Commons Sitting of 18 March 1952

Preamble
The House met at Half past Two o'Clock

PRAYERS
[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]
Another Member took and subscribed the Oath.

PRIVATE BUSINESS
  NORTH WALES HYDRO-ELECTRIC POWER BILL (By Order)
  Second Reading deferred till Tuesday next.
  ROCHESTER CORPORATION BILL (By Order)
  Second Reading deferred till Thursday, at Seven o'clock.
PETITION

  PRIESTY FIELDS, CONGLETON
  Air Commodore A. V. Harvey: I desire to present a Petition on behalf of 6,731 residents and 117 former residents of Congleton concerning Priesty Fields, situated in the Borough, which will be lost to the town as a beauty spot and place of retreat if the appeal against the Borough Council's refusal to allow sand quarrying there is successful.
  The appeal, which was the subject of an inquiry by the Ministry of Housing and Local Government on 30th–31st January, 1952, concerns land at the approach, but much of the remainder of the fields has been purchased by other sand quarrying owners who would no doubt similarly develop, with the result that the whole would be laid waste.
  This area, lying almost in the town's centre, has been recommended by the planning authority for zoning as an open space.
  The Petition concludes:
  "Your Petitioners pray that Priesty Fields which, since earliest history, have been used as a playground and place of retreat for young and old, shall not be lost to the town and that a cherished beauty spot shall not be
  2074
  desecrated. Serious danger to children would ensue if sand lorries used the narrow winding approach to the fields.
  And your Petitioners, as in duty bound, will ever pray."
  Petition to lie on the Table.

  SUPREME COURT: PRIZE, &c., DEPOSIT ACCOUNT, 1939–51
  Account ordered,
  of the Receipts and Payments of the Accounting Officer of the Vote for the Supreme Court on behalf of the Admiralty Division in Prize for the period from 3rd September, 1939, to 31st March, 1951, with a Copy of a Letter from the Comptroller and Auditor General thereon.—[Mr. Boyd-Carpenter.]

ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
  EMPLOYMENT

    Association Football (Dispute)
    Mr. Ellis Smithasked the Minister of Labour if the proceedings of the committee of investigation set up under the Conciliation Act, 1896, to inquire into the causes and circumstances of the differences that existed between the Football Players' Union and the Football League have yet been completed; and when he expects to receive the report.
    The Minister of Labour (Sir Walter Monckton): The report is now in my hands, and I am arranging to have it published.
    Mr. Smith: When it is published, will the Minister give an undertaking that he will consider taking action on it as soon as possible, in view of the delay which has already taken place, and will he also give an undertaking to get all the parties together as soon as possible in order that their relationships can be placed upon a much better basis than they have been in the past?
    Sir W. Monckton: May I say that the report was received by me only on the 14th of this month. I have not yet had an opportunity of fully considering it. When I do have to deal with it I, personally, shall be a little embarrassed, because when I was at the Bar I appeared for the Players' Union in the earlier proceeding.
    Mr. Smith: Will the Minister remember this when he considers the report?
    Mr. R. J. Mellish: In trying to settle this dispute, will the Minister also take into account the fact that since the report was issued increased taxes have been imposed on football? Will he make representations to the Chancellor of the Exchequer to have a look at the situation before these increases become law?
    Sir W. Monckton: I wish that I thought I was likely to achieve much in that direction for cricket or football.
    Mr. Ede: Can the right hon. and learned Gentleman tell us what was the transfer fee in his case?
    Sir W. Monckton: I can only say that it has been a very unsatisfactory financial undertaking.

    Durham
    Mr. Charles Greyasked the Minister of Labour if he is aware of the growing number of unemployed in the employment exchange areas of Durham City, Spennymoor and Houghton-le-Spring; and what action he intends to take to remedy this position.
    Sir W. Monckton: Yes, Sir. Much of the recent increase in unemployment here is due to the general decline in demand for clothing and hosiery. This is part of the North-Eastern Development Area, and we are continuing the policy of encouraging the provision of employment in such areas.
    Mr. Grey: Is the right hon. and learned Gentleman aware that the number of unemployed in these areas has risen by leaps and bounds during the past seven months? Is he aware of the general impression in these areas that they are sliding back to days which are best forgotten? Will he give the House an assurance that he has no intention of allowing these areas to become distressed again and, if he will, what plans has he in mind to maintain full employment there?
    Sir W. Monckton: I cannot give undertakings at this stage, but I can say this about the areas to which the Question relates: I have hopes that the labour force in Durham City, Spennymoor and Houghton-le-Spring will be required in the near future.
    Mr. Grey: Do I take it from that reply that the Government have no plans for these areas at all?
    Sir W. Monckton: Certainly not.
    Mr. Grey: What are they?
    Sir Waldron Smithers: Is my right hon. and learned Friend aware that, as in 1931, the inevitable result of a period of Socialist misgovernment is that unemployment is certain to increase—[HON. MEMBERS: "Full employment."]—until the application of Conservative principles has time to restore confidence?

    Blind Persons (Basket-making)
    Mr. Hector Hughesasked the Minister of Labour if he is aware that there is growing unemployment in workshops for the blind caused by the fact that fishing bins formerly made of basketwork are now being made of aluminium; how many blind workers in Scotland, England and Wales, respectively, during the last 12 months, have sustained unemployment in this way; how many are now unemployed; and what steps he is taking to deal with this problem.
    Sir W. Monckton: No, Sir, but I will make inquiries and will write to the hon. Member.
    Mr. Hughes: While I thank the Minister for that, does he realise that it is very important not to waste any of the technical skill of these blind persons, not only on national grounds but also on humanitarian grounds?
    Sir W. Monckton: Yes, Sir. The fact is that the next review of the employment position in workshops for the blind will take place at the end of this month, and I will arrange for special reference to be made to unemployment among workers on fishing baskets. I cannot anticipate the result.

    Dock Labour Scheme, Hull (Report)
    Commander Harry Purseyasked the Minister of Labour whether his attention has been drawn to the recent report by Aims of Industry Limited, a copy of which has been sent him, on the working of the National Dock Labour Board Scheme in Hull; and, in view of the dissatisfaction caused by the report to the

    2077
    Hull dock workers, whether he will initiate discussions with representatives of the trades unions and employers organisations concerned to restore the smooth working of the port.
    Sir W. Monckton: Yes, Sir. I have seen a summary of this report as issued to the Press and would like to take this opportunity of dispelling any doubts that may have been occasioned as to the conditions at Hull. The port has been singularly free from industrial troubles in recent years, and both employers and workers are to be congratulated on the good relations which exist.
    Commander Pursey: I thank the Minister for that reply, but may I ask him whether he can confirm that no responsible person from either side of the shipping industry in Hull was interviewed by Aims of Industry Limited, and that their report is not worth the paper it is written on?
    Sir W. Monckton: I am afraid I do not know the answer to that question.
    Mr. Mellish: But the right hon. and learned Gentleman will be aware of the fact that, consequent upon this report, a so-called port efficiency committee has been established and that there is great resentment arising from the fact that this so-called port efficiency committee was established consequent upon a report which in many respects is not founded on fact at all.
    Sir W. Monckton: I have no reason to suppose that the port efficiency committee has been appointed because of the report to which the Question relates.

    Foreign Workers
    Lieut.-Colonel Sir Thomas Mooreasked the Minister of Labour what representations he has received from the National Coal Board in regard to the introduction of foreign workers into our coal mines; and what action he has taken.
    Sir W. Monckton: I have received no representations on the subject but, after discussions with the National Coal Board, further recruitment of Italian labour has for some time been suspended in order to absorb the large numbers in Italy already selected for coalmining employment, parties of whom are continuing to arrive weekly in this country.
    Sir T. Moore: If there are not sufficient numbers of our own people who are willing to work in the pits—and I do not blame them for that—surely the obvious solution is to import foreign labour which is willing to work in the pits?
    Sir W. Monckton: I can assure my hon. and gallant Friend that I would do anything I could to encourage the incursion of more labour into the mines, but it is no good getting more men than can be absorbed.
    Mr. Emrys Hughes: Is the Minister aware that in Ayrshire many Scottish miners have no houses in which to live and that it would be very difficult to find any place in which the Italian workers could live?
    Sir W. Monckton indicated assent.
    Mr. Cyril Osborneasked the Minister of Labour if, in view of the threat of unemployment in many parts of the country, he will reconsider the policy of encouraging further foreign workers to come to the United Kingdom, and so safeguard the employment of our own people.
    Sir W. Monckton: I think the position is already safeguarded adequately by the present policy under which foreign workers are admitted for employment only when suitable workers are not available in this country.
    Mr. Osborne: Is the Minister aware that there is already fear of redundancy in many industries, and that there will be a great deal of resentment if our own people find themselves out of work while foreigners keep their jobs? Will he safeguard against that danger?
    Sir W. Monckton: It is my belief that the position is safeguarded now. If an industry or a firm wants to recruit foreigners, then before the scheme is put into operation we satisfy ourselves that agreement has been reached between both sides of the industry concerned. One of the conditions is that which I mentioned in my answer.
    Mr. E. Shinwell: How does the right hon. and learned Gentleman account for the rise in unemployment since this Government came in?
    Sir W. Monckton: That, of course, is quite a different question.

    Exchange Attendances (Bas Fares)
    Mr. William A. Stewardasked the Minister of Labour if he is aware of the hardship caused to men and women attending employment exchanges owing to the present cost of bus fares; and if he will consult with the British Transport Commission, with a view to the authorisation of reduced fares for those registered as unemployed.
    Sir W. Monckton: I do not think that satisfactory arrangements of this kind could be made.
    Mr. Steward: Does the Minister consider it fair and reasonable that a man living at New Eltham, which is in my constituency, should have to pay 2s. 8d. a week to attend the Woolwich Labour Exchange to qualify for unemployment benefit and to stand a chance of getting a job?
    Sir W. Monckton: The first thing I would say is that the suggestion for remedying the position is one which I am advised would be expensive to administer and would be open to abuse. I would also point out that, although an unemployed person has to attend a local office twice a week in order to get benefit, if he lives more than four miles away he need go only once a week, and if more than six miles away postal claims can be made. We are, therefore, trying to meet the situation.
    Mr. Anthony Greenwood: Would not the Minister agree that instead of making concessions of the type suggested, the important thing is to increase the weekly rate of pay for unemployed workers?
    Captain Robert Ryder: Will my right hon. and learned Friend bear in mind that this problem applies in the London area where, for some unaccountable reason, the fares have been increased long before those in other parts of the country?

    Hammersmith
    Mr. W. T. Williamsasked the Minister of Labour (1) how many men and women were registered as partly employed at the Hammersmith employment exchange in February, 1951, and on the last convenient date, respectively:
    (2) how many men and women were registered as unemployed at the Hammersmith Employment Exchange in February, 1938, in February, 1951, and on the last convenient date, respectively.
    Sir W. Monckton: As the reply includes a table of figures, I will, if I may, circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
    Following is the reply:

    NUMBERS OF UNEMPLOYED PERSONS ON THE REGISTERS OF THE BROOK GREEN EMPLOYMENT EXCHANGE (INCLUDING YOUTH EMPLOYMENT OFFICE) AT THE UNDERMENTIONED DATES.

    Date

    Total number on registers

    Number temporarily stopped* (included in preceding columns)

    Males

    Females

    Males

    Females

    12th Feb., 1951

    1,638

    497

    —

    3

    11th Feb., 1952

    1,761

    731

    22

    17

    The area hat is now served by the Brook Green Employment Exchange was served in 1938 by the Shepherds Bush Employment Exchange. The numbers of unemployed persons on the registers of that Exchange at 14th February, 1938, were 6,475 males and 2,246 females.
    *The figures of "temporarily stopped" relate to persons who were not at work at the dates in question owing to short-time working or other temporary suspensions. They do not include persons who were at work on those dates but were stood off on other days of the week.

    Carlisle
    Mr. A. Hargreavesasked the Minister of Labour (1) the total number unemployed in Carlisle at the latest available date, and a list of trades mainly affected;
    (2) the number of workers recorded as temporarily stopped in Carlisle at the latest available date; what trades are mainly affected; and what is the day of the week when such statistics are normally compiled.
    Sir W. Monckton: As the reply contains a table of figures, I will circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
    Mr. Hargreaves: Can the Minister answer the last portion of Question No. 16 and say on which day the statistics are compiled?
    Sir W. Monckton: The number unemployed are counted on a Monday in the middle of each month.
    Mr. Hargreaves: That is not a full answer. The Question I am asking relates to people on short time. Do I take it from the right hon. and learned Gentleman's answer that they, too, are recorded on the Monday in each week?
    Sir W. Monckton: I hope I made it plain—not the Monday in each week, but a Monday in the middle of each month.
    Following is the reply:

    NUMBERS OF UNEMPLOYED PERSONS ON THE REGISTERS OF THE CARLISLE EMPLOYMENT EXCHANGE AND YOUTH EMPLOYMENT OFFICE ON MONDAY, 11TH FEBRUARY, 1952.

    Industries

    Total Number on Register

    Numbers temporarily stopped (included in previous column)

    Cotton weaving

    183

    178

    Rayon, nylon, etc., weaving and silk

    23

    21

    Textile finishing, etc

    62

    55

    Overalls, shirts, etc.

    121

    118

    Building

    38

    —

    Distribution

    67

    5

    Catering, Hotels, etc

    65

    —

    All other industries and services

    290

    5

    TOTAL

    849

    382

    The numbers unemployed are counted on a Monday in the middle of each month.

    Oldham Exchange
    Mr. Leslie Haleasked the Minister of Labour whether he is aware of the difficulties caused to the staff of his Department in Oldham by the sudden increase in the number of men and women in the textile industry wholly unemployed or upon short time; and what steps he proposes to take to deal with this position.
    Sir W. Monckton: Yes, Sir. Steps have already been taken to reinforce the staff of the Oldham Employment Exchange.
    Mr. Hale: Yes, but is the right hon. and learned Gentleman aware that also the number of unemployed has been greatly reinforced; that 15 temporary workers were sent off a fortnight ago; that the air conditioning is bad; that 46 steps have to be climbed by each person to change his cards; that today there are 10,000 people in Oldham wholly or partly
    2082
    unemployed? Will he tell the House how soon he can make a statement of policy on this matter?
    Sir W. Monckton: I am not aware that the precise number is as high as the hon. Gentleman mentions. So far as the increase of my staff is concerned, I added 24 people to cope with this work. So far as the premises are concerned, I have been asking the Ministry of Works to give me some better accommodation.
    Mr. Shinwell: Is this the Government's policy for dealing with unemployment—to increase the staffs of the labour exchanges?
    Sir W. Monckton: No, Sir, the policy of the Government, when they are asked what they are doing to deal with the position and the difficulties of the staff at Oldham, is to state what that policy is.
    Mr. F. J. Erroll: Has not the increase in the number of unemployed in Oldham been considerably aggravated by the advice not to buy textiles given by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bishop Auckland (Mr. Dalton)?

    Institute of Houseworkers
    Miss Irene Wardasked the Minister of Labour, in terms of percentage, what cut has been imposed on the National Institute of Houseworkers.
    Sir W. Monckton: Approximately 66 per cent.
    Miss Ward: Has any such severe cut been imposed on any other Government establishment?
    Sir W. Monckton: I am afraid that severe cuts have been imposed in other places. I am afraid I have not all in mind now.
    Miss Ward: Can my right hon. and learned Friend name the other establishments in HANSARD?
    Mr. Anthony Greenwood: Would not the Minister agree that the National Institute of Houseworkers has done a great deal towards raising the status of domestic labour in this country? Would he not agree that these cuts are most regrettable?
    Sir W. Monckton: I can agree with this, that it is always regrettable, in a time when economies are forced upon

    2083
    us, to have to cut down on those who have done good work. We have, however, managed to save something here, from which I hope, when times get better, the Institute will rise again.
    Miss Ward: Can my right hon. and learned Friend say why the cut has been imposed on this particular section of Government-controlled establishments?
    Sir W. Monckton: The cut was imposed here because, when we looked among all the places where we could, but without wishing to, make cuts, we found that this was one where a cut could be made without damaging either the export trade or the defence programme, or anything of that kind.

    Older Persons (Report)
    Miss Wardasked the Minister of Labour how far the committee to be appointed to consider the retention of the elderly in employment, by its terms of reference, covers women as well as men.
    Sir W. Monckton: The terms of reference specifically relate to men and women equally.
    Miss Ward: Is it not really a pity to have cut down an establishment which may be able to train women until the committee has published its findings?
    Hon. Members: Answer.
    Sir W. Monckton: I am afraid I was not following what my hon. Friend was referring to.
    Hon. Members: Shame!

    Training Centres
    Miss Wardasked the Minister of Labour the number of training places which exist under his control for men and for women, shown separately; and what reduction, expressed as a percentage, in administrative costs, has been imposed on these establishments.
    Sir W. Monckton: The number of training places at present available at Government training centres is 3,623. It is impossible to allocate them as between men and women as some courses are open to either sex. Despite the needs of the re-armament programme and the necessity for providing facilities for training the disabled, a reduction of 13 per cent. has been made in the costs to meet current economic circumstances.
    Miss Ward: Will my right hon. and learned Friend reconsider what appears to be a savage discrimination against places for the training of women as well as of men?
    Sir W. Monckton: I did draw attention to the fact, in relation to this cut, that it was in spite of the needs of re-armament, and so forth, that we have had to have the cut on this training scheme

    Building Workers
    Lieut.-Colonel Marcus Liptonasked the Minister of Labour how many building workers are now unemployed in the London area; and what steps he is taking to provide work for them.
    Sir W. Monckton: Eight thousand five hundred and nineteen in Greater London on 11th February. This total includes over 4,000 painters and about 2,500 labourers. Employment exchanges are making every effort to find suitable employment for these men. Painting and decorating work is being licensed without restriction by the Ministry of Works and by local authorities. The general ban on new building work during the period December, 1951, to February, 1952, was lifted in the London area.
    Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: Is it not lamentable that so many thousands of building workers should be unemployed at a time when thousands of houses are so urgently needed? Is the Minister aware that it is getting quite like the old days of Tory rule?
    Sir W. Monckton: I have every hope that most of these people will be back at normal work within the next few weeks. The figure in February, 1951, though considerably less than it is at present, was nearly 6,000.
    Mr. Arthur Lewis: Is the Minister aware that the building trade workers feel that he could give greater service to this country and to the people of this country if he would advise the Prime Minister to tender the Government's resignation?

    Factory, Nantlle Valley
    Mr. Goronwy Robertsasked the Minister of Labour what steps he is taking to ensure that the new factory in the Nantlle Valley in the county of Caernarvon, due to be opened next month, will give employment to local unemployed persons.
    Sir W. Monckton: My local office at Penygroes is in close touch with the employer. Local persons will have the first opportunity of employment apart, possibly, from a few key men who may be necessary to get the factory working.
    Mr. Roberts: In that case, will the Minister kindly explain why a number of unemployed persons in this stricken valley have been disallowed their unemployment benefit because they would not move away from their homes to take up work in Bristol and London?
    Sir W. Monckton: I am afraid that I cannot deal without notice with a point about individual cases where unemployment benefit has been refused. I suppose that they are cases where what was thought to be suitable employment had been declined.
    Mr. Roberts: Will the Minister look into the point that this new factory is designed to meet the needs of the local unemployment and was set up with finances provided by the Development Corporation, and will he kindly see that no further compulsory migration from this stricken valley is enforced by his Department?
    Sir W. Monckton: I have already said that our hope is that local persons will get the first opportunity of this new employment, which is expected in April.

    Factory Inspections, Wales
    Mr. George Thomasasked the Minister of Labour the number of factories in Wales which have not been visited by one of Her Majesty's inspectors of factories during the past five years.
    Sir W. Monckton: On 1st January last out of 9,837 factories in Wales on the Department's registers 24 had not been visited since the end of 1946.

    Willesden
    Mr. S. P. Viantasked the Minister of Labour the number of men and women registering as unemployed at the Willesden employment exchange at the latest practicable date; and if he has any knowledge of the number employed for part-time owing to lack of material.
    Sir W. Monckton: Five hundred and thirty-two males and 177 females at 11th February. I regret that statistics of the numbers on short-time owing to lack of materials are not available, but the total numbers registered as temporarily stopped included in the foregoing figures were nine males and nine females.
    Mr. Hargreaves: Is the Minister aware that taking the figures on a Monday of those temporarily stopped ignores the fact that most of the short-time working occurs at the week-ends? Will he bring that fact to bear on the general consideration of the whole of this matter of temporarily stopped workers?
    Sir W. Monckton: I will go into the question of whether taking a Monday is satisfactory for the purpose which the hon. Member has in mind.
    Mr. Spencer Summers: Is there any significance in the fact that the question asks about men and women and the right hon. Gentleman's reply refers to males and females?

  NATIONAL SERVICE

    Reserved Occupations
    Mr. John E. Crowderasked the Minister of Labour if he will now issue an up-to-date schedule of occupations which would be reserved in the event of a national emergency.
    Sir W. Monckton: I do not think it would serve any useful purpose to publish a schedule of reserved occupations now, when we do not know when, if ever, it is likely to be required, or what the circumstances of the time might be. Preparatory work on a tentative schedule is in hand, but it cannot at this stage be put into its final form to fit unknown conditions at some unknown date in the future.
    Mr. Crowder: Can my right hon. and learned Friend say whether he will be calling up for National Service people whom he is quite certain would not be called up in the event of any national emergency?
    Sir W. Monckton: I find it very difficult to tell my hon. Friend who would or would not be called up until I know the exact nature of the emergency. I cannot, therefore, answer that.

    Agricultural Workers (Call-up)
    Mr. Gilbert Longdenasked the Minister of Labour if he will exempt from National Service all persons who work on the land.
    Sir W. Monckton: No, Sir.
    Mr. Longden: Will not my right hon. and learned Friend agree that the vital necessity of growing as much food as we can is being endangered by shortage of labour, especially in the Southern counties? As presumably agricultural labourers will be exempt in the event of an emergency, could he not do something to prevent their call-up now?
    Sir W. Monckton: What I am asked in the Question is whether I will exempt all persons who work on the land. I could not exempt them if I wanted to, but it would not be right to defer them automatically in that manner. There are any number of other employments for which special cases can be made out. At present we are getting from the land no more than about 10,000 in the year out of a force which, taking farmers into account, amounts to something like 900,000. I do not feel I could do more at the moment.
    Major Tufton Beamishasked the Minister of Labour what categories of farm workers are eligible for consideration for deferment of call-up from National Service; and if he will now extend the definition so as to ensure that all farm workers who are liable for National Service have the right to apply for deferment.
    Sir W. Monckton: Men employed on farms with not more than two regular whole-time male workers of 17 or over, in addition to a working principal or manager, and men on other farms employed substantially whole-time as fully experienced cowmen or shepherds. This definition is reviewed from time to time, but I could not, as at present advised, hold out any expectation that I could go as far as my hon. and gallant Friend suggests.
    Major Beamish: Is my right hon. and learned Friend aware that the dividing line between those who are eligible for consideration for deferment and those who are not appears to have no rhyme or reason about it at all, and that, unless
    2088
    he can amend the regulations, there is bound to be quite a lot of dislocation of agricultural production?
    Sir W. Monckton: It is quite true to say that it is very difficult to draw a precise line logically, but it was hoped that the line that has been drawn would mean that the position would be safeguarded in cases where a young man's loss would be particularly felt because he was one of three or four men working on a holding full-time and regularly and could not easily be replaced. So the line was drawn where it is.
    Captain J. A. L. Duncan: Would my right hon. and learned Friend consider the total deferment of agricultural workers for the next two months so that the spring work can all be done?
    Sir W. Monckton: I think that there are difficulties about that, but I am prepared to consider my hon. and gallant Friend's suggestion. I cannot go further than that now.
    Mr. Gerald Nabarro: Can my right hon. and learned Friend assure the House that the persons who are asked to serve on the deferment boards are indeed men and women who have a reasonable working knowledge of the agricultural industry and are not people who have never been in touch with it before?
    Sir W. Monckton: I think that that does raise a quite different question. It is one which we constantly have in mind. I think I can say that in general, both in the past and now, steps have been taken to ensure that agricultural interests are represented adequately.

  SCOTLAND

    Hospital Boards (Cost)
    Captain Duncanasked the Secretary of State for Scotland the cost of the regional hospital boards in Scotland during the last full year.
    The Secretary of State for Scotland (Mr. James Stuart): The administration expenditure of regional hospital boards in Scotland for the year 1950–51 was £258,616.
    Captain Duncan: In view of that large sum purely for administration, will

    2089
    my right hon. Friend consider abolishing regional hospital boards and setting up one central planning board for Scotland?
    Mr. Stuart: I have not considered that, and I very much doubt whether that would be the desire of the regions.
    Mr. A. Woodburn: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that in this administration the work of the hospital boards is done voluntarily, and that this is one of the greatest services rendered in a public spirit in Scotland?
    Mr. Stuart: Yes, Sir. I think they do very good service.
    Mr. James H. Hoy: Can the right hon. Gentleman say what percentage that sum represents of the total hospital costs in Scotland?
    Mr. Stuart: If the hon. Gentleman cares to obtain a copy of White Paper No. 52 in the Vote Office, he will find on pages 7 and 11 the figures for which he is asking. The total is £29,539,682.
    Mr. Hoy: What is the percentage?
    Mr. Stuart: I will have to get a slide-rule.

    White Fish Industry (Transportation Scheme)
    Captain Duncanasked the Secretary of State for Scotland whether he will instruct the White Fish Authority to publish the details of their flat rate scheme for the transportation of fish as soon as they have been worked out.
    Mr. J. Stuart: The Authority tell me that they are anxious to publish their draft scheme as soon as it is ready.
    Captain Duncan: Is the Minister aware that the present uncertainty is very prejudicial not only to the industry but also to consumers all over the country, and will he do something to expedite the publication of this scheme?
    Mr. Stuart: The White Fish Authority have not been in existence for very long, and I do not think that they have been very slow.
    Mr. J. Grimond: Can the right hon. Gentleman give any idea when the scheme may be put into operation, and will he urge on the Herring Board that they should draw up a similar scheme?
    Mr. Stuart: The Herring Board are considering their problems, but that is a different question. I have not yet seen the proposals of the White Fish Authority.
    Lady Tweedsmuir: Can my right hon. Friend give an indication when he expects the scheme to be put forward''
    Mr. Stuart: I do not know the exact date, but I think that it ought to be in the near future.

    Food Production (Opencast Coal Mining)
    Major W. J. Anstruther-Grayasked the Secretary of State for Scotland whether he is satisfied that his authority to safeguard Scottish food production will not be prejudiced by the transfer of opencast coal from the Ministry of Fuel and Power to the National Coal Board.
    Mr. J. Stuart: Yes, Sir. The Ministerial responsibility for deciding whether particular areas should be worked for opencast coal and, if so, how food production and other interests are to be safeguarded will continue as hitherto.
    Major Anstruther-Gray: May I take it that my right hon. Friend will still have powers to prevent the best agricultural and market gardening land in Scotland from being used for purposes other than the producing of vital food?
    Mr. Stuart: Certainly, my desire is to safeguard all our best agricultural land.

    Tuberculosis (Treatment, Switzerland)
    Mrs. Jean Mannasked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will report on the Scottish scheme for tuberculosis patients to go to Switzerland; and whether this will be continued, extended or abandoned
    Mr. J. Stuart: I am glad to say that the scheme is going well. There are now 167 patients in Switzerland and others will be sent as and when these patients complete their treatment. The first main party came home last week and have already been replaced.
    Mrs. Mann: Will the right hon. Gentleman give an assurance that the scheme will not be cut down in any way but will be extended?
    Mr. Stuart: The scheme is being continued, and by the early summer we hope to have a full complement of 180.

    School Accommodation
    Mr. A. C. Manuelasked the Secretary of State for Scotland what steps he is taking to ensure that the additional accommodation necessary for the increased school population will be available in 1953.
    Mr. J. Stuart: The necessary additional accommodation is being provided by education authorities under their current programmes for which I am giving first priority. If any education authority, to meet any emergency, proposes to put up more buildings not requiring steel I should be able to approve.
    Mr. Manuel: Is the Secretary of State aware that many parents and teachers are becoming increasingly anxious because of the present standstill order and the cessation of building and sincerely believe that the intake next year cannot be accommodated and that infants' classes will be starting at a higher age group than they would if the age of five were recognised?
    Mr. Stuart: I think I can assure the hon. Member that for the 1953 intake there will be no reduction in the number of school places, because the authorities have plenty of work in hand at present.

    Highland Beef-Cattle Industry
    Mr. Stewardasked the Secretary of State for Scotland what steps he is taking to restore the Highland beef-cattle industry in Scotland.
    Mr. J. Stuart: Considerable development of cattle rearing in the Highlands is already taking place, and the Hill Lands (North of Scotland) Commission is seeking ways and means of expediting further development. The Hill Farming Act, as extended by the Livestock Rearing Act, provides 50 per cent. Government grant for approved schemes of rehabilitation and development on land suitable for the rearing of cattle and sheep. The Government, in formulating their long-term policy for agriculture, will pay particular attention to the possibilities of expanding beef production in the Highland areas.
    Mr. Steward: Will my right hon. Friend agree that not so many years ago
    2092
    Scotland was producing most of the beef consumed in England until the cheaper Argentine supplies came along? In view of the great difficulties we are experiencing in obtaining meat, not only from the Argentine but also from other countries, will he continue to do his utmost to restore the once thriving Scottish beef industry?

    Flooding, Nith and Garnock Valleys
    Mr. Emrys Hughesasked the Secretary of State for Scotland what are his proposals in regard to measures for preventing the flooding of the Nith and Garnock Valleys.
    Mr. J. Stuart: As indicated in my reply to the hon. Member for Central Ayrshire (Mr. Manuel) on 4th December last, legislation will be required to provide adequate powers for promoting comprehensive schemes of drainage and flood control. The financial and other questions involved present considerable difficulties but it is my intention to have discussions with the interests concerned.
    Mr. Hughes: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the discussions have been going on for a considerable period? Is he just going to let these valleys be flooded and leave people's property to be destroyed by water?
    Mr. Stuart: It is a very complicated matter and a good deal of financial assistance is involved. I sympathise with the hon. Gentleman. I should like to see progress made.
    Sir T. Moore: Has my right hon. Friend received a protest from the Ayr County Council which I sent him, and will he, as promised, give careful consideration to the arguments advanced, especially those in the last paragraph of the letter?
    Mr. Manuel: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that I also sent him that document? Will he agree to take at least the first step of promoting schemes for the Nith and Garnock Valleys which could come into operation once the necessary money was available?
    Mr. Stuart: I am afraid that it also requires legislation. I have not yet got the powers.

    Drainage Schemes
    Lord Malcolm Douglas-Hamiltonasked the Secretary of State for Scotland what progress he has to report towards a comprehensive drainage scheme for the improvement of agricultural land in Scotland.
    Mr. J. Stuart: The financial and other arrangements required for carrying out land drainage work in Scotland present very considerable difficulties and will involve legislation. I hope to be able to have discussions shortly with the local authorities and other interests concerned.
    Lord Malcolm Douglas-Hamilton: Is my right hon. Friend aware that in view of the food shortage at home and the urgent need for us to obtain all the home produced food we can, foreigners travelling up to Inverness by train are at a loss to understand why we are not making better use of the thousands of acres of the Spey Valley?
    Mr. Stuart: Yes, Sir. I have that in mind. I know the area to which my noble Friend refers.

  HOUSING, SCOTLAND

    Rural Workers' Houses (Reconditioning)
    Major Anstruther-Grayasked the Secretary of State for Scotland whether he can make a statement about the reconditioning of rural workers' houses; and if he can give an assurance that grant is now available in every case of a genuine farm worker's house.
    Mr. J. Stuart: I am considering the possibility of legislation on this matter, but I regret that it is too early to make a statement.
    Major Anstruther-Gray: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the delay is preventing a lot of much-needed reconditioning from being started, and will he consider making a statement that in any future legislation any grant will be made retrospective to, say, one year's date from now?
    Mr. Stuart: I cannot say anything about retrospective legislation, which is apt to be dangerous in some cases, but I assure my hon. and gallant Friend that I am as anxious as he is to see this got on with.
    Mr. John Wheatley: Is the right hon. Gentleman not aware that under existing Housing Acts there is a 50 per cent. grant available for these houses, provided they are not tied?
    Mr. Stuart: I am aware of that
    Colonel Alan Gomme-Duncan: Is my right hon. Friend aware that an untied house in the agricultural industry is absurd?
    Mr. Malcolm MacMillan: Does the right hon. Gentleman's reply mean that it is intended to invest further public money in these houses so as to enhance their value, and not to give tenancy rights to the rural workers concerned, and also to leave these houses in the hands of private property owners?
    Mr. Stuart: The intention of the Government is to try to improve the condition of houses for workers.
    Mr. MacMillan: Will the right hon. Gentleman address himself to the very important principle embodied in my supplementary question?
    Mr. Stuart: Certainly.

    Vacant Properties
    Mrs. Mannasked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he is aware that houses urgently required by those living in sub-lets and lodgings are known to remain vacant for six months and more, awaiting the highest bidder for purchase; and if he will now allow local authorities to requisition such houses, or state what other action he proposes, to deal with this matter.
    Mr. J. Stuart: Requisitioning for housing purposes has been in abeyance for nearly three years and I am not prepared to authorise its resumption. As an alternative local authorities have powers to acquire existing houses, and it is for them to judge whether in any particular case they would be justified in doing so.
    Mrs. Mann: In view of the fact that there are many young couples with young children being thrown out of lodgings, will the right hon. Gentleman try to persuade the local authorities to use their powers to acquire some of these houses for couples who are in urgent need of accommodation?
    Mr. Stuart: If the hon. Lady is referring to Coatbridge in particular, I may say that the Department of Health wrote to the Town Clerk on 6th March on this subject, explaining the procedure, and if the hon. Lady would care for a copy of that letter I should be very glad to let her have it.
    Mr. Woodburn: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that this is a problem not only in Coatbridge but also over the whole of the West of Scotland, and also in many other parts of Scotland? In view of the difficulties which are arising, will the Government reconsider their decision not to support the Bill which is being promoted by my hon. Friend the Member for Dunbartonshire, West (Mr. Steele), to prevent this abuse?
    Mrs. Mann: Will the right hon. Gentleman make it plain whether a local authority can take over a house other than for modernisation?
    Mr. Stuart: Under Section 61 of the Housing (Scotland) Act. 1950, all local authorities have power to acquire houses—
    Mr. Manuel: For modernisation.
    Mr. Stuart:—and Exchequer assistance is available under Section 105. These powers could be used as an alternative Lo requisitioning.
    Mr. Wheatley: Is it not the case that there is no Exchequer assistance unless the house is being modernised?
    Mr. Stuart: I should like to look into that point.

    Housing Association Contracts (Fair Wages Clause)
    Mr. Manuelasked the Secretary of State for Scotland how far contractors and sub-contractors employed on Scottish Special Housing Association schemes are subject to the terms of the fair wages clause and the National Arbitration Tribunal Award No. 1442 of 10th May, 1950.
    Mr. J. Stuart: The fair wages clause is included in the conditions of contract operated by the Association and should therefore be included in all sub-contracts. The terms of the award of 10th May, 1950, are observed by the Association and,
    2096
    as far as they are aware, by all contractors and sub-contractors employed on work commissioned by them.
    Mr. Manuel: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that in some schemes operated by the Association certain contractors and sub-contractors are not observing the award mentioned in the Question? If I send him certain cases, will he see that the holiday with pay agreement is observed as it was laid down in the award?
    Mr. Stuart: Certainly, Sir.

    Rents (Repair Certificates)
    Mrs. Mannasked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he is aware that house-factors in the Coatbridge division have been uplifting portions of rent legally withheld by tenants in possession of a repairs certificate, issued under the Rent Restriction Acts; that such demands are made after the cancellation of the certificate by the appropriate authority; and if he will consider the necessary amendment to the Rent Restriction Acts in order to stop this practice when the next general review of the Acts is undertaken.
    Mr. J. Stuart: I am not aware of this practice, which would have no statutory authority. If the hon. Lady will let me have details of any particular cases which have come to her notice, I shall be glad to look into the matter.
    Mrs. Mann: In thanking the right hon. Gentleman for that reply, might I inform him that I have a very big list of such cases in Coatbridge which I will send him?

    Stone Building Industry
    Mr. James McInnesasked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he has yet received the recommendations of the Scottish Council for Development and Industry with regard to the D.S.I.R. report on the survey of the Scottish stone building industry; and if he will undertake that copies of these reports will be made available in the Library.
    Mr. J. Stuart: I understand that the report of the survey of the Scottish stone building industry has been sent to the Scottish Council for consideration. My noble friend the Lord President of the Council will consider the publication of the report as soon as the Scottish Council's comments are received.
    Mr. McInnes: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the survey was completed in 1950 and that I was informed in reply to a Question in April last year that the report had been published? Why then should an ad hoc body be allowed to hold up the publication of a Government report?
    Mr. Stuart: I do not think they are holding it up. In the first place, it is a long report. It had to be duplicated or triplicated or multiplicated, or whatever one calls it, and it consists of some 200 pages; but we are not trying to hold it up.

    Caithness
    Sir David Robertsonasked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will now permit new council houses to be erected in rural Caithness where water supplies will not be available for some years.
    Mr. J. Stuart: The county council were given this permission in 1946 on the understanding that suitable temporary water supplies would be introduced pending completion of the county council's comprehensive water supply scheme.
    Sir D. Robertson: As the County Council has done nothing at all to comply with that order, will my right hon. Friend ascertain why his Department has taken no action, because a very large number of people are living in thoroughly unsatisfactory conditions?
    Mr. Stuart: As my hon. Friend must know, this is a responsibility of the local authority.
    Mr. M. MacMillan: Will the right hon. Gentleman advise the electors of Caithness to elect something other than a Tory local authority?

    Subsidy
    Mr. William Rossasked the Secretary of State for Scotland what representations he has received from Scottish local authorities regarding his recent proposals for housing subsidy changes.
    Mr. J. Stuart: I am seeing the three associations of Scottish local authorities on 21st March to discuss a memorandum which they have recently submitted to me on this subject.
    Mr. Ross: Does the Secretary of State realise how completely unrealistic his proposals are and that they just do not meet the housing situation in Scotland?
    Mr. Stuart: I would not go as far as that. In England I believe the proposals have been accepted, but I will have these discussions and then I will know about the difficulties.
    Mr. Wheatley: Does the right hon. Gentleman accept the statement of the local authorities that instead of the burden being shared three parts by the Government and one part by the local authority according to the promise of Her Majesty's Government, it is now being shared in a ratio of 1.2 to 1?
    Sir T. Moore: Oh, no.
    Hon. Members: Oh, yes.
    Mr. Stuart: It would be better if I had this meeting on the 21st and listened to the different views.

  ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN AND MAINTENANCE ORDERS
  Mr. Hector Hughesasked the Prime Minister if he will recommend the appointment of a Royal Commission to consider and report on the law relating to illegitimate children and the mothers of illegitimate children and also on the means whereby a Scottish, English or Welsh wife deserted by her husband can obtain, in this island, a maintenance order enforceable in British Dominions, Colonies and foreign countries.
  The Prime Minister (Mr. Winston Churchill): As regards illegitimacy, I have nothing to add to the reply given by my right hon. and learned Friend the Secretary of State for the Home Department on 21st February.
  Maintenance orders made in England and Wales can be enforced throughout most of the Commonwealth. Arrangements for enforcement in foreign countries are under consideration. As regards orders made in Scotland, I would refer the hon. and learned Member to the reply given by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Scotland on 11th March.
  Mr. Hughes: Is the Prime Minister aware that the two previous replies to which he referred offer no help and no hope in this regard, that great suffering and injustice is being done by the present law and that a change is urgently needed? Will he devise some means of doing it?
  The Prime Minister: I have not felt that a case has been made out to establish at this juncture a Royal Commission.
  Mr. Wheatley: Will the right hon. Gentleman take steps to initiate negotiations with a view to seeing that the arrangements between Scotland and the other Commonwealth countries are properly in force?
  The Prime Minister: I think I might venture to ask for notice of that question.

  NATIONAL FINANCE

    Half-Crown Pieces
    Lieut.-Colonel Liptonasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether, as a measure of economy and convenience, he will recommend the abolition of the half-crown piece.
    The Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. R. A. Butler): Half-crowns, like other coins, are struck in the quantities demanded by the banks, which reflect the needs of the public. In 1951, in response to the banks' demands, about one-fifth (by value) of the year's issue of cupronickel coins consisted of half-crowns. This suggests that the coin could not be abolished without causing some inconvenience to the public.
    Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: Is the Chancellor aware that this proposal would reduce the innumerable mistakes and arguments which take place daily due to the similarity of the half-crown to the florin, and in any event what is the use of a half-crown which soon will be only worth two shillings?
    Brigadier Ralph Rayner: On the contrary, would the Chancellor bear in mind that the good old broad-beamed half-crown is a constant reminder of that old British currency which had the confidence of the world, and rather than do away with the one would he go on and try to restore the other?

    Balance of Payments (Exports)
    Mr. Ian Horobinasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer in view of the fact that it will require an improvement in the net United Kingdom balance of payments of about £800 million per annum to balance our current account by the last half of this year and that only £500 million per annum is hoped for from imports cuts, what steps he has taken to ensure that the necessary additional £300 million per annum can be obtained by increases in exports.
    Mr. R. A. Butler: As regards comparison between the second half of 1951 and the second half of 1952, I am not prepared to add to my statement of 29th January, but I would refer the hon. Member to what I said in my Budget speech about our new objectives and the improvement necessary in 1952–53 compared with 1951–52.
    Mr. Horobin: I thank my right hon. Friend for that reply but would he not agree, in view of the large proportion of invisible exports on which he is relying, that this strengthens the case for the re-opening of the produce markets, including the Liverpool Cotton Market.
    Mr. Butler: I think that raises a somewhat wider question.

    Austrian Debts
    Mr. William Teelingasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether the Austrian Government has yet entered into negotiations, as promised after the meeting in London last July, for some immediate payment on the outstanding Austrian loan debts; and what steps Her Majesty's Government is taking to obtain such payments.
    Mr. R. A. Butler: I understand that the Austrian Government are likely to propose debt negotiations on an international basis after the conclusion of the Conference on German External Debts.

    Public Works Loans (Interest)
    Mr. A. Blenkinsopasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he will make a statement about the effect of the increase in the Bank rate on the future rate of interest on advances made by the Public Works Loan Board.
    Mr. R. A. Butler: No, Sir. I do not see that there is anything I can usefully add to what I said in the debate yesterday.
    Mr. Blenkinsop: Is the right hon. Gentleman not aware that he left the future position completely vague and that this puts the local authorities in a very unsatisfactory position, particularly because to the Public Works Loan Board they have to pay rate of interest operating at the time when the loan is advanced and not when it is agreed to?
    Mr. Butler: I should be very surprised if the local authorities are not satisfied with the arrangements left for the time being.
    Mr. Blenkinsop: But does the right hon. Gentleman not agree that it is essential to give local authorities some understanding of their future position such as they had in the previous five years under Labour administration?
    Mr. Hugh Gaitskell: Will not the right hon. Gentleman reassure local authorities by giving an undertaking that the rate will not go up on Public Works Loan Board advances? He does not appear to think they will. Would it not be better for him now to say so?
    Mr. Butler: If the right hon. Gentleman did me the honour, as I believe he did, to listen to my speech last night, he will recall that I said it is far too early to see the effect of the increased Bank rate on the market and on long-term rates, and therefore I did not propose to make any prophecy about future rates.

    Foreign Travel Allowance
    Mr. C. S. Taylorasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer by what authority the foreign travel allowance has been reduced to £25.
    Mr. R. A. Butler: The Exchange Control Act, 1947.
    Mr. Taylor: Does that give this House any say in this matter, or is it done purely by the Executive?
    Mr. Butler: This power, if I may use legal language, involves the restrictions of the scope of consents and permissions given by the Treasury under this legislation, and to that extent it has been done by administrative act.

    American Cotton (Dollar Purchases)
    Mr. Horobinasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in view of the fact that India has recently bought over one million bales of North American cotton at prices below those for American-type cotton sold to Lancashire spinners by the Raw Cotton Commission, how far dollars were released by this country against Indian sterling balances in order to finance the purchase.
    Mr. R. A. Butler: I do not know how many dollars India paid in respect of this transaction. The Government of India are, of course, sole judges of the extent to which any particular dollar transaction accords with the general principles accepted by all members of the sterling area.
    Mr. Horobin: Would the right hon. Gentleman not agree that India appears to be obtaining considerably more American cotton than Lancashire, and that it is rather desirable that he should endeavour to increase American supplies of cotton to Lancashire?
    Mr. Butler: That also raises a rather different issue. It is important that Lancashire should have a proper supply, but I cannot interfere with the transactions of the Government of India.
    Mr. Horobinasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what steps he has taken to urge on the United States Government the necessity for equally favourable terms to be made available to this country for purchasing United States cotton by means of dollar loans as are enjoyed by Japan.
    Mr. R. A. Butler: If application by the United Kingdom were to be made I am not aware that similar facilities would not be available to this country.
    Mr. Horobin: In view of the fact that the Indian Government is being helped to obtain cotton by this Government and the Japanese by the American Government, is it not very important to help Lancashire in the way suggested at the highest level in order to try to obtain assistance in securing the necessary raw cotton for Lancashire?
    Mr. Butler: I presume India is being financed by a loan through the Export-Import Bank, and the question of

    2103
    whether Lancashire or this country needs a loan is another matter. I think out best step is to continue to put our finances on a sound footing.

    Public Companies (Government Directors)
    Mr. Errollasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what principles govern the appointment of Government-appointed directors to the boards of public companies.
    Mr. R. A. Butler: Broadly speaking, Government directors are appointed to the Boards of public companies because public money or issues of public policy are involved. In choosing such directors, the Government's aim is to appoint persons whose general qualifications and special experience are such as to safeguard the public interest in both respects.
    Mr. W. R. Williams: Will the Chancellor of the Exchequer tell us what principles are followed in private industry?
    Mr. Butler: The same high standards are followed in private industry as actuate Her Majesty's Government.

    Cost of Living Index
    Mr. George Chetwyndasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer the effect of the cut in food subsidies on the Cost of Living Index.
    Mr. R. A. Butler: A rise, when in full operation, of about 4½ points on the index.
    Mr. Chetwynd: As this rise will have a considerable effect upon the two million workers whose wages are effected by the Cost of Living Index and as it is bound to effect wage demands from other
    2104
    sections, would not the Chancellor reconsider the food subsidy problem from that angle?
    Mr. Butler: The hon. Gentleman has put his question in a sympathetic way, but there is no question of reviewing Government policy in this respect or revising the general plan of the Budget, which is calculated to help those who have the greatest need.

    Defence Services (per Capita Cost)
    Mr. Emrys Hughesasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer his estimate of the weekly sum per head that will be paid in 1952–53 in respect of the three Defence Services, and also in respect of housing and education.
    Mr. R. A. Butler: Taking the figures in the Financial Statement 1952–53, for Central Government expenditure only, 10s. 4d., 6d. and 2s. respectively. The hon. Member will realise that considerable extra local government expense is involved under the latter two heads.
    Mr. Hughes: Does that not prove that we now have a Government of savages?
    Mr. Butler: It proves that the hon. Gentleman has deliberately put a Question in order to get an answer in respect of public finances without taking account of local finances, which would have given a much better picture from his point of view.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE (SUPPLY)
Ordered,
That this day the Business of Supply may be taken after Ten o'clock and shall be exempted from the provisions of Standing Order No. 1 (Sittings of the House).—(Mr. Crook shank.)

ORDERS OF THE DAY
  SUPPLY
  [6TH ALLOTTED DAY]

Air Estimates, 1952–53, and Air Supplementary Estimate, 1951–52
MR. GEORGE WARD'S STATEMENT
Order for Committee read.
3.33 p.m.
The Under-Secretary of State for Air (Mr. George Ward): I beg to move, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."
The Air Estimates for 1952–53 first provided for a net total of £467,640,000. A revised Estimate has since been presented to cover an addition of £30 million to Appropriations-in-Aid, our estimated share of the grant of economic aid by the United States of America announced in the House of Commons by the Chancellor of the Exchequer on 29th January. Taking into account the recent Supplementary Estimate, this is a net increase of just over £107 million on the 1951–52 Estimates. Comparing gross totals, we are expecting to spend £147 million more in the coming year than we have provided for this year.
As the House knows, this sum would have been larger if the original programme of expansion over the next three years had been maintained, but it is still a very great sum, especially at a time when the country is subject to acute economic and financial strain. My task today is to lay before the House the reasons which have prompted Her Majesty's Government to put forward these Estimates.
To get matters into perspective and to enable the House to appreciate the good and bad points of the present situation, I would like to start with a brief glance at the post-war history of the Royal Air Force. I do not seek to apportion praise or blame for what has happened. Indeed, upon the more important decisions history alone can pronounce. All I want to do is to put before the House certain relevant facts and dates.
The rundown of the Royal Air Force after the war was planned to end with a front line large enough to meet normal peace time commitments in a period of no international tension. At that time,
2106
however, there were only 38,000 Regulars and many of these were coming to the end of their service. All the rest were war-time entrants who were due to be released under the age-and-length-of-service system; and it soon became clear that there would not be enough men in the skilled maintenance trades, and especially in certain key trades which need long training, to keep the aircraft serviceable.
The front line was, therefore, determined, not by the number of aircraft but by the number of trained men available. At one stage, the front line sank to little over 1,000 aircraft, and any expansion was governed by the manpower situation.
There is another effect of immediate post-war policy which is especially important and from which we are suffering now. Because the main assumption in planning the peace-time Air Force was a period free from international tension, re-equipment was planned on a long-term basis. This policy no doubt relied at that time—1946–47—on the belief that the need for replacement aircraft which would incorporate the best possible developments in design lay seven or eight years ahead. Therefore, it was decided to rely on the existing types until radically new and fully developed designs could be brought into service.
Now, the inevitable result of this policy was a rundown of the aircraft industry which exceeded, in terms of manpower, that of the Royal Air Force itself, and no increase in the numbers employed in the industry took place until June, 1950. I know that many of these points were made by my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence in his winding-up speech in the Defence Debate on 5th March, but I felt that the conclusion was so important that the factors leading up to it bear repetition; for it is this rundown in the aircraft industry which is making it so difficult to get production going quickly now.
In August, 1948, following the Berlin crisis, a number of emergency measures were taken to increase the production of existing types of fighters and to refurbish some of the war-time stocks of piston-engined fighters. The financial crisis in 1949 resulted in considerable economies in the Air Force, notably in Transport Command. On the other hand, Fighter Command began to expand slightly, and

2107
during this period intermediate types, such as the Venom and the Meteor night fighter, were ordered. We also obtained from America some B.29 Washington bombers, and the Canberra was ordered off the drawing board.
Then came the invasion of South Korea. This brought about a change in policy, and by the end of 1950 the £3,600 million programme was announced. This programme was designed on the basis of the maximum production of the armaments industry over a period of three years without special measures being taken. Under this plan, additional Canberras were ordered and the Valiant, the Swift and the Hawker P.1067 were ordered off the drawing board. The House will be interested to bear that we have now decided to name this new and important high-performance day fighter the Hawker Hunter.
In the defence debate two weeks ago, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) suggested that my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary for Defence was mistaken when he said that the Swift and other types of modern fighters were not ordered until after the invasion of South Korea. As my hon. Friend said at the time, the right hon. Gentleman's memory was at fault. The production orders for the Hunter and the Swift were approved some weeks after the invasion of South Korea.
Mr. E. Shinwell: The hon. Gentleman is correct. What I intended to say was that they were planned well ahead of Korea. It is perfectly true that they were not actually ordered until the Korean affair had begun.
Mr. Ward: I am, of course, talking about production orders.
Almost immediately after the announcement of the £3,600 million plan the Chinese entered the Korean war and the Government announced the £4,700 million armament programme. This programme was based on the assumption that special measures would be taken to ensure that materials and labour were available to the aircraft industry at the right time and in the right places. It is fair to say that little or no progress was made in 1951 towards ensuring that these basic assumptions were met. The result is that the capacity of the industry has
2108
been over-loaded and the programme is running behind the planned level.
During the last few months, however, my right hon. Friend the Minister of Supply has, in co-operation with the industry, been endeavouring to increase the rate of aircraft construction. Following the introduction of the Notification of Engagements Order, the Ministry of Labour have been doing everything possible to assist aircraft firms in expanding their labour force. The grant of super-priority for the newest types of aircraft, announced by the Prime Minister a fortnight ago, will enable speedy action to be taken to overcome delays due to shortages of machine tools, materials, and components. The Minister of Supply is meeting representatives of the industry in a few days time to inform them of the detailed administrative arrangements for putting this super-priority into effect.
But aircraft by themselves are not enough. As their numbers increase so also increases the need for more aircrews and ground staff; for more training schools; for more airfields and for more accommodation. So the prodigous task facing us is fourfold: first, to increase the rate at which modern aircraft are delivered to the Royal Air Force; second, to increase the numbers of skilled men—both those who fly themselves and those who fill the equally important role of keeping the aircraft flying; third, to increase the Regular content of the Force with consequent gains in efficiency and economy; and, last, to provide the training organisation, the airfields, the maintenance depots, the accommodation, and so on, which are indispensable to a large, complex and efficient Force and are necessarily heavier commitments than those facing the other two Services.
Because in the early stages of an expansion the heaviest burdens are inevitably placed on the training organisation, a significant proportion of the total uniformed Force has to be used on instructor duties or as pupils.
That brings me up to the present. But before I speak of what is going on now, I think it right to say a word about the strategic context in which these matters must be considered. The vast importance of air power was demonstrated in the last war. Today it is decisive. Do not let us draw false lessons from what

2109
is happening in Korea. The United Nations' Air Forces there have shown great stopping power. Indeed, without them our ground Forces must have been overwhelmed by weight of numbers. But air power has not been deployed in the way that it would inevitably be deployed in a major war; that is, against the whole war-making power of the opponent.
We must remember that our own experience of the effects of hostile air power in the last war, bitter though it was, was insignificant compared with that of the enemy. Our armies on the Continent in 1944 and 1945 enjoyed the help of massive air superiority and our ports, communications and industries were not subjected to one-tenth the weight of the attacks on Germany. If our preparations in 1944 had suffered the disruption inflicted on the enemy's, "Overlord" would certainly never have been mounted.
Since that time, the atomic bomb has come. I do not want to discuss the effect of nuclear fission upon the strategy of a hot war, but I think it must be clear that the atom bomb multiplies the effectiveness of air power many times over, and this was, no doubt, in the minds of the late Government when they planned a large expansion of the Royal Air Force and it is certainly in the minds of Her Majesty's present advisers when they seek to carry out this programme.
I now turn to the present state of affairs. First about the recruiting of men and women into the Royal Air Force. The year 1951 was the best for recruiting since the war, and this improvement in recruiting extended to all sorts of engagements. For example, the number of boys who entered training as aircraft apprentices at Halton and the Radio School at Cranwell amounted to 928 compared with 551 the year before. In ground trades we recruited 45,000 Regular airmen and airwomen compared with 25,000 in 1950, and recruiting for aircrew was three times the total of the previous year.
There are, I think, a number of reasons for this. The better pay announced in September, 1950, had a big effect, and in the ground trades the three and four year Regular engagements have proved popular. The new trade structure, with
2110
its promise of a Service career up to the age of 55 in technician as well as n.c.o. grades, which the Royal Air Force introduced in 1950, has done good because it has offered many excellent career opportunities to those who otherwise would not have had them.
From now on also the Royal Air Force will recruit young men of 17½ years for three and four year Regular engagements in the ground trades, in addition to the longer engagements of 5, 10 and 12 years. In aircrew, big factors have been the offer of engagements for four years in addition to those for the normal period of eight years, and also the scheme whereby all pilot and navigator trainees carry out their basic and applied flying training as probationary officers. The latter scheme provides that on the satisfactory completion of both flying and officer training aircrew are confirmed in their commissions and promoted to the rank of pilot officer.
I should like to take this opportunity of thanking the Press for the generous amount of editorial space devoted during the past year to our great need for aircrew. It has been the policy of the Royal Air Force to do all they can to attract recruits by good conditions of service, and no doubt the material rewards and amenities have had a big effect on recruiting. But we should not forget that many men join because they count it an honour to be in so great a service with so great a future before it.
The facts I have given the House are, as far as they go, encouraging. It is true that recruiting over the last few months has not been quite so good as it was early last year, but without being unduly complacent I do not consider that this need give great cause for alarm because it was only to be expected that late in 1950 and early in 1951, when the combined effect of the introduction of the new pay conditions, the new trade structure and the short three and four year engagements at Regular rates of pay were being felt, there should have been a boost in numbers which could not be constantly maintained at the same high level.
I must however, sound the warning that, owing mainly to the suspension of Regular recruiting during the war, we are still short of experienced airmen and n.c.o.s in certain highly skilled trades.

2111
This applies particularly to the radio servicing trades. We are trying to meet this difficulty by narrower specialisations, which enable a man to do servicing tasks after a shorter period of training. But it will take time to get the situation right.
In the expansion of the Air Force most of the interest, in the public eye, tends to be concentrated on the operational commands. But if the R.A.F. is to preserve its war-time reputation for quality second to none, we must plan not only for new squadrons but for the thorough training of the extra aircrews who will go to those squadrons.
Consider the training of pilots alone: it takes nearly two years to train a pilot to the stage when he can get the best out of a modern aircraft, and this means that trained instructors, aircraft and other valuable resources have to be ploughed back for the time being in order to produce a larger force of the quality which we must maintain. This training is also expensive in works services, because much of it is now carried out in jet aircraft which need runways up to operational standards.
When the re-armament programme was first considered in 1950 the Government of the day took immediate action to increase training facilities. As a result, the training expansion is now well under way, and during the coming year we shall be turning out about 3,000 fully trained aircrew, which is nearly twice as many as in 1951. During 1953, as a result of the opening of still more schools, we shall go very much higher. This I regard as solid progress.
Although my predecessor was not in the Air Ministry for very long, he managed to visit quite a number of stations in Flying Training Command and he has told me how deeply he was impressed by the keenness and determination of the instructors and their pupils. During part of the war I was a flying instructor myself, and so I was greatly pleased to learn that the Training Commands of the Royal Air Force are keeping up the very high standards which they have always set themselves.
We are also receiving considerable help from Canada in the training of aircrew, and it is hoped to arrange, in conjunction with N.A.T.O., to increase the numbers training in Canada. Very soon, we shall
2112
also be getting help in this training from the U.S.A.
Recruitment for the volunteer forces has not been good, but the A.T.C. and the Combined Cadet Force are in fine heart and working hard. Hon. Members of the House have always shown a keen and friendly interest in the progress of the flying scholarship scheme for air cadets. I am glad to say that because of the undoubted practical success of these scholarships, we have decided to award up to 500 of them to the Air Training Corps and to the Combined Cadet Force during the coming year: a handsome increase over the 300 originally awarded this year. I will refer to the Royal Auxiliary Air Force later in my speech.
I can sum up by saying that on the personnel side, the outlook is reasonably encouraging. There are always difficulties, but the men are there and morale is high. The difficulties will be overcome.
It is when we turn to equipment, to the machines that these men have to fight with, that the situation is not so happy. As I said at the beginning of my speech, the decision was made after the war, on the assumption of a stable peace, that no intermediate types should be produced. The production of a modern aircraft is not a quick process. The problems of the some barrier are new and not easily solved, and the greater speeds and heights of jet aircraft bring new problems with them.
There are requirements for new navigation and bombing aids, new means of identification and interception, and before such things can be produced they have to be designed and developed, and then they have to be married up with the aircraft. Indeed, airframes and equipment must be designed as a unity. All this has put a heavy load on the aircraft and the electronics industries.
The decision when to go into production on new aircraft is one which is always extremely difficult to make. Countries tend to move ahead in their developments in spurts, and in the race for aircraft of superior performance the lead frequently changes. Anyone who has attended the S.B.A.C. Show at Farnborough year by year, as I have, will. I am sure, have retained two main impressions: first, how important the jump

2113
forward is from the existing straight-wing types of Service aircraft to the swept-wing and delta-wing types; and, second, that there is a foundation for our belief that we now have prototypes of sufficiently high quality and performance eventually to regain for us the lead which we lost temporarily both to the Americans and to the Russians.
But these new fighters are only prototypes, which means, of course, that so far only one or two are being flown by test pilots. I do not want to create undue anxiety, but it would be quite wrong for me not to make it plain that the air defences of this island at the present time would be woefully inadequate if we had not powerful allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. The expansion of the R.A.F. is under way. But today it is still far from adequate, either to defend our country or to play its part in the defence of Europe and of our Atlantic lifeline.
These things are a matter of life or death for everyone of us in this country. The House is aware of the enormous numerical strength of the Soviet Air Force. But it is not only in numbers that we are so inadequate. Even more important is the fact which the Prime Minister has already told the House, that we are in some respects inferior in the performance of our aircraft. We have today no fighter in service to match the MIG.15 which is already operating in large numbers in Korea, and it will be some time before we begin to re-equip our squadrons with our own latest types.
It is a hard fact that we have temporarily lost our lead, and we cannot regain it for some time to come. There is no doubt that we shall regain it, and this Government will do everything it can to hasten the day. We have already given super-priority to the latest types of aircraft. But that in itself will not serve unless we have the whole-hearted cooperation of everyone.
This business of producing modern aircraft is one at which we have proved we can excel even in war, when the industry was exposed to enemy bombardment. We must have that same spirit throughout industry today—we must have a tremendous productive effort, which, I am convinced, we can and shall get, but only if everyone concerned is
2114
really aware of the need. It is for this reason that I have been frank in describing the present shortcomings of the R.A.F.
There is one other matter on which I must speak plainly. A vitally important element in the air defence of these islands is the Control and Reporting Organisation—the radar chain and the system of controlling fighters and putting them on to their targets in the air. The House will know full well that we were the pioneers of this development of radar—indeed, we might not be here now but for the radar screen, which, perhaps more than anything else, saved England in 1940 and reached such a peak of efficiency in the ensuing years. After the war, many of the stations were given up and others were put on to a care and maintenance basis.
Now, all that is being built up again. I will not pretend it is an easy business or that it is going ahead as fast as we would like. It is not merely a question of getting the old equipment out of store and refurbishing it. Modern techniques and, in particular, the greatly increased performance of the aircraft which might attack us in a future war, compared to last time, mean radical and expensive changes in equipment.
Moreover, the re-establishment of the system on a modern basis involves demands on material and labour which are difficult to meet and conflict with many important civilian requirements in such fields as steel, telecommunications and electronics. Also, many of the stations are in remote places, where labour is scarce.
Nevertheless, it is vital that these difficulties should be overcome. Since the re-armament programme started, the development of the Control and Reporting Organisation has had a high priority and has been pressed on with determination and vigour in so far as it lies within the capacity of the Service to do so. The Government are giving this their special attention and the highest priority. I would like to emphasise that all concerned in the production and supply of any of the material and equipment required must regard it as of transcendent importance. May I also take this opportunity of paying a tribute to the Post Office staff for the excellent work they are doing on the very extensive communications network which the system requires.

2115
The Royal Air Force, in its turn, is determined to play a full part in the all-out drive to bring the nation's defences speedily to a high state of readiness. We intend to cut out all inessential demands upon manpower and materials. We can also help by trying not to change cur minds too often and by doing everything we can to simplify the manufacture and maintenance of aircraft and other equipment. We can also refrain from ordering types of aircraft which, though highly desirable, are not vital for the defence of the country. I will refer again to this matter.
When considering the economies we can ourselves effect, it is right to remember that the Royal Air Force is a rapidly expanding Force. Nevertheless, there are things we can do to economise and we are doing everything we can, short of causing loss of operational efficiency to pare and prune expenditure. We are seeking every possible means of keeping agricultural land open to the farmers and making the smallest possible demands on building labour and materials. Because of this, hardstandings and concrete aprons on airfields have been reduced to the minimum that is operationally acceptable. Economies in the method of installing airfield lighting will produce a considerable financial saving.
We are using all possible expedients to avoid having to spend large sums of money and use large quantities of steel on building new storage accommodation. We have also made savings of money and materials upon domestic accommodation by more economically laid out schemes of heating and plumbing. Men in the Services must be properly accommodated, but it is only right that they should play their part with the rest of the community by really understanding and accepting the need for careful husbandry of our money and resources. We are, however, pressing on with the provision of more married quarters.
I now come to the operational commands. In Fighter Command we are at present necessarily carrying out our expansion with the latest version of existing types of aircraft, and we must continue to do so until the Swift and the Hunter are available. When our expansion is completed we shall have a larger fighter force than we had in 1939 and I must make it plain that although this increase in the home-based
2116
fighter force is being carried out with existing types, it will add very considerably to the security of this country.
The day fighters with which Fighter Command is now armed are still capable of intercepting and shooting down any type of enemy bomber likely to invade these shores in large numbers for some time to come. It is in a fighter versus fighter battle that our inferiority is likely to be apparent although the high quality of our pilots would no doubt largely counteract the difference in aircraft performances. However, we are very glad to have with us in this country Canadian and American fighter squadrons equipped with the Sabre, a high performance fighter which has proved itself in many ways superior to the MIG.15 in combat. Their presence will improve the defensive power of the whole fighter force in this country.
During the past year we have made considerable progress in the expansion and re-equipment of our night fighter force in Fighter Command. All squadrons now have jet aircraft, whereas a year ago all of them still had Mosquitoes. During the current year the rate of expansion will rapidly increase and the Venom night-fighter should do something to bring about a further improvement in quality. All Royal Auxiliary Air Force fighter squadrons have now been re-equipped with jets. They showed great keenness during their three months' intensive training last year and reached a high standard of efficiency. I think the House will wish me, on their behalf, to congratulate them on their good work and thank them for so cheerfully enduring the very real sacrifices which it entailed.
I now come to Bomber Command, which has a vital part to play in the defence of this country. If we think only of fighters, we see only part of the picture. It is never possible to maintain the air defence of a country if the enemy is left with the initiative. We must not be blind to the mistake the Germans made at the end of the last war, when they concentrated almost exclusively on fighter production. We cannot have a bomber force of the size we had in the last war. The cost would be prohibitive. Our aim must be to achieve striking power with fewer aircraft by increasing the bomb

2117
load, by greater accuracy, and by the use of more effective weapons.
I would particularly like to lay stress on the importance of accuracy. It is for this reason that we are developing new navigational and bomb-aiming devices, which are doubly necessary owing to the increased height and speed at which modern bombers operate. In the medium bomber role, we must at present rely on the Washington and Lincoln, which are essentially last war types. They are however fully capable of a wide range of duties. When the Valiant comes in we shall be able to build up a far more effective bomber force, which, in conjunction with the United States Bomber Force, should be able to fulfil all the tasks required of it. The expansion of Bomber Command is at present confined to the Canberra which is a light bomber designed to be used primarily in support of the N.A.T.O. Supreme Commander in Europe. Our Canberra force is not being built up as rapidly as was first hoped, but every effort is being made to speed things up.
The re-equipment of our Photographic Reconnaissance Force also presents problems. The speed and ceiling of modern fighters makes it essential that photographic reconnaissance aircraft should have comparable performance in order that they may bring back the results of their work, without which our Forces would be severely handicapped. For this reason, our Photographic Reconnaissance Force will be re-equipped with the Canberra and possibly other types of jet aircraft. The increase in speed and height presents new problems in the design of the camera and these problems are being tackled.
I will make only a few brief comments upon Coastal Command at this stage, as I understand that we shall have a further discussion when the Amendment in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Darwen (Mr. Fletcher-Cooke) is called.
One of the main lessons of the last war is that the defence of sea communications must be a joint Royal Navy-Royal Air Force responsibility. Official statistics show that more German and Italian U-boats were destroyed in the last war by aircraft than by ships. The House must, however, recognise that the submarine equipped with the Snort presents
2118
a very difficult problem, which is not yet solved.
With present equipment, our Coastal Command aircraft are likely to be less effective than they were in the last war. The balance can be restored only by better weapons and equipment. New types of torpedoes, asdic equipment, sono-buoys and other more subtle means of detecting submerged submarines are being developed.
The expansion and re-equipment of Coastal Command is going steadily ahead. Shackletons have proved to be a satisfactory aircraft for maritime reconnaissance and the first Neptunes are being received from the United States. Co-operation with the Royal Navy is the heart of the matter. It is close and continuous and numerous joint exercises were held during the last year.
The 2nd Tactical Air Force in Germany forms part of General Eisenhower's command and operates under General Norstadt, the Commander-in-Chief Allied Air Forces, Central Europe. Its planned expansion is greater than that of any other single command. Its night-fighter force will be built up. The Venom, a development of the Vampire, will be introduced into the fighter-bomber force. It is our intention to form a strong top-cover force of Sabre Squadrons as soon as these aircraft are available from Canada. Steps are also being taken to make the Second Tactical Air Force mobile, as its role requires.
This is a big job, as it means putting practically everything on wheels except the runways, but my noble Friend is satisfied that this is essential if the Force is to carry out its role effectively. My noble Friend hopes that the relations of the 2nd Tactical Air Force with the European Air Force will be of the closest. We have already given technical help and assisted in the training of the Air Forces of our European Allies.
As the House knows, we do not propose a full integration in the European Defence community, but we do propose the closest liaison with it. We hope, by methods such as the exchange of officers and joint exercises, to bring about a situation where the 2nd Tactical Air Force and the European Air Force can fight together with the greatest confidence and effectiveness.

2119
We fully recognise that the expansion of Transport Command is something which is highly desirable, but regretfully we see no means of expanding it beyond its present size while the expansion of the other operational commands is in progress. The House will, however, bear in mind that in case of emergency we shall have the considerable resources of civil aviation at our disposal. I am sure hon. Members would wish to congratulate Transport Command on the speed and efficiency with which they carried large reinforcements to the Middle East in Hastings and Valettas a few months ago.
So much for the present, I do not think it would be right to end this speech without making some reference to future developments. Restless inventive minds in all countries are constantly peering and searching into the future. It is, therefore, necessary for us to devote a considerable part of our resources to research and development. Fortunately, the aircraft industry is well provided with scientists and designers of originality and with abundant experience.
While the main responsibility lies with our colleagues in the Ministry of Supply, our task in the Air Ministry is to state our operational requirements with regard both to efficiency and to our economic resources. I can, of course, give no detailed descriptions, but the House may want to know something of the lines on which research and development are proceeding.
First, there are the guided missiles, for the development of which Australia has put her wide open spaces at our disposal. Guided missiles are of various sorts and their development is of interest to all three Services. They may be launched from one aircraft to another, from the ground against enemy aircraft, from an aircraft against a ground target and from the ground to another ground target. Among many other objects of research and development are improvements in the armament of our fighters, better detection of enemy aircraft at low heights, and radar and bombing aids for our bombers.
We are trying to simplify the production and maintenance of all our equipment. Even allowing for the rise in costs since before the war, the cost of aircraft and equipment has risen enormously. The improved efficiency of the aircraft is
2120
of little use if the cost makes it impossible to produce them in sufficient numbers. The same consideration will apply if maintenance of equipment is so heavy that no adequate use from it can be obtained, or such use can be obtained only by the inordinate use of manpower.
The simplification of our requirements must, therefore, be a basic element in technical development. Only by confining our demands to what is truly essential and by the constant efforts of our scientific colleagues and technologists, can we achieve adequate air power within the possibilities of the country's economy. I am glad to record that the relations between the Royal Air Force and our scientific colleagues are of the very best and give promise that in the long run we shall not lose this long and terrible race.
I have tried to give the House a broad picture of the Royal Air Force as it is at present; to sketch in some of the more important considerations of the recent past and to indicate a few of our hopes for the future. I have necessarily had to leave many gaps, but I hope that some of these may be filled when, with permission of the House, I speak again later and try to answer the points raised during the debate.
Meanwhile, I trust that those engaged in the work of any branch of the Royal Air Force which I have been unable to mention will not assume that I attach any less importance to their work than I do to those branches with which I have dealt. On the contrary, in a complex, technical service like the Royal Air Force, the efficiency of the Force as a whole depends on the work of every individual member of it.
The same is true when we consider the wider aspect of the Commonwealth and N.A.T.O. Air Forces. The unity and mutual support of the Air Forces of the free world, working in the closest possible accord as members of a team, can provide a powerful deterrent to aggression and a strong first line of defence if war should come.
The Royal Air Force has a vital and formidable task. But it will tackle that task with the same courage, determination and devotion to duty with which it earned, so short a time ago, the admiration of the world.
4.18 p.m.
Mr. Arthur Henderson: I would first like to congratulate the hon. Gentleman, who has just introduced his first Estimates, in his new office as Under-Secretary of State for Air. I hope that during his term of office he will earn the confidence not only of this House but also of the Royal Air Force.
The hon. Gentleman has just become "airborne," and I am sure the whole House sympathises with him in the ordeal through which he has just passed so successfully. He was in a more fortunate position than I when I introduced my first Estimates in March 1948. In that year I was allotted the sum of £173 million, whereas for the coming financial year, 1952–53, as the hon. Gentleman indicated he, or his noble Friend, has been allotted the sum of £467 million. That is just a "small" difference of £300 million. The Under-Secretary referred to the rundown of the Royal Air Force after the war. He also referred to the background of the present situation. He said that at one time, which I think was soon after the war ended in 1945, there were only just over 30,000 Regulars in the Royal Air Force. In 1948 I think that there were only 20.000 Regulars who had been in the Service in 1939.
Between June, 1945, and June, 1947, over 1,100,000 airmen and airwomen were released from the Force. With 20,000 Regulars remaining, many of whom were without the broad experience of leadership that was required to train and supervise the new entrants—National Service men as well as Regular recruits—it is not surprising that the condition of the R.A.F. began to deteriorate. As a result, as the hon. Gentleman has said, this Force, which is largely technical, became seriously unbalanced. There was widespread frustration leading to serious discontent.
The poor standard of accommodation in many of the camps, much of which was temporary war-time accommodation never intended for peace-time use, and the growing shortage of married quarters, only aggravated the situation. When I first went to the Air Ministry in October, 1947, the officials were working on a plan known as P.P.F.—Permanent Peace Force—which provided for a steady
2122
build-up stage by stage of the post-war Air Force. That plan was subsequently replaced by another which provided for a much more rapid expansion as a result of the vastly increased financial provision under the three-year re-armament programme, the second instalment of which was referred to by the hon. Gentleman.
Great credit is due to the officials of the Air Ministry and the Air Force authorities for the efforts they have made to build a balanced Regular Air Force almost from the ground up with, as I think hon. Gentlemen opposite will agree, a considerable degree of success. I am sure that the Minister will agree with me when I make the following comments on the present state of the Royal Air Force. I make them because I spent four years in the Air Ministry, and I should like to complete the picture which was presented by the hon. Gentleman.
First, it will be generally agreed that there is today a high state of morale throughout the Royal Air Force. The members of the Force are in very good heart. I think that that statement will be accepted on both sides of the House. I would then submit that, although we had serious difficulties in the years following the end of the war as a result of the unbalance in the Force, that has been largely put right except for the deficiencies mentioned by the hon. Gentleman in the more advanced trades, such as that of the armament fitter and radar fitter.
The Minister mentioned the improvement in Regular recruiting. Hon. Members on both sides of the House have continually argued that what was necessary was to build up a hard core of Regulars in the Air Force. In 1948 the number of Regulars was approximately 34 per cent. of the total force. Today, the percentage of Regulars is 68 per cent. The hon. Gentleman then referred to aircrew. Not only did he admit it in his speech but it is admitted in the Memorandum published by his noble Friend that there has been an improvement throughout the year in aircrew entrants. That is in accord with my knowledge of the situation.
I wish to emphasise the reference made by the hon. Gentleman to the contribution which is being made by the Government of Canada by the training of pilots

2123
and navigators in Canadian training schools. It was my privilege in September of last year to visit those training schools with the Air Member for Personnel. We were much impressed by the way in which our young men are received by their opposite numbers in the Royal Canadian Air Force. The contribution made by the Government of Canada and the R.C.A.F., by the training of our aircrew, will prove most valuable.
I am a little concerned about one matter and I should like the hon. Gentleman to deal with it later. The Second Report of the Select Committee on Estimates has stated that the lag in the production of fighters and heavier aircraft is anything from three to nine months. That was not contemplated when our plans were made for relating, or marrying, the number of fighters and bombers that were coming off the production line with the number of aircrew from the training schools.
I assume that this will obviously result in an unbalance, because there is no delay in the training of aircrew. I should imagine that it will be an embarrassment to the Air Staff and to the Air Ministry, unless it is that the hon. Gentleman can assure us that, for some reason or another, there will not be any problem. I think that there will be a problem. There will be a lag in the production of aircraft, but not in the training of aircrew.
I referred to the discontent engendered in the early days after the war by reason of the poor accommodation for some of the personnel who were put in temporary war-time camps. There has been considerable improvement. I think that the Minister has been at the Air Ministry long enough to have been told that there was a steady improvement from 1947 onwards in the standard of accommodation for airmen and airwomen.
Some 60 post-war barrack blocks, with an average accommodation of 100 or 150 men or women, are of a very high standard indeed. I can say without fear of contradiction that the record of the Royal Air Force in building married quarters is better than that of the other two Services. These improvements in themselves have made a marked contribution towards improving morale and lessening discontent in the Royal Air Force.
2124
The Prime Minister gave his meed of praise to the trade structure scheme in the defence debate last week, and I believe he was right so to do. It is generally agreed by all who are associated with the Royal Air Force that that has had a quite remarkable effect upon morale—although I do not like to keep using the word "morale." It has increased the happiness of the men, because it has removed a very serious problem from their minds. They now have the opportunity of a life career up to the age of 55, provided certain conditions are fulfilled.
There is one thing about which I am a little perturbed. In the debate on the Army Estimates the Secretary of State for War said:
"We are not only offering a man an opportunity to join the Army for 22 years, but any man who wishes to do so can leave at three-yearly intervals throughout his service. Furthermore"—
and these are the words about which I am concerned—
"provided his conduct is good and he can be employed—and I think in the majority of cases that will be so—he can remain in the Army until he is 55 years of age."
If my memory serves me aright, the estimate I was given last year was that not more than 23 per cent. of entrants into the Royal Air Force could be guaranteed this life career. I do not know whether the Secretary of State for War has, in a sense, overpainted the picture. After all, he was, so to speak, selling his wares. I do not know whether there is any difference between the scheme of the War Office and the scheme of the Air Ministry. Or is it that, for some reason or another, although the Air Ministry pioneered the scheme the War Office have got away with something? If they have, to what extent have they got away with it?
The Secretary of State for War also claimed that he had given instructions
"that the entire staff of the War Office should be cut by 10 per cent. That has been most loyally implemented and it will result in a saving of 750 soldiers and civil servants."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 10th March, 1952; Vol. 497, c. 1028–38.]
He also claimed that he had ordered a "combing of the tail" of the Army, which had resulted in a saving of 10,000 men. That is extremely interesting information. Will the Air Ministry be able to compete with the Army? Will they be able to save 10 per cent. of the

2125
staff of the Air Ministry, both civilian and uniformed?
Will they be able to "comb the tail" of the Royal Air Force to the extent of producing 10,000 bodies? Will they try to do it? It would be interesting to know. I have an idea that there is a catch in the saving in the War Office. But there it is. That statement is made with the authority of the Secretary of State for War. When we were the Government we were lectured many times about the way in which manpower was being wasted, but I am bound to say that the Air Ministry pioneered the way in saving manpower, because the first manpower economy committee was set up by the Air Ministry under my predecessor.
Mr. John Profumo: While the right hon. and learned Gentleman was Secretary of State for Air, did he conduct any examination to find out whether or not there could be any pruning of the Air Ministry staff? If so, to what conclusion did he come?
Mr. Henderson: No doubt the Under-Secretary will correct me if I am wrong; he has the advantage over me here, because I have to draw on my recollection, and I do not carry with me the papers containing this information. If my recollection is right, as a result of the manpower economy committee there was a cut of 20 per cent. in the establishment of the Royal Air Force. To what extent that was translated into an actual reduction in numbers, I cannot say. No doubt the Under-Secretary could find out.
Mr. Profumo: Perhaps I did not make myself quite clear. The right hon. and learned Gentleman does not need any papers for this purpose. It will be within his recollection to tell me whether he himself ordered any investigation of a cutting down of the size of the Air Ministry; and if so, with what result.
Mr. Henderson: I do not think that the hon. Gentleman listened to me.
I said that we were the first Department to have an inquiry into the use of manpower, both in the Air Ministry and in the Royal Air Force. To what extent that resulted in a saving of bodies or the number of bodies that were saved, I do not know. I suggest that the Under-Secretary could find out, because he is in a better position than I am to make
2126
inquiries about it. The point is that, as the War Office are apparently able to save 10,000 bodies as a result of "combing the tail" of the Army, surely we can be told by the Under-Secretary that his noble Friend will not be outdone by his colleague the Secretary of State for War, and that there will be a similar "combing of the tail" of the Royal Air Force.
Air Commodore A. V. Harvey: Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman give way?
Mr. Henderson: The Under-Secretary got through his speech without any interruption.
Mr. Charles Ian Orr-Ewing: There was scarcely anybody on the Opposition benches to interrupt.
Air Commodore Harvey: I feel that the right hon. and learned Gentleman is trying to score a party point. He emphasised at the beginning of his speech that the Royal Air Force is spending £300 million more this year than last year. If that vast amount has to be spent, and wisely spent, surely we must have the staff to do it. While I am all for economy, we must have the people to spend this money wisely.
Mr. Henderson: The hon. and gallant Gentleman has discussed Air Force matters with me for four years, and I do not think he has ever before suggested that I have been anxious to score party points. That is not my purpose at the moment. If he looks at the Army Estimates he will find that there is a considerable increase in them, just as there has been a considerable increase in the Air Estimates, because all three Services are expanding. Yet, although the Army is expanding they are apparently able to achieve this saving of 10,000 bodies.
In the Air Estimates debate last year I said that the front line strength of the Royal Air Force was more than half as large again as in March, 1948. I am sure the Under-Secretary will agree that since March of last year the front line strength has steadily increased. Indeed, that is stated in his noble Friend's memorandum. Referring to fighter strength, I said last year that the worldwide fighter strength in March, 1951, was greater than in September, 1939. I

2127
wonder whether the hon. Gentleman would disagree with me when I suggest that by the end of this year, 1952, it will approximate to the fighter strength we had at the time of the Battle of Britain.
I was not very impressed, if I may say so, with the amount of information the Under-Secretary gave about the size of the Royal Air Force. He mentioned that under the Labour Government in 1946 the front line strength was reduced to 1,000. I am very sorry the right hon. Gentleman the Minister for Housing and Local Government has left the Chamber, because I think he would be interested in what I am going to say.
During my four years in office, complaints were constantly made by hon. Gentlemen opposite that the House was not being given adequate information about the Royal Air Force. In the debate on the Air Estimates in 1949 the right hon. Member for Bromley (Mr. H. Macmillan) said:
"My view is that the great plan and the broad outline of the plan ought to be known to the public…The absurd thing about secrecy is that the facts, in outline, of what we have now are not very difficult to find out. I am sure that every great Power knows the general position and that every Air Attaché who is worth his salt knows it too…I should like more general information to be given to the House of Commons."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 15th March, 1949: Vol. 462, c. 1952–3.]
He pursued the same subject the following year. He said:
"We have not been very successful, for the Air Estimates conceal under a vast statistical apparatus an almost complete black-out, much more complete than the Navy Estimates, on everything of real importance. If we look up the index we can find the most extraordinary range of information, especially on trivial matters, from chimney-sweeps to sewing machines, but if we want to know about the great questions—the number, the character, the equipment and the fighting strength of the actual formations—nothing at all…We have repeatedly asked, why all this secrecy?"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 21st March, 1950; Vol. 472, c. 1728–9.]
Then, not to be outdone by the right hon. Member for Bromley, last year the right hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington (Mr. Eden) said:
"There is a great deal which we should have liked to learn and about which we still do not know…It is getting less and less…I suggest to the Minister of Defence…that it might be better to see whether further
2128
information can be made available not to individual Members of the House, but to the House as a whole."
Later, the right hon. Gentleman said:
"Do not let us have too much secrecy and hush-hush."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 6th March, 1951; Vol. 485, c. 265–8.]
I have looked at the Memorandum—we did not get very much out of the speech of the hon. Gentleman opposite—to see whether there is very much in it. It says:
"The Royal Air Force has grown stronger during the last year…In Fighter Command, there have been further increases in the strength of the forces for defence of the United Kingdom, against attacks by day or night. Nearly all the regular day interceptor squadrons now have the latest marks of Meteor aircraft…In Bomber Command, the first Canberra squadrons have been formed and more will follow during 1952…Coastal Command has been strengthened, but further expansion is necessary for the Command to perform its increasingly important role…In Europe, the Royal Air Force 2nd Tactical Air Force is a most important contribution to the resources of the Supreme Allied Commander. Our largest expansion is taking place in this Command; its increased front line strength will include squadrons equipped with Venom aircraft."
Mr. C. I. Orr-Ewing: Is the right hon. and learned Gentleman reading from this year's Memorandum or from last year's White Paper? It sounds very similar to me.
Mr. Henderson: I am not reading from the Memorandum for 1951–52, but from the Memorandum for 1952–53, which is the year we are dealing with in this debate.
The hon. Gentleman says it sounds very much like what was in the Memorandum last year. That is exactly my complaint. I was chided last year because I would not give any figures as to numbers of squadrons, numbers of front line aircraft and numbers of types in the front line. The right hon. Member for Bromley called it a black-out and the right hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington said there was too much secrecy and hush-hush. Were they really serious, or were they merely using the big stick with which to beat the then Government?
Mr. Orr-Ewing: Could the right hon. and learned Gentleman say what he achieved in his first 10 days at the Air Ministry compared with what my hon. Friend has achieved?
Mr. Henderson: I do not believe that the Under-Secretary of State for Air really thinks I am making any personal attack upon him. He was not even hi the Air Ministry when the Memorandum was drafted. I am quite sure the hon. Gentleman takes no exception to my reference to what is in the Memorandum. Quite frankly, I am not pointing a finger at the present Secretary of State either. All I say is that both the right hon. Member for Bromley and the right hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington, who are members of the Cabinet, if they seriously believe that more information should be given to the House and to the country, should have taken the necessary action to ensure that such information was given on the occasion of this debate.
I will now say a word about equipment. In his speech, the hon. Gentleman very rightly drew attention to the fact that we have no fighter equal to the MIG.15. The same point, of course, was debated during the Air Estimates last year when I admitted that the MIG.15 had a superior performance, certainly as far as level speed was concerned, against the Meteor or the Vampire. I entirely agree, if I may say so, with the Prime Minister that it is not a good arrangement for the highest class of pilots to have only second best machines. I think we must give our pilots, whether of Fighter, Bomber, Coastal or Transport Command the best available machines, and we must constantly endeavour to ensure that the best machines are available.
I will give the background of the day fighter. In 1949, the Meteor 8 and the Vampire 5 were regarded as the best fighters in the world, and certainly to my own knowledge most of the Air Forces of the world, with the possible exception of the Soviet and the United States Air Forces, were all queueing up to obtain supplies of either the Meteor 8 or the Vampire 5.
Wing Commander N. J. Hulbert: Then you sold them to the Russians.
Mr. Henderson: We listened with great courtesy to the Under-Secretary of State for Air, and I hope that the same courtesy will be extended to me.
These Meteors and Vampires were then in service in considerable numbers with our Regular squadrons. In 1950,
2130
the MIG.15 came along, which, as we all admit, has a superior performance to the Meteor or the Vampire in level fight. Then, in the autumn of 1950, the Hawker fighter, the Hunter, to which the hon. Gentleman referred this afternoon, and the Supermarine Swift were ordered in quantity off the drawing board. That was the earliest time that the Air Ministry could have placed that order. Both these planes are, of course, superior in performance to the MIG.15.
There is one aspect of this shortage to which I have already referred. I said that I do not think anyone could deny that the sooner we get the F.3 and the Swift into production the better it will be for the efficiency of Fighter Command and the fighter squadrons of the Royal Air Force. Our need of the F.3 and the Swift does not, in my submission, mean that we do not today possess an effective fighter force composed, as it is, not only of Meteor 8's and Vampire 5's but, as the hon. Gentleman said, of the American and Canadian Sabre squadrons. I believe—and I think it is the view of a good many Royal Air Force pilots—that the Meteors and Vampires would give a very good account of themselves if, unhappily, they were ever called upon to go into action.
May I bring to the notice of the House the views of Major Jabara, the American fighter ace in Korea, who said that in his view the jet pilots in Western Europe, with their present machines and equipment, could hold their own against Russia's MIG.15's in combat, man against man and plane against plane; that is his own statement. Therefore, while intensifying our efforts to speed up the production of the more modern fighter, I hope that nothing will be said or done to undermine the confidence of our pilots in their present machines.
The hon. Gentleman referred to the Canberra light bomber with which squadrons of Bomber Command are to be equipped, and which I think he will agree is regarded as the best of its kind to be found in any Air Force in the world today. The Valiant, as the hon. Gentleman admitted, was ordered off the drawing board. It may be that the long-term policy to which he has referred, and to which the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence referred in the

2131
defence debate—the policy which governed the advent of a four jet engined bomber—may, in the light of subsequent events, prove to have been unwise.
I do not think, however, that anyone in any Government could, in 1946 or 1947, have anticipated the Berlin blockade, or the invasion of South Korea by North Korea and subsequently by the Chinese forces. The Valiant, as the hon. Gentleman admitted, was ordered off the drawing board, and I hope that the tragic setback which this plane has recently had will not deter the Air Ministry from proceeding with this aircraft.
The fundamental difficulty confronting us in building up the Royal Air Force arises from the pressure for quantitative as well as qualitative power in each branch. While there is general agreement on the need for a balanced Air Force, some wanting a preponderance of fighters, others wanting a preponderance of bombers, some wanting a preponderance of aircraft for Coastal Command and others wanting a preponderance of transport machines, it is quite impracticable, in my opinion, to equip the Royal Air Force with great numbers of modern machines in all four Commands out of the means available or likely to be available; nor, in my view, is it essential.
The hon. Gentleman said that our air defences would be woefully inadequate if we did not have powerful allies. Does he or any other hon. Gentleman really believe that we have sufficient resources to match the production of a country like the Soviet Union? It is quite impracticable; it is impossible. Surely we must remember that we are part of a Western defence system, and the strength of our Air Force must, therefore, be related to that of our partners in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Our target should be to have a fighter force adequate to enable us to defend the United Kingdom and to make an adequate contribution to the combined fighter forces of the Western Allies in Europe and elsewhere.
We should, in my view, similarly relate the strength of our Bomber Command to the bomber strength of our American allies. Of course, we must make our contribution, but the Amercans, with their greater resources, must obviously have to make the major quantitative contribution to the combined bomber forces of the Western democracies.
2132
In other words, while the main responsibility for strategic bombing must, in these circumstances, rest with the American Air Force, Britain must build up a bomber striking force to co-operate with the American bomber force both for strategical and tactical purposes. Similar considerations should, in my opinion, govern the building-up of those vitally important Commands, Coastal and Transport.
At the end of the last war we were faced with a new weapon of attack, the V.2. We are told that it took only two minutes to travel from North Foreland to London and that it reached a height of 300,000 feet. If, unhappily, war ever came again, bombers must be available to strike at the sites from which the V.2 might be fired, because as far as I know—I may be wrong—there is as yet no other way of intercepting the V.2. On the other hand, the cost of the jet bomber remains very high, although I was interested in the suggestion—a new one to me—that we should have a very small bomber force but capable of carrying a very heavy weight of bombs. If that were possible that would be one way of dealing with the problem.
There is, however, another way which might be considered. So long as the cost of the jet bomber remains so high—and it is very high today—I agree that large numbers are out of the question. Perhaps the remedy may be found along the lines which the hon. Gentleman suggested, or alternatively in a simplified mass-produced jet bomber which could be produced at a lower cost. Moreover, whether we have a small number of bombers or a large number of bombers, so far as any possible enemy is concerned, we have the advent of the modern jet bomber which raises a vital defence problem.
In 1916 a German aeroplane took 58 minutes to fly from North Foreland to London, flying at 10,000 feet with a bomb load approximating six cwt. Today, one jet bomber would do the journey in six minutes flying at 30,000 feet, and it could drop an atomic bomb the equivalent of 20,000 tons—not lb.—of explosive. The jet fighter, backed by a modern radar chain, may be an effective defence against the jet bomber, but with bombers and fighters flying at speeds exceeding 500 miles an hour many experts consider that other means of defence must be found

2133
such as the guided missile to which the hon. Gentleman referred—although he did not make much of a reference—radarcontrolled, which can home on to a bomber and destroy it.
In my view, it is essential in the present circumstances, therefore—and I am not making this suggestion in any spirit of criticism—to intensify research and development, both air to air, ground to air and air to ground, as the hon. Gentleman suggested. We are confronted with the remorseless progress of scientific destruction. So long as wars unhappily afflict the world, so long will weapons even more deadly than those up to date be developed until, eventually, there will come the weapons that will destroy mankind.
We are told, again, that Russia is now spending £10,000 million a year on armaments, that the United States is spending £15,000 million and that we are spending £1,400 million. The entire world is mortgaging its future in a colossal arms race unprecedented in world history in peacetime. Surely the Governments of the world, in face of this menacing threat to all their peoples, must realise that it is their supreme duty to bring speedy security to a world that is in danger of annihilation.
I am certain the people themselves demand peace, and it is therefore imperative, in my view, that everything should be done to secure effective agreement in the disarmament discussions which are taking place under the auspices of the United Nations. An agreement on armaments might well transform the international situation and lead to those political settlements which are essential if we are to secure a stable world at peace.
On the other hand, until practical results have been achieved, we must all realise that it is the imperative duty of whatever Government may be in power in this country to ensure that we make our full contribution to the collective defence of peace consistent with the maintenance of our economic and social stability, and an essential part of that contribution must obviously be a highly efficient Royal Air Force.
5.2 p.m.
Mr. W. R. D. Perkins: As an old flying instructor, I wonder if I may be allowed to congratulate my hon. Friend the Under-
2134
Secretary of State for Air on a brilliant first solo, I must remark on the fact that he was airborne in 45 minutes, whereas the Secretary of State last year took an hour and 20 minutes. I am certain that my hon. Friend is now on the circuit, resting, and, later, in the early hours of tomorrow morning, I have no doubt that he will make a brilliant three-point landing all in one piece. I am sure that we all wish to congratulate him and to wish him the very best of luck in the difficult task which he has undertaken.
The Memorandum which has been supplied with the Air Estimates is, I believe, a soothing and, to a certain extent, a misleading document. I believe that it is an attempt to whitewash those people who are largely responsible for the present state of our air defences. In the last five years, we have spent something like £1,145 million on our air defences, and I think we are entitled to ask if we got value for that money, and, if we have got value for that money, why it is that the Air Force which, only six years ago, was all powerful, irresistible and invincible, has steadily wilted and withered until today it is relatively in a worse position than it has ever been since the late Colonel Guest disbanded the Service in 1919 and 1920.
I believe that, today, if the tragedy of war should occur, the Royal Air Force is not at present in a position to defend our country. I believe that the reason why we have fallen behind is because of the cut that was made in the Estimates four years ago, and to which reference has been made by the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. A. Henderson).
The Estimates were reduced from £212 million in 1947 to £173 million in 1948, a drop of £39 million, and I believe that it was that drop that is the prime cause of all our troubles today, and that the responsibility for that cut must rest fairly and squarely on the shoulders of hon. Members opposite.
Mr. Emrys Hughes: The hon. Member supported it.
Mr. Perkins: I could not have supported it, because I was not in the House.
Now, to go into greater detail, I want to refer to Fighter Command and today fighters only at the moment. We have not got in Fighter Command today one

2135
modern, swept-back wing fighter. All the fighters in Fighter Command today are not obsolete, but they are obsolescent in type, and, worse still, there is no prospect of our getting modern, swept-back wing fighters into Fighter Command, unless we buy them with dollars from America or Canada, for at least two years.
We won the Battle of Britain by quality—the quality of our machines and the quality of the pilots. We have been told today that we now have the necessary quality in the Hunter and the Swift, and it is universally agreed that these two aircraft are superior to the MIG.15, but will they be superior when they reach our squadrons in three years' time? Today, MIG.15 is finding its way into the Russian satellite air forces. It is obvious to me that the Russians are beginning to regard the MIG.15 as a second-line aircraft, and it is therefore also obvious that they have got something better up their sleeves—something which they are going to produce in two or three years' time.
I want to ask the Under-Secretary two questions. Will the Hunter and the Swift, when they go into the squadrons in two or three years' time, be superior to the latest Russian fighter? My second question is: Are these machines in production today, or are we still fiddling around with prototypes? Has a production line been laid down? Are we going right ahead with the production of these machines today? I believe that, if the answer is "No," the factories are still trying to improve the prototypes and have not yet actually started production of these machines.
Next, I come to night fighters. We read in this Memorandum that the squadrons have all been re-equipped. With what have they been re-equipped? With Meteor 11 and the Vampire 10 machines, which have no ejector seats and which are now obsolescent? I want to ask the Under-Secretary when we are likely to get modern machines in the night fighter squadrons? When are we likely to see the De Havilland 110 or the Gloster G.A.5? I read in the Press that they are to go into manufacturers' trials, which means that they are unlikely to go into the squadrons for at least three years, and probably even five years.
2136
Fighter Command today is a little low, and, as far as I can see, there is little chance of it being on top of the world again for at least two years, and probably three years. I believe that the main reason why Fighter Command has dropped back is the cut that was made four years ago.
I wonder if I might digress for a moment to the subject, which I am sure will be out of order, of the relationship between Fighter Command, guided missiles and the anti-aircraft defences. We read in the "Illustrated London News" last year that we are manufacturing and experimenting with a guided missile that will seek out and destroy at long range an enemy bomber, that will find its own target, and, by some mysterious process, will be attracted to the enemy aircraft before it reaches our shores. This country is eminently suited for rocket defence. Our frontiers are short compared with the frontiers of many other countries in the world.
Mr. Emrys Hughes: But we have a bigger population in a smaller space.
Mr. Perkins: Yes, we have a bigger and more concentrated population. It would be an easy matter to have round our coasts, like our radar chains, rocket stations from which these guided missiles could be fired. I believe these guided missiles are very nearly operational now and I should like to know who is to command those in charge of them and who is to be responsible for firing them, whether from the ground or from the air?
We cannot have our fighter pilots in the air at the same time as the missiles, for the missiles might not seek out the enemy bomber but one of our own fighters. We cannot have our fighter pilots going into action with the fear that behind their shoulders one of these monstrosities will come up and torpedo them. Who is to be in charge of the guided missiles when they appear? The whole control of guided missiles and Anti-aircraft Command must be taken from the Army and the Ministry of Supply and must be handed over entirely to Fighter Command.
As to Bomber Command, the hon. and gallant Member for Derby, North (Group Captain Wilcock) made a most interesting contribution a fortnight ago in the course

2137
of the debate on defence. I think he proved conclusively to the House that a heavy bomber force in this country would definitely act as a deterrent to any foreign aggressor. It would make the aggressor think twice. I entirely agree with him in that, although we probably disagree on every other subject under the sun. Not only would a bomber force in this country be a deterrent, but it would be a very effective form of defence against any potential attacker. Perhaps the most effective means of destroying any rockets or guided missiles is to smash the factories where they are made and their breeding and spawning grounds. If that is done the enemy attack will soon wither away.
Today, Bomber Command is equipped with Washington B29s—obsolete aircraft. They have been pensioned off for a long time. They have been in rest camps in cocoons. They have been brought out of those cocoons and are now in service with Bomber Command. Bomber Command may have two squadrons of Canberras, but that is all. That has been published in the Press so I am not letting out any official secrets. One day Bomber Command will have the Valiant, to which the Under-Secretary of State has referred. But as far as I can see, the chance of their reaching squadrons in quantities must be four years and may well be five years ahead. Today, Bomber Command is incapable of fulfilling its proper function of either acting as a deterrent to the enemy or destroying the breeding grounds where enemy bombers are made.
The Under-Secretary referred to Transport Command. He admitted it was an unwanted child of the Royal Air Force. He admitted it was really incapable of doing its job.
Mr. Ward: I really must correct that. I said nothing of the sort. I never made any such implication.
Mr. Perkins: That was certainly the impression that my hon. Friend gave me. He gave the impression that the whole of the R.A.F. wanted to concentrate on Bomber Command and Fighter Command and that Transport Command had to take a back seat, but if I am wrong I gladly apologise and withdraw.
The plain fact is that when we had to have a lot of transport machines to
2138
break the blockade of Berlin. Transport Command could not supply them and it had to call in civilian operators. When we had to send the Airborne Division out to Cyprus at the time of the Abadan trouble again Transport Command could not do the job and the Airborne Division which would normally expect to go by air, went by sea. It is quite obvious to me that Transport Command is very much a paper command.
As to Coastal Command, we have a handful of Shackletons. I do not know whether they are very good or very bad. All I know is that they are the old Lincolns re-designed and re-hashed in 1946, given another coat of paint, given a different name, given more petrol and a lot of gadgets. Whether the Shackleton is a good aeroplane or not I am not prepared to say, but I know that we have not very many of them.
The Under-Secretary will say, "What about the Neptunes?" The Press were asked to visit Coastal Command on 18th January last, They came back and reported that we then had only two Neptunes; so, obviously, we cannot place great reliance on Coastal Command with two Neptunes. Coastal Command today is in a sad state. I believe that the reason is that the Air Council, naturally and quite rightly, concentrate on fighters and bombers to defend this country. If they have anything to spare it goes to Coastal Command or Transport Command, but I believe that Coastal Command is regarded today as a kind of sideline. It is a rest home for the halt, the lame and the blind.
Air Commodore Harvey: No.
Mr. Perkins: I remember that when the Russian Ambassador was staying in Mr. Speaker's constituency outside Cheltenham during the last war he was asked one day by a friend of mine if he could explain why, at the beginning of the war, the Russian Government had liquidated so many of their generals. He turned round and very smartly and intelligently said, "We did not have a Cheltenham to which we could retire them."
I believe that Coastal Command is today the Cheltenham of the Royal Air Force Something is obviously radically wrong with that Command. It is more important to this country than is the

2139
British Navy. The Navy no longer have to worry about surface ships except, of course,, a few raiders. There are no longer battle fleets for the Navy to fight. All the Navy has to do is to keep our sea lanes clear of submarines and mines; and against the submarines in the last war the aeroplane was proved to be by far the most effective weapon. The Admiralty on 10th June, 1945, said—
Captain Robert Ryder: If my hon. Friend will allow me to interrupt, this is the second time that the claim has been made that more submarines have been sunk by aircraft. I should like to call my hon. Friend's attention to Cmd. 6751, which indicates that more submarines were sunk by ships than were sunk by aircraft. It is rather important that these misleading statements should not go out uncorrected.
Mr. Perkins: There appears to be a difference of opinion between us, because on 10th June, 1945. the Admiralty issued the statement that 781 U-boats had been sunk in the war, of which 413 were sunk either by bombing or by air attack or by ships working in conjunction with the air. That means that 413 out of 781, well over 50 per cent., could be attributed to the aeroplane.
Captain Ryder: That enables me to return to the charge. Since those claims were made this Command Paper has been published, dated 1946. It was the result of very careful examination and the figures were set out with very great care. If one adds up the total sunk by ships and ship-borne aircraft and submarines—
Air Commodore Harvey: Ah!
Captain Ryder: But the point was that the statement quoted by my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud and Thornbury (Mr. Perkins) was made in connection with Coastal Command.
Air Commodore Harvey: No.
Captain Ryder: Yes, it was. I think it is quite clear that my hon. Friend was referring to Coastal Command. Therefore, I think it is important that these misleading statements should not go out uncorrected.
Mr. Geoffrey de Freitas: I wonder if the hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes) would arbitrate in this matter?
Mr. Perkins: Perhaps I had better leave this highly contentious subject and go back to 1930.
I was a very humble, junior and insignificant Member of this House at that time. There was then a feud between the Admiralty and the Air Ministry. The Admiralty were anxious to get hold of Coastal Command, and various hon. Members of the House took sides. At that time I did my level best to help my friends who were fighting this battle. I was convinced that the old seadogs at that time did not realise the danger of aircraft attacks on ships and on submarines. The old seadogs were not air-minded and they were convinced that a battleship of that day could never be sunk by air power.
I have looked up the debate on the Navy Estimates for 17th March, 1938, and our present Prime Minister, who is usually well in advance of his time on these matters, then ridiculed the idea that any ship could be sunk by air power. He poked fun at my old friend who was sitting on the other side of the House—the then Member for Hertford, Admiral Sir Murray Sueter—suggesting to him that it was quite impossible for an aeroplane to fly along the deck of a ship and drop a bomb down the funnel, and he ended that speech with these words:
"…the air menace, however seriously it may operate in other directions, will not destroy the validity of sea power."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 17th March, 1938; Vol. 333, c. 664.]
The same gentleman, when he was Prime Minister, only three years afterwards—on 11th December, 1941—when the "Prince of Wales" and the "Repulse" had been sunk, announced the news in the House in these words:
"Both ships were sunk by repeated air attacks by bombers and by torpedo-aircraft."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 11th December, 1941; Vol. 376, c. 1695.]
Within three years that very distinguished thinker, the present Prime Minister, had realised that the impossible had happened.
I believe that from that moment onwards the Admiralty began to wake up and to realise the danger of air attack not only on big ships but on submarines.

2141
There came over them a change of heart. I believe that there should be pinned up in every room in the Admiralty that date—11th December, 1941. Today, like many converts, they are a bit too enthusiastic about air power. Their Fleet Air Arm have something like 28 different types of aircraft, whereas they really ought to have only three or four types. They are a bit too air-minded—in many ways more air-minded than some of the air marshals in the Air Ministry.
It is because of this change of heart which has taken place in the Admiralty and because Coastal Command is, as I say, the unwanted child of the Air Force, that that part of Coastal Command which is vital for the sinking of submarines should be taken away and given to the Admiralty, and that the responsibility for keeping our sea lanes clear of submarines should rest fairly and squarely on the shoulders of the Admiralty alone.
5.25 p.m.
Mr. F. Beswick: I should like to add my good wishes to the new Under-Secretary of State for Air. I hope he has a happy term of office, although a short-lived one. As fraternal greetings have been bandied about between one instructor and another, I think it should be stated that there are also former instructors on this side and, as a product of the Central Flying School myself, I think I am entitled to be included amongst them.
I am not surprised that we have had the usual complaint about the incomplete information that is provided to the House. Despite all the rash promises made by Government spokesmen when they were on this side, I noticed that in the literature they publish the word "substantial" is still preferred to hard figures. I beg leave to doubt whether a discussion of Air Estimates is best carried out in a Chamber of this kind.
I recognise that a great weight of responsibility does rest upon the Chiefs of Staff and upon the Air Council, and I recognise that they must pay very close regard to the question of security; but, after all, Members of Parliament also have a responsibility. In fact we have a dual responsibility. We have a responsibility not only for ensuring that the money collected from our constituents is spent wisely, but, as representatives of the
2142
people, for trying to assure ourselves that the physical safety of our people is being safeguarded.
Here I speak only for myself, but I sometimes think that some modification—some form of the American Military Affairs Committee—might very well be adopted for the discussion of these matters. One of the first items about which I should like some more information—though I doubt very much whether I shall be given it—is the question of our control and reporting system. The Under-Secretary, in introducing these Estimates, did stress its importance. He said that we were going to press on with the overhaul of our radar network with determination and vigour. I hope all our affairs in this field are pressed on with determination and vigour; but it really does not tell us very much.
I realise that we cannot get details, but I wonder whether it would be possible to know in what time it was originally intended to complete this overhaul. Is it likely to be completed within that time and, if not, is it material, equipment, personnel or a mixture of all three that will limit progress?
The second subject on which I should like to put several questions if I were a member of one of these American-type committees is one which was mentioned by the hon. Member for Stroud and Thornbury (Mr. Perkins) and one on which my right hon. Friend, the former Secretary of State, also had some very thoughtful and thought-provoking words to say. I refer to our defences against guided missiles and rocket projectiles. I should say that, as a former junior Minister, I have no information at all on these subjects, but I suggest that Soviet Russia is much further advanced in these matters than we are prepared to admit.
It seems almost certain that they have got a good deal of information and "know-how" from the Germans. Some of the Germans went over to their side voluntarily, some were bribed, and I know the names of at least two who were kidnapped and taken over there. In one way or another it is quite certain that the Russians have benefited a good deal from the experience and the research of the Germans during the last war.
If I may divert for a moment, I would say that there are three reasons why patriotic and intelligent citizens sometimes

2143
doubt the whole underlying assumptions of our arms programme. One reason is that although we are told that this is a time of great urgency we are, precisely at this time, running down our strategic stocks of essential raw materials. The second reason is that amongst all the work that is going on there is no sign that any provision is being made for deep-shelter accommodation for the civilian population. It is difficult to say that there is any urgency at the present time in our civil defence preparations.
I know that these two matters do not come within the scope of the Air Estimates, but this third matter does come within their scope, and it is one which alarms a good many thoughtful citizens of our country at the present moment. The big question in the minds of many people is the possibility of defence against projectiles and guided missiles. It is a mistake to think that people will be reassured by any impressive silence. Moreover, it is impossible for us, as Members of Parliament, to form a valid or worthwhile judgment about other decisions which this Government have taken unless we know something about the possibilities in this field.
We know that in the last war the German V.2 carried a warhead of one ton for a distance of about 200 miles and had an accuracy of around four miles. A great deal of research has been done since that time. About three or four years ago the United States Navy Department went or record with this statement, that it was
"a safe assumption that rockets with atomic warheads capable of thousands of miles of range could not be expected for 25 years."
Well, that may be some consolation to the people of the United States, but it is no consolation to the people of this country who are living considerably nearer to possible launching bases than the distance quoted by the United States Navy Department.
I am not convinced that there are not rockets with an atomic warhead now available which could traverse the distance to this island from possible launching bases. I remember discussing some of these possibilities in 1946 with one of the principal scientific advisers to Mr. Stalin. He told me at that time, in 1946, that they had in Russia already
2144
succeeded in separating fissionable isotopes, that they had stocks of plutonium, and that a bomb would be produced within two or three years time. My English scientist friends derided this suggestion, "Here," they said, "is an example of Soviet boasting." We now know that that Russian scientist was telling me the truth. I am inclined to think that the under-estimate which we had of the Russian development of the atomic bomb is probably duplicated in respect to guided missiles.
I have gone into this matter in some detail because it will have relevance to what I want to say at a later stage of my speech. All I now wish to ask is this: Can the Under-Secretary give us some general information about the possibility of defence against these guided missiles? If, for example, we are depending upon light or heavy bombers for destroying these missiles at their launching bases, as suggested by the hon. Member for Stroud and Thornbury, there are some of us who would wish to question the wisdom of giving super-priority, as the Prime Minister suggested, to our fighter defences.
Now I should like to turn to a rather more congenial subject. It concerns the total supply in this country and the potential reserve of pilots. Later I wish to say something about the supply and potential reserve of transport aircraft. We are all very glad to learn that the recruitment of pilots has improved so sharply, but I would argue that in this country we need a much larger pool of trained pilots in reserve than anything of which hon. or right hon. Gentlemen opposite have yet spoken.
When I had some responsibility for these matters in the Ministry of Civil Aviation, I was very keen to get a scheme working which would ensure a regular flow of recruits into the airline pilots profession. I was convinced that there were ample numbers of young men in this country who would be only too glad to turn to the airline pilots profession if, first, they could get their preliminary training without the expenditure of several thousand pounds, and secondly, if they knew how to go about it. Here, perhaps, I might digress again to say that, after all, this profession is not without its attractions. A senior captain's pay today is equal to that of a present-day

2145
Cabinet Minister, and is twice that of the hon. Gentleman who presented these Estimates.
Mr. Emrys Hughes: It is more dangerous.
Mr. Beswick: It certainly has greater security than that of hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite in their posts, and it attracts a pension.
My idea was to get young men interested in this profession before it came to the time when they had to report for National Service. I do not wish to be unfair, but I and others have the impression that the Air Ministry are not cooperating in this scheme quite so enthusiastically as they might. I am not now thinking of trained pilots only for the air corporations—I think the organisation they serve is immaterial provided we have the trained reserves available—but the more and the higher quality available for taking further training with the air corporations or with one of the charter companies.
I hope the Under-Secretary will note my remarks on this subject, because I know that he is as enthusiastic about this as I am. I hope that he will look into this himself to make absolutely certain that there is the fullest partnership and support between the Air Ministry, the Ministry of Civil Aviation, the air corporations and the charter companies in getting young men interested in this idea of National Service as a gateway to the airline pilots profession.
I now come to the question of aircraft. There is a growing realisation that we need a greatly increased capacity of transport aircraft in this country, but I doubt very much whether many people realise just how big a capacity we shall need one day. I am not thinking in terms of another two or three squadrons, or an additional 50 or 60 machines. I am thinking in terms of hundreds, if not thousands, of transport aircraft. The Berlin airlift gave us some idea of the possible problem. We have had other reminders in connection with Persia and Egypt.
Reference has already been made to a dinner in the City of London celebrating the fact that we flew 3,000 men out to Egypt, but I believe I am correct in saying that up to December of last year no fewer than 121,000 men had been flown
2146
half way round the world from San Francisco to the Japanese and Korean theatres of war. That is the order of the military problem, and it may well be that our own problems will be even bigger than that.
Besides the emergence of war-time uses, there is the question of air trooping. The Prime Minister said the other day that at any time there are 30,000 Service men in the pipe line; that is to say, coming or going from or to one or other theatre for which we have responsibility. I will not go into the figures, although some of them are known. The economics of air trooping as against sea trooping repay the most profound study; they are fascinating. I should have thought that added weight ought to be given to the advantages of air trooping. I say this partly because it is a better way of making the best possible use of the limited number of men available, and partly because it will have ready for us in war-time a ready-made reserve.
There is another matter about which I want to go into some detail. As the House knows, I had the privilege a few years ago of seeing two atomic bombs detonated. I am not likely to forget either spectacle. But to me the second one, the under-water detonation, was something quite out of this world. I remember that senior military officers and scientists around me were provoked into stamping and shouting to express their emotion when they saw this tremendous spectacle. What occurred to me immediately was, "Here is the method of attack that is going to be most deadly so far as we are concerned." I could very well imagine the Pool of London throwing up similar showers of radio contaminated spray.
I understand from one American journal that the Americans have a plan to put China out of action by rendering her waterways unusable. I do not know whether that plan is feasible or not. What I do know is that it would be quite feasible to put our Island out of commission if we were entirely dependent, if our communications and our supplies were entirely dependent, on our own waterways and ports and harbours. Members will, perhaps, now see why I went into some detail about the possibilities of guided missiles. Have we any defence that can prevent these weapons falling upon our harbours and ports?

2147
Have we any defence that can stop high flying aircraft from dropping these bombs from great heights, and probably 15 miles away from our coasts? I doubt it.
I do think that this is a possibility that we must concentrate on—that to all intents and purposes this Island can be rendered unusable so far as sea transport is concerned. We hear a lot in this Chamber about the dangers of submarines and mines and so on. I gather that there is to be quite a mock fight later on between the airmen and the sailors as to whether Coastal Command should be a naval or Air Force command. Such a fight` may well be quite unrealistic, and utterly irrelevant to the facts of the situation. If a ship, with the aid of the Admiralty or of the Royal Air Force, survived the submarine menace and found its way to these shores, of what use would it be if, when it arrived, the harbours were out of commission? Of what value would a ship in such circumstances be to us? In such circumstances, hundreds—indeed, thousands—of transport aircraft to assure the delivery of supplies to this Island would be absolutely invaluable, and we have to think in those terms.
I put forward this demand all the more confidently because I feel that a programme of this kind, unlike so many other military demands, can be undertaken without incurring an absolutely intolerable economic burden. The machines I have in mind can also develop a manufacturing capacity which would give us a tremendous export potential. One of the most telling points, I thought, in the document which was circulated by the Air League, was the figures it gave of weight against value ratio of transport aircraft. The figures, as most Members will know, were as follows: a De Havilland Comet represents exports worth approximately £530,000, and has a deadweight of approximately 50,000 lb.; the comparable weight of motor cars has an export value of between £10,000 and £15,000.
I am suggesting that the Under-Secretary of State needs to build up our transport aircraft reserve. It will be in his interest and in our country's interest to have a manufacturing potential for this type of aircraft, both for our own commercial needs and for the export trade. I have not time to go into all the details of how this force could be deployed.
2148
Quite obviously, however, Transport Command should be built up and priority given to the new machines for our air corporations. We should develop our air freighter services from this country, and I should like to see a large organisation, preferably a publicly-owned organisation, specialising in air trooping.
Just a word about aircraft types. Any one who goes to Farnborough, as the hon. Gentleman said, and has anything of an eye for aircraft, could not help but think that in the Valiant we have a basic type to provide for us admirable transport machines. I personally should like to see something bigger. Could the hon. Gentleman say whether the possibility of developing this aircraft as a transport machine is being explored with all the urgency that it requires?
Second, let me say something about flying boats. I am, sorry to see the Princess put back again. There was talk in a magazine the other day about the "martyrdom" of the flying boats. If ever a flying boat was martyred I think the Princess was, and by the manufacturers of aircraft engines. The treatment of the Princess flying boat from the engine point of view has been really appalling, and if the full story could be told I think it would reflect very badly on those people who had the responsibility for building the engines for that flying boat. Nevertheless, although it has been put back, I think there is still a great need for an aircraft of this weight which can alight on water, and I hope that the Air Ministry will not go back on its declared intention of using these machines for transport purposes. I hope that the Proteus III engines will be given some priority, and that the Princess will get some of the first engines that are produced at Bristol.
Third—but by no means of least importance—in connection with the aircraft programme is the necessity in this country for a big multi-engined helicopter. It is really a tragedy the way we have got so far behind in the development of this machine. I should like the hon. Gentleman to promise me that he will give this project his personal and his urgent attention in conjunction with the Ministry of Civil Aviation and the Ministry of Supply. There are immense possibilities for a machine of this kind—for a 40-seater helicopter—both for civil use

2149
and for military use. We need these machines very badly, and I hope that we shall be told that work on a machine of the type and size I suggest has been started.
Let me sum up what I have asked for and the opinions I have ventured to offer in this debate. What progress is being made in the overhaul of our radar network? On what do we fix our hopes for defence against guided missiles and projectiles? Will the hon. Gentleman give me an assurance that he will get a positive and enthusiastic partnership between his Department and the Ministry of Civil Aviation, in their common interests, to ensure an infinitely greater reserve of trained pilots and of transport aircraft? Will he give his support for greater priority for those jet transports that are now in production? Will he see that absolutely no time is lost in the development of bigger and faster machines that will be available by the year 1956? Will he promise that the decision to fit the Princess flying boats with a Proteus III engine is not made an excuse to scrap the project altogether? Will he also lend his energies, together with those of the other Departments concerned, to getting for this country a multi-engined 40-seater helicopter within the next four or five years?
In the last war the Allies had an agreement in which we concentrated on fighter planes. I think that at this time we might well have another agreement under which the United Kingdom could concentrate upon transport machines. Overseas transport communications are important to the United States. But to us, in peace as well as in war, they are absolutely vital. The proposals which I have tried to outline may well make all the difference to our survival in the event of another war. I believe they could also make a contribution to our prosperity in time of peace.
5.51 p.m.
Lord Malcolm Douglas-Hamilton: The hon. Member for Uxbridge (Mr. Beswick) posed three doubts about our arms programme which I think go to the core of the problem. First, he was concerned about the run-down of our stocks of raw materials, secondly, that we have not any deep shelters, and, thirdly, about the question of our defence against guided missiles. I quite agree that the first one does go to the core of the problem, and it reminds me of what a
2150
Russian officer in Berlin in 1946 or 1947 said to one of our officers. He said: "We reckon we have got you taped." The British officer said, "What do you mean?" The Russian officer replied, "If you do not re-arm we have got you at our mercy, and if you do, you are going to go bust economically." That is the problem which we have to face today in considering all forms of re-armament.
The question of deep shelters I have always considered to be an urgent one. I cannot understand why they were not started several years ago. With regard to guided missiles, there are four places where we can hope to get the projectile—the place where it is made; when it is on the way to the launching site; at the launching site; and, finally, when it is in flight. The last one poses the greatest problem of the lot and undoubtedly requires a great deal of scientific research.
What is the main factor in considering these Estimates today, and the whole question of air power? The right hon. and learned Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. A. Henderson) complained that the Under-Secretary did not give us very much information. I should like to add, as the third flying instructor called within an hour, my congratulations to my hon. Friend on the excellent way in which he managed his first survey, which was what I expected of him. My hon. Friend did say very definitely certain things. He said that the question of air power was a matter of life or death for this country. He indicated that we were virtually nowhere but for our powerful allies.
The hon. Member for Stroud and Thornbury (Mr. Perkins) raised a bit of a storm, or a potential storm, between the naval men and the air men. I think this is a matter which can be wrongly put, but it ought to be stated in perfectly plain language. What has really happened today is that air power has become what sea power was in the last century. That is to say, there is no other power that can operate today without the permission of air power. That does not mean that sea power or land power is not important; it means we have first got to conquor the air before we can either operate sea or land power. That surely is clear. That is why it is a matter of life or death to us that we take the right steps now in regard to our

2151
air power. Air power is probably the most delicate of all the forces, and it depends not only on skilful and brave air crews but on scientific development, technical efficiency and power of greater production.
What the Under-Secretary said today by inference was virtually this: That United States air power is keeping the peace of the world. That, in fact, is what is happening. We have to play our part and fit into this picture. It is the capacity to deliver the atomic bomb and not only the atomic bomb itself that matters, and the United States is the only nation that has the power of rapid production and the technical efficiency and scientific development that is necessary. We can make an immense addition to this. We can build and design extremely good aeroplanes and aero-engines. Almost equally important is not only defence front line aircraft, our economic position and our exports abroad.
The hon. Member for Uxbridge raised this point. I should like to stress that there is a wealth of difference in selling what is our life or death defence, our front line aircraft, and selling transport aircraft. The latter is perfectly permissible. It helps our industry and foreign peoples want them. But our latest type engines and airframes are something which foreign powers should not get unless we are certain they are going to be reliable allies. United States air power is keeping the peace today, but is it, after all, in such a happy condition? The Alsop Bros., writing in the "New York Herald Tribune" early in February, pointed out that Soviet Russia were making six jet interceptors to every one of the American interceptors, and two jet bombers to every one that the Americans are making. They are turning out MIG.15's at the rate of 6,200 a year and twin-engined jet bombers at the rate of 750 a year. As the hon. Member for Stroud and Thornbury said, the Royal Air Force is not in a position to stop these twin-engine Russian bombers from geting through to this country.
There is not only the danger of bombers coming through and of air-borne troops, but the danger of submarines. We have the Shackleton. Supposing that it is capable of and equipped for doing the job required, can the Under-Secretary
2152
give an assurance that the runways on which the Shackleton operates have been strengthened in the last year or two and that it can now operate on most airfields from all airstrips instead of only one, as was the case a year or two back.
I want to take up a point which was mentioned by the hon. Member for Uxbridge concerning transport. Here, I heartily agree with him that we cannot over-estimate the element of air transport in air power. It is an essential element of air power. At the present time, we have one or two freighters which have been developed by companies like Bristol and Blackburn, and I believe that the Blackburn freighter is a particularly good one.
This aeroplane has been flying since 1950. There is still apparently no definite order placed for this aeroplane for any of the fighting services by any Government Department. I believe that it is right to say that two squadrons of these freighters could carry a brigade plus its whole equipment to Egypt in half the time and at half the capital cost of the necessary sea transport. Surely that is something which is worth developing. But these modern aeroplanes cost a great deal of money, and aircraft firms have not got a great deal of reserves for development. They are tremendously dependent—
Mr. Emrys Hughes: What is the cost of one of these big transport aircraft?
Lord Malcolm Douglas-Hamilton: I cannot tell the hon. Member the exact cost, but it is something like £350,000. That is a lot of money for a firm to carry.
Flying-boats have also been mentioned today. I must here declare an interest, because I am a director of the only British company operating flying-boats today. However, hon. Members will know that I spoke in favour of flying boats even before I had this interest. Another firm is anxious to operate flying-boats and would do so if it could get permission from the Government.
The lesson I wish to draw from this is simply that there appears to be no high level machinery for deciding policy between civil and military air transport, and such machinery is very badly needed. We need high level policy to push matters like flying-boats and freighters. In that

2153
connection, I suggest that the Royal Air Force could save money and gain manpower if civil operators were allowed to operate all the scheduled routes which are at present being done by Transport Command and Transport Command confined its activities to Army support, paratroop carrying, airborne troop carrying, supply carrying, trooping, glider towing, etc. Machinery to decide this is needed at the highest possible level.
I want to say a word or two about training. Can we be told if there is any prospect of the R.A.F. Reserve getting some worthwhile aircraft in the near future? Is the reserve of pilots being built up with imagination and drive? Also, is there any chance of developing a jet trainer? It is a very big step to pass from the advanced trainer straight to a jet aircraft, and a jet trainer with a medium speed of about 350 miles an hour would be a great help and might be cheap in the long run.
Is the Air Ministry doing everything it can—this is perhaps something to be decided at the highest level—to encourage flying clubs and private owners? The Chancellor of the Exchequer should certainly be brought into those consultations. The petrol duty on private owners comes to not more than £5,000 a year with the present ownership. There is a danger that the private owner will become extinct. In the United States the private flyer is regarded as a kind of auxiliary reserve, and we ought to look upon him in exactly the same way.
The cost of our air power has been mentioned several times. The cost test is of very little value. The only test is what effective combatant units we can put in the field. Looking through the Air Estimates I find that if we take out all the aircraft, guns and bombs under the heading of "Aircraft and stores" we shall take out less than half the total cost. Therefore, it is possible to have an air force costing six or seven times what the most expensive air force did before the war and yet have no aircraft, guns or bombs in it. It is obvious that that side must be examined very carefully in relation to economy measures.
The right hon. and learned Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton mentioned—we all agree with him—that the morale of our airmen is high. That is an asset
2154
which we can count on very gratefully, but we ought to back it up as soon as we can with equipment of the latest type. Meantime, it is our duty to ensure that we repair this lack as speedily as possible and make do with all the available resources that we have.
6.5 p.m.
Dr. A. D. D. Broughton: I listened with interest to the speech of the noble Lord the Member for Inverness (Lord Malcolm Douglas-Hamilton), and I hope he will forgive me if I do not follow him in his arguments. I wish to draw attention to a branch of the Service which has been rather neglected in these debates. This is the fourth successive occasion on which I have been privileged as an hon. Member to listen to the annual debate on the Air Estimates, and in all the speeches to which I have listened I have not heard a word said about the Medical Branch of the Royal Air Force.
I speak today to remedy that serious omission and to draw attention to the importance of the work of that branch. I do not for a moment suggest that the Medical Branch is the most important branch of the Royal Air Force. Undoubtedly the key men of the Service are the aircrew. The Royal Air Force is a fighting Service and the highest place of distinction must be given to those who serve primarily as combatants.
All I suggest is that the Medical Branch, in common with all other ground staff, has a vital part in maintaining the efficiency of a great Service. My conviction about the value of the branch is fortified by the attitude of the aircrew towards the medical personnel of their Service. Speaking from personal experience, I found that those modest men who fly our aircraft hold the Medical Branch in high regard. That is the recommendation that really matters.
I have one or two suggestions to make to the Under-Secretary of State for Air, but before I do so I should like briefly to remind him and the House of the duties of the Medical Branch in the hope that my proposals will be thoroughly understood and accepted. I wish to confine my remarks to matters on which I can speak with a certain amount of knowledge, and, therefore, I speak from the point of view of the medical officer.

2155
First and foremost among the duties of the medical officer in the Royal Air Force I place the use of his knowledge and the practise of his art and skill in healing the sick and the injured. In addition to those literally vital duties he has indispensable and essential ones in the prevention of illness and accidents.
He is responsible for advising his commanding officer on all matters concerning hygiene and sanitation. He prevents disease by means of routine innoculations and vaccination, and he conducts medical examinations from time to time to make sure that personnel remain at the required standard of fitness for their respective duties. Those medical examinations are, of course, of the greatest importance in the case of aircrew.
Those are not all his duties, but they are the principal ways in which he prevents and treats accidents and disease. That is a brief summary of his duties which he undertakes by virtue of being a medical man. There are other duties which he shares with other officers of commissioned and non-commissioned rank in upholding the prestige and maintaining the efficiency of the Royal Air Force, but I wish to confine my attention to his medical duties.
In order that he may carry out these duties with a high degree of skill and efficiency, I believe it is necessary for him to acquire a knowledge of a comparatively new branch of medicine, namely aviation medicine. This has become a specialised subject containing medical problems which are not encountered in the other Armed Forces of the Crown with the exception of the Fleet Air Arm.
It is not natural for the human body to ascend to such heights as it is taken in aircraft. It is unnatural to ascend or decend with the rapidity required in flying. It is a new experience for human beings to travel at the speed of modern aircraft and to change direction when flying so fast. Therefore, from these few examples it will easily be seen how many physical and psychological problems arise as a result of modern aviation.
My first question to the Minister is, is he satisfied that medical officers in the Royal Air Force are given every opportunity and encouragement to learn the subject of aviation medicine? I know that useful knowledge of this subject can
2156
be gained by means of lectures and demonstrations on the ground such as the use of the de-compression chamber, but I suggest that the most useful way to understand this subject is by actual experience of flying. This is not an original idea of mine.
Before the war medical officers could qualify as pilots and have the distinction of wings on their uniforms. King's Regulations laid down clearly the requirements for that qualification. At the outbreak of war the Air Ministry stopped the practice. I believe that aircraft could not be spared for the purpose of training medical officers to fly, and it was rumoured that a shortage of medical manpower during the war made it undesirable that they should risk their lives unnecessarily.
Towards the end of the war, however, a new scheme was instituted and operated by the Air Ministry. Certain young medical officers who were taking Regular commissions, were given a full course of training required for pilots of modern aircraft. I should like to know whether that scheme is still in operation. Are Regular medical officers being given facilities for gaining that experience? I will go even further and suggest that all personnel of the medical branch should be given every opportunity of being airborne. It will bring good results I am sure.
In the first place, there will be a better understanding by all medical officers, airmen and airwomen of the work of aircrew, and such experience must still further that fine spirit among those concerned by making them feel that they are really members of an air force. I would also suggest that it gives aircrew greater confidence in their medical advisers because they know that those advisers understand and appreciate their own special problems and difficulties.
For all those reasons I ask the Minister to take an interest in this matter. I should be glad if he could advise the officers of the General Duties Branch to provide, whenever possible, opportunities for medical personnel of all ranks to have the experience that I have suggested.
I have another request to make: it concerns air ambulances. I know that air ambulances were used in the later years of the war, but I should be glad to know how far this life-saving measure has been developed since then. I am concerned

2157
about this matter because of a remark which was made by the Under-Secretary of State for Air in his speech this afternoon. I jotted down his words and I hope I wrote them correctly:
We must refrain from ordering types of aircraft, which, although desirable, are not vital for the defence of our island.
From that I understand that the Air Ministry are not ordering the construction of air ambulances. I appreciate the difficulty, but I would ask whether it is not possible for the conversion into air ambulances of some types of aircraft which have become obsolete for operational purposes and have been replaced by more modern types of machines.
Air ambulances, we must remember, can transport speedily cases requiring urgent and difficult surgical operations. The existence of a large number of air ambulances would increase the efficiency of medical treatment. The knowledge that such a service was available would be appreciated by the fighting men, and it would be a comfort to their relatives and friends at home. I am sure there would be no difficulty of staffing those ambulances. Volunteers would come forward readily from all ranks, and I would suggest to the Minister that some airwomen could be employed in air ambulances as nursing orderlies.
It might be advisable for the personnel who form the crews of air ambulances to be given some distinctive badge, possibly a shoulder flash saying "Air Ambulance," which I am sure would be worn with pride. That distinctive badge would be seen by the fighting men and by the civilians at home when the airmen and airwomen go on leave. It would show that a highly efficient medical service was doing everything possible to save life.
My final request to the Minister concerns the recruitment of medical officers in the Royal Air Force. Is he satisfied that every effort is being made to attract suitable men and women to take Regular commissions? Service in the Medical Branch of the Royal Air Force provides not only professional work, with opportunities for specialising in certain fields of medicine and surgery, but it gives the opportunity of travel and the experience of flying, and it provides a life lived in the company of men and women of a
2158
type of which our country is rightly proud.
6.19 p.m.
Dr. Reginald Bennett: I am particularly happy to be following the hon. Member for Batley and Morley (Dr. Broughton): as I can say with some feeling that I endorse truly all that he has said. As one who, in fact, did qualify during the war in aviation medicine, having been trained first as a pilot in the Royal Air Force and then trained back on biplanes by the Fleet Air Arm, I can say that I have seen the work of the flying medical officer, who is an indispensable adjunct to the flying service.
I know that many medical officers were flying in the Royal Air Force before the war. Sir Philip Sassoon said that I should continue to fly with the Royal Air Force if I joined as a doctor, but knowing that a doctor has to be on the ground, or else all flying stops, I did not fall for that one. The discontinuing of flying training for doctors during the war was a pity, although I can understand it. I trust that it will be reinstituted, because it has the greatest effect upon the morale of the flying types concerned. I know, and the aviators in this House will probably endorse it, that on the subject of flying a pilot will listen to a pilot and will not listen to anybody else. Therefore, if a doctor has to train aircrews in aviation medicine and about the things that happen to them in the air, the chap who is doing the instruction must be an aviator himself; otherwise he will not be listened to.
I can mention a point which arose in my own experience, although it was not altogether pleasant. I remember serving in East Africa during the war on an air station. I was approached by the Commander-Flying of H.M.S. "Illustrious," who was finding things a little difficult because a lot of pilots were having crashes during night flying. There was a good deal of what was known as "twitch" flying about. He suggested that I should undertake night deck landing training and go on and get twitch myself so that I could explain what happened. Fortunately somebody stopped me from doing that.
I can endorse that there is such a thing as an air ambulance, because only a few weeks ago I was near Bagdad, at the

2159
Royal Air Force station Habbaniyah, a magnificent place. I landed just behind an R.A.F. Hastings which was evacuating patients from the Korean war by stages, and this was one of the stages. There was a perfectly good, serviceable Hastings, one of a number which I understood were doing ambulance work, and there were women of the Royal Air Force doing orderly work on board, although they were not equipped with special indications of their airborne character.
The main point in these Estimates which strikes me a considerable blow, I must say, is the fact that we are still without a first-line British fighter. We did not have one last year, and we have not got one this year, that is fit to mix it on anything like level terms with the MIG 15, in spite of what the gallant Major Jabara may say. Furthermore, I do not think that we shall have one next year. This is a very serious matter. We are in a very sad position in this country. I think there is blame to be apportioned, and it must be brought to bear in the right place. It is also a very terrible thing that the Russian Nene engine is still superior to any Rolls-Royce engine now flying in the Royal Air Force. That is a pretty shameful position. We have a frightful amount of leeway to make up as regards the indiscretions—if I call them no worse—of the late Administration.
While we are sagging behind and attempting to catch up in the air, I should be very grateful if my hon. Friend could give some further description of the "super-priority" which is to be brought in about aircraft supplies. It is felt very far and wide throughout the country that this is wanted, and I know that the industry would like to have the information at the earliest opportunity. I would be very keen to know whether the super-priority applies to fighters only or to bombers as well. I do not think that I have ever seen that information clearly expressed.
What steps are being taken to bring about standardisation of air equipment between America and Britain, and among the North Atlantic Treaty Powers? In connection with standardisation, I recently had information which gave me a good deal of misgiving. It was that certain types of aircraft are being adopted for the North Atlantic Treaty Powers, such as the Sabre, which has now been in
2160
existence as a front-line aircraft for 3½ years, although we have nothing yet to compare with it. If this and the F.84 Thunderjet are to be standardised for the North Atlantic Powers, I should like to know whether this is the final crystallisation of standardisation, or whether any of our own aircraft, when produced, are to be taken up as standard equipment for the North Atlantic Treaty Powers.
I have been much disturbed by the fact that we have had to put our production, such as it has been, into intermediate types which, even when produced, are not of first-line quality. They are not capable of giving battle in the air to the best potential enemy machines. I should like to know when there is any likelihood of improvement. As soon as the Sabres, the Swifts and the Hunters come into production and are made the equipment for the Royal Air Force, the Government should lift the embargo on the export of military aircraft to friendly countries, and in particular in the Middle East. We should then supply the aircraft which they need and which it is not so vitally necessary should have the highest performance figures, as it would be if they were in the main theatre of war here.
I should like to have some misgivings put at rest, if it can be done, about the question of officers. The hon. Member for Uxbridge (Mr. Beswick) talked about the need for a reserve of trained pilots. I learned my flying training with the Royal Air Force and I had four years of it. I was instructed almost throughout by short-service officers, and afterwards, when they had done their few years' service, they went out of the Royal Air Force and had to support themselves in any way they could. I do not feel that that constitutes the most tempting prospect at all for young men for this country, and I should like to ask my hon. Friend whether there are any further prospects, or improvement in the prospects, or whether he will consider any improvements in the future employment of short-service officers.
In the matter of technical progress, I should like to see our resources include the production of helicopters and more provision made for them than is going on now. I am convinced that once the crisis descends on us, if it is to do so, there will be a concerted howl for helicopters from all the fighting Services, and from

2161
many other people. The usefulness of the helicopter is being demonstrated only in the tiny theatre of Korea, where there are few spectators, but once its usefulness as a communications instrument can be demonstrated we shall be overwhelmed with demands for helicopters, far more than for fixed-wing aircraft.
Mr. Emrys Hughes: What is the approximate cost of a helicopter?
Dr. Bennett: I am afraid that I have never bought one.
Mr. Hughes: The hon. Member should know the price of what he asks for.
Dr. Bennett: I hope I shall never have to ask for one, though I admit that they are very convenient.
Another preoccupation for me, which is becoming a preoccupation in wider circles throughout Europe, is the dreadful question of the swallowing up of land for runways. I see certain signs of recognition on the faces of hon. Gentlemen opposite as I approach this subject again. On a previous occasion I merely dealt with the possibility of transferring long landing grounds to the surface of the sea. On this occasion I will not touch on that one. Runways are getting longer and longer, and the longest ones in existence are still proving to be too short for the latest fighters. So runways will be going on across country until they can swallow up all the land there is.
Mr. Hughes: They are expensive too.
Dr. Bennett: I can appreciate this Scottish preoccupation with expenditure, but I am dealing now with areas and not bawbees. My hon. Friend said he wanted to keep agricultural land open for the farmers. I am perturbed that agricultural land all over this country and other countries is being swallowed up and rendered unfit for use even if it should be returned for farming. Denmark is petrified at the thought of having to operate modern fighters at all because she is an agricultural country and does not want to be paved with concrete throughout.
The problem is a difficult one and not merely one of academic interest. If there is to be any fighting, which heaven for-fend, the advanced operational runways off which the fighter defences work will be so long and so near the fighting that they will be intensely vulnerable. It will be impossible to camouflage them, and
2162
therefore they will be likely to be put out of action immediately. However, unless we have runways up at the very front of the fighting, the fighters will have to be too big and heavy for the highest possible performance if they have to sacrifice performance to range. Therefore, we must find some other solution to the problem of runways.
This brings us inevitably to the matter of having assisted launching, either with explosives—that is rocket take-off gear or by mechanical means, that is with catapults, or by using other aircraft as tugs. I believe it is correct to say that an aircraft can now pluck another aircraft off the ground up to one-quarter of the weight of the towing aircraft. Therefore, we must consider these ways of getting aircraft off the ground, and the one of towing has, so to speak, the fewest overheads underfoot and therefore is likely to be the most easy to instal.
The other point in this discussion is that we must have arrester gear. In fact both these are similar to the techniques which have to be provided in aircraft carrier practice today except that on terra firma there is much more room and we can deal with heavier and bulkier equipment and can use not only hydraulic brakes but friction brakes on a fairly large scale.
The Under-Secretary of State said earlier in the debate—I took down his words—that we are making the Second Tactical Air Force mobile, and that this means we shall be putting practically everything on wheels except the runways. I suggest that even the runway equipment should now be mobile and that, instead of having fixed and unmistakable targets, we should now have mobile landing and accelerating units which can anchor themselves in place, using stretches of roads which have been strengthened previously, and camouflaging themselves by hiding in woods or establishing themselves in clearings in the jungle. Above all, since they can be concealed, they are no longer vulnerable and are mobile. In that direction lies the only way of saving land, of saving our airfield works, of saving our fighter planes and maybe of saving the battle.
Finally, I am extremely glad that my hon. Friend has achieved the post of Under-Secretary of State for Air. I know that he has his heart in the Royal Air

2163
Force for he has spent many years with it. I know that he has the Royal Air Force and flying absolutely in his soul, and I am quite sure that we can now look forward with confidence to the future of our country in the air.
6.35 p.m.
Mr. E. Fernyhough: There was one observation made by the hon. Member for Gosport and Fareham (Dr. Bennett) with which I heartily agreed, and that was his concern at the appetite of the Air Force for valuable land. Obviously there would be little use in having the finest military Forces possible if we were likely to starve to death because we had taken the land which should have been growing the food to sustain us.
I do not want to intervene on technical or production matters but on manpower. I want the Under-Secretary of State to carry out an investigation into what is happening when boys go for their medical examination. Last week I met a number of boys who had just come back from Cardington. They informed me that when they went for their medical examination they said they would prefer to go into the Royal Air Force. They were told they could only go into the R.A.F. provided that they signed on for three years and that, if they did so, they would be given a choice of trades.
Two of those boys signed on for three years. They did not tell their parents because they would have been vexed if they had learned that the boys had enlisted for an additional year. The boys went to Cardington last week and on arrival they were told that although they had signed on for three years on the understanding that they would be able to choose their trade, the only trade they could go into for three years was that of a gardener, an administrative orderly or a cook.
Hundreds of boys at Cardington last week were interviewed by officers, and each was told that if he signed on for four years instead of three, he would be able to choose his trade. Of course, young boys of 18 facing the military bosses can be persuaded in the usual military manner to agree to an additional year or an additional two years. Those who refused to sign on for four years were given their cards, a railway warrant,
2164
and 21s. and were told to go back and await instructions from the Army authorities.
These boys were encouraged to sign on originally for three years on a fraudulent prospectus. They understood that if they went for three years they would have a choice of a trade. Having got to Cardington they were given the choice of the lowest and most menial occupations in the R.A.F. Because they refused to accept a further year, they were sent home. If the Army calls up these boys this week, are they due to serve three years in the Army? Does the fact that they signed on for three years in the R.A.F. and have been sent back mean that they will serve three years in the Army?
The Secretary of State for War (Mr. Antony Head): I can assure the hon. Gentleman that it is not so. Recruitment to the R.A.F. becomes invalid when the man is recruited into the Army.
Mr. Fernyhough: That will be reassuring to these boys because I told them that, if I had an opportunity, I would raise this matter.
Most people in this House know my feelings with regard to military matters, but I want the Under-Secretary of State to understand that all the speeches of my hon. Friend the Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes) do not do half as much damage to recruitment to the Services as the experiences which these boys had at Cardington last week. Until they are called up they will go back to their jobs in the factories. They will tell the rest of their colleagues of the treatment they have had. Therefore, it behoves those who are anxious to build up the personnel of our military Forces to see that boys are not treated in that manner.
I tell the Under-Secretary frankly that the British public will not tolerate attempts to recruit by press-gang methods. The British public will not tolerate boys being inveigled into the Services on false pretences. I hope the Under-Secretary will look into this question of Cardington, because I understand that hundreds of boys were turned hack from Cardington last week, having gone there on the basis I have given. All of them left because the prospectus for

2165
which they were looking was not available.
I think the parents of boys have a right to know under what circumstances they are being called up. If the Under-Secretary investigates this he will be performing a public duty, for unless methods of this kind are stopped, and unless the methods to which my hon. Friend the Member for South Ayrshire referred in the debate on the Army Estimates are stopped, then all the advertisements and all the propaganda in the world will not give the Government the number of men in any of the Services that they wish to have.
6.42 p.m.
Wing Commander N. J. Hulbert: It is unfortunate that in a debate on the Air Estimates the hon. Member for Jarrow (Mr. Fernyhough) should suggest that men are recruited into the Services on a fraudulent prospectus.
Mr. Fernyhough: They were.
Wing Commander Hulbert: In my experience, and that of many hon. Members, anybody who volunteers for the R.A.F. or the other Services is in possession of the most complete details of the Service and of the obligations into which he is entering before he signs on.
Mr. Fernyhough: Surely the fact that these men had signed on, had had their medical examination and had gone to the station, and then were sent back after three days, is indicative that they must have been called there under false pretences.
Wing Commander Hulbert: I certainly do not accept the hon. Gentleman's suggestion at all. No one who goes to the reception centres of any of the Services ever goes there under false pretences. If a statement of the kind made by the hon. Gentleman were to go out from this House unchallenged it would do immeasurable harm to recruiting to the Services.
I join in the congratulations which have been extended to the Under-Secretary of State on his appointment. It is the first time for six or seven years that there has been anyone in the Air Ministry with practical flying experience—and that is no reflection whatever on
2166
the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. A. Henderson) or his hon. Friend the Member for Lincoln (Mr. de Freitas), and certainly not on my hon. Friend the Member for Flint, West (Mr. Birch), who had a short tenure at the Air Ministry.
I wish to deal with one or two diverse matters. The first is a question which affects the Royal Auxiliary Air Force. I was a little disappointed that my hon. Friend did not devote more of his speech to that branch of the Service. Can he assure the House that the Royal Auxiliary Air Force is today being equipped with the very latest type of jets? If not, why not, and when is that happy state of affairs to be achieved? Secondly, what steps are the Air Ministry taking to ensure that Royal Auxiliary Air Force squadrons get better treatment about accommodation and ground services?
My hon. Friend may or may not know that before an Auxiliary Air Force squadron can obtain adequate town training facilities all sorts of authorities have to give approval. There has been an instance in the last few weeks in London, where an Auxiliary Air Force squadron has been without a town headquarters for about two years, in which the squadron has been prohibited by the local planning authority from obtaining headquarters on the ground that the location of this squadron would be seriously detrimental to the amenities of a quiet road because of the noise created by vehicular and foot traffic.
As my hon. Friends knows, the establishment of an R.A.A.F. squadron is comparatively small. It is, therefore, fantastic that a local town planning authority can say that the foot traffic of that squadron will upset the amenities of a quiet road, with the result that the squadron, which I believe my hon. Friend knows very well, is still without town headquarters.
Mr. Ward indicated dissent.
Wing Commander Hulbert: My hon. Friend shakes his head to indicate that he does not know the squadron. May I tell him that there is a very big file at the Air Ministry on this matter? I hope he will look into it.
Two years ago I advocated the appointment of a Royal Auxiliary Air Force

2167
officer as an inspector of the Royal Auxiliary Air Force, and that was done. On the expiration of his term of office he has been replaced by a Regular officer, whom I do not criticise in any way whatever; but it would be useful if the Under-Secretary could tell us that this is not a precedent and that on future occasions the claims of R.A.A.F. officers for this appointment will be considered.
There are two steps concerning personnel which could be taken which would, I think, considerably alleviate grievances in the Service. A man joins the Royal Air Force when he is 17 or 18 years old, and if he is good and successful, he should become a warrant officer or a chief technician by the time be is 40 or 42. Under present rules he then has to continue for another 15 years in the same rank. Not only is that rather a depressing outlook for him, but it also retards promotion in that rank.
Has consideration been given to the creation of some further promotion from that rank for a man who has reached the ceiling at the age of 40 but will not retire for another 15 years? I understand that one difficulty is the objection raised by the other Services, but I am sure that the Air Ministry will be able to overcome that through inter-Departmental discussions.
The second point on the question of personnel concerns the education allowances to officers serving overseas. I understand that in the Civil Service and Her Majesty's Foreign Service a man serving overseas gets a tax-free grant of £75 for the education of his first child and approximately the same grant for other children. In the Royal Air Force I believe that £25 is the maximum education grant paid to an officer up to the rank of squadron leader.
I should like the Under-Secretary of State to look into that matter to see if some further alleviation can be given to officers for the education of their children. As my hon. Friend knows, the ordinary overseas tour of duty is one of 2½ to three years and it becomes a very heavy burden on an officer moving about the world without a tax-free education allowance such as those in civil services receive.
I wish to say a word about Transport Command, which was dealt with by the hon. Member for Uxbridge (Mr. Beswick). I think we have all been rather concerned
2168
to read in the Press today of the cancellation, or possibly "postponement" is a fairer word, of production of the Brabazon and the second two Princess flying-boats. That is a decision which will have a very serious effect on Transport Command. I ask the Under-Secretary if the Air Ministry was consulted before this very drastic and far-reaching decision was taken by his right hon. Friend the Minister of Supply.
In his speech today the Under-Secretary referred, as did the Prime Minister a few days ago, to the super-priority which had been given to the production of certain types of aircraft. It is all very well to say that super-priority shall be given to this or that type of aircraft, but what precisely does the phrase mean? We cannot get a big volume of production of aircraft merely by constructing airframes, or even producing the motive power. We have to give super-priorities right down the lines. We have to get super-priority for the electric motors, for the hydraulic work, for the coils obtained from a subcontractor—the coil maker. The coil maker has to buy his copper wire from the wire maker: the wire maker has to buy the raw material, copper. It would be very helpful and useful if the Under-Secretary could give us further information of what this delightful phrase—which we hope will be translated into effect—really means.
My last point deals with Coastal Command. I would not wish to anticipate the debate which will follow the moving by my hon. Friend the Member for Darwen (Mr. Fletcher-Cooke) of the Amendment dealing with the future of Coastal Command, if that Amendment is called by you, Sir. I am rather provoked in what I am about to say by the observations which fell from the lips of my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud and Thornbury (Mr. Perkins), who had considerable experience in the Royal Air Force during the war and was for a time Parliamentary Secretary in the Ministry of Civil Aviation. I regret that at the moment he is not in his place.
So far as I gather, he said that everything that could be wrong is wrong with Coastal Command. There is one thing which from my experience I know E, not wrong with it—that is its high morale and spirit today. It is often said that there is little or no co-operation between Coastal Command and the Royal Navy,

2169
Only a few months ago I had the opportunity of serving for a time with Coastal Command and taking part in an exercise in which they were engaged with the Royal Navy.
If anybody doubts that there is cooperation, they have only to go to a combined operations station like Mountbatten, where they will see an admiral working alongside an air marshal, a group captain alongside a captain of the Royal Navy and an able seaman alongside an aircraftman of the Royal Air Force. They have only to spend a day there in order to come away with one feeling and one feeling only—that there is complete cooperation between those Services. Anyone who today would seek to upset those harmonious relationships is doing an ill-service both to the Royal Navy and to Coastal Command.
My hon. Friend the Member for Stroud and Thornbury made some remarks to the effect that Coastal Command was the Cheltenham of the Royal Air Force. I would not attempt to go into his reason for saying that, but so far as I know the only connection between Coastal Command and Cheltenham today is that the wife of an officer in Coastal Command has one acre and a cow near Cheltenham.
6.53 p.m.
Mr. John Rankin: I gather from the remarks of the hon. and gallant Member for Stockport, North (Wing Commander Hulbert) that the present Under-Secretary of State for Air—and I join in the congratulations which have been showered upon him—is the first individual with flying experience since the war to occupy that position. I am sure the hon. and gallant Member will forgive me if I correct him, because the previous occupant of the office under the Labour Government, Mr. Aidan Crawley, had experience as a fighter pilot and was shot down in actual combat. I am sure the hon. and gallant Member will note that little correction.
Wing Commander Hulbert: I readily accept the hon. Member's correction.
Mr. Rankin: I wish to confine myself to two points. In the Estimates before us there is a sum of £21 million to be devoted to radio, radar and electrical equipment. That is a very big sum indeed. Incidentally, I wish to ask the hon. Gentleman a question in regard to
2170
the supply of those people who carry out the very important job of watching on the radar screen the flight of an aircraft and reporting on it from time to time. I should like to know if the supply of these very important officers is meeting the demand.
Generally, I wish to ask what advances have taken place in the use of this equipment to make known the movements of aircraft to other interested Ministries and to private flyers. I should explain to the House that there is a little history behind that question, and I am sure that the Under-Secretary of State for Air will recollect some of it. He will remember the occasion when an Anson trainer aircraft collided with a Dakota civilian machine over Coventry three years ago last month and all those concerned were killed. The conclusion arrived at was that one or other of the pilots had not been keeping a sufficiently careful lookout.
As a result of that accident I made a proposal in this House, and I was supported by my hon. Friend the Member for Ayrshire, South (Mr. Emrys Hughes), that we should institute a system of airways throughout the country for civil aircraft. That seemed to me perfectly reasonable. If we can have sea lanes for merchant shipping- and railways for passenger locomotive traffic, and forms of control on the roads, there appeared to be nothing unreasonable in suggesting a similar system whereby aircraft flying from one point to another within the country should fly between minimum and maximum heights. Pilots would then know that there was no danger of their route being crossed without due warning by any other type of aircraft.
That proposal was opposed, I will not say how strongly, by the Air Ministry of that time. They assumed that everything was quite all right and that present methods, or at least the then existing methods of indicating the movements of aircraft, were quite satisfactory; although it emerged that at that period there was a time-lag in communicating those movements between Ministries which might conceivably have resulted in danger at one point or another during the flight.
No one gave more vigorous support to my proposal than the present Minister of Civil Aviation. He said that it was not good enough in a matter of this kind

2171
to assume that everything was all right and asked for an assurance that the two Ministers concerned were in active contact to make certain that these precautions were being taken. I am assured that an agreement has been reached which is acceptable to both the Ministries concerned, and that a system of positive air traffic control can be exercised which should help to provide a greater measure of safety than formerly existed in the transit of aircraft.
I am assured that the scheme has been agreed. What I want to know is whether that scheme is now in active operation. I was told it would be in operation by the end of 1949, but that did not happen. Later I was assured it would be in operation by the end of 1950, but again that was not so. I wish now to ask whether that scheme was in operation by the end of 1951 and, if not, why not?
Mr. John Grimston rose—
Mr. Rankin: I am sorry, I cannot give way. I am under an obligation to finish soon, because of other business.
My second point concerns the services to the Western Isles of Scotland.
The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence (Mr. Nigel Birch): They are not run by the Air Ministry.
Mr. Rankin: If the hon. Member will contain himself he will discover the reason why I am raising the question. I understand, and it is up to the hon. Member if he is to reply to clear up the point, that the nigger in the woodpile here is the Air Ministry. It is their action which is keeping back the development of civil air services to the Western Isles. Again let me recount a bit of history in order to make the position clear.
Everyone agrees that the D.H. Rapide ought to be out of service altogether. There is no argument about that. The machine was useful in its way, but now it is outdated and ought not to be in use. We were told it would be scrapped and the Merchantman, a machine more serviceable and more up-to-date, would take its place. Months passed and nothing happened. We were next assured that the Marathon would replace the D.H. Rapide. Again nothing happened. Then we were told that the Heron would take
2172
its place, but again nothing happened. Now we are back in the position where no new machine is even being suggested as a replacement for the old D.H. Rapide.
Mr. Speaker: This appears to be a discussion on civil aircraft. That is not in order on the Air Estimates.
Mr. Rankin: My point is that these machines have now, as it were, gone off the map. The three have all disappeared because, we are led to believe, none of them meets the strategic requirements of the Air Ministry. Therefore, because of that, the development of civil aviation in Scotland is impeded. I submit that my point is material to these Estimates.
We are spending a great deal of money on the development of aircraft. If it is true that in Scotland the Ministry of Civil Aviation is compelled to get a machine which will suit the strategic needs of the Royal Air Force, then in the interests of the development of civil aviation in Scotland the sooner that is done the better. I ask the Minister who is to reply to this debate to make the position perfectly clear to the House and to the people of Scotland.

COASTAL COMMAND
7.2 p.m.
Mr. Charles Fletcher-Cooke: I beg to move, to leave out from "That," to the end of the Question, and to add instead thereof:
"this House urges Her Majesty's Government to institute an impartial inquiry into the working of Coastal Command in order to ascertain the most efficient method of administration, operation and control of this essential arm of our maritime forces for the future."
This is an old problem—the problem of who shall command the aircraft that fly over the oceans to hunt and kill the U-boat. It is a problem almost as old as myself. Therefore, as a new Member of this House, I embark upon it with some trepidation. I would straight away, because I conceive that in this matter passions get aroused, declare that I have no personal axe to grind. I am not a member of any naval lobby, if there be such a lobby. Although I had the honour to wear naval uniform and bear His Majesty's Commission in the war, my connection with salt water was very remote.
I must, therefore, immediately deny an allegation that was made by the hon.

2173
Member for Preston, South (Mr. Shackleton) during the debate on the Navy Estimates, that I had, in some way, entered into a plot with a Member of his Front Bench. I have had no contact with his Front Bench for several years, as the hon. Member knows. I would not raise this matter for the aggrandizement of any Service. I am not concerned with any old dispute or old feud on this subject.
It will be necessary to go shortly through the history of this controversy to show that, in my submission, the considerations are now different from what they were before—not that the protagonists have the same arguments but that the arguments have changed.
I am sure that, as all I ask for is an impartial inquiry, those who may perhaps take a different view from my own should not fear such an inquiry which would only tend to confirm their view if they be right. It would be a great pity if this controversy was handled on the old lines of an inter-Service feud. If there is one thing that we have surely grown out of it is the sort of inter-Service feud that used to hit the headlines between the wars and during the last war. There is only one matter more tedious than an inter-Service feud, and that is a row between inter-Allied commanders.
This dispute started in 1916, and there were ranged on one side the heroic figure of Lord Curzon and, on the other, the equally heroic figure of Arthur Balfour. As our late lamented Librarian, Mr. Hilary St. George Saunders described it, it was a war between Leviathan and Behemoth. Ever since then, the argument has got snarled up with personal feelings, and high ranking officers have committed themselves to personal positions from which they have been unable to retract.
It must be remembered that the reason why the Navy was first deprived of its own aircraft for performing its own functions in 1917 was not because it was inefficient but because it was too efficient. It was because the Navy had the best aero-engines. As a result of that the Royal Flying Corps, as it then was, could not provide itself with the engines it wanted and cast covetous eyes on those of the Royal Naval Air Service.
That caused a great deal of ill-feeling. The war became so violent and so
2174
enraged that when the Royal Air Force was at last created the Admiralty made its position clear. Among other things, it stooped to the extent of refusing to allow the Royal Air Force to use any naval title among its officers as was at first suggested. It minuted that the use of any naval title was objectionable in the Royal Air Force. In 1924, the Fleet Air Arm was created, and from then until 1937 there was a system of dual control over the Fleet Air Arm that persists now over Coastal Command. That was after all those years discovered to be so unsatisfactory that in 1937 full responsibility for the Fleet Air Arm was transferred to the Admiralty.
In all these years Coastal Command was under the administration and supply of the Air Ministry. It is significant that in a fairly recent number of the "Naval Review" Air Chief Marshal Sir Philip Joubert de la Ferte, who was the distinguished chief of Coastal Command for many years, described that period as one of studied neglect by the Air Ministry of Coastal Command. I should not for one moment say today that the word "studied" should be applied. We are told that from 1937, during the war and up to today, the system of dual control of Coastal Command has worked well.
We are apt now, looking back on the war from quite a distance, to forget some of the perils and disasters that we endured. We are apt to think that because we won the war all went well during the war. I have very vivid recollections of matters that hon. Members on both sides probably remember better: questions of photographic reconnaissance, questions which I will not canvass now—I do not want to open old wounds—in which certainly the Navy had very bitter feelings, rightly or wrongly, about the way that co-operation with Coastal Command worked then.
In 1943, this matter was raised in the House by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Pollok (Commander Galbraith) who is now Joint Under-Secretary of State for Scotland. I do not think he would have raised it in the middle of a war if he had not had some prima facie evidence that this co-operation was not working as well as we are apt now to think that it did.
As a result of his interventions in debate then, a very distinguished High

2175
Court judge, as he then was, was asked by the Admiralty to investigate this matter, the Fleet Air Arm in particular and Coastal Command as well. He reported—I think it is an open secret—that then, in the middle of the war, the Royal Air Force should remain responsible on the grounds that in the middle of a war it was not possible for the Navy overnight either to equip, to train or to run shore-based aircraft. That was clearly right.
In my opinion, no one could properly suggest that during a war all that should be switched overnight. I make that point, if it be a point against myself, that there was an impartial inquiry. Whether that judge was appointed by the Air Ministry as well as by the Admiralty, I do not know, but I think not; but I distinguish his report from the situation today, first, on the ground that it was during the war, and second, that it was during that particular war.
In that war, the Navy had many other things to do than fight submarines. There was a Japanese high seas fleet in existence. Indeed, everyone expected the Japanese fleet to break into the Indian Ocean at any minute. The Navy's sole concentration was not anti-submarine war. But in the next war, apart from the question of mines, I think it is clear that to all intents and purposes the only substantial naval warfare would be against the submarine. Therefore, this question of divided responsibility for the prime function of Admralty becomes even more acute.
I mention these historical details only to show that the case is different today from what it was then, because, on the one hand, the Air Ministry no longer adopt the attitude that was adopted in some extreme quarters of what one might call the air school between the wars and during the war, that all other services are outmoded; somehow, that war can be waged much more cheaply if one has nothing to do with armies and navies at all, but simply bomb people from the air. That was a very prevalent view and one, of course, that did not appeal to the Navy between the wars or in the war. It is a view that I do not think even the most extreme air-minded person any longer adopts.
On the other hand, the Admiralty no longer hold the view that the aircraft,
2176
and all machines of that sort that fly in the air, are pestilential discoveries and ought to be suppressed. That was what the Air Ministry always feared. They feared—they had some reason in those days to do so—the views of the admirals, of certain gallant naval Members of the House of Commons. Commander Bellairs was one among them. Those who have read his speeches in the House would think that the invention of the aircraft was an offence of some sort. The Air Ministry were, therefore, naturally worried that the Admiralty were seeking to get control of the shore-based Coastal Command machines only in order to suppress them and not to develop them.
Neither of those views obtains today. It is quite clear that the experience of the sinkings of the "Bismarck" and the "Prince of Wales" has shown dramatically the effect of air power on sea power. There can, therefore, no longer be any question of the Admiralty neglecting the air for the sort of psychological reasons that might have been a danger between the wars. I submit that any neglect of Coastal Command, if neglect there be, is more likely to occur if it remains under the Air Ministry than if it were transferred.
I make the case for a transfer because I conceive that it is my duty to put a prima facie case. I am not saying that it is an unanswerable case. What I am saying is that it is a case that should be considered, and that owing to the history of the matter it cannot be considered except impartially. It cannot possibly be considered by people who have deep feelings on the matter.
The reason why Coastal Command is likely to be neglected by the Air Ministry is fairly clear. The R.A.F. have so many more dramatic and exciting things to do than to fly over miles of unbroken water for hours and hours without seeing anything at all. That is a function that the Navy has performed either over the water, on the water, or under the water, for years, and the boredom of it they have got used to; but it cannot be the great desire of an Air Force pilot to spend the best part of his life doing that when the other branches of his Service offer him such more exciting opportunities.
Air Commodore Harvey: My hon. Friend talks about Royal Air Force pilots

2177
wanting to do more exciting things. Would he admit, however, that many of them have to fly hours on end in cloud to get to their destination, that many of them fly hours on end over the desert and that many of their jobs are very monotonous indeed? It is unfair to describe as "glamorous" the jobs in Transport Command which take them over oceans on their way out to the Far East. My hon. Friend must give the Air Force credit for being versatile and undertaking all these jobs.
Hon. Members: Hear, hear.
Mr. Fletcher-Cooke: I am sure that the Air Force is very versatile and undertakes all these jobs. My only point is that if one was going into the Air Force as a pilot it would not be the height of one's ambition to go into Coastal Command and stay there.
Wing Commander Hulbert rose—
Mr. Fletcher-Cooke: I cannot give way. There are plenty of hon. Members who have served in Coastal Command and who, as my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Stockport, North (Wing Commander Hulbert) said, regard the Amendment as doing disservice to the country in some sort of way, and I will leave them to make their case.
Wing Commander Hulbert: I only wanted to say this. Is my hon. Friend aware that a man who joins the Air Force does not join one particular Command? He goes all down the Service, and his normal period of duty in Coastal Command would be only about two years.
Mr. Fletcher-Cooke: That was precisely my point, and I am obliged to my hon. and gallant Friend for making it. Those hon. Members who share my views agree that this is a specialised job, that the pilots who should fly Coastal Command machines should be students of sea war, that any other task that they perform when flying Coastal Command machines should be in connection with the sea war, and that they should not be taken off after two years on Coastal Command duties to bomb inland targets or to perform the other functions that Air Force pilots have to do.
As with the pilots, so with the machines. As we have been so ably told today, the
2178
function of the Ministry of Supply is to give super-priority to the fighters, to the interceptors and to all the machines which we so desperately need, and that is where their energies ought to be directed. The anti-U-boat warfare, on the other hand, is, as I say, almost the Admiralty's sole remaining task, and, apart from the mines and the normal peace-time functions of the Navy, that is where their energies are directed.
Mr. Edward Shackleton: When the hon. Gentleman says "apart from the mines," what does he mean? Does he mean sweeping mines or laying mines?
Mr. Fletcher-Cooke: Primarily, sweeping mines, but laying mines as well.
The logical case of the matter is, I submit, really unanswerable. But the case is not based on logic. The logical case, of course, is that in all these matters of warfare the correct categories are those of function and not of appearance. The function of keeping open the sea lanes of this country are a single and undivided function, and it is quite absurd to split it up except in so far as it happens to be split up at the moment. One might as well divide this House, not on the ground of function and opposition, but on the ground of appearance, of people with hair and people without hair, or something like that.
There is no logical distinction for this division of the function of keeping open the sea lanes of our country, and all-purpose airmen and all-purpose aircraft are not good enough for the fighting of the anti-U-boat war.
Take another aspect of it, the question of the allocation of money. The anti-U-boat war is a single and fairly detachable' branch of our war effort. Surely it is right that one Ministry, and one Ministry alone, should be responsible for allocating the funds available for the task of that particular warfare between the frigates, the aircraft, the destroyers and the anti-U-boat submarines, if there be such now, and all the different ways of fighting the enemy U-boat. The proportions of these things vary with the years, and it ought to be within the control of a single Ministry to say they want to put more money into aircraft and less into destroyers.

2179
But, of course, if it is an inter-Service matter, then the money for the aircraft comes out of a different Ministry, and it is not within the power of the Ministry responsible for waging this particular part of warfare to allocate the funds between its different instruments in the way it should be able to do that. As I have said, I do not want in the course of this debate to exacerbate in any way inter-Service ill-feeling, and I quite accept what my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Stockport, North, says, even though it is denied by my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud and Thornbury (Mr. Perkins), that co-operation is now working very smoothly.
Let us assume that is so. There is in this matter a very important psychological factor—the factor of uniform. It is an old factor, but it is still strong. I was much struck by an article written a month ago by the hon. Member for Reading, South (Mr. Mikardo), who had visited a United States air station in East Anglia. Why he did so, I do not quite know. His conclusion was, rather to his surprise, that the United States Air Force personnel were accepted by the inhabitants of East Anglia quite freely and much more openly than he had expected because now the United States Air Force wears a uniform of light blue almost indistinguishable from that worn by the Royal Air Force, and, therefore, the inhabitants thought it was all the same show, which they would not have thought had the U.S. airmen not worn that uniform.
That is an illustration, however much co-operation there may be and however many words may be spoken about cooperation in debate, of the importance, ultimately, of the matter of uniform. I cannot help feeling, however much they play the game—and I am sure they do—that the pilots of Fighter Command feel that their loyalty is not to the sea but to the Royal Air Force.
Finally, there is the question of the appointment of Admiral McCormick. Co-operation between the two Services, of course, is possible, but the more stages one puts into this business, the more likely it is that in a crisis something
2180
will go wrong. The imposing of another stage for the purposes of waging the next Battle of the Atlantic, in the awful event that there should be one, is, I submit, another reason why the matter should be examined. Admiral McCormick will have to fight the Battle of the Atlantic with United States naval aircraft in the west and Royal Air Force Coastal Command in the east. To impose yet another stratum of command, however great the co-operation may be, is asking for trouble.
The only serious objection to this is that the problems of supply and of training are, for the moment, beyond the capacity of the Admiralty. It cannot be so permanently, because the United States Navy performs its function very well, and anything they can do we can do better. It must be only a temporary matter, and, of course, this by no means suggests that this transfer, if it is to take place, should occur at once. But if ever it is to occur, this must be the time. We are rather tired of the doctrine of unripe time. It is one of those problems where it is wrong to raise the subject in war-time and unnecessary to raise it in peace-time. If ever there was the time, this is the time.
I suggest that those who disagree with me should show that they have nothing to fear in the matter by accepting the spirit in which this Amendment is moved. It is no good simply saying, "Why drag this up now because everything is working well?" I am quite sure that was said in 1936 and in 1937 by people who took the Air Ministry point of view, and yet we have Sir Philip Joubert's recollections that there was this studied neglect.
I appeal to hon. Member's on both sides to remember that it does not matter what hard feelings there may be in this, or what positions may have been taken up from which people find it difficult to withdraw; none of that matters if there is a chance of getting our organisation right now, and if we can save even one ship should war unfortunately come. Let us look at this matter as objectively as possible and admit, if having searched our souls we find it necessary to do so, that there may still be something in this case and that people would not feel so strongly about it if there was not something in it.
7.40 p.m.
Captain Robert Ryder: I beg to second the Amendment.
I should like to make it clear that all we are asking here is for an impartial inquiry into what we feel to be a matter of considerable importance. Some people may say that Coastal Command should be placed under the Admiralty and others might say that the Fleet Air Arm should be amalgamated with Coastal Command. I do not want to associate myself with either of those points of view. All I am asking is that an impartial inquiry should be made into the facts.
Our case rests briefly on the following facts. The present arrangement was entered into, I think, in 1936 or 1937, in what was generally referred to as the Inskip Award. Surely in the intervening 15 years or so we have gained some valuable experience which should be the subject of an impartial investigation. After all, when this arrangement was made, many divergent controversial points of view were put forward. Surely, after these 15 dramatic years, in which we have all the experience of the war to call upon, there is some case for having this matter investigated.
The war-time experience in this connection was that we entered the war lamentably short of anti-submarine aircraft for operating over the ocean, and we were unable to obtain the aircraft until we had suffered grievous losses. It was not until half-way through the war that the Admiralty were able to go to their colleagues in the Government and obtain sufficient priority for aircraft. Then, under the impetus of the war, a degree of co-operation was established, which was highly commendable; for in such circumstances any Britisher will always do his best to make the system work.
But what happened when the war was over? At the request of the Air Ministry the whole of this arrangement was scrapped, and in its place there was set up a committee with two sub-committees—the Sea-Air Warfare Committees. It is under that system that the co-operation between the Admiralty and the Air Ministry exists. If anyone cares to argue that the system that was developed during the war was in any way perfect, I would commend to him a careful study of the
2182
occasion when the German battle cruisers "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" and the cruiser "Prinz Eugen" escaped up the Channel.
That was an interesting occasion which brought into play the point which we are asking to be examined after all these years by an impartial inquiry. It was a case of reconnaissance failure, Fleet Air Arm aircraft being flown in, squadrons sent in without fighter escort, M.T.B.s and destroyers sent in without fighter cover, of bombers then being called in, and in the end the ships escaping up the Channel. That is the sort of operation which provides many lessons which ought to be studied.
I should like to consider the tactical aspect. It is an established fact that strike-aircraft and reconnaissance aircraft form an essential element in any naval operation. It is just as important for a commander to throw in his strike-aircraft at the right moment as it is to use his submarines or dispatch his torpedo-craft or even fire his main armament. They are all essential parts of the operation. Any arrangement which in this process divides the system of command, training, research, development and administration is basically unsound, however necessary it may be, and it is bound to give rise to certain difficulties.
Here are one or two of the difficulties. There is a natural and human tendency for any commander, especially when he is in a tight corner, to rely primarily on those forces which are under his direct command, on which he can count, which he has trained and for which he is wholly responsible, rather than on the forces for which he has got to go to another command or another Service, perhaps up through a long chain of commands to the top and then down the chain of commands, and then perhaps to be told that the forces he requires are not available because of greater priority being given elsewhere.
It is natural, in those circumstances, for the commander to place greater reliance on those forces immediately under his command. It may be that if this state of affairs is allowed to develop and all his life he is subject to this process, it will affect his true judgment of the tactical situation. It may very well happen that the whole of our tactical evolution may become distorted and we may be diverted

2183
in this way from a true balance between our naval and air Forces at sea. That is one very serious consideration which I put before the House.
Let us consider what is to be the position of an officer who has this experience all his life. He is quite possibly prejudiced in favour of his own Service. One can imagine the case of an officer who would place greater reliance on motor torpedo boats when, in point of fact, the best forces for him to have might well be torpedo aircraft. That is the sort of way in which tactical development can be distorted. When the officer gets into a higher command he will find that he has been denied the wider experience which might have been his had he been trained throughout his Service career in the whole wide range of maritime aircraft and naval Forces. This, of course, places him at a disadvantage in the higher ranges of allied command.
We have only to look at the present arrangement—the command in the Channel—when instead of appointing one officer—I do not mind whether he is a naval or an air officer—we have to appoint two officers. We have a sort of joint command, and we are told that one of them is to be a co-ordinating authority. I should have thought that in the narrow waters of the Channel, if unhappily there is a war, we want something more than a mere co-ordinating authority. It seems to me that we want a commander.
In this system of joint command we are going back to a system which was found obsolete in the old days of the consular armies of Rome. We are going back to a system of divided command which, throughout the centuries, has been proved to be basically unsound. I maintain that in this process we are liable to develop on the wrong tactical lines and we are liable to place this country at a disadvantage as against the other friendly countries in the allied system of command.
I should like to consider next the question of priorities. I can well imagine circumstances in which reconnaissance aircraft and anti-submarine aircraft might be considered to be an essential part, or even the most important part, of our naval Forces. These considerations are not altogether divorced from reality. At the same time, so far as the Air Ministry
2184
are concerned, I can well imagine that they would be under great pressure to give first priority to the fighter defence of this country—and I would not quarrel with that—and under heavy pressure also to develop their offensive armed Bomber Command; and then under heavy pressure also to build up and develop—we have heard it in debates—an effective Transport Command, so that they may carry our relatively small land forces quickly to any threatened theatre throughout the world.
At the tail end of the line comes Coastal Command, so that we can see, when we look at the system of priority, that what was essential for maritime forces has a very low priority when it goes to the Air Ministry. That is the essence of the problem which we are asking to be examined.
There is another argument which I should like to mention. It is sometimes argued that the system that we had during the war would provide a greater flexibility than a system whereby Coastal Command would be transferred to the Admiralty, if that were decided upon. That is argued on the basis that it is far easier to switch aircraft and aircrew from one section of one command of the R.A.F. to another in the event of a crisis or emergency during a war. That is a very valid consideration, and it is one of the questions which should be examined very carefully, but all that I am interested in at present is to suggest that that is no obstacle to an impartial examination of this matter.
The home commands of the R.A.F. operate very much in watertight compartments, and I am far from convinced that it is necessarily more flexible to switch forces from one R.A.F. home command to another than it is to second units, squadrons and aircraft from one Service to another. There were plenty of examples of that during the war. The Fleet Air Arm took part in the Battle of Britain, the American Army Air Force lent units to Coastal Command, the Fleet Air Arm operated from American carriers and the Marines frequently operated under military command.
Therefore, I suggest that that is no obstacle, although it is a very valid argument which will have to be weighed against any other argument. I am not going to come down on the one side or the other; I am merely trying to present

2185
the problem as I see it, and it is natural that I should raise objections as I see them from the naval point of view. Do not let us tackle this matter from the strictly narrow point of view of any one Department. That is why I am confining my interest in this matter to the impartial review which has been suggested.
There are one or two minor points. There is the question of the photographic reconnaissance units which carried out such very valuable work during the war, and which, for convenience, were placed under Coastal Command. [Interruption.] I am told they are now under Bomber Command, and I think that is the right answer, because there was no reason why they should be under Coastal Command. They are much more closely associated with Bomber Command, and I am glad to hear of the transfer.
Then there is the question of mine-laying from aircraft at sea, which was carried out to a very important extent during the war, both in the North Sea and in Japanese waters. This work was not carried out by Coastal Command at all. It was largely the outcome of most successful co-operation between Bomber Command, on the one hand, and the Naval Mine Warfare Division of the Admiralty, on the other, so that it does not enter into the argument at all, although it is a factor which will have to be considered.
To sum up, I say that the present position set out in the Inskip Award has followed no natural boundary and is confined to no classical pattern. Strike-aircraft, reconnaissance aircraft and antisubmarine aircraft can operate either from the shore or from ships, and to divide them is a basically unsound arrangement. I feel that, after 15 years' experience, and after all the mistakes made and the advantages we secured during the war, we have a great deal to learn and that we should benefit greatly by an impartial examination of this question.
What are we to lose by that? What do we fear? I hope that my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence will weigh up these arguments very carefully, but I would also ask him what we are to think if he turns down this proposal. We can, in those circumstances, only think that the Minister fears the outcome of the inquiry.
2186
If he cannot grant this request for an inquiry, or if any other Minister is opposed to it, it can only be because he is afraid of the outcome.
In case anyone puts forward the view that this is the wrong time to ask for an inquiry of this sort, I say that there is a most pressing need for it. The Fleet Air Arm is at a very low ebb, and it cannot get pilots; Coastal Command is also at a very low ebb; and both are running high overhead costs. It is clear that if some kind of amalgamation were achieved, half the problem of the Fleet Air Arm and of the difficulty in getting pilots would be overcome, the overhead costs would be greatly reduced and we should get greater efficiency.
There are a number of other points which one could raise. We are now told that a decision has been taken that there are to be no flying-boats. Is that a final decision from the naval point of view? Can Shackleton aircraft operate in the India Ocean? Have we got airfields there, and what strike-aircraft are being provided? These are all matters that seem to me to be in a very unsatisfactory state at the present moment, and I therefore very sincerely ask my hon. Friend not to close his mind on this very important matter.
I quite appreciate that he cannot give a snap decision after a short debate of this kind, but if he will leave the matter open and consult with his noble Friend the newly-appointed Minister of Defence, I am sure that he will get some very good advice. I would ask him to consider this Amendment very carefully and very seriously before turning us down on a matter on which, I am quite sure, it would not be in the interests of the country for him to do so.
7.58 p.m.
Mr. Edward Shackleton: Unlike the hon. Member for Darwen (Mr. Fletcher-Cooke), who moved the Amendment in such moderate and cautious tones, I must declare an interest. I declare an interest as one who served for most of the war in Coastal Command, and who had the opportunity of going back last year, and who hopes to have the opportunity of going back this year, to Coastal Command and missing many of the all-night Sittings of this House, as I did on the previous occasion.

2187
I would say at once that both the mover and seconder of the Amendment have been extremely careful to put forward their case without any sort of rancour at all. One of the difficulties that arise in discussing inter-Service cooperation, and particularly this very vexed question of the status of Coastal Command, is that feelings are apt to run high. Indeed, there are some people—and I confess myself to have been one of them on occasion—who have found pleasure in such an argument. But I think that tonight we are looking at a very serious question, and I hope I shall be able to treat it as calmly as the hon. Members who have spoken on this Amendment.
I should like to take up the point made by the hon. and gallant Member for Merton and Morden (Captain Ryder) that if the Under-Secretary resisted the case for such an inquiry it would show that his case was bad, and that if he has nothing to fear he should agree to such an inquiry. That is one of the oldest arguments used by all of us on occasions when advocating an impartial inquiry. It is not good enough for this House to recommend that an impartial inquiry be set up unless in fact, as the hon. Member for Darwen made clear, a prima facia case has been made out.
Although the hon. and gallant Member for Merton and Morden said he did not commit himself one way or the other on this matter, it is a fact that we know on which side he would probably come down. It is also a fact that this Amendment is worded in terms which quite clearly indicate that the mover and seconder and those who support the Amendment believe there is something wrong in the Coastal Command set-up and that they think that Coastal Command should be taken over by the Navy.
If the Amendment had been put in rather wider terms, if indeed it had been proposed to carry out an inquiry into the whole of air-sea co-operation, not excluding the status of the Fleet Air Arm, there might have been a case for examination on a less tendentious basis than is proposed in the terms of this Amendment; but I do not think that the type of inquiry—
Captain Ryder: I should like to make my point of view clear. I should be perfectly ready to accept terms of reference which included the position of the Fleet Air Arm as well.
Mr. Fletcher-Cooke: So should I.
Mr. Shackleton: Then it is unfortunate that the hon. and gallant Member seconded the wrong Amendment. If he had chosen the right Amendment we should have saved a lot of time. In any case, this Amendment has provided an. opportunity for which we should be grateful to discuss a most important problem which is exercising and has exercised the minds of many people, and of which I should be inclined to say it is extremely difficult to find a wholly satisfactory solution.
The question is whether at the moment we have adopted a solution which is the best in all the circumstances. Here I should like to make a point on the speech of the hon. Member for Darwen. I simply cannot accept his history of the setting up of Coastal Command or his history of why the Fleet Air Arm was taken away from that Command. I also have studied this subject, and I thought his was a rather one-sided version. One great difficulty that we have in any discussion of the Navy—and I say this as calmly as I can—is the fact that for the most part the Navy still prefers not to recognise the existence of air power.
Mr. James Callaghan: Rubbish.
Mr. Shackleton: I am not suggesting that they do not recognise that there are aircraft, but they regard aircraft as a tactical extension of sea power and—
Mr. Fletcher-Cooke: It is a mode of the exercise of sea power.
Mr. Shackleton: Precisely. That statement is in direct contradiction to the theory of air power. It may well be that the hon. Member spent a good deal of time studying the various staff handbooks—and I confess it is a somewhat unrewarding pastime—but one thing that can be stated with absolute certainty is that each Service has a primary and secondary role and that there is a double role involved for the Air Force and the Navy. The chief virtue of air power—and I shall attempt to substantiate this statement—

2189
is that it retains a flexibility which enables a far greater measure of concentration to be obtained at a vital point at the right time than is possible to other Services.
It is impossible for the Navy to go ashore, except where they land Marines or the Royal Naval Brigade at Antwerp. But the Air Force can be transferred to the precise and most important operation it is called upon to do at any one time. This is not just a question of taking a squadron of Coastal Command and saying, "Tomorrow you bomb so and so." But it is possible over a period of time to switch to different operations.
Both the mover and the seconder of this Amendment have blamed the Air Ministry for a lack of priority given to Coastal Command and to the antisubmarine role, but they will have heard the speech made by their own Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty who said:
"The total strength of the maritime arm of the R.A.F. is determined by the Chiefs of Staff or higher authority,…"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 6th March, 1952; Vol. 497, c. 867.]
fIt is not an Air Ministry responsibility to decide the size of Coastal Command. It is for the Chiefs of Staff and the Defence Committee of the Cabinet. This is a point we must accept, and we must dispose of this argument that Coastal Command is not larger due to the machinations of the wicked Air Staff in the Air Ministry.
Captain Ryder: The hon. Member has illustrated very clearly the precise point I was trying to make: that is that the Air Ministry will be under pressure to give priority elsewhere but the Admiralty are not in a position to say, "We are quite ready to do without a couple of destroyers if you give us a couple of flying-boats." If they had their own allocation of long-range flying-boats and other aircraft they could choose their own priorities within their own Service.
Mr. Shackleton: This account of the horse-dealing that goes on in the Defence Committee between Chiefs of Staff is really shattering, and completely illustrates the frame of mind both of hon. Members who have served in the Navy and of the Navy in these matters. What they seek is not co-operation with the Air Force. They want domination in this field. They should get it into their
2190
heads that success in war in the past and success in war in the future, if such a disaster should come again, depends on the best form of inter-Service co-operation and not on a series of horse-dealing transactions in destroyers and coastal aircraft.
I certainly do not think the Prime Minister, who takes a certain interest in defence matters, is likely to look very kindly on the sort of intrigue that it is suggested from the benches opposite takes place. In any case, it will be a matter for the proper authorities to decide priority. During the war the priority that was given to Coastal Command changed according to the needs of the strategic situation. I agree that at the beginning of the war Coastal Command had extremely small and inadequate forces; but the Navy, due to their over-confidence in the use of asdic had a quite inadequate supply of escort vessels. The wrong decision was taken in this matter before the war.
We need not go into the details, but the Navy was woefully short of escort vessels. For only one short period during the war did the Air Force have the support of a hunting group, such as that under the late Captain Walker—which tremendously increased the efficiency of that operation—in carrying out its offensive role in attacking submarines in the Bay of Biscay.
Those of us who are interested in Coastal Command desire a stronger Coastal Command, but this is a decision which must be taken not by vested interests, not by people who are primarily and rightly concerned with the strength of their own Service; it is a decision which must be taken objectively under the auspices of the Ministry of Defence.
Captain Ryder: An impartial inquiry.
Mr. Shackleton: I do not know whether the hon. and gallant Gentleman wishes to conduct government by impartial inquiry, but certainly that is not a device which will commend itself to his own Front Bench. Let me give an example of the advantages of unified Air Force control over a system in which we have two separate air forces, one Naval and one Royal Air Force.
At the height of the U-boat war, following a decision taken, I believe, at Casablanca, there was a change in priority, and Coastal Command were given first priority. At that time,

2191
Bomber Command was stripped of squadrons, which were sent into Coastal Command. Some were put straight on to operations, even though they were untrained, and they sank submarines; and others were re-trained and re-equipped and became an integral part of Coastal Command. Despite what the hon. and gallant Gentleman said, that was all the easier because they were part of the same Service, and it is in this matter of re-inforcement and of the switching of air power that the great strength of unified control lies.
But it was not only a question of switching squadrons from bomber command. At the height of the battle in the Bay of Biscay, the Germans were so concerned about the destruction of their U-boats that they put Ju. 88's into the Bay to fight off the anti-submarine aircraft. We retaliated by bringing Beau-fighters into Coastal Command to provide protection for our aircraft. Indeed, the hon. and gallant Gentleman knows that when he sailed down the Bay of Biscay on his very gallant exploit he did so under the protection of Coastal Command. The Germans retaliated, again, by bringing in Messerschmitt 109's in order to try to jump our aircraft off the Scillies, and we had to switch squadrons from Fighter Command to give additional protection.
The purpose of this argument is to show that even if the Navy were given control of Coastal Command, they would still be dependent to a very large extent indeed, and to an extent which would neutralise the arguments which have been advanced by hon. Members opposite, on the co-operation of the Air Force.
Let us look for a moment at some of the other roles. The hon. and gallant Member for Merton and Morden suggested that he would be content for photographic reconnaissance to remain in the Air Force, but that apparently is not the view of the hon. Member for Darwen. In my opinion, one thing we cannot afford is to have two independent photographic reconnaissance units. The job of reconnaissance will switch according to the priority of the day and the need of the day They may be required to bring back information about whether the Scharnhorst or the Gneisenau are at Brest, or they may be asked to bring back information for
2192
the Army or of Bomber Command; and that is a case in point where a centralised Air Force must fulfill this role.
Let us consider the anti-shipping role. During the war, all three Commands of the Air Force were involved in this role. At the beginning, with the disappearance of land fighting in Europe, Blenheims from Army Co-operation Command became redundant and were switched to an anti-shipping role. Then they were needed for anti-submarine work and switched to that, and No. 2 group of Bomber Command took on the responsibility. They were very successful, but the battle became too hot and we had to call in strike wings, including Torbeaus and Beaufighters, many of whom were on anti-flak protection, and they carried out the role.
In certain circumstances it was necessary to pull Fighter Command into the anti-shipping role, in attacks on shipping and E. boats off the French coast, and at no period in the war could we say that any part of the Air Force would be engaged exclusively and permanently on anti-shipping. I suggest that this is a very strong argument in favour of the unified Air Force because of the impossibility of foretelling the particular role which any Command would have to fill.
The hon. Member for Darwen mentioned mining. As is known, most of the mining during the war was done by Bomber Command, and when the Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau went up Channel they were damaged by mines laid by Bomber Command. In fact, one of them never put to sea again and was subsequently destroyed by bombers. I cannot allow to pass the suggestion that it was the fault of the Air Force that these ships were allowed to go up the Channel or that it was a result of the failure of reconnaissance through the system which we used.
Grave mistakes were made on that occasion—very grave mistakes. I confess that I was the senior intelligence officer at the station which was responsible for finding out whether these ships were coming up the Channel. I can claim, therefore, to speak with a little knowledge on the subject. Grave mistakes were made. The A.S.V. aircraft which was supposed to be patrolling off Ushant had an A.S.V. failure. We were using the Mark II A.S.V.; it was

2193
withdrawn and not replaced but the failure in that case cannot be laid on the Air Force because the Navy had operational control. The two Services were sitting side by side, but nevertheless grave mistakes were made and I do not believe the incident does any credit to either the Navy or the Air Force.
Mr. Emrys Hughes: Hear, hear.
Mr. Shackleton: I am glad to have my hon. Friend's approval on this occasion. That failure cannot be regarded as an excuse for switching Coastal Command to the Navy. I should like to develop this point at great length, but I will try to restrain myself.
Mr. Fletcher-Cooke: Before the hon. Gentleman leaves that point, may I put this to him? He says this incident brought no credit to the Navy. Although my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Merton and Morden (Captain Ryder) knows much more about this than I do, I think it is a fact that the main damage to these ships was done by Lieut.-Commander Eugene Esmond, who lost his life in that operation and who fired a torpedo into the Gneisenau.
Mr. Shackleton: I certainly did not want in any way to depreciate what was done by Coastal Command or Bomber Command or, particularly, by the naval squadron which took part in that attack, but as an operation of war it was not one of the more successful.
Mr. Hughes: That is right.
Mr. Shackleton: I thank my hon. Friend. Let me turn to some of the other arguments which have been advanced. A suggestion has been made that now we have an American Admiral in command of the Atlantic, it is desirable that he should have only people in Naval Blue to deal with. May I point out that S.H.A.P.E. is not only an international command; it is also an inter-service command, and a very successful one.
But the American example is a very unfortunate one to take. When America came into the war they had no effective anti-submarine forces and the damage which was done and the ships which were sunk in sight of American cities was a terrible experience, especially in the light
2194
of the fact that they had a fully-developed Naval Air Force. They built an antisubmarine command in the American Army Air Force. These squadrons came over here and served in Coastal Command, and in the course of time, as they gained experience, they became first rate at their job.
But right at the height of the battle in the Bay of Biscay, the American Navy carried out what I can only describe as another horse deal, and an infamous one; they traded their strategic bomber command for the army anti-submarine command. Out went the Army with the aircraft which they knew how to fly and in came the Navy, and for a long time they were prevented from taking an effective part in the battle because of lack of experience. This is another example of the difficulties we shall meet if we split up our air power and do not regard it as indivisible.
There are many other arguments which I should like to bring to bear, but there is one I want to make in conclusion. There is a very considerable need for improvement in the effective operational system of maritime air warfare. I would ask the Minister of Defence and the Service Ministers to look again to see if they cannot bring the Navy and the Air Force closer together. It is a fact, for instance, that the Fleet Air Arm Home Air Command, commanded, I think, by Flag Officer (Air) has not a single member of the Air Force on the staff; and equally, the number of naval officers in Coastal Command is very small.
If we are to benefit from the experience of the two Services and from the exchange of ideas between them there must be a closer mixing up of the various Armed Services. I am not suggesting tonight that Coastal Command should take over the Fleet Air Arm. There are many people, including many in the Fleet Air Arm, who wish that should be so. Many during the war, in particular, had very little confidence in the higher naval command, and the main cause of that was that the admirals as a whole lacked knowledge of aircraft and of air services and had very little understanding of air warfare. If they were given more experience they might be better, and they might not try to send Skuas over Brest in broad daylight to dive-bomb the Prinz Eugen.

2195
That sort of thing would be prevented if they had more knowledge of aircraft and air warfare.
At the same time, I think that this is not a question merely of transferring one part of a Service to another Service. It is mainly a question of inter-Service cooperation. I would suggest that, if a committee were set up—and I think that under the terms of this Motion I would strongly oppose it—but if an inter-Departmental inquiry were to take place, one of the things it might do would be to work out a closer mixing up of Coastal Command and the Navy. The difficulty we are up against still is that so few of the naval leaders yet fully accept the principles and idea of air power.
Mr. Callaghan: I was hoping that the Civil Lord would intercept, but, as it is, perhaps my hon. Friend will take it from me that the Fifth Sea Lord is a qualified pilot, and that the Flag Officer (Air) Home is also a qualified pilot, and that, indeed, the higher ranks in the Admiralty and in the Service are now becoming full of young men who started in the Fleet Air Arm only in 1937 or thereabouts and are only just now coming to the top. This out of date conception to which my hon. Friend refers—about the admirals not caring about air power—has really gone by the board a long time since.
Mr. Shackleton: I am delighted that my hon. Friend has contrived to make a speech in this debate. I am glad to know, though I am not unduly surprised, that the officer in charge of Naval Air Services is in fact a pilot. I do not think, however, that that is a very startling sign of acceptance of new ideas. The Fifth Sea Lord is one against I do not know how many members of the Board of Admiralty. My hon. Friend knows more about the Board of Admiralty than I do, but now that he no longer has an official relationship with the Admiralty he can seek to find out the opinion of serving members of Naval Aviation, and he will find that there are very strong views on this subject indeed. This is something that the Navy have got to get down to, and to think hard about.
Mr. Emrys Hughes: Hear, hear.
Mr. Shackleton: I am glad my hon. Friend agrees. I hope that he will agree with my last remark on this subject,
2196
when I say that one of the great virtues—I know he will agree with this—of air power is its flexibility, which enables a concentration of force to be developed at the right place at the right time. That is something too valuable to be thrown away merely for the expansion of sea power, and it is on this ground particularly that I ask the Under-Secretary of State to say quite clearly that the Government have no intention whatsoever of granting this inquiry, and are not considering any change in the status of Coastal Command.
8.25 p.m.
Air Commodore A. V. Harvey: I had not intended to intervene in this debate, but I feel so strongly about it that, after all, I feel I should say a few words.
I regret, personally, that the Amendment has been moved at all. We are told by successive Governments—certainly by the last and this—that we are living in times of great danger. The Russian air force is preponderant in numbers and in some cases in quality. In these circumstances I should have thought that, as Coastal Command is doing its job well, this would have been the last time at which to turn that Command upside down by this kind of inquiry. Personally, I should like to see all three Services wearing the same uniform—in complete integration. I hope that one day that will come about. [An HON. MEMBER: "In dark blue."] It may not be dark blue. It may be light blue.
Mr. Emrys Hughes: It may be red.
Air Commodore Harvey: I want to refer to the remarks of my hon. Friend the Member for Darwen (Mr. Fletcher-Cooke). He went back a long time, to the days of the Royal Naval Air Service in 1917. He talked about the Navy having priority on the equipment side. I well believe that, because since Nelson's day they have had a long arm that has got them what they have required, whereas the Army and the Air Force have had to go on their knees to beg for what they have wanted. That still happens to some extent. Unless the Royal Flying Corps was to disintegrate in 1917 something had to be done to give it equipment, and so I do not think that

2197
that was a balanced argument at all. I should like to know from the Under-Secretary of State whether the Navy has made any request for this inquiry since the end of the war. Perhaps, we should be informed on that.
I would congratulate the hon. Member for Preston, South (Mr. Shackleton), because I thought his speech was a very balanced one, and I want to reinforce what he said about priorities. I am quite sure that the Cabinet Defence Committee and the Minister of Defence tell the Service chiefs today in general terms—sometimes, I imagine, in great detail—what is expected of them in the way of equipment and what they have got to order. No doubt, that happens in Coastal Command.
My hon. Friend the Member for Darwen thought that the loyalty of the pilots in Coastal Command was not to the sea but to the Royal Air Force. I have never heard such nonsense in my life. When pilots are sought to be transferred from Coastal Command to another Command they fight for all they are worth to stay in Coastal Command. They cannot be very bored with flying over the sea. They are very loyal to their Command. It is disturbing to suggest the contrary—to suggest, as my hon. Friend did in the House, which enables that sort of thing to go on the record in the technical papers, that these officers are not loyal to their Command.
Then he said that if the transfer ought not to take place right now, the best thing would be to have an inquiry, and that the officers should wait for four or five years before the transfer takes place. Can anyone imagine anything more unsettling to young men entering the Navy or the Fleet Air Arm or the Royal Air Force than for them to know that in a few years' time they may be sent to another Service?
My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Merton and Morden (Captain Ryder), is very well versed in naval matters, and he said we cannot have a unified command. Of course, we did not have a unified command before the war, but in the Western Desert Air Force, under the late Air Marshal Coningham and Field Marshal Montgomery there was a classic example of how two Services could get along together working as one team. I do not accept that argument at all, because I do not think that it bears
2198
consideration. Twenty years ago as a young officer in the Royal Air Force I used to read the letters of Lord Trenchard and of the die-hard admirals in "The Times." They wrote sufficient letters to fill a book. Surely we are not going over to that again at this stage.
Although my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Merton and Morden tried to get out of it by saying that he was not saying quite the same thing as the mover of the Amendment, in fact he was, Everything that he said was in favour of Coastal Command going to the the Navy. He made no argument at all in the other direction. What we want is an Air Arm as a whole under one control, co-ordinated by one air staff. It must be so, because it has become such a vast and complicated problem with regard to communications, training and so on, and the ordering of equipment.
So far as the ordering of equipment is concerned, I should like to see it taken out of the Ministry of Supply and put under the Minister of Defence who would know the priorities and the allocations and dole out the equipment as he thought fit. It is not just a question of sinking submarines for Coastal Command. The Royal Air Force plays a much larger part than that. The fighters have to give fighter cover down the coast, and continually throughout the war they escorted our convoys up and down the coast and through the English Channel. That shows that Fighter Command has to co-operate with the Navy as much as Coastal Command. Likewise they strike against shipping and against land targets. I believe that Coastal Command took part in the bombing of Cologne, and on other occasions is was necessary to throw all our Commands in to make one supreme effort.
Today the Royal Air Force trains the naval pilots initially, and yet we have hon. Members talking about taking Coastal Command for the Navy and leaving the Air Force to train their pilots on Tiger Moths and Chipmunks. The hon. and gallant Member made his argument in favour of one Command only, and that was that Coastal Command should go to the Navy. He must not resent our loyalty to our own Service when we put forward both sides of the argument. The Royal Air Force today are training pilots for the Royal Navy,

2199
and I hope that they are doing it well, as no doubt they are. I am told that the Fleet Air Arm have something like 28 different types of aircraft. I do not know whether that is true or not, but if they have, it seems to me that the whole thing wants overhauling in the Fleet Air Arm. What do many of these types look like—box kites, bird cages or anything one likes. I think that is a deplorable situation.
Prior to the war, the Fleet Air Arm was grossly neglected. The new Under-Secretary, whom I congratulate sincerely on his appointment, was first a Regular officer, then a Reserve officer and then a Royal Air Force Auxiliary officer who spent some two years with the Fleet Air Arm. Unfortunately, he is not to reply tonight, because I should have liked to have heard his comments on the Fleet Air Arm. Many naval officers left the Navy during the inter-war years because they were left aside and were not promoted; they were given no encouragement, and it was not until the admirals saw the red light and realised that unless they recognised air power they would be out as well that anything was done. They only recognised it just in time, many of them, to save their own skins. We might as well argue that the Army should fly the aircraft which are carrying troops. We want all the Services to work together and co-operate and to be more efficient, and not to unsettle young officers and senior officers who, I think, are doing their best to bring about three efficient Services.
8.34 p.m.
Mr. Kenneth Robinson: I think that the Committee should congratulate the hon. Member for Darwen (Mr. Fletcher-Cooke) on using his good luck in the Ballot to introduce this very important but somewhat thorny topic this evening. I am glad to intervene quite briefly for two reasons. First, to show that the views expressed by the mover and seconder of this Amendment are not held exclusively on the other side of the Committee, and, second, to allay any suspicions that the views expressed by the hon. Member for Preston, South (Mr. Shackleton) represent the general views of this matter on these benches.
My interest in this matter is to some extent coloured, I admit, by the fact that
2200
I spent five years in the Navy. During that time I had the opportunity of seeing both the ship aspect and the aircraft aspect of the anti-submarine war. I spent the first six months of my naval career in destroyers in the Western Approaches and the last six months of it in the British Pacific Fleet, which was a carrier task force, almost exclusively concerned with air power.
Earlier today my hon. Friend the Member for Uxbridge (Mr. Beswick) suggested that this was a somewhat academic controversy in view of the likely nature of the next world war. It may well be that a lot of our defence preparations may turn out to be academic if another world war breaks out—
Mr. Emrys Hughes: Hear, hear!
Mr. Robinson: I thought that would meet with a little support from my hon. Friend the Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes). Nevertheless, we must devise the most efficient method of using the defences which we are building up.
I am not at all happy that the present arrangements for Coastal Command are conducive to efficiency. The hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Merton and Morden (Captain Ryder) referred to the Inskip Award. The House might be interested to know the background against which that decision was made.
In 1937 the problem which faced the Services, particularly the R.A.F., was that there would not be sufficient aircraft available to carry out the four main tasks which were likely to fall to the lot of aircraft in a future war—the bomber offensive, the fighter defence of our shores, transport and the defence of our trade routes. Therefore, it was considered that the aircraft available would have to be interchangeable.
That may sound laughable in these days of specialisation, but it was thought to be the only solution to the problem. As the roles of the aircraft had to be interchangeable, so the central pool had to be under a single control, and, naturally, it was decided that that should be the Royal Air Force. Those conditions are no longer valid. One might say that all the basic conditions on which the Inskip Award was founded are no longer valid.
Mr. Shackleton: My hon. Friend said that one of the conditions of the Inskip Award was acceptance of the fact that there would not be sufficient aircraft in any war which was likely to come. Does he now suggest that there are likely to be more than enough aircraft?
Mr. Robinson: I am not suggesting that. I am saying that aircraft are not going to be interchangeable in the sense that they were thought capable of being interchanged in 1937, and I think that my hon. friend will agree with that.
Let us admit that in 1941, when to some extent the operational control of Coastal Command passed to the Navy, the arrangement worked fairly well. But it was very wasteful. It entailed a duplication of officers. Mainly, I am afraid for reasons of inter-Service prestige, there was always a naval officer of equivalent rank sitting on the tail of his R.A.F. opposite number. That is not a very admirable way to conduct Coastal Command in any future emergency.
The war against submarines has to be fought by aircraft and by ships. This afternoon we heard statistics to the effect that in the last war aircraft sank more U-boats than did naval vessels. As all such operations during the war, the battle against the submarine fluctuated, and it will always fluctuate. Sometimes the aircraft will be on top and sometimes the escort vessels will be on top. I believe that it was in 1943–44 when the aircraft were so successful against the U-boat, but in 1945, when the Schnorkel device was invented, the escort vessel came into its own.
Mr. Shackleton: In 1943.
Mr. Robinson: It was in 1945, when the Schnorkel was in full production and being used extensively. That made it very much more difficult for an aircraft to locate a submarine, and in 1945 the escort vessels had the greater success. That kind of fluctuation is bound to take place in the future.
The lesson to be learned is that there must be the closest possible co-operation between ships and aircraft engaged in anti-submarine warfare. The closest co-operation can mean only one thing—that the two branches become part of the same Service. That is the closest cooperation that we can get in war-time, but what my hon. Friend the Member for
2202
Preston, South, seems to think is that if, by any chance, this inquiry should take place and the verdict were given that Coastal Command were to go into the Navy, it would adversely affect other forms of inter-Service co-operation. But that is not correct and there is no reason why it should affect other aspects of co-operation.
The lesson is that the two weapons in this fight against submarines must be in one pair of hands. Despite all the remarks of my hon. Friend the Member for Preston, South, I am not at all happy that the Air Ministry will give adequate priority to the war against the submarine. It is not entirely a matter of allocations or estimates decided by the Chiefs of Staff: it is also a matter of emphasis, personnel and a whole lot of similar factors. This inability to put the war against the submarine in its proper perspective is not a mistake of which the Royal Navy can ever be guilty. They are not going to forget the desperate ebb and flow of the Battle of the Atlantic during the six years of the last war.
All that the hon. Member for Darwen is asking the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence to do is to have an inquiry. The arguments against such a step are always those arguments for conserving the present status quo. I can understand such views coming from hon. Members opposite, but I am rather disappointed that my hon. Friend the Member for Preston, South, is not sufficiently sure of his case as to want the matter to be examined by an impartial court.
Mr. Shackleton: I have already answered that one.
Mr. Robinson: He said he would welcome a wider inquiry into the whole matter of air-sea co-operation, and I should like to echo the words of the hon. Member for Darwen that I would be perfectly happy if that was the nature of the inquiry and those were the terms of reference, for they would not exclude the future administration of Coastal Command.
This matter has never been properly investigated under modern conditions. In some ways it is a good omen that the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence is to reply to this part of the debate, because his noble Friend the

2203
Minister is in a position to arbitrate between the three Services. I hope we shall hear from the Parliamentary Secretary that his mind is not closed to this problem, which is giving serious concern to a lot of people, not only in the Navy but among all those who had experience of inter-Service co-operation in the last war.
8.44 p.m.
Mr. John Grimston: I disagree with a great deal of what has been said by my hon. Friend the Member for Darwen (Mr. Fletcher-Cooke), but I think we all recognise that this thorny subject could not have been introduced in a more fluent and factual manner. My interest in this is that for a short time I had the honour of serving in Coastal Command as a pilot, and one of the things where I disagreed with my hon. Friend was when he said that the Coastal Command pilots were all-purpose aviators and that their loyalty was to the R.A.F. and not to the sea.
I do not think that is a fair summary of the attitude of the people in Coastal Command. As my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Macclesfield (Air Commodore Harvey) rightly said, they are intensely proud of their Command and of the job they do.
I have the very greatest admiration for the Fleet Air Arm, and if I felt that this Amendment would help to build up the strength of Coastal Command I would certainly support it; but I do not think that it will, particularly because of its phraseology, which talks about Coastal Command as being an "essential air arm of our maritime forces." I regard Coastal Command as an essential arm of our air forces, and I do not think that an impartial inquiry could in any way help to build up its strength.
We are all in very great danger—and the hon. Member for Preston, South (Mr. Shackleton), is in that danger too—of trying to fight old wars in debates of this kind. The problem which now faces the Air Force and the Fleet Air Arm is, as much as any: "Where do we get our pilots and aircrews from?" As I understand it, young men over the age of 25 are not very good for flying at 40,000 feet or more today, because accident proneness, or liability to kill
2204
oneself, then begins to go up. The logical sequence is to get pilots into high performance aircraft first, and when they reach the ripe old age of 25 or thereabouts to start them flying in Coastal Command or indeed in Transport Command, which both call for qualities which are found more often in older and more experienced pilots than in very young men.
The crying need is for an aircraft of dual purpose, of enormous range and passenger-carrying capacity, which would operate either in Coastal Command over long distances or in Transport Command, where there is a shortage of aircraft at the moment. That type of aircraft would be relatively cheap to produce. It would have a piston engine and fairly simple equipment, and it would not become obsolete in a matter of months as high performance aircraft do. It would be much more economical to produce and to operate. I believe that we could man a lot of those squadrons, particularly of Coastal Command, from the Auxiliary Air Force or from the Reserves. At the moment we allow men with gallant flying records to go during their week-ends to civil aerodromes and fly light civil aircraft, although they are considered to be some of our first-line Reserves.
These men could be given very much more valuable training to keep their hand in in a more beneficial way for the country by flying larger aircraft on Coastal Command roles. My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Merton and Morden (Captain Ryder) said that at sea the commander must control his own tactical aircraft. I do not think that any of us who support Coastal Command would differ from that statement.
Those of us who wish to see in Coastal Command long-range heavy aircraft do not see them in anything like as tactical a role as does my hon. and gallant Friend. We see them as continually policing what he evidently does not regard as narrow waters. I regard all waters as narrow, because aircraft can cross all water with the greatest ease. I see Coastal Command continually policing the shipping lanes, and if they are not killing submarines they are at least keeping them down. That surely is a really vital objective because, if they keep them down, they impose strains on the submarine

2205
crews and reduce their effectiveness immeasurably.
I hope, therefore, that when my hon. Friend replies he will not accept this amendment but will, if any change has to be made, see that the functions of Coastal Command are confined more to the role of operating large aircraft. I hope he will deal with the building of heavier aircraft for manning both by reserve crews and by men who have reached an age at which they are no longer able to fly high performance aircraft; and therefore it is time for the Service to find them some other useful employment for which their earlier training will have fitted them.
8.51 p.m.
Group Captain C. A. B. Wilcock: I only intervene for a few moments in this homely debate because I was possibly the first in the House to serve in Coastal Command. Before saying anything on that matter, however, may I congratulate the hon. Gentleman on his appointment as Under-Secretary of State for Air? His politics are a matter of great regret to me, but his enthusiasm for flying and for the Royal Air Force is a matter for congratulation.
It is many years since I was posted to Coastal Command. I had been overseas in a hot climate for a couple of years and it was suggested that I might like to go to Coastal Command. It seemed attractive to me in those days. It was then called Coastal Area. My children bought buckets and spades and we all looked forward to a sea vacation. I reported to the Air Ministry for my posting instructions only to find that the headquarters of Coastal Command were in Tavistock Place on top of the Express Dairy. In those days it was very much under the domination of the Royal Navy, and I always felt it was a great mistake to place the headquarters of the Coastal Fleet in London.
Not only was Coastal Command considered a very honoured and a great command in those days, but it is also considered so today in the Royal Air Force. I make this remark because an hon. Member who is not in the Chamber at the moment appeared to speak disparagingly of it. I could not possibly let that pass,
2206
because my son is a pilot in Coastal Command. In fact, he is pilot for the Commander-in-Chief, and today the Commander-in-Chief has flown to Gibraltar with my son as his pilot. I only mention that to show that it is not a question of the people in Coastal Command sitting down at home; they move around the world today because Coastal Command has great and world-wide responsibilities.
The next part of my speech I would have preferred to make in the absence from the Chamber of the hon. and very gallant Member for Merton and Morden (Captain Ryder) and of my hon. Friend the Member for St. Pancras, North (Mr. K. Robinson) who, being a Whip, has a certain influence over myself and my movements. I question very much whether today we can really afford a Royal Navy at all. There is no doubt that in war today the only place for a capital ship and a large carrier is tied up alongside and well camouflaged. I doubt very much whether any naval commander-in-chief would dare to take a large ship to sea in a future war—they showed great reluctance in doing so during the last war. Therefore, would it not be better if the Royal Navy were a department—and a very important department indeed—of Coastal Command?
Mr. Shackleton: Would my hon. and gallant Friend suggest the Transportation Corps of the Army as a suitable title?
Group Captain Wilcock: That is very attractive. The hon. and gallant Member for Macclesfield (Air Commodore Harvey) mentioned that the real aim is to have an integrated Service of one uniform colour. When we have done this, as I have recently advocated, we should certainly not need these long discussions about under what jurisdiction the Command should be.
Those are my only remarks on the subject of Coastal Command, except to say that if my suggestion regarding the Royal Navy does not receive the approval of the Government Front Bench, at least there should be no change in Coastal Command and that it should remain, for the time being at any rate, until it has absorbed the Royal Navy, still one of Her Majesty's Royal Air Force Commands.
8.56 p.m.
The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence (Mr. Nigel Birch): We have had a very spirited sea-air engagement, and on strictly non-party lines. It was remarkable how everybody was loyal to his own Service, with the exception of, I think, my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud and Thornbury (Mr. Perkins), who wanted to lose Coastal Command but compensated for that action by caning the admirals in a very serious manner.
It is also very pleasant that the debate has been carried on with good temper. There was a slight Wisden feeling in the early part as to who scored what, but the general feeling has been to remember that in the presence of the Queen's enemies, at any rate, we are all on the same side.
I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Darwen (Mr. Fletcher-Cooke) on his speech in moving the Amendment and for his great historical knowledge on the subject. It is a good thing that we should discuss this, because it is an old subject of controversy which comes up all the time and is intimately connected with the protection of our sea communications, which, we all realise, is vital. I will, therefore, try to answer the arguments that have been put forward on both sides of the House.
Three main points have exercised the attention of hon. Members. There is, first, the idea, which has been put forward by several Members, including my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud and Thornbury and my hon. Friend the Member for Darwen, that Coastal Command is an ill-fed and unwanted child of the Air Ministry. It is certainly not an unwanted child. It is worth remembering that the present Chief of the Air Staff was a very distinguished Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief of Coastal Command, and it would certainly break his heart to lose it.
There remains the charge of malnutrition. It is certainly true that Coastal Command ran down. It is equally true that Fighter Command, Bomber Command and Transport Command ran down, and it is invidious to argue which is Cinderella and which are the Ugly Sisters.
Coastal Command is, as we know, vital, but the air defence of Great Britain
2208
is equally vital. We must have our maritime reconnaissance. If we cannot defend our own country, that will bring us to our knees just as quickly as a failure in maritime reconnaissance. Therefore, it is a matter for the correct allocation of our resources, as my hon. Friend the Member for Darwen said; and the size and shape of our forces is a matter for Government.
It is not open to the Air Ministry to say that they do not like Coastal Command and will halve it. They cannot do any such thing. The size and shape of our forces is decided by Government, who in their task have to weigh many factors—factors of foreign policy, of economics, and of the various threats with which we may be faced. It is a task of very great complexity, which cannot possibly be done by one Ministry. It can only be done by the whole power of Government, working together and keeping a sense of proportion.
So far as the present position of Coastal Command is concerned, as my hon. Friend said, a substantial expansion is taking place. The expansion is going on in the Shackleton principally and we are beginning to get the Neptunes, although we have not yet got a very great many.
It is also true, and I would ask the House to note this, that the only operational command where the expansion is going anything like up to plan is Coastal Command. Therefore, I do not think it can be argued that at present it is being neglected. In addition, a very great deal of research work is going on. As my hon. Friend said, when he presented his Estimates, the speed of the modern submarine equipped with the Snort presents new problems which have not been completely solved as far as the air is concerned. A great deal of effort has been put into that. That deals with the matter so far as the "unwanted child" goes. It is wanted, but is ill fed—
Mr. Emrys Hughes: It costs a lot.
Mr. Birch: Everything costs a lot.
The next point was the question of the career structure raised by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Merton and Morden, and also, I think, by my hon. Friend the Member for St. Albans (Mr. J. Grimston). It is true that there

2209
have been and are certain recruiting difficulties in naval aviation, but at present recruiting for naval aviation is improving and we always have variations in these things; there have been times when recruiting for the Royal Air Force was very bad. Now naval aviation is an integral part of the Royal Navy. My hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty said, when he spoke on the Navy Estimates:
"&aviation is now an integral part of the Navy and we do not want people to think of it as a separate arm."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 6th March, 1952; Vol. 497, c. 866.]
For that reason they bring Regular officers in through Dartmouth. It is true both of the Royal Navy and of the Royal Air Force that we want many more officer pilots than we can offer a full time career. It is equally true of both Services, but a study of the figures will show that there is very little indeed to choose between the career prospects of officers on short service engagements in the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force. I do not think there is very much to be said upon the argument about a career.
The main point in this debate has been the question of command, what sort of uniform ought Coastal Command to wear and who ought to command it? It has been argued that it is logical for maritime reconnaissance to be under the Navy and we have had the analogy of the United States Navy. One point on the United States Navy is that the Air Force in America has had a very different history from the Air Force here and it was only after the last war that the Air Force was accepted as a separate arm with equal status with the American Army and the American Navy. We must also remember that the Americans have rather greater resources than we have and, therefore can afford to spread them with a rather more lavish hand than we can.
All Commonwealth countries have the same sort of organisation as ours and many of the countries in Europe also. Several hon. Members have spoken of the thought that has been given to this matter and have referred to the Inskip Report of 1937. The decisions there were, I think, perfectly clear, and certainly the first was perfectly logical. It was decided that the Admiralty should have not only operational but the administrative control of seaborne aircraft: that is to say, everything on a carrier was naval. But the
2210
Admiralty claim to Coastal Command was rejected.
That settlement still holds. It was to a certain extent modified by something the Prime Minister said in this House on 10th December, 1940. He amplified it to a certain extent. My right hon. Friend said:
"as the function of the Coastal Command squadrons is that of co-operation with the Royal Navy, the operational policy of the command must be governed by the Admiralty, of course in consultation with the Air Officer Commanding in Chief. Excellent relations have been established since the war between the two Services, and the closest contact exists between the Naval and Air authorities. I am satisfied that the integrity of operational direction will be fully achieved."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 10th December, 1940; Vol. 367, c. 783.]
That modification of the policy was carried out, and the control chain was Admiralty, Air Officer Commanding in Chief Coastal Command and then down through the respective Service channels; and the main tactical control of naval and air operations was carried out from an area combined headquarters where naval and air commanders were working in partnership. The Navy gave the Air Force a task and it was up to them to carry it out.
It is worth remembering that much the same system of co-operation was worked out between the Army and the Royal Air Force. My hon. Friend the Member for Darwen talked about dual control. If we have two Services we necessarily must have two channels of command. It was something which was worked out after great difficulties and a great deal of thought in the war about how we could in fact get perfect co-operation between two Services.
At the beginning of the war things were not very good either with the co-operation with the Navy or the Army. We did not know how to do it. But by the end of the war we did know, and the thing was working. This system both of co-operation with the Army and with the Navy as worked out during the war did stand the supreme test. In my opinion, it is a great mistake to go back on something which has stood the test of war.
My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Merton and Morden talked about the Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau and said there had been great faults there. But if I heard him aright, he attributed

2211
most of the faults to Fighter Command and Bomber Command, and not to Coastal Command. It is difficult to see how the situation as it then arose would have been affected if Coastal Command had been under the Navy. That brings me to the point made by several hon. Members that Coastal Command is not the only Royal Air Force command which affects the maritime operations.
We have Fighter Command defending our bases here and providing air cover for convoys and coast-wise shipping. Fighter Command also carries out attacks on enemy shipping. In the last war we had Fighter Command helping to deny the Bay of Biscay to surfaced submarines. Then Bomber Command made attacks on U-boat bases, carrying out mine laying and attacks on warships and shipping and the crippling of repair work. A point to notice is that the proportion of air strength allotted to any of these tasks depended on the tactical and strategic situation at the time. By this system we had both economy of force and concentration of force, two of the great principles of war, as everybody knows.
My hon. Friend the Member for Darwen talked about function and appearance. Because something looks like a bomber it does not mean that it cannot affect the U-boat war, and I think that flexibility is enormously served by the present system.
I would say a word on the administrative aspect which was referred to by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Merton and Morden, but not enlarged upon. At the moment the Navy fly light ship-borne aircraft and not heavy aircraft. Within the Air Force we have not only heavy aircraft in Coastal Command but we have heavy aircraft in Bomber Command and Transport Command. It is far easier to switch a crew (trained) who have worked with heavy aircraft than it is to re-train and to switch those who have worked only with light aircraft, which, as several hon. Members have said, did happen a good deal in the war.
If we are to keep heavy aircraft flying we must have an enormous back-stage organisation. In the Royal Air Force that is supplied by Flying Training Command, Technical Training Command and Maintenance Command. They
2212
have the machinery for maintaining these aircraft, training men to maintain them and others to fly them. In the Navy there is no equivalent back-stage in existence. If the Navy were to start flying heavy aircraft they would have to set up some such back-stage organisation as that. I cannot think that it would really make either for economy or flexibility to set anything up like that.
My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Merton and Morden talked about flexibility and overheads. I should have thought that the way to pile up overheads and to lose flexibility was to do that. I have given the main reasons why I think the change is undesirable; I should now like to comment on the point about the inquiry. There have been some inquiries in the past. I should like to mention a few of the more important ones. There was the Haldane Inquiry in 1912; the Balfour Inquiry in 1921; the second Balfour Inquiry in 1923; and the Trenchard-Keyes Agreement in 1923; the first Inskip Inquiry in 1936; the second Inskip Inquiry in 1937; the Prime Minister's change that I have mentioned in December, 1940; and lastly—and I should like to mention this because it is the most important one—there was an Admiralty-Air Ministry Agreement in 1946.
My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Merton and Morden said that 15 years had elapsed since the Inskip Award and no fresh thought had been put into this question. That is not really true. This matter was gone into between the two Ministries in 1946. I should like to give to the House the conclusions they arrived at. They were three, and this was the first:
"Where the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force are working in co-operation the problem is a joint one, but as such operations are the primary concern of the Royal Navy, the Naval Command in all normal circumstances is the predominant partner."
That was the first proposition laid down. The second one was this:
"Other units of the Royal Air Force up to the total strength available may be required to undertake tasks connected with the war at sea, such as the fighter escort of convoys, sea mining and tactical or strategic bombing."
That was the second. The third and last point was this:
"The proportion of the total existing and potential air strength of the Royal Air Force which shall be specifically equipped, allocated

2213
and trained to meet world-wide maritime commitments will be laid down from time to time by the Government, acting on the advice of the Admiralty and Air Ministry."
It seems to me that those three conclusions, reached after reviewing the whole course of history during the war, should have great force with this House. They represent the position as it now is. I assure my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Macclesfield (Air Commodore Harvey) that there is at present no disagreement.
Mr. Callaghan: There has been a most laudable desire on the part of the heads of both these Services during the last few years to avoid an open quarrel on this matter, but will the hon. Gentleman keep in mind that the desire to avoid a quarrel should be no substitute for thinking again?
Mr. Birch: There has been a good deal of thought upon this. I know that opinions are not completely united, but it is a fact that there is no present high level disagreement. My hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty, speaking on the Navy Estimates, said:
"The Admiralty have not so far asked, and are not at present asking, for any such change."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 6th March, 1952; Vol. 497, c. 867.]
He was talking about this business. That, I think, represents the true state of affairs.
I would say to my hon. and gallant Friend that there is some danger of being plus royalist que le roi. My noble Friend has taken considerable interest in this matter, and he has also been much exercised upon the whole question of the protection of our sea communications. He is very glad that this matter has been brought up and that the attention of the House has been drawn to a most important problem, but he does not see, at the moment, any great value in a further inquiry.
My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Merton and Morden said that we should show fear if we did not accept the Amendment. Well, my noble Friend is not a very timorous man, and I do not think that he is really very afraid. There are a great many busy men who would be employed in this inquiry, and I cannot see that, apart from giving them the opportunity of thinking about it, it will have very much result.
Captain Ryder: My hon. Friend has not made any mention of the very strong
2214
pressure that was put upon the Admiralty not to raise this matter. If he does not have the inquiry now, it will give the impression that they are afraid of the result of the inquiry, and that is just the sort of thing that will build up contentious feeling in the Service.
Mr. Birch: If my hon. and gallant Friend thinks that my noble Friend and myself are afraid, he will have to think so. I am very sorry, but I am afraid that I cannot make any change in the opinion which I have offered to the House. After all, this is a very old quarrel. Is it really very much good raising—
"Old unhappy far-off things and battles long ago"?
I would have said not.
As an earth-bound type, I will try to get back to my own element. I have tried to give reasons why I think there is no very great point in an inquiry at the present time. I am very glad that my hon. Friend has raised the matter in such a temperate and persuasive speech, but I ask him now to withdraw the Amendment in order that the general debate may go on.
Mr. Fletcher-Cooke: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his reply. There is no doubt that the majority of opinion in the House tonight was against this Amendment, and that may well be because it is the occasion of the Air Estimates. As my hon. Friend has said, those who are interested in the air are loyal to their own Service and will regard this as something of an attempt to disrupt the Royal Air Force. At the same time, as the Admiralty do not wish to press it at the moment, and although I regard this as a Fox-North Coalition likely to last no longer than the earlier one did, nevertheless, in view of these circumstances, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Main Question again proposed.
9.18 p.m.
Mr. G. R. Mitchison: I have one brief point to make, and it is a simple plea to the Government on a comparatively small matter. In the Air Estimates which we are discussing, on pages 32 and 33, we get the figures for the pay of the personnel of the Royal Air Force

2215
Volunteer Reserve. These figures show that the bounties which are given to the Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve are roughly equivalent to their pay during training, if we deduct marriage allowance and National Insurance.
These bounties are given to all ranks of aircrew at a uniform rate, very properly, of £35 or £30 or £27, according to function, and, somewhat less properly, according to sex. But when one comes to the ground personnel one finds that the ground trades receive bounty only if they are not officers. The result is that throughout the whole of the Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve there is only one class which does not receive a bounty and that is the officers in ground trades.
I can see no logical reason whatever for this. I can see some logic, though I would not agree with it, in confining the bounties to aircrew as a whole. I can see some sort of reason, though I would agree with it even less, for making a distinction between ranks of the Service both in aircrew and ground personnel. But to make it in one branch only, the ground trades, seems to me, on the face of it, incongruous and indefensible.
I believe the history of the matter is that this Force was originally constituted for aircrew only, that the ground trade personnel in it were brought in at a later stage and that it so happened that the response to the appeal to officers to join was very good. Whether that is or is not the historical explanation, I feel certain that the Under-Secretary of State for Air would agree that if that happened it is not a sufficient reason for docking this small body of their bounty.
I agree it is a small matter but these officers are serving in the R.A.F. just as much as the others. They are a type of whom we can rightly and properly be proud and I hope that this anomaly—for we must agree that it is an anomaly—can be removed. It is a very small matter and it would not require any large expenditure of public funds, but very often the small unfairness is the most galling to those who suffer from it. In this case the mere fact that this group is so small makes them appear to be singled out, as it were, for what they regard as a piece of exceptional—I would hardly
2216
say hardship but perhaps the Under-Secretary of State will not object if I say, in this case—Departmental stinginess.
I have tried to make my plea as simply and I hope as movingly as I possibly could. There is no more to be said about it. I know it has been refused in the past but sometimes if one knocks again and again at the door one gets what I should regard in this case as justice and proper treatment for this small body of officers.
9.24 p.m.
Mr. P. B. Lucas: My hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for Air, in his admirable and most realistic statement this afternoon, has referred to the intention to press forward with all vigour and all speed and at top priority the production of the two new British swept-wing fighters, the Hawker Hunter, and the Supermarine Swift. If I do not follow up what the hon. and learned Member for Kettering (Mr. Mitchison) has said it is because I want to pass at once to that subject.
This must have been a very difficult decision indeed to take. Few Members on either side of the House would question, after the experience of the last year in Korea, that as things stand now these two aircraft, the Hunter and the Swift, will be superior in a great many ways to the Russian-built MIG.15.
But I submit that we must look two and three years ahead. How will these aircraft then compare with the later Marks of the MIG.15 or, if hon. Members like, any other fighter of advanced design attributed to Lavochkin and Yakovlev, and no doubt aided by German inventive genius. I think we can be pretty sure the Russians are not standing still. They have had an invaluable opportunity in the air fighting immediately South of, and high above, the Yalu River in Korea to size up the advantages, the disadvantages and the shortcomings of the MIG.15, an aircraft which, we should remember, has been developed and produced at a speed which should be an object lesson to us all.
In considering the development of new aircraft under Vote 7 of the Estimates, there is one matter to which I am particularly anxious to draw attention. We

2217
can give a fighter pilot the best aircraft. in the world; we can give him the best training in the world; we can give him the best gunsight in the world; but if, in the process, we have not taught him to hit a target moving at modern operational heights and speeds, a great deal of this expenditure will have been wasted.
In my submission, the most important single thing, operationally, which a fighter pilot has to learn today is to shoot straight. In the last war—and I was in some way concerned with this so that I take some measure of responsibility—we were surprisingly unimaginative in the way in which we tried to teach him this rudimentary principle. In those days the only place where a pilot could learn to shoot was in combat and there, I think, he learned pretty quickly.
Now, six or seven years later, we are dealing with a quite different set of circumstances. Then we were dealing with heights of 15,000 to 20,000 feet and below, and with speeds of 200 and 300 miles an hour—sometimes less. Now, the heights may be anything up to 35,000 or 40,000 feet and the speeds twice as great.
The questions I want to ask my hon. Friend are two-fold. First, are any attempts being made in Fighter Command today to give live firing practice to pilots under modern operational conditions—the sort of conditions, for instance, which exist high up over the Yalu River? Second, is every help and assistance being given to developing that type of equipment which would make such practice possible? I consider that this is a matter of top-class importance which, with the production of the aircraft—which it so much concerns—should be given super-priority. I hope the Air Staff are giving this matter regular attention; I hope it comes up every month; and I hope that the operational research section are being prodded for ideas all the time. Further, I hope that every idea is given, within proper reason, the consideration and thought it deserves.
It seems to me to be an interesting commentary—and this has a considerable bearing on what I am saying—that in this new and modernised conception of air fighting, which has taken place in Korea, the Americans have found that, as a rule, the best age for a pilot is
2218
around 30. I am sorry that my hon. Friend the Member for St. Albans (Mr. J. Grimston) is not here, because in the course of his speech he made some reference to the age at which a man was at his best as a pilot. It is interesting to record that some of the American pilots fighting in Korea are of the opinion that 30 is perhaps the best age. It is true that the average age of pilots of some of the F.86 Sabre jet squadrons now operating with the Americans in Korea is around 28 or 29. That is very different from the age of 21 and 22, as we have now come to recognise. At this age—28, 29 or 30—these pilots, some of whom, of course, have had experience in the late war, have learned to shoot, and they are more solid in the air than their younger, less experienced—though equally courageous—comrades, who saw nothing of the fighting in the war in Europe.
As we assess new types of aircraft for the Royal Air Force, and especially as we consider the man-hours and the expenditure—£111 million on this Vote 7—that is involved, we must always be on the look out for ways to economise. I have been impressed at the progress made the last few years with a synthetic training device which comes closer to reproducing the actual flying characteristics of an aeroplane than anything else I have seen.
I have never been very much attracted to the idea of a synthetic training device. It is a horrible phrase, anyway. While I fully appreciated in the old days the value of the Link trainer, it also had its limitations. I did not think, however, it could be considered to be any real substitute for time in the air. There is not, in my submission, and never will be any real substitute for actual flying time in an aircraft.
There has been developed in the United States, however, a new type of training device known as the "Flight Simulator," a product of the Curtiss Wright Corporation of America. This operational flight trainer simulates in the minutest detail the actual cockpit lay-out of the aircraft it is built to represent. I think at this stage it is interesting to recall that when Pan American World Airways were converting crews from Constellations on to Stratocruisers the actual flying time involved in the conversion from one

2219
aircraft to the other was of the order of 21 to 22 flying hours.
At £200 sterling an hour, the House will appreciate that this was a considerable expenditure. But later, when the "Flight Simulator" had been introduced, to represent in detail the cockpit lay-out of a Stratocruiser, by giving each crew 35 hours in this trainer, the actual time required in the air in a Stratocruiser was reduced to four or five hours—from 21 to 22 hours down to four or five hours. The House will see that this involved a very considerable economy.
We have entered a phase of fantastically expensive and highly complicated military aeroplanes. Moreover, the time taken over their production in terms of man-hours is infinitely greater than anything we have known in earlier years. If we can see a way of reducing the expenditure, if we can see a way of economising in both the expenditure of money and of man-hours, I submit we should grasp it. This operational flight trainer of which I am speaking is now, I understand, being developed in this country. British Overseas Airways Corporation has a copy of the Stratocruiser in operation near Heath Row and a copy of the Comet, I believe, is also becoming available shortly. The Commander-in-Chief, Bomber Command, has, I am told, signified his desire for a reproduction of the Valiant, and an order has been placed for a copy of this type.
A question I should like to ask my hon. Friend is, whether he could not now consider introducing these "Flight Simulators" into Fighter Command, if not to simulate the new, single-seat swept-wing fighters, then as an illustration of the new, all-weather fighters. I hope that my hon. Friend will have a look at this matter because I believe it is very important. I have said that I have always in the past been opposed to synthetic training devices, but I am not now. I think the position has changed through the development of British and American science, and I think that that is now a really important matter. I hope that my hon. Friend will consult with the Minister of Supply in this matter because I believe that certain production difficulties are here involved.
While we are considering the equipment for operational, advanced and con
2220
version training, let me say it surprises me that we should continue to undertake so much of this advanced jet training in the industrial areas of England. The House knows very well my views—and no one knows them better than the right hon. and learned Gentleman the former Secretary of State for Air—upon the need for an intermediate jet trainer. I think it a great pity that we have not now an easy jet aircraft on to which a pilot could convert after, perhaps, 50 or 60 hours' flying on a conventional, piston-engined trainer.
Now that we are resigned, if that is the word, to the Meteor and Vampire dual-trainers, I think we ought to make it as easy as possible for pilots to gain confidence on those aeroplanes. Learning to fly a piston-engined fighter in conditions of permanent industrial haze was hard enough in any case, but to have to do it in a high-speed, jet-propulsion aircraft with a high wing-loading and short endurance seems to me to be asking more of the pilot than is necessary. Perhaps my hon. Friend would have a look at the log books of the pilots who did their advanced training in the industrial North of England in December and January last year and this year because I think he would be surprised at some of the totals of flying hours he would find.
If this training has to be undertaken in this country—and I should like to see more of it transferred to the North American Continent and to the Carribean—I wish it could take place in the north of Scotland or in the extreme south-west of England—in Cornwall. There, I think, flying weather tends to be better than in the industrial North. I believe that if we did the training there, it would he safer—and we are trying to reduce accidents—and I believe we should be able to get through it quicker and, in some cases, I believe, it would lighten the heavy responsibility which falls on the judgment of chief flying instructors especially in winter.
In conclusion, I turn to a matter which I believe is a governing factor in the prevention of a third world conflict. Twelve months ago, on 6th March, 1951, speaking on the Air Estimates, I expressed myself in this House in these terms:
"In our endeavour to secure our own defence let us beware of concentrating too much upon short-range, lower endurance, defensive

2221
fighter aircraft and not enough upon the establishment of a long-range striking force. The development of rocket and jet propulsion, in all its modern and most hideous forms, has increased immeasurably the difficulties of interception by fighters alone&the place to meet modern air attacks is at its source."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 6th March, 1951; Vol. 485, c. 289.]
Few would, I think, deny that the ability of the United States to carry an atom bomb from continent to continent remains today the paramount deterrent to war.
Yet I feel—and perhaps my hon. Friend will correct me if I am wrong—that we are now engaged on the development of a highly-efficient and magnificently equipped Air Force composed primarily of defensive, tactical and middle-distance machines. I do not see as yet any signs of an inter-continental bomber. Perhaps there is one. If there is, I cannot think that it would do any harm to say so. I can scarcely believe that the aircraft industry has neglected this matter entirely.
It may be foolish of me to prophesy, but nothing I can now foresee—I am trying to look into the future as one has to do in considering military and civil aviation—alters my conviction that, with modern atomic weapons, the establishment of a long-range, strategic striking force will remain, perhaps for a decade, the prime deterrent to war.
The historic offensive waged by Bomber Command between 1942 and 1945 gave us, in the face of grievous losses, a practical knowledge of strategic assault which, of its type, was unrivalled in the world. From such a basis the development of inter-continental attack is the next and natural step. With all this experience, gained at so great a cost, I trust that it will not be our intention to surrender indefinitely to the United States the unquestioned supremacy which she now holds in this decisive field.
9.41 p.m.
Mr. Emrys Hughes: One word seems to have dominated the debate—"super-priority." This rather curious word was first introduced into our debates by that master of precise language, the Prime Minister. What is the difference between "priority" and "super-priority"? The Prime Minister used "super-priority" in relation to fighters; the dominating idea in his speech was that there should be super-priority for fighters.
2222
I have never accused the Prime Minister of being a war-monger, although one phrase of mine might indicate that. All that I have ever said about the Prime Minister was that not even his most ardent admirers had ever thought of recommending him for the Nobel Peace Prize; and after this resounding but rather curiously meaningless verbiage nobody is ever likely to do it.
The idea of super-priority for fighters is a development of what the Prime Minister told us in the last Parliament when be was warning us about the effect on the security and safety of our people of the establishment of the American Bomber Force in East Anglia. On three occasions the Prime Minister has told us of the terrible consequences which are likely to come to this country as a result of East Anglia being regarded by the Soviet Union as the base of the atom bombers, which are, I understand from the argument of the hon. Member for Brentford and Chiswick (Mr. Lucas), to be directed against the war potential of the Soviet Union.
As I have said, on three occasions the Prime Minister has warned us that, as a result of the establishment of this American base here, we have made ourselves the target or the bull's-eye for possible retaliatory action. That fits in with the argument of the hon. Member for Brentford and Chiswick. He has talked about the atom bombers being a deterrent to war. If that argument holds for this country and for the U.S.A., is it not also likely that the leaders of the Soviet Union, who also believe in having deterrents to war, will adopt exactly the same line of argument and also concentrate on long-range bombers meant to be a deterrent to the United States and to us should we think of the possibility of destroying the war potential of the U.S.S.R.?
The warning has come from the Prime Minister. I do not believe that the presence of the American Air Force here is, as the Under-Secretary indicated in his opening speech, a source of safety or security to the people of this country. It is a terrible danger, and this country would be safer if the American bombers were transferred to American territory or to the innumerable other American bases which are scattered throughout the world.

2223
I read an article on American air strategy in the "New York Times" by the reputable military correspondent of that paper. He pointed out that America had at least 20 of these atom bomb bases ranging from the Antarctic across Europe, through the Mediterranean, over Africa and across to Japan. General MacArthur declared on one occasion that he regarded Formosa as an aircraft carrier of the Far East.
Apparently the idea of American strategists is that this country must be the aircraft carrier for Europe. According to that we have risked what the Prime Minister calls a fearsome and terrible prospect for the people of this country. The Prime Minister has argued that if we get only 50 atom bombs on this country the consequences will be such as we cannot even contemplate. We should be knocked out of the war, our industrial centres would be destroyed and there would be millions upon millions of casualties.
I am going to suggest that it is not by getting more fighters to protect the bombers that the safety of the people of this country will be secured, but rather by the removal of these American bombers to other parts of the world. The Americans argue that they want to be as near Russia as possible, but anyone who knows anything about geography knows that the shortest way from America to Moscow is over the North Pole.
The Prime Minister has argued that the fighters are necessary to protect the bombers, and then presumably more bombers will be necessary to protect the fighter bases. So this argument goes on at a ruinous cost to this country, and here tonight we are discussing these astronomically increasing Air Estimates at a time when we are on the borders of national bankruptcy.
The figures we are asked to approve in this Estimate amount to £467,640,000, nearly £139 million more than last year, and as far as we can judge from the arguments that have been advanced this item is going up and up so that in five years time the expenditure on the Air Force will be ruinously high, and will be taking in an enormous amount of manpower and materials from the industries of this country which depend largely upon the export trade. I am concerned
2224
about the way that Ministers are coming to this House with the different Estimates. The Editor of the "Economist"—yes, we regard the "Economist" as a sort of religious paper in this House and I quote the editor with due reverence—declared in an article in the American paper "Look" that,
"The weakness of the present defence programme is that it does not look as if it means to slow down."
It means to go on apparently by geometric progression. It was conceived in the near-panic days of a year ago. He adds:
"The armed Services were given a blank cheque and told to fill it up. They naturally filled it to cover everything they wanted."
In this debate we are getting increased demands, without any real attempt to estimate what they will cost the country. An hon. and gallant Gentleman opposite put in a plea for helicopters and when I asked him what a helicopter cost he did not know. He said he had never inquired because he could not afford one. That is the way in which hon. Gentlemen opposite regard our national finances at a time of serious economic crisis.
I am always asking hon. Gentlemen in these Estimates debates, what does the thing cost? It is very difficult to extract the answer from the Ministry, but I hope that we shall be more successful with the present Minister. I remember the time, not so long ago, when he was wanting to know what things cost. I hope that he is going to be more communicative.
The cost of aircraft has steadily increased. We are told for example, in the recent report of the Select Committee on Estimates, that in 1945 a general reconnaissance plane cost £44,844 and that last year, 1951, it cost £105,055. Now, not a year afterwards, the cost has gone up to £114,695. With the complexity of modern aircraft and the increased cost of the metals and the gadgets inside one of these aircraft, the cost grows and grows, until we realise that the air Service is going to become far more expensive than ever the Navy was. In the same report, we are told about a fighter which in 1945 cost £7,680 and the latest model of which costs £16,720. The cost of a reconnaissance plane is the cost of a small village.
We shall find, as a result of pressure from hon. and gallant Gentlemen opposite, the cost of the air Service mounting astronomically, and it is the duty of those

2225
of us who look at the matter from the layman's point of view and are interested in the general finances of the country to put forward arguments in these debates which must criticise the purely specialist point of view.
It would be very interesting to add up the cost of all the suggestions which are being made by hon. and gallant Gentlemen in the debate. To meet that cost we should have to treble the Income Tax, put a bigger tax on excess profits and an enormous tax on whisky, and then we should not be able to pay for the Air Force in five years' time. Let me give one figure which illustrates the point. When the R.A.F. go out to exercise, the 650 cartridges which an R.A.F. pilot fires in one minute cost £150. In 10 minutes' firing practice by 40 planes, the amount is £52,000.
Sooner or later, we have to realise that this country cannot afford all these expensive machines, and that they mean the ruin and bankruptcy of this nation. I am surprised that the Chancellor of the Exchequer does not take a greater interest in these debates by coming to them and keeping an eagle eye on people before they spend the money that he has collected in his Budget.
Let us look at some of the indirect economic effects of the Prime Minister's new slogan "Super-priority for fighters." How has it affected us in industry? On the Sunday following the speech of the Prime Minister the air correspondent of the "Sunday Times" went to Sheffield and inquired what would be the effect on the steel industry. He published his conclusions under the heading "Aircraft instead of sinks and washing machines," thus making it look rather prosaic. He said:
"The extra aircraft are going to be made out of steels which would otherwise have gone into sinks, fish fryers, washing machines, fish tanks for trawlers and a great range of other domestic and industrial articles."
Those are exactly the articles which are needed for the export trade in order that we can face our problem of the balance of payments. Of course the Prime Minister never thinks in terms of economics, but we have to think in terms of economics. And when we find that not only our export trade but, our home market is being denuded of the articles needed by our people in this way, then we are
2226
entitled to have some regard to the economic consequences.
There is another aspect of aircraft production which is rather perplexing the manufacturers of aircraft, for example Mr. Sopwith, who is the chairman and managing director of one of our big manufacturing concerns. In a speech to his company at the beginning of this year he asked:
"What is the position today as compared with the war years? A modern fighter like the Hawker P1067 absorbs nearly three times as much manpower as did its counterpart, the Hurricane, in 1940. Manpower is the key to almost all our problems and we must beat the manpower shortage."
Is it possible to beat the manpower shortage? Look at all the evidence which was brought before the Select Committee on Estimates and it will be found that none of the experts who appeared before that committee can tell us where the manpower is coming from for this complicated machine. Even the hon. and gallant Member for Macclesfield (Air Commodore Harvey), the other day at Question time struck a note rather resembling some of the questions which I have been asking. He put what was, from his point of view, a perfectly rational Question to the Minister of Labour about the apprentices in the aircraft industry. After we have trained the aircraft apprentice boy for many years until he has become a skilled worker, he is taken for National Service. That is exactly what I have been saying about other forms of labour, and it is quite rational.
We find that the Secretary of State for War has only been able to achieve his increased manpower in the Army by denuding the aircraft industry of its skilled workers. And so this runs throughout all our industries, with the result that the manpower shortage has. as Mr. Sopwith said, become one of our main problems. My contention is that it is an insoluble problem.
There is another aspect of these Estimates. I maintain that they divert from the manufacture of civil aircraft the manpower that is needed for the development of what might be our most important export trade. I cannot go into the question of civil aviation on the Vote which is now before the House, except to say that all this elaborate programme of super-priorities for fighters is diverting manpower away from the manufacture of

2227
the aircraft which, Lord Douglas of Kirtleside has recently pointed out, are absolutely essential if we are to maintain our position in the manufacture of civil aircraft and to maintain our competition in the markets of the world.
Without developing that point, I only wish to say that I agree with Lord Douglas when he said:
"This year is a year of destiny for British aviation and it is important for the whole nation to know what is at stake. The genius of British scientists and aeronautical engineers has provided two civil liners that are several years ahead of all foreign competition: the straight jet Comet and the pro-jet fighter."
He went on to argue that it was a tragedy that at this time, there is being taken away in this super-priority programme, the materials and the labour which alone can help us to maintain this important prospective export trade which is essential to the future development of the industry of this country.
And so I say that from the point of view of security, we have no greater measure of security as the result of the argument that we must build more atom bombers as a deterrent. What we have got is that both sides of the Iron Curtain are building the atom bombers as a deterrent, with the result that the world is infinitely more dangerous, and the greatest danger of all is to the congested population of the islands for which we as a House of Commons are responsible.
The hon. Member for Brentford and Chiswick (Mr. Lucas) dwelt on the lessons to be learnt from Korea. There is another lesson that I should draw from Korea, and I hope that I will get an answer upon this point from the Under-Secretary. I should like to know whether our aircraft in Korea have had anything to do with the dropping of the napalm bomb. I should like to know whether the napalm bomb has become one of the recognised bombs which the British Air Force is likely to use in the event of war.
I believe that people of this country have been rather shocked by the revelations that have appeared in a recent book on Korea by a B.B.C. reporter. I refer to the book by Mr. Rene Cutforth entitled "Korean Reporter," in which he describes the effects of bombing in Korea. The "Manchester Guardian," in reviewing this book, gave an extract which must
2228
have horrified a very large number of its readers, with the result that letters poured in from all parts of the country.
I want to read this extract to the House, because that bomb is, presumably, the kind of weapon that we will use and for which we are actually budgeting in part of these Estimates. The B.B.C. reporter, in his book, describes what he saw. At a British field hospital a doctor showed Mr. Cutforth one case.
"In front of us a curious figure was standing, a little crouched, legs straggled, arms held out from his sides. He had no eyes, and the whole of his body, nearly all of which was visible through tatters of burned rags, was covered with a hard black crust speckled with yellow pus. A Korean woman by his side began to speak and the interpreter said, 'He has to stand, Sir. He cannot sit or lie.' He had to stand because he was no longer covered with a skin but with a crust-like crackling which broke easily."
The "Manchester Guardian" said:
"Whatever the rights or wrongs of using napalm, the casualties have to be attended to."
That is a very obvious comment—
"They may be gangrenous and affect other wounded. In Korea the Civil Assistance Command has had to deal with them and, according to Mr. Cutforth, it has almost made a success of an impossible job."
We are very glad to know that. This B.B.C. writer comments:
"I thought of the hundreds of villages reduced to ashes which I personally had seen and realised the sort of casualty list which must be mounting along the whole Korean front."
Mr. Speaker: I do not see anything about this in the Estimates.
Mr. Hughes: Oh, no. We do not find things like this in the Estimates.
Mr. Speaker: What we find in the Estimates is in order; if it is not in the Estimates, it is not in order.
Mr. Hughes: My argument is that we are estimating for aircraft that drop bombs and that these aircraft in Korea—
Air Commodore Harvey: No.
Mr. Hughes:—and that the napalm bomb is being used in Korea. I was asking the Under-Secretary if this is the kind of bomb that the Royal Air Force contemplate using in a possible future war.
Mr. Speaker: I must point out that an extension of that argument would carry the debate to any length.
Mr. Hughes: I appreciate the point, and I do not wish to carry that argument any further, except to say that when we have millions of public money being spent we should have some idea of the great deal of misery and the consequences which we cause as a result of that expenditure.
Air Commodore Harvey: On a point of order, as I understand it there are no Royal Air Force aircraft operating in Korea at all. The aircraft operating there are of the Royal Australian Air Force.
Mr. Speaker: If so, it takes the matter more out of order.
Mr. Hughes: Someone may have noticed that unfortunately there was a pilot killed in Korea yesterday.
Mr. Profumo: On reconnaissance.
Mr. Hughes: According to the Estimates there is a definite estimate for Korea—[An HON. MEMBER: "It has nothing to do with it."] I am asking a definite question of the Under-Secretary, if any of our money is being spent on the napalm bomb. The very fact that hon. Members are so sensitive about this means that in their heart of hearts they know quite well that the whole thing is a monstrous atrocity; and it is against the monstrous atrocity contained in these figures that I protest in this House tonight.
10.8 p.m.
Mr. John Profumo: I had not fully appreciated that the hon. Member for Ayrshire, South (Mr. Emrys Hughes) had finished speaking, because I imagined he would have said, "Here endeth the third lesson," as it seemed to me that I heard exactly the same speech from him on Navy Estimates and on Army Estimates. I shall not try to detract from the deep impression he has made on the House with his speech by commenting on it. Perhaps we can get away from South Ayr to the air proper for the rest of the debate.
May I start by joining hon. Members on all sides of the House in congratulating my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary
2230
on the remarkable way in which he introduced the Estimates so soon after taking office. One thing I found extremely refreshing was that his remarks were frank and open. We have not been used to that in the last six years. In every year in the Estimates to which I have listened we have been treated to a great deal of soft soap, platitude and generalities.
I do not know what my hon. and right hon. Friends feel, but personally I am getting a little tired of hearing right hon. Gentlemen opposite who come to the House in the guise of gamekeeper turned poacher so soon after they have been sitting on this side of the House and start teaching lessons to the present Government so soon after we have taken office.
The right hon. and learned Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. A. Henderson) made several remarks in his speech. He said that the morale of the Royal Air Force was very high. We would agree with the right hon. and learned Gentleman, but it seemed to me a little out of the context of his speech, because certainly the former Labour Government can claim no kudos for the fact that that morale is high. If anything, it is in spite of the Socialist Government that the Royal Air Force morale is high rather than because of it.
The right hon. and learned Gentleman went on to say, again rightly, that we were lagging behind in the construction of aircraft. That certainly is very true, but of course it is not the fault of Her Majesty's Government that we are lagging behind. If the right hon. and learned Gentleman will cast his mind back to what, I am sure, must has been a very trying occasion for him, to the first time when he himself presented the Air Estimates to this House in 1948, he will remember that at that time he was responsible for introducing a cut in the Estimates of £39 million. That was the first thing the right hon. and learned Gentleman did on assuming office as Secretary of State for Air. That was four years ago. In my submission it takes about four years to produce a modern Royal Air Force plane. Therefore, it is little wonder that the right hon. and learned Gentleman has to say that we are now lagging behind in the production of aircraft. If it is the fault of any one at all it is the fault of right hon. Gentlemen opposite.
Mr. Fernyhough: Is the hon. Member aware that the first thing the present Prime Minister had to do was to make a substantial cut in the whole Defence programme of this country?
Mr. Profumo: The Prime Minister has made an overall economic cut but, as the hon. Member for Ayrshire, South (Mr. Emrys Hughes) knows, he has accorded substantial priority to the production of aircraft. It was the production of aircraft I was talking about, because anything else would be out of order in this debate.
Group Captain Wilcock: Would the hon. Member be perfectly fair and agree that one would expect to see a cut in the Fighting Services when a successful war had just been terminated and that that was the time to make retrenchment in the Services? Would not he further agree that under the former Labour Government the Royal Air Force enjoyed a much greater expansion than at any other time before the war under a Conservative Government?
Mr. Profumo: I really cannot accept the whole of that interjection. Although it was fairly soon after the successful conclusion of a war, one must remember that several years had elapsed during which the party of the right hon. and learned Gentleman opposite were responsible for introducing conscription. One would imagine that there were some qualms in the minds of hon. Gentlemen opposite, and as a matter of fact it was soon after that that another and more terrifying war broke out in the Far East.
Mr. Beswick: If I understood the hon. Member aright, he criticised the Labour Government for running down the Forces too much. Will he explain why the present Prime Minister criticised the Labour Government for not releasing men from the Forces more quickly?
Mr. Profumo: I will come to the hon. Member for Uxbridge (Mr. Beswick) in a moment, if he will allow me and not try to muddle me. He will realise that I was talking about 1948 and not 1946. I was not talking about 1946 when my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister criticised the Government then in office. The Prime Minister has so often found it necessary to criticise the Government of the past few years that one might get a
2232
little muddled about the occasions. I was talking about 1948. I think that I had made my point that it is not right that right hon. Gentlemen opposite should seek to use the prestige of the Air Force to try to bolster up the prestige of their own battered and defeated party.
Perhaps I might come to my main point. I think all hon. Members will agree that the difficulty of any Government today is to apportion the resources of the nation adequately between the requirements of defence and of exports. The right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) would have one view, the right hon. Gentlemen on the Front Bench opposite would have another, and Her Majesty's Government would have a third view on how to apportion them. That is the difficulty which any Government has to face today.
There is one branch of our air arm which appears to be particularly important in our discussions tonight, in that it is common to both the two prongs of our thoughts at the moment. It is common to our air arm—our defence force—and it is also common to our export programme. I am speaking of the question of air transport about which the hon. Member for Uxbridge spoke earlier. I do not find any evidence, either in the Memorandum which accompanies these Estimates or in the White Paper on Defence, which would suggest that the Government were considering a considerable expansion in our air transport.
My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister rightly explained to the House the other day how important it was to hasten the production of the latest types of fighter aircraft. I wish to make the strongest plea that this should not be done to the complete exclusion of the development of air transport which is so much required today in the exercise of air power.
This appears to me to be one of the greatest lessons of the last war. We never had enough transport aircraft either for the R.A.F. or the Army. It is becoming a common thought today among hon. Members opposite that we should only continue with building up our defence forces in so far as we are able easily to adjust the position from the point of view of our internal financial situation, and that we should leave the rest to the United States of America.

2233
The hon. Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman) made a speech about that the other day, and the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton made a similar suggestion tonight. They say, "Let us do what we can, but let us remember that the Americans should do the rest."
If we leave the provision of these transport services to our United States Allies, I suggest that we shall be giving them an immense advantage over us in the field of civil aviation, a field in which at the moment we are in a position to lead the world. This is not merely a question of the transport of supplies but, even more important, the development of striking power based on high mobility.
There has been a striking example of the importance of mobility during the Korean campaign. The 15th United States Strategic Air Force, which consisted of 1,030 Superfortress bombers, was moved. It was flown 9,000 miles across the Pacific Ocean, with all the crews and equipment, and was in operation over Korea within nine days of having had orders to leave its bases in the United States. That really is something. It indicates the importance of the mobility of air power today.
If we consider the excellent progress being made by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, I, for one, would say that the future looks very much more likely to offer a protracted continuation of the cold war than the danger of an immediate hot war. If that is the case, under these conditions air transport can play a most important, and perhaps even a decisive, role.
After all, the only potential aggressor in the world today is the Soviet Union, and, if we are considering Russia, we must remember that Russia is operating on internal lines of communication, rather like a boxer who turns round slowly, making his opponent run right round in a circle. The British Commonwealth, and, indeed, the United States, never know when they will have to meet some new threat and from what part of the world it will come, whereas Russia sits still and works on internal lines of communication. In these circumstances, it is even more important that we should be able and ready to move our forces to whatever trouble spot next appears.
2234
In our present straitened circumstances, it would be quite impracticable for this country to hold in reserve large forces of military aircraft and personnel, and, therefore, the only way in which we can develop this side of our re-armament seems to be in the field of civil aviation. This means increasing the output of the aircraft industry, and encouraging the scope of the independent air operators so that they, together with the State Corporations, can form a reserve of air transport which can be used now for military purposes, if required, and, indeed, incorporated in our fighting forces in the event of war.
There must be an urgent survey of the whole conception of imperial defence. I am convinced that great economies can be made in personnel, in the Royal Navy, Army, and the Royal Air Force, in accommodation, in administration, and, indeed, in shipping, if full advantage is taken of the unique quality of high mobility which could be the result of the provision of adequate air transport.
It has been estimated that, at any one given time, there are as many as 30,000 men of the British Army in transit from one place to another, apart from air trooping itself. The six weeks' voyage to the Far East by ship could be reduced to three or four days if we were to use aeroplanes, but we simply have not got enough suitable types to carry out this sort of programme.
Mr. Emrys Hughes: So what?
Mr. Profumo: I will tell the hon. Gentleman what. Despite all the speeches which he has been making, I ask him to listen to some plain talking from an hon. Member who wishes to see our Air Force made strong and our country defended in the way which he would like to see it done, even if he does not understand it.
Air trooping would not only reduce the sterilisation of troops equivalent to a whole division, but would also enable much greater operational use to be made of National Service men and of men who are serving on a three years' Regular engagement. The expansion of air transport services would lead to the creation of large reserves of aircraft and aircrew maintenance engineers, and the fact that there was a substantial air transport industry would be a considerable incentive

2235
to men to accept short-term service in the R.A.F., and would ensure that these aircrew members would be maintained in civilian life, both in flying practice in conditions of modern multi-engined aircraft—
Mr. Hughes: Would the hon. Gentleman enlighten me on this point? The noble Lord the Member for Inverness (Lord Malcolm Douglas-Hamilton) has given the cost of one transport plane as £350,000. Does the hon. Gentleman agree with that, and, if so, how many of these planes does he think we can afford?
Mr. Profumo: The cost which my noble Friend gave was the cost of the prototype. The hon. Gentleman is always arguing about cost. I would say to him that he should listen more to arguments than ask questions about the cost. What I am seeking to establish is that, if we are spending money on the development of civil transport aeroplanes, we are not wasting it, and that is a point which ought to appeal to the hon. Gentleman.
We are not wasting money—and this ought to appeal to the hon. Member—because we ought to be able to earn money in the export markets of the world and to earn invisible imports by carrying people all over the world, and at the same time have these aeroplanes ready for use in case they are wanted in the event of war. That is a great economy.
Mr. Hughes: The hon. Member is now arguing against the Prime Minister's super-priority. The Prime Minister wants super-priority for fighters. The hon. Member wants it for transport planes. How can one get it for two things at the same time?
Mr. Profumo: I think the hon. Member is away up in South Ayrshire. He does not follow my argument. I believe it would be more appropriate if I spoke to him privately afterwards, because I believe that other hon. Members have followed me. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has asked for super-priority for fighters only. I merely say, "Please do not let us concentrate entirely on fighter aircraft." Super-priority leaves room enough for priority. On reflection, if the hon. Member for Ayrshire, South, reads my speech he will perhaps understand it better than if he sits and listens to it. I well understand his difficulty.
2236
It is an established fact that about 100 aeroplanes make the most economic size for any single operating civil aviation organisation. B.E.A. have already a fleet of that size, and B.O.A.C. will not be far short of that number when they have finished their present orders. Therefore that means that any extension must be amongst independent organisations.
The hon. Member for Uxbridge, in a speech with most of which I heartily agreed, pleaded for expansion in air transport. But the one thing the hon. Member did when he was Under-Secretary for Civil Aviation was to stop the expansion of the independent air operators by the policy of His late Majesty's Government. Therefore, it is not much good his coming along and saying what he is now saying. Why did he not do something to help when he was in charge instead of making these platitudinous suggestions? I agreed with those suggestions, but I would be far more impressed by them if the hon. Member had had enough guts to stand up to his hon. and right hon. Friends and had said, "Let us see that the independent air operators are allowed full scope, because it is not only a matter of civil aviation but a matter of defence."
Mr. Beswick: The hon. Member might at least endeavour to be accurate. Whilst I was in office no operator was stopped, private or otherwise. We gave considerable encouragement to private operators to take on work which hitherto they had not been allowed to take.
Mr. Profumo: If we must talk of accuracy I should really have thought the hon. Member would have been more accurate himself. It is a travesty of the situation to make a statement of that sort. Everybody knows that private operators were not given the scope under His late Majesty's Government which we on this side of the House thought they should be given. We came to the House constantly to ask that they should be given more priority.
Mr. Beswick: What the hon. Member is now saying is that his friends outside did not get all the work they would have liked. That is very different from saying that whilst I was in office certain operators were closed down. If he will examine the figures the hon. Member will

2237
see that certain private operators received £1 million worth of business from Government Departments.
Mr. Profumo: They were given the pickings, that is all; and many of these charter companies did not have enough money to continue. I have no wish to enter into violent conflict with the hon. Member, because I started by saying that I agreed with his thesis; and I hope he will join with my hon. Friends to increase the possibility of private charter companies having some encouragement even at the expense of his moral feelings about nationalised industries.
I only wish to say a word in conclusion about the problem of the aircraft industry itself, because this very much affects the Air Estimates. If we are going to be able to increase our transport aircraft, what we have got to try to do is to see that the manpower situation in the aircraft industry is eased. That is just as important, whether one is considering transport aircraft, bombers or fighter aircraft. The Select Committee on Estimates has shown very clearly that this industry is undermanned, and at this moment there are under 200,000 people in the industry. They are not capable of dealing with the present orders and the present problems, far less with an expanding situation such as I have envisaged.
One of the problems in this industry is the housing problem. It has always been a problem. The right hon. and learned Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton must have known that very well when he was Secretary of State for Air. I wonder how much he managed to prevail upon his Cabinet colleagues to give super-priority to housing for people in the aircraft industry.
Mr. A. Henderson: The hon. Member has already misrepresented what I have said. On the first occasion I did not take any notice, because I did not think it was worth it, but I am bound to say that he had no right to suggest that I criticised the former Government because of the time-lag in the production of aircraft. What I referred to was the state of unbalance by reason of the policy of marrying the live aircrews with the supply of aircraft. In so far as the aircraft do not come up to production expectations, there may be an embarrassment to the Air Ministry as regards
2238
the supply of aircrew. I was not criticising the Government. I said I agreed with the need for doing everything possible to obtain the necessary supplies as soon as possible.
As regards the housing of these workers, I do not know whether the present Under-Secretary will agree with me when I say it is not the responsibility of the Air Ministry to provide houses for workers in the aircraft industry, but if he wants to know whether I and those associated with me on the Air Council were extremely concerned about the provision of houses for aircraft workers, the answer is, Yes.
Mr. Profumo: I am obliged. If the right hon. and learned Gentleman had been listening he would have heard me say that I had no wish to criticise him unfairly. I said I would like to ask him whether, when he was Secretary of State, he made representations to his Cabinet colleagues in order to get a greater allocation of houses for the workers in the aircraft industry. I did not criticise the Air Staff. But the right hon. and learned Gentleman must take responsibility. His was the job of representing the Service to the Cabinet.
I hope my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary will bear in mind the very great importance of seeing whether his right hon. Friend the Minister of Housing and Local Government can make it possible to afford some form of priority to housing for workers in the aircraft industry instead of just the super-priority to the mining industry. I believe that it is of the utmost importance, and I hope my hon. Friend will bear it in mind.
But that is not the only problem. The real cause of the dearth of labour in the aircraft industry has in the past had a great deal to do with the fact that men are unwilling to transfer to an industry which is almost entirely engaged on rearmament. Here I know I have the hon. Member for South Ayrshire with me. Naturally everybody hopes that this matter of the high-powered re-armament programme will be of a reasonably short duration, but it nevertheless makes employment in the aircraft industry inherently unstable.
This danger would be very largely removed and we would be able to speed up our production of military aeroplanes

2239
if substantial orders were given to the aircraft industry for civilian type aircraft at the same time, so that the industry could develop on a more stable basis and could grow rather than shrink with an improvement in the international situation. The final justification for the case that I am seeking to make is that in the production of civil aircraft lies an immense source of export dollar earning power.
The hon. Member for Ayrshire, South, mentioned an article written by Marshal of the Air Force Lord Douglas of Kirtleside, entitled "Now or Never," which appeared in the "Observer." In case Lord Douglas, who is an eminent air officer, is not satisfied with the compliment paid to him by the hon. Member for Ayrshire, South, may I add my voice to that of his in saying that I thought it was an article which should be commended to everybody interested in civilian and military aviation today?
It brings out the point which I am trying to make, that if we want a healthy aircraft industry we must give it long-term orders, both civilian and military. If we are to take advantage of the chance we now have through the skill and ability of our designers and manufacturers to capture the world market, and to maintain it by taking the bull by the horns, then the Government must take action today to make a realistic reverse of priorities to the aircraft industry itself.
This is an opportunity which must be seized with all vigour for thereby we can improve the striking power of our fighting Forces and can help to meet some of our immense expenditure on re-armament. In addition, we can thus ensure that just as in the first Elizabethan era this country was supreme in mercantile transport on the high seas, so now in our new Queen's reign we can once again lead the world with our merchant ships of the air.
10.37 p.m.
Mr. Wilfred Fienburgh: Perhaps we might have a word on behalf of the Army here today. We have already seen the hand of the Navy come dripping out of the briny with seaweed hanging from it trying to drag Coastal Command into the waves.
I want to say a word or two about the use of aircraft in military ground opera
2240
tions, about the type of aircraft to be used and to be provided for that use, and, in particular, about the broad strategy of whether we are to have an Air Force which is to be capable of large-scale mass drenching of areas with high explosives, or whether we are to build up an Air Force which is to be capable of making pin-point attacks on crucial centres which will have the greatest effect in the shortest possible time.
My own authority for speaking on this matter is that I wrote the manuals subsequently published by the Air Ministry and Army Council on this whole subject of Army air co-operation. I shall be glad to hear from the Under-Secretary of State for Air that those manuals have now been withdrawn from circulation. Although I think they were good, my knowledge of syntax makes me think they can be better done nowadays.
The whole crux of the use of aircraft against ground targets, whether they be economic or military targets, revolves round the question whether the Air Force is to be designed, as I say, to obliterate enormous large-scale targets or to execute important pin-point attacks with the maximum degree of accuracy, with the maximum economy and with the greatest chance of saving human life both in our own Forces and among the civilians who are to suffer in any kind of air attack.
I want to draw one or two examples from experience, which I think will have been shared by many hon. Members, regarding the use of air power in support of ground operations during the last war. There were many occasions when we used air forces with a fine degree of accuracy in which we achieved very great effect. In the Normandy operations we used our Air Force to break up the Seine bridges, to isolate the battlefield, to win air superiority over the Army, and on the massive interdiction programme which tangled the enemy in a mass of destroyed communications so that he lost the volition for moving his reserves, and lost his power to influence the battle by moving his reserves within this area.
On other occasions we failed, and failed dismally as we now know, when we used air force as a bludgeon and not as a rapier. When we were delayed on the outskirts of Caen we called on air forces to obliterate the northern end of the

2241
town. They destroyed it. They created in havoc in the fields outside. They killed a large number of French civilians, and the total effect was merely one of destruction. There was no forward advance by the forces on the ground as a consequence of the use of air power as a bludgeon and not as a rapier.
I remember another occasion when we thought an armoured division was moving through two villages. We destroyed the villages of Villers Bocage and Tracy Bocage by Lancaster bombers, and it did not stop an armoured fighting vehicle from coming through, because they just went over the ruins on their own. By using air power as a bludgeon we created untold havoc and destruction for very little military effect. As time went on in these particular operations we did learn. The air force learned to restrain the soldier and the soldier to contain his impatience.
This misuse of aircraft happens when the soldier is frustrated and finds that mobile warfare has ceased and he is sitting on a defensive line and morale is beginning to suffer because forward momentum is beginning to stop. On these occasions an attack, even on a haystack, which may give the impression that something is happening, is welcomed. These are occasions when air power is misused and when air and army staffs must learn to restrain their impetuosity.
I am afraid some of the lessons which our harsh experience taught us in the Normandy campaign are being unlearned now. In Korea we are having a demonstration of the use of air power. We are learning. We are learning over again how to solve the fundamental problem. Are we to use the air weapon as a bludgeon, laying waste whole areas, attacking every single focal point and destroying every village through which an enemy may perchance come, or are we to use it intelligently and deploy the forces to get the maximum effect with the least possible destruction? If air power is used unwisely, one will get an enormous tract of land in which everything is laid to ruin for very little military advantage, giving rise to the additional social problem of trying to rehabilitate these areas afterwards.
Frankly, I think a gross misuse has been made of air power in Korea
2242
support of the ground forces. There one does not have mechanised forces operating against one, but soldiers leaving the road, lumping their supplies and going across open country. Because air force is available, and there is undisputed air superiority both locally and generally in that area, there is what I regard as a most disastrous temptation for military and air commanders to use the weapon for the sake of using it. And that does happen. I have known it happen in military operations in Normandy many times.
I am most anxious that the training methods in co-operation between ground and air forces should draw on experience so that we shall get the most efficient use of air forces. Reginald Thompson, who was a war correspondent for the "Daily Telegraph," in discussing the movement of army and air forces in Korea, says:
"If these armies have failed to destroy each other they have not failed to destroy the country over which they have fought. This result has been brought about by the mechanised force and its method of total interdiction. All the major towns of Korea, with the exception of Taegu and Pusan, have suffered the most terrible destruction; the slow and painful efforts at industrialisation have disappeared; roads and railways have been gravely damaged; hundreds of villages have been erased from the face of the earth, and countless people, caught in this dreadful exercise, have been reduced to ashes in their homes, or condemned hopelessly to roam the barren wilderness. Few of them know why."
This is an example of the misuse of air power from which I hope we can draw a lesson, and from which I hope we will draw the conclusion am trying to drive in, that we must regard our air weapon as a rapier and not as a bludgeon to be used indiscriminately over large areas of country.
If I may make one or two points of particular relevance to army-air support, I am worried about the way the Army is losing through the increase in speed of our modern military aircraft. Speed is the enemy of accuracy when aircraft are asked to operate close to one's own troops. I interrogated hundreds of pilots during the war, and there was great difficulty in briefing on to small targets and finding out what had happened when the men came back, mainly because the increased speed of military aircraft blurred memories of their accuracy when they got close to ground targets. What the answer is I do not know. But if there

2243
are to be intensive and closely cooperative efforts approaching close to ground troops in a military operation, something will have to be done to make up in accuracy what we may stand in danger of losing through the increase in speed.
Another matter to which I hope the Air Ministry is devoting attention is the Army's intensive demand that night shall be turned into day. If we have air superiority, most enemy ground troops who are driven off the roads during the day choose to travel at night. That denies us intelligence of their movements. Towards the end of the late war there were plenty of developments whereby air photography was taking place at night and night interception aircraft were flying up and down over the roads destroying enemy transport. I do not know what has happened to these experiments. But I hope that something can be done to provide that support which armies need.
This same simile of the bludgeon and the rapier applies in the use of air force to attack economic targets as well as military targets. There are justifiable economic targets, but we have to make a decision—and this is a political and not a military decision—on whether the target is to be a township and the factories in it or the factory in the first place.
A proper economic target to be knocked out is, say, an oil plant. That can be done in one of two ways. Enormous numbers of mass-produced aircraft can be sent over the town in which the oil plant is situated, drenching all of it with high explosive, at enormous cost to one's own force and with enormous and appalling destruction of civilians; and also at the appalling cost later when—since all our wars end in victory—we have to clear up the mess largely created by the large-scale methods of the attack. That is one way.
Alternatively, we can develop an air force smaller in content which carries a big bomb load but which, above all, is capable of the most fine and accurate attacks on specific targets. In that way we save an enormous social cost but still tie down large numbers of anti-aircraft guns and civil defence workers. We have to balance the profit and loss in this
2244
kind of operation and, more, important, preserve some of the decencies.
Mr. Emrys Hughes: The decencies?
Mr. Fienburgh: I know it is almost impossible to talk of preserving the decencies in war so far as my hon. Friend is concerned, but he will agree that if an air force can be designed to hit the oil plant in a town, instead of destroying the town itself, we shall at least be nearer decency than we were.
Mr. Hughes: I folowed three-quarters of that argument, and I want to carry it to the logical conclusion. How is it possible to destroy an oil well or, say, a railway siding, or an important military or munitions centre, without destroying the working people in it?
Mr. Fienburgh: There is a world of difference between what I am suggesting and the policy ultimately adopted towards the end of the late war, when to achieve the maximum economic dislocation we hit towns hard. There might be first and second targets within those towns, but in the main it was a centre of living people that was the target, and, with the pathfinder force above, the aircraft dropped bombs on the whole area. I do not rule that out if it is necessary for victory, but it is possible to concentrate on specific targets by using the more advanced electronic techniques.
I know all about the difficulties of flying in bomber operations; I was taken on a trip once and that was enough for me. But I am certain that, given a determination to develop an air force designed primarily for accurate and individual attacks, rather than an air force enormous in numbers and very costly to build, designed to drench whole areas, we can not only achieve our military and economic aim of destroying the enemy's economy, but preserve some of the decencies and save some of the civilians from slaughter.
This attempt to distinguish between the two possible uses of an air force is not derived from any mistaken pacificism—my hon. Friend the Member for Ayrshire, South (Mr. Emrys Hughes) would no doubt say that no pacificist could be mistaken. It is derived from my experience as liaison officer between the Air Force and armies in the field during the Normandy campaign. There were then

2245
occasions when we succeeded well, achieved our objective by, say, clearing strong points out of the way; but these successes came when we asked for and obtained the most accurate attacks upon small targets, with the maximum briefing and the maximum care.
Where we failed—and we failed many times, because we were learning and developing a new instrument of warfare in this period—was when we said someone might move through a certain town, so let us knock it out to make movement impossible. We failed when we said that there was a bridge across a river, so let us "bash" the whole town and destroy it completely, because, if we do not destroy the bridge, at least we shall block the route that will be used.
I think that the argument I have advanced is valid on the grounds of military experience and on the grounds of economy in the use of military forces, which is one of the foundations of military strategy. Above all, in the use of this air weapon, which is the one weapon above all others which can make of a civilian in an enemy country the prime target of its attack, the type of strategy I have been outlining is the more humanitarian approach to a problem which basically cannot be humanitarian at all.
10.55 p.m.
Mr. Charles Ian Orr-Ewing: I wish to take up two or three remarks made by hon. Members opposite before addressing myself to the main points of my speech. The hon. Member for Islington, North (Mr. Fienburgh) made a valid point, that none of us wish to see towns unnecessarily pulverised. At a time when there is competition between our economic stability and perhaps our Bomber Force, it is well worth remembering that if the bombing error is halved only a quarter of the number of bombers is needed. I hope my hon. Friend will direct his attention to more and more accurate bombing in order to prevent waste and to save the civilian population to the greatest possible extent.
The hon. Member for Uxbridge (Mr. Beswick) made a good point when he asked what was being done with regard to defence against weapons of the V2 variety. I submit that we are a very long way from inventing any sort of rocket interception weapon which will
2246
succeed in destroying a V2 which comes down at something like 6,000 miles an hour. I would support the hon. Member and say that this year or next year, and for some years to come, the only chance we have of avoiding attacks of that sort is by attacking the launching bases.
I realise that these weapons can be launched from roads and all sorts of places quite simply and without reinforcement, and it would be difficult to locate the launching sites. But I would ask my hon. Friend what is being done in this connection. Towards the end of the last war we pushed forward mobile radar units and were able within a few minutes of the launching of the V2s, to pin-point the sites from which they came. Although it may not be possible to do the site any damage, it is posible to know the area in which the enemy is concentrating his weapons, and from the interdiction of bridges, rail and road, and of dumps it may be possible to protect our civilian population.
I thought the hon. Member for Uxbridge was a little unfair. After having being so long in the Government, he should have taken the opportunity to make sure that some action was taken by his own Front Bench. On 7th March, 1951, I addressed a written Question to the Minister of Defence, in which I asked:
"if he has yet laid down the spheres of responsibility for defence against guided missiles as between the Service Departments."
The reply I received was:
"The problem of spheres of responsibility for defence against guided missiles is being examined by the Service Departments concerned."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 7th March, 1951; Vol. 485, c. 56.]
That was after we had had the rearmament programme for a considerable number of years. I followed that up three months later and asked what progress was being made in this connection. I was told by the Minister of Defence that he had nothing to add to the answer he had given me three months earlier. I cannot help feeling that the matter of defence against these missiles was not being given the priority it deserved. I hope that my hon. Friend, when he comes to reply, will give it some attention, as it is a matter of very great urgency.
I was interested to hear the remarks, as indeed I think were all hon. Mem-

2247
bers, of the right hon. and learned Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. A. Henderson), but again, surely if he was the responsible Minister for so many years it is surprising that he should come here today and in some way pretend that he was not at all responsible. In the Air Estimates considered on 15th March, 1949—just three, years ago—the right hon. and learned Gentleman said:
"I can say with confidence that the lead which we at present hold in day fighters will be maintained in the future."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 15th March, 1949; Vol. 462, c. 1931.]
Surely that is a reflection. He speaks of the "lead we hold," but does he suggest that the F.86 and the MIG.15 were not then flying?
Mr. A. Henderson: Perhaps the hon. Member has better information than we had at the Air Ministry, but, without fear of contradiction, I can tell him that we had no information in March, 1949, with regard to the MIG.15.
Mr. R. Maudling: We should have had.
Mr. Henderson: It is no use somebody shouting "We should have had," because that is a most stupid interruption. How does the hon. Member know that it was in existence at that time? The evidence is that it was not with the Russian squadrons in March, 1949. I made my statement on the very best information available, but I am quite prepared to add this point for the hon. Member; it is another example of the lack of wisdom of making prophecies.
Mr. Orr-Ewing: I appreciate what the right hon. and learned Gentleman says, but surely we had the closest liaison with the Americans at that time, and if our intelligence had slipped up about the MIG.15, we must have known of the F.86. But, we seem to be slipping behind even today. It was a R.A.F. "crack" at one period of the last war that the more one opens the throttle, the slower the enemy gets away, and unless we speed the new fighters, that is what is likely to happen.
I should like to make three brief points. First—and here I find myself in line with the hon. Member for Ayrshire, South (Mr. Emrys Hughes), although I hope that does not damage my political future—I suggest that we should produce more
2248
economical fighters. Something which is quicker to produce; something needing less engineering man-hours, and something more easy to maintain than those aircraft envisaged.
Secondly, we need to recruit more women for the W.R.A.F. in order to release young men for more of the combatant duties and, thirdly, there is the vital need for transport aircraft.
On the question of a cheap and simple fighter, it is surely an alarming fact—although I have no figures for British production—that a single fighter in America now takes 27 times the number of engineering man-hours that it took in 1940. The American figure is 1.13 million man-hours per aircraft. Are we not beginning to get so complex that we may never get aircraft that are better than the enemy's? By the time that they are in squadron service they may be slower than those we are up against.
The "Economist" among other papers, has drawn attention to the grave engineering problems which are going to be created in providing the new aircraft. Turbine blades were an example. Could we not go in for a rocket aircraft? I should like to draw attention to the very considerable results which the German Air Force achieved in the last years with the M.E. 163. This was a swept-wing rocket-propelled fighter, and would go to 30,000 ft. in 2½ minutes. It was simple and cheap to produce.
I believe, although we must not draw priority and super-priority away from the Swift and the Hunter, that we ought to divert some of our development effort to something which is cheaper and quicker to produce. One wonders whether the new plastic processes, which we have seen announced in the Press as developed at the Government's Research and Development Establishment at Farnborough, could not be applied and used for tail units and even wings for a new rocket fighter.
In the long-term future, we have been told today that we are going towards a greater and greater use of guided missiles for our air defence. My hon. Friend mentioned they were to be ground-to-air and air-to-air, etc. I hope we will not put too much faith in the guided missile. One must realise that a guided missile, when it is fired from the ground to the

2249
air, needs to home on its target. It may home—on radiation, light reflection, ionisation or radar reflection. Whatever it homes-on, it is capable of being jammed. I hope we will not put so much of our engineering effort or so much of our security into this one weapon and find, when it comes to be used in an operational crisis, it is jammed and does not achieve its proper result.
My own recommendation would be that we go for something between the Swift and the Hunter types and the guided missile, and that we produce a simple rocket aircraft manned by a person. One cannot jam a man's eyes or a man's intelligence with anything like the ease with which one can jam an electronic weapon homing on its target. I should also like to ask my hon. Friend whether an evaluation has been done on the load which will be thrown on industry, particularly on the electronic industry, by these guided missiles. One reads in American papers that each one of them may use up to 100 or more sub-miniature valves. Of course, each one goes to its destruction and never comes back to be used again. Have we got the economic capacity and the industrial know-how to produce all the equipment necessary to produce these guided missiles?
I will now turn to my second point. I notice in Vote A that the strength of the Women's Royal Air Force in the coming year will be only 10,650. It is surprising how this strength has steadily fallen over the last four years. In 1948, it was 22,000; in 1949, 15,000; in 1950, 10,900; in 1951, 10,300, and for the coming year, the estimate is 10,650. In the last two years, we have added 100,000 men to the strength of our Air Force and yet in the same period we have reduced the strength of the Women's Royal Air Force. Surely at a time when all the Armed Forces are going to comb the tail and produce the greatest effort and make the most economical use of the younger manpower, it is time to re-double our efforts to recruit women.
The right hon. and learned Gentleman was talking about his successes, but he certainly does not appear to have succeeded in attracting women into the Royal Air Force. I do not know to what it was due. I am not suggesting it was his personality, but I would sug-
2250
gest that either the leadership within that force is not right, or possibly the publicity is not right, or possibly even the shape of their headgear is not right. But something is clearly wrong that we cannot recruit women for the many jobs which all hon. Members will agree they do with much greater efficiency and conscientiousness than many men. On jobs like telephones, signalling, teleprinter operating, operations room work, intelligence, and photo interpretation, they were quite outstanding. The Americans always sang their praises in this direction. Surely we ought to set out to recruit more women to the Air Force and thus make better use of our young manpower.
Now I turn to my last point—transport aircraft. I will not repeat all the arguments we have heard this evening, but my hon. Friend in opening this debate said we could not have everything; we are short of money and industrial effort and if we are to have transport aircraft in addition to fighters and coastal aircraft and bombers it would break the back of the nation. I cannot believe this is a true valuation of the position. It is rather like saying you may have a rifleman, or the rifle or the bullet, but you cannot have all three. It is absolutely essential to have all three to achieve your object. With all our commitments today around the perimeter of the Commonwealth, it is essential, even if we have to cut down the strength of some operational command, to have transport aircraft to carry men and weapons to the places where we want to use them.
My hon. Friend mentioned the fact that we could use the civil aircraft fleets. I believe there may be 100 aircraft in each of the corporations, and there may be as many as 100 in all the charter firms, but we cannot take them all when a crisis arises because some will be needed to go on plying their routes. We have to maintain many of these routes just as we have to maintain our railways and shipping lines in war-time. Supposing one takes half of them—that means a force of 150 aircraft, which is not adequate. I believe this will be of little use for military purposes unless some plans are made at this instant. The civil aircraft has a small door—it is impossible to load military loads into a door that is only three feet wide.

2251
May I suggest that all aircraft, being designed or produced at the moment, like the Bristol 175, should be designed so that they can take double cargo doors, so that we can have their floors strengthened for military loads, so that tie-down points are provided and all those parts are stock-piled so that if an emergency arises they can be fitted in three weeks? I know the argument is that it would not take long, but in the rush and panic of the early days of a war, we may need our transport aircraft immediately. It will certainly take two or three months to produce all the parts that are necessary to modify these aircraft for military purposes.
Before the war, the War Office had a scheme whereby they provided a small subsidy to purchasers who bought lorries suitable for military loads. I do not believe the scheme was a very great success, but the principle has been established. Can we not carry out the same principle in regard to civilian aircraft now being built, which will come into commission for the various corporations and charter firms in the next few years? At last we begin to get a feeling of urgency about the air defence of this country, and our commitments in Western Europe. We seek to make this country safe, not sometime or never, but this year and next year. I hope that my hon. Friend will carry on with the good work he has started, and that, backed up by the Front Bench he will get the super-priority needed to put our Air Force into a state of operational efficiency in the shortest possible time.
11.16 p.m.
Group Captain C. A. B. Wilcock: I want to deal briefly with only one subject, and not to follow the hon. Member who has just made such a valuable contribution—except to clear up one point he made in relation to guided missiles. When he pointed out the difficulty of control, I am sure he was not putting forward the view that guided missiles against a very large target like London would be unsuccessful. It would be a great pity if he left that impression on the House and on the public.
Mr. Orr-Ewing: I am obliged to the hon. and gallant Gentleman. He is perfectly right. I did say ground-to-air and air-to-air.
Group Captain Wilcock: I want to ask the Under-Secretary of State if he will give his personal supervision to the matter of Reserves. We have heard a great deal of sense talked about aircraft, their arms and their functions, from both sides of the House, but I do not think the question of Reserves has been dealt with. For the Army, and even for the Navy, the training of Reserves to war standard takes some time, but the production of pilots and aircrew is a very different matter; it is a very long job, and it is useless making wonderful preparations for aircraft, arms, and bombs, and not having the aircrew.
I have been looking at the figures in the Estimates, and the amount we are spending on the Reserve side of the R.A.F. is totally inadequate. On page 12 a figure is given for the salaries and wages costs of the Regular Air Force. Incidentally, I think there is a mistake in the addition there. I am not very good at figures, but I cannot add the first three figures up to £77 million. I make it £78 million. I hope I am right, because I have so often been proved wrong by the Civil Service. But irrespective of this mistake of £1 million, the point I want to make is that a very small proportion of this is going to Reserve services. It looks to me as if out of every £100 the R.A.F. is spending, less than 10s. is spent on Reserves. That may be a reason why the Auxiliary Reserves and the R.A.F. Volunteer Reserve are a complete failure in regard to numbers.
Mr. de Freitas: Oh, no.
Group Captain Wilcock: The hon. Gentleman does not agree, but we have no sympathy with any Ministers, irrespective of party, unless we can get efficiency in the Air Force.
I do not know whether the Under-Secretary of State realises that if a civilian flying instructor is killed while flying, or an air line pilot, his dependants receive at least £3,000 in compensation, but the family of a volunteer reservist, to the best of my knowledge, receives nothing in the way of a lump sum if he is killed flying. There is a pension, but no sum in compensation. That is a very important factor in recruitment for the Volunteer Reserve.

2253
The Volunteer Reserve is the first and only reserve. The Auxiliary Air Force takes its place in the line immediately on hostilities, and the Volunteer Reserve is the only reserve. It is essential, therefore, that we should have a healthy and numerically strong Volunteer Reserve. If the Under-Secretary will give this his personal attention and will endeavour to give better benefits and better pay to Volunteer Reservists, I believe that we shall find an improvement in recruitment.
11.22 p.m.
Squadron Leader A. E. Cooper: I am sure that the right hon. and learned Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. A. Henderson) knows precisely what I am going to talk about. Some 18 months ago my noble Friend the Member for Inverness (Lord Malcolm Douglas-Hamilton) and I expressed very deep concern on the subject of reconnaissance squadrons and the right hon. and learned Gentleman promised that something would be done. He was good enough to arrange for us to pay a visit to the Royal Air Force station at Benson so that we could see for ourselves what was taking place there.
We were horrified to find that some five years after the war the Spitfire squadrons were only just being converted to Meteors and that two Mosquito squadrons still had their Mosquito aircraft. In the Air Estimates debate last year we expressed ourselves strongly on this point, and if my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary will read the speech of the right hon. and learned Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton he will see that the right hon. and learned Gentleman promised us then that Canberra aircraft would be available for the reconnaissance squadrons. That was more than 12 months ago.
Today, in his very excellent speech in presenting the Estimates, my hon. Friend was obliged to tell us that the reconnaissance squadrons will be receiving Canberra aircraft. What has happened during the past 12 months to the inquiry which we were promised would be taking place on the question of reconnaissance aircraft? Are we to understand that nothing whatever was done by the Socialist Government on this question?
Mr. A. Henderson: I personally visited a squadron of Canberra aircraft which is a reconnaissance squadron.
Squadron Leader Cooper: I can assure the right hon. and learned Gentleman that the twin engined reconnaissance squadrons as we know them in this country today are still equipped with Mosquito aircraft.
Mr. Henderson: I did not say it was in this country; it was across in Germany.
Squadron Leader Cooper: That does not seem to be a very effective answer to the charge I am making.
Mr. Henderson: I do not wish to continue intervening, as time is getting on, but I am stating a fact. The hon. and gallant Gentleman seemed to suggest that I had misled him and his hon. Friends. I say that is not true. All I said was that I had personally visited a photographic reconnaissance squadron which was equipped with Canberras.
Hon. Members: Withdraw!
Squadron Leader Cooper: I shall do no such thing, because I personally and my hon. Friends have the greatest confidence in the present Under-Secretary and in the statement he made today. He said quite clearly that our reconnaissance squadrons will be equipped with Canberra aircraft. That will is in the future, not in the past, and I still assert that the reconnaissance squadrons as we know them in this country are equipped with Mosquito aircraft. I submit that the right hon. and learned Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton is gravely at fault in failing to provide our reconnaissance squadrons with the most up-to-date aircraft which are essential.
Last year, we also drew attention to the type of photographic equipment with which these squadrons are equipped at the present time. Here, again, we are not satisfied that our squadrons are equipped with equipment equal to that being used by other air forces. I should like to receive an assurance from my hon. Friend that steps are being taken to put us at least in a position of parity in this field with other air forces.
Finally, I want to make a plea on the general question of the policy to be pursued with regard to reconnaissance squadrons. My noble Friend the Member for Inverness and I made this same plea last year. We are strongly of the opinion that to place these squadrons

2255
under the control of Bomber Command is the wrong thing to do. During the war reconnaissance squadrons were attached to Coastal Command, and it was only after the war that they were transferred to Bomber Command.
I have never been able to understand the reasoning that brought about that change. I am not suggesting, however, that it was correct that the reconnaissance squadrons should be under Coastal Command. Indeed, my noble Friend and I long formed the opinion that they should have a command headquarters of their own, together with an air officer in Air Ministry directly responsible for their operations.
We must not forget that reconnaissance squadrons are not concerned only with seeking out targets for Bomber Command. They have a much wider part to play in any theatre of operations in which we may be engaged—for example, in coastal waters, in seeking out targets for artillery attack, and, generally, in support of advancing armies. They have, in fact, a role to play which covers all branches of our attacking Forces.
We fear that if these squadrons are placed under the control of Bomber Command, they will be used purely and simply as an adjunct for that Command and for the seeking out of their targets and making the necessary estimates after attacks have taken place. Therefore, those of us, if I may say so with proper modesty, who have some considerable experience of this particular type of work urge that this matter be dealt with in Air Ministry as one of very great urgency.
11.29 p.m.
Mr. Geoffrey de Freitas: It is a great pleasure for me again to be taking part after three years in an Air Estimates debate, and it is also a delight to be putting some questions to the Under-Secretary of State for Air, as he did to me when I had his job some years ago. In our Estimates debate in those days we were chiefly concerned in discussing problems which flowed from demobilising a vast war machine and simultaneously building up an efficient, modern Air Force.
I ask hon. Members who were not in this House at that time and who have
2256
brought their experience to bear in this debate today to realise just what a problem it was to preserve the structure of an Air Force when one was demobilising at the rate then necessary. These problems have been overcome, and this debate, and particularly the speech of the hon, and gallant Member for Ilford, South (Squadron Leader Cooper), has been concerned chiefly with the shortage of equipment rather than the problems of manpower, which were the greatest we faced a few years ago, following as much as anything from the fact that by some great disaster the Royal Air Force, because of policy decisions, did not recruit Regulars during the war years.
Before I come to questions on equipment, there are three problems about manpower I should like the Under-Secretary to consider. They worry me, and he knows they worry me. I am not only worried because the problems are there, but that they may be forgotten through the emphasis on equipment. I refer first to the selection of officers, secondly to technical n.c.o.s, and, thirdly, to the more general point of the Women's Royal Air Force.
In selecting general duties officers there are many difficulties, but tonight I shall mention only a few. We all know an officer must be physically and mentally equipped to fly and to fight in the air. We all know an officer must have qualities of leadership, at least of command. We all know that a small proportion of each year's crop of young officers has to have the imagination, ability and personality to develop into a senior air officer in 20 to 30 years' time. The basic problem is to evolve a system of selection which balances these requirements.
For instance, I should like to know consideration is to be given to such matters as whether some physical qualities are over-emphasised. For example, eyesight. It may have been right in the days of the open cockpit, and before much flying was done by instruments, to make perfect eyesight an all-important factor. But should not other factors, such as eagerness to fly, eagerness to fight, academic qualifications and a sense of humour be included in the balance when selecting officers? I suggest eyesight should be a factor, and an important factor, but not the all-important factor.

2257
Again is there not danger too in the present method of testing aircrew aptitude? I know it cuts down wastage in training, and that could be proved dramatically by figures. But in concentrating on selecting hundreds of men who will be pilots, and who will be capable of becoming squadron leaders, may we not run the risk of eliminating the man who is just a little different? Have we avoided rejecting the air Nelson of the future? Do we know whether Nelson would have passed the aptitude test?
Mr. Emrys Hughes: Or the intelligence test.
Mr. de Freitas: May I now turn to the technical n.c.o.s. This ties with the speech of the hon. Member for Hendon, North (Mr. C. I. Orr-Ewing). We all acknowledge that the system of scientific education in this country has produced Nobel prize winners out of proportion to the population. It is a selective system of scientific education. But we do not produce enough technicians in this country.
Applied to the Royal Air Force it works like this. We have been discussing at great length the killing of U-boats and the best methods of doing it. We could invent some highly intricate depth charge. We might be able to produce it in large numbers. We might be able to produce and fly the aircraft to deliver those charges; but could we maintain and repair this highly intricate equipment? With our educational system, can we produce enough technicians of the n.c.o. grade? This is a big subject, and I should like to be assured that it is recognised today as a problem for the future, a problem which must be discussed by the Secretary of State for Air and the Minister of Education, and by that I mean the whole problem of technical education.
The hon. Member for Hendon, North, referred to the Women's Royal Air Force. I do not want to make too much of it but, on looking at the figures, my impression is that there is an increase forecast for next year, not a decrease.
Mr. C. I. Orr-Ewing: Three hundred.
Mr. de Freitas: It is going up a little. I am glad. But I agree that it is not nearly as high as it ought to be. This is surprising, because it is an attractive
2258
career for a girl. One can look at the index to the Estimates to find that a W.R.A.F. gets less pay than an airman as a trumpeter, and gets less as a parachutist, and for attending at divine service. But that is not the discouragement. There is obviously something wrong in the appeal. Therefore, I am asking the Under-Secretary to examine this. While I have been speaking I have remembered that at one time when there was a great shortage of girl labour in the cotton towns we deliberately did not advertise in the papers circulating in those areas. It is something that might be looked at to see whether there ought to be a change; perhaps it has been changed already.
With regard to equipment, I was worried last autumn when the Prime Minister took on the Minister of Defence. He had referred to and stressed in so many debates, "bayonet strength." He talked in debates about the number of sailors who slept ashore or afloat. He continually talked about the number of front-line troops. I was worried because he apparently did not appreciate that the number of men in the front line is not an important consideration in air warfare. The right hon. Gentleman had apparently ignored the fact that the test here is firepower and the accuracy with which firepower can be directed.
I was therefore delighted to hear the Under-Secretary stress the importance of accuracy in bombing. My hon. Friend the Member for Islington, North (Mr. Fienburgh) in another connection stressed this also. If tens of thouands of man-hours go into the making of an atom bomb, the accuracy with which it is delivered is vital. If there were a small front-line bomber force, it would not necessarily be a weakness provided large resources of brain power and manpower were devoted to research development, production and maintenance, of devices capable of delivering the bomb with greater accuracy.
I think I am right in saying that if bombing error is halved, the number of aircraft needed is divided by four. In other words, I ask the Secretary of State to consider whether some of the resources of men and materials going into aircraft research, development and production could not be of greater value

2259
if they were put on to navigation and bombsight research, development and production.
The Prime Minister served gallantly in the cavalry—and I agree it would be no good saying, if a cavalry charge were ordered, that half the squadron was absent because they were engaged on research about the merits of short and long stirrups. I know front lines do matter, as they matter today in Malaya. But that must not lead us into thinking—this is what worried me in the Prime Minister's speeches during the last few years—that a war in Europe would be anything like that; and I earnestly hope that during his reign at the Ministry of Defence the Prime Minister did not stampede the Air Ministry and the Ministry of Supply into dressing up the front line so that it looked well on a chart at the expense of research and development and production.
Above all, I ask whether we are doing enough research into radar, navigation equipment, and bombsights; we must do full justice to developments in aero engines and aircraft. The Canberra is an obvious illustration. We ordered it from the drawing board and it has been a great success, but is the ancillary equipment far enough ahead to do full justice to its speed?
My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Derby, North (Group Captain Wilcock) talked about reserves and the Under-Secretary mentioned the three-month call-up of auxiliaries last summer. I understand that there has been a postmortem conference at the Air Ministry, over which the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence presided. Can we know anything about the results? And is it a fact that the role of some of these squadrons is to be changed? If it is, I hope that we may be told. Again, how has recruiting benefited? Surely it cannot be as alarming as my hon. and gallant Friend suggested. And what about recruiting for the fighter-control units, which provide interesting work for women members of the Service?
The hon. Member for Inverness (Lord Malcolm Douglas-Hamilton) and others mentioned civil flying clubs. I declare an interest, not financial but a strong personal one, in civil flying, and I was pleased to hear that the A.T.C. scholar-
2260
ship scheme has apparently been a success and is going ahead. What about the training of engineering apprentices to fly at these clubs? We need a pool of potential officers and n.c.o.s for the R.A.F. engineering branch, and the clubs could undertake this training because they actually train Regular commissioned engineer officers. The flying clubs are ready to help, and the training of engineer officers is recognised by the Air Ministry, but I do not think that the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Supply, and the Service realise that the clubs can also provide practical engineering experience to technical students who are studying at the colleges up and down the country. I hope the Minister of Education and the other Ministers will consider making use of these clubs which have aircraft near our technical schools.
I should like the Under-Secretary to consider a point, which I regard as of considerable importance, concerning the experience of senior R.A.F. officers working with civilians. It is exceedingly important that the leaders in our fighting services should be men who can deal with civilians and who recognise the problems of statesmen and politics. Because of the organisation of the Army and Navy their officers have more experience of working with civil authorities.
Therefore, the fullest use must be made of the R.A.F. Commands, such as those in Aden and Iraq where the Air Officer Commanding works directly with the civilian authorities, and in Malta where he was, and probably still is, the Fortress Commander. I ask the Under-Secretary to consider that these commands should be held by men who are on their way to the top, because the experience of working with civil authorities is too valuable to be wasted on officers about to retire from the Service.
Five years ago in the debate on the Air Estimates, I gave an account of a remarkable example of peacetime integration in Japan—the British Commonwealth Air Command. I had just returned from there and had seen it in operation. At that time General MacArthur was there and I had a long discussion with him about its organisation. Whatever hon. Members may think of his politics, they would have a high regard for the opinion of General MacArthur on technical military matters. He was most impressed by

2261
the way in which this British Commonwealth Force, B.C.A.I.R., were grouped together in an entirely integrated command in peace-time.
What steps are we taking to build up a similar joint Commonwealth Command in peace-time? It is not enough to have flights or squadrons operating together. It is essential that they should work and fight together in an integrated command. The war in Korea has been mentioned in another connection, and I do not expect the Under-Secretary to go into a great deal of the story of that war; but I hope he will give us some idea of the air organisation in Korea to see if it is of any value to us in working an international or inter-Commonwealth command.
I asked a Question about gliding of the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence when he was Under-Secretary of State for Air. Apparently it was an ambiguous question, and I was rather floored by a supplementary question from an hon. Member opposite. I did not come out of that well, and I hope to have a better chance now of getting some information on gliding.
Many different opinions are held in the Royal Air Force as to the value of gliding training before powered flying training. A few years ago a test was started in which certain cadets were given gliding training before powered-flying training, and others were put straight on to powered-flying training. The idea was that in time data on these men would accumulate, and when their flying records were compared we could discover if there was any advantage in learning to fly a sail-plane before going into a powered aeroplane. What was learned and has anything been achieved?
My other point about gliding is on a completely different side of the subject. It is gliding at R.A.F. stations as a recreation for ground staffs and women members of the Service. I do not think anyone can over-estimate the importance of giving these men and women a chance to fly. After all, they are proud of being in the Air Force and normally they would have no chance of flying at all. How is that scheme going?
In his interesting speech, my hon. Friend, the Member for Uxbridge (Mr. Beswick), referred among other matters to the necessity for creating a pool of
2262
pilots. I agree. We must have more pilots in this country. The hon. Member for Inverness referred to the whole question of civil flying, and the question of air-mindedness. It is interesting to note that in 1938 there were more than 600 private aircraft registered in this country, but only 250 in 1950.
Mr. Birch: Taxation.
Mr. de Freitas: It may be because of taxation, but those are the figures. In 1938, there were 2,700 new private flying licences issued, the figure in 1950 was less than a thousand. Whatever the reason—be it expense, or taxation, or the higher standard demanded—what is the result?
It is becoming more and more difficult for a young man or woman to learn to fly unless he or she meets the physical and other requirements of one of the fighting Services. That is to be regretted, for aviation then becomes associated almost entirely with the Services. There is no doubt that Service experience has been enriched with civil flying experience, and vice versa. A little more of the free and easy atmosphere of civil flying might well make for valuable contribution to aviation for the benefit of all who fly.
Those hon. Members who speak for the Royal Navy would certainly agree that all the wisdom of sea-faring is not confined to the Royal Navy, great Service thought it is. We must be air-minded, and that does not mean only Service air-mindedness. There is now no Department bearing the title of "Civil Aviation." The Ministry of Transport care for it, and I say nothing of that. But the result is that men and women who are air-minded look more and more to the Air Ministry for guidance and encouragement, and it is not only the duty of the Ministry to build up an efficient fighting Service, but also to encourage air-mindedness.
I, with my right hon. and hon. Friends, wish the hon. Gentleman a pleasant tour of duty at the Air Ministry; I do not say short and sweet, although perhaps that is more appropriate, for we on this side are in Opposition, and it is our duty to criticise. But, he can count on us for a good hearing whenever he comes to the House to talk of the R.A.F., because it is a Service in which many of us are interested and all of us hold in the highest esteem.
Mr. A. Henderson: I should like to be allowed to make a short personal explanation. The hon. and gallant Member for Ilford, South (Squadron Leader Cooper) referred just a short time ago to reconnaissance aircraft, and I stated that I had seen a Canberra squadron in Germany. I was drawing on my recollection, but I now find that, in fact, the aircraft were Meteor 10's, which were the latest type of reconniassance machines prior to the introduction of the Canberra. I should like to express my regret for having misled him, but it was a genuine error on my part.
Squadron Leader Cooper: I am very grateful to the right hon. and learned Gentleman for that statement, which, I should like to add is fully in accordance with the high standard of courtesy which we in this House have come to associate with him.
11.55 p.m.
Mr. Ward: So many matters of substance have been raised in this long debate that I fear I shall not be able to answer more than a small proportion. I shall try to answer as many points as I can, and I can give an assurance that the others will be very carefully examined in the Department and that as many hon. Members as possible, whose points I do not answer tonight, will receive answers by correspondence.
The right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. A. Henderson), started by suggesting that we might do well to look into the Army offer of long-term pensionable engagements of 22 years. As he said, this includes an option of terminating Colour service at the end of every three years. We have studied this scheme very carefully and we agree that it may prove valuable to the Army to improve the Regular content of their forces.
But, we do think that the range of engagements in the Royal Air Force of three, four, five, 10, 12, and 22 years does strike a sound balance between flexibility and stability. As the right hon. and learned Gentleman will be well aware, Regular airmen in ground trades do secure an excellent career up to the age of 55 years in the new trades structure and they can re-engage up to this age after only four years' Regular service. This year there has been an excellent
2264
response to our scheme and, although we always preserve an open mind on these matters, we see no reason, at the present moment, to alter our own arrangements.
The right hon. and learned Gentleman also asked whether it was true that not more than 23 per cent. of entrants into the R.A.F. could be guaranteed a life-career up to 55 years of age. I am pleased to say that I can assure him that we reckon, with very few exceptions, that we shall be able to offer a life-career in the R.A.F. to all suitable airmen who wish to take it.
The right hon. and learned Gentleman also referred to the cut of 10 per cent. in the War Office staff and the combing of 10,000 men from the tail of the Army, and asked whether my noble Friend the Secretary of State for Air contemplated similar economies in manpower. The answer is that we have made economies and that we are continuing to search for further means of economising in manpower the whole time.
The right hon. and learned Gentleman knows well that in the R.A.F. conditions do not permit of the creation of further squadrons just by the comparatively direct process of combing the so-called tail. But, we are examining our manpower, not merely from the point of view of cutting establishments, but, what is even more practical, from the point of view of policies. As the right hon. and learned Gentleman knows, establishments follow policy, and not the other way round—which, though desirable, may not be vital. All this must be done in the context of our necessary expansion, of our total manpower, and of the greater expenditure on works which the building-up of an Air Force to the size contemplated at the moment necessarily involves.
My noble Friend, however, is determined that this great expansion shall be carried out with the most stringent regard for economy. He is well aware of the dangers in this respect, which are so often associated with a build-up of this rapidity. Then the right hon. and learned Gentleman drew attention to the need for a balance in our plans in the production of air-crews to match any reduction in output of modern operational types of aircraft. We are very well aware of the need for planning the expansion

2265
of the R.A.F. in all respects so that the various elements are kept in proportion to each other. I can assure the right hon. and learned Gentleman that the interesting point he made about air crews is being very carefully watched. Without going into detail I can say that to match the aircraft production programme the R.A.F. will certainly need all the air crews now coming into the Service.
The hon. Members for Uxbridge (Mr. Beswick) and Hendon, North (Mr. C. I. Orr-Ewing), both asked about modern forms of transport aircraft. I can say that it was agreed last year to replace the Hastings by a jet transport, and the specification has been drawn up. I am sure that the House will agree it would have been inadvisable to have ordered a new tactical transport aircraft to replace the Valetta until it was quite certain that the American C119, the Packet, was not forthcoming; because had these aircraft been forthcoming we should have obtained them without cost to ourselves. To have ordered British transports while there was a chance of getting American ones would have meant curtailing the other operational commands. Now we know definitely we are not getting the C119s, the problem of maintaining the transport force when the Valetta squadrons start declining is being urgently examined now.
The hon. Members for Uxbridge, Stroud and Thornbury (Mr. Perkins) and Stratford-on-Avon (Mr. Profumo) spoke about Transport Command, and I am glad to have the opportunity of saying another word about it. I can assure- the hon. Member for Stroud and Thornbury that the picture is not really nearly as black as he paints it. Of course, we have not got as many aircraft in Transport Command as we should like, but, nevertheless, it has been able to meet all the demands for airlifts which arose from recent emergencies in the Middle East. In particular, during the Egyptian crisis Transport Command carried some 10,000 Army troops, nearly 400 vehicles and a considerable tonnage of military equipment and supplies. It also evacuated several hundred families from the Canal Zone.
I should like to read one or two tributes to Transport Command from the Army. These are messages from General Erskine to Air Marshal Groom about Transport Command. The first one says:
2266
I would be most grateful if you would thank your staff and all concerned in the quite excellent arrangements which the R.A.F. made to bring in reinforcements from Cyprus. It has gone a long way ahead of schedule and under many difficulties, and we were all most impressed and delighted with the way it was handled by you. Perhaps you could also convey my thanks to the other end of the performance in Cyprus."
Another message from General Erskine to Air Marshal Groom reads:
"I should like to say how much we have admired and appreciated the efforts made by Transport Command to bring in troops at top speed and take out families. Every soldier into the Zone has made my situation easier, and every family to leave has made our responsibilities less. The total effect has been very considerable&This could not have happened but for exceptional efforts by Transport Command. I know other transport agencies have helped, and many of them in a big way, but that does not detract from the tremendous help we have had from the Transport Command of the R.A.F. It has been a decisive factor in enabling me to keep the situation under control."
I feel it right in view of what has been said about Transport Command to make that known. These flights have been undertaken in addition to continuous routine duties in support of all three Services in the Middle East.
The hon. Member for Uxbridge asked what plans we had made for the use of civil aviation in war. Considering that he left the Ministry of Civil Aviation such a short time ago, I should have thought that he might have known the whole resources of the Airways Corporations will be placed at the disposal of the Government for use as required on either civil or military duties. An agreement has already been reached between the two Corporations and Transport Command on the division of control where civil aircraft are allotted to military duties. Discussions are taking place now on detailed operational procedures to ensure full flexibility and efficient utilisation. One hon. Member was anxious about the Comets. I would remind him that, far from cutting down the production of Comets, they are now going to be produced under licence by Shorts and Harlands in Belfast.
My hon. Friend the Member for Inverness (Lord Malcolm Douglas-Hamilton) was worried about runways for Shackleton aircraft, and I can give him the assurance that the runways have been properly strengthened and that these aircraft can operate with full loads. He also asked about trainers. We already have a

2267
Meteor two-seater trainer in service, and Vampire and Canberra trainers will be in service during the coming year 1952–53: He asked also for more advanced aircraft for the R.A.F.V.R. I am afraid that the answer is that no more modern types will be available unless we can replace them with the Chipmunk, an extremely good aircraft with which we are going ahead. Training with more modern types is provided by flights with various operational commands, a scheme developed successfully over the past year or 18 months.
The hon. Member for Batley and Morley (Dr. Broughton) made an extremely interesting speech about the medical branch, which we hear far too little of in these debates. I am glad he raised this question, because I welcome this opportunity of paying tribute to the great efficiency of that branch, and I should like to couple with that the Institute of Aviation Medicine, which, deservedly, has a world wide reputation.
The hon. Member asked whether medical officers were allowed to qualify for their wings, and the answer is that Regular officers who will be engaged in flying personnel problems are allowed to do so. Four obtained the flying certificate in 1951, three qualified to fly jet aircraft, and seven were accepted for flying training. He asked whether medical officers are encouraged to become airborne. I can assure him that they are encouraged to get as much flying experience as possible.
As for recruiting, which was the other point he made, we have at present a deficiency of 80 medical officers; 92 medical officers were granted short-service commissions in 1951. The number applying for and granted permanent commissions, which was 13, was below our requirements. The standard of entrants to the medical branch is most satisfactory.
I was asked about air ambulances—a very interesting and important point—and I can say that while no special type of aircraft is produced as an air ambulance, transport aircraft are capable of conversion for that purpose and an airlift for Korean casualties has been maintained. Helicopters have been used as air ambulances in Malaya for a considerable time, and their value in saving life and maintaining morale has been very much appreciated.
2268
The hon. Member for Uxbridge and my hon. Friend the Member for Gosport and Fareham (Dr. Bennett) raised the question of helicopters and asked what the R.A.F. were using them for, if they were using them at all. The R.A.F. are using a small number of helicopters for the casualty evacuation in Malaya, to which I have just referred, for experimental trials in air-sea warfare, and for tactical trials with the Army. In Malaya, their value has been demonstrated for recovering casualties from very difficult country, and in Korean waters the Royal Navy has shown that the helicopter may have a very useful part to play in air-sea rescue.
Other uses which are being studied for helicopters are light communication and transport work. Of course, the American Army in Korea uses the helicopter like a jeep for staff officers to go right up to the forward part of the theatre.
There are only two types of helicopter at present in use in the Royal Air Force, and these are the Westland Sikorsky S.51, known as the Dragonfly, and the Bristol 171, which is known as the Sycamore. These two helicopters have a limited value, owing to their insufficient lift, to enable them to be used economically for the purpose for which we require them, but there are two new types planned for early production—the Westland Sikorsky S.55, which is an 8 to 10 passenger aircraft which will take six stretchers, and the Bristol 173, which is a twin rotor helicopter. Between them they could carry out most of the tasks which we foresee.
These are very costly aircraft. But against the high initial cost of the helicopter one can say that their advantage is that they can do jobs that other aircraft cannot do and they do not need the provision of very costly landing facilities.
Mr. Emrys Hughes: Could the hon. Gentleman tell us approximately—I do not ask him to give away any military secrets—the cost of a helicopter?
Mr. Ward: I am sorry, but I cannot. I would not like to guess at it, and I have not got the figure.
My hon. Friend the Member for Gosport and Fareham raised the very important point of air standardisation. I think the House might like to know some-

2269
thing of the machinery in air standardisation existing at the moment. The Air Standardisation Co-ordinating Committee, consisting of Britain, Canada and the United States, has existed for four years. The Military Standardisation Agency of N.A.T.O. has existed for just over a year. Agreement for the free interchange of equipment for this purpose between the three Air Forces has now been in operation for two years. Working parties cover the whole range of operational activity, and they provide a means for a continuous and rapid change of information.
The Military Standardisation Agency consists of a Navy Board, an Army Board and an Air Board. Each Board has a Service member from the United States, Canada, France and the United Kingdom and each of the other N.A.T.O. countries may appoint a liaison representative. The detailed work is done by working parties who report to the Board concerned and a standardisation agreement is then drafted. Examples of the sort of things that the Air Board have already agreed about on standardisation are things like airfield lighting, fuels and lubricants, aeronautical maps and charts, navigational briefing and air ground rockets.
Brigadier Peto: Does that include signals by radio within the aircraft?
Mr. Ward: That is one of the things that would be examined, but whether agreement has yet been reached on it I am not quite sure.
Then the hon. Member for Gosport and Fareham raised some very interesting points about the importance of developing methods of landing and launching aircraft without the use of long and costly runways. Although the solution to this problem may probably lie some years ahead, I can assure the hon. Gentleman that such ideas are being very carefully studied at the present time, not only because of the dislike of having valuable agricultural land taken for airfield development, but also because of the development of aircraft without undercarriages whose performance figures are very attractive.
The hon. Member for Jarrow (Mr. Fernyhough), who is not now present, made a rather important and serious allegation which I would like to deny. I am surprised that he has not had
2270
the courtesy to stay and hear the answer after having raised such a serious allegation. He talked about a false prospectus. I should like to say at once that in the time available to me to look into the allegation I have found no evidence whatever of men having been induced to sign on for three years under any false prospectus. In fact, none was attested at all.
The normal procedure is that men wishing to become Regulars in the Royal Air Force first attend a recruiting centre. There they undergo a short ability test to ascertain whether they are likely candidates for the trade of their choice. They are warned that acceptance will depend on their passing the ability and aptitude test for the particular trade. Where they are successful, attestation takes place.
Instructions to all recruiting officers make it clear that they are to make no firm promises to would-be recruits, and I have no reason to suppose that these instructions were disregarded in the present case. In some trades it is possible to accept a man for a three-year engagement if he has certain qualifications, such as the school certificate, or if he can pass the appropriate trade test; otherwise, it may not be possible to accept him for these trades unless he is prepared to enter for four or more years for only then can he become efficient and give us a reasonable return of productive service.
These men were not told to go home and wait to be called up; they were told to await instructions from the Ministry of Labour and National Service, who would issue enlistment orders for National Service in the ordinary way and have regard to any preference expressed by the men for the Royal Air Force. My hon. Friend the Member for Stockport, North (Mr. Hulbert), asked about the aircraft with which auxiliary squadrons are now equipped. I can assure him that most of the auxiliary fighter squadrons now have the same marks of jet aircraft as those with which the Regular squadrons of the Fighter Command are equipped, and re-equipment of all the auxiliary squadrons with these marks will be completed by this summer.
My hon. Friend the Member for Gosport and Fareham, and the hon.

2271
Gentleman the Member for Lincoln (Mr. de Freitas) asked about officer pilots. I am glad to be able to say a word about that because there are one or two recent developments which I do not think have yet been widely publicised. The branch officer scheme, introduced last November is the first one, and under that scheme some 3,000 junior officer posts in ground branches will ultimately be filled by selected warrant officers and chief technicians commissioned initially with the rank of flying officer at an average age of 40. They will serve until they reach the age of 55 and will be eligible for promotion to flight lieutenant, and a few will be able to reach the rank of squadron leader.
The advantages are, firstly, the better use of suitable serving men who have long experience, secondly, that the Regular airman's chance of getting promotion will be improved, and, thirdly, that the need to recruit young short service officers to ground branches will be reduced. There is the other scheme of offering permanent commissions in ground branches to selected short service general duties officers. Up to now the number of commissions in the general duties branch available for short-service pilots and navigators has been very small.
I see that this scheme is mentioned in the current issue of the "Aeroplane," but perhaps hon. Gentlemen have not had an opportunity of reading it yet. Since the experience of these men will be extremely valuable in the ground branches it was recently decided to make these officers available for permanent commissions in six ground branches at the end of eight years' service in the general duties branch. The ground branches concerned are the technical branch, equipment branch, secretarial, fighter control, provost and catering and they will be given professional training at the end of their eight years in the general duties branch. The advantages of that scheme are, first of all, better prospects for permanent commissions for short service pilots and navigators, and, secondly, we hope that it will help recruiting for short service commissions and provide ground branches with some officers with flying experience.
The hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Kettering (Mr. Mitchison) asked about bounties for ground officers
2272
in the R.A.F.V.R. It is not the practice to pay bounties to reserve and auxiliary officers in any of the services, except those on flying duties. The hon. and learned Gentleman suggested it would not cost much to pay bounties to ground officers in the V.R., but it would not be possible to give them more favourable treatment than members of the Territorial Army or other non-Regular forces. In the Territorial Army there are some 11,000 officers who would be equally eligible for some bounty if it was given to the Air Force.
The hon. Member for Brentford and Chiswick (Mr. Lucas), in another of his interesting speeches, asked several important questions. The first concerned live shooting at modern operational heights and speeds. I can assure him that fighter pilots are trained at these heights and speeds. To make this possible it has been necessary to introduce new targets and equipment and these are now in service. Efforts are continually being made to make air firing as realistic as possible, and progress continues within the resources available.
Live air firing training is extremely costly, and investigation is proceeding into improving simulated training devices and methods. The hon. Member also raised the question of the location of A.F.S's in industrial haze areas. While I appreciate the point, I am sure that he will realise that there are limiting factors. One of the factors limiting the choice of the Advanced Flying School airfields is that they have to match the output from the flying training schools, and this precluded building new stations in ideal areas, as from one and a half to two years would have been needed.
As to cost, the main runway of each Advanced Flying School is 2,000 yards long, exclusive of overshoots, and the building of a new station with the required runways would cost between £750,000 and £1,500,000. It was, therefore, essential to make use, wherever possible, of existing stations, and to adapt them to A.F.S. standards by runway extensions and in other ways. Then there is the other point about interference with agriculture. The building of new airfields in ideal areas would interfere a good deal with valuable agricultural land, which generally lies in the flat areas suitable for airfield construction.

2273
Of the nine new airfields constructed, only two are in industrial haze areas, those at Worksop and Middleton St. George. The hon. Member then asked about flying simulators for the training of Valiant crews, and crews for jet fighters. He will be pleased to know that this is being studied. He suggested, also, that none of the Swift and Hunter fighters would be introduced into service in 1952–53, or, perhaps, even in 1953–54. It is unwise to prophesy, but I shall be disappointed if this suggestion is not proved wrong in the event.
The hon. Member for Hendon, North, criticised the complexity of the new fighters which we have ordered to replace the Meteor and the Vampire. Our aim in future design is to build aircraft which can seek out targets and destroy them with the minimum risk of loss, and which will be able to operate in as wide a range of circumstances as possible, and with the greatest tactical freedom. To find and shoot down an aeroplane, even at present day speeds and heights of, say, 300 knots at 30,000 feet on a dark night, or in bad weather, is a difficult problem which cannot be solved in any simple way.
Nevertheless, we are alive to the possibilities of radically cheapening and simplifying designs for fighter aircraft to be used in certain limited and special roles by day, and we are going ahead with the design; but aircraft of the type of the Hunter and the Swift and the replacement night fighter must be the staple aircraft of our fighter force for some time to come.
The hon. Member for Lincoln, in a very thoughtful speech, talked about bombsights and navigational aids. The jet engine has doubled the height and speed of aircraft and this is the technical crux of the problem; the geographical problems are also more difficult than they were in the last war. Scientists and Service experts are developing equipment to satisfy these new conditions, but it would not be in the nublic interest for me to give any details of their work. We are very conscious of the need to provide bombsights and navigational aids that will do justice to the modern jet bomber. If he will bear in mind my words in opening about accuracy, he will know how keen I am on this matter.
2274
The hon. Member also raised the question of the control of the Air Force in Korea. The air forces are part of the United States command organisation. We have no R.A.F. squadrons in tactical air command, but it is only reasonable to suppose that the right answer is to have control of all the squadrons concentrated in the force by the country that is providing by far the largest contribution. This is the normal system for air operations and should provide the most effective control. So far as we know, this is the opinion of the Australian and South African Air Forces, which have a squadron in Korea. Sunderlands are operating with the United States Navy in maritime operations. During the war, when necessary, United States squadrons operated under British operational control.
He also raised the question of the W.R.A.F., where recruiting is very disappointing. It has been declining steadily. These are the figures: the first quarter of 1951, 1,097; second quarter, 1,071; third quarter, 840; fourth quarter, 797. We are doing all we can to stimulate recruiting, but the wastage rate, other than the expiry of engagement, is high at 20 per cent. The main cause, of course, is marriage, which accounts for 11½ per cent.
Mr. Emrys Hughes: Why does the hon. Member call that wastage?
Mr. Ward: It is some consolation to remember that for some time past the W.R.A.F. has been attracting as many recruits as the two other women's Services put together.
Although the initial engagement is for four years, our manning plans—not a very apposite phrase—have to provide for an effective period of service which experience has shown to be nearer three years than four, owing to so many women marrying before the end of their engagement. Recruits are especially needed for the trades of radar operator and fighter plotter. The hon. Gentleman the Member for Tradeston (Mr. Rankin) can be assured that we are very conscious of the need for more women for these highly important duties and we are doing all we possibly can to get them.
Lastly, a word about the air cadets, a subject in which the hon. Member for Lincoln is keenly interested. I know what a great part he played in starting

2275
this scholarship scheme and how keenly he has followed it since. Recruiting for the cadets has improved slightly. At the end of 1951 the strength was 41,202, of which 4,099 were proficient, that is, 9.9 per cent.
The Air Scholarship Scheme is going ahead very well. As I said earlier, we are giving 500 scholarships this year instead of 300; 351 cadets are qualified and 67 were under training at the end of 1951. Two additional scholarships are being provided by the Air League. Apart from that scheme selected cadets get 10 hours' dual instruction, and other selected cadets get overseas flights in aircraft which would otherwise be only partly filled.
The hon. Member asked about the value of gliding. Gliding schools are being re-equipped with two-seater Kirby Cadets, Mark III and 22 were in use at the end of 1951. So far as their value is concerned, I do not think it would be true to say that we attach any great importance to gliding experience as a means of helping a pilot to fly a powered aircraft. But we think it helps him to become enthusiastic for the air and keen on the whole range of aircraft he will eventually come on to. I have not any figures which I can give to the hon. Member, but I think that is a fair summary of our views on the matter, and we will go on with gliding.
I would like also to mention the point he made about pilots. I began to think he had been reading a speech I made last summer. In any case, he knows how keen I am on this subject and how often I have raised it in this House. It is largely a matter for the Minister of Civil Aviation, but I can assure him I shall not lose my keenness about private flying.
This has been an extremely valuable debate and I can assure hon. Members that we shall examine everything they have said with extreme care. The interest they have taken and the suggestions and constructive speeches they have contributed will be of great help and encouragement to all ranks of the Royal Air Force.
12.38 a.m.
Mr. Richard Fort: The Under-Secretary has covered a very wide field and answered many questions. But there is one matter which has not been
2276
discussed extensively and that is the production side of the aircraft and the equipment which must go with it. Perhaps the Under-Secretary did not deal with the subject because, although he orders the machines and the equipment, the contracts are placed for him by the Ministry of Supply, who see that they are carried through.
I ask them, jointly, to consider the part of the country where they place orders when they do so under the ex-pension programme. I ask attention for North-East Lancashire where, in the main towns, somewhere between a half and a third of the population is employed in the textiles industry and which is now suffering in a severe way industrially. As a result of world-wide depression in textiles, affecting not only this country, about half of the population in North-East Lancashire is on short time, or unemployed.
That is the position in my constituency and neighbouring constituencies, and we think that this may not be only a temporary situation. A few months ago many who had studied this subject thought that this recession might be short-lived. I think it a longer term problem, and I ask assistance now by rearmament orders for textiles being placed as soon as possible in this part of the country.
As a longer term proposition, we wish to see a greater diversity of industries being brought to that part of the country where employment is still so dependent on only one industry. What we should like, and what we believe is practicable, is to see both light and heavy engineering industry brought there. I believe that that would fit in with the programme which may hon. Friend and his colleagues at the Ministry of Supply have to carry through. In many part of this country where engineering is a more widely established industry they are, fortunately, in one way, suffering from a shortage of labour.
We, unfortunately, have no such shortage, and it does not seem that we shall have. I ask the Ministries concerned to see what can be done to guide industries to North-East Lancashire which would give employment, not only to the male population, but also to the highly trained female workers in the weaving area there. The local authorities and

2277
other interested concerns can give full information about facilities, and the help available. There are the facilities if only Government Departments and companies wishing to build air frames, engines and other equipment will turn to North-East Lancashire for part of the work they have to carry out in the air expansion programme.
Question, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair," put, and agreed to.
Supply accordingly considered in Committee.
[Mr. HOPKIN MORRIS in the Chair]

AIR ESTIMATES, 1952–53

  VOTE A. NUMBER FOR AIR FORCE SERVICE
  Resolved,
  That a number of officers, airmen and airwomen, not exceeding 315,000, all ranks, be maintained for Air Force Service, during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1953.

AIR SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATE, 1951–52
  VOTE A. ADDITIONAL NUMBER FOR AIR FORCE SERVICE
  That an additional number of officers, airmen and airwomen, not exceeding 15,000, all ranks, be maintained for Air Force Service, during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1952.
AIR ESTIMATES, 1952–53
  VOTE 1
  3. £87,250,000, Pay, &c., of the Air Force.
  VOTE 2
  4. £1,979,900, Reserve and Auxiliary Services.
  VOTE 7
  5. £161,000,000, Aircraft and Stores.
  VOTE 8
  6. £73,440,000, Works and Lands.
  VOTE 9
  7. £2,130,000, Miscellaneous Effective Services.
  VOTE 10
  8. £3,720,000, Non-effective Services.
VOTE 11

  ADDITIONAL MARRIED QUARTERS
  Motion made, and Question proposed,
  That a sum, not exceeding £100, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the expense of certain additional married quarters, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1953.
  12.45 a.m.
  Mr. Emrys Hughes: I should like the Under-Secretary of State for Air to explain why there has been such slow progress with the provision of married quarters. I remember that we spent very considerable time one day listening to the promises, which were held out to married airmen, of housing accommodation which was to be supplied to them. I should like to know why these promises appear to be unfulfilled. What is the reason the married quarters have not been built? Is it a shortage of labour or materials? How has this promise been redeemed?
  I would suggest that one of the reasons is that there is a shortage of building trade labour because of the call-up of the building trade workers into the Forces by the Ministry of Labour. I do not know into which sections of the Armed Forces the building trade workers have gone, but surely it is a waste of labour if building trade workers are called up for the Forces and the houses which have been promised are not then available. I have always argued that building trade workers should not be called up when they are needed for building either married quarters for airmen or married quarters for soldiers or for miners.
  I should like to know what the Government will do to get this housing accommodation which is so badly needed and if the promises made about a year ago are likely to be fulfilled.
  Mr. Ward: I can say that the housing programme. as planned, is going very satisfactorily and it looks as though revised provision for the current Estimates—not the Estimates we have been discussing tonight—will be fully spent, which is all that the hon. Gentleman can expect.
  Question put, and agreed to.
  Resolved,

AIR SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATE, 1951–52
10. £1,800,000 (Supplementary), Air Services

SCHEDULE

Sums not exceeding

Supply Grants

Appropriations in Aid

Vote.

£

£

1. Pay, &c, of the Air Force

300,000

500,000

2. Reserve and Auxiliary Services (to an additional number not exceeding 7,500 all ranks)

400,000

—

3. Air Ministry

250,000

—

4. Civilians at Outstations

270,000

100,000

5. Movements

2,600,000

*-190,000

6. Supplies

1,900,000

1,800,000

7. Aircraft and Stores

Cr 15,750,000

3,200,000

8. Works and Lands

11,500,000

*-3,070,000

9. Miscellaneous Effective Services

260,000

*-140,000

10. Non-effective Services

70,000

50,000

11. Additional Married Quarters

—

*-750,000

Total, Air (Supplementary) 1951–52 … £

1,800,000

1,500,000

* Deficit.

Chairman to report Resolutions and ask leave to sit again.—[Mr. T. D. G. Galbraith.]
Resolutions to be reported this day.
Committee to sit again this day.

SOLDIER'S DEATH, OSWESTRY
Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—[Mr. T. D. G. Galbraith.]
12.51 a.m.
Mr. Cledwyn Hughes: The circumstances surrounding the untimely death of Gunner Douglas Owen at Park Hall camp, Oswestry, have caused considerable public concern and I am very glad to have this opportunity of discussing the matter in the House, although I might have been rather more fortunate in the night that has fallen to my lot.
The training and conditions of service of our National Service men are matters in which we are deeply interested and we want to be completely satisfied they are receiving the maximum care compatible with their normal training. On the facts in my possession I am bound to say at the outset that I am extremely unhappy about this case, and I hope that the Under-Secretary can put my mind at rest.
Gunner Douglas Owen joined the Army on 15th November, 1951, at the age of 20. He was given the usual medical examination and placed in Grade I. On 31st December, 1951, he was undergoing physical training in the camp gymnasium with 29 other trainees. They were apparently engaged in a form of training known as horses and jockeys. At 12.5 Gunner Owen collapsed during training and, according to the available evidence, he was frothing at the mouth. They were the words used by two witnesses at the coroner's inquest. He was then carried to the side of the gymnasium and left there lying on mats.
According to the depositions taken at the inquest, no first-aid was administered, although it appeared that at 12.15 the physical training instructor saw the man lying on the mats, still apparently conscious. I would like the hon. Gentleman to note that point. The physical training instructor states that he sent for medical aid. This was at 12.15. He also reported the matter to the gymnasium officer. It appears from the evidence that the medical officer could not be traced at that time.
At 12.15 p.m. the commanding officer of the camp arrived in the gymnasium on a routine inspection, it was not because he had been sent for. He saw

2281
Gunner Owen and came to the conclusion that he was dead. That was 20 minutes after Gunner Owen had collapsed. The Commanding Officer then dismissed the squad and posted guards outside the gymnasium. One of the medical officers heard of the case at 12.40 p.m. and arrived at the gymnasium at 12.45 p.m., exactly 40 minutes after Gunner Owen had first collapsed.
When I asked the Secretary of State for War a Question on this subject on 26th February, the right hon. Gentleman gave the House the impression that Gunner Owen had been taken to hospital immediately. That was not the case, and the right hon. Gentleman was good enough to write me a letter the following day correcting that impression. The man was lying in the gymnasium, alive, for 40 minutes, and physical training continued for 20 minutes while he was lying there. The Minister also gave a very unsatisfactory reply to a supplementary question, when he said:
"The time involved was three-quarters of an hour. By and large, one is fortunate in a unit if it takes only 10 minutes in sending a man to find the doctor and getting him to the necessary place; it may take longer. In this case, I do not think there was any actual fault, in view of the location of the hospital and the gymnasium. It took three-quarters of an hour: a quarter of an hour would have been better, but, short of having a medical superintendent at every P.T. class, one cannot obviate that possibility."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 26th February, 1952; Vol. 496, c. 916.]
That is not good enough. Where strenuous training is going on all day it is reasonable that medical attention should be available almost immediately. I would put the following questions, which I think are fair and reasonable, to the Minister. In the first place, I understand there are four doctors on the establishment at Park Hall camp. Why was none of them available within a reasonable time of this man collapsing? There seems to me something radically wrong with the duty roster of that camp. Second, why was no medical orderly available to give first-aid at once?
I would like the Parliamentary Secretary to tell the House how many medical orderlies are on the strength of the camp. I understand there was a sergeant medical orderly on duty near the gymnasium at the time, and if he had been' sent for he could have administered first-aid or
2282
some respiratory treatment that might have saved this young man's life.
We do not know exactly when Gunner Owen died. I have studied the depositions at the inquest and obtained information from his family, and no one can say exactly when he died. We know that he lived for at least 10 minutes after 12.5 because he was alive when the physical training instructor saw him at 12.15. The third point I would like the Parliamentary Secretary to deal with is this. It appears that the case was reported to the gymnasium officer at 12.15. Why did the officer in charge of the gymnasium not investigate the case himself? He appears to have done little or nothing about it.
On the evidence I have been given I have been forced to the conclusion that this case was dealt with in a lax, slipshod, and almost callous fashion. The old tag about exigencies of the Service does not impress me. This young man is dead. For all we know he might have been alive today if he had received attention. My only consolation is that the result of this debate may result in the avoiding of similar laxity in the future.
I would draw attention to the verdict at the inquest—that Gunner Owen met his death by misadventure, and that the cause of death was asphyxia, aspiration of vomit, and pneumonitis due to carbon pigmentation while doing physical training. The jury added a rider that in their opinion there should be someone present with knowledge of first-aid during physical training. I hope that the jury's rider will be followed up carefully by the hon. Gentleman and his right hon. Friend.
1.0 a.m.
The Under-Secretary of State for War (Mr. J. R. H. Hutchison): The facts in this distressing case, with certain exceptions with which I will deal, have been reasonably accurately defined by the hon. Member for Anglesey (Mr. C. Hughes). I use the word "distressing" not only because of the pain and the irreparable loss that has been caused to Gunner Owen's mother and his other relatives, but also because there is a loss to the Army and, indeed, to the country in his death. He was a keen, enthusiastic soldier of the kind the country can ill afford to lose and, in fact, he was

2283
anxious, as I am informed, one day to become a physical training instructor himself.
On the morning in question Gunner Owen had, according to his usual practice, had no breakfast. Thereafter there was the normal training programme until shortly before 12 o'clock. There was then a break, and Gunner Owen consumed a glass of milk and three cream buns. I am not sure how important this is, but I am trying to add a few more facts to what the hon. Gentleman has already outlined.
Gunner Owen then paraded with the rest of the class for physical training in the gymnasium. They started with the exercise of horses and jockeys, which is not particularly strenuous; I have done it myself in this last war, and it is no more strenuous, if as strenuous, as many of the things that a soldier does when he is going through ordinary field training. However, as I think the hon. Gentleman knows, so enthusiastic was Gunner Owen about the physical training aspect of things that he did hand stands on his own before the class fell in. I add that as a side issue to show that he was really keen on this form of military training.
Then he collapsed. He was carried to the side of the gymnasium by the physical training instructor in charge of the class, and I would say straightaway that the physical training instructor was not fully qualified in first-aid. The physical training instructor thought that he detected the symptoms of a fit. As has been brought out at the coroner's inquest and at the court of inquiry, there was some evidence of frothing at the mouth. The physical training instructor massaged him and covered him with a blanket and sent for aid.
There are only two points upon which I have no confirmation, to which the hon. Gentleman referred in his speech, and the first is that I cannot find any evidence that anybody said that Gunner Owen was still alive 15 minutes after the time of the collapse, but I am not sure that it is material to the whole matter. I have looked hurriedly at the evidence submitted, and although I admit I may be wrong, I could not find that stated.
Mr. C. Hughes: Could I assist the hon. Gentleman? In the deposition taken at the coroner's inquest, evidence is given by
2284
the P.T. instructor who was on duty in charge of the gymnasium, and he says:
"At 12.15 p.m when I walked through the gymnasium I saw an instructor standing by a man. I passed on. I saw another instructor going down the gymnasium and I realised that there was something wrong. I went to him and found the man lying on the mats and he was going white and frothing at the mouth. He was not coughing at all."
My inference is that at 12.15 when this instructor saw him, Gunner Owen was alive.
Mr. Hutchison: The hon. Gentleman may be right, although I am not really sure that it is material.
The next point on which I cannot get corroboration—in fact, I think that on this point the hon. Gentleman is wrong and I am right—is the question of an officer in charge of the gymnasium. There was, in fact, no officer in charge of the gymnasium. There was a bombardier who was in charge of the gymnasium but not a commissioned officer. The only officers who made an appearance on this tragic scene were the commanding officer and later on the medical officer.
Mr. C. Hughes: I am sorry to interrupt the hon. Gentleman again, but the same witness whom I have just quoted says later on in his evidence:
"I went to the gymnasium officer and sent for medical aid."
Mr. Hutchison: I think he must have meant the n.c.o. in charge of the gymnasium. Again, I do not think it is very important, but I just wanted to get the facts right. At any rate, the evidence at the inquiry, which I have twice read over very carefuly, shows that there was no other officer there although there was an n.c.o. in charge of the gymnasium to whom this instructor in fact went.
There Gunner Owen was at 12.15—unconscious and covered with a blanket at the side of the gymnasium—and the class continued its work. Meantime, emissaries had been sent to try to get the medical officer. The first point I would like to deal with is the question of the class going on. Was that really a very unreasonable thing to happen?
Mr. Emrys Hughes: Very inhuman.
Mr. Hutchison: Wait a minute. I know the hon. Member's attitude to this, but let him be fair about it. Nobody had yet recognised that there was anything more than an ordinary faint.
Mr. Emrys Hughes: A man was lying unconscious.
Mr. Hutchison: Has not the hon. Member been present at many a military parade at which somebody collapses? Does he seriously suggest that whatever the military parade is called for, it should be abandoned because somebody goes to the ground? Would they not all crowd round and create the very situation which any doctor will say is one to avoid, instead of standing back and giving the man air? One cannot abandon all military activity just because one man falls down.
Mr. C. Hughes: What the hon. Gentleman now asks is, was it not reasonable for them to continue with their training if this man had fainted? If those were the facts, I do not think it would have been unreasonable, provided that they had sent for medical aid. But the hon. Gentleman must remember that when he commenced his speech he said it was generally accepted that this man was in a sort of fit, that he was frothing at the mouth. That is rather different.
Mr. Hutchison: It was only when it was recognised as being serious and when the commanding officer arrived on the scene that he at once dismissed the parade. I do not think, looking at it from a reasonable point of view, that there was anything very much to criticise in all that.
Mr. Emrys Hughes: The man was dead.
Mr. Hutchison: The man was dead, but had they known that then it would have been quite a different thing.
As soon as the tragedy was recognised, the class dispersed. Messengers had been sent for the doctor who was on his rounds. At that particular time there were many troops on leave. Remember the date in question was 31st December. The standard coverage, to use the technical jargon, is that there shall be one medical officer for, approximately, 2,000 troops—which, incidentally, is a more generous allowance than the National
2286
Health Service gives for the ordinary civilian—and that coverage was there.
In the morning at 10 o'clock there were two medical officers present who took a sick parade. One of them then went off to be replaced at 2 o'clock in the afternoon by a second medical officer so that the standard allowance, if one may use that term, of officers to men was not gravely interfered with. I think it would have been wiser, and I should myself have been happier about it had both the medical officers been there during the whole time. But, at any rate, there was no grave dereliction of duty in what happened.
Twenty minutes later—to go on painting the picture of this tragedy—the commanding officer arrived. He recognised that Gunner Owen was dead, and then at 12.45 the doctor arrived and corroborated this fact. As my right hon. Friend said, I think quite fairly—and he has been criticised by the hon. Member for his reply—it would have been, of course, a much happier state of affairs if the medical officer had arrived more quickly.
But is it unreasonable to find a delay of 40 minutes from the time of summoning a doctor to the time he arrives? I do not think that it is a very long time. There is another aspect of this matter. I am only a layman, but I have consulted high medical authorities and, while this may be cold comfort, it is very doubtful whether a doctor if he had arrived almost immediately could have saved this man's life. What is certain is that no man, trained in ordinary first-aid, could have done anything to help him. The fact is that what he was suffering from was desperately serious. I do not know, were I in the situation of this boy's mother, whether it would comfort me or not—if one could be comforted in a loss as deep as this—but I think it would comfort me to know that almost nothing that could have happened could have saved him.
This is a tragic case in a million, but that does not invalidate the criticism or the rider to the verdict of the coroner's inquest, or what the hon. Gentleman has advocated, that it would be desirable if physical training could be taken by somebody with a knowledge of first-aid, and instructions have been issued to that end. I cannot answer about the medical orderlies, because I cannot be sure

2287
whether their presence or absence would have had any influence at all in a complaint so serious as the one from which the man was suffering. I confess, however, that if a reasonable number of orderlies had been present I do not think that it would have affected the outcome.
Mr. C. Hughes: Does the hon. Gentleman not agree that a message was sent to the hospital, and can he say why no trained medical orderly from the hospital called at the gymnasium in view of the fact that the medical officer was probably on his rounds, or at any rate was not available at the time?
Mr. Hutchison: I am informed that a message was sent to get the doctor as quickly as possible. Emissaries were sent and telephone messages were made to find
2288
the doctor. I do not think it is really material whether a medical orderly from the hospital was called for or not, because if he had gone he could have done nothing. I do not think there is anything more to be said.
I would like to end on the same note as I started, and on the same note which impelled the hon. Gentleman to raise this matter. A story like this tugs at one's sympathy and if it is any comfort to the boy's mother and relations I would like to express my deep regret and the sympathy of the War Office that this should ever have happened.
Question put, and agreed to.
Adjourned accordingly at Fourteen Minutes past One o'Clock a.m.