that in the future we shall have the same cooperation from the trade unions as we have had in the past.
All Governments have tried to play their part in this, too, as many right hon. and hon. Members opposite will know. For many years certain posts in the Government service have been almost wholly reserved for ex-Regulars. In some Civil Service grades a proportion of vacancies is reserved for ex-Regulars and there are special examinations for them. For almost all Civil Service posts filled by competitive examination, ex-Regulars can deduct their period in the forces from their actual age for the purpose of the age limit. In addition to this, special arrangements exist for training ex-Regulars, and we train annually over 1,000 at the Government training centres run by my Department.
It is not possible today to describe in full to the House the work that has been done particularly in relation to the placing of other ranks and N. C. O. s, but I can show quickly what a success story it is. In 1956, for example, more than half of the other ranks who registered with the local offices of my Ministry were placed for employment before their terminal leave expired, and most of the others shortly after the expiry of their leave.
1946
Out of the scores of thousands who left the Services over the whole country, only 97 had been unemployed for more than 12 weeks on 9th January, 1957. These were chiefly in country districts or seaside resorts where employment opportunities are limited. In a difficult year—and we must remember that 200,000 Regular other ranks left the Services in the last two years—that really is a splendid achievement and it should be widely known.
The problem of finding suitable employment for officers is more difficult. Resettlement information which is circulated in the Services is available to officers as well as to men, but, speaking from my personal experience, I wonder whether the officer is as well briefed as the man. I wonder whether all the information does get through to him in the way that I am sure it should do.
Mr. Ellis Smith: Too true, it does.
Mr. Macleod: My experience at the end of the war—and I think that many hon. Members would confirm this—is that although infinite care was taken through organised classes, and so on, to see that all this information was given to the men and the N. C. O. s, I am not so confident that the information gets to all the officers as effectively as it should do.
For example, in planning for the future an officer should obviously think not only of where he will live but of what he will do there. It does not follow that Camberley or Cheltenham are the best springboards for an industrial career. I am, therefore, consulting my colleagues to see whether there is some way in which we can bring this information more 'closely and more effectively to the notice of the officers concerned.
Naturally, these officers tend to look for employment at a managerial or executive level—
Mr. Ellis Smith: Anything but do the work.
Mr. Macleod:I know that the hon. Gentleman did not mean that wholly seriously, but that is a most unfair remark.
Mr. Ellis Smith: It arises out of my experience.
Mr. Macleod: All I can say is that my own experience is very different. The arangements which have been made, following the closing of the three appointments offices, to provide an employment service for persons seeking employment at this level at about 40 of the larger employment exchanges throughout the country will be of considerable help to those men and will mean that more specialised knowledge is available within comparatively easy reach.
As the House knows, another method by which we try to help ex-officers is through the Ministry's business training scheme, which helps a number of officers with either practical or theoretical experience.
Dr. Barnett Stross: Will the right hon. Gentleman bear in mind that whether they be officers or other ranks, if they are sufficiently young and fit for the purpose they should have an opportunity of university or technical college training, as occurred at the end of the war?
Mr. Macleod: As the Minister of Defence said yesterday, the people with whom we are immediately concerned are not particularly young men, and I do not think that for this immediate problem the hon. Member's suggestion would help.
I should like to pay tribute, as I am sure would all those who have studied this matter, to the work of the Officers' Association and the National Association for the Employment of Regular Sailors. Soldiers and Airmen. They work in a specialised field but they do fine work, and employment exchanges give them every possible assistance.
One more problem which affects ex-Regulars of all ranks is the provision. of housing. Very full advice is provided by the Service authorities to help ex-Regulars solve their housing problems, including advice on how they may best secure or try to secure a council house and how they can set about trying to buy a house, if they wish.
Mr. Emrys Hughes: By cutting the housing subsidies?
Mr. Macleod: Over 90 per cent. of the local authorities, 1,330 out of 1,467, have said that they are prepared to relax residential qualifications for ex-Regulars who have found employment in, or near, the
1948
district, or who have family connections with it.
From that very brief review of the machinery that exists and has been built up by all Governments since the war I think it is clear that what is required is not the establishment of new machinery but the adaptation of the machinery that already exists. We are arranging to have those plans looked at by an inter-Departmental committee of officials. I would add that the Government are prepared to give careful consideration to any measures for expanding the volume of training or the placing machinery which seem necessary to give adequate assistance to the ex-Regulars from the forces.
It is an essential part of the Government's conception of the Regular forces that the man making a career for part of his life in the Regular forces should have confidence in his ability at the end of his service to obtain suitable and congenial work. That is of the greatest importance.
Mr. George Wigg: If the right hon. Gentleman is to set up an inter-Departmental committee to consider this matter of resettlement, would he be good enough to consider the co-option of serving warrant officers and N. C. O. s who, I am quite sure, would, in a commonsense way, make available to him some of the grievances from which the other ranks suffer, and which could be put right, without the expenditure of any public money, by a little good will and common sense?
Mr. Macleod: I should be very glad if the hon. Gentleman will allow me to discuss that with my Service colleagues. In any way in which we can make use of practical experience we will do so. What is needed is permanent co-operation between the Services, my Department and industry and it is the intention of the Government to see that that co-operation exists.
I referred at the beginning of this part of my speech to the Advisory Council set up by the Labour Government in 1950. On that are representatives of the Services, of the B. E. C. and the T. U. C., and it was extremely successful in securing special agreements with industry. This Advisory Council provides a convenient means of securing co-operation

1949
and I intend to have the Council convened in due course so that it can consider the new position and see whether a further approach to industry is required.
Notice was served on the Government yesterday by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Horncastle (Commander Maitland), my hon. Friend the Member for Berwick and East Lothian (Sir W. Anstruther-Gray), the hon. Member for Islington, North (Mr. Fienburgh) and others that they intend to watch carefully the actions of the Government in this field. Many newspapers, notably the Daily Mail,over the last few days have been taking an admirable interest in this matter. May I say, on behalf of the Government, that we very much welcome that interest which, I know, will be maintained in the House of Commons and that we will do our best to satisfy it?
I come now to the third of the three matters that I said I would put before the House, and that is our decisions in relation to National Service,. We had a debate on defence and manpower last July and it was then already clear that the needs of the forces for National Service men were less than the numbers that could have been called up. We were then, and we had been doing so over the previous year, calling up only three-quarters of an age group each year and thus raising the age of call-up. That was a policy which, in the absence of a firm decision to end the call-up on a given date, could not continue indefinitely.
The position now is different in two important respects. First, the ultimate size of the forces is substantially less than then envisaged and, secondly, we have set a date for ending the call-up altogether. I should now like to refer, as I was invited to do, to some of the remarks made yesterday by, in particular, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) and the hon. Member for Islington, North in relation to my speech in the manpower debate of July last year.
The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Belper addressed me with such ferocious cheerfulness about this that I thought he would end up by asking me to dinner. He invited me to compare some of the remarks I made then with some of the calculations we have made now and the hon. Member for Islington,
1950
North, in what I thought was the only over-rehearsed part of what, if I may say so, was otherwise an admirable speech, made some similar references. I do not think that we are, perhaps, quite as far apart as we think. I will take the point fairly briefly partly, because it is always tedious to the House of Commons to re-fight old HANSARD battles when only two or three hon. Members in the House know what we are talking about.
The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Belper advised me "to come clean" on this matter and said that the House was always very understanding and forgiving when one said that one was wrong. That is quite true. It is one of the attractive things about the House that the more often one says one is wrong, the wiser the House thinks one is, I have no particular objections, therefore, to that process, although I might offer, in about three minutes' time, a similar opportunity to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Belper, if he would like to take advantage of it.
The real difference between us, apart from something which arose out of a mishearing by the right hon. Gentleman of a figure which I gave in an intervention last night, comes from the simple fact that in these matters of recruitment we must always talk in the same currency terms. I learned this lesson very carefully from the hon. Gentleman the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg). I said a dozen times in that debate—so often that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey) asked me why I was using this particular term, which I explained to my satisfaction but not to his—that I was speaking throughout in terms of male other ranks. I said:
"If we talked in rough terms of 200,000 male other ranks for the Army, that will mean about a total of 450,000 for the whole of the Services."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 31st July, 1956; Vol. 557, c. 1198.]
I went on to argue that we could not recruit, by Regular recruitment alone, 200,000 other ranks for the Army or 450,000 other ranks for the Services. I said that then and I am sure that it is right now.
I then went on to say that I thought that the figures one might get of Regular other ranks was about 320,000. But, in fact, the figure in the White Paper,

1951
375,000, includes officers, and if we take away about 50,000 officers we find that the calculations are very similar to—indeed almost exactly the same as—those I made last July.
Secondly, so far as the Army is concerned, although a precise figure has not been given for its future size it is substantially less than the 175,000 which the right hon. Gentleman mentioned yesterday. Again, if one puts it in terms of male other ranks it would be a figure under 150.000 and, therefore, the gap is not 25,000, as the right hon. Gentleman suggested, but more than 50,000, which I am quite confident it is impossible to bridge by Regular recruitment. It will be hard enough as it is to recruit the number required for the Army, and there is a complication in regard to the outflow of the three-year engagement, into which I will not go now.
I think I have shown that, whatever the right hon. Gentleman may have said in his speech a year ago, what I said was in no way inaccurate. Indeed, looking back after the interval of a year, I am astonished at my own accuracy.
Mr. George Brown: What I gather from all that is that what I said, in column 1185 of the OFFICIAL REPORT of that debate, that we would probably get 130,000, to which we had to add 10 per cent. to allow for officers and also allow something else for men and women and boys, was right, and that, starting from a date around April, 1961, we should have 150,000. That was my figure. I was right in July, on the figures that the right hon. Gentleman now has, in April this year.
Mr. Macleod: I am sorry; the right hon. Gentleman really cannot ask for the sight screens to be moved after his middle stump has been knocked away. I do not know whether he made a good speech or not. Often he does, and perhaps he did. What I am saying is that the calculations I made a year ago are, in fact, very similar to the calculations on which we have based certain conclusions in the White Paper.
Mr. Marcus Lipton: Both are right.
Mr. Macleod: That is a very satisfying solution.
Before I explain our proposals, I should like to underline what was said by my
1952
right hon. Friend yesterday, that all action is proceeding on the basis that the call-up will end in 1960. That is the problem to which I will now address myself.
It is important that firm decisions should be announced so that young men and their parents can plan for the future and so that universities and colleges may know what to expect and the country and industry may see the pattern of the future as clearly as possible. It is only if our expectation that plans to build up Regular recruitment will provide us with the number of long-Service Regulars we need is falsified, that we shall have to consider the need for a limited form of compulsory service of the kind indicated in paragraph 48 of the White Paper. In those circumstances, in the classic words, a new situation will arise. But we regard that as a quite separate problem which could be dealt with only if and when it arose.
Under the existing National Service Acts, I have power to call up men born before the end of 1940. This power continues so long as they are within the age limits of liability. But I have no power under existing legislation to call up men born after 1940, and the Government have decided that it is not necessary to amend the present Acts to give me that power. Men born in 1941 or later will not, therefore, be brought into the call-up field. We are thus left with the men at present liable.
We estimate that we could, if necessary, call up between now and the end of 1960 570,000 men. There will be that number of fit men available. Of that total, 330,000 have not yet registered for National Service, and the remaining 240,000 are older people who are either in process of being called up or will become available following a period of deferment which has, in many cases, been given them so that they may increase their skill or knowledge. I hope that the House will bear the figure of 570,000 in mind in this argument.
Against that total of 570,000, we have to set the total demand of the forces for National Service men over the same period. The exact figure depends on the run-down of the forces and the rate of Regular recruitment, but it is unlikely, as far as we can foresee at the moment, that we shall need much more

1953
than half the potential pool. That leaves a surplus of at least a quarter of a million, and probably more.
When I spoke in the debate last July, I outlined to the House the various forms of selective service which might be of help. But this is an utterly different problem. The solutions, or most of them, put forward then would not be applicable to as wide a gap as this. For example, it would be impracticable and unfair to try to meet the situation by a wholesale extension of deferment on industrial grounds. Therefore, unless we can find a way of maintaining the long-standing principle of universal service while reducing the surplus to manageable proportions, we should have to rely on a ballot.
Mr. Alfred Robens: I thought for the moment that the right hon. Gentleman said a "battle".
Mr. Macleod: No, a ballot.
I shall not argue the merits or demerits of a ballot now; they are perfectly obvious. All I would say is that the Government would contemplate a ballot only if there were not a practical alternative. Now that a date for the end of call-up has been fixed, we believe that there is such an alternative, and, in consequence, we reject the ballot as a solution to the problem.
As things stand at the moment, men born before October, 1938, have already registered, and those of them who are due to perform National Service are either on deferment or in process of being called up. We intend to rely to a considerable extent on those men who have enjoyed the advantages of deferment to complete their training or studies, whose contemporaries—we should not forget—have been called up for military service. But if we were to rely on them alone, these rather older and more highly skilled people, quite apart from the fact that the numbers are not sufficient, there would be one obvious difficulty.
In the terminal years of National Service, if we were to follow that policy, all or nearly all the people called up would be skilled or trained men. Very many of them would have to be employed on routine tasks. The country would, I think, regard that as a wasteful process, and, moreover, the Services would not
1954
have a balanced intake. We intend, therefore, to supplement them by younger men, of whom about 30,000 become immediately available from each quarter's registration.
Men born in the last quarter of 1938 are due to register next month, that is to say in May, and we shall call as necessary on men born in 1939, who have, of course, not yet registered. I cannot tell the House and the country yet exactly how far into the 1939 age group it will be necessary to go. As far as men born in 1940 are concerned, we are planning on the assumption that, although they remain legally liable for service, they need not expect to be called up.
I should like to summarise the position in regard to these three years. I have no power, and I do not intend to ask for power, to call up those born in 1941 or later years. Secondly, although they are liable, I do not intend to call up the 1940 class. Thirdly, the 1939 class will be needed, though I cannot yet say if we will need them all—probably not.
Those decisions, given in exact terms to the House, show again, if I may say so, how trivial is that part of the Amendment which complains that our policy is not based upon firm decisions. Whatever criticism can be made, that certainly is not one.
Mr. Frederick Lee: The right hon. Gentleman will know that special arrangements were made for young men to anticipate the date of their call-up in order that they might be clear of military service in order, let us say, to synchronise with the start of a university term two years thereafter. It they were not clear of military service commitments by the time such other courses began, they might miss quite a long period of training. There will now be some doubt as to whether men should ask for anticipation of their call-up, and they may as a result miss the university terms. Could the Minister say something to remove these doubts?
Mr. Macleod: I can clear away part of the hon. Gentleman's doubts in the next part of my speech. All the arrangements for early call-up will, of course, remain.
What we have to try to do is to strike a balance and to maintain a due

1955
proportion between men coming off deferment after completion of training and other men posted to the Forces, and we have to decide what that proportion will be. It may be, and indeed it can be, varied as time goes on, but we shall register sufficient men to ensure that whatever proportions are decided on can be maintained.
This is how we propose to carry out the scheme. We shall separate the register from which men are posted to the Forces into two sections. The first section will comprise men who have had deferment and who become available for call-up after successfully completing their courses of training or studies. The second will consist in the main of younger men not eligible for deferment. This separation of the register into two sections will enable the predetermined proportion to be observed as we post men to the Forces in the terminal years.
Apart from this, the process of calling men up will not be affected, and I particularly want to emphasise that within each section of the register call-up will proceed as it does now. There will, therefore, be no new element of selection and, similarly, existing arrangements for deferment will continue. Indeed, as the House knows, I have been prepared in a number of cases recently to extend the arrangements in this connection—for example, those in connection with hardship, as recent regulations which I laid before the House will show. Only yesterday, in response to the hon. Member for Salford, East (Mr. Allaun), I made some important and valuable relaxations to meet the problem of some people doing part-time and other studies who might not have been able to complete their studies. I have shown, and I state again, my willingness to move in this matter, provided the grounds are sufficiently strong.
The arrangements which I have described, involving the division of the register, will come into operation on 1st April, 1958. During the current financial year there is no particular problem, because a reasonably balanced intake can be achieved by relying, first of all, on the 60,000 men or so who will come off deferment this year, secondly on those in process of being called up, and thirdly on those who will register next month, in May. It is unlikely that men born in the
1956
first quarter of 1939—that is, the next group we shall call up—will be asked to register until early next year.
I would make one last point on a rather specialised matter. The recruitment of medical and dental officers from the National Service field will need separate consideration, and we shall organise that, as we do now, on the advice of the professional medical and dental committees which handle this matter.
Mr. George Isaacs: I wonder whether in all this process of selection and sorting out, in a scheme which I think will be quite operative, any steps will be taken to change the relation of the Services to the conscientious objector? Is it still intended to go through the process of making him go to the courts? The attitude towards the conscientious objectors has always been sympathetic, but will a little more sympathetic attention be given to the man who is a genuine conscientious objector? Will he be freed without having to go to the courts and through all the other present procedure?
Mr. Macleod: I am not today announcing any changes in that respect. In any case, much of that would require legislation. I am prepared to look at any cases at which hon. Members want me to look for general relaxations in this matter.
Mr. Wigg: As I understand it, the right hon. Member does not intend to call up before 1st April the men who are due to be called up in the first quarter of next year. That means that the principle contained in his White Paper, Command 9608, National Service, by which the age of call-up would have reached nineteen in April, 1958, will be extended.
Mr. Macleod: Certainly. I am coming exactly to that point. I shall not duck it.
It is true that at the end of 1960 there will be men within the field of call-up who will not be called up, but the House must realise that that is part of any scheme which plans to end National Service on a certain day. Indeed, it is part of a ballot. It is inescapable. But I hope it will be possible for me, long before the end of 1960, to make an announcement that it is not necessary to call up any further men beyond those who, at that moment, are in the process of being called up.

1957
Replying to the hon. Member for Dudley, I do not claim that this scheme has no disadvantages. We cannot halve a number, such as 570,000, without having disadvantages. I will state quite frankly to the House the two main difficulties. The first is that men are likely to have to wait rather longer than they might have expected to wait before being called up. The second is that the age of call-up will continue to rise above its present level of 18 years and 9 months. Of course, that is true and we shall do our best to help where we can by continuing the existing arrangements whereby men who ask to be called up without delay are given special precedence.
I have considered as far as I can all the possibilities, in any event all those that I can think of, and I put this scheme to the country and the House as the fairest and the most practicable means of meeting the call-up problem between now and the end of 1960. The right hon. Member for Belper was good enough to say yesterday that with the very efficient Ministry of Labour—which, of course, is true—he thought it likely that the call-up scheme would be sound and workmanlike. I believe that it is, but we should very much welcome comments on it from the House and from the country. It is of course, difficult to pick up all the details in a speech, and no doubt hon. Members would like to study the scheme.
I said at the beginning that what I had to say was a little bit apart from the main stream of the debate, but it also pinpoints to some extent the dilemma which exists for every hon. Member. It is not a particularly easy dilemma. I am bound to say, if I can do so with all friendliness—which is a little different from modesty—to the right hon. Member for Belper and other right hon. and hon. Members opposite that we cannot escape this dilemma by going round waving a banner on which is emblazoned, "See what a responsible party we are; we all think differently". It is not possible to escape it in that way, because they cannot be a Government and cannot claim to be an alternative Government on a basis like that. It is not leadership to hawk a piece of paper round the House, to accept Amendments from everyone one meets, and then to pretend that the resulting document is an effective act of policy.
Mr. Ellis Smith: The right hon. Gentleman has spoiled a good speech.
Mr. Macleod: It is not possible to escape the dilemma in that way. Without comment, I put the dilemma in this way: if we refuse to rely on the deterrent, we cannot at the same time urge the abolition of National Service. Secondly, we cannot urge the abolition of National Service unless we are prepared either to rely for our protection for all time and in all circumstances upon a foreign but friendly country or are prepared to take the grim decision to make the bomb, and implicit in that decision, surely, is the decision to test it, too.
That is, of course, an awful decision, but, strangely enough, I do not believe that it is a particularly difficult decision. Many of the gravest decisions are, in fact, the clearest cut and the easiest to take. I think that is the reason that there is no dilemma on this side of the House, and that is why, when the Opposition have no answer to this eternal and haunting dilemma, we on this side of the House believe that we can find our answer in the courageous realism of the White Paper.
Mr. Robots: Apparently, it is not necessary for any regulations to be introduced to deal with this matter. It will be dealt with under existing powers. In view of that fact, does the right hon. Gentleman propose to issue a White Paper on this scheme in order that the House may have the opportunity of examining it and possibly debating it? Will he at the same time give some indication of the method by which the physical transfer of displaced workers, to which he referred in the first part of his speech, can be carried out in relation to their employment elsewhere in the country? This question of the call-up and the changes involved is of such importance that it calls for a White Paper to develop some of the points which the right hon. Gentleman mentioned, particularly in relation to the call-up of the 1939 class. The House will wish to give consideration to it and, I hope, to help him in producing the best possible scheme and one which is fair and equitable all round.
Mr. Macleod: I am very grateful to the right hon. Gentleman. I will consider with my right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence what help we will

1959
give the House, and if the House would be helped by a White Paper on this matter, we will do everything we can.
5.10 p.m.
Mr. E. Shinwell: I thought the concluding references of the right hon. Gentleman's speech, in which he referred to a party occasionally yielding to pressure groups, applied materially to the party of which he is an honoured member, because recently we have had evidence of the effect of pressure groups on the policy of Her Majesty's Government.
Nevertheless, the right hon. Gentleman's speech contained many interesting, although some disquieting, features. It may be that these disquieting features are temporary in character, yet it did seem to me that they were the inevitable result of the decision to curtail our military expenditure. We cannot have it both ways. If we insist, as we do, that the economy cannot sustain the heavy burden of military expenditure or the absorption of manpower for military purposes, then clearly we must face the inevitable consequence, namely, that even though temporary, there is bound to be some redundancy and dislocation in industry. As I see it, that is inevitable.
This is no new problem. We were faced with it during the period of the minority Labour Government between 1929 and 1931. I was myself then Financial Secretary to the War Office and was engaged in the process of curtailing military expenditure. We had to consider how far it was possible to switch over from military production to civil production, and I recall how, on behalf of the then Government, I approached the Director of Services of Woolwich Arsenal to ascertain whether it was possible in that establishment to engage in civilian production. It all seems very simple. "If you produce a tank," they say, "you can produce any ordinary vehicle. If you produce a military machine, you can produce one for civilian purposes."
It is not as simple as all that. It requires the gearing-up of factories, the provision of new tools and all the rest of it. This is a slow process, and in that process we have to accept the consequences of the decisions we take.
It seemed to me as I listened to the right hon. Gentleman's speech that we
1960
require considerable study of these proposals before we can actually make up our minds as to their validity and efficacy. I noted with gratification the Minister's decision, in response to a question by my right hon. Friend the Member for Blyth (Mr. Robens), to consider the production of a White Paper setting forth the details and amplifying the speech and the proposals which he made this afternoon. It is much too early to decide upon the details of his proposals, and it occurs to me that many debates will be required and many more explanations will be necessary before we can reach a final conclusion.
As the right hon. Gentleman rightly said, the subject was very important indeed. All these aspects, in the sphere of possible redundancy, in the reoccupation of all ranks in the Services into civilian life, in the provision of compensation and so on—all these are very important subjects indeed; but I should like to turn to the subject of defence, and which I think should be debated when we are confronted with a Defence White Paper.
It seemed to me, and I speak only for myself, that the Minister of Defence gave us yesterday an exposition of the White Paper which I thought bore all the evidence of clarity. I took no exception to the speech or the White Paper on that account. Naturally, he took the opportunity to taunt the Opposition because of the divergence of opinion within the Labour Party. That is familiar technique. To quote one's political opponents is a practice of which most of us have been guilty at some time or other, and indeed we will exercise our right to do it in future, as we have done in the past. It seemed to me, however, that the right hon. Gentleman over-reached himself. It seemed to me that he was like a misguided missile. His targets were not the best of targets, and his aim was not particularly accurate. However, we expect that sort of technique, but, if I may say so, it has very little to do with the subject of defence, and that is the subject under review, to which I now turn.
I want to make it abundantly clear that, in my view at any rate, and I hope in the view of hon. Members everywhere, the difference between the official view of the Opposition—please take note of what I say—and the official view of Her

1961
Majesty's Government can be narrowed down to a very simple issue indeed. Let me explain. The official view of the Labour Party has been declared repeatedly at our annual conferences, and the annual conference of the Labour Party is the supreme authority. We accept its dictates, although sometimes we kick against the pricks. Nevertheless, there it is, for what it may be worth.
The avowed and declared objective of the Labour Party is clear—the Labour Party has officially accepted the need for a measure of defence; let there be no mistake about that. Of course, there are differences of view about the principle of defence, whether there should be any defence at all, and different aspects of defence, such as the cost, the nature of defence and the like.
Nevertheless, the principle of preparing a defence organisation, in view of an emergency arising at some time or other, is accepted. We must provide what people believe is a measure of security in the event of a conflict, so the Labour Party has accepted the principle of defence; but, equally, the Labour Party has accepted—and it is on the record; indeed, the Minister of Defence made reference to it in his speech yesterday—whether we like the merits of the decision or not, the need for the production of the hydrogen bomb. I do not comment on it at the moment, but merely state the fact.
The same applies to the testing of the bomb. The Labour Party Conference has not complained about the need for testing the bomb, once we have agreed about its manufacture. There are differences of opinion as to whether the bomb should be tested once it has been produced, but, nevertheless, the Labour Party has not rejected the idea that, once the bomb has been produced, we should try it out to see whether it is of any value or not.
Mr. Victor Yates: Was there not a second resolution of the party which objected to a continuance of the tests?
Mr. Shinwell: My hon. Friend is quite right in one particular, by which I mean that the Labour Party sought in its resolutions universal agreement with a view to the abolition of tests; but that is quite another matter. There is no quarrel
1962
about this. That is the position of the party.
The only difference is that the Parliamentary Labour Party has asked the Government whether they would agree to postpone the Christmas Island test for a few months—for a limited period—to ascertain whether the U. S. S. R. and the U.S.A. will make a favourable response and approach to universal agreement.
Mr. Ellis Smith: On that we are completely united.
Mr. Shinwell: There is no difference there. I shall come to the merits of the matter in a moment. The right hon. Gentleman taunted us about our differences, but let me tell him something. He is unaware of the history of the Labour Party. For me it is not a matter of reading the history of the party; I have lived it right from the beginning of the century.
I recall the internecine strife within the Labour Party, the quarrels between Keir Hardie, the advocate of peace, and Robert Blatchford, the militarist editor of the Clarion.I recall the differences between the pacifist Independent Labour Party and the Social Democratic Federation, advocating the Citizen Army. I recall during the First World War when the Labour Party officially was in favour of prosecuting the war and the Independent Labour Party, led by MacDonald, advocated peace by negotiation.
It is as well that it should be known —it is important, and it has a bearing on this subject of defence, especially because of the taunts in which the right hon. Gentleman indulged against the Opposition. In the inter-war years there were acute differences of opinion on the subject of defence. In my judgment, there always will be. Why not? There are strong emotions in the Labour Party, and no matter how logical we are there is no use quarrelling with an emotion. It is of no value.
The Minister of Defence (Mr. Duncan Sandys): The right hon. Gentleman has several times referred to the fact that I taunted the Opposition about their dissensions yesterday. What I am surprised about is that the things I said yesterday, which were primarily concerned to show that the official policy of the Labour

1963
Party on the hydrogen bomb was the same as the policy of Her Majesty'3 Government, should be regarded as taunts. This is precisely what the right hon. Gentleman has been repeating in his speech today, referring to the same resolution which I quoted yesterday.
Mr. Shinwell: It is one thing to state a fact objectively, and it is another to state it maliciously. As the right hon. Gentleman is fully aware, I am completely without malice. I would never dream of exposing differences in the Tory Party or of saying a word about the disappearance of the Marquess of Salisbury. I never say one word about the differences on Suez or about anything that concerns the policy of the Government. I should not dream of such a thing. But the right hon. Gentleman has enough on his plate without indulging in that kind of political by-play, which does not help us when we are considering the subject of defence which, for the moment, is our primary consideration.
I return to the matter which I said divided us—the question whether the Government would be justified in asking for a postponement of the test. I accept it as a gesture. I do not quarrel with it. If I had any difference of opinion with members of my own party, it was not because I thought that this was an improper gesture. It may be a feeble approach, but nevertheless it is a right approach in the circumstances. Any approach is valuable if we can escape from the danger to which we are exposed in the international situation, because of the ideological quarrels, and the dread possibilities inherent in nuclear warfare.
Therefore, I accept it. If I had any difference at all, it is because I prefer the virtue of consistency. Once having made up one's mind, one should stand by one' decision. That is effective leadership. To come to a decision one day and to forget about it the next is not very good leadership; but I welcome the gesture.
This brings me to the most redeeming feature of the White Paper, and that is its emphasis on the need for promoting disarmament. It is not necessary to convince hon. Members in any part of the House about the dangers that lie before us in radio-activation, in strontium 90, about which I have heard so much but about which I know nothing. We are
1964
familiar with all this. I dare to challenge hon. Members opposite: are not they, equally with those of us on the Opposition benches, profoundly anxious to seek the opportunity to promote universal disarmament in order to guard us against these dangers? Of course, they are.
I do not believe that there is one hon. Member of this House who wishes to proceed with the manufacture of the H-bomb or the testing of that bomb, or with the manufacture of further nuclear weapons, if it can possibly be avoided. It would be insane to take a contrary line. This must be obvious. Is it really worth arguing? It should be accepted by everybody. Nevertheless, I emphasise that there is a great deal in what the Opposition asked for when it pleaded with the Government to suspend the Christmas Island tests for a limited period so that we might discover what is in the mind of the United States authorities and the Government of the Soviet Union. That is all that has been asked.
I come to the question of the deterrent. This is another salient feature of the White Paper. There is a dilemma facing every one of us, and I confess that it is not easy to resolve it. No matter how much thought one gives to it, it is not easy to reach a satisfactory conclusion. If one gives a great deal of thought to the subject of defence, one does not reach an immediate conclusion. On the other hand, those people—of course, I do not mean right hon. or hon. Members—who reach speedy conclusions do not seem to have given the subject much thought.
The dilemma amounts to this. The question is whether we are to rely almost exclusively on the deterrent of the nuclear weapon or whether we should discard this so-called deterrent and rely on conventional forces. Another aspect is whether we can afford both so-called deterrents.
I venture to pose this question to the House. It seems that there is some advantage in retaining conventional forces. I want to see them streamlined, of course, but that is nothing new. There is nothing original in that demand. I have ventured to express it in almost every speech I have made on defence since I relinquished the position of Minister of Defence. When I was Minister of Defence and the military were engaged in an exercise, I ventured the opinion that the

1965
divisions were unwieldy in size. I never pretended that I had any more knowledge than other hon. Members have, although some may think that they have more; but we cannot trouble about that. Right throughout the years since 1950 I have argued in favour of streamlining the Forces. The right hon. Gentleman was right to reduce the forces in N. A. T. O., even in spite, as is alleged, of the opposition he encountered from some of our allies. They had made a much less worthwhile contribution than we had throughout the years. We bore a heavy burden in manpower and expenditure.
The question is how the right hon. Gentleman is going to streamline the Forces. We have had very little information. Indeed, the only information we have had was given at the end of the Army debate recently when the Financial Secretary to the War Office, in a very casual fashion, told us about the Government's intentions. We have been given very little information about the formation of divisions, whether they are to be large or small, whether they are to be combat groups or brigade groups, and of what size. We are entitled to know. In other words, what is to be our contribution to N. A. T. O.?
I return to the point which I made. I prefer to rely as long as is possible and practicable on conventional forces, and I give the reason for saying that. When I listen to hon. Members talking about future strategy, I wonder whether they realise that they are completely in the realm of conjecture. Who can tell what the nature of a future war will be? What we know is that we do not want another war. But what sort of war is a future war going to be? Would it be a war in which the deterrent is bound to be used? I am not certain about that.
I can imagine a situation—it is purely speculation on my part, but my speculation is as good as anyone else's—in which some incident would give rise to a minor clash between rival forces in which we were involved. I am going to say something now to hon. Members which may startle them. They may accuse me of cowardice when I say it, but I say it nevertheless.
Let me preface what I am going to say by saying that when one is young one is apprehensive and full of fear, but that as
1966
one reaches an advanced age, such as I have done, fear disappears entirely—it matters no longer. I can imagine a situation where, in a conventional war, it might be more endurable to suffer defeat, even humiliation, even if it means survival on a limited scale, than to use the nuclear weapon and be completely destroyed. After all said and done, we do not want to commit suicide. If anybody does, he has my consent, but I do not particularly desire it for myself.
It seems to me that we must be extremely careful not to place undue reliance on the deterrent if that is what is meant by it. Therefore, I beg the right hon. Gentleman to proceed with his conventional forces and his conventional weapons. I am not speaking of the tactical atomic weapons. Let him proceed with the conventional method, but let him streamline the Forces and give them the ability and the striking power to be effective if they are ever needed. That is the approach. Let us keep in the background the dread possibility that we may some day have to use this so-called deterrent actively in retaliation. Retaliation, in my judgment, is complete nonsense.
The right hon. Gentleman referred to the matter yesterday when he spoke so feelingly and with such knowledge and understanding of the Russian position. I have no particular faith in Russian philosophy. I dislike it intensely. I prefer our own philosophy. It has its defects, but I prefer it nevertheless. All the same, it is my opinion—and I am sure it is the right hon. Gentleman's opinion—that the Russians do not want war. They also have the deterrent, but they do not want war in spite of ideological differences, and I cannot imagine that intelligent people in the United States hold a different opinion. I do not think anyone wants war in those circumstances. What is it that causes all this tension? It is only fear but having weapons at our disposal which we call deterrents and say that we are never going to use, but which some mischance, some incident outside our control, forces us to engage in what is called retaliation may mean the eventual destruction of humanity.
I am not speaking in an emotional sense at all; I am speaking quite objectively, and, I believe, logically. If that is

1967
the position, then we have to consider how we can best build up our defence because, as I say, some defence is essential. I believe it is essential, not because I think that it should be used some day, but because I have the feeling that if we said to the people of this country that we were going to abandon our defences entirely they would not accept it.
I believe that if I went to my constituents—and I think that I understand them as well as any other hon. Member —and said that we were going to abandon all defence preparations, they would not be inclined to accept it. They have the feeling that there must be some safeguard. It is a kind of insurance policy. A fire may never break out and the house may never be burgled, but it is worth while paying the premium. However, we must see that the premium is not too costly. That is my line of approach.
I now come to two final considerations. The first is N. A. T. O. I referred to it in passing, but I now want to say something more about it. I have been very suspicious of the position of N. A. T. O. for several years, and I have expressed my views very strongly both here and overseas. The right hon. Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill) once talked about 90 divisions for N. A. T. O., and he used them as a stick with which to beat us. I remember the Council of N. A. T. O. when it talked about 50 active divisions and 50 reserve divisions. I was present at a lecture given by General Norstad when he talked at large about the forces at the disposal of N.A.T.O.
Those of us with some experience of Service Departments and of N. A. T. O. find it quite unacceptable. We want to know far more about what is going on in N. A. T. O. Is it a strong organisation? Could it resist any kind of aggression, even conventional aggression? If it cannot, we ought to be told. Are we not placing ourselves in the position, without knowledge of the strength of N. A. T. O. —if it possesses any strength at all—of being compelled, whether we like it or not, to rely on the deterrent, the nuclear weapon?
That is a hopeless position for us to occupy. That is the first point. I could amplify it, but I leave it where it is, and I beg the right hon. Gentleman to give more attention to N. A. T. O., to see that
1968
it is a worth-while organisation, that it is effective, that it is not wasting its substance, and that the other countries are making an effective contribution just as we are.
Now I come to my final point; it is about our relations with the United States of America. I understand that we are allies of the United States, that we are partners. I venture the opinion that a partnership means effective co-operation.
Mr. C. R. Hobson: Not the double-cross in the Middle East.
Mr. Shinwell: I prefer to leave that bone alone; it is inclined to be a bit troublesome. I am speaking of our relationship in the military sphere. I cannot understand for the life of me why the United States authorities boggle at our demand that we should have the "know-how" in relation to the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Why should they conceal information from a partner, more particularly as now, whether we like it or not—and it is an inescapable fact that we should emphasise and proclaim from the housetops—this country is a launching site for United States guided and other missiles? That is a very great risk we have undertaken and is a great danger to which we are exposed.
I shall not quarrel with the concept underlying it, but I ask that for what we do, if we are to be a launching site or an aircraft carrier, the United States should give us something effective in return and not conceal from us knowledge which will be of great value for us not only in the military but in the civil sphere.
Mr. Hobson: Oil for pound notes.
Mr. Shinwell: We must press on with the demand for a greater degree of knowledge provided for us by the United States authorities.
The next point I shall mention will not divide us. It is something on which we can be completely united; it can be even a bi-partisan policy. Let us seek with all desperation, might and influence to promote disarmament. I know that something is being done in that direction. I listened with great pleasure to statements about the approach made by Mr. Stassen, a modest, minor approach, but nevertheless one in the right direction. I listened to what the Foreign Secretary

1969
said today in reply to questions on the subject. Perhaps the Minister of Defence could use his influence with the Government. I know that if he makes up his mind about anything he will press it with all his power. I beg them to be more resilient in the sphere of disarmament discussion.
I believe that it is sometimes possible to progress by compromise, and here is a subject replete with the possibility of compromise and one where it should not be rejected. We should make every possible endeavour, even if occasionally we have to give something away, to secure disarmament. I know that risks are involved. One inevitable consequence of disarmament is the risk of unemployment, but, with great respect to my hon. Friends, I would prefer unemployment rather than take the risk of utter destruction.
The White Paper on Defence is reasonable enough. It makes the proper approach within the Government's limited capabilities. The Minister of Defence means well. Naturally, he has a great deal to learn, particularly about the need, not for integration—I will not use that misunderstood term—but for more effective co-operation between the Service Departments. We wish the right hon. Gentleman well. Meantime, he would do us a favour which we would esteem very greatly if he would try to persuade his colleagues in the Government to agree this far with us and postpone the Christmas Island tests in the hope of obtaining a favourable response, if possible, from the country with which we are now engaged in what is called ideological warfare.
5.42 p.m.
Sir Henry d'Avigdor-Goldsmid: I am a newcomer to these debates and I think that I should congratulate the House, first, on the great galaxy of talent assembled here to discuss this subject. I should also like to pay particular tribute to the extraordinarily fine speech that we have had from the right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell). The particular interest of the Defence White Paper to me and one in which, to my mind and, I think, to the minds of all hon. Members, will differentiate it from its predecessors, is the categorical undertaking that it gives in paragraph 47 that no further call-up
1970
under the National Service Act is contemplated after 1960.
My right hon. Friend the Minister of Labour and National Service has detailed the way in which this undertaking would come into operation, but there is an enormous difference between the general effort made year after year to economise in manpower and to reduce the call that we make on our resources and this particular, firm undertaking which the Minister of Defence has obtained in collaboration with the Chiefs-of-Staff and Service Ministers to end the call-up. That, surely, is the most notable contribution that this year has brought.
There is one element which appeals to me. It will not be beyond the recollection of hon. Members that by the time this effective date is reached we shall have fought a General Election. I can think of no more disheartening thing to put in front of the public at a General Election than failure to fulfil this undertaking. Equally, this undertaking cannot be considered as in any way an attempt now to obtain support, because undoubtedly the public will have forgotten when it was given and, by 1960, it will be taken for granted if it is successfully fulfilled. Therefore, I should like to pay tribute to the courage and determination which inform this decision.
I have not been very greatly impressed by the attacks on the waste that has gone on in the Armed Forces since the war. The Services have had to take on limited operations in a very large number of fields. They have been engaged in Korea, in Kenya and in Malaya and all these operations have been completely successful. The fact that, at the same time, they had to prepare themselves for much worse ordeals and much greater tests has obviously meant the sort of waste to which reference is now made.
If I may use a simile from another field, I believe that the Government are in the position of having a racehorse in their stable which they trained to run in the Derby during the summer and in the Grand National over obstacles in the winter, and eventually, when the poor beast comes to its end, there are complaints from the public that it does not make very good eating. I submit that that is a reasonable comparison with the criticism that is now directed against our Service Departments.

1971
Our real problem is how to make the best and most economical use of our reduced manpower. Many suggestions have been made about integration, though there has been no strong lead on the subject. I know how unpopular a subject this is with the Service Departments. In this connection, an interesting letter was published in The Times yesterday from Sir Frederick Bovenschen, former Permanent Secretary to the War Office.
The Army accounting system has come in for some hard criticism recently. Sir Frederick pointed out that
"In 1923, a committee under Sir Herbert Lawrence recommended that the new system should be continued and should be accompanied by a complete change of army administration whereby administrative responsibility and accounting were decentralised to individual establishments and regimental units."
This is the sort of thing that many people have been demanding for years.
Sir Frederick added:
"After further committees had examined the detailed application of the Lawrence Committee, the Army Council decided to revert to the traditional accounting system, retaining cost accounts only for certain operative establishments, e.g., workshops. They could not accept the far-reaching changes in Army administration involved in the Lawrence Committee report; they found the cost of the new system (£300,000 a year) excessive and the economies claimed for it not proved; and there was grave doubt whether the system could work in war. Accordingly, after reference to the Treasury and discussion at the Public Accounts Committee, the experiment was abandoned in 1926–27."
Frankly, I think that it is the fate of most experiments to try to bring some new thinking into our Service Departments. Such experiments may perhaps increase expenditure temporarily by relatively small figures, and immediately zealous people in the Treasury drop on it and say that it is not to be tolerated.
I have a few suggestions to produce on the question of integration. The first thing we might look at is the tail of the fighting forces. After all, we have men who have to fight the enemy and, also, as we know to our cost, we have a much larger number of people who have to produce various services for the fighting men. I want to examine some of the services which are provided.
First, there are the medical services. It will not surprise the House to learn that at the moment there are in the United Kingdom 17 Army hospitals, four Royal Air Force hospitals and three
1972
Royal Navy hospitals. I cannot believe that there is any over-riding reason why the Services should be segregated in their hospital treatment. Indeed, I will go further than that—I cannot see why there should be entirely different arrangements for the collection and transport of casualties to the place of treatment. Even in Germany there are seven Army hospitals and two R. A. F. hospitals. Why must we have separate R. A. F. hospitals in Germany?
The next thing I want to mention is transportation. On land, the three Services, naturally, require transport vehicles. It may surprise the House to know that all their transport vehicles are different, all three Services having their own types. They train their own drivers, they carry out their own repairs and they have separate workshops. I am certain that if my right hon. Friend addresses himself to this point a fuss will be raised somewhere, and figures will be produced to suggest that there will be no immediate savings if we try to co-ordinate these services, but I suggest that this might be tried.
The next thing is accommodation. Why could not there be some inter-Service organisation to standardise the requirements of the Navy, Army and Air Force on land? Next, stores. The recent Report of the Estimates Committee on the Army accounts produced some remarkable figures about the amount of cubic feet of air that is stored in Army depôts. I have no information yet as to the amount of cubic feet of air likewise stored by naval and Air Force depôts here. I have no doubt that this will be obtainable, and I shall do my best to obtain it. I think we shall get some remarkable figures of the air storage space occupied by our separate Service arrangements in this country.
Now, air trooping. At present, we work on the system that much of the Army's air trooping is carried out by civilian air transport companies, and when an emergency arises these aircraft are sometimes requisitioned. If we are to build up R. A. F. Transport Command in the way the White Paper indicates, one use for it might be to take on the air trooping and so be relieved of having to pay civilian aircraft to do the work which our R. A. F. Transport Command would be particularly suited for, and especially well equipped to do.

1973
I see the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) in his place, and now I come to education. I wonder whether, in the future, when we have an entirely volunteer Army, we shall have the same need of the Army Educational Corps that we have had in the past? I would be unwilling to decry its work in any way, but I wonder whether, if we had a volunteer Army, an Army of picked people, its work could not equally well be done by civilian teachers.
Mr. Wigg: If the hon. Gentleman wants an answer to that question, I suggest that he should continue his military researches. He will then find that every Army reformer, starting with Sir John Moore, has found that he has had to educate the Army to put it right. That is as true today as it was then.
Sir H. d'Avigdor-Goldsmid: I am glad to have that help from the hon. Gentleman. I understand, on the authority of the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence, that the Army Educational Corps has the 1945 General Election in its battle honours. With great respect to the hon. Gentleman, I would say to him that we are trying to build up a new model Army, perhaps more like the model army of Cromwell, and I do not think that the Army Educational Corps featured amongst Cromwell's Ironsides.
Mr. Emrys Hughes: May I ask the hon. Gentleman whether, having abolished the Army Educational Corps, he would abolish the chaplains as well?
Sir H. d'Avigdor-Goldsmid: I have no suggestion to make for abolishing the chaplains, although I think that the Minister of Defence made a mention in his speech, or some other hon. Member did, about amalgamating the chaplain's services of the three Services. [Laughter.] I see nothing to suggest that this is a particularly humorous point.
Mr. Emrys Hughes: Sorry.
Sir H. d'Avigdor-Goldsmid: That is all right.
Still thinking in terms of the new model Army that we are trying to create, I want to suggest how we can do it. We have to recruit. How can we attract the people whom we want to recruit? The first point is
1974
pay. I have no doubt that this will have the attention of other speakers. I want to make the particular point that if we amalgamate some of our stores and workshop arrangements, particularly on the technical side, we shall be able to offer opportunities for technical employment to people of high qualifications. One of the great troubles about the Service world in recent years has been that the people with the highest technical qualifications are often called to take on work of a minor and rather menial nature. I am hopeful that if we think on the lines that I have suggested we shall have technical store men to whom we can afford to give rates of pay comparable with those obtainable in industry.
Next, I suggest that we might have a contributory pension scheme in the Services. In this period, when pensions and insurance are in the thoughts of everyone, I see no reason why only those in the Services should be prevented from indulging in them.
Further, adequate attention should be paid to the needs of the man leaving the Services. One important point is: why should there not be a system of loans for the retiring Service man, exactly as has been made possible in the United States and other countries?
Mr. Emrys Hughes: At what interest?
Sir H. d'Avigdor-Goldsmid: It is clear to anybody who looks at this question seriously that the status of the Service man must be lifted. We will have to say of a man not "He is good enough for the Army", but "Is he good enough for the Army?" Unless we achieve something on those lines, we shall not be able to meet our commitments to our allies with our reduced numbers.
Finally, although we have had much talk about the nuclear deterrent and the other appalling disasters which scientific war has waiting for us, I am slightly cheered by the thought that in the last war we never had to undergo the rigours of poison gas. I am cheered by that, because we were told by officers at all levels that there was no likelihood of the Germans not using gas if they were on the point of defeat. They were defeated and did not use gas. Therefore, the assumption that all wars are to be nuclear wars is not borne out by past experience.
Mr. Emrys Hughes: We used the atom bomb.
Sir H. d'Avigdor-Goldsmid: There is an old Latin quotation to the effect that when the gods fall out then, whatever they fall out about, it is the Greeks who get the blame and have to suffer.
I will put that into English and make it intelligible, and say that when it comes to war it is the P. B. I. who have to carry the burden. Whether they are Russians, carrying 18-pounder shells to the front, or the English soldier like the Bruce Bairnsfather character, it is upon them that we have to rely. The Duke of Wellington, on the eve of Waterloo, walking in the gardens of Brussels, was asked by Mr. Creevey what the result would be and the Duke of Wellington, pointing to an English soldier with his arms round a couple of Belgian girls, said, "It all depends on that article."
There is no question about it; it still depends on that "article". That is why I welcome the White Paper, why I welcome so emphatically its promise of relieving us from National Service so that we may once more have the volunteer Services under which this country has prospered in the past and which is the only way in which it will succeed in the future.
6.12 p.m.
Mr. R. H. S. Crossman: If I have understood the point which the hon. Member for Walsall, South (Sir H. d'Avigdor-Goldsmid) has just made, it was that he was relieved at the thought that because gas was not used in the last war, nuclear weapons would not be used in the next.
I do not think that that will cheer the Minister of Defence a great deal, for I remind the hon. Member that before the last war we did not decide to spend all our money on gas and cut down on every other form of weapon, on the ground that we would be able to rely on gas as a deterrent. If we had done in terms of gas what the White Paper has now done in terms of nuclear weapons, we should have been in a desperate situation in 1939.
I want to put to the House the reasons why I have come to the conclusion—and I do not pretend that anybody can possibly know for sure—that, on balance, the
1976
right defence policy for this country is to renounce not only the great deterrent, but all nuclear weapons. I am saying this not as a pacifist—I am not a pacifist, as my hon. Friends know—but on the basis of a calculation of risks. As one of the people who, two years ago, supported the production of the hydrogen bomb, I believe that the lesson of the last two years is that if we want to secure peace we shall have more chances of doing so by renouncing nuclear weapons than we shall by having them.
This is my one issue tonight. I add one thing. I believe that it would be essential to seek to do this in collaboration with France and Germany. With all the nations of Western Europe behind us, we should opt out altogether of the nuclear arms race. If anybody objects that what we have been doing over the last two years is preparing a nuclear weapon, I should reply as follows. The world is observing for the first time that the slogan, "If you want peace, prepare for war" has been abandoned by a British Government. For preparation for war must, in the age of the "Great Deterrent," mean preparation for fighting a local war.
So the great precept of the White Paper is that we should not prepare for war, but prevent it by making deterrents. We have decided not to prepare for the kind of wars which we are likely to fight, but to prepare for wars which we cannot possibly fight, by making the "Great Deterrent". So the deterrent should be regarded not as a weapon, but as a political instrument. It is there to try to persuade somebody else to behave in a certain way, provided that we do not use it. My contention is that we might persuade them more effectively to do what we want by not having the deterrent than by having the deterrent.
There are three arguments for having the deterrent and I want to summarise them as fairly as I can. The first is the one which persuaded me two years ago. It is that we are living in a nuclear age and that it would be as futile in a nuclear age not to adopt nuclear weapons as it was not to adopt gunpowder in the gunpowder age. The argument was, "In this nuclear age you must equip this country with the best weapons of that age." That is a very serious argument which I have to meet.

1977
Yet when I heard the Minister of Defence yesterday, trying to tell us exactly how we would use nuclear tactical weapons. I found his arguments for adopting these weapons utterly disastrous. If what he said is read in Germany, most Germans will want to make peace with the Russians tomorrow and opt out of N. A. T. O. We on this side are not the only people who are having difficulty about this. The Government themselves —if I may say so to the Prime Minister —do not seem to have made up their minds on the proper use not of the deterrent, because by definition that is not used. but of tactical nuclear weapons in semi-conventional war.
The second argument is economic and it has been used several times already in this debate. It is that unless we are prepared to nuclearise our forces we shall have to continue with conscription and a huge defence budget. It is a very striking fact that the Tory Government should defend a Defence White Paper mainly on the ground of economy. I want to deal with economy later and now I only register that the second argument in favour of nuclear weapons is that they are cheap. We can get out of spending so much on defence by adopting nuclear weapons and getting rid of conscription and winding up overseas bases we can have defence on the cheap if we concentrate on weapons which we cannot possibly use. [Interruption.] I know that we could use them, but we have to consider what happens to us if we do.
The third argument is political. It is that we need these weapons not to defend ourselves against the Russians, but to achieve independence of America. This argument was used by Earl Attlee very persuasively and many hon. Members on our side of the House believed him when he said that we could get rid of American bases in Norfolk if we had British bombers to take their places, equipped with hydrogen bombs. When we had that, his argument ran, we could say goodbye to the Americans.
This argument has nothing to do with defence, but is a matter of independence. It is a political concept and is sometimes amplified by saying that we must be able to choose the target on the first day of the next war. I observe that if one spent £300 million for the privilege of choosing
1978
the targets on the first day of the next war, one might overdo the expenditure.
Those seem to be the three arguments marshalled by the Government: (1) that we need nuclear weapons in a nuclear age; (2) that we could make savings by "going nuclear"; and, (3), that we could retain our independence of America by making H-bombs. I want to look briefly at each of those arguments and say why they do not convince me.
The first argument is about the "new look." It was put very clearly by President Eisenhower who, in a Press conference last week, congratulated the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence on doing in Britatin what the Americans had done two years ago, by giving a "new look" to the U.S. Armed Forces. I remind the House that when that" new look "policy was introduced by Mr. Dulles, it was called "massive retaliation at places of our own choosing." At that time we regarded it as a bad policy for America. I did not hear anybody in the House, two years ago, saying that we should adopt it for ourselves.
It is a very striking fact that we should now be told, two years later, that Mr. Dulles was right to introduce that policy and that we are now coming into line with Mr. Dulles by not relying on conventional forces. If we should have a limited war we are told that we should rely not on conventional forces but on a tactical big bang in places of our own choosing. I should have thought that before coming into line with Mr. Dulles on this issue the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence would have looked at what has happened to Mr. Dulles since he introduced the "new look." There have been occasions when it could have been used.
A famous case was Indo-China. The trouble in Indo-China occurred in the first days of the "new look" policy, when America was cutting down her conventional forces and relying on atomic tactical weapons. It is no secret that American aircraft carriers were in the area, but, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell), pointed out, the Americans and the French preferred to lose the war in Indo-China than risk world war. The issue was not the use of the H-bomb, but the use of atomic tactical weapons at Dien-Bien-Phu.

1979
It is a striking fact that even the Americans, who are a great deal more impetuous in these matters than we are, have not got complete certainty about the use of these weapons. It was said in the House last night, on behalf of the Government, by the hon. and gallant Member for Berwick and East Lothian (Major Anstruther-Gray) that we must have the weapons and be completely certain that we shall use them if they are to be any good. If that is really so, that is the reason why they are no good. No human being can be absolutely certain about these matters, but I am as certain as I can be that except in the circumstance of the threat of direct Russian attack on this island those weapons would not be used by British forces.
These weapons were not used by the Americans at Dien-Bien-Phu. They were not used, to be a little crude, at Suez, which was an ideal place for a little experiment in the use of atomic tactical weapons. Why were they not used? I know why. It was because we were not prepared to take the risk involved. This makes me think twice about whether we should be militarily stronger for scrapping all conventional force and nuclearising ourselves.
Here I am not concerned about the "Great Deterrent." I have in mind the problem of atomic tactical weapons. The Times and the Manchester Guardian agree in their leading articles this morning in saying that the Government must give us an answer this evening on this crucial issue. I take it that atomic tactical weapons are to be introduced in N. A. T. O. to counterbalance the overwhelming Russian manpower strength in conventional forces. Or perhaps I should put it as the overwhelming Chinese manpower strength in the Far East and the overwhelming Russian manpower strength in Europe.
Of course, I know that the situation which obtains in Western Germany today arose two years ago. There are already American atomic tactical weapons there which the Americans might use. But I want to emphasise that it is now clearly indicated in the White Paper that all our British forces are to be equipped and trained in the use of the "clean bombs," as they are called. This morning I was
1980
reading the Minister of Defence's contribution to our debate in February, when he remarked:
"Atomic weapons of the power of the Hiroshima bomb are now regarded as primarily suitable for tactical use by troops in the field."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 13th February. 1957: Vol. 564. c. 1311.]
It is only since February that that sentence has struck me as having a great deal of significance. It chimes with the GÖttingen Manifesto of the 18 German nuclear scientists. They must have read the speech by the Minister of Defence. Germany happens to be the place where the "troops in the field" are to be. The Minister of Defence has now told us officially that our "troops in the field", in Germany, are to use atomic tactical bombs of the strength of the Hiroshima bomb in German fields.
Mr. F. J. Bellenger: Surely the American forces have been in that position in Germany for a long time.
Mr. Crossman: It is not the first time that I have pointed out in the House the appalling danger that we are facing as a result of the American decision to arm their men in Germany with these weapons.
However, what we are now getting is a further stage. The White Paper commits us to the equipment and training of British forces with these weapons. We cannot stop the Americans, but we have to take responsibility for our own actions. Moreover, we must now face it that the German forces, too, are to be armed with these weapons.
This announcement has not had the effect of making every German feel loyal to N. A. T. O. On the contrary, the announcement, if it is prosecuted, will make it impossible to have Germany as a loyal ally, for it says, in effect, that several hundred of these weapons are to go off in any local European war since these are the only weapons available against the conventional forces on the other side. [Interruption.] Yes, of course. We are told that because we have only 12 or 16 divisions and if we do not have these weapons these divisions will be unable to undertake even a minor local action.
I would put to the Prime Minister the problem worrying every German—what will happen if there is a rising in Eastern Germany? It is a terrible danger. We

1981
know that if men in Eastern Germany were free to express their feelings they would do what the Hungarians did, rise and try to throw out their oppressors. Sooner or later, there is a risk of a rising occurring, because one cannot always keep people down. What is to happen then? What military action will be taken?
It was simple while it was a case only of occupying forces, because we could say that we were not going to help, but when there is a German part of N.A.T.O., are the Germans to be told, "Stand by doing nothing at all", or, "One hundred atomic bombs are to go off in the liberation of Eastern Germany"? These are the alternatives. Both are unattractive to Germans.

ROYAL ASSENT
6.16 p.m.
Message to attend the Lords commissioners:-
The House went:—and, having returned;
Mr. SPEAKER reported the Royal Assent to:

1. Customs Duties (Dumping and Subsidies) Act, 1957.

2. Public Health Officers (Deputies) Act, 1957.

3. House of Commons Disqualification Act, 1957.

4. Cinematograph Films Act, 1957.

5. White Fish and Herring Industries Act, 1957.

6. Wakefield Corporation Act, 1957.

7. Liverpool Hydraulic Power Act, 1957.

8. Port of London Act, 1957.

DEFENCE
Question again proposed.
6.28 p.m.
Mr. Crossman Mr. Crossman rose—
Mr. Julian Snow: On a point of order. With very great respect to you, Mr. Speaker, and to the history and tendencies of this House, is it not possible to make a commonsense arrangement by which Black Rod could come at a more convenient time to ourselves? It should not be too difficult to arrange. Here we have had an important speech by my hon. Friend the
1982
Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman) interrupted. After all, we slam the door in Black Rod's face. Could not we keep him waiting a few minutes until the speech which is in progress is finished.
Mr. G. B. Drayson: If a speech were being made from this side of the House the party opposite would not be taking the same point of view.
Mr. George Thomas: Since this interruption is to suit the convenience of another place, could not there be discussions behind the scenes to suit the convenience of both Houses?
Mr. Speaker: There are always discussions to try to suit the convenience of both Houses. That has always been done. The hon. Member who is addressing the House should be greatly flattered at the fact that the interruption of his speech has caused such a commotion—but it might have been anybody's speech that was interrupted.
Mr. Crossman: I should like to thank my hon. Friends for their support. This is not a question of the speech of any particular hon. Member, but rather a feeling that we should have an arrangement which would be of benefit to us all.
May I sum up to the Prime Minister the point which I was seeking to make about atomic tactical weapons? If we equip our forces with these atomic tactical weapons, and rely upon these weapons to make up for Russian conventional strength, are we not going to he in a situation where we either start a world war even from a purely local disorder, or are left defenceless? This applies, by the way, in the event of a quite small disturbance run by a satellite Government from the other side? That is the question which I wanted to put on the subject of atomic tactical weapons.
I wish now to turn to another part of the White Paper, where reference is made to the Middle East. I am disconcerted to find that the Government propose to keep Cyprus as a base, where, as part of our contribution to the Bagdad Pact, we shall have bombers equipped for nuclear warfare. I seriously say to the House that the belief that we shall retain the oilfields of the Middle East by telling the Arabs that we would commit nuclear warfare on their behalf is the strangest notion of a way to make our position less

1983
insecure than it is today in that part of the world.
The idea of nuclear warfare in Europe may be tolerable, but to spread the idea of nuclearising warfare to the Middle East and Asia is merely to ensure that the people of that part of the world—who are already deeply disturbed by the connection of atomic warfare with the West—will more and more come to the conclusion that their lot is not on our side but on the other side of the Iron Curtain.
These are the reasons why I cannot understand how, on the purely military side, the Government suggestion of the nuclearisation of our forces will add to our security either in Europe or in the Middle East, unless of course, they intend, in addition to this vast expenditure on nuclear warfare, to retain conventional forces of a very large size.
Here I come to the second argument for the White Paper economy It has been used a great deal by hon. Members on the Government side of the House. They say that to cut down expenditure on the forces we must nuclearise them. I believe it to be true that the Government have undertaken large-scale economies. I welcome the withdrawal of our forces from places like Libya and elsewhere. I am an anti-colonialist and I am delighted to see us liquidating all these imperialist commitments. But I want to be sure that the Government and their supporters are fully aware of what is meant by this White Paper. The provisions contained in this White Paper mean that, when they are carried out, this country will be incapable of waging any large-scale colonial war again.
I want to repeat what was said yesterday by my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) about the idea of transporting troops by air us an alternative to overseas bases. Do not let us have any illusions about this. The number of people who can be moved by air is negligible compared with the type of operation we had in Malaya. Let us consider the Malayan operation. We could never get men to Malaya again by air transport unless we crippled this country with an air transport command which we could not possibly afford. The size of the air transport command we are likely to have would be capable of moving troops by battalions and not by divisions.
1984
This means—I am surprised that we have not heard speeches from hon. Members opposite on the subject—that under this White Paper the switch over to nuclear weapons which are totally unusable for colonial police operations make it virtually impossible—I personally welcome this—to sustain overseas colonial commitments in the traditional way.
The White Paper talks about policing Aden, but does not tell us how the troops are to be got there. There are a lot of places left over. Let me assure hon. Members opposite that they will go on winding up the British Empire under this White Paper strategy by the same ignominious method—being kicked out —as we saw after Suez. The difference is that we Socialists want to get out on principle, but the Tories get themselves kicked out, after pretending to themselves that they have the conventional weapons to defend the Empire.
This Government will not last for five years, but if they were still in office—or a Tory Government were in power in five years' time, when the results of the policy contained in this White Paper begin to work themselves out—they would find that we shall have spent vast sums on nuclear warfare; and then, when there is trouble in a place like Kenya we shall find that we have not the forces to do the job. We shall have a rearmament programme of the conventional type and we shall be faced again with a most colossal arms estimate. I am afraid of that happening if the House does not realise the foreign policy conclusion to be drawn from this White Paper.
That conclusion is that once we accept the logic of this White Paper we cease to be an imperial Power. Either that, or the economies are unreal. I put that dilemma to the Government. Either the economies are real, in which case we cease to be an imperial Power, or they are bogus economies.
The third argument is the political argument in which it is argued, "All right, suppose nuclear weapons are not much good militarily. Suppose they do not save economically. Yet we must have them for the sake of our political independence." Here, I hope that the House will forgive me if I speak frankly. I think that we had better face it. Whether or

1985
not we have these weapons makes very little difference to our military dependence on the United States of America. The Government's attitude to "Thor" proves that up to the hilt. There is no question of geting rid of the Americans. On the contrary, they are here, "for keeps" and we are to become a rocket base instead of being a bomber base as now. The notion that because we have built a few H-bombs marked B for Britain," we therefore thereby achieve political independence is something which, I am ashamed to say, I was taken in by two years ago, when Earl Attlee told me that it was so. Now I do not believe it and 1 suspect that Earl Attlee believes it even less, having seen what has happened to us in two years while we spent the money on building our H-bomb.
Can we be militarily independent of America? On the contrary. The Suez fiasco revealed that. Within four days of attempting to "go it alone" we were brought to heel by economic sanctions of the politest and most efficacious sort. What is the use of going on saying that by building these weapons we achieve independence? All we do by building them is to compel the Germans and the French to build them as well. That is something upon which we should reflect very seriously. I was in Koenigswinter last year with several colleagues; and a Conservative colleague whose name I will not mention made a charming speech to the Germans. He explained how we had to build the H-bomb in order to be independent of the Americans. He said that we could not trust the Americans to choose the right targets but he added that of course we should always choose the right targets for the Germans.
That does not work. If, as members of N.A.T.O., we claim that we cannot trust the Americans, do hon. Members think that the Germans will not say the same? They will be driven to say the same by the same notions of national prestige which operated on the Government Front Bench in the drafting of this White Paper; the feeling that to prove that we are a big Power we must have some of these weapons. Can we blame the French and the Germans if they get together and produce a European H-bomb? They are bound to. Once we get out of the two-Power stalemate with the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., the only
1986
nuclear Powers, H-bombs will be produced by Frenchmen, Germans and Swedes. Yes, and Colonel Nasser will be given one by the Russians. [Laughter.] Do not let us laugh, these things can happen—and what hope is there then of world disarmament? By this White Paper and by this policy we are leading the Gadarene swine down the slope. It is our decision which makes everyone else feel that they must "go nuclear" as well.
Therefore, we have to weigh it up and ask ourselves whether we shall help the cause of peace more by adding to the Western deterrent 10 or 15 of these things marked "B for Britain" to put alongside the ones marked "A for America". There is not much difference between them when they go off. We must ask ourselves whether we shall make a greater contribution to peace by having a little British deterrent than by renouncing the deterrent and giving an example to France and Germany which those countries want to adopt.
I came back from Germany convinced that there is not a responsible German who will not sigh with relief if the British pressure for making the German H-bomb is removed. The German knows that he has to follow us, if we do it. There is not much nationalism in Germany at present; there is a much better mood. Unfortunately, we told them: first, not to make weapons; then, that they could have an army but it must be a conventional army; then that they could have a tactical atomic weapon army; and, finally, an H-bomb army.
Could we not stop this foolery? Could we not say to the Germans, "You are in a mood not to have H-bombs. We will make it possible for you not to have them by renouncing them ourselves". That would be an immense contribution to peace and to European unity. We should lead European unity. Let me assure the Government that this is the biggest thing that we can do for Europe. We should go into Europe as peace makers and say, "We set this example of renouncing something which, at best, adds slightly to the American shield and, at worst, aggravates the danger of war breaking out".
That is the theme I want to leave in the thought of the House. I think it most dangerous, after Suez, to remain in a "go it alone" mood. Surely we must

1987
have learned that this is political nonsense, moral nonsense, military nonsense. There is no "go it alone" for an island of our sort any more than there is for France or Germany. We must either be members of an alliance or neutral. If we join an alliance, we may be not a senior member any more, but a junior member. The nuclear balance is best left at the moment as a stalemate between the Russians and the Americans, both having their nuclear deterrents and wasting their resources upon it. We shall be well advised, both in terms of genuine economy and in the interests of defence, to opt out of that race and do what the Government themselves have said, concentrate on disarmament.
For that purpose, the fact that we began to make the H-bomb has a certain advantage. We set our hands to it and we then had the moral power to say, "We can do it, but we are the first people to prove we can and then to say that we will not do it." Therefore, I can see some good in the two years we have spent on this bomb. We have strengthened our ability to give a serious lead in the world. I agree with the Government that there is no defence except world disarmament. There is no security of defence in the nuclear world except disarmament.
We should take risks for disarmament, I cannot see how merely straining our resources, to see whether we can turn out a few of these things, and permitting the nuclearisation of our forces in Germany, can be considered a defence policy. That is why we should possibly go a little further than the Labour Amendment has gone. I hope that in a few months we should be in the situation of being able to say, "There is an alternative Government with an alternative policy, which is a real peace policy."
6.44 p.m.
Mr. Hugh Fraser: The hon. Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman), to whose speech we all listened with great interest, in spite of the interruption, has joined the via dolorosa,the steps towards party unity. The right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) yesterday started out on this via dolorosa,and, indeed, at one point seemed to have the whole Socialist Party, 300 strong, balancing on the point of a
1988
pin in regard to metaphysics of the atom bomb.
The hon. Member for Coventry, East is committing the fault or error, of which I am going to suggest that the Government are partially culpable, of basing strategy entirely on weapons. There is a great danger in these considerations, for the very simple reason that the interest of the country remains the same while the weapons may vary very greatly and quickly.
If we look back over the past ten years, it is clear that there have been three distinct phases, and if we project ourselves into 1962, to which the White Paper carries us, there is another phase. The first of these phases was when the atom bomb was held by America alone, which gave America the advantage. The next stage was that the atom bomb was held by the Russians as well. Obviously, this gave the Russians an advantage against the concentrations of population in this country. The third stage was the hydrogen bomb stage, which again put us at an advantage over the Russians. The fourth stage, into which we are moving now, is the inter-continental ballistic-missile stage, which will mean that the Russians and the United States are equally threatened.
At the moment, the United States are in the position to use this country and other places as a landing stage—to use the expression of "1984"—and therefore themselves to be remote from the fears which must obsess people like the right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell). I make no imputations upon the right hon. Gentleman's courage. He is a most courageous man and made a courageous speech.
If there is to be this change, in the 1960's the United States of America will be as much menaced by atomic warfare and by the hydrogen bomb as is this country. What are the conclusions which flow from that fact? It is not impossible that, by 1962, when "Atlas"—which is the technical word for the American rocket—and the Russian inter-continental ballistic missile have been developed, the N.A.T.O. Commander may have doubts —that is to say, the American Congress or Senate may have doubts—whether to press the button for the use of the atomic artillery.

1989
At present they would have no fear. In fact, I am informed that an instruction was handed to the N.A.T.O. Commander that if there were a minor aggression inside Europe he had perfectly within his control the power to release the local atomic artillery. That would fire off a series of explosions as large as the Hiroshima bomb.
Mr. Emrys Hughes: In Germany?
Mr. Fraser: Wherever the occasion might arise. We have to consider that fact in reaching our various conclusions. I am not prepared to say what the future will hold, or what precisely the policy of the Government should be, but there are two considerations which should bear heavily on it. One is that, in the circumstances which will exist after 1962, it is vital that we should be as close as possible to Europe. There may well be a change in the balance of power after 1962.
In face of the intercontinental ballistics of the Soviet Union, it is not impossible that the type of speech in which Mr. Dulles has indulged will no longer be able to fall from his lips, for the simple reason that the Americans will be as much menaced by these things as we are. The time may arrive, as Field-Marshal Smuts said ten years ago, in a great speech, when the greatest danger to humanity and to the world is that there should be only two super-Powers. We can and must avoid that.
It might well be that over this period we can and should get much closer to Europe. A moment or two ago the hon. Member for Coventry, East spoke of the fear of the Germans and the French going in for the construction of atomic weapons and so forth. It may well be that it is with them we should share atomic secrets rather than with the United States. That is not an impossible projection of what might happen, and it is a consideration which people should bear in mind.
The second consideration is that we should be careful of what the run-down in our men with conventional arms amounts to. I think the Government have quite rightly cut their coat according to their cloth, but there is the danger, or there was the danger, of being found wearing Imperial garments of the latest
1990
type; and hon. Members are familiar with the fairy story of the emperor and his fine clothes who was, in fact, wearing no clothes at all. That is another consideration that should be borne in mind. A great deal of that has been put into proper perspective this afternoon by the speech of the Minister of Labour, who made it perfectly clear that the Government stand by paragraph 48 of the White Paper, a thing about which I was not perfectly clear yesterday. Paragraph 48 says that should there be a failure to produce a sufficiency of troops, other means will have to be found.
I commend the suggestion of the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) that this question of conscription should be kept outside the bounds of party politics altogether. If it be a question of needing some form of continued call-up, by whatever means, that would have to be because national safety is far greater than the advantage of any political party. Speaking as a farmer, I know that at a price one can grow strawberries on Ben Nevis. Equally, if we pay enough we can produce an Army of the requisite size, and that has to be done; but it is a process which has its limits.
Something which has been frequently stressed by my hon. Friends and myself might be worth considering, the question of an African Army. There seem to be a great many surplus officers and warrant officers knocking about, and something could be thought of on those lines. Quite properly, the Government have said that the control of local units of the Army in Kenya, Uganda, East and West Africa and so on, should be under local commands as such countries come fully into the control of their own affairs. That is perfectly proper with the advance of colonial peoples. I think we should adopt something similar to the Gurkha Battalions, which after all come from the friendly and independent State of Nepal. The hon. Member for Coventry, East said that Imperialists like me—I am an Imperialist and very proud of it—would be greatly distressed by what goes on. I am glad to see that the Government in their wisdom have said that there will be a base somewhere in East Africa. I assume it will be in Kenya.
On the whole, provided the balances are kept right, the Prime Minister is perfectly right in his general overall policy

1991
for carrying out economies. That is right so long as the balances within the programme are correct, but it is difficult for hon. Members on the back benches to know when they are correct. If we are to make these economies we should consider further what we are defending. I have bored this House again and again on the question of oil supplies from the Middle East. We have now lost control of the bridge between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean, and we have to see that in times of trouble oil can be brought round the Cape to this country. I believe, therefore, there should be something in the nature of an office of war mobilisation—somewhat similar to what the American Government have established—to deal with the strategic aspects. the ordinary civilian industries, so to speak, outside the war industries.
If we are to maintain ourselves as a great Power, or as the centre of a series of Powers making a great concentration of power, far more attention should be paid to the question of the provision of tankers and other means of getting that oil. The provision of tankers today may be more important than the provision of battleships. We must sec that this oil flows to us. I believe the private companies and the great oil companies are not now capable of taking the necessary steps. If we have to cut £150 million off defence expenditure, we should seriously consider the reshaping of certain British ports, setting up sections of the steel industry, especially for heavy plate, and the creation of a fleet of tankers which can go round the Cape and be independent of local politics in or near the oilfields. That could result in a peaceful influence and in the bringing to this country of oil supplies on which we so vitally depend.
Taken as a whole, I believe this White Paper is a great step forward. Within it there are certain points which need to be cleared up. Above all, if we are to have economies, it is absolutely vital that those economies in the military field should be supported by advances in the field of carriage of goods and the support of oil flow vital to the needs of this country.
6.57 p.m.
Mr. Charles Pannell: I wish to bring the debate back to the speech made by the Minister of Labour
1992
this afternoon. Although we are concerned with a weapon which we hope we shall never use, and which will destroy us if we do in the war which we hope will never happen, we as a nation have still to live.
I suppose that most of us in this House and all the people in the country want to know the answer to the question, "Where do we go from here?" I wish to thank the Minister of Labour for the speech he made this afternoon. I recognise, and he recognises from his position, that he has almost assumed a quasi-judicial office, not an office in which one can make belligerent and truculent speeches.
I want to take part in the general forward look on the British economy, particularly in regard to labour relations. Although much has been said about officers who are to be "bowler hatted", they will not be the majority of people affected by these changes. They may be the people most disastrously affected, but, as one with no Service experience, I want to talk about the trends in the economy which we shall have to face.
I have been concerned—it is a great indictment of the past—about the waste of resources in National Service and the creaming-off of young men at the peak of their productive powers. This afternoon, we want to know what those young men are to be released for. I do not think that we should ignore the fact that mass unemployment between the wars existed until we started to rearm about 1935. Let no one misunderstand this. The arms programme since the war has been a factor in the overfull employment of our economy.
Paragraph 7 of the White Paper says:
"Over the last five years. defence has on an average absorbed 10 per cent. of Britain's gross national product."
The White Paper says:
"One-eighth of the output of the metal-using industries, upon which the export trade so largely depends, is devoted to defence."
If, in the course of my speech, which, I hope, will not be too long, I stress the metal-working industries, it is not only because of their size, but for the very good reason that perhaps I know more about them than about other industries.
We ought to be told whether it is our economic position, our loss of face after

1993
Suez or the ultimate deterrent which is responsible for the sharp shift in Government policy. I shall probably be told that it is a little of all three.
I want to talk about the "Switch of Resources," mentioned in paragraphs 67 to 69. 1t will be noticed that in paragraph 67 the White Paper says that
"In carrying it"—
meaning the policy—
"through a certain amount of disturbance is unavoidable."
This means not only disturbance in the Armed Forces. The White Paper says:
"The volume of defence work of many kinds will be curtailed and some establishments will have to be closed. The manpower and industrial resources released must be absorbed into productive use as quickly as possible; and the Government Departments concerned will do all they can to secure that this switch is effected smoothly."
I have gathered a great many papers for my speech and I have been surprised to find how much of a switch has been going on over the last few years. The Minister mentioned 15,000 people as being affected in a period of 12 months in the aircraft industry. I have in my hand a questionnaire which has been sent to branches of the Amalgamated Engineering Union, and the degree of redundancy which this questionnaire has revealed is remarkable.
Apart from the switch in the aircraft industry, there has been a closing down of Royal Ordnance Factories; there. were 44 at the end of the war and there are 22 now. In addition, a great variety of Admiralty and War Office yards have been closed down. Until I began to look at this matter with a view to making this speech, I did not appreciate that there had been so great a shift of emphasis.
The aircraft industry will, of course, be affected. The Minister of Supply has said that some reduction of orders is inevitable. He went on to say that this should be set off by increased civil and export work and that
"the industry should shape itself to that end."
Of the Royal Ordnance Factories he said that some contraction is inevitable. It is already taking place. I will mention purely the local case of Dalmuir, which seems to be largely closing down, while at Barnbow, within the City of Leeds, there seems to be apprehended an
1994
invasion of displaced persons from Scotland.
It will be said of the aircraft industry that most of the larger engine and electronic companies are already in the guided missile field and that they are well prepared for their new role, but more than this will be needed to mop up some unemployment, bearing in mind that there are to be no more land-based fighters and that the supersonic bomber project has been dropped. If we consider all these things together we ought to ask the engineering industry what are the most worthwhile tasks which this industry can carry out and what are the priorities if money and manpower are to be released.
I do not want to debate this at length, but I submit that there is no doubt at all that we need more steel. The industry is still far too traditional, both the employers and the trade unions. I know that it is part of the set-up of the industry and that this exists even after nationalisation and denationalisation and with possible future renationalisation. My right hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich (Mr. Stokes) has told us about the difficulties of his firm, caused by the allocation of steel for the armaments programme. He has had to import steel for British projects which are subsequently exported at a much higher price than would have been the case had British steel been available.
If I were to put my finger on one industry to which the Government should pay the greatest attention it is the machine tool industry. I do not want to make a political point of this, but there is a good deal of rumour in the air—certainly, when considering the programmes of the Labour Party—about nationalising parts of the machine tool industry. Unless this industry is stimulated, those cries to do something with the set-up of the industry will become more and more insistent.
The industry needs to be much expanded. After all, it is the industry which, above all, is likely to make us more efficient. One does not need to have to visit America or to be a technician to appreciate that the average American worker has three times as much electricity at his elbow as has the average British worker.

1995
The statement that American production is achieved by harder work, by the sweat of the brow of the operative, is the greatest nonsense. There is no doubt that the average worker on the bench in this country works rather harder than the average American, because the American does not have to work as hard. The American machine tool industry produces far more single-purpose machines for the benefit of the operative.
The average American businessman writes off his machinery far more quickly than we do. He will tell you, "I had all this machinery new last Fall, but it is out of date now". He often writes it off at the rate of 50 per cent. That, of course, is a matter of fiscal policy.
As I have told the House on previous occasions, I am Essex-born, a near-Cockney, domiciled in Kent and represent a Yorkshire constituency. I left the fitters' bench in London to represent part of the great City of Leeds in the House. One of the things which staggered me most in going round Lancashire and the West Riding, which is the cradle of the Industrial Revolution, was to see the factory slums and the old machinery which ought to have been thrown out years and years ago.
I have said this before: if ever a recession takes place in this country it will take place in Lancashire and the West Riding, because so many of the factories there are not tooled up to be efficient in the sense that we look upon efficiency today. In London, where we have 28 per cent. of the engineering industry, the industry is relatively modern; as is the car industry in the Midlands. The efficiency of our industry is a vital matter and we ought to take steps to increase it.
This comes within the ambit of the White Paper, for it is not just a matter of saying where we are to switch the men and resources; it is necessary also to switch them intelligently. I do not know how we shall do it. There may be several ways. We might consider trying to raise efficiency by fiscal policy or by allowances or even by direct grants and loans to factories which are prepared to make themselves more efficient than they are at the moment by taking in more modern plant.
Of course, we have to develop this industry abroad, too. Incidentally, this
1996
is the key industry if ever we were to embark on any new armaments programme. We can do our best to export to the United States, but the Americans are themselves great machinery and machine tool makers and it might be well for us to remember, when we are considering foreign policy in connection with full employment and trade, that in the early 'thirties, in the most disastrous economic period of our history, 80 per cent. of the exports of the British tool industry—and I am not at all sure that it was not 80 per cent. of the product of the British machine tool industry—went to countries which are now behind the Iron Curtain. We must, therefore, look into the question of the strategic list and we ought to ask what is the present position about trade with the U.S.S.R.
Air Commodore A. V. Harvey: I am sure that the hon. Gentleman wants to be fair to the machine tool industry. It is generally recognised that in the last ten years the British machine tool industry has come on by leaps and bounds. If he went to the industry's exhibition in London last year, or explored many of the factories, he would see that that is so in finish, design and output. It would not be good if the impression went out from this House that the industry was not efficient.
Mr. Pannell: I have not mentioned anything about its technical efficiency. I am talking about its size. It is not big enough. It tends to hang back. I do not want to be dragged into parenthesis, but I have read a technical report prepared within the A.E.U. about the machine tool industry. It reads:
"The machine tool industry is conservative with the rigid features of tradition. Less than half the industry's orders are fulfilled each year."
That is a terrible backlog—and we are considering now the men who will be switched from the armaments programme.
The report goes on:
"During the post-war rearmament programme demand outstripped capacity. Machine tool imports increased from under £6 million in 1950 to £59½ million in 1952. These imports revived the German machine tool industry, and Britain now faces a major challenge from Germany."
That is because we have refused to develop the industry—and I can tell the

1997
House that I started my apprenticeship in this sort of thing. The report continues:
"The Government have admitted a 'Disturbing increase in machine tool imports in the first half of this year'".
The year was 1956. It goes on:
"The industry is handicapped in foreign markets by extended delivery dates, and German under-bidding. The R.O.F.s could assist the industry, especially in the manufacture of single-purpose and transfer machines—orders which British firms refuse to accept."
The hon. and gallant Gentleman will appreciate, therefore, that I am not speaking about the excellence of the industry's products at all.
Air Commodore Harvey: Complicated and difficult machine tools which took two-and-a-half to three years to deliver some years ago, can now be delivered in about six months.
Mr. Pannell: It is still most unsatisfactory. The hon. and gallant Member will appreciate that my union has 900,000 members. It has a well-furnished research department and gets this information by questionnaires, and we are anxious that our members who are now working in the Royal Ordnance Factories will find worthwhile work. The backlog in that industry is far too great.
Following the Soviet leaders' visit in 1956, a few long-term contracts were received. I hear that in March, 1956, Messrs. Mather and Platt received an order worth £250,000. We were told that the value of the list of things needed by Russia was from £800 million to £1,000 million—but we can all allow for the illegitimate exaggeration of advocacy by Russia in these matters.
What the Russians said they have in mind is the production of such things as ships, electric furnaces, machine tools, galvanised plate, tinplate and the like. I want to know how much is left of the embargo on these things. The strategic list is still a reality, though there is misunderstanding about it, and if there is to be a switch the Government Departments will have to let us have more information.
I do not want to say much about the motor car industry. I do not really believe that the switch can take place there. I repeat my firm opinion that that industry's obsession with the home market has made it difficult for manufacturers to develop cars suitable for export. Never-
1998
theless, it should be remembered that there is a great and hopeful market for tractors. China wants tractors. Ours are the best in the world, and whereas the Chinese peasant does not need Austin Sevens, the Chinese economy needs tractors. I understand that the four-wheel drive is still on the strategic list. That is a matter for many Departments to get together to consider.
I should like to know how much of all this work—and the Minister will be concerned with this—can go into the R.O.F.s. What is their rô le? Are the Government to say, at the end of the day, that they intend merely to switch to private trade and just let the R.O.F.s rot? We are very much concerned about that, because the R.O.F.s make a most amazing variety of things, and make them successfully.
The R.O.F.s must not be confused with just one old factory like Woolwich Arsenal. I ask hon. Members not to be dogmatic and doctrinaire about nationalisation, because, during the war, and under the impact of war, the ordnance factories made ceramics, concrete railway sleepers, locomotive conversions for China, steel railway wagons, laundry machinery, wood-cutting machinery, overhaul lorries for U.N.R.R.A., and other lorries, oil well drilling equipment, stocking looms, clock mechanisms, automatic machines—and at the moment they are producing a limited number of steam turbines.
It is, therefore, evident that factories like that could mop up the backlog in the economy—and I suggest that in that we might even include the machine tool industry. The Minister of Labour will not, I think, adopt the rigid Tory doctrinaire attitude here. If our industry has this terrific backlog of orders, the Minister will not be so dyed-in-the-wool Tory about this, or look at the whole business from the doctrinaire angle which characterises the Tory Central Office. I hope that he will do what is necessary for the sake of the industry, and not just for the sake of slogans.
What about alternative work? We have a nationalised coal industry which is considering the manufacture of its own machinery. This is a matter of high policy with hon. Gentlemen opposite. Only the other week, in the Electricity Bill, they withdrew from the

1999
Authority power to manufacture its own machinery. Nevertheless, I should have thought that the R.O.F.s might make mining machinery.
I come to the point which worries me most, and which I say, with respect, most concerns the right hon. Gentleman's own Department. Even more than machines, I am worried about men, and the switch of manpower in a peaceful, orderly fashion. On 23rd June, 1955, I protested in the House that the engineering industry is only organised for battle between employers and employees. I said that this had been brought out in Lord Monckton's inquiry of 1954—that the two sides only met head on to argue about increases of wages, strikes and lockouts. I said that this history went back for a hundred years, and that under the threat of automation something better was needed.
The then Parliamentary Secretary, now the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation, gave me the "brush off." He suggested that if I did know what I was talking about I was hagridden by old fears, because I had been a trade unionist since my apprenticeship days. He will not say that this evening.The Times has been writing leading articles about the labour scene, and other papers have asked whether something cannot be done. They have asked whether the recent disturbances could not have been anticipated. Of course, neither the Minister nor anybody else would say, after the Briggs dispute and the recent shipbuilding and engineering strikes, that labour-management relations should not be the subject of a complete reappraisal.
There is a weakness in the Government machinery for dealing with the switch-over. I have the impression that the Ministry of Labour comes in only to clear up the mess it never comes in beforehand. The Minister flits in, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Huyton (Mr. H. Wilson) said, "like a cupid from room to room", when a great labour dispute is imminent.
I suspect—if this is untrue, I hope that somebody will deny it—that the Treasury and the Board of Trade have all the "know how" and the statistics about industry and about the economic state of the nation. Why do they accumulate all that information? Do they do
2000
it so that the Chancellor is able to make a good Budget speech? Is that why the chief gag and script writer to the Chancellor, Sir Roger Makins, is employed? Nobody could doubt the other evening that he was enjoying the Chancellor's jokes even more than the Chancellor himself, and that he had all the assurance of a man who had written them. It is probably because the gentleman has been an ambassador that he is a good protagonist for the Chancellor. No doubt, he will be just as good a protagonist for our Chancellor when he assumes office.
Let us consider what resources the Chancellor and the Board of Trade have. There is the census of production. There is all the information on Inland Revenue and profits, and the census of future trends of budgetary estimates. There is all the information about the transfer of employment. I do not think that, generally speaking, any of this information goes to the Minister of Labour.
While the Minister of Defence speaks about the need for a general staff to redeploy the Services, we need an economic general staff to redeploy the civilian population. It may be that the situation presents a field of activity in which those excellent people who assist the Treasury may be employed. I believe that the Ministry of Labour should be lifted to the level where, with the statistics of the Board of Trade and the Treasury, it should enter into labour disputes before a crisis. Anybody with a nodding acquaintance with the engineering industry knew that the dispute in that industry was coming months before it did. It is a reflection on the machinery of government that that sort of thing was allowed to happen.
These statistics and services should be freely at the disposal of the employers' organisations and the trade unions. We need a completely new conception so that both sides of industry march in step with the economy. Otherwise, in this great switch-over we can be in very great trouble. In addition to the switch-over, we must also bear in mind the automative processes which are coming upon us.
The right to strike will always be the last weapon of desperate and disappointed men. It is part of a tradition. It will never be given up. We should strive to

2001
create conditions which render the right to strike completely unnecessary. Sir Norman Angell said:
"Wars are not fought by bad men, knowing that they are wicked, but by good men—on both sides—passionately believing that they are right."
That is true of strikes, too.
I have always deplored the sort of aberrations which have tended to taint the great Labour movement with the smear of Communism whenever we have challenged the employers. Hon. Members opposite do not know the nature and purpose of Communism. The Right never has to fight Communism. Communism always attempts to fragment the forces of the Left before turning to its main attack. It is people like myself in the trade unions, along with my colleagues on this side of the House, who have fought the Communists.
When I hear sneers from the other side of the House, I condemn hon. Members opposite for the ignoramuses that they are. That is why I became annoyed when it was once suggested that when something went wrong in a certain part of Lancashire the whole dispute was engineered in King Street.
Mr. Douglas L. S. Nairn: The hon. Gentleman said that there are good men on both sides.
Mr. Pannell: The hon. Member is displaying the brand of ignorance of which I complain. When I was speaking about good men on both sides I was referring to the good men on both sides of industry. I reiterate: show me a Communist and I will show you a crook. I do not recognise any good men among them.
Let us then, as we turn our modern swords into ploughshares, see that we do so intelligently, not only giving every man who requires one a new job and new hope, but ushering in a new era not only of peace but of permanent industrial peace.
7.26 p.m.
Miss Joan Vickers: I hope the hon. Member for Leeds, West (Mr. C. Pannell) will forgive me if I do not follow him in detail. I want to deal with the White Paper on Defence, with particular reference to the civilian aspect of the matter.
2002
It appears to me that, if we are to implement this White Paper successfully, we must have the confidence of the civilian population and we must watch their morale. I have never had anything to do with planning for defence, but I have had considerable experience with workers in Royal Ordnance Factories and in the dockyards. One appreciates that these people have a great deal of the future in their hands.
Hon. Members may also know that I have considerable experience of victims of aggression both in this country and overseas. In my opinion, the last war was won to a major extent by the civilians in this country. If at any time they had shown fright at aerial attack or had slackened in their production, no armed forces would have been successful. One knows only too well from letters which were received from men overseas how great were their anxieties for the safety of their relations in this country.
I hope that the overriding policy of the Government is represented by paragraph 13 of the White Paper. In welcoming that paragraph, however, one must recognise the truth in paragraph 14, which says:
"… pending international agreement, the only existing safeguard against major aggression is the power to threaten retaliation with nuclear weapons."
The hon. Member for Islington, North (Mr. Fienburgh) said:
"… it is still necessary to possess some limited … degree of thermo-nuclear H-bomb deterrent."—[OFF IC I AL REPORT. 16th April, 1957; Vol. 568, c. 1868.]
If that is so, the civilian population must be given full information on this matter. I agree with many hon. Members opposite that, among all sections of the community, irrespective of politics, there is a genuine fear of the consequences of H-bomb attack. It is necessary that confidence should be given to the civilian population in the same way as the right hon. Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill) did when he encouraged them during the last war. He gave people full details of what was expected of them, and they responded.
The civilian population during the last war were genuinely frightened by the possible use of mustard gas and other gases. But we were able—and many of us helped in this—to give instruction and

2003
to provide them with some form of protection. I should like to know if there is to be any protection on the civil defence side such as we were able to issue in the last war in the form of gas masks and protective clothing.
At the present time a great many meetings are being held in the country where people are discussing certain problems to which, I think, the public have a right to know the answers. I will not discuss all of them. One which I think is too technical is, for example question No. 1—the famous equation "E=Mc2, a blessing or a curse"? Questions Nos. 4 and 5 are very important and should be answered. "Which is the most dangerous—internal or external radiation? Can you protect your children, your wife or yourself from the hazards of nuclear radiation."
I listened on 1st April to the speech of the Prime Minister, and I thought that he gave a fairly satisfactory reply to these points. But they have not got over to the general public, and I hope that more effort will be made to instruct people in regard to this in the future. If our whole future is dependent on the statement in paragraph 14 of the White Paper, and by this means we are going to be able to hold our position as a free country, it is very dangerous to put about the type of propaganda which is now being published in such papers as the Tribune.
I should like to read the "Letter to my grandchild," which appeared in that paper and begins:
"My dear grandchild. If you are blind, then let someone else's grandchild who is not dumb or imbecile read this to you. Because I am going to explain to you why we couldn't stop your generation being born backward, deceased, malformed and mutant."
It is very distressing that this type of propaganda should be put about the country. This type of article is far more likely to have detrimental effects on the unborn child than a bomb exploding on Christmas Island. It makes a mother over-anxious and nervous, and it may have far more reaction at the present time on the unborn child than any sort of bomb being exploded thousands of miles away.
Mr. E. Fernyhough: Would the hon. Lady prefer the type of propaganda of the Ministry of Supply which says, "Don't fear the H bomb"?
Miss Vickers: No, I think that one must have a realistic approach. I asked my right hon. Friend to tell people, when I read out the previous questions, to give answers to the questions people are worried about. I do not think it is fair to exaggerate and to put these ideas into the minds of people who, in many cases, are not able to think these points out for themselves. It gives them an unnecessary fright before they have any proper knowledge of the matter.
Dr. Stross: Does not the hon. Lady agree that if we are taking steps which, in effect, may mean the pawning of the future or crippling it, there are no words too strong to use to warn the nation?
Miss Vickers: I think that there is a great deal in what the hon. Gentleman says. One should warn them. We can discuss these things among scientists and doctors like the hon. Gentleman, but we ought not to put them in front of the public as something which may happen when we still do not know that it will happen. That is why I think that we are creating during the year a great deal of anxiety which may be detrimental to the children of this country at the present time.
The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) referred, in HANSARD, column 1791, to his being a Christian, and I must say that we respect his views. I do not think it is a question of Christianity. It is a question of whether one is an idealist or whether one believes in practical action. I have had quite a lot of experience, particularly overseas, and I have found, as a Christian, I am afraid that it is necessary to come down on the side of being practical—God helps those who help themselves."
Throughout history war has always meant great danger for civilian populations. I has meant that many have been forced to fly from their country and become refugees. In past wars many civilians have been besieged in towns and castles, but never before has a whole population been in the front line. That is why I am particularly interested in paragraph 18 with regard to civil defence.
I should like to ask my right hon. Friend the size of the force he intends to recruit. Is it to have local or national organisations? What type of training

2005
equipment is to be provided? How is essential research to be carried out? Are we to face the question of evacuation? Is this policy of evacuation really practical? We know in the West Country that it is contemplated at the present time that there should be the evacuation of thousands of people to Cornwall. Is this giving people false hopes that they will be able to get away and make themselves feel more secure than they are? Personally, I feel that in this small island this evacuation policy is one which we should drop.
I should like also to discuss the question of warning. Paragraph 19 refers to
"Fall-out warning and monitoring system."
Are those warnings going to be any good? I remember quite well one morning, when I lived near Marble Arch, having my breakfast, when a V 2 fell. The first thing I knew was that I was on the floor surrounded by glass. Will there be any chance to have adequate warning in regard to future bombs?
I should like to suggest that the practical way would be to concentrate on training all sections of the population through such organisations as the Red Cross, W.V.S., civil defence courses and St. John on how to treat people when they come into contact with radiation. There should he courses similar to those we had on gas instruction. I suggest that we might start on this in the very near future.
I welcome paragraph 33, because I have had experience in Indonesia, where we had a great many troops from overseas, and in Malaya. I should like to stress the particularly excellent manner in which they fought for their country in Malaya. I agree with the hon. Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman) that people when they are protecting their own country will obviously become a much better fighting force for that purpose than when protecting themselves as a Colony.
With regard to paragraph 44 concerning, the cutting down of the Forces, there will be a great number of civilian employees who are redundant. I hope that those who are established, particularly in the Admiralty service, will get the same consideration—I am referring now to established industrial civil servants—as their counterparts in the Services. I hope
2006
that if they become redundant they also will receive compensation.
I note that paragraph 50 deals with recruitment, which is not, in my opinion, dependent only on the amount of money that is paid over.
Mr. Walter Monslow: Is the hon. Lady referring to the administrative workers or also taking into consideration the industrial workers?
Miss Vickers: I thought I had made that clear; I referred to established industrial civil servants, in whom, as hon. Members know, I am particularly interested. I have about 19,000 of them in my constituency. Many of them are established, and because of their age and the fact that they would not be able to turn readily to other types of work, they may be put in a difficult position if they become redundant. I want to be assured that they will receive the same compensation and consideration as others in the Services are to receive.
Turning to factors influencing recruitment, I should like to know whether it is possible for the majority of regiments to be stationed near towns. Pay has already been improved, but it is important in Service life that the stations should be in a living community and not be an isolated unit. There are many Service towns at the moment, and it is essential, if there is to be a cutting down, that those in the stations in the "wilds", as it were, should be cut out first. People in the peacetime Army and Air Force, particularly in the Army, should be in contact with a community and not have to live an isolated life. I would advocate, therefore, that the garrisons near the towns should be kept and that those in the country should be done away with.
I hope that the Service towns will keep their identity. The inter-relationship between, shall we say, the Royal Navy and the Army is very helpful. I should like, if I may, to suggest that there should be more playing fields provided. One, of the great difficulties in the life of the Service people in the West Country particularly lies in the fact that they have so few forms of recreation and few playing fields are available.
I hope it will not be out of order for me to say something about the Women's Services, although they are not specifically mentioned. I presume that, in the

2007
cutting down of the Services, some reorganisation in the Women's Services will take place. Speaking entirely for myself at the moment, although I recognise the excellent service which they have given, I wonder whether there is any real need for the Women's Services in the future. I should prefer to see women not in uniform in our peacetime Services. The War Office employs civilians and the Army authorities in Singapore employ civilians. I would prefer immobile civilians to be used for this type of work in the future. If, by any chance, their numbers have to be augmented in distant parts of the country where there is need for extra help, we could perhaps provide something like the excellent hostels run by the Y.W.C.A., as was done for Royal Ordnance workers during the war. I would prefer that there should be no women in uniform.
The use of women in the Services is extravagant. One does not really get the full service of the individual in an economic way, because there have to be the ancillaries, cooks, batmen and so forth, thus creating a far larger force of women than is strictly necessary.
Finally, I wish to remind the House that there are towns which have, some for many hundreds of years, been dependent upon the Forces. If I may be parochial for one moment, I want to say something about Plymouth. For over 300 years, the town of Plymouth has been entirely dependent on the Services. The spending of personal money when men are ashore and the work of the Admiralty has provided employment for the majority of the population. For a great many years we have tried to get other industries there, but the Admiralty has been against any form of heavy industry. What policy is to be followed in the future? We are told that there is continuous work available for five to ten years, but that is not enough to guarantee the future economy of any town such as Plymouth.
Whatever the feelings of hon. Members, I hope that we shall agree on one thing in this debate. We must, in the light of what is decided, try to stop the undue anxiety which today presses upon the civilian population. If it is exaggerated, it will do great harm and will have a detrimental effect on the whole country.
7.45 p.m.
Mr. George Thomas: The hon. Lady the Member for Devon-port (Miss Vickers) has brought to the attention of the House some very important questions. In the course of what she had to say, she quoted from my good friend Michael Foot, from, I believe,The Tribune.I took it that that quotation—
Miss Vickers: It was from his paper, but he did not write the article.
Mr. Thomas: I am obliged.
The hon. Lady seemed to think that any reference to the consequences of tests and radioactive material from the sky falling upon people far removed from the explosion is something which is wrong and ought not to be made. The hon. Lady also referred to Civil Defence. I am reminded that, in 1939, the experts told us to put strips of brown paper on our windows, and we should be all right. But the houses went with the windows and the brown paper. I do not put much reliance upon experts.
Some people, if they have been in the Army, seem to regard themselves as military experts. Some, if they have been the Navy, think that they are naval experts. It is astonishing how people have the impertinence to think that a little experience in an occupation entitles them to be regarded as experts upon the whole subject. Those who have been teachers—I say this though I was a teacher—sometimes seem to think that they are experts in education. It is a conceit to which people are not entitled, and especially is that so when we consider major issues of the kind we are discussing tonight.
We heard from my hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Cross-man) a first-class speech. It was followed by what I thought was a first-class speech by the hon. Member for Stafford and Stone (Mr. H. Fraser). They were two speeches of high quality. One is not bound to agree with the conclusions to admire a speech. Yesterday's debate was almost monopolised by Privy Councillors on this side of the House. The back bench speeches today have been of a much higher quality. I only wish that they could have had a chance of being delivered yesterday.
Our debate yesterday was characterised by two basic assumptions: first, that we

2009
must have the hydrogen bomb to defend our people; and, secondly, that it will be used only as a deterrent. The House listened with respect, as it always does, to sincere speeches. They were speeches clouded with anxiety. I much admired, and followed with deep interest, the speech of my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) and the speech of the Minister of Defence himself.
My right hon. Friend made a moving reference to the words of Jesus on the Cross, a thing we do not often do in this Chamber. They were words which silenced us all, because my right hon. Friend, having quoted the words:
"Father, forgive them, they know not what they do."
continued by saying
"We do not know what we do, We do not know the consequences. We do not know that we may not be using the devil's means to interfere with the Creator's purpose."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 16th April, 1957 Vol. 568,
c. 1791.]
There is sufficient in that, I should have thought, for us to say, "Let us halt. If we do not know what we are doing, let us not take another step towards such a purpose". The logic of my right hon. Friend's argument would be that we should remove ourselves from the present policy, where fear dictates to our judgment. Such terrible anxiety and doubt, sincerely expressed by my right hon. Friend, fortifies me in what I want to say to the House tonight.
The White Paper signifies a military revolution equal in significance in our history to the Industrial Revolution of the nineteenth century. Sovereignty in defence is gone. This little nation no longer will rule either the waves or anything else. It will be very lucky if it can keep on its own even keel. As the Minister has said, we now depend upon our allies. Hydrogen bomb or no hydrogen bomb, there is no independence for this country. We depend on people outside in a world that accepts the military way.
The White Paper bravely attempts to face up to the challenge of this new world from the military point of view. It is not necessary to accept the conclusions of the White Paper to acknowledge its virtues. It is a great temptation to me,
2010
as to any other hon. Member, to select the parts of the White Paper with which I can play and to leave the other parts, but this subject is much too serious, for we cannot afford to ignore any of the unpleasant facts which are brought before us.
For the pacifists and for the non-pacifists there are questions that we must ask, for the nuclear age requires fresh thinking on the part of everyone. The militarist tries to deal with his problems in the White Paper. The pacifist has to ask whether the hydrogen bomb is so terrible that it will avoid war in future. Is it such a terrible deterrent that we will never have war again? He has to ask himself whether, if we do not manufacture the hydrogen bomb, we shall he overrun with Communism and become slaves to the philosophy of the Soviet Union.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich (Mr. Stokes) rather amused me yesterday when he divided the world into two parts in this great struggle—Communists and Catholics, the struggle between the Vatican and Moscow. A few of us come under neither of those headings. I must say, seeing the presence of my hon. Friend the Member for Shettleston (Mr. McGovern) in front of me, that we can all seek to make our contribution. Not only pacifists, but all of us, have to ask ourselves whether the rejection of the hydrogen bomb would mean that we must continue with conscription, for that is an argument which has been advanced. I propose to look at these questions and to seek to answer some of them, but also to look first at the military arguments of the White Paper.
We acknowledge in paragraph 15 that we never can compete with America or the U.S.S.R. in the matter of military strength. We acknowledge that we can never be a first-class military Power on a level with those countries, yet we say that we are to have a modest contribution of hydrogen bombs—a modest contribution! I presume, since the White Paper leads to this, that we are to manufacture a stock of these weapons here and that ultimately they are intended to be delivered by rockets, if they are to be deilvered at all.
Is it our intention, when we have a store of hydrogen bombs here, to sit

2011
back and say, "Now, peace is secure" and to rest on the store; for with this appreciable element of nuclear deterrent power I would presume, on the argument of the Government, that then we would not need to go to the next step with whatever other new weapons come about.
The Government have accepted the American policy of massive retaliation as the way for peace, and in paragraph 17 of the White Paper they lay the claim that peace depends on fear of the deterrent. All the Government's strategy is based on fear being sufficiently strong to deter people from resorting to war. All history warns us of the futility of depending on fear as a basis for peace. The Pope, in a pronouncement which has been followed by Church leaders all over the world, said that fear is an inadequate basis for peace. It certainly is an inadequate basis for a Government policy.
The fear of reprisals was thought in 1939 to be strong enough to have prevented a war. All the world knew that the cities of Europe would be laid low if a major war developed. Fear was present among the people, but it did not prevent the war. Fear never prevents war. The hydrogen bomb era means that a fear-stricken Power, believing that it was likely to be attacked, would be all the more likely to try to get its blow in first.
It is not without significance that the countries most fearful today are the nations possessing the hydrogen bomb. India, France, China—
Mr. Emrys Hughes: Ireland.
Mr. Thomas: —and other major countries in the world who do not possess the hydrogen bomb are not as fearful as we are or as Russia or America is. The strongest armed nations today are the nations who are all the time demanding an increase in their strength. It is a strange thing—I hope that my right hon. Friend the Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey) will bear this in mind—that the more military strength a nation possesses, the less secure it feels.
In the question of fear, we have before us the example of Russia, with America's defence lines pressed right up against the Soviet Union with her promise of rocket bases to attack the Soviet Union increasing the tension and not helping the atmosphere of peace in
2012
the world. Small wonder is it that Mr. Bulganin gave a broadcast talk to Asia in which he said, "Surely, no one can complain about Russia arming herself against those who bring their aggressive weapons right up to her frontiers." It is common sense. If the Russians were in South America or near to us—
Mr. Emrys Hughes: In the Isle of Wight.
Mr. Thomas: —we would be in a terrible state of anxiety.
The military philosophy of the White Paper, however, is so decadent that it measures our defence by the number of lives that can be taken in another country and its only consolation for the British people is that a lot of the others will die as well as ours.
The White Paper admits that there is today no defence of Britain. Some bombers will get through. Certainly, some rockets would get through. The White Paper refers to a dozen getting through, with a dozen hydrogen bombs —and we are now declaring as a danger zone for five months of the year an area bigger than the entire area of the United Kingdom for one of our tests. What would be left of this little country? The realist is the man who recognises that we have reached the end of the road. Small wonder that even a man like General Douglas MacArthur has said:
"Modern war has become total insanity."
We have long since said that to prepare for war is to end in war, and all history has pointed to the fact that every armament race in history has ended in war.
The fact that if there were to be war it would wipe out Western civilisation makes us believe that it could not happen. I do not believe that it would end the world. I believe that it would end Western civilisation, and that the people in Asia are wise to try to keep out of this nuclear struggle. The greatest hoax of all is that if we are stronger than our enemies, we are safe. This philosophy has led to a lot of bloodshed through the years. Yesterday's debate played down the destructive power of the hydrogen bomb. In my judgment, both sides placed as little stress as they could upon the effect on the people of the tests that are taking place.
Russia has just made another test. We have had so far 86 nuclear tests by the

2013
U.S.A., 21 or 22, counting the most recent three or four, by the U.S.S.R., quite apart from our own. The hydrogen bomb is an evil thing. It is an offence against God and man. It spreads death and worse over neutral lands as well as belligerents. This weapon need not be used in war in anger to spread its malignant curse.
The scientists of the world are alarmed and warn the politicians of the danger of continued tests. The hon. Lady the Member for Devonport asked whether we could protect people from the radiation effects. Perhaps the House will allow me to quote an extract from what Dr. Coulson, who is the Rouse Ball Professor of Mathematics at Oxford University and one of Britain's leading scientists, said recently:
"The grim part about this is that harm has already been done, and that nothing that we may attempt can now alter it. It is not easy to estimate how far reaching this is, but the experts, people like Nobel-prizewinner Müller and a British Professor J. B. Haldane, are agreed that the radiation already released will, before it has worked itself out, have caused the death of malformation of perhaps 30,000 people."
These are not the exaggerated words of an excited speaker. This is the cold language of the scientist. In the name of all that is righteous, is the House not disturbed by this—that already there is enough dust up above to cause 30,000 people to be malformed, and that we know now that there will be babies who will be born sterile, idiots, or with cancer in their bones, as a result of our experiments for our physical defence? What cowardice this is that, in the name of our defence, we are willing to risk the well-being of unborn generations.
Professor Coulson continued by saying:
"After a test shot on 1st March, 1956, some of the affected areas in the Marshall Islands did not cool sufficiently within a period of twenty months to permit the resumption of normal life."
I recall a debate a few years ago in this House when my hon. Friend the Member for Leek (Mr. Harold Davies), speaking from the bench just below me here, asked what would be the effect on fish and on sea life in the Pacific, and the House laughed at my hon. Friend. There is no laughing today. The Asians are worried and anxious and they believe that we have still that superiority complex that we are willing to take the risk of
2014
poisoning even the fish they eat, whereas we take no risks in the Atlantic with the tests on which we are about to enter.
Our proposed test is an arrogant disregard of the rights and well-being of other people, and we have no moral right, in the name of God or man, to declare that for five months of the year a great ocean of the world is unnavigable and a danger zone. I ask the question: what if the Soviet Union declared the Atlantic to be a danger zone for their tests? We should soon say that it was a breach of international law. This is the old pre-nuclear age mentality, when we were able to push the little peoples around all over the world. Suez has taught us that we cannot do that any more. We are faced with the certain knowledge that the unleashing of further radioactive dust will lead to the birth of babies who will suffer because of our short-sightedness.
The Prime Minister, in his report the other day, submitted two new arguments to the House. He told us that we can have hydrogen bombs exploded without them being detected, and straight away we heard that the Russians had tested another of their bombs. I want to ask on whose advice the Prime Minister was speaking. On the advice of the very people who, for the past year, have been concentrating their attention on building Britain's hydrogen bomb, and who want to test it? The advice of the leading scientists of the world denies the statement which the Prime Minister made. There is no reputable world authority that the Government can quote to say that a hydrogen bomb of any size likely to create this terrible death rate can be exploded in a dark corner, without the world knowing anything about it.
It is also submitted that the radioactive dust can now be controlled. Last year, we had a test of nuclear weapons in Australia in February, and 1,800 miles away from the scene of the test, radioactive dust fell on the mining town of Kudiralla, due to an unexpected wind. The scientist is not born who can control the wind, and this is a field in which I say there is a moral challenge which the politician dare not ignore, for surely there are times when moral considerations must have priority over military considerations, or we are not the House that once we were.

2015
We pride ourselves that this House has been able to give a moral lead to the world. This is our greatest opportunity, for, as my hon. Friend behind me said, we have this weapon and we can manifest to the world that we are not prizing our physical security higher than the well-being of all the other peoples of the world and of generations now unborn. The White Paper says that we have reached a turning point in history, and I submit that the time has now come when somebody must break through the miasma of fear which has decided our policy and perform an act of faith. I am not afraid to ask for a clear lead by unilateral example by Great Britain. A moral lead is bound to be unilateral, or it would not be a lead. At present, we find that the alternative to giving a moral lead to the world is to despair and to enter the race for nuclear power.
How wrong the militarists have been. They persuaded us in this very Chamber that our physical security was menaced unless we rearmed the Germans. We were told that there was a terrible Russian threat. But the Russians were so polite that they have waited while we rearmed the Germans. Now the militarists are saying that they are fearful of these nuclear weapons in the hands of the German people. I am fearful of them being in the hands of any people.
I would like Russia and America to stop the tests. I have influence here which I cannot have there, and I must make my witness where I can. I do not believe that the people concerned are indifferent to world opinion. It was my privilege to undertake a long tour in the United States last year, and it has been my privilege to undertake a long tour in the U.S.S.R. as well. The peoples in those places are the same sort of people as those here, with the same fears and hopes and the same loves and hates. They ask no more from life than we do. I believe that we have clouded our own judgment by the propaganda of the cold war.
Therefore, I say that this little country should use its opportunity now to give an example to the world. The Vice-President of India said recently in a speech quoted in the India News, on 13th April:
"If nuclear powers wait for each other to give a lead, the race will not end."
2016
I move to my conclusion by reminding the House that this little country has been greatly blessed in past years. We have played a part in world affairs out of all proportion to our size. Our faith has made for the greatness of these islands and has decided our conduct. I believe that we are now called upon to abandon this racing after the military might of the bigger Powers and unequivocally and unilaterally to set an example to the world. In this way we shall be the better able to remove the real causes of war and ensure peace by tackling the causes of world hunger, illiteracy and disease by using our resources in the name of brotherhood. It is because I feel deeply on that question that I should like us to abandon the tests and thus take our stand with those peoples of Asia and Africa who look to us to do the right thing.
8.14 p.m.
Major Tufton Beamish: The hon. Member for Cardiff, West (Mr. G. Thomas) always puts his arguments in the House with clarity, sincerity and eloquence, eloquence which I am afraid I cannot match; but to give him that praise does not mean for one moment that I admire his judgment. I cannot help reminding the House that the speech which the hon. Gentleman has just made was made on many occasions in the House in 1938 and 1939 just before the last terrible war broke out. Many speeches were made at that time in almost identical terms. Some might even have been made by the hon. Gentleman himself.
The hon. Gentleman scoffed rather at the argument which he realises many other people use, that if we are stronger than our enemies we are saved. I hope he will not mind my reminding him that we were saved at the end of the 1914–18 war because, in the end, we were stronger than our enemies, and we were again saved in 1945 because, in the end, we were stronger than our enemies. I hope that is not too much of an over-simplification. Even if it is, it is none the less true.
The hon. Gentleman also said that the H-bomb is an evil thing. There is not a right hon. or hon. Member who does not agree wholeheartedly with that. Of course it is a terrible and evil thing.
The Rev. Llywelyn Williams: If what the hon. and gallant Gentleman says is true, how can he justify the cuts in defence expenditure announced by the Minister yesterday?
Major Beamish: I appreciate the hon. Member's point and will come to it a little later.
The terrible thing about the H-bomb is that this evil thing is in the hands of evil people. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh".] Of course it is in the hands of evil people One has only to look at what happened recently in Hungary to know just how evil are the people in whose hands the H-bomb is.
Mr. Fernyhough: What about Hiroshima and Nagasaki? In whose hands was the weapon then?
Major Beamish: One of the oddest things about the debate has been this. For five or six years the Labour Party has been begging the Government on every possible occasion to abolish National Service or reduce it substantially. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] For several years the Labour Party has been asking the Government to slash defence programme expenditure. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] Recently responsible Members of the Labour Party were asking for an immediate cut of £500 million.
Mr. Pargiter: It was £400 million.
Major Beamish: I am grateful for that correction. For a long time the Labour Party has been asking that we should reduce our garrison in Germany, or even withdraw from Germany. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] The Labour Party has for a long been asking that we should abolish or substantially reduce our overseas bases. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] I am glad that on those four items I have not been doing an injustice to hon. Members opposite, because when I have described each of the things that they have been advocating I have been greeted with "Hear, hear," from the Opposition.
The extraordinary thing is that although hon. Members opposite have pressed for these things for five or six years, now that we are taking some very modest steps in those directions we are apparently criticised for doing too much.
2018
[HON. MEMBERS: "No."] Hon. Members opposite who say "No" must read some of the speeches made yesterday, and then they will realise some of the anxieties which have been expressed on that side of the House.
Two former Ministers of Defence and a former Secretary of State for War have shown themselves to be profoundly unhappy about the terms of the Labour Party's Amendment. I should like to put one or two questions to the right hon. Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey) who is to speak later for the Opposition. I am sure he will agree with me that it is extremely important that the country should understand where the Opposition stands on these vitally important questions. Last night the hon. Member for Islington, North (Mr. Fienburgh) used a phrase which obviously needs some further explanation. He said that the Labour Party was in favour of
"some limited degree of … deterrent,"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 16th April. 1957; Vol. 568. c. 1868.]
and he emphasised "limited." I do not understand that. I am sure it meant something, because those words were read from notes. and I have no doubt that they were carefully prepared by the official leadership of the Labour Party and that they have some important meaning. I should like to know exactly what those words mean.
I would also draw attention to something said by the right hon. Member for Ipswich (Mr. Stokes) in a speech which was as stimulating as most of his speeches are. He specifically said that he could agree to the suspension of H-bomb tests only if the Americans would lend us some bombs. I can only conclude from that that in default of that assurance from the United States he will not be voting for the Amendment this evening. I do not think that he is alone in his anxieties about the wording of the Amendment.
The right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) made a very brave effort in opening the debate—nobody likes having to eat his words, but he apparently ate his with considerable relish—but he could not forget that it was only a week or two before that he used these words on the radio:
"We must be able to show any aggressor that we have got the bomb."

2019
He went on in that broadcast, presumably speaking on behalf of the Opposition, not only to say that we had been right to manufacture the bomb, but that we must test it. He used those specific words. Therefore, there has been a complete change of policy on his part.
It is also worth recording, although it has been mentioned once earlier in the debate, that only two years ago the Executive of the Socialist Party passed a resolution saying that it was
"undesirable that we should be dependent on a foreign Power for the production of this vital weapon."
Yet it seems to me that the suspension of the H-bomb tests will quite inevitably make us more dependent upon the foreign Power which they must have had in mind when those words were agreed to. The right hon. Member for Dundee, West, speaking in the defence debate in 1955, described the policy of the deterrent as
"really common ground to all hon. Members." —[OFFICIAL. REPORT, 2nd March, 1955; Vol. 537, c. 2069.]
I hope that I am right in assuming that the right hon. Gentleman has not changed his views about that.
The fact is that a very large section of the party opposite shares the kind of anxieties expressed by the right hon. Member for Bassetlaw (Mr. Bellenger), the right hon. Member for Ipswich, and the right hon. Member for Belper. I beg hon. Members opposite not to think that I am trying to make party capital out of this; it is legitimate to draw attention to differences in the party opposite upon this vital question, and it is important for the country to know where the Opposition stands upon this matter. Many hon. Members opposite feel that the kind of compromise advocated in the Amendment is most unfortunate. I sincerely believe that to be so.
I beg hon. Members opposite not to misunderstand what I am now going to say. I think that it should give considerable pause for thought by the party opposite—the vast majority of whom dislike and detest Communism as much as any of us on this side of the House —that for months past the key point of Communist propaganda in this country has been the suspension of the British H-bomb tests. Over and over again that line has been plugged on Moscow
2020
Radio. It has been plugged every day in the Daily Worker. I have an extract written by Mr. John Gollan in World News of 30th March. He said:
"Scientists, religious and peace organisations, trade unions and Members of Parliament are redoubling their protests which are now building up into a mass campaign for the suspension of the tests"
The Daily Worker has been plugging this line consistently.
Mr. Emrys Hughes: Does not the hon. and gallant Member realise that this would have happened even if there had been no Daily Worker and no Communist Party?
Major Beamish: I believe that to be quite true. I quite appreciate that a very small section of the party opposite sees eye to eye with Communist views. I know that there is another section which has deeply sincere pacifist views, and yet another which sometimes allows its heart to rule its head, but all those sections, even added together, still make up only a small proportion of the Socialist Party.
Mr. Ellis Smith: There is still another section of this party which is sick of war.
Major Beamish: We are all sick of war—and those of us who have seen most of war dislike it most.
I should like to give one more quotation from the British Peace Committee—a Communist Front organisation of which the President is our old friend Mr. Pritt, who used to speak so often in this House. It says:
"The B.P.C. calls for the widest possible activity against the Christmas Island tests… Every M.P. should be urged to speak and vote against the tests."
I am drawing attention to these things not because I believe that the attitude of the Opposition is in the slightest degree tainted by what the Communist Party or their creature organisations have suggested. Some people might suggest that, and in case I might be accused of it I want to say that I dismiss that possibility. I am simply drawing attention to the fact that when one finds oneself advocating something which is being consistently plugged by the British Communist Party, which is the creature of the Soviet Union, one must stop and pause to think whether one is doing the right thing.
It is true of most hon. Members that if we find ourselves advocating this sort

2021
of thing we do stop in our tracks and ask ourselves whether we are doing the right thing. It so happens that in this case the new attitude of the Socialist Party is exactly consistent with the line that has been plugged for months past by the Communist Party.
Mr. Arthur Lewis: Very often the Communist Party drops upon the right line, by accident. Does not the hon. and gallant Member remember that during the Suez war the Communist Party clamoured for Britain to get out of Suez and eventually we got out? Are we to say that we have a Communist Government because they followed the Communist line?
Major Beamish: I cannot honestly see what relevance that remark has to what I am saying. I honestly regard the Amendment which will presumably be voted upon tonight as a very sorry and woolly compromise. It looks to me very much as if the Leader of the Socialist Party thinks that peace within his party is, in some ways, more important than peace in the world. I have no hesitation at all in saying that at this unhappy time in the world's history the power to retaliate against an aggressor is our only insurance against another holocaust.
There is another question which I want to put to the right hon. Member for Dundee, West. The Amendment asks for the suspension of the tests. I think we are entitled to know for how long. The right hon. Member for Ipswich said two or three months at the most. Another hon. Member spoke of the end of the year, and that is about eight months. There is a big difference between the two periods. I am sure that hon. Members opposite know what they mean when they ask for a suspension and that they must have put some kind of limit on the period. I feel it not unreasonable to ask that we should be told what is that limit.
There is another argument which has been mentioned several times during the debate, the argument about dependence on America. The Socialist Party has been saying for some time past that we are much too dependent on America, and a good many of my hon. Friends share that view. But surely it must be obvious that if we suspend the tests and leave for long a situation in which the United States is
2022
our only ally which has an H-bomb that has been tested, we are keeping ourselves dependent on the United States. After all, it was the Socialist Party which agreed to the establishment of American bases in this country. At those bases are stationed American airmen with American bombers, and they have stocks of American bombs. In other words, the vehicles, the men and the weapons all belong to the Americans and, presumably, they can be operated only on American orders.
After the Bermuda Conference and their criticisms of my right hon. Friend for the arrangements he made for the provision of American guided missiles, it comes strangely from hon. Members opposite when they say that we were thereby making ourselves more dependent on America. In my opinion, the Socialist Party must face the fact that if they wish to suspend the H-bomb tests they will keep this country dependent on the United States to a considerable extent.
On the subject of the H-bomb I should like to say a word about what is usually called the graduated deterrent. The hon. Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman) spoke about this in a very interesting speech with which I found myself in considerable disagreement. I feel that no one really knows the complete answer. My right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence chose his words very carefully indeed, and I am speaking only for myself when I say that, in default of an international agreement, with the sort of watertight guarantees for international inspection which any disarmament agreement must contain, we should be making a great mistake if we did not preserve our right to use whatever weapons we consider necessary in the national interest for our defence. At the moment I do not see how we can go beyond that point, and therefore I feel that we must make this reservation, while continuing to try by every possible means to ensure that a disarmament agreement is reached.
I do not understand the suggestion contained in the Amendment that some new initiative should be made. New initiatives are being made every day and every week and every month in an attempt to try to find a satisfactory arrangement for disarmament. The last paragraph of the communiquéfrom the Bermuda Conference made this clear. I refer to

2023
paragraph 5 in Annex 2 which I should like to read. It states:
"We shall continue our general practice of publicly announcing our test series well in advance of their occurrence with information as to their location and general timing. We would be willing to register with the United Nations advance notice of our intention to conduct future nuclear tests and to permit limited international observation of such tests if the Soviet Union would do the same."
I very much hope that tonight my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, who has just come in, will be able to tell the House whether the Soviet Union have agreed to that simple suggestion as a modest step in the direction of some kind of disarmament agreement. I am sure that that is something which the House would like to know, and I do not think it is fair or reasonable for the Socialist Party to suggest that no new initiative has been taken.
Hon. Members opposite seem to forget that even today at Lancaster House a Disarmament Commission is carrying on a debate which has been going on for years, both during the time when the party opposite was in power and since we have been in power. The fact is that we have been no more successful in persuading the Soviet Union to take any real steps in the direction of disarmament than was the party opposite when it was in power. Let us face that.
I promised to sit down at twenty-five minutes to nine. I have only thirty seconds left. I must miss out some excellent passages which I intended to put into my speech. I will conclude by saying that the White Paper is logical, precise and blunt. I offer to the Minister of Defence my most sincere congratulations on the forthright and hopeful start he has made in outlining so boldly our future defence policy.
Mr. John Strachey Mr. John Strachey (Dundee, West) rose—
Mr. Lewis: On a point of order. Before my right hon. Frined the Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey) speaks may I, as an hon. Member who has not attempted to get into the debate, ask you, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, what safeguards there are for back bench Members of the Opposition? We have had a two-day debate. Only one back bencher was called yesterday and only three have been
2024
called today; that is four in two days. Right hon. Gentlemen have been speaking. I see that there will now be one and a half hours to be shared between the two Front Benches.
Would you put to Mr. Speaker the view I am putting, and which, I am sure, is shared by all hon. Members, that for the two Front Benches to take up two-thirds of a two-day debate is, from the back benchers' point of view, taking liberties with the House of Commons? We feel that half an hour for any Front Bench speaker is ample, and that Front Bench speakers should limit their speeches to enable back benches to get in.
Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Sir Gordon Touche): The hon. Member will be well aware of the rule of the House that Privy Councillors have priority. If Members of the House want to make any change in that rule it is for Members of the House to make representations on the subject.
8.36 p.m.
Mr. John Strachey: I would begin by taking up the point made by the Minister of Defence in opening yesterday's debate when he launched himself into a discussion of the different kinds of war: limited and unlimited war and conventional and nuclear war: and two kinds of nuclear war: the all-out limited nuclear war using the ultimate weapon of the H-bomb and the war using the tactical atomic weapon and not the ultimate deterrent.
This is unquestionably and undeniably the most difficult and perplexing problem. I doubt whether any of us knew quite how difficult and perplexing it was until the Minister of Defence tried to explain it to us. He made confusion worse confounded about this issue, which is an important one. If we look at the responsible Press this morning we see that the right hon. Gentleman confused and disturbed responsible opinion a good deal on this matter. He has only to look at the leading articles in The Times and in the Manchester Guardian to see that that was so, and particularly so when he dealt, or attempted to deal, with the exceptionally important issue of the tactical atomic weapon.
All I want to say about this to the House is: do not doubt that I sympathise with the Minister of Defence. It is obviously a subject of the greatest possible

2025
difficulty, but the more I think of it and the more events unwind the less chance there seems that a war, certainly a war in Europe, in which tactical atomic weapons were used, could possibly stop short at that point. It seems more and more likely—I do not say certain, because that would be going too far—that it would go to the ultimate length and involve the use of the ultimate weapon of mass destruction. Therefore, the use of the tactical atomic weapon becomes something which we should regard with the utmost reluctance.
A great deal of thinking has been done on this matter of which the Minister of Defence seemed signally ignorant. There has been all the thinking which has been done by the earnest advocates of what is called the "graduated" deterrent. I have studied all the things that they have said as carefully as I could, but I have never been able to believe—I wish I could—that they were right in thinking that some kind of Queensberry Rules for atomic warfare could be devised. I do not think that that is so.
If that is not so, if once we have used atomic tactical weapons which are enormously powerful and are well on the way to ultimate unlimited war, it seems to me that not only the philosophy of the White Paper in some respects, but also the military thinking of N.A.T.O., needs very careful reconsideration. I more and more feel that the conclusion towards which my mind, at any rate, is moving —I do not say that it is a firm one—is not that we do not want ground forces —by no means that conclusion—but that the real rôle of the ground forces of this country, of N.A.T.0.. and of our allies in Europe is in the so-called conventional rôle, the non-atomic rôle altogether.
I think Captain Liddell Hart, in his recent letter to The Times, coined a good phrase for that. It is what he called "the fire extinguisher rôle". I think that there is a vitally important rôle in Europe, as elsewhere, not for large, but efficient, highly-mobile forces, not using or dreaming of using at this stage atomic weapons, to act as a fire extinguisher, as he graphically put it, for what begin merely as frontier incidents and to quench potential fires; to vary the metaphor, to nip in the bud incidents which, if not nipped in the bud, can become extremely dangerous.
2026
That is really the reason why, in our Amendment, we take the view that the Government have swung over and are now emphasising too exclusively the nuclear deterrent. They have gone to that extreme. That is why we criticise the White Paper in that respect for it seems to us to underestimate, or, at any rate, it gives the impression of underestimating, the remaining and vitally important rôle of conventional forces. I say "to give the impression" of doing so, because I am not sure that that is the intention of the Government, but I assure them that that is the impression which has been given to our allies in Europe.
The hon. Member for Scotstoun (Sir J. Hutchison), who is in his place, told the House that yesterday. Anyone who has been in Europe—we were together at a conference in Europe—knows that is so. Even if it were not true it is a very serious thing indeed to have given that impression to our allies. One thing which we really must not do is to get into the tragic dilemma in which, faced by a frontier incident, an episode quite small in itself—it is only too easy to think of instances—we must either accept a small but perhaps fatal fait accompli or blow up the world.
That would be a fatal position to get into. For lack of attention to and consideration of the remaining rôle of non-nuclear forces, that is a dilemma in which Mr. Dulles found himself when he spoke of massive retaliation. I do not say that the White Paper has got to that dilemma, but it points towards it and we emphasise that in the Amendment because we think the Government have swung too far in that direction.
Having listened to the speech of the Minister of Defence, I ask him and the Government to give the most careful thought to this desperately important issue of tactical atomic weapons. I could not go so far as the Manchester Guardian goes today and say that we should simply scrap the intermediate stage of tactical weapons. My mind has not reached that point. It might, in the end, be the right conclusion, but there are obvious and very great objections to that. The rôle of those weapons seems to me to become more and more doubtful and there is a higher and higher premium on keeping any conflict, any armed conflict even, which may arise on an

2027
altogether non-nuclear or conventional level.
That brings me to the main theme of our debate—it has necessarily been our main theme—of the other kind of war, the most dreadful kind of war, unlimited war. I think that the Minister of Defence became so confused on this issue mainly because he did not see that what differentiates unlimited war, all-out war, from limited war is not, in essence, the weapons which are used, but the aim: is the aim a limited aim or is it an unlimited aim? If it is an unlimited aim, if the aim of either side is the total destruction of their opponents, unconditional surrender, then no matter what weapons we start with, it will almost certainly go the whole length. This is the real issue and it is vitally important that it should be seen that this is what divides limited from unlimited war.
If we debate the issue of unlimited war, which obviously overshadows all our debates in the House and has certainly overshadowed this debate, we are debating it under a new official declaration of the utmost importance—the declaration in the White Paper, which has also been made repeatedly by Government spokesmen, that in the case of unlimited war there is no possible physical military defence for the people of these islands. That is stated in the famous paragraph 12 of the White Paper and it was said far more bluntly by the Minister of Defence in a broadcast on 5th April. His words are worth quoting:
"There is no longer any way of defending this country, or for that matter any other country, against the absolutely devastating effect of an attack with hydrogen bombs."
Even more striking in some ways were the Prime Minister's words in his speech to the English-Speaking Union, when he said:
"Let us be under no illusion. Military forces today are not designed to wage war. Their purpose is to prevent it. Total war can only mean total destruction."
The Prime Minister is perfectly right, but we must take him at his word, and we must be under no illusion what those words mean. When he suggests that we cannot think of or prepare for the waging of unlimited nuclear war, he is right for the simple reason that once unlimited nuclear war has broken out we shall not be here to wage it. That is a vital consideration. Every hon. Member must readjust his thinking to that. It brings
2028
something new in the history of this country, although some of us have suggested it in successive defence debates in earlier years.
To have that official pronouncement of the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence and the White Paper presents us with a new position, and what the Labour Party have been doing in these weeks is to attempt to adjust our thinking and our feeling to that position.
In his opening speech, the Minister of Defence made a great deal of play—it was the main other part of his speech—of these strivings of the Labour Party to adjust its thinking and feeling on this matter. It might have been a very good knockabout winding-up speech, but was not so good as an opening speech. I do not know what kind of speech the Prime Minister will make in winding up the debate. He may reverse the process and wind up with an opening speech, or he may again point to these heart searchings, the deep disturbances of mind and spirit that exist in this party.
We give him that right away. It is all perfectly true. These things have happened. We have been deeply and profoundly disturbed about all this, and I am moved once more to ask right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite if they also have really had no heart searchings on this issue also. The Minister of Labour said that they had had none at all; that they were perfectly easy in their minds about it. We find that very odd. In our opinion, it is not very easy to find the right national policy for this country in this situation.
If we have been in travail, trying to find it, it is probably true that, in the short run, immediate capital can be made of it, and we might lose ground for a few weeks on that issue; but I think that, in the long run, we shall find that the country will prefer people who have tried to face the issue honestly, even if it has exposed disagreements among them, rather than a party which, as far as we can see, has passively and quite easily accepted the policy of the Government, which seems to be to press on first with the manufacture and then with the testing of the hydrogen bomb without any real attempt whatever to secure, not unilateral but multilateral disarmament agreements on the subject.

2029
The Prime Minister has said, and, I dare say, will say again—and it is a serious charge, of course—that not only have we on this side had these disagreements and difficulties and arguments, but that, in the end, we have failed to come to an agreed policy. That, as I say, would be a serious charge, because we must run to an agreed policy, but the charge is simply untrue. The policy may be right or wrong, it may be criticised—any policy can be criticised—but we have come to a perfectly clear and definite policy, and it is easy to state. It has been stated repeatedly in this debate, and perhaps I may repeat it again. It may be stated in two short propositions—almost in words of one syllable.
The first proposition is to go to the other two nuclear Powers, and to the rest of the world—and already it is important to say that—and simply to say, "We will stop, if you will stop." That is, in its simplest and most coloquial form, the traditional policy of disarmament which this party has had for many years. We apply it simply in this new field of the thermo-nuclear weapon. We have now added to that a second proposition. It is that while we do that, while we make the attempt to get a real nuclear disarmament conference—and a convention to come from it—we suspend the test detonations.
Is that right or wrong? It is interesting to notice in the Press—and, I think, in some speeches in this House, also—the very strong criticism which has been made of the Russians. The Russians have been loosing off a whole series of nuclear detonations in the last few weeks, and, at the same time, they have been telling us, "We are all in favour of everybody stopping these tests." There is nothing at all illogical in the Russians saying that, but we have all felt, and said, that, psychologically, it spoiled the whole effect—that the Russians were, at the same time, loosing off a whole series of nuclear detonations.
If we really mean to make an effort to get the tests stopped, which is the first step—only a short one, but the first one—in stopping the nuclear arms race, if we really want to make an impression on the world, we must not do what the Russians have done. It is bad psychology. We must have a pause. We must suspend the tests, as we say in our
2030
Amendment, for the limited period necessary to make those offers.
That is exactly the policy of this party. It may be right or wrong, but it is simply not the case that we have not arrived at a definite clear-cut policy which can be stated, attacked and defended; it is simply not susceptible to the criticism that it is vague and undecided.
I want to say only one thing more about the tests issue, which is not the main issue. The nuclear arms race itself is the main issue. It may be asked, "What if that policy succeeds? What if you do get your nuclear disarmament conference; and what if America, Russia and the other potential nuclear Powers all agree not to have any further tests, and agree before we have had our tests? Would you agree to that? Do not let me burke that issue. That would be a very heavy national sacrifice for this country. The country would have to think many times about that before possibly agreeing to it.
I would, however, ask the Prime Minister this question, as my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition did the other day: would the Government commit themselves, here and now, to saying that in all circumstances they are determined to go on with the nuclear tests? For example, if, in such a conference, the Americans repealed the McMahon Act and gave us their information, and if nothing else stood in the way of an all-round international standstill on nuclear tests, would they now commit themselves, in the face of that, to a decision, whatever happened, to go on with our tests?
If they would, I think that they would be extremely rigid. They would be very unwise to do so in advance of the event. Far from my right hon. Friend failing to face the issue when he said he could not commit himself there, it seems to me that he was striving to face this exceedingly difficult and complex issue of the tests much more carefully and realistically than anyone else has done before.
So much for the tests. Of course, they constitute only a first step in nuclear disarmament as a whole. I can only imagine an international standstill on the tests as a temporary halting point which would either then break down or would lead on towards general nuclear disarmament. I

2031
should be asked there—and it is a perfectly fair question—whether I couple that with general disarmament, with disarmament in conventional weapons as well, because of the old point—I think there is much less in it than there was, but there is still something in it—that nuclear disarmament by itself would give a differential advantage to the Russians rather than—to the West.
I am bound to say that I thought the Minister of Defence hugely overstated that argument today, but there is obviously some force in it. What I say is, "Yes, of course we should lead in that general disarmament. Far more than that, why have we not, during the past few months, put forward proposals for conventional disarmament?"
The most extraordinary thing about this whole White Paper is that here we suddenly announce that we are, quite unilaterally in this case, to reduce our conventional Armed Forces to 375,000 men and we make no effort whatever to use that as a bargaining factor for conventional disarmament in the rest of the world. I really am curious about this, and I hope that the Prime Minister will tell us why, after we made our announcement in the White Paper, we went on talking, at Lancaster House, about a limit of 750,000 men. Surely this showed that we are carrying on the disarmament negotiations, such as they are, really quite in the void without any reference to what we are actually doing with our own arms at all.
That gives me more than anything else the impression that the Government are not taking disarmament seriously at all. They arc just saying that that is a sort of quadrille which has to be danced at Lancaster House. The proposals which they put forward have no real reference to their defence policy. I think that that is w hat at heart they think. They feel that we are sentimentalists and unrealistic when we think that the two ought to be really brought together and some attention paid to the disarmament issue. That seems to me to be the point where conventional and nuclear disarmament could have been brought together with tremendous effect and where we really might have had a chance of going forward.
Here, of course—let me say at once—I am not underestimating the difficulties of
2032
nuclear disarmament beyond the tests. They are not the difficulties mentioned by the Minister of Defence, of a differential advantage to the Russians, but they are the difficulties of inspection and control. They are very real and baffling. Therefore, if I may return to the tests for one moment, that is why we think that the tests, where these difficulties are, at any rate, far less, are incomparably the best first step towards nuclear disarmament.
The Prime Minister has, in recent weeks, made tremendous play with this new view that after all, and contrary to what everybody has said up to now, the nuclear tests cannot be detected and, therefore, the whole difficulty of inspection and control really arises. I should like to ask him a question on this and I am sure that he will give me an answer. Is it not still so that any test which is big enough to do appreciable harm to the health of the world is, ipso facto, big enough to detect?
I am not suggesting that there are no tests which cannot be detected. It is quite probable that there are. But when we are talking in terms of raising appreciably the radiation level of the world, of the lethal fall-out from tests, those are surely precisely the things that can be detected and, therefore, the fact that automatic detection, as it were, would not apply to all tests—may be it would not—is not really relevant to this issue. What we want to get, what the world wants to get passionately, is a stay, at any rate, to the tests which are doing physical harm to the people here and now.
Perhaps harm is not being done to very many, but scientists are not very sure about that. I see even, in today's newspapers, that one group of scientists has just revised its viewpoint and put out a good deal more disturbing verdict on the strontium 90 side of the issue. But that the tests are doing some harm is. I think, common ground to everyone. Those tests, at any rate, can still be detected internationally very much more easily than can the manufacture and storage of the weapon.
Here, surely, is the place to begin the process, and I hope that the Prime Minister will deal with that issue. Nuclear disarmament itself is the only thing that can really save the world, not

2033
the stopping of the tests. That can only be a halting point. But nuclear disarmament itself can obviously only come as a part—part cause and part effect—of a general amelioration and relaxation of tension in the world. Nobody denies that. But is that not precisely the reason why it must be the objective of the most sustained efforts on the part of this country, because that alone is of any real good to us?
I want now to say why we on this Bench and on this side of the House, the majority of us, cannot go further than that. There are, of course, as we know, hon. Members who take a different view. One of them is my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, West (Mr. G. Thomas), who made an admirable and moving speech in favour of unilateral nuclear disarmament. There are some of my hon. Friends on this side, pacifists, as he is, who take that view. I should like to say a word or two to explain why we cannot go that far. There are hon. Members opposite also, I believe, who—
Mr. V. Yates: Non-pacifists, also.
Mr. Strachey: I was going on to say that there are other hon. Members, non-pacifists, who are in favour of unilateral nuclear disarmament by this country, which amounts, in effect, to the scrapping of nuclear weapons by this country, whatever anybody else might do. I believe that there are hon. Members opposite who take that view, but for other reasons.
This view, the non-pacifist view, was put in detail by my hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Cross-man) in the debate today. The argument, putting the core of it, is that, when it really comes down to the point, it is not worth while for this country to try to make a contribution to the nuclear deterrent; what we can add to the forces of the West will make so very little difference that we should not attempt to have nuclear weapons, certainly not thermo-nuclear weapons, and probably not—my hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, East thought—nuclear weapons of any kind. It is said that we should concentrate what defence effort we can make on conventional arms while, as it were, sheltering under the American nuclear umbrella.
2034
My first comment on that non-pacifist position is this. I hope that the House realises that there is no moral advantage whatever in that standpoint. It is not really any better to depend on somebody else's l hydrogen bomb than to have a hydrogen bomb of one's own. Frankly, I find it unpalatable when hon. Members, in any part of the House, express their horror at our producing the hydrogen bomb or testing it and then make it perfectly clear, in the next few sentences, that they are wholly relying for their safety on American hydrogen bombs.
I find this particularly unpalatable when it comes from hon. Members—this applies to both sides of the House, I think—who are foremost in advocating policies contrary to, independent of, and flouting the policies of the United States. If we take the line that we can depend entirely on the American nuclear umbrella, we really must not, at the same time, flout the United States and think that we can run a completely independent world policy. We cannot do things in that way.
Major Sir William Anstruther-Gray: The right hon. Gentleman will surely agree that that policy is not adopted by many hon. Members on this side of the House. It is to be found upon his own side.
Mr. Strachey: The advocacy of policies entirely independent of and contrary to the policy of the United States is certainly advocated by very many hon. Members opposite. Indeed, it reaches the Order Paper.
I think that most Members who take this view see and realise that it entails almost complete dependency on the United States, and I understand their point of view. They feel that Britain, resigned and a little weary, can, as it were, leave the world stage of the great world events, can leave it to the great Powers, America and Russia, to pursue, undisturbed and undeflected, their terrible nuclear duologue. That is a view which I can understand and in the post-Suez disillusionment it is certainly a view which will appeal to quite a number of people.
I do not attach great importance to the arguments which have been usually raised against it. There was the argument that we must have our own hydrogen bombs for the selection of targets. Of course,

2035
there is something in that, but it is contrary to the Prime Minister's point of thinking about waging an unlimited nuclear war; and that is a rather remote contingency for us.
It is true that in the present world situation it is fairly difficult to imagine any situation of unlimited world war—even its threat—in which we should have any particular use for our own hydrogen bomb as a part and as totally independent of that of America. One could imagine such a situation, but, again, it is fairly remote.
The real argument which sways me is different. If, in default of world nuclear disarmament in whole or in part—which, I repeat, is the only salvation—the other Powers insist on going on, with the utmost reluctance we cannot unilaterally and, by example, abandon the hydrogen bomb.
What one has to realise here is that what we are settling is the future of our country, not for just three or four years or a decade even, but probably over the whole remaining fifty years of this century. What we are really settling is the position of this country in the future world thirty, forty or fifty years hence. I do not know, none of us knows, what that world will be like, but I would say that we do, perhaps, know one thing: that it will not be at all like the present world situation.
We are much too apt to presuppose that the present world situation of the two great power blocs of Russia and America will continue for ever. In my opinion, that is very unlikely. What will Russia be like forty or fifty years' hence, or America, China, India or West Germany? None of us knows these things.
If, again, we have not succeeded in getting nuclear disarmament, if we have not succeeded in getting all-round agreement to ban nuclear weapons, it will be a fairly rough world. In such a world as that, in which the alignment of power is quite unforeseeable, can we take the decision now, which we should have to do if we went in for unilateral nuclear disarmament by example, that in such a world as that, this small and very vulnerable, but, to us, infinitely precious, island should be quite helpless? That is what it would be.
2036
Those are the long-term reasons which seem to me decisive in the end, because what a tragedy it would be if this country, in this year, 1957, lacked the will and the nerve to preserve itself and its enormous influence for good in the world by taking that step of rendering itself negligible by unilateral nuclear disarmament by example. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."]
Having said that—and I am afraid that hon. Members opposite will not like what I am going to say now quite as much—the decision, which was shared by both political parties, to equip this country with nuclear weapons, and I think that this has emerged over the last two years, can be nothing but a stop-gap, an indispensable stop-gap, perhaps, something which we cannot avoid, but it has no real salvation for this country in it. Once we realise both these things, surely the country is faced, and the Government are faced while they are the Government, with enormously difficult psychological problems.
On the one hand, it seems to me Britain cannot render herself negligible in the affairs of the world by a unilateral decision to undertake nuclear disarmament by example, but, on the other, the only really useful purpose, and the only really useful thing, which can save us is to devote our whole efforts to the achievement of all-round nuclear disarmament.
Brigadier O. L. Prior-Palmer: The right hon. Gentleman has touched on the point only lightly, but would he not agree that all-round multilateral nuclear disarmament, if it were not accompanied by all-round multilateral disarmament in conventional weapons, would set a light to the biggest arms race in conventional weapons that has ever been seen?
Mr. Strachey: The hon. and gallant Member should remember that conventional disarmament is going on rapidly on both sides. We have cut down our forces, the Russians have cut their forces, and the Americans have cut down their forces. I do not think that there is any difficulty on that score.
Of course, I shall be told that that position is too psychologically difficult—that the ordinary man will insist upon an

2037
"either-or" position. He will insist that either we must scrap all nuclear weapons, regardless of what everybody else does, or we must retain all nuclear weapons, regardless of what anyone else does. Of course, these are both far easier positions to argue, far more attractive positions, far more clear-cut, definite and forthright. There is only one objection to both these positions, and it is that they are absolutely disastrous.
Therefore, if this country is really to be what it claims to be—the most mature political country in the world—I say that it must go for the only objectively realistic position of seeking all-round nuclear disarmament, because that is the only thing that actually makes sense, however psychologically difficult it is to sustain.
At bottom, that is the real reason why we shall divide the House tonight. [Laughter.] Yes, certainly. It is not on the military criticisms which we have of the White Paper. We have made these, and I think they are important, but the real reason why we are dividing the House, and we say it in our Amendment in its last clauses, is because it seems to us—unless the Prime Minister can tell us differently—that the Government are not making a real effort to achieve all-round nuclear disarmament.
What are the Government doing? We have heard during the last few days that at Lancaster House the British representative has done no more than give rather tepid support to some rather tepid American proposals for the limitation of nuclear weapons. For Britain—this island which has just been told by the Government, by the Prime Minister and by the Minister of Defence, that it is indefensible from nuclear weapons and that it can be blotted out by nuclear weapons—to be doing only that is madness. Britain ought, in season and out of season, to be taking the lead in nuclear disarmament. That is the only practical, tolerable policy for this country.
Therefore, we divide the House because, above all, we see no sign of a recognition by the Government that the only salvation for Britain is to lead the nations of the world back from the abyss of nuclear suicide.
9.21 p.m.
The Prime Minister (Mr. Harold Macmillan): I listened with great attention to the speech of the right hon. Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey), as, indeed, did the whole House, and I am bound to say that I found a great deal in what he said with which I was in full agreement. I thought it rather a feat of mental acrobatics, however, to connect the main argument of his speech with the Amendment which he was supporting. I cannot help saying—I am sure he will not think it discourteous of me—that I feel that the real reason for dividing the House is an attempt to unite his party.
The Defence White Paper, which the House is asked to approve, has been generally recognised as an imaginative and constructive statement of military policy, perhaps the most imaginative and constructive that has been made by any great nation since the war. Naturally—I fully admit it—it has been the cause, like any radical approach to this problem, of some anxiety among our allies, especially on its first publication, for on a cursory reading it might seem to look forward to a diminution of British military strength. The right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) and the hon. Member for Lincoln (Mr. de Freitas) both made this point.
I must make it clear that we did not confront our allies in N.A.T.O. or in Western European Union with sudden decisions. As long ago as October, 1955, the then Minister of Defence proposed a radical review of the N.A.T.O. defence effort, and he urged this again in N.A.T.O. in the following December and again in May, 1956. When I was Chancellor of the Exchequer, I specifically stated at the N.A.T.O. meeting in Paris in December, 1956, that for the last five years the United Kingdom have enjoyed the unenviable distinction of devoting a larger proportion of resources to defence and a smaller proportion to internal investment than any other European member of N.A.T.O., and I made it clear that we were reviewing the whole character of our defence expenditure, including the manpower demands of our Forces.
We have scrupulously followed our obligations to both organisations, and it is really a dis-service to this country to

2039
suggest anything different. We consulted our N.A.T.O. allies through all this long period, and we have obtained the agreement of our partners in Western European Union. I should like to express the gratitude of the Government to them for the understanding that they have shown. The more our proposals have been studied the more their true nature and value have been appreciated.
The hon. Member for Lincoln referred to some criticisms of the White Paper, made by a Washington correspondent, but I was glad to note that so experienced a soldier as President Eisenhower only a few days ago said that he admired the courage and nerve which this country had shown in drawing up this plan, and that it represented an effort to bring our military establishment into line with the military facts of today and to keep our economy viable. That is a higher authority than that of some newspaper correspondent, however distinguished.
There are really three vital aspects to the whole question: the size of the forces; the character of the forces, and the nature of the weapons with which they are to be armed. Upon the decision about the last of the three aspects the first two must necessarily depend, for if we are to accept anything like a cut of nearly half in our manpower force, and if we are to pin ourselves—as we do —upon the determination to raise all Regular forces, it is clear—to me, at any rate, and, I believe, to the House as a whole that not only must such forces be made mobile by the provision of modern transport, about which much was said today and yesterday, but they must be armed and backed by the most effective weapons which are available.
Therefore, whether we like it or not, the decision upon the weapons—and it is a terrible decision—governs the whole issue. Without the nuclear deterrent it is obvious that a reduction of forces of this kind becomes impossible. Indeed, much larger forces would be required if we were to rely entirely upon conventional forces. In that case there would be no hope of raising the necessary men upon a voluntary basis, and then it would be all over with any chance of abolishing conscription.
I looked at the Amendment in vain for some reference to National Service. It
2040
is quite an important part of these proposals.
The fundamental question which the House must face today—as it has faced it in recent debates, under Governments of both complexions—and face without "vacillation," if I may borrow one of the words of the Amendment, is whether or not the nuclear deterrent is to form the basis of British defence planning. If this is not faced, no one, except perhaps a genuine pacifist, has a right to urge the ending of National Service. There can be no doubt at all about this. Short of general disarmament—which is the ideal that we all seek—the end of conscription must depend upon the acceptance of nuclear weapons.
Before coming to this supreme issue, to which the right hon. Gentleman devoted the whole of his speech, and to which I shall devote the greater part of what I have to say, I want to answer some specific questions raised by the right hon. Member for Belper and especially the hon. Member for Lincoln. If I have misunderstood them, they will correct me, but I thought that they suggested that we had taken some risks—perhaps even some grave risks—in reaching decisions especially about the means of delivery of the bomb while so many problems of production and development were unresolved.
I assume that they were referring to the decision not to proceed with the supersonic bomber. The present family of V-bombers, with their normal developments, are expected to do good service for many years. If research and development upon the supersonic bomber were to go on now it could not be ready in under ten years—that is the information that we are given. Within that time, in addition to the remaining V-bombers we shall have the support of rockets.
The agreement which we have made in principle with the United States, when it is worked out in detail, will provide us with American missiles with American warheads. It is quite true that these warheads will be in American custody, as United States law requires. I am always being urged to try to get the United States law altered. It is quite easy to say that; it is not quite so easy to do. I have not quite so good a majority in Congress as I have here in the House of Commons. They will, therefore, be in

2041
American custody under what is called the "key of the cupboard" arrangement.
They cannot, therefore, be used—though I think they have a deterrent effect, because the object of a deterrent is really not to use it—without American consent. Of course, this applies even more strongly to the American bombing force over here, by agreement with the Labour Government, where both the bomb and the means of delivery are under the control of the Americans subject to our veto. That is the first thing we shall have. I am trying to justify the decision not to go on with the supersonic bomber. It is a big decision, but I am sure it is a right one.
Secondly, as I have already said, we are not precluded from making our own warheads. It may be that we shall make our own rockets and warheads before we make a British warhead for the American rocket—it may he. Thirdly, and this is very important, by the experience which British officers arid men will have in using the American missiles, and by our continued co-operation in this field of work, we shall be able to concentrate our research and development on more advanced types of our own. I thought it right to deal in a little detail with that, because it is a question which I know arouses considerable interest, both inside this House and outside.
I now come to the terms of the Opposition Amendment. It regrets and deplores the repeated "vacillation" and lack of "firm decisions"—words which I should have thought, in this context at any rate, it might have been wiser for the Opposition to eschew. The Amendment goes on to regret
"the undue dependence on the ultimate deterrent on which the policy … "
seems to be based. It seems to me that we must either depend on the deterrent to stop global war or not depend on it. It is quite true—and this was the point raised by the hon. Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman) and other hon. Members—that to prevent the dangers of infiltration and the gradual seepage of aggressive forces into neighbouring territories, without actually bringing into play the massive counter-attack, conventional forces are necessary. Of course they are, as they are necessary for our manifold commitments overseas. Of course they are necessary, and it may well be that these forces, especially in Europe, will
2042
have, as they already have had, an element of tactical atomic weapons. I think the reason is that they serve a double purpose.
Their first purpose—it was well put by the right hon. Member for Dundee. West —is to prevent mere frontier incidents from developing into a serious situation; what I think the right hon. Gentleman called—quoting a distinguished military author—a "fire extinguisher." That is their first purpose. They have a second purpose, that if a real major attack were to develop—which, of course, might become known by other means, by the size and character of it—if the enemy were determined to launch a real major war with the aim of absolute victory, why, then, these forces must have this element in order to hold the position long enough for the nuclear counter-measures to become effective. Were these forces wholly withdrawn, there would be great danger to Europe which they avert by their existence in N.A.T.O. The hon. Member for Coventry, East devoted a good deal of a very skilful speech to trying to make this position absolutely precise I have heard it in other debates—to define exactly what would be the occasion when conventional resistance would he right and what would be the occasion when almost all-out war would be necessary.
This is very dangerous. We had it two years ago in a famous debate on a White Paper, and I venture to repeat what I said then—to define too closely seems to be almost to incite and invite aggression. Anyway, to provide all this is the function of N.A.T.O. The particular methods of carrying out these purposes must change from time to time as reassessments of the position are made; but this is N.A.T.O.'s broad function.
I want to make it clear here, and I hope overseas, that in making a reduction in the actual number of men we shall have in Europe I do not believe that we shall be reducing the striking power of our forces. I think this point was raised by the right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell), who is a former Minister of Defence. In replanning our contribution to N.A.T.O., we propose to make a very small reduction in the teeth to give them more bite and, by various means, to make drastic reductions in the tail. Anyone who looks at the figures will be rather

2043
horrified at the present proportions between the two.
When I knew that the right hon. Member for Belper was to speak yesterday, I wondered how he would set about his task. I will say for him that he put a very bold front upon it and adopted very good tactics, and I think we all admired him for it. There is a story about Disraeli with which all hon. Members might not be familiar which seems very apposite. One of his Governments got into a good deal of trouble; I think it was on a Home Office affair. Mr. Cross, who was the Home Secretary, had to defend the Government's position. He said to the Prime Minister, "This is a very difficult matter. We are in great trouble. What do you think I had better do? Shall I be short and clear?" Disraeli replied, "No. You should be prolix and obscure."
The right hon. Member for Belper told us at the end of his speech that he found the whole thing very confusing and that a lot of worthy people held different views about the question of the bomb. Of course, that is absolutely true, and not at all to be wondered at. The trouble is that those who carry responsibility, and perhaps even those who aspire to responsibility, must make decisions; and on this matter a decision must be made now. Individuals and private persons can enjoy the luxury of vacillation, but those who govern or wish to govern must boldly proclaim their opinions and act in accordance with their duty.
I said that I admired the bold and gallant effort of the right hon. Member for Belper. What about the Leader of the Opposition? What was his position? I do not understand it at all. The "lost leader" I might call him. In a debate a few weeks ago, he was almost forthcoming when I asked him, the House will remember, to answer a simple question, whether, if he were in my position, he would go on with the bomb test. Although he hedged the reply with a good many if and buts, the general impression is that he came down, gingerly and nervously, but still came down, definitely on the Government side of the fence. I will not charge the right hon. Gentleman with any clarity of expression, but I think that was generally the way in which the House and the country understood his statement.
2044
In spite of the ingenious arguments and, if I may say so, brilliant arguments of the right hon. Member for Dundee, West, the Amendment really represents a compromise, and a compromise on a matter of principle between two sets of people who really hold diametrically opposite opinions never results in anything very satisfactory. There are a number of hon. Members in this House who sincerely object to the nuclear bomb either as a deterrent or to its testing, or to both. They say we should set an example by calling off the tests and abolishing any reliance on the nuclear weapon. They would like to leave all these horrors to the Russians and Americans. They say that if we were to give a lead by abandoning tests we have not yet made other countries would follow in due course. Of course, I appreciate the type of sentiments which inspire that view. It is one which has its roots and has been held in different forms right throughout our history. I respect it.
There is another form of semi-pacifism which is not quite so honourable. They seem to reserve all their appeals to our own Government and our own country and are not so critical of other Governments. They see clearly enough the Western mote but never seem to consider the Soviet beam. The right hon. Member for Bassetlaw (Mr. Bellenger) dealt very forcibly with that yesterday. That is one school, and we respect it—the first school I described—and then there is the other school in the Labour Party. I think the right hon. Member for Ipswich (Mr. Stokes) in a robust speech last night made it quite clear where he stood, Amendment or no Amendment. Their position is, or was, first, that the nuclear deterrent is the only way to prevent global war, and, secondly, that although we must rely to a varying degree, as we have done in recent years, on the protection of American nuclear power, it is right and proper that a British contribution to the nuclear deterrent should be the basis of our defence.
That has been the other side. I am not sure whether this is still the official view of the Opposition Front Bench, but I believe it is the view which, in their hearts, a great number of hon. Members opposite really hold. We have what seems to be a compromise, and it is embodied in this Amendment. Let us con-

2045
sider what it says. We are to rely on the nuclear deterrent—but not unduly. We are to postpone our bomb tests—but not for very long. We are to ask other Powers to agree to abolish all bomb tests, and if by any chance they should agree, then presumably they would be left with the fully tested bomb and we should be left with a bomb which had not been tested at all. So, of course, we should have to rely on American nuclear power for our defence. In the same breath the same hon. Members tell us that it is humiliating to obtain, whether by gift or purchase, an American rocket because the warhead is under American control until we can make our own. Then, to crown it all, the House is asked to withhold its approval from a policy which lacks firm decisions.
I am bound to say that I find it all very confusing; so do they, and so does the whole country. A great appeal has been made to us to postpone the tests. Every day pressure has grown, sometimes from respectable and sincere sources, and sometimes, I think, promoted by definitely hostile forces. People try to make it impossible for us to hold the tests, but I ask hon. Members opposite to search their hearts. Is this really a practical proposition to postpone it?
Do lion. Members think that if the Government made this tremendous decision to postpone the tests for six months or a year it would be possible to put them on again like a dish at a restaurant`? [HON. MEMBERS: "Why not?"] I will explain to the House. What would be the position when these postponed tests took place not, as now, at a time when the disarmament conference is sitting, when we still have good hopes of the allied proposals in one form or another being agreed? They would be carried out only if this conference had definitely failed and at a time when international tension was heightened rather than relaxed. Everyone in the House knows, and the whole of the party opposite know—that is why it is a triumph for those below the Gangway—that if these tests are postponed they will never be held.
Mr. Gaitskell: That is a great misrepresentation of the Amendment and the point of view of the Labour Party. What we are asking the Prime Minister and the
2046
Government is to postpone the tests until the proposals, which we hope they will still put forward for all-round abandonment of the tests, have been considered by the other Powers and until replies have been received. If the replies are unsatisfactory, there is no reason on earth that we should not proceed to carry out the tests.
The Prime Minister: I will leave it at that. With a growing pressure from different quarters, all kinds of pressure, brought upon us to abandon them, it is my view that if they are postponed they will never be held. [HON. MEMBERS: "Why not?"] In my view, they will never be held, and I am bound to tell the House that this is a responsibility which I am not prepared to take.
Nevertheless, I recognise to the full the deep feeling which the coming of the nuclear weapon, to which the right hon. Member for Dundee, West referred, stirs in every heart and the anxiety, although I believe some of it may be a little over-emphasised, which has been raised about the radiation effects of the bomb tests which have already taken place or are likely to take place. Nobody in my position—and it is one of considerable responsibility—could fail to be moved by the appeals which are made to me from sources which are quite sincere in their anxiety, and I should therefore like to restate very shortly the Government's position in this matter.
First of all, as the House knows, we are in favour of general disarmament. We have worked for it, as did our predecessors, and we shall continue to work for it. We are not in favour of the abolition of the unconventional, that is the nuclear, weapon without such corresponding reductions in conventional forces as will make Europe secure from Soviet aggression. Nor, may I say in passing, are we in favour of war even by conventional weapons. [HON. MEMBERS: "What about Suez?"] I have been through two major wars fought by conventional weapons. Some people now talk as if those were quite harmless and quite respectable operations.
The contrast, of course, between the new and the old is great, but let nobody think that if we could ban all nuclear weapons it would be all right to have a massive third world war with conventional weapons. That is the reason I

2047
believe we must strive for full disarmament covering unconventional and conventional weapons alike. Until we get that we have only two choices—we must rely on the power of the nuclear deterrent or we must throw up the sponge. This is a harsh choice to make.
Mr. George Chetwynd: Is there a middle way?
The Prime Minister: I do not think there is. I believe that most of my fellow countrymen would prefer to stand boldy on the deterrent rather than to hazard all the traditions of our religious and civil freedom.
Now, Sir, we are worried about the possible medical effects of the tests in years to come, but we must not get even that out of proportion. Though we need to know whether the bombs will work, the object, as the right hon. Gentleman has said, is that they never should be used. The purpose of 'preparing the deterrent to global war is to prevent it happening. If we can do that, then there really is something on the other side of the balance sheet. Do not let us forget that.
Meanwhile, this is our position about the tests. I shall not repeat in detail what I tried to say to the House a fortnight ago, when I tried to set out as best I could, and with the best advice available to me—
Mr. Harold Davies: I am very grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for giving way. This is a vital matter. It is vital that the nation should know what group of responsible scientists and geneticists gave the Prime Minister the information which he gave to the House in his last speech. The House is entitled to know who they were, and their status.
The Prime Minister: I gave it when I spoke a few weeks ago. It is a body called the Medical Research Council, which is the official adviser of the Government on this matter. It comprises, as I think everyone knows, some of the most intelligent, experienced, knowledgeable people that we have available to us. We have also to draw upon the work of the United Nations research authorities, who are employed on some of the same investigations. Those are the two major sources from which my advice is drawn.
2048
Since I spoke a fortnight ago, our position has, in fact, been taken a little further than I was able to say then, owing to the recent meetings of the Disarmament Sub-committee. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Montgomery (Mr. C. Davies) asked me, in an admirable speech, what our attitude was towards the proposals which Mr. Stassen has put forward there. I think that this is an important question, and the House may like to hear the answer.
As the right hon. Gentleman knows, these meetings are, in principle at any rate, private meetings, and therefore he would not expect me to divulge details, but it is known—and generally known—that these proposals deal with the general question of nuclear disarmament, both as to manufacture, as to stocks, as to testing, and as to inspection and control. They are, therefore, pretty comprehensive. These proposals put forward by Mr. Stassen were, in fact, arrived at in consultation with Her Majesty's Government, and we support them fully. They cover the wider field.
As regards the narrower question of nuclear tests and nuclear tests alone—though I want to make it clear that Mr. Stassen has dealt with stocks and the rest —on the narrower question of nuclear tests, which is perhaps more germane here, we are in touch with our allies, and hope at an appropriate stage to formalise certain proposals. Meanwhile, we have made inquiries of the Russians, on which we are awaiting clarification.
Perhaps I may say something more which I hope will give encouragement—it certainly gives me some encouragement. Our representatives at the Conference feel that the atmosphere there is better and less polemical than in previous years. We believe that the area of agreement between the major Powers may, perhaps, be widened as the work proceeds. Therefore, I have not at all given up hope that by trying new proposals, either over the wider field or the narrower field, we shall reach some ultimate basis. In many ways, the indications are better than at some of those long-drawn-out, tortuous, and rather hopeless arguments in the past.
I repeat, and I believe that the House as a whole will accept the view, that the policy laid down in the White Paper is both novel and sound. It follows, of

2049
course, the ideas to which we have been working up in recent years, but it is dramatic and it is sound. The efforts of the present Minister of Defence have received wide support in the Press and in the country. We shall get substantial savings in expenditure. We hope to get —and I believe we shall get—even greater savings in manpower, and these will be a great relief to our internal economy. We hope to reduce the pressure on the metal-using industries, and that in its turn gives more opportunity for investment and exports.
We hope to move to all-Regular forces, which will give us Services of equal, if not greater, fighting strength than those at our command. We hope to make them mobile and streamlined. We hope to civilianise where necessary the tail, while retaining the striking power of the fighting units. All this, if we can achieve it, will he a great relief to our economy and to our national life in every form.
I am not one of those who thinks that there are no compensating advantages in the system of National Service. There are. But it also has great weaknesses and
great wastefulness. There are too many people under this system learning and then leaving when they have learned, and there are too many people teaching. None of this can we afford to do without. But, of course, as I have said before, we have no hope of doing without National Service unless we will accept the nuclear armament as the basis of our defence. We are confident that we can achieve our purpose.
I want to say to the outside world that we shall certainly not fail to honour our commitments. This policy is not intended to weaken us. It is intended to increase our real strength both from the military point of view and from the point of view of the economy, which is the only basis upon which military strength can really ultimately depend. It is intended, I say, to make Britain stronger, and I therefore ask the House to reject the Amendment and to record its approval of the Government's policy.
Question put, That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question:—
The House divided: Ayes 309, Noes 258.

Division No. 99.]

AYES

[9.57 p.m.

Agnew, Sir Peter

Brooman-White, R. C.

Eden, J. B. (Bournemouth, West)

Aitken, W. T.

Browne, J. Nixon (Craigton)

Elliot, Rt. Hon. W. E.

Allan, R. A. (Paddington, S.)

Bryan, P.

Elliott, R. W.

Alport, C. J. M.

Burden, F. F. A.

Emmet, Hon. Mrs. Evelyn

Amery, Julian (Preston, N.)

Butler, Rt. Hn. R. A. (Saffron Walden)

Errington, Sir Eric

Amory, Rt. Hn. Heathcoat (Tiverton)

Carr, Robert

Erroll, F. J.

Anstruther-Gray, Major Sir William

Cary, Sir Robert

Farey-Jones, F. W.

Arbuthnot, John

Channon, Sir Henry

Fell, A.

Armstrong, C. W.

Churchill, Rt. Hon. Sir Winston

Finlay, Graeme

Ashton, H.

Clarke, Brig. Terenoe (Portsmth, W.)

Fisher, Nigel

Astor, Hon. J. J.

Cole, Norman

Fletcher-Cooke, C.

Atkins, H. E.

Conant, Maj. Sir Roger

Foster, John

Baldock, Lt.-Cmdr. J. M.

Cooke, Robert

Fraser, Hon. Hugh (Stone)

Baldwin, A. E.

Cooper, A. E.

Freeth, Denzil

Balniel, Lord

Cooper-Key, E. M.

Garner-Evans, E. H.

Barber, Anthony

Cordeaux, Lt.-Col. J. K.

George, J. C. (Pollok)

Barlow, Sir John

Corfield, Capt. F. V.

Gibson-Watt, D.

Barter, John

Craddock, Beresford (Spelthorne)

Glover, D.

Beamish, Maj. Tufton

Crosthwaite-Eyre, Col. O. E.

Godber, J. B.

Bell, Philip (Bolton, E.)

Crouch, R. F.

Goodhart, Philip

Bell, Ronald (Bucks, S.)

Crowder, Sir John (Finchley)

Gough, C. F. H.

Bennett, F. M. (Torquay)

Crowder, Petre (Ruislip—Northwood)

Gower, H. R.

Bennett, Dr. Reginald

Cunningham, Knox

Graham, Sir Fergus

Bevins, J. R. (Toxteth)

Currie, G. B. H.

Grant, W. (Woodside)

Bidgood, J. C.

Dance, J. C. G.

Grant-Ferris, Wg Cdr. R. (Nantwich)

Biggs-Davison, J. A.

Davidson, Viscountess

Green, A.

Birch, Rt. Hon. Nigel

D'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir Henry

Gresham Cooke, R.

Bishop, F. P.

Deedes, W. F.

Grimston, Hon. John (St Albans)

Black, C. W.

Digby, Simon Wingfield

Grimston, Sir Robert (Westbury)

Body, R. F.

Dodds-Parker, A. D.

Grosvenor, Lt.-Col. R. G.

Boothby, Sir Robert

Donaldson, Cmdr. C. E. McA.

Gurden, Harold

Bossom, Sir Alfred

Doughty, C. J. A.

Hall, John (Wycombe)

Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hon. J. A.

Drayson, G. B.

Hare, Rt. Hon. J. H.

Boyle, Sir Edward

du Cann, E. D. L.

Harris, Reader (Heston)

Braine, B. R.

Dugdale, Rt. Hn. Sir T. (Richmond)

Harrison, A. B. O. (Maldon)

Braithwaite, Sir Albert (Harrow, W.)

Duncan, Capt. J. A. L.

Harrison, Col. J. H. (Eye)

Bromley-Davenport, Lt.-Col. W. H.

Duthie, W. S.

Harvey, Air Cdre. A. V. (Macclesfd)

Brooke, Rt. Hon. Henry

Eccles, Rt. Hon. Sir David

Harvey, Ian (Harrow, E.)

Harvey, John (Walthamstow, E.)

Macdonald, Sir Peter

Robertson, Sir David

Harvie-Watt, Sir George

Mackeson, Brig. Sir Harry

Robinson, Sir Roland (Blackpool, S.)

Hay, John

MoKibbin, A. J.

Robson-Brown, W.

Head, Rt. Hon. A. H.

Mackie, J. H. (Galloway)

Rodgers, John (Sevenoaks)

Heald, Rt. Hon. Sir Lionel

McLaughlin, Mrs. P.

Roper, Sir Harold

Henderson, John (Cathcart)

Maclay, Rt. Hon. John

Ropner, Col. Sir Leonard

Henderson-Stewart, Sir James

Maclean, Fitzroy (Lancaster)

Russell, R. S.

Hesketh, R. F.

McLean, Neil (Inverness)

Sandys, Rt. Hon. D.

Hicks-Beach, Maj. W. W.

Macleod, Rt. Hn. Iain (Enfield, W.)

Schofield, Lt.-Col. W.

Hill, Rt. Hon. Charles (Luton)

Macmillan, Rt. Hn. Harold(Bromley)

Scott-Miller, Comdr. R.

Hill, Mrs. E. (Wythenshawe)

Macmillan, Maurice (Halifax)

Sharpies, R. C.

Hill, John (S. Norfolk)

Macpherson, Niall (Dumfries)

Shepherd, William

Hinchingbrooke, Viscount

Maddan, Martin

Simon, J. E. S. (Middlesbrough, W.)

Hirst, Geoffrey

Maitland, Cdr. J.F.W.(Horncastle)

Smithers, Peter (Winchester)

Hobson, J. G. S.(War'ck & Learm'ton)

Maitland, Hon. Patrick (Lanark)

Smyth, Brig. Sir John (Norwood)

Holland-Martin, C. J.

Manningham-Buller, Rt. Hn. Sir R.

Soames, Christopher

Hope, Lord John

Markham, Major Sir Frank

Spearman, Sir Alexander

Hornby, R. P.

Marlowe, A. A. H,

Speir, R. M.

Hornsby-Smith, Miss M. P.

Marples, Rt. Hon. A. E.

Spence, H. R (Aberdeen, W.)

Horobin, Sir Ian

Marshall, Douglas

Spens, Rt. Hn. Sir P. (Kens'gt'n, S.)

Horsbrugh, Rt. Hon. Dame Florence

Mathew, R.

Stanley, Capt. Hon. Richard

Howard, Gerald (Cambridgeshire)

Maudling, Rt. Hon. R.

Stevens, Geoffrey

Howard, Hon. Greville (St. Ives)

Mawby, R. L.

Steward, Harold (Stockport, S.)

Howard, John (Test)

Maydon, Lt.-Comdr. S. L. C.

Steward, Sir William (Woolwich, W.)

Hughes Hallett, Vice-Admiral J.

Medlicott, Sir Frank

Stoddart-Scott, Col. M.

Hughes-Young, M. H. C.

Milligan, Rt. Hon. W. R.

Storey, S.

Hulbert, Sir Norman

Molson, Rt. Hon. Hugh

Stuart, Rt. Hon. James (Moray)

Hurd, A. R.

Moore, Sir Thomas

Studholme, Sir Henry

Hutchison, Sir Ian Clark (E'b'gh, W.)

Morrison, John (Salisbury)

Summers, Sir Spencer

Hutchison, Sir James (Scotstoun)

Mott-Radclyffe, Sir Charles

Sumner, W. D. M. (Orpington)

Hylton-Foster, Rt. Hon. Sir Harry

Nabarro, G. D. N.

Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)

Iremonger, T. L.

Nairn, D. L. S.

Taylor, William (Bradford, N.)

Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)

Neave, Airey

Teeling, W.

Jenkins, Robert (Dulwich)

Nicholls, Harmar

Temple, John M.

Jennings, J. C. (Burton)

Nicholson, Godfrey (Farnham)

Thomas, Leslie (Canterbury)

Jennings, Sir Roland (Hallam)

Nicolson, N. (B'n'm'th, E. & chr'ch)

Thomas, P. J. M. (Conway)

Johnson, Dr. Donald (Carlisle)

Noble, Comdr. Rt. Hon. Allan

Thompson, Kenneth (Walton)

Johnson, Eric (Blackley)

Nugent, G. R. H.

Thorneycroft, Rt. Hon. P.

Johnson, Howard (Kemptown)

Ormsby-Gore, Rt. Hon. W. D.

Thornton-Kemsley, C. N.

Jones, Rt. Hon. Aubrey (Hall Green)

Orr, Capt. L. P. S.

Tiley, A. (Bradford, W.)

Joseph, Sir Keith

Orr-Ewing, Charles Ian (Hendon, N.)

Tilney, John (Wavertree)

Joynson-Hicks, Hon. Sir Lancelot

Orr-Ewing, Sir Ian (Weston-S-Mare)

Turner, H. F. L.

Kaberry, D.

Osborne, C.

Turton, Rt. Hon. R. H.

Keegan, D.

Page, R. G.

Tweedsmuir, Lady

Kerr, H. W.

Pannell, N. A. (Kirkdale).

Vane, W. M. F.

Kershaw, J. A.

Partridge, E.

Vaughan-Morgan, J. K.

Kirk, P. M.

Peyton, J. W. W.

Vickers, Miss Joan

Lagden, G. W.

Pickthorn, K. W. M.

Vosper, Rt. Hon. D. F.

Lambert, Hon. G.

Pike, Miss Mervyn

Wakefield, Edward (Derbyshire, W.)

Lambton, Viscount

Pilkington, Capt. R. A.

Wakefield, Sir Wavell (St. M'lebone)

Langford-Holt, J. A.

Pitman, I. J.

Walker-Smith, Rt. Hon. Derek

Leavey, J. A.

Pitt, Miss E. M.

Wall, Major Patrick

Leburn, W. G.

Pott, H. P.

Ward, Rt. Hon. G. R. (Worcester)

Legge-Bourke, Maj. E. A. H.

Powell, J. Enoch

Waterhouse, Capt. Rt. Hon. C.

Legh, Hon. Peter (Petersfield)

Price, Henry (Lewlsham, W.)

Watkinson, Rt. Hon. Harold

Lennox-Boyd, Rt. Hon. A. T.

Prior-Palmer, Brig. O. L.

Webbe, Sir H.

Lindsay, Hon. James (Devon, N.)

Profumo, J. D.

Whitelaw, W. S. I.

Linstead, Sir H. N.

Ralkes, Sir Victor

Williams, Paul (Sunderland, S.)

Llewellyn, D. T.

Ramsden, J. E.

Williams, R. Dudley (Exeter)

Lloyd Rt. Hon. G. (Sutton Coldfield)

Rawlinson, Peter

Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)

Lloyd, Rt. Hon. Selwyn (Wirral)

Redmayne, M.

Wood, Hon. R.

Longden, Gilbert

Rees-Davies, W. R.

Woollam, John Victor

Low, Rt. Hon. A. R. W.

Remnant, Hon. P.

Yates, William (The Wrekin)

Lucas, Sir Jocelyn (Portsmouth, S.)

Renton, D. L. M.

Lucas, P. B. (Brentford & Chiswick)

Ridsdale, J. E.

TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh

Rippon, A. G. F.

Mr. Heath and Mr. Wills.

NOES

Ainsley, J. W.

Blackburn, F.

Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)

Albu, A. H.

Blenkinsop, A.

Callaghan, L. J.

Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)

Blyton, W. R.

Carmichael, J.

Allen, Arthur (Bosworth)

Boardman, H.

Castle, Mrs. B. A.

Allen, Scholefield (Crewe)

Bowen, E. R. (Cardigan)

Champion, A. J.

Awbery, S. S.

Bowles, F. G.

Chapman, W. D.

Bacon, Miss Alice

Boyd, T. C.

Chetwynd, G. R.

Baird, J.

Braddock, Mrs. Elizabeth

Clunie, J.

Balfour, A.

Brookway, A. F.

Coldrick, W.

Bellenger, Rt. Hon. F. J.

Brown, Rt. Hon. George (Belper)

Collick, P. H. (Birkenhead)

Bence, C. R. (Dunbartonshire, E.)

Brown, Thomas (Ince)

Collins, V. J. (Shoreditch & Finsbury)

Benn, Hn. Wedgwood (Bristol, S.E.)

Burke, W. A.

Corbet, Mrs. Freda

Benson, G.

Burton, Miss F. E.

Cove, W. G.

Beswick, Frank

Butter, Herbert (Hackney, C.)

Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)

2052

2053

Cronin, J. D.

Jones, David (The Hartlepools)

Roberts, Albert (Normanton)

Crossman, R. H. S.

Jones, Elwyn (W. Ham, S.)

Roberts, Goronwy (Caernarvon)

Cullen, Mrs. A.

Jones, Jack (Rotherham)

Robinson, Kenneth (St. Pancras, N.)

Dalton, Rt. Hon. H.

Jones, J. Idwal (Wrexham)

Rogers, George (Kensington, N.)

Darling, George (Hillsborough)

Jones, T. W. (Merioneth)

Ross, William

Davies, Rt. Hon.Clement(Montgomery)

Kenyon, C.

Royle, C.

Davies, Ernest (Enfield, E.)

Key, Rt. Hon. C. W.

Shinwell, Rt. Hon. E.

Davies, Harold (Leek)

Lawson, G. M.

Short, E. W.

Davies, Stephen (Merthyr)

Ledger, R. J.

Shurmer, P. L. E.

Deer, C

Lee, Frederick (Newton)

Silverman, Julius (Aston)

de Freitas, Geoffrey

Lee, Miss Jennie (Cannock)

Silverman, Sydney (Nelson)

Delargy, H. J.

Lever, Leslie (Ardwick)

Simmons, C. J. (Brierley Hill)

Dodds, N. N.

Lewis, Arthur

Skeffington, A. M.

Donnelly, D. L.

Lindgren, G. S.

Slater, Mrs. H. (Stoke, N.)

Dugdale, Rt. Hn. John (W. Brnwch)

Lipton, Marcus

Slater, J. (Sedgefield)

Dye, S.

Logan, D. G.

Smith, Ellis (Stoke, S)

Ede, Rt. Hon. J. C.

Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson

Snow, J. W.

Edelman, M.

MacColl, J. E.

Sorensen, R. W.

Edwards, Rt. Hon. John (Brighouse)

MacDermot, Niall

Soskice, Rt. Hon. Sir Frank

Edwards, Rt. Hon. Ness (Caerphilly)

McGhee, H. C.

Sparks, J. A.

Edwards, Robert (Bilston)

McGovern, J.

Steele, T.

Edwards, W. J. (Stepney)

McKay, John (Wallsend)

Stewart, Michael (Fulham)

Evans, Albert (Islington, S.W.)

MacMillan, M. K. (Western Isles)

Stokes, Rt Hon. R. R. (Ipswich)

Evans, Edward (Lowestoft)

MacPherson, Malcolm (Stirling)

Stonehouse, John

Fernyhough, E.

Mahon, Simon

Stones, W. (Consett)

Fienburgh, W.

Mainwaring, W. H.

Strachey, Rt. Hon. J.

Finch, H. J.

Mallalieu, J. P. W. (Huddersfd, E.)

Strauss, Rt. Hon. George (Vauxhall)

Fletcher, Eric

Mann, Mrs. Jean

Stross, Dr. Barnett(Stoke-on-Trent, C.)

Forman, J. C.

Marquand, Rt. Hon. H. A.

Summerskill, Rt. Hon. E

Gaitskell, Rt. Hon. H. T. N.

Mason, Roy

Swingler, S. T.

George, Lady Megan Lloyd

Mayhew, C. P.

Sylvester, G. O.

Gibson, C. W.

Mellish, R. J,

Taylor, Bernard (Mansfield)

Gooch, E. G.

Messer, Sir F.

Taylor, John (West Lothian)

Gordon Walker, Rt. Hon. P. C.

Mikardo, Ian

Thomas, George (Cardiff)

Greenwood, Anthony

Mitchison, G. R.

Thomas, Iorwerth (Rhondda, W)

Grenfell, Rt. Hon. D. R.

Monslow, W.

Thomson, George (Dundee, E.)

Grey, C. F.

Moody, A. S.

Thornton, E.

Griffiths, David (Rother Valley)

Morris, Percy (Swansea, W.)

Timmons, J.

Griffiths, Rt. Hon. James (Llanelly)

Morrison, Rt.Hn,Herljert(Lewis'm,S.)

Tomney, F.

Griffiths, William (Exchange)

Mort, D. L.

Ungoed-Thomas, Sir Lynn

Hall, Rt. Hn. Glenvil (Colne Valley)

Moss, R.

Usborne, H C.

Hamilton, W, W.

Moyle, A.

Viant, S. P.

Hannan, W.

Mulley, F. W.

Wade, D. W

Harrison, J. (Nottingham, N.)

Neal, Harold (Bolsover)

Warbey, W. N.

Hastings, S.

Noel-Baker, Rt. Hon. P. (Derby, S.)

Watkins, T. E.

Hayman, F. H.

O'Brien, Sir Thomas

Weitzman, D.

Healey, Denis

Oliver, G. H.

Wells Percy (Favershsm)

Henderson, Rt. Hn. A. (Rwly Regis)

Oram, A. E.

Wells, William (Walsall, N.)

Herbison, Miss M.

Oswald, T.

West, D. G.

Hewitson, Capt. M.

Owen, W. J.

Wheeldon, W. E.

Hobson, C. R. (Keighley)

Padley, W. E.

White, Mrs. Eirene (E. Flint)

Holman, P.

Paget, R. T.

White, Henry (Derbyshire, N.E.)

Holt, A. F.

Paling, Rt. Hon. W. (Dearne Valley)

Wigg, George

Houghton, Douglas

Palmer, A. M. F.

Wilcock, Group Capt. C. A. B.

Howell, Charles (Perry Barr)

Pannell, Charles (Leeds, W.)

Wilkins, W. A,

Howell, Denis (All Saints)

Parkin, B. T.

Willey, Frederick

Hoy, J. H.

Paton, John

Williams, David (Neath)

Hubbard, T. F.

Peart, T. F.

Williams, Rev. Llywelyn (Ab'tillery)

Hughes, Cledwyn (Anglesey)

Pentland, N.

Williams, Ronald (Wigan)

Hughes, Emrys S. (Ayrshire)

Plummer, sir Leslie

Williams, Rt. Hon. T. (Don Valley)

Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)

Popplewell, E.

Williams, W. R. (Openshaw)

Hunter, A. E.

Price, J. T. (Westhoughton)

Willis, Eustace (Edinburgh, E.)

Hynd, J. B. (Attercliffe)

Price, Philips (Gloucestershire, W.)

Wilson, Rt. Hon. Harold (Huyton)

Irvine, A. J. (Edge Hill)

Probert, A. R.

Winterbottom, Richard

Irving, Sydney (Dartford)

Proctor, W, T.

Woodburn, Rt. Hon. A.

Isaacs, Rt. Hon. G. A.

Pryde, D. J.

Woof, R. E.

Janner, B.

Pursey, Cmdr. H.

Yates, V. (Ladywood)

Jay, Rt. Hon. D. P. T.

Randall, H. E.

Younger, Rt. Hon. K.

Jeger, George (Goole)

Rankin, John

Zilliacus, K.

Jeger, Mrs. Lena(Holbn & St. Pncs. S.)

Redhead, E. C.

Jenkins, Roy (Stechford)

Reeves, J.

TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

Johnston, Douglas (Paisley)

Reid, William

Mr. Bowden and Mr. Pearson.

Jones, Rt. Hon. A. Creech(Wakefield)

Robens, Rt. Hon. A.

Main Question put:—
The House divided: Ayes 308, Noes 250.

Division No. 100.]

AYES

[10.10 p.m.

Agnew, Sir Peter

Alport, C. J. M.

Arbuthnot, John

Aitken, W. T.

Amery, Julian (Preston, N.)

Armstrong, C. W.

Allan, R. A. (Paddington, S.)

Amory, Rt. Hn. Heathcoat (Tiverton)

Ashton, H.

2054

2055

Astor, Hon. J. J.

Godber, J. B.

Lucas, Sir Jocelyn (Portsmouth, S.)

Atkins, H. E.

Goodhart, Philip

Lucas, P. B. (Brentford & Chiswick)

Baldock, Lt.-Cmdr. J. M.

Cough, C. F. H.

Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh

Baldwin, A. E.

Gower, H. R.

Macdonald, Sir Peter

Balniel, Lord

Graham, Sir Fergus

Mackeson, Brig. Sir Harry

Barber, Anthony

Grant, W. (Woodside)

McKibbin, A. J.

Barlow, Sir John

Grant-Ferris, Wg Cdr. R. (Nantwich)

Mackie, J. H. (Galloway)

Barter, John

Green, A.

McLaughlin, Mrs. P.

Beamish, Maj. Tufton

Gresham Cooke, R.

Maclay, Rt. Hon. John

Bell, Philip (Bolton, E.)

Grimston, Hon. John (St. Albans)

Maclean, Fitzroy (Lancaster)

Bell, Ronald (Bucks, S.)

Grimston, Sir Robert (Westbury)

McLean, Neil (Inverness)

Bennett, F. M. (Torquay)

Grosvenor, Lt.-Col. R. G.

Macleod, Rt. Hn. Iain (Enfield, W.)

Bennett, Dr. Reginald

Gurden, Harold

Macmillan, Rt. Hn. Harold(Bromley)

Bevins, J. R. (Toxteth)

Hall, John (Wycombe)

Macmillan, Maurice (Halifax)

Bidgood, J. C.

Hare, Rt. Hon. J. H.

Macpherson, Niall (Dumfries)

Biggs-Davison, J. A.

Harris, Reader (Heston)

Maddan, Martin

Birch, Rt. Hon. Nigel

Harrison, A. B. C. (Maldon)

Maitland, Cdr. J. F. W. (Horncastle)

Bishop, F. P.

Harrison, Col. J. H. (Eye)

Maitland, Hon. Patrick (Lanark)

Black, C. W.

Harvey, Air Cdre. A. V. (Macclesfd)

Manningham-Buller, Rt. Hn. Sir R.

Body, R. F.

Harvey, Ian (Harrow, E.)

Markham, Major Sir Frank

Boothby, Sir Robert

Harvey, John (Walthamstow, E.)

Marlowe, A. A. H.

Bossom, Sir Alfred

Harvie-Watt, Sir George

Marples, Rt. Hon. A. E.

Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hon. J. A.

Hay, John

Marshall, Douglas

Boyle, sir Edward

Head, Rt. Hon. A. H,

Mathew, R.

Braine, B. R.

Heald, Rt. Hon. Sir Lionel

Maudling, Rt. Hon. R.

Braithwaite, Sir Albert (Harrow, W)

Henderson, John (Cathcart)

Mawby, R. L.

Bromley-Davenport, Lt.-Col. W. H.

Henderson-Stewart, Sir James

Maydon, Lt.-Comdr. S. L. C.

Brooke, Rt. Hon. Henry

Hesketh, R. F.

Medlicott, Sir Frank

Brooman-White, R. C.

Hicks-Beach, Maj. W. W.

Milligan, Rt. Hon. W. R.

Browne, J. Nixon (Craigton)

Hill, Rt. Hon. Charles (Luton)

Molson, Rt. Hon. Hugh

Bryan, P.

Hill, Mrs. E. (Wythenshawe)

Moore, Sir Thomas

Burden, F. F. A.

Hill, John (S. Norfolk)

Morrison, John (Salisbury)

Butler, Rt. Hn. R. A.(Saffron Walden)

Hinchingbrooke, Viscount

Mott-Radclyffe, Sir Charles

Carr, Robert

Hirst, Geoffrey

Nabarro, G. D. N.

Cary, Sir Robert

Hobson, J. G. S. (Warwick&Leamington)

Nairn, D. L. S.

Channon, Sir Henry

Holland-Martin, C. J.

Neave, Airey

Churchill, Rt. Hon. Sir Winston

Hope, Lord John

Nicholls, Harmar

Clarke, Brig. Terence (Portsmth, W.)

Hornby, R. P.

Nicholson, Godfrey (Farnham)

Cole, Norman

Hornsby-Smith, Miss M. P.

Nicolson, N. (B'n'm'th E. & Chr'ch)

Conant, Maj. Sir Roger

Horobin, Sir Ian

Noble, Comdr. Rt. Hon. Allan

Cooke, Robert

Horsbrugh, Rt. Hon. Dame Florence

Nugent, G. R. H.

Cooper, A. E.

Howard, Gerald (Cambridgeshire)

Ormsby-Gore, Rt. Hon. W. D.

Cooper-Key, E. M,

Howard, Hon. Greville (St. Ives)

Orr, Capt. L. P. S.

Cordeaux, Lt.-Col. J. K.

Howard, John (Test)

Orr-Ewing, Charles Ian (Hendon, N.)

Corfield, Capt. F. V.

Hughes, Hallett, Vice-Admiral J.

Orr-Ewing, Sir Ian (Weston-S-Mare)

Craddock, Beresford (Spelthorne)

Hughes-Young, M. H. C.

Osborne, C.

Crosthwaite-Eyre, Col. O. E.

Hulbert, Sir Norman

Page, R. G.

Crouoh, R. F.

Hurd, A. R.

Pannell, N. A. (Kirkdale)

Crowder, Sir John (Finchley)

Hutchison, Sir Ian Clark (E'b'gh, W.)

Partridge, E.

Crowder, Petre (Ruislip—Northwood)

Hutchison, Sir James (Scotstoun)

Peyton, J. W. W.

Cunningham, Knox

Hylton-Foster, Rt. Hon. Sir Harry

Pickthorn, K. W. M.

Currie, G. B. H.

Iremonger, T. L.

Pike, Miss Mervyn

Davidson, Viscountess

Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)

Pilkington, Capt. R. A.

D'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir Henry

Jenkins, Robert (Dulwich)

Pitman, I. J.

Deeds, W. F.

Jennings, J. C. (Burton)

Pitt, Miss E. M.

Digby Simon Wingfield

Jennings, Sir Roland (Hallam)

Pott, H. P.

Dodds-Parker, A. D.

Johnson, Dr. Donald (Carlisle)

Powell, J. Enoch

Donaldson Cmdr. C. E. McA

Johnson, Eric (Blackley)

Price, Henry (Lewisham, W.)

Doughty, C. J. A.

Johnson, Howard (Kemptown)

Prior-Palmer, Brig. O. L.

Drayson, G. B.

Jones, Rt. Hon. Aubrey (Hall Green)

Profumo, J. D.

du Cann, E. D. L.

Joseph, Sir Keith

Raikes, Sir Victor

Dudgale, Rt. Hn. Sir T. (Richmond)

Joynson-Hicks, Hon. Sir Lancelot

Ramsden, J. E.

Duncan Capt. J. A. L.

Kaberry, D.

Rawlinson, Peter

Duthie W. S.

Keegan, D

Redmayne, M.

Eccles, Rt. Hon. Sir David

Kerr, H. W.

Rees-Davies, W. R.

Eden J. B. (Bournemouth, West)

Kershaw, J. A.

Remnant, Hon. P.

Elliot, Rt. Hon. W. E.

Kirk, P. M.

Renton, D, L. M.

Elliott R W.

Lagden, G. W.

Ridsdale, J. E.

Emmet Hon Mrs. Evelyn

Lambert, Hon. G.

Rippon, A. G. F.

Errington, Sir Eric

Lambton, Viscount

Robertson, Sir David

Errol, F. J.

Langford-Holt, J. A.

Robinson, Sir Roland (Blackpool, S.)

Farey-Jones, F. W.

Leavey, J. A.

Robson-Brown, W.

Fell, A.

Leburn, W. G.

Rodgers, John (Sevenoaks)

Finlay, Graeme

Legge-Bourke, Maj. E. A. H.

Roper, Sir Harold

Fisher, Nigel

Legh, Hon. Peter (Petersfield)

Ropner, Col. Sir Leonard

Fletcher-Cooke, C.

Lennox-Boyd, Rt. Hon. A. T.

Russell, R. S.

Foster, John

Lindsay, Hon. James (Devon, N.)

Sandys, Rt. Hon. D.

Fraser, Hon. Hugh (Stone)

Linstead, Sir H. N.

Schofield, Lt.-Col. W.

Freeth, Denzil

Llewellyn, D. T.

Scott-Miller, Cmdr. R.

Garner-Evans, E. H.

Lloyd, Rt. Hon. G. (Sutton Coldfield)

Sharples, R. C.

George, J. C. (Pollok)

Lloyd, Rt. Hon. Selwyn (Wirral)

Shepherd, William

Gibson-Watt, D.

Longden, Gilbert

Simon, J. E. S. (Middlesbrough, W.)

Glover, D.

Low, Rt. Hon. A. R. W.

Smithers, Peter (Winchester)

2056

2057

Smyth, Brig. Sir John (Norwood)

Taylor, William (Bradford, N.)

Wakefieid, Edward (Derbyshire, W.)

Soames, Christopher

Teeling, W.

Wakefield, Sir Wavell (St. M'lebone)

Spearman, Sir Alexander

Temple, John M.

Walker-Smith, Rt. Hon. Derek

Speir, R. M.

Thomas, Lesle (Canterbury)

Wall, Major Patrick

Spence, H. R. (Aberdeen, W.)

Thomas, P. J. M. (Conway)

Ward, Rt. Hon. G. R. (Worcester)

Spens, Rt. Hn. Sir P. (Kens'gt'n, S.)

Thompson, Kenneth (Walton)

Waterhouse, Capt. Rt. Hon. C.

Stanley, Capt. Hon. Richard

Thorneycroft, Rt. Hon. P.

Watkinson, Rt. Hon. Harold

Stevens, Geoffrey

Thornton-Kemsley, C. N.

Webbe, Sir H.

Steward, Harold (Stockport, S.)

Tiley, A. (Bradford, W.)

Whitelaw, W. S. I.

Steward, Sir William (Woolwich, W.)

Tilney, John (Wavertree)

Williams, Paul (Sunderland, S.)

Stoddart-Scott, Col. M.

Turner, H. F. L.

Williams, R. Dudley (Exeter)

Storey, S.

Turton, Rt. Hon. R. H.

Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)

Stuart, Rt. Hon. James (Moray)

Tweedsmuir, Lady

Wood, Hon. R.

Studholme, Sir Henry

Vane, W. M. F.

Woollam, John Victor

Summers, Sir Spencer

Vaughan-Morgan, J. K.

Yates, William (The Wrekin)

Sumner, W. D. M. (Orpington)

Vickers, Miss Joan

Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)

Vosper, Rt. Hon. D. F.

TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

Mr. Heath and Mr. Wills.

NOES

Ainsley, J. W.

Fernyhough, E.

Lingdren, G. S.

Albu, A. H.

Fienburgh, W.

Lipton, Marcus

Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)

Finch, H. J.

Logan, D. G.

Allen, Arthur (Bosworth)

Fletcher, Eric

Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson

Allen, Scholefield (Crewe)

Forman, J. C.

MacColl, J. E.

Awbery, S. S.

Gaitskell, Rt. Hon. H. T. N.

MacDermot, Niall

Bacon, Miss Alice

George, Lady Megan Lloyd

McGhee, H. G.

Baird, J.

Gibson, C. W.

McGovern, J.

Bellenger, Rt. Han. F. J.

Gooch, E. G.

McKay, John (Wallsend)

Bence, C. R. (Dunbartonshire, E.)

Gordon Walker, Rt. Hon. P. C.

MacMillan, M. K. (Western Isles)

Benn, Hn, Wedgwood (Bristol, S.E.)

Greenwood, Anthony

MacPherson, Malcolm (Stirling)

Benson, G.

Grenfell, Rt. Hon. D. R.

Mahon, Simon

Beswick, F.

Grey, C. F.

Mainwaring, W. H.

Blackburn, F.

Griffiths, David (Rother Valley)

Mallalieu, J. P. W. (Huddersfd, E.)

Blenkinsop, A.

Griffiths, Rt. Hon. James (Llanelly)

Mann, Mrs. Jean

Blyton, W. R.

Griffiths, William (Exchange)

Marquand, Rt. Hon. H. A.

Boardman, H.

Hall, Rt. Hn. Glenvil (Colne Valley)

Mason, Roy

Bowles, F. G.

Hamilton, W. W.

Mayhew, C. P.

Boyd, T. C.

Hannan, W.

Mellish, R. J.

Braddock, Mrs. Elizabeth

Harrison, J. (Nottingham, N.)

Messer, Sir F.

Brockway, A. F.

Hastings, S.

Mikardo, Ian

Brown, Rt. Hon. George (Belper)

Hayman, F. H.

Mitchison, G. R.

Brown, Thomas (Ince)

Healey, Denis

Monslow, W.

Burke, W. A.

Henderson, Rt. Hn. A. (Rwly Regis)

Moody, A. S.

Burton, Miss F. E.

Herbison, Miss M.

Morris, Percy (Swansea, W.)

Butler, Herbert (Hackney, C.)

Hewitson, Capt. M.

Morrison, Rt. Hn. Herbert (Lewis'm, S.)

Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)

Hobson, C. R. (Keighley)

Mort, D. L.

Callaghan, L. J.

Holman, P.

Moss, R.

Carmichael, J.

Holmes, Horace

Moyle, A.

Castle, Mrs. B. A.

Houghton, Douglas

Mulley, F. W.

Champion, A. J.

Howell, Charles (Perry Barr)

Neal, Harold (Bolsover)

Chapman, W. D.

Howell, Denis (All Saints)

Noel-Baker, Rt. Hon. P. (Derby, S.)

Chetwynd, G. R.

Hoy, J. H.

O'Brien, Sir Thomas

Clunie, J.

Hubbard, T. F.

Oliver, G. H.

Coldrick, W.

Hughes, Cledwyn (Anglesey)

Oram, A. E.

Collick, P. H. (Birkenhead)

Hughes, Emrys (S. Ayrshire)

Oswald, T.

Collins, V. J. (Shoreditch & Finsbury)

Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)

Owen, W. J.

Corbet, Mrs. Freda

Hunter, A. E.

Padley, W. E.

Cove, W. G.

Hynd, J. B. (Attercliffe)

Paget R. T.

Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)

Irvine, A. J. (Edge Hill)

Paling, Rt. Hon. W. (Dearne Valley)

Cronin, J. D.

Irving, Sydney (Dartford)

Palmer, A. M. F.

Crossman, R. H. S.

Isaacs, Rt. Hon. G. A.

Pannell, Charles (Leeds, W.)

Cullen, Mrs. A.

Janner, D.

Parkin, B. T.

Dalton, Rt. Hon. H.

Jay, Rt. Hon. D. P. T.

Paton, John

Darling George (Hillsborough)

Jeger, George (Goole)

Peart, T. F.

Davies, Ernest (Enfield, E.)

Jeger, Mrs. Lena (Holbn&St. Pncs, S.)

Pentland, N.

Davies, Harold (Leek)

Jenkins, Roy (Stechford)

Plummer, Sir Leslie

Davies, Stephen (Merthyr)

Johnston, Douglas (Paisley)

Popplewell, E.

Deer, G.

Jones, Rt. Hon. A. Creech (Wakefield)

Price, J. T. (Westhoughton)

Delargy H. J.

Jones, David (The Hartlepools)

Price, Philips (Gloucestershire, W.)

Dodds, N. N.

Jones, Elwyn (W. Ham, S.)

Probert, A. R.

Donnelly, D. L.

Jones, Jack (Rotherham)

Proctor, W. T.

Dugdale, Rt. Hn. John (W. Brmwch)

Jones, J. Idwal (Wrexham)

Pryde, D. J.

Dye, S.

Jones, T. W. (Merioneth)

Pursey, Cmdr. H.

Ede, Rt. Hon. J. C.

Kenyon, C.

Randall, H. E.

Edelman, M.

Key, Rt. Hon. C. W.

Rankin, John

Edwards, Rt. Hon. John (Brighouse)

Lawson, G. M.

Redhead, E. C.

Edwards, Rt. Hon. Ness (Caerphilly)

Ledger, R. J.

Reeves, J.

Edwards, Robert (Bilston)

Lee, Frederick (Newton)

Reid, William

Edwards, W. J. (Stepney)

Lee, Miss Jennie (Cannock)

Robens, Rt. Hon. A.

Evans, Albert (Islington, S.W.)

Lever, Leslie (Ardwick)

Roberts, Albert (Normanton)

Evans, Edward (Lowestoft)

Lewis, Arthur

Roberts, Goronwy (Caernarvon)

2058

2059

Robinson, Kenneth (St. Pancras, N.)

Strauss, Rt. Hon. George (Vauxhall)

White, Mrs. Elrene (E. Flint)

Rogers, George (Kensington, N.)

Stross,Dr. Barnett(Stoke-on-Trent,C.)

White, Henry (Derbyshire, N.E.)

Ross, William

Summerskill, Rt. Hon. E.

Wigg, George

Royle, C.

Swingler, S. T.

Wilcock, Group Capt. C. A. B.

Short, E. W.

Sylvester, G. O.

Wilkins, W. A.

Shurmer, P. L. E.

Taylor, Bernard (Mansfield)

Willey, Frederick

Silverman, Julius (Aston)

Taylor, John (West Lothian)

Williams, David (Neath)

Silverman, Sydney (Nelson)

Thomas, George (Cardiff)

Williams, Rev. Llywelyn (Ab'tillery)

Simmons, C. J. (Brierley Hill)

Thomas, Iorwerth (Rhondda, W.)

Williams, Ronald (Wigan)

Skeffington, A. M.

Thomson, George (Dundee, E.)

Williams, Rt. Hon. T. (Don Valley)

Slater, Mrs. H. (Stoke, N.)

Thornton, E.

Williams, W. R. (Openshaw)

Slater, J. (Sedgefield)

Timmons, J.

Willis, Eustace (Edinburgh, E.)

Smith, Ellis (Stoke, S.)

Tomney, F.

Wilson, Rt. Hon. Harold (Huyton)

Snow, J. W.

Ungoed-Thomas, Sir Lynn

Winterbottom, Richard

Sorensen, R. W.

Usborne, H. C.

Woodburn, Rt. Hon. A.

Soskice, Rt. Hon. Sir Frank

Viant, S. P.

Woof, R. E.

Sparks, J. A.

Warbey, W. N.

Yates, V. (Ladywood)

Steele, T.

Watkins, T. E.

Younger, Rt. Hon. K.

Stewart, Michael (Fulham)

Weitzman, D.

Zilliacus, K.

Stonehouse, John

Wells, William (Walsall, N.)

Stones, W. (Consett)

West, D. G.

TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

Strachey, Rt. Hon. J.

Wheeldon, W. E.

Mr. Bowden and Mr. Pearson.

Resolved,
That this House approves the Outline of Paper No. 124.

UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT
Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. E. Wakefield.]
10.21 p.m.
Mr. E. Fernyhough: The problem that I wish to raise tonight is one upon which I questioned the Minister of Pensions and National Insurance earlier this week. It arises out of the recent strike in the shipbuilding and engineering industries. It affects my constituency and the constituencies of a number of other hon. Members.
It appears that a number of workers who were declared redundant and signed on at the employment exchange twelve days before the recent strike commenced have had their benefits suspended because of the strike. Many of these workers were genuinely redundant. One firm in particular in my constituency—Palmers—had intimated to the employment exchange that, because it was carrying out a policy of reorganisation and introducing new machinery and so on, workers would be paid off. Some of the workers knew as early as February that within the next few weeks they would become unemployed. These workers are among those affected.
Other workers are also affected, including workers who were in no way concerned in the shipbuilding or engineering industries. In one instance, some of these workers were employed on construction work as labourers at a chemical factory. They were declared redundant by their employer because the contract was com-
2060
Future Defence Policy set out in Command pleted. When they went to sign on at the employment exchange they were told that because they had become redundant within twelve days of the commencement of the strike they were not entitled to unemployment benefit.
This decision was based upon decisions reached by the umpire more than twenty years ago. Today the social conscience of this nation will not tolerate the unemployed being treated in a harsh, inhumane and uncivilised way as they were twenty years ago. The Ministry will be doing itself an ill service and spoiling the good name it has built up in the post-war years if administrative decisions of this kind are to be made.
I will illustrate what has happened. These men, because they have not been called out on strike by their trade unions, were obviously not entitled to strike pay. Yet they were informed by the Ministry of Labour that because, in the opinion of the Ministry, they were out on strike they were not entitled to unemployment pay.
Furthermore, because the Ministry of Labour included them amongst the strikers, the National Assistance Board adjudged them to be strikers and they were, therefore, denied unemployment benefit by the State, National Assistance benefit by the National Assistance Board, and strike benefit by their respective unions.
At a time when those in responsible positions were doing everything they possibly could to keep the bitterness of the men within bounds and to pave the way for a settlement, I was astounded that the

2061
chairman of the tribunal denied me permission to hear the test case. I made the request in a very fair way. I am not one of those Members of Parliament who feels that he has some extraordinary right to invade territory where others would not be permitted, or who thinks that they should have special favours, but in the circumstances of this case, when scores of my constituents had come to see me and had expressed in typical working class language just what they were thinking, it would have been helpful if the court of referees had permitted me to hold a watching brief, which was all that I asked.
It would have been helpful because, when this blanket decision was made, the natural reaction of the men on strike was that it was the fault of the Ministry of Labour. They felt that the Ministry should have been impartial in the dispute. I am not saying that the Ministry was responsible; I am trying to convey the thoughts of the workers. In a dispute which had created such a depth of feeling it was very undesirable that at any point a decision should have been made which made it appear that the Ministry of Labour was taking the part of one side or the other, especially at a time when the Minister was deeply involved in trying to get the two sides together.
If this policy is carried to its logical conclusion, it will mean that if, in a strike area, the sales of a shop go down and the assistants are dismissed, they will be denied unemployment benefit because it will be argued that they have lost their jobs in consequence of a strike. In the same way, if, because they are on strike, the tenants of houses have no money to pay their rent, it can be argued that because the rent collectors have been told that their services are no longer required, because the tenants cannot pay the rent, they should not be entitled to unemployment benefit.
I know that it would be out of order for me to suggest anything in the way of amending legislation in this Adjournment debate. I shall not do that. I hope that similar circumstances and a strike of the magnitude that we have had recently will not occur again. But the Minister appoints the chairmen of the courts of referees and other officers, and, without there being any question of amending legislation, is there any reason why, when he is making these appointments, he
2062
should not drop a hint about how Parliament intended the Act to be interpreted? I am sure that it was never the intention of this or any previous Parliament that these Regulations should be interpreted in the way they were during the recent strike.
I hope that the Parliamentary Secretary will take note of what has been said and will appreciate that it has been said in a spirit of helpfulness and in an endeavour to avoid in the future feelings of bitterness and detestation about the Ministry which became apparent during the recent strike. If, by raising this matter, I have been able to achieve that, I shall consider that this debate has been worth while, and I shall be satisfied, despite my feeling of frustration at being unable to take part in the defence debate.
10.32 p.m.
Mr. Cyril Osborne: I wish to support the plea made by the hon. Member for Jarrow (Mr. Fernyhough). Men in my own constituency went through the same experience and appealed to me. They were not in a union, and when they were declared redundant, because 80 per cent, or 90 per cent. of their fellow employees were on strike, they got nothing from the welfare services because, as they were told, they were on strike. In a way, they were "sent to Coventry".
I made inquiries, and I was told that this was a long-standing arrangement; that it was a difficult problem which had been shelved by successive Ministers. I urge that it shall not be shelved again. I can assure my hon. Friend that people in my constituency felt very sore about it, and neither side wishes men to feel a sense of injustice at such a time.
10.34 p.m.
Mr. H. A. Marquand: I am not surprised that the hon. Member for Louth (Mr. Osborne) has experienced in his constituency incidents of the kind complained of by my hon. Friend the Member for Jarrow (Mr. Fernyhough). They have happened also on Tees-side. Men employed by contractors, whose work ended while the strike was on, have been refused unemployment pay. We cannot understand that, because Section 13 of the National Insurance Act, 1946, dealing with this subject, states:
"A person who has lost employment … by reason of a stoppage of work which was

2063
due to a trade dispute at his place of employment shall be disqualified for receiving unemployment benefit. …"
What seems to have happened here is that people have been disqualified when they have lost their employment by reason of a dispute which did not occur at their place of work.
I wish to draw attention to an administrative aspect of this problem about which I questioned the Minister when the matter was raised at Question Time the other day. I asked the Minister what part was played in the administrative procedure by the National Insurance officer. He said that he did not know whether the National Insurance officer in London had given guidance to the local insurance officer on the spot in making his ruling. The fact that the same rulings were made in different parts of the country rather suggests that he did. I want to know why, and on what authority, the National Insurance officer could give guidance at all.
As I read the Act, it speaks in Section 43 (3, a) of
"an officer appointed by the Minister"
being given power to determine questions as to the right of benefits and of
"authorising the said officer either himself to determine any such question or to refer it to a local tribunal."
It does not say anything about the said officer getting guidance from a third party.
When I looked at the Regulations made under the Act to deal with this part of the Act, I find, in Part IV, Regulation 10 (1):
"Any Question as to the right to benefit shall be submitted forthwith to one of the Insurance officers."
The Regulations seem throughout to imply that the insurance officer will be a person in a certain locality who will give a decision from which an appeal will lie to a local tribunal. I have not been able to find any reference to a National Insurance officer.
I do not see how the Minister can be satisfied that the Act is being administered fairly and impartially unless local officers who know local conditions can alone make the determinations. It seems quite wrong that a National Insurance officer can give general directions or
2064
guidance about how a statute is to be interpreted, and I would like the matter to be explained. The statute refers all the time to an insurance officer as one of the officers of a locality.
10.37 p.m.
The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance (Miss Edith Pitt): The point chosen by the hon. Member for Jarrow (Mr. Fernyhough) is connected with the 12-day rule, but I will try to answer the other points about people in his constituency who were not in the engineering or shipbuilding trades and the question about his presence at the tribunal.
There is in particular the point the hon. Member mentioned about the decisions being made by an umpire twenty years ago. He felt that in these days the decision should be interpreted differently. I would remind him and other hon. Members that the trade dispute provisions of the Act were unchanged from 1927, and that they were re-enacted by the Government of the hon. Member for Jarrow and his right hon. and hon. Friends in 1946, in the National Insurance Act. These provisions were not the subject of question at any time during the passage of that Act.
An interpretation of Section 13 of that Act leads us to the 12-day rule which has by now become established case law. It is the practice of the statutory authorities to consider, under the disputes provisions of the National Insurance Act, the position of all workers who claim unemployment benefit and have been laid off within 12 days of the stoppage.
Since 1920, the statutory authorities have applied this test to decide to what extent suspension from work should be treated as equivalent to final termination before a period of recognised holiday. To this extent, the 12-day rule was beneficial in intent because the purpose was to allow suspension to be treated as employment that was terminated if it was longer than 12 days and so to enable unemployment benefit to be paid for recognised holidays.
In 1931, the umpire, who was, of course, an independent statutory authority, confirmed the application of a similar test for determination whether a person could be treated as definitely discharged before a stoppage. The test applies to a worker habitually employed, or who habitually seeks work, at certain premises, and

2065
whose employment ended before the stoppage of work at those premises. It has been held that if such a worker is laid off within 12 days before the stoppage he must be regarded as having lost his employment by reason of the stoppage, unless there is strong evidence to the contrary.
I want to make it clear that it does not apply to the man who can prove that his employment has ended and that he would not go back to that employer or to that employment. Here I take up the hon. Gentleman's point; shop workers and the like could not be affected because the strike is not at their place of employment. I hope that that is clear.
Equally, because of the 12-day rule, there is no disqualification for the worker indefinitely suspended for reasons unconnected with the dispute a fortnight or more before the stoppage, but the worker who is not finally discharged, and only suspended, within a fortnight of the stoppage may be disqualified if, had there been no stoppage at his place of employment, he would otherwise have been employed there.
Whether the man is discharged or only suspended is a matter for the statutory authorities to determine. It is not always easy, I agree.
Since 1920, in the particular industry in which the hon. Member for Jarrow is interested—shipways—it has been held that men are not discharged in the ordinary sense, but are regarded as doing semi-casual work. Those men, when a job is completed, may be temporarily suspended, but they regularly seek work, and expect to return to work, in the same or in neighbouring yards.
If the man concerned can establish to the satisfaction of the statutory authorities that he had severed his connection with the yards, he would not be disqualified. If he cannot, he is in the same position as anyone else working for a regular employer shortly before the stoppage begins—for instance, someone who is sick or who is on short time. It would clearly be unreasonable to exempt such a man from the disputes provisions for unemployment benefit if he were as much concerned with or affected by the dispute as his colleagues who have equally lost work because of it. This is a matter in which the commissioner's decision is final, by the law as it stands, and could be
2066
altered only by fresh legislation, which is not, of course, a matter for an Adjournment debate.
In the other instance, the men he refers to, who are neither in shipbuilding or engineering work—they are the men employed at Lennigs were paid off on 22nd March, the last working day before the strike, during which all technical men on that site withdrew their labour. The benefit was initially disallowed by the regional insurance officer on the grounds that the labourers were connected with the dispute. On further inquiry, he discovered that the men's wages were governed by rates of pay in the building industry and not in engineering or shipbuilding, that they were not participating in the strike, and that no labourer on the site was a member of any union participating in it.
In the light of that information, the regional insurance officer reviewed his decision on 16th April, and allowed the claims, and the local exchanges were notified yesterday. The men concerned, I am told, have now all returned to work, but are being notified immediately of the decision to allow claims, and invited to claim any benefit due.
Mr. Arthur Lewis: My hon. Friend did mention that he was generalising, and a number of constituents of other hon. Members are affected. Would the hon. Lady go so far as to say that the same procedure will apply in those cases?
Miss Pitt: If they come under the provisions, and if their employment was suspended within 12 days, then I think they will be subject to the 12-day rule; but the hon. Member may be quite sure and clear—as I am sure other hon. Members are—that all these decisions are a matter for the independent statutory authorities. I could not comment on a particular case. The hon. Member for Jarrow began by referring to a particular case. I could not comment. It has already been before the tribunal, and there is a further right of appeal to the commissioner, if the men choose to exercise it. I could not give an "off the cuff" answer to a particular case. Each one would have to be decided upon its merits by the independent authorities.
I was going to deal with the question as to who has a right to be present—
Mr. Fernyhough: I am sure the hon. Lady will do me the honour of accepting that I was not saying that I had a right to be present, because I know that the Act has laid that down, and it says who may be present, with the permission of the chairman.
Miss Pitt: I was not suggesting that the hon. Gentleman asserted that he had a right. I was wishing to deal with the general principle of who has a right to be present at these courts, which are, of course, closed courts, the public and Press not being admitted. The Regulations of 1948 specify those who have a right to be present but leave it to the tribunal to decide who may be regarded as an interested party. Again, this is not a matter on which I can comment. My right hon. Friend made it clear, in answering the hon. Gentleman's Question on Monday, that the decision was taken by the tribunal itself. However, the hon. Gentleman may like to know that his constituents were represented by their trade union officials at that particular tribunal, and other trade union officials whose members might be affected by the outcome of these particular cases, which were test cases, were admitted as interested persons.
The first man was a painter, who was represented by Mr. Youll, of the National Society of Painters. The interested parties present on that case were Mr. McDonald, the district delegate of the Boilermakers' Society, Mr. McCutcheon, the district delegate of the Shipwrights' and Ship Constructors' Association, and Mr. Lake, the district secretary of the National Union of Municipal and General Workers. In the second case, the man was a driller. He was represented by Mr. McCutcheon, the district delegate of the Shipwrights' and Ship Constructors' Association, and the interested parties present were Mr. Youll, of the National Society of Painters, and Mr. Lake, the district secretary of the National Union of Municipal and General Workers.
My right hon. Friend expressed a certain sympathy with the point raised on Monday. If there is any question of these Regulations being modified, I would say that that is one of the matters which the Franks Committee has been taking a keen interest in. We ourselves in the Department have given evidence and have quite frankly told the Committee of the restric-
2068
tions imposed by the Regulations. The Minister is now awaiting the Report of that Committee, which I am told is expected early in August. We shall wish to see what recommendations the Committee makes about closed courts before we make up our minds about any change.
The hon. Gentleman mentioned also that those of his constituents who were denied unemployment benefit were denied National Assistance also. I think that that cannot be correct, because, even though they are not eligible for unemployment benefit—strike pay, of course, is no concern of ours—their wives and children, if they are in need, may apply for, and should certainly receive, National Assistance.
Mr. Fernyhough: But if the men were not going to be on strike, they did not get National Assistance for themselves or strike pay.
Miss Pitt: My point—I am sure this is what the hon. Gentleman wishes to be reassured about—is that their families did not suffer from lack of assistance in that way.
The hon. Gentleman referred also to the Minister of Labour appearing to take sides in this matter. He referred to a "blanket decision". Similarly, the right hon. Member for Middlesbrough, East (Mr. Marquand) asked by what authority guidance was given—the guidance to which my right hon. Friend referred on Monday. Those two points are tied together.
My right hon. Friend said on Monday that he had no knowledge of any guidance that had been given, but in any event it was not his province. Following Questions on Monday, we have made some inquiries, and we find that some guidance has been given by the Chief Insurance Officer, which the right hon. Gentleman will recognise as a very proper thing to do because the Chief Insurance Officer has a duty to advise regional and local officers on the law by directing their attention to it, particularly in the case of an emergency in which many cases have to be considered. The process of seeking and being given guidance is a continuous one, for it goes on all the time. I understand that on this occasion much of it was given by telephone.
There is no question of either a directive or instructions being given by the Chief Insurance Officer. He has properly

2069
discharged his duty of keeping regional and local insurance officers informed of the law and of giving them guidance where they have asked for it. It is the same method that has operated for twenty years or more. No change has been made.
The hon. Member for Jarrow expressed the hope that the Regulations might be interpreted differently. It is a question not of Regulations but of an Act. If it were to operate any differently, amending legislation would be needed, unless there were change in the commissioner's decisions. The commissioner is appointed by the Crown, and the tribunal chairman is appointed by the Minister. Both are independent authorities. It would be very improper for the Minister to inter-
2070
fere with them or tell them how to interpret the law.
10.50 p.m.
Mr. F. H. Hayman: I would ask the hon. Lady to inquire whether instructions were given by the Chief Insurance Officer in connection with Falmouth, where 2,000 men were declared redundant before the strike began, due, the employers say, to a lack of orders because of the Suez incident. It seems rather—
The Question having been proposed after Ten o'clock and the debate having continued for half an hour, Mr. SPEAKER adjourned the House without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.
Adjourned at nine minutes to Eleven o'clock.