Commons Sitting of 5 July 1955

Preamble
The House met at half-past Two o'clock
PRAYERS
[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]
PETITION

  Service Men (Overseas Deaths)
  Mr. Allaun: Mr. Speaker, I have to present a petition on behalf of citizens of Manchester and Salford. The petition bears the signatures of 10,728, and it shows
  "that the grief of parents whose children die in the Armed Forces is aggravated by the financial cost of bringing the coffins to this country and burial here when so desired, and that the burden on the Government of meeting these expenses, particularly as compared with total defence expenditure, would be trifling."
  The petition concludes:
  "Wherefore your petitioners pray that your honourable House should call upon the Government to bear the cost of transporting the coffin and burial at home of any Service man or woman who dies while serving at any station designated 'home posting,' if the parents so desire.
  And your petitioners will ever pray, etc."
  To lie upon the Table.

ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
  BRITISH ARMY

    Personal Cases
    Mr. Doddsasked the Secretary of State for War why 2312670 Private B. F. Cammell, rejected by the Royal Air Force because of having Grade II(a) feet preventing him from being called upon in the Royal Air Force to serve abroad, is being sent by his Department to Japan; how he is now employed; and what consideration has been given to his discharge because of his foot troubles.
    The Secretary of State for War (Mr. Antony Head): I have checked up on this case and recent examination shows that his foot trouble is not serious and should not hinder him in his job as a pay clerk at home or abroad.
    Mr. Dodds: Does the right hon. Gentleman recognise that this man has Grade II(a) (feet), that he was rejected by the Royal Air Force because of that, and that this grading is the same as the grading of a well-known cricketer who has been rejected by the Royal Air Force and excused National Service altogether? Is this right?
    Mr. Head: It is not for me to make comparisons, because that is not part of the Question. All I know is that this man came from the Royal Air Force. Many more men volunteer for the Royal Air Force than are required, and so far as we are concerned—and this is all I am speaking for—he has been re-examined and is perfectly fit for duties as a pay clerk at home or abroad.
    Mr. Dodds: Will the right hon. Gentleman say why a man can be rejected by the R.A.F. as unfit to go overseas because of his physical condition and yet the Army will not only take him but will send him overseas? Why this difference?
    Mr. Head: I have already told the hon. Member that there are many more men who want to join the R.A.F. than the National Service requirements need. Inevitably many who want to join the R.A.F. are not taken.
    Mr. Dodds: Why does not the Army take the cricketer then?
    Mr. Doddsasked the Secretary of State for War why 23082491 Gunner F. Thompson is being retained in view of the condition of both feet; what was the date of his call-up; what was his grade when called up; why he is excused all parades and marching; what type of footwear he is called upon to use; and if he is aware that a foot specialist at the Royal Herbert Hospital, Woolwich, has informed him that an operation would not be successful and advised amputation.
    Mr. Head: Gunner Thompson was called up on 4th November, 1954, having been placed in Grade II(a) (feet). He is excused guards, marching and all parades except the morning muster parade because of foot trouble; he wears Service pattern shoes. The specialist at the Royal Herbert Hospital, Woolwich, recently offered to remove the soldier's right little toe, which was giving some

    925
    pain, but the offer was refused. Gunner Thompson is retained in the Army because he is fit to carry out his work as an equipment repairer which does not entail much standing.
    Mr. Dodds: Why does the Secretary of State say that this man was accepted as Grade II(a) (feet) when I have his medical card here which says he is Grade III? Will he look into the case again? In view of the pain which this man is suffering, will he not discharge him from the Army? If he will not, where is the fair play in National Service? Win he accept these photographs of this man's feet, which show that he is totally unfitted to serve under National Service in the Army when others are going scot-free?
    Mr. Head: This case has been investigated by an expert and I must judge by his report. Whether or not the hon. Member knows better, I cannot tell. All I can say is that the man came in Grade II(a) (feet) but since then, because of this little toe trouble—the little toe which he did not wish to have amputated—he has been regraded one grade lower.
    Mr. Dodds: I beg to give notice that I will raise this matter on the Adjournment as soon as possible.
    Mr. F. Noel-Bakerasked the Secretary of State for War whether he will arrange for a home posting for Barry Pearce, of 13, Upham Road, Swindon, in view of the family circumstances to which his attention has been drawn.
    Mr. Head: Mr. Barry Pearce has not yet been called up, and it is not therefore certain whether he will even serve in the Army.
    Mr. Noel-Baker: As the right hon. and gallant Gentleman's Department has already taken some interest in the matter, will he at least be good enough to pass the papers on to the Ministry of Labour and National Service and do what he can to see that this particularly difficult case is sympathetically considered?
    Mr. Head: Frankly, I do not think the question of posting can arise until the man goes to a unit. The only interest in him which we have taken so far is to try to find out which of the many Barry Pearce's in the Army the hon. Member had in mind.
    Mr. Callaghanasked the Secretary of State for War if, in view of the fact that the Monmouth Agricultural Executive Committee is now backing the appeal of Mr. C. Handford, Sea Bank Farm, Rumney, that he should be excused his Territorial Army training in view of his commitments on his farm, he will reconsider his previous decision.
    Mr. Head: I regret that I cannot meet the hon. Member's request. Mr. Handford was excused annual training in 1953 and 1954, and has had a lot of time to arrange for his business to be carried on during his absence.
    Mr. Callaghan: Is it not the case that this man is single-handed and has been building up a stock of 1,000 head of poultry and 60 pigs and has a door-to-door sale of eggs?
    Mr. Nabarro: Tory agricultural policy.
    Mr. Callaghan: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the Monmouthshire Agricultural Committee says that he will have to dispose of this business? Does the Secretary of State think it fair to require a young man to give this up to do a fortnight's Territorial training? It is quite clear that the young man cannot make alternative arrangements.
    Mr. Head: The hon. Gentleman made it sound a very strong case, but, in fact, his father and brother farm next door to him. He has a 12-acre farm. It is true that the Monmouthshire Agricultural Committee put up the case last year, but I understand that it has not done so this year.
    Mr. Callaghan: It has.
    Mr. Head: I am informed that it has not. The Ministry of Agriculture has been approached, and I understand that it does not support this recommendation.
    Mr. Callaghan: Will the right hon. Gentleman refer to a letter from the National Farmers' Union, a copy of which I have in my hand, dated 28th April and supporting this application—a letter which should have reached him by now? Is it not clear that the right hon. Gentleman has not checked these facts, for the man's father is ill and cannot work—and that, too, is in the papers which he has in front of him. Does he not know that the brother is wholly engaged in working the father's farm

    927
    because the latter cannot work? In view of the fact that the right hon. Gentleman has not appreciated all these facts adequately, as is shown by his answer, will he please reconsider the matter?
    Mr. Head: I apologise to the hon. Gentleman. I was wrong. The Monmouthshire Agricultural Committee has never handled this case or had anything to do with it. At least I know more about it than does the hon. Gentleman. It was handled by the Glamorgan Agricultural Committee in each case.
    Mr. Callaghan: By both.
    Mr. Head: That body has not considered the case this year, nor has it approached the hon. Gentleman, as I am informed—and he may correct me if I am wrong. The Ministry of Agriculture does not support the application. I have stated the facts, which I have taken the trouble to find out.

    National Service Men (Annual Camp)
    Mr. John Hallasked the Secretary of State for War if National Service men, serving their third year on the reserve with the Territorial Army or the Army Emergency Reserve, but whose camp was cancelled this year, will be required to attend a training camp in 1956.
    Mr. Head: No, Sir, except for those who did not complete their training liability in their first two years of part-time service.

    Emergency Reserve
    Mr. John Hallasked the Secretary of State for War if he will make such changes in the organisation and training of the Army Emergency Reserve as may be necessary to enable that Reserve to be effectively mobilised and deployed in the event of a major conflict.
    Mr. Head: Yes, Sir.

    London Assembly Centre
    Mr. C. Howellasked the Secretary of State for War what arrangements are made for the periodical examination of the troop concentration depot situated in Tottenham Court Road, London.
    Mr. Head: A hygiene expert inspects the London Assembly Centre once a month and there are weekly unit hygiene
    928
    inspections. The General Officer Commanding London District inspects the centre once a year to see that it is functioning efficiently.
    Mr. C. Howellasked the Secretary of State for War what bedding accommodation is provided in the troop concentration depot situated in Tottenham Court Road, London; and at what intervals the bedding is cleaned or changed.
    Mr. Head: Mattress covers are changed once a week, and mattresses are fumigated every three months. Each man gets clean blankets.
    Mr. Howell: Is the right hon. Gentleman satisfied that these arrangements are being carried out?
    Mr. Head: As I have said, this centre is inspected once a month by a hygiene expert and G.O.C. London District. They inform me that these arrangements are carried out. Occasionally, if we have a lot of fog and aircraft are grounded, the centre gets overcrowded, and then conditions are not all we want.
    Mr. Howell: Am I to understand that when aircraft are grounded the effect is felt in Tottenham Court Road?
    Mr. Head: Yes.
    Mr. C. Howellasked the Secretary of State for War how many times during each year for the past five years has the ventilation plant in the troop concentration depot in Tottenham Court Road, London, been found to be defective; and what arrangements are made for the accommodation of troops whilst the ventilation plant is defective.
    Mr. Head: There are two recorded cases during the past five years on which the ventilation plant in the London Assembly Centre has failed. On each occasion the failure was due to a motor breakdown and the plant was repaired within a few days. About once a month the plant is closed down for up to two hours for maintenance but this short closure has no appreciable effect.
    Mr. Howell: Will the Secretary of State keep a very close watch on this centre, because it should be obvious to him that these Questions have arisen because of complaints. It is quite clear to those who know Queen's Regulations that they allow men to make complaints,

    929
    but there are certain complaints which, if made, indicate that the soldier or Service man is what we call effeminate—although the Army and the other Forces have another name for it.

    Cyprus (Expenditure)
    Mr. Emrys Hughesasked the Secretary of State for War how much expenditure he has incurred in Cyprus in the year ended 30th June.
    Mr. Head: Total expenditure including pay, food, rent, works, etc., amounts to about £6 million.
    Mr. Hughes: Is the Minister aware that he is piling up a very heavy bill in Cyprus and that it looks as if Cyprus is going to cost more than the groundnuts scheme? What is he doing to cut expenditure in Cyprus?
    Mr. Head: We do everything we can to cut expenditure in Cyprus, but I can assure the hon. Member that the value of Cyprus strategically is far greater than the value of the groundnuts commercially.

    Mobile Defence Battalions
    Mr. Ian Harveyasked the Secretary Secretary of State for War whether he is now in a position to indicate the establishment of personnel and scale of equipment agreed for each Mobile Defence Corps Reserve Battalion.
    Mr. Head: Provisional establishments for both rescue and fire battalions have been fixed by the War Office and Air Ministry in consultation with the Home Office. These battalions will be on the general lines of the Civil Defence and Fire Service units. Rescue battalions will have three companies providing 54 rescue sections and one ambulance company of 54 ambulances. Fire battalions will consist of five mobile companies each with six fire trucks. Scales of equipment have been fixed except for a few details.
    Mr. Harvey: Would my right hon. Friend be prepared to set these details out so that hon. Members may see the actual composition of this battalion?
    Mr. Head: Speaking without notice, I can see no objection to that at the moment, and if possible I will do so.
    Mr. Wigg: If he cannot send copies to every hon. Member, would the right hon. Gentleman be prepared to place all the available information in the Library?
    Mr. Head: Yes.

    Hotel, Portsmouth (Use)
    Sir J. Lucasasked the Secretary of State for War if he is aware of the feeling in Portsmouth at the continued requisitioning of the Royal Pier Hotel, especially in view of the shortage of hotel accommodation for visitors; how long the hotel has now been unoccupied; and what action he proposes now to take.
    Mr. Head: We acquired the freehold of this hotel from the Ministry of Health in May, 1954. Internal alterations and repairs are being done to make it suitable for an Army families hostel. It should be ready for occupation by the end of this year.
    Sir J. Lucas: Is the Secretary of State aware that this hotel has been vacant for ten years and that, as it has been entirely unoccupied for that period, this represents ten years' loss of rates? Is he aware that the corporation are very angry about it? Will he please make some offer of compensation to the rates? Is he aware that my constituents regard it as a second Crichel Down?
    Mr. Head: I do not want to "pass the buck," but this hotel was nothing to do with us before we got it in May, 1954. I am not the right person to ask about anything which happened before that. As for its functions, it is essential to have places where these homeless families can go in England when soldiers have gone abroad. I can assure my hon. Friend that it will be fulfilling a vital purpose.

    Prisoners (Handcuffs)
    Mr. Ian Harveyasked the Secretary of State for War the existing regulations with regard to the use of handcuffs in the Army, with particular reference to those on a court-martial charge.
    Mr. Head: If a commanding officer considers handcuffs necessary to ensure the safe-custody of an accused soldier, he may direct that the accused be escorted to and from his court-martial in handcuffs. It is however laid down that no soldier under escort, whether in

    931
    handcuffs or not, will be marched through public thoroughfares or taken on buses or underground trains. One cannot avoid a prisoner in handcuffs having to cross the street from the vehicle in which he has been conveyed to court into the building.
    Mr. Harvey: Will my right hon. Friend assure himself that these regulations were scrupulously observed in a recent court-martial in Germany?
    Mr. Head: Yes, Sir. I have looked into that case and I am satisfied that the accused was taken in a vehicle. The photographs were taken in the very brief interval between his leaving the vehicle and entering the court.

    Overseas Service (Germany)
    Mr. Ian Harveyasked the Secretary of State for War the circumstances under which the British Army of the Rhine is graded as being on home service.
    Mr. Head: Service in Germany does not count as overseas service because the distribution of our Forces at home, in Europe and elsewhere overseas does not permit it. In other respects men serving in Germany are deprived of no benefits by the fact that service there does not count towards an overseas tour, and, in fact, they get some additional benefits such as free leave travel to this country.
    Mr. Harvey: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the fact that members of the Royal Air Force serving in Germany are regarded as on overseas service creates an anomaly which must be very difficult for members of the British Army of the Rhine to understand?
    Mr. Head: Yes, Sir, I am aware of that, and I am obliged to my hon. Friend for his supplementary question. The fact is that the world-wide deployment of the Royal Air Force allows it to count Germany as overseas, but such is our deployment that if we were to count Germany as overseas it may be that we would have hardly any troops at present on home service.
    Mr. Fernybough: Since Western Germany has regained her independence, can the right hon. Gentleman say whether any compensation is being granted to
    932
    British troops serving in that territory, having regard to the fact that they had concessions when they were occupation troops which at that time it was thought they might lose?
    Mr. Head: That is an important subject, but I do not think it arises out of this Question.

    Ranks and Titles (Civilian Use)
    Mr. Simmonsasked the Secretary of State for War whether he will obtain an undertaking from serving officers that they will refrain from using their military rank and title after retirement from active service.
    Mr. Head: No, Sir. I see no reason for such a change.
    Mr. Simmons: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that many of these people running about with high-sounding titles have never seen any active service and they flash these titles about politically? If he is not prepared to make this request to commissioned officers, will the Minister give warrant officers and non-commissioned officers the right to use their titles?
    Mr. Head: I am glad to be able to inform the hon. and gallant Member that warrant officers and sergeants have permission, if they wish, to use their rank after they have left the Service. This is a fairly optional matter. If anyone wants to retain his rank, it is a sign that he is proud of having served in the Army.

    Haircuts
    Mr. Simmonsasked the Secretary of State for War what proficiency regimental barbers are required to attain; and if they are allowed to give National Service men any choice of hair style when operating upon them.
    Mr. Head: Paragraph 1,003 of Queen's Regulations states that hair will be kept short. A soldier may please himself what style he wears provided this rule is observed. There is no establishment for regimental barbers and, although units usually provide civilian or soldier barbers, any man may choose his own civilian hairdresser.
    Mr. Simmons: Is the Minister aware that many of the people who practise their art as hairdressers upon National

    933
    Service men are more fitted to practise the arts of a carpenter or a metal shearer? Will he look at a photograph I have? I have not brought it here, as I think it is not desirable to make an exhibition of this House. It is of a National Service man who looks a perfect fright after the operations of a regimental barber. This is a very important question. If we are to encourage National Service men to continue in the Service, we have to treat them as human beings. I ask the Minister to give serious consideration to the way in which some of these Service men are treated.
    Mr. Head: I am all in favour of people having decent haircuts. I will certainly look at the photograph and take the matter up.
    Mr. Burden: Have any instructions been given about trimming moustaches in the Army?
    Mr. Nabarro: Order, order.

    W.D. Stores, Cyprus (Losses)
    Mr. Bellengerasked the Secretary of State for War to what extent losses of arms or ammunition from Government stores in Cyprus have occurred in recent months.
    Mr. Head: The right hon. Member may be referring to recent reports in the Press about the theft of arms. I am informed that no arms or ammunition from Army stocks have passed into the hands of civilians in Cyprus.
    Mr. Bellenger: Bearing in mind the depredations which occurred in the Middle East—not far from Cyprus—and the very disturbed circumstances which now prevail in Cyprus, has the right hon. Gentleman issued stringent orders that commanding officers should pay very close attention to possible thefts or disappearance of arms from military establishments?
    Mr. Head: That is always a standing order, particularly when local inhabitants show signs of hostility, but I would remind the right hon. Member that in the Canal Zone we had vast stores of ammunition and weapons and that situation has not obtained fully in Cyprus.

  TRADE AND COMMERCE

    Samples and Advertising Imports (International Convention)
    Mr. Holtasked the President of the Board of Trade if he will make a statement on the reasons for the delay in the ratification of the International Convention to facilitate the Importation of Samples and Advertising, signed by the United Kingdom Government on 30th June, 1953.
    The Minister of State, Board of Trade (Mr. A. R. W. Low): Certain small changes were necessary in our procedures to bring them into line with the provisions of the Convention. These changes have been effected by Statutory Instruments Nos. 814 and 815 which were made on 6th and 7th June. The Government propose in the near future to ratify the Convention which has not yet entered into force.

    Raw Cotton
    Mr. Holtasked the President of the Board of Trade if he will make a statement on the marketing and pricing arrangements in connection with raw cotton imported into the United Kingdom, indicating in which countries there is no Government interference, and in which countries the quantity available, or the price, is interfered with; and the nature and extent of the Government interference.
    Mr. Low: The Governments of all the principal countries supplying the United Kingdom with raw cotton impose regulations which directly or indirectly affect its export price. Several of the Governments concerned also restrict the acreage for cotton growing or the amount and types of cotton exports. With permission, I will circulate in the OFFICIAL REPORT a detailed statement of the information available about the present arrangements in each of the principal supplying countries.
    Mr. Holt: Can the Minister say whether the Board of Trade is being active in making representations to those countries to cease these undesirable practices?
    Mr. Low: We have, of course, no responsibility for the policies other Governments pursue. We can only intervene

    935
    if they are contravening international obligations. As the hon. Member will know, this is a complicated problem and

    RAW COTTON

    Country

    Nature of marketing and price arrangements

    Whether export duties are imposed

    Whether exports are restricted

    Whether planting is restricted

    Argentina

    …

    Export sales require the approval of the Argentine Trade Promotions Institute. The Government guarantee minimum prices to the cotton growers.

    No

    Yes-by global quotas fixed each season.

    No

    Brazil

    …

    The Government fix the rate of exchange for the proceeds of cotton exports.

    No

    No

    No

    Egypt

    …

    Cotton is bought and sold by the Government at pre-determined prices. Export prices in certain currencies including sterling, are affected by discounts resulting from regulations governing the disposal of foreign exchange earned by exporters.

    Yes

    Occasionally, particular qualities required by the domestic industry.

    Yes

    India

    …

    For most varieties of cotton prices are free to fluctuate between minimum and maximum prices prescribed by the Government.

    Yes

    Yes. Exports limited by type and quantity.

    No

    Mexico

    …

    Free market

    Yes

    No

    No

    Nigeria

    …

    Sold on the open market by the Nigerian Produce Marketing Co. Ltd., London.

    Yes

    No

    No

    Pakistan

    …

    Free market

    Yes

    No

    No

    Peru

    …

    Free market

    Yes

    No

    No

    Syria

    …

    Free market

    Yes

    No

    No

    Tanganyika

    …

    Auctioned with reserve prices partly by the Tanganyika Lint and Seed Marketing Board and partly through the Uganda Lint Marketing Board.

    No

    No

    No

    The Sudan

    …

    Mostly auctioned by the Gezira Board with reserve prices.

    Yes

    No

    No

    Uganda

    …

    Auctioned by the Uganda Lint Marketing Board with reserve prices.

    Yes

    No

    No

    U.S.A.

    …

    Free market with a Government price support scheme.

    No

    No

    Yes

    U.S.S.R.

    …

    The amounts for export are determined and the prices are agreed by a Government organisation.

    —

    —

    —

    it is greatly affected by the price charged for United States cotton.
    Following is the information:

    G.A.T.T. (Organisation for Trade Co-operation)
    Mr. Holtasked the President of the Board of Trade if Her Majesty's Government have yet decided to sign the agreement to establish the Organisation for Trade Co-operation drawn up at the last session of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
    Mr. Low: As was announced in the Statement of Policy regarding the review of the G.A.T.T. (Command Paper 9413), Her Majesty's Government propose to sign, at the appropriate times, the Protocols of Amendments to the General Agreement and the agreement on the Organisation for Trade Co-operation. The Protocols of Amendments are open for signature till the 15th November, 1955, and we shall arrange for their signature by that date. No date has been fixed for signature of the agreement on the Organisation for Trade Co-operation. The Government will decide when to sign it in the light of developments in the consideration of this agreement by the United States Congress.
    Mr. H. Wilson: Will the right hon. Gentleman say whether the Government intend out of their time to provide facilities for a debate on this matter before it is finally concluded? Will he look at the precedent of the original G.A.T.T. in this connection, as when that was drawn up there was a full debate in this House before we entered the commitment?
    Mr. Low: I will certainly look at that although I do not think it is a matter for me but for the Leader of the House.
    Captain Duncanasked the President of the Board of Trade how many countries have ratified the recent General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade agreement.
    Mr. Low: Canada, the U.S.A., Greece and Germany ad referendum, have signed the two Protocols amending the substantive provisions of the G.A.T.T. The Agreement for the Establishment of an Organisation for Trade Co-operation has been signed by Greece, by the U.S.A. subject to approval by Congress, and by Germany and Turkey ad referendum.
    The U.S.A., Greece and Germany ad referendum, have signed the Protocol of organisational amendments which are
    938
    consequential upon the establishment of the Organisation for Trade Co-operation.
    Captain Duncan: While thanking my right hon. Friend for that complicated answer, may I ask if he is aware that we are anxious to proceed with this matter so that we can take advantage of Article VI and Article XVI in the flax industry and the horticultural industry?
    Mr. Low: I have explained the Government's policy on that aspect of the matter in answer to an earlier Question.
    Commander Agnew: Is my right hon. Friend aware of the real need of urgency in dealing with this matter, because at the present time first-class carrots grown in the Vale of Evesham are fetching only 1d. a bunch because of the very severe competition from Algeria?
    Mr. Low: As my hon. and gallant Friend knows, that is another question.

    Furniture Exports
    Mr. Shepherdasked the President of the Board of Trade the value of furniture exports from the United Kingdom in the last available period.
    Mr. Low: £643,000 of wooden furniture and £2,541,000 of metal furniture during the first five months of this year.
    Mr. Shepherd: Does not my right hon. Friend agree that the exports of wooden furniture are particularly low? Will he say what the Board of Trade is doing to try to stimulate a higher level of exports in this regard?
    Mr. Low: The exports of wooden furniture are, in fact, slightly higher than last year. We would certainly welcome an expansion of these exports and are in touch with the industry.
    Mr. Gaitskell: Is it the intention of the Government to maintain the very severe restrictions on hire purchase in this country in order to stimulate exports?
    Mr. Low: That was not the object of the hire-purchase restrictions.

    Wool Exports
    Mr. George Craddockasked the President of the Board of Trade which countries have been the principal buyers of British wool tops in the period January, 1955, to the latest convenient date; what have been the respective values of their purchases; and what were the values of purchases by the Union of Soviet

    939
    Socialist Republics, China and Eastern Europe in the same period and their percentage of the total.
    Mr. Low: As the answer contains a number of figures, I will, with permission, circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
    Mr. Craddock: Is there any significance in the diminution of exports of wool tops to Russia during recent months?
    Mr. Low: Exports of wool tops to Russia during recent months have been almost exactly the same proportion of

    UNITED KINGDOM EXPORTS OF TOPS OF WOOL (INCLUDING BROKEN TOPS, CUT TOPS AND CARDED SLIVERS) JANUARY-MAY, 1955

    Main markets (excluding China and Soviet Eastern Europe)

    China and Soviet Eastern Europe

    £

    £

    India

    …

    …

    …

    …

    2,095,211

    China

    2,519,972

    Canada

    …

    …

    …

    …

    2,477,787

    Soviet Union, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania

    366,022

    Finland

    …

    …

    …

    …

    1,519,905

    Denmark

    …

    …

    …

    …

    615,109

    Other Soviet Eastern Europe*

    977,550

    Greece

    …

    …

    …

    …

    838,914

    Sweden

    …

    …

    …

    …

    729,289

    Total all countries

    £16,052,318

    * Eastern Germany, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Albania, Bulgaria, Roumania.

    Exports to China were 15·7 per cent., to the Soviet Union 2·3 per cent., and to other Soviet Eastern Europe 6·1 per cent. of the total.
    Mr. George Craddockasked the President of the Board of Trade how much wool Roumania imported from Great Britain for the months of January, February, March and April, 1955,

    TOTAL EXPORTS* OF RAW WOOL FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM TO ROUMANIA

    1954

    1955

    Thousand lbs.

    £ thousand

    Thousand lbs.

    £ thousand

    January

    …

    …

    143

    53

    605

    196

    February

    …

    …

    231

    83

    387

    118

    March

    …

    …

    102

    36

    422

    126

    April

    …

    …

    786

    278

    673

    208

    January-April

    …

    …

    1,262

    450

    2,087

    648

    * Including re-exports of imported wool, which in these periods constituted the whole of the exports.

    Anti-Dumping Legislation
    Captain Duncanasked the President of the Board of Trade when he proposes to introduce the Bill to deal with dumping to enable this country to take
    total exports of wool tops as they were last year. I think they are quite satisfactory.
    Mr. Osborne: Would my right hon. Friend say whether there is any restriction on the export of wool tops to Russia? Is it not a fact that the Russians can get as many as they like if they are prepared to pay for them?
    Mr. Low: There are no restrictions. My hon. Friend is quite right.
    Following is the answer:
    with corresponding figures for the same period in 1954.
    Mr. Low: As the answer contains a number of figures, I will, with permission, circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
    Following is the answer:
    advantage of the recent General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade agreement.
    Mr. Low: After the Summer Recess, we hope.
    Captain Duncan: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the horticultural industry is anxiously awaiting the passing of this Bill so that there can be freedom to manoeuvre in case increased protection is required for it?
    Mr. Low: I am aware of that because my hon. and gallant Friend has informed me of it.
    Mr. Holt: Can the right hon. Gentleman give an assurance that anti-dumping legislation will not be used to give increased protection but only where there is subsidisation by the Government of an exporting country?
    Mr. Low: The point of this legislation has already been made plain, and I do not think that that arises out of this Question.

    Hire-Purchase Restrictions (Electric Washers)
    Mr. H. Hyndasked the President of the Board of Trade whether he is aware that one firm of electric washer manufacturers in Accrington has had to suspend 90 workers owing to slackness of trade following hire-purchase restrictions; and whether his consideration of difficulties caused in the furniture trade will extend to electric washers and similar goods.
    The Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Trade (Mr. Donald Kaberry): Yes, Sir. My right hon. Friend is ready to consider representations from anyone about the effect of these restrictions which, in this case, may have been aggravated by the rail strike.

    Huyton Industrial Estate (Factory)
    Mr. H. Wilsonasked the President of the Board of Trade if he will make a statement on the threatened closure of the Hosemaster factory on the Huyton Industrial Estate, of which he has been given particulars.
    Mr. Kaberry: I am making inquiries into this matter and hope to discuss it with the right hon. Gentleman very shortly.

    Silk Imports
    Air Commodore Harveyasked the President of the Board of Trade what quantity of silk lengths has been imported from China during each of the past three years, respectively.
    Mr. Low: Imports of silk fabrics from China were 43,000 square yards in 1952, 248,000 in 1953 and 1,170,000 in 1954.
    Air Commodore Harvey: In view of the figures given by my right hon. Friend and the very serious effect this trend is having on the people in my constituency, will he bear this industry in mind when he is dealing with the proposed Bill about dumping, and give us an assurance that it will definitely be brought in early in the autumn?
    Mr. Low: It would be a mistake to judge the imports solely on the figures of imports from China. The total imports of silk fabrics from all sources were only slightly higher in 1954 than in 1953.
    Air Commodore Harvey: Does my right hon. Friend realise that so far this year imports are up compared with last year?
    Mr. Low: Not very much, and they are very substantially down on pre-war figures.

    Imported Machinery (Duty-free Licensing)
    Air Commodore Harveyasked the President of the Board of Trade if he will take steps to reduce the present minimum of £2,000 in respect of duty-free imports of machinery to £500.
    Mr. Low: No, Sir, for the reasons stated by my right hon. Friend in his reply to my hon. Friend the Member for St. Marylebone (Sir W. Wakefield) on 28th February last.
    Air Commodore Harvey: Yes, but does my right hon. Friend realise that the reply given by the President was a very unsatisfactory one, and that the minimum rate for importing this machinery hits small businesses hard? If we want to encourage small industries, we must give them equal facilities to obtain modern machinery. Will my right hon. Friend give an assurance that this matter will be considered?
    Mr. Low: The matter was very closely considered by the Wilson Smith Committee, which went into the whole question of the duty-free licensing of imported machinery, and which recommended that there was no other way of limiting the cost of the administration of

    943
    the scheme than that of imposing a comparatively high minimum value. As the House will remember, my right hon. Friend accepted the whole of that Report, and this was an important part of it. While he was considering it he was, on account of the importance of the small businesses, reluctantly forced to the conclusion that he would have to accept this part as well as the rest of the Report.
    Dr. King: Is the right hon. Gentleman not aware that this minimum hits hard the little industrialists, and that chambers of trade in this country are urging the Government to reduce the minimum to £500?
    Mr. Low: I am aware of that. All these matters have been taken into account, and they were taken fully into account by the Wilson Smith Committee, which consisted of a large number of responsible industrialists.
    Air Commodore Harvey: I am very sorry, but I shall have to give notice that I shall raise this matter again at the earliest opportunity.

    New Factories
    Mr. Ness Edwardsasked the President of the Board of Trade (1) the number of factories built in the United Kingdom, and the annual area, for each year 1946 to 1954;
    (2) the number of new factories, and the total square footage, authorised under the Distribution of Industry Act, for each of the years 1946 to 1954.
    Mr. Kaberry: Figures are not available for the United Kingdom, but the right hon. Member will find figures for Great Britain in Table 92 of the current Monthly Digest of Statistics.

    Oil and Coal Imports
    Mr. Nabarroasked the President of the Board of Trade (1) how many licence applications for importing foreign coal, and in what total tonnage, he has granted this year;
    (2) what percentage of United Kingdom trade is now liberalised; and why coal is excluded.
    Mr. Low: An open individual licence is held by the National Coal Board and seven specific licences have been issued during 1955 to other importers for a
    944
    total of 3,747 tons of coal. Like most items, coal may be imported from the sterling area under open licence. Some two-thirds of our imports from non-sterling sources are free from quantitative restrictions, but coal is included among the items on which detailed licensing control is maintained so that proposals to import may be considered in relation to available United Kingdom supplies and the overseas expenditure involved.
    Mr. Nabarro: Yes, but in consideration of the fact that Britain is now the largest coal importing nation in the world, why should we support a system giving favourable treatment to the National Coal Board and denying similar treatment to private enterprise merchants? Why cannot there be free and open competition in order to induce some efficiency into the Coal Board's arrangements?
    Mr. Low: I have explained in my answer why it is that quantitative restrictions have to be retained and licensing control has to be kept on. I think my hon. Friend will remember that he has been told on several occasions that licensing does not at present restrict imports of coal. All applications for licences have been met.
    Mr. Holt: If it does not restrict the import of coal, why not have an open general licence? Why this discrimination against coal? When the Government's avowed policy is to obtain 90 per cent. liberalisation of trade, and when coal is so important, why discriminate against coal of all things?
    Mr. Low: It is not very important in relation to the 90 per cent. liberalisation of O.E.E.C. trade. If the hon. Member will look at the last sentence of my answer when it is printed, he will see that I have already answered his question.
    Mr. Nabarro: How can it possibly be equitable that the whole of our private enterprise merchants bring in 3,000 tons of coal against 12 million tons of coal imported by the Coal Board?
    Mr. Low: But that is all they have asked for.
    Mr. Nabarroasked the President of the Board of Trade whether he will state the respective aggregate values of

    945
    oil and coal imports into the United Kingdom in twelve months ended on the latest date; and in respect of what tonnage of coal he has now granted an import licence to the National Coal Board.
    Mr. Low: During the year ended May, 1955, imports of petroleum and petroleum products amounted to £313 million and imports of coal to £43 million. As already stated, imports of coal are made by the National Coal Board on open individual licence.
    Mr. Nabarro: Is it not a fact that the private enterprise merchants are not in a position to apply for additional imports of coal because the Minister of Fuel and Power controls the price of it at a level which would not enable them to show a margin of profit on the resale? In those circumstances, cannot we have equity and fair competition between the Coal Board and private enterprise?
    Mr. Low: I do not think that any of those questions arise out of the main Question. Certainly, they are not questions for me.

    Development Areas (Factories)
    Mr. Slaterasked the President of the Board of Trade what form of advertisement is used by his Department in bringing to the notice of industrialists sites available on trading estates in Development Areas; and what response there has been to such form of advertisement on the Aycliffe Trading Estate for the years 1951 to 1954 in view of the fact that there is ample land available on the estate for any expansion likely to be required.
    Mr. Kaberry: The Board of Trade has used the handbook "Room to Expand," articles in the Board of Trade Journal, and booklets produced by the industrial estate companies, and has also displayed exhibits at the British Industries Fair. These describe the advantages of the Development Areas and Northern Ireland in general terms and it is not possible to measure their effect with regard to a particular trading estate.
    Mr. Slater: Will the Minister not agree that everything must be done to offset any desire on the part of industrialists to go back to the "red" areas away from these Development Areas, and that everything
    946
    should be done to develop sites on existing available trading estates?
    Mr. Kaberry: Yes, Sir.
    Mr. Slaterasked the President of the Board of Trade (1) what number of new factories went to the North-East Development Area for the years 1946 to 1954; and what percentage of the total of new factory works for the United Kingdom this represents;
    (2) what number of new factories went to the development areas for the years 1946 to 1954; and what percentage of the total of new industrial construction in the United Kingdom went to the development areas for those years.
    Mr. Kaberry: According to the latest information available to the Board of Trade, 2,241 new industrial buildings and extensions of more than 5,000 sq. ft. were completed in the areas which are now Development Areas in the years 1946 to 1954 inclusive. This represents 33 per cent. of the total area completed in Great Britain during the same period. The comparable figures for the North-East Development Area are 634 and 10·4 per cent.

  MONOPOLIES COMMISSION

    Collective Discrimination Report
    Mr. Lewisasked the President of the Board of Trade if he will make a statement of the Government's intentions with regard to the recommendations contained in the Monopolies Commission's Report on restrictive practices.
    Mr. H. Wilsonasked the President of the Board of Trade what steps he proposes to take to give effect to the majority recommendations of the Monopolies Commission Report on exclusive dealing, collective boycotts, aggregated rebates and other discriminatory trade practices.
    Mr. Jannerasked the President of the Board of Trade what steps he proposes to take to implement the suggestions made by the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Commission in their recent Report.
    Mr. de Freitasasked the President of the Board of Trade whether Her Majesty's Government accepts, in principle, the Monopolies and Restrictive

    947
    Practices Commission's recent Report on Collective Discrimination, Command Paper No. 9504.
    Mr. V. Yatesasked the President of the Board of Trade if he is aware of the practice of certain tea wholesalers in withholding supplies from retailers who sell below the fixed price to old-age pensioners; and if he will now introduce legislation to prevent such practice in accordance with the recommendations of the Monopolies Commission.
    Mr. Grimondasked the President of the Board of Trade when he expects to be able to make a statement on the latest Report of the Monopolies Commission on Collective Discrimination.
    Mr. Kaberry: It is the Government's intention to arrange for a discussion of the Monopolies Commission's Report before the Summer Recess, and I would ask hon. Members to await this.
    Mr. Lewis: Could the Minister give us some inkling whether the Government are favourably inclined to accepting the recommendations? Are we to take it that, as many of the culprits mentioned in the Report are heavy contributors to the Tory Party's funds, the likelihood is that the Government will not take any action that might upset the financiers who support them?
    Mr. Kaberry: I think that the hon. Member can safely await the discussion which is to take place before the Summer Recess.
    Mr. H. Wilson: Since the hon. Gentleman will realise that the general conclusions of this Report expresses views which have been the policy on this side of the House for some years, a policy which in fact was announced from the Dispatch Box opposite before the change of Government in 1951, can the hon. Gentleman not now at least inform the House whether the Government are going to accept the majority conclusions of the Report? Is he not aware that, in reply to all Questions which the Government have been asked on these subjects and trades for two or three years, we have always been told that we must wait for the Monopolies Commission's Report, and will he not now say that he accepts it?
    Mr. Kaberry: The Report was published last week and the debate will take place within a short time. I think that the right hon. Gentleman should await that debate.
    Mr. Grimond: Can we be assured that not only will there be a debate but that the Government will announce what action they will take before the House rises for the Summer Recess?
    Mr. Kaberry: I think that the hon. Member could be referred to a statement which was once made by one of his illustrious predecessors.
    Mr. Janner: Is the Minister aware that his own Chancellor of the Exchequer said only a few days ago that the cost of goods is so high that something must be done about it? Why is the hon. Gentleman not prepared to take action at once on these recommendations? Why is he not prepared to do something about the restrictions imposed by private courts, which he himself said should not be put on traders?
    Mr. Kaberry: As the hon. Member appreciates, the Report is an important and complex one which raises very big problems. I trust that the legislation which will follow may not be the worse for having been discussed previously.
    Viscount Hinchingbrooke: Would my hon. Friend consider publishing the evidence which was taken by the Monopolies Commission, in view of the fact that ultimate policy may turn on some nicer considerations than the Commission—either the majority or the minority of its members—was able to put in the Report?
    Mr. Kaberry: That raises a broader question of which I should like to have notice.
    Mr. H. Wilson: Would the Minister not agree that it would be very much more helpful to the whole House if the President of the Board of Trade were to make a statement of Government intentions in relation to this Report before we have the debate, in order that the debate should not appear to be merely an academic discussion on a report published by an outside body but should be a discussion on Government policy on what is easily the most important Report we have had on an industrial subject for many years?
    Hon. Members: Answer.
    Mr. Yates: Is the Minister aware that one of the traders to whom my Question refers has had his supplies of tea withheld since February last because he sold supplies cheaper to old-age pensioners? Is he aware that, having called the attention of the Prime Minister to the matter, he received a telegram from the right hon. Gentleman on 26th May which said:
    "Our policy is to obtain an impartial statement of the facts and their effect on the national interest and then to take the action appropriate in each case."?
    May we then ask what action the Government think is appropriate to end a scandal of this nature?
    Mr. Kaberry: I would remind the hon. Member that a short time ago the question of monopoly interest in tea was referred to the Monopolies Commission.
    Dame Florence Horsbrugh: Will my hon. Friend tell his right hon. Friend that the majority of people in this country would prefer the President of the Board of Trade to consider this matter very carefully, not be hurried on a Report which has been described as one of the most important Reports from any Committee, and only then express his opinion to the House?
    Mr. de Freitas: Will the hon. Gentleman recollect that my Question asked simply whether the Government accept the Report in principle? Since that has not been answered now, can we have an assurance that it will be answered in the debate?
    Mr. Kaberry: I think that my right hon. Friend will make a full statement.
    Mr. Stokes: May I ask why the President of the Board of Trade is not here to answer all these Questions?

    Monopolies (Tariff Protection)
    Mr. Grimondasked the President of the Board of Trade if he will give an assurance that no industry in which monopolistic or restrictive practices have been criticised by the Monopolies Commission will be afforded protection by tariffs or quotas against foreign competitors.
    Mr. Low: When considering tariff applications, it is our policy to take into account all relevant factors, including any recommendations made by the Monopolies Commission, and I could not prejudge the outcome of a particular application. It is not the Government's policy to impose import quotas for protective purposes.
    Mr. Grimond: That is a most unsatisfactory answer from a Government which is said to be against monopoly. Surely one of the simplest ways in which they can exercise sanctions is at least not to give them protection so that they can put up their prices unjustifiably?
    Mr. Low: That raises a very wide question, but I can tell the hon. Gentleman that we do take into account all the relevant factors, including any recommendation of the Commission. In actual fact it has never recommended tariff action, except in its most recent Report when it said that if an industry is to be protected the best way to do it is by tariffs and not by restrictive practices worked within the industry.

    Calico Printing
    Mr. L. M. Leverasked the President of the Board of Trade the policy of the Government in relation to the Report of the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Commission on the Process of Calico Printing.
    Mr. Kaberry: We accept the conclusions of the Monopolies Commission that the practices described operate, and may be expected to operate, against public interest, and we were in general agreement with the Commission's recommendations. Discussions with the calico printing industry concerning detailed implementation of the Report are still in progress.
    Mr. Lever: Will the President of the Board of Trade bear in mind the anxiety of the workers in the calico printing industry, and will he take steps, when considering the proposals, to see that their position is safeguarded?
    Mr. Kaberry: That will be considered, but I prefer not to anticipate any further statement.

    WAR PENSIONERS (DEPARTMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY)
    Mr. Simmonsasked the Prime Minister why the medical and surgical treatment of war pensioners in Northern Ireland is controlled by the Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance while this service in the Republic is under the control of the Ministry of Health.
    The Prime Minister (Sir Anthony Eden): When the Ministry of Pensions and the Ministry of National Insurance were merged in 1953, it was the general policy of Her Majesty's Government that medical services should be provided by the Ministry of Health. It was in accordance with this general policy that these responsibilities in the Irish Republic were transferred to the Ministry of Health. So far as Northern Ireland is concerned, it was the wish of the Northern Ireland authorities that the Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance should discharge the responsibilities which were previously those of the Ministry of Pensions, and this course was accordingly adopted.
    Mr. Simmons: Is the Prime Minister afraid of causing a little trouble in Ireland between the North and the South about this differential treatment? Is this situation not an indication of the need for a co-ordinating Minister to deal with war pensions, which are now bandied about between three separate Government Departments? Will the right hon. Gentleman not appoint a Minister of State for War Pensions to look after the interests of war pensioners?
    The Prime Minister: I go with the hon. Member so far as to say that this is not perhaps a particularly logical arrangement, but that is not altogether unknown in our affairs. Sometimes things work a little better when they are not logical. I am told that the arrangements have proved satisfactory, in practice. If the hon. Member has evidence to the contrary, I will, of course, consider it, but if arrangements are working well I rather like to leave well alone.

    COMMONWEALTH AND COLONIAL IMPORTS
    Mr. Peytonasked the Prime Minister if he will, at the next conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, raise the
    952
    question of duty-free entry into the United Kingdom of goods manufactured in Commonwealth countries particularly in those Dominions and Colonies where labour costs are much lower than those of this country.
    The Prime Minister: As my hon. Friend will understand, I cannot anticipate the discussions of the next Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, which are in any event not made public in advance.
    Mr. Peyton: Will my right hon. Friend at least acknowledge that this problem is increasing for a number of British industries, and is he aware that in the case of the glove industry over the past five years the level of imports of gloves from Hong Kong into the United Kingdom have risen from a negligible level to a level very nearly equal to the whole of the home production? Is not this a very serious matter and one which demands the most urgent and immediate consideration and action from Her Majesty's Government?
    The Prime Minister: I recognise that the free entry of Commonwealth and Colonial goods can give rise to difficulty in particular cases, but, as the House knows, these arrangements are part of a long established system for fostering Commonwealth and Empire trade, and I certainly would not be willing to make a pronouncement on that issue at Question Time.
    Mr. Albu: Will the Prime Minister bear in mind that the underdeveloped countries cannot expect to be able to buy engineering equipment for their own development if they are not able to sell the goods to raise the money with which to buy that machinery?

    STRIKES (LOSSES)
    Mr. Osborneasked the Prime Minister if he will give an estimate of the approximate total cost to the nation of the recent railway, dock and coal mining strikes; and if he will use the Central Office of Information to emphasise the economic folly of strikes.
    The Prime Minister: Not even an approximate estimate of the total cost of the strikes can usefully be attempted, at all events for some time. It is known,

    953
    however, that they caused the loss of about two million working days by the men on strike and that certain of our major exporting industries have been seriously affected. Their ill-effects have already been made known in debate in this House.
    Mr. Osborne: Would the Prime Minister inquire into the precedents established by the late Sir Stafford Cripps during the economic crisis of 1947–49, when he used the Central Office of Information to put the seriousness of the situation to the public? Will he see whether similar steps could not now be taken?
    The Prime Minister: Of course, I look at any precedents there may be.

    ATOMIC ENERGY (INTERNATIONAL AGENCY)
    Mr. de Freitasasked the Prime Minister what further steps Her Majesty's Government will take to help establish the International Atomic Energy Agency; and whether, in order that our future export trade in the nuclear field may not be prejudiced, he will make it clear that this country like the United States of America has both the means and the will to give similar help.
    The Prime Minister: The United Kingdom was one of the countries which sponsored the United Nations resolution on this matter. Discussions are now proceeding between these countries.
    The answer to the second part of the Question is "Yes, Sir." A number of agreements have already been made between the Atomic Energy Authority and the corresponding bodies in other countries. These should in due course lead to export trade in nuclear equipment.

    NORTHERN IRELAND DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL
    Mr. Chichester-Clarkasked the Prime Minister if he will now define more clearly the proposed relationship between Her Majesty's Government, the Advisory Development Council for Northern Ireland and the Government of Northern Ireland in dealing with unemployment.
    The Prime Minister: I do not think I can add to what my right hon. and gallant Friend the Home Secretary said in the
    954
    debate on 5th May. The Council will be set up by the Northern Ireland Government, and will advise that Government on ways of promoting further economic development. Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will be ready to lend their support in whatever way seems most appropriate.
    Mr. Chichester-Clark: Has my right hon. Friend anything to add to his answer about who will be the chairman of this body, or will that pronouncement come from the Northern Ireland Government?
    The Prime Minister: I am not in a position to make any statement on that at present, but I hope it will be possible to do so very shortly.
    Mr. Callaghan: As the Home Secretary said on 5th May that this Council was being set up almost immediately, what is the reason for a delay of two months?
    The Prime Minister: As the hon. Gentleman knows, there have to be consultations with the Northern Ireland Government and also agreement about the individual who is to be chairman of this Council. I think it is worth while taking a little time to get this arrangement correct, rather than make a hurried arrangement and find that we have not exactly what we want or who we want.

    DEPARTMENTAL RECORDS (LEGISLATION)
    Mr. Hydeasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer when he hopes to give effect to the recommendation of the Committee on Departmental Records.
    The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. Henry Brooke): As the answer is rather long, I will give it at the end of Questions.

  NATIONAL FINANCE

    U.S.S.R. Gold (Imports)
    Mr. Bottomleyasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer the amount of gold from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics imported into this country for the first six months of 1955.
    The Economic Secretary to the Treasury (Sir Edward Boyle): Figures for the first half of 1955 are not yet available; but

    955
    in the period from January to March, 1955, about 3·3 million troy oz. of gold bullion with a value of about £42 million was imported from all sources, of which just under 161 thousand oz. troy, with a value of just over £2 million came from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. As the right hon. Gentleman knows, the amount of gold imported does not necessarily correspond to the amount of gold purchased from overseas countries.
    Mr. Bottomley: Does the Chancellor accept the fact that the importation of Russian gold is responsible for keeping up our gold and dollar reserves which, in spite of that, fell last month?
    Sir E. Boyle: I really do not think that that follows from what I read out.

    Hong Kong Gloves (Tax)
    Mr. Peytonasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he will give an estimate of the revenue derived from Purchase Tax on gloves imported from Hong Kong.
    Mr. H. Brooke: I regret that this information is not available.
    Mr. Peyton: Is my hon. Friend aware the answer quite clearly is that not one penny is derived from Purchase Tax on Hong Kong gloves, and will he realise that this matter is a serious penalty and a quite unwarrantable penalty on the home industry? Is he aware that this industry is in very grave difficulty, and will he not make representations to his right hon. Friend the Chancellor to remove this unnecessary tax upon an industry which has quite enough to bear already?
    Mr. Brooke: These are matters which are very important, and I know my right hon. Friend wrote to my hon. Friend some time ago on the matter, but his supplementary question goes a great deal beyond the Question he put on the Paper.

    Building Societies
    Mr. Dainesasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he is aware that, as a consequence of the financial and economic policy of the Government, building societies are unable to raise sufficient funds for prospective house purchasers; and what steps he proposes to take so that the societies will not again have to raise their rates to borrowers.
    Mr. Coldrickasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he is aware that, as a result of the Government's credit policy, building societies are restricting the amount of advances which they are making to would-be house purchasers: and whether he will take steps to alter his policy so as to avoid hardship to such people.
    Sir E. Boyle: My right hon. Friend sees no reason to interfere with the operation of monetary policy in the field of house purchase, or with the terms on which the building societies borrow and lend.
    Mr. Daines: Can the hon. Gentleman say whether the policy of his right hon. Friend is not greatly undercutting the Government's policy of encouraging people to buy houses in which to live; and, secondly, does it not make nonsense of the Tory propaganda claim of a property-owning democracy?
    Sir E. Boyle: No, Sir. The present Government's housing record shows quite clearly their success in providing new houses for the people to buy. But monetary policy is a very important part of the Government's general economic policy and my right hon. Friend does not intend to make a special exception in the case of house purchase through building societies.
    Mr. Coldrick: Is it not a fact that the changed position of the building societies has been brought about in consequence of the Government's policy, and is the Minister aware that this change in the policy of giving advances to would-be house purchasers is causing a good deal of apprehension among builders and building trade workers?
    Sir E. Boyle: I understand that this issue will be raised by the building societies at their monthly meeting next Friday, but there is no reason at all to interfere with their discretion in this matter.
    Mr. Gaitskell: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that a serious situation is now developing in regard to the building societies? Because of the high rates of interest which can be earned elsewhere, depositors are switching their money from the building societies to other institutions and, in consequence, the building

    957
    societies are having to curtail their lending quite seriously. Is it the intention of the Government that this should continue? If not, what do they propose to do about it, and will they at least consult the building societies to see what steps can be taken to prevent the obvious diminution in business which will otherwise follow?
    Sir E. Boyle: I know that my right hon. Friend will bear in mind what the right hon. Gentleman has said, but I cannot add this afternoon to my original answer.
    Mr. Nabarro: Is it not the fact that the Co-operative building societies have shown the greatest increase in participation in building mortgages, particularly for houses, in the last twelve months and that they have derived direct benefits from the policy of Her Majesty's Government?

DEPARTMENTAL RECORDS (LEGISLATION)
At the end of Questions—
Mr. H. Brooke: With your permission, Mr. Speaker, and that of the House, I will now make a statement in answer to Question No. 55.
The Government propose to make changes in the arrangements for preserving the records of Government Departments in England and Wales, on the general lines proposed by the Committee which recently examined the subject under the chairmanship of Sir James Grigg. I have been asked to express the Government's warm thanks to the members of the Committee for a very useful report. Some of their detailed recommendations will require further examination, including that on the period after which various classes of records can be made available for public inspection. Meantime a start will be made with reorganising the Public Record Office and revising the arrangements in Departments for handling their records.
Several of the Committee's major recommendations will require legislation, and the Government will submit proposals to Parliament. One matter that requires legislation concerns the responsibility for the Public Record Office. In view of the very valuable services which have been rendered to the State by the present
958
Master of the Rolls and his predecessors, the Government have felt considerable reluctance to make any change in the arrangement, dating from 1838, by which the Master of the Rolls is responsible for the Public Record Office. Nevertheless, and in view of the enormous increase during the present century in Departmental Records, the arguments in favour of the transfer of responsibility to a Minister of the Crown which are advanced by the Grigg Committee are of great weight.
The Master of the Rolls has been consulted, and as a result of these consultations, my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has decided that the Bill which will be submitted to Parliament should include a provision for the transfer of responsibility for the Public Record Office to the Lord Chancellor. But, in accordance with the recommendations of the Grigg Report itself, the historic link between the office of the Master of the Rolls and the Public Record Office will not be severed.
Mr. Hyde: While thanking my right hon. Friend for his comprehensive answer, which will give satisfaction to historians and research workers generally, may I ask him whether all the Departments concerned have agreed to what is the main proposal in the Report, that save in exceptional circumstances all records considered worthy of preservation should be transferred to the Public Record Office after twenty-five years and that they should be open to public inspection after fifty years?
Mr. Brooke: No, Sir, I said there were certain matters which the Government had reserved for further consideration. The statement I have made today enables us to proceed with a chain of actions which will become necessary. The decision to which my hon. Friend has referred, about the date on which records should become available for public inspection, needs to be reached only towards the end of that change and need not be reached at the beginning.
Mr. Gaitskell: While not desiring to oppose the decision that a Minister should be responsible in future for the Public Record Office, may I ask the right hon. Gentleman which Minister will be answerable to the House of Commons in this matter, and could he give us some

959
idea of when the Government are likely to reach a decision on the important point about the period which must elapse before public records will become available for inspection? That is the point in which most people are particularly interested.
Mr. Brooke: With regard to the first question, I would not like to give the right hon. Gentleman a definite answer at the moment. Normally, however, the Attorney-General answers in this House on matters which are the responsibility of the Lord Chancellor. As regards his second question, I could not yet give an indication as to when the Government may be able to announce their decision regarding the time when records will become available for public inspection.
Colonel Gomme-Duncan: May I ask my right hon. Friend if he would not agree that the transfer of certain Scottish records from the English Record Office would materially assist that office, and are there not many documents which should be in Edinburgh that are still in London?
Mr. Rankin: Including the Stone.
Mr. Brooke: That is dangerous ground, on to which I would not like to venture in answer to a supplementary question.
Mr. Woodburn: Would the right hon. Gentleman make it clear that his statement applies only to Great Britain and the English Record Office and does not apply to the Scottish Record Office in Scotland?
Mr. Brooke: My statement applies to the Public Record Office and to the records of Government Departments in England and Wales.
Mr. S. Silverman: Since the Report refers to the records of Government Departments in England and Wales, is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the Ministry of Pensions has used for many years in Nelson one of its most modern factories, which otherwise would have been available to offer for alternative light industry in the town, which greatly needs alternative light industry? May I, therefore, ask him whether this Report, and the Government statement today, mean that we may anticipate that the Government will be handing back that factory to us at an early date?
Mr. Brooke: I was really thinking of what was happening in London, and I would not like to forecast what may happen in Nelson as a result of this, but perhaps the hon. Gentleman would like to table a Question.
Captain Orr: Can my right hon. Friend say whether, in order to reduce the bulk of the records which are kept, he will encourage the use of micro-film?
Mr. Brooke: That is a matter on which the Grigg Committee made certain comments, but it is not a solution of the problem.
Mr. Rankin: When the Government are in process of establishing this office, will they at the same time return to Scotland all records belonging to Scotland which are presently held in England?
Mr. Brooke: That question is on the same lines as the previous question, to which I replied that I would not venture on to that dangerous ground in reply to a supplementary question.

INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS (QUESTIONS TO MINISTERS)
Mr. Benn: Mr. Speaker, I rise to ask your guidance on a point of order. Following the, statement made by the Prime Minister, two weeks ago, about the Anglo-American Agreements on atomic co-operation, I sought to table two Questions asking for clarification of the Agreements and was told that it was not possible to put down Questions asking for clarification of international agreements. I was, indeed, referred to Erskine May where, in page 344, in the rules relating to Questions, occurs the following passage:
"Seeking an expression of opinion on a question of law, such as the interpretation of a statute, or of an international document, a Minister's own powers. …"
I looked up the references given by Erskine May to support this ruling and found that they all referred to domestic laws, to questions that Members had sought to ask about the powers of magistrates, and points of general law and that none of them dealt with international agreements. I would like to ask you, Mr. Speaker, whether you would rule on the admissibility of Questions addressed to Ministers on this subject, whether you would review the very wide prohibition

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given against them in Erskine May, and whether you could, if possible, give precedents in the practice of the House which might support Erskine May's view if any precedents exist?
May I submit, briefly, that a differentiation ought to be made between domestic laws and international laws in that in the one case they are subject to interpretation by the courts whereas, in the other case, they are not; and, secondly, that the practice of the House as laid down only refers to domestic law and not to international law and that you do in fact, as Speaker, admit verbal questions to Ministers when statements are made, immediately after such statements are made.
Finally, may I invite you to rule that it is in order for a Member to put down a Question seeking clarification of treaties or agreements or inquiring into their meaning or likely consequences, whether before they are ratified or afterwards, subject only to the other rules laid down for Questions?
Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member for Bristol, South-East (Mr. Benn) was good enough to give me notice of the point he has raised and I have had time to consider it.
The difficulties sometimes experienced by hon. Members in appreciating the rules governing Questions to Ministers arises from the difference between these rules and those governing our debates. The main purpose of the House is debate, and it is fundamental to our whole procedure that debate can only proceed upon a Question proposed from the Chair after a Motion has been moved by a Member of the House. In debate, subject to the rules of order and relevancy to the Question proposed from the Chair, hopes and fears may be freely expressed and, in particular, opinions may freely be interchanged. I adopt the dictionary definition of opinon: "what seems to one to be probably true." Indeed, the expression of opinion, in this sense, is the main content of debate.
The useful practice of putting Questions to Ministers, which grew up during the last hundred years, has, from its start, been governed by quite separate rules. At Question Time, there is before the House no Question proposed from the Chair, and, therefore, there can be no debate.
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Consequently, there is no place for the expression of opinion. A Question asking for an opinion has always been out of order.
A Question asking a Minister to interpret the domestic law offends against the rule of Ministerial responsibility, since such interpretation is not the responsibility of a Minister. That the hon Member has himself admitted. But it also offends against the rule that a Question may not ask for a Minister's opinion. The interpretation of written words is a matter of opinion. It is for the latter reason, I think, that the rule has been applied to the interpretation of an international document. This application of the Rule has been the constant practice of my predecessors at least since the 1920s but, as its validity has not been hitherto contested, there is no reference which can be quoted in Erskine May.
I think that the rule of Questions against seeking a Minister's expression of opinion is fundamental and must be maintained. But if a Question seeks only to ascertain the policy of a Minister, either about the subject matter of an international agreement, or arising out of any of the clauses of a document to which he is a signatory, then I think that it would be in order. The distinction may sometimes be a narrow one, but I feel that it should prove wide enough to enable Members to obtain information on policy without infringing the Rule against asking for an opinion.
Mr. Benn: I thank you very much for that Ruling, Mr. Speaker. As you have said, it is the first time a Ruling from the Chair has ever been given on this matter. I have wondered whether it is not just the legalisation of twenty years of undetected crime. May I ask you whether you expect that in the future it will be possible or easier for hon. Members to detect the intentions of Ministers from the sometimes calculated ambiguities contained in international documents and agreements?
Mr. Speaker: I think that with a little ingenuity and the assistance of the learned Clerks at the Table, who are always willing to help hon. Members in these matters, the hon. Member can so frame his Question as to comply with the rules of order and not transgress this fundamental principle. The hon.

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Member is not quite right in saying that there is no precedent for it in Erskine May. I had the industry to look up the first edition of Erskine May, which was published in 1844. In that edition there was no reference at all to the subject of Questions to Ministers, Questions to Ministers are of recent growth but in the second edition, which was published in 1851, there appears this comment:
"On 13th December, 1847, a Member was proceeding to put a Question relating to the affairs of Switzerland, but the Speaker interposed and explained to him that his Question involved an opinion and an argument."
It was, therefore, disallowed. The Ruling is, therefore, quite old and has always been accepted by the House.
Mr. Bellenger: Without seeking to appear to challenge your Ruling, Mr. Speaker, does it not follow from what you have said that if a Minister expresses Government policy, that policy must have been formulated on a prior opinion by the Government—or are we to understand that Governments express policy without first of all forming opinions?
Mr. Speaker: That is in debate. The hon. Member for Bristol, South-East said that I allowed questions following a statement about a treaty by a Minister. That is quite true, but a statement by a Minister, made at the Box, is not an international document. What I mean by an international document in this context is a document to which some other country or group of countries besides this country is a party—in other words, a document which cannot be altered unilaterally. That is what is called an international document for the purpose of the Ruling which I have given.
If a Minister makes a statement about what is happening, that is like any other Ministerial statement and subject to questions, but when the document has been reduced to writing and other people are parties to it, then the interpretation of what the words mean is a matter of opinion, and the opinion of the hon. Member for Bristol, South-East on that matter of interpretation is just as valuable as the opinion of the Minister.
Mr. Benn: In your last comment, Mr. Speaker, you drew a distinction between a ratified and an unratified document, if I understood you correctly. If I recall
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them, your words were that once a document had been reduced to paper it could not be unilaterally repudiated. I understand that the Agreements on atomic energy co-operation have been initialled but not ratified. Could you rule whether, before ratification, the opinion as to the meaning of a document may be sought from a Minister?
Mr. Speaker: I said that a Ministerial statement was not a document at all. It is not an international document. When the terms of the agreement have been reduced to writing, however, various other countries besides this country are parties to the document, and if the document cannot be altered unilaterally by this country it is an international document within the meaning of my Ruling and that of my predecessors.

HONOURABLE MEMBER FOR HALLAM (SELECT COMMITTEE)
The Lord Privy Seal (Mr. Harry Crook-shank): I have to inform the House that it has come to notice that the hon. Member for Hallam (Sir R. Jennings) has for some years held an appointment from the Treasury as an Approved Auditor for Great Britain for the purposes of the Industrial and Provident Societies Acts, the Friendly Societies Acts and the Industrial Assurance Acts. This appointment I am now advised may be an office of profit under the Crown and the hon. Member may consequently have been incapable of election to this House.
Hon. Members will recall that last week, in somewhat similar circumstances, a Select Committee was set up to consider the validity of the election of the hon. Member for Pollok (Mr. George), and it is now proposed, if the House agrees, to refer the case of the hon. Member for Hallam to this same Select Committee.
I think I should inform the House that the hon. Member took steps, immediately he became aware of the position, to resign his appointment. Beyond that, however, I do not think that there is anything I can usefully or properly add at this stage.
Mr. Attlee: Does the right hon. Gentleman think that there are many more of these cases coming along?
Mr. Crookshank: I have no idea, but we should have to go a long way to reach the number of five Labour cases in 1945.
Mr. J. Hynd: I understand that some time ago this whole question of offices of profit under the Crown and the Act which covered it was being examined by the Government in order that the whole situation could be cleared up to meet special modern circumstances. Are the Government continuing that examination? If so, is there any prospect of this intolerable situation being brought to an end?
Mr. Crookshank: The hon. Gentleman is quite right. This matter is very complicated and has been studied by both the present Government and previous Administrations. He may be surprised how soon a Bill may come along on the subject.

BILL PRESENTED
  SUGAR
  Bill to provide for the establishment of a Sugar Board, and to make provision as to the functions and finances of the Board, including provision for a surcharge on sugar and molasses and provision for distributing any surplus revenues of the Board; to make further provision as respects the British Sugar Corporation Limited, to dissolve the Sugar Commission, and otherwise to make new provision as respects the sugar industry in, and the importation of sugar and related goods into, the United Kingdom; and for purposes connected with the matters aforesaid, presented by Mr. Heathcoat Amory; supported by Mr. James Stuart, Mr. Alan Lennox-Boyd, Mr. Peter Thorneycroft, Mr. Henry Brooke, Mr. Dodds-Parker, and Mr. Harmar Nicholls; read the First time; to be read a Second time tomorrow and to be printed. [Bill 22.]
ORDERS OF THE DAY

  COUNTY COURTS [MONEY]
  Resolution reported,
  That, for the purposes of any Act of the present Session to extend the jurisdiction of county courts and, in connection therewith, to make further provision for the despatch of business in county courts by increasing the number of judges, it is expedient to authorise the additional charge on public funds attributable to that Act for the salaries and travelling allowances of county court judges and for pensions and other benefits payable in respect of their service as such.
  Resolution agreed to.

COUNTY COURTS BILL
Considered in Committee.
[Sir CHARLES MACANDREW in the Chair]

Clause 1.—(ACTIONS OF CONTRACT OR TORT, OR FOR MONEY RECOVERABLE BY STATUTE, AND RELATED MATTERS.)
3.56 p.m.
Mr. Sydney Silverman: I beg to move, in page 1, line 14, at the end, to insert:
Provided that, if the amount claimed exceeds two hundred pounds the defendant may, within such times as may be prescribed by county court rules, give notice that he objects to the action being tried in the county court and, when such notice is given, the judge shall order that the action be transferred to the High Court.
The Chairman: I think that this Amendment might be discussed together with the proposed Amendment to the First Schedule in the name of the hon. Member for Oldham, West (Mr. Hale) in page 11, line 1, to leave out paragraph 3, and the proposed Amendment in the Second Schedule in the name of the hon. Member for Islington, East (Mr. E. Fletcher) in page 14, line 14, column 3, to leave out "Section sixteen."
Mr. Silverman: The Attorney-General, I am sure, will recognise the words in my Amendment as being exactly the words in Section 16, I think it is, of the Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1938, with one amendment. For that, and for other reasons, I should have thought, Sir Charles, that your suggestion of dealing with this Amendment together with the other Amendments relating to Section 16 of the 1938 Act would be of assistance to the Committee.

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All I seek to do in this Amendment is —instead of repealing Section 16 altogether as the Bill in its present form would do—to retain the principle of Section 16 and its machinery, but adapt it to the new increased limited jurisdiction in the county courts. In other words, in the days when the limited jurisdiction was £200, Section 16 provided that a defendant could, on his option, transfer a case to the High Court if the amount was £100 or more. The Bill increases that sum to £400 and the logical consequence, if we are to retain the same principle, is that a defendant could transfer a case to the High Court if the amount involved was £200 or more. The real difference, therefore, between the Amendment which I am proposing and the Bill is whether the principle of Section 16 should be retained or not.
I think that the opinions of hon. Members on that point will depend very much on what is their approach to the Bill as a whole. Many right hon. and hon. Members think that nowadays the county courts should be given a totally new jurisdiction. They consider that the alteration should not merely be an alteration in the quantitative jurisdiction, but that county courts should be treated as a kind of affiliate, so to speak, or a branch of the High Court with an independent jurisdiction of their own. So that once a case has been started in the county court, or ought to have been started there, it should remain there without any right in the dependant to remove it into another court.
I do not know that there is a great deal of importance to be attached to it. For my part, and I do not wish to delay the Committee with argument about it, I think that Section 16 was a useful Section; that the right it afforded is a right that a defendant should be allowed to retain and that all that is necessary is to limit the figures so as to apply the old principle in the new circumstances. For that reason, I am against repealing the Section altogether. I would prefer to retain the Section, altering the qualifying figure from £100 to £200.
Mr. David Renton: I hope that my right hon. and learned Friend will not accept this Amendment.
The opportunity given to a defendant under the 1938 Act to have a case trans-
968
ferred to the High Court has, I think within the experience of many of us, been used mainly for the purpose of obstruction. It can be so used very easily, irrespective of the simplicity of the case. It is used sometimes because a defendant hopes that if he threatens the plaintiff with having to bring the case in the High Court, he will hear no more of the matter. For those reasons, I should have thought that experience would have told us that this manoeuvre should not be allowed to continue, and that, therefore, this Amendment should not be accepted.
Mr. Leslie Hale: I ought to explain that my own Amendment, for which I am wholly responsible and for which I apologise, clearly does not carry out what I intended to do because I should have coupled it with the Amendment later in the Schedule repealing Section 44 of the principal Act.
The intention of my Amendment was to destroy the right of a defendant to have the absolute right of transfer, but not to destroy the limitations which the right hon. and learned Gentleman puts on it. Therefore, so far as I am concerned, and speaking only for myself, I should have thought that the limitations contained in paragraph 3 of the First Schedule—which means that a defendant would have a right of transfer only provided that the judge satisfies himself that an important point of law or fact may arise—is a fair and proper limitation which should continue.
I agree with the hon. and learned Member for Huntingdonshire (Mr. Renton). In my experience, and in general, the right of transfer is a right which can be used for obstruction, and which is so used. It adds to expense and to the difficulties of poor litigants. We are always in difficulty about discussing anything during the Committee stage of a Bill, because we discuss only one Amendment at a time, and we cannot have regard to what the Clause might look like when all the Amendments to it are carried or rejected. But the limitations on the plaintiff now, and the penalties directed at he who brings his case in the High Court instead of the county court, show clearly the implicit and differential arrangements as to orders for costs, and so on.
Why should a defendant have this special privilege? Why should a defen-

969
dant have the absolute right to come to the court and say, "I wish to transfer this case to the High Court as a matter of right?" I am not sure whether one is in order in moving a Clause and advocating its rejection at one and the same time, but as we are discussing two Clauses and trying to get the best of both, I would venture to say that I should have preferred to sec my hon. Friend's Amendment carried with the addition to the limits on that right imposed in the Clause which now stands in the Schedule as paragraph 3. In other words, I should prefer that if a defendant has the right to transfer at all, it should be limited to £200 subject to satisfying the judge that matters of importance arise which should be transferred. I should have thought that during the Report stage something might be raised on those lines which might meet the views of lawyers on the matter.
In these debates we have not had a chance of hearing views widely expressed, but most of us have had a chance to ascertain the opinions of our colleagues and what law organisations are thinking and saying. We have also had the opportunity of seeing the representations of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for St. Helens (Sir H. Shawcross) in the columns of "The Times" and of familiarising ourselves with various points of view in that way. On the whole, therefore, I should have thought that that might be the best solution to this difficult problem.
4.0 p.m.
The Attorney-General (Sir Reginald Manningham-Buller): I have listened with interest to the arguments adduced by the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) in support of his Amendment, and I am grateful to him for the brevity and clarity with which he expressed them. I must, however, disappoint him by saying that we cannot accept the Amendment, partly for reasons advanced by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Huntingdonshire (Mr. Renton) and also by the hon. Member for Oldham, West (Mr. Hale) namely, that such a right of transfer can be abused by defendants who are anxious only to secure delays in the hearing of their cases.
There is another and perhaps more powerful reason for resisting the Amendment. Paragraph 36 of the First Interim
970
Report of the Evershed Committee recommended the abolition of the defendant's right to transfer as a part of its recommendations for reducing the cost of litigation. Experience since 1938, when this right was first created, has shown that the proviso to Section 16 of the 1938 Act has done more than anything else to divert to the High Court actions which a county court is fully competent to try.
While enlarging the jurisdiction of the county courts, as the Bill proposes to do, and while providing a "cushion"—if the Amendments which I propose to move shortly are accepted—it would be a thoroughly retrograde step if we maintained the provision which the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne has put forward in the Amendment. The defendant has, and will continue to have after the Bill reaches the Statute Book, a right of transfer under Section 44 of the 1934 Act. This will apply in any action involving more than £40, and the judge will he obliged to order such transfer if the defendant gives security for costs not exceeding £450 and the judge certifies that, in his opinion, an important question of law or fact is likely to arise.
That is a useful provision, because the amount at stake is not always an accurate criterion of the complexity and importance of the issues involved. In addition, Section 111 provides that a Master of the High Court can remove a case from the county court if he thinks it desirable that the proceedings should be heard and determined in the High Court. With those two provisions remaining, we feel that it 'would be unwise and wrong, for the reasons which I have expressed, to accept the Amendment. I hope that I have been able to satisfy the hon. Member that it would be undesirable to do so, and that in those circumstances he will be good enough to withdraw the Amendment.
Mr. S. Silverman: I do not wish to press the Amendment unduly, and I have listened with great interest and some satisfaction to the arguments which have been put forward. I want to make two points before dealing with that matter. First, I cannot accept the view that the plaintiff should always be entitled to the choice of tribunals. As the right hon. and learned Gentleman has just said, the amount at stake is not always the only criterion, or even the most important one

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of the proper tribunal before which a matter should be litigated. Merely because the amount falls below a certain sum and it is, therefore, proper to commence an action in a county court, I do not think that the defendant should be deprived of a share in the choice of a tribunal.
Secondly, I should have been very ready to accept an Amendment to my Amendment which limited the defendant's right to transfer by not making it an absolute right but a judicially discretionary right if he established certain things. In that connection, when we come to the other Clauses which the right hon. and learned Gentleman mentioned, I should have thought that if a defendant satisfied a judge that he has an important point of law he ought to be entitled to have his case transferred to the High Court even if the amount at stake is no more than £40. However, provided that the points raised against the Amendment are remembered in my favour in subsequent Amendments—I think the right hon. and learned Gentleman knows what I mean—I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Mr. Eric Fletcher: I beg to move, in page 2, line 3, at the end, to insert:
(a) if he recovers a sum of two hundred and fifty pounds or more shall be entitled to costs on the High Court scale.
The Chairman: I think that we can discuss, together with this Amendment, the three following Amendments to line 4. The four would appear to go together.
Mr. Fletcher: If you please, Sir Charles.
The Amendment raises perhaps the most crucial and controversial question that has been occasioned by the Bill. It has been colloquially referred to in the Press, in this House and elswhere as the "cushion." Hitherto, there has been a certain area in which it has been possible for a plaintiff to bring his action either in the High Court or the county court, without any sanction as to being penalised in costs if, by bringing his action in the High Court, he recovers an amount of damages which happens to be less than the maximum in the county court scale.
That provision has been found very convenient in practice and, in fact, essen-
972
tial. As all practitioners know, there are innumerable cases where, at the outset of an action, it is quite impossible for a plaintiff's advisers to give him any kind of satisfactory estimate of the amount of damages he might recover. That happens in cases of contract and tort and, notably, in cases of personal injury, which occupy such a large amount of the time both of the High Court and of the county court. We therefore regard it as important that the Bill should contain this cushion.
If there is no cushion an intending plaintiff and his advisers will be faced with an intolerable dilemma at the outset. If the county court jurisdiction is £400 and the plaintiff has a cause of action which obviously merits substantial damages, his advisers will not know whether, when the case comes to trial, he will be awarded more or less than £400. It may be that the plaintiff will be entitled to £500, £600, or £700. On the other hand, by the time the case comes to court he may have made a certain amount of recovery; the medical evidence may not be so potent as it was thought to be, and the views of the judge before whom the case comes may be different from what his advisers thought—and he may be awarded less than £400.
As the Bill originally stood a plaintiff had to choose between bringing his action in the county court—limiting his claim to £400 and perhaps finding, after so doing, that he has had to forgo a considerably larger sum in damages, to which he would have been entitled if he had brought the action in the High Court—or chancing his arm and bringing his action in the High Court and perhaps finding, for some reason which could not have been foreseen, that he will recover less than £400, thereby being mulcted in costs to the extent that instead of recovering the normal costs applicable in the High Court he will receive costs upon the county court scale, which makes a difference of £50, £60 or even more. That is why we believe it is essential that a cushion should be provided.
On opening the Second Reading debate, the Attorney-General said that in the view of the Government
"the existence of a cushion would go a long way—indeed, a very long way—to defeat the object of the Bill—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 24th June, 1955; Vol. 542, c. 1658.]
I entirely disagree with that point of view.
Mr. S. Silverman:.It depends upon the object of the Bill.
Mr. Fletcher: It depends entirely upon the object of the Bill, but if the object is as the Attorney-General stated on 24th June he appeared to think that the existence of a cushion would go a long way to defeat it. We think nothing of the kind. We think that the existence of a cushion is not only essential to justice to litigants, but will not do anything to defeat the objects of the Bill. In a nutshell, the objects of the Bill are twofold. They are, first, to relieve the pressure on the High Court by diverting a certain number of cases to the county court, and secondly, they are to bring the limit of county court jurisdiction into line with the conditions which have resulted from the change in the value of money.
That being so, we believe that the necessity for a cushion is the same as it was before the Bill was introduced. Speaking for myself, I am inclined to believe—I hope that I am interpreting the Attorney-General correctly—that by his proposed Amendment in page 2, line 4, to leave out "four" and insert "three," he has to some extent been converted by the arguments which were addressed to him, not only from this side of the Committee, but by hon. Members on his own side on Second Reading. I can only assume—and I hope that the Attorney-General will tell us so quite frankly when he speaks on these series of Amendments—that having accepted in principle the arguments for a cushion, he no longer believes that the existence of a cushion will defeat the objects of the Bill.
I believe that this is merely another example, of which there were many instances in the last Parliament, and no doubt there will be several more in this Parliament, of the Government being prepared to accept suggestions put forward by the Opposition for the improvement of Bills which they introduce.
Assuming that the question of principle is accepted, and that the Government have been converted by our arguments on principle, there remains the question of the amount. I ventured to suggest on Second Reading that the appropriate figure would be £250. I mentioned that figure because that seemed to me to be a relative comparison with the cushion that exists now. After all, £250 is a fair sum of money.
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I would have thought that any plaintiff with a claim for damages, and not being able to tell what the amount of that claim might be, should be entitled, if he so desires, to bring his action in the High Court and if he recovers £250, should have the satisfaction of knowing that as a consequence and as a right he will get his costs on the High Court scale.
May I say, of the Attorney-General's observation on Second Reading that this would defeat the objects of the Bill, that there are various motives in different parts of the country which induce litigants to choose between the High Court and the county court. The reasons which induce them to do so are not the same in the Metropolitan area as in the provinces. Those who practice in London are tempted to go to the High Court because, in London, it is very much more convenient to bring an action in the High Court than it is in the county court.
The same considerations do not apply in the provinces. A practitioner in Bournemouth might well say that the convenience and relative inexpensiveness of bringing an action in the Bournemouth County Court outweigh the advantage of his case being tried at Winchester Assizes. Whatever the reason may be that operates in this choice, I would have thought it desirable that there should have been this element of choice, and that wherever litigants are situated geographically, they should be able to choose which court suits them best.
I do not think that it will impinge on the objects of this Bill in the slightest if there is now written into the Bill the words which I venture to propose, and I hope that for these reasons the Amendment will be accepted.
4.15 p.m.
The Attorney-General: I think it may be for the convenience of the Committee, as all these Amendments are being dealt with together, if I say a word at this stage about the Amendment in my name. I think that that will probably clarify the position, and, perhaps, shorten the debate on this matter.
The hon. Member for Islington, East (Mr. E. Fletcher) has referred to certain observations of mine which I made in the course of the Second Reading debate. I

975
will say a word or two about those observations in a moment. I think that it might be convenient to remind the Committee that the Amendment in my name, which we are now discussing, also goes with the Amendments to Clause 1, page 2, lines 38 and 39. It might be convenient to discuss those Amendments at the same time as this one.
The Bill as it was introduced extended the jurisdiction of the county courts to £400 and that was one of the main objects of the Bill, and it still is. As an inducement to use the extended jurisdiction, the Bill provided that the litigant in the High Court should only be entitled to county court costs if he recovered less than that sum. The Committee will remember that there are still two safeguards in the Bill, namely, the power under Section 47 (3) of the High Court judge to award High Court costs if he is satisfied that there was sufficient reason for bringing the action in the High Court, and also the power, of the judge to award High Court costs if he is satisfied that it was reasonable to suppose that more than £400 would be recovered.
Mr. S. Silverman: Will the Attorney-General explain why it was necessary to put in both provisions? Would not the first one to which he drew our attention cover the second, and include it?
The Attorney-General: I think I did refer to that on the Second Reading. The provision under Clause 1 (2), which is new, was deliberately put in, in view of the doubts as to whether "sufficient reason" in Section 47 (3) made it possible to take into account the fact that the claim might have amounted to more than the limit. As the hon. Gentleman reminded us, these proposals were criticised from both sides of the House on Second Reading. The hon. Gentleman seemed to claim all the credit for the criticism to himself and to his friends, but, of course, that was not the case. There was general criticism of the abolition by the Bill of what the lawyers regard as the cushion.
The criticism was on two grounds, First, that the abolition would penalise a litigant in a case where it was difficult to assess the damages which he or she would recover, particularly in personal injury cases. It was contended, on the one hand, that a judge would be reluctant to say
976
that it was reasonable to bring an action in the High Court and expect more than £400 if he himself had awarded less. We need not discuss now what force there was in that argument. I think that it is right, however, to remind the Committee of it. On the other hand, it was contended that the litigant might be forced to go to the county court, where the maximum is £400, when in the High Court he might have recovered £500 or more.
We have carefully considered the views expressed in the Second Reading debate. This is really a non-party Measure, although some hon. Members may seek to claim party credit for some particular proposal. As I said in my speech on Second Reading, I recognise the difficulty —all lawyers do—of advising clients as to the amount which they are ultimately likely to recover.
There is also the other important factor to remember, that if we are to increase the jurisdiction of the county court it should be a real increase of jurisdiction. We should secure that cases up to that limit actually go to the county court. We appreciate the objections to the Bill, and we have considered most carefully the views that have been expressed. The Amendment in my name is designed to meet the difficulty. It reintroduces the so-called cushion.
The effect of the Amendment will be that the High Court litigant who recovers £300 to £400 will be entitled to High Court costs, notwithstanding that he could have sued in the county court. It is our belief that the margin from £300 to £400 gives an adequate margin for error, particularly when one bears in mind that the extra safeguard contained in Clause 1 (2) remains. Let me give this example. Even though a judge awards in the High Court a sum, say, of £200, under Clause 1 (2) it will still be open to him to say, "I am satisfied that the plaintiff had reasonable ground for commencing this action in the High Court," and to award High Court costs.
Mr. Hale: I wish the Attorney-General would clear up this point. The same judge is considering both points. How can he say, "I have come to the conclusion that the right amount of damages is £175," but "I think a reasonable man would have taken a different view from mine"?
The Attorney-General: I do not agree with the hon. Gentleman, but I will certainly try to clear up that point. The judge dealing with these matters does so from two different points of view when hearing the case, and when he has to assess damages. He hears evidence from both sides, and he has to come to the right conclusion on the evidence. Having heard that evidence, he may think that in view of the plaintiff's injuries the right sum to award is £250. It may be a very proper sum.
Then he has to look—and this is well within the powers of the judge—at what the position was when the litigation started. He has to consider the quite different question, whether there was reasonable ground then for starting the action in the High Court. He may say that, having regard to the medical evidence then available and to the gloomy prognosis about the plaintiff's recovery, it was entirely reasonable for the plaintiff to start the action in the High Court.
The judge has to look at the matter from two different points of view. I ask the hon. Member to bear that fact in mind. The point I am seeking to make, for what it is worth—and the hon. Gentleman disagrees with me about what it is worth—is that the powers in Section 47 (3) still remain, over and above the cushion.
The Amendments to lines 38 and 39 are consequential. If the jurisdiction of the county court is raised to £500, which can be done by Order in Council under Clause 1 (3), the cushion area is also raised from £400 to £500. Then the High Court litigant recovering between £400 and £500 will be entitled to High Court costs and below £400 to county court costs, subject, again, to the safeguards to which I have referred.
I emphasise that the object of moving these Amendments is to meet the practical difficulties to which so many hon. Members on both sides of the Committee have referred, and which confront litigants and their advisers, particularly in personal injury cases, in deciding in which court to start their proceedings. It is not the object of the Amendments in my name to divert all the £300 to £400 cases to the High Court, but experience showed that the majority of the cushion cases went in the past to the High Court.
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It was in that connection that I indicated on the Second Reading that the creation of a cushion would impede the operation of that part of the Bill which is designed to raise the limit of county court jurisdiction to £400. The reason was perhaps that as the Evershed Committee indicated the lower costs in county courts provided inadequate remuneration for those who work in those courts. That matter is being dealt with at the present time county court scales are now under consideration.
If the effect of the Amendments is to reduce the effective jurisdiction of the county court from £400 to £300—we feel that £400 is the proper figure—the Government may have to reconsider the position. It might prove necessary to ask Parliment to approve a draft Order increasing the jurisdiction to £500 sooner than if the Bill had not been amended. I hope I have made it clear that there is nothing between us, judging by the Second Reading debate, on the issue whether or not there should be a cushion. The Amendment moved by the hon. Member for Islington, East seeks to provide a cushion and so does the Amendment in my name. There is no need to say anything more about the necessity for a cushion. The question is, "Where should the line be drawn?"
We have given careful consideration to that question. In our view, the right figure for the cushion is £300. That will provide an adequate margin bearing in mind the safeguards contained in the County Courts Act, and the additional safeguards in the Bill. The hon. Member for Islington, East suggested £250. Other hon. Members have put forward the figure of £200. Every step one takes in a descending scale, enlarging the cushion, increases the risk of all cases which might be started in the county court being started in the High Court.
I assure the Committee that since the Second Reading, and, indeed, before it, we reached the conclusion that the right figure to put in the Bill as the limit for the cushion was £300. I hope that the Committee will realise that in providing for a cushion we have done a great deal to meet views expressed on both sides of the Committee. I hope that in due course the Committee will accept the Amendment.
4.30 p.m.
Sir Lynn Ungoed-Thomas: May I now ask a question to clear up what the right hon. and learned Gentleman said? I understand from him that there is between us merely the £50 in the amount of cushion. That is a serious matter and will certainly be debated by us. The right hon. and learned Gentleman will notice that in the Amendment which my hon. Friend has just moved there is a positive provision that, over and above the limit, the litigant shall be, entitled to costs on the High Court scale.
In the Bill there is no corresponding positive provision. First, is it his view that there is no need for that provision, inasmuch as the ordinary rules of the High Court would apply, carrying High Court costs with the amount that would be recovered? Secondly, would there be any objection on his part to include in the Bill for the sake of clarification—perhaps on Report—a positive provision to make it perfectly clear to anyone who reads the Bill that, over and above whatever limit the Committee eventually decides, the High Court scale of costs would apply?
The Attorney-General: I think I can answer those questions quite shortly. In the first place, I do not think that there is any need whatever for a positive provision of that sort. In the absence of a provision saying that something other than High Court costs will be awarded, High Court costs, within the judge's discretion, would necessarily follow. I think that the judge should have his usual discretion, as he has in all cases. Whether the case were brought in the county court or not I should be sorry to see the judge's discretion in any way affected.
The hon. and learned Gentleman asks whether, supposing £350 were recovered in the High Court there is any need for an express provision that there should be High Court costs? My answer is, "Certainly not." One has to have an express provision that it does not carry High Court costs, and we are taking out that provision. But if there is any doubt about it I shall certainly consider it between now and Report—but I do not think that there should be any doubt about it at all.
Mr. S. Silverman: The Committee as a whole will be grateful to the right hon.
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and learned Gentleman for having, at any rate, conceded the point of principle about which, I understand, there was considerable debate on Second Reading, and about which, in view of his statement, I agree with him entirely that there is no need for considerable debate now. We are now, apparently, all agreed on both sides—wherever the initiative may originally have come from—that the principle of the cushion ought to be preserved in this Bill, and, indeed, improved in what may be called its resilience as compared with what it is in the existing law.
The Attorney-General having proved so amenable to reasonable argument and persuasion on the principle, I hope that he will not close his mind entirely to the question of quantum, which still remains. The effectiveness of the safeguard—which it is now conceded by every hon. Member there ought to be—is considerably influenced by the choice one makes in drawing the line. Although it may, at first blush, seem that there is not a great deal of difference between drawing it at £250 and drawing it at £300, I think that the right hon. and learned Gentleman will agree that when we are dealing with cases of the kind contemplated in this Amendment a difference of £50 may be a very substantial matter. If the line is drawn at too low a level a great deal of injustice may easily be done, and I hope that the Committee will not think that I am unduly prolonging the argument if I devote a minute or two to looking at this question.
Quite a number of hon. Members will have had considerable experience over a great many years of handling the kind of case in which this type of question is most likely to be important. I think that all of them who have had that experience will agree with me when I say that probably the most difficult thing that a professional adviser is called upon to do is advising a probably quite inexperienced client as to what is the reasonable expectation of the quantification of his damage—in other words, advising him how much. It arises at various points in a case; not only at the commencement, when we are concerned with choice of tribunal but at later stages, when payments into court are made. When one is acting for very poor people, to whom the results of the case may be of the very

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greatest importance, it is extremely difficult, on the one hand, to advise, "You are quite certain not to get more than £400," or, on the other hand, "You are quite certain to get less." It is a very difficult question and it has the most important consequences.
What is the object of the Clause which we are seeking to amend? The Attorney-General put it clearly and fairly. He said that it was to make sure that the object of the Bill, which is to make the effective jurisdiction of the county court £400 was defeated by making the effective jurisdiction £300 or, as my hon. Friend would have it, £250. In other words, what the Bill, as drawn, seeks to do—and no one quarrels with it in principle—is to impose a penalty. It says to a litigant, "You bring your case in the wrong court at your peril. If you bring it in the High Court you may be just lucky and get £405, and you will be all right. But you may get only £395 and then you will have to lose a substantial portion of the damages you sought to recover."
It is blind guess. There is no criterion, no yardstick, no way in which one can, at the beginning of a case, correctly forecast what the damages are likely to be. Nowadays, when so many cases are tried quickly by a judge alone—I do not complain of that—there is the added fact that different judges do, in practice, take very different views about what are the proper damages for a given set of facts. What is done is to impose on a poor litigant—because it is only there that the matter is really of importance—a very heavy penalty if he chooses wrongly.
I would say to the Attorney-General that the thing that will make the object of this Bill work most effectively is not penalties and sanctions on costs. If litigants and practitioners find that they get much quicker, and quite as effective and impartial, objective justice in the county court as they would in the High Court, the object of the Bill will be satisfied, because it will serve a public need to the satisfaction of those who have to rely on it. If it proves true that these cases can be dealt with far more cheaply and quickly in the county courts than in the High Court people will prefer to go to the county court. That is the real answer. If that turns out not to be so the existence of a penalty on plaintiffs who wrongly chose the High Court will not
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make it worse, because they will prefer to take that risk anyhow.
Mr. Raymond Gower: Will the hon. Gentleman deal with the other point made by my right hon. and learned Friend—that if the cushion is brought down low enough litigants might be tempted in great numbers to go again to the High Court?
Mr. Silverman: I do not think that they would be tempted at all. There are long, long delays in the High Court, and one of the main advantages of increasing the jurisdiction of the county court is to enable cases, which by their very nature demand to be dealt with much more quickly, to be taken to the county court. That is the real inducement, and unless it is going to work like that, we had better not have the Bill at all.
If we do have the Bill and if it works in that way, there is no reason whatever for saying that people will prefer to go to a court that takes longer and is more expensive rather than obtain the quicker and easier justice in the court on their own doorstep. It is an exaggerated fear, in my opinion.
I come, finally, to the question whether it ought not to be a little lower. I myself would prefer £200, but I am quite content to support the £250 proposal of my hon. Friend. I should have thought that £300 was putting it too high, and that the margin between £300 and £400 is a much narrower margin than the reasonable margin of error. Those of us who have had experience of the assessment of damages in different courts will see exactly what I mean.
I need two more minutes to put the point clearly, and perhaps I may be excused for citing two cases of which I myself have professional knowledge. One was a case in the High Court in which a High Court judge awarded what, after all calculations had been made, amounted to £120. It was not thought to be sufficient. We went to the Court of Appeal, and we got £465. The margin of error was very nearly 400 per cent. The High Court judge concerned was a most humane man, with long experience, and no one could possibly have complained of his handling of the case, the way he dealt with it or anything else except the result. He happened to take a view of

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damages that represented only one-quarter of what three judges in the Court of Appeal thought they ought to be.
The margin is too wide. The possible reasonable margin of error is altogether too wide to be properly cushioned by a mere £100 between £300 and £400. I therefore ask the right hon. and learned Gentleman, who, I know, wants to do the right thing in this matter, not to close his mind to it, but to keep it open, to listen to the arguments here and elsewhere, and to reconsider it between now and Report stage to see whether he cannot agree with us that, if we are to have a cushion at all, it should be an effective cushion, and that an effective cushion must be something more than the difference between £300 and £400.
Mr. Renton: The interesting speech of the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) could have been made equally well and with equal force if we had been discussing the difference between, for example, £100 and £150 as the basic level for the cushion.
I should have thought that the right way in which we should judge this matter is to decide whether the cushion which we are to allow is big enough to cover a reasonable margin of error, taking due account of the law of averages, but not so big as to deprive the county courts of the jurisdiction which we wish them to have. On the figures with which we are actually dealing, and leaving out exceptional cases of the kind mentioned by the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne, which incidentally can always be covered by appeal to the Court of Appeal, I should have thought that—
Mr. S. Silverman: Not so easily.
Mr. Renton: We are necessarily dealing with theory as well as fact, and I think it is right for us to bear in mind that at any rate there is the theoretical possibility of appeal, when there has been an assessment of damages wrong in principle, or wildly wrong in quantity. That is a factor which we should not exclude from our minds.
4.45 p.m.
Mr. S. Silverman: May I suggest to the hon. and learned Member for Huntingdonshire (Mr. Renton) that the factor which he should not exclude from his mind is that we are dealing for the most
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part in these matters with very poor people, to whom the Court of Appeal is as unattainable as is Paradise in their lifetime? In the case of which I was speaking, the Legal Aid Committee, supported by the Legal Aid Appeal Committee, refused us legal aid to go to the Court of Appeal. We managed to do that, but it is only in very exceptional cases that we can do so.
Mr. Renton: That is an argument which might equally well be addressed to the Committee if we were discussing any difference in principle at all. What we are discussing here is whether a cushion of 25 per cent. in the total proposed jurisdiction of the county courts of £400 is appropriate, which is what the £300 proposed by my right hon. and learned Friend would give, or whether we should have a cushion of 37·5 per cent., which is what the figure of £250 would give.
The question for us to decide is whether, on the law of averages and within the experience of most of us, the margin of error which is likely to be made, not only by solicitors and junior counsel, but also by committees of the Law Society —which, when legal aid is applied to the county courts, will have to consider the matter—is a fair margin to allow. It is a matter of opinion. Mr. Speaker has already described today what a matter of opinion is, and I am not going to repeat his apt definition.
I should have thought that the 25 per cent. margin of error proposed by my right hon. and learned Friend was, in the circumstances, a perfectly fair one to allow. The 37·5 per cent. margin of error, if I may say so with great respect to the hon. Member for Islington, East (Mr. E. Fletcher), whose experience in these matters we all acknowledge, I should have thought was too big. Generally speaking, the legal profession do not make as large a margin of error in advising upon, and neither do judges in assessing, damages as 37·5 per cent.
Mr. E. Fletcher: The hon. and learned Gentleman will appreciate that the present cushion is very much larger, being the difference between £50 and £200.
Mr. Renton: I entirely agree that the cushion is very much larger, and, personally, I have always found great difficulty

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in my own mind in trying to justify it. There has been extremely little justification for maintaining the large cushion which has prevailed up to the present, but I do not think that point is relevant to the very narrow argument before us at this moment.
I would say that, bearing in mind the need to take the best possible advantage of this extended jurisdiction of the county courts, we should not allow a greater margin of error than 25 per cent. I think that is a reasonable one, and one which the Committee would be well advised to accept.
I would only add that I agree with the hon. and learned Member for Leicester, North-East (Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas), who spoke from the Opposition Front Bench, that we should acknowledge the fact that the Attorney-General has shown his willingness to listen to the views of both branches of the legal profession on both sides of the Committee in this matter, and that we should welcome his usual adaptability to the views which have been expressed.
Mr. David Weitzman: I should like to add a few words in support of what my hon. Friends have said. I recognise that the Attorney-General has very fairly summarised the arguments put from both sides, and has conceded the fact that the cushion is necessary. Therefore, one need not spend much time or use many words in taking that argument further now.
A sum of £300 is suggested on one side. I would prefer £200. Like my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman), I will settle for £250. It is really a matter of opinion, but surely that opinion must be based upon practical experience. I was very surprised to hear it stated from the benches opposite that £300 would be sufficient. Surely, from the point of view of experience, it is clear that a margin of £100 would be far too great. We know of many cases in which injustice would be done, and I ask the Attorney-General, as he has been so conciliatory in allowing the principle of the cushion to be accepted, to recognise that a figure of £250 is far more acceptable.
It is possibly to put forward arguments on both sides. One can say that £300 is enough or that £250 is enough, but I suggest that from the point of view of
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practical experience, £250 is nearer the mark. In this case, when we are seeking to remove a cushion of a far greater margin than we are now proposing, surely some indulgence ought to be shown, and I suggest that £250 is a proper figure.
Mr. Hale: I hope that I may now explain to the Committee the Amendment which we have been discussing for the last three-quarters of an hour. Up to now, few Members who have spoken appear to have read all four Amendments which are before the Committee. My hon. Friend the Member for Islington, East (Mr. E. Fletcher) has moved a new provision stating that when a man recovers over £250 he shall be entitled to High Court costs, subject to the discretion which exists in every form of litigation. The Attorney-General is in favour of a figure of £300; and I am in favour of £200 instead of £300.
My hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman), who is a skilled debater at Question Time, has been riding two horses at once with his usual skill, and has left us in some doubt as to which horse he was riding at the termination of his remarks. I thought that he was throwing over the reins of my horse and perhaps leaving it to me to ride—or perhaps he retained the right to support me in the Division Lobby.
Mr. S. Silverman: It is true that I am riding two horses, but they both happen to be going the same way, and I want to be on whichever horse comes first. If there is any possibility of my hon. Friend persuading the Committee that the figure should be £200, I will certainly support it. But I would sooner have £250 than £300.
Mr. Hale: I am grateful for that assurance of support. We shall have to see how the contest proceeds.
I say with all diffidence that I do not think the Committee has considered the immediate practical point with which this Clause confronts us, or some of the inherent difficulties in it. If one brings an action in tort at the moment—a running-down case or a case against employers at common law—no responsibility is placed upon solicitor and counsel to consider what the damages are likely to be—and for very real and valid reasons. We have always accepted the view that

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it is not possible to estimate the damages at that stage.
What happens is this. A writ is issued. One says, "We have lost so much in wages, and these are what we claim by way of special damages." But one does not have to say that one is claiming £5,000 or £4,000 or £500 as general damages. One merely claims damages at large. There are practical reasons for that. If I may put the lowest of the reasons first, no scale of costs allows solicitor or counsel at that stage to consider the matter. No claim could be made for making the inquiries at that stage because the law presumes that there is no point in the inquiries, that there is no substance in them and that no one could say at that stage what is the gravity of the injury.
We are now being asked to assume a wholly new duty. The whole responsibility is being placed on a solicitor to say at the commencement of a case, "In my view, in no reasonably foreseeable circumstances in this case could the damages exceed £400." With respect to the Attorney-General, I know that he put forward a fair case on the Second Reading, and I have no desire to come into conflict with him on this matter, but he knows as well as I do—and there is not a Member of this Committee who appears in court who does not know this—that the margin between one judge and another can be at least 100 per cent. One judge will award £1,000 and another judge will award £500. The margin is often wider.
I remember a case involving neurasthenia. After all, nervous consequences are the commonest effects of accidents and the most difficult to estimate. Very rarely is a solicitor in a position to know how far the injuries are genuine or to what extent the plaintiff may be exaggerating in a claim for nervous disease. Any doctor will say that only within certain limits can he decide a matter of that kind with certainty.
I once had a case in which I offered to settle for £150. The case had been entered in the High Court. The doctor said, "The woman is a great deal better and you ought to settle." The defendant offered £75 and I said that I would not take it. The defendant asked for a special jury. I said, "Very well, if we have to fight, we will fight." We called
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expert medical evidence, and the special jury gave us £1,500. These are common events in court, and naturally I quote the sort of case in which I got more than I expected rather than the cases in which I got less. Of course, I concede that such cases do exist.
The Attorney-General, in reply to an interjection by me, said, "There is no point in this. A judge can easily say that in his view the right figure today is £300, but the figure in the mind of the solicitor who commenced the action may have been £450 three months ago." On what evidence? Is it suggested that a judge will hold an inquiry into the professional propriety of a solicitor in his conduct of the case, into how many inquiries he made at the time, into whether the solicitor has ascertained that the doctor used the word "possibly" recently but that in his report three months ago he used the word "probably" and that has made all the difference? We should be opening up fantastic inquiries.
Mr. E. Fletcher: And on which presumably the solicitor can be cross-examined by the unsuccessful defendant.
Mr. Hale: Yes, on which the solicitor can be cross-examined by the unsuccessful defendant if this Clause were applied in the way that the Attorney-General suggests it will be applied. I do not think it will. I do not think judges would tolerate it. If that does not happen, the Attorney-General's argument is destroyed.
Someone may say, "I was badly knocked about and bruised in a motoring accident. My nerves are suffering. I cannot sleep and my doctor does not know how long this will go on. I am taking sleeping tablets." What do we do? On what basis does one say, "I think this woman will be better in about six months. It is not worth more than £400. She is married. She is not working and is not losing any wages"? On what basis does one say that she will not be in the lunatic asylum in five years' time? Who can judge?
Is there anyone who has had any long experience of actions in tort who does not know that time after time the whole basis of medical opinion changes and that the whole diagnosis of a case changes? We have heard of the man who has walked about for three months with a fractured skull. Time after time

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X-rays taken by the specialist have presented a state of affairs which were not known before the hearing, in spite of the exercise of reasonable diligence which a solicitor is entitled to give to a case of this kind. Therefore, when I urge the acceptance of £200 I am even now only urging what I regard as something which leaves a genuine evil. But I realise that there has to be some protection against the wanton use of the High Court.
I agree with every word that my hon. Friend has said. I cannot speak for the practice in the large towns, but one of the reasons that I welcome the Bill is that it will provide an incentive to bring cases into the county court. It is said that there is a big difference between costs in the county court and in the High Court, and we have been told that that difference is to be narrowed. The announcement by the Attorney-General is one of the important factors in considering the merits and the practicability of this Measure.
The principal difficulty for solicitors and counsel has been the absence of power in the county court to give costs for instructions for brief. This was removed by the Committee on county court procedure which sat under the chairmanship of Mr. Justice Austin Jones.
5.0 p.m.
People still think that costs go exclusively to solicitors and barristers, whereas in fact the costs of litigation are largely the costs of the witnesses. In litigation at assizes they are very largely the costs of witnesses. Everybody knows that in spite of all the recommendations made by various committees from time to time, doctors are kept waiting for three days or more before giving evidence. Specialists demand almost exorbitant fees because of their reluctance to give evidence. I have had to pay as much as 200 guineas to an expert for him to give evidence in the witness box. It was a case of difficulty and gravity where some doubt was felt and I had to take the responsibility of guaranteeing that fee, for which I had no resources and which, therefore, I had to guarantee at my own risk.
Those are the big items, and every solicitor therefore prefers to litigate in the county court if he can do so on reasonably practical terms. There is no ground for the suggestion that in the main solici-
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tors prefer to go to the High Court. In a number of cases it would mean issuing writs some distance away and carrying out the whole proceedings at a distance. It leaves the possibility of the proceedings being transferred to London by an appearance having been entered there, and it means handing the case over to London agents and all sorts of other difficulties.
I wonder whether the right hon. and learned Gentleman's advisers have considered some of the implications of his proposal. If we want to claim in the count court we have to say exactly what we are claiming, and we pay hearing fees and plaint fees based on that amount. In the High Court we issue the writ and pay 30s. and we do not have to say what we are claiming, but in the county court we have to say what it is that we are claiming. These provisions will place a real difficulty upon solicitors, counsel and plaintiffs. They must make up their mind at a very much earlier stage.
I urge the right hon. and learned Gentleman to consider the practical difficulties of the Clause between now and Report and to see what he can do about them. I hope we shall consider the matter thoroughly because it is one of real importance. I believe that in the Clause there is a danger of the Bill being wrecked.
Mr. Frederick Lee: On a somewhat similar occasion a layman who dared to intervene was described as the hon. and nearly learned Gentleman. There is precious little fear of that being said about me.
I was grateful to the Attorney-General for accepting the principle of the reintroduction of the cushion. I can speak with some authority in trade union matters, and I can say that my own trade union, the A.E,U., has been very concerned about these questions because they involve accidents sustained at work. Those who advise the unions have a difficult problem even under existing conditions in the county courts, with a cushion of £150. The Bill as drawn, without the provision of a cushion, might make life pretty well impossible for them and it would mean that they would tend to play safe. That of itself, I should have thought, would be a negation of justice.

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The provision would mean that they would be so afraid of involving those for whom they act in heavy damages that they would not take the chance. They would be disposed to go to the county court and in that way probably negative the chance of a client getting effective justice in the compensation which he receives. I am thinking of the future position of the smaller trade unions, in particular, which have not adequate financial backing. If they have constantly to think in terms of the effect on their finances of going to the High Court, that would be a very bad thing and would mean that their members were not receiving justice.
I thought that the suggestion made by the hon. and learned Member for Huntingdonshire (Mr. Renton), that under those conditions one could lessen the extent of the cushion, was a bad suggestion. At a time when we are widening the scope of the courts there is at least a case for saying that we should keep certainly the same ratio of cushion as that existing under the £200 rule.
I am grateful to the Attorney-General for his general comments, and I know that he is trying to be fair, but I wish he would look again at this problem, because the whole course of these cases from now on will be affected by it. I do not know what percentage of these cases is taken by trade unions but it must be quite large. If they are all to be forced into forever looking after the pool of funds at their disposal because of the fear of further cases arising, it will be very bad.
Some of the smaller unions, operating in heavy engineering and foundry work, for example, have a very high percentage of accident cases arising among their members. It would be detrimental to increased production in industry and to men going full out at their work if they feared that they would not get adequate compensation in the event of accident. All that could have a deterrent effect.
I hope the right hon. and learned Gentleman will consider the argument used by my hon. Friends the Members for Oldham, West (Mr. Hale) and Islington, East (Mr. E. Fletcher). There is great force in their argument. I seriously believe that it could have a detrimental effect in industry if we narrowed the scope of the cushion by comparison with the cushion which has existed under the old conditions.
Mr. Barnett Janner: I think everybody will agree that the difficulty to which my hon. Friends have referred is a real one. To all of us who have had experience of these matters the question of margin is one of considerable difficulty from the commencement of the case until the end. It is impossible to advise a client and impossible to get counsel to advise a solicitor as to what amount he should consider reasonable in a particular set of circumstances.
We should have been able to deal with the question much more easily had we known exactly what the Attorney-General has in mind for the fresh scale of costs. A lot depends on that.
The Attorney-General: As I said on Second Reading, that is still being negotiated by my noble Friend, and I can give no indication.
Mr. Janner: I appreciate that, but had we known what ultimately would be the scale on what county court costs would be awarded, we should have been in a better position to decide the amount on which High Court scale of costs should be awarded. It would make a considerable difference to the argument.
It is also extremely important that we should know what new regulations the Government have in mind in respect of legal aid in the county courts. How can anyone decide an issue of this description without knowing exactly, or at least as nearly as possible, the deciding elements in the remuneration of those who will undertake this work? That is a perfectly reasonable request to make of the Government, and I hope that before we reach the Report stage we shall be given more definite information about that and about the earlier point which I made.
As a practising solicitor, in both provincial and town practice, I know what affects the position when a poor litigant comes forward to have his case considered. Many solicitors and counsel put themselves out considerably for litigants who are not in a position to pay fees. We are talking about moving a large number of cases from the High Court to county courts. If we are to make that general the position must at least be one in which some kind of reasonable return is made to those acting in the professions and assisting litigants, on whichever side they may be, to get a just result.

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My hon. Friend the Member for Newton (Mr. Lee) had no cause to apologise for intervening in the debate. A trade union official knows very much more than most of the lawyers who practise in the courts what the position is in matters pertaining to damages which come within the purview of his trade union. I have seen that in South Wales. Very often the union has to decide what amount it will allow professional people to accept by way of damages in a case of settlement: not infrequently it falls on the union to make the decision as to those amounts and to give that view to those advising on the legal side.
I think those two points are of very considerable significance and will play an important part throughout the whole of our discussions in Committee and during later stages of the Bill. In my view, the Government ought to take into consideration the largest margin—not the smallest margin—so that litigants who desire to take their cases shall not be precluded from having the very best assistance they can have. I have practised in the county courts for many years. There is no question at all that in the county court legal and factual points which arise are as difficult as, if not more difficult than, in most cases before the High Court. As much and more attention has to be given to those matters when a small amount is under consideration as when larger sums are being applied for.
In fairness to the litigants, the people who have claims, and to the professional people who have to deal with them, I appeal to the Attorney-General to accept the lower sum of £200 and to forgo the right of being able to say, "I was right." No one can be certain in this matter, and to enable all to be fairly treated the lowest sum is, in my view, the most likely to be the right one.
The Attorney-General: We have had an interesting discussion on this Amendment as to the line at which the cushion should be inserted. We have a long list of Amendments to be discussed during the Committee stage, raising many other important questions. I hope that the Committee will think it is about time we came to a conclusion on this important, but narrow, question. May I say at once in answer to the hon. Member for Leicester, North-West (Mr. Janner) that the first two points which he made
994
were made on Second Reading and answered by the Solicitor-General.
Mr. Janner: There has been time since then.
The Attorney-General: There has been time since then, and negotiations are still continuing. I am sure the hon. Member knows that the Law Society is working hard on the scheme for legal aid. That scheme will be brought into effect as soon as it is ready and as soon as it is approved. We want to bring in the enlarged jurisdiction of the county court at the same time. Work on both is going on contemporaneously.
5.15 p.m.
Mr. Janner: Does not the right hon. and learned Gentleman agree that the scales which will be allowed in and regulations made in respect of the county court bear very significantly on the subject matter which we are dealing with now, and will be dealing with throughout the debate?
The Attorney-General: If the hon. Member will read the speech that I made in moving the Second Reading of the Bill he will see that I paid attention to that and said something about it. I am not going to take up time in saying the same thing today.
The Amendment in my name seeks to provide a cushion. The whole debate has been directed to trying to induce the Government to provide a bigger, better and softer cushion. I am one who always looks for a fairly large cushion if one is available. We have given very serious consideration to this matter and we think we have drawn the line where it should be drawn.
I have listened to all that has been said in support of a lower figure. We all know the difficulties that a barrister or solicitor has in advising as to quantum. The difficulty of knowing what the judge's assessment is likely to be also exists. We have to balance the two claims—on the one hand, the difficulty of assessing damages and, on the other, the serious risk that if we make the lower limit too low we shall make the effective increase in county court jurisdiction very small indeed. Those are the two issues which we have to bear in mind.
The Evershed Committee recommended a rather Draconian method for securing that cases within the county court juris-

995
diction went to that court. The Committee suggested that power should be given to a master to order a case to be transferred to the county court whether the parties liked it or not. We did not think that right, and thought it was going a bit too far. At the same time, experience has shown that one wants a bigger incentive than has existed up to now to secure that, where possible, cases within the county court jurisdiction should find their way into the county court.
The Evershed Committee recommended £300 as the increased jurisdiction. We felt it should go up to £400. We feel that a cushion of £100—a 25 per cent. margin —should be more than sufficient in the vast majority of cases. In the case where a claim is brought in the High Court and damages of, say, only £200 are recovered we are not providing a hard-and-fast line. That fact does not finally and irrevocably preclude the obtaining of High Court costs. The discretion in the High Court still remains as it has been since 1934. Over and above there is an extra discretion, which I think may well prove of value, whereby if it appears to the judge —that does not necessarily mean he has to hear evidence on the subject—that there was reasonable ground for bringing the case in the High Court, even though the amount recovered is less than £300, he can still award High Court costs.
Mr. S. Silverman: Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman say what kind of reasonable grounds would be operative in such a case?
The Attorney-General: I can only give the indication that occurs to my mind. For instance, if one had a client in a personal injury case who sustained what at first sight appeared to be a very serious injury, and then, before the case came on in the High Court—which may take nine, ten or twelve months—he or she made a wonderful recovery, the damages would be low but I am sure that on the production of the first medical report showing a gloomy diagnosis at that time by his or her medical advisers, the judge would not be reluctant to say that there was reasonable ground for bringing the case there. After all, one has to bear in mind that nearly all judges who try these cases have had experience of these difficulties, and appreciate them.
996
We have given serious consideration to this matter. Most of the arguments which have been advanced today were touched upon during Second Reading—the arguments, I mean, about the difficulty in which advisers of litigants, and so the litigants, are placed. We have provided a cushion. I am sorry to have to disappoint hon. Members who still think that it should be a bigger and better cushion, but I must tell them, quite frankly, that we cannot accede to any of their Amendments to lower the limit.
Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas: As we have had a considerable debate on this matter, I shall be very brief. First I should like to thank the Attorney-General for the Amendment which he has put down. I certainly do not want to say anything which will make him stiffer, more obdurate, in considering other Amendments which may be moved to this or any other Bill.
Our approach to this question of the margin appears to me to be fundamentally different from that of the Attorney-General. He would not, of course, have introduced a Bill without a cushion in it if his approach were not that we must push into the county courts as many of these cases as we can. Our approach is entirely different. It is summed up in this question. Would the litigant be put in a difficult, in some cases in an impossibly difficult, position if no cushion were provided? So the right hon. and learned Gentleman for his part and we for ours approach the matter from two different angles. The Attorney-General is now to make a concession and is to give a cushion of £300, but, nevertheless, our attitude and approach to the problem are fundamentally different.
I shall not repeat what my hon. Friends the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) and Oldham, West (Mr. Hale) have said. We do not consider that there is a reasonable margin of error between £300 and £400, and we must express in the Lobby our opposition to this inadequate cushion. It becomes merely a question of which horse we should put our money on, and I am allured by the suggestion of my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne that we should put our money on the horse which will travel the farther. I certainly advise my hon. Friends to divide upon the Amendment.
Question put, That those words be there inserted:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 191, Noes 234.

Division No. 15.]

AYES

[5.24 p.m.

Ainsley, J. W.

Griffiths, Rt. Hon. James (Llanelly)

Orbach, M.

Albu, A. H.

Griffiths, William (Exchange)

Oswald, T.

Allaun, F. (Salford, E.)

Hale, Leslie

Owen, W. J.

Allen, Scholefield (Crewe)

Hall, Rt. Hn. Glenvil (Colne Valley)

Padley, W. E.

Anderson, Frank

Hall, John T. (Gateshead, W.)

Paling, Rt. Hon. W. (Dearne Valley)

Attlee, Rt. Hon. C. R.

Hamilton, W. W.

Paling, Will T. (Dewsbury)

Awbery, S. S.

Hannan, W.

Palmer, A. M. F.

Bacon, Miss Alice

Hastings, S.

Panned, Charles (Leeds, W.)

Balfour, A.

Hayman, F. H.

Pargiter, G. A.

Bartley, P.

Henderson, Rt. Hn. A. (Rwly Regis)

Parkin, B. T.

Bellenger, Rt. Hon, F. J.

Herbison, Miss M.

Paton, J.

Benn, Hn. Wedgwood (Bristol, S.E.)

Hewitson, Capt. M.

Pearson, A.

Benson, G.

Hobson, C. R.

Peart, T. F.

Blackburn, F.

Holmes, Horace

Price, J. T. (Westhoughton)

Blenkinsop, A.

Houghton, Douglas

Probert, A. R.

Boardman, H.

Howell, Charles (Perry Barr)

Proctor, W. T.

Bottomley, Rt. Hon. A. G.

Howell, Denis (All Saints)

Pursey, Cmdr. H.

Bowden, H. w. (Leicester, S.W.)

Hubbard, T. F.

Rankin, John

Bowles, F. G.

Huges, Cledwyn (Anglesey)

Reid, William

Boyd, T. C.

Hughes, Emrys (S. Ayrshire)

Rhodes, H.

Braddook, Mrs. Elizabeth

Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)

Roberts, Albert (Normanton)

Brookway, A. F.

Hunter, A. E,

Roberts, Goronwy (Caernarvon)

Brown, Rt. Hon. George (Belper)

Hynd, H. (Accrington)

Ross, William

Brown, Thomas (Ince)

Hynd, J. B. (Attercliffe)

Shinwell, Rt. Hon. E.

Burke, W. A.

Irving, S. (Dartford)

Short, E. W.

Butler, Herbert (Hackney, C.)

Isaacs, Rt. Hon. G. A.

Silverman, Julius (Aston)

Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)

Janner, B.

Silverman, Sydney (Nelson)

Callaghan, L. J.

Jay, Rt. Hon. D. P. T.

Simmons, C. J. (Brierley Hill)

Carmichael, J.

Johnson, James (Rugby)

Skeffington, A, M.

Champion, A. J.

Johnston, Douglas (Paisley)

Slater, Mrs. H. (Stoke, N.)

Clunie, J.

Jones, Rt. Hon. A. Creech (Wakefield)

Slater, J. (Sedgefield)

Coldriok, W.

Jones, Jack (Rotherham)

Sorensen, R. W.

Collick, P. H. (Birkenhead)

Jones, J. Idwal (Wrexham)

Sparks, J. A.

Corbet, Mrs. Freda

Jones, T. W. (Merioneth)

Steele, T.

Cove, W. G.

Key, Rt. Hon. C. W.

Stewart, Michael (Fulham)

Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)

King, Dr. H. M.

Stokes, Rt. Hon. R. R. (Ipswich)

Cronin, J. D.

Lawson, G. M.

Stones, W. (Consett)

Crossman, R. H. S.

Ledger, R. J.

Strauss, Rt. Hon. George (Vauxhall)

Cullen, Mrs. A.

Lee, Frederick (Newton)

Summerskill, Rt. Hon. E.

Daines, P.

Lever Leslie (Ardwick)

Swingler, S. T.

Dalton, Rt. Hon. H.

Darling, George (Hillsborough)

Lewis, Arthur

Ungoed-Thomas, Sir Lynn

Davies, Ernest (Enfield, E)

Lindgren, G. S.

Usborne, H. C.

Davies,Harold (Leek)

Lipton, Lt.-Col. M.

Viant, S. P.

Davies, Stephen (Merthyr)

Logan, D. G.

Warbey, W. N.

Delargy, H. J.

McGhee, H. G.

Watkins, T. E.

Dodds, N. N.

Mclnnes, J.

Weitzman, D.

Donnelly, D. L.

McKay, John (Walsend)

Wells, Percy (Faversham)

Dugdale, Rt. Hn. John (W. Brmwoh)

McLeavy, F.

Wheeldon, W. E.

Dye, S.

MacPherson, Malcolm (Stirling)

White, Mrs. Eirene (E. Flint)

Edwards, Rt. Hon. Ness (Caerphilly)

Mahon, S.

Williams, Rev. Llywelyn (Ab'tillery)

Edwards, Robert (Bilston)

Mallalleu, E. L. (Brigg)

Williams, Ronald (Wigan)

Edwards, W. J. (Stepney)

Marquand, Rt. Hon. H. A.

Williams, Rt. Hon. T. (Don Valley)

Evans, Edward (Lowestoft)

Mayhew, C. P.

Williams, W. T. (Barons Court)

Evans, Stanley (Wednesbury)

Mikardo, Ian

Willis, E. G. (Edinburgh, E.)

Fernyhough, E.

Mitchison, G. R.

Wilson, Rt. Hon. Harold (Huyton)

Fletcher, Eric

Monslow, W.

Winterbottom, Richard

Forman, J. C.

Moody, A. S.

Woodburn, Rt. Hon. A.

Fraser, Thomas (Hamilton)

Morris, Percy (Swansea, W.)

Yates, V. (Ladywood)

Freeman, Peter

Mort, D. L.

Younger, Rt. Hon. K.

Galtskell, Rt. Hon. H. T. N.

Moss, R.

Zilliacus, K.

Gibson, C. W.

Moyle, A.

Greenwood, Anthony

Neal, Harold (Bolsover)

TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

Grenfell, Rt. Hon. D. R.

Noel-Baker, Francis (Swindon)

Mr. John Taylor and

Grey, C. F.

Oliver, G. H.

Mr. G. H. R. Rogers.

Griffiths, David (Rother Valley)

Oram, A. E.

NOES

Agnew, Cmdr. P. G.

Atkins, H. E.

Bidgood, J. C.

Aitken, W. T.

Baldook, Lt.-Cmdr. J. M.

Birch, Rt. Hon. Nigel

Allan, R. A. (Paddington, S.)

Balniel, Lord

Black, C. W.

Amery, Julian (Preston, N.)

Banks, Col. C.

Body, R. F.

Anstruther-Gray, Major W. J.

Barber, Anthony

Bossom, Sir A. C.

Arbuthnot, John

Barter, John

Boyle, Sir Edward

Armstrong, C. W.

Baxter, Sir Beverley

Braine, B. R.

Ashton, H.

Bevins, J. R. (Toxteth)

Braithwaite, Sir Albert (Harrow, W.)

Brooke, Rt. Hon. Henry

Holt, A. F.

Pannell, N. A. (Kirkdale)

Brooman-White, R. C.

Hopkinson, Rt. Hon. Henry

Peake, Rt. Hon. O.

Browne, J. Nixon (Craigton)

Horobin, Sir Ian

Peyton, J. W. W.

Bryan, P.

Horsbrugh, Rt. Hon. Dame Florence

Pickthorn, K. W. M.

Buchan-Hepburn, Rt. Hon, P. G. T.

Howard, Hon. Greville (St. Ives)

Pitman, I. J.

Bullus, Wing Commander E. E.

Howard, John (Test)

Pott, H. P.

Butcher, Sir Herbert

Hudson, Sir Austin (Lewisham, N.)

Powell, J. Enoch

Carr, Robert

Hudson, W. R. A. (Hull, N.)

Price, David (Eastleigh)

Cary, Sir Robert

Hughes Hallett, Vice-Admiral J.

Price, Henry (Lewisham, W.)

Chichester-Clark, R.

Hughes-Young, M. H. C.

Prior-Palmer, Brig. O. L.

Clarke, Brig. Terence (Portsmth, W.)

Hutchison, Sir Ian Clark (E'b'gh, W.)

Profumo, J. D.

Cole, Norman

Hyde, Montgomery

Raikes, Sir Victor

Cooper, Sqn. Ldr. Albert

Hylton-Foster, Sir H. B. H.

Rawlinson, P. A. G.

Corfield, Capt. F. V.

Iremonger, T. L.

Redmayne, M.

Craddook, Beresford (Spelthorne)

Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)

Rees-Davies, W. R.

Crookshank, Capt. Rt. Hn. H. F. C.

Jenkins, Robert (Dulwich)

Renton, D. L. M.

Crouch, R, F.

Jennings, J. C. (Burton)

Ridsdale, J. E.

Crowder, Sir John (Finchley)

Johnson, Dr. Donald (Carlisle)

Rippon, A.G.F.

Crowder, Petre (Ruislip—Northwood)

Johnson, Eric (Blackley)

Roberts, Peter (Heeley)

Cunningham, S. K.

Kaberry, D.

Robertson, Sir David

Currie, G. B. H.

Kerby, Capt. H. B.

Robinson, Sir Roland (Blackpool, S.)

Dance, J. C. G.

Kerr, H. W.

Robson-Brown, W.

D'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir Henry

Kershaw, J. A.

Roper, Sir Harold

Deedes, W. F.

Kirk, P. M.

Sandys, Rt. Hon. D.

Digby, S. Wingfield

Lagden, G. W.

Schofield, Lt.-Col. W.

Donaldson, Cmdr. C. E. McA.

Lancaster, Col. C. G.

Scott-Miller, Cmdr. R.

Doughty, C. J. A.

Langford-Holt, J. A.

Simon, J. E. S. (Middlesbrough, W.)

Drayton, G. B.

Leburn, W. G.

Soames, Capt. C.

Dugdale, Rt. Hn. Sir T. (Richmond)

Legge-Bourke, Maj. E. A. H.

Spearman, A. C. M.

Duncan, Capt. J. A. L.

Legh, Hon. Peter (Petersfield)

Speir, R. M.

Eden,Rt.Hn.SirA.(Warwick&L'm'tn)

Lindsay, Hon. James (Devon, N.)

Spens, Rt. Hn. Sir P. (Kens'gt'n, S.)

Eden, J. B. (Bournemouth, West)

Lindsay, Martin (Solihull)

Stanley, Capt. Hon. Richard

Elliot, Rt. Hon. W. E.

Linstead, Sir H. N.

Steward, Sir William (Woolwich, W.)

Emmet, Hon. Mrs. Evelyn

Lloyd, Maj. Sir Guy (Renfrew, E.)

Stewart, Henderson (Fife, E.)

Errington, Sir Eric

Lloyd, Rt. Hon. Selwyn (Wirral)

Storey, S.

Erroll, F. J.

Lloyd-George, Maj. Rt. Hon. G.

Summers, G. S. (Aylesbury)

Fell, A.

Longden, Gilbert

Sumner, W. D. M. (Orpington)

Finlay, Graeme Fleetwood-Hesketh, R. F.

Lucas, Sir Jocelyn (Portsmouth, S.).

Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)

Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh

Teeling, W.

Fort, R.

McCallum, Major Sir Duncan

Thomas, Leslie (Canterbury)

Fraser, Hon. Hugh (Stone)

Fraser, Sir Ian (M'cmbe & Lonsdale)

Macdonald, Sir Peter

Thomas, P. J. M. (Conway)

Freeth, D. K.

Maokeson, Brig. Sir Harry

Thompson, Kenneth (Walton)

Galbraith, Hon. T. G. D.

McKibbin, A. J.

Thompson, Lt.-Cdr.R.(Croydon, S.)

Gammans, L. D.

Mackie, J. H. (Galloway)

Thornton-Kemsley, C. N.

Glover, D.

McLaughlin, Mrs. P.

Tiley, A. (Bradford, W.)

Gomme-Duncan, Col. A.

Maclean, Fitzroy (Lancaster)

Tilney, John (Wavertree)

Cough, C. F. H.

McLean, Neil (Inverness)

Touche, Sir Gordon

Gower, H. R.

Macleod, Rt. Hn. Iain (Enfield, W.)

Vane, W. M. F.

Graham, Sir Fergus

MacLeod, John (Ross & Cromarty)

Vaughan-Morgan, J. K.

Grant, W. (Woodside)

Macpherson, Niall (Dumfries)

Vickers, Miss J. H.

Green, A.

Maddan, Martin

Wade, D. W.

Gresham Cooke, R.

Maitland, Cdr. J. F. W. (Horncastle)

Wakefield, Edward (Derbyshire, W.)

Grimond, J.

Maitland, Hon. Patrick (Lanark)

Walker-Smith, D. C.

Grimston, Sir Robert (Westbury)

Manningham-Buller, Rt. Hn. Sir R.

Wall, Major Patrick

Gurden, Harold

Markham, Major Sir Frank

Ward, Hon. George (Worcester)

Hall, John (Wycombe)

Marlowe, A. A. H.

Ward, Miss I. (Tynemouth)

Hare, Hon. J. H.

Marples, A. E.

Waterhouse, Capt. Rt. Hon. C.

Harris, Frederic (Croydon, N.W.)

Marshall, Douglas

Webbe, Sir H.

Harrison, A. B. C. (Maldon)

Mawby, R. L.

Whitelaw, W.S.I.(Penrith & Border)

Harrison, Col. J. H. (Eye)

Medlicott, Sir Frank

Williams, Rt. Hn. Charles (Torquay)

Harvey, Air Cdre A. V. (Macclesfd)

Milligan, Rt. Hon. W. R.

Williams, Gerald (Tonbridge)

Harvey, Ian (Harrow, E.)

Molson, A. H. E.

Williams, Paul (Sunderland, S.)

Harvey, John (Walthamstow, E.)

Nabarro, G. D. N.

Williams, R. Dudley (Exeter)

Harvie-Watt, Sir George

Nairn, D. L. S.

Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)

Heald, Rt. Hon. Sir Lionel

Neave, Airey

Wood, Hon. R.

Heath, Edward

O'Neill, Hn. Phelim(Co. Antrim, N.)

Woollam, John Victor

Henderson, John (Cathcart)

Ormsby-Gore, Hon. W. D.

Yates, William (The Wrekin)

Hill, Mrs. E. (Wythenshawe)

Orr, Capt. L. P. S.

Hill, John (S. Norfolk)

Orr-Ewing, Charles Ian (Hendon, N.)

TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

Hinchingbrooke, Viscount

Osborne, C.

Mr. Studholme and Mr. Wills.

Holland-Martin, C. J.

Page, R. G.

Amendment made: In page 2, line 4, leave out "four" and insert "three."— [The Solicitor-General.]

5.30 p.m.
Mr. Hale: I beg to move, in page 2, line 9, to leave out "seventy-five" and insert "forty."
The Amendment again draws attention to the very serious anomalies of this curiously complex and rather unworkable Clause. It will be found that the words at the outset of Clause 1 (2) are:
"'Where an action founded on contract or tort is commenced in the High Court which could have been commenced in the county court …'"
I do not know what that means. I do not think that anyone has ever said what it means. As I have said previously, one does not have to name damages in the High Court. One does not have to say that one is claiming £275 or £75. One claims damages at large. Therefore, who is to say whether an action should have been commenced in the county court? Any action can be commenced in the county court if it is limited to £400.
Then we come to the extraordinary anomaly at which the Amendment is directed. The Government, in their wisdom, say that a defendant shall be entitled to transfer any action to the High Court on his application to the judge, where the claim is over £40, if there is a point of law. On that, presumably, High Court costs follow, because there is an order of the court to say that it is proper that the case should go to the High Court.
What is the position of the plaintiff under the provisions of this quite fantastic Clause? In the case of the plaintiff, if the judge says that the appropriate amount to be recovered is £74 19s. 11d. he will get no costs, no court fees or witnesses' expenses. He will be penalised to the extent of being fined the whole of the cost of preparing the case, of medical expenses and witnesses' expenses, and for what reason? Because it will be said, "Your doctors have given evidence today which is quite different from the evidence with which they provided you." Counsel will be told, "Your client has made a rapid recovery."
There is no provision whatever in the Clause which permits for any justice to be done to a claimant in the High Court who recovers less than £75. The words are:
"… this section shall not affect any question as to costs if it appears to the High Court
1002
or a judge thereof … that there was reasonable ground for supposing the amount recoverable in respect of the plaintiff's claim to be in excess of the amount recoverable in an action commenced in the county court."
In other words, one has to satisfy the judge to have any costs at all on any scale. But when one went to the High Court one had reasonable cause to believe that one would obtain over £400, although one recovered less, in fact, than £75.
There is more than one reason for going to the High Court, and one reason which I have exercised in a case has been that I did not trust the judgment of the county court judge who would be called upon to deal with the case. This is a right which litigants have and in which they should not be fettered. I yield to no one in my admiration of the general sense of honour and of the conduct of county court judges, but everybody knows that there comes a time when one has a county court judge who is defendant-minded or plaintiff-minded. Everyone knows the county court judge who is landlord-minded or tenant-minded. One finds such cases constantly.
Mr. W. R. Rees-Davies: Will the hon. Member be good enough to explain why, in that case, he wants to insert the figure £40 instead of £75 in the Clause?
Mr. Hale: The only reason is that that is a figure which the Government have selected. If there is to be a limit, we suggest that it should operate equally for defendant and plaintiff, but the general body of litigation is between injured people and insurance companies. As the Bill stands, the Clause will give the overwhelming advantage to the insurance companies. It will give rights to defendants and impose penalties on plaintiffs who cannot afford to bear them. The penalties are of a very serious nature.
The motive of the Clause, as expressed by the Attorney-General, is not directed against the defendant but against the defendant's solicitor, to ensure that more and more cases are tried in the county court. It is the wrong way of doing it. I quite agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman). I do not believe that solicitors normally want to go to the High Court if they can avoid it. I do not believe that it pays them to go to the High

1003
Court today. It is true that county court costs are not very high, but the advantages of a speedy trial outweigh that consideration, in the light of going to assizes and having days of waiting in the corridors for listed cases to be called. I can see no reason for incorporating this peculiarly punitive subsection in the Clause.
Mr. Weitzman: I should like to support my hon. Friend the Member for Oldham, West (Mr. Hale). At present, if a plaintiff brings a general action in the High Court to recover £75 he is entitled to High Court costs. In this Clause not only is that right taken away, but, in giving him county court costs, the Government are not giving any costs at all. That is manifestly unfair.
The Solicitor-General (Sir Harry Hylton-Foster): I have listened with great attention to all that hon. Members have been saying and particularly to what has been said by the hon. Member for Oldham, West (Mr. Hale), about the delays in civil actions at assizes and the cost of keeping, for instance, doctors there for more than one or two days at a time. When he asks the reason for this part of the Clause, I would answer that it is in part to avoid delays of that kind to unload the burden, so far as it can be properly unloaded, from the High Court to the county court.
There has always been a provision of this kind as to a limit below which the plaintiff, if he has adopted the course of proceeding in the High Court when he might have proceeded in the county court, cannot recover the costs of the action. The change here involved is, first, merely one of amount. It looks as if we have done no more about the amount than about keeping pace with the change in the value of money.
Now I want to make a point against the argument I am advancing. The Evershed Committee did not, in fact, re- commend an increase in the relevant figures below which a litigant would get no costs, but was relying, of course, not only on economic sanctions, as it were, but on what my right hon. and learned Friend called the Draconian power in the Master, to transfer cases to the county court against the will of the parties. If we do not propose to rely on that power, as we do not for the reason my right
1004
hon. and learned Friend gave on Second Reading, it becomes essential that the economic sanctions should be sufficient in themselves for the purpose of unloading, so far as it can properly be unloaded, the burden from the High Court to the county court.
I would ask hon. Members to consider how well covered by these provisions is the exceptional case. It would be a very odd case where the plaintiff, having started in the High Court, got less than £75 when he believed that he was going to get more than £400. It is rather difficult to see what kind of a case it would be in which it would not be possible to make it appear to a High Court judge that a litigant had no reasonable grounds for
"supposing the amount recoverable in respect of the plaintiff's claim to be in excess of the amount recoverable in an action commenced in the county court."
I suppose there might be a case in addition to those that this Committee has already discussed. There may be one, for instance, where on the final hearing of the evidence it turned out that the plaintiff's injuries or illness were only in part due to the cause for which the defendant was responsible. In that case, the judge would quite easily allow it to be made to appear to him that this was a case for reasonably supposing that the amount recoverable was going to be in excess of the amount recoverable in an action begun in the county court.
5.45 p.m.
Mr. S. Silverman: I am not quite clear about this and I may have it all wrong. The Clause as drafted gives a judge power to award High Court costs where less than £300 is recovered, but when the judge is satisfied that there was reasonable ground for believing that when the case was brought the plaintiff would recover more than £400. If the plaintiff recovered less than £75, is the judge then to be invited to lighten the penalty and to exercise his discretion in the plaintiff's favour if the plaintiff says there was reasonable grounds to expect more than £75 or more than £400? If the plaintiff has to show, as I believe is the proper construction of the Clause, that in such a case there was reasonable ground to believe he would get more than £400 where he recovered less than £75, then I should regard such a task as hopeless.
The Solicitor-General: I agree with the hon. Gentleman's interpretation of the Clause, and I was trying to illustrate by a supposed case where it might be reasonable.
Let us take the case of a man who suffers serious injury to his knee while at work. It is thought at first that all the trouble with the knee is due to the accident at work. Anybody looking at the case on that footing will expect that he will get £400. It then turns out, as the defence gets down to its task with all its usual ingenuity, X-rays and the like, that the actual results of the accident to the knee are quite small, and that, unknown to the man, he has had a congenital complaint in that knee which turns out to be the principal cause of his disability.
Anyone who has practised in the courts in these matters would not be at all surprised to find a case like that. I am sure that hon. Members who practise would know of that kind of case, and I submit it is a fair illustration of an instance in which a man might properly recover from the defendant less than £75 whereas, at an early stage of the action, he was justified, in believing that he would recover more than £400.
Mr. Hale Mr. Hale rose—
The Solicitor-General: Let me deal with this one matter and then I will give way.
I do not think that in the course of our discussions, the matter has been stated quite accurately, because in this instance the position would be that once it appeared to the judge that that was the position, then these provisions restricting costs would not apply at all and they would come right out of the picture.
Mr. Hale: Would the Solicitor-General deal with this case, because it seems to me that he is introducing a new doctrine into the administration of justice? As I understand his argument, it is that if a plaintiff establishes that he has a case for £60 and he thought he had, which he has not, a case for another £200 or £300, if the judge thought he had a case, which he has not, and if he decides that the defendant was right and the plaintiff wrong, he will then award the plaintiff the costs against the action. If that is so, I submit to the Committee that we are getting into a position of some difficulty.
The Solicitor-General: The hon. Member has not yet appreciated the value of this provision. Perhaps some of his criticisms of it would not have been made if he considered what it says. The question is: does it appear to the High Court judge that there was reasonable grounds for supposing—that is, the time when it is decided whether there is to be a High Court or county court action—that the amount recoverable in respect of the plaintiff's claim would be in excess of the amount recoverable in an action commenced in the county court? That is the first protection against the supposed injustice which this, I submit, necessary provision would effect.
It is not the only one, however. There is also the provision, already referred to, in Section 47 (3) of the principal Act, which still stands. If the plaintiff can say to the High Court judge, whether his action be founded on contract or tort, that there was sufficient reason for bringing the action in the High Court, and the judge is of that opinion, once again he would suffer no penalty under the words that are here complained about by the hon. Gentleman.
Mr. Weitzman: Does the hon. and learned Gentleman anticipate that this difficulty might arise, that a month or so after the action had been brought and the learned judge was discussing the question of exercising his discretion, he might say, "You ought to have realised the position a month or two afterwards. You ought to have applied to transfer the matter to the county court or to have discontinued it"? Where then does the real exercise of discretion by the learned county court judge come in?
The Solicitor-General: He is invited to consider it at that moment when he has to deal with costs and he is asked to consider was there ground for commencing the action in the county court—I am telescoping the words.
Mr. Weitzman: It does not say so.
The Solicitor-General: I submit to the Committee that is the view, that there was reasonable ground for supposing it at the antecedent time, but I will not argue matters of construction with the hon. and learned Gentleman. The whole of this substituted subsection deals with an action commenced in the High Court which could have been commenced in

1007
the county court, and "commencing" is the clue word in each part.
I would like to be more concessionary but I cannot, and I would be misleading the Committee if I said that I could. Having considered these difficulties, what we feel basically is that not to retain a provision on these lines would be to thwart the main purpose of this Bill, which is common to all sides of the Committee, namely, to induce the passing to the county court of matters that could properly and safely go there.
Mr. S. Silverman: The concluding words of the hon. and learned Gentleman were that for him to make any concession on this point would be to defeat the purpose of the Bill, which is to force as many cases as possible into the county court. The Solicitor General appears to have overlooked the fact that this was not the view of the Evershed Committee which, as he himself frankly told us, did not make that recommendation. It made another recommendation which the Government have discarded, and we all agree with their discarding it, namely, the giving of the Master an absolute right to send a case to the county court if he thought fit.
If, however, in rejecting that proposal the Government were intending to substitute this one for it, they might have left the Committee the opportunity of choosing between the two. To many of us it seems that the proposal of the Government is more Draconian and not less Draconian than that of the Evershed Committee, and if we had to choose between the two, we would rather give some discretion in the matter to an experienced Master in the High Court than to leave the unfortunate plaintiff to persist in his error until all the costs of a High Court action had been incurred and then have the judge say, "You had no right to come here at all. You are here at your peril and you shall have no costs on coming here, even though this means that, so far from recovering the damages which the court thinks you ought to have, you will be worse off at the end of the action than before you issued your writ."
How the Government have persuaded themselves that the second of these proposals is less severe than to allow a Master at an early stage to order the matter to be transferred to the county
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court, I cannot understand. I hope sincerely that the hon. and learned Gentleman will consult his right hon. and learned Friend and see whether the Government really mean this.
It is a long time since I saw anything so anomalous as the proposal which the Government are now recommending to us. Apparently, in this one class of case the plaintiff is to get High Court costs or no costs. There is no provision for the perfectly possible case where a man might be able to satisfy the judge that, although he has recovered less than £75 and although he never had, and could not reasonably ever have had, any hope of recovering more than £400, he nevertheless had a hope of recovering more than £75 or more than £100.
Mr. J. E. S. Simon: Or more than £40.
Mr. Silverman: I would rather not be diverted.
There are various ways in which the argument can be put, more and less favourably, but the point I want to make is the anomaly that a man who might satisfy the judge that he has reasonable cause to expect more than would have enabled the defendant to take it out of the county court into the High Court but, nevertheless, not more than £400, is deprived not merely of the High Court costs but of any costs. How can that be justified? I do not know whether the hon. and learned Gentleman has thought of it, whether it has come into the discussions, but he certainly did not mention it and it seems to me an obvious anomaly.
Let us compare this anomaly that a man cannot recover any costs because he began in the wrong court with the comparable case of which my hon. Friend reminded the Committee in his argument. Supposing such a man in such a case as I have been suggesting had been of the mind of the Government, that all cases capable of being tried in the county court must necessarily be commenced and tried there, and he commences in the county court and wins £50 of damages or, as was pointed out by my hon. Friend, £75. If he does, the defendant can go to the county court judge and say, "I am prepared to provide security for damages and costs. I can satisfy you that there is something fit to be tried in the High

1009
Court or more fit to be tried in the High Court than here, and the damages that are sought are more than £40," and he can then get it transferred to the High Court.
If one is to have those two provisions existing side by side in one's legislation, surely the criterion ought to be the same in each case. One might well have a case where a man had started in the county court and was taken by the defendent into the High Court where he recovered less than £75, and then the judge might deprive him of any costs on the ground that he had to give the plaintiff High Court costs or nothing, and, as there was no case for High Court costs, he would get nothing.
Unless the Government are very careful in their enthusiasm for crowding as many cases as possible into the county court they will end up by establishing a double system of justice. I am sure that is certainly not their intention. However, if they are not going to look at anomalies of this kind and take precautions to avoid them, the result will be one kind of judge, one kind of court, one kind of procedure and one standard of costs if one is poor, and another if one is rich. I am certain that no one on the Evershed Committee, no one on the Government benches and certainly no one on the Opposition benches, would wish to lend his support to any such result, but unless we are careful that is where we shall end up.
6.0 p.m.
Mr. Weitzman: I should like to put this to the Solicitor-General. I take it that if a plaintiff brings an action in the High Court and recovers £300, now that the cushion principle has been conceded he will get High Court costs, but if a plaintiff brings an action, and recovers less than £75, the criterion on which the judge will consider whether he is entitled to any costs at all will be in relation not to £300 but to £400.
Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas: I cannot sympathise with the approach of the Government towards the object of the Bill, which is emerging more and more clearly as the debate goes on. It emerged to some extent on Second Reading, it was emphasised more in the debate on the last Amendment, and it is emerging again now.
The Government seem to consider that the whole purpose of the Bill is to push
1010
litigation into the county courts. The Solicitor-General even suggested that the Opposition share his view. I do not share it. I do not consider that this is a Bill to achieve administrative convenience in the working of the courts. I consider it to be a Bill which extends county court jurisdiction commensurate with changes in the value of money in the interests of the convenience of and justice for litigants who resort to the county courts.
Our approach is from the litigant's point of view. The Government's approach is from the point of view of administrative convenience. All the issues and points of detail that have been discussed upon our Amendments have been discussed from those two points of view. I do not share the view that it is a Bill—if it is so conceived, I do not agree with the object —to achieve administrative convenience by pushing cases from the High Court into the county courts.
It therefore follows in our case that all these provisions should be regarded not on the test "Will it, or will it not, achieve the transfer of litigation from the High Court to the county courts?" but on the test, "Is it, or is it not, just in relation to the poor person who frequents the county courts?" Those two tests represent the cleavage separating the two sides of the Committee on the Amendments that we have been discussing.
I now want to talk about the sanction to push cases from the High Court into the county courts. The Solicitor-General will appreciate that there is already a sanction for that in the case of the recovery of sums under £300, where nothing more than the county court scale of costs can be recovered. We are now considering applying the sanction of granting no costs at all although the litigant succeeds on the question of liability and merely fails on the quantum of damages, which everybody knows to be an extremely questionable, and sometimes extremely speculative, factor.
I will not repeat the very forcible considerations put forward by my hon. Friends. I hope it will never be thought in this Committee or in this House that if one does not repeat an argument already put forward one does not agree with it. I merely want to put another test, as mathematical tests are becoming very fashionable in these debates, and that is

1011
the reasonableness of the figure suggested by my hon. Friend the Member for Oldham, West (Mr. Hale).
As things are now, no costs can be recovered if less than £10 is awarded in the High Court in tort or £40 in contract. In the case of tort, £10 is one-twentieth of the county court £200 limit. In the case of contract, the £40 is one-fifth of the present county court limit. We are doubling the limit of the county court jurisdiction. If we similarly doubled the limits of £10 for tort and £40 for contract, we should get £20 for tort and £80 for contract. The Government are proposing a £75 limit for both, which is nearly the contract limit.
We all know that the distinctions between tort and contract were made because of the great difficulty of assessing damages in tort. That distinction is being abolished, and, if that is so, we ought to lean towards the tort proportion rather than the contract proportion. What the Government are substantially doing is adopting the contract proportion for tort as well. What my hon. Friend proposes is, in effect, that the difference should be split in half and that there should be a limit of one-tenth for both contract and tort instead of one-fifth for contract and one-twentieth for tort. It seems to us to be an eminently reasonable provision. It is another way of arriving at the figure of £40 which is included in my hon. Friend's Amendment, and it is one which I should certainly commend to my hon, Friends.
I appreciate that one can argue about figures, and in relation to quantum one can invariably be cheese-paring here, there and everywhere, but it does not get one far. Nevertheless, a substantial difference in amount is involved. We can test the amount, as my hon. Friends have done, by reference to the provision for the defendant transferring to the High Court, and we can also test it by means of the figures which are already in operation and splitting the difference between contract and tort.
The figure of £40 is justifiable from more than one angle, and the fundamental approaches which lead the Opposition to the figure of £40 and the Government to the figure of £75 represent an extremely important difference. If one finds behind the two figures such a difference in
1012
approach which is fundamental to the purpose of the Bill, then the difference between £40 and £75 cannot be brushed aside as being without significance. I believe it to be a difference of very substantial significance, and I certainly hope that my hon. Friend will press his Amendment to a Division.
Mr. Rees-Davies: This Amendment is one with which I cannot agree in its present form. But I wish to make a few brief observations on this matter, because I share certain anxieties about the Clause. The hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) and other hon. Members were manifestly correct when they said—and I say this as one of many of us who have had a good deal of experience of these courts—that either High Court costs will be awarded or nothing. That is correct.
I was interested to hear the graceful way in which the Solicitor-General tried to pose a theoretical case where someone might get less than £75 and still persuade the judge that he ought to have got more than £400. But those of us with a wide experience of these courts know that that would not be the case. What is absent in this Clause is any proviso where a person gets under £75, and it seems to me that this Amendment could be obviated were the Government to look at the matter from this point of view.
They wish to raise the figure by seven-and-a-half times. If at present a person receives more than £10 in tort he would, none the less, be able to get county court costs. Now the figure is to be raised to £75, and even in these days, that is a good deal more than the cost of living has risen between now and the pre-war period. It is also a great deal more than jurisdiction has been expanded which is only from £200 to £400.
I do not think that that leads us to the argument that £40, or any other figure, is necessarily right. Therefore, I should like hon. Gentlemen opposite, and the Government—because they are both affected by this—to consider this reasonable compromise: whether the proviso, which says that the High Court judge shall consider whether there is reasonable ground for supposing that the amount recoverable should be in excess of the amount recoverable by action in the county court, should apply to paragraph (a).

1013
The judge would then consider this. If a person got more than £300, he would get High Court costs. If he got just under £300, there would be discretion, but I think that the High Court judge would say that he would still get High Court costs. But, under paragraph (b), if a person recovered a sum less than £75, he would not be entitled to any costs of the action, unless the judge thought that in all the circumstances it was reasonable for him to get county court costs. That is to say, the judge would have a quite simple function. First, he would decide whether he would grant High Court costs, and a person would get it if the figure was £300 or over with the discretion there; and if a person got less than £75 there would also be a discretion to award county court costs—but no other discretion—if the judge thought fit.
I have not had time to give deep consideration to this, and it may well be that my proposal is unsuitable or wrong. I put it forward in nothing but complete humility in an endeavour to arrive at a determination. It seems to me wrong for a litigant to start in the High Court in an action of tort and then to get, say, £65 eventually, but to have no discretion at all, and, therefore, get no costs at all. We should try to remedy that in some way, but I do not think that the Amendment does so. In any event, it is raising the figure by as much as seven-and-a-half times the previous figure, which is not in accordance with the principle.
6.15 p.m.
I wish to say a word about the Government's attitude on this matter. I do not think that the Government are seeking to press these cases into the county courts for the convenience of administration. Hon. Gentlemen must recognise that we have the Legal Aid and Advice Act and
there must be some protection for defendants. I think that this Clause was drafted primarily for the purpose of assisting defendants and I merely mention that, of course, a defendant does have certain rights to apply for remit from the High Court to the county court in all the circumstances of the case. But in cases of tort it is difficult to remit if the plaintiff's solicitor or counsel says that he really believes that his client will get more than £400.
I do not think that the Government need be ashamed of their attitude in this matter. Nothing they have done could lead us to suppose that they are doing this solely for administrative purposes. I consider that the Government are trying to hold the scales of justice evenly balanced between the plaintiff and the defendant. If the Government would undertake to look at this matter between now and the Report stage, not only in the light of what I have said, but to see whether it be possible to find a solution, perhaps hon. Gentlemen opposite might not wish to press this Amendment to a Division.
The Solicitor-General: I rise merely in courtesy to the Committee, because were I to address the Committee again I should be guilty of what the hon. and learned Member for Leicester, North-East (Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas) has warned me against, namely, repeating arguments. Of course, everything which has been said on this point will be considered between now and Report stage, but I have said that I cannot accept this Amendment and I must adhere to that.
Question put, That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Clause:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 232, Noes 183.

Division No. 16.]

AYES

[6.17 p.m.

Agnew, Cmdr. P. G.

Bevins, J. R. (Toxteth)

Carr, Robert

Aitken, W. T.

Bidgood, J. C.

Cary, Sir Robert

Allan, R. A. (Paddington, s.)

Bishop, F. P.

Chichester-Clark, R.

Amery, Julian (Preston, N.)

Black, C. W.

Clarke, Brig. Terence (Portsmth, W.)

Anstruther-Gray, Major W. J.

Body, R. F.

Cole, Norman

Arbuthnot, John

Bossom, Sir A. C.

Cooper-Key, E. M.

Armstrong, C. W.

Boyle, Sir Edward

Corfield, Capt. F. V.

Ashton, H.

Braine, B. R.

Craddock, Beresford (Spelthorne)

Atkins, H. E.

Braithwaite, Sir Albert (Harrow, W.)

Crookshank, Capt. Rt. Hn. H. F. C.

Baldock, Lt.-Comdr. J. M.

Brooke, Rt. Hon. Henry

Crouch, R. F.

Balniel, Lord

Brooman-White, R. C.

Crowder, Sir John (Finchley)

Banks, Col. C.

Browne, J. Nixon (Craigton)

Crowder, Petre (Rulslip—Northwood)

Barber, Anthony

Bryan, P.

Cunningham, S. K.

Barter, John

Bullus, Wing Commander E. E.

Currie, G. B. H.

Baxter, Sir Beverley

Burden, F. F. A.

Dance, J. C. G.

Bell, Ronald (Bucks, S.)

Butcher, Sir Herbert

D'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir Henry

Deedes, W. F.

Johnson, Dr. Donald (Carlisle)

Price, Henry (Lewisham, W.)

Digby, S. Wingfield

Johnson, Eric (Blackley)

Prior-Palmer, Brig. O. L.

Donaldson, Cmdr. C. E. McA.

Jones, A. (Hall Green)

Raikes, Sir Victor

Doughty, C. J. A.

Joynson-Hicks, Hon. L. W.

Rawlinson, P. A. G.

Drayson, G. B.

Kaberry, D.

Redmayne, M.

Dugdale, Rt. Hn. Sir T. (Richmond)

Kerby, Capt. H. B.

Rees-Davies, W. R.

Duncan, Capt. J. A. L.

Kerr, H. W.

Renton, D. L. M.

Elliot, Rt. Hon. W. E.

Kershaw, J. A.

Ridsdale, J. E.

Emmet, Hon. Mrs. Evelyn

Kirk, P. M.

Rippon, A. G. F.

Errington, Sir Eric

Lagden, G. W.

Roberts, Peter (Heeley)

Erroll, F. J.

Lancaster, Col. C. G.

Robinson, Sir Roland (Blackpool, S.)

Fell, A.

Langford-Holt, J. A.

Robson-Brown, W.

Finlay, Graeme

Leavey, J. A.

Roper, Sir Harold

Fleetwood-Hesketh, R. F.

Leburn, W. G.

Sandys, Rt. Hon. D.

Fort, R.

Legge-Bourke, Maj. E. A. H.

Schofield, Lt.-Col. W.

Fraser, Hon. Hugh (Stone)

Legh, Hon. Peter (Petersfield)

Scott-Miller, Cmdr. R.

Fraser, Sir Ian (M'cmbe & Lonsdale)

Lindsay, Martin (Solihull)

Simon, J. E. S. (Middlesbrough, W.)

Freeth, D. K.

Linstead, Sir H. N.

Soames, Capt. C.

Galbraith, Hon. T. G. D.

Lloyd, Maj. Sir Guy (Renfrew, E.)

Spearman, A. C. M.

Gammans, L. D.

Lloyd, Rt. Hon. Selwyn (Wirral)

Speir, R. M.

Glover, D.

Lloyd-George, Maj. Rt. Hon. G.

Spence, H. R. (Aberdeen, W.)

Gomme-Duncan, Col. A.

Longden, Gilbert

Spens, Rt. Hn. Sir P. (Kens'gt'n, S.)

Gough, C. F. H.

Lucas, Sir Jocelyn (Portsmouth, S.)

Stanley, Capt. Hon. Richard

Gower, H. R.

Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh

Steward, Harold (Stockport, S.)

Graham, Sir Fergus

McCallum, Major Sir Duncan

Steward, Sir William(Woolwich, W.)

Grant, W. (Woodside)

Macdonald, Sir Peter

Stewart, Henderson (Fife, E.)

Green, A.

Mackeson, Brig. Sir Harry

Storey, S.

Gresham Cooke, R.

McKibbin, A. J.

Studholme, H. G.

Grimond, J.

Mackie, J. H. (Galloway)

Summers, G. S. (Aylesbury)

Grimston, Sir Robert (Westbury)

McLaughlin, Mrs. P.

Sumner, W. D. M. (Orpington)

Gurden, Harold

Maclean, Fitzroy (Lancaster)

Teeling, W.

Hall, John (Wycombe)

McLean, Neil (Inverness)

Thomas, Rt. Hn. J. P. L. (Hereford)

Hare, Hon. J. H.

Macleod, Rt. Hn. Iain (Enfield, W.)

Thomas, Leslie (Canterbury)

Harris, Frederic (Croydon, N. W.)

MacLeod, John (Ross & Cromarty)

Thomas, P. J. M. (Conway)

Harris, Reader (Heston)

Macpherson, Niall (Dumfries)

Thompson, Kenneth (Walton)

Harrison, A. B. C. (Maldon)

Maddan, Martin

Thornton-Kemsley, C. N.

Harvey, Air Cdre. A. V. (Maccisfd)

Maitland, Comdr. J. F. W. (Horncastle)

Tiley, A. (Bradford, W.)

Harvey, Ian (Harrow, E.)

Maitland, Hon. Patrick (Lanark)

Tilney, John (Wavertree)

Harvey, John (Walthamstow, E.)

Manningham-Buller, Rt. Hn. Sir R.

Touche, Sir Gordon

Harvie-Watt, Sir George

Markham, Major Sir Frank

Turner, H. F. L.

Heald, Rt. Hon. Sir Lione

Marlowe, A. A. H.

Vane, W. M. F.

Heath, Edward

Marples, A. E.

Vaughan-Morgan, J. K.

Henderson, John (Cathcart)

Maude, Angus

Vickers, Miss J. H.

Hill, Mrs. E. (Wythenshawe)

Mawby, R. L.

Wade, D. W.

Hill, John (S. Norfolk)

Medlicott, Sir Frank

Wakefield, Edward (Derbyshire, W.)

Hinchingbrooke, Viscount

Milligan, Rt. Hon. W. R.

Walker-Smith, D. C.

Holt, A. F.

Molson, A. H. E.

Wall, Major Patrick

Hornsby-Smith, Miss M. P.

Nabarro, G. D. N.

Ward, Hon. George (Worcester)

Horobin, Sir Ian

Nairn, D. L. S.

Ward, Miss I. (Tynemouth)

Horsbrugh, Rt. Hon. Dame Florence

Neave, Airey

Waterhouse, Capt. Rt. Hon. C.

Howard, Hon. Greville (St. Ives)

O'Neill,Hn. Phelim (Co. Antrim, N.)

Webbe, Sir H.

Howard, John (Test)

Orr-Ewing, Charles Ian (Hendon, N.)

Williams, Rt. Hn. Charles (Torquay)

Hudson, Sir Austin (Lewisham, N.)

Osborne, C.

Williams, Gerald (Tonbridge)

Hughes Hallett, Vice-Admiral J.

Page, R. G.

Williams, Paul (Sunderland, S.)

Hughes-Young, M. H. C.

Pannell, N. A. (Kirkdale)

Wills, G. (Bridgwater)

Hutchison, Sir Ian Clark (E'b'gh.W.)

Peake, Rt. Hon. O.

Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)

Hyde, Montgomery

Peyton, J. W. W,

Woollam, John Victor

Hylton Foster, Sir H. B. H.

Pickthorn, K. W. M.

Yates, William (The Wrekin)

Iremonger, T. L.

Pitman, I. J.

Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)

Pott, H. P.

TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

Jenkins, Robert (Dulwich)

Powell, J. Enoch

Mr. R. Thompson and

Jennings, J. C. (Burton)

Price, David (Eastleigh)

Colonel J. H. Harrison.

NOES

Ainsley, J. W.

Brockway, A. F.

Daines, P.

Allaun, F. (Salford, E.)

Brown, Thomas (Ince)

Dalton, Rt. Hon. H.

Allen, Scholefield (Crewe)

Burke, W. A.

Darling, George (Hillsborough)

Anderson, Frank

Butler, Herbert (Hackney, C.)

Davies, Ernest (Enfield, E.)

Awbery, S. S.

Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)

Davies, Harold (Leek)

Bacon, Miss Alice

Callaghan, L. J.

Davies, Stephen (Merthyr)

Bartley, P.

Carmichael, J.

Delargy, H. J.

Benn, Hn. Wedgwood (Bristol, S. E.)

Champion, A. J.

Dodds, N. N.

Benson, G.

Clunie, J.

Donnelly, D. L.

Blackburn, F.

Coldrick, W.

Dye, S.

Blenkinsop, A.

Collick, P. H. (Birkenhead)

Edelman, M.

Boardman, H.

Corbet, Mrs. Freda

Edwards, Rt. Hon. Ness (Caerphilly)

Bottomley, Rt. Hon. A. G.

Cove, W. G.

Edwards, Robert (Bilston)

Bowden, H. W. (Leicester, S. W.)

Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)

Edwards, W. J. (Stepney)

Bowles, F. G.

Cronin, J. D.

Evans, Edward (Lowestoft)

Boyd, T. C.

Crossman, R. H. S.

Evans, Stanley (Wednesbury)

Braddock, Mrs. Elizabeth

Cullen, Mrs. A.

Fernyhough, E.

1016

1017

Fletcher, Eric

Lee, Frederick (Newton)

Roberts, Goronwy (Caernarvon)

Forman, J. C.

Lever, Leslie (Ardwick)

Ross, William

Fraser, Thomas (Hamilton)

Lewis, Arthur

Shinwell, Rt. Hon. E.

Freeman, Peter

Lindgren, G. S.

Silverman, Julius (Aston)

Gaitskell, Rt. Hon. H. T. N.

Lipton, Lt.-Col. M.

Silverman, Sydney (Nelson)

Gibson, C. w.

Logan, D. G.

Simmons, C. J. (Brierley Hill)

Greenwood, Anthony

McGhee, H. G.

Skeffington, A. M.

Grey, C. F.

Mclnnes, J.

Slater, Mrs. H. (Stoke, N.)

Griffiths, David (Rother Valley)

McKay, John (Wallsend)

Slater, J. (Sedgefield)

Griffiths. Rt. Hon. James (Llanelly)

McLeavy, F.

Snow, J. W.

Griffiths, William (Exchange)

MacPherson, Malcolm (Stirling)

Sorensen, R. W.

Hale, Leslie

Mahon, S.

Sparks, J. A.

Hall, Rt. Hn. Glenvil (Colne Valley)

Mallalieu, E. L. (Brigg)

Steele, T.

Hall, John T. (Gateshead, W.)

Marquand, Rt. Hon. H. A.

Stewart, Michael (Fulham)

Hamilton, W. W.

Mayhew, C. P.

Stokes, Rt. Hon. R. R. (Ipswich)

Hannan, W.

Mikardo, Ian

Stones, W. (Consett)

Hastings, S.

Mitchison, G. R.

Strauss, Rt. Hon. George (Vauxhall)

Hayman, F. H.

Monslow, W.

Summerskill, Rt. Hon. E.

Henderson, Rt. Hn. A. (Rwly Regis)

Moody, A. S.

Swingler, S. T.

Herbison, Miss M.

Morris, Percy (Swansea, W.)

Taylor, John (West Lothian)

Hewitson, Capt. M.

Mort, D. L.

Thomas, Iorwerth (Rhondda, W.)

Hobson, C. R.

Moss, R.

Ungoed-Thomas, Sir Lynn

Holman, P.

Moyle, A.

Usborne, H. C.

Holmes, Horaoe

Neal, Harold (Bolsover)

Viant, S. P.

Houghton, Douglas

Oliver, G. H.

Warbey, W. N.

Howell, Charles (Perry Barr)

Oram, A. E.

Watkins, T. E.

Howell, Denis (All Saints)

Orbach, M.

Weitzman, D.

Hubbard, T. F.

Oswald, T.

Wells, Percy (Faversham)

Hughes, Cledwyn (Anglesey)

Owen, W. J.

West, D. G.

Hughes, Emrys (S. Ayrshire)

Padley, W. E.

Wheeldon, W. E.

Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)

Paling, Rt. Hon. W. (Dearns Valley)

White, Mrs. Eirene (E. Flint)

Hunter, A. E.

Palmer, A. M. F.

Williams, Rev. Llywelyn (Ab'tillery)

Hynd, H. (Accrington)

Panned, Charles (Leeds, W.)

Williams, Ronald (Wigan)

Hynd, J. B. (Attercliffe)

Pargiter, G. A.

Williams, Rt. Hon. T. (Don Valley)

Irving, S. (Dartford)

Parkin, B. T.

Williams, W. T. (Barons Court)

Isaacs, Rt. Hon. G. A.

Paton, J.

Willis, E. G. (Edinburgh, E.)

Jay, Rt. Hon. D. P. T.

Pearson, A.

Wilson, Rt. Hon. Harold (Huyton)

Johnson, James (Rugby)

Peart, T. F.

Winterbottom, Richard

Johnston, Douglas (Paisley)

Probert, A. R.

Woodburn, Rt. Hon. A.

Jones, Jack (Rotherham)

Prootor, W. T.

Yates, V. (Ladywood)

Jones, J. Idwal (Wrexham)

Pursey, Cmdr. H.

Younger, Rt. Hon. K.

Key, Rt. Hon. C. W.

Rankin, John

Zilliacus, K.

King, Dr. H. M.

Reid, William

Lawson, G. M.

Rhodes, H.

TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

Ledger, R. J.

Roberts, Albert (Normanton)

Mr. Short and Mr. J. T. Price.

Mr. E. Fletcher: I beg to move, in page 2, line 36, to leave out subsection (5).
This was a point to which I referred in the Second Reading debate, and I am bound to say that my reasons for desiring the omission of this subsection have been considerably reinforced by the fact that the Attorney-General has since put down two Amendments to the subsection which, so far as I can see, are completely meaningless. I am further reinforced in my desire to omit the subsection by the very curious reference which the Attorney-General made to it a few moments ago, I gathered that he was telling the Committee that, in his opinion, it might be necessary to implement the subsection at an early date.
I should like, first, to deal with the proposed Amendments to the subsection. because it may be that the Solicitor-General will be able to make clear, for the edification of the Committee, the intentions behind them. If these two
1018
Government Amendments were carried the subsection would read:
"If Her Majesty by Order in Council so directs, this section and Part I of the First Schedule to this Act shall have effect with the substitution for the references to three hundred pounds to four hundred pounds and to four hundred and fifty pounds of references to four hundred pounds to five hundred pounds and to five hundred and fifty pounds ֵ"
I do not know whether other hon. Members can make sense of that, but I certainly cannot. It is beyond me to know what those words can possibly mean. The Attorney-General is suggesting that Her Majesty, by Order in Council, shall have the power to substitute for the references to £300, £400 and £450 references to £400, £500 and £550. It may be that it is possible to understand it with elucidation, but it is certainly not apparent at first or second sight.
6.30 p.m.
I desire to omit this subsection for reasons of principle. I am convinced that in matters of any constitutional importance it is desirable not to give the

1019
Government power to legislate by Order in Council. Here we are dealing with a matter of jurisdiction, and the object of this subsection is to enable the Crown, with Parliamentary approval but without any opportunity of Parliamentary discussion, except the very attenuated form of Parliamentary discussion that is possible by a Prayer, to limit still further the jurisdiction of the High Court by extending the jurisdiction of the county court.
That seems to me to be quite a wrong principle. It is a very long time since the Executive has sought the power to confer private jurisdiction on anyone. For many centuries Parliament has been very jealous of its rights of jurisdiction in all matters affecting the judiciary. It seems to me undesirable, constitutionally, that there should be any innovation in the hitherto accepted doctrine that if there is to be any jurisdiction conferred on any court or any limitations of the existing jurisdiction of any court, that is a matter for Parliament and not for the Executive.
I would reinforce that argument in this way. The matter is obviously a far more complicated one than the Law Officers of the Crown thought when this subsection was inserted in Clause 1. It is not as though this will be a trivial matter when the Attorney-General wants to increase the jurisdiction from £400 to £500, and produces an Order in Council to that effect. It is obvious from the discussions which we have had in Committee on the Bill that all kinds of consequential matters of considerable concern are cropping up.
It seems to me, therefore, very desirable if, as the Attorney-General apparently thinks it may be necessary in the not distant future to ask Parliament to increase the county court jurisdiction still further to £500, that this should be done by Parliament so that we may have all the opportunities of Parliamentary debate and the House may consider what consequential changes are required as regards the cushion, the rights of defendants to apply for a remit, and all the other matters which are only now emerging, and which will continue to emerge during the Committee stage of the Bill. This shows how important it is that the proposals of the Government in this matter should be minutely and carefully examined to ensure that benefit to legislation eventually results.
1020
I hope that the Attorney-General will accept the view that if, in the future, he finds it necessary to ask the House still further to review the appropriate limits of jurisdiction in the county court, with all the attendant consequences that flow from it, that should be done Parliament as a whole, with full opportunities of Parliamentary discussion, and not done in the form of an Order in Council.
Mr. S. Silverman: I should like to say a word in support of the Amendment of my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, East (Mr. E. Fletcher). I hope to do so without repeating any of his arguments, not that I disagree with any of them but because he stated a very powerful argument very fully, and it would be a mistake to try to add to it.
There is one other point which my hon. Friend has not mentioned with which I should like to deal. It was said by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Leicester, North-East (Sir L. UngoedThomas) that the Government seemed to be seeking to carry out the object of the Bill for reasons of administrative convenience rather than having regard to the justice of the case. I do not think he meant that as a sweeping generalisation applying to all the Bill, but as influencing their thinking on a number of disputed points. I think this is one of them.
The subsection which my hon. Friend wishes to leave out begins:
"If Her Majesty by Order in Council so directs, …"
That obviously means: if Her Majesty is so advised; and that, I suppose, means: is advised by the responsible Minister. That might be by the Attorney-General or the Lord Chancellor, or it might be by a decision of the Cabinet. What we are not told is what kind of consideration would lead them to tender that advice. In what circumstances would they think it right to alter again the jurisdiction of the county court by raising it —to put it in its simplest form—from £400 fixed by this Bill to £500—£100 more, or another 25 per cent.? What will make them wish to do that?
I can conceive of no reasons which would make them want to alter it by so small a proportion, other than a further deterioration in the value of money. I think that one of their main arguments in favour of the Bill is that it does little more than adjust the actual jurisdiction of

1021
the county court by the rise in the cost of living since 1938. Whether it actually does that or not is a matter of some doubt. If that kind of consideration is in their minds on this proposal, why stop at £500? The logical thing would be to have a kind of escalator so that by Order in Council the Government could, at any time they thought fit, alter the jurisdiction of the county court up or down according to the Minister of Labour's index of the cost of living, or a statistical assessment of wholesale prices. The Government are not proposing to do that. I cannot imagine that they ever would propose to do that.
If the Government are not proposing to do that, what is the purpose of having this subsection? If we are not to apply a sliding scale and raise it according to the changes in the cost of living or lower it accordingly if the cost of living goes the other way, and adopt that as a principle, why put this subsection in the Bill with the one purpose of raising the limit, not from £400 to £450 or £550, but from £400 to £500? When we have done that, we have no further power, no matter what other changes may take place in the index of the cost of living or in the value of money or anything else.
This seems to me to be a new proposal. I do not think that any Government at any previous time has sought powers to "muck about" with the jurisdiction of a court by Order in Council. This is proposed to be done, not in the case of the courts generally, but in the case of the county court for this one limited purpose. I hope that the right hon. and learned Gentleman will again think about this. It gives him no power of any substance, because he raises the limit in one operation from £400 to £500, and leaves it there. It has no value in social purposes, such as might lie behind keeping the limit of jurisdiction in tune with the changes in the cost of living.
It does not enable him to do that. He does not want to do it. Therefore why do it at all? If £500 is the right limit, put it in now. Will £500 be the right limit in six months', two years', five years' time, or when? Suppose the cost of living goes the other way. Why have the Government not the power to reduce the jurisdiction of the county courts accordingly? This is a totally new principle to introduce in this kind of
1022
legislation. It does not seem to have any useful or practical purpose. The Government will be well advised to accept the Amendment.
Lieut.-Colonel Marcus Lipton: I gladly associate myself with what has been said by my hon. Friends the Members for Islington, East (Mr. E. Fletcher) and Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman). To the best of my recollecdon I was one of the very few present for the Second Reading debate who specifically drew attention to this subsection. I then asked the Solicitor-General to consider excluding it altogether from the Bill either by making the necessary Amendment to subsection (1) or otherwise as he might think desirable. The Solicitor-General did not think fit to deal with the point when he wound up that debate.
Nevertheless, the Law Officers have had notice on this matter, and I hope that they will be able to provide evidence and reasoning for retaining the subsection. I have tried to work it out for myself, but I think the only argument that can he advanced in favour of the subsection is that the Law Officers do not know how the Bill will work and whether or not it will lead to a diminution of pressure on the High Court and a substantial increase in the number of cases in the county court.
There is the possibility that the Bill as it stands, without this subsection, will not sufficiently divert litigation from the High Court to the county court. If that is so, there is an argument for retaining this kind of discretionary power to enable the Government to raise the limit by Order in Council. In that way they would reduce the number of cases going to the High Court and would bring more cases into the county court.
It strikes me as odd that there should be doubt in the mind of the Attorney-General whether the Bill will serve the purpose for which it is primarily intended. Evidence of that doubt which obviously lurks in his mind is the existence of the subsection, and if he insists upon retaining it the only interpretation must be that he believes that in the not too distant future the Bill will fail in its primary object and that it will be necessary to raise the limit so as to bring more work to the county court.

1023
If that is so, the Attorney-General should make up his mind now and put the higher limit into the Bill, not wait for twelve months or two years and then, by Order in Council, try to achieve the object for which the Bill has been introduced.
There is the other argument, about the undesirability of creating more delegated legislation by Order in Council and that sort of thing, which I will not stress as it has already been dealt with.
Now that the Government have had time to consider the matter which was raised on the Second Reading, I hope that they will come to the conclusion either to introduce on the Report stage the appropriate limits into subsection (1), which will settle the matter, or to abandon this subsection altogether.
6.45 p.m.
The Attorney-General: In our view, the case for the subsection is a strong one. As I said in my Second Reading speech, nobody can tell at present precisely what increase of work will result from the operation of legal aid in the county court, or how largely the work will increase as the result of recent legislation.
As I said on the Second Reading, the one thing one does not want to do is to transfer congestion from the High Court to the county court. I repeat again, as the hon. and gallant Member for Brixton (Lieut.-Colonel Lipton) obviously has not heard me, that it is necessary to fix a line and highly desirable that one should do so with a certain measure of flexibility. If the increase to £400 compensated fully for the depreciation in the value of money since 1938 there would be a lot more force in the argument advanced by the hon. Member for Islington, East (Mr. E. Fletcher), but that is not the case.
After listening to the arguments, I think it is most desirable to preserve flexibility to make the increase to £500 by Order in Council. One has to remember that the Order in Council has to be approved by Resolution of each House of Parliament, with ample opportunity for debate. If it is thought that the increase is being made too soon or will result in overloading the county court, one can express those views as well as if a Bill to effect that increase were under discussion.
1024
I gathered that the hon. Member for Islington, East found difficulty in construing this subsection, in the light of the Amendment which is now being moved into it. If he will read in the words where they should appear, he will find that his comments were based upon a misconstruction. He will read it as follows:
"This section and Part I of the First Schedule to this Act shall have effect with the substitution for the references to four hundred pounds and to four hundred and fifty pounds of references to five hundred pounds and to five hundred and fifty pounds."
Mr. E. Fletcher: Does that mean respectively?
The Attorney-General: I will see whether the meaning would be made clearer by the insertion of that extra word.
Mr. Fletcher: Could the Attorney-General tell us where and what would be the cushion figure in the event of county court jurisdiction being raised to £500?
The Attorney-General: I did say, when I moved the original Amendment, that it would be between £400 and £500.
Mr. Fletcher: How could it?
The Attorney-General: By reason of the Amendments. If the Order in Council is brought in these consequential Amendments make provision for precisely the same cushion, that is to say, £100 if the limit is raised to £500.
Mr. S. Silverman: But would not that require that. in this Clause, there should be power to make an Order in Council not merely to raise the maximum limit of jurisdiction but also to raise the figure of £300?
The Attorney-General: The power is there, and if the hon. Gentleman will study it he will see that it is done by the substitution of these references to amounts of other figures. I can assure the hon. Gentleman that it is effectively secured by substitution of those figures—that the main cushion of £100 is preserved. I can assure the Committee that, in moving the Amendment. I would not have said that we were giving a similar cushion unless I was quite sure that we were doing so.
Mr. Silverman: I am very much obliged—I was wrong. It is quite clear that the subsequent Amendments do give

1025
power for that, but is not the consequence that if the powers are then used to make this Order in Council, the cushion is preserved at £100 but the proportion is reduced from 25 per cent. to 20 per cent.'?
The Attorney-General: The hon. Gentleman's mathematics are quite right.
Mr. Silverman: But is that fair?
The Attorney-General: Having regard to the retention of the other safeguards to which I have referred, I think that it is a satisfactory margin.
Mr. Silverman: I do not want to make another speech, but the right hon. and learned Gentleman satisfied a majority of the Committee that a reasonable margin was 25 per cent. He now wants power, by Order in Council, to reduce it to 20 per cent., and appears to regard that as a reasonable thing to do. If it is a reasonable thing to do, he will have to persuade some of us a good deal more convincingly than he has done so far.
The Attorney-General: I base my argument in support on the grounds that it was a margin of £100, and we are preserving the same margin here if we increase the amount. My hon. and learned Friend drew attention to the fact that it was 25 per cent. Here, I agree, it is a little less mathematically, but really, in my belief, the £100 is an adequate margin.
Mr. Silverman: At any level?
The Attorney-General: At the level proposed—£500.
Mr. Silverman: Suppose it was £1,000.
The Attorney-General: I am not dealing with hypothetical cases, but I think the amount is adequate to provide a satisfactory cushion.
There is one reason in favour of this flexibility which, again, I indicated earlier. It is that if the effect of providing this cushion is to mean only enlarging the jurisdiction of the county court effectively to £300 then the time might come—and come more speedily than otherwise would be the case—when it would he desirable to make this Order in Council so as to raise the effective jurisdiction of the county courts to £400.
Mr. E. Fletcher: The Attorney-General talks of flexibility. Supposing that, as a
1026
result of two or three years' experiment in the working of this Act, it is found desirable to raise the limit of county court jurisdiction to £500 but to have a cushion of £150, he would not be able to do that by Order in Council, would he?
The Attorney-General: No. That can only be done by moving an Amendment making variations in the figures here. The hon. Member is quite right. If the jurisdiction is increased to £500 this subsection fixes the cushion. I thought I had made it clear and I am sorry if I did not.
Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas: I think that the right hon. and learned Gentleman's explanations of this Clause are most unsatisfactory. He is arguing on the ground of flexibility, but he is proposing a Clause which is, in itself, the most inflexible instrument one could possibly conceive. He is producing this Clause in order to deal with circumstances which he is now attempting to forsee. We do not quite know how this will work out, how the cushion will work out, how the raising of the limits will work out or how other provisions in the Bill will work out.
We shall get experience of this, but the Government are seeking to say now that one thing which they may decide after having experience of the working of the Bill. It is a most extraordinary approach. If the Government believe that they may have to make alterations in the Bill as a result of the experience of working it the proper method, of course, is then to bring another Bill before the House, so that the House may have an opportunity of debating it, amending it and dealing with it in a way in which we cannot deal with an Order. It is quite inappropriate to use an Order for legislating ahead for circumstances which may be as variable as the circumstances which the Government are trying to foresee in this case.
In addition, there is the important matter raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, East (Mr. E. Fletcher). Here, we are dealing with the jurisdiction of courts. We are not dealing with a parcel of food, or a piece of fish, or something of that kind, which may be dealt with properly by an executive order which the House can accept or reject and be done with. We are dealing with the administration of the courts, which affects

1027
the ordinary people in their daily lives. That is not a matter to be dealt with by an Order of this kind. The House should not now be put in the straitjacket of an Order, as though it had no discretion when coming to deal with the circumstances in which this Bill will operate. It seems to us, both on principle and as a matter of common sense that this is a
thoroughly pernicious proposal to apply to our courts, and I hope that my hon. Friend will press his Amendment to a Division.
Question put, That the words proposed to be left out, to "to," in line 38, stand part of the Clause:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 213, Noes 174.

Division No. 17.]

AYES

[6.56 p.m.

Agnew, Cmdr. P. G.

Green, A.

Manningham-Buller, Rt. Hn. Sir R.

Altken, W. T.

Grimond, J.

Markham, Major Sir Frank

Allan, R. A. (Paddington, S.)

Grimston, Sir Robert (Westbury)

Marlowe, A. A. H.

Amery, Julian (Preston, N.)

Gurden, Harold

Marples, A. E.

Anstruther-Gray, Major W. J.

Hare, Hon. J. H.

Maude, Angus

Arbuthnot, John

Harris, Frederic (Croydon, N.W.)

Mawby, R. L.

Ashton, H.

Harrison, A. B. C. (Maldon)

Medlicott, Sir Frank

Atkins, H. E.

Harrison, Col. J. H. (Eye)

Milligan, Rt. Hon. W. R.

Baldock, Lt.-Cmdr. J. M.

Harvey, Air Cdre. A. V. (Maccesfd)

Nabarro, G. D. N.

Balniel, Lord

Harvey, Ian (Harrow, E.)

Nairn, D. L. S.

Banks, Col. C.

Harvey, John (Walthamstow, E.)

Neave, Airey

Barber, Anthony

Harvie-Watt, Sir George

O'Neill, Hn. Phelim (Co. Antrim, N.)

Barter, John

Heald, Rt. Hon. Sir Lionel

Ormsby-Gore, Hon. W. D.

Baxter, Sir Beverley

Heath, Edward

Orr-Ewing, Charles Ian (Hendon, N.)

Bell, Ronald (Bucks, S.)

Henderson, John (Cathcart)

Osborne, C.

Bevins, J. R. (Toxteth)

Hill, Mrs. E. (Wythenshawe)

Page, R. G.

Bidgood, J. C.

Hill, John (S. Norfolk)

Pannell, N. A. (Kirkdale)

Bishop, F. P.

Hinchingbrooke, Viscount

Peake, Rt. Hon. O.

Black, C. W.

Holt, A. F.

Peyton, J. W. W.

Body, R. F.

Hornsby-Smith, Miss M. P.

Pickthorn, K. W. M.

Braine, B. R.

Horobin, Sir Ian

Pitman, I. J.

Brooke, Rt. Hon, Henry

Horsbrugh, Rt. Hon. Dame Florence

Pott, H. P.

Brooman-White, R. C.

Howard, Hon. Greville (St. Ives)

Powell, J, Enoch

Browne, J. Nixon (Craigton)

Howard, John (Test)

Price, David (Eastleigh)

Bryan, P.

Hudson, Sir Austin (Lewisham, N.)

Price, Henry (Lewisham, w.)

Bullus, Wing Commander E. E.

Hughes, Hallett, Vice-Admiral J.

Prior-Palmer, Brig. O. L.

Burden, F. F. A.

Hughes-Young, M. H. C.

Raikes, Sir Victor

Butcher, Sir Herbert

Hutchison, Sir Ian Clark (E'b'gh, W.)

Rawlinson, P. A. G.

Carr, Robert

Hyde, Montgomery

Redmayne, M.

Cary, Sir Robert

Hylton-Foster, Sir H. B. H.

Rees-Davies, W. R.

Chichester-Clark, R.

Iremonger, T. L.

Renton, D. L. M.

Clarke, Brig. Terence (Portsmth, W.)

Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)

Ridsdale, J. E.

Cole, Norman

Jenkins, Robert (Dulwich)

Rippon, A. G. F.

Cooper-Key, E. M.

Jennings, J. C. (Burton)

Roberts, Peter (Heeley)

Corfield, Capt. F. V.

Johnson, Dr. Donald (Carlisle)

Robinson, Sir Roland (Blackpool, S.)

Crouch, R. F.

Johnson, Eric (Blackley)

Robson-Brown, W.

Crowder, Sir John (Finohley)

Jones, A (Hall Green)

Roper, Sir Harold

Crowder, Petre (Ruislip—Northwood)

Joynson-Hicks, Hon. L. W.

Schofield, Lt.-Col. W.

Cunningham, S. K.

Kaberry, D.

Scott-Miller, Cmdr. R.

Currie, G. B. H.

Kerby, Capt. H. B.

Shepherd, William

Dance, J. C. G.

Kerr, H. W.

Simon, J. E. S. (Middlesbrough, W.

Davies,Rt.Hon.Clement(Montgomery)

Kershaw, J. A.

Soames, Capt. C.

D'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir Henry

Kirk, P. M.

Spearman, A. C. M.

Deedes, W. F.

Lagden, G. w.

Speir, R. M.

Donaldson, Cmdr. C. E. McA.

Lancaster, Col. C. G.

Spens, Rt. Hn. Sir P. (Kens'gt'n, S.)

Doughty, C. J. A.

Leavey, J. A.

Stanley, Capt. Hon. Richard

Drayson, G. B.

Leburn, W. G.

Steward, Harold (Stockport, S.)

Dugdale, Rt. Hn. Sir T. (Richmond)

Legge-Bourke, Maj. E. A. H.

Steward, Sir William (Woolwich, W.)

Duncan, Capt. J. A. L.

Legh, Hon. Peter (Petersfield)

Stewart, Henderson (Fife, E.)

Elliot, Rt. Hon. W. E.

Lindsay, Martin (Solihull)

Storey, S.

Emmet, Hon. Mrs. Evelyn

Linstead, Sir H. N.

Studholme, H. G.

Errington, Sir Eric

Lloyd, Maj. Sir Guy (Renfrew, E.)

Summers, G. S. (Aylesbury)

Fell, A.

Lloyd, R. Hon. Selwyn (Wirral)

Sumner, W. D. M. (Orpington)

Finlay, Graeme

Longden, Gilbert

Teeling, W.

Fleetwood-Hesketh, R. F.

McCallum, Major Sir Duncan

Thomas, Rt. Hn. J. P. L. (Hereford)

Fort, R.

Macdonald, Sir Peter

Thomas, Leslie (Canterbury)

Fraser, Hon. Hugh (Stone)

Mackeson, Brig. Sir Harry

Thomas, P. J. M. (Conway)

Freeth, D. K.

McKibbin, A. J.

Thompson, Kenneth (Walton)

Galbraith, Hon, T. G. D.

Mackie, J. H. (Galloway)

Thornton-Kemsley, C. N.

Gammans, L. D.

McLaughlin, Mrs. P.

Tiley, A. (Bradford, W.)

Glover, D.

Maclean, Fitzroy (Lancaster)

Tilney, John (Wavertree)

Gomme-Duncan, Col. A.

McLean, Neil (Inverness)

Touche, Sir Gordon

Gough, C. F. H,

Macleod, Rt. Hn. Iain (Enfield, W.)

Turner, H. F. L.

Cower, H. R.

MacLeod, John (Ross & Cromarty)

Vane, W. M. F.

Graham, Sir Fergus

Maddan, Martin

Vaughan-Morgan, J. K.

Grant, W. (Woodside)

Maitland, Hon. Patrick (Lanark)

Vickers, Miss J. H.

Wade, D. w.

Webbe, Sir H.

Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)

Walker-Smith, D. C.

Whitelaw, W.S.I.(Penrith & Border)

Woollam, John Victor

Wall, Major Patrick

Williams, Rt. Hn. Charles (Torquay)

Yates, William (The Wrekin)

Ward, Hon. George (Worcester)

Williams, Gerald (Tonbridge)

Ward, Miss I. (Tynemouth)

Williams, Paul (Sunderland, S.)

TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

Waterhouse, Capt. Rt. Hon. C.

Wills, G. (Bridgwater)

Mr. R. Thompson and

Mr. E. Wakefield.

NOES

Ainsley, J. W.

Hale, Leslie

Oswald, T.

Allaun, F. (Salford, E.)

Hall, Rt. Hn. Glenvil (Colne Valley)

Owen, W. J.

Allen, Scholefield (Crewe)

Hall, John T. (Gateshead, W.)

Padley, W. E.

Anderson, Frank

Hamilton, W. W.

Paling, Rt. Hon. W. (Dearne Valley)

Awbery, S. S.

Hannan, W.

Palmer, A. M. F.

Bacon, Miss Alice

Hastings, S.

Pannell, Charles (Leeds, W.)

Bartley, P.

Hayman, F. H.

Pargiter, G. A.

Benn, Hn. Wedgwood (Bristol, S.E.)

Henderson, Rt. Hn. A. (Rwly Regis)

Parkin, B. T.

Benson, G.

Herbison, Miss M.

Paton, J.

Bevan, Rt. Hon. A. (Ebbw Vale)

Hewitson, Capt. M.

Pearson, A.

Blackburn, F.

Hobson, C. R.

Price, J. T. (Westhoughton)

Blenkinsop, A.

Holman, P.

Probert, A. R.

Boardman, H.

Holmes, Horace

Proctor, W. T.

Bottomley, Rt. Hon. A. G.

Houghton, Douglas

Pursey, Cmdr, H.

Bowden, H. W. (Leicester, S. W.)

Howell, Charles (Perry Barr)

Rankin, John

Bowles, F. C.

Howell, Denis (All Saints)

Reid, William

Boyd, T. C.

Hubbard, T. F,

Rhodes, H.

Braddock, Mrs. Elizabeth

Hughes, Cledwyn (Anglesey)

Roberts, Albert (Normanton)

Brockway, A. F.

Hughes, Emrys (S. Ayrshire)

Roberts, Goronwy (Caernarvon)

Brown, Thomas (Ince)

Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)

Ross, William

Burke, W. A.

Hunter, A. E.

Silverman, Julius (Aston)

Butler, Herbert (Hackney, C.)

Hynd, H. (Accrington)

Silverman, Sydney (Nelson)

Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)

Hynd, J. B. (Attercliffe)

Simmons, C. J. (Brierley Hill)

Callaghan, L. J.

Irvine, A. J. (Edge Hill)

Skefington, A. M.

Carmichael, J.

Irving, S. (Dartford)

Slater, Mrs. H. (Stoke, N.)

Champion, A. J.

Isaacs, Rt. Hon. G. A.

Slater, J. (Sedgefield)

Clunie, J.

Johnson, James (Rugby)

Snow, J. W.

Coldrick, W.

Jones, Jack (Rotherham)

Sorensen, R. W.

Collick, P. H. (Birkenhead)

Jones, J. Idwal (Wrexham)

Sparks, J. A.

Corbet, Mrs. Freda

Key, Rt. Hon. C. W.

Steele, T.

Cove, W. G.

King, Dr. H. M.

Stewart, Michael (Fulham)

Craddook, George (Bradford, S.)

Lawson, G. M.

Stones, W. (Consett)

Cronin, J. D.

Ledger, R. J.

Strauss, Rt. Hon. George (Vauxhall)

Crossman, R. H. S.

Lee, Frederick (Newton)

Summerskill, Rt. Hon. E.

Cullen, Mrs. A.

Lever, Leslie (Ardwick)

Thomas, Iorwerth (Rhondda, W.)

Daines, P.

Lewis, Arthur

Ungoed-Thomas, Sir Lynn

Davies, Ernest (Enfield, E.)

Lindgren, G. S.

Usborne, H. C.

Davies, Harold (Leek)

Lipton, Lt.-Col. M.

Viant, S. P.

Davies, Stephen (Merthyr)

Logan, D. G.

Warbey, W. N.

Delargy, H. J.

McGhee, H. C.

Watkins, T. E.

Dodds, N. N.

Mcinnes, J.

Weitzman, D.

Dye, S.

McKay, John (Wallsend)

Wells, Percy (Faversham)

Edelman, M.

McLeavy, F.

West, D. G.

Edwards, Rt. Hon. Ness (Caerphilly)

Mahon, S.

Wheeldon, W. E.

Edwards, Robert (Bilston)

Mallalieu, E. L. (Brigg)

White, Mrs. Eirene (E. Flint)

Edwards, W. J. (Stepney)

Marquand, Rt. Hon. H. A.

Williams, Rev. Llywelyn (Ab'tillery)

Evans, Edward (Lowestoft)

Mayhew, C. P.

Williams, Ronald (Wigan)

Evans, Stanley (Wednesbury)

Mikardo, Ian

Williams, Rt. Hon. T. (Don Valley)

Fernyhough, E.

Mitchison, G. R.

Williams, W. T. (Barons Court)

Fletcher, Eric

Monslow, W.

Willis, E. G. (Edinburgh, E.)

Forman, J. C.

Moody, A. S.

Wilson, Rt. Hon. Harold (Huyton)

Fraser, Thomas (Hamilton)

Morris, Percy (Swansea, W.)

Winterbottom, Richard

Gaitskell, Rt. Hon. H. T. N.

Mort, D. L.

Woodburn, Rt. Hon. A.

Gibson, C. W.

Moss, R.

Yates, V. (Ladywood)

Greenwood, Anthony

Moyle, A.

Younger, Rt. Hon. K.

Grey, C. F.

Neal, Harold (Bolsover)

Zilllacus, K.

Griffiths, David (Rother Valley)

Oliver, G. H.

Griffiths, Rt. Hon. James (Lianelly)

Oram, A. E.

TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

Griffiths, William (Exchange)

Orbach, M.

Mr. J. Taylor and Mr. Short.

Question put and agreed to.

The Solicitor-General: I beg to move, in page 2, line 38, after "references" to insert "to three hundred pounds."
This Amendment, and the following one, to line 39, were dealt with in the opening observations of my right hon. and learned Friend.
Amendment agreed to.
Further Amendment made: In page 2, line 39, after "references" insert "to four hundred pounds."
Motion made, and Question proposed, That the Clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
Sir Lionel Heald: Before we part with the Clause, which extends

1031
the jurisdiction of the county courts, there is one matter upon which I should like to ask for the assistance of the Solicitor-General.
It relates to the difficulties that county court judges have in relation to law reports and text-books. At the present time, as many hon. Members will know, the county court judges in many parts of the country find that supplies of these necessary things are very deficient. While it is, of course, quite impossible to imagine that every county court in the country should be completely supplied with a library, it is the fact, as many hon. and learned Members will know, that county court judges have very great difficulties in that respect.
Now that we are extending the jurisdiction of the county courts, we shall be putting a greater burden on the judges. I believe it is the fact that some county courts may have one or two copies of text-books, but if they are dated "1923," they are not very helpful.
The Temporary Chairman (Sir Norman Hulbert): I am not quite clear how the right hon. and learned Gentleman can bring books into the discussion on the Clause.
Sir L. Heald: With great respect, Sir Norman, if we are asking that the jurisdiction of the county courts should be extended, surely, before we do that, we want to make quite certain that the judges who will carry out that jurisdiction are fully equipped for the task. I should have thought that if they have to do the job, we should make sure that the tools of their trade are in order. This is quite a serious matter, and it is one that is very well known to members of the Bar and solicitors—
The Temporary Chairman: Order. I am afraid that I must remind the right hon. and learned Gentleman that this is a matter of administration, which is not referred to in the Clause.
Mr. S. Silverman: Further to that point of order. With great respect, Sir Norman, the Committee is now being asked whether it will in fact adopt Clause 1. If we adopt Clause 1, then the jurisdiction of the county courts will be increased. What the right hon. and learned Member for Chertsey (Sir L. Heald) is seeking to argue, as I understand it, is
1032
that before he makes up his mind whether he wants to agree to that or not, he wants to know whether the people who will have to do the job will be provided with the tools with which to do it. The answer to that may be a matter of administration, but, nevertheless, I should have thought that we are entitled to have it.
The Temporary Chairman: It may or may not be desirable for learned judges to read books, but that does not happen to be a matter dealt with in the Clause.
Mr. Hale: Further to that point of order. With great respect, the Question is whether Clause 1, as amended, should stand part of the Bill or not. It is a long, detailed Clause and this suggestion appears to be a very important consideration. If we are to add Clause 1 to the Bill, increase the number of judges and increase their jurisdiction, are they to be in a position in which they can competently perform the duties imposed upon them? I submit that it is amply within the rules of order to apply one's mind, and to ask the Committee to apply its mind, to whether Clause 1 should stand part of the Bill or not.
Before we agree to the Clause we want to be satisfied that county court judges will not be charged with the duty of interpreting the law without having the necessary instruments to ascertain and interpret it and without having access to books. In most county courts in which I have practised there was not a book of any kind. It is well within our knowledge, certainly within my knowledge, that county courts have no law books—[An HON. MEMBER: "They do better without them."] I do not want to discuss whether they do better or not without them, but I submit that it is necessary to consider whether this provision should be made.
Mr. Silverman: Before you give a final Ruling, Sir Norman, may I suggest an analogy? Suppose the Committee was considering, not the increase of the jurisdiction of county courts, but the raising of the school-leaving age. Would it not be competent, on a Question "That the Clause stand part of the Bill," for hon. Members to discuss whether school buildings were available before deciding whether the school-leaving age should be increased, or to discuss whether there

1033
were sufficient teachers? Is not that a complete analogy to what the right hon. and learned Member for Chertsey (Sir L. Heald) is seeking to discuss here?
The Temporary Chairman: I think it would be in order in such a case to refer to school buildings and to say that the provision was not adequate, but it would not be in order to go into the details of the matter.
Sir L. Heald: I do not wish to delay the Committee, but I submit with the very greatest respect that I am entitled to ask my hon. and learned Friend if he will look into the matter before we finally dispose of this Bill. I am not asking him to do anything about it today, but to take into account a matter which, in the opinion of many qualified to judge, is hampering the administration of justice and which, if the jurisdiction of county courts is increased, will hamper that administration still more.
Mr. Scholefield Allen: I should like to support what the right hon. and learned Member for Chertsey (Sir L. Heald) has said. All with experience of county court judges know how handicapped they are in this respect. Many of them provide their own books by expenditure from their own pockets. They should not be called upon to do that. We are extending the jurisdiction by 100 per cent. and have not increased the salaries of these judges in the same proportion, although I have no doubt that someone will propose that that might be done with advantage. They should be provided with the necessary equipment. If we agree to this Clause it might be considered very unfair. They might say in words similar to those used by a very famous statesman, "You should give us the tools if you want us to do the job." I am sure the Solicitor-General knows quite well the conditions which exist in most county courts and it is very necessary to have this provision.
7.15 p.m.
As I had not an opportunity earlier and we are now considering the Question, "That the Clause stand part of the Bill," I wish to deplore the fact that the cushion is to be as low as £100. Arguments were put forward that the Clause should be amended. Any of us who has had experience of practice, especially in
1034
running-down cases and personal injury cases, is convinced that although a concession was made by the Government this Clause will work serious injustice in many cases where litigants will be called upon to suffer a diminution of their costs, because of the chances and changes of litigation. We know that behind the scenes judges have very differing views about the amount of damages.
I recall a case in which a very distinguished member of the present High Court was against me at Manchester Assizes. He was appearing for the plaintiff and I was appearing nominally for the defendant, but, in fact, for an insurance company. I offered £495, which was thought to be an adequate amount, but counsel for the plaintiff, after a good hour of argument with his client, supported by his junior and his solicitor, was informed that his client would not budge. The client said, "No, I want the award of the judge," and he got it. He got £975 in a case in which his two advisers thought the amount should be under £500. That is the kind of problem we shall be up against day after day.
On a technical Bill, which does not involve party questions, it is a great pity that when the Division bell rings a great many hon. Members come in from outside the Chamber, not having listened to the argument, and vote down a very reasonable Amendment. I have no doubt that when we divide on this Question hon. Members will again come in and vote that the Clause should stand part of the Bill, with a cushion of only £100.
Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: And without law books.
Mr. Scholefield Allen: Although this Clause may be passed now, I hope there will be second thoughts about it as there will be still further opportunities to ease the burden.
Another point which occurred to me during the discussion is the power of insurance companies, who really are the defendants in the majority of these cases. If in a case in which one is very perplexed as to the amount of damages which should be asked an insurance company offers an amount which will just carry High Court costs, or offer to pay High Court costs, the pressure of this Clause may cause a professional adviser to accept an amount which, as in the case I have mentioned, is less than the

1035
case is thought to be worth. The company may offer £390 and costs, or £400 and costs, whereas in the illustration I gave if there had been a larger cushion the client could have got £975. I am sure that as a result of this too small cushion many of the poorest people will suffer—not only the trade unions; they have money.
Two hon. Friends sitting in front of me, my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) and my hon. Friend the Member for Oldham, West (Mr. Hale), are very knowledgeable about this kind of case. Many times they must have taken on cases and won them when they were not financed by a trade union or by legal aid but they went on because they felt the justice of the case. If they take all those risks to ensure that justice is done a further burden would be added by this chancy process, which is governed by medical opinion, or the opinion of a High Court judge. In my submission, the cushion ought to be greater.
The Solicitor-General: I hope that the hon. and learned Member for Crewe (Mr. Scholefield Allen) will forgive me if I do not follow him in the last part of his observations, because the Committee has decided those matters. He referred to hon. Members coming in suddenly in a rush to vote, but they have the advantage of not having heard the repetition of the same arguments again and again.
The hon. and learned Member rose to support my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Chertsey (Sir L. Heald) in the case he made for the supply of books for county court judges. I do not know when my right hon. and learned Friend was last in a county court, but I suspect that it was in a case in which the plaintiff expected to recover more than the sum which he could recover under county court jurisdiction. I do not know. I think that if my right hon. and learned Friend went to a county court now he would find that such things as the supply of books are better than they used to be in those days when he went there.
One cannot, of course, guarantee a county court judge out in the hills or elsewhere in the provinces a first-class library. The endeavour which is made is to see that on each circuit there is what I may call a reasonably decent library
1036
for his use. The object is to go on building that up, one for each circuit, and we try to meet any specific requests which a judge makes for a new book or a new edition of a book at any time. My right hon. and learned Friend's point is important, and the Committee will be obliged to him for having mentioned it.
Clause, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 1.—(ACTIONS OF CONTRACT OR TORT, OR FOR MONEY RECOVERABLE BY STATUTE, AND RELATED MATTERS.)

  Clause 2.—(ACTIONS FOR RECOVERY OF, OR RELATING TO, LAND.)
  Motion made, and Question proposed, That the Clause stand part of the Bill.
  Mr. G. R. Mitchison: I notice that the Clause substitutes for a value by the year or in rent a net annual value for rating. The question I should like to have answered is this. In the case of agricultural land, works or industrial hereditaments which are rated at one-quarter of their value, is it one-quarter or the full amount which, for this purpose, is the net annual value for rating?
  The Solicitor-General: I am obliged to the hon. and learned Gentleman for raising the question. In our view, it is the full amount which is their net annual value for rating. We refrain from dealing with rateable value as a measure of value for this purpose to avoid the very difficulty he has in mind. For instance, in the case of industrial hereditaments where the distinction would be a difference of three-quarters it would manifestly be wrong, for the purpose of measuring a jurisdiction of this kind, so I would submit to the Committee, to adopt rateable value as opposed to net annual value for rating.
  Clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.
  Clause 3 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

  Clause 4.—(PROBATE PROCEEDINGS.)
  The following Amendment stood upon the Order Paper in the name of Mr. HALE:
  In page 4, line 19, leave out from "beneficially" to end of line 20.
  Mr. Hale: The position at present is that although, in 1925, an alteration was made so that county courts were allowed

  1037
  jurisdiction in probate matters, a jurisdiction in general after the entry of a caveat for testing the validity of testamentary documents, there is a limit that the estate must not exceed £200 gross. I do not recall a single case taken in a county court under the relevant Section of the Act of 1925, and I should be very surprised indeed if anyone here says that there has been very much litigation in the county courts over this question.
  I suggest that if there is one sort of action which, in the public interest, should be transferred to a county court it is action over a very small estate. It is a tragedy of the law that estates are whittled away in litigation. It is a responsibility for a professional man to be involved in such a case, for he does not like to find himself in a situation in which the beneficiaries, in trying to establish their claim, are deprived by legal expenses of the money they are seeking to obtain. That, however, is very often what happens.
  The suggestion in the Bill is that the jurisdiction of the county court shall be substantially increased to £1,000 gross. I concede at once that that is a substantial increase. However, in this sort of litigation the man concerned is nearly always one who owned his own house, nearly always a man who saved to buy the first thing that anyone who saves buys, his own house. Then there is a disputed will, or there is a dispute about relationship. The assets have to be considered. What are the assets? The assets are a house which cost £750 to build before the war. Such a house is valued now at £2,000.
  I know, of course, that there is provision now for reducing the value in a case in which the testator lives in his own home and leaves it to someone living in the home. We got that through the House a few years ago. If the house is mortgaged the case goes to the High Court. The mortgage cannot be taken into account in estimating the value of the estate. For this purpose the mortgage is a debt. So if the house is worth £2,000 and is mortgaged for £1,500, and there is only £500 left, the case has to go to the High Court because, by this Clause, one is not allowed to take into account any deduction on account of debts. It is really fantastic. Suppose the house is worth £1,100 and the deceased owed his
  1038
  doctor £50, and his funeral expenses were £50, and there is a mortgage for £750, then there is only £250 left. Yet that is still an exceedingly important amount for the people concerned in the case. Yet it has to go to the High Court. Litigation starts there.
  The hon. and learned Member for Middlesbrough, West (Mr. Simon) seems a little mystified. I refer him to subsection (2) of the Clause, which says:
  "… the reference to the value of the deceased's estate refers to the value of his estate at the time of his death … but without any reduction on account of his debts."
  This repeats, though not quite in the same form, the provisions of the Acts of 1925 and 1934.
  Mr. Simon: Is not the effect of the last half sentence sought to be left out to say that what we are dealing with is the gross estate and not the net estate?
  Mr. Hale: Yes.
  Mr. Simon: That is the opposite to what the hon. Gentleman is saying.
  Mr. Hale: The words of the subsection are:
  "In the foregoing subsection the reference to the value of the deceased's estate refers to the value of his estate at the time of his death, exclusive of what he was possessed of or entitled to as a trustee, and not beneficially, but without any deduction on account of his debts."
  Now that the hon. and learned Member puts the point, it seems to me that it may mean that. If the Solicitor-General tells me that it does mean that I shall most happily withdraw my Amendment. However, I did not read the subsection as meaning that.
  Mr. E. Fletcher: Nor did I.
  Mr. Hale: Nor did my hon. Friends with whom I discussed it. It means the value of the estate at the date of death, but without any reductions on account of debts. I am still not sure. In the circumstances, if the Solicitor-General will clear up the matter, I shall sit down at once.
  The Solicitor-General: I was rising in the hope of clarifying it. The phrase, I think, has been hallowed since 1858. The Statute of 1858 has always been taken hitherto to mean the distinction between the gross and the net estate.
  Mr. Hale: With what final result? That is the question we are asking. Can the Solicitor-General answer it straight away? Presumably there is an answer to it, since it has been going on since 1858. Does he take the words to mean that the test of county court jurisdiction is that if the net estate after deduction of debts is less than £200 it can go to the county court, or is it the gross estate which is the test for county court jurisdiction?
  7.30 p.m.
  The Deputy-Chairman (Sir Rhys Hopkin Morris): It might be convenient to have the Amendment moved before we start discussing it.
  Mr. Hale: The problem which you put to me, Sir Rhys, is this. If I move my Amendment I am finished, and I was proposing to make some observations when the Solicitor-General rose for the convenience of the Committee.
  The Deputy-Chairman: The hon. Member is not finished. We are in Committee and he can speak again, but we should not discuss an Amendment until it has been moved.
  Mr. Hale: I appreciate that, but I was anxious not to thrust myself on the Committee a second time.
  Mr. E. Fletcher: On a point of order. You have raised an interesting point, Sir Rhys, and I should like to put a further matter to you. If the hon. Member who has an Amendment finds, in the course of his speech, and as a result of an interjection from the other side of the Committee, that he wishes information from the Minister in charge about the effect of the proposed Amendment and of the Clauses, surely it is possible to elicit that information for the benefit of the hon. Member before he decides whether he wishes to pursue his speech or not in moving the Amendment.
  The Deputy-Chairman: If an hon. Member wants to elicit information, the proper course is for him to move the Amendment and have the information on the Amendment.
  Mr. Hale: I will conclude my remarks, Sir Rhys.
  The hon. and learned Member for Middlesbrough, West (Mr. Simon) has put the point to me and the Solicitor-General
  1040
  has offered no other elucidation. Suppose that we inserted in the Clause the word "with" to make the Clause read:
  "In the foregoing subsection the reference to the value of the deceased's estate refers to the value of his estate at the time of his death, exclusive of what he was possessed of or entitled to as a trustee and not beneficially, but with any deduction on account of his debt."
  The Clause then must be a negative and must say that one cannot have a deduction on account of debts. Therefore, this is a gross estate, therefore I am right, and, therefore, with increased confidence, I beg to move, in page 4, line 19, to leave out from "beneficially" to the end of line 20.
  Mr. Simon: I came to the Committee with the intention of supporting the hon. Member for Oldham, West (Mr. Hale), having understood his Amendment in exactly the opposite sense to that in which he evidently understood it.
  It is and always has been taken to be the gross estate which determines the jurisdiction of the county court in probate, though my experience is the same as that of the hon. Member. I have never known probate proceedings litigated in the county court and I entirely agree that, essentially, they are the type of proceedings which, in the case of small estates, should be litigated in the county court. Of all types of litigation of which I have had experience, these cases are the ones which arouse the worst feelings. They are generally litigated in a family, and family feelings of great virulence are aroused. The parties are not prepared, generally speaking, for compromise and they are prepared to litigate until the whole estate has been frittered away.
  It is most important, in the public interest and in the interest of the litigants themselves and particularly other parties who may be concerned in the estate, that the matter should be litigated as cheaply as possible, but I cannot see any logical reason for making the test of jurisdiction the gross estate. It 'seems to me from every point of view that it ought to be the net estate which should determine the jurisdiction, otherwise, whether the county court can be seized of the matter or not depends upon the extent of the person's debt and not upon the estate which is ultimately available for distribution.
  I hope, therefore, that the hon. Member for Oldham, West will proceed with

  1041
  the Amendment and that my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor-General will see his way to accept it, notwithstanding the fact that these words have appeared in Acts since the middle of the last century and that, for a reason which I have never understood, it has always been the gross estate that has been considered.
  The Solicitor-General: Listening to my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Middlesbrough, West (Mr. Simon), I wondered whether the reason for this provision had not been perhaps that it is the gross estate in respect of which the administrator has to give a bond and which has to be administered by him, and that it is the size of the gross estate which very probably governs the degree of complication and difficulty which is attached to the job which has to be done. Even the most insolvent estate may involve a degree of complication as a result merely of its size. I do not know, but I wonder whether that is the reason for providing that it is the gross estate which has to be considered.
  It is certainly our reason for continuing in the Clause to adopt the gross estate as the measure because, as far as I know now, there has never been until this day any complaint about that method of gauging this jurisdiction, under a form of words which has existed since 1858. I hope that in these words I have answered the question which I was in the middle of answering when something happened a little earlier.
  The difficulty about the Amendment is that, if it were adopted, it would leave the county court jurisdiction extended to a gross estate whatever its size, because if the estate were solvent to the tune of only one penny it would come within county court jurisdiction even if the rest of the estate amounted to £1 million. We felt that to be undesirable, because, in the case of large estates, problems would arise under the bond which would involve complication and difficulty and would distort county court business if the matter had to be dealt with in the county court. That is why we have adopted this method.
  Although I cannot hold out any hope, I will undertake to consider with great care what has been said by the hon. Member for Oldham, West (Mr. Hale) and my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Middlesbrough, West, but I could not
  1042
  advise the Committee at this stage to accept the Amendment.
  Mr. Mitchison: I confess to the Committee that on the only occasion when I appeared professionally in the probate court the testator was, after all, found to be competent and my knowledge of these things is limited. I hope that the Solicitor-General will enlighten me on a matter which puzzled me when my hon. Friend the Member for Oldham, West (Mr. Hale) spoke about a mortgaged house. Is it in that case treated as an equity of redemption, which has a certain value, or as a house subject to a debt—and there is, of course, a personal debt—and, therefore, the value of the house is taken rather than the value of the equity of redemption?
  I should like to say a few words also on what was said by the hon. and learned Member for Middlesbrough, West (Mr. Simon). I entirely agree with him, and I expect my hon. Friends agree, also. If we could have a rather wider reference of small estates to the county courts we on this side of the Committee would certainly welcome it. I hope that the Solicitor-General will bear that consideration in mind, coming as it does from both sides of the Committee.
  Mr. E. Fletcher: I appreciate that the Solicitor-General has undertaken to consider this matter between now and the Report stage, but I think that we on this side of the Committee feel that the real test for determining the county court jurisdiction in matters of probate should be the net value of the estate and not the gross value because there must be many thousands of cases in which the gross estate is over any reasonable limit—put it at £1,000 or any other figure—whereas in reality the sum about which the intending beneficiaries are litigating is under £1,000. Therefore, it is desirable that such disputes should be determined in the county court.
  The Solicitor-General said that one of the reasons why he thought the test should be the gross estate and not the net estate was because there might be some quite exceptional estate with gross assets of £1 million and it was a corresponding figure of liabilities which would then bring the net estate to a very low level or perhaps to a minus quantity. But that is not a realistic argument.

  1043
  Surely those cases must have been very few and far between. If there are such cases they could reasonably be excluded from the ambit of county court jurisdiction by an appropriate form of words. But surely it would not be right, because of that hypothetical and certainly exceptional case, to deprive the majority of small people, who would want to litigate in probate matters, the right of going to the county court when the assets are under £1,000. I hope that, as a result of reconsideration that the Government are to give this matter, they will agree with the point of view that we have been expressing.
  The Solicitor-General: I should like briefly to reply to the hon. and learned Member for Kettering (Mr. Mitchison) and the hon. Member for Islington, East (Mr. E. Fletcher). The hon. Member for Islington, East will understand that I was merely illustrating the effect of the Amendment on the Order Paper. I was deliberately taking the extreme case to show why we could not accept the Amendment in this form.
  In reply to the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Kettering, I should like to say that we all share the view that the more small estates we can have dealt with in the county court the better. Indeed, the appeal provisions of this Bill are designed to help in that field, but the problem is what, in this context, is meant by small estates. We will pay attention to what has been said here, but I cannot hold out any hope that we shall find it right to alter the gauge of gross estates which has been adopted for so long.
  There is the question of mortgages on houses. I am told, knowing nothing about the matter myself—and I do not pretend to —that the answer to the hon. and learned Gentleman's question is that it depends on how it is set out in the affidavit for this purpose, and that what is put into the affidavit governs the jurisdiction. I am told that the value of the house is put in and that in that context one ignores the amount of the mortgage in doing so.
  Mr. Simon: I only want to add that while I am most grateful to my hon. and learned Friend for saying that he will look again at this Clause, I want to
  1044
  emphasise the manner in which debts come into a probate action. What we in the Committee want to do is clear—to ensure that the litigation over small estates takes place in the county court. The extent of the debts does not affect that at all. Where the question of debts affects the probate of a will is where the creditors seek a grant. That is done on motions, and I do not imagine that it is desired to remove that from the High Court. I would ask my hon. and learned Friend to look into that aspect of the matter. What I want to see is that the action itself, which is almost always a question of fact as to whether the will has been properly made or not, is tried in the county court in the case of smaller estates.
  Similarly, the expense of the bond has no effect on that matter at all, because the bond is not given in either the county court or the High Court, but in the Probate Registry. I do not imagine that that will be altered either. I would ask my hon. and learned Friend very seriously to look again at this matter. There seems to be an overwhelming argument for dealing with the net estate rather than the gross estate.
  7.45 p.m.
  Mr. Scholefield Allen: When the Solicitor-General is looking at this form of words I wonder whether he will face the real problem we are discussing in relation to small estates, and that is the mortgage on a house owned by someone who is actually living in that house. That is the real problem. General debts are one thing, but the matter which brings most of these small estates into the High Court rather than into the county court is the mortgage on a house. Perhaps if the Clause could be so drafted that that could be excluded from the gross estate, and that only in ascertaining the amount, it might possibly meet ninety-nine cases out of a hundred.
  Sir Eric Errington: I want to say a word about this matter, because it seems to me to be a rather important issue. The position, as I understand it now, is that probate proceedings may take place in the county court where the personal estate does not exceed £200 and the real estate does not exceed £300. Of course, the result, as has been said, is that there is practically no probate litigation in the county court.

  1045
  What really worries me is the figure. It seems that a £1,000 is completely inadequate in these days. There has been considerable discussion as to whether a mortgage on a house should or should not be considered, but whether it be considered or not it seems to me that £1,000 is quite inadequate. If it is the declared object of my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor-General to have these smaller estates dealt with in the county court rather than in the High Court, then the sum mentioned in the Clause is inadequate.
  The Deputy-Chairman: It seems to me that the speech of the hon. Gentleman is more directed to the Question, "That the Clause stand part of the Bill" rather than to this Amendment.
  Sir E. Errington: I have said what I have said, and possibly it will be noted in the appropriate place.
  Mr. Hale: In view of what the hon. and learned Gentleman the Solicitor-General said, I do not want to ask my hon. Friends to press the Amendment to a Division. I think there is no question whatever that mortgages are looked on as debts today. There is no question whatever that as the Clause stands the house with a mortgage on it will have to be valued at its gross and not net value for the purpose of the Clause, which means that almost every estate will be kept out of its purview.
  Mr. Mitchison: The purpose of my question was to elicit the absurdity of what I thought the practice was, because the real point is the equity of redemption.
  Mr. Hale: That was the point I was trying to make clear in opening the discussion, and that is the difficulty now.
  In pursuing his inquiries, I hope that the right hon. and learned Gentleman will bear in mind that the estate has to be sworn and that every item of furniture has to be given a value. Technically speaking, the beneficiary should swear even the value of the clothing left by the deceased. It is clear that the Estate Duty people take a reasonable view and rarely press an inquiry, but someone must put a value on it of at least a reasonable figure. The result is that most estates are likely to go over £1,000 gross even if they are considerably less net. I hope, there-
  1046
  fore, that the right hon. and learned Gentleman will consider this matter seriously. Subject to that, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.
  Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, That the Clause stand part of the Bill.
  The Solicitor-General: As a matter of courtesy, and keeping within the rules of order, may I, Sir Rhys, answer my hon. Friend the Member for Aldershot (Sir E. Errington)? The Government may be blamed for the £1,000 but it was the figure in the context recommended by the Evershed Committee.
  Clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.
  Clauses 5 to 7 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

  Clause 8.—(INCREASE IN NUMBER OF JUDGES.)
  Mr. E. Fletcher: I beg to move, in page 5, line 43, to leave out "eighty" and insert "ninety."
  The Deputy-Chairman: It may be for the convenience of the Committee if we consider at the same time the Amendment to line 46.
  Mr. Fletcher: I am obliged to you, Sir Rhys, for your suggestion because the two Amendments raise precisely the same point.
  My Amendment raises a point which was considered in some detail on Second Reading and goes to the root of the objects and purposes of this Bill. The Amendment seeks to increase the number of county court judges whom the Government will have power to appoint under this Measure because, if it is to work at all, it is essential that there should be an adequate number of county court judges.
  In considering an earlier Amendment, the Attorney-General said that he did not want to find that we had transferred congestion from the High Court to the county court. None of us wants to find that, because one object of the Bill is to relieve the congestion in the High Court, and we all agree that it would be most undesirable if, as a result of the Bill, that congestion was transferred to the county courts.

  1047
  The most obvious way of avoiding any such congestion in the county courts is to make sure that there is an adequate number of county court judges. The only question is what is the appropriate number? Originally it was 60. Today the number is 65. When a Bill similar to this in the preceding Parliament was introduced in another place the Government proposed that the authorised number of county court judges should be increased from 65 to 75. The Explanatory and Financial Memorandum to the present Bill also states that the proposed increase should be from 65 to 75, but the text of the Bill in Clause 8, which we are now considering, recommends that the increase should be from 65 to 80.
  Now the figure of 80, as distinct from 75 has, I am sure, been selected by the Attorney-General largely because of the Amendment moved from the Opposition benches in another place in the lifetime of the previous Government recommending that the number of county court judges should be not 75 but 80. My Amendment suggests that the number should be increased to 90, but whatever the appropriate number may be, we on this side of the Committee are anxious to secure that under this Bill the Government should have power to appoint whatever may be found to be the necessary number of county court judges to ensure the satisfactory and expeditious working of this Measure. We feel that we can trust the Government not to appoint an unnecessary number beyond which the working of the Act may reveal to be the appropriate number.
  At the same time, we are anxious to remind the Government that in our view one object of the Bill, which will be brought into operation at the same time as legal aid is extended to the county courts, is to ensure that for the first time all people of limited means will be able, without risk of undue hardship to themselves, to have full facilities for having their disputes tried in the county court. I have no doubt that the result of the twin operation of extending the county court jurisdiction and of introducing legal aid into the county court must inevitably be a considerable increase in the volume of litigation in the county courts.
  On these benches at any rate we should welcome that, because it will mean that for the first time people of limited means,
  1048
  who, hitherto, have been deprived of having their injustices redressed, will at last be able to take their cases to the county court and obtain redress. The whole scheme will be unworkable, however, unless there are enough county court judges to make that possible, and we cannot tell at the moment what the precise number should be. Therefore, all we are seeking to do by the Amendment is to ensure that the Government have power, if necessary, to increase the number beyond 80 without having to come back to Parliament for further powers.
  I am sure that I shall have the attention and sympathy of the Attorney-General in this matter. In the course of the Second Reading debate various speakers drew attention to one of the admitted evils of county court procedure as it exists at the moment; that is to say, the frequent experience of actions which go on for a considerable length of time. Instead of being finished in one day, or if necessary the following day and two or three succeeding days, as occurs in the High Court, we find in the county court that a long case which is not finished on a certain day is adjourned to a date a month hence, then perhaps is heard for two or three hours and, if it is not finished, is again adjourned for another month.
  You know, Sir Rhys, as well as I and all Members of the Committee who have experience of these matters know, that this is a most unsatisfactory state of affairs. It is unsatisfactory for the legal advisers of the parties concerned, unsatisfactory for the witnesses, unsatisfactory for the litigants and unsatisfactory from the point of view of the county court judge. Obviously, he cannot be expected to administer justice so well, if he hears a case at intervals of from month to month, for two or three hours at a time, as the High Court judge who sits de die in diem until the case is finished.
  8.0 p.m.
  If the Bill is to be a success, it will be essential to have a reserve of county court judges, who, if necessary, can sit from day to day to deal with long cases. If litigants in county courts are to have the same kind of expeditious justice as in the High Court, it is essential for us to be sure that the Government have adequate power in deciding the number of county court judges to be appointed.

  1049
  Let us remember that the Bill's primary object is not merely to avoid congestion in the High Court but to ensure that adequate justice is done in the county courts for a class of litigant who has not yet had the same accessibility to justice as is provided for those who can afford to go to the High Court. We must have an adequate number of county court judges to achieve that object. I am suggesting, not that we should fix the number of county court judges at 90 as distinct from 80, but that we should give the Government power to appoint up to 90, if it is found necessary to do so.
  The Attorney-General: In moving the Amendment, the hon. Gentleman's theme was that we must have an adequate number of judges. I entirely agree with him. However, he advanced no argument to show that the number proposed in the Bill would be in the least degree inadequate or that the number that he proposes would be sufficient.
  I completely agree with most of the hon. Member's propositions and generalities. It is essential that there should be an adequate number of county court judges. In determining whether or not the number should be varied from what it was when the Bill was originally introduced, and, indeed, in considering what number should be in the Bill when it was drafted, regard was had to that fact. The maximum authorised number, when the Bill was originally introduced, was increased from 65 to 75, an extra margin of ten.
  As to the suggestions made by Members of another place, my noble Friend gave further consideration to the matter and made inquiries in different parts of the country, discussed local conditions with various county court judges, and then decided that, although the increase originally proposed from 65 to 75 would probably be sufficient, the position was sufficiently uncertain, particularly having regard to the extension of legal aid to the county courts as well as the increase in the jurisdiction of the county courts, to justify him in increasing the number by 15 to 80. Having gone into the matter, he thinks that that will provide him with an adequate number of judges, and an adequate margin.
  That decision was reached before I moved the Amendment, which the Com-
  1050
  mittee accepted, to institute the so-called cushion. The effect of that is certain to be, I should think, a reduction in some of the pressure which would otherwise fall upon the county courts. Now that the cushion is there, the number of county court judges who will be adequate may well be less than would have been adequate if the cushion had not been provided, but we have no reason to suppose that 80 is not more than sufficient to deal with all the problems to which the hon. Gentleman referred. Therefore, I must resist his Amendment.
  Mr. Mitchison: I find that answer very unsatisfactory. I have a suspicion that when the maximum number of county court judges stood in the text of the Bill at 75 the right hon. and learned Gentleman would have risen with the same assurance to tell us that he saw no reason why 75 should not be sufficient.
  He has already explained to us that the results of the Bill are unpredictable in the volume of additional litigation which will be brought to the county courts. That stands to reason. It seems to me unlikely that the considerable increase which is being made in the jurisdiction of the county courts will not lead to bigger demands for county court judges which may well go beyond the additional fifteen proposed.
  However, that does not seem to me to be the point. The point is that none of us can speak with any certainly on these matters, or even with any real approach to certainty. I should be very interested to know exactly what happened when the Lord Chancellor made his inquiries in sundry places from county court judges and others. The one thing of which I am certain is that none of those gentlemen could have given any answer with any degree of accuracy.
  I now come to the question of flexibility. Whenever I hear the right hon. and learned Gentleman talking about flexibility, I wonder what is coming. Last time he was exceedingly flexible on the question of whether or not further legislation was required to increase the jurisdiction of county courts. That is a question upon which I should have thought flexibility was somewhat doubtful. However, if ever there was a case for flexibility. I should have thought that one found it here, particularly for the reason

  1051
  which the right hon. and learned Gentleman provided just now.
  He explained—I entirely agree—that the extension of legal aid to the county courts is bound to have a very considerable effect in this matter. He told us earlier that the terms and method of the extension were still under negotiation. If legal aid is extended in such a form that it really provides sufficient aid for those who go to the county courts—that is something about which many of us have our doubts already, premature though they may be—I should have thought that an extension of county court work more than proportionate to the proposed increase in the maximum number of judges was well within the bounds of possibility.
  If the right hon. and learned Gentleman and the Government generally were so prepared to be flexible on the subject of jurisdiction, surely the very least they can do is to be more flexible about the question of the number of county court judges required. We do not want the county courts to be choked with work, We do not know what the effect of the Bill will be or what the effect of the
  extension of legal aid will be, and we do not even know the terms of that extension. In those circumstances, to force the House of Commons to pass another piece of legislation if the figure of 80 is found insufficient seems to be improvident folly.
  We have already had a maximum of 75 proposed, but 75 was not enough, and, with remarkable readiness, the figure was changed to 80. Is there any real reason why a further extension could not be made? Surely, it is the business of the right hon. and learned Gentleman to tell us why the original number of 75 and 80 is now thought to be adequate, rather than for us to say why we think the extension which we propose will meet the case. We are not proposing an increase in the number of county court judges; we are simply proposing that there should be power to make that increase without coming to the House for another Act of Parliament for that purpose.
  Question put, That "eighty" stand part of the Clause:—
  The Committee divided: Ayes 206, Noes 160.

  Division No. 18.]

  AYES

  [8.10 p.m

  Agnew, Cmdr. P. G.

  Cunningham, S. K.

  Heath, Edward

  Aitken, W. T.

  Currie, G. B. H.

  Henderson, John (Cathcart)

  Allan, R. A. (Paddington, S.)

  Dance, J. C. G.

  Hill, Mrs. E. (Wythenshawe)

  Alport, C. J. M.

  D'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir Henry

  Hill, John (S. Norfolk)

  Anstruther-Gray, Major W. J.

  Deedes, W. F.

  Hinchingbrooke, Viscount

  Arbuthnot, John

  Digby, S. Wingfield

  Hopkinson, Rt. Hon. Henry

  Ashton, H.

  Donaldson, Cmdr. C. E. McA.

  Hornsby-Smith, Miss M. P.

  Atkins, H. E.

  Doughty, C. J. A.

  Horobin, Sir Ian

  Baldock, Lt.-Cmdr. J. M.

  Dugdale, Rt. Hon. Sir T. (Richmond)

  Horsbrugh, Rt. Hon. Dame Florence

  Balniel, Lord

  Eden,Rt.Hn.SirA.(Warwick&L'm'tn)

  Howard, Hon. Greville (St. Ives)

  Banks, Col. C.

  Elliot, Rt. Hon. W. E.

  Howard, John (Test)

  Barter, John

  Emmet, Hon. Mrs. Evelyn

  Hudson, Sir Austin (Lewisham, N.)

  Baxter, Sir Beverley

  Errington, Sir Eric

  Hughes Hallett, Vice-Admiral J.

  Bell, Philip (Bolton, E.)

  Fell, A.

  Hughes-Young, M. H. C.

  Bell, Ronald (Bucks, S.)

  Finlay, Graeme

  Hyde, Montgomery

  Bevins, J. R. (Toxteth)

  Fleetwood-Hesketh, R. F.

  Hylton-Foster, Sir H. B. H.

  Bidgood, J. C.

  Fort, R.

  Iremonger, T. L.

  Birch, Rt. Hon. Nigel

  Fraser, Sir Ian (M'cmbe & Lonsdale)

  Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)

  Black C. W.

  Freeth, D. K.

  Jenkins, Robert (Dulwich)

  Body, R. F.

  Gammans, L. D.

  Jennings, J. C. (Burton)

  Bossom, Sir A. C.

  Glover, D.

  Johnson, Dr. Donald (Carlisle)

  Boyle, Sir Edward

  Gomme-Duncan, Col. A.

  Johnson, Eric (Blackley)

  Braithwaite, Sir Albert (Harrow, W.)

  Gough, C. F. H.

  Jones, A. (Hall Green)

  Browne, J. Nixon (Craigton)

  Gower, H. R.

  Kaberry, D.

  Bryan, P.

  Graham, Sir Fergus

  Kerby, Capt. H. B.

  Buchan-Hepburn, Rt. Hon. P. G. T.

  Grant, W. (Woodside)

  Kerr, H. W.

  Bullus, Wing Commander E. E.

  Green, A.

  Kershaw, J. A.

  Burden, F. F. A.

  Grimond, J.

  Kirk, P. M.

  Butcher, Sir Herbert

  Grimston, Sir Robert (Westbury)

  Lagden, G. W.

  Carr, Robert

  Gurden, Harold

  Lancaster, Col. C. G.

  Chichester-Clark, R.

  Hall, John (Wycombe)

  Leavey, J. A.

  Clarke, Brig. Terence (Portsmth, w.)

  Hare, Hon. J. H.

  Leburn, W. G.

  Cole, Norman

  Harris, Reader (Heston)

  Legge-Bourke, Maj. E. A. H.

  Cooper-Key, E. M.

  Harrison, A. B. C. (Maldon)

  Legh, Hon. Peter (Petersfield)

  Corfield, Capt. F. V.

  Harvey, Air Cdre. A. V. (Macclesfd)

  Linstead, Sir H. N.

  Craddock, Beresford (Spelthorne)

  Harvey, Ian (Harrow, E.)

  Lloyd, Maj. Sir Guy (Renfrew, E.)

  Crookshank, Capt. Rt. Hn. H. F. C.

  Harvey, John (Walthamstow, E.)

  Lloyd, Rt. Hon. Selwyn (Wirral)

  Crouch, R. F.

  Harvie-Watt, Sir George

  Longden, Gilbert

  Crowder, Sir John (Finchley)

  Heald, Rt. Hon. Sir Lionel

  Lucas, Sir Jocelyn (Portsmouth, S.)

  Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh

  Pickthorn, K. W. M.

  Thomas, Rt. Hon. J. P. L. (Hereford)

  McCallum, Major Sir Duncan

  Pitman, I. J.

  Thomas, Leslie (Canterbury)

  Macdonald, Sir Peter

  Pott, H. P.

  Thompson, Kenneth (Walton)

  Mackeson, Brig. Sir Harry

  Powell, J. Enoch

  Thompson, Lt.-Cdr.R.(Croydon, S.)

  McKibbin, A. J.

  Price, David (Eastleigh)

  Thornton-Kemsley, C. N.

  Mackie, J. H. (Galloway)

  Price, Henry (Lewisham, W.)

  Tiley, A. (Bradford, W.)

  McLaughlin, Mrs. P.

  Rawlinson, P. A. G.

  Touche, Sir Gordon

  McLean, Neil (Inverness)

  Redmayne, M.

  Turner, H. F. L.

  Macleod, Rt. Hon. Iain (Enfield, W.)

  Renton, D. L. M.

  Vaughan-Morgan, J. K.

  MacLeod, John (Ross & Cromarty)

  Ridsdale, J. E.

  Vickers, Miss J. H.

  Maddan, Martin

  Robinson, Sir Roland (Blackpool, S.)

  Wade, D. W.

  Maitland, Cdr. J. F. W. (Horncastle)

  Robson-Brown, W.

  Wakefield, Edward (Derbyshire, W.)

  Manningham-Buller, Rt. Hn. Sir R.

  Roper, Sir Harold

  Walker-Smith, D. C.

  Markham, Major Sir Frank

  Schofield, Lt.-Col. W.

  Wall, Major Patrick

  Marlowe, A. A. H.

  Scott-Miller, Cmdr. R.

  Ward, Hon. George (Worcester)

  Marples, A. E.

  Shepherd, William

  Ward, Miss I. (Tynemouth)

  Marshall, Douglas

  Simon, J. E. S. (Middlesbrough, W.)

  Waterhouse, Capt. Rt. Hon. C.

  Maude, Angus

  Soames, Capt. C.

  Webbe, Sir H.

  Medlicott, Sir Frank

  Spearman, A. C. M.

  Whitelaw, W.S.I.(Penrith 4 Border)

  Milligan, Rt. Hon. W. R.

  Speir, R. M.

  Williams, Rt. Hn. Charles (Torquay)

  Nabarro, G. D. N.

  Spence, H. R. (Aberdeen, W.)

  Williams, Gerald (Tonbridge)

  Nairn, D. L. S.

  Spens, Rt. Hn. Sir P. (Kens'gt'n, S.)

  Williams, Paul (Sunderland, S.)

  O'Neill, Hn. Phelim (Co. Antrim, N.)

  Stanley, Capt. Hon. Richard

  Wills, G. (Bridgwater)

  Ormsby-Gore, Hon. W. D.

  Steward, Harold (Stockport, S.)

  Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)

  Orr-Ewing, Charles Ian (Hendon, N.)

  Steward, Sir William (Woolwich, W.)

  Wood, Hon. R.

  Orr-Ewing, Sir Ian (Weston-S-Mare)

  Stewart, Henderson (Fife, E.)

  Woollam, John Victor

  Osborne, C.

  Storey, S.

  Yates, William (The Wrekin)

  Page, R. G.

  Studholme, H. G.

  Pannell, N. A. (Kirkdale)

  Summers, G. S. (Aylesbury)

  TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

  Peake, Rt. Hon. O.

  Sumner, W. D. M. (Orpington)

  Colonel J. A. Harrison and

  Peyton, J. W. W.

  Teeling, W.

  Mr. Barber.

  NOES

  Ainsley, J. w.

  Gaitskell, Rt. Hon. H. T. N.

  Marquand, Rt. Hon. H. A.

  Albu, A. H.

  Gibson, C. W.

  Mayhew, C. P.

  Allaun, F. (Salford, E.)

  Greenwood, Anthony

  Mitohison, G. R.

  Allen, Scholefield (Crewe)

  Grenfell, Rt. Hon. D. R.

  Monslow, W.

  Anderson, Frank

  Grey, C. F.

  Moody, A. S.

  Awbery, S. S.

  Griffiths, Rt. Hon. James (Llanelly)

  Morris, Percy (Swansea, W.)

  Bacon, Miss Alice

  Griffiths, William (Exchange)

  Mort, D. L.

  Bartley, P.

  Hale, Leslie

  Moss, R.

  Benn, Hn. Wedgwood (Bristol, S.E.)

  Hall, Rt. Hn. Glenvil (Colne Valley)

  Moyle, A.

  Benson, G.

  Hall, John T. (Gateshead, W.)

  Neal, Harold (Bolsover)

  Bevan, Rt. Hon. A. (Ebbw Vale)

  Hamilton, W. W.

  Oliver, G. H.

  Blackburn, F.

  Hannan, W.

  Oram, A. E.

  Boardman, H.

  Hastings, S.

  Orbach, M.

  Bottomley, Rt. Hon. A. G.

  Hayman, F. H.

  Oswald, T.

  Bowden, H. W. (Leicester, S.W.)

  Herblson, Miss M.

  Owen, W. J.

  Bowles, F. G.

  Hewitson, Capt. M.

  Padley, W. E.

  Boyd, T. C.

  Hobson, C. R.

  Paling, Rt. Hon. W. (Dearne Valley)

  Braddock, Mrs. Elizabeth

  Holman, P.

  Pannell, Charles (Leads, W.)

  Brockway, A. F.

  Holmes, Horace

  Pargiter, G. A.

  Brown, Rt. Hon. George (Belper)

  Houghton, Douglas

  Parkin, B. T.

  Brown, Thomas (Ince)

  Howell, Charles (Perry Barr)

  Paton, J.

  Burke, W. A.

  Howell, Denis (All Saints)

  Pearson, A.

  Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)

  Hughes, Cledwyn (Anglesey)

  Probert, A. R.

  Callaghan, L. J.

  Hughes, Emrys (S. Ayrshire)

  Proctor, W. T.

  Carmichael, J.

  Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)

  Pursey, Cmdr. H.

  Champion, A. J.

  Hunter, A. E.

  Rankin, John

  Clunie, J.

  Hynd, H. (Accrington)

  Reid, William

  Coldrick, W.

  Hynd, J. B. (Attercliffe)

  Roberts, Albert (Normanton)

  Collick, P. H, (Birkenhead)

  Irvine, A. J. (Edge Hill)

  Roberts, Goronwy (Caernarvon)

  Cove, W. G.

  Irving, S. (Dartford)

  Ross, William

  Craddock, Ceorge (Bradford, S.)

  Isaacs, Rt. Hon. G. A.

  Short, E. W.

  Cronin, J. D.

  Jay, Rt. Hon. D. P. T.

  Simmons, C. J. (Brierley Hill)

  Crossman, R. H. S.

  Johnston, Douglas (Paisley)

  Slater, Mrs. H. (Stoke, N.)

  Cullen, Mrs. A.

  Jones, Rt. Hon.A.Creech (Wakefield)

  Slater, J. (Sedgefield)

  Davies, Ernest (Enfield, E.)

  Jones, Jack (Rotherham)

  Snow, J. W.

  Davies, Harold (Leek)

  Jones, J. Idwal (Wrexham)

  Sorensen, R. W.

  Davies, Stephen (Merthyr)

  Key, Rt. Hon. C. W.

  Sparks, J. A.

  Delargy, H. J.

  King, Dr. H. M.

  Steele, T.

  Donnelly, D. L.

  Lawson, G. M.

  Stewart, Michael (Fulham)

  Dye, S.

  Ledger, R. J.

  Stones, W. (Consett)

  Edelman, M.

  Lee, Frederick (Newton)

  Summerskill, Rt. Hon. E.

  Edwards, Rt. Hon. Ness (Caerphilly)

  Lever, Leslie (Ardwick)

  Taylor, John (West Lothian)

  Edwards, Robert (Bilston)

  Lewis, Arthur

  Thomas, lorwerth (Rhondda, W.)

  Edwards, W. J. (Stepney)

  Lindgren, G. S.

  Ungoed-Thomas, Sir Lynn

  Evans, Edward (Lowestoft)

  Logan, D. G.

  Viant, S. P.

  Evans, Stanley (Wednesbury)

  McGhee, H. G.

  Warbey, W. N.

  Fernyhough, E.

  Mclnnes, J.

  Watkins, T. E.

  Fletcher, Eric

  McKay, John (Wallsend)

  Weitzman, D.

  Fraser, Thomas (Hamilton)

  Mahon, S.

  Wells, Peroy (Faversham)

  1054

  1055

  Wells, William (Walsall, N.)

  Williams, Ronald (Wigan)

  Winterbottom, Richard

  West, D. G.

  Williams, Rt. Hon. T. (Don Valley)

  Yates, V. (Ladywood)

  Wheeldon, W. E.

  Williams, W. T. (Barons Court)

  Younger, Rt. Hon. K.

  Wilcock, Group Capt. C. A. B.

  Willis, E. G. (Edinburgh, E.)

  Williams, Rev. Llywelyn (Ab'tillery)

  Wilson, Rt. Hon. Harold (Huyton)

  TELLERS EOR THE NOES:

  Mr. J. Johnson and Mr. J. T. Price.

  Question put and agreed to.

  Clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.

  Clause 9.—(EXTENSION OF POWERS OF REGISTRAR.)
  Motion made and Question proposed, That the Clause stand part of the Bill.
  Sir E. Ellington: I notice that a rather wide definition has been used in subsection (1, e), which is to be added to Section 18 of the Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act. Paragraph (e) (i) refers to "any proceedings other than actions." During the course of the Second Reading debate I asked a question about registrars, with a view to discovering whether it would not be possible for them to deal with very important and time-consuming judgment summonses.
  I realised that commitment to prison was a responsibility which it might be difficult to remove entirely from the jurisdiction of the judge, but no undue complication arises in the case of judgment summonses, and I should have thought that the words to which I have referred might well include such judgment summonses. If that is so it will be an excellent arrangement, because it will enable a judge to get through the other work which the Bill imposes upon him.
  The Attorney-General: The words "any proceedings," as my hon. Friend indicates, are of a very general and wide description. This Clause merely provides enabling powers to make rules, and I am quite sure that my hon. Friend's suggestion will be fully considered by those upon whom the responsibility rests for making rules in relation to these matters.
  Clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.

  Clause 10.—(JUDGE'S POWER AS TO PLACE OF HEARING.)
  Mr. Hale: I beg to move, in page 6, line 26, at the end, to add:
  "provided that he is satisfied that it is in the interest of the parties so to do."
  This is so simple an Amendment that I should have thought the right hon. and learned Gentleman could have accepted
  1056
  it without any discussion, in order to make further progress with more important matters. As I read it, the Clause gives to the county court judge power to transfer a trial from any court on his circuit to any other court on his circuit, but it provides no criterion or test to which he should apply his mind in coming to that decision.
  I have a great regard for county court judges, and I am reluctant to impute to them any improper motives in coming to decisions; indeed, I wondered how far I could develop this argument in view of the respect which I have for them. The difficulty of imputing egoistic eccentricities to a county court judge is, perhaps, accentuated geometrically by the rectangular nature of the Bench. I make a study of the Sabbath Press, as I hope the right hon. and learned Gentleman does, because it is one way in which he can keep in touch with the opinions of back benchers.
  Last Sunday I was surprised to see, in a newspaper, an article written by a county court judge who was described as being widely known as very good to the under-dog and a terror to the dirty dog. It was said that he stretched the law for "Old Charlie." I should mention that "Old Charlie" was a mare—not a city or borough sort of mayor, but the wife or mistress of a horse—and I have no doubt that a considerable part of the British public was suitably moved by all this. The article further stated that the Lords Justices of Appeal who heard the appeal rather appreciated this example of Nelson's blind eye being placed to the telescope. Nobody was told who paid the costs of the appeal; that was one of the matters which a cynic might have considered.
  At any rate, I have been able to quote evidence of the fact that county court judges have not invariably applied their minds exclusively to the problems which the law directs. Let us face the difficulty, which is, quite simply, that many of our county towns are near the middle of their counties, and nothing is more convenient for the county court judge in, say, Leicestershire, to transfer all his cases to

  1057
  Leicester. It is a wretched journey to Ashby. The train service is bad.
  I remember once arguing a case in a remote Northamptonshire county court, where a very distinguished barrister told me, rather sadly, about three-quarters of the way through the case, that he had lost it. He said he knew he had lost because the judge had passed him a note saying, "Could you give me a lift home?" The barrister said that the judge was so honest that he would never ask for a lift home from a barrister in whose favour he was going to decide the case.
  County court judges could find excellent reasons for transferring cases from Ashby-de-la-Zouche to Leicester. It is easier to get there; one can get luncheon more conveniently, and, in any case, the judge probably lives there. Under the Clause as it stands at present, it seems to me that those are exactly the considerations which will appeal to him.
  I have merely sought to provide a suitable test, by saying that the judge should consider the interests of the litigants. I should hardly have thought that I was embarking upon any controversy if it were not for some curious observations of the Solicitor-General earlier about the objects of the Bill, which apparently did not include any consideration of the interests of litigants. Perhaps I misunderstood him; I do not want to be ungenerous.
  It is said that if this Amendment—so carefully drawn, and setting out such unexceptionable principles; because there are no sanctions—were passed, county court judges could still transfer cases, and there would be nothing to stop them doing so. I do not take such a low view of county court judges. I am sure that they will bear in mind the considerations to which their minds are directed by the Amendment. As for the absence of sanctions, I humbly venture to remind the Committee that a similar comment can be made about Magna Charta, the Petition of Rights, the Declaration of Human Rights, and other documents of an importance at least equal to that of the Amendment.
  Mr. Ronald Bell: I have much sympathy with the Amendment, which has been moved so ably and wittily by the hon. Member for
  1058
  Oldham, West (Mr. Hale). The difficulty which I feel about the matter is that if county court judges are as ingenious as the hon. Member thinks they are they will not find it very difficult to satisfy themselves that the changes which they propose are in the interests of the parties—and we might find ourselves back where we were before, notwithstanding the addition of seven or eight words.
  Nevertheless, this is a point which my right hon. and learned Friend should consider. It is possible that hardship might be caused to parties in scattered circuits by the transfer of their case, without their consent, from one court to another. I am not sure that the words proposed by the hon. Member will meet the case. It may be that words requiring the consent of the parties should be inserted. That would be a more extreme matter, but I do not see why we should be deterred from considering it.
  If, in accordance with the jurisdiction rules, the parties enter their case at a certain court, it has to stay there, and it would be a considerable relaxation of the present rules in favour of the litigants if, with their consent, the case could be transferred. I mention this very briefly because I remember that when I referred to the difficulties which sometimes afflict litigants by the fact that their cases are part heard and are then deferred, perhaps for several months, the Solicitor-General said that Clause 10 might be of some help. If it is intended that a case shall be started in one court and then heard the next day or very soon afterwards in another court on the circuit, having been transferred without the consent of the parties, considerable hardship may be caused to them. I would urge my right hon. and learned Friend to see whether, at a later stage, he cannot propose a form of words which would meet this difficulty.
  8.30 p.m.
  The Attorney-General: The Amendment, moved in such an attractive fashion by the hon. Member for Oldham, West (Mr. Hale), is deceptive in its simplicity. Its very simplicity might lead one to think that it was an eminently desirable Amendment to accept, and so it is on the face of it. But when one comes to examine the position and to consider what is likely to arise, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will see that it would not be in the interest

  1059
  of the litigants in the county courts if this Amendment were accepted.
  In considering whether or not to transfer a case from one court to another, a county court judge should properly have regard not only to the interests of the particular parties to that action but to the interests of the other litigants on his list in that court. I will, in a moment or two, give an indication of what this Clause is meant to deal with.
  I would remind the Committee that at present, under Order 16, Rule 1, the judge may transfer the proceedings to another court where they can be suitably tried, but under the provision the whole of the proceedings must be transferred and all the interlocutory work must take place at the other court. It may be in the interests of the parties for the interlocutory work to take place in the court where the proceedings were started. That may be a court in which the judge sits only once a month. If he sees that there is a long case likely to go from one month to the next and fill up the whole of his day's work at the expense of other litigants who want to come on, it may be right and advisable for the proceedings, although they had been started in that court, to be transferred to another court where the judge can give continuous attention to that long case and it would not get in the way of other litigants. So it would be limiting it too narrowly to make this provision exercisable only if it appeared to be in the interests of the particular parties.
  I think that it is difficult to define the conditions and considerations which a county court judge would always have to bear in mind. I think that one can leave this safely to the county court judges who, by and large, although one may remember some odd happenings, do their utmost to meet the needs of those who appeared in their courts. I think that we can safely leave it to them, bearing in mind this—and no doubt attention will be drawn to it—that if it were found that a practice that one person was developing was leading to inconvenience to litigants and to others, there is, in addition to Order 16, Rule 1, also power under Section 38 of the principal Act whereby
  "A judge may, with the consent of the parties to any proceedings, hear and determine the proceedings … at any place either within or without any district for which he is judge."
  1060
  There is, therefore, no need for an additional provision for the consent of the parties. This provision was so drawn as to enable, and with the object of enabling, the problem to be dealt with in particular where the courts sit once a month—courts where there may be a great number of small cases and where there suddenly starts a big case which will hold up the whole of the list—whereby, in the big town more than in the country, there can be a transfer which will be in the interest and to the convenience not only of the litigants in a particular action but to the other litigants who are waiting for their cases to come on.
  The hon. Gentleman moved the Amendment in a most attractive and sympathetic fashion. I fully appreciate the dangers to which he has drawn attention, and I am not unsympathetic with his idea; but I think we must go a little wider than the interests of the parties in a particular action, and that if this is to work, as I believe it will, to the advantage of the litigants, we must leave it to the discretion of the county court judge in the way suggested.
  Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas: The longer the Bill goes on and the more I hear of the Government's approach to it, the less I like it. When I first saw the Amendment in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Oldham, West (Mr. Hale) I thought it was rather unnecessary and that the answer would be, "This is exactly what the county court judge will inevitably do and what the whole object of the rule will be, namely, to see that discretion is exercised in the interests of the litigants." We find now that it is not so at all. The Attorney-General started off—
  The Attorney-General: I am sure that the hon. and learned Gentleman does not wish to mispresent what I said. It would be wrong to confine this solely to the interests of the litigant, or, it might be, the interests of the two litigants. If their case was transferred, that might be to the great disadvantage of a great many more. It might, of course, be possible to transfer a case without doing anyone inconvenience. I would not like it to be thought or suggested that the judge, in deciding whether or not to transfer a case, should not bear in mind the interests of the parties as well as to the interests of the other litigants.
  Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas: I understood what the Attorney-General said in the first place. He said it clearly and I understood it clearly. He has now explained clearly what he said clearly before. He started off with the proposition that it would not be in the interests of the litigants to have a stipulation in the Bill that the judgment should be in the interests of the litigants. This seemed rather an astonishing proposition until I found that the litigants about whose interest the Attorney-General was concerned were not the litigants who were actually the parties to the proceedings.
  Let us just consider this point. The Attorney-General says that he cannot accept words requiring that the discretion shall be exercised in the interests of the parties to the proceedings, because, and only because, it may be necessary in the interests of other parties and of other litigants to have a matter transferred to another district. The Attorney-General shakes his head. I beg him to apply his mind logically to the proposition, which is that discretion shall be exercised in the interests of the parties. The Attorney-General refuses that proposal. I will give way if he wishes to interrupt again.
  The Attorney-General: The hon. and learned Gentleman does not seem to appreciate what I said at all. I said, "The county-court judge will, of course, bear in mind the interests of the parties." I hope the hon. and learned Gentleman has got that right. Then I said, "He would rightly bear in mind the interests of other parties as well." It would not be limited to the interests of the parties.
  Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas: I hope that the Attorney-General will follow this point. I fully appreciate what he has said. I will take the matter stage by stage.
  The Amendment proposes that discretion shall be exercised in the interests of the parties. Let us assume that the discretion exercised in the interests of the parties is that the case shall remain at the court where it now is. That decision would then stand. The Attorney-General refuses the Amendment because, and only because, some other consideration must prevail over the interests of the parties. I agree that the judge might take the interests of the parties into consideration, but the whole purpose of the refusal of this Amendment by the Attorney-General is to
  1062
  enable the interests of the parties to be over-ruled. I hope that that is quite clear.
  Why does the Attorney-General wish the interests of the parties to be overruled? He wishes to provide for overruling the interests of the parties because it may be in the interests of other litigants not to exercise the discretion in the interests of the parties. What does that mean? In the case which he has mentioned that simply means administrative convenience.
  The Attorney-General indicated dissent.
  Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas: Of course it does. It means that it is more convenient for parties other than the parties in the action that the case should be heard in court A rather than in court B, and that is exactly what we mean by administrative convenience.
  The answer to the difficulty of overruling the interests of the parties in the interests of administrative convenience is to provide more county court judges. We say that the administration should serve the interest of the parties—of all the parties—in each case and that their interest should not be over-ruled by administrative convenience. That is the issue which has emerged between the two sides of this Committee more and more clearly as the debate has proceeded. It was for that reason that we divided on the last Amendment. We did not divide on a difference between 80 and 90, but on the difference in approach between the Government and ourselves. We said that the number of county court judges should be determined by the convenience of the parties and not by other conveniences.
  That is exactly our attitude on this Amendment. While we are completely unable to accept the Attorney-General's defence of his rejection of this Amendment, my hon. Friend may well consider, as time is getting on, that perhaps it is undesirable to divide on this particular Amendment—
  Mr. Hale indicated assent.
  Sir. L. Ungoed-Thomas: —because we have, in fact, expressed our views on precisely the same principle in dividing on the last Amendment.
  Amendment negatived.
  Clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.

  Clause 11.—(APPEALS ON QUESTION OF FACT, AND CONSEQUENTIAL AMENDMENTS AS TO APPEAL ON LAW.)
  Mr. E. Fletcher: I beg to move, in page 6, line 42, to leave out "two" and insert "three."
  The Temporary Chairman (Mr. James H. Hoy): I think that it would be for the convenience of the Committee if, with this Amendment, we take the two which follow and the first six on the following page, all of which relate to Clause 11.
  Mr. Fletcher: I certainly think that that would be convenient, Mr. Hoy, because all the Amendments relating to Clause 11 are interconnected, and I think that it is obviously desirable, before we leave the Committee stage—and whether or not we divide—that certain things should be said, if only for consideration hereafter by the Law Officers and others concerned with this very vexed question of whether or not there should be introduced into our system of the administration of justice appeals on fact from the county court.
  During the Second Reading debate it was apparent that this is not a subject on which opinion is divided on party political lines. There is, indeed, considerable division of opinion on both sides of the Committee, and having considered the matter very carefully, first as member of the Evershed Committee and then subsequently, I think that the balance of difficulties is very nicely drawn and that the arguments on both sides are very evenly balanced. I hope, however, that the Attorney-General and the Solicitor-General will bear with me if I make just a few observations in the light both of what was said in the Second Reading debate and of the printed recommendations of the Evershed Committee.
  This whole series of Amendments—or, at any rate, those standing in my name—has for its effect a reduction in the number of appeals on questions of fact which could go from the county court to the court of appeal. On the other hand, there is an Amendment in the name of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Stoke Newington and Hackney, North (Mr. Weitzman) which proposes to reduce the monetary limit, and which would thereby extend the permitted number of appeals to the Court of Appeal on questions of fact.
  1064
  8.45 p.m.
  Might I just remind you, Mr. Hoy, of the words appearing in the Report of the Evershed Committee? That Report states:
  "The question of appeals from County Courts has proved to be one of obstinate difficulty and has given rise to a remarkable diversity of view amongst the witnesses whose opinions we sought."
  The Report also states that it was this issue which provoked the most lively controversy. It goes on:
  "We were much impressed by the evidence given by the Lord Chief Justice, who, speaking from his long experience of sitting in the Court of Appeal, informed us that there were several cases within his recollection in which the Court of Appeal felt that the County Court Judge's decision on the facts was plainly wrong —yet the Court of Appeal was powerless to interfere."
  That would obviously be a very cogent reason, if it stood alone, for giving litigants a right of appeal on questions of fact from the county court to the Court of Appeal in all cases, but this Bill does not do that. The Bill proposes that in future, and indeed for the first time, there should be appeals on questions of fact in the normal case—and I am leaving out Admiralty, Probate and exceptional cases—where the amount involved is over £200.
  The precise recommendation of the Evershed Committee was that there should be a right of appeal if the amount involved was over £100, but what worries me now, on further reflection, and I am sure it will also worry the Solicitor-General, is this. If it is correct, as it appeared to the Lord Chief Justice, that there were cases within his experience, in sitting in the Court of Appeal, in which the county court judge had from time to time gone wrong and in which injustice had been done, it is just as likely to occur if the amount involved is under £200 as it is if it were under £100.
  Indeed, it may be more likely to occur; I do not know. It may be that county court judges exercise less care when the amount involved is less than £100. I should not like to say whether it is or not, but I think we can assert that, in the case of a litigant who is claiming under £100, his claim is just as important to him as that of any litigant in the county court who is claiming £300 or £400, or indeed of any litigant in the High Court who is claiming £4,000 or £5,000.

  1065
  If there is a possibility of injustice in the one case, there is also that possibility of injustice in the other. Therefore, I ask myself why, in common sense, there should be an appeal on the facts from the county court in a claim for just over £200 but not in a claim for just under £200. Let us suppose that the litigant cannot be sure what the amount of the claim is. Let us look at it from the position of the county court judge, who, hearing an action for damages for personal injury, knows that there is a disputed question of liability and that the amount involved is arguable and may be either a little more or less than £200. He knows that if he decides on the one side or the other on questions of fact and awards under £200, there will be no appeal.
  Sir E. Errington: As I understand the Clause, as drafted, a right of appeal arises when there is a claim for £200 or over, so that the position would be that the litigants themselves would be able to decide, by the very nature of their claim, whether or not they should have a right of appeal.
  Mr. Fletcher: It may well be, as my hon. Friend the Member for Oldham, West (Mr. Hale) pointed out in the debate on an earlier Amendment, that in the county court, as in the High Court, one can ask for damages at large in an action for personal injury, but one cannot say that one limits one's claim to £400. If it means that in all cases in the county court except those in which the plaintiff deliberately limits his claim to below £200 there is an appeal on question of fact it would meet the point raised by the hon. Member for Aldershot (Sir E. Errington), but I do not so read it. Perhaps the Solicitor-General will tells us whether that is the meaning, because it makes a very great difference. The words of the Clause are that there shall be an appeal in
  "any action founded on contract or tort, or for money recoverable by statute, where either—
  (i) the debt, demand or damage claimed exceeds two hundred pounds;"
  Take the case of an action for personal injuries where the amount is large. Is one to assume that in all such cases there has to be an appeal on question of fact? That is something which must be cleared up before we proceed with this Clause. If that is the case, it is something far more than the Evershed Committee recommended. That Commit-
  1066
  tee recommended that there should be a definite monetary limit to the occasions on which an appeal on questions of fact would be permitted. Be that as it may, and suppose the right of appeal or not is to be determined, not by the amount for which judgment is given, but by the amount which the plaintiff feels he can claim, that only throws the onus of responsibility further back.
  Sir E. Errington: I think that would result in almost everybody claiming £201 in order to have right of appeal.
  Mr. Fletcher: Not necessarily. I do not agree, and that gives point to what I am trying to say.
  The hon. Member is now assuming that there is some virtue in right of appeal, but is forgetting that there is a corresponding virtue in finality and no right of appeal. One of the virtues of county court jurisdiction as we have had it through the centuries has been that it gives the plaintiff certainty and finality, and does not expose him to the risk of appeal.
  It is not correct for the hon. Member to assume that all the virtue is on the side of having the right of appeal. It may be so in the High Court. That may be why it has always been the case that one may appeal on fact from a High Court judge to the Court of Appeal, but social considerations, personal considerations, considerations of equity and justice, which affect the poor litigant in the county courts, are quite different. What more often than not he desires is finality.
  It is no advantage to him to be told that he has a right of appeal. In fact it may be a positive disadvantage. He may prefer to know that if he has a claim he wants to ventilate he can take it to the county court and get a decision and, although there is the possibility of error, that decision is final. If he wins he cannot be taken to the Court of Appeal and involved in further expenditure.
  Sir E. Errington: The hon. Member will realise that this Bill is to come into force when legal aid becomes effective both in the county court and, presumably, for appeals from the county court.
  Mr. Fletcher: I am very much obliged to the hon. Member. In fact every intervention which he is good enough to make

  1067
  assists me more. I am very grateful, and should like to adopt that view.
  If the hon. Member is now claiming that the introduction of legal aid into the county court will in future make it completely unnecessary for any litigant in the county court to be bothered about any financial burden that may fall on him by reason of litigating in the county court or by any fear of being taken to the Court of Appeal, I welcome it. I hope that in 'view of the interventions of the hon. Member the Solicitor-General will take note of this question. If that be the ideal, and legal aid is introduced on such a favourable, sympathetic and beneficial basis, having regard to the means of litigants, that in future no litigant need bother whether his case goes to the Court of Appeal or not, that would be something that I should welcome.
  However, as legal aid is administered at present in the High Court, and as it will be administered in the county courts unless we are very careful, there is already very considerable financial hardship on litigants receiving legal aid because of the exorbitant contributions which they are called upon to pay. I have for a long time been urging the Attorney-General and the Minister of Pensions and National Insurance to revise the scale of contributions which are at present exacted from those who obtain legal aid because I think it bears harshly on a great many of them.
  It will bear even more harshly on litigants in the county courts because a priori those who want to sue in the county courts are people of limited means whose claims are limited in amount. They will want assistance, but they will not want their certificates of legal aid encumbered with financial contributions which they cannot afford. Unless the regulations are changed, those people will, even with legal aid, be handicapped by the possibilities of appeals to the Court of Appeal. Therefore, I do not think that the debate on the Clause should proceed on the basis that in future, because of legal aid, nobody need worry about an appeal to the Court of Appeal. I hope it will be so, and I shall press for it to be so, but even were it so there would still be other litigants who would not be entitled to legal aid certificates. Perhaps they would be people on the borderline,
  1068
  and so would be more harshly affected than some of those within the scheme. What about them?
  The more I think about it the more am I conscious that, although there is some apparent anomaly in the fact that hitherto one has been able to appeal from a High Court judge to the Court of Appeal and has not been able to appeal from a county court to the Court of Appeal, nevertheless that distinction has been of benefit to county court litigants, because it has given them the advantage of knowing that the county court judgment is a final and conclusive one and that they cannot be burdened with an appeal. Moreover, that has presumably made county court judges more careful, in trying disputes, to arrive at just conclusions, even though their assessments of the law may not be so refined and up to date as those of a High Court judge, and because of the circumstance that on law the county court judge could, if necessary, be set right in the Court of Appeal.
  There is a further consideration, that if we are to preserve for the county court litigants this element of finality and certainty in the county court systems, we can do it only if the county court judge is able to watch the demeanour of witnesses carefully, is able to spend the whole of his time sifting the evidence, listening to what the witnesses say, and is not burdened with the responsibility of having to take a note, of having to write down what the witnesses are saying, in case there is an appeal to the Court of Appeal at which his note will be regarded for reference.
  Having given a lot of thought to this matter, I admit that it is very debatable. I know that many of my hon. Friends do not agree with the doubts which I am now expressing. Diverse views have been expressed on both sides of the House. I would at any rate hope that if, after the Bill have been passed through Parliament, it is decided to make this quite considerable innovation in our system of jurisprudence, it will be looked upon as an experiment, and carefully watched, and not regarded as something beyond recall.
  9.0 p.m.
  For these reasons, while I suppose that the appropriate technical course would be for me to formally move the Amendments which stand in my name, I think.

  1069
  that I have already indicated that my own preference, if it remained with me, would be to move the Amendment, which I gather is not being called, to leave out Clause 11.
  Mr. Graeme Finlay: While one must pay respect to the long experience of the hon. Member for Islington, East (Mr. E. Fletcher) particularly in relation to the Evershed Committee, I must say that I disagree with the points which he takes up. No doubt there is a great deal of room for different points of view in this matter, but the hon. Member has said that the primary criterion for litigants in the county court, the poor man's forum, is finality, and that that is the most important element of all. I am bound to say that that is only half accurate, because I think that what the litigant wants is victorious finality. He wants to win.
  No one who has appeared in the county court and seen and heard the defeated party, with his look of disappointment, his criticism of the judge and his supporting witnesses and probably his advocates as well, can be left in any doubt about that. He wants to win, and if he feels that he has not had justice in the county court he wants to appeal. That is the important fact to him. It may be that in the kind of life which the county court judge has to live and the way he has to conduct his duties, he has perhaps restless, informal and difficult surroundings for taking that full detached note upon which it is necessary to formulate an appeal. But are they more difficult than the kind of surroundings experienced by the High Court judge or the judge of assize when he conducts proceedings, and has to take a careful note to enable an appeal to be framed?
  I really think that that should not be the case and that steps must be taken to put the matter in order if it is so. I understand that there is a great shortage of shorthand writers and that, for some reason or other, the authorities are not able to attract the requisite number, but surely justice is a very valuable commodity and something should be done to provide such a corps if they are not available. In any event, in the case of a reserved judgment, where an appeal appears likely, somebody from a pool of shorthand writers should be provided. At present, it seems to be necessary for the
  1070
  litigants to lay on a skilled shorthand writer.
  While realising that there is no doubt room for more than one point of view, I cannot help feeling that this is an important provision in the interests of accuracy. I notice that it is frequently argued that poor men's courts are places where one has untutored or relatively unlettered people going to litigate and that they are places where formality is a valuable element. I would say as well that accuracy was a highly essential part of the proceedings and that that applies particularly to the way in which the evidence is reported. I think that the Amendment is an undesirable one and that if the hon. Member presses it to its final conclusion I shall vote against it.
  Mr. Weitzman: The Amendments which stand in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman), are, of course, the direct opposite of the Amendments moved by my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, East (Mr. E. Fletcher). Subsection (2, a, i) of the Clause provides a right of appeal, where
  "the debt, demand or damage claimed exceeds two hundred pounds."
  There seems to be no doubt what that means. My Amendment would make the figure £100. I believe that the right of appeal ought to be given to a dissatisfied litigant in every case. If it were possible from the practical point of view, I should like it to be given in the county courts in every case, but from the practical point of view and from the way in which our courts have been administered that right has not been given for many years and should not be accepted now.
  But I would remind the Committee of the declared intention of the Government about the conferment of the right of appeal. It is that the right of appeal which is in operation now in connection with any action brought in the High Court should be preserved, and it is because of that declared intention that I have put the Amendments in my name on the Order Paper.
  I will tell the Committee why I did this. As matters are now, if a person brings an action in the High Court for, say, £100 or less, he will get costs on the High Court scale if, in contract, he gets £100 or, in tort, £50. Having brought it

  1071
  in the High Court he has the right of appeal on fact. The Government say that they intend to see that the litigant's rights are preserved on the question of appeal on fact, but they are not doing it in the provision that they have inserted now in limiting that right of appeal to where a man is claiming £200 or more. If they really mean to allow a litigant to enjoy the rights as they exist today, then they must accept the Amendments which I have put down, because that will have the result of carrying out their declared intention.
  I would ask the Solicitor-General to look into this matter to see whether something can be done to carry out the Government's declared purpose as would be the case if my Amendments were accepted.
  Sir E. Errington: I should like to say a word or two on this matter. I do not think there is very much difference between myself and the hon. Member for Islington, East (Mr. E. Fletcher). Obviously, the whole question of appeal is one of difficulty and of a nice and careful balance. While legal aid in the county court will not solve the question of the difficulty that a poor litigant may have about appealing, it will help otherwise very much indeed.
  The figure of £200 is the dividing line between an appeal on fact and the absence of an appeal on fact, and it will be quite inexplicable to the average litigant who goes to the county court and is dissatisfied with the judge's decision. The situation at present is that a litigant can even go to the Court of Appeal, with the leave of the judge, on a matter where the amount involved is under £20. I submit that £20 is about the mark where the question of finality is really desirable and I do not hold, as does the hon. Member for Islington, East, that finality is in any sense a virtue by itself. Finality can be a most distressing thing if injustice is done to the person to whom finality is given.
  In those circumstances, I submit that there is no reason why the whole of the amount between the £20, where leave may be given by the judge, up to the £400, which is the limit of jurisdiction, should not be subject to appeal on fact. My own view, which may be entirely wrong, of subsection (2, a, i) of the Clause
  1072
  is that it is entirely in the hands of the litigant, who can claim what figure he likes. If he has a claim for £50 or £60 there appears to be no reason why he should not make that claim £201 in order to get the benefit of the appeal.
  Mr. Weitzman: The hon. Gentleman will appreciate that the litigant has to pay a considerably higher fee if he does that?
  Sir E. Errington: It would be for the litigant to decide whether it would be worth paying the extra fee for having an appeal. I submit that we have a position where, in effect, it is possible, at any rate for the plaintiff, to have an appeal right up from the £20 to the £400 so that there is a considerable danger of a great number of appeals.
  Frankly, as the situation stands, it does not seem that the courts could deal with those appeals because of the remarkable, but none the less true, shortage of shorthand writers. It was for this reason that I took the opportunity on Second Reading of suggesting that what should happen for economy and good sense was that mechanical aids should be made available in the county courts. There is a criticism in the Evershed Report of the efficacy of those aids, but, electronics having developed as they have, so much and so quickly, I doubt whether those objections would be valid at this time.
  If I am right, the expense of installing those aids would be small, the expense of upkeep would be negligible, and the result would be that there would be a record of every case heard in the county courts. Of course, the real expense in an appeal would be the transcript of the recording of the automatic machine. However, that would be an expense which would only be incurred, presumably, by a litigant who had decided that injustice had been done and that he was prepared to face the expenditure of doing so, or had the leave of the legal aid committee to do so.
  9.15 p.m.
  That seems to me to be the only way out of the impasse which now arises. I do not think that a person who has heard of somebody who has been awarded, or who has failed to be awarded, damages of £50 or £60, knowing that there is no appeal on fact, would be satisfied to hear that somebody who had claimed more

  1073
  than £200 would have a right of appeal which was not available to him. There is no logical distinction between the over-£200 and the under-£200, and it is a convenient step to be taken.
  I believe that the effect of it will be to increase the number of appeals, and that will mean a considerable expense, and unless the mechanical method, which I very strongly submit is the real method of dealing with the situation, is used, I am afraid that the only result will be increased expense to litigants, and, what is much more important, a lack of justice being done to their cases.
  The Solicitor-General: It is very unwise to venture upon prophecy, but on Second Reading I said that we should never get agreement on this topic, and I believe that to be true. The Order Paper and the things that have been said reveal it to be true.
  There are lots of arguments against conferring any right of appeal on fact. One of them is that, by doing it, we may be dislocating the business of the Court of Appeal by putting upon it a burden which it cannot reasonably sustain.
  Another is the practical, physical difficulty of securing an adequate record for the Court of Appeal of what happens in the county court. I have been listening to what my hon. Friend the Member for Aldershot (Sir E. Errington) has been saying about electronic recording devices. I hope that one day we shall put the Official Reporter out of business by something of that kind, but we have not thought about it yet; subject to our personal inaudibility at the Dispatch Box, I do not suppose that we shall be slow about it when the time comes. I beg to assure my hon. Friend that we shall be watchful of the progress of that science, and as soon as it looks to be a useful and effective answer to this part of the problem, we will consider its adoption. That is sure.
  In urging just those few arguments against a right of appeal, I hope I have brought the Committee to consider why there is a need to put a limit on the right of appeal on questions of fact if it is proposed to introduce one. If it were left without some money limit, one would, in our view, be in danger—the Evershed Committee indicated the possibility of the danger—of giving the Court of Appeal more than it could properly do.
  1074
  As against the arguments adduced by the hon. Member for Islington, East (Mr. E. Fletcher), one would go further to destroy the obvious merit in the proposition that the county court is in many instances something which is quick and cheap and final by way of decision. On the other hand, there are a large number of good arguments—they are all set out in the Evershed Committee Report—for introducing a right of appeal on fact. It does not seem to be very sensible that, whereas, whatever the amount of the claim may be, the High Court judge's finding on fact is not sacrosanct, the county court judge's finding on fact should be sacrosanct, more particularly when there is an overlap in jurisdiction.
  As my hon. Friend the Member for Epping (Mr. Finlay) pointed out, it is very important that a litigant should not be left with a sense of fulminating grievance. That does not help anyone or serve any good purpose, and it certainly will not be true, if the House of Commons approves this Bill, that the amount concerned will be so trivial as not to justify the expense of the appeal. What we have set about is, frankly, a compromise. Subject to this consideration, which was emphasised by the Evershed Report, I believe it to he true if we put the alternative figure too low, it will be difficult hereafter to raise it, but the other way, not so. It seems right, therefore, on that consideration, to adopt as a matter of decision, the "Iron Curtain" as it were of a certain amount.
  I confess that I do not understand the indignation which is expressed when the amount adopted is the amount claimed. That was the recommendation of the Evershed Committee and is a method which we have always adopted in the question of determining county court jurisdiction. It is difficult to see what other gauge or yardstick could be adopted if we are to consider a money limit over and above which we are to confer a right of appeal.
  I am not depressed by the fact that the litigant may himself determine whether he has a right of appeal or not. As has been pointed out, he may have to pay more for it, and if he inflated his claim on paper he would have to do so. But if he is the kind of litigant who desires finality he may not claim a right of appeal and if he is the other kind of litigant he may.
  Sir E. Errington: Only if he happens to be a plaintiff.
  Mr. R. Bell: If he does so, he automatically gives the defendant a right of appeal as well.
  The Solicitor-General: Yes, of course, he gives the defendant the right of appeal. That, presumably, is a risk which he calculates at the moment of decision.
  I do not wish to detain the Committee long in emphasising that, frankly, this is a compromise. We have to proceed on a course which corresponds substantially with the Evershed Committee recommendation in the sense that it was recommending a distinction based on a money figure being the amount claimed by the defendant in the claim. I believe that we have been supported in our choice of the position taken up in this Bill by the obvious argument that it would be unfair, where we are depriving the defendant of a right to transfer from the county court to the High Court, to deprive him of the right of appeal which he had before.
  In answer to the hon. and learned Member for Stoke Newington and Hackney, North (Mr. Weitzman), may I point out that the Evershed Committee was recommending that for this purpose we should take £100 to be the effective figure because it was the effective limit of county court jurisdiction having regard to the defendant's right of transfer. In choosing £200, we have taken that figure as being the effective limit of county court jurisdiction because that is the present limit of jurisdiction subject to the defendant's right of transfer.
  In indicating that line of thought I hope I have indicated the logic underlying the choice of that figure. In effecting this compromise figure we have chosen to draw the line at that point.
  Amendment negatived.
  Mr. Hale: I beg to move, in page 7, line 8, to leave out from "land" to the end of line 9.
  The Temporary Chairman: I think it would be convenient if this Amendment was discussed with the proposed Amendment in the name of the hon. Member in line 36, to leave out subsection (4).
  Mr. Hale: I am obliged, Mr. Hoy. They deal, in fact, with separate points,
  1076
  but I see no difficulty in arguing them together as they come within the purview of the same type of consideration. The proposed Amendment in line 36 will omit the subsection which excludes the right of appeal in cases under the Rent Restrictions Acts.
  I think it has been made clear in a previous discussion that we all have a certain mental dichotomy in this matter. I want to be quite frank with the Committee. I start upon the basis that I am not in favour of appeals, and I am not in favour of the Clause. I am not in favour of appeals of any kind in any sort of action. As to the question of costs, I start upon the basis that I am not in favour of awarding costs as a normal consequence of litigation. People should go into court and pay their own costs. If, however, we accept it as the will of the people, that costs should be awarded and that appeals should be made, we must consider the matter from that standpoint. Therefore, my main point of dissent has gone.
  Upon that basis, I want to make a quite simple point in regard to land. The Clause provides that an appeal can be made upon a question of fact in relation to the trial of an issue about the ownership or possession of land or a home only if the rateable value is more than £60. This seems to me to be the most fantastic of all the fantastic provisions in this somewhat unusual Bill. A man's home is his home; it does not matter whether it is great or small, to him it is the most important thing he has—and if we are to confer a right of appeal in the case of castles or villas I see no reason why we should not do so in the case of cottages, which are just as important to their owners.
  The theory is often quoted in the House that an Englishman's home is his castle, but apparently it will be a castle only if it has a rateable value of over £60.
  "The rich man in his castle,
  The poor man at his gate,
  God made them high or lowly
  And ordered their estate."
  And now the right of appeal is conferred if the rateable value is more than £60, but not otherwise. [Laughter.] I am glad that this matter is beginning to appear as fantastic to the Committee as it appears to me.

  1077
  Then we get this extraordinary omission of appeals in Rent Act cases. Here we come to a different and important point. There is a right of appeal on law, which has frequently been exercised, but it requires a very able man to say, in connection with the determination of greater hardship, where law ends and fact begins. There is a whole series of decisions in connection with the law relating to this matter, which has laid down the considerations which should enter the mind of a county court judge in deciding this vexed and difficult point. No one knows what is a matter of fact or what is a matter of law.
  There is a reported decision by a court of appeal upon an appeal from a county court—I do not know whether this is a real case—in which, having observed that the learned county court judge had made nine separate findings of fact without a single fact having been proved before him, the appeal court went on to say, "There has been some argument in this matter as to whether this is an appeal on fact or an appeal on law, or an appeal on mixed fact and law." We must consider ourselves in some difficulty, therefore, because when we endeavour to adapt law which has never existed to facts which cannot be proved some confusion of mind becomes inevitable. That is certainly the difficulty about this matter.
  I do not suppose there are any cases in the county court which involve more heartburning and sorrow than Rent Act cases. All these are cases where an owner of property has to prove substantial hardship. Today, there is no question of an owner saying, "I am the owner, and I want possession," as was the case in my early days, with proceedings under the Small Tenements Recovery Act, 1838. I am not suggesting that I was alive then, but that Act continued until I arrived on the scene.
  It is not so now. There is the landlord who is having to prove hardship, or the son or daughter who wants to get married and who cannot get a home, and people who have lived, often for twenty or twenty-five years, in a particular house. These are matters of great importance. As I have said before, and one has to face up to it, there is the landlord's judge and the tenant's judge; the plaintiff's judge and the defendant's judge.
  1078
  9.30 p.m.
  On the whole, I think that the great advantage of the right of appeal, and the argument strongly in favour of it, is that the existence of the right of appeal makes the inferior court more careful. Judges do not like appeals. A judge is almost as upset by the critical observations of an appellate court as is a sergeant major by the observations of his colonel, and a colonel by the observations of his brigadier, and so on. Therefore, I think that the strongest case that can be put for the right of appeal is that it imposes the duty of greater care. It is, therefore, possible that the existence of the right without its exercise may be the value of this Clause.
  I do not think that this right of appeal will be much exercised. I do not think that there are many litigants who, when their issues have been tried in the county court, will want to appeal. Except on questions of law, where we may have insurance companies asking for a statement on law which will be followed in other cases, what argument can there be for saying that we will give the right of appeal to someone who has claimed a liquidated sum of damages or the right of appeal about land of over £60 rateable value, if we are to exclude the right of appeal concerning the home of a person who has lived in it for twenty-five or thirty years? I can see no defence for that at all.
  The defence which was put up in the course of the Second Reading debate appeared to me to be the least convincing of all. It was said that this was a very difficult matter upon which a county court judge had great difficulty in coming to a decision. I hope that I am paraphrasing the argument fairly; I have not checked my references. If a county court has difficulty in coming to a decision then let us have some finality.
  Finality is a relative thing, however. One can have finality at any stage of the proceedings. I know of no solitary ground for thinking that finality in a court of appeal is likely to produce more justice than in the court of first instance. I should have thought that there was more possibility of error before the appellate court than in the court of first instance, where the judge sees the witnesses and hears the evidence.

  1079
  If we are to allow an appeal on law in all Rent Act cases, as we do now, and an appeal on fact in nearly every other substantial county court case, I suggest that there are two classes of cases of equal importance to anything that the county court is likely to be called upon to hear. If we put, in terms of value, the value of being allowed to remain in one's rent-controlled house for another ten years, we should find it being expressed in terms much more emphatically than some of the other appellant rights with which we have to deal. If we put it in terms of damage and loss because of eviction, storage of furniture and being forced out, we are dealing with a more substantial issue than that in some of the matters to which we have referred. Although I have not much hope of persuading the right hon. and learned Gentleman to accept the Amendment, I suggest that there are many substantial reasons for accepting it.
  The Solicitor-General: Two points arise on this Amendment. My answer to the hon. Gentleman and to the Committee is that we still have to observe the need to draw the line at some point. All we have done is to take £60 net annual value for rating as being the rough equivalent, as indeed it is, of the £100 yearly value which previously existed under Section 51, to which this provision relates. The other point is that it was urged before the Ever-shed Committee—I am looking at page 181 of the final Report, that
  "To introduce a right of appeal on fact would be to substitute for the decision of the Judge with local knowledge that of a remote tribunal quite out of touch with local conditions and ways of life. It is thought that this objection is of particular force in relation to proceedings under the Rent Restrictions Acts, which by Statute are assigned to the County Court and in which a knowledge of local conditions on the part of the County Court Judge is of importance."
  That was the argument before the Committee, which it accepted. The recommendation is to be found in paragraph 559 (c), on page 183, that there should not be a right of appeal on fact in cases under the Rent Restrictions Acts, just on that ground.
  We have adopted that recommendation in subsection (4), together with the equivalent statutory jurisdiction. I hope that the hon. Member and the Committee will understand the principles which we have accepted and which I believe to be sound.
  Mr. Hale: I should not like to say that I am satisfied with the answer or that I am impressed with it, but at this late hour I shall not ask my colleagues to take this issue to a Division. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.
  Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
  Clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.
  Clause 12 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

  New Clause.—(RIGHT OF TRANSFER TO HIGH COURT.)
  Where there has been commenced in the county court an action founded on tort, the plaintiff may at any time give notice that he desires to transfer the action to the High Court on the ground that there is reasonable cause, at the time of giving such notice, to believe that the plaintiff's damages might exceed the sum of four hundred pounds, and the judge, if satisfied that there is reasonable cause for such belief, shall transfer the said action to the High Court without making any order as to the costs of the action which will be subject to such order of the High Court as to a judge of the High Court or master in chambers seems just.—[Mr. Hale.]
  Brought up and read the First time.
  Mr. Hale: I beg to move, That the Clause be read a Second time.
  This new Clause deals with quite simple case. I know there are transfers from the High Court to the county court, but they do not cover the position.
  The whole purpose of Clause 1, as explained by the Attorney-General, is to compel litigants with comparatively small claims to bring them in the county court and not in the High Court. A great deal of pressure is put on them by way of deprivation of costs to commence their cases in the county court. Then a medical man involved in the case comes along and says, "I thought this was a comparatively simple case, but it now appears to be one of much greater seriousness." Earlier in the debate today, I mentioned a case of neurasthenia. A doctor may say, "This is a perfectly normal case, but I am giving the patient sleeping draughts." It often means very wise and patient treatment to get cases of this sort disposed of as quickly as possible, because the worry of the case very often affects a patient's condition.
  Suppose a summons is issued in the county court. Weeks go by. A doctor

  1081
  says, "I am sorry, but my patient is getting worse and I am not sure that she will recover. She may finish up in a mental hospital." These are not fanciful cases, but are part of the experience met with in every county court. We all know the case of the man who has had a severe shock. He may have been thrown over the handlebars of his motor-cycle and have what appears to be a slight fracture of the skull. An action is begun in the county court. Then the injured man's sight begins to fail, a development which may result in total blindness.
  In all such cases there should be a simple and clear method of transferring the matter 10 the High Court. [Interruption.] The Solicitor-General says that there is. I listened with very great respect to what he had to say. The purpose of the Clause is simply to say that at any stage in the proceedings—and I think that that is important; someone may be in the witness box and then it is suddenly found that facts are coming out which are relevant—the applicant can apply for transfer to the High Court. If that is done, then, in my view, the whole question of costs should be left until the final hearing, and whether it is settled in the High Court, or by a judge or master in chambers should be left to the discretion of the judge who tried the matter.
  The Solicitor-General: We cannot accept the new Clause because, as the Committee would agree, the matter would have to be considered in the presence of the other party, and the Clause does not provide for notice to the other party. For instance, there would have to be notice to the defendant. Certainly, between now and Report we will look at this with care. I quite understand the kind of case which the hon. Member for Oldham, West (Mr. Hale) has been presenting, but when I tried to indicate by a head gesture that the matter was already covered I meant that I should indicate what is in our minds.
  Supposing that the action is started in the county court and then, for some reason, as it goes along it appears that the claim should be above the county court jurisdiction, the claim can be amended. If one has not got to the hearing that can be done without leave of the judge, but leave of the judge is
  1082
  needed at the hearing. If one amends, one amends in such terms as, in our belief, bring one within Section 64 of the principal Act, and the judge can then transfer the case to the High Court.
  So that I should not make a false point, I should mention that there is a proviso to that Section in the principal Act which means, in effect, that if the court did not think fit it would not have to transfer the proceedings. It is worth considering whether or not that should be retained, but advocates like the hon. Member for Oldham, West, and myself will know of those painful occasions when, owing to some observations by the tribunal, one begins to suspect that one is not going to succeed on liability. Without such a proviso it may be that there is some danger of abuse in the scheme by means of amendments where the prospects of liability do not look so good in the inferior tribunal.
  I suggest that such matters are worth looking into. If this matter is already covered I know that hon. Members would not wish to multiply provisions. We will look at this between now and Report to see that it is covered.
  Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas: We are not in the least concerned with drafting points here, and we fully appreciate what the hon. and learned Gentleman says about notice to the defendant, but we do—let us have no mistake about it—attach tremendous importance to the principle of this new Clause. I hope that that is clearly understood between us.
  On the other hand, I fully appreciate what the Solicitor-General has said about these other provisions and we shall, of course, have to look at them carefully in the light of what he has said. On that footing I am sure that my hon. Friend the Member for Oldham, West (Mr. Hale) would not wish to press this Clause to a Division. When we come to the Report stage, we shall certainly require to be satisfied that the principle embodied in this new Clause is met in one way or another.
  Mr. Hale: In the circumstances, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Motion.
  Motion and Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

  New Clause.—(LEAPFROGGING APPEAL.)
  Where at the conclusion and determination of the trial of any case tried in the county court either party gives notice of appeal and satisfies the county court judge that he desires to appeal on a question of law upon which an appellate court has already given a ruling, the county court judge may give leave for the appeal to be taken direct to the House of Lords and the rules relating to an appeal from the Court of Appeal to the House of Lords shall thereupon apply to such appeal from the county court.—[Mr. Hale.]
  Brought up and read the First time.
  Mr. Hale: I beg to move, That the Clause be read a Second time.
  This new Clause has the attractive title of "Leapfrogging Appeal," which is a phrase coined by the Evershed Committee, which rejected the proposal for permitting the leapfrogging appeal, which I had better define for the benefit of those hon. Members who have not had time to study the Report.
  A leapfrogging appeal is an appeal which permits the by-passing of a court which has already determined on the matter. If one wishes to test a long existing, or indeed a recent, decision of the Court of Appeal, and brings a case in the county court on the point, it is obviously a waste of time to go to the Court of Appeal under the germs now existing.
  However the arguments may go on in the Court of Appeal and however much time may be taken, the Court of Appeal will inevitably say that it is bound by the existing decision, that it can do nothing about it, and that the only hope lies in going to the House of Lords. The leapfrogging appeal would permit, in appropriate cases and under the certificate of the judge, an appeal being made direct from the county court to the House of Lords, and thus saving a fantastic waste of time and money.
  There are two arguments that are advanced against it. The first is that if one goes to the Court of Appeal, one says, "We will not argue the matter at length, because we are here on the way up and we are really going to the House of Lords," and that not much expense is incurred. That is true, but there is an item of expense and delay which is incurred, and there is a good deal of unnecessary work.
  The Evershed Committee—and I quarrel very strongly with it—has said
  1084
  that the reason why one cannot do that is that the county court would not give such careful consideration of the facts and the notes as the House of Lords would need for the consideration and determination of the case. I see no reason for that at all, and I am talking only of cases in which the parties know beforehand that there is a determination before the thing is started to take the case to the House of Lords. These things do not arise by chance.
  This is an attempt to test the existing law for the benefit of other cases. In those circumstances, the county court is certainly adequate, the case is carefully prepared and argued and there is no reason why adequate shorthand notes could not be taken and all the other steps taken. I cannot understand a county court judge not giving a leapfrogging decision in such circumstances, and I suggest that the matter is one for serious consideration of the learned Attorney-General.
  The Attorney-General: I am sorry to disappoint the hon. Member for Oldham. West (Mr. Hale) at this hour of the evening, when we are nearly reaching the end of our labours and I think we may be able to finish the Committee stage by ten o'clock. This matter has been very fully considered by the Evershed Committee, which reported against it.
  Mr. Hale: That Committee did not hear me on the subject.
  The Attorney-General: That is its misfortune, but it is not a misfortune that we share.
  The hon. Gentleman knows that the arguments on this question have been the subject of debate for years and have been well developed and stated. If he will look at paragraphs 561, 500 and 498 of the Evershed Report, he will see that they really are substantial. One of the difficulties always is in deciding whether a case before the county court is precisely covered by the decision of the Court of Appeal, and, when we get to the House of Lords, we might find that it was not. I therefore hope that the hon. Gentleman will forgive me for not expanding the reasons. I can only conclude by saying that we cannot accept his new Clause.
  Mr. Hale: In view of what the Attorney-General has said, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Motion.
  Motion and Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

  New Clause.—(TRANSCRIPTS OF EVIDENCE.)
  The power to make county court rules under the principal Act shall include power to make rules as to the terms and conditions under which shorthand writers or mechanical aids or recording apparatus may be employed in the county court in cases in which it is anticipated that there will be an appeal, and also to the terms and conditions on which transcripts of the evidence shall be made available.—[Mr. Hale.]
  Brought up and read the First time.
  Mr. Hale: I beg to move, That the Clause be read a Second time.
  Out of courtesy to the Committee, and in view of the fact that our labours are nearly concluded, I propose to put this matter briefly but that does not indicate any lack of interest in it. This is a vexed problem, and the proposed new Clause is put forward more for the purpose of obtaining elucidation than for that of tying up the rules, but necessarily it covers the point as well as it can be covered.
  The existing provision is very unsatisfactory. There is no doubt at all that if mechanical aids could be provided, or if more adequate provision could be made for shorthand writers being available in cases of importance, the working of the courts would be very much more satisfactory and in the main very much more economical. It is strange how the Legislature has always been prepared to employ judges and never give them any staff with which to work. County court judges did not have paid clerks until recent times and even now I believe they have to make special arrangements. They never have a chauffeur although they have to cover wide areas. In the same way no provision is made for shorthand writers in these important courts.
  I do not know as much as do hon. Members opposite about the development of electronics, and so on, but certainly we know that recording machines of great ability and comparative cheapness are available and could cover the whole of the events which take place in the county court. Therefore, this is a matter for consideration. I suggest that between now and the Report stage the right hon.
  1086
  and learned Gentleman should make a statement on the sort of principles which should guide magistrates and their advisers on the provision of recording apparatus.
  The Attorney-General: I think I can tell the hon. Member that a close watch is being kept on the development of recording instruments and mechanical aids to see when they reach the stage at which they can be usefully employed in court. My hon. and learned Friend said, on Second Reading, that at present it is extremely difficult to distinguish who is speaking when a record is played back. I imagine that it would be very difficult in the case of a quick interchange between the hon. Member for Oldham, West (Mr. Hale) and a witness to whom he was addressing questions.
  Attention is being paid to the problem, and under the rules as they stand it is felt that provision can be made for the use of these instruments should they reach a stage at which they can be relied upon to portray what has taken place in the county court in such a form that the appellate tribunal is left in no doubt about who is giving evidence. In conclusion, I thank the hon. Member for the brevity with which he moved the Second Reading of this Clause, which, I agree, raises a question of very great importance.
  Mr. E. Fletcher: May I ask the Solicitor-General whether he is satisfied that under the existing law the Rules Committee has power to make county court rules to provide for shorthand writers in county courts?
  The Solicitor-General: Our view is that Section 99 of the principal Act, which in effect improves the provisions of Section 99 of the Judicature Consolidation Act, 1925, is as wide as the hon. Member could want in the circumstances, and by amending it one would be in grave danger of actually narrowing the power.
  Sir E. Errington: I wish to refer to page 181 of the Evershed Committee Report, where words are used which quite definitely indicate the difficulties arising about shorthand writers. The Report says:
  "It was generally accepted, and we think it must be assumed, that it would in practice be found quite impossible to man every County Court with a properly trained official shorthand-writer."

  1087
  In those circumstances it seems that we ought to have some indication from the Government of how they intend to deal with this limiting factor. That seems much more of a limiting factor than the work in the Court of Appeal.
  Mr. Hale: I feel concern because of the very large number of matters which the right hon. and learned Gentleman says he is going to watch, and I hope all that watching will not lead to any optical trouble, as the contemplation of so many things at once has been known to do. However, in view of the very courteous and kindly answer which the right hon. and learned Gentleman gave to me, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Motion.
  Motion and Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
  Schedules agreed to.
  Bill, as amended, to be reported.
  Bill reported, with Amendments; as amended, to be considered Tomorrow and to be printed, [Bill 23.]

  ROAD TRAFFIC [MONEY]
  Resolution reported,
  That, for the purposes of any Act of the present Session to amend the law relating to road traffic and the provision of parking places and for other purposes, it is expedient to authorise the payment out of moneys provided by Parliament—

  (a) of any sums payable out of such moneys (whether under the said Act or other enactments) by virtue of provisions of the said Act relating to the speed limit in built-up areas, arrangements for promoting road safety by disseminating information and advice or giving practical training to road users, or the examination of vehicles;

  (b) of any other increase attributable to the said Act of the present Session in the sums payable out of moneys provided by Parliament under Part I of the Local Government Act, 1948, or under the Local Government (Financial Provisions) (Scotland) Act, 1954;

  (c) of any increase in the sums payable under the Superannuation Acts, 1834 to 1950. attributable to the repeal of the provision for modifying those Acts made by section two of the Chairmen of Traffic Commissioners, &c. (Tenure of Office) Act, 1937;

  and the payment into the Exchequer of any receipts of the said Minister under the said Act of the present Session and of any other sums which by virtue of that Act are payable into the Exchequer.

  IMMINGHAM DOCKS (FACILITIES)
  Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Colonel J. H. Harrison.]
  9.56 p.m.
  Mr. Cyril Osborne: I wish to raise a matter which affects a large number of my constituents, whom I have had the honour to represent for the last ten years—the subject of Immingham Docks. I am thankful to have this opportunity of bringing up what they consider to be grievances. I hope that my hon. Friend will not consider me to be like the importunate widow. I can assure him that I do not regard him as an unjust judge. I have been told, however, that it is only by continual pleading and prodding that we can get things done.
  This is a matter which concerns the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation and the British Transport Commission. I know full well the great difficulties facing the Commission at the present time, and that because of the recent strike those difficulties have been increased enormously. I appreciate that it is unreasonable for Members to bring up here what are called day to day administrative problems of the nationalised industries. What I want to talk about, however, is not merely a day to day matter. Indeed, it has been growing for several years. My constituents regard the House of Commons as the place—as it always has been—where the grievances of constituents can be aired, and, therefore, I hope that my hon. Friend will not feel that I am being unreasonable in submitting these grievances tonight. I am not so much bothered about what has happened in the past as concerned about what my hon. Friend, having heard the representations I am trying to make to him, can do for us in the future.
  It was on 16th October, 1952, that I first brought up in this House the question of the re-equipment of Immingham Docks. Immingham is probably the best port on the eastern seaboard. It will take vessels at all times, and it has enormous potentiality for development. I raised the question of new cranes, because the old equipment, with which my constituents had to work, was mostly

  1089
  installed before the First World War. They had to work in difficult and uncomfortable circumstances, and it seemed to me at that time that it was not unreasonable that I should ask on their behalf that they should have some of the modern equipment being supplied in great quantities to the great port of Hull, just across the river. I picked on one special item, the provision of four new 10-ton portal cranes for the mineral quay. I said on 16th October, 1952, that the expenditure there was authorised on 1st November., 1951, and that the tenders had been accepted.
  It being Ten o'clock, the Motion for the adjournment of the House lapsed, without Question put.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.— [Colonel J. H. Harrison.]
  Mr. Osborne: I asked the Minister what, at the time, seemed to be this reasonable question:
  "Can the Minister tell us when the work is to be started and when he thinks it will be finished?"
  The then Parliamentary Secretary, later in the debate, said in reply, that
  "…it was decided some time ago to order four 10-ton electric portable cranes fitted for grab working at a cost of about £135,000. I am glad to be able to tell him "—
  That is, myself—
  "that delivery of the first of these is expected next month, while the fourth and last should arrive in May, 1953, unless unforeseen circumstances arise. Further stages of re-craning will be considered."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 16th October, 1952; Vol. 505, c. 555–60.]
  That was a definite promise by the Parliamentary Secretary which gave comfort to my constituents, and for which I was most grateful.
  We waited a long time for those promises to be fulfilled. Again, I was prodded by my constituents and I raised the matter in February of this year. On 16th February, I put a Question to the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation. I asked the Minister when these four great cranes would be available for my constituents and would be completed and in working order. He replied:
  "I understand from the British Transport Commission that the first crane should be ready for operation by April and that they expect all four to b2 in operation before the end of July."
  1090
  It seemed to me that the new machinery for the supply of which I was pleading was being put off again and again.
  I asked my right hon. Friend, therefore, whether he did not think that a wait of two-and-a-half years was rather overlong. Again, I had the reply:
  "This is a matter between the owners of the port—the British Transport Commission—and the manufacturers of the cranes. What my right hon. Friend did was to pass on the information which the suppliers had given to him, and which turned out to be unduly optimistic."—[OFFICIAL REPORT. 16th February, 1955; Vol. 537, c. 386–7.]
  Not only was the information which was given in 1953 optimistic, but the information which I was given by my right hon. Friend in February of this year has also proved to be unduly optimistic. He had been promised—and l do not blame him, because, obviously, he is not carrying out the work—that this equipment would be in my constituency, all ready and working before the end of the month.
  The position is that, so far, only one of these four great cranes has been erected. I was promised on the third occasion that it would be ready by April. Building is just starting on the other two, and no start has been made on the fourth. As far as local people can see, there is no prospect of work on the fourth being started in the immediate future. Therefore, I think it reasonable for me to ask the Minister to go through the appropriate channels to the Transport Commission and use his authority and power to ask when the Commission will get the job done and whose responsibility it is that it has not been done, as it was promised to me that it should be done.
  I do not expect the Minister to give me all the information tonight, but it would help my constituents, and it certainly would satisfy me, if I could get to know why the work is held up. Is the work being done on a cost-plus basis? If it is, that system should be ended. Nothing delays constructional work so much as the cost-plus basis. Is there in the contract a penalty clause and a time limit? If so, will they be enforced? It is of great importance to my constituents, who are willing workers and who want only good equipment to do a better job. It is unfair that they should be promised new machinery year after year and not have it supplied to them.

  1091
  I should like to remind my hon. Friend that these three great cranes are being put into "A" berth of the present mineral quay. The "A" takes up about one-third of the whole of that quay, and it handles a good proportion of the trade that goes in and out of the port. While this construction work is on that quay is out of commission. The "A" berth is completely immobilised and it is, therefore, vital to my constituents that this new machinery should be installed without further delay. I hope my hon. Friend will not think me unreasonable when I ask him if he will use every means in his power, through the Transport Commission, to see that whoever or whatever has delayed the fulfilment of the previous promise is removed.
  I do not think anyone would say I am being unreasonable in asking for the delivery of this machinery for my constituents. It was promised to them as far back as November, 1951. Here we are in the middle of 1955, and in a few weeks' time Parliament will be entering on the long Recess and I will not have a chance of pleading my constituent's case for some months to come. I wonder whether my hon. Friend will make such inquiries as he thinks he can with a view to securing happier results.
  There are two other points that I should like to put to my hon. Friend. I understand that in addition to these four cranes that were agreed in 1951 there are other plans that have been tentatively agreed with the Transport Commission. They have not yet been officially approved. What I cannot discover is who is to approve them finally. If it is the Minister, could I ask that these other plans for further equipment shall be approved without delay? I understand that the officials of the Commission have agreed the wisdom of these other plans and if my hon. Friend could hasten the approval I should be most grateful.
  What has been agreed on both sides is that the next lot of equipment that is needed is, first, five six-ton cranes to be installed on No. 1 quay, six three-ton cranes to be installed on No. 2 quay, four single purpose grabbing electric cranes for the mineral quay "A" berth, and two three-ton hydraulic cranes to be installed on the mineral quay "A" berth.
  1092
  This will put into the hands of my constituents machinery that will help them to do a better job for the country and, what is important, help them to earn better wages. It is unfair to expect our people to work with machinery that was installed before 1914.
  The greatest difference between American productivity and British productivity is not that the Americans are better workers than our men. Far from it. In many industries the British worker is not only as good but a great deal better than the American. The vital difference is that the American has three to four times more horse-power at his elbow than we have. It is not reasonable to expect our men to produce as good results as their counterparts on the other side of the Atlantic if we expect them to do it with pre-1914 machinery. I would ask my hon. Friend to see how soon this approval can be obtained, doubly so since I understand that the B.T.C. officials are in favour of the scheme.
  My constituents have also requested me to ask that since the previous scheme has, unfortunately, been so long delayed —again, I am not saying whose fault it was; I am not interested in that, but I am interested in action—the new scheme should be given a priority. Can my hon. Friend do something about that?
  My constituents who, in earning their living, are doing well for the country by helping to run these docks, say that there are one or two other facilities which they should have that have only been discussed tentatively with the Transport Commission. If I mention them to him, I hope that my hon. Friend will consider them favourably, and if he can influence his right hon. Friend to sanction them I shall be greatly obliged.
  My constituents want an enlargement of the oil berth on the eastern jetty, which would enable two ocean-going tankers to berth together.
  The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation (Mr. Hugh Molson): But they asked for three.
  Mr. Osborne: They will be satisfied with two, which is what they asked me to ask for, but if my hon. Friend could give them three, I am sure they would be grateful. If I am under-stating their

  1093
  case, I should prefer two-thirds of a loaf to getting no bread at all.
  They also ask whether my hon. Friend can do anything to help with their appliances for use with the coal trade. These were originally built to take on coal exports for the Baltic before 1914, but that trade has gone and coal comes in now instead of going out. The appliances with which my constituents have to work, therefore, are old-fashioned and out of date.
  Lastly, I want to reiterate what I have asked before in this House, that there should be better transport facilities for the workers who come to and from these docks. I raised this matter in March this year and I am grateful to you, Sir, for giving me the opportunity of doing so again. My hon. Friend said:
  "I shall do what I can to make certain that the two different forms of transport are considered in comparison with each other, and that a decision is expedited as much as possible."—[OFFICIAL, REPORT, 7th March, 1955; Vol. 538 c. 124.]
  I understand that the B.T.C. will not agree to modernise the small railway in and out of the port until it is certain that the Minister will not build a direct road between Immingham and Grimsby. Once they know that the Minister is not prepared to spend a lot of money on that road, I understand that the Commission will do something to modernise that old railway which was built before 1914. My hon. Friend was good enough to tell me in March this year that he would do what he could to expedite a decision on this matter. If he could do that, I should be grateful to him, and so would my constituents.
  If, as I believe, trade between the East and West will grow again; if the Iron Curtain that has cut off trade between East and West is removed, then the ports on the Eastern Coast will be required much more in the future than they have been in the past ten years. Immingham is one of the ports that is fitted to do this trade and, I hope, will increase it in the next few years. I therefore ask my hon. Friend to use what influence he can exert with the Transport Commission to get the facilities for my constituents which they deserve to have.
  I would remind my hon. Friend that during the labour troubles in the docks in recent years, the men at Immingham have
  1094
  never been on strike. They have stuck to their job. They have done well. They have done well for themselves, I agree, but they have also done well for the country, and they deserve better equipment.
  I ask my hon. Friend to answer the plea made on a greater occasion by the previous Prime Minister when he said, "Give us the tools, and we will finish the job." If my hon. Friend can help with a quicker supply of the new machinery, I can assure that it will be well used and that we shall be very grateful to him.
  10.16 p.m.
  The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation (Mr. Hugh Molson): I make no complaint that my hon. Friend the Member for Louth (Mr. Osborne) has again raised the difficulties which afflict his constituency and, especially, the important deep-water port of Immingham. I fully recognise that in availing himself of his rights to raise the matter upon the Adjournment, as he has done again tonight, he is trying to keep before the British Transport Commission and the Ministry of Transport the need for speed in dealing with the re-equipment of the ports.
  Let me begin by admitting frankly that the history of the cranes at Immingham is an unfortunate one. When my hon. Friend first raised the matter, on 16th October, 1952, there was an unfortunate, but, I think, very natural, misunderstanding. There are two kinds of cranes, portal cranes and portable cranes. Portable cranes had been on order for some time, and my Department had been doing all it could to expedite their delivery, and we naturally, but wrongly, jumped to the conclusion that the cranes to which my hon. Friend was referring on that occasion were, in fact, the portable cranes which were on order, and not portal cranes, which he desired to have ordered. My predecessor, Sir Gurney Braithwaite, took the first opportunity of writing to my hon. Friend to explain the misunderstanding which had taken place.
  I fully recognise that since then, while my hon. Friend has, as he has said, been continuing to prod the Ministry upon this subject, there has unfortunately been great delay in the delivery of the cranes. We have on no occasion made any promise on our own behalf about the

  1095
  matter. What we did—perhaps unwisely —was to pass on to my hon. Friend for the information of his constituents the dates which had been given to us by the manufacturers of the cranes as those upon which they expected to begin delivery. I am sorry that, owing to a number of reasons, the delivery has been very much delayed.
  I do not wonder that my hon. Friend has asked certain questions tonight. I am, I am glad to say, in a position to answer some of the questions through the courtesy of the British Transport Commission. I ought to make it plain that we regard the provision of equipment for a port by the Commission as part of its day-to-day administration, and I do not feel that I have any right to call upon the Commission to provide information of this kind. I recognise, however, Mr. Speaker, that this is a custom which has grown up under your guidance and, therefore, when, with your approval, questions are raised on the Adjournment, we sometimes deal with matters which would be out of order were they put at Question Time. None the less, I felt that the British Transport Commission was under no obligation to give the answers to these matters, and I should like to express my appreciation of its courtesy in doing so.
  My hon. Friend has asked whether the contract was on a cost-plus basis. The answer is "No." The contract was given by the Commission to the lowest tenders after tenders had been invited from all crane makers. This contract did not provide any penalty for late completion. The person in general charge is the Chief Docks Engineer of the Humber Ports. As I understand it, he has responsibility for all the ports in the area, Kingston-upon-Hull, Immingham, and so on. My hon. Friend asked who was behind the contractor. I do not fully comprehend the meaning of that question and therefore I have not been able to obtain an answer to it.
  I understand that there is a proposal for the further re-equipment of the port with cranes for Nos. 1 and 2 quays and the mineral quay. That matter is at present under consideration by the Commission. My hon. Friend asked whether priority could be given for this new scheme. As a result of the change of
  1096
  Government in 1951 there is very much less supervision and control in these matters than there used to be under the previous Administration. It would not be possible, therefore, for us to give what my hon. Friend calls priority. At the same time, I can assure him that the Commission is fully alive to the importance of providing Immingham with new and up-to-date equipment.
  My hon. Friend asked about accommodation for oil tankers, and I ventured to interrupt him to ask whether he was asking for berthing accommodation for two or three oil tankers. My information is that at present there is accommodation for two oil tankers to come alongside, and for the future it is planned that by having a mooring slightly out to sea and making fast the other end of the third oil tanker to the oil quay, it may be possible to enable three oil tankers to fill or empty simultaneously. That matter is at present under consideration.
  My hon. Friend also asked about facilities for loading coal. It is intended to do whatever is possible to facilitate the shipment of coal in a more modern way. I understand that the appliances consist of radial tipplers, conveyors and chutes, and it is hoped that they will have a capacity of a million tons per year each. For several months the Commission has been engaged on preparing specifications for these appliances. Tenders for them have recently been invited, and will be considered in the early autumn.
  As my hon. Friend knows, the Chairman of the British Transport Commission paid a personal visit to Immingham not long ago, and he was concerned at the delays which had taken place. After a thorough inspection of the port, and learning about the delays in the delivery of the cranes, he personally drew the attention of the manufacturers to the matter, emphasising the importance which the Commission attached to the early delivery of this equipment.
  Finally, my hon. Friend referred again to the difficult subject of the Immingham Railway and the road which, if it were modernised and improved, might so compete with the railway that neither would be fully used. Upon the same visit, the Chairman of the Commission looked into the matter, and I rather think that he discussed it with my hon. Friend. He

  1097
  can, therefore, be assured that the Chairman is following up the matter at the present time.
  I beg my hon. Friend not to be in any undue hurry. He quoted what I said on 7th March. Fortunately, I have available a record of what I said. On that occasion he asked me for an undertaking that within three months I should be able to give him a definite answer. I warned him that in view of the division of responsibility between the Commission and the local highway authority it might be some time before it was possible to arrive at a conclusion.
  1098
  I hope that what I have said will give my hon. Friend the assurance that these important matters are still under consideration and that everything possible will be done to expedite the delivery of equipment to Immingham Port. I also hope that there will be no unnecessary delay in the consideration of the Immingham Railway.
  Adjourned accordingly at twenty-eight minutes past Ten o'clock.