CLAUSE 53.—(Provisions as to Instrument of Instructions).

HC Deb 20 March 1935 vol 299 cc1221-83

4.3 p.m.

Marquess of HARTINGTON

I beg to move, "That the Chairman do report Progress, and ask leave to sit again."

I do so because, in my view, and in the view of my hon. Friends and allies, the position has been so fundamentally altered by what we now know of the attitude of the Indian Princes that no useful purpose whatever can be served by our further discussion of this Bill in its present form. Hon. Members have in their hands the White Paper which my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State issued on Monday. It is a lengthy Paper containing many explanations to show that when people say "fundamental" they do not mean fundamental, and that when they say "vital" they do not mean vital. Never since the first cuttle-fish used his device for concealment has ink been better used for the purpose of concealment than that which blackens this White Paper. My right hon. Friend may issue one White Paper; he may issue 20 White Papers, but he cannot alter the fact that a representative body of the Indian Princes has met together and has passed unanimously a Resolution. I do not want to weary the Committee with quotations, but we are dealing with a White Paper full of quotations, and I cannot avoid using some. The Resolution says: This meeting is of the definite opinion that in their present form, and without satisfactory modification of and alteration to the fundamental points, the Bill and Instrument of Accession cannot be regarded as acceptable to Indian States. That Resolution—I have quoted only the concluding words—was passed a few moments only after some very pregnant words had been uttered by the Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes. He said: I appeal to you not merely as Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes, which high office I hold by the suffrage of my brother Princes, but also as the Ruler of Patiala, to say in the most unequivocal terms that this Bill is totally unsatisfactory, and cannot be accepted. That does raise a very serious position, indeed. It is true that my right hon. Friend's White Paper contains on the part of the Princes a certain number of protestations of their devotion to the principle of Federation. I think you, Sir Dennis, are very familiar with that kind of protestation. When hon. Members say to you, "Far be it from me, Sir, to question your ruling," what they really mean is that they are generally in favour of others accepting your ruling, but that in this particular case they violently disagree with it. In the same way the Princes may be generally in favour of the principle of Federation, but they mean to take good care that the practice of it in particular shall never affect their own States. That is their real meaning. I believe that when the Princes have really been confronted with what Federation means to them, they will be quite determined not to agree to this principle of Federation. They use in their letter to the Viceroy—and I notice that the Secretary of State refers to it—a very peculiar word—a word which, in my limited Parliamentary experience, I have never hitherto encountered. They say that they do not "resile" from the principle of Federation. I was so interested in the word that I consulted a dictionary at once, and I found it to be this: (Of elastic bodies) recoil, rebound, resume shape and size after stretching or compression; have or show elasticity or buoyancy or recuperative power. I believe that very interesting and obscure word must have been used advisedly. The Princes do not intend to be bounced back violently from the precipice to which they have been so nearly led. They mean to retire with a united front and in good order. Using very plain English, which their Highnesses would be far too polite to do, what they really mean to say is that they do not intend to be "bounced."

I have given one or two quotations to the Committee, and I do not want to weary them. Hon. Members have the whole of the evidence before them in this White Paper. I believe that no Member who reads pages 14 to 28 of the White Paper can possibly resist the conclusion that the objections of the Princes to Federation are vital and fundamental. I believe that if that long list of objections could be met—I do not think for a moment they can be met; it is utterly impossible that they can be met—still I believe that others would be raised until finally the attempt to draw the Princes into this scheme of Federation has been abandoned. As I have said, hon. Members have all the evidence before them, and I do not want to weary the Committee with that issue. With your permission, Sir Dennis, I would like to leave the documents now, and go into the argument of "the nature of the case," so dear to Dr. Paley. When my right hon. Friend was so optimistic about the Princes joining Federation, it never seemed to me in the nature of the case that when really confronted with the issue they would do anything of the kind. It seemed to me quite clear that by doing so they would surrender many advantages which they enjoy at the present time. They would give up treaties which must be regarded as absolutely inviolable. They would give up the position of very nearly absolute security. They run many risks, and avoid only one.

The risk which they avoid is that some future Government in this country might force upon them a measure even more disadvantageous to them than that which we are considering this afternoon. I hear one voice behind me say "Hear, hear." This risk has been used to the full by the Government and by the supporters of the Measure. We have certainly heard all about it, and I venture to hazard a guess that the Princes have heard a certain amount, too. I do not believe for one moment that that argument has the slightest validity. We who think it right to oppose this Bill have been told over and over again what fools we are to jeopardise this Bill, which is probably the last chance of securing a permanent settlement of the Indian question on sound Conservative lines, when we know that a Government of a very different complexion would bring in a Measure far more radical. I do not admit the validity of that argument for a moment. The present Government, enjoying a majority such as no Government has ever had before, is finding considerable, and, I think, increasing difficulty in passing this Measure. I do not think that another Government of a different complexion cumbered up, as it would be, with pledges of every kind, could contemplate the introduction of a Bill which would prevent it very seriously from getting on with its task of nationalising the railways, banks and all the rest. They would be far too busy with the first-class financial crisis which they have promised, to contemplate the introduction of a Government of India Bill. I do not believe that any Government could carry through a Bill of the kind with which we are threatend if we do not pass this Bill.

I have not heard many good arguments advanced in support of this Bill, but there is one which has had a powerful effect on my mind, and upon the minds of all of us, namely, the argument that many of what may be called the men on the spot, are in favour of the Bill. It is a fact that many weighty and authoritative men with long service in India though they may not like this Bill very much, believe that it is the best way out of the very difficult situation. I, myself, believe that their support of the Bill has been given, to a large extent, under a misapprehension. I think that if they knew as much about politics in general as they know about India in particular, they might well not have given the support they have. I believe that if they had a reasonable hope of a really Conservative Government in this country, they might take a very different view. It is something like 30 years since anything like real Conservative doctrine was tried in India or elsewhere. Liberal Governments whose motto is, "Get out before you are kicked out," have been succeeded by Conservative Governments whose motto is "Don't miss the bus. Get out before anyone thinks of kicking you out." If we could have a reasonable hope of securing something really Conservative, I believe that men in India who have given their support to the Bill would very soon revise their views. But that is neither here no there.

The Bill can claim weighty and authoritative support from informed British Indian opinion. I do not think that it would be possible for any Government of this country to pass a Bill which did not enjoy that support. If a more radical and drastic measure be threatened, if this Bill does not go through, the whole weight of the informed opinion of those influential names which at present decorate the literature of the Union of Britain and India would be transferred en bloc to the literature of the India De-fence League. I do not think that an alternative Government would attempt to pass a Government of India Bill of a more drastic nature than this. For that reason I believe that the Princes have the best and the weightiest of reasons for refusing to enter into Federation. I believe that their reasons are permanent, and that, in the nature of the case, it is in the highest degree improbable that the Princes will ultimately enter Federation.

What then becomes of the Bill? The entry of the Princes has been the whole foundation on which the Bill has been laid. Those of us who have been opposing the Bill from these benches have accepted an alternative. I do not say that it is one of which we are desperately enamoured, but it is one which we have adopted because we realise that the Government have got themselves into a difficult position and that it is rather hard not to do something to help them. We suggest that, instead of taking the irrevocable step of setting up an All-India Federation, we should try provincial autonomy and see how it works. We have been told over and over again by the Government that such a course would be disastrous and that it would leave the Central Government so weak as not to be able to survive. That road of retreat the Government have blown up for themselves. We are told that we must have Federation and that we must bring in this sane, loyal, stabilising influence of the Princes. It is pretty clear, if words have any meaning at all, that that influence is not there. That influence cannot be relied upon for future Federation. It has been made plain, absolutely from the word "go," that the whole of this Bill stood or fell by Federation and the adherence of the Princes. That adherence is not there. That being so, it is an almost overwhelming reason for the withdrawal of the Bill. What is the good of our continuing to discuss a Bill, which, on the Government's own admission, can never become operative? What is the good of our continuing to waste months of Parliamentary time? The credit of the House and of the Government can best be; served in the long run by dropping the Bill.

If the case is serious in regard to the Indian position it is even more serious in regard to the Parliamentary position. We have been told over and over again that the whole of Federation depended upon the adherence of the Princes. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for India told the Committee of Supply on 27th June, 1932: Every hon. Member in this House should see the whole picture of the comprehensive constitutional scheme before he is asked to give a vote or a decision upon any part of it. He told them again: No one in any part of this House can categorically say that an All-India Federation Bill can be produced until we know in detail and for certain that the Indian States are going to be an effective part of the Federation."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 27th June, 1932; col. 1495, Vol. 267.] To-day we know almost for certain that they are not. [HON. MEMBERS: "Why?"] Read the White Paper, if hon. Members ask "Why? If there be any doubt about that, it is quite certain, and in detail, that we do not know that they are. My right hon. Friend has given a categorical promise that no hon. Member shall be asked to vote upon any part of the Bill until we know. I submit that the Parliamentary position is an exceedingly serious one.

My right hon. Friend would not willfully mislead us, but he himself has been woefully misled. His information from India has been wrong information, and he has not fully understood the attitude of the Princes. The Princes are not the only persons about whom he has been misled. We understood that he hoped to get the overwhelming mass of Liberal opinion, but every Indian Liberal has said that he loathes the Bill and cannot bear it. The opinion upon which my right hon. Friend has relied has not backed him up as he thought it would. As regards both the scheme of Federation and the information which my right hon. Friend has laid before the House, the position is so radically altered from what we had been led to believe, that no useful purpose could be served by continuing this discussion. I believe that the most candid and useful course would be for the Government to withdraw the Bill.

4.22 p.m.

The SECRETARY of STATE for INDIA (Sir Samuel Hoare)

My noble Friend the Member for West Derbyshire (Marquess of Hartington) has, as he always does, made a very able and incisive speech, but it seemed to be directed against the whole Bill rather than to the immediate object of this Motion to report Progress. It was a speech showing also what a terribly ignorant person the Secretary of State for India is, and how much more almost everybody else in the House of Commons knows about these Indian affairs. I accept the reproof in the friendly spirit in which it was given. My Noble Friend made one or two quotations from the meeting of the Princes in Bombay. He quoted in particular an observation from the Maharaja of Patiala. He forgot, however, to quote the first and opening observation made by the Maharaja of Patiala, which was in these words: I would, in conclusion, urge everyone present here to keep our deliberations absolutely confidential. Untimely publicity may cause great harm, and I earnestly request that the secrecy of our consultations should be rigorously maintained. I cannot congratulate my Noble Friend and those whom he called his allies in acceding to the request made by the Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes. Be that as it may—

Mr. CHURCHILL

What does the right hon. Gentleman mean by that?

Sir S. HOARE

I think the meaning is obvious. My right hon. Friend, I dare say for very good reasons from his own point of view, has circulated an account of these speeches, and that is a direct repudiation of the request made at the beginning of the meeting by the Maharaja of Patiala.

Mr. CHURCHILL

My right hon. Friend is surely aware that what I have circulated to the House and to my colleagues in the House of Commons has already appeared in the public Press.

Sir S. HOARE

I imagine, although I do not want to enter into a controversy with my right hon. Friend, that the source of his information and the source of the information in the public Press are exactly the same.

Sir WILLIAM DAVISON

And it has never been denied.

Sir S. HOARE

Let me come to the very general considerations urged by my Noble Friend the Member for West Derbyshire, and to the definite points that we are considering this afternoon. In accordance with my undertaking to the Committee I have published in full the information at our disposal. I claim that the information now published confirms in every respect the accounts that I have previously given to the Committee of the exact state of affairs. The White Paper confirms the fact that the Princes have not withdrawn from Federation We should like to make it clear beyond doubt"— these are their words— that there has never been any intention. on our part to resile"— I pause on that word in view of what my Noble Friend has said about it— from the position which we have all along taken. Let me say, in passing, that I, like my noble Friend, was surprised when I first-saw this word "resile." I saw it when I first went to the India Office three or four years ago. It is a word which has been in frequent use in the phraseology of India, and it is the outward and visible sign of the influence which Scotsmen have had upon administration in India. My noble Friend will remember that it was always said that the two exports from Scotland were thin cattle to England and impecunious adventurers to India. That has resulted in a word which is not ordinarily used in the phraseology of the English members in that Committee.

The fact which emerges is that the publication of this document shows that the Government have gone back on no agreement. It shows that the points connected with the Bill are substantially those which I stated in the Committee during my first speech on the subject some few weeks ago. The last conclusion which I wish to impress upon the Committee arising from these papers is that they show that these differences are adjustable, formidable as they may look at first sight. I claim that they are adjustable, and, in support of my view, I claim the opinion expressed by the Princes themselves It is, in our opinion,"— say the three signatories of this communication— still not beyond the sphere of statesmanship to adjust our differences in such a manner as would lead" to a satisfactory and desired result. There are about 30 points upon which the Princes feel doubt. To some extent those points overlap, but the questions may be not unfairly regarded as 30 separate questions. Apart from two substantial issues, about which I shall speak in a minute, the rest of these points are points of detail. If hon. Members will study them, I think they will agree with me when I say that about a third of them are simply misunderstandings, and, of the other two-thirds, the great majority are either points where the drafting is not quite clear or where the drafting ought to be readjusted without any sacrifice of any substantial principle in the Bill. The Committee, therefore, can take it from me that, of these 30 points of difference, all except two are points that ought to be adjustable, and adjustable comparatively easily.

I come now to the two points of substance. The first point is the point about which I spoke the other day—the point about the method of accession of the Princes into the Federation. I have always admitted that this is a difficult and complicated issue, and I would not like it to be supposed that it is not complicated. I will, however, point the Committee to paragraph (vii) on page 34 of the White Paper. They will see there set out the exact position with reference to the method of accession, that is to say, to Clause 6 of the Bill. I think I had better read the paragraph to the Committee: His Majesty's Government are of opinion that Clause 6, if analysed and correctly interpreted, does not disclose any differences which can be justly described as fundamental or vital. From their point of view it is essential that there should be a single constitution, and not a multiplicity of constitutions; they realise that the States, on the other hand, desire to secure that the method of their entry into Federation should be so expressed as not to subject them to any risk of finding their powers and jurisdiction diminished beyond the point which they contemplated when they executed their Instrument of Accession. His Majesty's Government are confident that it is not impossible to reconcile these two points of view, and they believe that the suggestions in this Memorandum with regard to other Clauses, for example, Clauses 45, 127, and 129–132, will facilitate an adjustment of view on Clause 6. It cannot be said here and now how far we shall be able to meet the States' views on these questions. This must depend largely upon the States' reactions to the White Paper. But I can say this, and I emphasise this point to the Committee, that my advisers have been in close consultation about them with the legal advisers of the States. The latter cannot, of course, bind the Princes in any way, but the views of both parties have been discussed in detail at these meetings, and the discussions have not revealed any differences which appear to me to be incapable of adjustment.

The other point of substance is a point of a different kind, and a point with which, curiously enough, my Noble Friend omitted to deal in the course of his speech. It is the emphasis that the Princes lay in their communication upon the position of their treaties and upon the question generally of what is known as paramountcy. This is a question upon which I believe there have been misunderstandings in various quarters. Let me say a word, before I deal in greater detail with the question of paramountcy, about these misunderstandings. The Princes claim in their communication that there must be a satisfactory settlement of the claims of paramountcy precedent to their accession. Some people seem to think that this means that we cannot proceed with the Bill until those claims are settled. My Noble Friend who has just addressed the Committee seemed to take that view. This is not the case. The Princes are not being asked here and now to accede—

Mr. CHURCHILL

Hear, hear!

Sir S. HOARE

My right hon. Friend seems surprised at that statement. I thought it was of the nature of a platitude which was in everybody's mouth. The Princes are not being asked here and now to accede. Parliament, rather, is passing the best Bill it can, and is taking into account as fully as it can all the various interests—British Indian interests, the interests of the Indian States, the interests of Great Britain and the interests of the Empire. The Princes themselves have always said that they could give no final answer as to their accession until the Bill was on the Statute Book, and the negotiations were actually started for their Instruments of Accession. Parliament is now doing its best, and is acting on the merits of all these difficult issues. The Princes are not being asked here and now to say, "Yes" or "No" to its work. When the Bill is passed, the Princes will have to decide. If they accede, there will be Federation; if they do not accede, there will be no Federation. My Noble Friend seemed to think that that would not only not be the position to-day, but that I have changed in some way from the position which I had previously taken up. Nothing is further from being the case.

My Noble Friend was good enough to quote a sentence or two from one of my former speeches, a speech made about three and a half years ago. If hon. Members will look at that speech, they will find that it was a speech in which, at the end of the second Round Table Conference, I was explaining the future procedure and in particular, first of all, that the Government had decided to proceed by a single comprehensive Bill rather than by a Bill based only on provincial autonomy. Secondly, I was proceeding to describe what were going to be the future activities of the third Round Table Conference, and subsequently of the Joint Select Committee. I was saying to the House that, the Government having then decided, and having then announced for the first time, that they were going to proceed by a single comprehensive Bill, we had to show in our Bill that we could meet the conditions of Federation, that is to say, that we could produce a Bill in which the Princes could play an effective part. It was perfectly obvious that I meant to draft a Bill in which the Princes' rights would be adequately safeguarded, and under which they would receive effective representation in the Federal Legislature, the Federal Executive and the other Federal organs. There was not the least question at the time, and nobody ever understood for a moment from my statement, that we were not going to produce a Bill till the Princes had said they were going to accept it. Nothing was further from our intentions; nothing was further from the intentions of the Joint Select Committee; nothing was further from the intentions of the representatives of the Princes themselves.

Mr. CHURCHILL

My right hon. Friend will admit that the general impression of everyone was that the Princes were in hearty accord with the main details of the proposals?

Sir S. HOARE

Certainly, and I claim that that is the case to-day. [HON. MEMBERS: "NO."] So far from its being the fact that there was any misunderstanding about what I said, quite a few weeks afterwards, at the third Round Table Conference, there was a committee of which the representatives of all the principal States were members, and in their report they accepted the procedure I had set out in the House of Commons, and said: The procedure in contemplation would secure that the States should not be asked to commit themselves definitely until they had the complete Act before them, but it was suggested that opportunity might be found to enable the Princes' views on the draft constitution to be made known to Parliament while legislation was in progress. Hon. Members will see that that is exactly the procedure that we are adopting to-day. I hope I have said enough to clear up the first of these misunderstandings. I come now to the second misunderstanding. The Princes seemed to think in their communication, and my Noble Friend seemed to think in his speech, that, so far as paramountcy is concerned, the Princes were going to he worse off under the Bill than they would be without the Bill. If the Committee is to understand the position, I must make a short digression into this field, though I do so with a word of caution. Paramountcy does not concern the discussion of the Bill at all, but, as it has been mentioned, I will say as briefly as possible what it means and how it affects, so far as it affects at all, the constitutional matters before us. Paramountcy is the term commonly used to describe the powers of the Crown in its relation to the States. The Crown is bound by engagements of great variety, only some 30 of them, however, being treaties, with the Indian States. The nature of the undertaking has varied with the circumstances in which the relationship arose. A common feature of great significance is that the Crown accepted responsibility for the States' external relations and their internal and external defence. These contractual obligations embodied in the treaties have, with the growth of the Crown's authority throughout India, been supplemented by usage and by the course of events. The Crown's suzerainty has been established for generations. When the Crown took over direct authority in India from the East India Company, Lord Canning made the following pronouncement: The Crown of England stands forth the unquestioned ruler and paramount power in all India. … There is a reality in the suzerainty of the Sovereign of England which has never existed before and which is not only felt but eagerly acknowledged by the Chiefs. I quote a second pronouncement which has an important bearing on the question, and which illustrates some of the applications of paramountcy. I take Lord Minto's statement in 1909: Our policy is with rare exceptions one of non-interference in the internal affairs of native States. But in guaranteeing their internal independence and in undertaking their protection against external aggression, it naturally follows that the Imperial Government has assumed a certain degree of responsibility for the general soundness of their administration and would not consent to incur the reproach of being an indirect instrument of misrule. There are also certain matters in which it is necessary for the Government of India to safeguard the interests of the community as a whole, as well as those of the paramount power, such as railways, telegraphs and other services of an Imperial character. But the relationship of the supreme Government to the States is one of suzerainty. These latter matters, railways, telegraphs and so on, mentioned by Lord Minto, will now come within the Federal purview and, if a State accedes to the Federation, paramountcy will not be applicable to that extent; paramountcy will to that extent be limited. This is where paramountcy is directly affected by our deliberations. In other respects, whether a State federates or not, paramountcy must remain a fact affecting its relationship to the Crown.

There have been frequent discussions over a long period of years with a view to clarifying, and so easing, the exercise of paramountcy. Much has been done in this direction with the help of leading Princes in the Chamber since its creation a decade or so ago. In the ultimate analysis, however, the Crown's relationship with the States is not merely one of contract, and so there must remain in the hands of the Viceroy an element of discretion in his dealing with the States. No successful attempt could be made to define exactly the right of the Crown's representative to intervene. But we are anxious to relieve any genuine apprehension of the Princes. Endeavours have already been made to remove them, but if the Princes wish to revive discussion on the matter the Viceroy will be glad to take further action in this regard. Subject to what I have already said about ultimate discretion which must rest with the Crown's representative, discussion with the States might with advantage cover the clarifying of the circumstances in which the exercise of paramountcy would be justified and they might also aim at building up a customary procedure whereby the matters sometimes described as justiciable would ordinarily be referred to arbitration.

I have made that digression, and I am grateful to the Committee for allowing me to make it, to lead me to the final summary of the position. First of all, the question of paramountcy is one for consideration in India. It is to a great extent distinct from the consideration of the Federal Constitution. Secondly, we stand on the principle that the Crown's representative must retain an ultimate discretion. Thirdly, we recognise there are matters which by further discussion in India can be adjusted, while in any case through Federation the States would exchange the control of paramountcy for a due share in constitutional control over a wide field of subjects.

The three conclusions that I draw from these considerations are: First, the Bill so far from worsening the Princes' position in regard to paramountcy will make is better. Secondly, the greater part of the Bill has nothing to do with paramountcy at all. Paramountcy is never so much as mentioned in the Bill. The greater part of the Bill has to be decided on other considerations and the introduction of paramountcy into the controversy should in no way complicate or delay our proceeding steadily and normally with the Bill in this Committee. Thirdly, paramountcy must be dealt with in the normal way in India. It affects all the Princes, whether they federate or not, whether this Bill passes on to the Statute Bill or not. I hope I have now made the position clear. The questions within the Bill can in my view be adjusted in the course of our proceedings. The adjustments that we hope to make are in no way sacrifices of principle. That is the position.

There are two courses open to the Committee. On the one hand, it is possible for the Committee to take the advice that I have given it. On the other hand, it is possible for the Committee to take the advice that is given by my Noble Friend the Member for West Derbyshire. How tempting for any of us to take advantage of differences of this kind, to look at the criticisms that we see in one section or another of Indian opinion and to say to ourselves: "Well, we have done our best, we have worked year after year with this investigation and this great and complicated Bill, and British India and the Indian States meet our efforts chiefly with criticism—[An u" Repudiation!"]—why should we, now that we may be absolved from our responsibilities to go further, not drop the Bill and say to Indians, whether in British India or in the Indian States: "You have brought it on yourselves. -We have done our best. We can do no more." If we took that line, we should have abandoned a great and high endeavour. We should have abandoned, it may be for years, it may be for ever, an opportunity that certainly will not occur in the lifetime of any Member of this Committee, of building up the one kind of government that I believe is the only possible government in India in the future, an All-India Federation.

Some of my hon. Friends seem to think that I am only anxious to persuade the Princes to enter the Federation in order to help our position here in bringing to the Central Government of India certain conservative elements. That is a very small part of what is in my mind. I have felt that an All-India Federation was essential to British India, if British India was ever to achieve its full status in the British Empire. I have felt that an All-India Federation was essential to Indian India if the Princes were for all time to come to have the influence in the government of the Indian sub-continent to which they are entitled. On these grounds, I would regard it as a calamity if, in the face of criticism, we were led to drop an essential part of the whole scheme, and we were led to drop it when I believe most sincerely that the differences at issue are not unbridgeable and that they can be honourably adjusted in full harmony with the interests of both sides.

This is not a pet scheme of some insignificant and conceited Minister that I am trying to thrust down the throats of the House or the throats of Indians. It is much more than that. It is the work of investigation after investigation. It is the result of generations of irresistible events. I would ask the Committee to-day to set their faces against the temptation, attractive though it may be, to exploit differences that may exist with a view to absolving us from our responsibilities. I would ask them rather to help me—for after all this is the Bill of the House of Commons just as much as it is the Bill of the Government—to adjust rather than to exploit these differences. We shall need a lot of patience in the course of our discussions. We have needed a lot of patience in our consultations over the last five or six years, but I comfort myself with an observation that was once made to me by the late Lord Haldane. He told me that he, the late Lord Morley, and Elihu Root were once discussing with each other what was the quality most needed for a public man. One of them said "Eloquence." One of them said "Enthusiasm" and the third said "Patience."

Mr. CHURCHILL

Big majorities.

Sir S. HOARE

I am inclined to think that of the three patience is the greatest. I would ask the Committee to-day to reject this further Motion for delay, set their faces against the exploitation of differences, and use the utmost patience in our dealings with each other here, still more in our dealings with our friends in India. I believe that if we pursue that course we shall not regret the day when we pass the Bill, and, having passed the Bill, we shall see in due course of time an All-India Federation brought into being.

5.0 p.m.

Mr. ATTLEE

We have taken the line that we wanted to see a federated India, but we did not believe that the people of India should pay too high a price for it, and the danger is that in order to get the Indian States into Federation you are going to pay too high a price for it. I think that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill) and his allies and associates below the Gangway have been instrumental in getting the Indian States to raise their price, and I think the Secretary of State is to blame also, because he has taken the line that it was essential to this structure that the States should come in, and, when that is said in order to quieten supporters of the Government and when we have hon. and right hon. Gentlemen below the Gangway taking up the line that they do with regard to the States, it is natural, human nature being what it is and Indian human nature being the same, that the Indian States should hold out for higher and higher terms.

As I read this document, the real danger is not to my mind in the least that the States would not come in, but that they want to come in and make the best of both worlds; they want to have all the advantages of Federation and the full advantage of doing what they please in their own States and coming in on their own terms. The Noble Lord the Member for West Derbyshire (Marquess of Hartington) does not see quite as far as the Rulers of the Indian States. I do not know how safe the Noble Lord feels in view of the existence of the party on this side, but I am quite sure that the rulers of the Indian States are not Very happy in their position in the modern world. They know quite well that the movements in India cannot be confined to the Provinces, but are liable to flow into their States. They are aware also that the Government in this country is not likely for very much longer to be content to be in a position in which they must support the Indian rulers without the power of seeing that the people in the Indian States are fairly treated by them, and, although the power of paramountcy is undefined at present, it has been exercised, and may be exercised. Therefore I think that the Indian States Rulers see a good deal farther than the Noble Lord, and I think that we should not take the line that there must be concession after concession made, and that every complaint should be met. There should be no attempt to put the Indian States in a still more powerful position than they are under this Bill. We think that they are far too powerful already, and I contrast the zeal and enthusiasm that are always displayed on behalf of the Indian States, and the empty benches very often when it is a question of the Indian people.

Representatives of great bodies of Indian opinion have taken a line against this Bill, have demanded all kinds of things that are not in this Bill, but we do not get their claims pressed by hon. Gentlemen below the Gangway; and we do not hear nearly so much as to the need for agreement by the Indian people, while we get stressed all the time the need for agreement by the Indian States. It is thoroughly unsatisfactory that we should be going through at this stage of the Bill without being a good deal more definite on the position of the Indian States than we are at the present time. I gather that the main outline of matters of the Indian States had been practically agreed; I do not say that it had been put down absolutely in black and white. But I certainly thought that at this stage there would be a fairly practical proposition put up by the Secretary of State, and that he would be able to tell us of a certain degree of accession.

We have taken the line that responsibility in India should not be at the whim of the Indian States. We believe that you should form your Federation and let the Indian States adhere or not, as they please. I certainly agree with the right hon. Member for Epping in that, that we want a degree of certainty, and I think that if he was not endeavouring so constantly to mobilise the Indian States as elephants in his battle, he would have a greater degree of definiteness. The whole question is whether there is to be responsible Government or not at the Centre. It always surprises me, considering how little responsibility there is under this Bill, that the right hon. Gentleman takes such a lot of trouble about it. We think that there should be no more yielding to the States. If you want to get agreement, why not try the other side? Why not bring in all the political parties in India? It is not much good going forward with a Bill that is going to be accepted even by a percentage of States if it is not going to be accepted by the bulk of the political opinion in India.

I would like to have more satisfaction than we have had from the Secretary of State, a vague and pious hope that some people may work this Bill. I see no sign of it at all, and for these reasons I am inclined to support the Noble Lord in his Motion. The Secretary of State says in this White Paper that a Federation can be brought into existence only one way. I do not agree. He says that they have framed a constitution and have embodied it in a Bill which they have invited Parliament to pass into law: The Government of India Bill, if it becomes an Act, will be binding upon British India, because British India is subject to the authority of Parliament. The Act would not as such be binding upon the Indian States …. That is the difference, and we do not see any reason why a Bill should be imposed on the Indian people, whereas, on the other hand, at every possible point there is to be concession after concession to the Indian States, which are, we think, already given far too preponderating a place in the constitution.

5.10 p.m.

Lord HUGH CECIL

My position is not entirely the same as that of the Noble Lord the Member for West Derbyshire (Marquess of Harrington), nor the position so admirably expounded to the Committee by the Secretary of State. I applaud the devotion of the Secretary of State to the virtue of patience, and I can easily understand that during the last few years he has had to make great draughts upon his ethical resources in order to maintain his exercise of that virtue. But we have got a little beyond patience, because we are engaged in trying to decide what is to be done. Patience has all sorts of advantages, but it does not enable you to come to a decision about action. Merely adhering perpetually to turning one cheek after another to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill), however edifying—

Sir S. HOARE

I did not know that I had done that.

Lord H. CECIL

Even to endure all the difficulties of the lack of support in India which the Bill has encountered, you cannot settle the question like that. When we have disagreement as to what the Princes really do want, I am reminded of those criticisms of ancient documents in which various readings are put forward by various eminent authorities. The meeting of the Princes might be one of St. Paul's Epistles. But since we do really want to know—the Government want to know, the Labour party want to know, and my hon. Friends below the Gangway want to know—what the Princes really do mean, surely it would be better to clear that up once and for all?

Sir S. HOARE

That is what we are doing now.

Lord H. CECIL

Why should not the Viceroy convoke the Chamber of Princes and propound to the Princes in their Chamber the simple question—it should not be amended, but answered yes or no—Do you wish the Government to withdraw their Bill? If they vote that the Government should withdraw their Bill, I think that the Government would be in a position of considerable advantage rather than if the Bill collapsed for any other reason.

Mr. MORGAN JONES

Would the Noble Lord propose the same procedure for British India?

Lord H. CECIL

Yes, I would, as a matter of fact. I would not proceed with the Measure if the elected members of that Assembly similarly voted that the Bill ought to be withdrawn, because if you are going to apply to India the principle of self-government it is a poor way to begin by transgressing this principle altogether. You cannot forcibly feed India with federation. It is no good your saying that it is good for India if India does not think so. If particular bodies of opinion which you have set out to satisfy are not satisfied, what is the use of going on with it? It seems to me a matter of mere common sense. I know that what one is told is that you must not pay attention to the irresponsible judgments, but if the procedure which I recommend is followed, the judgment would not be irresponsible. You make it abundantly clear when you ask the Chamber of Princes and the elected members that the Bill would actually be withdrawn if they said that they wanted it to be withdrawn. That is a responsible decision.

Other people say: "They do not understand. They are not like English people. You cannot calculate on their doing what we can do." I listen to such arguments with sympathy, because it is my own opinion that Indian people are entirely unsuited to our methods of Parliamentary government. But I listen also with surprise. It is strange to come to this House and say, "We are going to set up self-government in India on English lines," and, if the condition which you would certainly expect from England or any Western European country beforehand, that is, their own consent, were not forthcoming, you say, "After all, they are Orientals, and do not understand."

I am persuaded that the Government have acted very honestly and very laboriously, and in a way which deserves the applause of their supporters and of the country. But I am sure that they want to do what would be best in the end both for this country and India, and there really is not the smallest hope for a system of self-government which has not got the approbation of those who are going to exercise it; nor is there the slightest hope for a scheme of federation unless the Indian Princes approve it. Therefore they should carry their Bill forward, with all the Amendments with which they can smooth its path, until they get to the Third Reading. They ought then to hold up the Bill until they have got the feeling—and at that time it must be perfectly clear—of both the elected members of the Assembly and the Chamber of Princes. They should ask them the one question, "Do you want the Bill, or do you want to withdraw it?" If they said they wanted to withdraw it, then you could withdraw it, and you would be in an immensely stronger position than you have ever been in past years in regard to the government of India. From the point of view of those who dislike these measures you would be in a stronger position, because the risk of not having to disappoint hopes which existed and the like would be at an end. It would not be you who were refusing the Bill, but the mass of Indian opinion. On the other hand, from the point of view of the Labour party opposite who would like to see some measure taken but who are not satisfied with this, they would be in a much better position, because future discussions would not go back to the beginning or where they were when the Round Table Conference first assembled.

There would be this positive, very elaborate, most carefully worked out Bill ready as a basis for further amendment and discussion. The subject can never go back, therefore, to where it was before. To those who want this Bill in rather a more extended form, what could be better than to have the Bill as the basis of further discussion upon India? So that from both points of view, we should be immensely better off than we are now. I suggest to the Government that that is what they should do, and that that is what should be their answer to my Noble Friend below the Gangway; that they recognise that it must depend upon Indian consent, and that before the Bill is read the Third time they will take means to ascertain, not by putting a particular forced meaning on this word and disagreeing with Members below the Gangway about the interpretation of that word, but by a simple vote taken by the Chamber of Princes and by the elected members of the Assembly, "yes," or "no" to the question as to whether they want the Bill. When my right hon. Friend complains that what we know of the Indian Princes' judgment has been indiscreetly revealed after a confidential meeting, I think he weakens and does not strengthen his case by dwelling on the confidential character of the meeting. If there is a dispute about what people really think, and they say something different in public from what they say in private, the usual conclusion is that what they say in private is the more to be trusted. We are not concerned whether we ought to be told what took place at the meeting. We have been told, and what we care about is—is it the truth? If the Government say that it is not the truth, let them put it to the test, and have a meeting of the Chamber of Princes called for the purpose.

5.18 p.m.

Mr. ISAAC FOOT

I am rather surprised at the suggestion which has just been made as to the reports which have reached this country and this House of the confidential meetings held in Bombay. Surely the only course we can take in this House is to consider the document properly before it. The other documents are not properly before us. I should like to thank the right hon. Gentleman for the Paper which was circulated to Members of the House. It is of some advantage to us in our personal capacity to have these Papers by us, but the House has no right to base its discussion upon them. They have not been confirmed by those to whom the speeches have been attributed, and surely to say, "Do you deny them?" is an unfair question to put in the circumstances. The Princes and their representatives met on this occasion and said," It is important in the interests of India and in the interests of the Bill that our discussion should be confidential and that we should only publish the resolutions at which we arrive." That is confidence which this House should be anxious to honour. This House ought not to be listening at keyholes or to be availing itself of a source of supply that we cannot test. I was a little surprised that the right hon. Gentleman earlier in the afternoon attributed all this knowledge to the right hon. Gentleman opposite. I remember that one evening the right hon. Gentleman came to the House and quoted from the report before it appeared in the "Morning Post."

Mr. CHURCHILL

It was handed to me by the representative of the "Morning Post."

Mr. FOOT

It is very remarkable that on that occasion, when he asked the House to come to a conclusion, it should have been not merely upon a published article, but something which reached him apparently before it reached other Members of the House, the Secretary of State and the public of this country. I listened with great interest to what was said by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Oxford University (Lord H. Cecil). I understand that his proposal is different from that of the Noble Lord who wants to get rid of the Bill altogether. The proposal made by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Oxford University is that we should go to the Third Reading and then enter into consultation with the Indian authorities

Lord H. CECIL

Before the Third Reading.

Mr. FOOT

The right hon. Gentleman does not suggest that we should now hold up the Bill but that we should proceed to consider its clauses, and that before the Third Reading we should use some machinery for ascertaining Indian opinion. I agree altogether with him as to the importance of Indian opinion. I was astonished to hear the hon. Member for Limehouse (Mr. Attlee) just now speak of the danger of imposing the Bill upon Indian opinion. This House has no power or authority to impose any Bill upon India in the last resort. It cannot be imposed upon British India for the one simple reason that the Bill cannot be worked except by Indians themselves, and unless in British India there are a number of people prepared to work the Bill, then, as far as British India is concerned, it is simply paper, and nothing more.

Brigadier-General Sir HENRY CROFT

How is the hon. Gentleman to ascertain before the Bill is put into operation whether the Indian people will work it?

Mr. FOOT

My ascertainment would be by that simple test, as far as British India is concerned, if, as I believe, the Bill is fully understood, there are enough people of public spirit in India who see the prospects of the Bill, and who are satisfied as to our good faith, to work it in the Provinces and the Centre. That will be the measure of consent upon which the Bill depends. That is as to British India. As to the Princes, the answer is perfectly clear. Here again, as far as the States are concerned, the Bill, when it becomes an Act of Parliament, must depend upon consent in the States That was made quite clear by what was said by the Secretary of State this afternoon, namely, that we cannot decide now whether they will accede. It will be for them to decide if they are to accede, and if the States do not accede in sufficient numbers, as is provided in the terms of the Bill, then, again, as far as the States are concerned, this Bill is paper, and nothing more.

Lord H. CECIL

Have we not been told that without Federation the Bill would not work? If you are not to have Federation, and the Princes do not come in, the Bill will not work.

Mr. FOOT

That is precisely my point. Federation is impossible unless you have the accession of the requisite number of the Princes. If you have not the accession of the requisite number, the Bill does not come into operation. The test of Indian consent is quite clear—in British India, a sufficient number of public-spirited people to work it in their Provinces and in the Centre; and in the States, a sufficient number of States acceding to the Measure after it is passed. This House will say, after we have given the Bill the Third Reading, and it has received assent in another place, "This is the house that we have constructed. It is for you to say whether that house shall be occupied by you." It is unfortunate, perhaps that responsibility rests upon this House, but there it is. That responsibility has always been claimed by the right hon. Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill), and he has insisted that he would never let that right go. He has again and again insisted that the responsibility for this Measure depends only upon the British Parliament, and that responsibility we have to discharge, and I think we are discharging it in good faith.

Some of the speeches which have been made this afternoon have suggested that this is a Bill which was born in the mind of the Secretary of State for India. What has he done? He did not create the Bill. The Bill has seven years' history behind it. How did it come about at all? It came from the proposition of the Princes themselves, in the first instance. I do not say that they proposed the terms of the Bill, but they made the suggestion at the very beginning of the Round Table Conferences. It was from that first proposal that this structure has been built up, and what we have in the Bill is not something that was thought of a few months ago. It is the result of such preparation and care as has never previously been given to any Measure in our Imperial history. It was discussed in detail at the first Round Table Conference. It was discussed in fuller detail at the Second Round Table Conference, and then, in order that there should be a full exploration of all the ground, committees were set up that went out to India and entered into close consultation with the Indian people themselves. They came back with their reports, and there was then the Third Round Table Conference, and day after day, week after week, and month after month those considered proposals were put upon the anvil of opinion, and the work went on until the White Paper was produced.

The White Paper is virtually the basis of this Bill, and that was the work, not of the Secretary of State for India, except, of course, in the special capacity in the position he occupies, but of many minds, and for the most part it is the work of Indian minds, and represents the contribution made by the Princes themselves and by their representatives who were the parties to all these prolonged and exhaustive negotiations. There is not a Clause in this Bill that raises any subject which has not been discussed at length, not merely with the representatives of British India, but with the representatives of the Princes themselves. I am very apprehensive about some of the things which have been said consequent upon the Princes' opposition. I think that the exploitation of this trouble and division is most discreditable to the Press of this country when it was alleged, as it was two days ago in the "Morning Post," that the Secretary of State for India was waiting for his opportunity to find the means to put the screw upon the Princes, and when it was alleged that the Princes are well aware of their danger and will not walk into the trap. I want to know who has set the trap? If there is a trap in this Bill, it was set, not merely by the Secretary of State but by this House when it adopted and endorsed the White Paper. If there is a trap and if the Princes are being lured into the trap—that is the only construction to be put upon those words—the trap was laid and set by the Joint Select Committee during its 17 months of hard work. It was set by this House on the Second Reading in support of this Bill. Surely, upon a matter upon which such grave issues hang, the biggest thing perhaps that has ever concerned our Imperial mind, these differences should not be exploited in such a way as to suggest that this House has been laying a trap for the Princes of India and is anxious to put force upon them. I hope that whatever may be the differences between us in this House, we shall dissociate ourselves in the most unequivocal terms from the suggestion made by a leading and responsible newspaper only a few days ago.

So far as the Princes are concerned, I am astonished by some of the things that they have said. I want to make the position of my friends on these benches and myself quite clear upon that point. The Princes have done very well, we think, under this arrangement. They have got a very substantial position in the lower Chamber and a very substantial position in the upper Chamber, at the Centre. They have 33⅓ per cent. in the one and 40 per cent. in the other. Those figures would not, perhaps, be justified by their population, and certainly would not be justified by the strength of British India. Who made that representation? How did it arise? It was not made on the proposition of any British Minister. That relationship, a relationship of the utmost importance in the future government of India, was adopted mainly as the result of discussions between the Indians themselves.

It was felt at the Round Table Conference in the first instance, when my hon. Friend had not the privilege of serving, that the question of the respective representation of the States and of British India was a matter that could best be dealt with by Indian opinion. It was left to them to make the first suggestion, and when as a result of that consultation this proposal was made that the States were to have so large a representation in the Lower House and so large a representation in the Council of State, I was apprehensive about it, and certainly some others were. But we felt that if that was the agreement that had been virtually arrived at as the result of discussions among the Indian representatives themselves, they were the best judges of their own interests. Therefore, when the criticism is made, as it has been made in the course of these Debates, that we are giving the Princes too great a power in the new Constitution, I would like the House to know that the power was given to them virtually as the result of agreement between the Indian representatives themselves.

Apart from that power, other requests have been made by the Princes, and I want the Committee to know that so far as we on these benches are concerned we think that we have gone with the Princes to the utmost limit of concession. When it is suggested that the question of paramountcy is to be brought in, I think the Princes do not realise what will be the resistance to that suggestion in this country. Paramountcy means, in the end, the protection of the States against misrule. That misrule may not arise. I am happy to recognise that in many of the States of India there is a very high standard set, and we should be doing grievous injustice to those who have set a high standard if we allowed this talk of tyranny, autocracy, hardship and wrongs to be indulged in as if it applied generally to the States. In many of the States the highest possible standard has been fixed. It may be said that that is so in most of the States, but I am not qualified to speak fully on that. I have, however, read that in some of the States women have been given the right to vote on terms of equality with men, and that in some States education is on a very much higher standard. It is true that in some States there is some backwardness. This House must never surrender, whatever may be the inducement, whatever may be the trouble with which we are faced, the principle of paramountcy which, in the end, gives the right to the people in the States of India to look to this country or at least to look to the Crown for protection against misrule and wrongdoing. The suggestion that is made in this controversy that paramountcy is now to be brought into consideration will raise questions which, I think, the Princes might just as well leave alone.

On one or two points of detail I want to express gratification. I am glad that for the first time certain States are going to allow their legal representatives in this country to be in touch with our representatives here. That is of the highest importance. In matters of close detail, if you are to have the correspondence that takes place between two different countries with thousands of miles intervening, there must be every inducement to misunderstanding. Now that we are told in the White Paper that all the States will have their legal representatives in this country in close touch with the advisers of the Government, let us hope that some of these difficulties will be straightened out and that some of the difficulties will be found to be not so serious as they were before. Whether the right hon. Gentleman will be able to straighten out all the difficulties I do not know, but I wish him god speed in his efforts. I would not like to see a failure of these proposals at this time.

When the Noble Lord the Member for West Derbyshire (Marquess of Hartington) moved his Motion, he made it clear that when he said these things could not be settled, he hoped that they never would be settled. He was against the Bill, and he hoped these matters would never be settled. When he said that the Princes were not likely to be satisfied, there was no doubt about his position. He hoped they would not be satisfied. That position is held to-day by other hon. Members. I would like to have it made clear whether those who oppose the Bill hope that these differences will be straightened out.

Sir H. CROFT

We think that the whole Bill is wrong.

Mr. FOOT

They think that the whole Bill is wrong and that the Princes have been their allies in raising objections. That is not the attitude that was taken by the right hon. Member who spoke last. There is a gulf between us. They on their side think that this is a bad Bill, bad for the country, bad for the whole Empire, and that they are entitled to oppose it by all the means in their power. We do not say that it is the best Bill, but we do say that it is a Bill that holds out a great prospect of substantial self-government in India, and that it is immeasurably better than any alternative that has been placed before the country. I thought it was a very revealing thing when the Noble Lord, in proposing that we report Progress, suggested that he was in favour of provincial autonomy. On what ground? "Not because I like it," he said," but because we realise that the Government have got themselves into a difficulty, and that this is perhaps the only way in which they can be extricated." I want to know whether in all our Imperial history we ever had a proposal such as giving provincial autonomy to India that was to rest upon such a slender and flimsy foundation. The Noble Lord said that he did not like provincial autonomy, but that he was prepared to run the risk of it. He said that he would give to these great centres of population these powers of self-government not because he believed in provincial autonomy, not because it carried any conviction with him, but because he recognised that the Government were in a difficulty, and that somehow they must be extricated. Whatever may be said for or against the Bill, I should hold any Government in contempt that brought in a Measure which had no better foundation than that.

We wish to give our message to the Princes who have made their representations to the Secretary of State and to the Government. The Princes have a great deal to get out of these proposals. Here, I should like to thank the Secretary of State for the very clear words on Federation in the White Paper. I am astonished at what was said by some of the Princes about Federation. Federation carries with it great advantages and some responsibility, but it cannot mean mere association. It cannot mean coming in for a few things and staying out for most. There is to be, as the Secretary of State has insisted in his reply in the White Paper, that central organic body, which is of the highest consequence. We are told that the Princes must derogate some of their powers in coming into the Federation. They must give up something. The man who marries gives up something of his freedom, but he gives it up for the sake of a larger partnership. In the same way, if the Princes come into the Federation they may have to sacrifice something, but what they gain will make up, we think, very substantially for their sacrifice.

I think it will be a disastrous day for the Princes if they fail to seize this opportunity. We would like them to know that if this proposal for Federation does break down, the claims of India will still have to be met. Then, I should like to know what would be the position of the States. I am not speaking of the bigger and more powerful States, but I ask what will be the position of States in days to come, scattered as they are and representing in some cases areas that are almost like an archipelago in India; what will be their position when, side by side with these unfederated States, there is growing up a strong self-governing community, with political ideas that no frontiers can keep back, that no State frontiers can keep back.

I welcome the declaration made by the Secretary of State to-day that while we desire Federation we desire that the Princes should take their part in Federation, because the Princes to a large extent are India and represent the outlook and philosophy of India. If the great Dominion of India is to play her part, a foremost part in the affairs of the world in generations to come, she is the more likely to do that and to play that part if the Princes take their full share of the responsibility as well as their full share of the advantages. There are two courses clearly before us, and the Secretary of State, in what I think was a speech that will compare with any speech that he has made in his political history, made it clear that there is only one course that is consistent with the past declarations of this House and, indeed, with the honour of Parliament.

5.44 p.m.

Viscount WOLMER

My hon. Friend the Member for Bodmin (Mr. Isaac Foot) is a most generous and fair-minded man, and yet he apparently seems to think that we on these benches are doing something wrong or unworthy in drawing attention to the attitude of the Princes. He describes it as exploiting the attitude of the Princes. He seems to think that my right hon. Friend the Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill) has done something wrong, dishonourable or, at any rate, a little bit shady in circulating to the Members of this House the reports which had already appeared in the "Morning Post." I can assure the hon. Member that the right hon. Member for Epping was not under the table taking shorthand notes at the Princes' conference. He is not responsible for any breach of confidence, but to shut our eyes to the facts that have been brought within our knowledge would be the height of political folly and, indeed, something worse than political folly. To shut our eyes to facts and then try to legislate is to be blind leaders of the blind. We shall lead this country and India into the ditch.

The only exploitation in which we have indulged is to try to draw the attention of hon. Members to facts which they have persistently ignored. Our difference of opinion on this question is not that we are any less solicitous for the welfare of Indians than they are but because we feel that they have approached this problem with their minds so made up and they have ignored facts to such a degree that they have arrived at an impossible solution. The hon. Member for Bodmin says that the Bill is the result of seven years careful examination. I dispute the accuracy of that description. The real history is this. You started with a careful examination by an impartial and independent commission, who reported on the merits of the case and on the facts—which they did not ignore—which they had investigated on the spot. They gave us a unanimous opinion, but because the Prime Minister of the day and the Government of the day did not dare to stand up to the clamour of certain people in India, their Report was thrown into the waste paper basket, and the Prime Minister tried to deal with the problem as he would deal with a strike. A round table conference is an admirable method of settling a trade dispute, but it is not the right way to draft a constitution.

Mr. ISAAC FOOT

Does the Noble Lord suggest that the Round Table Conference was constituted by the Prime Minister? Is it not the fact that the Round Table Conference was the result of a suggestion made by the Chairman of the Statutory Commission?

Viscount WOLMER

I am perfectly aware of the facts to which my hon. Friend alludes. My charge against the Prime Minister is that he used the machinery of a round table conference, not to implement the Simon Report, but to reverse it altogether. Sitting round a table may be a proper method for settling minor differences, but it is not the right method to lay the foundations upon which a great constitution is to be built. The history of this Federation is a most excellent example. How often have we not experienced in this House the whole course of a debate being changed by-some striking speech of an hon. Member? The intervention of the Princes was something of the same nature. It brought a new idea to the problem; but it did not prove that Federation was practicable. Because a few representatives of the Princes expressed the opinion that they would be willing to come into Federation it did not mean that they had really thought the problem out and were competent to give an opinion on a question of that sort. As the Noble Lord the Member for West Derbyshire (Marquess of Hartington) has said, they knew India a great deal better than they knew politics. The expression of that opinion at the Round Table Conference has been used by the Prime Minister to get himself out of a political mess, and he has tried to build a constitution on it. That action of his has landed us in the difficulties we have been in ever since. The truth of the matter is that the Princes never did mean to come into a Federation such as we know is necessary if you are to have a Federation at all. Look at the White Paper in paragraph 11, on page 20. There the Princes say: They have consistently asked that the sovereignty and autonomy of their States shall he fully respected and guaranteed, and there shall be no interference, direct or indirect, with the internal autonomy of their States. That is what they meant by Federation. How can you possibly have a federation of States which desire to remain independent, autonomous, sovereign States? That is not Federation. That is an alliance. You may have an alliance of independent autonomous States, but once you have Federation you lose your independence, and that is the point which the Princes never realised until they saw the Bill in black and white and sent it to their legal advisers, who pointed these facts out to them. We have contended all along that the Princes and the Government were talking about two totally different things, and it is for that reason we feel that these differences, are unbridgeable. If they are unbridgeable, it is much better that it should be discovered now, rather than there should be more trouble later on. If you are on a wrong basis, the sooner you discover it the better. I regard it as a great tragedy that in this matter the Government have been leading this country and the Princes up the garden path for two years. The Secretary of State spoke about the virtue of patience in a politician. We are all admirers of the great amount of patience which he possesses, but he also seemed to think that it would be cowardly or immoral on his part if he turned back from the path he is pursuing at this juncture. If you are exploring an avenue, as we say in this House, and you find that avenue is a cul-de-sac, the sooner you turn back the better.

The real difficulty is that the Princes have all along believed that they can preserve their sovereignty and autonomy and have Federation. We know that they cannot; and these two fundamental questions among the 30 points—I do not think that the Secretary of State is justified in saying that the other 28 points are of no substance—these two points, the mode of accession and paramountcy are absolutely fundamental to the whole question. The Secretary of State said that paramountcy does not come into the Bill. How can the Government contend that for a minute? Paramountcy will come into the working of the Bill at every turn. You are transforming the Viceroy from an autocratic monarch into a Parliamentary leader. Instead of being a ruler he will be dependent on a Parliamentary majority, he will have to square his Ministers and carry his Parliament with him. Do you think that if these Ministers want something done in one of the States of the Princes that they will hesitate to go to the Viceroy and say, "Use your powers of paramountcy to get this or that done and we will support you in what you want in the Central Legislature "? Everyone who has thought about the matter must realise that this is the first thing which will happen; and it will happen every time.

The CHAIRMAN

I do not want to interrupt the Noble Lord, but I must call attention to a point which, I think, must be watched very carefully. He knows quite well that in the earlier Clauses of the Bill it is provided that the powers and duties of paramountcy are to be exercised by an individual as the King's representative in a capacity or position which is not that of Governor-General, although the individual holding the two positions may be the same person. I want to impress on the Committee that the question of paramountcy and the relation between the States and the suzerain Power is one which is entirely outside the scope of the Bill, except in so far as it concerns the question of the States coining into Federation.

Viscount WOLMER

Surely I am in order in discussing the point on the Motion to report Progress? I quite agree that we cannot discuss it on any Clause of the Bill.

The CHAIRMAN

I was more moved to warn the Noble Lord than to say that he had offended so far. I want to make it quite clear that we cannot, on the Motion to report Progress, or on any discussion in connection with the Bill, discuss, for example, the way in which the suzerain Power should deal with States in certain contingencies. That is not included in the Bill, and it is entirely outside the scope of the discussion on the Motion to report Progress.

Viscount WOLMER

I am grateful for the reminder, and I do not think there is the slightest need for me to transgress the Ruling you have given in order to make my point. We all know that the Viceroy and Governor-General are two different offices but they have always been occupied by the same person; and it is not suggested that they will be occupied by different people in the future. I need not labour the point. If you have a ruler who in one capacity is dependent on a parliamentary majority and in another capacity exercises this great undefined power of paramountcy dependent only on usage, the Princes in my opinion are perfectly right in feeling that his actions in one capacity will be influenced by his difficulties in the other. Therefore, the Secretary of State is not justified in saying that paramountcy does not come into the Bill. It comes into every Clause. It is one of the fundamental difficulties which the drafting of the Bill brings out, and which the Princes had not realised. It is one of the reasons why Federation as visualised by the hon. Member for Bodmin is not possible at the present moment. Therefore, when we were told at the Queen's Hall that the Government's attitude had been dictated by the Princes' offer, or when we were told by the Foreign Secretary that the "new fact" had altered the whole situation, the Conserva- tive party and the country were told something which had no substance whatsoever.

The so-called Princes' offer was made under circumstances which deprived it of the value and importance which was put upon it. It was not an offer of a body of responsible rulers who had been able to consider a legal document and take expert advice upon it. It was the offer of one or two, and not the most experienced, of the Princes at a round table conference, and in my view the Government were very wrong in putting the weight and reliance on the offer they have done since. I was interested in the suggestion of my Noble Friend the Member for Oxford University (Lord H. Cecil). I hope that the Government will give that suggestion very careful consideration. We feel all the more flattered on these benches because on an earlier Clause of the Bill we moved an Amendment that the Bill should not come into force until it had been approved by the Indian Legislature. We listened to my hon. Friend the Member for Bodmin explaining to us in a very eloquent speech how it was contrary to all Liberal principles to consult a democracy as to whether a Constitution should be given it or not.

I want to ask the Government what is going to happen? Are they going to put this Bill on the Statute Book knowing that the Federation part of it is never to come into force? Are they trying to arrive at provincial autonomy by a roundabout way? If that is their policy do they think that they will get either the approval or the respect of Indians for doing so? Is not my Noble Friend quite right when he says that you cannot have a Constitution unless you have some measure of the consent of the people upon whom you propose to confer the Constitution? Therefore, if the Princes are not going to come into the Federation the sooner we are told the better. If the Indian politicians are not prepared to work provincial autonomy or the present Bill, the sooner they say so the better. I do not believe that this ostrich-like policy of ignoring facts and pretending that there are no irreconcilable differences when there are, is going to bring us any good.

I said just now that I admired the patience of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State. I do. I admire his patience and his pertinacity, and there are many other things about him which I admire, but the thing I admire most is his imperturbability, when with statements like these in front of him he can stand up and say with perfect assurance that there are no insurmountable difficulties in this problem. I believe that if he crashed a motor-car into a stone wall he would explain to the policeman that only the paint was scratched.

I am glad that my Noble Friend the Member for West Derbyshire has moved to report Progress. I endorse his opinion that there is no useful purpose to be served in going on with this Bill unless we know whether or not the Indian Princes are to come in. The Secretary of State says that they have made only 30 objections, of which only two have substance. I would remind him that that is their first impression, and the first impression of their legal advisers. This Bill has been so rushed that I am not in the least confident that there are not a great many other difficulties which will emerge only upon further examination. If my right hon. Friend is relying on the Report stage for putting all these things right, he may very likely reach a point when he will get into further difficulties. My hon. Friend the Member for Bodmin interjected just now that he thought I hoped so.

Mr. ISAAC FOOT

The Noble Lord spoke of unbridgeable difficulties. Would he say whether he hopes that those difficulties will be bridged?

Viscount WOLMER

What I hope is that the facts will be brought out. If a difficulty is unbridgeable I want to recognise that fact. Then you have to plan, perhaps, a longer road round the valley. To treat difficulties which are unbridgeable as if they were bridgeable, to throw a bridge across them which will collapse when you first put any weight upon it, will not achieve success in the end.

6.6 p.m.

Mr. MORGAN JONES

Members of the Committee will endorse what I say when I recall the fact that whenever we have been called upon to vote in the Lobby with right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite it has been almost invariably for different reasons. We shall approach this problem from a different point of view from that of right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite. But I am bound to say, differing as I do from them, that I think the Committee is indebted to them for having given us an opportunity to discuss this matter. The more I study this matter the more unhappy do I get. I started quite honestly in the belief that some sort of Federation was possible in India, and I still entertain that hope. But I was also under the impression that one essential element in the Federation, as adumbrated by the Government, was the accession of the Princes. It is quite clear from the document that we have in our possession that there is a case which the Government must answer.

We have had presented to us two documents, one an official document circulated by the Government, and the other a report of the speeches made in the Princes' Chamber, for which we are indebted to the right hon. Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill). We cannot very well ignore those speeches, which have been presented to us in verbatim form, I understand. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State tells us, "Oh, well; after all there are some 30 points of difference outstanding between us, but when you come to examine those 30 points there are only two of them of any real consequence." The two that are of consequence, I understand, are, first, the question of the method of accession; and secondly, the question of paramountcy. In the White Paper, in paragraph 11, on page 20, there is this statement regarding the Princes: Among the essential conditions they had laid down from time to time, the one treating with a definition of paramountcy has been made a sine qua non to any federation. It is no use fobbing us off with light-hearted statements about this. We have been told since 1929 that the Princes were prepared to come into Federation, and it was fair for us to assume, therefore, that in the years from 1929 to 1934 the Princes had had discussions with the Government, on the main point at issue any way. Indeed, I understand that the Government do not deny that. Surely the question of paramountcy, whether it belongs to the Bill or not, is a matter of first-class importance, and would have been, therefore, a matter of discussion between the Government and the Princes? Yet we are told that this sine qua non, as the Princes call it, has not yet been settled to their satisfaction. I submit that we really are entitled to a much more precise statement of the position of the Princes in relation to this matter. Let me read another passage from the speech of the Maharaja of Patiala, not the first speech but the last speech which he delivered in winding up the discussion at Bombay. I am bound to say that it is a passage which filled me with astonishment. I am speaking now as one who has not taken the trouble to argue the case for the Princes, because my experience has shown me that I can rely on other people doing that. But I am astonished to read this passage: We Princes of India have no desire to resile the position which we have consistently taken, but we must say, with all the emphasis at our command, the present Bill does not in any way embody the views we had pressed from the beginning, nor the conditions which we had always insisted upon. The Federation that is sought to be imposed on us and which is being rushed without even awaiting our criticism has nothing in common, except in name, to the scheme which in its general outline we accepted at the first Round Table Conference. "Nothing in common, except in name." That is a sweeping criticism. It is not for me to argue the case for the Government or the Princes. My case is that it is the business of the Government to give us an assurance that this criticism arises from a complete misunderstanding of the implications of the Bill itself in relation to them.

Sir S. HOARE

That is what I tried to say.

Mr. JONES

I am obliged to the right hon. Gentleman; but he must remember that this criticism has been made by his Highness the Maharaja of Patiala and his colleagues after having examined the Bill in the light of criticisms submitted to them by their lawyers. Instead of that, the Maharaja says that the Bill has nothing at all in common except in name, with what the Princes agreed to at the first Round Table Conference. I am bound to say that that criticism only emphasises the justice of the claim that we should know precisely where the Princes are in this matter.

The Noble Lord the Member for Oxford University (Lord H. Cecil) made an interesting suggestion. It was that, supposing we passed the Committee stage and Report stage of the Bill, we should then stop the proceedings before we enter upon the Third Reading stage, and that in the meantime we should discover what are the views of the Princes and of the British-Indian representatives; and the Noble Lord said: "The views of the elected representatives of British India." We know already what their view is. Votes which have been recorded after the recent discussion in the central Assembly at Delhi show what their view is. So, so far as British India is concerned, one half of the Noble Lord's request is available. The other half is, what is the view of the Princes themselves? So far I have only made reference to the Princes, but I want to add this, and it is a point which we have made constantly from this side of the Committee. I consider that the legitimate deduction to be drawn from these two documents, both the official and the unofficial, is that the Princes have come to the conclusion that the Government are now in such a position that they can, appropriately and with success, bring pressure to bear in order to squeeze further concessions out of the Government.

I can only say that if the Government propose to make further concessions, then, the case is all the stronger for knowing what is the view of British India in relation to any new concessions which may be made. I admit that the Princes ought to know completely and thoroughly the conditions on which they are to enter the Federation. Equally, British India ought to know on what conditions they are to be harnessed to the chariot of the Princes in the Federation. It cuts both ways. It is legitimate that both sides should know to what they are or are not committed. For my part, I am bound to say that a fairly careful perusal of this document has led me to the conclusion that there is much more in the differences between the Princes and the Government than one would gather from the speech of the Secretary of State. I say, candidly, that I tend more and more to lose any desire for the form of Federation which we are called upon to discuss just now. I feel sure that if we go on making further concessions, then, from the point of view of the people of British India, Federation will not be worth while. Whether that be so or not, I shall join in demanding that we should be informed precisely where the Government stand and where the Princes stand in regard to this question of Federation.

6.18 p.m.

Mr. CHURCHILL

This Debate has been remarkable for the unanimity of the criticism and condemnation which have been directed at this stage upon this Government of India Bill as it now presents itself to us. The speeches from every quarter of the Committee have converged and concentrated their fire upon the position now occupied by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State and those who have been associated with him in the long task of promoting this Bill. We have had a notable speech from the Noble Lord the Member for Oxford University (Lord H. Cecil)—a very rare pleasure to us in this House. He brings to us the fruits of profound reflection and of absolute disinterested sincerity. Then we have had the speech delivered by the hon. Member for Caerphilly (Mr. M. Jones) representing His Majesty's Opposition, who has given proofs of his sincerity and is known to be a very strong supporter of what is called advance in India. That speech certainly requires an answer from the Treasury Bench. Certain facts which he adduced and which have been brought forward from every quarter ought to be answered if we are to continue to be a reasonable and reasoning debating assembly.

Sometimes one wonders what is to happen if British Members of Parliament lose all contact with each other by means of reasonable processes. It is very difficult to know how we should get on in such a case, and we are in great danger of it. The Government persist in their policy. The right hon. Gentleman recites at intervals the formulae at which he has arrived. He publishes his despatches and memoranda in a highly specialised and technical jargon which only occasionally forms contact with the English language. For the rest, matters are left to the Patronage Secretary and to a large number of gentlemen who, if they were only giving to this problem the attention which they gave to it a year ago or two years ago, when they began to make up their minds, would rush this Bill out of the House. Unhappily, they have taken their decision. They are not with us here, but they will be in the Division Lobby. So the machine goes on. That you can roll the Bill forward I do not deny. We cannot doubt that you have the power, during the continued lifetime of this Parliament, to roll this Bill through, in defiance of every fact and every appeal, but the consequences will not be dispersed so easily.

My Noble Friend has moved to report Progress this afternoon because of this White Paper with its unofficial companion the verbatim report of the Princes' speeches—its handmaiden and concomitant. The White Paper undoubtedly presents us, officially, formally and directly with a new situation. No one can deny that it is a new situation. I do not believe that even the hon. Member for Bodmin (Mr. Isaac Foot), who has suffered in political controversy from being at bottom a fair-minded man, would deny that he feels himself in the presence of new facts in the situation produced by this White Paper and the speeches of the Princes. Whether we have a National Government or not is arguable, but evidently there is a National Opposition in the sense of all parties reaching a certain general basis of agreement on the fact that there is a new situation.

This White Paper and its companion represent—what? They represent the Princes' offer. I had not meant to be controversial, but it seems almost a joke. This White Paper is the Princes' offer on which the Government have gone into action for the last four years. This is the Princes' offer which induced the Foreign Secretary to abandon all the conclusions which he and his commission had reached as a result of their study. This is the Princes' offer which my right hon. Friend the Lord President of the Council dwelt on as the ground on which he solemnly advised his party to adopt this policy. I read in the "News-Chronicle," the organ of the Liberal party—I beg pardon, I am not so sure about that, but an organ at any rate of the Liberal and Labour parties—[HON. MEMBERS: "No!"] Do not repudiate any support. You may need it all. I read that paper's epitome of this situation—their headline—and what was it? The Princes reaffirm their faith in Federation. Can any reasonable person who has read the White Paper and also read the actual text of the Princes' speeches imagine that we are going to make progress in our affairs by taking such nonsensical views as that? What is the moral of this White Paper? It is the final refusal of the Princes to have anything to do with this Federation scheme. [HON. MEMBERS: "No!"] I believe we are going to have a reply from the Attorney-General. I am sure that if he were consulted in a legal capacity and if he saw this document, especially if he saw the report of the speeches, he would say that on the correspondence there was a complete breakdown. On the correspondence there appears a total and utter breach. Mind you, it is not only a question of a breach such as might arise between a willing buyer and a willing seller who were still haggling about how the thing should go and who was to get some advantage here or there. Not at all. This is a deliberate decision on the part of the Princes of India to break from this scheme of Federation. Do not delude yourselves. There is no compromise, no alternative possible.

Let me point out that it is a question of paramountcy. Paramountcy, the Secretary of State says, is not in the Bill. "I rejoice," he says, "that our differences are narrowed by the fact that I need not discuss paramountcy." But why do the Princes raise this question of paramountcy? I must say it astonishes me that my right hon. Friend, with all his ability, does not seem to be in touch with the actual way in which the forces in India are working. Why do you suppose the Princes have raised this question of paramountcy and dragged it in by the heels? Not because they expect the Government to grant their wishes, but because they wish to put up a barrier against being involved in this scheme of Federation. It may be said that there are 30 points of difference, and the lawyers may discuss them and write them out in great detail and make proposals for compromise, for arrangements and for accommodations. But the Princes were not going to trust only to that. No, they raise the question of paramountcy, and they now say "Before we come into this Federation you have to define paramountcy and deal with us on that subject." They twice use the expression that this is a "condition precedent" to their joining the Federation.

What does the right hon. Gentleman say? He says what any Secretary of State would say, the only thing which any Secretary of State could say. "I am not prepared to entertain a discussion at this time with the Princes of India upon their relations with the King Emperor." Could you possibly have a more complete and absolute breach than is disclosed by that position? On the one hand, the Princes say, "We will not enter the Federation until, as a condition precedent, our wishes about paramountcy are met." On the other hand, you have the right hon. Gentleman saying, as it was his duty to say, "We are not prepared to discuss the high relationship of these princely States with the sovereign Power." There is a complete breach. I do not think there can be any doubt about it. You may work for several months, you may spend a lot of time, trouble and money with the lawyers in trying to work out a compromise but this means that the Princes have definitely decided not to come into this Bill.

Why they have so decided it would take a long time to tell, but there is one reason that the right hon. Gentleman ought to appreciate because I think it is the dominant, the actuating reason, the motor muscle of their position. It is because their compatriots in the political classes of India have told them not to come in. It is because from all over India they have received appeals, protests, even threats, all with the object of inducing them to stop out. It is because they are making common cause with the rest of Indian educated intelligentsia and public opinion against this Measure, and therefore the Princes have withdrawn from it. There may be many other reasons, such as their position and their sovereign rights, and many of them have never liked the idea of Federation; but the decisive fact undoubtedly is that the Princes have refused to come into Federation because those forces in British India which asked them five years ago to come in have now in the most explicit and earnest manner begged them, urged them, exhorted them to stay out. Therefore, they have erected this insuperable obstacle of paramountcy.

That is the position. It is a very serious position. I really must ask my right hon. Friend the Lord President of the Council—I am always having to ask him questions—to think over very carefully what he said to the National Union of Conservative Associations. I am absolutely sure that the last thing in the world my right hon. Friend would do is to obtain support, to get round a difficult corner by anything in the nature of false pretences. I am sure that when he sees that the facts on which he presented his case to the Conservative associations are not borne out and have actually fallen from beneath his feet, he will take the earliest effective opportunity of either detaching himself from the policy or of explaining that new circumstances have arisen which induce him to base his advocacy of the Measure on different grounds from those he then put forward.

I am glad to see the Prime Minister back. It gives me great satisfaction, and I hope he will not mind my pointing out to him how different the situation is now from what it was in 1931. In those days he had the offer of the Princes; there was an offer then. In those days he had the assent and agreement of British Indian politicians. In those days he had a large amount of support among Indian Liberals—active support from that great body of central opinion of which we have heard. In those days also he had hopes of obtaining the Congress party and Mr. Gandhi—" My Dear Mahatma "we had then. In those days he had the official support of the Conservative party and Liberal support, and he was himself the head of a Socialist Government. In those days four or five years ago he had every expectation, as it seemed at the moment—although I did not share it—of being able to make a great settlement for India with an equally broad basis of public assent here. Every one of those factors has been swept away; not one vestige of that structure remains. You may say that you will continue with the Bill, but every man who has studied the matter knows that the situation has no resemblance in any way to what occurred at that time.

What do the Government say should happen now? They say, "It is quite all right, it makes no difference." The Indian Liberals will not have it. Congress will not have it, the Princes will not have it, and the Labour party will not have it. It is not an agreed Measure here, it is not a Measure which can be said to be, as it were, high and dry above the ebb and flow of party conflict. All that has vanished. Still, the Government say, "It is all right, wait until the Division bell rings, and we will get them through the Lobbies, and it will be all right." Their newspapers—they still have some in their support—their devoted newspapers will read to-morrow, "The House of Commons decided by an overwhelming majority that there was no substance whatever in those ridiculous and obstructive tactics put forward against the Bill." All this, and a reference to the fine speech of the Secretary of State, in which he depicted himself in action on behalf of a cause which has got into a somewhat ramshackle condition, will be, no doubt, admirably portrayed.

But what is the Government's policy? It is to place this Bill on the Statute Book, no matter what happens and whether they have agreement of all parties or not. They wish to place the Bill upon the Statute Book. What will happen then? I see that Lord Lothian made a speech the other day. He is a very important person and has a great influence in our relations with Germany and in our relations with India. I quote from the report of his speech in the "Times" of the 8th March: Lord Lothian, discussing the Indian Bill, said they had nothing to do to-day but to put the Bill on to the Statute Book and make a fresh start from that position. I ask the Conservative party, I ask the Government and their faithful supporters, if that is the position they take up? I ask particularly my Noble Friend the Member for Horsham (Earl Winterton). If faith holds between man and man, we are entitled to know where we stand in a matter of this kind. This Bill has been represented as the most that we can give and the furthest we can go. All its safeguards have been drawn carefully in order to salve the consciences of members of the Conservative party and to make it easy for the great mass of that party to do what without their support would never have been done in this country. Now, when it is to be put on the Statute Book, what is it to be? A settlement? No, it is to be the point from which a fresh start is to be made. The Attorney- General is a Conservative. He is a sincere patriot. Has he any bottom to his convictions in this matter? Is there any point where we shall reach finality? He is going to force the Bill through, but is he prepared to take it as a starting point for some great new lurch, some downward slurge? We ought to know. Of course, you can vote us down, but if there is no sort of attempt to meet propositions of this kind, you cannot blame us if we try to fight not only in this House, but elsewhere, by every method open to us, because, once all contact is lost on a basis of reason and argument, then the only thing people can do is to organise and to endeavour to express their opinions as effectively as they can. I hope that we shall have some answer upon that point—how far do you mean to go?

This Bill is now to be placed on the sideboard like a ham from which anyone can come and cut a slice if they feel inclined before it gets mouldy and rotten. There is your Bill, there is your settlement of India, and of course it will be the starting point for any further legislation if it is passed. Every concession you have made, the most extreme point which you have reached, will be the starting point for new legislation. The Attorney-General made a speech in the country the other day. He usually indulges himself at week-ends in the country by giving us orations which are most interesting and nearly always afford food for controversial comment. He made a speech in which he said that it ought to be five or ten years before the policy of this Bill could be carried out. In five or ten years there will be a change of Government in this country. However sanguine may be the hopes that are entertained, one cannot imagine that in such a period there will not be a change. But when you have passed this Bill of 400 or 500 Clauses and put it on the Statute Book, it will not be difficult to pass a Bill of 20 Clauses. It will be quite a manageable matter. It will slip through this structure and completely transform it; it will completely prune out, excise, eliminate and excavate every one of the particular points upon which the Conservative party have been induced to carry this policy so far.

Why press this matter further? It is not any longer a great measure of Indian constitutional reform. The right hon. Gentleman has no doubt to introduce a great many Amendments to meet the objections of the Princes. I suggest that at the same time he should change the title of the Bill. He should no longer call it the Government of India Bill, but the Chelsea Hospital (No. 2) Relief Bill. He should call it by the name which far more accurately delineates its purpose, namely, to enable a number of officials and powerful people to escape from a difficult situation without undue loss and countenance and face. This Bill has nothing whatever to do with India. India will have nothing whatever to do with the Bill. The whole position has now become one of will power, of clash of opinions and wills here at the centre. Why can we not relax this position? The right hon. Gentleman spoke of the temptation of abandoning this Bill in the face of the universal opposition which it has excited among those for whom it was designed. Why can he not yield to that temptation? Temptation which is a natural instinct is not necessarily wrong. You beg the question when you say that all that reason and all that convenience and all that public interest urge is temptation. You ought to yield to these things, and this is the time to yield. This is the time when the Government ought to lay aside every impediment. There is great need of simplifying our policy here and abroad. There is great need of uniting forces which are harmoniously blended and must act together. Surely this is the time to take a reasonable step.

It is little that we ask, and how very little it is now that we have reached the point when, as far as arguments and facts are concerned, it is admitted by all parties in the House that the case has been made out. Surely it is not much to ask that the Federal Clauses should be dropped, that they should not be placed on the Statute Book until or unless the Princes have concurred in them, that they should, as my Noble Friend has suggested, be brought to the Third Beading and then be left out with any other ancillary parts as may be required. Then we could go forward. If that were done, very useful legislation would still rest in the hands of the Government, but, if they persist in the course which they have adopted, if they simply go forward using the dull brute force that they can demand. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear.] The right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Birmingham (Sir A. Chamberlain) has taken very great responsibility in this matter, and I hope he will not be left high and dry when the subject is concluded. If the Government go forward, using their force, they must not suppose the trouble will end with the passage of the Bill. That is not possible. While this Bill remains on the Statute Book it claims from all those who disapprove of such policies and principles a consistent and persistent effort to establish forces, continuing and organised forces, which will resist the repetition of such Measures in the future, and will endeavour, as far as possible, to repair the mischances of the past.

6.46 p.m.

Lord EUSTACE PERCY

My right hon. Friend the Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill), at the beginning of his speech, implored us not to lose contact with each other's minds. I certainly agree with him in that appeal, but surely it is a little beside the point when he ends his speech with a menace as to what he and those working with him intend to do if we who support the Bill go on as we are going on. Will my right hon. Friend allow me to say that I am amenable to arguments but not to threats.

Mr. CHURCHILL

You are not amenable to arguments.

Lord E. PERCY

I am extremely amenable to the arguments of my right hon. Friend or any other of my hon. Friends, and I am sure they will admit that I have always tried to meet their arguments and to see what is the real ground of their objections. It is sometimes a little difficult in the case of my right hon Friend the Member for Epping, because he is so like that eloquent gentleman in "Love's Labour's Lost" who drew out the thread of his discourse so much finer than the staple of his argument. When I am faced with these vast cocoons of spun thread, relevant or irrelevant, I do sometimes find it difficult to penetrate to the real argument. But there is no doubt about the argument to-night. My right hon. Friend the Member for Epping has summed up all the speeches that have been made by his friends, from my noble Friend the Member for West Derbyshire (Marquis of Hartington) onwards, and the contention which they are urging on the Government is this: that if the Princes do not come into the Federation we must drop this whole Bill, drop the whole scheme of Indian reform, and scrap the Report of the Simon Commission.

Mr. CHURCHILL

No.

Lord E. PERCY

The whole of the Bill which you are proposing to postpone, from the Clause which we have just adopted onwards, is all completely, and practically solely, the Report of the Simon Commission.

Mr. CHURCHILL

My Noble Friend really must not misrepresent the position. I think it would meet with general acceptance if the Federal Clauses were dropped and we proceeded within the ambit of the Simon Commission.

Lord E. PERCY

I heard my right hon. Friend say that at the end of his speech, in postscript, but it was not an argument of any of his supporters or of the rest of his discourse. He said, "If you pass this enormous Bill, then anyone in a future Government can introduce a Measure of 20 Clauses." But that is an argument against passing this Bill. That is not an argument against opposing this Bill—except the 40 Clauses of Part II. The general argument of the Noble Lord the Member for West Derbyshire was the same. It was that this vast Bill with all these Clauses is gone, is dead, and must-be scrapped. After arguing like that, what is the good of my Noble Friend the Member for Aldershot (Viscount Wolmer) complaining that the Simon Commission's Report was scrapped? He proposes to scrap it now.

Viscount WOLMER

I never said that.

Lord E. PERCY

But it was the whole of my Noble Friend's argument—that the Bill must be dropped. I am going to drive home that point, as he will see. The reason why I have risen is that the whole course of this Debate and the action of the supporters of this Motion to report Progress can create only one impression outside this House, that this House is at the mercy of the Princes, that if they do not enter into Federation this House can vote no Indian reform at all.

Mr. CHURCHILL

No, no.

Lord E. PERCY

My right hon. Friend really must pay some attention to the arguments of his hon. Friends. They argued in this Debate that the whole Bill must be scrapped because the supporters of the Bill had said that provincial autonomy without responsible government is impossible.

Mr. CHURCHILL

Ah!

Lord E. PERCY

But does not my Noble Friend see that he has been arguing that? He has done his best—I do not know whether he has done his best, but certainly he has been most successful—to create the impression that, basing himself on the admission of the supporters of the Measure, he wants to scrap the Simon Commission's Report altogether and the whole of the rest of the Bill.

Viscount WOLMER

I am grateful to my Noble Friend for giving way to me. I think he is anxious that there should be no misunderstanding on the matter. If my Noble Friend is under the impression that those of us who are opposing this Bill would also oppose the Simon Commission's Report he is entirely mistaken. We have repeatedly said that we would be willing to co-operate on the basis of the Simon Commission's Report—subject to points of detail. [Interruption.] We would take that as a basis on which we could co-operate.

Lord E. PERCY

I am still left in some doubt as to what could have been the meaning of my right hon. Friend when he talked about passing the rest of this enormous Bill and leaving only 20 or 30 Clauses to be put in by a future Government. What does the Noble Lord say to that? Was the right hon. Member for Epping expressing the views of his followers, or was he not?

Mr. CHURCHILL

We are all agreed.

Lord E. PERCY

I gather that my right hon. Friend and his Friends show the beautiful superficial unanimity of the Princes assembled at Bombay. But that issue must be faced. Here I would refer to my Noble Friend the Member for Oxford University (Lord H. Cecil). He made a most interesting speech which was not open to these criticisms. It was, of course, open to the criticism which I am just making, that he proposed to leave the coming into force of this Bill, or even its final enactment by Parliament, to a vote both of the British Indian Legislature and the Princes.

Lord H. CECIL

The elected members.

Lord E. PERCY

And of the Princes. So if the Chamber of Princes refuses to vote this Measure British India could not have the British Indian part of it. I do not know whether my Noble Friend meant that. May I say further that he must remember that the Chamber of Princes is not an organic body and that we cannot ask for a vote from a diplomatic body. Finally, may I ask him if he has reconsidered his proposal to submit this to a vote of the elected members of the Central Legislature, because, if my Noble Friend will forgive me, that will take him nowhere It corresponds to no principle whatever. There is something to be said for submitting an Act or Bill of this kind to a constitutional convention in India, but to submit it to a legislature—and the first result of the Act would be that that legislature would be abolished—elected on totally different issues and for totally different purposes corresponds, as I have said, to no principle whatever. It is a Legislature, moreover, as so many of my hon. Friends have pointed out, in which there is a very large element of our declared enemies, who have said, according to what we have been told, that nothing will satisfy them except independence. To submit it to that sort of body is no substitute for submitting it to a constitutional convention.

Lord H. CECIL

May I point out that you either believe in self-government or you do not. If you do you ask the elected representatives of the people if they want this particular plan. If you do not believe in self-government your plan is nonsense and hypocrisy.

Lord E. PERCY

I do not take that position at all. I take the view that this House is responsible and cannot share its responsibility with any other Parliamentary body. I only wish to point out to my Noble Friend that if he seriously suggests that His Majesty's Government are setting out on that path, it is leading up to a position which could only be satisfied by the special election of a constitutional convention. Unless he is prepared to go for that I think he had better not put forward that particular argument. I wish to say in conclusion, because I have never stated this in the House before, that even at this moment, and even on the assumption that it is now unlikely that the Princes will immediately come into the Federation—an assumption which I do not make, because I do not believe in prognostications and have never based my policy on prognostications—I would retain Part II of the Bill and would enact it.

I would do that on two grounds. I would do it, first, on the ground urged by the Simon Commission, that a new Constitution for British India must have in it the seeds of development. Is it agreed that there can be no question of any measure of responsible government, responsible to an Indian electorate at the Centre, except on the conditions laid down in Part II? Is it agreed that those are the minimum and unalterable conditions of the British Parliament? If so, let us lay down those conditions finally and clearly, for the very reason that my right hon. Friend the Member for Epping urged so forcefully, because there are Lord Lothians in the world who want to start all over again, and because if we leave the whole thing open bright gentlemen like the Members of the Labour party will introduce another little Bill of 20 Clauses and slide further down the slippery slope. For that very reason, if we are convinced that these are the minimum conditions and the only conditions on which we can create a central government with any measure of Indian responsibility, then lay them down finally and irrevocably, and let the people of the Provinces of India know that so, and so alone, can they advance along the road of self-government.

The second reason is because I warmly agree with those of my hon. friends who have said that the method of the Round Table Conference and Select Committee is not suitable for planning a constitution. You get involved in vague negotiations; the people with whom you negotiate come to provisional agreements which always remain provisional. Here, again, I would ask, is it agreed that Part II of this Bill gives the most favourable terms to the Princes which this Parliament can ever give them to enter as a basis for an all-India Federation? If so, cannot we lay down clearly, definitely and finally the basis on which the Secretary of State is to negotiate, set it down in legal terms, and then make him responsible for carrying that out? If these are the facts, surely my hon. Friend will see that the difficulty in which we are involved is not that of any argument which may have been made on either side in this House, but that the difficulty lies in the fact that there is only one safe way of Indian advance at the Centre, and however long you wait, and however long you avoid making up your mind, these facts remain the same.

The right hon. Member for Epping has accused the Princes of being influenced by politicians of British India, and of not expressing solely their own mind, but of having been tampered with and intimidated by the politicians of British India. That is the account he gave. Do not let us allow ourselves to be influenced by similar political manoeuvrings, debates, arguments and intrigues. Do not let us be so influenced that our eyes are blinded to the unalterable facts, for there are unalterable things in this situation. I have dealt with these facts as they affect Part II. They will not be altered however long you wait. Then at least let the representatives of the British people in this Parliament, bearing as we do that tremendous responsibility both for this country and for India, have the courage to make up our minds, to take our course and to follow it steadily to the end.

7.4 p.m.

The ATTORNEY-GENERAL (Sir Thomas Inskip)

This is the third occasion on which this tune has been played by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill) and his friends, and perhaps the Committee will allow me to make one or two observations in conclusion of the Debate of which, I rather think, the Committee is already a little weary. My right hon. Friend has more than once in the course of his speech this evening voiced the opinion, which he seems sincerely to hold, that there is something derogatory or dishonourable to the Government in that they are able to obtain a majority of their supporters to vote with them in the Lobby. I do not understand my right hon. Friend's theory about Parliamentary majorities. In his time he has been as dependent upon them as any other Minister. Nor do I understand his reproaches to those who may not have listened to the Debate but will record their vote in the Lobby. I think I have observed him sometimes in the Lobby when he has not sat patiently through the Debate. [HON. MEMBERS: "Usually."] Well, I did not say that. I cannot help thinking that when my right hon. Friend makes such a constant moan and complaint about the majority of this House supporting the Government he is living in an unreal world, because he knows perfectly well that, although many Members have different avocations and duties to perform while the House is sitting, it is no compliment to Members of this House to say that they do attend matters of serious importance to their parties and their country, take care to inform' themselves as to the issues involved, and to give an opinion agreeable to their own consciences. My right hon. Friend has charged me with the offence of speaking at week-ends. I might say in my defence that it has generally been in my constituency, and it is my misfortune and his if any of my observations have been reported. At any rate I have been trying to get in touch with that democracy of which he seems to have so curious an opinion in regard to Parliamentary institutions.

I have observed that the Noble Lord the Member for West Derbyshire (Marquess of Hartington) and those who have followed him have been anxious to explain, what they believe to be the fact, that the Indian Princes are no longer friends of Federation, and it is said that they have disclosed their real intention and opinions in the speeches which they have made. Some reference has been made to the fact that those speeches were made in circumstances in which it was believed that their observations would be confidential, and that the confidence would be respected. I was not a little surprised to hear the right hon. Member for Oxford University (Lord H. Cecil) apparently give support to the suggestion that we are entitled to use a document in breach of confidence as long somebody else had committed the breach, and that the more confidential it was the more likely it was to represent the real opinions of those whose speeches were reported. I think that an extraordinary statement. It does not agree with my own experience of life. I have taken part, as anybody in my profession has to do, in many discussions as to the compromise or settlement of disputed questions, and I have always observed that in private conference, where people are free to say things that they know will not be publicly used, they always express themselves with more heat and less care than they otherwise would.

If the speeches on the occasion in question had been intended to break off negotiations with regard to Federation, then the Princes seem to have adopted a most extraordinary course. I have never heard of anybody bringing a long series of negotiations to a summary conclusion in a long letter of seven or eight closely printed pages. In the documents contained in the White Paper the Princes have taken care to declare the points upon which adjustment is required, and I can only arrive at the conclusion that in this way they expressed their desire to reach the completion of this scheme of Federation. My right hon. Friends have not condescended to discuss any question upon which they say there is a final breach. They have referred to paramountcy and to the Instrument of Accession. So far as paramountcy is concerned, my right hon. Friend and his supporters are under a strange delusion if they really believe that the Princes expect, or could be entitled to expect, a final settlement of questions with regard to paramountcy which have been under discussion between them and His Majesty's Government in this country for many years, and most certainly will never be settled in time for this Bill or any other Bill in the present Parliament.

What you, Captain Bourne, or Sir Dennis Herbert said earlier from the Chair is true so far as this Bill is concerned—that the Bill does not really deal with the question of paramountcy, and when the Princes raised the question of paramountcy in the long and elaborate statement of the points upon which they desire adjustment, it will be found that they raised this question, not with a view to final settlement of the very big questions involved, but in relation to two or three particular Clauses in which they think their position as sovereign States will be affected. It is this question with which my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State in his final document, which has been tele- graphed to India and has been printed in the White Paper, has dealt. The question still remains for us whether these are or are not matters capable of adjustment. It is very easy for the Noble Lord to say they are incapable of adjustment. If the Princes regard them as incapable of adjustment, it is a remarkable fact that they should have instructed their legal advisers to meet the legal advisers of my right hon. Friend—and as late as yesterday afternoon were they meeting for a second time—to see whether understanding could be reached on matters which my right hon. Friend is declaring are the grounds of a final repudiation of any intention to enter Federation.

I think the Princes have been a little hardly dealt with by my right hon. Friend to-night. They have been held up to a little public obloquy, whatever my right hon. Friend may have intended. I did not like to hear him say that the Princes' attitude was due to the fact that appeals, protests and threats had been addressed to them to which they were now yielding. He has some sources of information I know that are not open to other people, but it is paying too high a compliment to a statement of that sort to call it backstairs gossip. It is imagination on the part of my right hon. Friend, indicating an unhealthy mind.

Mr. CHURCHILL

The grounds on which I stated that the Indian political classes were appealing to the Princes not to come into Federation are fully set forth in the Indian newspapers, and particularly in that able newspaper with which I do not agree at all, "Conservative India."

The ATTORNEY-GENERAL

My right hon. Friend has hardly paid attention to the full force of the statement he made. He said not merely that people were making appeals, protests or threats to the Princes, but that the Princes' action was yielding—that was his word—to these threats and protests. What does that mean? That these great Princes of the sovereign States in India are adopting the unworthy attitude of departing from that in which they firmly expressed so much confidence merely because of the threats, appeals and protests reaching them from other parts of their country. I do not believe a word of it. I should be very much surprised to hear that the Maharaja of Patiala or of Bikaner, or the Nawab of Bhopal will agree that this is the motor muscle of the views that they have presented. I prefer to take at their face value the statements that the Princes themselves have made in the speeches which have been quoted. What did the Maharaja of Bhopal say? I have been one of the staunch supporters of the idea of Federation. What did Sir Akbar Hydari say? I must at the same time make it clear that I am a great believer in Federation. I should like to know what right has my right hon. Friend to tell these Princes, whom he is so anxious to fawn upon at one moment, that they have no sincerity when they say that they are still supporters, and always have been supporters, of Federation?

Mr. CHURCHILL

What right has the right hon. and learned Gentleman to say that I fawn on them?

The ATTORNEY-GENERAL

What right have I to say that? Exactly the same right as the right hon. Gentleman claims to have, in expressing his views in his own language.

Sir W. DAVISON

On a point of Order. Is the Attorney-General quoting from this tainted source' which he says the Committee should not hear?

The DEPUTY-CHAIRMAN (Captain Bourne)

That is not a point of Order.

The ATTORNEY-GENERAL

The observation I was making is justified, I think, by the attitude taken up by my right hon. Friend and his allies when they say that in some way or other the Princes have been misled over this question of Federation, that the Princes are now slowly discovering what the intentions of the Government are and always have been, and that they are finding the proposition unacceptable. In the next sentence my right hon. Friend is saying that the words of the Princes which he has been at so much pains to circulate to hon. Members are not to be taken at their face value, and that what they said in confidence cannot be relied upon as an accurate statement of their opinions on this important question.

My Noble Friend the Member for Oxford University (Lord H. Cecil) has a proposal which is going to solve all these difficulties as to what the Princes mean. His proposal is that we should proceed with the Bill and ask the Chamber of Princes or some other body whether they accept it. Before we pass the Third Reading we are to put that question to the Chamber and to the Central Legislature, and let them answer "Yes" or "No." It is one thing to put a question to somebody, as I know, and tell him to answer "Yes" or "No," and a very different thing to get an answer. If my Noble Friend the Member for Oxford University is so sanguine as to believe that the Princes and the Central Legislature would give him his simple "Yes" or "No," I can understand the rest of my right hon. Friend's suggestion. The fact is, as everybody must appreciate, that if a question of that sort were put to the Princes they would say, "Yes, we are prepared to come in on certain conditions contained in paragraphs (a) to (z)," and then where should we be? Exctly at the beginning. Talk about making a new start: My Noble Friend would have to make a great many appearances in this House and submit a great many questions to the Princes before we should get to the end of it.

As my Noble Friend the Member for Hastings (Lord E. Percy) has said, that would be tantamount to an abdication of the functions of this House. I have yet to learn that the House of Commons or Parliament in governing this great Empire, of which India is a part, is unable to make up its own mind. We have a great function to play in the government of India, and not the smallest part of it is to help to settle those questions upon which, unhappily, the people of India are not able to arrive at a common agreement among themselves. How easy would be our task if we could compose the communal differences or the political differences of the people of India. We have, I think, not been unready to consider Indian opinion as expressed in many conferences and in many a private discussion, but in the end this Parliament has to make up its mind as to what measures it will propose to India. It will then be for us to see whether the forebodings of my right

hon. Friend the Member for Epping are right, or whether the high hopes which some other people have formed are justified. If it be the right hon. Gentleman's purpose—or, not his purpose, but the effect of his speech—to-night and on other occasions, to disparage the Bill as, for instance, when he described it to-night as "one more slurge "—I know as little about the word "slurge" as my Noble Friend the Member for West Derbyshire did about "resile," but I gather that it is something unworthy and disgraceful—it is our part to try to build while he tries to prevent us. We must, perhaps, work with the trowel in one hand and with the sword in the other, while the enemy tries to prevent us from building the walls of this new constitution.

I read with great interest, indeed, I may sincerely say with not a little emotion, the statement which is made in one of the documents as to the motives which brought the Princes originally into a scheme of Federation. They say in paragraph 27: In conclusion, it will be well to remember that the Princes originally accepted the invitation to federate out of their anxious desire to be of service to the Empire.

Could there be a more worthy note upon which to end our discussion? The question I would ask the Committee to answer is, Do they think that we are likely to make an end of our difficulties, perplexities or problems by adopting the course which the right hon. Gentleman proposes of abandoning the Bill and beginning afresh with some scheme not more congenial than the present Bill to my right hon. Friend or to the Indian people, or shall we not be best following the Princes of India in their desire to be of service to the Empire if we build as firmly as we can on the sound and solid foundation of conference and examination? The task may truly be a difficult one, but the prize at the end of it is glorious if we are faithful to our responsibilities.

Question put, "That the Chairman do report Progress, and ask leave to sit again."

The Committee divided: Ayes, 94; Noes, 270.

Division No. 113.]	AYES.	[7.25 p.m.
Acland-Troyte, Lieut.-Colonel	Atholl, Duchess of	Balfour, George (Hampstead)
Alexander, Sir William	Attlee, Clement Richard	Banfield, John William
Astbury, Lieut.-Com. Frederick Wolfe	Bailey, Eric Alfred George	Batey, Joseph
Bracken, Brendan	Greenwood, Rt. Hon. Arthur	Milner, Major James
Broadbent, Colonel John	Grenfell, David Rees (Glamorgan)	Nicholson, Rt. Hn. W. G. (Petersf'ld)
Brown, C. W. E. (Notts., Mansfield)	Gretton, Colonel Rt. Hon. John	Oman, Sir Charles William C.
Brown. Brig.-Gen. H. C. Berks., Newb'y)	Griffiths, George A. (Yorks, W. Riding)	Paling, Wilfred
Burnett, John George	Griffiths, T. (Monmouth, Pontypool)	Parkinson, John Allen
Cape, Thomas	Gritten, W. G. Howard	Peto, Sir Basil E. (Devon, Barnstaple)
Carver, Major William H.	Groves, Thomas E.	Rathbone, Eleanor
Cecil, Rt. Hon. Lord Hugh	Hall, George H. (Merthyr Tydvil)	Reid, David D. (County Down)
Churchill, Rt. Hon. Winston Spencer	Hartington, Marquess of	Remer, John R.
Cobb, Sir Cyril	Jenkins, Sir William	Salter, Dr. Alfred
Cocks, Frederick Seymour	John, William	Sandeman, Sir A. N. Stewart
Courtauld, Major John Sewell	Jones, Sir G. W. H. (Stoke New'gton)	Sanderson, Sir Frank Barnard
Craddock, Sir Reginald Henry	Jones, J. J. (West Ham, Silvertown)	Smith, Tom (Normanton)
Cripps, Sir Stafford	Jones, Morgan (Caerphilly)	Somerville, Annesley A (Windsor)
Critchley, Brig.-General A. C.	Keyes, Admiral Sir Roger	Strauss, G. R. (Lambeth, North)
Crott, Brigadier-General Sir H.	Kimball, Lawrence	Templeton, William P.
Daggar, George	Kirkwood, David	Thorne, William James
Davies, David L. (Pontypridd)	Lansbury, Rt. Hon. George	Tinker, John Joseph
Davies, Rhys John (Westhoughton)	Lawson, John James	Todd, Lt.-Col. A. J. K. (B'wick-on-T.)
Davison, Sir William Henry	Lees-Jones, John	Wayland, Sir William A.
Dawson, Sir Phillp	Leonard, William	Wedgwood, Rt. Hon. Josiah
Dobble, William	Levy, Thomas	Wells, Sydney Richard
Donner, P. W.	Lunn, William	West, F. R.
Emmott, Charles E. G. C.	Macdonald, Gordon (Ince)	Williams, Edward John (Ogmore)
Erskine-Bolst, Capt. C. C. (Bik'pool)	McEntee, Valentine L.	Williams, Thomas (York, Don Valley)
Fuller, Captain A. G.	Maclean, Nell (Glasgow, Govan)	Wolmer, Rt. Hon. Viscount
Gardner, Benjamin Walter	Macquisten, Frederick Alexander	Wragg, Herbert
Graham, D. M. (Lanark, Hamilton)	Maltland, Adam
Greene, William P. C.	Maxton, James	TELLERS FOR THE AYES.—
		Mr. Raikes and Mr. Lennox-Boyd.
NOES.
Acland, Rt. Hon. Sir Francis Dyke	Cooper, A. Duff	Guest, Capt. Rt. Hon. F. E.
Adams, Samuel Vyvyan T. (Leeds, W.)	Cranborne, Viscount	Gunston, Captain D. W.
Agnew, Lieut.-Com. P. G.	Crookshank, Col. C. de Windt (Bootle)	Guy, J. C. Morrison
Albery, Irving James	Crookshank, Capt. H. C. (Galnsb'ro)	Hamilton, Sir R. W.(Orkney & Zetl'nd)
Allen, Sir J. Sandeman (Liverp'l, W.)	Croom-Johnson, R. P.	Hannon, Patrick Joseph Henry
Allen, William (Stoke-on-Trent)	Cross, R. H.	Harbord, Arthur
Amery, Rt. Hon. Leopold C. M. S.	Crossley, A. C.	Harris, Sir Percy
Apsley, Lord	Culverwell, Cyril Tom	Harvey, George (Lambeth, Kenningt'n)
Aske, Sir Robert William	Dalkeith, Earl of	Harvey, Major Sir Samuel (Totnes)
Assheton, Ralph	Davidson, Rt. Hon. J. C. C.	Haslam, Henry (Horncastle)
Ballile, Sir Adrian W. M.	Davies, Maj. Geo. F.(somerset, Yeovil)	Headlam, Lieut.-Col. Cuthbert M
Baldwin, Rt. Hon. Stanley	Denman, Hon. R. D.	Heilgers, Captain F. F. A.
Balniel, Lord	Danville, Alfred	Henderson, Sir Vivian L. (Chelmsford)
Barciay-Harvey, C. M.	Dickle, Jonn P.	Heneage, Lieut.-Colonel Arthur P.
Barrie, Sir Charles Coupar	Doran, Edward	Hills, Major Rt. Hon. John Waller
Barton, Capt. Basil Kelsey	Duckworth, George A. V.	Hoare, Lt.-Col. Rt. Hon. Sir S. J. G.
Beauchamp, Sir Brograve Campbell	Dugdale, Captain Thomas Lionel	Hopkinson, Austin
Belt, Sir Alfred L.	Duncan, James A. L. (Kensington, N.)	Hornby, Frank
Benn, Sir Arthur Shirley	Dunglass, Lord	Horobin, Ian M.
Bernays, Robert	Eales, John Frederick	Horsbrugh, Florence
Blrchall, Major Sir John Dearman	Eastwood, John Francis	Howard, Tom Forrest
Borodale, Viscount.	Eden, Rt. Hon. Anthony	Howitt, Dr. Alfred B.
Bower, Commander Robert Tatton	Edmondson, Major Sir James	Hudson, Robert Spear (Southport)
Bowyer, Capt. Sir George E. W.	Elliot, Rt. Hon. Walter	Hume, Sir George Hopwood
Boyce, H. Leslle	Elils, Sir R. Geoffrey	Hunter-Weston, Lt.-Gen. Sir Aylmer
Bralthwalte, J. G. (Hillsborough)	Emrys-Evans, P. V.	Hurst, Sir Gerald B.
Brass, Captain Sir William	Entwistle. Cyril Fullard	Hutchison. W. D. (Essex, Romf'd)
Briscoe, Capt. Richard George	Eesenhigh, Reginald Clare	Inskip, Rt. Hon. Sir Thomas W. H.
Brocklebank, C. E. R.	Evans, David Owen (Cardigan)	Iveagh, Countess of
Brown, Col. D. C. (N'th'I'd., Hexham)	Fleiden, Edward Brocklehurst	Jackson, Sir Henry (Wandsworth, C.)
Brown, Ernest (Leith)	Foot, Dingle (Dundee)	James, Wing-Corn. A. W. H.
Buchan-Hepburn, P. G. T.	Foot, Isaac (Cornwall, Bodmin)	Jamieson, Douglas
Burghley, Lord	Fox, Sir Glfford	Janner, Barnett
Butler, Richard Austen	Fraser, Captain Sir Ian	Jennings, Roland
Butt, Sir Alfred	Fremantle, Sir Francis	Josson, Major Thomas E.
Cadogan, Hon. Edward	Galbraith, James Francis Wallace	Joel, Dudley J. Barnato
Campbell, Vice-Admiral G. (Burnley)	Ganzoni, Sir John	Jones, Henry Haydn (Merioneth)
Campbell-Johnston, Malcolm	Gault, Lieut.-Col. A. Hamilton	Jones, Lewis (Swansea, West)
Caporn, Arthur Cecil	George, Megan A. Lloyd (Anglesea)	Ker, J. Campbell
Cassels, James Dale	Gibson, Charles Granville	Kerr, Lieut.-Col. Charles (Montrose)
Cayzer, Sir Charles (Chester, City)	Gillett, Sir George Masterman	Kerr, Hamilton W.
Cazalet, Thelma (Islington, E.)	Glimour, Lt.-Col. Rt. Hon. Sir John	Kirkpatrick, William M.
Chamberlain. Rt. Hn. Sir J. A.(Birm., W)	Glossop, C. W. H.	Knight, Holford
Chapman, Col. R.(Houghton-le-Sprlng)	Gluckstein, Louis Haile	Lamb, Sir Joseph Quinton
Clayton, Sir Christopher	Glyn, Major Sir Ralph G. C.	Lambert, Rt. Hon. George
Cochrane, Commander Hon. A. D.	Goldie, Noel B.	Law Sir Alfred
Colfox, Major William Philip	Grattan-Doyle, Sir Nicholas	Law) Richard K. (Hull, S. W.)
Colman, N. C. D.	Graves, Marjorle	Leech, Dr. J. W
Colville, Lieut.-Colonel J.	Grenfell, E. C. (City of London)	Leighton, Major B. E. P.
Conant, R. J. E.	Griffith, F. Kingsley (Middlesbro', W.)	Lewis, Oswald
Cook, Thomas A.	Grigg, Sir Edward	Lister, Rt. Hon. Sir Philip Cunliffe-
Cooke, Douglas	Grlmston, R. V.	Little, Graham-, Sir Ernest

Llewellin, Major John J.	Ormiston, Thomas	Spears, Brigadier-General Edward L.
Lloyd, Geoffrey	Orr Ewing, I. L.	Spens, William Patrick
Lockwood, John C. (Hackney, C.)	Patrick, Colin M.	Stanley, Rt. Hon. Lord (Fylde)
Loder, Captain J. de Vera	Pearson, William G.	Stanley, Rt. Hon. Oliver (W'morland)
Lottus, Pierce C.	Peat, Charles u.	Steel-Maitland, Rt. Hon. Sir Arthur
Lovat-Fraser, James Alexander	Percy, Lord Eustace	Stevenson, James
Lumley, Captain Lawrence R.	Perkins, Walter R. D.	Stones, James
Mabane, William	Petherick, M.	Storey, Samuel
MacAndrew, Lt.-Col C. G. (Partick)	Peto, Geoffrey K.(W'verh'pt'n, Bilston)	Strauss, Edward A.
MacDonald, Rt. Hon. J. R. (Seaham)	Pickthorn, K. W. M.	Strickland, Captain W. F.
Mac Donald, Malcolm (Bassetlaw)	Pownall, Sir Assheton	Stuart, Lord C. Crichton-
McEwen, Captain J. H. F.	Radford, E. A.	Summersby, Charles H.
McLean, Major Sir Alan	Ramsay, Capt A. H. M. (Midlothian)	Sutcllffe, Harold
McLean, Dr. W. H. (Tradeston)	Ramsay, T. B. W. (Western Isles)	Tate, Mavis Constance
Magnay, Thomas	Ramsbotham, Herwald	Thomas, James P. L. (Hereford)
Makins, Brlgadisr-General Ernest	Ramsden, Sir Eugene	Thompson, Sir Luke
Manningham-Buller, Lt.-Col. Sir M.	Reed, Arthur C. (Exeter)	Thomson, Sir Frederick Charles
Margesson, Capt. Rt. Hon. H. D. R.	Reid, James S. C. (Stirling)	Todd, A. L. S. (Kingswintord)
Mason, David M. (Edinburgh, E.)	Rhys, Hon. Charles Arthur U.	Tree, Ronald
Mason, Col. Glyn K. (Croydon, N.)	Rickards, George William	Tryon, Rt. Hon. George Clement
Mayhew, Lieut-Colonel John	Roberts, Sir Samuel (Ecclesall)	Turton, Robert Hugh
Meller, Sir Richard James	Ross Taylor, Walter (Woodbridge)	Ward, Lt.-Col. Sir A. L. (Hull)
Mills, Sir Frederick (Leyton, E.)	Ruggles-Brise, Colonel Sir Edward	Wardlaw-Mline, Sir John S.
Mills, Major J. D. (New Forest)	Russell, Albert (Kirkcaldy)	Watt, Major George Steven H.
Milne, Charles	Russell, Alexander West (Tynemouth)	Wedderburn, Henry James Scrymgeour-
Mitchell, Sir W. Lane (Streatham)	Salt, Edward W.	White, Henry Graham
Mitcheson, G. G.	Samuel, M. R. A. (W'ds'wth, Putney).	Whiteside, Borras Noel H.
Molson, A. Hugh Elsdale	Sandys, Edwin Duncan	Willoughby de Eresby, Lord
Monsell, Rt. Hon. Sir B. Eyres	Sassoon, Rt. Hon. Sir Philip A. G. D.	Wills, Wilfrid D.
Moreing, Adrian C.	Savery, Samuel Servington	Wilson, Clyde T. (West Toxteth)
Morris-Jones, Dr. J. H. (Denbigh)	Selley, Harry R.	Windsor-Clive, Lieut.-Colonel George
Morrison, G. A. (Scottish Univer'ties)	Shakespeare, Geoffrey H.	Winterton, Rt. Hon. Earl
Morrison, William Shephard	Shaw, Helen B. (Lanark, Bothwell)	Womersley, Sir Walter
Muirhead, Lieut-Colonel A. J.	Shaw, Captain William T. (Forfar)	Wood, Sir Murdoch McKenzie (Banff)
Munro, Patrick	Smiles, Lieut.-Col. Sir Walter D.	Worthington, Dr. John V.
Nation, Brigadier-General J. J. H.	Smithers, Sir Waldron	Young, Ernest J. (Middlesbrough, E.)
Nicholson, Godfrey (Morpeth)	Somervell, Sir Donald
Normand, Rt. Hon. Willtrld	Somerville, D. G. (Willesdon, East)	TELLERS FOR THE NOES.—
O'Connor, Terence James	Soper, Richard	Sir George Penny and Sir Victor
		Warrender.

Question, "That the Clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill," put, and agreed to.

Clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.