Commons Sitting of 12 March 1951

Preamble
The House met at Half past Two o'Clock
PRAYERS
[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]
NEW WRIT
For Ormskirk, in the room of the right honourable Sir Ronald Hibbert Cross, baronet (Manor of Northstead).—[Mr. Buchan-Hepburn.]
ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
  MINISTRY OF SUPPLY

    Sheet Steel Imports
    Lieut.-Colonel Sir Thomas Mooreasked the Minister of Supply what reduction in the import of steel sheets was caused during 1950 as a result of the shortage of shipping facilities.
    The Minister of Supply (Mr. G. R. Strauss): None, Sir.

    Machine Tools
    Mr. Watkinsonasked the Minister of Supply if he will make a statement on the procurement of machine tools from the United States of America and European countries.
    Mr. G. R. Strauss: Orders for the defence programme have been placed on suppliers in the United States and in Western Europe to a value to date of approximately £40 million.
    Mr. Watkinson: Is the Minister satisfied that great care has been taken to dovetail these orders so that our production and what we are buying from abroad will match up?
    Mr. Strauss: Yes, Sir. That matter has been and is giving us very considerable concern, and I think we are doing what is necessary.
    Mr. Snow: Will my right hon. Friend be very careful indeed to keep in touch with the American end of the supply
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    line, since there is some doubt in industrial quarters whether by virtue of American increased production we are getting all the supplies we want?
    Mr. Strauss: Yes, Sir. That is again a point that we have very much in mind.
    Mr. Watkinsonasked the Minister of Supply the number of machine tools taken from his Department's reserve in the last six months and placed in use in industry.
    Mr. G. R. Strauss: Eight hundred and ninety-three machine tools have been withdrawn from Ministry store during the last six months; 424 for immediate use and 469 for reconditioning before use.
    Mr. Watkinson: Is it possible to say what proportion that withdrawal bears to the remaining stocks?
    Mr. Strauss: It is quite a small proportion, because most of the remaining stocks are special purpose tools that are not suitable for our defence programme.
    Mr. Duncan Sandys: Has a very large number of machine tools now required for re-armament purposes been disposed of since the war?
    Mr. Strauss: No, Sir.
    Mr. Kirkwood: Is it not the case that we are in a better position today to supply all the machine tools we require either now or in the immediate future?
    Mr. Strauss: Yes, Sir.
    Mr. Summers: For what purposes are these tools in store if they are unsuitable for the re-armament programme?
    Mr. Strauss: They are special purpose machines that were mostly used for equipment required during the last war but which are not now required according to the demands given us by the Service Departments.
    Mr. Summers: Would it not be reasonable in that case for them to be sold?
    Mr. Alportasked the Minister of Supply what steps the Government intend to take to indemnify firms failing to complete their contract for the export of machine tools to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or Eastern Europe as a result of the Government's policy for subsequent legal proceedings.
    Mr. G. R. Strauss: My Department have informed the machine tool industry that, for completed machines the export of which to Eastern Europe has been frustrated as a result of Government action under the Export of Goods (Control) Order of 6th October, 1950, the Government will indemnify firms against damages and costs awarded as a result of their failure to carry out contracts. No indemnity has been given for unfinished machines but, as the industry is aware, the Government will consider claims on their merits. Any payments by the Government will be conditional upon damages and costs not being otherwise recoverable under a contract of insurance and upon the firms consulting and being guided by my Department in the conduct of legal proceedings.
    Mr. Alport: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that considerable modifications are necessary to many of the machine tools ordered, particularly for Poland, which will not have been finished and for which, therefore, no indemnity will be available? Does he not think that it is a great hardship to the firms concerned that they have to stand the very substantial loss involved?
    Mr. Strauss: The hon. Member may not have heard my answer. I said that such claims will be considered on their merits.
    Sir Herbert Williams: Do I understand from the Minister's answer that British courts will be available to enable the Soviet Union to sue British firms?
    Mr. Strauss: Certainly.
    Mr. R. S. Hudson: When was this information communicated to the firms or to the industry? My information is that a short while ago they were not aware of it.
    Mr. Strauss: I could not say without notice the day on which the firms concerned were first given this information.
    Mr. Hudson: Has the right hon. Gentleman no idea at all—not even a rough idea?

    Jet Engines (Export to U.S.S.R.)
    Mr. Fitzroy Macleanasked the Minister of Supply how many British jet aircraft engines were sold to the Union
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    of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1947; and of what make and design.
    Mr. G. R. Strauss: Twenty-five Rolls Royce Nene Mark I and 30 Rolls Royce Derwent Mark V.
    Mr. Maclean: Is the Minister aware that the M.I.G.15 jet engines being used against our troops in Korea are simply copies of the Rolls Royce Nene engines supplied to the Russians by his Department, and will he not now agree that the transaction in question was a blunder of the first order?
    Mr. Strauss: I cannot personally make any comment about the first part of the question. The hon. Member is no doubt aware that these engines were no longer on the secret list when supplied to the Russians.
    Air Commodore Harvey: Has the right hon. Gentleman any knowledge to what use Soviet Russia is putting these jet engines?
    Mr. Strauss: I have not myself.
    Mr. Henry Strauss: Can the Minister reconcile the policy of selling these jet engines to the Soviet Government with the terms of the note of His Majesty's Government handed to the Soviet Ambassador on 17th February last, in which His Majesty's Government complained that ever since the end of the war the Russian Government had disregarded the terms of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty and engaged in hostile acts?
    Mr. Kirkwood: Arising from those supplementary questions, how do hon. Gentlemen happen to know that those engines which the Russians have are taken from the engines which we have sent to Russia?
    An Hon. Member: It is a good guess.

    Houses, Stone (Tenancies)
    Mr. Hugh Fraserasked the Minister of Supply whether he proposes to proceed with the eviction of Mr. James and Mr. Dixon and their families from his Department's housing estate at Stone, in view of the fact that both men were until lately in his employ, and that despite his request the local authority is unable to provide them with alternative accommodation.
    Mr. G. R. Strauss: Yes, Sir. Mr. James and Mr. Dixon occupied these bungalows as serving members of the War Department Constabulary. They have now resigned and the accommodation is urgently needed for their successors. Mr. James has in fact vacated his bungalow.
    Mr. Fraser: Surely the Minister is aware that these tied cottages, which is what they amount to, are more than four miles away from the point of work, and that in recent local proceedings the judge went so far as to say that if it had not been Crown property he would not have given an eviction order? Is the Minister further aware that of the 16 houses only six are used by his own employees? Surely Mr. Dixon should be allowed to remain, since he has a son overseas who has served in Singapore and elsewhere?
    Mr. Strauss: For security reasons it is absolutely essential that we should have the requisite number of constabulary to look after this Royal Ordnance Factory. There is no other place where we can put them, and therefore, although I much regret it, it is essential that we should get this accommodation.
    Mr. Harrison: Will my right hon. Friend, by an example, strike a blow at this most distressing side of the tied cottage question and press local authorities to permit such people as these to go on their local lists before they are actually turned into the street?
    Mr. Strauss: Yes, we approached the local authorities and asked if they could help to find accommodation for these people.
    Mr. Fraser: Surely it is utterly absurd to have security police living five miles away from the factory they are guarding? The whole argument breaks down. Surely something can be done about that?

    Atomic Research (Security)
    Mr. Shepherdasked the Minister of Supply if he can now give an assurance that atomic research stations in the United Kingdom are free from any elements likely to be a danger to the safety of the State.
    Mr. G. R. Strauss: I can repeat the assurances I have already given that I am satisfied with the security measures in force.
    Mr. Shepherd: Does the Minister realise that, although we welcome that assurance, it is now only given after the greatest damage has already been done?

    Steel Allocations
    Mr. H. Fraserasked the Minister of Supply how far, during the interim period, he accepts responsibility for steel allocations to consumers.
    Mr. G. R. Strauss: There is no Government allocation of steel, apart from steel sheets and tinplate.
    Mr. Fraser: But did not the British Iron and Steel Federation make allocations in the past? What has happened to the advisory system which I understand existed previously?
    Mr. Strauss: There was no allocation system operated by the Federation. There are at present in operation informal arrangements among certain suppliers of steel, but there is no formal arrangement in operation apart from sheet steel and tinplate.
    Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: Is my right hon. Friend considering the adoption of some measures which will enable those who really need the steel to get it before those who do not need it.

    Helicopters
    Mr. Doddsasked the Minister of Supply, in view of the need for the development of helicopter travel, if he can now give information about the production by the Bristol Aeroplane Company of a new type of two-engined helicopter suitable for inter-city travel.
    Mr. G. R. Strauss: The Bristol 173 has not yet reached the production stage.
    Mr. Dodds: Is my right hon. Friend aware that many progressive business houses are arranging facilities for helicopter landings in connection with their business, and in view of the need for inter-city passenger services, will he do all he can to expedite the production and use of twin-engined helicopters?
    Mr. Strauss: Yes, we ordered two of these helicopters from this firm. The first is just completing its prototype stage. It will then have to undergo considerable tests before it is finally passed.

    Ball Bearings (Steel Supplies)
    Mr. Robert Carrasked the Minister of Supply whether he is satisfied that sufficient quantities of the right quality of steel are, and will continue to be, available to the manufacturers of ball bearings to enable them to meet the essential requirements of the engineering industries.
    Mr. G. R. Strauss: Sufficient supplies of steel of the types required by the manufacturers of ball and roller bearings are being maintained. Manufacturers have been asked to furnish estimates of their forward requirements and every effort will be made to meet essential needs.
    Mr. Carr: In speaking about future requirements, is the Minister taking into account the present shortage of ball bearings for armament orders and therefore allowing for an extra production of that type of article?
    Mr. Strauss: Yes, as far as we are aware, the ball bearing making companies have been able to get the supplies which they require to maintain their present output, though sometimes with some difficulty.
    Mr. Geoffrey Lloyd: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that one of the largest firms manufacturing these bearings, in the Midlands, have lately been warned that they can have only 80 per cent. of their requirements of steel during period 2, which I understand starts almost at once?
    Mr. Strauss: No, and I should like to have information about that.
    Mr. Sandys: In view of the acute shortage of ball bearings which we experienced in the last war, can the Minister say what steps he is taking to expand our production or, alternatively, to stock-pile ball bearings from Sweden and other manufacturing countries?
    Mr. Strauss: There has been some expansion of the ball bearing industry recently, but until we have further information from the ball bearing companies, which we have asked for, it is impossible at this stage to say to what extent we shall be able to cover our own ball bearing needs.

    Tinplate Supplies
    Mr. Shepherdasked the Minister of Supply for how long it is anticipated that the production of tinplate from the
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    Margam Works will meet our requirements based upon the current rate of increasing demand.
    Mr. G. R. Strauss: I would refer the hon. Member to the statement made by my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary in the course of the debate on 27th February.
    Mr. Shepherd: May I ask, for further information, how long it is anticipated that these works will continue to meet our demand, in view of the continuous rise in the demand for tinplate?
    Mr. Strauss: It is impossible to say because we do not know exactly what the output of the new tinplate works at Trostre will be. We know there will be a substantial increase in the tinplate produced when those works get into full operation next year, but I cannot say exactly what it will be.

    Re-armament Organisation (Appointments)
    Mr. Pargiterasked the Minister of Supply if he is taking any steps to strengthen the higher levels in his organisation to deal with industrial problems arising from the re-armament programme.
    Mr. G. R. Strauss: Yes, Sir. I have been fortunate enough to secure the services of Mr. S. W. Rawson, Managing Director of John Brown, Ltd., Mr. George Briggs, Assistant Managing Director of Tube Investments, Ltd. and Mr. W. C. Puckey, Director and General Works Manager of Hoover, Ltd.
    Mr. Rawson will become Director-General of Machine Tools and the other two gentlemen will be concerned with the production aspects of the re-armament programme on the munitions and air sides, respectively. I should like to express my warm appreciation of the action of the chairman and boards of the companies concerned in placing the services of these gentlemen at my disposal. I am considering further appointments of a similar nature in the near future.
    In addition, I have established a panel of experts to deal with the allocation of steel required for the re-armament programme. The panel, as I have already announced, will be presided over by Mr. T. W. Senior.
    Mr. Pargiter: May I ask my right hon. Friend why he thought it was not necessary to include a prominent trade union representative in this body? May I further ask him whether he is satisfied that these distinguished gentlemen are likely to be more successful in the advice they give to him than would appear to have been the case in certain Departments where private enterprise representatives have been giving advice?
    Mr. Strauss: For the type of job which we want these gentlemen to do, the prerequisite is experience in the management of works and on the board of a company, and also some experience in this type of work during the last war. I think the gentlemen concerned, who are all very distinguished, are the most suitable for the type of work I want them to do.
    Mr. R. A. Butler: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the appointment of these singularly distinguished gentlemen will give great satisfaction to this side of the House? I am glad to congratulate the Minister on his choice.
    Mr. Snow: Is my right hon. Friend aware how extremely interested we are in these appointments, and may I appeal to the Opposition not to classify these distinguished gentlemen as "quislings" merely because they work of this Government?
    Mr. Watkinson: If I put down a Question, will the Minister give for the information of the House a full list of all the committees which advise his Ministry and act as a link between his Ministry and industry?
    Mr. Strauss: I will do my best. They are a large number.
    Mr. Somerville Hastings: What proportion of their time will these distinguished gentlemen give to the Government?
    Mr. Strauss: The arrangement is that they give all their time, but they are free for a day or two a month if necessary to advise the companies from which they came.
    Mr. Edgar Granville: Can the Minister make available to the House, with regard to these new appointments, information concerning whether they will be in an advisory capacity to his Department,
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    whether they will have effective powers with regard to the allocation of machine tools, and to whom they will report—to the right hon. Gentleman or to his Department?
    Mr. Strauss: They are advisers to me and they will be responsible for administering the policy which I, of course, will lay down and for which I will be responsible.

  NATIONAL INSURANCE

    Prisoners (Contributions)
    Mr. Doddsasked the Minister of National Insurance what progress has been made, following discussions with the Secretary of State for the Home Department, in respect to enabling prisoners in His Majesty's Prisons to maintain themselves in benefit under the National Insurance Scheme.
    The Minister of National Insurance (Dr. Edith Summerskill): My right hon. Friend and I have come to the conclusion that the existing arrangements, which are described in the reply given on 13th February to a Question by the hon. Member for Lancaster (Mr. F. Maclean), are as satisfactory as is possible in all the circumstances.
    Mr. Dodds: Is my right hon. Friend aware that under the present unsatisfactory arrangements many men and women who go to prison have to pay a far higher penalty than the law demands, despite the time that is allowed for the payment of their contributions afterwards; and in view of the modest sum of money involved, could not something more effective be done to get rid of these injustices?
    Dr. Summerskill: I cannot agree with my hon. Friend. Perhaps he has not recalled the regulations, that were made last year which enable these men and women after release to make their payment retrospectively. In certain circumstances, they have five years in which to do so.
    Mr. Dodds: Is not my right hon. Friend aware that to be imprisoned for five years and then to come out and to have these arrears added, is too much for most people who have been in prison for several years?
    Dr. Summerskill: I did not say "if the person had been in prison for five years."

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    I said that the person concerned would have a period of five years after release in which to make the payments.
    Mr. Dodds: They might have been in prison for five or seven years.
    Mr. Emrys Hughes: If Z men in His Majesty's Prisons are called up for His Majesty's Forces, how will this affect their insurance benefits?

    Sickness Benefit
    Mr. Perkinsasked the Minister of National Insurance why her regulations enable self-employed persons, including Members of Parliament, to draw sickness benefit under the National Insurance scheme at the same time as other emoluments; and what is the waiting period.
    Dr. Summerskill: I have written to the hon. Member about the first part of his Question. The waiting period is three days.
    Mr. Perkins: Does not the Minister think it rather undesirable for company directors, Members of this House and others who are paid full salary, whether sick or not, to be eligible to draw benefit, and would not the right thing be to reduce the weekly contribution that everyone pays and to debar M.P.s from obtaining sickness benefit?
    Dr. Summerskill: No, Sir. The hon. Member has forgotten that this is an insurance scheme. It does not matter whether the person concerned is a manual labourer or a company director. If he has paid his contributions, he is entitled to benefit.
    Captain Duncan: For the interest of other hon. Members who may want to claim sickness benefit, can the right hon. Lady say what were the contents of the letter to my hon. Friend?
    Dr. Summerskill: It explains the situation in simple language.
    Mr. Speaker: Mr. Vaughan-Morgan.
    Mr. C. S. Taylor——
    Mr. Speaker: I thought we had had enough of that Question.
    Mr. Taylor: On a point of order. I was going to ask if the——
    Mr. Speaker: When I said that we were going on to the next Question, the hon. Member must not get up and ask a supplementary which I had stopped.
    Sir Waldron Smithersasked the Minister of National Insurance what sum was paid out in the year 1950, and in January and February, 1951, respectively, in sickness benefit; to how many people; and of how many working days this payment represents the loss.
    Dr. Summerskill: I regret that I cannot give figures on the precise basis asked for by the hon. Member, but I am sending him such information as is available.
    Sir W. Smithers: Is the right hon. Lady aware that in the opinion of many experts in administration some of the public are taking a mean advantage of the granting of these sickness benefits? Will she have the cases examined so that public money shall not be wasted?
    Dr. Summerskill: There is no evidence of that at all.

    Retirement (Postponement)
    Mr. Vaughan-Morganasked the Minister of National Insurance what steps are taken to draw the attention of those who become entitled to retirement pensions to the fact that higher pensions can be earned by postponing retirement.
    Dr. Summerskill: The position is explained in leaflets and other documents issued to persons approaching pensionable age. I am, however, considering what more can be done to make such persons aware that they can earn higher pensions if they postpone retirement from work beyond the ages of 65 for men, 60 for women.
    Mr. Vaughan-Morgan: As most of that answer was entirely inaudible on this side of the House, may I ask the Minister whether she is satisfied with the present position?
    Dr. Summerskill: I am prepared to look at it again, but there are a number of leaflets in existence which are sent to the old people and which, I know, they read.
    Sir W. Smithers: May I respectfully ask you, Sir, whether you could ask the engineers to put on a little more "juice"? We cannot hear a word in this part of the House.
    Mr. Speaker: I am very sorry that I cannot put that right myself. I often do not hear. I have no doubt, however, that the hon. Member's protest will be heard.

    Seasonal Workers
    Mr. J. N. Browneasked the Minister of National Insurance to what extent, in considering whether any case comes under the provisions of the National Insurance (Seasonal Workers) Regulations, 1950, differentiation is made between persons who are severely handicapped in their search for employment and others who are not in any way handicapped.
    Dr. Summerskill: The interpretation of the regulations is a matter for the statutory authorities. Until decisions have been given in a fairly wide range of cases by the National Insurance Commissioner, I am unable to say how they will affect individual cases.
    Mr. Browne: Has the Minister considered the case of Mr. Hugh Quigley, of 58, Elderpark Street, which I sent her when putting down this Question? Does she not think that if anyone is incapacitated and unable to obtain work during the winter, these regulations should not apply to him? Is the right hon. Lady satisfied that these regulations, which are causing a great deal of trouble, should continue to apply at all?
    Dr. Summerskill: I have explained before to the House that the statutory authorities have wide discretion in this matter and can take all these circumstances into account.
    Mr. David Rentonasked the Minister of National Insurance what representations were put forward on behalf of agricultural seasonal workers, and by whom, before the National Insurance (Seasonal Workers) Regulations, 1950, were introduced; and whether those representations were accepted or rejected.
    Commander Maitlandasked the Minister of National Insurance whether the organisations she consulted before bringing in regulations to prevent seasonal unemployed workers from drawing unemployment benefit included the National Union of Agricultural Workers; and whether the regulation was introduced in agreement with that trade union.
    Mr. Goochasked the Minister of National Insurance how far consultations
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    took place with the National Union of Agricultural Workers before the National Insurance (Seasonal Workers) Regulations, 1951, were introduced; and if she will indicate the nature of the representations made by the National Union of Agricultural Workers then and since.
    Dr. Summerskill: I understand that when the National Insurance Advisory Committee were considering the question of special rules for seasonal workers, the unions representing agricultural workers made representations to them. When I received the Committee's Report and before regulations were drafted certain representations were made to me by the Trades Union Congress and various points of view were put forward including those of agricultural workers. I take full responsibility for the draft regulations which I subsequently asked the House to approve.
    Mr. Renton: Would the right hon. Lady be so good as to answer the last few words of my Question, which asked whether or not the representations were accepted or rejected? Is she aware that the regulations so far have had a most unsatisfactory effect so far as women in agriculture are concerned and is it not a pity that the advice of the union was not accepted?
    Dr. Summerskill: When the National Insurance Advisory Committee made their report to me, representations were made to me from the T.U.C. and a deputation came to see me representing all the unions which were concerned with seasonal workers. The hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Renton) now asks me to disclose to this House what one individual, or two individuals maybe, of certain unions said—in fact, in Question 28 I am asked to give the name. I believe it would be a breach of confidence to do that publicly and would be calculated to prejudice my discussions in the future.
    Mr. Gooch: Does not my right hon. Friend agree that the National Union of Agricultural Workers have been opposed to the imposition of these regulations all the way through? Did she not say in a letter to the union:
    "I am sorry if any remarks I may have made in the House of Commons on the 5th February have been taken as implying that these Regulations had actually been agreed with the agricultural union"?
    Dr. Summerskill: I would refer my hon. Friend to the answer I have just given, but I must also recall that when I made the draft regulations and submitted them to the Advisory Committee, no unions made representations. Furthermore, when I came to the House and asked for approval of the regulations—the House will recall that approval was necessary in this matter—I got them on the nod and there was no debate.
    Mr. Turton: Are we to understand from the earlier reply that these regulations were approved by the T.U.C.?
    Dr. Summerskill: Not at all; I invited the T.U.C. to send a deputation to see me. The hon. Member has asked me what certain individuals said and I have refused to disclose publicly what they did say.
    Major Legge-Bourke: Will the right hon. Lady bear in mind that some weeks ago in this House she replied to me that she considered that the unions were the obvious people to advise and that we ought to have their advice? Is not the effect of her reply that she has not accepted their advice?
    Dr. Summerskill: When I am given advice, on whatever matter it is, I consider the advice given. I do not always take it.
    Mr. Renton: On a point of order. The right hon. Lady has misstated what I said only two minutes ago. I have never asked what individuals had said. I asked her what the unions had said.

    Short-time Working
    Sir H. Williamsasked the Minister of National Insurance what unemployment benefit is paid to persons who normally work five days a week and are now only working four days a week owing to shortage of material.
    Dr. Summerskill: On the facts stated, two days' benefit would normally be payable provided the claimant does not receive wages for the period in question and is not otherwise disentitled.
    Sir H. Williams: Why are people paid two days' benefit for one day's unemployment?
    Dr. Summerskill: I should have thought that the hon. Member would have known
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    these rules. This is nothing new. This is common practice, and has been so for many years. The position is that if a man does a normal working week of five days, is unemployed on the fifth day, registers at an exchange and makes himself available for employment for the rest of the week, he is then entitled to two days unemployment benefit.
    Sir H. Williams: Do I understand, then, that if a firm works a five-day week with the same number of hours as a firm which works five and a half days, all those who work what they regard as a full five-day week can draw unemployment pay on the Saturday.
    Dr. Summerskill: Certainly not. They cannot draw unemployment pay if they have already worked a full week. They can only draw it if they are unemployed on the fifth day of their normal work and are then available for two more days.
    Sir H. Williams: Then anyone who works four-fifths of a week is entitled to two days' unemployment benefit? [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] Of course, that is the interpretation.
    Mr. C. S. Taylor: To get the answer correctly, may I ask the right hon. Lady whether a man who works only four days through shortage of materials, and so on, is entitled to draw two days' unemployment benefit?
    Dr. Summerskill: I have said this three times already. If the man has a normal working week of five days but works only four days, registers at the exchange and then is available for work for the rest of the week but no work is forthcoming, he can then draw unemployment benefit for two days.

    Retirement Pensions
    Mr. H. Fraserasked the Minister of National Insurance whether, in view of the increasing number of old age pensioners and of the necessity for as many persons as possible remaining in work, she will reconsider the anomaly by which self-employed persons in shops, smallholdings, etc., are forced to abandon either their work or their pension on reaching pensionable age.
    Mr. Sidney Marshallasked the Minister of National Insurance whether, in view of the increasing need for maximum output of every kind in industry,

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    she will consider the introduction at an early stage of the necessary legislation to enable State pensioners, in all categories, who are willing and able to work, to be allowed to do so without any restriction on the amount earned.
    Dr. Summerskill: It was unanimously agreed by all parties in 1946 that the pensions to be provided under the new scheme were to be retirement pensions for those who gave up regular work. They were designed to encourage people to go on working beyond minimum pension age by providing higher pensions for themselves and their wives when they retire or reach the age of 70. I do not think the abolition of the provisions would have the effect the hon. Members desire.
    Mr. Fraser: Surely the right hon. Lady would agree that things have changed a great deal since 1946 and that if the older people who can carry out jobs of this sort have to go, they have to be replaced by younger people? Surely it is worth looking at the regulations again?
    Dr. Summerskill: We are anxious to encourage older people to go on working.
    Mr. Harrison: Without abandoning the principle of the retirement pension, could my right hon. Friend do something to increase the amount which it is permissible for these old people to earn before they are disqualified from drawing their benefit?
    Dr. Summerskill: I am quite prepared to consider that.
    Mr. Marshall: Does not the right hon. Lady consider the present position, arising out of the urgent need for production, vastly different from that obtaining in 1946, and will not she have the matter reconsidered?
    Dr. Summerskill: Yes, Sir.
    21 and 22. Mr. Vaughan-Morganasked the Minister of National Insurance (1) at what values coal and light were assessed in 1948 and today, respectively, in assessing the earnings allowable together with a retirement pension;
    (2) whether she will consider raising the amount of earnings allowed without loss of retirement pension by an amount equivalent to the average rise in wage-rates since the National Insurance Act was passed.
    Mr. Alportasked the Minister of National Insurance whether the Government have any intention of increasing the permitted level of earnings for old age pensioners before reductions in retirement benefit are made.
    Dr. Summerskill: The amount of earnings to be disregarded was fixed in the Act of 1946 as a measure of the amount of employment which could be ignored consistently with the principle that the pensions provided were to be retirement pensions. It was not related to specific items of expenditure or to a particular level of wages. I have, however, noted the hon. Members' suggestions.
    Mr. Vaughan-Morgan: May I now have an answer to Question 21, which was not included in the answer given by the Minister?
    Dr. Summerskill: I have answered it, as the hon. Member will see if he reads my answer.
    Mr. Summers: Will the right hon. Lady bear in mind that the level of wages in comparison with pensions plus casual earnings must necessarily be a relevant factor in considering how much casual earnings should be ignored?
    Dr. Summerskill: I said in answer to the previous Question that I am considering that.
    Mr. Alport: Can the Minister give us any idea whether there is any intention on the part of herself and the Government to bring in necessary amending legislation in the near future to assist in solving this problem?
    Dr. Summerskill: I am afraid that I cannot commit myself.
    Mr. R. A. Butler: How soon does the right hon. Lady suggest she can bring in any amendments?
    Dr. Summerskill: The same answer applies to the right hon. Gentleman's question.
    30. 31 and 32. Sir Ian Fraserasked the Minister of National Insurance (1) whether she is now in a position to announce any changes in the assessment of part-time or casual earnings of old age pensioners, in order to encourage all who wish to do so to contribute to the national productive effort;

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    (2) whether, in view of the steady rise in the cost of living since current rates of pension were fixed, she will now consider an increase in those rates;
    (3) when she expects the present review of the operation of the National Insurance Act, as it affects old age pensioners, to be concluded; and whether she will expedite this review, in view of the difficulties old age pensioners are encountering owing to the rise in living costs.
    Dr. Summerskill: I regret that I am not in a position to make a statement on these matters. I would remind the hon. Member that any person in difficulties can apply to the National Assistance Board for supplementary help.
    Sir I. Fraser: In regard to Question 30, is not the proposal there suggested one which is in the national interest, because the people will be employed and thus contribute towards their own benefits? Does the right hon. Lady realise, in relation to the other Questions, that the figure of 26s. first recommended by Lord Beveridge—[HON. MEMBERS: "No, 24s."]—was in fact out of date by the time the scheme was launched and is it not now time that a revision was made?
    Dr. Summerskill: In regard to Question 30, I think that perhaps the hon. Member was not in the House when I said I was considering this matter.
    Mr. Summers: When the right hon. Lady is considering the matter, will she bear in mind the advantage of doing something simultaneously to increase the incentive to remain at work when considering the increase in the casual earnings limit, so as to preserve the present balance between those who decide to remain at work and those who decide to retire?

    Assistance (Urgent Applications)
    Mr. Douglas Houghtonasked the Minister of National Insurance under what Sections of the National Insurance Act, 1948, or Regulations made thereunder, the National Assistance Board are entitled to order their staff to receive or deal with applicants at their homes.
    Dr. Summerskill: The board's officers are civil servants whose terms and conditions of service do not depend on any
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    particular provisions of the National Assistance Acts and regulations made thereunder.
    Mr. Houghton: Will my right hon. Friend be prepared to receive a small deputation from the staff concerned with a view to getting this troublesome matter settled?
    Dr. Summerskill: I am very surprised that my hon. Friend should ask that question. There have been no complaints from the staff. I feel very strongly—and I have said this before in the House—that the National Assistance Act should be administered humanely. All we have asked of the staff is that, in the case of an emergency which calls for the applicant to go to the house of the official, the applicant who goes for assistance or information shall be treated humanely and courteously. I would remind my hon. Friend that of the 2,500 officers asked to do this since 1948, only 169 have been called upon and no one has complained.
    Mr. Houghton: Is my right hon. Friend aware that there has been persistent failure to reach agreement in the Departmental Whitley Council as to the conditions under which this obligation should be fulfilled? May I ask her again to try to reach agreement with the staff, so that this service, which all members of the staff are anxious to render, shall be given with the utmost good will?
    Mr. Houghtonasked the Minister of National Insurance to what extent the National Assistance Board take account of the home circumstances of officers upon whom the obligation has been imposed of receiving or dealing with applicants at their homes.
    Dr. Summerskill: The Board are not aware of any particular difficulty but they are, I understand, prepared to take account of individual circumstances on representation by any officer concerned.

    Pensioners (Supplementary Allowances)
    Mr. George Thomasasked the Minister of National Insurance the number of retired pensioners in Wales and the number in receipt of supplementary pensions.
    Dr. Summerskill: There are 226,000 retirement pensioners in Wales of whom some 61,000 are receiving supplementary allowances from the National Assistance Board.
    Mr. G. Thomasasked the Minister of National Insurance whether she will consider making a general allowance for clothing for all retired pensioners in receipt of supplementary assistance.
    Dr. Summerskill: As I informed the hon. Member for Hitchin (Mr. Fisher) in reply to a Question on 5th February, the regulations governing National Assistance only provide for payment of clothing allowances where there is exceptional need. There is, therefore, no power to make an automatic allowance for this purpose as my hon. Friend suggests.
    Mr. Thomas: May I ask my right hon. Friend whether she will consider an alteration of these regulations, in view of the fact that the very circumstance of these people drawing National Assistance reveals that they are in need and that the case in general is at least made out?
    Dr. Summerskill: I think my hon. Friend will agree that the officers are exercising a wide discretion when I tell him that last year there were 132,000 grants at a cost of £490,643.
    Mr. Yates: Will my right hon. Friend consider especially the case of the single pensioner living alone? Is it not a tragic fact that many of them are unable to purchase any clothing, or household or bed linen? Does not my right hon. Friend think that some special consideration should be given to them?

    Assistance Rates
    Mr. J. N. Browneasked the Minister of National Insurance under what circumstances, in view of the increasing cost of living, there will be a revision in the basic rates of National Assistance.
    Dr. Summerskill: Any alteration in the scales for National Assistance is a matter for the National Assistance Board in the first instance. They have the matter under constant review, but I cannot say in what circumstances they might decide to put forward new proposals.
    Mr. Browne: Will the Minister bear in mind, in view of the increasing cost of living, that a day will shortly come when a
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    man and wife without other resources will no longer be able to live on 43s. 6d. per week, excluding rent?

    Personal Case
    Mr. Crouchasked the Minister of National Insurance why Mrs. H. F. Ford, Blandford, Dorset, is unable to be legally represented before a local tribunal in her appeal.
    Dr. Summerskill: As I have explained in correspondence with the hon. Member, legal representation of claimants before local tribunals under the National Insurance Act is precluded by a regulation. This regulation was made on the advice of the National Insurance Advisory Committee, who, after considering numerous representations, took the view that the proceedings should be kept as informal as possible.
    Mr. Crouch: Is the Minister aware of the embarrassment caused to this lady, who was appearing before the tribunal for the first time, while the tribunal were quite accustomed to these matters? Could not some alteration be made in the Act so that she could be legally represented at all levels?
    Dr. Summerskill: My experience is that women are often more fluent than men.
    Mr. Paton: Is there anything that would preclude the hon. Member for Dorset, North (Mr. Crouch), from accompanying his constituent?
    Dr. Summerskill: No, provided that he is not a barrister.

  COAL INDUSTRY

    Domestic Supplies (Invalids)
    Mr. Braineasked the Minister of Fuel and Power what arrangements he has made to ensure that emergency stocks of coal are held to meet the needs of invalids possessing a doctor's certificate.
    The Minister of Fuel and Power (Mr. Philip Noel-Baker): The first claim on the coal supplies in any area is always given to anyone who satisfies the local fuel overseer, either by medical certificate or otherwise, that he is in real need of coal. These arrangements have worked extremely well, and I think there is no need for any change.
    Mr. Braine: While I quite understand that these arrangements are supposed to work well, might I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he will not agree that recent correspondence which I have had with his Department shows that there is a wide gap between theory and practice? May I urge him to look into how these arrangements work in order to ensure that no sick person in need of coal goes without it?
    Mr. Noel-Baker: I am always ready to look at any special case. I have made inquiries into many special cases and have always found that the arrangements have in fact worked well.
    Mr. Geoffrey Lloyd: Has the Minister's attention been called to the case of Mrs. Vernon of Birmingham, who last Friday told the magistrate that she had been in bed for a fortnight and had been unable to obtain any coal?
    Mr. Noel-Baker: Can the right hon. Gentleman tell me if she had sent a message to the local fuel overseer?
    Mr. Mellish: Does my right hon. Friend agree that coal merchants themselves have, through illness of their staff and not because of shortages, not been able to deliver the coal and that in fact it has not been the Ministry that has been at fault?
    Mr. Geoffrey Lloyd: Is the Minister aware of the case of Mrs. Sirriter, of Leahouse Road, Birmingham, aged 71, who has been in considerable distress, without coal, although she sent a doctor's note when applying for the extra supply? Does the Minister realise that this is a good scheme on paper but that it is not working in practice?
    Mr. Noel-Baker: No, I realise nothing of the kind. I hope the right hon. Gentleman will send me the evidence that these ladies applied to the local fuel overseer and did not receive the coal.
    Mr. Yates: Is my right hon. Friend aware that so far as hon. Members on this side of the House who represent Birmingham are concerned, every case that has been submitted to the local fuel overseer has been dealt with favourably and sympathetically? Will my right hon. Friend take some action to see that Members who raise matters like this shall submit the evidence on which they raise them?
    Mr. Angus Maude: Is the Minister aware that in the case of one of my constituents, of which I have now sent him particulars, the correct formalities were exactly complied with but that it took the local fuel office eight days to send her the required form to fill in?
    Mr. Noel-Baker: I will certainly look into that case when I receive the particulars from the hon. Member.
    Mr. Maude: They were sent a fortnight ago.
    Mr. Braine: On a point of order. Since the Minister knows quite well——
    Mr. Speaker: That is not a point of order; it is a supplementary question. I had decided that we would move on to the next Question.
    Mr. Braine: On a point of order. In view of the totally unsatisfactory answer given by the Minister, I beg to give notice that J shall raise this matter on the Adjournment at an early date.

    Opencast Working, Shropshire
    Mr. J. Langford-Holtasked the Minister of Fuel and Power how many acres in Shropshire it is expected will be used for opencast coal mining in the next five years; where this land is situated; and what percentage has been used for agricultural purposes since 1939.
    Mr. P. Noel-Baker: The acreage which will be required for the opencast working of coal in Shropshire during the next five years largely depends on the results of future prospecting. I regret, therefore, that I am not able to make any estimate.
    Mr. Langford-Holt: Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether all these activities, past, present and future, have the specific approval of the Minister of Agriculture?
    Mr. Noel-Baker: Yes, Sir. We always work in the closest co-operation.

    Supplies (Allocation)
    Mr. Langford-Holtasked the Minister of Fuel and Power in view of the coal shortage this winter, what plans he is now making for the winter of 1951–52 to ensure a sufficient coal reserve for the event of a hard winter.
    Mr. Rentonasked the Minister of Fuel and Power whether he is aware that the amount of coal at present available for domestic consumption is less than 30 million tons per annum, compared with over 40 million tons in 1938; and what steps he is taking to increase the amount available for domestic consumption.
    Mr. Bossomasked the Minister of Fuel and Power what special provision he is making this year to ensure that the horticulturists who have to have heated greenhouses will be enabled to obtain the essential fuel supplies.
    Mr. Nabarroasked the Minister of Fuel and Power whether he can state the policy of His Majesty's Government in regard to coal exports from the United Kingdom during the nine months, April to December, 1951; and how the total projected coal exports for 1951 will compare with the figure of 17 million tons exported during 1950.
    Mr. P. Noel-Baker: The question of the supplies of coal to be allocated to exports, to inland consumers and to the building up of adequate winter stocks is now under consideration. I regret that I cannot today anticipate the decisions which will be made.
    Mr. Langford-Holt: In view of the fact that the right hon. Gentleman is the authority through whom both imports and exports pass, could he tell us when he will be able to tell the House what fuel stocks he anticipates holding at the beginning of next winter.
    Mr. Noel-Baker: Yes. I will tell the House when the decision has been made.
    Mr. Renton: Is the Minister aware that in the last few weeks local coal merchants have frequently been without sufficient coal to meet the domestic ration, and what immediate steps have been taken to prevent those circumstances from arising again?
    Mr. Noel-Baker: I believe that coal merchants have not been without sufficient coal to make deliveries but they have been greatly impeded in some weeks by sickness among their workers, as my hon. Friend the Member for Bermondsey (Mr. Mellish) has said.

  ELECTRICITY SUPPLIES

    Transmission Poles
    Mr. Thornton-Kemsleyasked the Minister of Fuel and Power whether he is aware that the South-Western Electricity Board are refusing to buy home grown timber transmission poles, on the ground that they are only interested in imported red fir; and whether he will include in the allocation of poles to the British Electricity Authority a proportion of home-grown timber poles.
    Mr. P. Noel-Baker: The South-Western Electricity Board have not refused to buy home-grown transmission poles since none have been offered. The Board's inquiries have been for imported red fir, where they are available, since they have a much longer life. The allocation of poles to users is already made on the basis of merchants' stocks, which include imported and home-grown poles, and it would not be practicable to stipulate what proportion of home-grown poles the electricity boards should take.
    Mr. Thornton-Kemsley: Would the Minister be surprised to know that the South-Western Electricity Board were, in fact, recently offered home-grown poles which were absolutely satisfactory and that they replied in writing saying they were only buying imported red fir poles?
    Mr. Noel-Baker: Yes, Sir. If the hon. Member will send the information, I will look into it. My information is that none were offered. There are, in fact, only 100 home-grown poles in the merchants' stocks.

    Costs
    Mr. Thomas Reidasked the Minister of Fuel and Power what was the average cost of electricity supplied to domestic and industrial consumers before nationalisation; and what it is now.
    Mr. P. Noel-Baker: The average revenue per unit sold for lighting, heating and cooking (including supplies to shops, offices, hotels and so on) was 1.391Id. in 1947 and 1.504d. in 1949. The average revenue per unit sold for power was 0.907d, in 1947 and 0.940d. in 1949.
    Mr. T. Reid: May I ask whether this increase in costs is much lower than the average increase in costs in industry?
    Mr. Noel-Baker: Yes, Sir; much lower; and compared with 1938, very much lower still.
    Mr. Pickthorn: Can the right hon. Gentleman tell us whether he has information in such a way that it could be readily understood which would show how much costs have been increased by unpredictable variation in voltage; how much real costs have been increased to the consumer?
    Mr. Noel-Baker: I am afraid I could not make a reliable estimate, but I know the loss to industry has been considerable and I greatly regret it.
    Miss Irene Ward: May I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether, before electricity prices are increased, notification is sent to the local authorities, because my local authority takes very great exception to the fact that there was neither negotiation nor notification before prices were recently increased? I should be glad if he would take action in that matter in future.
    Mr. Noel-Baker: Perhaps the hon. Lady will give me time to consider the point.
    Mr. John Hynd: On a point of order. I wonder if you, Mr. Speaker, will give me some guidance on why it is in order for the Minister to answer a question as to the prices of electricity before and after nationalisation, and it is not in order for the Table to permit a question on what is the incidence of pilferage on the railways before and after nationalisation?
    Mr. Speaker: I certainly cannot be expected to give an authoritative answer to a question like that without notice.

  FESTIVAL OF BRITAIN

    Interpreters
    Sir W. Smithersasked the Lord President of the Council to whom application should be made for Festival interpreters' badges for the period of the Festival of Britain.
    The Lord President of the Council (Mr. Herbert Morrison): I assume that the Question refers to newspaper reports of a scheme designed to encourage members of the public to wear badges indicating that the wearer speaks a foreign language. The scheme is not sponsored
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    by the Festival organisation, nor is it supported by them in any way. It is, I understand, essentially a private commercial venture.
    Sir W. Smithers: As this question is of such importance as to be answered by the new Foreign Secretary, may I ask him whether he is satisfied that this suggestion is a good one or not; and is he so vain as to think that good suggestions come only from the Socialist Government, and cannot be put forward by private individuals?
    Mr. Keeling: May I ask the right hon. Gentleman, whom I should like to be allowed to congratulate on his appointment as Foreign Secretary, whether he will normally be answering questions addressed to the Lord President, and if not, who will?
    Mr. Morrison: That is a question which should be put down to the Prime Minister, who is, of course, responsible for the allocation of duties among his colleagues.

    Train Services
    Mr. Deedesasked the Lord President of the Council whether, in view of the shortage of coal and resulting cuts in train services, any fresh arrangements will be made between the Festival of Britain Committee and the Railway Executive regarding extra train services in connection with the Festival.
    Mr. H. Morrison: It is not expected that shortage of coal will affect railway services after Easter and I have no doubt that the Railway Executive will be able to make adequate arrangements for dealing with traffic arising out of the Festival.
    Mr. Deedes: Arising out of that answer, can the right hon. Gentleman say from what dates it is expected that these extra trains will run, bearing in mind that mid-June is far too late? Can he give an undertaking that the British Transport Commission will not stop road transport or coaches from supplying an alternative service where that appears to be desirable?
    Mr. Morrison: It would appear to me that those questions would be more appropriately put down to the Minister of Transport.

    Overseas Visitors (Food)
    Mr. Keelingasked the Lord President of the Council whether, in advertising the Festival of Britain abroad, he will state that, while visitors will get their share of rationed food, they are invited to bring as much food as possible with them; and whether he will increase, during the Festival, the maximum quantity which each passenger may bring in, namely, 50 pounds weight in all and 10 pounds of any one food, except from the Republic of Ireland, whence only seven and two pounds respectively may be imported.
    Mr. H. Morrison: No, Sir. The hon. Member is mistaken if he is under the impression that the advertising campaigns of the Festival of Britain Office make any reference to food.
    Mr. Keeling: I presume that the right hon. Gentleman has been asked to reply. As the best that the Minister of Food was able to say during the weekend was that our food supplies will not get worse, and surely we want as much food in this country as possible, what is the objection to removing these maximum quantities?
    Mr. Morrison: I think that it would be rather undignified to suggest that visitors to this country should bring their own food. I notice that both in television and the Press very elaborate advice is given to ladies at the present time as to how they can slim, because the food supplies are making them too—otherwise.

  DEFENCE (COMMONWEALTH CONSULTATION)
  Mr. Blackburnasked the Lord President of the Council whether he will provide time for the Motion in the name of the hon. Member for Northfield as to consultation with Commonwealth Governments on major issues of defence policy.
  [That this House affirms that it should be the practice of His Majesty's Government before deciding major issues of defence policy such as the appointment of an American Admiral as Supreme Commander, Atlantic, to consult the Governments of the British Commonwealth.]
  The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. Ede): I have been asked to reply. I am afraid that I cannot find time for the discussion of this Motion at present.
  Mr. Blackburn: While appreciating the reasons for that reply, may I ask at any rate for this assurance, that issues of defence policy such as the appointment of Supreme Commanders in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic are subjects upon which His Majesty's Government take prior steps to consult with the Governments of the British Commonwealth who are so closely affected?
  Mr. Ede: That appears to be anticipating the discussion on the Motion.

  SOIL FERTILITY, GAMBIA (MEMORANDUM)
  Mr. Hurdasked the Lord President of the Council if he will place in the Library of the House of Commons a copy of the Memorandum on Soil Fertility and Cropping in the Gambia which the Medical Research Council sent to the Colonial Development Corporation on 9th February, 1951.
  Mr. H. Morrison: Yes, Sir. I am placing a copy of the communication in the Library of the House.
  Mr. Hurd: May I thank the Lord President for that answer, and shall we have an opportunity of seeing the memorandum today, before the debate tomorrow?
  Mr. Morrison: I am not sure, but I will do my best in the matter. Hon. Members should not regard as a precedent the fact that the memorandum of the Medical Research Council is being put in the Library, but I thought that in the special circumstances of this case it would be right to do so.
  Mr. Renton: Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether the Office of Lord President of the Council has become Siamese twins?

  SUEZ CANAL (BRITISH TROOPS)
  Mr. T. Reidasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if, in view of the fact that Britain is bound by treaty

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  to come to the aid of Egypt if attacked, he will ask the Egyptian Government to desist from its demand that British troops at the Suez Canal should leave Egypt, since that is the place which they and Egyptian forces might have to defend in a sudden emergency.
  The Minister of State (Mr. Younger): Both His Majesty's Government and the Egyptian Government are very conscious of the need to ensure the proper defence of this area, and the discussions to which my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary referred in his answer to a question by the hon. Member for Hitchin (Mr. Fisher) on 29th January are aimed particularly at reconciling the need for active defence measures in peace-time with the political difficulties raised in Egypt by the presence of foreign military forces in their territory.
  Mr. T. Reid: Is the Minister aware that if our troops were removed from Egypt it would cause consternation in Egypt, especially among politicians?
  Mr. Younger: I am aware that this is a very important and complicated matter, but I cannot go further than what I have said while these discussions are in progress.
  Mr. Eden: Will the hon. Member represent to the Foreign Secretary, whom I am sorry to see leaving the Chamber during Foreign Office Questions, that the question of the hon. Member represents views strongly held by hon. Members on both sides of the House?
  Mr. Younger: I will certainly take that into account.
  Sir W. Smithers: May I ask whether the Minister will communicate with an Egyptian in Cairo called Galal Hussein Bey, who has taken a leading part in Egypt in trying to settle the differences between the two countries so that the matters in question can be more easily settled?

  INDONESIA (BRITISH SUBJECTS' CLAIMS)
  Mr. J. Enoch Powellasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what information he has as to when the Union Court of Arbitration will sit on
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  the question of liability to British subjects for war losses as between the Netherlands and Indonesian Governments; and what representations have been made on this subject to the court by His Majesty's Government.
  Mr. Younger: I am informed that the question which is to come before the Union Court of Arbitration is whether the Netherlands or the Indonesian Government is responsible for paying final rehabilitation grants for war victims in Indonesia. The court will not be considering the specific question of compensation for British subjects. I have no information when the court will sit, nor is its constitution such as to permit His Majesty's Government to make representations to it.
  Mr. Powell: Will the hon. Gentleman bear in mind that compensation to His Majesty's subjects concerned cannot be paid until this court has sat and reached a decision? Therefore, will he consider making representations to both Governments involved to get the matter considered and decided by the court?
  Mr. Younger: I am not aware of the point mentioned by the hon. Member in the first part of his question. I do not really think that he is correct in assuming that it depends on the decision of the court, but I can tell him that we have already made representations to the Indonesian Government about compensation for British subjects.

COMPLAINT OF PRIVILEGE
Mr. Ian L. Orr-Ewing: I desire to raise a matter of complaint and to ask for your Ruling, Mr. Speaker, upon whether the facts I propose to give provide a prima facie case of Privilege or contempt. This matter arises from a broadcast in the Light Programme of the B.B.C. at 8 o'clock on Friday night last in a performance called, "Any Questions?" It may be within your recollection that on Thursday last a point was. raised by the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) who asked for your Ruling on a matter of Privilege. Though I was not present in the House on that occasion, as I was ill, I studied the OFFICIAL REPORT and I understood that the matter was left in your hands.

1065
to decide whether in fact a prima facie.case had occurred or not.
I understood, therefore, that the whole matter which was raised by the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne was sub judice.In this broadcast the first question that was put referred directly to the subject matter of complaint on Thursday afternoon. I should explain that in this programme the questions are submitted before the performance to the producer, who then selects questions. Having selected the questions, the producer calls the selected questioner to the microphone from which point he puts the question.
The first question was:
"A letter written by a constituent to his M.P. protesting against re-armament was sent on, without his permission, to the writer's superior. Is it the opinion of the team that this is opening the way to endless victimisation of people who write to their M.Ps.?"
The moment that question was put, the hon. Member for Bristol, South-East (Mr. Wedgwood Benn), followed at a later stage by the hon. Baronet the Member for Handsworth (Sir E. Boyle), both of whom I would with respect remind the House are fairly new to this House, took a line of which this House need never be ashamed. They stood up for the rights, duties and decencies of Parliament and also for the prestige, standing and respect of you, Sir, and the Committee of Privileges. But, that question having been put, and this protest by the hon. Member for Bristol, South-East, having been made, the chairman of the session referred the matter to the producer, saying that he thought it would be wrong to discuss it. The chairman's words were:
"Well, that does really rather put a spanner into our works, doesn't it? It's very difficult to discuss something which is still sub judice;in fact, it is one of our laws and regulations that we do not do that. I understand that's right isn't it? I'm going to ask the producer here to say a word or two, he knows the policy very much better than I do."
The producer then said:
"In this instance I think we should be perfectly correct and we can trust to the good sense of our team in discussing this matter. I have no hestitation in saying that it should be discussed this evening."
That is the first point on which I ask for your Ruling. I should like to know whether in fact it is not correct that the whole of this matter, being left in your hands for you to give a Ruling whether
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a prima facie case of Privilege had been made out, is not therefore sub judice.
Once that decision by the producer had been made, the effect was that further answers asked for from members of the team. I will quote from one by somebody called Mr. Longland. He said, in reply to the question:
"I'm tremendously relieved to find two distinguished M.Ps. who have such respect for the Speaker and for the Committee of Privileges. Anybody reading the newspaper account today of what happened in the House of Commons last night would not suppose that either the Committee of Privileges or the Speaker mattered at all. But there are, I think, just two things that the ordinary man who hasn't got the misfortune of being an M.P. can say. I honestly think that anybody who writes to an M.P.—apart from writing about a purely personal matter—and thinks that his letter is a perfectly private document is a bit of a mug: that seems to be the first thing to say. The second thing is that I think in general that M.Ps have got far too much sense, and sense of responsibility, for the fears expressed in the question to have any reality."
I have quoted from a transcript supplied to me by courtesy of the B.B.C. and made from the recording of this programme. I hope that it may prove possible that some mistake has arisen in transcription. That, I am afraid, is not a matter which I can investigate or which this House as a House can investigate.
I submit to you with all respect that the mere fact that the question was received and that these comments were made was improper as the whole matter was left in your hands and was, therefore, sub judice.I beg to ask for your Ruling.
Mr. Speaker: Of course, one must not discuss the matter on which I shall give a Ruling tomorrow but, as far as this case is concerned, it appears to me that there is a prima facie case of Privilege, and I rule accordingly.
Mr. Orr-Ewing: I thank you for your Ruling, Mr. Speaker. In view of what you have said, I beg to move, "That the matter of the complaint be referred to the Committee of Privileges."
Mr. Poole: May I respectfully suggest, Mr. Speaker, that no evidence in support of this declaration has yet been laid at the Table.
Mr. Speaker: Is it not often very much better that the Committee of Privileges should hear the evidence? If we are to

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be a court of law we shall be hearing evidence for ever. It is only fair, as somebody is accused, that they should have a chance of giving evidence; otherwise, they have to be brought to the Bar of the House, and that is something which has not been done since 1905. If the House agrees, I think it is only fair that the matter should go to the Committee of Privileges.
Mr. Sydney Silverman: Before the House comes to any conclusion on the matter, I should like to offer one single argument.
Sir Ian Fraser: On a point of order. Have not the voices been collected?
Mr. Speaker: This is a debatable Motion.
Mr. Silverman: Although you have Ruled that there is a prima facie case, Mr. Speaker, nevertheless it is one which the House would be ill-advised to pursue. It seems to me that the only question which was sub judice,and which remains sub judice,is the question whether the particular alleged conduct—we do not even know what the conduct was yet—was breach of Privilege or not. Therefore, the only way in which this House could have felt itself reasonably affronted by anything said in the broadcast to which the hon. Member has referred would have been if any one had sought to prejudge that question. Whether the events complained about happened or not, and, if they have happened, whether they should have happened or not, are questions quite different from the question whether a breach of Privilege is involved or not, and whether a breach of Privilege is involved or not is for the House of Commons to determine; not even, Sir, as I understand it, for you, but for the House of Commons itself.
I would myself have been inclined to support any Motion based on a breach of Privilege if anybody taking part in that programme, or any newspaper or speaker, had ventured to say that what was complained of was a breach of Privilege or that it was not, that question being for determination by the House of Commons. Since it seems to me that what was read out did not venture in the least to beg the question which the House will have to decide—whether or not a breach of
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Privilege was involved—since it did not do that, I should have thought that this was a matter which, in the interest of public discussion, the House of Commons might well ignore.
Mr. Speaker: I must point out that the hon. Member has got a complete misconception of our proceedings. We have not decided that a breach of Privilege, or anything of that kind, has taken place. I have only said that it looks possible that it may have taken place, and, therefore, we are asking this very important Committee of the House to find out and let us know. The hon. Member has argued as if we had decided that a breach of Privilege had taken place. We have not decided anything of the kind.
Mr. Silverman: I was venturing only to debate the Motion which is before the House, namely, that the complaint be referred to the Committee of Privileges: that is a debatable question, and I was venturing to offer the House reasons why they should deny the Motion rather than adopt it. I am not in the least seeking to prejudge the question whether there was a breach of Privilege or not, and, if anything I said gave you to understand that I was prejudging it, let me hasten to correct it at once. The last thing in the world that I wanted to do, Mr. Speaker, was to prejudge that or any other matter. I am saying that it seems to me that the House of Commons on this occasion would best consult its own dignity by ignoring the matter.
The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. Ede): The matter raised by the hon. Member for Weston-super-Mare (Mr. I. L. Orr-Ewing) is one which arises out of the growth of the possibilities of comment on the proceedings of this House, and the way in which modern science affords fresh vehicles for it. Let us be quite certain of this. Any report of the proceedings of this House is a breach of Privilege. I had to preside during the last Parliament over the Committee of Privileges when complaint was made by the hon. Member for Northfields (Mr. Blackburn) about a report in the "Daily Worker," and the learned Clerk of the House drew our attention to the fact that any report of our proceedings is a breach of Privilege; but we said that that was not in accordance with modern practice, and that, in fact, there would be grave

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complaint if the proceedings were not reported. We said that there was a breach of Privilege, but we advised the House to ignore it, and the matter was never further discussed.
We are now faced with one of the ways in which the proceedings of this House have been commented upon, and the stage at which they are commented upon is raised in this particular Motion, but it seems to me, without making any reflection at all at this stage on any of the participants in the discussion of last Friday night, that this is the kind of matter that ought to be discussed by the Committee of Privileges, so that guidance can be given, not merely to hon. Members of this House but to the outside public, as to what are their rights, responsibilities and liberties in this matter. I am quite sure that the last thing that this House would desire to do would be to circumscribe the rights of discussing the affairs of Parliament, when that can be done without impeding the reasonable course of justice, and I suggest to the House that at this stage we might very well accept the Motion which has been moved.
Mr. Eden: I should like to endorse the advice which the Leader of the House has given us, and I simply want to add this. I think that the hon. Member for Bristol, South-East (Mr. Wedgwood Benn) and my hon. Friend the Member for Handsworth (Sir E. Boyle), if I may say so with respect, did exactly what they should have done in what was obviously a difficult position for them, and, therefore, this is not in that sense a party matter at all. I think the attitude which they adopted is one which the House should now adopt. It is the same thing in another context, and it is that the matter should be referred to the Committee of Privileges to give us their advice.
Mr. Duncan Sandys: I should like to raise one point, because I want to ask for your guidance, Mr. Speaker. As I understand it, the practice of this House in cases of Privilege is that, when you have ruled that there is a prima facie case of breach of Privilege, the Leader of the House or the Prime Minister proposes the Motion, in which case it is usually adopted without discussion. Are we departing from that normal practice in this case?
Mr. Speaker: I am afraid that the right hon. Gentleman is mistaken. If, after an hon. Member has raised a case, I then declare it to be a prima facie case, it is the duty of the hon. Member who made the complaint to move that the matter of the complaint be referred to the Committee of Privileges. It is not the duty of the Leader of the House to do so, and I do not remember that that was ever done.
Mr. John Hynd: I am sorry to detain the House, but I really have listened very carefully to the complaint made, and, while it has been ruled that there is a prima facie case, I should like to support the appeal of my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman), because I am concerned whether or not we are likely to discourage what is legitimate public discussion of what happens in this House.
As my hon. Friend has said, and so far as I could gather, at least from the statement made by the hon. Member who moved the Motion, there was no discussion at all on the merits or demerits of the Ruling given by Mr. Speaker in regard to the case at issue. All that happened, so far as I could understand, was that a question was asked on the wireless, and, on that, a comment was made which made no reflection upon the House nor upon the Ruling of Mr. Speaker. It was, I understood, on all fours with any comment that may have been made in a newspaper to the effect that a complaint had been made in the House of Commons and that a certain matter was being referred to the Committee of Privileges.
As the commentator might well say, the public are entitled to consider how far it is safe for them to write to their Members of Parliament at all, and I do not think that can convey breach of Privilege. I am only concerned whether or not we are going a little too far and reducing the status of this very important question, and, therefore, bringing the whole procedure of Privilege into disrepute. Therefore, I hope the House will consider very seriously before it passes this Motion.
Question, "That the matter of the complaint be referred to the Committee of Privileges," put, and agreed to.

DIVISION LIST (CORRECTION)
Mr. Henry Strauss: May I draw your attention, Mr. Speaker, to a mistake in HANSARD? In the first Division at the end of last Friday's debate, my name is printed among those hon. Members who supported the Closure. In fact, I was not in the House, but was absent, paired. HANSARD reports that 102 hon. Members voted for the Closure, and proceeds to list 105. It appears, therefore, that there were other hon. Members as well who have been wrongly included, and I shall be very grateful if you will order a correction to be printed.
Mr. Speaker: I shall try to find out how the odd three Members appear in the Division list without having voted.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
Ordered:
That this day the Business of Supply may be taken after Ten o'clock and shall be exempted from the provisions of Standing Order No. 1 (Sittings of the House).—[The Prime Minister,]

ORDERS OF THE DAY
  SUPPLY
  [7TH ALLOTTED DAY]
  Navy Estimates, 1951–52

    MR. JAMES CALLAGHAN'S STATEMENT
    Order for Committee read.
    Mr. Speaker: There is one point I have to put to the House, and it is a matter for which we have to apologise. In today's Order Paper, unfortunately, the Amendment has not been printed, but the Amendment is in the White Paper of the Order Book of the House of Commons, and, of course, it will be debated in the ordinary way. I have to express regret that somehow it has been omitted from the daily Order Paper.
    3.51 p.m.
    The Parliamentary and Financial Secretary to the Admiralty (Mr. James Callaghan): I beg to move, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."
    This is the second occasion on which I have had the privilege of introducing the Navy Estimates, and it is a privilege of which most hon. Members would feel proud. I am quite sure that my noble friend the First Lord would like to be here in order to move the Estimates instead of me. He has had a long experience of the Admiralty for many years, both as Civil Lord in 1929–31 and as Financial Secretary in 1942–43, and he has presided with wisdom and skill over our affairs since 1946.
    The net cost of the Navy this year is £278 million, and if hon. Members will look at pages 4 and 5 of the Navy Estimates they will see how that sum has been made up. It compares, as hon. Members will see, with the sum of £193 million for which we asked the House on the last occasion, representing an increase of 40 per cent. over the sum voted by the House at the corresponding time last year. As the House will readily understand, there will be a further Estimate later in order to support the programme that was laid before the House by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister on 29th January last, and that Estimate will come in due time.

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    Pages 4 and 5 show how the main amounts which go to support the Navy are made up, and I have extracted them in a slightly different and perhaps more comprehensible way so that the House can see and judge for itself what is the division of cost between the various Services. It goes in this way. Pay, clothing—uniform—victualling of the Navy, and pensions for those who have retired account for 28 per cent. of the total expenditure. The cost of materials for the ships that are built in the Royal Dockyards, the cost of ships that are built by contractors, and the cost of aircraft and stores amount to some 30 per cent. of the total. Pay in the Royal Dockyards is 10 per cent., and the fuel of the Navy costs 5 per cent. of the total. That, I ought to say, includes some element of stockpiling, and is not merely the current expenditure. Weapons, such as guns and torpedoes, account for 9 per cent. of the total expenditure, and the Admiralty Office for something under 2 per cent.
    I think it would be as well, in view of some of the discussions we have had in past years, to outline the method by which we try to control our naval expenditure, especially as we are asking for such a large amount on this occasion. As the House well knows, the Board of Admiralty, in addition to having its collective responsibility, has a functional responsibility. Every member of the Board has his own separate responsibilities for his own department, and, therefore, every single member of the Board in watching his own department is also consistently and continuously engaged in watching expenditure to see how it is going, and in keeping a close eye on economies.
    In addition to that, in the autumn when the Navy Estimates are being prepared, it is the custom for the Finance Committee, of which I am the Chairman, to have regular meetings to consider the Estimates that are later to be placed before the House. Last autumn we had something like 16 meetings—long sessions—at which we considered memoranda which had been prepared beforehand, and examined witnesses. Altogether, it was a pretty gruelling task, and the Estimates now presented to the House are the result of those meetings.
    I can assure the House that the Finance Committee goes through the Estimates
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    very carefully. In a small way we are like the Select Committee on Estimates of the House with, perhaps, the additional advantage of having an inside knowledge, and the examination which takes place every autumn is a very real one in which we can focus upon and pick out particular items contained in the Estimates placed before us before it is my duty to submit them to the House.
    As we are asking for such a large sum this year, I would like to make a more detailed reference to the financial side of the Navy than is normally done. One aspect that I wish to report to the House is that the system of competitive tendering to which we had returned in a very large number of fields, except for ships, is now likely to be less in evidence because of the re-armament programme. Instead of being able to put out items for competitive tendering, it is highly likely that we shall have to revert over a considerable part of the field to a system of nominated contractors.
    This system cannot be so satisfactory, and, therefore, I should like to assure the House that, recognising that it is not such a satisfactory method of procedure as competitive tendering, we shall be watching our expenditure very carefully. We are not altogether without information. For example, we can cross-reference our costs through the work done in the Royal Dockyards. That enables us to have some idea of the standard of cost in respect to work done by contractors.
    Viscount Hinchingbrooke: A very high standard.
    Mr. Callaghan: Yes, I agree it is a very high standard indeed.
    Viscount Hinchingbrooke: Of cost.
    Mr. Callaghan: I do not know what the noble Lord means by cost. It is a high standard by which contractors are being judged, and that is, I think, as the House would like it.
    Similarly, in respect to technical costing, we have a great deal of experience to go on from the last war, and a number of Admiralty officials, overseers and accountants are attached to firms of contractors with the object of ensuring that the expense that is incurred, and for which we are responsible to this House, is kept as low as possible. The basis of payments has been worked out, and will, I think,

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    be satisfactory to the House if the Public Accounts Committee inquires into it.
    I cannot go into it in any great detail this afternoon because I am anxious to get on with the work of the Navy, but as we are departing from the system of competitive tendering and entering upon a system under which we shall have to nominate particular contractors, it is extremely important that we should have the full co-operation of those contractors in enabling us to examine costs and to see that the work is going ahead as it should. I am quite certain we shall get that cooperation, but we shall certainly watch in order to ensure that it is forthcoming
    The naval re-armament programme, about which I am going to say more later, is going to absorb a considerable part of the shipbuilding and ship-repairing industry's labour force. In 1948, the Navy's share of the industry was about 2 per cent. of the labour force employed. This year it is 11 per cent. By late next year as much as 30 per cent. of the labour force in the shipbuilding and ship-repairing industry ought to be engaged upon the work of the Navy. That is an extremely significant amount.
    Another matter on which I should like to comment before I get on to the work of the Navy is our use of civilians, because that too has often come in for a considerable amount of criticism. During the meetings of the Finance Committee this year we examined the use of civilians as opposed to Service men very closely indeed. I think the broad objective is an obvious one, namely, to employ either civilians or Service men according as to which proves the most efficient and the most economical, and the whole of the arrangements of the Navy are looked at from that point of view.
    By contrast with the Army we have found that the whole of our supply services can be most economically served by being"civilianised"—I hope the House will pardon the jargon—right up to the point at which stores are embarked into ships and up to that point—where the crane swings across and down into the hold, or wherever it may be—civilians are employed. In that case, where it might be legitimate to a certain extent to employ Service men, we employ civilians. Similarly in the case of our boom defences
    1076
    and salvage vessels, most of those employed are civilians—over 2,000 of them.
    Consequently, I make this point because it is not an accurate comparison to ask, "How many civilians have the Admiralty in relation to the total number of Service men and how does that compare with the other Services?" That is a matter for each Service Department to settle, and the fact that there is a large ratio of civilians to Service men does not necessarily mean that we have a lot of clerks trying to run the Navy as against very few sailors.
    Commander Galbraith: The two particular services to which the hon. Gentleman has called attention have been in that condition for a period of years.
    Mr. Callaghan: Indeed that is so, and that is why I have brought the point out now—I do not think it has been brought out before so fully—as justification of the large number of civilians employed. There is another point, namely, that the Admiralty bears on its Votes a large number of scientific and technical officers who, in the case of the other Services, are borne on the Votes of the Ministry of Supply. That swells the apparent number of civilians as against the number of Service men.
    On the Finance Committee we have also investigated very closely the size of the Admiralty civilian staff. I can assure the House that very full investigations are going on to make sure that the Admiralty Office is not swollen beyond what it should be. Special investigation teams have been set up and are moving round from department to department to examine the organisation of work and to see that it is carried out in the best way. So much for the rather and waste of finance and organisation.
    I should like to come now to the work done by the Navy during the year. The outstanding event has been the work of the Far Eastern Fleet. When the Korean trouble started this Fleet was a thousand miles from its base and doing a summer cruise. Within three days the Fleet was on station and within six days it was engaged in operations and had sunk half a dozen North Korean E-boats. Within eight days sorties were being flown from H.M.S. "Triumph," the Light Fleet carrier attached to the Fleet. The broad

    1077
    division of responsibility in Korea has been that the British and Commonwealth Navies have looked after the West coast and the United States Navy has been operating off the East coast. But, as the House will know, our own admiral. Admiral Andrewes, is now in command of Task Force 95, which is the whole of the two navies, both the United States and our own Commonwealth Force, and also elements from the French and other navies which are operating out there.
    I think the really outstanding feature of the naval side of the operations has been the work of H.M.S. "Theseus." She was commissioned in the normal way, and my hon. Friend the Member for Devonport (Mr. Foot) will not be surprised to learn that her airmen are Devonport men, but her ship's company come from Portsmouth. They were not hand-picked, but just a normal ship's company. They have been operating at a higher level of efficiency than ever known before.
    Surgeon Lieut.-Commander Bennett: Would not the aviation personnel be based on Lee-on-Solent?
    Mr. Callaghan: Perhaps that may be so. Perhaps the hon. and gallant Member might care for me to distribute credit to those who manufactured the planes and built the ship, but that would take rather a long time.
    The interesting, significant and encouraging point is that ever since last October when the ship arrived out there, the ship's company has worked in such a way that no aircraft has ever been unserviceable for longer than two hours, and they have had the remarkable record of 1,300 deck landings without a failure and without an accident. This is unprecedented. It has never been known to have been done before and the accident, when it came, was a minor one due to a plane landing in very rough weather and buckling a strut. I am sure that the House will recognise that this is a really remarkable feat of efficiency from a ship's company drawn from barracks and depots in the normal way and who have been operating in conditions which are just like those of a North Atlantic winter. Yet they have 'maintained this remarkably high standard.
    The co-operation between sailors and fighting men of all the United Nations has been superb. I should like to pick
    1078
    out one incident. One of our pilots, Lieut. Leonard, R.N., from H.M.S.
    "Theseus," was attacked and his plane was damaged. He had to make a forced landing and was wounded and trapped in the cockpit of his plane behind the enemy lines. Immediately a United States helicopter set out to rescue him. His plane was found and the pilot and doctor in the helicopter had to fight off the enemy who were approaching. They cut him loose, got him out of the cockpit, got him into the helicopter and returned him to the ship. I am sure the House would like to express their appreciation of this fine example of co-operation between the nations.
    Commander Maitland: Is it not a fact that an almost exactly similar incident has happened again?
    Mr. Callaghan: I believe that to be the case. I should also like to refer to the feats of the 41st Independent Commando. When they first went to Korea they were engaged in coast raiding in which my hon. Friend the Member for Maldon (Mr. Driberg) did his share. At a later stage they found themselves at the reservoir in North-East Korea with the United States Marines, and it was from there that they carried out that remarkable fighting retreat from the reservoir to Hungnam. They fought off attacks through the whole of those 23 miles in a temperature of 42 degrees below zero. They had no sleep and no food for 72 hours. They had to climb high mountains and plunge through snow drifts when every step went two feet deep. They battled their way for 72 hours to Hungnam.
    They suffered many casualties although I am glad to say they were not as severe as we had feared at one time. We have learned from unofficial sources—I hope it is true—that a number of the casualties are in North Korean hands and are safe. Colonel Drysdale, who was the commanding officer, wrote towards the end of those 72 hours in his war diary, "I thought the morning would never come." I think we can all understand the tension and weariness of those men who were fighting their way through in extremely difficult and indeed almost indescribable conditions.
    As to the rest of the Navy, both the Mediterranean and the Home Fleets have been engaged in training and exercising

    1079
    throughout the year—weapon training, anti-submarine, anti-aircraft and Fleet actions. The First Lord, the Civil Lord and myself have all been able, despite attendance at the House, to visit the Fleet. I was fortunate enough in January to spend a week with the Mediterranean Fleet when they went through a series of very telling exercises indeed, and they did a first-rate week's work. We made our way from Malta to the Greek islands under constant simulated submarine and aircraft attack. There were a number of anti-aircraft actions, and the work was finished by a most realistic night action in which we chased each other around the small group of Greek islands, having split into two forces. I am glad to say that my side won.
    The conditions of navigation and of night fighting were most realistic and it was a great test of nerve and skill. I only recount this personal incident in order to show the sort of work which the Navy has been doing during the past 12 months. There was nothing exceptional during this week which I spent with the Mediterranean Fleet. Attached to us on that occasion were two Pakistan frigates who joined in the whole of the exercises which we were doing, and I hope they derived benefit from them. We were certainly glad to have them there. That is symptomatic of what has been going on between the Commonwealth Navies and the Royal Navy.
    When I was at Malta two of our frigates had just returned from being attached to the New Zealand Navy, and we in turn had received two New Zealand frigates which were training in the Mediterranean. I think we often overlook how big the Commonwealth Navies are growing. Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa now possess between them a very sizeable force of aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers and frigates, and they are certainly a great addition to our potential strength.
    So far as the Reserve Fleet is concerned, some 450 refits of ships in the Reserve Fleet have been made, spread over a period of 2½years. Indeed, we are now coming round the second time, and are refitting ships again which have not been used since they were refitted 2½years ago, and their standard is thereby being improved. The reservists
    1080
    who are now being called up to help us will assist to maintain, store and equip these ships of the Reserve Fleet during the summer.
    On the Board of Admiralty itself we have had some changes. We have had changes in the Second Sea Lord, the Fourth Sea Lord and the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff. We have been joined by Vice-Admiral Madden from the Far East Fleet, Vice-Admiral Mountbatten from the Mediterranean Fleet and Rear-Admiral Evans-Lombe from the Home Fleet. So all three of these Fleets have sent someone to the Board. I must say I like these turnovers. They send a nice fresh salty breeze blowing through the rather dusty, musty corridors of the Admiralty.
    I should now like to say something about the technical needs of the Navy. The major problem with which the Navy is confronted is the increased speed of attack. It is that problem which is dominating the whole of the research and development work of the Admiralty scientists at the present time. Increased speed of attack obviously means that we must be able to detect the attacker at a greater distance. It makes it more important to measure range and height earlier. It means that the computation of the aim-off is more difficult, and we also want a shell which is going to travel faster. All these things are resulting in equipment, instruments and weapons that are becoming much bigger and more complex than some of us would have thought possible, and the Navy is now becoming a scientists' dream.
    Our research is, therefore, concentrating on reducing the size of equipment, getting lighter materials—because weight is extremely important in this connection—and on finding the answer to increased speed. In this direction radar has come to the fore. This was the case, of course, during the last war, but I should think that now it is even more the servant of our arms and our equipment than it has ever been in the past. I was asking the Controller of the Navy how he would compare a television set, which, to me is a mystery, with the latest piece of radar anti-aircraft equipment. This is what he told me: "A television set has got about 20 electronic valves in it. The latest piece of equipment which we have got for

    1081
    anti-aircraft has 2,000 valves and 25,000 other components, and it needs 20,000 drawings in order to produce it. "That will give the House some idea of the sort of work which has had to be undertaken.
    Mr. Daines: Does it work?
    Mr. Callaghan: That, of course, raises a very real problem, because the maintenance of the components in this sort of equipment is resulting in a large increase in the number of men we must have aboard ship, and is cramping conditions to an extent which we would not otherwise have expected. If I may give one example, a town class cruiser in 1939—the "Liverpool" or "Sheffield" or "Birmingham"—had a war complement of 790. Today the complement of one of those cruisers is 890–100 up—and the increase is almost wholly the result of the radar and other electrical equipment. It is really an extremely grave problem, especially in matters of accommodation.
    Some of these radar equipments are, of course, mysteries and a source of wonderment to me. I stood aboard a destroyer the other day and watched a gun mounting which is worked by radar. An aircraft was coming over; there the mounting was, with the gun muzzles peering blindly up into the sky. As the aircraft came over, the muzzles searched for it, located and followed it across, directing the shots when the shots were fired. When they fired tracers it was a remarkable illustration to see the tracers following the aircraft. Theoretically one gets a bull every time, but I am sorry to tell the House that actually one does not.
    In other fields, too, there is great development. Much better ship's machinery is being developed for frigates. A new steam turbine has been developed, working at higher pressures and temperatures than has ever been known before, and there has been a most significant diesel engine development for smaller craft. This has a large horsepower and is a light and small engine. Indeed, several thousands of horsepower are obtained from an engine which bulks no larger than about half the size of the Table which is in front of you, Mr. Speaker. This is a development which the experts say is about as significant as the development of
    1082
    water tube boilers in the early part of the 20th century, and it will also have a most important commercial application later on.
    While I am dealing with this field of the Admiralty's needs, there is one other most significant development, and that is a new equipment for locating submarines. It is a development of the asdic equipment which we all knew so well. It detects, locates, aims and fires all in one equipment. I myself have seen a demonstration of this equipment which is now undergoing' tests at sea. and it is a most remarkable and encouraging evidence of the way in which anti-submarine weapons have developed since the last war. It is, indeed, one of the great feats of the research and development programme which was undertaken by the Admiralty since the end of the last war, and I think it can give us all cause for great encouragement.
    I want now to turn to the effects of re-armament on the Navy. I think the House knows that there is a plan for the Fleet. It exists. We knew what size of Fleet we wanted and what purpose it had to fulfil. Therefore, the result of rearmament so far as the Navy is concerned is that we have not got hastily to improvise what we need. What we had to do was to accelerate the plan which was already in existence, and therefore we were able very swiftly to say what we needed and in what order we would like it. As I told the hon. and gallant Member for Chelsea (Commander Noble) last week in answer to a Question, the immediate effect has been to bring forward a further 60 ships from reserve and put them into the active Fleet. Other ships it the Reserve Fleet are now being stored. We are building up a large amount of stocks and, in stocks and stores together, I can say that the Navy will be in a very healthy position indeed when this programme is completed.
    As to the longer term effects, I hope the House will not under-estimate the importance of ships' conversions. A substantial and important part of the programme which we are undertaking is the conversion of a number of fleet destroyers into anti-submarine frigates, and this is a net gain for the Navy which is most significant and most important in our programme. Altogether we are proposing to convert 45 destroyers to anti-submarine

    1083
    frigates. It has the advantage not only of providing a very fast ship but also of saving a great deal of money.
    Lieut.-Commander Clark Hutchinson: How old?
    Mr. Callaghan: "Old" is a relative term. I do not know whether the hon. and gallant Gentleman regards himself as old, but I would not think he was. These are all fleet destroyers which were actively engaged in the last war. There are no pre-last war destroyers included. This has the great advantage of saving money.
    The conversion of one of these destroyers into an anti-submarine frigate role will cost something of the order of half-a-million pounds. That is enough, but today a new frigate would cost something like £1⅓ million. If I may give some comparisons, which I think are at any rate interesting, I was told, when I asked, that today a new destroyer costs about £l¾ million, which is more than the cost of a battleship before the First World War. Of course, hon. Members may draw what comparisons they like from that, but the fact remains that we have now entered the field where a destroyer costs more than a battleship cost before the First World War.
    Commander Noble: Before the hon. Gentleman leaves the point of conversion, may I ask him a question? He says that we get a new frigate this way, but we also lose a good destroyer. Could the hon. Gentleman say whether these ships can still perform their destroyer duties?
    Mr. Callaghan: The hon. and gallant Gentleman can be sure that that question occurred to the Board of Admiralty. The proportion between destroyers and frigates was fixed to enable us to take up a certain number of destroyers which could obviously be of use as destroyers but which we thought would be of more use as frigates. If the hon. and gallant Gentleman will allow me to give the complete programme, he will then perhaps see how the picture looks in its entirety. During the next two or three years we intend to modernise a large number of destroyers without converting them and also to modernise a number of cruisers.
    Now for new construction. The "Eagle," our latest and biggest aircraft
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    carrier, is undergoing her sea trials at this very moment. We are also pushing ahead with the "Ark Royal" and with the four "Hermes" Light Fleet carriers. These four carriers will be able to operate the latest aircraft which we have and which are being developed at the present time. I shall say a few words more about naval aviation later on in this speech. Six of the eight "Daring" class destroyers will be undergoing their sea trials this year. We call them "Daring" class destroyers, but I think before the war they would have been called light cruisers. They are certainly approaching that in size, in power, in fire control and all the rest of it. At any rate, today we call them destroyers.
    The House will probably want to know about the "Tiger" class cruisers. We do not propose to resume them for the moment, until research work in connection with their fire control and gunnery has been completed. This is a matter which exercised our judgment considerably, but on balance we think it is better to leave them for the time being, and I believe we can afford to take that risk. Altogether, 24 frigates are to be built under the new complete programme. I recognise that I am not within the terms of this year's Estimates when I speak about the complete programme, but if you, Mr. Speaker, and the House will permit me, I should like to give four figures which will enable the House to see the whole of the programme outlined by the Prime Minister on 29th January—that spread over three years—as a complete picture in terms of ships to be built.
    The programme includes altogether 24 frigates, and 17 of them have been ordered already. It includes a large number of minesweepers; 41 of them have been ordered so far, with more to follow. Twenty-eight patrol boats of various, descriptions have also been ordered; we call them patrol boats now but we used to call them M.T.Bs., M.G.Bs. and M.Ls. Taking this together with the current construction programme, when the new three years' programme is completed the Navy will possess altogether 232 new ships, ranging from the most powerful fleet carriers like the "Eagle" and the "Ark Royal" to the fast patrol boats. There will be six new aircraft carriers, eight new destroyers, 24 frigates and nearly 200 minesweepers, patrol boats.

    1085
    seaward defence craft and craft of the like.
    Let me emphasise the supreme importance of the minesweeper. The Admiralty attach a very great deal of importance indeed to the dangers of enemy mining if trouble should arise. In addition to the cruisers which we intend to modernise, about 70 destroyers will have been either modernised or converted to an anti-submarine role. I place that programme before the House with considerable confidence. I think it represents a marked improvement in and addition to the strength of the Royal Navy at this time.
    Commander Galbraith: Could the hon. Gentleman give us some further information on that point? Are we to understand that that is the programme which is to be completed or that that is the number of new vessels to be laid down during the next three years?
    Mr. Callaghan: The hon. and gallant Gentleman is quite right; I should have made that clear. This is the programme of vessels to be laid down during the next three years. I certainly hope that they will be completed during the first half of this present decade.
    Captain Ryder (Merton and Morden): The hon. Gentleman said that it cost £500,000 to convert a destroyer to a frigate and he added that we were building 24 frigates. Are these of the cheaper and simpler form, and how does the cost of the simpler form of frigate compare with the rather expensive and lengthy process of conversion?
    Mr. Callaghan: No. These frigates include both the first-rate frigate—the leader—and the standard frigate. The cost of one of the simpler frigates would be about the same as the cost of a conversion. I am speaking now in answer to an interjection—and I hope the hon. and gallant Gentleman will not hold me to that figure—but I think I am right in saying that the cost of one of the simpler frigates is about the same as the cost of a conversion.
    I turn now to the question of naval aviation. At our war-time peak we had 11 Fleet and Light Fleet carriers and today we have 12, so that we have one
    1086
    more. As I said earlier, as a result of the re-armament programme there will be some additions to this number—the "Eagle" the "Ark Royal" and four"Hermes"carriers—so that we shall then have a total of 18 carriers, plus three in the Commonwealth navies, making 21 in all. That compares with the 11 which we had during the peak of the war. I think it is a substantial addition to our naval aviation, and it is a development which I certainly regard as being in the right direction. We are up against great problems with the heavier and faster planes which we are now getting. They throw a greater strain on the arrestor gear on the deck and also create a problem about the height of the hangars because of the height of some of the new planes. This will involve a process of modernisation and conversion to some of our existing carriers.
    I think that during the 'thirties and early 'forties the Navy suffered from the fact that so many of its aircraft were adaptations of machines from the Royal Air Force. What are good aircraft for the R.A.F, do not necessarily meet the requirements of the Navy. I should like to tell the House that we have coming along now a series of tailor-made planes for- the Navy—planes which can search and strike and fight. The Sea Hawk jet fighter will be coming into use during the financial year about which I am now speaking and it has a performance which I believe will rival that of any land plane. In addition, there is the Wyvern, which is coming into use this year—a turboprop strike plane. We also attach very great importance to the G.R.17, an antisubmarine plane which has been specially designed for these carriers. It is a three-seater and, I believe, will be found capable of doing really important work in this field which has not been done before.
    Meantime, we have the Attacker which will be coming into operation this year. That is really an interim plane—the plane we really want to rely upon is the Sea Hawk—and also the Fairey Firefly. One other plane I have forgotten to mention is the Venom, which is a night fighter for operation from carriers, and that will be coming into operation at the end of 1952. There are also newer types at present on the drawing board being developed and designed.

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    Helicopters are engaging our attention in quite a practical way. Hon. Members may have seen some photographs of the experiments in flying helicopters off the deck of the Fort Duquesne, a Fleet auxiliary vessel, and we hope that helicopters, together with the G.R.17s, will be able to make great use of the Sono-buoy, to which reference has been made in one or two of our debates in the past. Sono-buoys, which we are steadily getting experience of, are dropped either from an ordinary aircraft or a helicopter; they can be dropped at different places, and used for listening to submarines which cannot be seen. They relay what they hear to the helicopter or to the ordinary aircraft, and in that way the Sono-buoy is a very useful and very formidable means of defence for any convoy coming behind. It will enable us to improve and develop our methods of dealing with submarines.
    What we are suffering from in the field of naval aviation at the moment is a shortage of pilots. Here, again, I think this is due to the fact that in the past we have not had the planes that we should have liked to have had, and we are now hoping that, as a result of the new planes that are coming along, the pilots that we need will be forthcoming in much larger numbers.
    Surgeon Lieut.-Commander Bennett: Before the hon. Gentleman leaves the subject of aircraft, I should like to ask him what is the purpose of ordering a fairly large number of Fireflies, often of a late mark. They are a very small and ancient heritage.
    Mr. Callaghan: They are not small and ancient. The new mark is a three-seater that will do the anti-submarine job exceedingly well until the G.R.17s are produced in large numbers. It is an interim plane, but has quite a long life in front of it—of several years, I would certainly hope.
    On the question of pilots, I would emphasise that a boy coming into the Navy now as a pilot comes in as an executive officer in the Royal Navy. It is, in fact, a career for him as long as he stays in the Navy, and the rates of pay and conditions I suggest are good, I asked for some details, and the information I was given was that the rate of pay for a married lieutenant on full flying duties, and aged 25, is about £985 a year. If he is living away from his air station, he gets ration
    1088
    Allowance in addition. I do not think that anyone could say that that is a discouragement to coming into the Navy and to flying. I do hope that we shall get a number of the right type of young men coming in for this purpose. We welcome National Service boys, too, and are prepared to give a number of commissions to National Service boys who are ready to fly.
    I ought to say something more at this juncture about officers and men. More ships need more men. We are having more ships; therefore, we need more men. I was saying to my hon. Friend just now that, in relation to the type of ships we are having, the number of men needed is increasing, because of the radar and the electrical appliances we are getting. Consequently, we shall have to come to the House later to ask for a Supplementary Vote A to increase the number of Regular men that we are now to have in the Royal Navy. Meantime, this gap in our strength is being filled by reservists being called up for a period of 18 months, and by the retention of those who are due to finish their time.
    This has been a very great disappointment, I know, to those men. I referred last year to the fact that many of these men have gone through one of the hardest periods of 12 years possible. They joined in 1938 to 1939 at the time of Munich; they went through the whole period of the war; they went through the period of run-down after the war: and now we are asking them to take on again, or, at any rate, to stay a further period. I know that their wives, too, are wanting their husbands home, and I can well understand it. I can give the House this assurance, that I think the new rates of pay—I think the House can be satisfied about this—mean that these men are being remunerated properly and decently, and that we are not asking them to stay on, and, at the same time, not paying them properly.
    I asked for details of changes in the rates of pay. These are general figures. Taking one of the best paid jobs on the lower deck, a chief engine room artificer in 1945 was getting £6 16s. 9d. a week; he is now, with the new pay code, getting £12 1s. 6d. a week. A chief petty officer was getting £5 17s. 3d. in 1945; he is now getting £10 6s. 6d. a week, plus, of course, his keep and kit upkeep allowance. We recognise the great responsibility we

    1089
    have for these men. It has been a unpalatable job to say that we must keep them.
    One of the reasons for keeping them is, of course, the gap that arose in Regular recruitment during the war. During the war there was practically no Regular recruitment, apart from that of boys at the age of 15. The consequence is we have now this gap in the ranks of men who would have had between five and 11 years' service, and it is that gap which some of these men are now filling. It was an inevitable gap in recruitment, and it is a matter of regret to us that we have had to ask these men, who have carried the heat and burden of the day, especially during the war, to stay on for a longer period. They will be rendering a great service to the nation by doing so.
    The House is always interested in the number of men serving afloat. I can give a guide, but it is no exact comparison, and I warn the House that it must not draw too firm conclusions from it. In fact, the number of men serving afloat at the moment is 44.5 per cent. of the total. It is said that every sailor ought to be at sea; but perhaps the House will let me analyse the remaining 55.5 percent. so that it may see how this comes out. Men on leave—sick leave, ordinary leave, foreign leave, draft leave—and on draft itself at any one time in the Navy come to 10 per cent. The number at naval air stations is also 10 per cent. of the total strength. Those on new entry training—because we are now taking in a large number of new men—form 7 per cent. Those on technical training number 13 per cent.—i.e., doing technical training and courses. The W.R.N.S. number 4 per cent.
    I do not apologise for the number of men undergoing training and courses, either new entry or technical training. Twenty per cent. of the Navy at the moment are doing courses of training in one form or another, for peace-time is the time when we want to train men, and there is no reason at all why we should not have a very high proportion of the Navy undergoing training. However, we do not want the training force to become too luxurious. Therefore, the First Lord has set up a special committee, made up of officers from a number of branches, who are overhauling the whole of our training schedules at the
    1090
    present time to see whether improvements can be made, whether courses can be compressed, and whether we are asking for too high a quality or not. All these matters can properly be brought under review from time to time, and that is what is now being done.
    There is one further matter about which I must say a word—and I am very glad to say that we have been able to start on this—and that is on amending the system, under which the Navy is operating today and has operated since the war, of running commissions. I like fixed commissions. Let the ships pay off and re-commission. We have had to have running commissions because of the shortage in various branches, but we have now just started to get to the point where we can have ships pay off and re-commission. We are starting with the ships in the Persian Gulf. Virtually from now on they will pay off and re-commission. It improves the morale of a ship's company to know that they are to live together for a couple of years; it also improves efficiency if the officers and others responsible for training know they will not have to be constantly fitting new men into particular units. I ought to warn the House that although we have made this start it will be as much as three years yet before we can say that the whole of the ships in the Navy are working to a fixed commission.
    Commander Galbraith: The hon. Gentleman has accounted for 88.5 per cent. of the men in the Navy. Can he tell us where the other 11.5 per cent. are?
    Mr. Callaghan: I am sorry, I cannot at this moment. They are made up of a number of miscellaneous small groups. If the hon. and gallant Gentleman wants them, I shall be glad to get the information for him. I have extracted the main percentages. Most of the rest are quite small.
    Apart from odd spots, recruitment has continued to be good throughout the year. The policy is still to recruit half those coming into the Navy on continuous service—that is, for 12 years—and half on seven-year periods with five years in the Reserve. There will be opportunities for entry this year into practically every branch because of the Vote A we shall be asking the House for later. I have the feeling that we have got a bit arthritic in the joints about the methods of entry

    1091
    into the Navy, and I think we ought to overhaul them. The First Lord has agreed, and I am acting as chairman of a committee which is looking into the whole question of the methods of entry. We have boys, youths, and adults. One can enter as a boy in certain groups and as a youth in others; there is a whole conglomeration of regulations which have grown up, no doubt based on very good reasons when started, and I think it is time we looked at them again. I think we can get a more uniform method of entry into the Navy, and if not a common system of entry at any rate something near to it.
    We shall be glad to have National Service men, although we cannot have as many as we might like because of the needs of Regular recruitment. Altogether, there will be room for some 2,500 this year, and at least 320 vacancies for officers among them. The Reserves number in all over 50,000—experienced organised trained Reserves. That includes the R.F.R., which has dropped slightly in size during last year because of the retention of men since last July; the R.N.V.R., which has increased in size quite substantially, and is doing extraordinarily good work; and some 10,000 National Service men who have passed through the Navy, or are going through at the present time.
    Can we mobilise the Navy? Yes, we can. The organised Reserves can be identified individually and called up. Equally, our equivalent of the Army Z Class is being identified and selected, and those we would require in the early stages of mobilisation could be called for individually now. I can put it in this way. It would be quite possible now to regulate the flow of ships and the flow of men coming forward and match the two if trouble should arise.
    The Civil Lord will deal with living conditions in the speech he will make later. I should just like to say from my own experience, having visited cruisers, destroyers, frigates and aircraft carriers this year, that modern ships are much better laid out, but that, on the whole, conditions are still extremely cramped because of the increased technical devices we have got to fit in somewhere.
    Lieut.-Commander Gurney Braithwaite: The hon. Gentleman omitted any reference to the Royal Naval Reserve, recruitment to which was re-opened a short time ago. Can he give us any figure about that?
    Mr. Callaghan: I have not the figure available. I may say that we have not got as many in the R.N.R. as we would like. The officers have come forward quite well, but the men are not coming forward as fast as I would have liked.
    We regard the Merchant Navy as our prime care, and I have already given details, in answer to Questions, on the gun stiffening which is taking place and the accumulation of stocks and materials, for the Merchant Navy, about which the hon. Member for Woking (Mr. Watkinson), asked me last week. Defence courses for officers and men are now being held.
    I should now like to take part in the public debate that has been going on during the last few weeks on Britain's position in the world in relation to sea power, and to offer some observations that there are my own, but which, I hope, also reflect the view of the Board of Admiralty on this matter. When we started the last war, in 1939, the American Fleet and our own were roughly equal: roughly equal in size, in manpower and in the sort of ships we had.
    Then, as a result of the war, the position changed very rapidly. The House will remember only too well—certainly those who were in the Navy will remember—the terrible battle against the U-boat that we waged on our own for two years from 1939 to 1941, and the desperate expedients to which we were driven; how pilots had to be catapulted off ships to which they knew they could not return and, when their fuel was exhausted, had to put down in the deep waters of the Atlantic hoping to be rescued before their planes sank.
    It was those experiences and those expedients which made the right hon. Member for Woodford (Mr. Churchill) decide, in 1941, that he would have to postpone any large-scale naval construction once the existing programme of construction had been completed—to put back the heavy cruisers and the large aircraft carriers. He set himself twin top

    1093
    priorities: one was the air and the other the small ships to win the Battle of the Atlantic. Those were hard decisions to take. I do not disagree with them. I am sure, if I may say so with respect, that they were right decisions to take; but it did mean that our Navy started to develop in a rather different shape and form from what it had been up to that time.
    When the United States came into the war they embarked on the biggest ship building programme the world has ever seen. As the Leader of the Opposition said, they built carriers numbered not in dozens but in scores—and with what a sigh of relief the right hon. Gentleman must have heard that they were being built, and that they were coming to our rescue in those days. Let me give just one example. We finished the war with 17 carriers. The Americans, having started the war with five carriers, finished with 98.
    That was the measure of their wartime construction—and I am excluding from that a large number of escort carriers that have been re-converted. We started about level in destroyers and frigates. They finished with a fleet of destroyers and frigates twice as large as that of our own. By 1945 our Navy had been built up to about 850,000 including the W.R.N.S. The Americans' uniformed personnel in the Navy numbered over four million. That is the measure of the development that took place in the two navies during the war. Today, we have about 140,000 to 150,000 men in the Royal Navy. The Americans will, this year, have 850,000. Those are the figures and the basic elements from which we start.
    It is clear that the balance of sea power has tilted away from us very dramatically during the last 10 years. It must have done. When we were running the gauntlet in the Mediterranean, driven defeated in the Pacific—if the Japanese had been more courageous they could have come across the coastal waters to Aden and Cape Town—when we were desperately fighting the Battle of the Atlantic, we had no time to think of these other matters, except how best we could preserve the safety of our merchantmen and keep this island in the war.
    It is during this last period that, for the first time, certainly, in many hundreds of
    1094
    years, our Fleet has been out-numbered and out-paced by a friendly ally. While this has been going on—and here I follow up the point made by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War—there has been, simultaneously, a profound change in the strategy of the defence of these islands. We are now to a very large extent a part of the Continent; conscription is a recognition of that fact, and air power is there to remind us if we are ever likely to forget it.
    In the Christmas Recess I was reading Sir Edward Grey's Memoirs. He was Foreign Secretary in 1914. He describes the sense of comfort that he felt as Foreign Secretary in knowing that the Royal Navy was mobilised at the time trouble came, and—this is the important point—could prevent invasion across the Channel. No Foreign Secretary today could feel comfort in the thought that the Royal Navy of itself and on its own could do that job, because of the developments, which have taken place since 1914. As one of a third generation who has had something to do with the Navy, I do not feel very pleased about these developments, but it would be improper not to recognise them and we must recognise the change which has taken place in this matter.
    The whole of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is a recognition of this changed strategy. The decision to place divisions of soldiers on the Continent and to commit them beforehand is a recognition of it. I claim that the North Atlantic Treaty strengthens us very considerably at sea. The contribution which we are to put into the North Atlantic Treaty will be a powerful one and a significant one, but it is to be doubled by the other allies we have in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, whose total contribution will be twice our own.
    We shall have to face a large number of Russian submarines if war should come. I have no hesitation in saying that they are Russian submarines because, apart from the Americans and ourselves, there is no other navy in the world constructing a large number of submarines. Any maritime Power like our own has to look around to see where submarines are being built, and wherever they are being built that is a potential danger to us, because they can be used only against our mercantile trade. Numerically, the

    1095
    Russian submarines, if war should come, will be much larger than that the Germans had. There are, however, factors which have to be offset against this. Unlike the German submarines which were concentrated in one sea, the Russian submarines are divided; they are in the Baltic, the Black Sea, the North Sea, and the Pacific. They are not easily able to reinforce each other, and they are not easily transferable from one sea to another. That is an important element of this problem to remember; but there is no doubt that they will constitute a grave threat, especially if they secure any Atlantic bases, and the building potential which the Russians have is extremely great.
    But there is no doubt that the North Atlantic Treaty and the contribution which we are to make to it turns what would be a hard, grim and uncertain Battle of the Atlantic into a confident prospect of success. Of that I have no doubt whatever when I see the relative forces which would be available and which would be put into the task. One of the primary tasks of the Royal Navy is to make a proper contribution to that joint force, but it has another task as well. We must remember all the time that our own large Merchant Navy is working throughout the whole of the seas of the world. It is our job, therefore, to preserve a balanced Navy, to use all the arts of the Navy and to have ships of all types, quite distinct from the forces that must be put into our North Atlantic Treaty contribution. That is what we propose to do.
    The emphasis will change from time to time. The major emphasis at the moment must be on anti-submarine and anti-aircraft. We must be flexible in our approach, and recognise our twin task of making our contribution to the North Atlantic Treaty and maintaining a balanced Navy in addition. I still regard our own Navy, although second in size, as first in seamanship and first in the quality of our ships. I have no doubt at all about that; I mean no offence to anyone else when I say it. After all, we are a nation of seafarers, and there is no need for us to feel overwhelmed by anyone else. We have watched many navies come and go—the Spanish, the Dutch, the French, the German and the Japanese
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    We have lived with them all; we have seen them on the seas, and we have seen them disappear from the seas. Now we have a large and friendly ally who has out-built us, partially through our own decision and partially through the immense resources which she herself possesses; but I think that we can afford to regard that with comparative equanimity.
    I do not take the view, taken by some of our people who run to the newspapers, that we ought now to put ourselves in a position in which our Navy must, by virtue of sheer size, be as large as that of our friendly ally. That seems an impossible and ridiculous position. It has been advanced by some of the writers to the newspapers who deal with naval matters, and as it has been advanced by Admirals who have served in the past I think that it is worthy of comment. I would not dismiss it without comment, as they have been writing for more than one newspaper recently. It would be a gross and profitless waste of resources to undertake a task of that sort.
    I would say, in conclusion, that, so far from being overwhelmed by what is happening or feeling that the Royal Navy is taking a second place, I am confident that in our men, ships, history, tradition and fighting qualities our Navy, which has stood for many hundreds of years, will go on, will continue in the paths it has set itself, and that we ourselves, in this House of Commons, have a most formidable task still to preserve it as a safeguard and a shield for our country.
    4.57 p.m.
    Mr. J. P. L. Thomas: I am sure that all sides of the House would wish me to compliment the Parliamentary Secretary once again. I think that this is the third year that I have had the pleasure of complimenting him upon the very competent way in which he has introduced the Navy Estimates. He has shown a mastery of figures—a mastery, I suppose, which comes from his past occupation in civilian life—which I appreciate very much as an ex-Financial Secretary to the Admiralty. In wartime I had a little to do with the finances of the Admiralty, and I listened with interest to what he had to say in the earlier part of his speech about the control of finance in that Department.

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    For many reasons this debate on the Navy Estimates is somewhat different from that of previous years, because the spotlight of the Press, at least during the last fortnight, has been played on this day and also on a' question of keen interest to the public. At the request of the Government, the main question of interest is not being discussed today, and the bigger and heavier guns are biding their time for future and more formidable action. I thought that it was possible, however, with this background of the last fortnight, that the Parliamentary Secretary might have touched on that question of interest.
    At one stage, I thought that he was skating on thin ice. If he remembers his childhood, which is not quite so far off as mine, he will remember the game of Tom Tiddler's ground, and I expected to see the Parliamentary Secretary make several raids into that forbidden territory, followed by swift withdrawals. I thought that at the end of his speech he did make a substantial approach into that forbidden territory and took up a firm position on the question of the North Atlantic Treaty.
    The Parliamentary Secretary quoted what Sir Edward Grey said at the beginning of the 1914 war. I want to talk about the year leading up to the last war—the year of 1939—because I feel that in discussing the Navy Estimates this year, in a time of tension, there is much that is similar in the debate today to that which took place in the debate on the Navy Estimates in 1939, before the outbreak of the last war. All the efforts of diplomacy have failed to prevent today, as in 1939, the threat to our freedom from a totalitarian tyranny. Here I should like to pay my tribute to the new Lord Privy Seal, who was a very kind and helpful friend to me when he was Minister of Labour and National Service, and when it was my job at the Admiralty to keep in touch with the trade union and the Royal dockyards and shipyards.
    As in 1939, we fall back once more on our armed power to resist aggression, our strength to protect ourselves and our determination to rally our friends by showing that we are in a state of preparation to play our usual leading part in the defence of freedom. I know perfectly
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    well that the balance of naval power may have shifted today compared with 1939, when we were faced with the combined tonnage of the Axis navies, and when there was no certainty that America would be ranged alongside us. To my mind nothing has happened in the intervening years between then and now to alter the fact that the main supplies of food and raw materials can only reach this island if we hold the seas and keep intact the lines of our communications. Our charge against the Government during the past two years has been not so much that they have neglected the Navy—although I shall come to some specific criticisms under that head later—but that they always appear to hide the strength of the Navy and present it in the least favourable light.
    The Parliamentary Secretary today did a great deal to rectify that position, though not quite enough. It is very important, especially in view of the controversy which is raging at the moment, that we should get this matter in its right perspective. If the House will allow me, I shall explain what I mean. I was delighted at what the Parliamentary Secretary told us about the growth of the Dominion navies. That is an extremely valuable piece of information to get out for world consumption.
    In the explanatory statement to the Navy Estimates a new term has been introduced, which has -only been used in recent years, namely, "the Active Fleet." From the Navy lists which were published up to 1939 it was possible to see the names of all our ships and to know their stations. What a prodigious list it was. In 1939 the fleets and squadrons presented indeed a formidable array. The Navy List showed that we had in full commission nine battleships, five aircraft carriers, 27 cruisers, 73 destroyers, 25 ships of the class which we now term frigates, and a host of smaller vessels. If we judge our naval strength today only by those shown and in the Active Fleet a very poor picture is presented to the world. In spite of what the Parliamentary Secretary said in his speech, there are no battleships, five aircraft carriers, 13 cruisers and only 64 destroyers and frigates. There is the grave danger that by presenting our naval strength in this way, our friends abroad will get a wholly wrong impression.

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    But that is not a true picture of our real naval strength. If we were called upon to muster our strength, it would indeed be a different fleet which after a few weeks would put to sea, for we have five of the most modern and powerful battleships in the world, as well as 13 aircraft carriers, 26 cruisers, 273 destroyers and frigates. In all these classes our total fleet today is 317 ships, more, in fact, than we had in 1939. Leaving America out of it for the moment, we have twice as many ships as the rest of the North Atlantic Treaty Powers put together.
    I seem to be getting near the Tom Tiddler's ground again, for it must be obvious that the object of my comparison between 1939 and 1951 is to show that if we stop hiding our might, if not our light, under a bushel, we should put an end once and for all to the ridiculous nonsense which is being talked in some quarters at the moment, that we are no longer a first-class naval Power.
    Commander Pursey: It is hon. Members on the other side of the House who have said it.
    Mr. Thomas: I challenge the hon. and gallant Gentleman to produce any speech from this side of the House that bears out what he is now saying.
    Commander Pursey: I shall take the hon. Gentleman up on that later on.
    Mr. Thomas: The hon. and gallant Gentleman will probably have his chance.
    Great as is our strength, it would have been far greater if the Government had not gone in for their improvident policy of wholesale scrapping and, above all, selling to foreign countries ships which might today be standing in the second line. Apart from the 11 old battleships, the Government have scrapped two aircraft carriers, 28 cruisers, 123 destroyers and 42 frigates. We have only to reflect how valuable in 1940 were those 50 destroyers of the First World War, which America had so wisely laid up, to realise how valuable many of these ships that were scrapped might be to us today and in the future.
    We are told that orders are now being placed for an unspecified number of coastal forces craft and I should like to ask the Civil Lord to the Admiralty, who is to wind up this debate, what has hap-
    1100
    pened to the 1,200 little ships which we had at the end of the war, and of which only 126 remain. Have we got so many destroyers and frigates available to meet the growing threat of the Russian submarine fleet that we could afford to sell 73 of this class abroad, including eight to Egypt?
    I ask the Civil Lord to give us some further explanation about the "Cottesmore" which, though sold to Egypt, is still in a British yard for refit. We were told that the export of Centurion tanks to Egypt was being suspended pending the conversations on the Egyptian Treaty. We should like an assurance that the same conditions are being applied to this ship, the "Cottesmore." It is also suggested by a reliable authority—and I refer to Brassey's Annual—that we are selling four 950-ton minesweepers of the "Algerine" class to Egypt? May I also have an assurance about that?
    Mr. Callaghan Mr. Callaghan indicated dissent.
    Mr. Thomas: I see that the Parliamentary Secretary shakes his head, and I am glad to have that information so quickly given. Encouraged by that I will turn to the Government's policy with regard to the Reserve Fleet. When the Prime Minister unfolded the re-armament programme in January and announced the call-up of the men to the Royal Fleet Reserve and the retention of men who would otherwise have been going out of the Service, he said that this would enhance the state of readiness of the Reserve Fleet. The Parliamentary Secretary added a great deal of information to that during his speech today.
    I still maintain, however, that the House has not been given enough information. We do not know exactly what is the state of readiness of the Reserve Fleet, and we cannot judge whether the steps being taken are sufficient or not. It is not enough to say, as the explanatory statement does, that
    "Energetic measures have been taken to ensure that the ships of the Reserve Fleet are at their proper notice for emergency."
    What, might I ask, does "proper notice" mean? Before the war the Reserve Fleet was arranged in divisions with a time scale so that after a certain number of days one would know that the first division was ready to put to sea, and at intervals thereafter further divisions were to be brought into readiness.

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    I should like the Civil Lord to give the House more information about the state of the Reserve Fleet. We should like to know how many divisions there are, what classes of ships are available, how many of each class are in these respective divisions and what are the intervals of time at which each ship can be ready to proceed? I do not intend to refer at any length to the position of any class of personnel Reserves, but I am not entirely satisfied that we have enough men in the Reserves to bring the ships of this Reserve Fleet forward.
    I asked this question last year, and was somewhat surprised at the confidence of the Parliamentary Secretary when he interrupted me and gave me the assurance that all was well. I notice that on the Navy Estimates in 1939 this same question was put in the debate. It is very interesting to read that debate and to compare the information there given with the position that we have to tackle today. I expect that the Parliamentary Secretary and the Civil Lord have already done so.
    The Reserve Fleet was far smaller then than it is today, because it was possible to keep a much larger number of ships in full commission. On that occasion, the Parliamentary Secretary was able to put some substance into his assurance. He said that the Reserves numbered 70,000, or more than half the total Vote A. Do our Reserves now total anything like that figure? We have been told that our Royal Fleet Reserve numbers about 23,000, the R.N.V.R. under 7,000, the R.N.R. not more than 4,000, and the Special Reserve of National Service men will build up during the year to about 10,000 men, which is an outside figure. My figures come to about 45,000. The Parliamentary Secretary gave us a total of 50,000. I still think that that is enough to make no more than a modest start to the mobilisation of the Fleet in an emergency.
    Commander Pursey: The hon. Gentleman ought also to make the point that the number under Vote A is 10,000 larger than it was in 1939. How does he relate his argument about the want of more Reserves with his other argument which was, quite rightly, that we have fewer ships? Surely we have to relate the three Services together, and not to treat the Navy as a parochial affair.
    Mr. Thomas: I am not treating the Navy as a parochial affair. I have given a total which shows that there are more ships than there were in 1939 but that the Reserves, which were 70,000 in 1939, number 20,000 fewer than what they were then.
    Commander Pursey: There are more small ships.
    Mr. Thomas: The hon. and gallant Gentleman may have a chance of making his own speech, when he can advocate his policy. The Parliamentary Secretary has told us that 60 ships are to be brought out of the Reserve, and that the list includes only two destroyers and two frigates, while the great majority are small minesweepers, and there are 21 unspecified light craft. This is not a very great contribution, considering the number of men who have been called up and retained.
    Mr. Callaghan: The hon. Gentleman must not forget that we are going to commission a number of "Daring" class destroyers, and that there is the "Eagle" and the ships resulting from new construction.
    Mr. Thomas: The hon Gentleman told us that in his speech, and it was a very cheering bit of news, but it would create a tremendous effect abroad if the Admiralty could mobilise a large part of the Reserve Fleet this summer. That would do valuable service in shaking out the moth-balls and removing what I think is known as the kooncoting, in order to see how long it takes to bring the ships which have been treated in this way back to a state of readiness. I do not suppose that the Civil Lord can give us an answer tonight, but I should be very grateful if he would consider that point.
    I want to deal with the encouraging, but in some ways disappointing question of naval aviation. On the material side, the Parliament Secretary was extremely encouraging. It was very good indeed to hear about the jet fighters coming along and about the new anti-submarine aircraft which has at last been ordered. They should put our Air Arm into a strong position. We should like to associate ourselves to the full with the tribute that the Parliamentary Secretary paid to the officers and men of "Theseus" and

    1103
    "Triumph," which are still doing gallant work and serving with such distinction in Korean waters. Their brilliant achievements, and the speed with which they went into action, are in accordance with the highest traditions of the Service, and show that the skill, courage and efficiency of the Royal Navy are as good as ever they were.
    It is obvious that in future operations naval aviation will have to play an increasingly prominent role, not only in defence of the Fleet and of convoys against air attack, but in offence against submarines. For these reasons it is all the more disturbing to read in the explanatory statement and to hear from the Parliamentary Secretary today about the serious shortage of officers for flying duties. This branch of the Royal Navy offers a promising future for keen young officers. The Parliamentary Secretary told us of the substantial increases in pay. We are glad that the aircraft that they fly now can compete on equal terms with anything that the R.A.F, can produce.
    While I willingly endorse all that the Parliamentary Secretary said on this subject, I have some criticisms to make and one or two of what I hope will be constructive suggestions. Crews of naval aircraft spend a considerable time ashore at naval air stations. Most of those stations are in the more remote corners of our coast, and also at places where there is a very heavy demand for tourist accommodation, especially in places like Culdrose, St. Merryn and Lossiemouth. They are good examples. There is not enough accommodation normally for those who are married, but in the summer, added to the shortage of accommodation is the difficulty of the enormous rents charged for the accommodation which is available.
    I know that the Admiralty have been giving attention to the question of building married quarters near those stations, and I hope that we shall hear something on that subject from the Civil Lord, because that is the responsibility of his Department. I hope that he will tell us how many of the quarters are for ratings and how many for officers. My information is that officers' quarters are very scarce. The Parliamentary Secretary said
    1104
    today that it is officers of whom we are short at the moment.
    I would say a word about short-service commissions. Even when they are running for as long as eight years they are not popular. In other walks of life it is difficult enough for officers to get new jobs at the age of from 26-30, but these men have been trained only to fly and they are equipped to do little else. What are their prospects of getting flying jobs. Pilots of single-engined jet planes are not readily acceptable as air line pilots by the two nationalised Corporations, while, in the field of private enterprise, commercial flying is on a rapidly diminishing scale. The Corporations are being actively encouraged by the Minister of Civil Aviation to seize as much as possible of the charter work done by the private operators, so there are few jobs there.
    Before the war, short-service commissions were not so unpopular, because civil aviation was an expanding market. Today I am afraid, as a direct result of Government policy, it is a contracting market. Government policy in one direction is having a most unfortunate effect in another. The Navy badly needs these young men. It is up to the Government to make their terms of service satisfactory, and also to give them a reasonable chance of finding work when their commissions come to an end.
    Another suggestion—I would repeat what I said two years ago and what has never been answered since that time—is that there should be formed an Air Crew Reserve for the Navy. The R.N.V.R. air squadrons are to be increased from four to five. That is good news, but this Reserve corresponds to the Royal Auxiliary Air Force. That is to say, both these Reserves are of complete operational squadrons. The Navy has no pool reserve of air crew similar to the R.A.F.V.R. If such a Reserve were formed, it would provide refresher courses for the short service officers after the end of their full-time service, which, in itself would be a stimulant to recruiting. There would also be jobs in the Reserve schools for ex-naval pilots as instructors.
    I hope that the Admiralty will look at our suggestions. I realise that it may not be possible for the Civil Lord to give me answers today, but I feel that, if our suggestions, which we have made over a period of years, had been adopted, there

    1105
    might not have been the present shortage of officers and there would also have been a valuable Reserve for the carriers in the Reserve Fleet.
    Now I turn to the general question of personnel. As I have already said, it is difficult to consider the Estimates this year in any detail because of the changes in policy which the Prime Minister announced in January. We know from the White Paper and from what the Parliamentary Secretary has said today that Vote A is to be increased from 143,500 to 152,000 by an increased call-up of 6,600 reservists and by the retention of a further 1,900 men who would otherwise be taking their discharge. The total of 152,000 is almost exactly the number proposed by my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition on 22nd October, 1945, when he said:
    "Let us take, as a working figure, 150,000."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 22nd October, 1945; Vol. 414, c. 1690.]
    How about the employment of National Service men? There seems to be no settled policy. Year by year the intake fluctuates, and although in May the First Sea Lord was reported as saying that the Navy of the future would be Regulars only, we find in this year's explanatory statement that 2,500 are to be entered. I should have thought that this frequent vacillation makes it very difficult for the depots to make any long-term plans.
    We have had a lengthy explanation from the Parliamentary Secretary this afternoon—quite rightly so, for it is a matter of vital importance—about the call-up of the Royal Fleet Reserve and about the retention for 18 months of 7-and 12-year men whose engagements would otherwise come to an end. However, I am far from satisfied that these steps have been brought about solely by the demands of the Korean operations and the international situation. The exlanatory statement says that the Navy is short of senior and experienced ratings. Is not that the real reason for the unprecedented measures that the Admiralty has had to take?
    For two years my hon. Friends have been trying to impress on the Government the fact that a most serious manning situation would develop if no steps were taken to stop the drain of the senior and experienced ratings through their failure to re-engage for pensionable service. Every
    1106
    excuse has been made by the Government, particularly the excuse of full employment in civilian occupation, during the last two years. It was not until last September that the gratuities scheme for men leaving after 10 years or more was extended to include a bounty of £100 to men who reengaged. The suggestion was made repeatedly from these benches by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Chelsea (Commander Noble).
    As regards the 18 months' retention, presumably the legality of this rests on the 1939 Proclamation of Emergency. [HON. MEMBERS: "The Act of 1859."] Good Gracious! Under the authority of that Act or the 1939 Proclamation, authority is given to the Admiralty to break the 12-year contracts with these men. We really ought to consider how long this state of emergency will continue. I do not know whether it is a state of emergency since 1939 or one ever since 1859.
    Mr. Callaghan: The men are being retained for a further 18 months under the Act under which they were engaged. The Act under which they were engaged is that of 1859 or 1853, and it provides for a continuance of their service.
    Mr. Thomas: I see. Anyhow, I do not think that destroys my point. It is becoming apparent that present conditions—far from this being a temporary emergency—are becoming normal. If under normal peace or cold-war conditions the 12-year contract is to be regularly broken, it will have a very bad effect on Regular recruiting. What we feel is needed is a manning policy which takes into account the international situation, of course, but which does not inflict hardships on individual men which could have been obviated, we think, by foresight on the part of the Government during the last two years.
    I want to support from this side of the House—I think it is necessary—the final statement of the Parliamentary Secretary about our belief in the future of the Navy, mainly for the benefit of those who, unlike him, believe mistakenly that, in the light of our commitments on the Continent and in the light of the development of air warfare, the Navy should take third place in our defence considerations. The larger our continental contribution becomes, the more powerfully it is equipped

    1107
    in mechanisation and with tanks, the heavier our bombers become and the faster our fighters fly, so their dependence on the Royal Navy for the safe conduct of fuel and supplies is increased. The more determined our Allies and ourselves are that the frontier of freedom shall be on the Elbe, the more violent must we expect the attack to be on our sea lines of communication.
    All reputable and reliable authorities are agreed that Russia is building an enormous submarine fleet. Such a fleet can be used only for one-purpose. In anti-submarine measures the Royal Air Force has a tremendous part to play and an increasingly heavy task to fulfil, but the main burden of the safety of our convoys must rest, as it has always rested, upon the Royal Navy and upon the navies of our Allies in the struggle, should it unfortunately come.
    But, apart from these practical and tangible factors in the defence of democracy, there is an even greater, though far less tangible, factor. It is that for 400 years the ever-growing influence of Britain and her opinions in the Chancelleries of the world has been inextricably bound up with respect for the Royal Navy and the sea-faring traditions of this island. Though, as the Parliamentary Secretary admitted, we may no longer have the largest Navy in terms of tonnage, in all other respects the British Navy has yet no equal, and we neglect it at our peril.
    5.28 p.m.
    Mr. J. P. W. Mallalieu: The hon. Member for Hereford (Mr. J. P. L. Thomas) has led the Opposition in this debate with his customary charm and moderation. I agreed with nearly all of his speech, but one or two parts of it I could not quite understand. I could not gather whether he thought that the present size of the Navy was sufficient to meet the present needs of the country. At one stage he was complaining that the Government were writing down the Navy in the sense of making it appear smaller than it really was, but at another stage of his speech he appeared to me to be doing precisely the same thing himself. I do not know whether that was intentional.
    Mr. J. P. L. Thomas: I thought I made it quite clear that that was in regard to the position of the Reserve Fleet.
    Mr. Mallalieu: Then, so far as the active Fleet is concerned, we are agreed. The needs are being met. That removes the main item of possible disagreement that I had with any of the remarks of the hon. Gentleman. It seems to me that, so far as the immediate needs are concerned, the active Fleet is adequate and sufficient to meet any present threat. So far as we can judge from the most excellent and competent report given by the Parliamentary Secretary, it seems that, apart from the immediate present, the future prospect is not too bad either. The Admiralty always seem to be supreme among Government Departments. As they have been for some centuries, so now they are right in the van of technical progress, and the story of the achievements of Admiralty research which we had from the Parliamentary Secretary today were extremely heartening. While I throw out that annual bouquet to the Admiralty on the skill with which they look after the research needs of the Navy, I also throw out a brickbat about the deficiencies of the Admiralty in looking after the needs of the men. That brings me without any difficulty to the old subject of barracks.
    I have protested on each occasion during the past six years on the Navy Estimates about the Royal Navy barracks. I have protested against their size for several reasons—partly because it was difficult in an organisation that is very big to maintain discipline, and partly because it is difficult to provide the amenities that we should like in a large organisation. But an even greater worry arises now from the size of the barracks, and that is the improved types of bombs that are likely to be used. It is conceivable that one little bomb dropped on Devonport or Chatham would wipe out 15,000 men in one go, which is not a prospect anyone would regard with equanimity.
    The only safeguards against the possibility of that calamity we are offering at the present moment in Portsmouth is a slight smearing of tarmac on the parade ground under which the lads have to shelter. That is their only A.R.P. I think that in Chatham they have a more horrid plan, that of the tunnel. The point

    1109
    is that none of these things is any protection against the type of bombs likely to be used in any future war. I plead once more with the Parliamentary Secretary to reconsider the whole question of having large conglomerations of men concentrated at our main ports, and instead, within the limits of our building programme, to try to split up the barracks and spread them around the country with much smaller depots.
    Another matter which gives me some fears is the question of co-operation between the Navy and the Royal Air Force. It is pretty clear, whether we like it or not, that the safety of the realm in the future will chiefly depend on the Royal Air Force, which seems to be taking the senior place. I am quite certain that this, which is an inescapable fact, will be deeply resented by some people in the Navy who look upon the Royal Air Force as an organisation for cultivating moustaches. It would be tragic if any sort of prejudice of that kind should prevent the closest co-operation between the Royal Air Force and the Navy.
    It is very important, to give one example, that in any future war, unlike some of the wars in the past, the Royal Air Force should be able to distinguish between a ship that is friendly and one that is not. There should be the closest co-operation between the two Services in connection with anti-submarine exercises and exercises on defending convoys against torpedo bombers and all the rest. These exercises should not take place with the Navy on its own, but there should be the fullest integration all the time between all the Services.
    I come now to the question of pay. Men with skill and experience, badly needed in the Navy are tending to leave the Navy at the first opportunity they get. It is time that the Admiralty considered offering these men greater inducements to keep them in the Navy. It is a pity that pensions in many cases have remained the same since they were cut down in 1931. I think it is about time that we looked at this question. The pensions offered to men when they come out are not very high. Furthermore, it would be a good plan if the Admiralty considered some form of gratuity. It is a little difficult for a chief petty officer at the age of 45 to find a job when he leaves the Navy, even in this period of
    1110
    full employment. A really substantial gratuity would enable some of these men perhaps to set up in business on their own account. I am certain that gratuities plus a higher rate of pension would be a great inducement to many men to stay on and so to give the full value of their services to the Navy.
    I do not much like this business of keeping men for 18 months after their time has expired. But everyone who signs should know that there is that danger and liability. On the other hand, I think it would be fair if we increased their compensation to balance that criticism. The men, by signing on for seven years, have an additional liability for five years, and to make this liability easier to bear we should increase the R.F.R. retainer in civil life while the man is subject to recall. Pay and the desire to join a good Service are two inducements to men to join the Navy. But there is a third, and that is the feeling that there is full opportunity for promotion.
    I am not sure that even today there is the fullest possible opportunity for promotion for men who come in on the lower deck. I was very impressed in my short time in the Service with the quality of the men coming from the upper yardman scheme. I am a little worried to find that not many of these men are getting commissions. I believe that the original target was 25 per cent. of naval officers from this source, but rumour has it that the percentage is very much lower than that. I should like to know the reasons for that if the rumour is true—whether the quality of the men is too poor, or whether it is harder to get through under this scheme than from Dartmouth.
    Again, I hear that the applications for Dartmouth are rather disappointing both in numbers and in quality. I am told that the applications are very low, particularly from the north of England, a part of the country in which I am specially interested. Why is that? If it is so, what are the Admiralty doing about it? Are they letting headmasters and parents know the tremendous advantages now offered to suitable boys, who can get an absolutely first-class education and career without any charge to themselves?
    I wonder whether some of the potential officers are being turned down wrongly on medical grounds. I know that the

    1111
    Navy are particularly careful about astigmatism, but it is possible to have a slightly defective vision corrected by contact lenses. Does the Navy permit a man to wear such lenses? If it does not, it would be a grave mistake if men who were qualified in every other way to serve as naval officers were being turned down because the Navy would not move with the times and admit that contact lenses provide as good vision as natural sight.
    These points are important in themselves, but they are important for another reason. Both the two Front Bench speakers have mentioned the pride which the country feels in the Navy. It is extraordinary how in places far from the sea, among people who have never seen a ship, the Navy has a direct personal appeal. You can do things to the Army and to the Royal Air Force but you must not touch the Navy. That is as true today as it has been for many years. It is also true that throughout its long history since the days of Alfred, with the possible exception of one occasion in the 17th century which I will not mention, the Navy has done all that has been asked of it by the British people.
    It is a great organisation. But an organisation, however good, needs continual refreshment—[An HON. MEMBER: "A tot."]—Apart from the tot, it needs refreshment from the brains, the new outlook, and the energies of social classes in this country who in years gone by never thought of going into the Navy, or, if they did, never dreamt that they had any chance whatever of promotion. There is a tremendous new source of strength for the Navy in the country today, if we can tap it, through the upper yardman scheme, through wide publicity for Dartmouth, and the rest. If we can tap it, the Navy in the future as in the past will do whatever specific jobs it is called upon to do, will play whatever rôle is allocated to it vis-à-vis the other Services, and will do it, no matter under whose command, to the great pride of Britons everywhere.
    5.44 p.m.
    Lieut.-Commander Clark Hutchison: It is impossible for anyone in this debate to cover the whole wide field of Government policy in relation to the Navy. Therefore I propose to
    1112
    deal only with three specific points in the short time at my disposal. First, however, may I say that I find myself in substantial agreement with the hon. Member for Huddersfield, East (Mr. J. P. W. Mallalieu), in his remarks on naval barracks. There is a decided danger in having large concentrations of men in the existing, in some cases rather elderly, establishments and there is a good case for decentralising or dispersing barracks. In that connection, as the Civil Lord is well aware, I and some of my hon. Friends from Scotland have frequently advocated the creation of naval barracks in that country, particularly at Rosyth. No doubt the hon. Member for Huddersfield. East, would support me in that.
    As regards my three specific points, the first has already been touched upon by the Parliamentary and Financial Secretary; the question of manpower and, in particular, the ratio of civilians to sailors in the employment of the Admiralty. This is a matter in which I have taken some interest during the past few years. The hon. Gentleman pointed out in his opening statement that a substantial number of civilians were employed in the Navy in supply services, salvage, and the boom defence vessels. He made the point that in either of the other two Services comparable people would probably have been uniformed personnel. That may be so but, nevertheless, those services to which he referred have been in existence for a considerable time. They existed before the war, and I do not think the relative position has changed much.
    I feel justified in referring to this matter again this year because it is within the recollection of the House that only a few weeks ago, in the course of the defence debate, the Minister of Defence laid considerable stress upon the importance of reducing the civilian tail in the fighting Forces. I would commend to the attention of the hon. Gentleman what the Minister of Defence said in that debate:
    "Since I have been associated with the Service Departments, I have repeatedly attacked this problem, both in my present capacity and when I was at the War Office, and I believe that my efforts were not without some effect. It is a problem which needs to be constantly watched and attacked and I can promise the House that I shall not relax the pressure.—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 14th February, 1951; Vol. 484, c. 414.]

    1113
    It is perfectly true that the main burden of those remarks was directed to the Army, but I suggest that what the Minister said is equally applicable to the other two Services. I hope, therefore, that the Admiralty will co-operate to the fullest possible extent with the Minister of Defence in reducing the civilian tail in the Navy to the lowest number compatible with efficiency.
    According to the figures with which we are supplied this year, in Vote A—not allowing for the increase to which the hon. Gentleman referred—there are at the moment 143,500 sailors, marines and members of the W.R.N.S., whilst the civilian element in the employment of the Admiralty, according to the answer to a Question given to me by the Civil Lord on 22nd February, is 167,000. In other words the civilian element at the present moment exceeds the uniformed or active service element by over 23,000 persons, whereas in pre-war days, for example in 1939. there were 26,000 more sailors than civilians in the naval service. I still feel that the tail is disproportionately large as compared with the fighting element.
    The Parliamentary and Financial Secretary referred to the fact that a reduction had been made in the staffing of the Admiralty. I welcome that, and I think it must be the outcome of the report of the special committee to which the Civil Lord alluded in his closing speech last year. However, the reduction is rather slight, just under 4 per cent., and I observe that an increase is again foreshadowed in the current year. Nevertheless while I welcome this earnest of good intentions of trying to economise in manpower in the Admiralty, I must put this point to the Civil Lord. Perhaps he would be kind enough to refresh his memory by referring to our debate last year.
    In answer to an interjection which I made in the closing stages, the hon. Gentleman said he would look into the possibility of having a similar committee to inquire into the staffing of establishments other than the Admiralty—that is, 'the outlying naval establishments. Although he said it would be a matter of some difficulty, the Civil Lord certainly did not close his mind to it, and I should like him to say tonight whether anything has been done along these lines and, if
    1114
    not, why not. When we are called upon to vote these very large sums of money which are necessary for re-armament, we want to make sure that they are being applied to the best possible purpose and that we are not carrying any unnecessary dead wood in the way of too many civilian personnel in the outlying establishments.
    I turn to my second point, which is of particular interest to everybody who lives on the nation's eastern seaboard. Twice in this century we have found ourselves engaged in bitter conflict with an enemy situated at the other side of the North Sea. Now, once again, we are faced by a potential aggressor whose territory, if not exactly at the other side of the North Sea, is at least not very far remote from it. Therefore, once again all the estuaries and ports along the East coast assume prominence in connection-with the defence of the country. Foremost among them, of course, must be the great estuary of the Firth of Forth, and I ask the Civil Lord for an assurance that due attention is being paid to all the antisubmarine and other defences necessary for this and other areas. There has, of course, been a tendency since the conclusion of the war for these things to get out of date.
    Furthermore, I should like to know, as I believe is the case, that the Rosyth dockyard is busy and is being developed and is properly equipped. I should also like to know the position regarding the small but very useful little base at Port Edgar, which is probably familiar to a number of Members who served in the Navy during the war. Last year, the naval hospital was closed down, and to the best of my knowledge and belief the base is now on a care and maintenance basis. It has a very useful small harbour for the smaller fighting vessels, and I know from experience that it is well. equipped with training facilities and the other things necessary for a base. Is it the intention of the Admiralty to make use again of Port Edgar and to bring it into full commission? Perhaps the Civil Lord will refer to this in the course of his reply.
    Finally, I must say a few words once more about a subject I have raised on numerous occasions, as have a number of my hon. and gallant Friends. I refer to the future of the Naval Ordnance

    1115
    Inspection Department. Thanks to the combined efforts of a number of my hon. and gallant Friends and to the report of the Madden Committee, and as a result of several deputations to the First Lord, a little headway has been made in solving some of the difficulties of that department, but the position is still not at all satisfactory.
    The older inspectors in that department, who entered under the conditions laid down in A.F.O. 2078/31, still feel that they have had a raw deal. As one who has known the history of this matter for a good number of years, I think that they have reason to feel aggrieved. What in some respects is more serious still is the fact that, I am advised, the post-war intake of young inspectors, who came in in response to an Admiralty message of 10th April, 1946, also feel that they have been misled and that the conditions are not those which they were led to expect. I am told that as a result it has now become very difficult to obtain recruits from among active service specialist officers for this department and that there has, in fact, been no recruitment from specialist officers for the past few years. As vacancies arise, therefore, it has been necessary to fill them by taking in civilians of the requisite technical knowledge.
    That may be all right theoretically, but through no fault of their own the civilian inspectors, some of whom I met during the war, and who are admirable men, simply do not have sea or active service experience. That is an undesirable practice and may, indeed, be dangerous, because it means that weapons and ammunition will be inspected by persons who have not had the sea experience of using these appliances. Safety margins and efficiency, therefore, may well be reduced. This in turn leads to the risk of failure and even to dangerous accidents, or, perhaps, to disasters such as occurred during the first war, when a number of explosions took place in ships because of defective ammunition, a thing which mercifully was absent from the last war due to the greatly increased efficiency of the Inspection Department.
    I urge the Admiralty to take this matter very seriously, because nothing is more detrimental to morale than that any idea should get about that accidents which
    1116
    occur to weapons or ammunition are because they may not have been propertly inspected. I think quite definitely that the solution of this difficulty is to make the Naval Ordnance Inspection Department a fully uniformed branch of the Navy, where the officers have as far as possible the same rates of pay and conditions of service as the officers who serve at sea. I believe—I hope I am correct in this—that the Civil Lord has not yet turned his mind away from this possibility. If only this course could be followed, it would be to the great advantage of the future of the department and of the Service as a whole, and I urge the Admiralty to consider this matter very carefully and to come to a decision as rapidly as possible.
    5.58 p.m.
    Commander Pursey: Too often in debates in this House, hon. Members on both sides begin their orations, as, I think, did the hon. and gallant Member for Edinburgh, West (Lieut.-Commander Hutchison), with an apology and the hope that "the hon. Member who has just spoken will forgive me if I do not follow him." As the hon. and gallant Member got away to a detailed start, I want to get back to the previous speech, that of the hon. Member for Hereford (Mr. J. P. L. Thomas), who led for the Opposition.
    One of our main objects, on this side of the House in debates, should be to deal with the Opposition case and arguments, because in the majority of instances their case and that of the Tory Press can be completely demolished. I intend to demolish it today, and to go into action against the enemy on the other side of the House—that is, on the other side of the 38th Parallel here—and to demolish their fanciful case and their fantastic arguments about the naval situation at large.
    I will, however, deal first with a constituency problem, in order to get it out of the way so that we may have a tidy debate. Will my hon. Friend the Civil Lord, when he replies, please state what work in new building, conversions and refits the Admiralty have given to the Humber ports, in particular Hull, which is the third port in the country, and of which I have the honour to represent the larger dock area?

    1117
    Private enterprise between the two wars closed the only shipbuilding yard in Hull, Earle's Yard, in my constituency, and some thousands of shipyard workers were thrown out on the street without any consideration at all as to employment, health, or sustenance. Today, fortunately, with a Labour Government in power and full employment, although for years they suffered mass unemployment, the situation in the shipyards of Hull is better than it has ever been in peace-time. However, it is not a question of the present but of the future, bearing in mind how, with a Tory Government in 1939 and full re-armament under way, there were 20,000 unemployed in Hull, compared with only 4,000 today.
    Mr. I. J. Pitman: In shipbuilding?
    Commander Pursey: Ship repairs.
    The main purpose of this debate, however, is to discuss the Labour Government's naval policy. That is the object of this debate; that is the attack from the other side of the House. Considerable action has been taken by the present Government in naval affairs in the world situation as it is today, because it is necessary to consider the problem in terms of the Seven Oceans, and not in the Tory terms of the dyke around our coasts, even though that dyke extends 3,000 miles across the Atlantic to America.
    The Tory Party and the Tory Press campaign about the naval position and the Navy Estimates which we are considering is not one about the money provided, nor the ships nor the men, nor even the Admirals, which matter we are to debate on another occasion so that I will not deal with it now. The present Tory Campaign is purely blatant politics. [Laughter.]Wait for it. One needs to have a long memory in politics, but I happen to be able to go back, I believe, longer than anyone else in this House today, including the Leader of the Opposition. The present Tory campaign is purely blatant politics, as it was when the Liberal Government was in power, from 1906–1914, even in the three years when the present Leader of the Opposition, the right hon. Member for Woodford (Mr. Churchill), was First Lord of the Admiralty in the days of his better understanding of politics and of
    1118
    the party he should be in, and in the days when he said things about the Tory Party which I would never say myself.
    The obvious fact is that today the main Tory attack is a personal one against the Prime Minister and the Labour Government with the object of creating alarm and despondency in this country when there is no justification for it and of disseminating an idea that if war is to come, the Tory Party is the only party which could successfully handle it. Never was there such nonsense. This is all part of the so-called "patriotic" party's present electioneering campaign of national and international denigration at a time when, relatively, Britain was never in a stronger and better position, from whatever aspect it is considered. There is no question about it; it is a fact and cannot be disputed. For the first time we have full employment. It can easily be seen from the Opposition's tactics that they do not like this.
    Surgeon Lieut.-Commander Bennett: On a point of order. Is it in order, Sir, for the hon. and gallant Member to read his speech.
    Commander Pursey: If the hon. and gallant Member is concerned about my notes, I will give them to him to give him a chance of being able to reply to some of the points I am making. I am quite prepared to give way to anyone on the benches opposite if they want to mess up the debate. But let them remember the statement which was made by an hon. and gallant Member opposite during the debate on pensions, that, if an hon. and gallant Member wanted to interfere and quack, it would be better if he went out to St. James's Park and quacked to the ducks. Later in that debate several hon. Members of the Opposition were imitating the ducks in St. James's Park and, apparently, they intend to do the same tonight.
    The effect of my argument can easily be seen by the tactics of the Opposition on the Estimates of the three Services. In the case of the Army and the R.A.F. Estimates, Opposition speakers have dealt with the number of Russian divisions and the strength of the Russian Air Force and even with details of types of tanks and aircraft. In the majority of cases hon. Members opposite have argued that the

    1119
    Russians are superior, in a blood-curdling attempt to put the wind up this country and the other democratic countries on our side.
    An important question therefore arises. Why have the Opposition not pursued the same tactics in naval affairs? For example, why have they not given the strength of the Russian Navy in detail and compared it with that of the British Navy and, in particular, with that of the American Navy, which has the main naval responsibility because the main Russian naval force is in the Far East and is a greater threat to America than to Britain? The plain answer is that the Opposition, and no one more so than their leader—who I regret to say, is not in his place this afternoon, though presumably he will come down later like a prima donna as he has done before, after ignoring the Navy Estimates—know full well that they have no similar arguments to those employed with regard to the other two Services and no real case to put against the Labour Government's naval policy.
    No one should underestimate Russian military and air strength, but there is no reason to exaggerate it. On the other hand, it is quite traitorous and simply playing the Communist game to attempt to build up fictitious pictures of Russian naval strength. Moreover, there is no justification for trying to lead the British people to think that in the event of war—which we on this side think is not inevitable—Russia could achieve any major success at sea, because that would be quite impossible.
    What are the facts of the naval situation today? I will deal with the Russian submarines separately—[Laughter]—I will deal with the Russian submarines separately. I have challenged hon. and gallant Members opposite time after time to say where those submarines are, but they will not answer, I will deal with them in a moment. [An HON. MEMBER: "Ask the Parliamentary Secretary."] The Parliamentary Secretary did not say where they were. Hon. and gallant Members opposite are laughing, but they will see the point of that in a moment. Other than in submarines Britain and America each have greatly superior naval strength and the two nations together have overwhelming naval superiority, greater than any allies have ever had against a single
    1120
    enemy at any time in the history of the world.
    The Tory case is, therefore, simply one of shadow boxing with their own imagination. I will show why. The Tory Party and the Tory Press will not state the facts and the comparative figures. I shall take, first, money and men, two most important criteria. The present Labour Government alone—to say nothing of the Commonwealth navies, to which the Parliamentary Secretary referred, America and our several allies-is this year providing for the Navy no less a sum than three times the money that a Tory Government provided in 1938; and over 10,000 more men on Vote A—on the active list—than in 1939. So where does the hon. Member for Hereford get his nonsense when he argues that we have not Reserves, men or anything else?
    The position today, so far as Vote A is concerned, that is the number of men borne, is that this year—and it will be increased later—the Vote is higher than at any time in the last two centuries during peace-time. Yet in 1939 Britain had to consider not only the German Navy but the Italian and the Japanese navies. There can, therefore, be no real ground today for criticism under those two main headings of money and manpower when there is only one possible enemy and on the other side are the two largest navies.
    Let us consider ships. Britain alone, counting the two Fleets, has five vast new battleships, 13 aircraft carriers, with nine building, 26 cruisers, with three building, 111 destroyers and 162 frigates. There are minor differences in those figures, but those are the figures in the First Lord's Statement explanatory of the Naval Estimates. The Opposition will not compare the Russian figures because in respect of those ships, the Russians are grossly inferior both in number and value, the figure being ridiculous when compared with both the British and the American Fleets.
    The Tory Party and the Tory Press, and also that adjunct of the Tory Party, the Navy League, with their armchair strategists and admiral experts of two generations ago, attempt to make a case to the effect that Britain is today largely undefended at sea, by comparing, as the hon. Member for Hereford did, the present numbers of ships with the numbers

    1121
    in 1939. But, as always, they select only the figures which suit their argument, and ignore the greater number of classes which prove the contrary case and show that relatively we were never stronger at sea than today when considering our only possible enemy.
    We have five battleships and Russia has none capable of fighting them. Admittedly, we have 26 cruisers as compared with 60 in 1939, but the function of cruisers has changed, and in any future war their task will be largely taken over by aircraft, both seaborne and shore-borne. Consequently, we have doubled the number of aircraft carriers—13 as compared with seven in 1939—and we have largely increased the number of naval aircraft. In submarine-hunting vessels, the position today is even more advantageous than it was in 1939. We then had practically no frigates; today, we have 162, and 111 destroyers as compared with 180 destroyers in 1939. That gives a 50 per cent. increase over the 1939 figures for the most important class of vessels, namely, submarine hunting vessels—273 compared with 180.
    Moreover, we have a greater proportion of small craft, motor gunboats and the like, both in type and numbers, than in 1939, when under the Tory Government there were practically none of those craft. Yet Members of the party opposite have the audacity today to stand up and criticise the Labour Government for having done far more, with limited resources, than their own Government did in fact of a more serious threat, in 1939. New prototypes are already in existence, with yards ready to build them, whereas the pre-war Tory Government had neither the vessels nor the plans nor the yards ready to build them.
    There is, therefore, no need to debate our naval strength further to show conclusively that, comparatively speaking, we are in a better position to deal with our only potential enemy than at any time in our long maritime history. If the Opposition agree with me I will not put forward any more points to convince them, but I can guarantee that I have got the necessary points. I have the 1939 documents from which to quote if I am challenged, so I do not intend to stand any nonsense from the Opposition.
    1122
    I now turn to the question of the Russian submarines—[An HON. MEMBER: "Where are they?"]—on which the Tory Opposition and the Press base their main arguments for their purely political attack on the Labour Government's naval policy. I served in one of the early anti-submarine flotillas, so I can claim some knowledge of the original difficulties of submarine hunting. It is now a much easier problem. I was "in" on the first development of asdics, so I know very well what has happened since then. I repeat that it is easier today to deal with the submarine than it was in the 1914–18 war.
    However, I have no wish to be unpatriotic, like the Tory Party, by putting ideas into Stalin's mind. But the first question I would ask the Opposition about the Russian submarines is this: If those submarines are so numerous and so capable as the Opposition would have us believe, why have those vessels not been used in force in the Korean campaign? There have been operations, with big ships loafing about the coast, because when battleships are engaged in a non-naval operation—necessarily so—in supporting the Army, they are just loafing about the coast. When they are bombarding in support of the Army they provide an ideal target for enemy submarines on the largest possible scale, about which I will say no more. Look at the offers I have had from the other side of the House—not a word; they are down and out for the count.
    Commander Galbraith: I really think that the hon. and gallant Member is being perhaps very foolish in putting ideas into Stalin's mind. He is really giving a lot of naval information by saying that ships are loafing about inviting attention.
    Commander Pursey: Well, of all the nonsense, and coming from a short-term naval amateur who now adorns the Opposition Front Bench, and who, presumably, is to wind up for the Opposition. I ask hon. Members! It was much the same as the interruptions he made in the speech of the Parliamentary Secretary. But I do not take any objection to them; this is a free place. It was perfectly obvious that he was just out to trip up my hon. Friend on certain things in order to try to score political points. If there is any question of putting ideas into

    1123
    Stalin's head he has had innumerable ideas put into it by the Tory Party and their spokesman on naval affairs, the Navy League, and the Tory Press—[HON. MEMBERS: "What about the British Legion?"] We have heard nothing of Russian submarine activities and there has been this great opportunity. Presumably, the reason is because in warlike operations with the British and American navies, their ideas about expectation of life in operations in submarines is not great.
    What is the position now about these Russian submarines? Tory M.Ps, and the Press claim there are hundreds. I do not mind what is the number. They increase like the number of Russian troops that were landed in Scotland during the First World War—people even saw them with the snow on their boots. They compare the number of Russian submarines with the smaller number of German submarines in 1939, and then argue that they would create more havoc among British shipping at the outbreak of war. The Opposition make no reference, however, to the greatly improved counter-measures to which the Parliamentary Secretary referred, and about which I shall not speak, but about which they have far more information from their Service and club contacts than we have on this side of the House.
    A number of these Russian submarines are obsolete. Others are for coastal defence and not for overseas attack. But submarine success depends on crews, and the Russians have not proved themselves sailors in their three major wars of the last half-century—1904 with Japan; 1914–18, and the last one. In previous debates both on defence and on the Navy Estimates I challenged the Opposition—as I have today—to say where are these Russian submarines. Will they answer that challenge today? If so, I am prepared to give way to any hon. Member on the other side of the House. No takers! Their case is largely fictitious; it is fanciful shadow-boxing with their own imagination.
    I am duly cognisant of what the Parliamentary Secretary said, but I will take it a stage further. In the last defence debate I challenged the right hon. Member for Bromley (Mr. H. Macmillan) by asking, "Are not the greater number of these submarines in the Pacific, and the
    1124
    responsibility of the American Navy? "He replied, with what he thought was a devastating retort, that submarines have a habit of moving about. What abysmal ignorance for one who was leading for the Opposition in that debate on a technical subject like the Navy; because apparently he failed to appreciate that submarine-hunting vessels also move about, and with greater speed and ease.
    Even if we accept, and I am prepared to accept, that there are some Russian submarines on the west side of Russia and the north coast, where are they now based? The Parliamentary Secretary said they were in the Arctic, the Baltic and the Black Sea—which divides the Russian submarine forces into four and weakens them accordingly. The Arctic is not a good place from which to operate and is thousands of miles from any of our convoys. Both the Baltic and the Black Sea are largely inland lakes, and are most difficult both from the point of view of exit and entry; particularly if both sides of the entrance are held by powers supporting the Allies, as they are today. The Russian submarine menace, therefore, is in no way as serious a threat as the Tories and the Press would lead us to believe.
    I shall not develop that point any further, because apparently there are no takers on the other side of the House; they now agree with that, and from now on we shall not hear any more of this exaggeration and fanciful talk about the Russian submarines. Even so, throughout the whole of the statement of the First Lord and in a considerable part of the speech of the Parliamentary Secretary the importance of being prepared to deal with such Russian submarines as may be used to attack our naval ships and merchant fleets, or those of our Allies, was stressed. The steps taken, and those projected, for the development of secret new anti-submarine weapons are such as to prove a strong deterrent, even to the Kremlin, to embarking on a shooting war; and the assurance was given that the Navy will be in a relatively stronger position to cope with events than at any previous time.
    There are other subjects with which I should like to deal on this annual occasion for reviewing our naval position, such as promotion from the ranks, which was dealt with by the hon. Member for

    1125
    Huddersfield, East (Mr. J. P. W. Mallalieu); and also the question of married quarters to which reference was made by the hon. Member for Hereford. What is the position about married quarters? Under a Tory Government there were no such things as married quarters. The only married quarters provided were for the men who had jobs ashore, and who were living on what was known as "lodging and compensation." It was left to the Labour Government, at this late stage in our naval history, to decide to go in for married quarters for the ordinary rank and file, as well as for officers serving in other appointments.
    The point was made by the hon. Member for Hereford about making things more attractive. The Service today is better paid than it has ever been in its long history. As regards pilots, of which there is a shortage, the Parliamentary Secretary gave an example. A married pilot of 25, on flying duty, receives £980. I do not begrudge him a penny of it, but let the Tories say whenever they were near that figure. Never in their long history. I will content myself with having fired the first broadcast—[Laughter.]—the first broadside—I shall come to a broadcast later, when we shall have some more—in the Labour Party's new counter-barrage against the political campaign of the Opposition and the Tory Press against the Prime Minister and the Labour Government.
    I would warn them, and also some of the "decoy ducks" on this side of the House, who are always ready to support Motions and other things from the other side, that from now on, we are prepared to debate with the Opposition any subject under the sun. We are prepared to show the country at large that the Tory Party are not concerned with what harm they can do both at home and abroad; that their main concern is not the safety and welfare of this Realm, but simply how soon they can get back into power, no matter by what means, genuine or otherwise.
    6.30 p.m.
    Lieut.-Commander Gurney Braithwaite: I should like to preface the few remarks which I have to offer to the House by saying how much I enjoyed the manner in which these Estimates were presented by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty. He
    1126
    covered the whole field in the shortest possible space of time and he gave a very clear and concise survey of the present naval situation. The hon. Gentleman's speech really was a speech. So often on these occasions we find Ministers in the position of the Scottish preacher of whom an elder said at the end of the service that the trouble with the sermon was that he read it, that he read it badly and that it was not worth reading. The hon. Gentleman's speech was worth hearing in all its aspects.
    I was sorry that he could not find a sentence or two in his lengthy survey to speak about the department in which he himself rendered conspicuous service towards the end of the war, namely, the education department. The first time I heard the hon. Gentleman's name before I had the opportunity of meeting him, was when I was told that he was a particularly brilliant lecturer to the Fleet and indeed to shore establishments. It would be interesting to know if that most important work of adult education in the Navy—the provision of information rooms and so on—is still being continued in time of peace. I hope that it is. It is the sort of activity which gets lost sight of when we are confronted with a menace from outside; none the less it is valuable.
    I propose to confine my remarks to one aspect only of the naval problem. As my constituency contains the great port of Avonmouth, I want to speak about the essential task of the Navy, to which the Parliamentary Secretary referred, of protecting the Merchant Navy and ensuring that at all times and at all seasons the necessary food and raw materials for the sustenance of this island are able to arrive safely in our ports. Of one thing I am certain. Hon. Members on both sides will agree with the statement that in the recent conflict no body of men played a more heroic part than our merchant seamen, exposed as they were to the most terrible perils all over the seven seas. Even the Royal Air Force—and I yield to no man in my admiration for all that they achieved in the Battle of Britain and other operations—would have been grounded and unable to take the air had not the tankers been able to get through to our ports with the necessary oil fuel to maintain that magnificent wing of His Majesty's Forces.

    1127
    I assure the hon. and gallant Member for Hull, East (Commander Pursey), that I shall not enter into any arguments concerning the speed of Russian submarines. That they exist in large numbers we have been assured, not only by the Minister of Defence but by the Parliamentary Secretary today. Belief in the existence of Russian submarines is no monopoly of the Tory Party. Perhaps it would be a good thing if it was. Yet, unfortunately, there is this menace. I will not discuss our shortage of frigates or similar technicalities upon which many hon. Members possess superior knowledge to my own.
    I want to address myself, however, to the question of the personnel who in time of war have to sail in the merchant ships themselves. These include the convoy signalman, for example, who is specially trained. There is a branch of the Service with the rating of convoy signalman. Many hundreds of them passed through my hands, and they performed an invaluable part in the organisation of all our convoys. Then there are the radar operator and the whole branch of convoy protection which we refer to as D.E.M.S. In the First World War it used to be known as D.A.M.S. We are improving as we move down the ages. The defensive armament of merchant shipping was known as D.A.M.S., but a more refined Admiralty in the Second World War called it D.E.M.S.—defensive equipment of merchant shipping. We all know what it means.
    A large number of naval ratings have to be trained to man the weapons not in the escorts but in the merchant ships themselves. Also we had valuable assistance in the last war from a military organisation who called themselves Maritime Anti-Aircraft. They were largely engaged in firing machine guns and weapons of that type and they also sailed in the merchant ships. One would like to be assured that these activities are being borne in mind at present and that, should a sudden conflict break upon us, the Admiralty will not have overlooked the importance of having this type of personnel available.
    I should like to remind the House that when the prize money was distributed—I believe it was before the Parliamentary Secretary was promoted to the Front
    1128
    Bench—we found that all the categories I have mentioned were excluded on the ground that they were sailing under the Red and not the White Ensign. Parliament, with its usual pertinacity, got that matter put right. That showed that the House at that time appreciated the value of these men. I hope that the Civil Lord will be able to tell us that they are now being borne in mind.
    The Parliamentary Secretary referred to the retention of what we call active service pensioners—the time-expired men who are required for a further 18 months service. I have sent him a letter on the subject. In passing, I wish to ask, because this is relevant to the organisation of convoys as well, whether it is necessary to retain such a large number of supply ratings. In view of his own definition that civilians can perform this task up to the point where the gear goes on board the ship—I think he said as far as the derrick—I should like to know whether it is appreciated that in the last war, as the years went by, an immense amount of this supply work was very efficiently carried out ashore by the W.R.N.S. under the supervision of accountant officers. Is it really necessary to retain supply chief petty officers and petty officers for the full 18 months? It seems to me that perhaps they come in a category where the urgency is less great than in others.
    I pass to another essential feature of our protection of merchant shipping—the training and readiness of commodores of convoys. It will be remembered that in the early part of the last war ocean-going convoys were commodored by retired admirals of the Royal Navy, and as time went on senior officers of the Royal Naval Reserve who were captains and who became broad-ring commodores. They rendered invaluable service. The slower convoys which dealt with coastal cargoes, such as bringing coal from the Tyne to the Thames, and coastal convoys along the coast of Italy and the like, were commodored more often by commanders of the Royal Naval Reserve drawn from the Merchant Navy.
    That is why I interrupted the Parliamentary Secretary this afternoon, when he was giving figures about the various Reserves, to ask about the R.N.R. He said that he had not got the figure with him. I am told that the figure is in the

    1129
    vicinity of 3,000. That is an approximate figure.
    There was a gap, before the hon. Gentleman came to the Admiralty, when recruiting for the R.N.R. was suspended. I believe that there was some sort of tug-of-war with the Ministry of Transport about whether these officers should not be retained in the Merchant Navy where it was obvious that they would be valuable. Of course, perhaps the hon. Gentleman in his former capacity as Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Transport was hauling on the other end of the rope at that time. Perhaps he has now shifted and is hauling on the right end of the rope; but I am quite sure that his Admiralty experience will have told him that, whatever the claims of other branches may be, there are a certain number of officers who really are essential for such tasks as the commodoring of convoys. They are not only to be found among those who are actually afloat, but those who have gone ashore, "swallowing the anchor," as it is called, and have left the sea but remain on the retired list of the R.N.R., who would be invaluable for these duties. Could it not be possible, unless it is already under way, for officers of that type to be recalled for short refresher courses for convoy protection in the modern conditions, a picture of which we have been given this afternoon?
    May I also suggest that there are ex-officers of the R.N.V.R. and the Royal Naval Volunteer Supplementary Reserve who would be useful men in this matter of convoy organisation? There are the officers who served in the special branch wearing the green stripe in the last war, many of whom have a good working knowledge of most of the preliminaries necessary before a convoy can sail; for instance, routeing and the organisation of D.E.M.S., the naval control services, boarding of ships, collection of the necessary statistics, arrangement of convoys in speeds and so on. Then there are many men, especially the retired R.N.R. or R.N.V.R. officers, who would be most useful to the Admiralty as instructors immediately on the outbreak of war in various measures of which they have a certain knowledge and who left the service fairly recently. Signals and navigation occur to me at once, and I hope that the Admiralty will be sensible about the age limit.
    1130
    In the last war, for a long time, they would not look at anybody who was over 40 years of age, but perhaps the hon. Gentleman himself, when he took his white paper and, presumably, passed through that excellent school, H.M.S. "King Alfred," was instructed in navigation, as hundreds of officers were successfully instructed, by a gentleman of 72 years of age, a lieutenant-commander of the R.N.R., who passed through a very large number of officers who were afterwards able to function with great success in M.L.s, minesweepers and other craft. The Admiralty should have at their disposal in total war those who would be able to pass on their knowledge to others. I naturally hope that the services of the hon. and gallant Member for Hull, East, might be pressed into service under that heading. I naturally hope so, because I am never controversial about these matters.
    I hope also that steady progress will be made on the lines suggested to us by the Parliamentary Secretary in the provision of adequate escort for our convoys, but that those I have mentioned will be maintained as an efficient means of protection for our merchant shipping. The lives of thousands of brave men depend upon this essential task, and I would therefore urge upon the Government that this matter should be attended to without delay.
    6.43 p.m.
    Mr. Donnelly: The very few remarks I am about to make will follow upon those made by the hon. and gallant Member for Bristol, Northwest (Lieut.-Commander Braithwaite), in dealing with the question of convoy defence and the protection of our merchant shipping.
    One of the great difficulties which faced us in the last war was that we did not have the use of the Southern Irish ports that we had in the First World War, and, although to some extent we were able to make up for that deficiency through the creation of Coastal Command, the development of long-distance aircraft operating from bases in Southern England, West Wales and Northern Ireland, that problem still remained as a real problem, and, regrettably, and I say that advisedly, is still with us today. Unless the advice of my hon. and learned Friend

    1131
    the Member for Hornchurch (Mr. Bing) is followed, I think it will remain with us for a long time to come.
    However, I would with some diffidence suggest to the Civil Lord that a great deal more use might be made of some of the more western "harbours in the British Isles. At the moment, one of the best of these harbours, and indeed one of the finest in the world, is not being used by the Navy to any extent. I refer to Milford Haven, which is one of the finest deep-water harbours one could find in the seven seas, which will take the largest ships of the Royal Navy, having a depth at low tide of eight fathoms.
    Although I am not myself an expert in naval matters, having spent the greater part of my adult life in the Royal Air Force, experts tell me that there is no finer harbour anywhere, and this point was made by the present Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster when speaking in a debate on the Navy Estimates on 27th February, 1940, when he said:
    "When compared with the East Coast ports, Pembroke would be valuable for services in connection with light flotillas in the antisubmarine campaign at the Western approaches."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 27th February, 1940; Vol. 357, c. 1944.]
    I wish to bring to the notice of my hon. Friend on the Front Bench the very valuable facilities which exist, which are not utilised at the moment, but which we might well need to utilise in the future. In the last century, the Navy built a dockyard at Pembroke, across the water from Milford, and some of the finest ships which have served in the British Navy were built there. In 1926, however, the naval dockyard was suddenly closed, with the result that the town of Pembroke Dock, which had grown up as a result of the establishment of the naval dockyard, languished and a quarter of its population left.
    The social history of Pembroke Dock is as bad as that of Jarrow, and the blame for it rests on the Admiralty under a Tory Government at that time every bit as much as the blame for the situation at Jarrow rested with the directors of Palmers Shipyard. The social effects were worse in Pembroke Dock than in Jarrow, because there were other industries to which the people of Jarrow could turn, while there was literally nothing at Pembroke Dock. Thus I should like to suggest tonight that use should be made of this
    1132
    fine harbour of Milford Haven. I earnestly suggest that a great deal can be done to remove the memory which still exists as the result of the decision of a Tory Government in 1926, and to make the harbour at Milford Haven ready for the future, in case we should ever need to use it.
    6.48 p.m.
    Mr. Hamilton Kerr: The hon. Member for Pembroke (Mr. Donnelly) devoted the major part of his remarks to the question of our western ports, and he referred to the fact that we encountered great difficulties in the last war because we did not have the use of the Irish ports. I am certain that we feel that if Ireland had been able to allow us the use of her ports she would have obtained the greatest chance in her history of winning the admiration of the world. She missed it to her detriment.
    The debate today has ranged over a wide field and I would like to take it to a somewhat gloomy region, namely, the Arctic Ocean. I do so with some diffidence, because I know that my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Merton and Morden (Captain Ryder) is an authority on the subject, whereas I myself have virtually no qualifications except, perhaps, the fact of having walked across the lava fields of Iceland with the Parliamentary Secretary, and having landed, gibbering with fear, I confess, on a runway at the foot of the ice cap of Greenland.
    I should like, in particular, to make some remarks on the protection of our trade routes, a matter which may play a great part in any possible future conflict. I suppose it is true to say that, in fact, the history of naval warfare is the history of the struggle for trade routes. It is for this reason I suppose that in the heyday of our power, we obtained possession of fortresses along the trade routes leading to the East like Gibraltar, Malta, Aden, Trincomalee, and Singapore. That is why, in two great wars of this century, the sea struggle centred round the Western Approaches, where the great trade routes from the coasts of America, from Panama, and from the River Plate converge on these islands. Again, the sea war raged in the area between the Azores and the Tagus, for in that area the trade routes of the Mediterranean and the Cape likewise converge.

    1133
    We are now told that the aeroplane has opened up a new route across the roof of the world. I have in my possession an American atlas of global geography written by a certain well-known Harvard professor, and I confess that to my simple tastes its coloured charts greatly appeal. That atlas tells us some remarkable facts. It tells us, for instance, that only some 4,525 miles separate Moscow from New York. It tells us that a Russian bomber could, with equal effect, attack-Minneapolis, the American naval base in Virginia, or San Diego, the base in the Pacific; and that a bomber, taking off from Kiska, in the Aleutians, could strike with equal ease at San Francisco or the great industrial centre of Detroit on the Great Lakes.
    I conclude from that information that in any possible conflict the Arctic Ocean would certainly be the scene of intensive air warfare, of long-range bombers, of radar posts, and, possibly, of descents by parachutists. But I think we equally deceive ourselves if we believe that the Navy will not have to play an important part there. From the best information I have been able to obtain, I understand that the Russians are intensively training a certain proportion of their Navy for Arctic conditions. I understand, again, that they are using, on the sea route north of Siberia, ice-breakers made in this country.
    If it be true that they can maintain open that route north of Siberia, they will be able to shift their submarine fleet from the Pacific, or, by way of the White Sea Canal, from the Baltic into the Atlantic. I am told that our American Allies are, fortunately, training a certain number of their naval personnel in Arctic conditions, and that they have icebreakers in use on the Great Lakes. But for ourselves, who have been pioneers in Arctic exploration, I gather that we have fallen a considerable way behind. I believe I am right in saying that the Admiralty have a certain number of technical committees dealing with clothing and kindred matters likely to be of interest in Arctic warfare. But this is not really sufficient preparation for war. We want men trained under Arctic conditions, men who have a certain amount of practical experience.
    I ask the Government, therefore, to consider three propositions; as soon as possible to train a small nucleus of young
    1134
    naval officers under conditions of Arctic warfare; as soon as possible to obtain even from Norway if necessary, ships in which these men can be trained and finally, that we ourselves should build ships capable of entering Arctic regions. I hope that by the time the Navy Estimates for next year are before us, we may learn that some progress has been made in this field.
    6.54 p.m.
    Mr. Keenan: I am particularly pleased to have the opportunity of following so quickly one or two hon. Members who have made some reference to the Merchant Navy, because, representing and living in a place like Liverpool, I naturally know something of what is expected from this House in this respect, in view of the times through which we are now passing. But before putting one or two questions to the Minister in the hope of allaying some misapprehensions on this point, I wish to make a reference to former Navy Estimates debates, because it does not seem to me that some of the comments made in those debates have yet produced any results.
    I am still very dissatisfied—and this was a point of view expressed by the hon. Member for Huddersfield, East (Mr. J. P. W. Mallalieu) earlier today—with the conditions in the Service. They are not what they ought to be. The things about which we complained in earlier years, and which we asked should be improved, are apparently still in the same state. I am referring to accommodation and to conditions generally. I remember, when I was fortunate enough on a previous occasion to be successful in the ballot for a Motion on going into Committee of Supply on the Navy Estimates, complaining, as I still do, that nothing had been done to modernise the uniform of the average sailor. I think that improvement is long overdue, and I hope that before I pass on, at any rate, somebody in charge of the Navy will introduce the square rig in place of the present sailor's uniform.
    The Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty told us earlier today that the expenditure on the Admiralty Office accounted for under 2 per cent. of the total sum involved; but according to Vote 12, there is an increase of approximately £500,000 in the Estimate this year

    1135
    as compared with last year, and as the new Estimate is somewhere in the region of £6 million, I think my hon. Friend will see that it is actually an increase of 8 per cent. I remember complaining last year that the Admiralty Office Vote was over £5 million. I think there are a lot of posts in the Admiralty that could be done away with; in many cases, they are redundant. In this connection, I was very impressed during the Army Estimates debate in what the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) pointed out when he was comparing the numbers of the different Army staffs in the several countries which he mentioned.
    In my opinion, there are too many retired admirals at the Admiralty. I said this last year, but I do not observe that any change in the number has been made. As a matter of fact, the Admiralty is costing more this year. I remember saying last year that it cost as much in 1949–50 as it did during the war, when there were something like four times the number of men to be looked after and greater responsibilities in the Service.
    Mr. J. P. L. Thomas: Surely, if the admirals are now working at the Admiralty, they cannot be retired.
    Mr. Keenan: My complaint is that some of the individuals in the Admiralty, though retired from the Service, have been posted, so far as I can judge from the long list which is incomplete. If the hon. Member for Hereford (Mr. J. P. L. Thomas), is in any doubt, I am prepared to say that there is no need for the Deputies at the Admiralty. There are eight Deputies on the Board of Admiralty, and in my opinion the 11 Lords on the Board are enough to do the job properly. It costs a few extra thousand pounds to pay for the others.
    Now I want to come back to the Merchant Navy. I know that, generally speaking, those in the naval Service have spoken very feelingly about and paid tribute to the men of the Merchant Navy because of their service during the last two wars. I am anxious that we should not neglect the lessons to be learned from our failures and mistakes in the past and should not fail to take advantage of those lessons.
    What is being done in the present international situation, which unfortunately may mean war? If it comes to war, then,
    1136
    as far as I can judge, it will not be a question of battleships and cruisers so much as merchant ships and submarines. What arrangements are being made to stockpile the equipment which will be required to re-equip merchant ships in an emergency? We know how long it was before we were able to give our merchant ships the equipment to protect them against the magnetic mine during the last war. We know how many ships still lying in the Mersey, were sunk before that equipment had been provided. If we recognise our responsibilities, we ought to be prepared to equip every ship immediately it comes into dock, and we should have the labour and equipment ready for that purpose.
    The hon. and gallant Member for Bristol, North-West (Lieut.-Commander Braithwaite) spoke feelingly about the need for anti-aircraft equipment. In the event of war, is the necessary armament available? In the First World War, as in the last war, a lone 3.6 gun at the stern of a ship did not engender much confidence. I was told by those who went to sea that in the early stages they had not much confidence either in the weapons provided or in the men sent to man them. When we consider the valuable part the Merchant Navy must play in future wars, we should be ready to equip them so that they may be protected from aircraft as well as from under-water attack.
    As the hon. and gallant Member for Bristol, North-West, asked, have the Government thought about the personnel and has the need to have them available immediately they are required been considered? All this will involve great alterations in re-equipping ships, both large and small. During the last war I was a member of an emergency committee. I was always on the dock-side looking after men discharged from ships and I was acquainted with what went on. I was very disturbed to find what was happening. I suppose the same thing would happen again. Trawlers and small vessels will be wanted for mine-sweeping and other purposes, but last time there was a tremendous waste of manpower on ship repairs and re-equipment. During that time there were twice as many men on the decks of small ships as were required, and often the necessary materials were not available to enable the work to be done quickly.

    1137
    I know why that happened. Ship repairers and contractors employed anybody they could secure to do the work. Because of the cost-plus system of payment, it did not matter how much it cost or how many were employed on the job. I was rather alarmed today when the Parliamentary Secretary said that contract work, which was a safeguard in a matter of expense, was in a measure disappearing and that we were getting back to the cost-plus system. Has not note been taken of the waste that occurred last time and the financial burden to the Navy and other Services because this cost-plus system was allowed? I am satisfied from my own observations, particularly in 1939, 1940 and 1941, that contractors on Merseyside, as elsewhere, received too much for the job they did.
    Mr. Callaghan: There is one essential difference that will apply in the new system. Previously the cost and hence the plus operated upwards or downwards according to the amount of materials and the number of men employed. In the schemes we now hope to use, the plus will be invariable, that is to say, there will be no temptation to employ more men or to be lavish with materials in the expectation of having a higher amount representing the plus.
    Mr. Keenan: I am glad to have some reassurance, at any rate, that the matter has been noted and that an effort has been made to prevent the leakage that there was in the past. That is very satisfactory. It was about this that I was largely concerned. Furthermore, it is not only a question of armaments and equipping ships to protect themselves against under-water and air attack. I should like also to see more attention given this time to life-saving apparatus and the provisioning and equipping of lifeboats. The last war had gone on for two or three years before the Merchant Navy obtained some of the elementary protection and safeguards to which they were entitled. It should be remembered that we lost more men in the Merchant Navy than in the Royal Navy during the last war. That alone sufficiently indicates the need there is to look after them.
    My hon. Friend the Member for Pembroke (Mr. Donnelly) spoke of the facilities at Pembroke Docks, but Liverpool stands alone. Liverpool was the port farthest away from the Germans in
    1138
    the last war and it is the farthest away from our potential enemy, Russia. I hope that the few remarks I have made about the Merchant Navy will cause those responsible to see that the Service is adequately looked after and that in future there is not the financial waste that there was during the last war.
    7.8 p.m.
    Major Cundiff: It is always a privilege to be called to speak on the day that the House discusses the Navy Estimates. The Royal Navy and the command of the Royal Navy are as precious to us today as they ever have been in our long maritime history. I have always thought it to be an unfortunate policy that in the senior Service the Minister should sit in another place, but the First Lord has two lieutenants in this House, one on the bridge attending to his navigation and the other below decks responsible for a fair head of steam, and I think they both render to their captain loyal and faithful service.
    I wish to make three points. The first is concerned with naval construction. In the First World War, the Royal Navy was frequently asked to provide inshore coastal bombardment. I refer to the Dardanelles and the Euphrates River. In the Second World War we saw a repetition of this in the English Channel and on the coasts farther up to the north. Today in Korean waters United Nations ships are frequently being asked for support for land operations and landings. If, by chance, we become involved in another war in Europe, I think this question of coastal bombardment may play a very important part.
    The question therefore arises, what units have we got to carry out this work? The old county class cruiser, 10,000 tons with eight-inch guns, has disappeared, and so far there has been no kind of replacement. The tendency today is to build smaller cruisers and to fit them with six-inch guns. Except in the case of grave necessity, I think it would be most unwise ever to employ a vessel like the "Vanguard" or any of the "King George V" battleships on coastal bombardment in these restricted waters. Therefore, the Government should consider laying down a limited number of shallow draft monitors—perhaps half a

    1139
    dozen. They are comparatively cheap to produce. They are merely floating mobile gun platforms. They could carry one or two 12-inch guns, of which I understand we have a reserve. They carry a very small complement of men, but in certain conditions they are most effective units, and I hope the Government will give sympathetic consideration to that suggestion.
    I wish to say something about the surface speed of a potential hostile submarine. It has been said that Russia, with the help of German technicians, has evolved a submarine hull capable of a surface speed of something between 30 and 40 knots. If that statement is true. I suggest that it may alter the whole picture of submarine attack on merchant convoys. It would enable a "smash-and-grab" raid to be made. Under a courageous and determined submarine commander, and in the suitable conditions of a lumpy sea and reduced visibility, a surface attack could be made and one or more selected ships could be sunk or crippled.
    More than this, it would enable the hostile submarine to make a surface retreat, and if a surface retreat were possible at all, it would confer on that submarine commander the very greatest benefit in that he would not be subjected to the most terrible of all antisubmarine actions—that is, a prolonged depth charge attack while the submarine is submerged. This new submarine would have everything. It would have its fast battery drive when submerged deep; it would have the use of a Schnorkel apparatus enabling it to use its main engines when it was just submerged, and it would have this very great surface speed.
    I was very pleased and cheered to hear this afternoon the Parliamentary Secretary telling us about the progress which had been made with regard to radar and also air cover. But what about our escort ships? We must face the fact that the 30-knot destroyer and the 20 to 25-knot frigate are not good enough. Much more attention will have to be paid to the hull design of destroyers, anti-submarine vessels and escort ships, and we must pack into those hulls a vastly increased shaft horsepower to give an appreciably
    1140
    higher speed and greater manoeuvrability. We must also give them our very latest in quick-firing equipment.
    Another point which I think is of paramount importance is that the gun crews must be individually trained to absolute perfection. If by any chance another war comes, the question of transport on the North Atlantic and South Atlantic routes will be of vital importance to us. May I remind the House what our losses were in the last war? During the last war over a period of 68 months we lost 14½ million tons of merchant shipping. By direct U-boat action alone we lost 2,775 ships, which is an average of 41 ships for every month that the war lasted.
    May I now turn to my last point? I have raised this question on two previous occasions, but I make no apology for raising it again. I refer to the necessity for a naval base in the eastern half of the Mediterranean. A few days ago my right hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Mr. Eden) referred to a possible new threat to Yugoslavia. Suppose Yugoslavia fell to the Russians, and suppose a little later Greece and Turkey were over-run. What would there be to prevent submarines being assembled in some of the Black Sea ports such as Sevastopol, Odessa, Constanta or Varna, and then proceeding through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles into the Mediterranean? At the same time, we must not overlook the fact that a certain number of other submarines would enter the Mediterranean through the Gibraltar Straits.
    I ask the question: Have we got a naval base in the eastern half of the Mediterranean Sea? Is there anywhere where we can refuel, refit and victual our ships? We have lost the Port of Alexandria with its 600 acres of good anchorage; and at this point let me say that in view of the present attitude of Egypt towards this country, I look upon her as a very doubtful friend. Shall we be allowed to use Haifa? Has anything been done about the preparation of a naval base in Cyprus? In asking these questions, I have in mind the tragedy of the "Ark Royal," crippled and gallantly struggling back to make port, which she just failed to do. If by any chance one of our capital ships is crippled in this area where does she turn for help? Must she just turn to the West and make the long

    1141
    struggle to reach Malta? The Mediterranean Sea and the Suez Canal are a main artery for Australia and New Zealand. If our ships are to have the freedom of this sea, they must have a base; they must have a home in the eastern end as well as a home at Gibraltar.

  NORTH ATLANTIC DEFENCE
  7.20 p.m.
  Mr. Mulley: I beg to move, to leave out from "That" to the end of the Question and to add instead thereof:
  "this House, recognising that the first task of the Royal Navy, in conjunction with its Allies, is to maintain the freedom of the seas, views with satisfaction the prominent part played by the Royal Navy in bringing about close working relations with the Navies of other Atlantic Treaty powers and welcomes this development as a powerful instrument for the preservation of world peace."
  This Amendment was conceived, as is proper, in decent obscurity, but many words have crossed the Table since then and, during its period of gestation, there was so much excitement that a miscarriage nearly occurred. I am glad that it is born in rather calmer circumstances tonight, but one consequence of what has been said here and elsewhere on the subject in recent weeks is that tonight we have more information available for our debate.
  Because of the understanding that the appointment of the Supreme Atlantic Commander is to be discussed in the near future on a separate occasion, I do not propose to raise that subject tonight, although I hope to have the good fortune of catching your eye, Mr. Speaker, on that occasion. Nevertheless, I think the hon. Member for Hereford (Mr. J. P. L. Thomas) will appreciate that it is quite impossible to discuss this Amendment without treading rather a lot on what he called Tom Tiddler's ground or skating on thin ice. As one hon. Member has said, it is perhaps best compared to a performance of "Hamlet" without the Prince of Denmark.
  Before turning to the Amendment, I feel I should explain to the House that it is the strange fortune of the ballot which brings me with some diffidence to intervene in naval affairs. I cannot claim to have held the high rank which seems to be the qualification for participating in these Service debates. In fact, my service was in the Army, which I left as
  1142
  war-substantive corporal, which qualifies me for the Z Reserve and for very little else. As a soldier, I learnt that we envied the Navy for two things. The first was the fact that sailors were allowed to grow beards and the second was the very great elegance and charm of the W.R.N.S. I do not know whether my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary can tell us from his own experience whether there is any connection between these two facts.
  I can, however, claim some constituency interest in naval affairs. Sheffield is, I believe, technically a port, although our River Don is even more quiet than its namesake, and we do not see many sailors in Sheffield. We make in Sheffield a great amount of the special steel which is required for Navy work and our engineering workshops are always full of Admiralty contracts, so that in a small way the workers of Sheffield can claim to play some part in the great achievements of the Royal Navy.
  Since I have no naval connections, I can perhaps say some kind things about the Royal Navy which would appear to be immodest and a breach of the tradition of the Silent Service if said by hon. and gallant Members with a naval background. I think it is true to say that the Royal Navy is held in special affection in the hearts of all our people, no matter where they live or in which Service they happen to have served. Jokes about the Army or the Air Force are very popular. Comedians and others have been known even to make jokes about His Majesty's Government, but in all seriousness I would say that we find very few jokes about the Royal Navy and people tend to regard them as rather irreverent if they are made.
  Traditionally we have been a great sea Power and there is no doubt that the Royal Navy has saved this nation on many occasions. Today, in the battle of Korea and in the recall of reservists which the Navy has made, all who heard the Parliamentary Secretary will agree that, quietly and efficiently, the Navy is playing its full part in our re-armament and defence burden. That is particularly appropriate because our re-armament is purely for defence reasons, for we believe that only by strengthening our defences, in co-operation with our allies in the

  1143
  North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, can we achieve our ardent desire for peace. While the Navy can be formidable in offence, I think it can be said that its strategic rôle is mainly defensive.
  In my view, it has three main tasks, the first being the protection of our convoys and the maintenance of the freedom of the seas so that we can get the essential supplies without which we should not long survive. The Battle of the Atlantic was the keystone of our victory in the last war. The second task is the movement and supply of our troops and the support of coastal operations. The third task is the protection of this island from invasion.
  It is this third task which more than anything else determines our whole defensive strategy, and I think it is on that account necessary to review our traditional and historic position as being primarily a sea Power. In a future war I do not believe that the Navy, whatever its size, could by itself secure us from invasion. The development of guided missiles, of airborne troops and of atomic warfare has minimised the protection for centuries the sea gave us, and for this reason I do not think we can ever again afford to allow the enemy to occupy the Channel Ports and to depend on the Channel and the Royal Navy to protect us.
  If we take this view, it is clear that we must devote an increasing proportion of our defence resources to the Army and to the Air Force, and, in fact, become primarily a land and air Power and no longer chiefly a naval Power. It is a hard decision to take; it involves a loss of prestige and, indeed, is a complete reversal of our traditional defensive strategy. It is often said as criticism of the Services that we fight the next war with the strategy of the last war and that we enter a new battle with the tactical lessons of the battle before the last. If this is true, how much more serious will it be if we approach another war with the overall defensive strategy not of 1951 but of 1941?
  I believe that the Navy has never been as much subject to this criticism of fighting a war with the strategy of the last war as have the other Services. I think the Navy has always been realistic and that the Navy has accepted its new role. In my view, it is essential for all of
  1144
  us to achieve the necessary revolution of thought to review our strategic position in a realistic modern light. Unless we are able by land and air power, in cooperation with our Allies, to protect this island, the Navy will be denied a home base from which to conduct its vital defensive and offensive work in carrying our supplies and moving our troops. The case for this new strategy was well put in "The Observer" yesterday, and my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War referred to it in the Army Estimates debate last week. I think there was more than a hint of this view in what my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary said tonight. It is a view that I have held for a long time.
  In saying this I do not wish to underestimate the danger and the menace of submarine attack. Nor do I wish to minimise our dependence on overseas supplies, the safeguarding of which I gave as the first task of the Royal Navy. In this field, the Atlantic area is of supreme importance. But, whether we like it or not, in my view it is impossible, in terms of economic and manpower resources, for us to do this job alone, as we were forced to do in the early stages of the last war.
  It is against this background that we should examine the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Navy's contribution to it. In terms of size, as we have heard again today, the Americans will make a much bigger contribution than we. The other eight North Atlantic Powers in the North Atlantic Ocean Regional Planning Group will make a useful contribution, too; and I do not think we should forget that this is not a matter for the United States and ourselves alone; we should remember that we are associated in this task with Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway, and Portugal. While the problem of the European Army remains, I believe we have already gone a long way towards the formation of a North Atlantic navy. While we may not be able to play the part in terms of quantity that many of us would perhaps like us to do, I am quite sure that in terms of quality our Navy will give us cause in the future, as it has in the past, to be very proud of its contribution to our defensive arrangements.
  The title of the Treaty itself suggests that naval forces must play an important

  1145
  part in implementing it. It is vital that there should be close co-operation in all fields of naval activities in time of peace between the navies of all parties to the Treaty, so that the maximum effort can be forthcoming in the event of war. I want, therefore, to put some questions to my hon. Friend—questions to which, I hope, he can reply without fear of international repercussions—about the part that the Navy is playing in the building up of North Atlantic defence.
  As I understand it, the coastal waters of both the American and European Continents and of the British Isles remain the individual responsibilities of the countries concerned, and that the rest of the Atlantic is divided into two zones, Eastern and Western, which are operationally controlled by ourselves and the Americans respectively, and that there is to be a supreme command to co-ordinate the planning—not the operations—so that the naval forces may be deployed to the best advantage—unlike the arrangement in the last war by which we each kept strictly to our own side of the dividing line. I think I had better say no more about that, because if I do I may risk falling right through the ice; and so I will leave my remarks about the division of responsibilities in the Atlantic until, I hope, another occasion.
  If there are to be joint naval operations in war, it is desirable that we should plan and have exercises together in time of peace. Exercises of this kind have been publicised. I wonder whether my hon. Friend can give us an assurance that the results of those exercises have been satisfactory. Clearly, again, combined exercises cannot be effectively performed unless all personnel are fully conversant with all aspects of the material they are called upon to operate. Training is very important, and I wonder if anything has been done, for example, by the Royal Navy to train officers and men of the navies of other North Atlantic Powers. There would also appear to be an urgent need of standardisation, not only of material, which is essential for economic production and supplies, but standardisation also of procedures—for example, in communications. Can my hon. Friend tell us what has been achieved in this field of standardisation, and what is planned for the future?
  1146
  My final question is, perhaps, the most important. In addition to the fact that we must increase our land and air forces to a greater proportionate strength than ever before, with the consequent restriction of the expansion of the Navy, in proportionate terms of our total defence Services, we have also world-wide naval commitments. I wonder if my hon. Friend can tell us how far such commitments may be affected by our contribution to Atlantic Pact defence. It is clear that we would wish to make the maximum possible contribution to North Atlantic defence, but we cannot ignore our strategic commitments elsewhere. If additional argument is required, it is an additional argument for the supreme importance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and the need to make it the very basis of our naval defensive strategy.
  In conclusion, I congratulate the Royal Navy on the prominent part it has played in bringing about close working relations with the navies of other Atlantic Treaty Powers, and I welcome this development as a powerful instrument for the preservation of world peace.
  7.36 p.m.
  Mr. Paget: I beg to second the Amendment.
  I am very glad to do so. I think my hon. Friend did rather less than justice to his claims to take part in a Service debate. He was a pre-war Territorial and was one of that very gallant band who formed the rearguard covering the evacuation of Dunkirk, and enabled those of us who were in the Navy to get his comrades off, with the consequence to him of five years in a German prison camp.
  I am very glad also that he has raised the question of the co-ordination of our defences within the defences of the Atlantic area, because I believe that in all the arms that we are considering that is the primary consideration. I am reminded of an observation made by Marshal Foch. I think actually it was at an interview with General Pershing. Marshal Foch said this:
  "My opinion of Napoleon has fallen a good deal. He had only to fight alliances. Any competent general ought to be able to beat an alliance."
  That is the difficulty which we are trying to overcome with the Atlantic Pact. We

  1147
  do not want to be a mere alliance, with all the divisions within that alliance which make it so easy for a single, co-ordinated enemy to gain a victory. The object of the Atlantic Pact is to create an integrated force—an integrated force of the whole Atlantic area.
  Now, of course, each individual nation starts with the inclination to have an integrated force of its own. During the debate on the Air Estimates we heard that we must have an integrated Air Force with the right proportion of heavy bombers. With my hon. Friend, I believe that that is national thinking, not Atlantic Pact thinking. Again, all the various nations have the inclination to have an integrated balance between their general forces. If we get each of these balanced forces created by each nation, we shall have not a balanced force for the whole Atlantic area, but we shall have our forces wrongly disposed.
  I would say that this country is now a Continental power, and our job is a Continental role primarily instead of, as in the past, an oceanic role primarily. The first instrument of our defence is, unquestionably, the Royal Air Force; the second is the Army, whose objective is to keep the enemy air bases far enough away to enable the Royal Air Force to operate; and the third is the Royal Navy, whose job is to keep open the supply routes of the Royal Air Force. That is the order of priorities within our defence structure. Within the whole conception of Atlantic defence we must conceive the other role to be to provide here that which the Americans cannot immediately make available; that is, short-range fighter defence and the shorter range bomber, the close anti-submarine work, and the divisions which will have to operate and defeat the enemy in the area round here. Those are the things which will not be immediately available from America.
  On the other hand, of course, the big ships, the capital ships are available in America in quite unlimited supply in terms of our effort. Indeed, I would say that their Lordships of the Admiralty have done a good deal too well in these Estimates. I believe that so far from not having got their fair share of the men, materials and money available for defence, they have probably got a good deal more than their fair share. They are inclined
  1148
  to do that; they are very, very able men, as we all recognise.
  Now, just what is the menace we have to face? What we have to consider is not a surface fleet in the present context but the submarine menace. I had the good fortune to catch your eye, Mr. Speaker, on two other Service Debates, in each of which I dealt a little with the Russian position, and rather with the favourable aspect. I shall do so again with regard to the submarine menace. According to "Jane's," and according to the information which apparently the Admiralty have, the Russians have between 350 and 370 submarines. Of that number I think that something like 250 are listed in the 1939"Jane's"; that is to say, they are pre-war submarines either of the Russians themselves, or of the Germans, or of the Italians.
  That leaves something over 100 unaccounted for. How many of those are post-war submarines of the latest design? That is to say, how many are the genuine under-water ship, the "fish" whose natural habitat is in the water instead of the surface ship which can merely dive, and which, frankly, is today no menace whatever, because we have got the answer to it? It is the genuine under-water ship that we have to consider, and I think we can say that at the moment the Russians have not got them in very large numbers. None the less, 100 is quite a lot.
  There is one other piece of information that I have. The Russians have been very energetic indeed in recruiting submarine crews in Germany. I am not in the least frightened of a submarine with a mercenary crew. To handle a submarine effectively requires enormous courage and dedication. It has to be a man who values his life infinitely below his cause, who is to be of any use in a submarine, and I do not believe that it is an arm which could be in the least effective, if they have to use mercenary crews who are tempted by money considerations. But the fact that they are so energetic in Germany in trying to enlist these crews seems to indicate a great shortage of Russians to make submariners. After all, the Russian never has made a naval man as we know him. Therefore, do not let us exaggerate this menace too much. It is almost as dangerous to overrate the enemy—as Mr. Chamberlain did at Munich—as it is to underrate him.

  1149
  Do not let us run into either of those dangers.
  As I have said, the main battle will clearly be an anti-submarine battle, and that anti-submarine battle will be one to cut the supplies of Britain and Europe from America. It is a battle which in all human likelihood will be fought in the Northern Passage, the Western Approaches, the North Sea and the Arctic. That is where there will be the overwhelming concentration of the antisubmarine vessels of the Atlantic Powers. Now I do not want to trespass on to the forbidden ground of command, save to say this. If the Western Approaches, the North Sea, the Northern Passage and the Arctic are areas of British tactical command and control, then the function of whoever it is who assigns the warships of these 12 nations to their operational area will be, in the overwhelming majority of cases, to assign American and foreign ships to serve under British command. In those areas there will be far, far more antisubmarine vessels of the Atlantic Powers operating than Britain possesses, so when one considers at all the question of a command that allocates vessels to areas, one must remember that its job will primarily be to allocate foreign vessels to serve under British Command. That is a point we ought to bear in mind.
  The other question I should like to raise is one which I have raised in every Navy Estimates debate since 1945. I do not know yet, and I shall fully understand if we still cannot have the answer to it. We are now facing what I may term the "fish" submarine; that is, the submarine whose real home is in the depths of the ocean, and is not merely a surface ship that can dive. I have always believed that the effective way to fight that sort of submarine will be to go down to the depths and fight him. In other words, I have always believed that the anti-submarine vessel of the future will be the submarine.
  We shall require submarines as escort vessels. That will provide a great many problems for our surface escort vessels which have to identify their own underwater ships from the enemies. Are these problems being worked out? To what extent are we developing or have we developed the anti-submarine submarine? I should very much like to hear whether
  1150
  any steps have been taken in that matter. I feel that eventually, just as in the same way the answer to the aeroplane is the fighter aeroplane, so one must have the fighter submarine.
  My second point is this: Cannot we do more—this may be more a Board of Trade question—about stock-piling here the essential things which have to be carried in the initial phases of a war? America is stock-piling. They are stockpiling things which they would probably require here. Cannot we negotiate with the Americans to store a great deal in Great Britain, because if war starts, it will start at the Russians' choice and on the date they select. That is to say, their submarines will be at their posts. If one were in a position to take all our merchant ships off the sea and bring them into port on the outbreak of war, thus give ourselves a period in which we could hunt the submarine without giving the submarine much in the way of targets, we would have a great advantage to begin with, but to begin in that position would depend on adequate stock-piles. Has that aspect of the matter been considered?
  The third point which I want to mention is this: In our co-ordination with the Americans, certainly in my own experience, language has been one of our great difficulties; a much greater difficulty than in our co-ordination with the French. French words are not likely to be confused with English words, but many American words when used in England have quite often a different meaning. One word may mean one thing to an American and another thing to an Englishman and all sorts of confusion arises. I suggest that to overcome this language difficulty it is extremely important to make sure that in naval terms, at any rate, we use the same words to mean the same things. I know the language difficulties that arose in the last war, and I hope that this matter is being carefully considered.
  7.52 p.m.
  Sir Ronald Ross: I am sure that we all feel that the hon. Member for Sheffield, Park (Mr. Mulley), is to be congratulated on his choice of Amendment, which is very wide and of the utmost importance. I think that we all enjoyed listening to his speech and also to the amusing paradoxes of the hon. and learned Member for Northampton

  1151
  (Mr. Paget), who seconded the Amendment.
  The contribution of the Navy to Atlantic defence, which is the subject of the Amendment, seemed to get less and less during the speeches of the mover and seconder of the Amendment. The speech of the hon. and learned Member for Northampton seemed to deal with close-range anti-submarine protection, and the chief emphasis, we were told, was not on the Navy but on the Air Force and the Army. I should be out of order if I discussed the co-operation necessary between the three Services, which was so important in the last war and the preceding war, but there was a certain neglect of the extraordinary importance of the protection of the trade routes of these islands.
  The greatest peril in which we found ourselves during recent wars was not, I think, that of invasion, but of our being cut off from our raw materials, our food and the assistance which we got from our friends. I am certainly not prepared to rely upon the forces of another great nation, however friendly and however great, to protect our trade routes which run throughout the world, because we have still the greatest merchant navy in the world. Perhaps it is not inappropriate that I should have the good fortune to speak on the Amendment, because in my constituency I have the port from which, I think, the majority of the anti-submarine escorts sailed during the war. I also have in my constituency both the principal combined air and naval anti-submarine school—a most wonderful establishment—and a naval aerodrome which is one of the most important of its kind in the country.
  There was one matter mentioned by the hon. and learned Member for Northampton which I think is of considerable importance, and that is the use of the submarine to chase the submarine. I think that I raised this question last year. We know that the United States Navy has already launched a submarine for that precise purpose. I alluded last year to the R class boats, which were built for that purpose in the war before last, and I got a reply from the Parliamentary Secretary that attention was being given to that matter, but we have not heard anything about it today. I entirely agree with the hon. and learned
  1152
  Member for Northampton that that is a direction in which research and inquiry should be directed.
  In the statement on defence, there is an allusion to fast submarines of a new type, but I cannot say that I heard anything about that during the speech of the Parliamentary Secretary, nor have I been fortunate enough to find anything much about these submarines in the Estimates. The hon. Member for Sheffield, Park, very rightly pointed out the great importance of joint exercises, and I entirely agree with him. I think that common doctrine, common practice and common tactics for the navies of all countries which are involved in the Atlantic Pact are of vital importance. We all know the difficulties which the unfortunate A.B.D.A. Navy suffered in the Java Sea at the beginning of the war with Japan, when they had not the same familiarity with one another's methods, ideas and tactics as, I trust, the Atlantic Pact navies are now acquiring.
  I am glad to see evidence of this work going on in Londonderry where we have had visits from aircraft-carriers very recently—one from Canada and another from Australia. We have also constantly had visits from the United States Navy, and we were particularly glad to welcome a detachment of the Dutch Naval Air service, which is at present at Eglinton, in my constituency. I always look for a chance of congratulating the Government on something, and I think that I have found it in these circumstances. I must congratulate them on the way in which they treated the rather silly protests that were made about this piece of work for the Atlantic Pact countries.
  The question of repairs has already been mentioned, as has the sufficiency of work in the dockyards and private yards. As Londonderry has recently been associated with anti-submarine defence and, as far as I can see, craft will always be based there, would it not be a good thing to re-open the repair facilities which were used there during the war to the complete satisfaction of the Admiralty? Thus there could be tapped a reserve in ship repair which is outside the ordinary run of the ship repairing yards.
  We are all agreed that the problem which we have to face is to protect our lines of communication across the Atlantic and to other parts of

  1153
  the world from attack by submarine. We must not be blind to a combination of surface and submarine attack, because that is what we suffered from particularly during the last war. A lesson which the Germans evidently learned from the 1914–18 war was that a submarine attack on commerce is doubly dangerous if it is supported by surface ships. There are two types of attack on commerce of this kind against which we must guard, either attack by warships in support of their submarines or attack by disguised raiders. The latter can be a great danger when we are protecting our ships, as we know from the sad fate of H.M.S. "Sydney," a very historic ship, which had an Australian crew and was deceived by the peaceful appearance of a raider. Are we able to deal with that type of attack?
  I am concerned about our cruiser position. At the moment we have 26 cruisers, and I was interested to hear the Parliamentary Secretary say that the big D class destroyers are really as formidable as the old C class cruisers were; but before they can be used as cruisers we must know whether their radius is large enough. On that the text books seem to be silent. The 26 cruisers we have now compare poorly with the 61 we had in 1939, and before the 1914–18 war we had twice as many as that. The function of a cruiser in the protection of commerce must not be confused with its function in the battle fleet. The function of the cruiser is generally defensive, and we have thousands and thousands of miles of sea ways which we must protect.
  On Wednesday last I was questioning the Parliamentary Secretary on this matter, and no doubt to quieten my anxiety about our lack of cruisers he said that we had fewer cruisers because there were fewer cruisers against us, in that there were no German or Japanese cruisers on the other side to prey upon our commerce. That is adopting a wrong balance in judging our need for cruisers, because we must take into account the enormous extent of the sea ways which have to be protected and the vast volume of merchant traffic which must come and go from these shores if we are to carry on a war successfully and even to live.
  Mr. Paget: Surely today the long-range endurance aircraft is far more effective
  1154
  than a cruiser for searching and clearing distant sea ways from raiders?
  Sir R. Ross: I do not agree with the hon. and learned Gentleman, because there are parts of the sea ways to which a long-range aircraft cannot yet go. I do not think a long-range aircraft could be of any particular use at night. When such an aircraft does find a raider, what is it going to do about it? It will then have to summon a cruiser to sink the raider, because a long-range aircraft would be but one against such a raider and would not have very much hope of sinking the vessel which it had found. We all know from past experience how extraordinarily difficult it is to locate even a single ship. In the 1914–18 war there were the "Karlsruhe," the "Konigsberg" and the "Emden," and in 1939 there was the "Graf Spee," which created a lot of dislocation in our arrangements, and a very large number of ships were destroyed by her before she was located and destroyed most gallantly by cruisers inferior to her in force.
  One thing I would ask of the Parliamentary Secretary, and that is, that we do not have that unfortunate and disastrous compromise, the armed merchant cruiser. Such a cruiser deprived the merchant fleet of valuable tonnage and produced a ship which was a death trap to her crew and which really could not fulfil the function which it was sent out to do. It was deprived of fulfilling the function for which it was built, and has only left us a glorious heritage in the "Rawalpindi" and the "Jervis Bay." I implore the Parliamentary Secretary not to have that sort of thing over again.
  As a quick reinforcement we have three cruisers which, judging from their photographs, are about 80 per cent. complete. I am encouraged by the speech of the Parliamentary Secretary and by page 250 of the Estimates to see that the equipment is being proceeded with. How long are we to wait before the ships are complete? There is an interesting expression "periodical finality." Have we' not about reached periodical finality as regards the three ships? When we remember how few are the cruisers which we have, compared to our needs and the enormous length of our communications, these ships might be very valuable and they should be completed as soon as possible.

  1155
  There is one other matter: how are we prepared to deal with the heavy type of commerce raider? We have never heard officially about the supposed Russian battleship.
  Commander Pursey: There is not any such vessel.
  Sir R. Ross: I do not suppose that the hon. and gallant Member for Hull, East (Commander Pursey) will ever go to sea again, so he will not be attacking it. I have never heard anything about this type of ship from the Government, although the leading textbook on the subject gives, with a certain reserve, facts about it which it is suggested can be authenticated. Are we in a position to deal with such a menace? Suppose we had a sortie from the Baltic rather similar to the "Bismarck's" sortie during the last war. Although the "Bismarck" was severely damaged by aircraft in the very gallant attack from the "Ark Royal," it was Service ships that had to dispose of her in the end. Are we in a position to deal with that kind of attack? It could be a very formidable attack indeed. These vessels are adequate as defensive craft, and they are equipped also to deal with submarines, but not to deal with surface ships.
  If I were asked to say what is the greatest contribution that the Navy can make to North Atlantic defence, I would say that it is experience. In that we are unequalled. We have the great experience of two wars in which the most fierce attacks were made upon our lifeline across the North Atlantic. We have a generation of seamen who have been brought up in the tradition of fighting those attacks, and to whom those experiences of defensive war in the North Atlantic are probably the most constant lesson that has been taught them. We have a great advantage over the United States Navy in that respect.
  We all admire the very astounding achievements of the American Navy during the last war, but its problems were entirely different from ours. Weather and geography were different for them, and in the enormous area of the Pacific the submarine policy of their opponents, the Japanese, was not to prey upon their merchant vessels but much more to attack their warships. Although the Americans
  1156
  were brilliant in light tactics and the use of those enormous torpedoes—which the Japanese had developed, though the Americans did not know they had—they were not particularly formidable submariners.
  Any question of command should be settled not as a matter of prestige as to who has the greatest fleet, and certainly not between ourselves and our Allies, the Americans, but as to who has the best and greatest experience to deal with the particular problem which has to be faced. Whatever objection anyone has made about having an American admiral, it has never been made in a personal sense in the slightest degree. We admire the American Navy. The name of this officer, Admiral Fechteler, is one that we can admire and respect, as that of a fighting seaman with a grand record, but in a different kind of warfare, for instance, the capture of the Admiralty Islands, in which he took such a distinguished part. We cannot imagine anything less like the defence of a convoy in the North Atlantic.
  Mr. Mulley: When we made our speeches, we could probably have dealt with the points which the hon. Member is now making, except that there was an understanding that the question of the appointment of the American admiral would not be referred to.
  Sir R. Ross: I quite appreciate what the hon. Gentleman says. I hope that he will take up some of these points when the debate on that subject does take place, and I am sure he will deal with them most effectively. I conclude by repeating that our greatest contribution to Atlantic defence is our experience and the tradition in the sea service of the Royal Navy.
  8.15 p.m.
  Mr. Snow: I propose to deal with three points which were mentioned by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget). I did not intend to speak, but his speech was so interesting that I should like to express some friendly divergence of opinion on some of the things he said.
  On the question of the employment by the Russians of German crews, I thought he came to a very dangerous conclusion. I do not know that his information is any better than mine; at any rate much of

  1157
  mine is surmised. If it is a fact that the Russians are recruiting German crews, or as I think is has probable, German instructors of Russia crews, I think my hon. and gallant Friend seriously underestimates the whole history of defeated Germany. The record of the German General Staff or of the naval staff after the defeat of 1919, is that they took the most urgent possible steps by devious ways to overcome the provision of the Treaty of Versailles and tried as best they could to maintain the service traditions of the Imperial Navy and of the Army.
  My hon. and gallant Friend says that he would not trust a mercenary crew to put up a whole-hearted fight. I am paraphrasing his words. He runs the danger of assuming that such crews would not have the stomach to fight. On the contrary, I believe that they would thus provide a most important nucleus for a resurgence of the German Navy. That is the whole lesson we should learn from the past.
  Then my hon. and learned Friend referred—this is very much more his line than mine—to the conjecture that in future wars the most potent anti-submarine weapon would be the submarine, or a submarine craft of some sort. I am prepared to concede that this is even a probability, and certainly a possibility, but to my mind, in the present design of naval craft and the present tendencies in warfare, it seems most likely that we must concentrate on provisions for the building and the maintenance of small surface craft. It is a far cry to the old battle that we used to hear between Sir Percy Scott and "Jackie" Fisher. We see it coming up in a different form now.
  One justification for this debate is that I feel very scared sometimes when I see the apparent policy of the Admiralty in maintaining the vast Royal Naval Dockyards. It would be far safer to organise thoroughly the repair and maintenance of small surface craft in the hundred and one small yards around our coasts. Take the question of the deployment of maintenance equipment. We shall have to maintain and repair craft on the northern coast of Scotland and certainly on the North-West coast. We shall have to concentrate far more equipment in that part of the country than we did in the previous war.
  Sir R. Ross: And in the North of Ireland.
  Mr. Snow: I quite agree. If it comes to a question of whether or not to maintain these large naval dockyards, one has to consider the sort of weapon that is available, whether it is dropped from an aeroplane or is the result of guidance. If a bomb is dropped in the catchment area from which the work comes, the job has been done. That is far more so than it has ever been before. Take the history of Portsmouth. Hundreds of bombs were dropped there during the last war but the yard never went out of action. One atomic bomb three or four miles on either side of the harbour will knock out the whole place. We have therefore to consider not only building up a system of a hundred small yards but, as my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton said, maintaining adequate stocks on the spot.
  I am glad that my hon. Friend the Parliamentary and Financial Secretary has this job in hand at the moment. He has had experience in the Ministry of Transport. I would recall to his memory the problem during the 1914–18 war and the work done by Sir Eric Geddes. The House will remember the strategic problem then of doing something about the grossly inefficient French railways. It was the job of Sir Eric to try to get men and materials to the numerous battle points during that war. Something on these lines must be considered in connection with the maintenance of the small yards which I have advocated.
  Mr. Callaghan: I concede my hon. Friend's point. It is a proper point. In connection with the new programme of minesweeper building, which we have just launched, we have, for the most part, placed the orders wholly with small yards, some of which are in the North of Scotland.
  Mr. Snow: I am reassured to hear that, though I note that my hon. Friend referred only to minesweepers, and he has a vastly greater knowledge of naval warfare than I have, but I am thinking in terms of small surface craft charged with tracking down and fighting the submarine. It seems to me that we have to think of not half a dozen small yards but numerous small yards up and down the country. I shall not press the point

  1159
  now; I merely bring the matter to the attention of my hon. Friend as a question of the siting of the yards and of getting the materials there in the light of the possible bombing of our major ports.
  I should not like it to be thought that I considered the function of the Royal Naval Dockyards as they exist at the moment to be finished. On the contrary, I know that they fulfil an immensely important role in maintaining our naval strength. But I should like to mention the feeling that many of us have had for some time that the supervising of our Royal Naval yards should come under civilian control. The present set-up with an Admiralty superintendent and a skeleton senior naval staff at the yard may have been all right in times when the industrial life of our country was on a simpler basis than it is now. I see my hon. Friends from Plymouth here and I hope to carry them with me on this point.
  I well remember during the lifetime of the last Parliament convening, with Major Donald Bruce, then the Member for Portsmouth, North, a meeting between the naval staff in Portsmouth dockyard and the trade union officials. I was very seized of the fact that the trade union members in the dockyard felt themselves at a disadvantage with senior naval officers, a disadvantage which I do not think they would feel if they had to deal with industrial leaders in the civilian sense of the term.
  Whether we should get greater efficiency must depend on whether or not we consider the Royal Naval Dockyards at present to be industrially efficient. I do not know whether my hon. Friends from Plymouth would agree with me, but I should say that, by comparison with the Royal Ordnance factories, there are pretty obvious signs that improvements could be made. I have heard it argued by senior naval officers at the dockyards that a naval officer is required to translate, as it were, the language of the seagoing naval officers to the dockyard civilians. The reverse is true. We might get greatly increased efficiency if we had civilian control, as there is in the Royal Ordnance factories.
  My last point is on the subject of the dockyard schools. I believe I may be somewhat inhibited in this because I
  1160
  understand that dockyards in general and the schools in particular are being considered by a Select Committee of which I am a member. We must be very careful that, with the introduction of new methods of securing apprentices into the yards, we do not in any way allow the standards to fall. A problem with which the Admiralty has been confronted in the last few years is the serious falling off in the number of dockyard apprentices. That has now been arrested. Figures which I have show a gratifying increase in the number of students in the lower schools in the dockyards. It is right and proper that we should modernise entry and inspection. The whole science of naval repair and maintenance must depend on the young men who are coming forward, and we must see that the standards demanded are reasonable and that, in contradistinction, we do not allow standards of efficiency to drop.
  This naval debate seems to have come at a most opportune moment, because we may be enabled to get into better perspective, bearing in mind some of the remarks of the Parliamentary and Financial Secretary, one of the more controversial matters of the day. I want to make a comment on the speech of the hon. Member for Londonderry (Sir R. Ross). I do not know whether he has an arrière-penséeof prejudice or what it is, but it seems to me that, if Russia is the potential enemy, we should not rule out that the Irish Republic will be on our side. I cannot conceive of any single new political problem today which makes it more likely that the Roman Catholic population of Southern Ireland will not find itself ready, and indeed very pleased, to align itself with the Western democracies.
  Sir R. Ross: I should be only too glad to see—I should have been only too glad to see it in the last war—what is now the Irish Republic coming in on the side of the Allies to fight for freedom, but I do not think it would be very wise to give away the only naval ports which we have in Ireland to a country which is, though non-alien, certainly not one of us and not a member of the Atlantic Pact.
  Mr. Snow: I guessed that there was an arrière-penséeof prejudice there. I was right.
  Sir R. Ross: No prejudice.
  Mr. Snow: One has to realise that one must balance the old antagonisms between this country and the Republic of Ireland against the new and much more vital antagonisms between the Christian faith on the one side and Communism on the other.
  8.29 p.m.
  Mr. John Hay: I am sure that all of us on this side of the House will congratulate the. hon. Member for Sheffield, Park (Mr. Mulley) upon choosing this topic when he won his place in the Ballot. This discussion comes at an extremely opportune time, as the hon. Member for Lichfield and Tamworth (Mr. Snow) has just observed, because I do not think that since the setting up of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation or since the end of the war, there was ever a time when it was more vital for us to consider exactly how we are to integrate British naval forces with those of the other countries of Atlantic Union.
  The problem, as I see it, resolves itself into two main compartments. The first is the consideration of those with whom we are to integrate; and the second is the fields in which integration will be necessary. To deal briefly with the first, it is quite obvious that the people with whom we shall have to integrate our naval Forces as well as all our military and air Forces are, firstly, the United States and, secondly, the bulk of the European countries.
  I was very impressed by the remark made a few minutes ago by the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) when he discussed the difficulties which one is up against in dealing with the language problem. I very much hope that the Admiralty and the Parliamentary and Financial Secretary have their eyes firmly upon this point because as one who had a little to do during part of the last war with liaison with various Navies I know from personal experience that it is sometimes extremely difficult indeed to reach agreed policies with one's opposite numbers if language difficulties supervene. It is so easy to be misunderstood. In another war, in which, as other hon. Members have said, speed will perhaps be vital, we cannot risk the slightest delay, the slightest hindrance or check as a result of difficulties of that kind.
  There are three fields in which integration of British naval forces will be
  1162
  necessary—first, in the field of operations at sea, second, in the field of the provision of stores, weapons, ammunition and training, and third, in the interrelation between the naval forces and the air forces. I should like to say a few words about each of those aspects.
  It is most important that we should continue to have a series of joint exercises between the British Navy and the various Continental, and, I hope, the United States navies. Great lessons are to be learned, and I hope that whoever is to reply to this debate for the Admiralty will tell us not only that the results of the joint exercises already held have been satisfactory but that the Admiralty intend to go much further along that road than they have done up to now. I feel that a great deal can be done at this time, when we have the opportunity of getting through the teething troubles and the initial problems which war at its onset will not give us time to solve. By carrying out exercises of that kind, I believe we can do a great deal. It is obvious that tactics will have to be integrated and that systems of signalling which will overcome the language difficulty will have to be worked out. It may be that these problems are already being considered but I urge that something should be done if they are not.
  The second major aspect in which integration is necessary is in the field of equipment generally. On the question of stores, standardisation between the various navies forming part of the Atlantic Pact needs to be thought out far more than has been the case up to now. Another hon. Member has already discussed briefly the question of standardisation. We all know that if war comes to us it will be an all-out war and that it will be an atomic war. The hon. Member for Lichfield and Tamworth, dealing with the more narrow sphere of the dockyard problem, referred to the damage which could easily be done by atomic bombs. I believe it is absolutely essential that we should set up store depots not on a large but on a small scale, in various countries and not only here in Britain. To take a long view, if we depend solely upon the country as the major naval base of Western Union defence, we may easily be making a great mistake. Therefore, I hope that the Admiralty are looking at that question

  1163
  and the problems of standardisation of weapons and ammunition.
  Here again I think there is a tremendous amount to be gained by taking the right decision quickly at this time and not waiting until it is too late. During the later stages of the last war a great deal was, I believe, done in the way of standardisation of weapons and ammunition. I hope that the Admiralty have very much in mind those lessons which were learned at that time because if the Royal Navy is to be prepared to fight the next war with other than the methods of the last war or of some past war we have to make that sort of decision now.
  I would say a word about the integration of training. I believe it is very important that where units are to operate under a joint command, or where there are units of different navies operating under the single command of some particular sea officer who may be a foreigner to many of them, we have to be quite certain that training methods are uniform so far as can be humanly obtained. After all, everything depends upon adequate and proper training. It may well be that the standard of training in some foreign navies is not up to that of our own. It may be that other foreign navies are ahead of us in certain departments of training. I hope something will be done to make certain that training is put upon a minimum level throughout the whole of the various naval forces in the Atlantic Pact.
  I shall take a broader view of the question of naval construction and say a word about construction policy. I am absolutely certain that there is a most pressing and urgent need for properly balanced naval forces in Western Europe. Everyone who has spoken in this debate appears automatically to have assumed that the role of the British Navy in any future war, will be to provide—certainly in the Atlantic—the major part of the anti-submarine vessels.
  That pre-supposes that our construction programme and policy must turn inevitably from the big ships to the smaller ones. Assuming that view is correct, I ask whether or not in all the circumstances that is really the wisest policy? To talk like that at the present moment may sound a little like heresy, but we
  1164
  have to be very careful that we do not allow our big ships to be scrapped, or to fall into something like disuse by relying too much on the big ships of other countries, particularly the United States.
  The hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) made one rather remarkable statement. He said that in his view there would be small need for big ships again, and that British forces must always be based upon the small units. I think that was, generally, what he said. But as my hon. Friend the Member for Londonderry (Sir R. Ross) pointed out, we are still up against the problem of the raider. The raider, whether it be the heavily armed warship or the disguised merchant ship, still constitutes, on the vast oceans of the world, one of the most dangerous adversaries it is possible to come up against. I served for a time with the armed merchant cruisers, about which my hon. Friend had some rather uncomplimentary things to say, and I am certain that unless we have an adequate searching force, combining the air and the surface vessel, with the object of finding the raider as quickly as possible, the raider, in conjunction as my hon. Friend said with the submarine, can easily put a stranglehold upon the life-lines of this country.
  I hope therefore that the Admiralty are bearing this in mind; that they will not devote their attention exclusively to the small ships, but realise they have to replace their obsolescent cruisers with new ones, and that from time to time it may be necessary to take new decisions as to even larger ships. I beg them to ensure that, if another war should come, we are supplied with an adequate number of escort carriers, because I think the aircraft carrier may easily be the capital ship of the future.
  I wish to turn to the question of convoys. Here again, I think that integration between the various Atlantic Pact countries is important. Are we doing something now to prepare the way to integrate and bring about coordination in the question of convoy procedure. There is, for example, the question of signalling; the size of the convoys; how they are to be routed; the proportion in which the merchant ships of different nationalities will be put together. T read the other day that the

  1165
  Norwegians always feel that it is somewhat of an insult to them to say that Britain in 1940 stood alone. Those of us who sailed in 1940 and 1941 know that the Norwegian Merchant Marine was a tremendous asset to us. I believe that the Norwegians in particular, as well as the French and the Dutch, have a very great part to play in the whole question of integrating Western Union defence from the convoy and merchant shipping point of view. I hope that we are taking steps now to get our convoy procedure in apple-pie order as quickly as we can.
  Again, integration is important on the question of fuelling and docking facilities. If an atomic attack is made upon ports, obviously they will be put out of action in a very short space of time and may be completely unusable for a long time thereafter. There is great need for the right steps and decisions to be taken now to find alternative fuelling and docking facilities abroad as well as in this country. During the last war, there were a number of disguised inlets and bays in various parts of Britain which were used as emergency refuelling and docking points. I believe that even so big a ship as the "Nelson" was once docked in an obscure inlet on the West coast of Scotland after she had been mined.
  I sincerely hope that steps are being taken now to survey and prepare all these places. I hope, too, that something is being done to prepare the necessary underground storage for fuel oil, ammunition and the other stores upon which we shall have to rely. If our docks are treated as being the one place where our ships can be refuelled, revictualled and re-stored, then we run a great risk, because atomic attack may easily knock them right out.
  As the hon. Member for Sheffield, Park, has pointed out, integration is vital to the role of the Royal Navy in Atlantic Pact defence which is really what his Amendment is about. I should like to emphasise and impress upon the Admiralty, if indeed it is necessary—and perhaps it is not—the great urgency of this problem. The need is for speed. We do not know how short time may be. Unless the Admiralty, and the Parliamentary Secretary and his colleagues, are taking the right decisions now and are
  1166
  looking ahead and taking the necessary risks, if risks are necessary, I believe that we may find ourselves, in time of war, in very great difficulties which could have been avoided. I hope that we may be given some assurance that these points, and others which I have not had time to mention, are being considered and that something is being done.
  8.44 p.m.
  Mr. Callaghan: Perhaps it would be for the convenience of the House if I intervened at this stage on the Amendment and then, perhaps, the House could return to the general debate. We have had a most interesting debate on the question of the Navy's contribution to North Atlantic defence. I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Park (Mr. Mulley) on the terms in which he moved his Amendment. He started a fertile train of ideas which ought to be ventilated in this House and which were followed up by a number of hon. Members who placed the searchlight upon a field of study about which we have not had a great deal of information so far, if only because the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is itself still a child.
  The main objects that we are attempting to pursue in bringing together a number of nations—12 or 13 nations—are, first, to standardise procedure in order to minimise the difficulties that arise from different languages, different doctrines and different tactics, and, second, to standardise equipment as far as that may be possible. Of course, two or three of us in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation have a preponderant weight in ships and men. It is, therefore, easier to carry the rest along. Standardisation is a major problem, therefore, for perhaps only two or three of the large number of Powers concerned.
  The House should remember that a standardisation agreement was published on 15th August last between the Royal Navy, the Royal Canadian Navy and the United States Navy, and, although full details have not been given, I can assure the House that considerable progress has been made in standardisation among three of the navies that will be putting most into the North Atlantic Treaty.
  Let me take up at once one of the points. The hon. Member for Henley (Mr. Hay) raised the question of re-

  1167
  fuelling. One of the means of standardisation that is now being considered is in respect of common specifications for the fuels that are used by all the ships of all the navies—obviously, a most important point—in order that they may mutually refuel each other at sea. Provision is also being made for refuelling equipment which will enable refuelling to take place in most North Atlantic Treaty ports. That is a very big step forward, involving a great deal of preparatory work, but it is clearly the sort of benefit that can arise from the integration to which the hon. Gentleman referred.
  My hon. Friend the Member for the Sheffield, Park, spoke about the training and interchange of officers. Here, again, I would remind the House that the North Atlantic Treaty is still only an infant, but this work has been started. For example, the Royal Navy has trained about 400 officers and ratings from other navies during the currency of the North Atlantic Treaty. Most of them, interestingly enough, have come from the Netherlands, which has contributed the largest single number, but I believe it is true to say that we have had officers and men from nearly all the navies concerned with us in the North Atlantic Treaty, and, in addition, we have interchanged a number of our own officers with officers of other navies concerned in the Treaty. Again, that is a most important development and advance.
  Another matter on which general agreement has been reached, the significance of which I think the House will appreciate, concerns the types of electrical power to be used in ships. If and when the agreement is implemented, it will make it possible to switch equipment and weapons from one navy to another, whereas if the electrical power were different that would not have been possible.
  My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) raised the question of a common language to avoid confusion, and I am glad to tell him that in the near future the N.A.T.O. forces will manoeuvre under a common system. I think it is now quite common in the Admiralty to see one of these famous dockets with a minute in French, followed by one in English and another in American. I think we can assume that, when the Fleet goes to sea, there will
  1168
  be a common signal book, which will be of very great benefit indeed in promoting the mutual action that we all want to see.
  Mr. Emrys Hughes: May I ask my hon. Friend a question, although I am afraid it is not a helpful one? When are our friends the Italians coming in? I read recently that a gentleman called Rear-Admiral Ferranti Caponi was to have a position under the North Atlantic Pact. Is he an American officer who has settled in Italy, or who is he, and where does he come from?
  Mr. Callaghan: I suggest to my hon. Friend that he should wait for the debate which we are to have, when we shall be discussing the whole scope of the North Atlantic Treaty, and when I am sure that the lineage of the gentleman he mentions will be fully explained.
  The hon. Member for Henley also mentioned the question of naval construction and the importance of standardisation, and with that we fully agree. As the House will know, the French are already using one aircraft carrier that was formerly serving with the Royal Navy and so are the Dutch, and some smaller vessels, too. I am now looking slightly ahead, but I would not be a bit surprised to find that the new anti-submarine frigates we are now developing—and which we regard as among the best things we have—were put to common use and placed in a common pool in due course. Certainly it is the sort of idea that ought to be fully worked out.
  My hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Park, asked me about joint exercises. I have asked for statistics, and am told that altogether 20 joint exercises were held with other North Atlantic Treaty fleets during the last 12 months. Those fleets included the French, the Dutch, and the Sixth United States Mediterranean Fleet. The main exercise they undertook was convoy defence against air and submarine attack, and also minesweeping and coastal defence work. I hope that a similar number of exercises will be arranged among the North Atlantic Treaty Powers during the next 12 months.
  Mr. Mulley: Could my hon. Friend tell us anything about the success or otherwise of those joint operations?
  Mr. Callaghan: If by that my hon. Friend means do we feel that there are no lessons to be learned, the answer is no. There were lessons to be learned, and I would not claim that the exercises to be carried out this year will not be better than those carried out last year. I am bound to say that there is considerable room for integration, to use the word which was used so much by the hon. Member for Henley. The contribution of the hon. Member for Henley, like the contributions of other hon. Members in relation to Atlantic defence, emphasised very much the necessity for integration. He will know—and this is part of the argument that is going on in public at the present time—that, last time, the arrangement was that every nation should defend the little bit, or the big bit, it might have been, for which it was responsible. At any rate, it was done in bits and pieces.
  I am bound to say that I agree with the hon. Member for Henley—and this is the Government's policy—that there should be this integration rather than that we should have a system of defence consisting of bits and pieces. Therefore, the system of command that is being worked out has as its basis no artificial dividing line between parts of that segment of the globe Concerned with the Atlantic Treaty, but rather an integration of the whole in the various fields I have described. I believe that to be the correct approach to this question at the present time.
  My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton was provocative, as usual. He almost makes me a blue water man—and I regard myself as being comparatively advanced on some of these issues affecting the future of the Navy. But may I just make one or two observations? When he says that we cannot look to the Navy to defend us, that is saying much the same as I said in my speech this afternoon, but he says it in a very different tone. Let me put it this way. If by that he means that ships alone cannot defend us, then that is true; but it would not be true if he suggested that ships plus aircraft cannot defend us. The question is, who controls the aircraft?—because that seems to be the real issue in this case.
  Although I know it is very easy to criticise one's predecessors, I must say that I think the Navy were slow in the 1930's
  1170
  regarding their attitude towards the growth of air power. Looking back—although, of course, it is very easy to be wise after the event—I cannot help thinking that the Royal Navy should have done much more on the lines of what the United States Navy did, namely, have gone out for air power and realised its significance much earlier. However, they did not do that.
  I think it is only now that the Navy, because of the lapse and the lag, is able to say, "We have aircraft we can put into the air that compare with anything else that exists." The gloss that I put on my hon. and learned Friend's statement is merely that, and I hope he will not use such a gleeful tone when he speaks about the subject in the future, because it hurts somewhat. Neither do I accept his very broad statement that we are primarily a land Power. How can a nation be primarily a land Power when it has the largest active merchant fleet in the world and when it means the closing down of factories, and starvation even, if its supply lines are cut off?
  We have over 100,000 men in the Merchant Navy. As long as that Merchant Navy exists—and there is no sign of its being removed from the seas yet, and never will be as far as I can see—and as long as we depend upon overseas supplies not only from the European continent but from other continents, it would be foolish for us to fall into the habit of saying that we are primarily a land Power. Let my hon. and learned Friend not swing the pendulum too far either way. Let us try, as I do, to keep a strict, objective balance in these matters. We cannot defend the sea routes alone, but that is no excuse for flying to the other extreme and saying, conversely, that we are primarily a land Power.
  I will not trespass further on the time of the House. I think the discussion has been interesting. I hope at least that in what I fear was only the very general outline that I have given to the House of the start that has been made in matters of standardisation, hon. Members will realise that the North Atlantic Treaty really means something. Although I should be quite happy to accept the Amendment, I fear that I must ask my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Park to withdraw it, because I should not like to incarcerate you. Mr. Speaker, in

  1171
  the Chair all night, which I gather would happen if my hon. Friend does not withdraw it. I therefore ask him to withdraw the Amendment in the knowledge that we are in full sympathy with the terms of it.
  Mr. Mulley: In view of what my hon. Friend has said, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.
  Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
  Main Question again proposed.
  8.58 p.m.
  Captain Ryder: I am very glad to have the opportunity of speaking immediately after the remarks which the Parliamentary Secretary has made. I thought that his opening speech was very interesting indeed, and I could not help feeling that he had had a great battle behind the scenes to get permission to disclose the valuable information in his speech. He was quite right to disclose this information at the present time. It is most important that the world at large should realise that our Royal Navy is keeping up to date and, indeed, is leading the way in many fields of research.
  The Parliamentary Secretary added some very valuable remarks in winding up the debate on the Amendment. I understand that there is an agreement that we will not discuss the structure of the Atlantic Command. I must confess I had not heard of that agreement at all. If there is such an agreement, I do not wish to take any advantage in the matter, but I thought the Parliamentary Secretary made a very useful contribution at the end of his speech when he spoke about British sea power. What he was saying was very much in the right direction. I felt he was trying to build up in the eyes of the world the position which our Royal Navy occupies and to that extent, I, in my humble capacity, should like to try and support him.
  In the past I have paid tribute to the administrative efficiency of the Admiralty. I have always felt, and still do, that it is by far and away the most efficient of all the Service Departments, and it is, indeed, one of the most efficient of all the Government Departments, being equalled only by its natural and hereditary enemy, the Treasury, on the other side of the Horse Guards Parade. I do not wish to detract
  1172
  from anything that I have said with reference to the administrative efficiency of the Admiralty, but when it comes to matters of higher strategy and political policy, mistakes have been made in the past, and I could instance quite a number.
  But when we consider these matters of higher strategy, I do not know to what extent the Admiralty themselves are able to influence the course of events or to what extent their advice is accepted; I do not know whether decisions are being taken over their heads—let us hope it will not be over their dead bodies—but it seems to me that we are facing very serious issues indeed at the moment, and that if we are to wait until the details of the command structure of the Atlantic Treaty are produced to us in final form, we may well be faced with something resembling an accomplished fact. If we are in any way to influence the course of events, now surely is the time to speak. However, I will try and abide by what I understand has been agreed.
  I feel that the main issue which faces us at present is the fact that in the allocation of our military resources we are becoming more and more of a continental Power, and consideration of the various Estimates over the past few years indicates this very strongly. In 1913 the allocation to the Royal Navy was 62 per cent., and to the Army 38 per cent.; there was then no Air Force. In 1938 the Royal Navy's allocation was 38 per cent., the Army's 33 per cent. and the R.A.F.'s 29 per cent. In 1951 the allocations to the Royal Navy was 27 per cent., to the Army 41 per cent. and to the Royal Air Force 32 per cent. So it will be seen that the Royal Navy, from being top of the list even as late as 1938, is now well at the bottom of the list, and the main transfer has gone, not to the Royal Air Force, but to our land forces. That is the point which I feel should be considered very seriously.
  Whether or not these decisions are correct, I do not wish to argue at the moment. I want to call attention to what has taken place, and to consider, in view of the transfer of our main effort from the sea forces to the land forces, what we may suffer in consequence. In this connection we should recall the part which has been played by the Royal Navy in years gone by in the founding and building up of the British Empire and Commonwealth. The strong protective

  1173
  arm of the Royal Navy has been held out in every part of the world to defend everyone who calls himself British, and a great many others besides, and it has had a cohesive effect on the Commonwealth and Empire—an effect which is not visible nor tangible but which is indeed very profound. That is of great significance to this country. If we are to be regarded as a small and overcrowded island, then I feel we shall be at the mercy of every ill wind that blows across the trade routes of the world, both in peace and in war. If, on the other hand, we are to be regarded as the centre of a great, powerful and united Commonwealth all over the world, then our position, our security and our influence will be immeasurably increased.
  It is inevitable that at the present time the countries of the Commonwealth should look in a large measure to the United States for much of the war material that they need. Equally, the United States looks to the Commonwealth for much of the raw materials and many naval and air bases. But if, in addition to looking there for material, the countries of the Commonwealth—including this country—have to look to the United States also for command, direction, tactical doctrine and all that goes with it, then we shall lose our position at the centre of this great Commonwealth, and the Commonwealth itself may fall apart.
  The causes which are forcing this position upon us and creating this dilemma are not hard to see. Quite clearly, a major requirement in our Defence Forces is the protection of this island against air attack. On top of that, we are called upon to bolster up our friends on the Continent of Europe. We have also enormous commitments in the protection of the Middle East. All these things eat into our military resources so that less and less is available for the Royal Navy.
  We must look with some envy at the position of the United States of America, surrounded on either side by the enormous expanses of ocean, who, very naturally and very rightly, is building herself up more and more and has now achieved the position of a major naval Power in the world, not only in combat ships but also in her merchant fleet. Trade follows the flag—and that, too, is of great significance to this country. I
  1174
  read with some sorrow, under an Oslo date-line, a report that many Norwegian ship-owners—and Norway has one of the largest merchant fleets in the world—were transferring their head offices from London to New York. Norway is very friendly towards us, and our friends there warn of the danger that soon London may cease to be the maritime centre of the world. That is a very serious thing for us, and it is one of the factors we must consider when these matters are discussed, negotiated and decided.
  When we view our position on the map and consider the threats which we face in Europe and our problems and interests in the world at large, I think it is apposite to say that we are between the devil and the deep sea. One can think of many sound arguments why we should play a prominent and leading part on the Continent of Europe. One can think of equally good reasons why we should retain our position as the centre of a great Commonwealth. There are even stronger reasons why we should seek to do both. In this connection, the Royal Navy has a significant role to play. But if we are not very careful we may fall between the two stools.
  There are many factors connected with this. There is not time now to mention all but it seems to me that the position of the Royal Navy is subject to some threat. For many years the Navy has enjoyed the reputation of being the Silent Service. It has not argued, perhaps, as forcefully as it might in protecting its spheres of influence. Other Services have come forward with books, publications, lectures to the universities, papers to be read before the learned societies, and so on. On the other hand, the Royal Navy is told there is now to be no surface fleet, and so, bit by bit, it is shorn of its responsibilities.
  Not least—and very significant, I think—was the decision made some time ago that Coastal Command should be a part of the Royal Air Force and not a part of the Fleet. Many reasons for this were put forward at the time, and I do not want to argue the rights and wrong of the case. A great case was made out on the ground of the need for the coordination of the supply of aircraft. That was before the Minister of Aircraft Production. However, it marked, I feel, a

  1175
  moment of great significance, when the decline in the influence of the Admiralty started.
  Remembering these things, we look to the command structure as it has been disclosed at the present time. In the case, for instance, of the Standing Group of the Military Committee of the Atlantic Treaty Organisation, we see that the United States appointed a general as their representative and that the French appointed an airman, leaving a vacancy for this country as the third member to fill; and we find that our original member was an airman, who was relieved by an airman, and whose relief, we are now told, will also be an airman. Even in the Western Union organisation, which is now largely being superseded, we had the principal military appointment, the principal air appointment, but the sea appointment was filled by a French officer. It seems to me that in all these ways the policy which is being pursued by this country is to relinquish the influence of our sea command, and to transfer our efforts and to concentrate them more and more upon becoming a continental Power.
  I am not qualified to argue the rights and wrongs of this case, but it seems to me, considering all these matters, that we are face to face with an issue of the very greatest magnitude, and it is my feeling—I may be wrong—that we have drifted into this decision, and that it is being reached by the competing claims of the various Services. I feel that what we need now is to have a much broader review of where this country is heading in the future years, including in that review every aspect of sea power. A far more searching analysis is required.
  I feel that there is some doubt whether the strategic bomber arm, for instance, will exert the same cohesive influence throughout the Commonwealth and Empire that has been exerted by the Fleet. A great deal of effort has been put into the building up of the bomber arm as being the decisive offensive arm, but are we right in assuming that, because it achieved decisive results in the comparatively narrow area of Germany, it would necessarily achieve the same results in a future war? These are matters, I feel, that have not been given full consideration. The Estimates are dealt with year by year in a piecemeal way, by the
  1176
  competing claims between the Services, and we have not really considered the whole broad aspect of what our strategy is to be.
  All I can say, in conclusion, is that when we approach our friends in the Commonwealth and our Allies on these matters, we should speak quite frankly, and set out clearly what and where our interests be. We should remember perhaps the way in which the influence of the Netherlands declined throughout the world once she came to rely on British sea power to protect her trade and interests in other parts of the world. In matters of this great importance, let us not try to hide or camouflage the decisions that are being made. Trust the people and they will trust you.
  9.15 p.m.
  Mr. Michael Foot: I think almost every speaker tonight has begun by congratulating the Parliamentary Secretary on the brilliant speech with which he opened the debate, and I should like to join in those congratulations. I think that on a previous occasion I revealed to the House the secret of the success of the Parliamentary Secretary. The fact is that, although he has an Irish name and a Welsh constituency, he has got some good Devon blood in his veins. That, no doubt, is the reason for the great success he makes in his office.
  I should like now to turn to the other speech made at the beginning of the debate, the speech of the hon. Member for Hereford (Mr. J. P. L. Thomas). I know that sometimes it is said that it is wrong to introduce controversial matters into debates on the Navy Estimates. I certainly never subscribed to that view, and as I listened to the speech of my hon. Friend, the Member for Hull, East (Commander Pursey), I detected that he did not subscribe to it either. Then there was the hon. Member for Hereford. He began his speech by making a quite considerable attack on the Government. It it quite true that he puts it all so gently and mildly, and in such cooing tones, that nobody knows it is supposed to be an attack, but if one takes down his words they amount to an attack upon the Government, and I want to deal with the main attack that he made.
  I think I have got his words roughly, although I do not say they are his exact words. He said: "The main charge

  1177
  against the Government"—on its naval policy presumably—"is that they have concealed the strength of the Navy, or at least presented it in the least favourable light." I do not think that is a misrepresentation of what he said. Now if that is what he said it is very interesting, because the charge that has been made in previous naval debates-and, indeed, what would be a much more serious charge against the Government—is that the Government have allowed the naval defence of this country to deteriorate and decline in a shocking fashion. That has been the general burden of what they said in the previous debates. It has also been the burden of what has been printed in the "Daily Express" or "Daily Mail," or any of these journals which try to repeat what the Tories are saying in the country about the naval policy of this country.
  Mr. J. P. L. Thomas: If the hon. Gentleman looks back to what I said on the Naval Estimates, I think last year, and to what my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition, making a speech from this side said two or three years ago, he will find that on that occasion my right hon. Friend took the same line that I took today—that the Navy was there and was big, and that the Government should declare it.
  Mr. Foot: I am glad the hon. Gentleman has made that intervention. Although it may not be possible for him to quote what he said a year ago or what his right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition said two years ago, I am happily in a position to be able to quote exactly what they said on those occasions, so perhaps the hon. Gentleman will be patient and listen to what they did say.
  It is certainly very interesting, because if the main charge against the Government is that they have hidden the might of the British Navy under a bushel—another of the phrases he used—I hope we shall never hear any more, either in this House, or in the country, or in the Conservative Party handbook, or in any of these other documents that are circulated about the country, of the Labour Government having in any way reduced the naval strength of this country and put us in any difficulty on that account. I hope we shall have the agreement of the hon. Gentleman on that matter.
  1178
  The main so-called charge against the Government is, not that they have allowed the naval strength of this country to decline but merely that they have concealed from the country, or other countries, how strong they have maintained the British Navy. It was murmured by hon. Members on this side of the House, when the hon. Gentleman said this, that perhaps people have these wrong ideas because of what has been said by hon. Gentlemen opposite. That brings me to the statements in question. I quote first the hon. Member for Hereford in the debate on the Navy Estimates on 22nd March, 1950. Remember that the hon. Gentleman's accusation against the Government is that they have been concealing from this House, from their own country and from the world the tremendous strength of the British Navy at this time. This is what he said:
  "We are particularly weak in our naval aviation, as we pointed out last year. Of our 13 existing carriers, only one Fleet carrier and four light Fleet carriers are in active commission. Three are used for training, and the remainder are all in reserve. We have only nine under construction and, as I have said, construction on three of these is still suspended. When one appreciates the many hundreds of thousands of square miles which will have to be patrolled for submarines, the number of aircraft that these ships can carry will be far below our tactical needs."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 22nd March, 1950; Vol. 472, c. 1993.]
  It may be that each of these particular references was accurate, but I do not believe that was a statement calculated to strike fear into the heart of Marshal Stalin or exactly the way to tell the world that we were militarily strong and that there had been no decline in the strength of the British Navy.
  I must say to the hon. Member for Hereford, who is always sent here to open the Navy Estimates debate from the other side when the Leader of the Opposition has no real criticisms to make, that he based his criticism of the Government on this point in very much more moderate terms than those used by the Leader of his party. The hon. Gentleman specifically invited me to look at the speech made by the Leader of the Opposition on 8th March, 1948, in the debate on the Navy Estimates. This is how the right hon. Member for Woodford (Mr. Churchill) tried to tell the world how strong was our Navy, and how very wrong

  1179
  it is to hide our might under a bushel. He said:
  "The efficiency of British administration in the Fighting Services has sunk to its very lowest level at the present time, and no one in the Government has the mental grip and vitality to reform and restore it."
  In his peroration in that debate on the Navy Estimates, which was the only debate on Navy Estimates in which the right hon. Member for Woodford had taken part since 1945, he said:
  "And, finally, running through it all, I censure the lack of policy and comprehension which in this as in other spheres, has led our country down to levels of inefficiency which we have never plumbed before."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 8th March, 1948; Vol. 448, c. 834–5.]
  The right hon. Gentleman says that it has been the Government which has been responsible for hiding our might under a bushel. [Interruption.]If hon. Gentlemen opposite want any more quotations there are plenty here.
  We all know that the right hon. Member for Woodford is sometimes inclined to be led astray by the heat of the moment, but no one has ever accused the right hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington (Mr. Eden) of having been led astray on these matters. If hon. Gentlemen opposite will look at another speech on 1st March, 1948, made by the right hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington, they will find that he said, when talking about the information given to the public, which is the only point of criticism which the right hon. Gentleman had against the Admiralty:
  "I must make an exception in the case of the Admiralty, which now in a later statement in the Navy Estimates has produced some information incidental to our naval strength, or perhaps I ought to say to our naval weakness."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 1st March, 1948; Vol. 448, c. 61.]
  An Hon. Member: That is true.
  Mr. Foot: An hon. Member opposite says that that is true. He must fight that out with his Front Bench. They started by saying that the main charge against the Government was not that they had allowed the strength of the Navy to decline but that they had concealed that strength either from this House or from the country. I suggest that the whole of the attack which was made by the hon. Gentleman was completely beside the point, and I hope that now we are going to have not only a cessation
  1180
  of these attacks made in the country about Britain's naval weakness, which certainly can do no good to our diplomacy, but that also we are going to have a cessation of the kind of attacks which I have quoted in the previous debates.
  Now I turn to an item in the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Huddersfield, East (Mr. J. P. W. Mallalieu). He was concerned with the question of naval pensions. I should like to support him in urging upon the Government to consider this question and also the question of some form of gratuity. My hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary and those in charge of the Admiralty fully appreciate the importance of this matter. If we are to succeed in getting more men to sign on after their first period of engagement and so build up the necessary numbers to man the increased Fleet, it is vital that we should overhaul the naval pensions' scheme which I believe can be the biggest factor in securing greater recruitment.
  I come again to the hon. Member for Hereford. He referred to the latter part of the speech of my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary when he was talking about the comparative naval strengths of the United States and this country. I think the hon. Gentleman said that my hon. Friend was skating on thin ice. The truth, of course, was that my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary was skating on thick ice—he had put forward such a powerful case about the dramatic transformation which was taking place in comparative naval strengths of this country and the United States that the hon. Member found it unanswerable.
  In a future debate we are to discuss this question of the American admiral, and I am not going to say much on that subject because there is supposed to be a self-denying ordinance in this debate, so I will content myself with saying that the controversy has done a great deal of good and I am certainly very gratified at the recovery of Tory pride in the British Navy. That is one good thing which has come out of the controversy. There had been a suggestion that it is injurious to our prestige for an American admiral to be appointed Supreme Commander in the Atlantic. If there were any question of a threat to British naval prestige, it certainly came in a very much

  1181
  more direct form in the 'thirties, when this country refused to take action against armed aggression, because it was thought that we could not stand up to the challenge of the Italian Navy in the Mediterranean. There is a lot of talk about the appointment of a Supreme Commander in the Mediterranean now, but in the days of which I am speaking the Supreme Commander in that sea appointed by the Tories was an Italian—Admiral Mussolini. It is good to see that this controversy has lead to a revival of Tory pride in the British Navy.
  I will concede this to hon. Members opposite, that it is of great importance to keep a very close watch on the Board of Admiralty. The mere fact that the First Sea Lord is in favour of the appointment of an American admiral to be Supreme Commander in the Atlantic is not conclusive in the issue. It has to be argued out, and I certainly agree that it is most important that there should be perpetual and constant civilian check on the Board of Admiralty, which brings me directly to the subject of the Royal Dockyards.
  I do not think that many Members have trespassed on the preserves of the Civil Lord during this debate, and I am sure he would be greatly disappointed if nobody brought this subject up, because he would have nothing to reply to. As a few of us will discuss this aspect of the matter I hope that the Civil Lord will be able to devote a much more extensive part of his reply to dealing with the subject of the Royal Dockyards than he did when he spoke on the last occasion. The efficiency of the Navy depends upon the efficiency of the dockyards, primarily. I can see the Civil Lord wincing a bit, so before I come to the main subject I shall say one or two words on some smaller matters.
  There is, in Vote 10 of the Navy Estimates, reference to the question of married quarters. I wish to bring to the attention of the Civil Lord the question of married quarters not only for naval personnel returning to their home ports and home towns but also for dockyard workers coming back. I do not know what happens in other dockyard towns but in the City of Plymouth it has been decided by the housing authority that those who return, for instance from Bermuda where the dockyard has been closed down, or come back from other
  1182
  places to which they had been sent by the Admiralty, have to put their names on the housing list the same as anyone else, and they have to wait 12 months before their cases can be considered. The Admiralty should consider whether they can provide married quarters for dockyard workers who are returning and who very often find themselves in just as difficult a situation as naval personnel.
  While I am on the question of dockyards, I want to refer to the point mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Lichfield and Tamworth (Mr. Snow) about dockyard schools. By the way, I did not like the suggestion in my hon. Friend's speech that, somehow, the Royal Naval Dockyards should be scattered all over the country. It seems that now he has left Portsmouth, he wants to take the dockyard with him. I assure him that there will be a lot of opposition to that proposal.
  Mr. Snow: The ancient city of Lichfield is not on the coast.
  Mr. Foot: I quite appreciate that, so possibly it is not the case that my hon. Friend wants to take the Royal Dockyard with him. I hope, anyhow, that he will reconsider the proposition that he made. He referred to the question of dockyard schools. The Admiralty deserves some word of tribute, because the dockyard schools do a fine job. In the debate we had on the dockyards two years ago, there was discussion on the difficulty of getting apprentices to come into the dockyards, and of recruiting skilled workers.
  I believe that a decision was made by the Admiralty a year or two ago that boys should be brought into dockyard schools solely by way of interview, and that it works very well. I hope that the Admiralty will go forward with that proposition, which will assist in solving the problem of the shortage of apprentices, and of the competition for apprentices that exists in other kinds of factories in dockyard towns like Plymouth. I hope also that the Civil Lord can give some assistance in extending the work of the dockyard schools in Plymouth, by the provision of a hostel, as I believe they have in Portsmouth.
  Now I will come to the main subject—I shall not disappoint the Civil Lord, because I promised I would bring it up—which is the case that we have been presenting from dockyard constituencies for

  1183
  the past five years. It is that dockyards are nothing like as efficient as they ought to be and that an independent working party designed to bring about an overhaul of the whole system should be appointed. The answer has always been that the dockyards are immaculately efficient and that no possible improvement could be made by the kind of overhaul we have put forward. If the Civil Lord can discover one dockyard worker in Devonport who agrees with him on that proposition, I solemnly give him this undertaking that I shall never make this speech again.
  Let us take one example. There has been much concern inside the dockyards about the system of merit awards. I am not saying that it was wrong to introduce that system—it was agreed with the trade unions—and I am not criticising the system which was introduced or the way in which it has been run; but it has led—the Admiralty should know this—to a considerable amount of criticism. The criticism arises from a just cause, that the system of merit awards to some extent re-introduces the worst feature of the old establishment system, which, I am glad to say, has been swept away by this Government, with great credit to the Civil Lord. The old establishments system would not have been tolerated in any other industry, and it was swept away about 40 years late. It was a system under which most monstrous favouritism could be shown by the authorities among the dockyard workers. I fear that to some extent in some cases the merits awards system tends to re-introduce that kind of favouritism, and I hope that that will be considered.
  There is also—the Civil Lord ought to know this—great criticism inside the dockyard towns about the overtime which has been worked during the past six or eight months in the dockyards. No dockyard worker dislikes overtime and he certainly does not dislike the money which he gets for it. It is all the more credit to the desire of dockyard workers to see that industry is made as efficient as possible and to their patriotism that, despite the fact that they were getting advantages out of it, they have come forward and said that the overtime system was not being worked as it should have been to protect the taxpayers' money, and that many of the workers in the dockyard were employed not on real work but on
  1184
  a system which was not properly planned and organised, and that they were involved in wasteful expenditure. If the Civil Lord comes down to Devonport, he will find that a great number of workers will be able to tell him the same.
  These are just illustrations. I have given the Civil Lord several other illustrations in the five previous debates which we have had on this subject in the last five years. Eventually the Admiralty must come to the decision that there should be an independent inquiry into the conduct of the Royal Dockyards. In brief, what I am proposing is that we should nationalise the Admiralty. Some people imagine that the dockyards are already nationalised industries; but they have no idea of the independent power which is exercised in this country, in particular in the case of the Royal Dockyards, by the Admiralty.
  The other nationalised industries every year present to Parliament a much fuller account of their operations than does the Director of His Majesty's Dockyards. There is full publicity in the Press about the other nationalised industries. In the case of most of them, consumers' councils are beginning to come into operation. There is an opportunity for inquriy by the newspapers into the way in which the other nationalised industries are run.
  In the case of most other nationalised industries, before they were nationalised there was the most detailed and full inquiry into the way in which they were conducted. There was the most valuable Reid Report upon the coal industry, which provided an enormous amount of technical information about the industry, led the way to nationalisation, and provided the basis for the technical improvements which have been brought into operation by the Coal Board in the last three or four years.
  Why should we not have an inquiry of that nature into the Royal Dockyard? Why should we not have an inquiry like there was into the coal industry by the Reid Committee, or into the gas industry, or such as the Working Party for the cotton industry? Why should the Royal Dockyards be exempted from this kind of inquiry? There has been only one independent inquiry into the functioning of the Royal Dockyards since the days of King Alfred and that was made in 1578 by John Hawkins of Plymouth.

  1185
  It brought great results. It was as a result of that inquiry that many of the naval glories of the Elizabethan age were achieved. It was as a result of the overhaul of the dockyards at that time that we were able to lay the basis of British naval strength then. It is high time that the Admiralty listened to what the dockyard towns and cities have to say about this.
  9.40 p.m.
  Surgeon Lieut.-Commander Bennett: Having heard with some interest, if not with much enlightenment, the somewhat characteristically waspish utterances of the hon. Member for Devonport (Mr. Foot), I must at the same time say that there is one point on which I find myself in entire agreement with him. I hope it will not be held against me. He mentioned the necessity of some improvement in the pension structure for the Royal Navy. I assure the House that it has many times come to my ears that the reason for the comparatively poor response, even to the improved rates of pay, by senior ratings, in the matter of re-engagement has been largely the fact that the outlook before them as pensioners later was so poor. Apart from that one point, I do not think that anyone will expect me to follow the hon. Member for Devonport in the various points he made, though I, too, have dockyards. to look after and they have their problems, which I meet daily.
  I should like to take the House with me to survey again the somewhat wider horizons which have been surveyed in the earlier part of this debate, horizons in respect of which there is no party feeling. I refer to the question of the war of the oceans to which the Navy is committed and has been committed every time throughout its existence. It is a war which takes it far away from England and puts one in mind of that phrase of the great American historian Mahan about those
  "far-distant storm-beaten ships, on which the Grand Army had never looked, which stood between it and the Dominion of the world."
  I need hardly say that in these days we are not at war in the full sense of the word, and we need not talk as though we were; but we must always bear in mind that at any moment it may become a reality. In these days we still have to think in terms of those "far-distant
  1186
  storm-beaten ships," though in this case we have also to add "far-distant storm-beaten aircraft" as well.
  In the course of the history of the Royal Navy there have been many changes in its composition and make-up. At one time the Navy progressed from square rig to steam, as the hon. and gallant Member for Hull, East (Commander Pursey) may remember. Later the aeroplane came into being and was added to the armament of the Royal Navy. Later still, the battleship went out; or perhaps I am anticipating there, though I do not think the battleship is really regarded as one of the most important ready-use assets in our Navy. Of course, aircraft have themselves gone through the stages of conversion from square rig into somewhat more streamlined models.
  None of these conversions and changes in the Navy has taken place without a struggle, and well-meaning men have been locked in mutual combat in trying to bring about or prevent each stage of these evolutions. Therefore, it is gratifying to have heard the Parliamentary Secretary say in this House last week that—
  "flying is an integral part of the activities of the Royal Navy."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 7th March, 1951; Vol. 485, c. 415.]
  because in the experience of my hon. Friend the Member for Shrewsbury (Mr. Langford-Holt) and others, flying has been definitely regarded as a rather unpleasant sideline, and it is very good to hear that it has come into its birthright as far as the Royal Navy is concerned.
  In the war of the oceans we do not have to consider very much the question of the surface raider, though undoubtedly we have to consider its possible existence and make arrangements for dealing with it. The Russians are believed now to have 15 cruisers, and to the best of my information, to be building another six. Each one of these is far more likely to try to perform at some time or another as a commerce raider rather than that all of them should sally forth as a united fleet intent on going in for an old-fashioned fleet action. In connection with the surface raiders, which are or may be fairly tough vessels, I wish to put a question to the Admiralty. Can they say, without any undue breach of proper

  1187
  secrecy, whether they are yet developing a satisfactory larger torpedo than the 21 inch torpedo with which we waged most of the war recently past? It is becoming, comparatively speaking, a very minor weapon.
  Mainly, however, the war will have to be fought under water in the high seas, wholly with under-water weapons and under-water vessels. There also will have to be combat against aircraft of a foreign Power as these may come—as some of us know only too well they did in the last war—cruising round the Western Approaches, either to attack or merely to report ships to their submarines. We certainly cannot ignore the Russian submarines and pretend that there is no danger. If there is any danger at all, it is from those submarines.
  I would say that the future of the Navy is bound up more than merely partially with the use of air power to combat submarines. I have figures which may indicate the progress that has been made. From the beginning of the war to the end of 1941, out of 48 submarines sunk, seven were sunk with the aid, in some measure or other, of aircraft. From 1943 until the end of the war, of the 629 submarines which were sunk, 326 were sunk with the aid of aircraft to some extent or other; a very different matter from the results of the first years of the war. It has appeared, therefore, that the air has in fact been getting increased recognition as an essential part, if not perhaps the major part, of naval power. In that connection it has been a matter of considerable interest to find that there was recently published an article which I read with considerable interest called, "Tasks of Naval Aviation," written by the Director of Air Warfare of the Admiralty and published as a reprint of a talk which he gave, I believe, at Ashridge.
  The hon. Member for Henley (Mr. Hay) said he hoped we would not enter on a future war using ideas appropriate to its predecessor, but I must say, with all diffidence in face of the opinion of such a senior officer, that almost every word of that article would have been very welcome to me could I have read it in 1938, because it seems entirely related to the ideas of that period. There are a number of points on which I cannot really believe that this officer can be right. I
  1188
  feel that the main fallacy which underlies his arguments is his belief in, or his adherence to, aircraft of a short range appropriate to an earlier age. There were long-range aircraft which were available at the outset of the last war but they were hardly used. There was the enormous American aircraft called the B.19 and now we have the B.36, though it may be we are short of any modern long-range aircraft built in this country.
  Whatever the aircraft may be, it is, I think, the semi-official estimate of the Admiralty that only within 400 miles of terra firma can aircraft be expected to carry out the lion's share, if not the main task, of patrol against submarines. I can hardly believe that is so in these days. After all, in the recent war we had the Catalina—and speed is not a matter of primary importance in these aircraft—which, if I remember rightly, had a cruising range of 27 hours. Therefore, the honourable aircraft, the Shackleton, is likely to have at least that same range. A flight of Shackletons can be expected to oversee an area of sea reaching considerably more than 400 miles from land.
  Even if we accept this figure as being true, and that the 400-mile radius for shore-based aircraft is all that is required, I submit that if we take the point of land nearest to what was more or less the old North Atlantic great circle route in the recent war, the whole of it can still be done under complete air cover even today. If we take the southern route via the Azores and Bermuda, it is still very nearly possible to do it with that radius, or one very much like it. There is only a queer-shaped patch in the middle of the Atlantic which would not today be adequately covered by shore-based aircraft if we accept the 400 mile limit.
  In this article the economy of using aircraft carriers for this kind of patch, and for covering inshore waters as well is stressed by the author. Surely, that is not a very real economy. The cost of flying aircraft about the sea may be high in terms of petrol, but propulsion is turning now to a more humble form of fuel. The jet engine and the turbo-prop use something more like paraffin, which is not so very expensive. The great item is that if we are to use carriers for patrolling deep sea we shall have them sitting as sort of fixed, permanent Aunt Sallies round the middle of the Atlantic, which

  1189
  is one of the places where they ought not to be. Furthermore, they will need to be escorted by numerous smaller ships which could much more profitably be used guarding convoys.
  The value of these carriers is simply terrific. I would say at a guess that a full-sized fleet carrier is equal in value to perhaps two convoys, and there are 2,000 men's lives at stake in it. I cannot help feeling that economy is not a very good argument to use in connection with aircraft carriers in deep sea. I believe that shore-based aircraft can, even now, do the job more economically and as well.
  Another point from this article, which I assume reflects the policy of the Admiralty in these matters, is that an advantage of using carriers all over the ocean is that they are mobile. I humbly submit that 25 knots is not mobility when seen from the air, except in the small matter of actually dodging projectiles. Aircraft are on a different plane of mobility altogether. They are far more appropriate when dealing with other aircraft, and infinitely superior in mobility to the submarine. Therefore, that argument, too, is fallacious.
  There is, however, one argument which is incontrovertible, and that is that the aircraft carrier can put up fighters and can afford fighter cover to the ships or landing forces in its neighbourhood. That is true, but the argument is not really quite so true that we should need to have short-range interceptor fighters involved in the Atlantic war. Would it not be possible that some very long range aircraft could primarily be offensively armed as anti-.aircraft long-range fighters? Their job is not interception; their job is merely -to frustrate the attempts of enemy aircraft to attack convoys. If these aircraft.are within "cab-rank" distance to be called in to a convoy when there is a report of enemy aircraft approaching, then, provided that they get there in time, the enemy aircraft will not be able to attack the convoy. Therefore, the object will be achieved and we would not need to have the carrier with its high performance fighters.
  One point which I ought to mention in this consideration of the aircraft carrier is that a lot of us have thought about the escort carrier which did excellent service in the last war. All of us know of the
  1190
  existence of the light fleet carrier, but I would express my doubts—and I should be grateful if the Civil Lord could say anything on this subject—whether it will be possible to operate the heavy antisubmarine ship-borne aircraft such as the G.R.17, which is such an excellent aircraft, from anything but a large carrier; or whether it will be possible to operate even the high-performance jet fighters from anything but a very large carrier in view of their extremely high landing and take-off speeds. It does seem that the day of the escort carrier and of the light fleet carrier may, in fact, be over even now, and that nothing but very large carriers can be used for modern aircraft.
  Another fallacious line that was taken in favour of escort carriers was that they were on the spot and that, therefore, the pilots did not need to be so bothered about weather. We all know that bad weather is about the worst thing a pilot can meet. I think that it probably caused as many casualties over the Atlantic as did projectiles. But the matter of bad weather in the search for submarines is not of such great importance, because most of the work is now done by electronics. The aircraft's chance of survival is far better if it is going back to terra firma guided by radar and radio to make a landing on a large airstrip which does not go up and down 60 feet, as the "Ark Royal" did on one occasion when, I think, 810 squadron landed after the "Bismarck" episode. I still feel that carriers are useful, but I am sure that the Government have not yet fully appreciated the potentialities of long-range, shore-based aircraft.
  We have to think of the problem of long-range, shore-based aircraft, and I would say, with all deference to their lordships at the Admiralty, that there should be some consideration given even now to the use of the four-motor aircraft by the Royal Navy. They must be shore-based, and I think we should get these aircraft, and get more and more of them, until they can cover the whole range of the ocean, and we should then have a service capable of patrolling whatever parts of the ocean fell to the responsibilities of the British Navy. In brief I would say "Put the money into aircraft; they are much better value."
  We now know, and we have seen in recent days—I think hon. Members are

  1191
  satisfied; certainly, I am—that Coastal Command at present is probably the most neglected of the whole series of neglected branches of the Royal Air Force. I think my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud and Thornbury (Mr. Perkins) put it in a nutshell on 6th March, when he said:
  "The importance of Coastal Command is not, I believe, realised by the people of this country. I am certain that it is not realised by the Air Ministry, who regard it as a sideline, as a kind of unwanted child."—[OFFICIAL REPORT. 6th March, 1951; Vol. 485, c. 360.]
  I would say that, if Coastal Command is now run down—and, as Earl Beatty said in another place in words which I must paraphrase, at a recent air exercise fewer than 20 aircraft turned up constituting Coastal Command—surely, it is now time to have another of these welcome changes of name of the Fleet Air Arm so as to include the functions previously exercised by Coastal Command, and to do a deal with the Air Ministry to take the unwanted child now languishing on a very cold doorstep. If we could do that, we should have unity of command instead of the division which was mighty successful in the last war, though not entirely so, and we should get a homogenous service for the good of the country.
  A problem related to this question is the shortage of aircrew, which has been mentioned by one or two hon. Members. There has been a "poor aircrew response." What is wrong that we have to recall men who served in the last war—elderly men, about 30 years of age—who are altogether too old for operational flying in modern combat aircraft? Surely, we have to think entirely afresh on the subject of obtaining aircrew. We need to get these people at the age of 19 to fly these terrifying jet aircraft, because nobody older is mad enough to do it. We should not first put them through all their square-bashing in the barracks; we should train them in the air first of all, and we should get them from whatever sources are open to us.
  I welcome the Parliamentary Secretary's remark that the sources are somewhat crystallised and could be susceptible to improvement. But primarily we should get the best, the fittest and the most intelligent of the new entry boys—and as many of them as we can—and volunteers to train as officers, and we should put
  1192
  them through what I consider should be a Royal Naval Air College, where they could learn to salute the quarter-deck and drink their tot, or whatever else is required of them, while learning to fly at an age young enough to be useful. Such an arrangement would fit in with the scheme for having long-range multi-engined aircraft, because it is well-known that the commercial air lines like the older pilot. He is a more staid and patient fellow, prepared to put up with a good deal more instrument flying without getting bored.
  If we could have this sequence, we should afford a far better future than the miserable eight-year short-service commission for the Fleet Air Arm pilot. We should have them to fly the single-motor jet interceptors when they are young, to fly the more tubby aircraft, such as the G.R.17, when they get older, and they could finish up as respectable aerial mariners flying the multi-engine aircraft on long patrols. That would mean that they would have a long Service life, and this would to some extent do away with the wastage, and help to solve the problem which is, perhaps, the most difficult the Admiralty now has to face.
  There are other problems with which I should like to deal, but I must not detain the House beyond the limits of its patience. However, I wish to mention the necessity of providing married quarters in order to make life more tolerable for aircrew officers. The men are being looked after quite well, but the officers are not. I welcome the document which I saw only this weekend—I hope I was intended to see it—which talked about the taking over of civilian "digs" by the Admiralty on behalf of officers. But this, apparently, is only to be done to a limited extent. Why should not each air station in remote parts of the country be able to take over civilian "digs" by arrangement when they are required for their aircrew? Why on earth, if this project is going on, have the Royal Naval Air Stations at Lee-on-Solent and Gosport not been allowed any facilities whatever, especially as they are the places where there is the thickest congregation of Fleet Air Arm personnel on the. ground, and where there is great competition for holiday accommodation?
  There is one further point I would single out for mention to the Civil Lord, and that is, why do not we have more Naval Volunteer Reserve Squadrons?

  1193
  Are they not a very good idea and a great success, and do not they tap some of the immense enthusiasm available for aviation in this country? I noticed with pleasure that there is a new squadron being formed in the constituency of my hon. Friend the Member for Henley which is to be moved down to Bognor, to the Naval Air Station at Ford, and which will, I believe, serve the functions of the big cities of the South Coast, such as Portsmouth and Southampton. I am sure there are more than enough men in those cities to form more than one squadron, and that it would be doing a very useful service to the country if we could get more.
  Finally, on the subject of the ships to be convoyed and defended, is it not really the most important thing that we should—and I would underline what has already been said on this subject this afternoon—have the necessary equipment for the defence of merchant ships? Are new merchant ships, for instance, being fitted with prefabricated gun mountings on board so as to save weeks and months in dock at the outbreak of any war or threat of war? Are merchant seamen being trained in defensive armaments on ships, even if they have not got the defensive armaments? Are officers being trained in convoy routine and duties? Are arrangements being made to improve the T.124 agreement which has been the bane of ships of the Western Approaches in two wars now? I should be most relieved to hear that any lessons have been learned from two world wars during which no improvements have been instituted in this agreement.
  Do we still take it that armaments for merchant ships are no longer defensive unless they are aft of the ships? Cannot we arm merchant ships all round, as the Americans do, and not rely upon it that our probable enemy will have such scruples as to look to see where the guns are before they torpedo our ships? If my worries were laid at rest on all these points, I feel there might be some good prospect of the efficient waging of any other war which might be forced upon us at any time in the future.
  10.7 p.m.
  Mr. Shackleton: I have listened with great interest to the speech of the hon. and gallant Member for Gosport and Fareham (Surgeon Lieut.-Commander Bennett) and I should
  1194
  like to deal with some of his remarks at a later stage of the few remarks I intend to address to the House. But I want first to take up again the subject which has been referred to more than once today by hon. Members on this side of the House, a subject which I believe is of very great importance, namely the possible strength of the Russian submarine navy.
  The reason why I wish to do this is that I believe that when we hear the speeches of some of the hon. Members opposite we are in real danger of creating a bogy which may distort careful and accurate thinking on the subject of naval strategy. I should like to refer first to the speech which the right hon. Member for Bromley (Mr. H. Macmillan) made on 14th February when he said the Russian U-boats were 10 times as numerous and twice as fast as the German U-boat navy at the outbreak of the last war. If I may say so, that is the sheerest nonsense. He has not the slightest evidence for that statement. What is even more alarming is the fact that to some extent he has been supported in that statement by the right hon. Member for Woodford (Mr. Churchill) who said Russia had 300 or 400 submarines, or words to that effect. At any rate, he supported that broad line.
  When the right hon. Member for Bromley referred to the German Navy at the outbreak of war he mentioned that the Germans had 30 "ocean-going" U-boats. If I may say so, that is a meaningless remark. "Ocean-going" U-boat is, I recall, a technical term for 700-ton U-boats. They also had "seagoing" U-boats of 500 tons and, predominantly it was the 500-ton U-boats, as well as the 700 ton U-boats, that operated throughout the Atlantic Ocean. It is important to realise that in studying U-boat strength it is necessary to have regard to detail and to precise equipment which any U-boat in any Navy may have.
  When we look at these figures quoted from "Jane's Fighting Ships" we find that there are contradictions even in that authority, and I am sure that that authority would be the first to admit that they had no accurate information on the subject. It was said in "Jane's" for 1949, for instance, that the Russians might have 1,000 U-boats. I believe that figure

  1195
  was also quoted by the right hon. Member for Bromley, but the right hon. Gentleman did not go on to add the additional remarks that "Jane's" makes that this figure was,
  "highly doubtful because of the limited Russian shipyard capacity and the trained technicians to produce them."
  Then in the current edition of "Jane's" we find that whereas in the section dealing with the Russian Navy it says that the Russians have no fewer than 350 to 370 submarines in service, I notice that they have advanced to a greater degree of accuracy over their 1949 edition where they said the Russians had 360 U-boats in service. The had decided to widen the field a little bit. In another part of "Jane's" they mention these figures but, instead of saying that the submarines are in service, they say that they are believed to be in existence, and they go on to add that Russia seems to have a policy of never scrapping any vessel which can be used for any purpose, no matter how old or how worn out it may become. It may be that the Russian U-boat navy would be an important source of scrap which my right hon. Friend the Minister of Supply should bear in mind. But, in fact, we cannot take seriously these figures in "Jane's" of the strength of the Russian underwater navy.
  When we examine the types that are listed in "Jane's" and compare one class with another class, we find that, as my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) pointed out, those same types appeared in pre-war editions of "Jane's," and many of them—at least 70 or 80—are small coastal "Malutka" class boats which by no stretch of the imagination can be regarded as a serious threat to our ocean-going convoys in time of war.
  What can be a danger is the new type of U-boat, if they have it. I should like to say a few words about that because I believe that a few of the new type U-boats which the Germans were producing—the type 21 which was the large ocean-going high speed battery type, and the type 23 which was a small so-called high speed battery type, although its performance in operation in the last few weeks of the war was very discouraging to the Germans—are undoubtedly in Russian hands. Whether there are a dozen or two dozen
  1196
  I do not know. In addition there may undoubtedly be a fair amount of building of these types in Russian yards. But I hope it will be possible to deal even with those types, with the resources which I hope the Admiralty and, above all. Coastal Command possess, or are going to have. I am inclined to agree with the hon. and gallant Member for Gosport and Fareham that Coastal Command have not got enough resources.
  There remains the one revolutionary type of submarine which was in course of production in the latter part of the war, and that was the type known as the "Walter boat"—a type which in addition to diesels and batteries also had some sort of closed system of propulsion dependent upon hydrogen peroxide for its source of oxygen. That type of boat was being experimented upon by the Germans. They had great difficulty with it. They never succeeded in getting it into operation, and I believe that it presents great difficulty in actual operation at sea. It is far less satisfactory on passage than the standard type. It must depend on a lower battery capacity for its progress on passage, and it must use, like others, the Schnorkel. In addition, it is as vulnerable as any type of U-boat when proceeding to the area of operation.
  If any of those submarines are in existence in the Russian navy I should be surprised to hear that there are more than a very few experimental types. I do not make this point because I wish to depreciate the danger of under-water attack in any war that may take place, but I do think it is very harmful to our discussions when we have some of these doubtful figures hurled out in a meaningless way calculated to cause alarm and despondency instead of in a manner in which we can consider the problem seriously.
  I believe there is a possibility of great danger. I have spoken several times of the dangers of submarine attack in a future war, but I do not believe the danger is anything like that which the right hon. Members for Woodford or Bromley thought fit to present to the House. I hope the House will accept what I have to say on this subject, because we shall get on better in the future if we get our minds clear on the point.

  1197
  I should like to turn briefly to some of the remarks made by the hon. and gallant Member for Gosport and Fare-ham. I was disturbed to see him reviving in a very subtle way the old suggestion that Coastal Command should be taken over by the Navy. Let me say straight away that however we divide our aircraft between Navy and Air Force, it is highly desirable that, once we have fixed the dividing line, we should stick to it. His suggestion that the Navy might build up a force of four-engined aircraft, because the Air Force were not doing the job, is not a reflection on the Air Force but on the Chiefs of Staff and their failure to lay down that operational requirement.
  I remember the situation which grew up during the war between the American Navy and the American Army. At one time four American Army squadrons came to Coastal Command to reinforce us in our anti-submarine activities. After a certain amount of indoctrination—they learned the navigational problems here and learned to fly over British waters—they became first-class and, if I may say so, were as good as anything we had in Coastal Command. But, at the very height of the Battle of the Atlantic, the United States Navy traded its strategic Bomber Command for the Army's antisubmarine command. It was a straight case of politics; out went the Army with their highly-trained anti-submarine crews and in came the Navy flying Liberators, which they had seen comparatively recently. It took a long time to get them to the same standard of operational efficiency as that which had been reached by the Army's anti-submarine squadrons.
  I believe that the general dividing line in the question of the control of aircraft is that between aircraft which take off from the land, which should be under the Air Force, and aircraft which take off from ships, which should be under the Navy. The reason the latter should be under the Navy is because the Navy have many peculiar habits of their own and it is highly desirable that those who go to sea should understand those habits and be able to conform to them.
  Surgeon Lieut.-Commander Bennett: Does the hon. Gentleman mean that the Navy should not have shore establishments where squadrons could be disembarked? Does he mean that they should
  1198
  have only machines which are actually with the Fleet?
  Mr. Shackleton: No. Obviously they have to learn, to do their training, to practise their take-offs and all the rest of it on shore. But they are essentially training establishments. The dividing line to which I refer is in the operational theatre.
  I believe that, far from strengthening our resources at sea in a war, such a suggestion as that of the hon. and gallant Gentleman might tend to weaken those resources. There might come a time, as there did in the last war, when it was necessary to reinforce the anti-submarine forces. It was infinitely easier on that occasion to switch from Bomber Command. I agree that it was difficult in a way because they were completely Bomber Command-minded and it was not easy to get them to take an interest in 'Coastal Command, but nevertheless it was easier to make the change than it would have been under the hon. and gallant Gentleman's system because they were, after all, wearing the same uniform, had had the same training, and so on. Within a short time they fulfilled the role as competently as any of the fully-trained Coastal Command squadrons.
  Perhaps I might point out that in wartime the bulk of the aircrew will not be those who were in the Navy or the Air Force and were trained in peace-time. There will always be a great expansion and, in the end, we shall depend on men trained for the job in war. The idea that they must be sailors in order to fly with the Fleet at sea is impracticable in wartime because the real need then is to get men who can fly aeroplanes. I hope the hon. and gallant Gentleman will see this point. This is but another exchange of fire in the many which have taken place on this subject.
  Perhaps I may also refer briefly to the suggestion which has been made that the Navy might depend less on carriers. I believe that V.L.R., very long-range, aircraft are of the greatest importance. They were of the greatest importance in the last war and they played a great part, with the aircraft carriers, in March, 1943, when the decisive battles of the Atlantic were fought. I believe that the new aircraft coming along, if we have enough of them—and I agree there is a shortage—can do the job. At the same time we

  1199
  cannot pin our faith to any one weapon. What I should like to see is not so much the existing expensive types of carriers—I am in full agreement with the hon. and gallant Gentleman about this—but a type very much smaller and very much cheaper. The danger of the expensive carrier is that it means, so to speak, that we do put an awful lot of eggs in one basket.
  What I would suggest the Admiralty ought seriously to consider is developing the cheapest possible ship from which aircraft can take off to join in the antisubmarine patrols, and I believe we should consider even building a special type of anti-submarine escort carrier. The degree of performance required of the aircraft is not high. What is needed is endurance. However slow the aircraft may be, what is much more important is endurance when it comes to hunting U-boats.
  With this must come the appropriate' weapons. I would say that with the new type U-boats the aircraft is, to a large extent, already neutralised. It can play an important rôle, and even if it can no longer hunt to exhaustion, it can keep the U-boats down; but I do not believe that the aircraft is the effective reply to submarines, even with the sono-buoys, to which the Parliamentary Secretary referred. They must have super-men in the Navy and in the Air Force to make effective use of the sono-buoys, because the operational technique of making use of the sono-buoys in hunting is something which calls for a very high degree of training.
  I shall not detain the House any more, except to say that I believe it is necessary to preserve the sort of balance we had in the last war between the Navy and Air Force in naval operations. I believe that the Navy should have operational control over Coastal Command. I believe it was exercised much better from the time the Navy had formal operational control because they no longer had the inhibitions which were caused by fear that the Air Force would not do what they asked them to do. and we had far less interference after the formal change of operational control than before. But. as part of this control, it is necessary that the Navy—if I may so speak in the presence of so many naval gentlemen-should have the admirals who understand something about aircraft. This is
  1200
  a problem the solution of which I do not know.
  The American Navy had the great advantage—and this is one argument for the Navy's having land-based aircraft—of having admirals brought up with a wide field of experience in aviation. [Interruption.]I do not want to make any comments on the Fleet Air Arm. The hon. and gallant Member for Gosport and Fareham does know how the Fleet Air Arm were treated during the war and the difficulties they had with superior officers. I recollect one case of a naval commander who refused to let an aircraft take off from a catapult because it would have dirtied the quarter deck. There is need to have admirals who understand aircraft and who are prepared to make use of both the Fleet Air- Arm and Coastal Command.
  Commander Pursey: Tell that to the Marines.
  10.24 p.m.
  Mr. I. J. Pitman: I do not propose to follow the hon. Gentleman the Member for Preston, South (Mr. Shackleton), in his private war with my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Gosport and Fareham (Surgeon Lieut.-Commander Bennett) on the question of Coastal Command. It seems to me that the two Services have accepted the present organisation, and that the Minister of Defence and the public at large feel that this is the machine which ought to be accepted, and that the real solution, if there is a problem, lies in the proper use of that machine. This organisation is settled, and it is now a question of using it to the best advantage.
  I should like to join with the rest of the House in congratulating the Parliamentary Secretary on the way he has introduced the Estimates. I have only one criticism, and that is his use of the word "heliocopter." I hope he will take a lesson from Daedalus and Icarus and not set the sights of the Navy too high, because if the Navy tries to fly too high it may singe its wings.
  The point I wish to make is a small one, but it concerns an important principle, involving four grades in the electrical engineering department of the Admiralty, and it is a matter in which I think the Civil Lord himself is particularly interested. In July of last year

  1201
  the Parliamentary Secretary wrote to me to say that the increased salaries of these four grades had been agreed in principle and that they were under urgent consideration. It was agreed in principle to the extent that it was admitted that back payment should be made to 1st January, 1946, yet nothing has been happening, and the cost of living, as we all know, has been constantly rising. All other grades have had their increases, but these unfortunate people have been left with promises; nothing whatever has been done. There is an expression at sea, "Hoisting the dead horse," for working for only notional pay and these men have hoisted the dead horse for five and a half years. I think the House would not wish any civil servant to go on in that situation.
  The Civil Lord has previously been very good in putting right matters of Civil Service staffing and I ask him to look at this point in particular, because I am sure the House would not wish any of our honoured civil servants in the Admiralty to go for five and a half years without their back pay. It is something which needs very urgent attention.
  10.27 p.m.
  Mr. G. R. Howard: I am sure my hon. Friend the Member for Bath (Mr. Pitman) will forgive me if I do not follow him on the rather complicated subject about which he has spoken. I will, if I may, revert to the defensively equipped merchant ships. Earlier in the debate remarks were made about "Tory pride," and the only thing I will say tonight which might be construed as at all controversial is that it was my pride to serve at sea throughout the six years of war, a good deal of the time on convoy duty, and it is upon those matters that I wish to speak for a few minutes.
  I understand that today we have a greater tonnage of merchant shipping than we had in 1939. This is a magnificent achievement, but at the same time it is our duty to see that not only the men but the ships are protected. I should like the Civil Lord, if it is possible, to give some small indication of the plans for the training and equipping of these defensively-equipped merchant ships. I remember that in the last war there were unfortunate cases of lack of co-operation between aircraft and convoys.
  1202
  The hon. Member for Huddersfield, East (Mr. J. P. W. Mallalieu), mentioned that lack of co-operation in connection, with the Air Force, when ships were bombed. I remember a sad case when an aircraft was told to close with the commodore of a convoy for instructions and was shot down in the act of doing so. What is being done in this connection? What is being done about giving simple training in fire discipline? Those of us who served on Russian convoys in the war will know what I mean. It was a very alarming experience for ships in that convoy to be subjected to the strain of the terrible attacks that were made, and under the pressure of several days of attack the fire from our ships was directed rather less accurately than one would have hoped, with considerable damage to other ships in convoy.
  What provision will there be for providing guns and crews quickly in case of emergency? Will those crews be avail-able, and will they be given some simple form of training so that they are able to use the weapons at their disposal efficiently? Will there be some form of simple convoy training for merchant navy officers so that they know the general procedure of how convoys are run, and things of that sort: such matters have been mentioned by hon. Members on this side of the House, as to training in convoy signals and language difficulties?
  I remember a graphic case of a convoy in the last war, when we had difficulty in persuading a ship to close up. She was not, perhaps, making the best speed. Several efforts were unsuccessful. Then the captain of the ship I was serving in. who recently had been in Greece, hit upon the bright idea of addressing the captain of this particular ship in Greek over the loud-hailer. This had the most remarkable result. Smoke poured out of the ship's funnel and the vessel closed up quickly. Let us hope that something can be done to simplify such communications.
  I should like to deal for a moment with plans for the standardisation of equipment. At the oubreak of war, it surely is vitally important to us that any armament which is put into these ships shall be available quickly and easily. I understand that in the last war the Americans had a certain type of high-angle, low-angle, gun which was extremely effective. This gun had an easily

  1203
  interchangeable barrel. That would be a very useful piece of equipment if it could be made available to our merchant ships. What can be divulged about plans for making these guns available, perhaps with a spare barrel to go with the guns, to be fitted at the Ordnance depots on the other side of the ocean, and can we be told about gun mounting standardisation?
  The question of interchangeability and standardisation of ammunition has been touched on. I feel that plans of this sort should be made known as far as possible within security restrictions. After all, is it not the case that those who man our ships, those magnificent officers and men, if there should be any emergency in the future, will have to face it as they have always faced emergencies in the past. Is it not our duty to see that they will do so fitted for the task, and knowing that the arrangements for their armament are under consideration now, and that they are as efficient as they can be? After all, whatever hon. Members on both sides of the House may say, it is upon them and their ships that the survival of these islands has depended, and does and always will depend.
  10.34 p.m.
  Sir Jocelyn Lucas: Tonight I want to say a few words about welfare. I understand that in Malta, for instance, free education is supposed to be granted to the children of naval ratings. In fact, in "Notes for the Guidance of Wives and Families on First Arrival in Malta," issued by the Naval welfare authorities, paragraph 26, it says:
  "Free primary and secondary education to Higher School Certificate standard is provided at the Naval Children's School at Tal Handak and Verdala."
  Apparently, if these children go for this examination their parents have to pay, and I have here an example from a naval rating who is being asked for £2 16s. to be paid before 24th March before his daughter can enter for the School Certificate examination. I understand that if she had been in England the examination would be free. In addition, there is a letter from the instructor commander, which says:
  "I myself am making inquiries from the Admiralty about a change in policy to bring us into line with conditions in English schools."
  I would like the Parliamentary Secretary to look into this and see what can be
  1204
  done so these children could get the same chance as they would in England.
  I would also like to ask him about the Royal Naval Benevolent Fund. Is there sufficient money in it for all the calls made on it? Do the Government make a grant or do they have to rely on N.A.A.F.I. or on legacies? It is very helpful in many cases, but the finances are limited, and if it was not for other societies, such as the Forces Benefit Society, there would be many cases of grievous hardship.
  I had hoped tonight to speak about commissions for National Service men, but I was glad to hear the Parliamentary Secretary say that they would be able to get commissions in the future. I remember that two or three years ago a young man who had Service traditions on all sides was desperately keen on getting into the Royal Navy and obtaining a commission there. He was told that he could not get a commission as a National Service man unless he enlisted for 12 years, and then if he did not get a commission he could not get out.
  That was the point I was going to raise tonight, but I am glad that it has been put right. In this instance that man did his National Service in the Army, and within a few months had a temporary commission and when his time was up he had a permanent commission. I am sorry to say he was killed in Malaya on his first jungle patrol. That young man would have been by now a naval officer.
  Hon. Members who sit for naval constituencies have had numerous letters about the £100 bounty. I think that everyone considers those who were patriotic enough -to re-engage before September last have had a raw deal. I know it is a difficult matter as far as the technicalities are concerned, but I am glad to know the matter is being reconsidered and I hope the Parliamentary Secretary with his usual good will will do his utmost to have the matter put right.
  10.38 p.m.
  Mr. Douglas Houghton: I wish to refer to the brief remarks made by the hon. Member for Bath (Mr. Pitman). When he rose to speak I heard a question asked, "How long is it since the Navy sailed into Bath?" The question, "How long is it since the Fleet sailed up the Calder?" could be asked in my case. We have, however, one thing in

  1205
  common—a close interest in the efficiency of the administrative side of the Admiralty. If the hon. Gentleman will permit me to make a personal reference to him it is to say that he was the founder and pioneer of that section of the Treasury known as Organisation and Method, of which the Admiralty is so much in need.
  The hon. Member referred to the long delays which have occurred in dealing with staff affairs of both senior and subordinate staffs on the civilian side of the Admiralty. The Parliamentary and Financial Secretary will remember that in the debate of 22nd March, 1950—col. 2,083 of the OFFICIAL REPORT—I referred to the staff matters to which the hon. Member for Bath referred tonight. The Directorate of Electrical Engineering are still waiting for the settlement of their salary claim, which, when it comes into effect, will date back to 1st January, 1946. It seems intolerable that a Government Department cannot settle these small, yet important, questions of grading and salaries of highly placed and key technicians in the Admiralty on whose services, vigour, initiative and skill the Royal Navy relies for the development of much of the technical side of its work.
  The hon. and gallant Member for Merton and Morden (Captain Ryder) paid tribute to the administrative efficiency of the Admiralty. I was very glad to hear that and have no desire to detract from any tribute which he feels moved to pay *to the Admiralty from the point of view of a naval officer, but I regret to say that a similar tribute cannot be paid by those who see the Board of Admiralty from a civilian angle. I could add a long list to the grades already referred to by the hon. Member for Bath. Delays are occurring in the grading of important technical officers of the staff of the Director of Naval Construction, the Department of the Engineering Chief, the Department of the Chief Inspector of Naval Ordnance and the Department of the Director of Armament Supplies.
  Twelve months is long enough for the Admiralty to put its house in order. It seems to me that the establishments or personnel administration side of the Admiralty is in need of a thorough shake-up. It requires the importation of experienced and vigorous establishment officers from other Departments, perhaps the one to which the Parliamentary Secretary and
  1206
  I once belonged. We could supply from such a Department those who could get these reorganisation and regrading affairs settled quickly.
  I am not minimising the wide range of officers with which the Admiralty has to deal, but they have been long enough at it. They have had to deal with those technical grades and other specialist classes almost since the days of Nelson. Surely they have now developed a technique for dealing with these matters more quickly than they do. I sincerely hope that whoever replies for the Government will be able to assure us that the Admiralty will get on more quickly with these things and I shall be relieved of the necessity for repeating this speech next year.
  Mr. Vernon Bartlett, a former Member of Parliament, once said that the House of Commons was the most difficult audience in the world; it was the only one which did not want to hear whoever was speaking because it was composed mostly of people who had speeches of their own to make. That may be brutally true of the few remarks I am making, though it was not true of the interesting and comprehensive statement made by the Parliamentary Secretary, who seemed to put new meaning and deeper fervour into the saying by infantrymen in two world wars, "Thank God we have a Navy"—or should it be, "Thank God we are going to have a Navy"?
  Before sitting down I should like to refer to another part of the administration of the Admiralty which seems to be in need of a thorough overhaul. It was referred to by the hon. Member for Devon-port (Mr. Foot), namely, the review of the operation of the dockyards. In the dockyard establishments overseas, there are classes known as "local entry" and that means, presumably, that they are people forming a staff which has not been sent out from this country, but which is recruited locally. But, here again, there are intolerable delays which seem to occur over their conditions of service. It appears that the Admiralty is anxious not to do anything about its "local entry" staffs until it sees what the local colonial Government is going to do about its staff; and then, probably, we have the War Office wanting to say something about its "local entry" staff and, possibly, the R.A.F, as well.

  1207
  The result is that three Service Ministers, the local Government, and possibly the Colonial Office, are all interested in these locally recruited staffs, all of which must have much in common. I hope that this aspect of Admiralty administration may be looked into; and that, I think, is the end of my catalogue of criticism. But these are serious things in the Admiralty's part of the Civil Service administration of our affairs.
  10.47 p.m.
  Mr. G. P. Stevens: May I, at the outset, add my congratulations to those already offered to the Parliamentary Secretary on his introductory speech? It was, I thought, a very "easy" speech, and one felt, perhaps, that it all went a little too smoothly in parts; that there was some complacency in part of his remarks, and that he did not show the necessary sense of urgency. Of course, it may well be that the dark shadow of the Treasury was behind him, forcing certain financial limitations. But could not more be accomplished within the financial limitations laid down? According to the newspapers, some weeks ago the Minister of Works said that we could all work a little harder, and that, I think, is true of the dockyards up and down the country. It might mean more pay for overtime, but overheads would be lowered, and there would follow cheaper production.
  We have heard of destroyers being converted to fast frigates, and I should like to ask if these are prototypes; because, if so, then the highest possible priority should be given the work. If these are prototypes, then the run of production depends upon them, and work should proceed on them round the clock. I would ask the Parliamentary Secretary, or whoever is to reply for the Government, if that is the case at present. There may be equipment bottlenecks and, if this is one of the troubles, then the contractors supplying the equipment should be asked to work harder, too.
  I should like to say a word about the complexity of modern radar equipment. One piece I saw recently had 2,000 valves, and in one of these prototype conversions I visited about a fortnight ago I came across a very complex piece of electronic equipment. It may surprise hon. Members to know that, as part of the decora-
  1208
  tion of the case—not something just chalked on by somebody in the dockyard—there was the slogan, "Do not repair, fit the spare." So, if there is any damage done to this valuable piece of equipment, it will not be a question of repairing or replacing one of the 2,000 valves, but of replacing the whole "shooting match." Is our supply of spares so great that it is sufficient for this purpose?
  There is another point. I understand that the programme of conversion of these destroyers was laid down about two years ago. I have reason to believe that the work of conversion is up to programme, but I wonder whether the tempo of the programme, though it may have been sufficient for our purpose two years ago, is not rather leisurely at present? I wonder also whether the Royal dockyards' capacity is adequate to the whole of the conversion programme which is envisaged. I think obviously that the answer must be, "No." If that be true, I wonder if the private yards have been warned of the proposed demands so that they may plan ahead.
  So far as the dockyards are concerned, which is the Civil Lord's particular interest, I wonder whether work is as efficiently supervised as it might be. The hon. Member for Devonport (Mr. Foot), for the fifth or sixth time, asked for a working party. I do not think that is necessary. I think the Civil Lord's supervision in that matter is enough. But I wonder whether the supervision of work-in the dockyards is adequate? Are the time clocks near the job? I wonder how many breaks there are in the course of the day's work, and if some are not too long. I would like to know if overtime is being worked in general, and in particular upon these prototypes.
  I wonder if incentives are sufficiently strong to encourage the men. I was a bit shocked to see the new rates of pay for the dockyards which were published some three or four weeks ago. I saw that the new rate of wage for unskilled labour was £5 3s. 0d. a week. For a schedule (1) skilled labourer, it was £5 6s. 0d. a week, a differential of 3s., which seems inadequate to encourage men to get on and become skilled and efficient at their job. I heard the hon. Member for Lichfield and Tamworth (Mr. Snow) make a suggestion in regard to the supervision of the dockyards at the top level. He indicated that the industrial

  1209
  personnel find dealing with admirals and other senior naval officers difficult and that perhaps they lacked the necessary diplomacy to approach naval officers.
  Mr. Snow: I did not say that.
  Mr. Stevens: I think that was the gist of the hon. Gentleman's remarks—that they would prefer to have civilians to deal with.
  The point is not what is for the convenience or what is for the comfort of the industrial workers in the dockyards. It is what is going to give the best and most efficient service to the uniformed personnel in the Royal Navy. The uniformed side in the ships very much prefer that the senior supervision shall be by uniformed personnel, who themselves have been through the same kind of difficulties and have encountered exactly the same kind of problems they are themselves encountering. On the topic of incentives, I wonder if, on the uniformed side, incentives to promotion are sufficient.
  I think it was the hon. and gallant Member for Hull, East (Commander Pursey), who wondered why it was that married quarters for officers were not provided by the Tories before the war. The answer is that before the war officers found it very much easier to live on their pay than they do at present. It is for that reason that the provision of married quarters for officers has become a matter of very much greater urgency than before the war. I am pleased to see that the financial allocation for married quarters in the current Estimates is just over double what it was the previous year. But a lot more should be done because lodgings for officers' wives cost some five guineas a week and. furthermore, so far as officers are concerned, there is the immense expense of the diverse uniforms they are required to find out of their pay. All these make commissioned life a financially gnawing struggle.
  I deplore the Socialists' abandonment on differentials throughout. In industry it means the end of all craftsmanship; in the Royal Navy it means that fewer and fewer men of the right kind will be willing to accept the hazards and responsibilities of commissioned rank even with a pension at the end of it. So far as pensions are concerned, about a fortnight
  1210
  ago I was speaking to a retired admiral of the Fleet and we worked out what cash was left to him out of the pension of £1,800 a year which he was being paid and we discovered, much to his surprise and mine, that after taxation it was almost the equivalent in pounds, shillings and pence, of the cash left to a retired admiral of the Fleet in the days of Lord Nelson. This certainly does not provide any incentive for a man to achieve these very high ranks.
  I said right at the start that I thought there was a certain lack of urgency about the Parliamentary Secretary's speech. Some progress, undoubtedly, these Estimates reveal, but I look to the day when there will be not merely a good Parliamentary performance in introducing the Estimates, but when there will be some drive and vigour and determination in carrying them out.
  10.57 p.m.
  Lieut.-Commander Baldock: I would like to make a few points about a particular branch of the Royal Navy, the R.N.V.R., in which I have a particular interest. I do not know whether it is the custom to declare one's interest in these matters, as it is in industry and commerce, but I am still serving in that branch of the Royal Navy. I would like to raise three points. One is the rather curious position revealed by a widely circulated Sunday paper on 11th February last, to which the Parliamentary Secretary may have had his attention drawn. This article pointed out—and I am sure the avenue they carefully explain is being explored by many—that there is an excellent means by which "spivs" and "drones" of the potential Z Class Reserve are avoiding their obligations to the country.
  They join the R.N.V.R., which automatically releases them from any obligation to undergo Z Class training, and they fail to attend drills, and are, deliberately, generally inefficient. After a certain time they are discharged as being unsuitable for a naval rating. Then the curious position arises that, having been discharged they are free from any obligation with any service. It is obviously an anomalous position which cannot bring any credit to the R.N.V.R., and can only bring satisfaction to "spivs" and "drones" who have the chance to follow it up. I imagine that this position is

  1211
  being looked into carefully, and that the loophole will be stopped.
  The second point I want to make is with regard to holidays. What is the position of holidays for a National Service man, who is doing his 3½years in the Reserve, subsequent to his two years in the Forces? His holidays are constitutionally protected and he is enabled to have a holiday in addition to his fortnight's camp or training with the Fleet. This does not apply to volunteers. If one is in the R.N.V.R. or in any volunteer force, one is not protected in any way so far as holidays are concerned. In some cases volunteers are being discouraged by finding they have to sacrifice their holiday, for the sake of their training. I think they should be given as good conditions in that respect as those called up compulsorily.
  The third point is with regard to methods of entry into the R.N.V.R. There are two methods from the scholastic or educational establishments. One is that a boy can join the R.N.V.R. before he leaves school. He can then have three weeks special training, and then he can go to the Fleet for his two years as a National Service man. That arrangement appears to be working very well. The universities are a parallel source of new entries to the R.N.V.R. When a man "opts" to do his National Service after graduation there is very little apparent enthusiasm to try his hand in the Navy.
  I believe that is largely because the Army and the R.A.F, have contingents in the university corps with fairly strong representation, whereas the Navy have no liaison with the universities. As a result, what would be a very valuable number of men in the engineering and technical grades are being lost to the Navy because few graduates appreciate that they can go into the R.N.V.R. instead of doing their National Service in one of the other two arms.
  This question of the technical people who might come forward as engineers or other technicians brings up the subject of maintenance, which is a serious one. I believe that the Parliamentary Secretary thoroughly appreciates it. He realises how far more complex apparatus is becoming and the seriousness of the demand for experienced artificers in the Service. This is a greater problem than
  1212
  it was in 1939. The position in the anti-submarine field disturbs us most. In those days the anti-submarine corvette was equipped with a simple Asdic apparatus and depth charges mounted on the stern. Compare that today with the conversion of a fleet destroyer costing over £500,000 and one appreciates how much more complex maintenance is now. My own experience at sea since the war makes me feel a bit doubtful about the position. I should feel happier if a greater number of artificers were available, and if there were reserves in case of emergency.
  The hon. Member for Hereford (Mr. J. P. L. Thomas) has already mentioned the desirability of stabilising the National Service intake into the Navy. He mentioned that it would greatly help the manning depots if they knew there was to be a regular flow each year. How much more important is that information to the R.N.V.R. The National Service men are their only source of new entrants. It is most important to the Reserve to know how many men are available annually.
  On the problem of retaining senior ratings in the Service and getting them to re-engage, I agree with my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Gosport and Fareham (Surgeon Lieut.-Commander Bennett), and the hon. Member for Devonport (Mr. Foot), that pensions are probably a more important factor in re-engagement than any further increments of pay. This question raises again the point that pensions should be thoroughly considered. I cannot pass this point without a reference to the decision on the £100 bounty. That really was a shabby trick. I can think of no other way to describe it, and I myself believe that the Parliamentary Secretary is ashamed himself. To hold out a bait to those people still free to leave the Service, and give nothing to those who had volunteered to stay in, smells strongly of the press gang. It would do a great deal of good to the morale and enthusiasm of those likely to re-engage if this was cleared up as quickly as possible.
  There is one point about the construction programme which I do not think has been referred to, and that is in regard to landing craft. We have not been told anything about the programme for those vessels. The Korean campaign has shown

  1213
  the value of having a reasonable number of these craft available in the early part of a campaign. They may be wanted at a very early stage in operations, not merely to deliver the coup de grace.They also have very valuable uses in other directions which the Parliamentary Secretary will appreciate, and I hope that their construction is being considered.
  Finally, on the question of the role of the Navy in defence in general, while, obviously, it can no longer carry the whole responsibility of one of its original functions—the defence of this country against invasion, which it must share with the Army and Air Force—the other, the defence of our Merchant Fleet, is as vital as it has ever been. As our economy becomes more complex we are becoming more and more dependent on a greater variety of imported products, and it is vital that the Merchant Fleet should be protected. I hope that our basic position as a maritime power in the centre of an empire will always be kept in mind.
  11.12 p.m.
  Commander T. D. Galbraith: The course which the debate has followed, and its whole trend and tone, are further evidence that the House continues to feel the deepest interest in the Navy and everything that concerns its welfare, notwithstanding the great changes that have taken place in recent years through the advent of air power and the great technical development there has been. We appreciate that to an island kingdom the safety of commerce on the seas is of vital and paramount importance. It is true that ships of war are no longer able themselves to protect this country from invasion, as they were when Lord Grey was at the Foreign Office. It is evident that paratroops could descend in our island at any time of the day or night and that the Navy could do nothing to stop them. It is also true that guided missiles and bombs might devastate large parts of this island without the Navy being able to help. But I do not think these things will inevitably bring disaster to us, such as the severance of our sea communications would certainly entail.
  As the Parliamentary Secretary said in his opening speech, we are still dependent on ships to bring us our food and raw materials, and to supply us with the motive power on which the Navy, the R.A.F., and the highly mechanised land
  1214
  forces now depend. So long as can be foreseen, ships will be required to replenish this country, and if we are not to starve those ships must be protected. No one has ever suggested that our commerce can be protected by ships alone. The safety of our shipping in time of war depends on the closest collaboration of the ships and aircraft of the Navy and the aircraft of the R.A.F. If we fail to achieve that full co-operation which existed between the Services during the war we may well find ourselves on the verge of disaster. These two Services must act as one, and I suggest that to that end they must be imbued with the same common doctrine; they must see things alike, and they must constantly be training together.
  Frequently, during the 22 years in which I had the honour to be a short-term officer, I heard it said that no nation could possibly prepare for war unless it had a potential enemy either actually in mind or in imagination. Today, unfortunately, the potential enemy is much in evidence, and that is Russia. I therefore suggest that we must endeavour to forecast the nature and the extent of the attack which Russia might mount against our sea communications.
  I have noticed recently that there are those who would rule out all thought of surface warfare, but to do that would, to my mind, be very foolish indeed. We know for a fact that Russia today possesses at least 10 cruisers which are no older than the year 1934. We also know that' she is credited with having 20 cruisers under construction, and if even a few of these get out on to the open sea we know very well from our experience that they could inflict very great damage upon us—damage arising not only through the loss of ships but also through the loss of time and effort, for undoubtedly we would have to hunt them down; we would have to guard the focal areas on the trade routes, and we might even have to sail ships in convoy on distant seas. So, even with the help of aircraft, the force employed would be out of all proportion to the strength of the raiders. Apart from the possibility of raids by enemy cruisers we have always to keep in mind the possibility of raids by armed merchant vessels.
  In 1939 we possessed 50 cruisers, and we know that they were all too few;

  1215
  that, even with the help of our merchant cruisers and the vessels which were constantly forthcoming from the 20 cruisers which we were building at the outbreak of war, that did not prevent continuous anxiety at the Admiralty. I remind the House that during the war Germany possessed only 11 ships capable of operating against our commerce on the high seas. In comparison with the 50 ships which we had in 1939 we today have 26, and I submit that that number is insufficient to provide for all the duties which cruisers would be called upon to perform in time of war, including, of course, the protection of trade.
  It is inconceivable, I believe, that we should ever fight alone again—and by that I mean that undoubtedly we hope that America would be with us. But in proportion to the value of our commerce, in proportion to the danger involved through any temporary interruption of our trade, do 26 cruisers really represent our fair share of the burden of protecting shipping throughout the seven seas of the world? I cannot feel that they do, or that that number is consistent either with our position as a Great Power or with our duty to ourselves. Yet today we have only three cruisers building, and work on them has meantime been suspended. So much for the question of attack on our lines of communication by surface vessels.
  Now I turn to the subject which has been uppermost in the thoughts of hon. Members during the debate this evening —the danger of the submarine. We do not know with any accuracy the number of submarines which Russia possesses, but there cannot be any doubt that, whatever the number may be, it is against our lines of sea communications that they will be directed. Of that there is surely no doubt whatsoever. If war comes the United Kingdom is, by reason of its position in relation to the Continent of Europe, an advance post of the Western Powers without which the defence of Western Europe would be greatly hampered, if not made utterly impossible.
  Therefore, from the point of view of a potential enemy it would be a matter of the utmost importance that the facilities which this country offers should be rendered ineffective at the earliest moment. To achieve that end our enemy might well
  1216
  attempt to destroy our ports. He would indulge in the most intensive mining campaign to block the entrances. I am glad, for that reason, to learn from the Parliamentary Secretary that the Admiralty is guarding against that contingency. I believe, for a variety of reasons, that it might be more effective if they were to attack shipping on the high seas.
  We require to guard against all these contingencies, but it is with the latter that we are particularly concerned this evening. It is reported that the Russian shipbuilding programme included 1,000 submarines. I believe that that is too optimistic. They are credited with 300 submarines in service, but many of these are of coastal type. Like the hon. Member for Preston, South (Mr. Shackleton), I will attempt to evaluate the present strength of Russia in submarines, though I hope the hon. Member will not think that I am raising a bogy.
  I propose, in the first instance, to disregard all the coastal types of submarine, and the 70 ocean-going submarines which, according to report, are stationed in the Black Sea and in Far Eastern waters. We are left, again according to report, to face 75 modern sea-going submarines which are supposed to be stationed, 30 in the White Sea and 45 in the Baltic. Making every possible allowance for exaggeration, I will assume, for the purposes of my argument, that Russia has, in fact, only one-third of that number in positions from which they can attack us at the outbreak of war. I hope it will not be thought that this estimate is likely to create despondency or alarm among the people of this country.
  On these estimates, the weight of attack which we might be called upon to face is that which can be mounted by a force of 25 modern submarines. The question I would like to ask, and I do not suppose that I shall receive a reply, is whether at this moment we are capable of meeting an attack of that weight. In 1939, and I stick to that figure in spite of statements made to the contrary, I think by the hon. Member for Preston, South, the effective German force in submarines consisted of 27 ocean-going vessels. The total number of vessels of all types suitable for antisubmarine work was 219. The number was considered to be insufficient and, in fact, we had another 71 building. So that gave us a prospective strength of 290.

  1217
  That number, we well know, was quite insufficient. Everyone will remember the feverish haste with which new utility vessels were ordered, constructed and put into service.
  Mr. Shackleton: The hon. and gallant Gentleman must realise that there were other types beside ocean-going. I made the point that it was the simple sea-going types which did most of the damage during the war.
  Commander Galbraith: I am aware of that, and I am giving the actual figures of German submarines on the outbreak of war as 57. Thirty of them were of the coastal type. Therefore, I thought it right to deduct that number, as it is probable that the great majority of them operated in the North Sea and along the Norwegian coast, and that the deep sea vessels did not at any time amount to more than 27.
  Mr. Emrys Hughes: Is not the hon. and gallant Gentleman leaving out the fact that the whole power of the American naval anti-submarine forces will be on our side?
  Commander Galbraith: If the hon. Gentleman had been listening he would have heard me say that it was inconceivable that we should fight alone, which means that we hope to have the Americans with us. I think that takes care of the point, but he will find that I will allude to the same circumstances again.
  We have to be ready to meet a force of 25 submarines, superior in underwater endurance and speed to those of 1939, and to meet that number, after we have taken into account 12 ships building suitable for anti-submarine work, the total counter force is 285 vessels. That is a force of about the same number of ships we had available in 1939 and which we later found to be inadequate. In spite of the welcome news of 24 new frigates which the Parliamentary Secretary mentioned this afternoon, that must be our position for a considerable time ahead.
  To some people it will, I know, be a comfort to know that we have as many anti-submarine vessels as we had in 1939, but when hon. Members remember that I have estimated the strength of the attack on a very conservative basis and have included in our strength 126 frigates of the last war—many, I am informed, of insufficient speed to enable them to keep contact with a submarine, far less press
  1218
  home an attack on her—we may well have some misgivings and I do not think these are diminished when we remember how close we were to disaster in the recent wars.
  I have no doubt that the Admiralty shares our misgivings. When we have been warned so often about the danger of submarine attack on our commerce it seems to me that the Government have been dilatory in providing the safeguards required. The conversions of the "Rocket" and the "Relentless," about which we heard so much a year ago have not been completed, and we have been told that another four conversions have been started and the programme is to be extended. Now we have been told that the total conversions are to number 45 over a period of three years. I think the Parliamentary Secretary made that clear in answer to a question I put to him. I suppose we can estimate that in four or five years from now these 45 conversions will be completed. These conversions do not, of course, actually increase the number of ships capable of antisubmarine work available in the service. The situation we appear to be in is that a year from now it is possible that we will have six modern anti-submarine vessels available. I do not think that that is sufficient.
  Then we are told of a new design of anti-submarine frigates to be built but the provision of machinery is the limiting factor, but as many as possible are to be laid down according to the First Lord's statement in the next financial year. What does that mean? Does that mean 1951–52 or 1952–53?
  Mr. Callaghan: Ten are to be laid down in 1951–52.
  Commander Galbraith: Ten in 1951–52 and the rest in 1952–53. The Parliamentary Secretary has told us that, in addition, 24 vessels are the ultimate aim, and I think he told us that 17 had been ordered. But the impression I got from the First Lord's statement was one of calm complacency: the Parliamentary Secretary has certainly lessened that impression, but I am afraid he has not succeeded in removing it altogether.
  The situation in 1939 was not more serious than it is today. The threat then was no greater than it is today. Yet in our programme for 1939–40 we had 40

  1219
  ships capable of undertaking anti-submarine duties. Against that, this year the machinery for two frigates has been ordered. Frigates of new design may subject to the limitations on machinery be laid down in the next financial year, and we now know that 17 have actually been ordered and that 10 of them are to be laid down during the present year. So, gradually, we are accumulating a little more information than was given us by the statement of the First Lord; and we are very grateful indeed to have it.
  The defence against the submarine is not only a matter of anti-submarine vessels, but of both shore-based and carrier-borne aircraft. We know very little indeed about the extent of the protection which will be allowed by our carrier-borne and shore-based aircraft.
  Mr. Callaghan: Before the hon. and gallant Gentleman leaves the question of escorts, may I say that I followed his analysis with great care and do not dissent from much of what he said. But he might give some guidance as to what he thinks is the appropriate force at which we should aim, if indeed he thinks that our force is insufficient. In answer to one of my hon. Friends, he said that we should not fight alone. I put it to him that, by comparison with the figures which he has given of the number of escort vessels we have, we can double that with the number that the United States has; so that, altogether, we should be entering a new combat, if we had to enter one, with three times the number of escort vessels that we had in 1939. How does he evaluate this, and at what figure should we aim if we are not aiming at the right figure?
  Commander Galbraith: I can tell the hon. Gentleman that he is aiming far too late. If he had arranged for 24 two or three years ago, we should have had some in commission now, when the situation is so very threatening and no one knows from one moment to another what may happen and when we may be involved in war. If the hon. Member for Ayrshire, South (Mr. Emrys Hughes), is not satisfied with that answer he will, no doubt, catch Mr. Speaker's eye later and tell me where I have gone wrong.
  In the debate on the Air Estimates last week the Secretary of State for Air devoted to Coastal Command less than
  1220
  three minutes of a speech which lasted for an hour and 15 minutes. He said in that speech that considerable progress had been made in developing techniques, that the Government planned greatly to expand and re-equip Coastal Command, that the Shackleton had completed its tests, and that a number of medium-range reconnaissance squadrons were to be formed. His concluding remarks in that portion of his speech were those which interested me most. He said that antisubmarine protection was a formidable problem, and that the Sunderlands, which, I am told, are some 15 years old, would continue to be used for some time, and that their replacement was under consideration.
  Hon. Members who took part in that debate spoke of the greater need for cooperation between Coastal Command and the Navy. They spoke of the need for more operational experience for Coastal Command, and of the need for closer liaison and of further training in ship recognition, a matter mentioned today by the hon. Member for Huddersfield, East (Mr. J. P. W. Mallalieu); and one hon. Member spoke of "Coastal Command, when it exists." There was another hon. and gallant Member who has already been quoted, but the quotation should be repeated at this stage of the debate. He said that the Air Ministry regarded Coastal Command as a sideline, a kind of unwanted child, and he charged the Air Ministry with gross neglect. He stated that the position was grim and that Coastal Command should be taken away from the Air Ministry and given to the Army.
  I should have thought that that very grave and challenging statement would have called for some reply, but no reply was forthcoming. Quite naturally, I assume, there was no mention whatsoever of Coastal Command in the statement by the First Lord, and so we are left with very little knowledge indeed as to its strength, its equipment, its training or otherwise. These are surely matters of the very greatest importance to the defence of our sea-borne commerce for which this House has some responsibility to the country. Therefore, I think it will be quite correct for me to ask the hon. Gentleman who will reply tonight to give us a definite statement as to whether or not the Admiralty is satisfied with the position in all respects.

  1221
  Are we satisfied about Coastal Command, and its training, and equipment, and its co-operation with the Royal Navy? These are questions to which we have the right to demand an answer. I do not for a moment suppose that the Admiralty proposes to depend solely on anti-submarine vessels and shore-based aircraft for the defence of our shipping, but some information on this vital question would be welcome. Outside the 400 miles limit, I understand—and, seemingly, so do other hon. Members—shore-based aircraft do not provide effective protection for our convoys and, therefore, some small carriers would seem to be necessary for convoy escort work.
  Is that the Admiralty's view of the situation? If so, then what provision is being made to give us small carriers? I do not imagine that our Fleet and light fleet carriers are suitable for the purpose. In any event there are only 12 of those, with nine building, and surely 21 is insufficient to go round. What is the Admiralty's intention in this matter? If, by any chance, which we most sincerely hope will not happen, war was to come soon and suddenly, while our cupboard is bare, and we have no stocks of raw materials in the country, then it is vitally important that we should have a fully effective convoy system available from the start.
  I have grave doubt whether our Naval Aviation, or Coastal Command is in a position to give the protection which would be required. Having listened to the speech, very able though it was, from the Parliamentary Secretary today, my views on this subject still remain; but I look with confidence to him for some information of a re-assuring character.
  I want now to turn to a completely different matter, one which, by implication at least, can be of very great importance to the Royal Navy. In 1939 there were in the Fleet, 414 sea-going vessels; today, that figure is 441. In 1939, the ships in commission in the Home Fleet, in the Mediterranean Fleet, with the China Squadron, and the other stations, numbered 172. Today, the number of active Fleet vessels is 127. The number of men in 1939 was 133,000, and today we are providing in the Estimates for 143,500.
  1222
  From these figures it would not appear that more persons should be required in the Admiralty for administering the Service than were thought necessary in 1939. But what is the position? In 1939 in the Admiralty offices there were 4,355 persons of one kind or another; today, the figure is 10,222. May I put this to the House in another way? In 1939, 10 persons were in the Admiralty for every fighting ship in the Service, whereas today there are 23. In 1939, every ship in active commission represented 25 persons in the Admiralty. Today, the number is 80. In 1939, one person at the Admiralty looked after 30 men with the Fleet. Today, the number is one person at the Admiralty but 14 with the Fleet.
  I am always prepared, like my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Merton and Morden (Captain Ryder), to stand up for the Admiralty against every other Department, but I do say that that, great disparity in numbers calls for some explanation. Why should the Admiralty require an additional 13 people to administer different ships in the Service today, an additional 55 for each ship with the active Fleet, and why should two people at the Admiralty be required to look after the same number as one person looked after in 1939?
  The Parliamentary Secretary, I was very glad to note, has mentioned that a special investigation is to take place into the civilians employed at the Admiralty. Let me say to the hon. Gentleman that it is not before time. I intend to go into an even more detailed examination of this matter because, I think, it may probably interest the House. I want to ask hon. Members if they will be good enough to keep three figures in mind during the course of what I am going to say.
  The first figure is this, that since 1939 the number of ships in the Navy has increased by 7 per cent. The number of men in the Navy has gone up by 8 per cent. and the number of ships with the active Fleet has gone down by 26 per cent. The Board of Admiralty still consists of 11 persons. The number of assistants they had in 1939—that is, naval assistants—was 12. That number is now 35. In those circumstances, it would be quite natural for us to expect an increase in the naval staff. It has

  1223
  increased from 171 to 371. I think this is somewhat interesting. I think I have my facts right, but if I have not, I shall be corrected, I have no doubt.
  The Second Sea Lord's Office has as one of its duties looking after the appointment of officers. In 1939, six officers were in the Second Sea Lord's Office for the purpose of these appointments. Today, there are 37 employed on that task, although the active Fleet has decreased by 26 per cent. In every other Department the same thing is going on. The medical department has increased three times in size, the education department by three and a half times, and even the Chaplain of the Fleet's department has been increased to twice its size in 1939. Let me take another aspect of this matter. In 1939, we had 35 major and 83 minor vessels actually building. There was a new construction programme for 1939–40 consisting of seven major and 55 minor vessels. We had in 1939, undergoing large repairs, in the dockyards 18 major vessels and 25 minor vessels. That is a total of 223 ships altogether.
  I suggest to the House that these ships naturally require the particular attention of the naval construction department, the engineer-in-chief's department, the dockyard department, the naval stores department, and the contract and purchase department. Compare that position with the position this year. We have nine major and 56 minor vessels building, and five major and seven minor vessels undergoing large repairs. There are 60 minor vessels being brought forward from Reserve which is a total of 137. Compared with the 223 of 1939, or 86 fewer. It would seem to follow that before 1939 the strength of the departments I have mentioned should have been over-burdened, but actually what has happened is this. The department of the Director of Naval Construction has increased by 43 per cent., the Engineer-in-Chief's department by 80 per cent., the dockyard department by 75 per cent., the naval stores department by 242 per cent., and the contract and purchase department by 86 per cent.
  The number of men in the present estimates is up by 8 per cent. as I said a few moments ago, compared with 1939, but to meet the victualling needs of that slight increase in personnel seemingly demands
  1224
  that the victualling department should show an increase of 152 per cent. over the 1939 number.
  Now I come to two departments the increase in which, in view of the experience we had in other spheres recently, one would expect, but which, in relation to the naval service, may have the most undesirable consequences. I refer to the Secretary's department and to the Record Office, Registers, and Reproduction department. The Secretary's department has increased from 881 in 1939 to 2,235 in 1951 and the Record Office from 528 to 1,197. The Secretary's department has increased by 153 over 1939 and the Record Office by 127 per cent. I think it would be natural to assume from these figures that the paper work in the Royal Navy has very largely increased and that officers in command of His Majesty's ships and establishments have got to give far more of their time than previously in paper work. In consequence of that, they can only have less time available for the purposes of their proper and most important function, which is the organising and training of their commands for war.
  It may be that these increases arise from a tendency which, to my mind at least, would be most detrimental to the efficiency of the Royal Navy. It may, indeed, be due to very close supervision over commands. It may be due to the Admiralty adopting a "grandmother" attitude towards commanding officers—prying into their management and prying into their every action——
  Commander Pursey: Nonsense.
  Commander Galbraith: —to the detriment of their initiative, independence and also to their efficiency.
  Commander Pursey: Absolute rot.
  Commander Galbraith: The hon. and gallant Gentleman has spoken today. He might have the decency to keep quiet while I am addressing the Housed.
  If that last suggestion I have made happens to be true, then I doubt very much whether, in future, we can expect to have, in command of our naval forces, men confident in their own judgment or capable of making an instant decision and of taking immediate action as the situation in their vicinity may demand, without reference to some higher autho-

  1225
  rity. Should that be the result, then the Navy will, indeed, have received a deadly blow.
  Under the administration of the present Government, the Navy has suffered a good deal. Not only have men had to be retained in the Service, which would not have been necessary had steps been taken in time—and if steps had been taken in time I doubt very much whether it would have been necessary to call up men of the Fleet Reserve—but apart from that, in recent years there never have been sufficient ships at sea with the active Fleet to enable officers and men to gain experience of that element in which they will be called to work in war, and close acquaintance with which is essential to our success in war. Commanding officers of the present day and of the future have had insufficient experience of handling ships at sea in all conditions of weather. Officers and men, generally speaking, have had no chance of becoming accustomed to the sea or to handling their weapons under these conditions.
  Commander Pursey: Not in Korea?
  Commander Galbraith: The sea-going strength of the Navy has been allowed to diminish to far too low a level—indeed, to such an extent that foreign nations are apt to underrate its potential power. In 1939 we had 42 per cent. of our ships with the active Fleet. Today, we have 29 per cent. It is true, of course, that the Admiralty proposes now to bring forward from reserve 39 sea-going ships. Although that is a step in the right direction, it only succeeds in raising the strength of the active Fleet to 38 per cent. of the total.
  I maintain that that percentage is still too low, either to impress our friends or our potential enemies. It is too low to meet the calls the Navy might be required to meet, or to provide opportunities of training an adequate number of officers and men at sea. I trust that some of the additional sums of money which I understand the Government intends to allocate to the Navy will be used to increase the strength of the active Fleet.
  The people of this country want to see the men and to see the Fleet. People all over the world desire to see it also. The White Ensign has been far too little in evidence in recent years. In my remarks I have called attention to cer-
  1226
  tain deficiencies in aircraft and in ships which I believe it is essential to make good, if we are to have a properly balanced Fleet. Notwithstanding that, the Navy potential is a most powerful weapon. Both in ships and men it is stronger than it was in 1939. Given sound administration and the opportunity of adequate training at sea there is no doubt that in war it would rival the great efforts which saw us safely through the last two wars.
  Mention of the need for sound administration brings me to the hon. Member for Devonport (Mr. Foot). In his remarks he took my hon. Friend the Member for Hereford (Mr. J. P. L. Thomas) to task. Surely it was right for my hon. Friend, 12 months ago, to call attention to a sign of weakness to which the Parliamentary Secretary referred today. The hon. Gentleman also took my right hon. Friend the Member for Woodford (Mr. Churchill) to task because he had said on one occasion that the efficiency of our naval administration had sunk to a low level, that there was a lack of policy and a lack of comprehension. Those are the very failings which today conceal the real strength of the British Navy.
  I am going to quote further from the speech of my right hon. Friend, which the hon. Gentleman the Member for Devonport quoted earlier. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Woodford said:
  "All our friends in South Africa, Boer and Briton alike, who held to the great association of the Commonwealth, were embarrassed in the face of the Admiralty statement. They did not know what to say. Let me tell them now—I found myself upon the Parliamentary Secretary—that it was all rubbish, and that there never was, in time of peace, a British Navy which had so few possible naval foes and so many powerful naval friends. There never was a British Navy, in time of peace, which had more ample resources and power. Let them not be misled by this passing phase of mismanagement and disorganisation. A period of wise, vigorous and careful administration, making the best and most thrifty use of all our resources, could soon restore our naval strength and repute throughout the world."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 8th March, 1948; Vol. 448, c. 828.]
  The Navy, in spite of every change, still retains that high place in the regard and affection not only of the people of this country, but millions of citizens abroad, who still look to it to provide a sure shield against our enemies at sea. It is our duty in this House to make

  1227
  sure everything is provided to enable the Navy to make that shield effective. Criticisms which have been levelled today have been made against the administration and not against the personnel of the Fleet. They call the attention of the Government to the fears and apprehensions of hon. Members and of the public, and I sincerely trust that they will receive the urgent and active consideration which they deserve, so that the Navy may be restored to its rightful place in the opinions of the peoples of the world, and may ever remain a safeguard to this Empire and all those who pass on the seas on their lawful occasions.
  11.51 p.m.
  The Civil Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. Walter Edwards): A large number of hon. Members have taken part in this debate, but until the hon. and gallant Member for Pollok (Commander Galbraith) rose most speeches, from both sides of the House, showed some appreciation of what the Admiralty had placed before the House in its Estimates for 1951–52. Even the hon. Member for Hereford (Mr. J. P. L. Thomas) found little to complain about in the statement made by my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary. I suppose it was to be expected that the hon. and gallant Member for Pollok would speak in the way that he has done. As long as these benches are occupied by the Labour Party we shall never get one iota of praise from him, whatever we may do; and I should feel rather disappointed if at any time we did.
  I listened carefully to what he said, and it seemed nearly all to go back to 1939, when we had few ships, few people at the Admiralty Office, hardly anybody in the Second Sea Lord's office, and nobody on victualling. We are asked to go back to those good old days, when the Fleet was in such a state as a result of the administration of the Admiralty that we almost lost the war before 1941.
  Commander Galbraith: Will the hon. Gentleman tell us what caused us almost to lose the war in 1940–41? What was lacking?
  Mr. Edwards: What caused it was bad administration at the Admiralty at that time, and insufficient forces to meet our needs.
  Commander Galbraith: We have the same number of anti-submarine vessels now.
  Mr. Edwards: We may have, but then we had a huge German Fleet to deal with, and we never had the American Navy behind us as we have today. The mind of the hon. and gallant Member is so imbued with 1939 that he just cannot remember that it is now 1951. He spent about half the time for which he spoke in criticism of the Admiralty Office. That comprises about 2 per cent. of the Estimates we are presenting today. What a hard job he must have had to sort out some criticism of Admiralty administration at the present time. However, I will leave him with that for the time being.
  I should like to revert to what I consider a much more co-operative and cordial speech on behalf of the Opposition, that made by the hon. Member for Hereford, whom I have had the pleasure of replying to each year for the past six years. I understood that the hon. Member was ill last week and probably as a result he may not have been at the top of his form today, but I can assure him that those of us who deal with these matters at the Admiralty are very glad to see him back, playing his part, as he has done previously. He certainly found something on which to criticise the administration. He said that the charge the Opposition had against the Government was that they appeared to hide the strength of the Navy, that we did not tell the world about the wonderful Navy we have got. His hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Pollok was obviously not listening to him when he said, "They do not tell the world of the wonderful Navy we have got," and that we should give the figures in a far better way, as they used to in pre-war days. I do not want to go over that ground again, because I think that was very capably dealt with by my hon. Friend the Member for Devonport (Mr. Foot), and I do not think I could do better.
  The hon. Member for Hereford then went on to say that we should not have sold or scrapped any ships; that it was folly on the part of the Admiralty to do that. The policy of selling and scrapping has been dealt with in the House on a number of occasions, and he knows quite well that we considered it wrong to keep these out-of-date ships year after year, with

  1229
  no possibility of their being used, while absorbing the manpower we had at that time in looking after them. I think the right policy is the one we are adopting now, which is to build up the Fleet as quickly as we possibly can.
  I wonder what the hon. and gallant Member for Pollok really wants us to do. He has compared the present position with 1939. He knows that there is to be defence expenditure of £4,700,000 spread over the next three years. His argument is that that is far too long: that that money should be spent in much less time than three years. Does he say to the House that if his party were back in power they would spend £4,700,000 on defence in the next financial year?
  Commander Galbraith: No. We would have taken time by the forelock, as I have already explained to the House.
  Mr. Edwards: They would have taken time by the forelock and gone on spending more money than we have done since 1945.
  Commander Galbraith: We would have put it to better use.
  Mr. Edwards: Judging by speeches made by the Opposition since 1945 I do not think there would have been much more spent on production in any way at all.
  The hon. Member for Hereford then asked about four minesweepers which he had seen mentioned in "Brassey's Naval Annual" which were to be sold to Egypt. There must be a mistake somewhere; there is no question of four minesweepers being sold to Egypt. Then there is the question of a destroyer now in this country which the Egyptian Government applied and paid for some time last year. It was arranged that that destroyer would be refitted in this country, and she is now on the verge of completion. In view of the whole circumstances, and of the fact that the ship has already been bought by the Egyptian Government, it is felt right and proper that it should be delivered after it has been repaired.
  Then the hon. Member and other hon. Members wanted to know the state of readiness of the Reserve Fleet. The House will know that quite a large number of ships have been brought out of the Reserve Fleet for active service, and we are
  1230
  getting on with the refitting of the Reserve Fleet. It is the intention to utilise some of the increased manpower that we now have to look after ships in the Reserve Fleet so as to have them all ready in the event of an emergency, but we do not necessarily think that an emergency may arise within one month, or two or three months. Some people would leave the impression that war is bound to come in three months, and that therefore we must have everything ready for it.
  On the question of whether the Reserve numbers are sufficient to man the Navy in an emergency, we take the view that they are. The hon. Gentleman raised the question of naval aviation, as several other hon. Members have done. He expressed concern at the shortage of flying officers. We share that concern. I can assure the House that the Admiralty is thoroughly examining every possible means of increasing the number. With regard to married quarters, it may interest the hon. Member, to know that in 1951–52, at Culdrose, Lossiemouth and St. Merryn 82 married quarters will be erected for officers, compared with six for ratings. The reason for the change in the allocation is that when we began the married quarters programme we had not decided on the exact type of house required for officers. That is why there has so far been a greater number of quarters for ratings than for officers.
  The hon. Member also said that the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition stated that from 1945, Vote A should have been the same as it is for 1951–52. That would have meant much more money to be found for the Navy. But I maintain that we have been able to carry on in a very efficient way within the limits of the finances of the country with the Vote A which we have provided since 1945.
  Another point which the hon. Member made concerned re-engagement. This has been dealt with many times by way of Question and answer in the House. It seems to me to be one of the points at which the Opposition is feebly grabbing because it has not many other points to take up. They have been told all about it for two years, and yet they will not understand it. The main reason for the difficulty over the higher ratings at the moment is not so much that these men are not re-engaging at the same rate as

  1231
  they did before the war, but that there was no regular recruiting during the war. Therefore we have not the 10, nine, or eight years' men now. The last recruiting of long-service men was somewhere about 1939 or 1940. That is the reason for the difficulty with petty officers in particular, and, to some extent, with chief petty officers. That difficulty will not be overcome until we get the benefit of the re-introduction of regular recruiting after the war. But I maintain that the Admiralty has done all that it can to encourage men to re-engage.
  As was pointed out by the hon. and gallant Member for Hull, East (Commander Pursey) we have provided married quarters, which no other Government thought of providing. We have given conditions in naval barracks which were not known before. At present we are giving pay which is more comparable with the industrial rate applicable to the job than has ever before been the case in the Navy. There is no such thing as one shilling a day now for men who are giving service to their country. They are being given all these improved conditions. That is not all, for this is the first time, since we have had a Navy, that a man can complete his service knowing that he will be sure of getting a job at the end of it. Many of them stayed there in the past for fear of having to come out only to receive meagre unemployment pay provided by the Conservative Governments. That is the position so far as most of the re-engagements are concerned. It is our intention that extended service shall be as temporary as it can be and the Admiralty will not retain it longer than is essential.
  My hon. Friend the Member for Huddersfield, East (Mr. J. P. W. Mallalieu), in his annual speech dealt again with the question of naval barracks. I cannot tell him tonight that we are able to reduce the size of barracks and introduce a number of smaller units throughout the country. That would be a costly procedure, obviously requiring a long-term plan, or else erecting the buildings during a war when money is more available. We are doing our best about the barracks at the present time. Modernisation is taking place at three of the naval barracks and at the Royal Marine Barracks at Deal. Modernisation
  1232
  of the first block at Chatham and Portsmouth will be completed in the near future. That at Chatham will be ready in April and at Portsmouth later in the year. We are getting on with the chief and petty officers block at Devonport, and it would be a happy sight if my hon. Friend could go back to see them now: they are much better than they were when he left them.
  Mr. J. P. W. Mallalieu: What about A.R.P.?
  Mr. Edwards: I cannot give an answer about A.R.P.. but the point will be taken into consideration, and will be looked into.
  My hon. Friend the Member for Kirk-dale (Mr. Keenan) was, I think, unfair to the Navy in the statement he made about ventilating grievances year after year and nothing being done about them.
  Mr. Keenan: I said there was not enough done.
  Mr. Edwards: I do not know what we have to do to satisfy my hon. Friend. We have been trying to do all we can, and I am sure he knows, with all the contacts he has in the area in which he lives, that men in the Navy are better off than they were in 1945, and, indeed, better off than ever they were. My hon. Friend the Member for Huddersfield. East, also raised the question of pensions and asked whether there was the fullest opportunity for promotion. The question of pensions is being examined for all three Services and not for the Royal Navy alone. He raised a new point when he spoke about a proposal for a gratuity, but there is nothing I can tell him on that. On the question of promotions he may have been mistaken about the percentage of commissions granted: the number is not far from 25 per cent., and therefore not far from what was intended.
  Mr. Mallalieu: What was the actual number granted?
  Mr. Edwards: Thirty-eight. It is based on a percentage of the total intake for the year. We did say we would like to grant commissions up to 25 per cent. of the total intake and nothing, so far as I know has been done to prevent this.
  The hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Edinburgh, West (Lieut.-Commander Hutchison), raised some of

  1233
  his hardy annuals, and I think that the question of civilians was very capably dealt with by my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary. Evidently the hon. and gallant Gentleman did not know, when he prepared his brief, that the Parliamentary Secretary would say what he did say today.
  Lieut.-Commander Hutchison: Yes, but I asked whether the Civil Lord would follow up the suggestion that a scrutiny should be made of the outlying establishments and not of the Admiralty office.
  Mr. Edwards: We were talking about the numbers as a whole in the first place. As to the outlying establishments, the hon. and gallant Gentleman can rest assured, as I told him last year, that the matter is constantly and carefully under review. Wherever we can make economies in staff we shall make them, but he must bear in mind that, if we are to have a re-armament programme such as that to which the House has agreed, we cannot always have a cut in civilian staffs at the same time as we are having to spend more money. And that is bound to go on.
  The hon. and gallant Gentleman asked about anti-submarine defences in the Firth of Forth. I think he can rest assured that the Admiralty have that in mind. I have a note here saying, "Is Rosyth dockyard all right?" I should have thought so, in view of everything that has been done since 1945, despite the fears.
  Lieut.-Commander Hutchison: I asked about Port Edgar.
  Mr. Edwards: I have no information about Port Edgar. As to the Naval Inspection Ordnance Department there, there is nothing much that I can add to what has already been stated in debate and in reply to Questions. The hon. and gallant Gentleman is rather keen to see that the Department should be navalised, but that is a matter which is still under consideration at the Admiralty and something upon which I cannot give a reply tonight.
  I ought to find time to reply to my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Hull, East, who made a rather long speech and a good one. He asked only one question, and that was about the shipbuilding work on the Humber. I am
  1234
  happy to be able to tell him that out of the 41 minesweepers recently ordered six will be built on the Humber, that repair work now in hand there employs upwards of 700 men, and that there may be a destroyer going there in the near future for extensive machinery repairs. His constituents will be as pleased as he is that he has been able to raise this matter tonight and that he has received that information.
  The hon. and gallant Member for Bristol, North-West (Lieut-Commander Braithwaite), who takes part in these debates every year, struck a rather different line tonight by dealing mainly with the Merchant Navy and referring to the question of education in the Navy, in which my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary has taken so much interest in the past. The hon. and gallant Gentleman can rest assured that that subject is being carried on more or less as it was during the war and just after the war. It may not be on exactly the same scale, because there may not be the same opportunities, but I do not think that he has anything to worry about there.
  As to the Merchant Navy, a subject on which he has always been very keen, I think he can safely rest assured, as can all the other hon. Members who referred to it, that that matter is being given as much consideration in the Admiralty at present as are naval matters themselves. I do not think that it is necessary for me to make a long speech on that issue, but I can assure the House that that is the position. There is one point which I might add. We have now reinstituted Merchant Navy defence courses similar to those held before and during the 1939–45 war. These have been started at London, Liverpool, Glasgow and Newcastle-upon-Tyne. The object of them is to keep Merchant Navy officers and men informed of the measures that will be taken by the Royal Navy for the protection of seaborne trade in time of war and to make known to them the part they will be expected to play if the maximum degree of safety for their ships is to be ensured. I hope that hon. Members will be satisfied with that assurance.
  An hon. Member was interested in the glories of Pembroke Dock. As regards its being the finest dock and harbour in the world, I do not want to differ with him, but I am sure that he can rest content

  1235
  that the Admiralty will pay attention to what he has said. Another hon. Member dealt with a point which is uncommon in naval debates—I cannot recall it having been raised previously—and that is that we should get Arctic experience. Like some other hon. Members of the House, I have served in the Arctic, and as a result, I have a rough idea of what is in the back of the hon. Member's mind. The Admiralty has been interested in this subject since the end of the war and obviously, the Royal Navy has gained some experience from the Arctic convoys which we ran during the war. Furthermore, we have been in the closest contact with our Allies on this matter—particularly with Canada. What the hon. Gentleman has said will be very carefully thought about, and, if anything can be done, we shall fall in line with the wishes he has expressed tonight.
  The hon. and gallant Member for Merton (Captain Ryder) also made the kind of speech in which one does not have a dozen questions to answer at the end of the debate. He was very worried about the position of the Navy's influence throughout the world compared with pre-war days, and asked whether the advocates of the Navy are putting up the fight they should, to get as much money as possible from the defence Votes. I assure him that when these matters are under consideration, representatives of the Admiralty do all that they possibly can to see they get their rightful share of the amount the nation can afford to spend on defence. But when the hon. and gallant Member compares the percentages for the Admiralty with those for the Army for some time before the First World War——
  Captain Ryder: One year.
  Mr. Edwards: I am certain he understands that the number of men in the Army compared with the Royal Navy was far different from what it is today.
  What has to be borne in mind is that when one considers the total cost of each Service, it is surely the pay and allowances which come first. The number in the Army is now three times that of the Royal Navy before the war, and with a 50 per cent. increase in pay, it does make the Army figure much higher than the Royal Navy would be. But I
  1236
  am quite certain that the Royal Navy is respected, and that its influence is just as great as it was in those pre-war days when the percentage of the defence expenditure was so different from what it is today. I have visited various naval establishments throughout the world since 1945, and I can assure the hon. and gallant Gentleman that we have lost nothing. We shall carefully watch the whole situation, and see that the Admiralty's point of view is put before those people responsible for providing the money for defence in the most necessary way possible.
  I ought to have said a few words about the speech made by my hon. Friend the Member for Devonport, who spent some of his time in replying to the hon. Member for Hereford and, therefore, has enabled me to spend a little less time on that hon. Member's speech. There is nothing I can do to help in regard to my hon. Friend's advocacy again this year of a working party for the Royal Dockyards. I think this has come up as a hardy annual since 1946, at least, and I cannot find any more reason to agree to a working party this year than I could in previous years.
  I do not know where all this criticism about dockyards comes from. As I have explained before, the dockyards are in a position comparable to the private shipyards of this country, and I have also heard complaints about working conditions in the private shipyards and about their administration. If, every time we heard complaints, we had to set up a working party to inquire into them, far too much time would be spent by our people in looking around to see what other people were doing. I could not agree to a working party unless it was clear that some useful result would come from it. For that reason my hon. Friend will have to leave his request over, at least until the Navy Estimates next year.
  My hon. Friend also referred to the question of married quarters for civilian work-people returning from abroad. That is a very difficult problem. It is one we are not unmindful of, but it is one we have to be very careful about. So far as civilian workers are concerned, there is the danger, if housing accommodation is to be provided for civilian workers, of getting into a system of tied cottage which is going to make it

  1237
  extremely difficult. While it has never been our policy to provide accommodation in home ports for employees who have been abroad, I will look at this matter to see if we can do anything to help them on their return.
  I think I have now dealt with most of the points, and I have assured hon. Gentlemen that all their questions will be taken into account. If there is any particular point which any hon. Member would like me to deal with, I shall be only too happy to let him have a reply to his questions by letter. I conclude by thanking the House for the cordial way in which they have received the Estimates, despite the hon. and gallant Member for Pollok, who, I trust, will show, next year, some appreciation of the good work performed by the Admiralty.
  12.23 a.m.
  Lieut.-Commander R. H. Thompson: I count myself unfortunate in having been so late in catching your eye. Sir, as I was hoping to get a reply. However, in view of the lateness of the hour, I will endeavour to be brief. The first point I wish to make it to ask whether the Admiralty has fully considered the impact of the enlarged emergency programme on the dockyards and shipbuilding capacity of this country. It seems to me that if we are trying to put through this very large programme at such very short notice, at a time when our shipyards are already choked with work, and when our principal firms have full orders booked for 1952, 1953. and, in some cases, 1954, it will be difficult to accommodate a programme of this size without certain sacrifices being made.
  I want to know whether this particular' matter is receiving Admiralty consideration because, after all, it is not just a question of substituting naval ships for merchant ships which might otherwise be going on to the stocks. We have to weigh the possible advantages to the cause of the North Atlantic Treaty Powers of, say, a frigate, or possibly a very large tanker, between all our Allies. There are the competing claims of our merchant marine and also of the exceedingly valuable tonnage which we are building for export at this time. I do not say that we can, at one and the same moment, pay for this programme and afford other commitments. I should like to know what the view of the Admiralty is, and whether
  1238
  any priorities have been established with a view to trying to sort out the most effective and economical way in which this can be achieved.
  The second point I want to make is on this vexed and much discussed question of Russian submarine strength. Whether we take the view, as certain hon. Members have, that this Russian business is a bogy, or whether we do not, the fact remains that the whole justification for this emergency programme is the alleged Russian menace. As the Explanatory Memorandum says:
  "The whole programme is projected towards the underwater menace."
  So, whatever certain hon. Members may feel, the Admiralty, with the sources of information at its disposal, evidently considers that the Russian menace is sufficiently serious to warrant very drastic steps being taken to meet it. I am perfectly aware that, if we bring into commission every available frigate we have at this time, we shall arrive at a total of 162.
  Clearly, the Admiralty does not consider that even that quite impressive figure, coupled with the resources of our Allies, is sufficient to meet this potential threat. Therefore, we have to ask ourselves whether the steps now being taken are adequate or not. I am very glad the Parliamentary Secretary today enlarged on that rather vague statement made in the explanatory Memorandum and told us quite clearly that 24 frigates were proposed, of which 17 were actually on order. But it seems to me that two or three years must elapse, perhaps longer, before the bulk of these are in commission; and the emergency we are seeking to avert is much more immediate and urgent than that. Therefore, I very much hope that the Admiralty will give priority at this stage to the 45 destroyer conversions which, I understand, are in hand.
  It is not just a matter of these conversions costing £500,000 apiece as against, I believe, £1⅓ million for a new frigate. It is a question of speed and urgency, and surely these ships can be more expeditiously converted and brought into service than new hulls can be laid down. I hope we shall receive some assurance that the emphasis of the Admiralty programme is on the conversion of these former destroyers and less on the building of new frigates.

  1239
  I agree with my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Gosport and Fareham (Surgeon Lieutenant-Commander Bennett) in expressing the view that many of the functions contemplated for aircraft carriers could, in fact, be carried out better by shore-based aircraft. Having had some little operational experience of big carrier operations during the last war I must say that it always struck me as a very hazardous, complicated, and expensive way of operating aircraft. It seems to me that today, with the advances in very long-range aircraft, together with the numerous bases which we and our Allies dispose of throughout the world, many -of the functions of the carrier could be more efficiently performed from the shore.
  What is happening to the remaining light fleet carriers of the Majestic class? I believe that they have been held up since 1946. Are they now to be pressed on? Are the Majestic class, and light carriers in general, considered adequate for today's performance? I think their speed is in the neighbourhood of 27 knots and I can recall that in 1945 27 knots was hardly sufficient to get the heavy Corsair fighters off the decks of fleet carriers. As the tendency is for naval aircraft to grow heavier and larger, it seems to me we shall need faster carriers to be sure that they will operate in all conditions in the future.
  The figures I have show how the establishment of W.R.N.S. has progressively declined. Now that we are coming to a manpower shortage, and as everyone wishes to see more sailors at sea and less in offices, I think that there is a very good case once again for recruiting W.R.N.S. at least partially on the basis on which they were recruited during the war. I suggest that recruitment is re-opened for those who can only work in certain parts of the country near their homes. Surely there must be a number of sedentary office posts in various naval establishments in the country where locally recruited W.R.N.S. could do the work quite efficiently and economically. With the shortage of man- and woman-power with which we are undoubtedly faced, I suggest that we should take note of this possible source of economy in manpower.
  1240
  Those are my three points which I had hoped to make earlier, and on which I hope on a future occasion the Civil Lord or the Parliamentary Secretary will be able to give me assurances.
  12.34 a.m.
  Mr. Peter Smithers: I hope that my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Croydon, West (Lieut.-Commander Thompson) will forgive me if I do not follow him in his pursuit of the "Wrens" and other matters. I want first of all, to refer to the speech of the Civil Lord to which I listened with great attention. I do not think that he gave any answer to the argument developed by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Pollok (Commander (Galbraith). My hon. and gallant Friend spoke for some considerable time about the potential strength of the Soviet Submarine fleet, and he reduced his argument to this question: he asked the Admiralty whether they considered they had sufficient forces to meet 25 modern ocean-going submarines. To that we have not had any reply, and it is rather disquieting.
  The Civil Lord began his speech with three wrong statements. His first was, in blaming the Tory Party, to say that at the beginning of the Second World War there was a huge German fleet. That he must, on reflection, know to be inaccurate. His next argument was that the Navy was in a bad state in 1939, but as my hon. Friends who spoke on this side of the House, most of whom served in the Navy, and myself, know, that is quite inaccurate, and the Civil Lord knows it. There was an interesting point—developed by the hon. Gentleman and also by the hon. Member for Ayrshire, South (Mr. Emrys Hughes) in an intervention—that whatever happens there is always the American Navy. I cannot help noticing that whenever there is any criticism of the strength of the British Navy, forgetting the shabby moneylenders and all that, hon. Members opposite say that they are willing to fight to the last American ship.
  I now turn to my main argument, which is about another matter. The Parliamentary Secretary—I am sorry he is not here, because I think he would appreciate the argument I wish to put—told us that he hoped that the modest building programme he spoke of would be completed

  1241
  in the first half of the coming decade. Everyone will agree that in the meanwhile our resources will be stretched very loosely all round the world. We are apt to forget, in making comparisons with 1939, that although the naval problem in itself may not be a much larger problem, the whole world security problem is far larger, and the fact that our resources are to be strained in so many other directions makes the provision for the Navy all the more important.
  The particular kind of provision I wish to refer to is that for the Naval Intelligence Service. It will be generally agreed that when our resources are very much extended good intelligence is more important than ever. Good intelligence can save both lives and money in war-time, and, at a time when we are preparing to defend ourselves, if necessary, it can also save waste of resources. Talking of intelligence, I am glad to see that the Parliamentary Secretary is back; I think he understands intelligence and I think he is intelligent. When we talk about intelligence I sometimes feel that the public believe that we are speaking of standing in the dark shadows of some far off dockside doing a little snooping. Anybody who has had anything to do with naval intelligence will know that that is not accurate. The collection is not all done by the Navy. But assessment and interpretation are very complex and important problems which must be solved by the Navy.
  We are undoubtedly facing a submarine menace. [Interruption.]If hon. Members think that there is any menace from me, the more they encourage me the more I shall go on. In sea warfare the proper use of intelligence is of greater importance than in any other type of warfare. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman is well aware of the immense complexity of the machine which has to be mobilised for that purpose. It is, of course, argued that a successful war effort consists in having the minimum number of civilians and staff at the Admiralty for the administration of the Fleet, but I do not think that that is an argument which can be applied to the Naval Intelligence staff at the Admiralty, to which I want now to refer.
  The Naval Intelligence staff is of double importance in view of the fact that naval intelligence, and particularly submarine naval intelligence, is work which we
  1242
  carry out much better than anybody else; much better than the Americans, and much better, I have no doubt, than any prospective opponents of ours. I therefore hope it will be agreed that the Naval Intelligence staff is a matter of very considerable importance. This is a difficult matter to discuss in the House because the information is rather hard to come by. As one goes through the Estimates one can find, for example, in Vote 12 on page 185, a certain amount of information about the Naval Intelligence staff, and in only one other place, on page 140, do I find something else about the staff. That is all the information the document vouchsafes.
  My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Pollok pointed out that there are 10,000 people at the Admiralty now compared with 4,000 before the war. My view is that the Admiralty is probably fat in the wrong places, as is sometimes, the case. I notice from the Estimates that the total figure of expenditure for the Naval Intelligence staff of the Admiralty is £103,000; that is an increase of only £11,000 over the previous year. It seems to me that, in view of the rising costs of administration, that must indicate that there has certainly been no expansion in that connection. In fact, I very much suspect that there has been a reduction.
  Mr. Balfour: On a point of order. Is it in order for the hon. Gentleman to read a whole book to us?
  Mr. Smithers: I have not read a single line out of the Estimates. I have it with me lest hon. Gentlemen opposite should be interested in checking the figures.
  I see that on page 185 there is provision for nine commanders. I have consulted the Navy List and, while that document is restricted and I cannot quote it, I think I can say that that provision is less than the present establishment. I suspect, therefore, that there must be a reduction taking place in that category. I also see provision for 21 lieutenant-commanders and lieutenants, and that again is, I believe, less than the present establishment.
  Although there does not seem to be any means of verifying from this report of the establishment for naval attaches, judging by the establishment in the Navy List the naval attaches strength of the Naval In-

  1243
  telligence organisation is very weak. Very few of them have assistants, and assistant naval attaches are very useful people. In particular, I notice that we do not have, as we had in 1939 on the outbreak of war, an assistant naval attaché, Europe. He was a kind of roving naval attaché who did extremely good service at that time.
  I want now to turn to one of the most difficult problems of the Naval Intelligence organisation. That is the fear of naval officers—and I think there may be some foundation for it—that by going to the Naval Intelligence Division, or taking the post of attaché, they are prejudicing their careers. Many who are proposed for these positions against their will and are compelled to take up such posts, when, finally, they give them up, do so with the intention of never again returning to naval intelligence work. That is a most unfortunate thing, because we thus lose the experience of very valuable officers. I would ask the Parliamentary Secretary to look into the position of the officers carried on this staff and see whether something can be done to remedy this grievance.
  I will now sum up what I have to say—unless hon. Members compel me to prolong my speech. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will satisfy himself that conditions in this particular branch of the Service are fair to those who are called upon to go into it. I hope that he will also satisfy himself that when men have served in it, their experience is not lost to the Service. I hope, thirdly, that he will satisfy himself that our knowledge of the preparations of our prospective opponents in any future armed disagreement is adequate. I am sure that if he makes inquiries he will find that it is not. I cannot think that he can be sure that we really know very much about Russian naval strength. I hope that he will make careful inquiries to see whether the Naval Intelligence Staff is not being dangerously squeezed by other Departments, because if that were the case, it would be most disastrous. Fourthly, I would hope that if this is the case, he would do his best to make sure that neither lives nor materials are wasted through lack of intelligence. Finally, it only remains for me to thank hon. Members opposite for attending in such large numbers to hear my speech.
  12.44 a.m.
  Brigadier Clarke: So that the Parliamentary Secretary will have an opportunity to reply to me, I will try to make myself heard. I will put to the Parliamentary Secretary——
  Mr. James Hudson: On a point of order. Is the hon. and gallant Member not going to observe the conventions of the House and offer congratulations to my hon. Friend the Member for Stirlingshire, West (Mr. Balfour) who, I understand, has just delivered his maiden speech?
  Mr. Speaker: That is not a point of order. The hon. and gallant Gentleman is entitled to address the House, even though the last bus has gone.
  Brigadier Clarke: I know nothing about the hon. Member for Stirlingshire. West (Mr. Balfour).
  I had hoped that the Parliamentary Secretary would have replied to the subject of sailors now retained in the Service, about which I have written and spoken to him. I have also raised this question with the Minister of Defence. So far, I have not had a satisfactory answer. Many of the men who are retained have got a gratuity coming to them from 1st September or whatever date they were retained from. They have borrowed against that gratuity prior to being held in the Service, in anticipation of being able to pay back the money when they received it. I have sent particulars of certain cases to the Parliamentary Secretary, but I have had no reply to my questions, which have not been answered by the Minister of Defence. If the Parliamentary Secretary will answer this one. I shall be glad, for I have a number of constituents who are anxious to have that answer. Any time will do.
  I would also like to draw attention to the fact that the Royal Fleet Reserve are only getting £5 for being held for 18 months whereas Z reservists are getting £4 for 15 days. It seems that £5 is an inadequate sum to offer for 18 months. Earlier this year I raised the question of naval personnel who were due to get £100 bounty but were unable to get it, because they signed on before 1st September. We were told this was being looked into. I hope the Parliamentary Secretary will give an answer to that one also. My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for

  1245
  Gosport and Fareham (Surgeon Lieut.-Commander Bennett) also raised this matter on 26th February in an Adjournment debate. We were told then that we would get ah answer, but we have not had it so far.
  Another matter I would like to raise relates to naval constructors. There are three ways in which these men can get into the Navy—as a fourth year shipwright apprentice, as a first-class honours graduate from a major university or as a selected engineer officer. There are few entering as fourth year shipwrights: no first-class honours man will take the wages now being offered for constructors, and the engineer officers are not inclined to accept that wage either.
  I will quote the different wages these officers get: constructor lieutenant at Greenwich 16s. 6d. a day, whereas a sub-lieutenant receives 17s. 6d. a. day if he is not a constructor. A lieutenant R.N., on promotion to that rank, gets 21s. 6d. a day, which is a great deal more than the 16s. 6d. a day allowed for constructors. Good naval constructors will not be obtained until they are paid adequately. These constructor lieutenants have to live in the wardroom as do other officers: they have exactly the same expenses as those officers who are not constructors. At the present rate that constructors are running down, there will be a great shortage of constructors in the reasonably foreseeable future. This is the sort of thing that we Tories have been telling the opposite side on many subjects, but they have failed to take any notice of us until it has been too late.
  Recently, only three apprentices made themselves available for six vacancies for constructors. That shows that even the apprentices are not taking up these jobs. We are unlikely to get graduates, and I cannot understand engineer officers going in for the Service. The conditions for constructors must be improved if we are to induce them to join the Service.
  I agree with the hon. Member for Devonport (Mr. Foot) about merit awards. They have a merit in that more men in the dockyards get more money than they used to. At the same time, the system leaves itself open to favouritism, and we are fairly often faced with men who think that they should have had a merit award. It is very diffi-
  1246
  cult for the men in charge to decide which of five or six men should receive an award, as they are unable to give it to them all.
  I am sure that hon. Members on both sides of the House will be very glad to learn of the recent rise in dockyard wages. Everyone will agree that it was quite wrong to have 450 men at Portsmouth dockyard on a wage of under £4 15s. a week with the cost of living what it is today. The hon. and gallant Member for Gillingham (Squadron Leader Burden) and I played a great part in getting that extra money. The Admiralty were very reluctant to move until pressed by my hon. Friend and myself on more than one occasion.
  Mr. Snow: On a point of order. While I cannot, of course, prevent the hon. and gallant Gentleman from making an hon. and gallant buffoon of himself, may I suggest to him——
  Mr. Fort: On a point of order. Is it in order——
  Mr. Speaker: I understood the hon. Member for Lichfield and Tamworth (Mr. Snow) was raising a point of order. Was that not so?
  Mr. Fort: Is the hon. Member for Lichfield and Tamworth in order, Mr. Speaker, in referring to my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Portsmouth, West (Brigadier Clarke) as making an hon. and gallant fool of himself?
  Mr. Snow: I did not use the expression "fool." I would not dream of saying that. I said that I could not prevent him making an hon. and gallant buffoon of himself. His boast that he and his hon. Friend had a great deal to do with getting the rise will not serve him in very great stead among the trade unionists of Portsmouth.
  Brigadier Clarke: I do not think that the hon. Member had any right to suggest that I was making a buffoon of myself. I have a perfect right to speak. I think we got the rise in the dockyard wages and he thinks that the trade unions did it. Well, we are both happy. My constituents at Portsmouth showed their regard for the hon. Member by asking him to go to Lichfield. Otherwise, they might still be without that rise.

  1247
  I now want to touch upon a matter on which I feel both sides of the House will be in agreement. It is the question of unmarried mothers——
  Mr. Speaker: I should really like to know where unmarried mothers come into the Navy Estimates.
  Brigadier Clarke: I am 'about to explain to hon. Members. [Laughter.]I am quite serious on this matter. I do not raise it facetiously. I have a number of unmarried mothers in my constituency and they are in a very bad way.
  Hon. Members: Oh.
  Mr. Speaker: Unmarried mothers cannot possibly come into the Navy Estimates. Surely the hon. and gallant Gentleman is father making a reflection both on the Royal Navy and on the ladies of Portsmouth.
  Hon. Members: Withdraw.
  Brigadier Clarke: These unmarried mothers are dependent on sailors in Korea; that is how they come into the debate. During the last war the unmarried mother was recognised and given a married woman's allowance.
  Captain Field Captain Field (Paddington, North) rose——
  Brigadier Clarke: The sailor or soldier goes into the Services, and is either married, and gets a marriage allowance, or does not; but if a man is called up against his will, and happens to have somebody dependent on him, he is entitled to draw something for the maintenance of the woman concerned. I am not going into the morals of the case at all, but would ask the Parliamentary Secretary merely to answer the letter which I have written to him.
  I have only one other small point to make, and that is that I do think the Admiralty ought to house sailors when they leave the Service. The authorities could easily recommend housing committees to give a certain number of points for the men who have done overseas service. I do put this very seriously to the Parliamentary Secretary. I apologise for speaking so late in the debate, but I would point out that I have been here since 3.30 yesterday afternoon.
  1.4 a.m.
  Mr. Richard Fort: I should like to ask the Parliamentary Secretary about the condition of the equipment in the Reserve Fleet because if. unhappily, hostilities broke out, we should have to rely to a large extent on the resources of the Reserve Fleet to face the enemy, and deal with him. We have, heard about the Fleet which the Russian enemy may have, to put against us. The Russians have cruisers and submarines, and to deal with these vessels on the surface, our Reserve Fleet will undoubtedly have to make full use of modern gunnery equipment, including the range finding and radar and computer equipment which has been developed over the last few years. That gunnery equipment is 'very much more complicated than it was during the Second World War.
  In recent years, the ingenuity of the naval constructors and of the. scientists associated with them has been able to bring into the ships some. of. the mathematical computation equipment which have been worked out to solve some of the most complicated mathematical sums with which science is nowadays confronted.. To bring that on to the ships they have had to introduce exceedingly complicated electrical circuits, with their valves, repeaters, and all the rest of the equipment, so as to get the guns quickly and accurately trained on to the enemy. I am told on some of the more straight-forward circuits that 3,000 electronic valves are involved.
  To keep this very complicated equipment in operation, there must clearly be technicians, who are familiar with it and who have had a long training, to keep it working correctly and to repair it should any of its intricacies go astray. With the Reserve Fleet as it is today, the radar operators and the electronic technicians who received their training during the Second World War will find this new equipment well beyond the experience which they have had in the past, unless they are given not several weeks, but several months of training, when they are confronted with it.
  I suggest to the Parliamentary Secretary that either the Admiralty should bring in people right away to learn about this latest equipment and to study its working on every ship, or they should take very much more care than they are taking at present to have it standardised.

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  I understand that the United States Navy, with this problem before them—and it is common to all navies who wish to engage the enemy as it should be engaged nowadays—have standardised to a degree which is far beyond anything which we have in the British Navy at present.
  I ask what action the naval designers are taking either to standardise the gun-laying equipment—this electronic equipment—so that if a man is trained on one ship he can move into another ship and undertake its supervision and proper operation. Or. alternatively, if that is not possible, that in the case of the different types of ships which are built for the British Navy they make proper training arrangements so that people are, as it were, brought up with the equipment which, in fact, they will have to handle, should hostilities, unhappily, start.
  I would like to hear from the Government Benches, how they intend to face the problem of making the best use of the Reserve Fleet at the present time, equipped, as it is, with this highly complicated electronic equipment. Unless they are making special arrangements for this, we are defrauding ourselves. We have a Reserve Fleet which sounds all right when it is described in this House, but from the point of view of a Fleet which can immediately engage an enemy should hostilities start, we should find we are relying on something which, in fact, cannot be brought into immediate operations. I ask those who will be giving us in-, formation on this subject what arrangements they are making to ensure that the latest scientific devices are used to the best possible advantage.
  Question, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair," put, and agreed to.
  Supply accordingly considered in Committee.
  [Colonel Sir CHARLES MACANDREW in the Chair]

  NAVY ESTIMATES, 1951–52

    VOTE A. NUMBERS
    Resolved:
    That 143,500 Officers, Seamen and Boys and Royal Marines, who are borne on the Books of His Majesty's Ships and at the Royal Marine Divisions, and members of the Women's Royal Naval Service and the Naval Nursing Service, be employed for the Sea Service, for the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1952.

    VOTE 1. PAY, &C, OF THE ROYAL NAVY AND ROYAL MARINES
    Resolved:
    That a sum, not exceeding £47,151,000, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the expense of the pay, &c, of the Royal Navy and Royal Marines, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1952.

    VOTE 2. VICTUALLING AND CLOTHING FOR THE NAVY
    Resolved:
    That a sum, not exceeding £17,517,000, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the expense of victualling and clothing for the Navy, including the cost of victualling establishments at home and abroad, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1952.

    VOTE 4. CIVILIANS EMPLOYED ON FLEET SERVICES
    Resolved:
    That a sum, not exceeding £6,292,000, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the expense of civilians employed on fleet services, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1952.

    VOTE 6. SCIENTIFIC SERVICES
    Resolved:
    That a sum, not exceeding £12,231,000. be granted to His Majesty, to defray the expense of scientific services, including a Grant in Aid to the National Institute of Oceanography, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1952.

    VOTE 10. WORKS, BUILDINGS AND REPAIRS AT HOME AND ABROAD
    Resolved:
    That a sum, not exceeding £13,067,000, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the expense of works, buildings and repairs at home and abroad, including the cost of superintendence, purchase of sites, grants and other charges connected therewith, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1952.

    VOTE 11. MISCELLANEOUS EFFECTIVE SERVICES
    Resolved:
    That a sum, not exceeding £5,853,900, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the expense of various miscellaneous effective services, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1952.

    VOTE 13. NON-EFFECTIVE SERVICES
    Resolved:
    That a sum, not exceeding £15,035,000, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the expense of non-effective services, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1952.

    VOTE 15. ADDITIONAL MARRIED QUARTERS
    Resolved:
    That a sum, not exceeding £100, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the expense of certain additional married quarters at home, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1952.
    Resolutions to be reported on Tuesday.
    Committee to sit again on Tuesday.

  FIREWORKS BILL
  Read a Second time, and committed to a Standing Committee.

  COUNCIL HOUSE LETTING, CAITHNESS
  Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—[Mr. Bowden.]
  1.16 a.m.
  Sir David Robertson: The case which I am presenting tonight is of importance for several reasons. Firstly, it reveals gross misconduct by a county council in the allocation of a council house; secondly, it involves a number of families living in homes unfit for human habitation longer than is necessary; thirdly, the law has been broken by the county council and condoned by the Secretary of State for Scotland; and fourthly, money provided by the British taxpayers for those in greatest need of homes has not been honestly applied for that purpose.
  The facts are as follows. At the end of July a county council house became available for letting in the village of Halkirk in Caithness. There were 17 applicants for the house. Seven days before the allocation meeting took place the sanitary inspector for the county presented his report in regard to the 17 applications. One was from a single man who desired to get married, and the remaining 16 were from men with wives and families, all of whom were living in overcrowded and insanitary conditions, and eight of whom were living in conditions which were unfit for human habitation. But the single man got the house.
  The council stated publicly that it was on the advice of the local councillor for Halkirk, a member of an ancient feudal family which has rendered distinguished service to the county of Caithness and to
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  the country, that this extraordinary letting took place. When I ventilated the matter publicly for the first time at a public meeting in Wick, Councillor Finlayson, a member of the Caithness County Council, and a member of the Public Health Committee, stated that all my facts were wholly correct, and that the council had not only received advice from the local councillor of Halkirk, but he had subjected them to extreme pressure.
  I do not in any way minimise the behaviour of the members of the Public Health Committee in doing something which they knew was very wrong at the behest of this member of a distinguished family. They behaved like serfs, in my opinion. These are the facts. I am not going to add to them. I leave the House to decide for itself what it thinks of them.
  This matter was raised subsequently with me by two of the unsuccessful applicants, both ex-Service men living in Halkirk in abominable conditions, and as they were entitled to do, they alleged unfairness in the allocation, and asked me to take action to right this wrong. I passed on these two letters to the county clerk, with a covering letter asking that they should be investigated and the reply sent to me. There was no obligation on me to move in that courteous fashion, but there was an obligation on me to bring these letters to the notice of the Secretary of State for Scotland. I thought it more courteous to send them to the local authority concerned, with whom I wanted to act in whole-hearted co-operation for the benefit of the people.
  The next I heard of this strange matter was that the Sunday newspapers of 6th August carried a report of a meeting held the previous day by the Caithness County Council in which I was rebuked for inter-ferring.
  Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Colonel Sir Charles MacAndrew): Has the Secretary of State any responsibility for this?
  Sir D. Robertson: Under the law of Scotland the Secretary of State has the greatest responsibility. The Housing (Scotland) Act, 1935, Section 47 (2) imposes on local authorities the duty to give reasonable preference in selecting their tenants to persons who are occupying insanitary or overcrowded houses,

  1253
  who have large families, or who are otherwise living in unsatisfactory housing conditions. I submit there can be no doubt whatever that that is the law of Scotland.
  Mr. Deputy-Speaker: It does not give the Secretary of State any control.
  Sir D. Robertson: I have taken the advice of the highest legal authority available in Scotland, and I am assured that the only man who could have taken action to right this wrong was the Secretary of State, or one of his Law Officers. Obviously not one of these poor afflicted people who have been treated so unjustly could take action in the Court of Session, because he could not prove that he would have been the successful one if fairness had been used instead of the great unfairness which was used.
  Mr. Deputy-Speaker: That again does not make the Secretary of State responsible.
  Sir D. Robertson: The Secretary of State is surely responsible for upholding the law in Scotland.
  Mr. Woodburn: Is it not the case that the law of Scotland empowers the local authority to make this choice between tenants? It makes the local authority the body whose opinion decides what is the proper course where a house is to be allotted. Once that supreme authority has decided, no one else has any authority unless the law is altered.
  Mr. Deputy-Speaker: On an adjournment Motion we cannot suggest any alteration of the law.
  Sir D. Robertson: I am not suggesting any alteration of the law. I am quoting the law as it stands. If there is any meaning in these words it must surely be that in a case such as this, where the law has been broken, where there is widespread feeling—as there is in my constituency—that the law has been broken, and where members of the council admit that the law has been broken——
  Mr. Deputy-Speaker: If the law has been broken, that is a matter for the courts, not for the Secretary of State.
  Sir D. Robertson: Forgive me for referring to the matter again, but I did take advice. I was willing to take the matter to court, I was willing to encourage a
  1254
  group of these men to do so. I was told that was impossible because no one could say that his family was the one that would have been chosen. I was assured that the Secretary of State for Scotland was the man responsible for acting and taking it to the courts in restraining the council.
  Mr. Deputy-Speaker: In my opinion—I am, of course, not a lawyer—he is not responsible. It is the law courts which must decide this. We have the Lord Advocate here and I understand that he has no responsibility, so I really have no option but to stop this debate.
  Major Sir David Maxwell Fyfe: On a point of order. I speak with great deference in regard to the law of Scotland, on which I do not pretend to be an expert, but the law of the Sovereign King is that if a local authority does not carry out its statutory duty, an action for an injunction can be brought by the Attorney-General, and I cannot believe that the jurisprudence of Scotland is so weak that the Lord Advocate has not got similar power.
  The Lord Advocate (Mr. John Wheatley): I am sorry to disillusion the right hon. and learned Gentleman, but as far as my knowledge goes there is no such power vested in the Lord Advocate in Scotland. On the other hand, a person who had an interest, whether he might have been the tenant ultimately chosen or not, would have a locus in the courts to bring an action against the local authority if an action lay. I am not saying whether an action would lie or not, because the hon. Member for Caithness and Sutherland (Sir D. Robertson) obviously has his own legal authority whom he consults, and in those circumstances I do not think it would be my position to proffer him legal advice.
  Mr. Woodburn: It is very important for hon. Members of this House that this should be made clear. The law has established the local authority as the supreme arbiter as to what is a deserving tenant or what is a tenant under the Act. There is no appeal from that. The local authority have that power under the Act, and I would respectfully submit that unless the Act of Parliament is altered, this House has no right, nor has any Member of the Executive any right, to interfere with the discretion of the local authority in the allocation of houses.
  Sir William Darling: I think that the issue—which looks as if it is going to be truncated—is one which can be enlarged, with your permission, Sir Charles. What my hon. Friend has said is that the allocation of houses in Caithness is unsatisfactory——
  Mr. Deputy-Speaker: This matter cannot be debated. I am led to understand that there is no responsibility in the Secretary of State. I have no option and must stop this debate.
  Sir W. Darling: On a point of order. Am I not right in saying that my hon. Friend has brought forward a matter—which you have ruled out of order—concerning certain unsatisfactory conditions in house letting in Caithness? I venture therefore to suggest that what you have ruled out of order in my hon. Friend's speech is only part of the circumstances, because the Secretary of State has a duty to provide housing in Scotland under instructions of his own to the Scottish Special Housing Association, and the unfortunate person who is getting no housing under the present arrangements would seem to me to have a claim directly on the Secretary of State for housing, under the right hon. Gentleman's own hand.
  As I think the right hon. Gentleman will agree, he has power in the Scottish Special Housing Association to provide houses for persons in special need, and I submit that those who are refused housing under the arrangement which has been described by my hon. Friend should have it under the other arrangement, for which the Secretary of State has a personal direct responsibility, and I should like to speak on that subject if I have your permission.
  The Lord Advocate: I submit that that is not a point on which any question can arise under the present Adjournment debate. The substance of this debate is that the Secretary of State for Scotland has some responsibility because of the failure of the local authority properly to allocate houses in a particular set of circumstances. The question whether or not he could build houses through the medium of the Scottish Special Housing Association is, in my submission, quite irrelevant, because that deals with the question of building houses in a particular area. This question relates to the allocation of houses by a local authority,
  1256
  which is an entirely different matter and is primarily the responsibility of the local authority.
  Sir D. Robertson: Of course, I should be the last person to suggest that the Secretary of State for Scotland or any other Minister should be saddled at any time with the responsibility of the individual allocation of houses. I have brought this case to the notice of the House for a totally different reason. That is because of what I, and a vast majority of my constituents, believe to be a case of gross misconduct, where the law has been broken by the local authority.
  Mr. Deputy-Speaker: Misconduct of a local authority is not the responsibility of the Secretary of State for Scotland.
  Sir W. Darling: No responsibility for housing in Scotland?
  The Joint Under-Secretary of State for Scotland (Mr. Thomas Fraser): It seems to me that the hon. Member for Edinburgh, South (Sir W. Darling), has been most insulting to the Chair. The Chair said that the Secretary of State for Scotland has no responsibility for the exercise of authority over the local authority in Caithness and Sutherland. The hon. Member for Edinburgh, South, has misinterpreted the Chair as saying that the Secretary of State for Scotland has no responsibility for housing in Scotland. I think that is being most mischievous, and that it is a serious matter.
  Sir W. Darling: I understood that it was said that this debate was out of order because the Secretary of State for Scotland had no responsibility. No responsibility for what? No responsibility for housing in Caithness?
  Mr. Deputy-Speaker: No responsibility over the matter brought before the House. That was my view.
  Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe: I should like to get this clear. If the Lord Advocate advises us, we shall, of course, take his advice. But it is a most serious point. I want to know what is right. Is it the case that the Lord Advocate, the Secretary of State for Scotland, and the Executive have no power to raise an action for interdict against a local authority which exceeds a statutory

  1257
  power? If the Lord Advocate gives us that assurance, then, if I may say so, with respect, I fully understand your Ruling, Mr. Deputy-Speaker. But if that assurance cannot be given to us, surely my hon. Friend the Member for Caithness and Sutherland (Sir D. Robertson) has something to put before the House.
  The Lord Advocate: I think that the right hon. and learned Member has a wrong approach to this problem. The challenge is not that a local authority has exceeded its statutory power; the challenge is that it has wrongly exercised its discretion in the discharge of its statutory duty—wrongly exercised the discretionary power. That is entirely different from exceeding a statutory duty. If a local authority exceeds its statutory duty, or fails in that duty, then surely one has a means under the Housing Acts, if it is a housing case, to bring that local authority to book. But we are not dealing with that type of case.
  We are dealing with a challenge to the exercise of a discretion vested in the local authority. If that challenge is made, then it has to be pursued in court. It is the duty of the person wishing to challenge that particular action to take proceedings, and not the duty of the Secretary of State for Scotland or of the Executive.
  Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe: I am grateful to the Lord Advocate who has put the point with the greatest clarity. But respectfully, I submit that that puts my hon. Friend on the right foot, because the Lord Advocate has drawn a distinction between exceeding statutory power and the misuse of a discretion within that statutory power.
  Mr. Woodburn: The alleged misuse.
  Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe: I am grateful. The alleged misuse. As I understood the hon. Member for Caithness and Sutherland, his allegation, which of course it is on him to substantiate, is that the misuse of the discretion was of so grave a nature that it amounted to misusing a statutory power, and misusing a statutory power is, of course, the same as an excessive, or wrong, use. The right hon. and learned Gentleman knows the long line of cases which have been established during the war and since, where statutory powers can only be used for the purposes for which they are given. If one moves
  1258
  outside that purpose then one is doing wrong, and all that I am saying is that my hon. Friend should, I submit, have the opportunity to show, as he seeks to show, that the misuse is of so flagrant a nature as to amount to wrongful use of a statutory power.
  The Lord Advocate: I am afraid that this is developing into a legal argument, but I think the right hon. and learned Gentleman is mistaking the situation with which we are dealing here. There is not the slightest doubt that in allocating houses to this or any other gentleman the local authorities were acting within their legal powers. Recently we had to take the words "working class" out of the Housing Acts to widen the scope of the persons to whom allocation can be made. There is not the shadow of a doubt that they were acting intra vires in allocating a house to a person of this nature.
  As I understand the gravamen of the hon. Gentleman's charge, it is that though the local authority could competently allocate this house to this particular person, having regard to other considerations and the Section of the 1935 Act, now incorporated in a Consolidation Act of 1950, they could make a prior allocation to B rather than to A. That is where discretion comes into it, and the discretion is vested in the local authority, and the right hon. and learned Gentleman was working up a case that they were acting illegally and outwith their powers. That was competent for them to do within the Housing Act and the only question at issue is whether this or any other application deserved what the application received, and that is a discretionary matter.
  Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe: I am sorry to involve the House in a legal argument at this late hour, but it is an important point. The point I am making is whether a local authority is acting in complete disregard of the duties that are imposed on them by the Section of the Act to which my hon. Friend has referred. May I then put this point to the Lord Advocate? Suppose there was extrinsic evidence by letter from the clerk saying, "we have completely disregarded this and have refused to regard the matters placed to our regard under Section 5 of the Act," then I think I should say it was a wrongful action because they had disregarded their statutory duty. All I am saying is that my hon.

  1259
  Friend should be allowed to develop that case if he can, and if he can he may have something worthy of inquiry by the Executive. My hon. Friend has a strong burden to satisfy the House that the council have disregarded the duty imposed on them by the Section, and if he can satisfy the House surely this House as the guardian of the actions of the Executive should be allowed to hear that case.
  Mr. T. Fraser: May I say that there is no need for any of us to draw on our imaginations to see whether or not this case ought to be discussed by the House. The fact is that this local authority, rightly or wrongly, allocated a three-apartment house to the applicant whose application was outstanding for the longest period of any of the 16 applicants. Manifestly, since this man lived within the area, he was a person for whom the local authority had a duty imposed on them by the Housing Act to provide accommodation. He had a claim for a house. It seems to me that all we can argue in this House or anywhere else is whether or not the local authority have properly exercised the discretion which the statute gives them in these matters.
  Mr. Woodburn: Is it not important that in the exercise of its duties this House should not interfere with the discretion of local authorities? Local authorities will resent very bitterly this House passing judgment on them in matters which are left entirely to their discretion by an Act of Parliament. It seems to me that this House cannot over-ride an Act of Parliament, however eloquent an hon. Member may be in putting forward some account of its administration in the country.
  The Lord Advocate: Since a legal question has been raised by the hon. Member for Caithness and Sutherland and the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for West Derby has developed it, I think it is right, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, that you should know what the legal position is to the best of our mutual ability to inform you. It would appear from the representations from the other side of the House that the Section of the 1935 Act quoted by the hon. Member for Caithness and Sutherland was the exclusive criterion in rela-
  1260
  tion to the allocation of houses. It is nothing of the kind. It is one of several criteria which local authorities take into account. Mention was made of unsanitary houses and overcrowded houses.
  Anyone with any local authority experience knows that, while these factors are taken into account in a points allocation, other factors are also taken into account. My hon. Friend the Joint Under-Secretary mentioned the length of the application. War service is another matter taken into consideration in computing the number of points in an allocation. I merely use these examples to indicate that the Section quoted by the hon. Member for Caithness and Sutherland is not an exclusive section for consideration.
  That reinforces my point that it is manifestly a question for the discretion of the local authority to take into account the factors referred to in the Section quoted by the hon. Gentleman, and also any other factors relevant and within their powers, and since one of their duties under the Housing Act is to provide houses for people in their area——
  Sir W. Darling: Hear, hear!
  The Lord Advocate: Yes, the duty of the local authorities is to provide houses for people in the area, and, therefore, as between one claimant and another it is manifestly the exercise of a function, and since that is the question at issue in this Adjournment debate, I submit, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, that your original Ruling was correct.
  Sir D. Robertson: Further to the point of order raised by the Joint Under-Secretary and supported by the right hon. Member for East Stirling (Mr. Wood-burn), may I remind them that this excellent booklet entitled, "Choosing Council Tenants" was brought out owing to the pressure of public opinion in Scotland? People were gravely dissatisfied with the allocation of houses, and the right hon. Gentleman, who was then the Secretary of State for Scotland, very properly called in the services of the Scottish Housing Advisory Committee who published this book of 50 pages. They began by stating the law as I quoted it from the booklet. They say that is the law. I am not on that point now, but, as to the point made by the Joint Under-Secretary that the single man should be qualified because he was longer on the

  1261
  list, the book says that time of application has not to be taken into account as a major factor. This is a very important point——
  Mr. Deputy-Speaker: We cannot pursue this matter any further.
  Sir D. Robertson: I should like just one more moment to explain——
  Mr. Deputy-Speaker: No. I have come to the conclusion, having heard the matter discussed on both sides, that there is no responsibility in the Scottish Office for anything that has happened in this case.
  Sir D. Robertson: I agree that you have been most tolerant, Mr. Deputy-Speaker The only point I want to make is that the Joint Under-Secretary——
  Mr. Deputy-Speaker: Order. I have said that we cannot pursue this matter as I have come to the conclusion that there is no responsibility in the Scottish Office. We cannot pursue the matter further.
  Sir D. Robertson: I wanted to say that the only reference to single men here is that they are excluded.
  Mr. Deputy-Speaker: That does not give the Scottish Office any responsibility. The Question is——
  Sir W. Darling: The Adjournment half-hour is not yet at an end, and, therefore, I would raise the question of the Scottish Special Housing Association. As you, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, will be aware, we have some very bad housing conditions in Scotland, but Parliament gave power for a special instrument to deal with that unhappy state of things. Now this really is relevant, although I admit that I must not bring in any of the matter you, Sir, have just ruled out of order. But it is relevant to Caithness. There is not a local authority in Scotland which is satisfied with the housing of its people, and the Secretary of State now has——
  The Question having been proposed after Ten o'Clock on Monday evening, and the debate having continued for half an hour,Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER adjourned the House without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.
  Adjourned at Fourteen Minutes to Two o'Clock a.m.