Commons Sitting of 10 May 1928

Preamble
The House met at a Quarter before Three of the Clock, Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair.

PRIVATE BUSINESS.
PRIVATE BILLS [Lords] (Standing Orders not previously inquired into complied with),
Mr. SPEAKER laid upon the Table Report from one of the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills, That, in the case of the following Bill, originating in the Lords, and referred on the First Reading thereof, the Standing Orders not previously inquired into which are applicable thereto, have been complied with, namely:
Mid Kent Water Bill [Lords].
Bill to be read a Second time.
PROVISIONAL ORDER BILLS (Standing Orders applicable thereto complied with),
Mr. SPEAKER laid upon the Table Report from one of the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills, That, in the case of the following Bill, referred on the First Reading thereof, the Standing Orders which are applicable thereto have been complied with, namely:
Ministry of Health Provisional Orders (No. 6) Bill.
Bill to be read a Second time Tomorrow.
Bournemouth-Swanage Motor Road and Ferry Bill [Lords],
Read the Third time, and passed, with Amendments.
Scottish Insurance Companies (Superannuation Fund) Bill,
Read the Third time, and passed.
Ministry of Health Provisional Order (Peterborough Extension) Bill,
Ministry of Health Provisional Orders (No. 4) Bill,
West Hartlepool Corporation (Trolley Vehicles) Provisional Order Confirmation Bill,
Read the Third time, and passed.
Land Drainage Provisional Order Bill, Ministry of Health Provisional Order (Torquay Extension) Bill,
As amended, considered; to be read the Third time To-morrow.

CHESTERFIELD CORPORATION (TROLLEY VEHICLES) PROVISIONAL ORDER BILL,
"to confirm a Provisional Order made by the Minister of Transport under the Chesterfield Corporation Act, 1923, relating to Chesterfield Corporation Trolley Vehicles," presented by Colonel Ashley; read the First time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills, and to be printed. [Bill 127.]
ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.
  NAVAL AND MILITARY PENSIONS AND GRANTS.

    EAST SURREY REGIMENT (J. W. EDWARDS).
    Mr. MALONEasked the Minister of Pensions whether he is aware that Mr. Joseph Wilfred Edwards, of 204, Birch-field Road East, Northampton, formerly private, No. 3,067, East Surrey Regiment, was a prisoner of war from July, 1915, until the Armistice; that on his release he was detained in a mental hospital until the end of 1919 when he was discharged with a disablement pension; and that he subsequently married, and his wife suffered considerably until in December,, 1927, she had to obtain the assistance of the police, and her husband was taken to the Northants Mental Hospital where he now is; whether he is aware that all pension has been refused, and Mrs. Edwards and her family of five are existing on Poor Law relief; and why, in view of the fact that Mr. Edwards was in need of mental treatment on his return from a war prisoners' camp before his discharge from the Army, it is claimed that his recurring mental derangement since that date is not due to his War service?
    The MINISTER of PENSIONS (Major Tryon): On the information available it

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    has not been found possible to admit the claim. I have, however, received further representations from the man's wife, into which I am having inquiry made.

    ATTENDANCE ALLOWANCE.
    Mr. R. MORRISONasked the Minister of Pensions whether constant attendance allowances are granted in cases where there is total incapacity, although the recognised disability from War service is less than 100 per cent.?
    Major TRYON: No, Sir. It is a condition, under the terms of the Warrant, of the grant of the special allowance referred to that the pensioner is in receipt of pension based on an assessment of not less than the maximum.

    PARLIAMENTARY REGISTER.
    Mr. DAYasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department the number of persons on the register of Parliamentary electors in Great Britain whose sex is not distinguished?
    The SECRETARY of STATE for the HOME DEPARTMENT (Sir William Joynson-Hicks): None.

    ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY (EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT).
    Mr. ROSEasked the Home Secretary if his attention has been called to a contract in use in the entertainment business which enforces contracting out of the Employers' Liability Act, 1880, and any Act continuing or amending that Act; and will he institute an inquiry into the conditions of employment in this industry?
    Sir W. JOYNSON-HICKS: I have seen the clause in the contract referred to by the hon. Member, but so far, at any rate, as theatrical performers are concerned, it would appear to be based on a. misapprehension as to the scope of the Employers' Liability Act. That Act applies only to workmen as defined in Section 8, and I am advised that a theatrical performer would not as such come within that definition, and would not, therefore, in any case have any right of action under the Act.
    Mr. ROSE: In view of the unsatisfactory nature of the Home Secretary's reply, I beg to give notice that at an early date I shall call attention to this matter on the Motion for Adjournment.

    HYDE PARK (PROSECUTIONS).
    Mr. HANNONasked the Home Secretary the total number of police officers detailed for duty in Hyde Park daily, and the number of such officers specially employed in relation to the observance of the by-laws and regulations of the park; and if Reports are submitted to the Home Office from time to time on the activities of these officers?
    Sir W. JOYNSON-HICKS: The average number of police performing duty (including traffic duty) in Hyde Park on each day is 45. They work a tour of eight hours, so are not all on duty at any one time. Their ordinary duty includes the enforcement of the Park regulations, and none of them are specially employed in relation to those regulations. Reports on their work are submitted to me as required.
    Mr. HANNON: May I ask whether, apart from these cases that appear in the papers, the conduct of the police in Hyde Park has been above reproach for years past?
    Sir W. JOYNSON-HICKS: Yes, Sir; and I might add that I have no complaint whatever in regard to them, and am satisfied that they carry out very difficult duties with honesty and courtesy.
    Mr. HANNONasked the Home Secretary the annual cost of police supervision in Hyde Park, and the amount expended upon the special services which relate to observance of by-laws during the hours of darkness; and if he will consider the reduction of these costs by a more effective lighting system in the park?
    Sir W. JOYNSON-HICKS: The total annual cost of all the police regularly employed in Hyde Park, including those engaged on traffic control as well as those patrolling the park, is approximately £25,000 per annum. My Noble Friend the First Commissioner of Works informs me that apart from the police there are no special services relating to the en-

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    forcement of the Park by-laws. I will consult him as to the adequacy of the present lighting system.
    Mr. HANNON: Has my right hon. Friend not received, from time to time, complaints that the lighting of the park is not adequate; and in point of fact is it not the worst lighted park in Europe, having regard to its importance?
    Sir W. JOYNSON-HICKS: I have received information that it is not well lighted. It so happens that my Under-Secretary is also the representative in this House of the First Commissioner of Works, and I have asked him to take this matter in hand.
    Mr. SAKLATVALA: Did the right hon. Gentleman not publicly say that the morals of the people were no part of the duty of the police, but that what was required of the police was to make sure that any romantic behaviour on the part of some people should not be seen by respectable persons; and in view of that fact, would not that duty be better performed by extinguishing all the lights in the park?
    Sir W. JOYNSON-HICKS: I am afraid I cannot regard the hon. Member's statement as bearing much resemblance to any speech which I have ever made.
    Mr. MONTAGUE: Does the right hon. Gentleman realise that the figure which he has given amounts to over £10 per week for each policeman?
    Mr. HANNON: Would the right hon. Gentleman be able to tell us, after consultation with the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, as the representative of the First Commissioner of Works, when the question of the lighting of the park will be considered?
    Sir W. JOYNSON-HICKS: I am in communication already with the First Commissioner of Works, but, as my hon. Friend will understand, we cannot reconsider the whole question of the lighting of Hyde Park in a couple of days.
    Sir ROBERT THOMAS: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that Hyde Park is one of the few places where servant girls in London can carry on innocent flirtations?
    Sir W. JOYNSON-HICKS: I do not know, but I have not the slightest objection to it.
    Mr. DAY: Will the right hon. Gentleman consider, when he is consulting with the Under-Secretary, the question of the lighting of the other parks as well?
    Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHYasked the Home Secretary how many persons have been apprehended by the police for alleged indecency in Hyde Park during the last 12 months; in how many cases have convictions been obtained; and whether he has come to any conclusion about the need for better lighting of Hyde Park after dark?
    Sir W. JOYNSON-HICKS: During the 12 months ended 31st March, 325 persons were arrested for offences of indecency under the Parks Regulations, of whom 258 were convicted, while 37 others, the charges against whom were found to be proved, were discharged: a total of 295 guilty out of 325 arrested.
    For prostitution offences, the figures are 242 out of 269.
    Aiding and abetting prostitution offences, 36 arrests, 36 convictions.
    Importuning, 2 arrests, 2 convictions.
    Indecent exposure, I arrest, I conviction.
    Rape, I arrest, no conviction.
    Indecent assault on females, 2 arrests, no conviction.
    Offences of insulting behaviour under the Police Act, 56 arrests, 40 found guilty.
    For all these various offences taken together the figures are 692 arrests; 616 found guilty, of whom 540 were actually convicted. As regards lights, I would refer to the reply given to the preceding question.
    Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY: Do not these figures show how few mistakes the police make in this difficult duty?
    Sir W. JOYNSON-HICKS: As the Minister who is responsible for the police, I have gone very carefully, before the present time, into the very difficult position which exists in regard to these matters, and I am really satisfied that the police, not only as a whole but individually, do their best in very difficult circumstances.
    Viscountess ASTOR: Can the right hon. Gentleman tell us how many of the persons charged with indecency were warned before arrest; and does he not think that a warning before arrest, given by a uniformed policeman or policewoman, would be more effective, as a way of dealing with this particular subject?
    Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY: Absolutely useless!
    Sir W. JOYNSON-HICKS: Of course, it would be exceedingly difficult when a gross offence has been committed, not only against the code of regulations of the park, but against decency, to say that the man or woman concerned should have been warned, the offence having actually been committed at the time. There are cases which take place in public parks where those who commit the offences are deserving of punishment for what is really an offence against the whole community. As far as the other point is concerned, I propose to refer the general question to the Macmillan Committee on Street Offences.
    Mr. ERNEST BROWN: In how many of these cases were the accused persons legally represented at their trial?
    Sir W. JOYNSON-HICKS: I could not tell that without notice.
    Mr. BROWN: I will put the question down.

    PRINCE CAROL OF RUMANIA.
    Mr. LANSBURYasked the Home Secretary whether Prince Carol of Rumania and the lady accompanying him, and the staff of attendants who landed with him on his recent arrival in this country, were all provided with Rumanian passports, and did the passports receive a visa of the British Consul in Paris, or other official representing this country abroad; and will he also state what is the usual procedure in relation to passports which is followed in the case of Royalties visiting this country?
    Sir W. JOYNSON-HICKS: The members of this party carried Rumanian passports, duly vised by a British representative abroad. Three French servants who carried French passports did not require visas. I understand that members of
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    foreign Royal families visiting this country are usually provided with diplomatic passports.
    Mr. LANSBURY: So Prince Carol and his party received no advantage over anyone else?
    Sir W. JOYNSON-HICKS: None whatever, except—I do not want to mislead the House—that Prince Carol had what is called a diplomatic passport. That, however, is not issued by us, but by the Rumanian Government.
    Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY(by Private Notice) asked the Home Secretary whether he can make any further statement on the circumstances of Prince Carol of Rumania's visit to this country, and his request to Prince Carol to leave?
    Sir W. JOYNSON-HICKS: Ex-Prince Carol arrived in this country on 28th April, and, as there was no reason to believe that the mere fact of his presence here would be undesirable, he received in the ordinary course leave to land for a temporary visit of two months. Since his arrival events have occurred which made it necessary for me to ask him to curtail his visit and to leave the country as soon as possible. I received yesterday from M. Jonescu a communication expressing, on behalf of his guest, regret that the ex-Prince had unintentionally caused embarrassment to His Majesty's Government, and assurances that, if my request were withdrawn, he would not exercise any political activities during his stay here. I have carefully considered these representations, in consultation with ray right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, but have reluctantly felt compelled to reply to the effect that the unfortunate impression which has already been created cannot be removed by any assurances for the future, and that, while I am prepared, on the clear understanding that the ex-Prince and those directly associated with him refrain scrupulously in the meantime from any form of political activity, to allow him a reasonable time to make his arrangements for leaving the country, I regretted that the directions already issued could not be withdrawn.
    Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY: May I ask what the right hon. Gentleman means by "ex-Prince"? Is he aware that he referred to this Prince two or three days ago as a gentleman, which

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    is quite incorrect, and what is an ex-prince?
    Mr. SPEAKER: That is not a proper question.
    Mr. STEPHEN: May I ask what the right hon. Gentleman considers a reasonable time, and whether he would have given the same time to a Bolshevist in the same position?
    Sir W. JOYNSON-HICKS: In reply to the last supplementary question, perhaps the hon. Member is net aware how very kindly I am to people who are obliged to leave this country for our good. I always give them sufficient time to make their arrangements for getting away. I do not want to fix a time, but I hope that the gentleman in question will have gone by Monday.
    Sir R. THOMAS: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that a great many Scotsmen have left their country for their country's good?
    Mr. GEOFFREY PETO: Do the Socialist party wish to entertain Prince Carol at lunch in this House before he leaves?
    Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY: On a point of personal explanation, may I say that, when I asked the Home Secretary about his description of Prince Carol as a gentleman, it was not in any way in disparagement of the Prince at all, but I thought that the Home Secretary was not giving him his proper title, and I wanted to know why he should not call a prince a prince, and not a gentleman.
    Mr. SPEAKER: The hon. and gallant Member appears to mix in circles which I do not quite understand.

    BIRLEY COLLIERY COMPANY (RENTS).
    Mr. LEEasked the Home Secretary whether his attention has been drawn to the fact that two men, named Grundell and Cowling, workmen and tenants of the Birley Colliery Company, near Sheffield, resumed work after the 1926 stoppage under an agreement to have 1s. per working shift deducted from their wages for rents accrued during the stoppage; that on the 1st February several men were given notice to leave the employ
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    of the company, Grundell and Cowling amongst them, and on the 17th and 24th February all the wages earned during the two weeks were stopped at the colliery office in payment of rent arrears, and the men had to apply to the guardians for relief; that representations were made to the colliery company, who would not make any allowance whatsoever, but took immediate steps to get the men out of the houses; and, in view of the provisions of the Truck Acts, what steps he proposes to take?
    The SECRETARY for MINES (Commodore Douglas King): I have been asked to answer this question. This matter has not previously been reported either to me or to my right hon. Friend. I am making inquiries, and when I am in a position to reply I will invite the hon. Member to repeat his question.

    ROYAL COMMISSION ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT.
    Brigadier-General BROOKEasked the Home Secretary when the Report of the Royal Commission dealing with the general question of local self-government is to be expected?
    Sir W. JOYNSON-HICKS: The Commission are still engaged in hearing evidence and I cannot, I regret, make any statement as to the date on which the Report will be presented.

  EDUCATION.

    CLASSES (SIZE).
    Mr. DAYasked the President of the Board of Education the number of classes which are classified according to the number of pupils on the school registers of elementary schools, which have over 60 pupils; and will he give particulars, including the numbers of the four largest classes, of which he has any statistics?
    The PRESIDENT of the BOARD of EDUCATION (Lord Eustace Percy): On the 31st March, 1927, there were 278 classes in public elementary schools in England and Wales with over 60 children on the rolls. As regards the second part of the question, I have made inquiry into the cases of the four largest classes. As the hon. Member may be aware, the

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    returns made by local authorities relate to a particular date in the year, and I find that in each of these cases the large size of the class on that date was due to an entirely unavoidable cause, such as the temporary absence of a teacher owing to illness; moreover, in three out of the four cases the class was, in fact, divided between the class teacher and the head teacher or another assistant, though this fact was not actually shown on the return. I have little doubt that similar considerations would be found on investigation to apply to the large majority of the classes returned with over 60 children on the roll.
    Mr. DAY: Will the Noble Lord answer that part of the question, in reference to the numbers in the four largest classes?
    Lord E. PERCY: I have not included those figures because, to give the numbers of the four largest classes, when those classes were the largest, only because of the fact that the principal teacher happened to have a cold on a particular day, would seem to be rather useless. If the hon. Member wants them I will send the figures to him.
    Mr. DAY: Could we have the numbers of the four largest regular classes?
    Lord E. PERCY: How could I tell, without going through all the 278, which were regular and which were irregular?

    OPER-AIR NURSERIES, LONDON.
    Sir R. THOMASasked the President of the Board of Education how many schools in the London area conduct open-air nurseries for the infants during the whole or a part of the year, and the aggregate number of children in these classes, giving figures for the last five years?
    Lord E. PERCY: As the reply consists largely of figures, I will, with the hon. Member's permission, circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
    Viscountess ASTOR: Is it not the case that between 30 and 40 per cent. of children in elementary schools are either diseased or delicate, and that only 7 per cent. of those between two years and five years of age who have attended open-air schools are diseased or delicate; and will he not consider the question of providing more open-air schools?
    Mr. SPEAKER: That question should be put on the Paper.
    Following is the reply:
    I assume that the hon. Member is referring to open-air classes held in connection with the infants' departments of elementary schools. The number of such classes in the London area and the approximate number of children attending them during each of the last five years have been:

    Year.

    Number of Classes.

    Number of Children.

    1923

    …

    …

    25

    …

    1,000

    1924

    …

    …

    28

    …

    1,120

    1925

    …

    …

    28

    …

    1,120

    1926

    …

    …

    33

    …

    1,320

    1927

    …

    …

    42

    …

    1,680

    SCHOOL ACCOMMODATION, WEDNESBURY.
    Mr. SHORTasked the President of the Board of Education whether he is aware of the shortage of elementary school accommodation in Wednesbury; that school children residing on the municipal estates, Wood Green area, have to walk long distances to school; and that the number of elementary school children has increased, though the accommodation is almost the same as existed in 1918; and whether he can state what financial assistance he can render to enable the Wednesbury Education Committee to provide additional school accommodation where needed?
    Lord E. PERCY: I am aware of the shortage of school accommodation in the Wednesbury area. I have already drawn the authority's attention to the matter and invited them to confer with the officers of my Department. A conference will, I hope, take place very shortly. The authority's approved expenditure on the provision of additional accommodation will, of course, be taken into account in determining the Board's grant.

    DISTRESSED AREAS, DURHAM.
    Mr. BATEYasked the President of the Board of Education whether as a result of his recent visit to Durham, any report will be issued as to the objects and conclusions of his visit?
    Lord E. PERCY: No, Sir.
    Mr. BATEY: Has not the Minister been in Durham at the request of the Prime Minister to inquire into the con-

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    dition of the wives and children of the miners there; and are we not entitled to a report?
    Lord E. PERCY: No, Sir. I promised the House the other day that I would pay personal attention to and keep a personal eye on the conditions in the distressed mining areas. That I am doing, but if I am asked to publish a report every time I go for two days to a distressed area, I do not think it will serve any very useful purpose.
    Mr. MARCH: Is the Noble Lord satisfied with the conditions which are now prevailing among the children there?
    Lord E. PERCY: No. Of course I am not satisfied with the conditions prevailing among the children in any distressed area—no one could be.
    Mr. PALING: If the Noble Lord is not satisfied with the conditions, is he going to recommend any remedial measures being taken immediately?

    SPECIAL SCHOOLS, LONDON.
    Mr. R. MORRISONasked the President of the Board of Education (1) the number of London special schools for mentally defective children which have been closed during the past five years;
    (2) the number of mentally defective children at present on the roll of London special schools, and the corresponding number for 1918?
    Lord E. PERCY: Since the 1st April, 1923, 18 London special schools for mentally defective children, providing 1,332 places, have been closed. The number of children on the rolls of special schools for mentally defective children has fallen from 6,994 on the 31st March, 1924, to 5,594 on the 31st March, 1928. The corresponding figure on the 31st March, 1918, was 7,004. I may add that the standard of ascertainment of mentally defective children in public elementary schools in London has remained practically constant for several years and the number of children so ascertained has fallen from 12.64 per thousand in 1923 to 11.22 per thousand in 1927.

  PUBLIC HEALTH.

    MIDWIVES.
    Mr. DAYasked the Minister of Health whether he is now in a position to state the names of the persons who will serve on the committee that he is setting up to inquire into the general question of the training and supply of midwives?
    The MINISTER of HEALTH (Mr. Chamberlain): No, Sir. This committee is not yet quite complete.
    Mr. DAY: Can the right hon. Gentleman say how many acceptances he has had in response to the invitations sent out?
    Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: No, Sir, not without notice.

    MEDICAL RESEARCH.
    Sir BASIL PETOasked the Minister of Health, whether the General Medical Council or the Medical Research Council are concerned with the investigation of new discoveries in connection with, and new treatments of, disease; if not, whether there is any body of medical men in this country whose business it is to make such investigation officially: and, if not, how his department is kept advised of such new discoveries and treatments?
    Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: The answer to the first part of the question is in the negative as regards the General Medical Council, and in the affirmative as regards the Medical Research Council. The recognised method of bringing a new discovery to notice is publication of the scientific evidence for it in a technical journal. This allows its value to science or practice to be confirmed or otherwise by other workers.
    Sir B. PETO: As the public generally do not read these technical papers of the medical profession, can the right hon. Gentleman say in what way the public can be informed, in view of the action which is taken by the General Medical Council in the case of any member of the profession who advises the public of a new treatment by any communication in the public Press?
    Viscountess ASTOR: Is it not the view of the right hon. Gentleman that the less the public know, read and think about disease, the freer they will be from it?
    Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: I cannot admit that it is not desirable that alleged new medical discoveries should be submitted to technical examination, and I do not think it is possible for the Medical Research Council to take any useful action unless they have the benefit of some such publication as I have suggested.
    Sir B. PETOasked the Minister of Health whether he has recently received particulars respecting new discoveries in treatment for asthma and goitre from a medical specialist; whether these discoveries have been investigated; and, if not, whether there is any step which can be taken by his Department to see that the value of these discoveries is thoroughly investigated?
    Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: The answer to the first question is in the affirmative. As regards the second and third questions, I am advised that the case is not one in which the Ministry could appropriately take any action.

    COUNTY MEDICAL OFFICER, SALOP.
    Mr. W. M. ADAMSONasked the Minister of Health what conditions have been laid down by his Department in connection with the appointment of the county medical officer for Salop; and, seeing that the Salop County Council now dispute the terms proposed, what action does he propose to take to bring about a settlement?
    Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: No special conditions have been laid down by my Department in connection with this appointment, but I have suggested to the county council that in making the appointment they should have regard to the standard salaries for such appointments which have been commended by my Department for the guidance of local authorities. As regards the last part of the question, I am informed that the county council have deferred consideration of the matter for the present.

  HOUSING.

    BUILDING PROGRESS.
    Sir WALTER de FRECEasked the Minister of Health whether any centres of population, over 25,000, now regard their requirements with respect
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    to the provision of new houses as having been substantially met; and, if so, how many?
    Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: I have not received any formal statements to the effect indicated, but as my hon. Friend is aware very great progress has been made in the provision of houses in the last two or three years.

    SUBSIDY.
    Mr. LANSBURY (for Dr. SALTER)asked the Minister of Health whether he is aware that, following the reduction in the subsidy, there has been a marked falling of in the number of houses under construction or authorised under the 1923 and 1924 Acts; and whether, with a view to stimulating local authorities to undertake wide schemes of building for letting, he will give an early assurance that the present rates of Exchequer assistance will be available for all houses completed by 30th September, 1929?
    Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: I am aware that as compared with the abnormally high rate of house construction just before the reduction of the subsidy became operative, the subsequent statistics showed a falling off in the rate of house building. The latest figures indicate that the rate is now increasing again. With regard to the last part of the question, although I cannot, of course, anticipate what the result will be of the statutory review of the subsidy at present payable, which must be undertaken after the 1st October next, I have in the meantime decided that houses completed by the 31st March, 1929, shall, if otherwise eligible, qualify for subsidy at the existing rates.

  BUDGET.

    OIL DUTY (EMPIRE PREFERENCE).
    Mr. HURDasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he has under consideration the representations of the West India Committee and the desire of supporters of Imperial Preference that oils from Empire sources should be encouraged in the British market, with a view to the opening up of new oil areas within the Empire and lessening our dependence on foreign liquid fuel; and if he proposes to give some form of preference to oil imported from Empire sources?
    The FINANCIAL SECRETARY to the TREASURY (Mr. Arthur Michael Samuel): I can add nothing to the reply which the Chancellor of the Exchequer gave on 1st May to my noble Friend, the Member for Shrewsbury (Viscount Sandon).
    Mr. HURD: Can the hon. Member say why Empire oils, being a dutiable commodity, should be exempted from the general policy of Empire preference?
    Mr. SAMUEL: The practical benefit of preference in the case of hydrocarbon oils would be negligible, and complications which would be introduced into the working of the tax would be great.

    MECHANICAL LIGHTERS AND BUTTONS.
    Mr. E. BROWNasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether consignments of mechanical lighters and buttons at present in transit, which were ordered prior to the imposition of the new duties, will be allowed to enter this country duty free?
    Mr. SAMUEL: The answer is in the negative. Under the Resolutions, the duties on mechanical lighters and buttons took effect as from 28th April and apply to all such articles imported on and after that date.

    CURRENCY NOTES (FIDUCIARY RESERVE).
    Sir FRANK NELSONasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether, under the new arrangements, the Bank of England will be permitted to hold commercial bills as a portion of its fiduciary reserve; if so, to what extent; and what conditions will govern the acceptance by the bank of mercantile bills as part of the fiduciary reserve?
    Mr. SAMUEL: The Bank of England will be required to hold in the issue department securities of an amount in value sufficient to cover the fiduciary note issue and to notify to the Treasury from time to time the actual securities held. The word securities is wide enough to cover commercial bills. It is not, however, intended to prescribe specific rules on this subject.
    Sir F. NELSON: May the House understand from that reply that the securities held by the Bank of England
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    as part of the fiduciary reserve need not necessarily be Government securities, but may, in fact, be such securities as are chosen in the discretion of the bank, subject to periodical revision by the Treasury?
    Mr. SAMUEL: That, Sir, is too wide a subject for me to deal with by way of question and answer across the Floor of the House.

  GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS.

    TEMPORARY CLERKS.
    Mr. E. BROWNasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he is aware that in the memorandum of action to be taken in connection with, or as supplementary to, the recommendations contained in the Third Report of the Southborough Committee of January, 1925, it was provided that temporary clerks should be selected for permanent non-pensionable employment in Government Departments on scales prescribed for temporary grades; that some of the personnel so selected for permanent unpensionable employment were selected for employment upon scales prescribed for clerks, Grade I or II, and that in certain cases such clerks have since been reduced to lower grades contrary to the provisions of the memorandum; and whether he will take steps to restore such officers to their former grades?
    Mr. SAMUEL: The memorandum of January, 1925, setting out the agreed conditions of service of clerks selected for permanent non-pensionable employment does not provide for the retention by individuals of the rates of pay of the particular grade in which they may have been serving at the time of selection if posts in that grade cease to be available. On the contrary, it is specifically laid down in Clause 3 that, where it is necessary to transfer clerks who become redundant in their existing posts, they shall receive the rates of pay and be subject to the conditions of service of the posts to which they are transferred.

    DISABLED Ex-SERVICE MEN.
    Mr. SMEDLEY CROOKEasked the Financial Secretary to the Treasury the number of disabled ex-service men engaged in Government Departments on the 31st March last, and the comparable number at the 31st March, 1927?
    Mr. SAMUEL: The number of disabled ex-service men employed in Government Departments was 44,116 on 1st April, 1927, and 45,985 on 1st April, 1928. These figures do not cover industrial staffs.

  AGRICULTURE.

    PEDIGREE LIVESTOCK, NORTH WALES.
    Sir R. THOMASasked the Minister of Agriculture whether, having regard to the improved prospects of exporting pedigree livestock to the Dominions and Colonies, he will give statistics for each of the six counties of North Wales, showing the number of breeders of pedigree animals, the number of bulls, boars, heavy horses, and rams for which grants were awarded during the last financial year, and the aggregate amount of the grants awarded?
    The MINISTER of AGRICULTURE (Mr. Guinness): The information desired
    STATEMENT showing (i) the number of approved sires located under the Ministry's scheme for the improvement of live stock in each of the North Wales counties during the year 1927–28 and (ii) the aggregate amount of grants awarded in respect thereof.

    Name of County.

    Bulls.

    Boars.

    Heavy Horses.

    Rams.

    Aggregate amount of the grants awarded.

    £

    s.

    d.

    Anglesey

    …

    …

    20

    8

    1

    Nil

    320

    15

    0

    Caernarvon

    …

    …

    21

    9

    1

    Nil

    360

    0

    0

    Denbigh

    …

    …

    27

    20

    2

    1

    654

    15

    0

    Flint

    …

    …

    18

    15

    1

    Nil

    422

    2

    6

    Merioneth

    …

    …

    21

    11

    3

    10

    614

    3

    4

    Montgomery

    …

    …

    32

    19

    4

    1

    872

    0

    0

    Totals

    …

    …

    139

    82

    12

    12

    3,243

    15

    10

    FOOT-AND-MOUTH DISEASE.
    Sir R. THOMASasked the Minister of Agriculture whether his attention has been drawn to recent experiments which showed that the virus of yellow fever was still alive after being completely frozen for 12 days; and what steps are being taken, in view of the possibility of foot-and-mouth disease being introduced into this country in frozen, and still more in merely chilled, carcases from abroad?
    Mr. GUINNESS: The answer to the first part is in the affirmative. On the discovery by the Foot-and-Mouth Disease Research Committee that bone marrow
    as regards the number of breeders of pedigree animals is not available. I will circulate in the OFFICIAL REPORT a statement with regard to grants.
    Sir R. THOMAS: Will the right hon. Gentleman endeavour to obtain particulars?
    Mr. GUINNESS: I think it would be very difficult to get these statistics for the six counties, but I will see what information we have and let the hon. Baronet have it.
    Sir R. THOMAS: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that he has in North Wales a representative who should have these statistics?
    Commander WILLIAMS: Would not the cost of obtaining these figures be almost prohibitive and would not the expenditure be at variance with the policy of the Liberal party?
    Following is the information:
    remained infective in frozen and chilled carcases, the Ministry made arrangements with the South American Govern-merits for the initiation of precautionary measures designed to prevent the risk of the introduction of infection through frozen and chilled meat. As an additional precaution Orders have also been issued which require the boiling of waste foodstuffs of animal origin and the sterilisation of meat wrappings. I am sending the hon. Baronet a full statement of the various measures referred to.
    Sir R. THOMAS: Am I to understand from the right hon. Gentleman that he

    403
    now does believe that foot-and-mouth disease can be imported into this country in frozen or chilled carcases?
    Mr. GUINNESS: I have always agreed that there is a risk.
    Sir R. THOMAS: Is not the right hon. Gentleman aware that he said a few weeks ago that there was no risk?
    Mr. GUINNESS: I never said there was no risk. I have said that there was as yet no proof.
    Sir R. THOMAS: Has the right hon. Gentleman some proof now?
    Mr. GUINNESS: No, I have no proof. I only said there is a risk, and that we are doing all we can to provide against it.
    Mr. HURD: Has the right hon. Gentleman considered the suggestion made in another place with regard to quarantine provisions?
    Mr. GUINNESS: The proposal that this meat should be kept for 21 days, I think it was, in store, would, of course, make it uneatable, and it would deprive consumers in this country of any supplies of chilled meat.
    Mr. HURD: That would not apply to frozen meat?
    Mr. GUINNESS: Oh, no; frozen meat could still be brought in, but, as my hon. Friend is aware, that is not such a popular form of importation as chilled meat.
    Dr. VERNON DAVIES: Has the right hon. Gentleman considered the advisability of seeing that these carcases are imported with the head and feet attached?
    Mr. GUINNESS: That would be a very illusory safeguard, because animals may be in an infective condition without lesions on the head and feet.
    Sir R. THOMAS: Does the right hon. Gentleman not think that there is less risk in importing live animals than dead?
    Mr. GUINNESS: No—emphatically no.
    Mr. HASLAMasked the Minister of Agriculture if he has any information to give as to the progress made by the Argentine Government in measures taken
    404
    to prevent the exportation of meat infected with the virus of foot-and-mouth disease into this country?
    Mr. GUINNESS: I am informed that the Argentine Government have appointed 70 additional veterinary inspectors and have stationed them in the country to inspect cattle before they are despatched to the frigorificos for slaughter. The veterinary staffs in the frigorificos have also been strengthened in order to administer the new Decree which forbids the export to Britain of the carcases of animals when affected with disease, or of any animals which have been in immediate contact with them. The railway companies are proceeding with the installation of plants for the disinfection of trucks as required by the Decree. A real attempt is apparently being made by all parties to carry out the new law which is designed to protect Great Britain from the introduction of infection.

    OSIER INDUSTRY.
    Brigadier-General CLIFTON BROWNasked the Minister of Agriculture whether he is aware of the depressed state of the osier industry; and whether he will assist this industry to find better markets by affording it assistance in organised marketing or by any other methods in his power?
    Mr. GUINNESS: I am aware that there is a depression in the osier industry in certain parts of the country, but this is by no means general. A considerable amount of research work is being done at Long Ashton with regard to the combating of the disease to which osiers are liable, and with a view to the introduction and testing of new varieties of plant. The Rural Industries Bureau, acting in close association with rural community councils in certain counties, e.g., Somerset and Leicester, are doing their utmost to assist and develop the various industries that depend upon osiers, and committees of growers and basket-makers have been set up in those two counties, who are now watching the position, and have already secured a reduction in the railway charges for the conveyance of the raw material.
    Brigadier-General BROWN: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that one of the Ministry's very able officials has been going round encouraging people to grow

    405
    osiers and teaching them how to plant their setts and make osier beds, and now their difficulty is that they are at a loss to know how to sell them? Is not this a waste of effort and could not they be given some assistance in the matter of marketing them?
    Mr. GUINNESS: If the hon. and gallant Gentleman can suggest any way in which further help can be given towards marketing them I shall be very pleased to hear it.
    Brigadier-General BROWN: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the Rural Industries Bureau have suggested in the last issue of their periodical that osiers should be safeguarded, and will he take some steps to this end?

    CREDITS, SCOTLAND.
    Captain STREATFEILDasked the Secretary of State for Scotland whether he intends to introduce legislation for long-term agricultural credits applicable to Scotland?
    The SECRETARY of STATE for SCOTLAND (Sir John Gilmour): Yes, Sir.
    Captain STREATFEILD: Can the right hon. Gentleman assure the House that this legislation will be introduced with a minimum of delay?
    Sir J. GILMOUR: Yes, Sir.
    Mr. STEPHEN: Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether this legislation will be introduced in this Session?
    Sir J. GILMOUR: I am not able to say.
    Mr. STEPHEN: Is the condition of Scottish agriculture so much better than that of English agriculture that there is not the need for this legislation to be applied to Scotland as soon as to England?

    INDUSTRIAL ASSURANCE POLICIES.
    Mr. MACLEANasked the Financial Secretary to the Treasury whether he has received any complaints from policy holders against any industrial assurance company; and, if so, whether he has taken any action?
    Mr. SAMUEL: I have recently received three complaints from policy holders in industrial insurance companies. In one case it is hoped that the point at issue
    406
    will shortly be determined by the High Court in proceedings instituted by the Industrial Assurance Commissioner hi another case. The others related to disputes which had been referred to the. Commissioner under Section 32 of the Industrial Assurance Act, 1923. One of these cases is still sub judice.
    Mr. MACLEAN: Can the hon. Gentleman say what action was taken in the other case? He has told us that one case is sub judice. What happened in the other case?
    Mr. SAMUEL: The other case will be determined by the result of the proceedings which are now going on in the High Court.
    Mr. MACLEAN: If the hon. Gentleman will look at his answer, he will see that he has stated that one case is sub judice. Another case has evidently been settled, and I wish to know what was the decision in that case.
    Mr. SAMUEL: No, Sir, it has not been settled, but it is shortly being determined.
    Mr. DAY: Will the hon. Gentleman say whether the industrial insurance companies to which he refers are life or sickness or accident, or both?
    Mr. SAMUEL: I must have notice of that question.

    PORT OF HULL (CONGESTION).
    Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHYasked the Minister of Transport if he is aware of the serious congestion that periodically occurs in the port of Hull, especially during the height of the timber-importing season, and of the need, for example, of a better connection between the Alexandra and Victoria docks and the utilisation of the empty land space known as the Western Reservation; that a deadlock has been reached between the corporation of the city and the London and North-Eastern Railway Company on the question of using this ground for relieving congestion and further developing the port; and whether he will take any steps in the matter?
    The MINISTER of TRANSPORT (Colonel Ashley): I am aware that congestion has occurred at Hull during the height of the timber-importing season,

    407
    but, so far as my information goes, this congestion is not due to shortage of storage acccommodation. With regard to the last part of the question, I am not fully aware of the nature of the discussions to which the hon. and gallant Member refers, but I understand that no offer in connection with the Western Reservation has been made by the corporation to the railway company and that the offer which is understood to have been made to the timber trade was on lines which would not be suitable for permanent development by the railway company.
    Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that he has been misinformed on this point, and that an offer has been made by the corporation, and will he use his good offices in the matter to try and bring about a settlement?
    Colonel ASHLEY: If the hon. and gallant Member will let me know what he thinks I can usefully do, I will see what action I can take in the matter.

  BRITISH ARMY.

    HAMPTON COURT BARRACKS.
    Mr. VIANTasked the Secretary of State for War whether the barracks at Hampton Court are empty; if so, for how long they have been empty; and whether his Department has given any consideration to the possibility of these premises being made available for occupancy by persons employed in the immediate vicinity?
    The FINANCIAL SECRETARY to the WAR OFFICE (Mr. Duff Cooper): The barracks have been empty since 1925, but the question of their reoccupation is at present under consideration. As regards the last part of the question, the barracks are Crown property, and their disposal, if not required for military purposes, would rest with the Office of Works.

    SERVICE PENSIONS.
    Mr. MACLEANasked the Secretary of State for War whether he is aware that Patrick Nelson, late No. 6,800, Sea-forth Highlanders, 38, Fairfield Street, Govan, enlisted on the 23rd October, 1899, and served with the colours until the 29th December, 1907, was on the Army
    408
    Reserve to the 4th August, 1914, when he was recalled to the colours; that he served until 15th April, 1919, which constitutes a total of 19 years and 5 months service; that Nelson has a permanent pension of 20 per cent.; and whether he can state the reasons why this ex-soldier has been refused a service pension?
    Mr. COOPER: I presume the hon. Member refers to Patrick Neeson, who cannot be awarded a service pension because his qualifying service amounts to 12 years 10 months only, and is less than the minimum of 14 Years necessary for an award. His reserve service does not reckon as qualifying service, because he was mobilised from Section D and not subsequently invalided.
    Mr. MACLEAN: Can the hon. Gentleman quote the Regulation which excludes this man from having his period of reserve service counted as part of the qualifying period for a service pension?
    Mr. COOPER: Section D would certainly disqualify him.
    Mr. MACLEAN: Can the hon. Member tell me the number of the Regulation that disqualifies this man?
    Mr. COOPER: I cannot give the number of the Regulation off-hand, but I will send the hon. Member a copy of it.
    Mr. MACLEANasked the Secretary of State for War whether he is aware that Charles Doyle, late No. 283,132, Royal Irish Fusiliers, 39, Hamilton Street. Govan, enlisted on the 22nd August, 1873, completed that service (colour and reserve), served also during the South African War, volunteered for service in the Great War on 2nd September 1915, and served to the 2nd April, 1918, when he was discharged as no longer physically fit for further service; and whether he can state the reasons why this ex-soldier has been refused a service pension?
    Mr. COOPER: When Mr. Doyle enlisted in 1915 he did not declare his former service, which was therefore forfeited. Even if the forfeited service were restored, his qualifying service for pension would only amount to 9 years 7 months, which is considerably short of the minimum of 14 years necessary. His reserve service does not reckon as qualifying for pension, as he was not on the reserve at the date of his subsequent enlistment.
    Mr. MACLEAN: Will the Financial Secretary say if this man is to be penalised because when the Great War broke out he concealed his real age in order to get into the Army?
    Mr. COOPER: According to the Regulations, the fact that this man concealed his age would disqualify him, but, quite apart from that consideration, his service does not qualify him for a pension even if he had not done so.
    Mr. MACLEAN: Will the hon. Gentleman send me a copy of the Regulation which deals with this particular case?
    Mr. COOPER: Yes.

  INDIA.

    EAST INDIA RAILWAY (DISPUTE, LILLOOAH).
    Mr. SAKLATVALAasked the Under-Secretary of State for India if he has yet received any report of the magisterial inquiry into the shooting of railwaymen in the Lillooah district during the dispute on the East India Railway?
    The UNDER-SECRETARY of STATE for INDIA (Earl Winterton): No, Sir.

    DISTURBANCE, BOMBAY.
    Mr. SAKLATVALAasked the Under-Secretary of State for India if he can state the number of occasions on which armed mounted police or other military or semi-military forces have been used to disperse crowds of strikers in Bombay during the current textile dispute, and the numbers of killed and wounded on each occasion; and will he cause investigation to be made into the grounds upon which such action has been taken in each instance?
    Earl WINTERTON: On the 23rd April, when 20 unarmed police were being stoned by a mob, armed police were called in with the result that one striker was killed and one seriously injured. So far as I am aware—though full reports have not yet been received—this is the only occasion on which it was necessary to use armed police. There have been no other casualties. My Noble Friend understands that the police were in a very difficult and dangerous position, and does not consider that any action on his part is called for.
    Mr. SAKLATVALA: Do I understand that the Under-Secretaryy expects to receive a fuller report on this question later on?
    Earl WINTERTON: Oh, yes; fuller reports than those which have been received will no doubt be forthcoming.
    Mr. SAKLATVALA: Shall I be able to get information concerning those reports if I put down another Question in about a fortnight?
    Earl WINTERTON: I could not give the exact time, but perhaps the hon. Member will put down another Question in due course.

    EGYPT (BRITISH WARNING).
    Mr. MALONEasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for what reason His Majesty's Government waited until the Public Assemblies Bill had been passed by the Egyptian Assembly before addressing the ultimatum to the Egyptian Government?
    The SECRETARY of STATE for FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Sir Austen Chamberlain): What the hon. Member describes as an ultimatum was not addressed to the Egyptian Government until all friendly representations had failed. Such representations had been made to the late Prime Minister, and it was hoped that the Assemblies Bill would be amended by Parliament on the lines strongly urged there by the representative of the competent department of the Egyptian Government. Subsequently every effort was made to persuade the present Prime Minister to secure the Bill's amendment, before it finally passed the Senate, and it was only when it became clear that he refused to do so, that His Majesty's Government, on 30th April, addressed their final warning to the Egyptian Government.

  ROYAL NAVY.

    NON-SEAGOING SERVICE.
    Mr. SHINWELLasked the First Lord of the Admiralty how many officers are now employed on non-seagoing service, and the number in May, 1914, respectively?
    The PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY to the ADMIRALTY (Lieut.-Colonel Headlam): The number of officers, Royal

    411
    Navy, Royal Marines, etc., serving in harbour ships and shore establishments at home and abroad at the nearest available dates was as follows:

    15th December, 1927

    3,902

    15th March, 1914 (approximately)

    4,046

    RATINGS (LOANS AND TRANSFERS).
    Mr. HORE-BELISHAasked the First Lord of the Admiralty how many applications have been received from naval ratings during the past 12 months to serve in the Royal Australian Navy or other Dominion forces; and how many loans and transfers have been effected, respectively?
    Lieut.-Colonel HEADLAM: Records of the number of applications for transfer or loan are not kept. 215 naval ratings and Royal Marines were lent and 20 transferred to the various Dominion naval forces during the 12 months ending the 2nd May, 1928. I will, with the hon. Member's permission, circulate the particulars in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
    The particulars are as follow:

    —

    Lent.

    Transferred.

    Total.

    Australia

    …

    48

    18

    66

    New Zealand

    …

    149

    —

    149

    Canada

    …

    14

    2

    16

    South Africa

    …

    4

    —

    4

    Totals

    …

    215

    20

    235

    DOCKYARD DISCHARGES.
    Mr. HORE-BELISHAasked the First Lord of the Admiralty the terms of, and the reasons for, the recent Admiralty Fleet Order regarding the change in the term of notice which is henceforth to be given to dockyard workmen discharged on reduction?
    Lieut.-Colonel HEADLAM: The terms of the Order were that the practice of giving two weeks notice to workmen discharged on reduction, which was adopted when heavy discharges had to be made at the end of the War, is now to cease, and that in future a week's notice is to be given in accordance with the dockyard regulations. The reason for the Order was that the special circumstances which warranted the departure from the
    412
    ordinary practice, in accordance with the regulations, no longer exist.
    Mr. HORE-BELISHA: Does the Parliamentary Secretary not consider that this change is a most inhuman one when the great amount of unemployment in Devonport is taken into account, as well as the impossibility of these men finding alternative employment?
    Lieut.-Colonel HEADLAM: I cannot say that I do consider it is inhuman. I think that in the circumstances it is a perfectly natural and sensible decision.
    Mr. HORE-BELISHA: Was it dictated by reasons of economy, or by any other reason?
    Lieut.-Colonel HEADLAM: It was because it was considered that the special circumstances which existed immediately after the War, when there were so many discharges, no longer existed.

    SKILLED LABOURERS (PAY).
    Mr. HORE-BELISHAasked the First Lord of the Admiralty if he will explain the passage in the appropriation account that, whereas at Chatham and Devonport a substantial proportion of the men employed was classed and paid as ordinary labourers, practically all the men at Portsmouth were rated as skilled, and that the proportion of skilled labourers at Portsmouth receiving the higher rates of skilled pay was considerably greater than at the other yards; and whether it can be so arranged that skilled labourers at Devonport and Chatham should be placed on the same scale as at Portsmouth?
    Lieut.-Colonel HEADLAM: I do not think it would be proper for me to explain a passage in the Report of the Comptroller and Auditor-General which will be shortly considered by the Public Accounts Committee of this House. With regard to the last part of the question, skilled labourers have always been on the same scale of pay at the home dockyards, and the question of the proportion of skilled to unskilled labourers in the Works Department at Portsmouth is under consideration
    Mr. HORE-BELISHA: Can the Parliamentary Secretary explain what is meant in the Auditor-General's Report? Why is it that the men at Portsmouth are rated as skilled predominantly when they do the same kind of work?
    Lieut.-Colonel HEADLAM: I think that is a question which really must be settled by the Auditor-General in his Report.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE.
Mr. RAMSAY MacDONALD: Will the Prime Minister be good enough to tell U3 what will be the business for next week?
The PRIME MINISTER (Mr. Baldwin): On Monday: the Second Reading of the Currency and Bank Notes Bill, and the Bankers (Northern Ireland) Bill.
Tuesday: Supply, Committee—Ministry of Health Vote.
Wednesday: Supply, Committee; the Vote will be announced later.
Thursday: the remaining stages of the two Bills which are down for Second Reading on Monday.
Friday's business will be announced later. On any day, if time permits, other Orders will be taken.
Mr. PETHICK-LAWRENCE: With regard to the Currency Bill, will not the right hon. Gentleman consider giving a somewhat longer interval between the two stages, in accordance with the practice in the ease of Money Bills where it is of importance that opinion should inform itself and express itself before the stages are all taken?
The PRIME MINISTER: We have already lengthened the time that we had provisionally fixed, and it is now proposed to take the Second Reading at the beginning of the week and the remaining stages at the end of the week. It seemed to us, after consideration, that that is ample time. Recently, at any rate, it has been done on successive days.

STANDING ORDERS.
Resolution reported from the Select Committee;
"That, in the case of the London County Council (Ilford and Barking Drainage) [Lords], Petition for Bill, the Standing Orders ought a be dispensed with:—That the parties be permitted to proceed with their Bill."
Resolution agreed to.

MESSAGE FROM THE LORDS.
That they have agreed to—
Local Authorities (Emergency Provisions) Bill.
Ministry of Health Provisional Orders (No. 1) Bill.
Ministry of Health Provisional Order (No. 2) Bill.
Ministry of Health Provisional Order (Ealing Extension) Bill.
Ministry of Health Provisional Order (Luton Extension) Bill, without Amendment.
Amendments to—
Bournemouth-Swanage Motor Road and Ferry Bill [Lords], without Amendment.

SELECTION (DOVER GAS BILL [Lords]) (JOINT COMMITTEE).
Mr. William Nicholson reported from the Committee of Selection; That they had discharged the following Member from the Joint Committee of Lords and Commons on the Dover Gas Bill [Lords]: Captain Cunningham Reid: and had appointed in substitution: Major Ropner.
Report to lie upon the Table.

CHAIRMEN'S PANEL.
Mr. William Nicholson reported from the Chairmen's Panel; That they had appointed Major Sir Richard Barnett to act as Chairman of Standing Committee C (in respect of the Agricultural Produce (Grading and Marking) Bill [Lords]).
Report to lie upon the Table.

NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE BILL.
Reported, with Amendments, from Standing Committee C.
Report to lie upon the Table, and to be printed.
Minutes of the Proceedings of the Standing Committee to be printed.
Bill, as amended (in the Standing Committee), to he taken into consideration upon Monday, 21st May, and to be printed. [Bill 128.]

ORDERS OF THE DAY.

  SUPPLY.
  [7TH ALLOTTED DAY.]
  Considered in Committee.
  [Mr. JAMES HOPE in the Chair.]

CIVIL ESTIMATES, 1928.
  CLASS II.

    FOREIGN OFFICE.
    Motion made, and Question proposed,
    "That a sum, not exxceeding £116,700, be granted to His Majesty, to complete the sum necessary to defray the Charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1929, for the Salaries and Expenses of the Department of His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs."—[Note.—£90,000 has been voted on account.]
    Mr. RAMSAY MacDONALD: I think it is very unfortunate, though no one is responsible for it, that it should be necessary to use the opportunity given to us to-day to discuss two subjects of first-rate importance. It will be necessary to refer to Egypt, and also to the United States Note on Peace, in the course of our discussion to-day. As I have said, I blame nobody at all for it, but I do comment upon its being unfortunately necessary that it should happen, because either subject is sufficient for a full day; but, in view of the limited opportunities that we have of raising questions on Supply, we felt that we had to take what opportunity we had and get both subjects discussed to-day. I will refer to Egypt first of all.
    Whatever we may say or feel about the issue of what is generally known as the crisis, I think we must all feel a little unhappy and disquieted at the present situation. It began, if we may give it a beginning at all, with the failure of the negotiations with Sarwat Pasha. I want to say quite definitely that I cannot understand how anyone who knew the situation in Egypt, who knew the composition of the Egyptian Parliament, who knew the nature of the support on which Sarwat Pasha had to rely, could possibly have believed, or could possibly have hoped, that the document which was drawn up and which has been published
    432
    in the White Paper could have been accepted by the Egyptian Parliament and been made the basis of an agreement between Egypt and ourselves. It did not contain the elements that would have made our relations with Egypt what I might call comfortable, happy and cooperative, and I think that, if it had been found, in the course of the preliminary negotiations, that such a document was the only one that could be produced, it was a great pity that the conversations were pursued at the time. The situation between Egypt and ourselves is such that I think that, so far as we are concerned, we ought to trust to time and experience. If in the meantime events are carefully handled, I think that time and experience will remove some obstacles which are now absolutely insurmountable in negotiations between Egypt and ourselves if they are met straight face on.
    The first result of those negotiations and this draft was that Sarwat Pasha had to resign. Immediately after he resigned, the crisis entered upon a peculiar stage, the stage marked by the Assemblies Bill. That was finished by the ultimatum and the despatch of warships. It may be said that, as a result of that, the matter is finished. I do not know. A misunderstanding, a crisis—give it what name you like—a dispute, a failure to agree, a challenge, I do not care what name is given to it, such as happened a week or two ago, cannot really be resolved by an ultimatum and by warships. It may be suspended, and we may congratulate ourselves that it has been suspended; but over-exertion in the display of power is not a sign of strength but of weakness and what we must always remember is not merely the satisfaction it gives us if we happen to pull it off but the psychological impression it makes on the person who has had to withdraw. I have taken the best pains I could, not from Egyptian but from responsible British sources in Egypt, to find out what the effect has been in Egypt and I am sorry to say the result is exactly what one would have expected. Instead of elevating us in the eyes of Egypt, the way this crisis has been ended has rather lowered us.
    The second Egyptian White Paper might well give rise to very considerable apprehension. Four-fifths of the reasons given in the second Paper by our Foreign

    433
    Office for our apprehension regarding the Assembly Bill had far better been kept out of print altogether, because they do not relate to our business at all. They are reflections upon what we consider, may be rightly, to be the internal effect, not in relation to the reserved subjects at all but the internal effect upon Egypt of the passing of this Bill. I say four-fifths, I think that is too little. The reflections upon the reserved subjects, upon reservation C, are perfectly proper. The right hon. Gentleman, I think, must know very well that in a very ticklish subject like this the less he says about Egyptian internal self-government, that part of self-government which is quite clearly laid down in the constitution we granted, and which is not touched by the reserved subjects, the better. The apprehension that has been raised is very considerable. I regret very much the tone of the last Paper, where in a somewhat ungracious way the Foreign Secretary accepts the proposal of Hanna Pasha. There is a most unfortunate third paragraph in that Paper where he accepts the decision of the Foreign Minister and communicates with Lord Lloyd in that decision of the Government. That third paragraph implies a meaning which I am sure he never intended. He says, on page 24, in order to be very strong:
    "His Majesty's Government can enter into no discussions respecting the Declaration of Feburary, 1922."
    As a matter of fact in that Declaration it says you must. I am saying, and I hope I am saying it helpfully, that the Foreign Secretary did not mean that at all. What he meant to say was that His Majesty's Government would not enter into any discussion—I hardly venture to put any words into his mouth—but I think his idea was, that His Majesty's Government could not enter into any discussion about the validity of its right to make this Declaration, about its right to make it a unilateral Declaration, and about its right to stand by and to interpret the four reserved subjects and the meaning of the Clause which refers to them. That Declaration goes on to say—that is the third Section of the Declaration of 1922—
    "The following matters are absolutely reserved to the discretion of His Majesty's Government until such time as it may be possible by free discussion and friendly accommodation on both sides to conclude
    434
    an agreement in regard thereto between His Majesty's Government and the Government of Egypt.
    Why do not hon. Members cheer that? That is your Declaration. We are bound in honour by that. That is an extract from the Declaration of 1922, which I think practically every Foreign Secretary, certainly the two who are now facing each other, have taken advantage of in order to see whether it was possible to produce such a situation as would enable us to get into a better relationship with Egypt than the relationship which was left by the Declaration of 1922, and in order to do that we have both tried to apply the obligation to negotiate on the reserved subjects. After the four subjects are reserved, it goes on to say:
    "Pending the conclusion of such agreement the status quo in all these matters shall remain intact."
    There is no doubt at all that His Majesty's Government is bound to enter into discussions respecting the Declaration of February, 1922, and nothing that has happened can justify us in refusing to negotiate with an Egyptian Government which wishes to negotiate with us how we are going to substitute for these four reserved subjects an agreement which will add to the liberty and to the power of self government which the Egyptian Government now have. There is no doubt about our responsibility, and I am perfectly certain a wise policy will compel us to carry out that responsibility. What this looks like—and this is what is disturbing a great many people—is that the inspiration of this is more an inspiration against the Egyptian constitution than an inspiration in favour of our standing by the reserved subjects. I do not believe the Foreign Secretary meant it to be so and if there is any useful thing that will come out of the Debate to-day, I hope it may be a very definite statement by him that that is so. I know perfectly well that he put it in one of his despatches but, not as a Foreign Secretary who approved of his own work and judges his own work but reading it as a Britisher in Egypt, or as an Egyptian who is anxious to promote co-operation with Britain in Egypt, he will find it is so mixed up with expressions of spirit and words of a different kind that an assurance to-day will certainly not be wasted.

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    We are in a very delicate position regarding these Egyptian affairs. I think it is advisable that Egypt should understand exactly where we stand. The root trouble—I am afraid there is more than one root trouble—one of the root troubles, one of the main troubles, the Foreign Secretary, in negotiating with Egypt, will always find, is that there is a very large section of Egyptian opinion who decline to accept the reservations and decline to regard themselves as parties to the Declaration of 1922. I think the sooner that position is realised the better. This country has realised, not only this country but the poor people living at this moment, after the War, after the psychology that has followed the War, what a tremendous impetus we gave to nationality—I need not go into it. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George), who is going to follow me, perhaps may explain the origin of a good deal of that impetus—when everybody was told that if they would do certain things they would be absolutely free for the rest of their lives to determine their own affairs. Unfortunately, a good many of these simple-people took us at our word.
    The result is that we, above all nations in the world, have inherited treaties, responsibilities, and all sorts of obligations, and what may be called rights, which characterise peculiarly a country that has had an Imperial history. It is not only in Egypt, but it is in China and elsewhere. We are now placed in a most extraordinary position with our inheritance of old treaties, as in China and in Egypt, and the question is whether the situation is going to be handled, we declaring in favour of nationality and sincerely meaning to carry out our declaration, and determined to pursue a policy which in the end will mean free peoples—whether the way that that is going to be done is, that we simply, without any negotiations and without any accommodation, cut ourselves adrift and withdraw from the scene and leave somebody else to come in if they like, or leave the peoples from whom we have cut ourselves adrift to do what they like and develop as they like.
    I am perfectly certain that that policy is a wrong policy, and that the right
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    policy is to create a transition period between what was before the War and what is going to be fully as soon as negotiations have been completed and agreements made. Therefore, I think that in Egypt, instead of merely treating the reservations as hostile declarations, on our part we ought to have proposals for satisfying, and not attempts merely to set them aside. What we want now is to get proposals from Egypt which will enable us to satisfy the reserved points, so that an agreement may be come to, and then the next stage, the stage that naturally follows the Declaration of 1922, can be carried out. I make that observation because I think it is necessary that it should be made. I can conceive of nothing which is going to be more fatal to the people of the world, nothing which is going to do more damage in the way of creating chaos where there is now, at any rate, a semblance of order, than this sort of idea that there is going to be no evolution and no transition, but a simple sharp-cut change by people who are not responsible and whose irresponsibility would very soon be found out if they were left to carry out their will. That is a doctrine from which, in any event, I decline to move one inch.
    Then we come to the particular point which has raised this difficulty, the question of the Assembly Bill. I agree there is something more to be said than has been said, especially in our newspapers up to now. I have taken a great deal of pains to get at the facts, and I must say they are not so easy to get at. They are not at all easy to get at. I have been trying to wade through—I confess in an imperfect way—the Official Reports of the Egyptian Parliament, and as far as I can follow them in their French the representations made by our newspapers of what took place in the Egyptian Parliament, and the purpose of the Bill, the intention of the Ministers, have been grossly misleading, even unfair. Our newspapers have not played the game in that respect. We begin with the present police law. Everybody will admit that it ought to be liberalised. The present police law is the inheritance partly of military law and partly of special administrative orders created as the result of troubled situations in Egypt. We have to remember this, that when we talk about riots in Alexandria

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    and about disturbances here and disturbances there those riots and those disturbances took place when the police law was strongest, not when there was no police law at all. The Egyptian history of recent times and the history of disturbances in Egypt will be one of the most magnificent examples of how freedom brings democratic faith and trust and, instead of leading to riots, leads to peace; whereas where you have repressive legislation and where you have special police powers your riots are the worst, and the disturbances of mind—[Interruption.] I should be very glad indeed if hon. Members opposite will just bring out the facts and tell us how the Alexandria riots took place under conditions of freedom and try to discover what sort of mare's nest they are living in if they are under that impression. I use the argument and give it for what it is worth.
    Those who trust—I put it quite tentatively—the special police powers regarding public meetings, and so on, to keep the peace of Egypt and to protect foreign life and property have not a shred of recent historic experience to justify them in their policy. I said, first of all—and I hope to carry the whole House with me—that a liberalising process of the existing law relating to the police and also of the legislation relating to the police and public meetings would be a very good thing for Egypt and would be a real, substantial contribution to the grip the Egyptian executive has upon public opinion. In any event, Sarwat agreed to this. This Bill which has caused us so much trouble is not the emanation of the Wafd, it is the emanation of the Liberal Government, the Sarwat Government. Sarwat was Prime Minister in active office when this Bill went through the Egyptian Parliament.
    4.0 p.m.
    There is the answer that the right hon. Gentleman gave to a question to-day about representations that had been made. Those representations were not made to any one leader; they were made to Sarwat. It is perfectly true that when the Bill was going through Parliament Sarwat left it to his Under-Secretary to answer for him. Sarwat was in his room in the Parliament building all the time. There was nothing done in
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    that Parliament; there was not a single decision come to in that Parliament without Sarwat being consulted and agreeing to it. Therefore do let us be fair in this matter. Then, when the time for rejection came, it was not the Wafd that rejected, but Sarwat's own Cabinet that rejected it. When Sarwat went back with his proposals in his pocket it was not the Wafd that he was afraid of, it was not the Wafd which compelled him to keep those proposals in his pocket before he communicated them to anyone; it was his own Cabinet of which he was afraid. That is the situation in Egypt, and it requires exceedingly delicate handling. I have received this statement from an Englishman who follows Egyptian politics in Egypt as closely as I follow our politics at home. He is not at all inclined to our way of thinking, but, in order that we might have some really experienced advice, I asked if I might have a definite and concentrated statement on the situation and this is what I got:
    "The law, if passed, would have made very little difference in its applicability while the Parliamentary regime was in action.
    "The Minister of the Interior would have to answer to Parliament for the action of his police officer. What Egyptians are thinking of is a return of the time when Parliamentary institutions shall be in obeyance. They have very lively memories of what happened at the time of Ziwar Pasha (1924–26), when there was no Parliament to check the actions of his Cabinet. There are Deputies now sitting in Parliament who have never once been allowed to address their constituents."
    There are actual Ministers, not only Deputies, who, when they had announced public political meetings in their own constituencies, when fighting their constituencies, were met, not by cheering crowds of supporters, but by police batons, and in some cases, bayonets, and were not allowed to address their constituents. It made no difference; they were elected. Nevertheless, those of us who do care for law and order prefer that there should be some different law from that put into operation. My correspondent goes on:
    "There are Deputies now sitting in Parliament who have never once been allowed to address their constituents. Police barred their way wherever they went. Egyptians of all parties hold that the British view of the dangers inherent in the Bill is exaggerated. In the Upper House only

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    one vote was cast against the Bill. Now the Senate is composed, to the extent of two-fifths, of the nominated members of all parties. It includes Zehia Pasha, who carried out the behests of the Residency so faithfully and well in 1923, and Ziwar Pasha who carried out the will of the Palace in 1924–26 after the coup d'état which de prived Egypt of Parliamentary government. Both these very experienced and conservatively minded ex-Premiers voted for the Bill."
    Other things a little bit more detailed have been published since, but that is a very good indication, or, at any rate, a very fair view, of the situation, and a view which has never been represented in our newspapers. It does not appear in the papers that have been circulated to us. There is another point. This Bill went through Parliament first of all on 2nd February or 2nd January, I am not sure which. It is said now that foreigners are interested. There was not a single protest in any single foreign newspaper in Cairo on the passing of the Bill. There is published there a very lively paper that those of us who have been in Cairo know perfectly well, a weekly paper which makes a special point of commenting upon politics, and it is a paper which has sometimes annoyed the Egyptians on account of its pro-foreign attitude. In its issue on the 7th of that month of February, I am informed—I was not able to see it, but I am informed on very reliable authority—there is not a single reference to the Bill, although it had passed its Second Reading.
    Surely that does not indicate a tremendous foreign interest in this Bill when it first went to the House? As a matter of fact I think we ourselves took no interest in the Bill when it first went through the Egyptian Parliament. Our interest did not arise until Sarwat was unable to carry out that agreement which was to cover all these reserve points, except possibly the Sudan. I suggest that it is necessary for this House to keep its head in these matters, and just to see how it is possible that, by being a little bit too frightened of these provisions. we may, as a matter of fact, do more harm and endanger the lives of foreigners by throwing back the steady development of good will towards ourselves, than by ensuring that the civil law is drafted as we should like it to be on the Statute Book of Egypt. I understand that we made no representa-
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    tions in detail about that; I understand that when that Bill was first of all going through the Egyptian Parliament we made no attempt to get it in such a form as would satisfy our views on the re served section C—that section relating to our right to protect foreigners in Egypt. I understand that that is so. I also understand that the objections are taken to the provisions regarding the police—I have seen this in the report of the debates in the Egyptian Parliament—the question of the powers of the police, the matter of punishments and responsibilities and rights and so on. But if you are judging by the speeches that were delivered by men bearing names that have always been associated by me with extreme views—if you read the speeches that these extremists, some of whom, I believe, have seen the inside of prisons or our initiative and therefore are not likely to be very pro-British now—if you read those speeches it is perfectly clear that, as a matter of fact, there was no real dispute about the rights of the policemen, but a great deal of dispute as to how they were to be expressed.
    I am told again by someone, who has a better knowledge and command of idiomatic French than I have, that even now there is very grave doubt as to what is the meaning of Clause 7. I mean the Clause which imposes the duty on policemen, according to one translation, "not to interfere with a meeting until evil has been done," and, according to another translation of the same words, "not to interfere until they apprehend that evil is likely to be done." I sent the passages to a friend of mine in order to get expert advice as to what the words mean. The reply I have received is to the effect that there was no accurate English idiom that expresses the fine shade of meaning of the French, that a true translation would be something between the two. We sent an ultimatum and warships to Egypt in order to settle the question of a French idiom!That really is a little bit subversive of one's sense of the proportions of life. What I want to emphasise is this: I see there are some who seem to wish to undo and recall the Declaration granting sovereign rights to Egypt—I do not believe for a moment that the Foreign Secretary is one of them. We must stand by the Declaration and try to resolve its reserved points by negotiation. I do not think, however, that it

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    will be of any use to reopen negotiations with Egypt until the preliminaries are clear. I tried to clear the preliminaries. I failed. At the end of the failure the good feeling between, at any rate, two persons engaged in the negotiations, was quite as sincere—it was very sincere—as it had been before the preliminaries started.
    But let us make it perfectly clear that we have no intention whatever of interfering with the natural and ordinary operation of the self-government which is given to Egypt as the preliminary part of our Declaration of 1922, and that so far as the British Government is concerned we should leave no doubt in the minds of Egyptians that we are only too anxious to come to an arrangement with the Egyptian Government to enable that part of the Declaration which I have quoted to become effective after guarantees have been given, that all we had in our minds when making these reservations has been properly protected. There are two courses open to us. We can cut the knot, or appear to cut the knot, and go back to 1922. I regret to say that the comments which have been published in some of our papers seem to indicate that people are under the impression that you can go back to Lord Cromer, and that in 1928 or 1929 we can re-establish Cromerism. I have heard myself in Egypt that we made a mistake in ever going away from Cromerism. If this House or any Government is under the impression that it is possible to go back, very severe and very tragic will be their disillusion. We should make it perfectly clear that we have not got that idea at the backs of our minds. But the other policy has to go on. It is the longer and more troublesome and even baffling way of working out in the most friendly co-operation with Egypt the full rights of Egypt as a self-governing State.
    I am sorry to say that all the evidence in the Egyptian Press is that the growing good feeling between Egypt and our-selves, upon which so much of our commercial prosperity depends, has been rather worsened during the last six weeks, and that the prospect is not as good or as bright as it was. I hope that we shall have a declaration regarding these alternative policies—a declaration which will remove any doubts that may
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    be in honest Egyptian minds as to what we propose to do.
    Let me now deal with the American Note. The point about that Note is this, that everyone who has tried his hand at peace-making finds that he is in a curiously baffling entanglement of fears, suspicions and prejudices and, although I hesitate to say it, let it be said, a differing value in the spoken and in the pledged word. Consequently, when you go to Geneva with the intention of doing something that is definite, precise and clear cut, you find as soon as you get there that you have to meet a very difficult series of conflicting interests, conflicting demands and conflicting states of mind. Then, Mr. Kellogg—the American Note is known as the Kellogg Note—comes in with a very simple proposition. The proposition is so simple that, first of all, we suspect it, more particularly everyone who has been working away at this problem of international peace. Mr. Kellogg makes a proposition which amounts practically to this: "Let us all agree and declare, or"—he makes a special appeal to the great Powers of Europe—"let as many as possible of the big nations of the world agree together, in a common instrument, that war shall henceforth be no part of their national policy." At once, we spring into a dubious frame of mind and we say, "How is it to be done?" and so on.
    I am not at all sure that we ought not to thank Mr. Kellogg for compelling us to recognise the essential simplicity of our problem, which has become so complicated in our minds. When we see this problem so simply put and we see how we can meet our difficulties, we realise that the larger part of the net work is of our own creation. Therefore, after the first reaction of scepticism and criticism, I think it is only proper and good that we should say: "Thank goodness! There is somebody who is striving with might and main to bring us back to the essential simplicity of the problem!" When we look at Geneva—I do not care which Geneva or whose Geneva—we certainly have the very best cause for being thankful to anybody who can by the waving of some wand or other, or by the utterance of some phrase or other, resolve out of existence many of the psychological difficulties with which we have been faced. The American view is this: "If every nation said, There

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    shall be no war in our national policy,' then what is the use of talking about safeguards to maintain your present obligations which may involve military operations, because if you all say that there will be no military operations, there will be none?" That is exactly the sort of thing that you laugh at, but when you have slept over it you do not laugh; you discover that there is a great deal in it.
    If we could only get Europe, the big nations of Europe, to say: "We eliminate war from our national policy," and if we could get them to say it with conviction and if we could get all other nations to believe that they have said it sincerely, 99 per cent. of our peace difficulties would be solved. [HON. MEMBERS: "Agreed!"] Certainly, but what I would say to those hon. Members who are apparently so very sceptical about it, is this; have they any record of which they need be proud regarding the beliefs in security which they have cherished in their hearts up to now? If all the nations of Europe accepted Mr. Kellogg's suggestion to-morrow and then went on tottering and stumbling through war for the next century, the century of war that would follow the acceptance of Mr. Kellogg's Note, would not be any worse than the centuries of war that have followed trust in the ideas of securities which characterise the minds of the party of hon. Members opposite.
    Let us see how the position stands in regard to the Kellogg Note. Undoubtedly, whatever answer we give or whether we do not answer, were that possible which, of course, it is not; but supposing it were possible and that we never answered the Note, our attitude towards the Note is bound to have a very considerable influence on Anglo-American relations. Nobody who has been in America recently, nobody who follows the American press, would, I think, deny that those relations are not quite as good as they ought to be. Officially, they are perfectly good, never better, but there is an underlying anti-British feeling. You cannot take up a newspaper, especially if you go away from the Eastern States, without seeing that there is always a possibility of certain American parties, certain American sections making capital out of anti-British propaganda and anti-British feeling. [HON. MEMBERS: "Who
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    is to blame for it?"] You get the same thing here. Does anyone deny the fact that the comments that have been made in this country from time to time about the American attitude to the War Debt have not been resented very bitterly by very good American citizens? And that is the mildest and the best of our criticisms. It is no use hon. Members opposite smiling with that benign wisdom which always characterises them in this House. I am perfectly content to go upon one's own experience. One cannot go to New York, one cannot meet people who are important in American public opinion, one cannot have half an hour's conversation either with a Democrat or a Republican, but that within that half hour they will make comments upon our criticisms of them and upon their criticisms of us. If any hon. Member has had a different experience, I envy him because that was certainly mine.
    Our attitude towards the Kellogg Peace Note is going to influence Anglo-American relations very likely for a very long time to come. Supposing it is all nonsense so far as the avoidance of war is concerned. Supposing one could write, as undoubtedly the Foreign Office could write, a most learned and effective reply to the Note, showing how impracticable it is. What then? There are two great dangers which the nations have to face now; war is one, and the other is that nations will begin to use the threat of war in their diplomatic action. Everyone who has been engaged in it knows that the danger is not merely that we are building up organisations which, when they reach the stage of maturity, will run themselves and will control the situation—that is happening again and again and it is very serious and a very grave and immediate danger—but there is another danger which has not received its proper place, and that is that in conducting ordinary negotiations the threat of war, the hint of war, diverts political wisdom, fair play and justice, and finally makes itself felt in the actual preparation for war. If such a declaration as is asked for in the Kellogg Note were made, if such an agreement were signed, some critics, in their wisdom, might say: "Still, you cannot avoid war." At any rate, it would do this: it would make it impossible during these critical times in international diplomacy, for important nations to threaten war, because they

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    will have declared solemnly and openly: "We refuse to include war as part of our national policy."
    There is another important thing in regard to the Kellogg Note, and that is that its acceptance would certainly bring America far nearer to our practical peace problems. It is perfectly true that it leaves out such questions as to how you are going to do it, whether by arbitration, conciliation or some other way, sanctions and so on; all these are untouched. Where you can safely do the right thing, you can leave the consequences to mature themselves. Can anyone imagine that if by reason of a nation in Europe having agreed to accept the Kellogg Note and having put that Note into operation, so far as it can be put into operation, that nation should find itself in difficulties and should find itself being punished, and action had to be taken to protect and defend that nation, the Americans would say: "It is not our affair." In these circumstances, America could not possibly stand aloof and take no action whatever in the consequences that come to a nation for having followed her advice. It is far better to leave the whole thing to consequences and to allow those consequences to mature themselves.
    There can be no doubt at all that America having stood so much aloof from the League of Nations and from European peace efforts has had a hampering effect upon our efforts in that direction. Again and again in trying to come to arrangements to apply certain clauses of the League Covenant and forseeing certain possibilities coming out of the League Covenant, when you sit down and try to arrange what is going to happen or what might happen and what would happen in certain eventualities, the mere fact that the world is not properly covered by the League of Nations is having a deterrent and hampering effect in the evolution of the peace conferences. Now America comes forward and offers this covenant and gets it signed. I think that is just exactly the sort of sowing, just the scattering of seeds, which she who sows can rejoice at in her heart, and go away in faith and leave the germination and the results to Providence.
    There are various other points of considerable importance that arise out of this document, but I will leave other hon.
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    Members to develop them. The general position that I take up is that which I have already indicated. Something more is required from us in regard to the. Kellogg Note. Undoubtedly, that was the first reaction which the Note produced on us. That reaction is more and more confirmed, we are becoming more and more sympathetic and we are brought to that frame of mind in which we conclude that acceptance—simple acceptance—is the best method. I hope we are not going to accept with reservations. That is not the way. I hope we are not going to raise League of Nation problems. It will be one of the greatest tragedies in history if the League of Nations commitments in Europe prevent us from doing our best to develop wider and more comprehensive proposals of peace when they come from a nation which hitherto has not seen its way to associate itself with the League of Nations. The man of formula and the man of institutions is very often the man who stands in the way of real progress, because he cares more for his formula and far his institutions than he cares for the spirit which inspires action. I say that as one who believes most profoundly in the League of Nations, who believes that the League of Nations is only just beginning its useful work in Europe, work for the new spirit of peace, but I say it more as one who pleads that we may recognise the spirit of the League of Nations when it is enshrined in the offer, even when the offer is other than one which has been planted at Geneva.
    Therefore, I think we ought to accept without attaching reservations. An instrument signed is a far better guarantee than a speech made. We can make our speeches and we can say, "War with America is absolutely unthinkable." Unthinkable, yes, but not impossible perhaps, 100 years hence. We can say, of course, that war is no part of our national policy, and that in nothing which we are doing in our international relations have we any thought of war. We can say quite sincerely, but, surely, it is an advantage if we can put that in a document; a document not only for our own archives, but a document for American archives, for French archives and for German archives. Once that document is signed it is a mark which no nation will ever go back upon without seeing it. Nine-tenths of our short-

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    comings are due to the fact that we often make them without seeing them, and it is when the marks are set up that you see the right way, so that, in the future, when the crisis arises, we may come to the mark and turn our backs upon it and go along the right course. That is a great advantage of our accepting this Note.
    I, therefore, hope that we may have a statement to-day—again I apologise most sincerely for having been compelled in the circumstances to raise two subjects—but I do hope the Foreign Secretary will find it possible to say something on both those subjects that will allay feelings in Egypt, that will give security, and that we may say, "We do not like this method. We think there is something wrong in it. We feel that there is a bit of an insult somewhere, but nevertheless we are prepared to see what we can do to get beyond it." That is on the one hand—security in regard to Egypt, pacification, co-operation and goodwill. Then, in regard to America, let us range ourselves alongside of her, taking a large, a general and undetailed but a very useful declaration, and showing her that we are side by side with her, giving the whole of our people hope that it is possible to co-operate with America in building up a great policy of effective co-operation.
    The SECRETARY of STATE for FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Sir Austen Chamberlain): There is so much with which I am in agreement in what the right hon. Gentleman has said on both subjects on which he has addressed the Committee—in the most fundamental parts of his speech—that I hope that, if I make a reply to him and answer some criticisms which he has put forward, my reply will not exceed the extent to which the two sides of the Committee are in agreement on the main lines on which our policy is to be conducted, both in regard to the particular problems which concern us in Egypt and to the peace of the world in general. It will, perhaps, be convenient that I should deal first with Egypt, and follow the same order as that taken by the right hon. Gentleman. The right hon. Gentleman was, if he will permit me to say so, at times a little illogical in certain separate phrases of his speech, but with the main underlying conditions which
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    he laid down for the policy which this country, under any Government, no matter of what party, must pursue, I am in agreement with him, and I say so here. Of course, the right hon. Gentleman is the Leader of the Opposition and I am the Minister responsible, and he is bound to find fault with my handling of the problem, even if he cannot find fault with my purpose and my object.
    The right hon. Gentleman says that the recent crisis began with the rejection of the Treaty negotiated by Sarwat and myself. I should have said that it arose out of circumstances which have already too often led to quite real crises in our history before that Treaty was ever brought up, and which, unless more wisdom is brought to the direction of Egyptian policy in the future, will inevitably introduce such crises again. It was because I felt that, that in the circumstances in which Egypt then was I tried to negotiate a Treaty which should be the substitute for the unilateral declaration which at present regulates our relations with Egypt. The right hon. Gentleman suggested, rather than said, that I was wrong in entering on those negotiations. He said that there could be no negotiation until time and experience had done their work and had produced a state of things in which the negotiations could certainly be pursued fruitfully and successfully. I ask the right hon. Gentleman and the Committee to remember that I did not propose a Treaty. Sarwat Pasha proposed a Treaty to me.
    Sarwat Pasha, in the first business interview that I had with him, offered an explanation in regard to the then recent crisis which had occurred in our relations. I accepted his explanations, but said I was less interested in explanation or comment on the past, than in the question of what our present and our future relationships would be, and whether they were always to continue in the way they had done, or whether the time would come, or was coming, when Egyptians could recognise facts which neither they nor we could alter and, by recognising those facts, enter into an arrangement or a treaty with us in substitution of our unilateral declaration, which would at once strengthen their liberties and secure those interests of the British Empire which successive British Governments had

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    declared that this country must always maintain. I asked Sarwat to think over this. I asked him to think over the danger of these crises, and to consider whether or not the time had come when we could turn over a new leaf, recognise a certain partnership, recognise common interests and, combining together, find a satisfactory solution and a basis of a firm friendship. I told him that I did not ask or suggest that we should negotiate here and now but if, on reflection, he thought that there was something in what I had said, I should be prepared to instruct Lord Lloyd to resume the conversations which had broken down.
    What was the result? In three days' time Sarwat Pasha came back to the Foreign Office with the draft of a Treaty which he had to offer. Does the right hon. Gentleman really think that I should have said, "Go away; I must wait for further time and experience. I cannot negotiate a peace with you. I have no answer to make to you at present." That was a serious offer by the Prime Minister of Egypt, which required an equally serious and friendly consideration on our part. I set to work—and I venture to submit that no one in my place could have done otherwise—to consider with my colleagues how much of Sarwat Pasha's Treaty could be accepted, what alternative, what variation we must make, and what we could suggest for the fulfilment of the purpose which we and he had in common. They left my relations with His Excellency, and his with me, not merely unchanged in friendliness, as the right hon. Gentleman said his and Zaghloul Pasha's were after their conversations, but very much improved. They were conducted in the most cordial way throughout. Sarwat Pasha went back to Egypt with the conviction and the knowledge that he had rendered a great service to his country, if only his countrymen were wise enough to seize the opportunity which he had created for them. I profoundly regret that that wisdom was not there. Sarwat Pasha, when, after long delays and further explanations and even further concessions, I pressed for the signature of the Treaty, or at least the answer of the Cabinet, replied that the Cabinet could not answer until the Wafd had taken their decision. The decision of the Wafd was unfavourable, the decision of Sarwat Pasha's colleagues
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    followed the decision of the Wafd, and the Treaty was killed by them.
    I agree with the right hon. Gentleman that in these circumstances fresh negotiations would be useless until time and experience have done their work. In the meantime, I hope that it may be possible—at any rate, on the side of His Majesty's Government, all that can be done will be done to make it possible—to conduct our relations without these recurring crises and without the necessity of resort to grave warnings or even to the moving of ships. The right hon. Gentleman wished to criticise the handling of the crisis when it arose. He seemed to think that no fair notice was given in time to the Egyptian authorities of the objections which His Majesty's Government entertained to this Bill. He is mistaken. As long ago as 2nd January, Lord Lloyd was instructed to take Sarwat Pasha into his confidence and to tell him, for his personal information—these were my instructions by telegram to Lord Lloyd:
    "His Majesty's Government regard the Wafd's reckless legislative programme with grave concern, and I should already have instructed you to protest vigorously but for the confidence with which Sarwat Pasha's declaration in London and his negotiation of the Treaty have inspired me. I may yet be obliged to make this protest, but before His Majesty's Government take a final decision, they have instructed you to invite a full explanation of Sarwat's views."
    Sarwat Pasha, therefore, knew at the very beginning of January the grave view that we took of the provisions of this law. He did not keep that knowledge to himself. There was fair warning to those concerned that we objected. We were then still, I do not say in expectation, but at any rate we had not abandoned hope that the Treaty might he signed, that with the signature of the. Treaty a new spirit would enter into our relations, and that a formal warning amounting to an ultimatum would no longer be needed. At the same time, I may say that if that Treaty had been accepted, our own responsibilities towards others would have been less than they are in the absence of any such Treaty.
    Fair notice was given. When it became practically certain that the Treaty was going to be rejected, I instructed Lord Lloyd to give a formal warning to

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    Sarwat Pasha as soon as he handed in his reply in regard to it, and that was done, and the new Government came into office having received a copy of that reply. The warning was in itself only a formal repetition of what informally I had said to Sarwat Pasha at the very beginning of the year. The right hon. Gentleman complains of the White Paper. He says that I have published too much, that it would have been well if I had left out four-fifths of the third column of the second Paper, that column which contrasts the new law with the old.
    Mr. MacDONALD: No. The columns are in the first Paper. The second Paper is where the right hon. Gentleman gives his reasons.
    Sir A. CHAMBERLAIN: I beg the right hon. Gentleman's pardon. I thought that was what he was referring to. At any rate, I have this to say in my favour, that I was asked to present to the House the two laws, to point out the differences between them, and that four-fifths of that third column—I am still dealing with that—
    Mr. MacDONALD: I do not object to that.
    Sir A. CHAMBERLAIN: Let me give this information. Four-fifths of the third column, commenting on the differences between the two laws, is based upon the views of Egyptian police authorities, whether British or Egyptian; that is to say, of those who have worked the present law, and who would have to work under the new law, to guard Egypt against the dangers which we fear. The right hon. Gentleman objects, not, as I thought, to that information, but to the publication of my despatch to Lord Lloyd.
    Mr. MacDONALD: No. I am sorry I have not made it clear either to the right hon. Gentleman or to the Committee. I objected to the sending of such a despatch to Lord Lloyd, because four-fifths of the despatch comments upon affairs internal to Egyptian self-government and not to affairs which relate to any of the reserved subjects, and that that, being read in Egypt, would be taken as an interference with what is their legitimate right of self-government.
    Sir A. CHAMBERLAIN: I confess I find it difficult, if that is the objection of the right hon. Gentleman, even to follow the grounds on which that objection is based. He agrees with me that the Declaration must govern our relations with Egypt until such time as by common agreement some other instrument is substituted for it. I see nothing in the Paper which he criticises which is not compatible with that position and which it is not well to state in view of that fact. But I really need not labour the point, because the right hon. Gentleman is unduly sensitive. Some friend of his, who passes anonymously through our discussions, has informed him of the unfortunate effect of my handling of this question, has drawn to him a picture of the unhappy reaction which my lack of skill and tact has produced upon the Egyptian mind. I should regret it if it were true, but is it true'? In answer, I will read a message which I received from Lord Lloyd about a week ago. He said:
    "The Prime Minister asked me for an interview yesterday. He asked me to convey to you his gratitude for the conciliatory and friendly spirit which he felt, whatever the differences of opinion between England and Egypt, had inspired the happy solution of the recent crisis. Both Governments, he said, have maintained their respective points of view, but he wished to renew to me the expression of his keen desire to work in harmony with His Majesty's Government and to avoid future sources of friction."
    If the right hon. Gentleman had himself conducted the negotiations, they could not have been concluded with a more satisfactory acknowledgment of his friendliness than that which has been accorded to me by the Prime Minister of Egypt. That is all that I need say about the past. The right hon. Gentleman, however, criticised some language that I had used, or some comment that had been made outside the House, as indicating to Egyptian minds that, in the action which we had taken, we had intended or foreshadowed an attack upon the Egyptian Constitution. Against that suspicion we protected ourselves in advance, and when I showed my surprise at the right hon. Gentleman's apprehension, he admitted that he had read the despatch and had in mind the despatch, which plainly guards against it.
    Mr. MacDONALD: That point was in my notes.
    Sir A. CHAMBERLAIN: What the right hon. Gentleman wants is a repetition of a statement which is already made. I will give it:
    "It should be made clear to the Egyptians that the intervention which His Majesty's Government in Great Britain cannot new avoid is strictly limited to those points which, in the absence of agreement between the two Governments, were reserved by the Declaration of 1922 to the absolute discretion of His Majesty's Government. It is directed neither against the liberties accorded by that Declaration to Egypt nor against the Constitution, which last His Majesty's Government has declared to be a matter for King Fuad and the Egyptian people."
    5.0 p.m.
    Those words were not written in haste or without consideration of their meaning. I stand by them, and if it is any satisfaction to the right hon. Gentleman, or can serve any useful purpose in our relations with Egypt, I am pleased to repeat them here at this Table to-day. One final criticism on this aspect of the question was made by the right hon. Gentleman to which I must refer. It was almost a verbal comment on the third paragraph of the Note which I directed Lord Lloyd to present to Nahas Pasha. That paragraph begins:
    "His Majesty's Government can enter into no discussion respecting the Declaration of February, 1922."
    If there is any difference between the right hon. Gentleman and myself about the Declaration of 1922, I think it is only a difference as to how we can best express ourselves, but not as to the thoughts themselves. We have got to maintain that Declaration until and unless they substitute for it some treaty which takes its place, and will thenceforth regulate our relations with Egypt. Those conditions are not subject to discussion. They are the necessity of the geographical position of Egypt, and her inevitable relations with the United Kingdom and the rest of the world; but there is nothing here to preclude, when the proper time comes, conversations or discussions or even negotiations as to the character of the instrument which shall eventually supersede the present Declaration. There is nothing to close the door against future negotiations when, in the right hon. Gentleman's own words, time and experience have done their work, and a treaty is offered to us which safeguards the vital interests
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    which are at present safeguarded only by the unilateral Declaration. That is all I have to say. I hope that it will be long before the relations of Egypt again require the House of Commons to give half-a-day to their consideration. I hope that we shall proceed smoothly, that the position defined in our Declaration, for which we ask no theoretical acceptance, but of which we must ask and shall require the practical observance, will be observed, and that these unfortunate incidents will be avoided in future.
    I come to the question raised by the right hon. Gentleman, one of far more immediate consequence and interest, and of far larger eventual possibility—the proposal for a pact or treaty for the renunciation of war, to be signed by, in the first instance, the six great Powers, with, it is hoped, the adhesion of others to follow. I need scarcely repeat, what I have already said, that His Majesty's Government warmly welcome this initiative of the Government of the United States. I will go further to-day, and I will say that, not only have we warmly welcomed it, but that we are hopeful that it will be successfully concluded, and that it will make a real contribution to the peace of the world. How could the attitude of any British Government, and this Government in particular, be different towards such a proposal? For three and a-half years now, we have been responsible for the conduct of the foreign policy of this country, and our prime object, and our unceasing care, has been to establish peace firmly, to proceed to the reconciliation of differences, and to prevent a recurrence of war. But more than that, this country never has treated war as an instrument of policy. There have been countries in the past which deliberately worked for war at a moment convenient to themselves, in order to solve in their favour a problem a favourable solution of which they saw no other means of attaining. There have been Governments which have provoked what has been called a preventive war. No British Government could contemplate a preventive war; no British Government could take action of that kind; and war has never been an instrument of policy.
    HON. MEMBERS: Never?
    Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY: What about the South African War?

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    [HON. MEMBERS: "Order!"] The right hon. Gentleman was a Cabinet Minister at the time.
    Sir A. CHAMBERLAIN: The hon. and gallant Member's interruption is due to a forgetfulness which I shall correct, perhaps ought to correct. This country did not declare war. I repeat that war has never been an instrument of the policy of this country within any time which we contemplate when we are discussing the Europe of to-day. I will not go back to the Crusades, if the hon. and gallant Gentleman thinks that they are an exception.
    Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY: Only the South African War.
    Sir A. CHAMBERLAIN: I say, therefore, that, both because it is in consonance with the general policy of all British Governments, and because it is a move forward in the direction to which this Government has devoted all its efforts ever since it came into power in international relations, we welcome the American proposal, and we are hopeful that it will be brought to a successful conclusion. You may ask—though the right hon. Gentleman himself did not make this criticism, others may make it—you may ask why, in that case, has there been any delay; why could not you say so at once; why is not your answer already sent? We received the American proposal on 13th April. It so happened that the evening before I had left for my short holiday. I think that I was away 12 days, including my journey, and one of the first matters to which I turned my attention on the night of my return was the papers, which had been received in my absence, in relation to this matter. But we had to consult—and I am sure the Government of the United States recognised this, and will take no umbrage at it—the Governments of His Majesty's Dominions in other parts of the world. In a matter of this kind the policy of the whole Empire should be one. We want them all to sign the engagement; we do not want any part of His Majesty's Dominions to be left out.
    That is not all. We, like other nations, and like Germany, which has already replied, have undertaken certain engagements already. Now, I beg the House and hon. and right hon. Gentlemen, to
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    use no language to cast doubt on the honour of our signature. We know what we felt when the contrary doctrine was preached by statesmen of another country. The right hon. Gentleman referred to his experiences in Geneva. He spoke of the difference between the spoken and the pledged word. I, too, have had my Geneva experience. In that atmosphere it is so easy to make large and generous declarations, to propose fair-sounding and specious resolutions, and even to vote for them; and when you sit down privately to talk with those who have supported them, you find, sometimes, that they are advocated or signed or voted only with mental reservations, which are quite other than the verbal form which has been publicly accepted. Would peace be preserved by signing a declaration which, because it was signed with different interpretations and meanings, would only lead to misunderstandings and accusations of breach of faith? Is it not worth while, and was it not better, to take a little time to consider these questions, and the relation of the new obligations which we are asked to undertake, to the old obligations, which we have undertaken in the service of peace? Was it not right that we should take a little time to consider the bearings of the matter?
    What is our object? What is the object, I venture to say, in this matter, of the United States Government, as well as of ourselves? It is to get a document which all sign in the same spirit, which all sign meaning the same thing, which all sign with the same good will, the same heartiness, and the same determination to maintain it. I do not think that the time has been lost. We have been greatly helped in our consideration of these problems by the remarkable and very interesting speech delivered by Mr Kellogg before, if I remember rightly, the Foreign Policy Association in New York. That speech shows quite clearly that it was not the desire of the United States Government to impair the engagements of those who had already laid the foundations of peace and reconciliation in Europe, whether by the Covenant with its larger obligations, or whether by the Treaties of Locarno. It is quite possible to reconcile our obligations under these instruments with the new declaration which Mr. Kellogg invites us to take. The present position of the matter is that

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    His Majesty's Government in this country have concluded their examination of the proposals. Their comments and their suggestions for the reply to be made to the Government of the United States are, I suppose, on their way to the Dominions at this moment.
    Here I will refer to a question put to me yesterday by the hon. and gallant Gentleman, which I did not answer at the time, but promised to deal with to-day. I thought that, having regard to the number of Powers already addressed by the United States, to the difficulties, by correspondence, of bringing six Powers readily and easily into agreement, and the dangers, which are often in correspondence, of magnifying differences instead of diminishing them, that some other procedure would perhaps have led us more quickly and surely to the end we desire. My mind reverted back, naturally for me, to the procedure which we employed so successfully before and at the Conference of Locarno, and I tentatively suggested that, as in that case, the way might be smoothed for us and the differences, if there were any, reduced to a minimum, if a meeting of the jurists took place in which they could exchange opinions and arguments. But as soon as I learned that that proposal did not commend itself to one of the Governments concerned, I withdrew it, and we shall proceed therefore now by the other ordinary diplomatic channels. As soon, therefore, as the reply of the Dominions has been received by us, we shall hope to deliver our answer to the Government of the United States, and I need scarcely say after my opening words on this topic that our answer will be to the effect of our desire to cooperate in the conclusion of such a, pact as is proposed, and to engage with the interested Governments in the negotiations required for that purpose.
    Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY: Before the right hon. Gentleman concludes, may I ask him if what he has just told us means that, providing our Dominions agree, we are perfectly free to negotiate directly and are not bound to consult France, for example, in any way?
    Sir A. CHAMBERLAIN: No, Sir, of course we are not bound to consult with any other Government unless we think it desirable to do so. But the purpose of
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    the American Government was, in the first instance, to get the signatures of six Governments, and if we can contribute anything to securing unity among the six Governments we shall be very glad to do so.
    Mr. RAMSAY MacDONALD: May I ask if the right hon. Gentleman has any idea as to when he will be able to deliver the Note to America, after having consulted the Dominions? Will it be a matter of weeks or of days?
    Sir A. CHAMBERLAIN: I should hope, assuming that the Dominions concur in a reply, and that further time is not needed for consideration by them, that I should at once hand a reply to the American Ambassador in this country, and as soon as it is in the hands of his Government I think it would be their desire, as certainly it would be mine, that it should be published.
    Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY: I begin by saying that, the statement to which we have just listened, as far as it goes—and I am conscious of the right hon. Gentleman's responsibilities—is altogether satisfactory. I.say that because I will have to make some further suggestions which will sound rather like criticisms. I take it that as soon as the Dominions have agreed an official Note is to be sent in reply to the Kellogg invitation, and we gather that the Note will be one of acceptance. I regret, however, that on behalf of His. Majesty's Government a more immediate and quicker declaration has not been made. In the case of the Locarno Treaty, am I right in saying that the right hon. Gentleman only consulted the Dominions after he had signed the instrument? Is it not the case that he was able to pledge this country in that case to make war if required and that the meaning of Locarno was that we were obliged to make war with all our resources on the side of France or Germany if either party violated the Agreement? The right hon. Gentleman was able to sign away the honour of this country to intervene in the defence of the Locarno Agreement without consulting the Dominions. The right hon. Gentleman will correct me if I am wrong.
    Sir A. CHAMBERLAIN: No, I will not undertake to correct the hon. and gallant Gentleman. I do not propose to inter-

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    rupt him, and he must not cite me as a witness in support of any statement he makes. The hon. and gallant Member has already been inaccurate.
    Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY: Am I still inaccurate when I say that the agreement of the Dominions to the Locarno instrument has not been received? However, I think I am speaking within the knowledge of the Committee when I say that it was not necessary to consult the Dominions before pledging this country to make war under the Locarno Agreement, but the assent of all the Dominions is required in the case of pledging the country to abandon war and to preserve peace. There we have an extraordinary anomaly, and I hope the Under-Secretary, when he replies, will give the Committee some reassurance on that point. The Foreign Secretary does not often upset my balance. His unfailing courtesy and the consideration which he shows to the humblest Back Bencher are apt to disarm, but this afternoon, to use a common phrase, he completely bowled me over. The funny part of it is that the right hon. Gentleman believed what he was saying. He said that this country had never used war as an instrument of national policy. Of course he excepted the Crusades, and I apologise for so far forgetting myself as to interrupt the right hon. Gentleman by reminding him of the last war but one on a large scale which we had. There have been a score of minor wars with which I am not so familiar, but I was referring to a war waged by a Government of which the right hon. Gentleman was a distinguished Member. The South African War has usually been considered by the people of this country to have been a war of aggression, as was shown at the polls in 1906.
    The CHAIRMAN: The hon. Member may say that that is his opinion, but he cannot go into the subject, otherwise this discussion on the Foreign Office Vote will turn into a historical disquisition.
    Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY: I was not going into the details, and, to tell the truth, I have not armed myself with the facts. But my point is that there is no good in taking up this atti-
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    tude of saintly hypocrisy, if I dare say so. All modern nations have committed sins against this new plan of peace. All have broken the pledge which it is now proposed to sign, and we might as well realise that there is no use in coming to repentance pretending that we have never sinned. Such an attitude on the part of Ministers only reinforces the popular conception, all too widely held in Europe and America that the Englishman is good at deceiving himself and hopes to deceive others in the same way. Nothing is to be gained by romantic extravagances such as we have heard from the right hon. Gentleman.
    I do not wish, however, to appear too critical, and, therefore, may I be allowed to compliment the right hon. Gentleman on still being in a position to defend his own Estimates? I thought that part of his functions, perhaps during that short holiday to which he referred, had been usurped by the Secretary of State for India. The Secretary of State for India was reported to have made a curious suggestion during his golfing expedition on the Continent. The Foreign Minister of Germany has chivalrously come forward and denied that these statements are of any importance, but, apparently, the sort of policy discussed, as a result of the noble Lord's visit to Berlin, was on the lines that there should be a new alignment of the three principal Western European Powers, England, Germany and France, and that they should form a kind of alliance against Russia. I took it on myself to question the Prime Minister as soon as these reports appeared. They were widely circulated in French and German papers, and created a great deal of disturbance in France. One of my excuses for mentioning the matter is that we know of the Foreign Secretary's proper desire to remain on the closest possible terms of political intimacy with France. The Prime Minister said that the Secretary of State for India had only paid a private visit to Berlin and was not there in his capacity as Minister. But I noticed when I put the question that hon. Gentlemen opposite who are not without importance in their own party, endorsed the proposals alleged to have been made in Berlin by the Secretary of State for India.
    Sir A. CHAMBERLAIN: I think I ought to say that my Noble Friend the Secretary of State for India made no such proposal. It is denied by the other statesmen, and I have my Noble Friend's authority to deny it.
    Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY: I am very much obliged. I presume then that is no part of the policy of His Majesty's Government?
    Sir A. CHAMBERLAIN: Certainly not.
    Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY: I accept the fact that the Secretary of State for India was misrepresented or misquoted. The reporters, as usual, are to blame. I am glad to learn that such is not the policy of His Majesty's Government. Any such policy would be quite foreign to the subject matter of the second part of this Debate. I thought there was unconscious humour in the fact that we should be discussing recent events in Egypt and the Kellogg Note on the same afternoon; but it would be a travesty on the whole policy which we are attempting to follow with America, if the attempts to encircle Russia or form alliances against Russia were continuing. I understand that Italy has sent a favourable reply to the American proposal. The right hon. Gentleman has made as friendly a reply as he could in the present situation, Germany has replied in a friendly way and Japan, I understand, is favourably inclined. That means that five out of six great Powers, including America, are agreed on this great new departure for the outlawry of war. It will follow that other Powers must be invited, and that the policy that was certainly pursued for some time by His Majesty's Government of trying to align the rest of Europe against Russia will have to be abandoned.
    Something else follows. Is it understood that it will not be passible, if we sign such an instrument with Japan, to continue the Singapore base? Other things will follow as well. It will be possible to repair the damage that was done at Geneva last autumn. It is recognised I think that in the present Covenant of the League of Nations there is a gap especially in reference to Article 16. The State members of the League under Article 16 may impose economic sanctions by a blockade upon
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    a recalcitrant member or a member who does not keep international obligations. The Americans have been declaring for some time, especially since the Geneva Naval Conference, that they will not recognise any blockade in future by any group of Powers to which they are not a party, and that they are prepared to uphold their nationals in carrying on what they consider to be legitimate commerce with all the world. For that reason they say they intend to have a Navy of a size which can safeguard their commerce. There was, therefore, a loophole left in one of the most important sanctions of the Covenant of the League. In a speech to the Foreign Affairs Council in New York on 15th March, Mr. Kellogg declared very plainly that his proposed multilaterial pact would not violate the terms of the League Covenant, or conflict with the obligations of the members of the League, and Senator Borah has said much the same thing.
    Incidentally, these declarations meet the objections of certain persons who have been arguing that the proposed Pact would conflict with the Covenant of the League. I think, having studied the reports of the speeches of Mr. Kellogg, and the article of Senator Borah in the "New York Times" of 5th February, there is nothing hostile in these proposals, either to the Locarno Agreement or the League Covenant. It follows, if the Pact is signed, that America can hardly support her nationals in treating with a State member of the League who has 'offended against the other members of the League, and on whom the Council of the League has decided to bring economic pressure. That closes a very wide loophole. That being the case, it is absolutely necessary that as soon as may be, we should enter into a two-party conference with the American Government to consider the necessary revisions of international law at sea. If America on her part—and I believe it is an inescapable corollary of the policy now being embarked upon—is prepared not to break a League of Nations blockade, we on our part must express our willingness to abandon the right of private blockade. These two things go together. The only difference between the two great English-speaking peoples, that could make war thinkable, is a difference in interpretation of maritime rights at sea in time of war.
    Sir PHILIP PILDITCH: Why does the hon. and gallant Member think that the declaration of Mr. Kellogg implies that America would not think of interfering with a League blockade?
    Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY: I think it follows as a corollary. Both Mr. Kellogg and the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, have declared that the American proposal in no way conflicts with the Covenant of the League. That being so, surely the declarations which were made recently in America especially after the Geneva Naval Conference that America would trade with a nation which was being blockaded and boycotted cannot stand. Therefore I do not think I go too far in saying that it follows, as a further corollary, that America will have to recognise that a League blockade would not necessarily be broken by her, and 1 submit that we should express our willingness to discuss with the United States the whole question of maritime rights at sea in time of war. I repeat that this is the only question which would make war thinkable between the two peoples, and all who have studied the present and recent relations between the British and American peoples must be driven to that same conclusion.
    Rear-Admiral BEAMISH: Do I understand you to say that you, in common with the United States, are now prepared, in consequence of these proposals, to give up belligerent rights and neutral rights during war?
    Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY: Not during a war for enforcing the observance of agreements by covenanting Powers against a recalcitrant Power, but certainly during what I referred to a moment ago as a private war. If we still cling to our sovereign right of making war on some other nation and cutting off her commerce, we cannot expect other nations to recognise that right in the future if we agree to signing the Kellogg Treaty. As Viscount Grey said in a speech which a great many Members of this House heard with pleasure, the greater covers the less. The Kellogg Treaty covers the Covenant of the League of Nations and Locarno and the other legitimate instruments for keeping the peace of the world.
    Mr. AUSTIN HOPKINSON: May I ask the hon. and gallant Gentleman—
    Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY: No, I am afraid I cannot give way.
    The CHAIRMAN: This Debate is getting rather too conversational.
    Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY: Perhaps I have not explained very clearly the policy I am trying to outline, but it seems to me that our line must now be as follows: The Foreign Secretary has committed the Government, in so many words, and provided the Dominions agree, to accepting the American proposals, and we hope that as many other nations as possible will accept them. That means that five nations adhere in principle to the great proposal for the renunciation of war as a national policy. The next step which it seems to me, should in the first instance be taken between this country and America, must be a full examination of all the problems that remain unsolved in connection with international law at sea. I am as certain as I can be that if we on our part are prepared to renounce the private right of blockade, that is, the right of putting on a blockade as an instrument of national policy in a private war, that America on her part will be prepared not to give comfort and aid to her nationals who may try to break a League blockade or a blockade that has been enforced, as President Wilson laid down in the second of his original 14 points, for the enforcement of international covenants and agreements. The second of the 14 points was left out of the Armistice terms on the insistence of His Majesty's Government, supported at that time by the French Government. I think it will have to be resurrected.
    The second of the 14 points laid down that the seas or parts of the seas could not be closed in peace or war except for the enforcement of international covenants by international action. That plainly envisaged the abandonment of the right of private war and of private blockade, and we practically agree to that if we agree to the Kellogg proposals to-day. Whether all the Members of the party opposite have quite thought out the implications of the Kellogg proposals I do not know, but I am quite certain that the Foreign Secretary has spoken for the great majority of the people of

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    this country in declaring that we are prepared to accept the Kellogg proposals as soon as we get Dominion adherence, which surely will be forthcoming. That being the case, we must follow up the implications of the Kellogg proposals, and now, perhaps, that war is disestablished as an institution and as a national policy, we can make another and a more fruitful attempt to erect a structure of peace by a limitation of armaments by agreement. Above all, I hope, we will have brought about or will bring about a psychological change amongst the heavily-armed nations which will enable us to cut down the terrific expenditure on armaments both here and on the Continent of Europe and in America, and that will really round up the work that was begun in the Covenant of the League of Nations, with its admitted imperfections, when it was originally signed.
    Sir RENNELL RODD: I would claim the indulgence of the Committee, not only because I am addressing it for the first time, but also because of a rather husky voice after a recent attack of laryngitis. In the circumstances, I would not have ventured to interpose in the Debate but for the fact that I lived eight consecutive years of my life in Egypt, and in relatively recent times have once more had the opportunity of studying rather closely subsequent developments in that country. When I heard the recent action of the British Government criticised, I felt I was entitled to express the views of one who has had considerable experience in Egyptian administration and who has followed the vicissitudes of that country with close attention in the service to which he has belonged almost ever since the beginning of the British occupation in 1882. I realise that now, at last, after some 40 years, we really have a definite policy with regard to Egypt, a policy which seems to me to represent the maximum that we can properly concede and the minimum that we can accept from a country with which we are, for various reasons, indissolubly connected, and which, after all, owes to us not only its regeneration from anarchy and its present prosperity but also its actual independence. That independence connotes also certain conditions, conditions which, it seems to me, have been accepted in principle from the first by reasonable and
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    educated opinion in Egypt, and on which we have no option but to insist.
    It would not be possible within the few moments during which I shall venture to detain the Committee to go into all the antecedents, the events, which led up to the Declaration of 1922, but I really think that in order to have a clear conception of what has recently taken place, and of the reasons why the Government could not act otherwise than they have done, it is a little necessary to look back at the sequence of events there and of our experience. After the rejection in 1887 of our attempt to negotiate an understanding with Turkey by which we should have evacuated Egypt in three years, there was a long period of drift in that country in which our energies were almost exclusively devoted to material development, a development which, unfortunately, and especially after the retirement of the late Lord Cromer, entailed a very large increase in the number of British and foreign officials in that country. Under the educational system then in force in Egypt, there was not a sufficient number of young Egyptians trained to higher studies who were competent to take on very responsible work. On the other hand, with a population more than 90 per cent. of which remained illiterate, there was growing up in the country an ever increasing group of what I might describe as second-class clerks, for whom there was little or no prospect of getting employment. That group grew up owing to the ambition of the small farmer, when he became prosperous and when his security from oppression was guaranteed, to pass his sons into a new condition of life in which they would wear Western clothes instead of the traditional Galabeeah of the country. I think we cannot altogether escape from a certain responsibility, owing to the educational policy which was then in force, which was starved in the higher grades and which really never took any proper pains to consider the moral and social training of the young Egyptian, for having contributed to creating a class for which there was no other occupation available than that of political agitator and propagandist. We have, however, to recognise the fact that such a class exists in Egypt and that in recent years, owing to the use which has been made of them, there have been a long series of regrettable aggressions

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    and acts of violence. I feel convinced, from my knowledge of Egypt, that it would be very premature, very dangerous, to weaken in any way the powers which now exist for controlling and repressing such acts of violence.
    If we pursue a little further the sequence of events in that country, we shall see how these things have followed on political events with a certain regularity. When it was found impossible, here to give due consideration to the representations that were put forward by the Egyptian Ministers immediately after the close of the Great War, during which Egypt suffered many privations and disabilities with commendable patience, a situation arose in Egypt which led in a comparatively short time to the deplorable events of 1919. Had it been possible for the Commission which went out to investigate them to start immediately after order had been re-established, I think a settlement would have been comparatively easy to find, but six or more months had elapsed, and a reaction had set in. The special mission on which I accompanied Lord. Milner was eventually successful in restoring a condition of confidence to the Egyptian people. Again, I think if it had been possible to accept their proposals forthwith, a settlement of the whole question would have been easily arrived at. We realised there that it was quite impossible to return to former conditions, as has been suggested from the other side to-day. A great change had come over the spirit of the world at the end of the War, and it was perfectly obvious that with a country with which we were so intimately associated as Egypt, new links would have to be formed in the chain in order to stand a strain which had hitherto never been encountered.
    At that time, however, our proposals appeared too drastic, though we have come round to them since. But they had the effect that the Moderate Party in Egypt regained the ascendancy. This, however, had also this very unfortunate counterpart in the fact that the extremists, seeing the re-establishment of moderate opinion in Egypt, engaged in acts of violence in Alexandria, and in the following months we witnessed a series of deplorable aggressions against British officers and British officials in Egypt.
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    Under the condition of things brought about, any Government in Egypt practically became impossible. Government in Egypt is only possible with the cooperation of the Egyptians. When that co-operation failed the nigh Commissioner was obliged to admit that he could no longer control the situation and that paralysis had taken place in the administration of Egypt itself. He was able, fortunately, more fortunately than we were, to convince the Government that the Egyptian and British standards might be adjusted.
    The result was the Declaration of 1922, with the points therein reserved for future consideration. I welcomed that Declaration because it seemed to me that thence-forward, for the first time, we really had a definite policy in Egypt. I feel that we have been looking at things a little bit from the point of view that institutions in Egypt are very much the same as they are in this country. A Legislative Assembly which has barely come into existence, which is filled with elements entirely unaccustomed to political life, is apt to play curious pranks, sometimes, and even Egyptian Ministers, as we have known in the old days, though acting with the very best intentions in the world, were sometimes very ready to embark on legislation which would have led them into the most desperate shoals had there not been some guiding hand to steer the barque through the central channel. In those circumstances, I do not believe it would have been possible for us to take any other step than that which has been taken until some definite adjustment is made. This has always been open to the Egyptian Government—it has been open to them during the last four or five years. Until that adjustment is made it is impossible for us to budge from the position we have adopted. On the other hand, it is equally impossible for us to renounce any measures calculated to prevent that adjustment being attempted with prejudice to our interests.
    Knowing Egypt and the Egyptian people well, and having shown them—and many Egyptians have thanked me for it—that I was able to sympathise with their aspirations as a young people when, after many centuries of oppression and repression, they at length achieved national consciousness, I can only say once more than we must he watchful of what is done in their Legis-

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    lative Assembly, and that we cannot permit the introduction of any legislation which would be obviously dangerous, not only to our own people and their property in Egypt, but to the lives and property of foreigners whom we had actually undertaken to safeguard during the Protectorate. We are under definite obligations to safeguard their property, and we must consider that as one of the most sacred obligations in Egypt. We cannot permit any legislation to be introduced there which would render the protection of foreigners little better—I do not wish to use a sarcastic word, and I will say, little better than something written on paper which could never be put into force.
    6.0 p.m.
    Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: I count it a privilege to be the first to have an opportunity of congratulating my right hon. Friend the Member for St. Marylebone (Sir Rennell Rodd) upon his maiden speech in this House. He has won distinction already in many spheres, and after listening to his speech I am sure we all feel that he will be able to make a really serious contribution to the discussions in this House upon matters of very great importance. I congratulate the Foreign Secretary upon his speech, and I am also going to congratulate him upon having so very little to answer. I listened very carefully to the speech of the Leader of the Opposition order to find out the basis of his criticism, and the impression left on my mind was that, as far as the Debate was concerned if the Leader of the Opposition had been in the position of the Foreign Secretary he would have done exactly the same thing, and he could have done nothing else. I do not know that I can say very much more—
    Whereupon the Gentleman, Usher of the Black Rod being come with a Message, the Chairman left the Chair.
    Mr. SPEAKER resumed the Chair.

  ROYAL ASSENT.
  Message to attend the Lords Commissioners.
  The House went; and, having returned,
  Mr. SPEAKER reported the Royal Assent to:

  1. Rating and Valuation Act, 1928.

  2. Local Authorities (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1928.

  3. Provisional Orders (Marriages) Confirmation Act, 1928.

  4. Ministry of Health Provisional Orders Confirmation (No. 1) Act, 1928.

  5. Ministry of Health Provisional Order Confirmation (No. 2) Act, 1928.

  6. Ministry of Health Provisional Order Confirmation (Ealing Extension) Act, 1928.

  7. Ministry of Health Provisional Order Confirmation (Luton Extension) Act, 1928.

  8. Harwich Harbour Act, 1928.

  9. Mersey Docks and Harbour Board Act, 1928.

  10. Governments Stock and Other Securities Investment Company, Limited, Act, 1928.

  11. Bournemouth-Swanage Motor Road and Ferry Act, 1928.

SUPPLY.
Again considered in Committee.
[Major Sir ARCHIBALD SINCLAIR in the Chair.]
Question again proposed,
"That a sum, not exceeding £116,700, be granted to His Majesty, to complete the sum necessary to defray the Charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1929, for the Salaries and Expenses of the Department of His Majesty's Secretary: of State for Foreign Affairs."
Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: There is only one question we have to consider, and it is whether we are going to remain in Egypt or not. If we remain in Egypt, then we must discharge our obligations. I have yet to learn that there is any party in this House which has put forward a definite proposition to clear out of Egypt. I doubt very much whether you could form a Government, or get a sufficient number of Members of this House to form a Government, that would be prepared to put forward such a proposition. I do not believe that such a Government would get a sufficient number of Members to support it in the Division

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Lobby. Egypt is in a very peculiar position. It is obviously an exceptional country. It is a corridor country. It is exactly in the same position as Panama, on the other side, and the American Government have found is absolutely necessary to plant garrisons there, and to exert a certain control over the country. They find it essential to do so. They would watch with very jealous eyes any attempt on the part of any foreign country to interfere with Panama. I am not criticising it, but what is true about Panama is certainly much more true about Egypt. It practically divides the British Empire. You have, on one side of Egypt, in the British Empire, a population of 100,000,000. On the other side of Egypt, Egypt being the only road between them, you have a population of 300,000,000, and that is practically the only access, unless you go right round the Cape. During the War, we realised that it was not merely a theoretical question, that it was not merely a nominally geographical question, but a question of vital moment to the Empire itself We found that all troops from India—practically a million of all kinds and grades—had to come through Egypt; all the troops from Australia had to come through Egypt, and all the troops from New Zealand had to come through Egypt; and, had it not been for the protection of British troops, that country would have been, not merely a nominally Turkish province, but really a Turkish province under German control.
The whole defence of Egypt devolved upon us, and I recollect the anxiety of Lord Kitchener, who knew a good deal about Egypt. I think that his apprehensions turned out to be exaggerated, but he was very apprehensive, as my right hon. Friend knows very well, as to what might happen there, and it was deemed necessary to send an enormously large force to Egypt in order to protect that country and prevent it from being captured by the Turks, officered by Germans. It is no use talking about Egypt as if it were an ordinary country. It may be fortunate or unfortunate, but Egypt is so placed that it is the corridor between east and west, and, as the British Empire is the one that is most concerned with a corridor of that kind, it has devolved upon us to take charge of it. If we did not, some other country
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would inevitably take charge of it. When there was trouble in Egypt a short time ago, the French, the Italians, the Greeks, and I rather think the Americans, appealed to us for protection, and said that unless we protected them they would themselves have to land troops there. That was quite right. We said that the obligation was ours, and we would discharge it, but, unless we do discharge it, someone else will inevitably do so.
I agree with my right hon. Friend the Member for St. Marylebone that we are too apt to discuss the Egyptian Parliament in terms of the British Parliament. It is, however, quite a new experience for them. I am not trying to disparage them because they are a foreign people, or even because they have not yet reached a standard of literacy which would enable them to be a thoroughly modern democracy; but they are not accustomed to free institutions. Liberty is not merely a privilege to be conferred; it is a habit to be acquired. We know that in this country it has taken us hundreds of years to acquire the mastery of democratic institutions, and, even in countries which are far advanced in comparison with Egypt, one sees how constantly parliamentary institutions break down because people are not habituated to institutions of that kind. It occurs in many European countries, and in others as well, and undoubtedly the same thing will happen in Egypt. Can anyone imagine any country habituated to self-government passing a law which punishes the protector of the law more severely than the man who breaks the law—punishes him four times as severely? That is a kind of thing that no country accustomed to self-government would ever have dreamed of passing; but there they have not yet mastered the art of self-government. I have no doubt at all that they will in due course, and it will be time enough then to discuss what would be the right thing for us to do in face of developments of that kind.
My right hon. Friend asked a question which he said he had no doubt would be explained. I wish he would explain the question, because I do not understand it. It was a question which was full of the obscurity which occasionally characterises him when he likes, but, as far as I can understand it, he was referring to

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the Fourteen Points in self-determination. I was not the author of the Fourteen Points, and it was never proposed so far as Egypt was concerned. I do not think that anyone, not even President Wilson, ever suggested it as far as Egypt was concerned. It is a totally different proposition. It is a very easy thing, if anyone exercises his ingenuity, to suggest that the Foreign Secretary ought to have done this or the other thing, or that he should have written in a different sense. I am not doing that, because I do not find anything to criticise. I dare say, if I applied my mind to it, I could find something. But it is very difficult to handle a situation like this in Egypt. I have had some experience of it. The Government of which I was the head was the author of the Unilateral Declaration. We did not agree with the recommendation made by the Milner Commission that troops should be sent to the Canal. I am still very doubtful about that proposition. I do not pretend to know enough about Egypt, but I should ask the Government very seriously to consider, before they committed themselves to that proposition, what the effect would be upon the British Army if you are always going to send contingents of it to desolate places here and there. You must think of your Army first, and I am doubtful whether you could exert the same authority by planting your troops there. Still, if the Government come to the conclusion that it is a feasible proposition, I am not criticising them from that point of view.
At any rate, if the right hon. Gentleman erred at all, it was in the direction of straining his authority and the position of this country in order to meet the demands of Egypt. Whether in 10 years the League of Nations takes that point of view or not, I am very glad that he has agreed that this matter shall be referred to the League of Nations to decide definitely—that it shall be referred to some body to which we can present our case and which will decide quite impartially on the facts. I have not the slightest apprehension as to what will happen, because any body set up by the League of Nations to adjudicate on a proposition of that kind would give fair play to both parties. The right hon. Gentleman has not committed himself, but is proposing only to refer the matter to the adjudication of the League. I congratulate him also on
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the fact that the Egyptian Prime Minister has acknowledged the very conciliatory manner in which he has handled the matter, and I hope now that that is the end of the trouble, and that Egypt will proceed on its way without giving us any further anxiety. I think the incident itself may have a very good effect. It was necessary for us to make it absolutely clear, by a demonstration of this character, that we meant to abide definitely by our obligations, and were neither going to be cajoled nor bullied out of them. I think it will have an extraordinarily good effect in Egypt itself. With regard to America, I am not quite clear what line the right hon. Gentleman means to take. I understand that on the whole it is friendly—
Sir A. CHAMBERLAIN: Hear, hear!
Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: I am not sure whether he is going to have some reservations here. I agree with the Leader of the Opposition in thinking that that would be a mistake. After Mr. Kellogg's speech, I do not think there is any point in making reservations. He has made it clear that, if we accept his declaration, it does not interfere in the least with our obligations under Locarno or under the Covenant of the League of Nations, and those are the only two obligations that we have, so far as I can recall them; I do not know of any others. He has made it quite clear that the acceptance of his proposals would not interfere in the least with the obligations which we have already incurred. I agree with the right hon. Gentleman that we must abide by declarations which we have already made, and by obligations which we have already incurred. We have the reputation of standing by our treaties, and that is a great asset to this country. We waged a great war because we were parties to a treaty, and that treaty was infringed. Therefore, I agree with the right hon. Gentleman that we ought to make it clear that we are not entering into any arrangement which is a departure from solemn obligations which we have already incurred. I think that Germany has already made that clear, and I do not see why, that declaration having been made, it should not be possible to accept this.
I agree that it is purely the acceptance of a principle or a declaration, but I agree with the Leader of the Opposition

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that that has a value. It is just like saying, "Thou shalt not steal." The enforcement of it depends upon other laws and other machinery, but it has its value in training people to regard it as an offence against the moral law and against society; and, in the same way, if you get a declaration outlawing war, it will have its moral value and its instructional value. I think there is another advantage in accepting this from America, and that is because it has come from America. America is the only great country—let us say it quite frankly—that has increased its Army and its Navy in comparison with what they were before the War, and, when a country that does that actually comes and offers to outlaw war, we ought by all means to accept it the very first time it is done; and it might have a very useful effect, because, having outlawed war, we surely ought to have no difficulty in making arrangements about cruisers.
There is another advantage. The United States of America and Russia are the only two countries that have not come into the League of Nations. I think the United States of America have experienced practical difficulties in consequence, and they have made attempts by various propositions to come into the community of nations in a general effort to promote peace. The party in power, having declared against the League of Nations, find it impossible to go back upon that, but they have made other proposals, and, if they are willing to make proposals of that kind, which would bring them into co-operation with the Powers that are inside the League, ultimately it will work out all right, and we shall be working together. Therefore, there is a real advantage in accepting this proposition because it comes from the United States of America, and I hope the right hon. Gentleman will do it and make it quite clear, as he has done to-day, that if there has been any delay it is not because there has been any hesitation. That is really very important. It is also important that it should be made clear that we are not merely coming in behind France. France has other obligations, and very dangerous obligations, in Central Europe. They have to take those into account. We have no such obligations, and I do not think there ought to be left any impression,
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either in France, in Germany, in the United States, or in this country, that we have not a mind of our own upon this subject. We have our own interests, we have our own view, and we have our own standing in this matter. We are in a better position than any other country in the world except the United States of America to make peace and to ensure peace in the world, and I hope the right hon. Gentleman, when he comes to make his Declaration, will make a really British Declaration and will speak on behalf of the conscience of his own country. Let France speak her own mind. Let her deal with her own difficulties. Let him speak in the name of Britain and of her Empire. I think it will have a very great effect throughout the whole world.
Captain L0DER: It is a little difficult to switch one's mind from one of the newest of the great countries of the world to one of the oldest, but it is to Egypt to which I wish to direct my remarks. The Government, I feel sure, will be grateful for the support they have received from the right hon. Gentleman. He has given almost complete support to the Government. I am not quite sure that we on this side do not watch him most carefully when he is distributing his favours, but, at the same time, on the subject of Egypt there is no one whose support we have a greater right to expect. After all, he was himself Prime Minister during the years when the events took place which are the foundation of the present situation, and, as he may justly remark, it was the situation in Egypt during the War which brought home to people in this country the essential nature of the special relations in which we must stand to Egypt. There are those, on the one hand, who say that we are not firm enough in our relations with Egypt. On the other hand, there are those who say we are always bullying her. In point of fact, I do not think either of these two theories will hold water. Take the case of what happened at the beginning of the War. We might quite well have annexed Egypt. Annexation was considered. Actually we proclaimed a Protectorate. In that way we thought we should be paying regard to the national feelings of the Egyptian people, and at the same time we recognised, what is undoubtedly a fact, that without Egyptian co-operation the

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Government of Egypt is almost impossible. It is very often forgotten that we have never directly administered Egypt. The British and other foreign officials who are in Egypt are there as servants of the Egyptian Government and not of the British Government. They are not appointed in any kind of way from London.
It is a great pity that the Declaration of February, 1922, could not have been made immediately after the Armistice. That Declaration gave us a policy. It did make people understand what we were really after and what the important points in our relations in Egypt were. Immediately after the War I suppose people had not had time to look round and take account of what was going on. It has always seemed to me that the really vital mistake, so far as mistakes have been made on our side, was made immediately after the Armistice, when the Egyptian Prime Minister and Zaghloul Pasha asked to be allowed to come to England and open the question of the status of Egypt. Naturally, I suppose, when that request was refused it was not imagined that it would have such serious results. Very likely the right hon. Gentleman who was then Prime Minister said to himself, "We must take these things one by one. We must first of all deal with the situation in Europe, and after that we will deal with the situation in the East." That was a very natural thing to say, but of course he left out of account the fact that the people of Egypt thought their problems were the most important of any. That, I think, was a mistake. If it could have been avoided—and it is difficult to say it could—it might possibly have produced the Declaration of 1922 at the end of 1918, and might have saved us many years of bickering and difficulties of which we yet can see no definite solution. Yet things have progressed a great deal in these last 10 years. By the Declaration of February, 1922, Egypt's independence was proclaimed. With that proclamation of independence went the establishment of Egyptian diplomatic representation abroad, the abolition of martial law, which had been in force all through the War, and the termination of the control of the internal affairs of Egypt through the retirement of a number of foreign officials. Whether Egypt has not
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lost more than she has gained by dispensing with the services of these very devoted servants is, I think, open to question. The fact remains that Egypt is now entitled only to employ, except in one or two cases, such foreign officials as she wishes.
That fact, together with the general state of the country and the disorder in which it has been in the last few years, has undoubtedly brought about a serious decline of the administrative efficiency of the Government of Egypt. That fact has been one of the most important in creating difficulties for the Egyptian Government itself. The Declaration of February, 1922, was a unilateral Declaration and by it we gave independence to Egypt, but at the same time when we made those four reservations we put it to the Egyptians to fulfil their part of the bargain, which was to set up such a constitution, such a standard of administration, that it would be possible for us to negotiate our agreement with them on those four points on terms which would not derogate from the independence of the country. Those conditions have never yet materialised, but since the Declaration of 1922, the onus has been on Egypt and not upon us. We have made the fullest possible gesture. We have said, "We abrogate the Protectorate. We do not wish to be in any relations with Egypt which would make the people think Egypt was a subordinate country. We are only waiting for Egypt to put her house in order so that those four reserved points can be settled." We hope that time will come very soon, but I do not think everyone quite realises how extraordinarily difficult it is for an Egyptian Government to make the necessary progress in the direction of getting a stable administration.
The Leader of the Opposition said the Treaty had been turned down not so much by Sarwat as by his own Cabinet. Of course, his own Cabinet only contains two Liberal members, and the rest are all members of the Wafd, but, apart from that, the difficulty of the Parliamentary situation has been that ever since the first Parliament elected under the new constitution at the end of 1923 or the beginning of 1924, there has been a Wafdist majority but no actual or potential Wafd Prime Minister. They have not desired to enter into negotiations with

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England or made the slightest effort to improve relations with this country. Every other Prime Minister has been faced with a hostile majority in the Chamber. If Sarwat had had the ordinary constitutional majority which we should expect a Government to have in this country, there is no question that be would have been able to carry the Treaty through. Unfortunately, that was not the case. It is exceedingly difficult, and I think we ought to take that into consideration, especially in judging the attitude of Egyptian leaders such as Sarwat Pasha. I am glad no one so far has tried to take either a tragic or a bellicose view of the situation. This is not the first time we have had our little troubles with Egypt. After all, we can carry on under the Declaration of February, 1922. It has its inconveniences, but these inconveniences are not very great from our point of view. From the point of view of Egypt, the position is much more unsatisfactory. These perpetual crises do no good either to the moral or to the material credit of Egypt, and it is very much more to Egyptian interests than it is to ours, I believe, to reach an early settlement.
The right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary, I think, ought to be congratulated upon the patience which he has shown during the years he has been in office. I think he ought also to be congratulated upon the broad-mindedness with which he faced the problem of the Treaty which he was negotiating with Sarwat. From time to time one hears it rumoured that this Government are unfriendly to the League of Nations, yet in looking through that Treaty I find that the League of Nations is mentioned in almost every other article. It is a document in which we express our willingness to lay such an important question as to where our troops shall be stationed for the protection of the Canal before the League of Nations if no agreement can be reached in 10 years. I feel sure that the right hon. Gentleman will get not only the support of the Liberal party but the support of most of the hon. Gentlemen opposite, who will in this case, as in other cases, see with what good sense their Leader spoke. I hope that the whole Committee and the whole country will press the Foreign Secretary to maintain that patience and that broad-
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mindedness to which I have alluded, that before very long the Treaty which we all desire will have become an actual fact, and that our relations with Egypt will at last be stabilised.
Mr. THURTLE: I want to say a few words about Egypt. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) said he believed that the Leader of the Opposition, had he been in the same position as the Foreign Secretary, would have acted in a similar way, and I gather also that the right hon. Gentleman himself would have acted in a similar way. It is very good to know that the Liberal party, as represented by the right hon. Gentleman, take the same view as the Conservative party on this issue. They are prepared to back up the warship policy. But I cannot believe that he is right in suggesting that my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition would have taken up any such attitude.
The Foreign Secretary seemed to me to be extraordinarily pleased about the result of the recent crisis in Egypt. He reminded me very much of a new kind of Dr. Pangloss, who says, "All is for the beat in the best of all Foreign Offices." I cannot imagine seriously that he thinks he has achieved anything in the nature of a diplomatic triumph in connection with Egypt. This settlement, such as it is, was not a settlement by negotiation, was not a settlement by argument, was not a settlement of reason, but was, in fact, a settlement of brute force. It was a triumph of the policy of the mailed fist, and if the Foreign Secretary is satisfied with a triumph of that sort, I am bound to say that he is very easily satisfied. The view of the Labour party is, that this policy is a mistaken policy. They do not think that it was necessary over this Public Assemblies Bill to go to the drastic step of sending warships to Egypt and sending an ultimatum to the Government of that country. If it was not necessary, it was bound to do the reputation of the country infinite harm. We are looked upon with suspicion in America, as the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs said, and we are looked upon with suspicion in Russia and in many quarters as a bullying Imperialist Power. We ought not to do anything to give countenance to that kind of belief. But by this policy of

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sending warships to Egypt over a comparatively trivial dispute such as this we have given the impression to the outside world that we are a bullying Power, and are prepared to use force even when force is unnecessary. I want to make it clear here and now that it is futile for the Foreign Secretary, or for the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs, or for anyone else on the benches opposite to identify the policy of the Labour party with the policy of the Government in this matter. We are emphatically in disagreement with what has recently taken place in connection with Egypt, and in case it has escaped the notice of the Committee I would like to call their attention to the statement regarding the Labour party's policy which was issued only last week. It reads:
"The method adopted by the British Government, to enforce its views upon Egypt was that of an ultimatum and a threat of armed force, which the Labour party strongly condemns "—
anyone who suggests that there is uniformity of policy, please note this—
"as wholly unsuitable to the situation, and calculated to leave behind it feelings which are inimical to the growth of the relations desired with the Egyptian people."
You have there in specific language the disavowal of the Labour party that they agree with the policy of the Conservative Government. When I put a question to the Foreign Secretary last week and suggested that there was a considerable body of opinion in this country which dissented from that policy, he said that no such opinion existed. I would ask him now to remember that the Labour party, with all the great mass of working class opinion for which they stand, are opposed to that policy, and I am entitled, therefore, to say that there is a very large body of opinion in the country which feels that the action of the Government was precipitate and provocative. I would like to go further, and make this point. It is idle for Members opposite to try to induce the Labour party to accept the gospel of continuity in foreign policy. Our conception of foreign policy and Imperialist policy is as far apart almost as the poles from the policy of the Conservative Government. The Conservative Government believe, as far as their Imperial policy is concerned, in retaining possession of all those tracts of country which has been obtained in the past,
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by some means or another, as long as they possibly can, and they would only relinquish their hold on those tracts of country reluctantly and as slowly as possible.
The policy of the Labour party is the exact opposite of that. We have Imperialist commitments which we want, to see liquidated at the earliest possible moment. Therefore our policy is to hand back to the people to whom this land belongs, at the earliest possible moment, what is their rightful possession. Whatever obstacles we may encounter we shall show an earnest desire to get those responsibilities liquidated at the earliest possible moment. When you have two totally opposed conceptions of Imperialist policy such as those, you cannot possibly have what is known as continuity. I hope that there will be no attempt on the part of Members on the benches opposite or on the part of Members of the Liberal party to suggest that the Labour party have no distinct and separate Imperialist policy and no distinct and separate foreign policy from that of the present Government.
Let me get back to Egypt. The Declaration which we have been discussing this afternoon has never been accepted by Egypt as one which is valid and binding upon that country. Repeated declarations to that effect have been made by successive Egyptian Prime Ministers. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for St. Marylebone (Sir R. Rodd), to whose speech we listened with so much interest this afternoon, said that we had given Egypt her independence. What sort of independence is it that we have given to Egypt? It is an independence which involves occupation by foreign troops. It is an independence which debars the country from doing anything in connection with foreign policy. It is an independence which involves, as we have seen in the present crisis, interference with Parliament as far as the-regulation of its own domestic affairs is concerned. Surely, one might say, if that is independence, if that is freedom, in Heaven's name what is slavery? It does seem to me that if you are giving a country independence, and you hedge it round with all sorts of conditions and restrictions of this kind, it is equivalent to keeping it in bondage. Let me refer to the way in which the Foreign Secretary has treated Egypt on this occasion.

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So far from treating Egypt in a friendly way and desiring to get a satisfactory settlement, he has adopted a patronising and, if I may so put it, a hectoring kind of attitude towards the Egyptian Government. Let me direct the attention of the Committee to paragraph 3 in page 13 of the White Paper—and, mind you, we are not supposed to interfere with the internal affairs of Egypt—
"Recent Egyptian history, from time to time, affords evidence of a willingness to stir up unreasoning political passions in order that they may he turned to party purposes."
That comes from a Minister who was a member of the "Hang the Kaiser" Government.
That comes from the Foreign Secretary who is identified with the party which won the last Election on the Zinovieff letter, and that is the Foreign Secretary who lectures Egyptian politicians on the undesirability of stirring up unreasoning political passions in order that they may be turned to party advantage. Surely, it is absurd for the right hon. Gentleman to stand upon a pedestal like that, and lecture the Egyptian people in this way.
7.0 p.m.
Let me deal with one other point. There is the question of the Canal. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs said it was imperative that we should preserve that as a free means of communication with the rest of the Empire. Let us accept that as being absolutely essential to our existence. He then went on to say that if we did not guard the Canal, if we left it, that someone else would be bound to come in. I could not help wondering, as the right hon. Gentleman was talking—I almost interrupted him to say so—whether he had ever heard of the existence of the League of Nations; because surely if there is one body more than another competent to take charge of that vital means of communication and preserve it not only for the British Empire but for the convenience and well-being of the whole world, it is the League of Nations? As a matter of fact that is a policy which the Labour party has in regard to the Suez Canal. It wants, I say, the Suez Canal put under international control, and I submit that any fair-minded man ought to admit that vital waterways like the Panama and
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Suez Canals and the Straits of Gibraltar ought to be put under international control, so that they can always be free for the use of the whole world and not any particular sections of it.
That is all I wanted to say as far as Egypt is concerned, but I would like to add a few words in conclusion: I have been striving since the end of the War to see the creation of conditions which will guarantee the world against the occurrence of another war. I was extremely glad to hear the attitude expressed by the Foreign Secretary in regard to the Coolidge offer. I believe the whole of the House must be glad to think that there is a possibility, by means of this offer, to build up an effective barrier against the possibility of another war. I would only like to ask the Foreign Secretary to get rid of any kind of reservations, any kind of doubt or misgiving in regard to this matter. Whether he knows it or not I do not know, hut the great mass of the people in this country, irrespective of political affiliations, are passionately desirous of seeing some international bulwark created against another war, and if he will only take his courage in both hands and take this offer from America in the spirit in which it is made, I am sure that he will earn the gratitude of the whole British people.
Lord HUGH CECIL: After listening to the hon. Gentleman who has just spoken no one would dream of denying that the Labour party has a definite foreign policy. Some people might even think that they have several foreign policies. I am sorry that the Leader of the Opposition was not here listening to the hon. Gentleman's statement of the policy of the Labour party. If I understand the hon. Member, his plan is to dispose of the various fragments of the British Empire to people who might be able to manage them. That is an interesting policy, and it must be instructive to the electors of this country, if that is the policy they may expect to be carried out when a Labour Government comes into power. I gravely doubt if the hon. Member in putting forward such a policy would succeed in carrying conviction to the electorate, or would get many votes in support of his party's policy.
Mr. THURTLE: I do submit myself to the people. I am not like the Noble Lord.
Lord H. CECIL: The hon. Member does not submit himself to his own leader. Independence, with him, begins at home, like charity. He is out to make all the different parts of the British Empire independent, and he wishes to make the Members who compose the Labour party not less independent. I welcome very much indeed the impressive and important declaration of the Foreign Secretary that it is the intention of His Majesty's Government at the proper time to accept the proposal of the Government of the United States to make some common declaration of the outlawry of war. Such declarations, of course, are principally important because of their weight with opinion, and I cannot help hoping that the opportunity may be taken to educate opinion by adverting to what really are the root causes of war, and by showing how, if we wish to get rid of them, we must set about that business. Many people, even many of those who are guides to public opinion, seem never to have reflected that the essential cause of war lies in the resolve of every nationality to insist on what it conceives to be its own vital interests, in defiance often of the conflicting interests of other nations. The greater part of the wars that have taken place, I think it would be true to say, have not really taken place on an issue of right—on anything that is issuable—that you can bring before a tribunal which can even theoretically come to a judgment between the disputants. It is the fundamental difficulty of using arbitration as a complete solution to the problem. Obviously, you cannot go to a Judge and ask him to determine your dispute, unless you admit a common law to begin with, covering the whole area of the dispute, and unless you admit an equal claim to justice and right, a claim which recognises a common standard of right, common both to the litigants in the dispute. Unless you do that there is nothing for the Judge to decide upon.
That is not what happens. In every war you say, "This interest is vital to us. It does not matter to us what other people's interests are. Our first duty is to our own people and to stand by their vital interests, and for that reason we must fight." The effect of that attitude of mind makes war inevitable, and it makes every war and every country engaging in war essentially defensive and
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not aggressive. My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary said with perfect truth that in this country it has never been our plan to make war as part of our policy. That is to say, we have not gone to war to achieve a political object. All the wars we have made we claim to have made defensively or for some other country wrongly and intolerably invaded; and it will be generally found that we never unreasonably threatened the vital interests of other countries, but have acted on the defensive. It is clear that if you once admit that there is no common standard and their interests are put higher than the interests of anyone else, and each country is entitled to insist upon its own interest and disregard the interests of other countries, war from time to time seems to be inevitable and seems to be defensive.
Therefore I do not think, and I have never thought, that arbitration is a complete solution. Arbitration is very valuable, because it enables you to get rid of a great number of minor disputes, and to get authoritative judgment on the meaning of documents on which a dispute may turn. But it does not completely solve the problem, except in getting national opinion all over the world to recognise that now, at any rate, whatever may have been the case in the past centuries, the world is a community whose common interests are more important than the individual interests of each nation. That, I think, is, at any rate, true of the most civilised countries. They are so intimately bound together that they cannot get anything individually by a war which would balance the injury to the whole community. Therefore any war that took place between them would be a civil war rather than an international war, and I believe the late War was of that character, and that that is why it carried destruction so far as it did. The characteristic of civil war is that every part of the community that engages in a civil war is desolated and impoverished in that war.
It would be a valuable thing if, in connection with this American declaration, the whole subject could be explored, because, after all, let us recognise that it is in opinion that there lies the real mischief. Unless you pledge the opinion of the world your safeguards are liable to break down. You must get opinion

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in a new attitude. I think, for example, that it is desirable to recognise that national sentiment, if productive of a great deal of good, like other human passions may be productive of a great deal of evil. It is not at all recognised by the great mass of the people who are still in the habit of thinking that they must stand by their own country, that the nationalist attitude and that the nationalist cause is the right one, that you must insist and vindicate the interest of your country regardless of the interest of the other country. You want to balance that by a loyalty to the European community. That could be done only by change of opinion. Disarmament may be a very valuable thing, but armaments are a sign of evil rather than the cause of it. They are like a high temperature in illness. It would be very desirable, if we could, to carry out disarmament—immensely desirable from the financial point of view; but the root cause of war will be there as long as we have this sense of separateness. The only real idea is to get people accustomed to thinking that they are members of a larger community.
I should like to see the League of Nations divided into three sections. I should like to see a European section which would comprise Africa, an Asiatic section, and an American section which would naturally be dominated by the United States. The three sections would have common meetings once in ten years, but the international business, the normal business, would be done by each section. That would be a more natural limitation of common feeling than the world-wide one, and you would build up the centre of a true European community; and that is the real way of stopping war. The hon. Member who last spoke wanted bulwarks. You cannot stop war by bulwarks. If public opinion in two countries desire war, there will be war, and no treaty, no system of diplomatic negotiations will prevent it. At the present time, so long as the late War is an approximate memory, no doubt opinion, provided the process of diplomatic relation allows time for reflection, will be on the side of peace, and that is the only possible bulwark which will keep war out. What we want to do is to change opinion more thoroughly; to get people not to think so much of nationality as they used to
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do, but to think more of the common interests of the whole world.
The extreme emphasis on nationalism is a very modern thing. It really arose in the 18th and 19th centuries. Earlier, of course, there was a sense of European community; the holy Roman Empire was a relic of it. There was a sense of common Christianity and the Roman Catholic Church for many centuries preserved that sense of civilised mankind or rather of Christian mankind belonging to the community. That disappeared with the smash-up of western Christianity and the growth of rationalist opinion, and during the 19th century people thought of nothing but nationality. It took different forms. The Conservative temperament concentrated on the glory of the British Empire. The Liberal temperament was zealous for small nationalities and new nationalism; the enthusiasm for Garibaldi in Italy and the enthusiasm for various small nationalities all over the world. All these things were part of the same sentiment, and that sort of sentiment is the cause of war. I do impress upon political parties in this House, especially the Labour and Liberal Members of this House, the fact that zeal for nationality is a very imprudent thing—
Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY: Will the Noble Lord impress that on his own party also?
Lord H. CECIL: I know that a great many people of my own party have nationalist errors, but for the moment I am pointing out the danger of it to the Liberal party and the Labour party, who do not even know that they are in the wrong. That knowledge is the first step in contrition, which is called being convinced of sin. For example, the hon. Member for Shoreditch (Mr. Thurtle), while he was asking for bulwarks against war, was insisting on the claims of Egyptian nationality; two almost contradictory frames of mind. The most unwise thing, of the many unwise things which were done in the Treaty which closed the late War, was the bringing into existence of a great number of new nationalities, without the security that they would not be the centres of war.
Mr. LANSBURY: Who did that? It was a Coalition Government of Tories and Liberals who did it, and not Labour people.
Lord H. CECIL: Which was, in my opinion, the very worst Government this country has ever had.
Mr. BROAD: Is not this Government worse?
Lord H. CECIL: This Government is thoroughly unlike that Coalition Government, in every respect. When I was interrupted, I was saying that these new nationalities, these small nationalities were called into being, and necessarily they have become centres of armaments, centres of war expenditure. No doubt, the League of Nations has most usefully exercised a restraining influence over them, and apart from that there would probably already have been a war caused by one or other of them. They are the most inflammable element in Europe at the present time. It was a most imprudent thing to bring these new nationalities into existence without stipulating that they should have no armaments which were not approved by the League of Nations, no expenditure upon armaments which did not pass some independent authority, and certainly no tariffs which were injurious to the interests of their near neighbours.
Unlimited nationality is a danger to peace, and we ought not to desire it or to pursue it any more. We ought to look forward to the time when it will gradually be merged in the life of the larger community. I am afraid that I have been led astray somewhat. I was only seeking to press upon my right hon. Friend the necessity of ventilating the whole subject. I hope that the American declaration will be mainly of value because of the effect it will have on European and civilised opinion. We shall co-operate, and I have no doubt that my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary and other statesmen will be able to make diplomatic capital out of it, diplomatic organisation which will give expression to it advantageously in one way or another, and in the end the great value of it will be in its stimulus to opinion. I think that stimulus might be made much more valuable if it were accompanied by some authoritative instruction; if the general subject of the dangers of war and how wars originate were authoritatively investigated, and why war comes about was lucidly expounded, so that people could be taught that, fundamentally, they
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must recognise that nationalism, though a most ennobling passion, is, like certain other passions, a great danger if it is not disciplined and controlled. My right hon. Friend will remember what was said by Gretchen after her betrayal:
"Doch allas das mir
Dazu Trieb Gott war so gut ach!
War so lieb"—
"Yet everything that drove me to it God! was so good ah! was so dear."
Extreme nationalism is a sense of the beauty and passion of living made a destructive vice or crime; it is that we want to emerge into a notion of nationalism; a beautiful, powerful and elevating passion, but one which must be disciplined and controlled if it is not to destroy the world.
I wish to advert to another question on which I feel very deeply and on which I know that my right hon. Friend sympathises with me. I refer to the present position of the eastern Christians—some of whom are still undergoing great suffering in Turkish territory—who are being settled in Syrian territory within the mandated territory of France. I would like to impress upon my right hon. Friend very strongly the desirability of our coming to the help of these poor people and doing all we can to settle them. The story is perfectly familiar to the right hon. Gentleman. It is a terrible story and one which must make every Englishman feel heartily ashamed and, indeed, the whole body of Allies. The story is that the Armenians who took our side in the War were massacred and almost exterminated. I think the late Lord Curzon stated that of 3,000,000 people only 130,000 were left alive. Many have been driven out of the country and dreadful as that may be at the moment it may perhaps be the happiest thing for them in the long run; but There remain a remnant of people for whom help is urgently needed.
The Prime Minister when he was out of office signed a document, jointly with the late Lord Oxford, most strongly pressing the claims of these people upon the Government of which the right hon. Member the present Leader of the Opposition was Prime Minister, and asking that a substantial sum of money should be given to help them. I believe that much less money would be caned for now than would have been needed at that time, because in various ways the problem has solved itself; that is to say,

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the British Exchequer has gained by the blood, the tears and the sufferings of these poor people. It is no longer necessary to appeal for so much money, but it seems to me to be a most elementary claim upon us that we should help the people who remain. The difficulty of my right hon. Friend will be a financial one, but the sum of money which would be a very sensible advantage to these poor people would be quite insignificant compared with the great figures of the Budget. I hope my right hon. Friend will consider the matter sympathetically. I know that he has expressed sympathy, but will he see that some small sum of money, I mean small in relation to our national exchequer, will, be provided, to settle these poor people in Syria and enable them to lead not only a peaceful but a prosperous life?
I have spoken of the dangers of nationalism. Is it not remarkable that if you can make a national appeal you can get things done? If I were able to say that these people are British subjects, that they are our own flesh and blood, the whole world would ring with their wrongs. But they are of another race. They are, however, of the same religion as ourselves; but that seems hardly to count at all. Although they hold in pawn the honour of our country, that counts for little. Because we thick so much more about nationality than about justice or about religion, they suffer and will, I am afraid, continue to suffer a great deal. For my part, I would rather have us do those things that come to our hand, try to vindicate justice, try to show compassion where opportunity offers, than even make great schemes for the future for the vindication of that inestimable benefit, the perpetuation of European and world-wide peace.
Mr. RENNIE SMITH: The mentors of the party to which the Noble Lord belongs are, as a rule, never weary of telling us that we of the Labour party have no country, no sense of patriotism, and that the last thing we have is the capacity to be just to our own people. Therefore, it is extremely refreshing to us to have been able to listen to the Noble Lord and to know that there is, at any rate, one very distinguished voice in the Conservative party which expresses views n an opposite direction.
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I wish to add my very deep satisfaction with the statement of the Foreign Secretary in relation to the American proposal for the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy. During the last few months I have followed public opinion in this country on this subject with some care, and I think the Foreign Secretary will agree that there has not been for many years an international proposal which bears so vitally upon foreign politics which has had so remarkable and so widespread a reception of welcome in this country as the Kellogg proposals. Whether we take the representative leaders of the "Times" or the "Manchester Guardian" or the "Daily Herald," we find a common attitude of mind asking for the acceptance in principle and the welcome in principle of the proposal of the American Government. If we turn to the political parties, the Foreign Secretary knows the state of opinion within his own party, and he knows that the Liberal party have, in principle, committed themselves to the acceptance of the Kellogg proposals. Lady Bryce speaking yesterday at the Women's National Liberal Federation meeting advocated the proposals.
It being Half-past Seven of the Clock, and there being Private Business set down by direction of the CHAIRMAN OF WAYS AND MEANS under Standing Order No. 8, further Proceeding was postponed, without Question put.

PRIVATE BILLS (CONSOLIDATION).
Motion made, and Question proposed.
"That so much of the Lords Message [27th March] as relates to the Resolutions That it is expedient that in the present Session all Private Bills for the exclusive purpose of consolidating the provisions of existing Private Acts of Parliament lie referred to a Joint Committee of both Houses of Parliament: That the Joint Committee shall not take into consideration any Petition against any such Bill which seeks to alter the existing law' be now considered."—[The Chairman of Ways and Means.]
Mr. CAD0GAN: There is one point which I wish to raise in connection with

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this Motion. I read the discussions in another place, and I understand that the Motion is designed to refer all consolidation Bills of a Private Bill nature to a Joint Committee of both Houses of Parliament. There have been a number of such Bills in previous Sessions, but I understand that none of them dealt exclusively with consolidation. Accordingly, these Bills have been subject to the normal and ordinary rule of Parliament, namely, that when a promoter comes to Parliament with proposals regarding powers which he has already been given, these powers are subject to review. I understand that the object of the Motion is to initiate a new procedure to facilitate consolidation, which is, I admit, a worthy enough object, and to insure that the practice, which has been well established in regard to public Bills, shall be the practice followed in all respects with regard to private Bills. There is a Bill before Parliament entitled "an Act to Consolidate the North Metropolitan Electric Power Supply Acts, 1900–1927." It is said that this is a Consolidating Bill pure and simple, and I understand that if this Motion be carried, it will go through, and no objection to it will be allowed to be heard. If this is a consolidating Bill pure and simple, if it is merely a re-enactment of existing law, I quite see that no one's interest would be materially affected. If, on the other hand, I can prove that Clause 117 of this Bill does not correctly re-enact Section 13 of the Act of 1919, but is a considerable departure from it, it is conceivable that certain interests will very materially be affected.
I wish to adduce one instance where this procedure would operate harshly. In 1899 the Urban District Council of Finchley were authorised to supply electrical energy for all public and private purposes in their area. They accordingly erected a generating station, and since 1903 they have supplied the district. By the Act of 1909 which the North Metropolitan Power Company purports to reenact by Clause 117 of the present Bill, it is provided that the company shall not supply energy within the district of the Finchley Council without the consent of the Council under its Common Seal. But under existing circumstances it would be open to the Finchley Council to argue that it has a veto on supplies by the North Metropolitan Supply Com-
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pany, but that they would lose that right if the Act of 1909 were re-enacted, in view of the provisions of the Electricity Supply Act, 1926, by which the Finchley Council is deprived of the right of obtaining a direct supply from the Central Electricity Board. To explain the matter in simpler language, it means that if the needs of Finchley increase, as undoubtedly they will, the Finchley Council will not be able to obtain supplies from the Central Electricity Board, but will have to seek them from such a source as the North Metropolitan Supply Company, which will ultimately entail increased charges to the users.
The whole character of electricity legislation has been subject to constant changes to meet the changing needs and conditions. The first public Act was passed as long ago as 1882, and this was modified and amended by subsequent Acts in 1888 and 1909. Another great change was effected by the Act of 1919 by the establishment of joint electricity authorities throughout the country, and a still greater change was effected in 1926, when the Central Electricity Board was established. Doubtless, if Parliament in 1909 had realised the possible effect of the Section that was then enacted, consequent upon the passing of the Act of 1926, the Section would not have taken its present form. In view of these considerations, I wish to ascertain whether this Motion, if carried, would definitely preclude the Committee's consideration of petitions which merely ask for an alteration of the existing law. I can fully appreciate the advantages of consolidation, but consolidation in this instance operates very harshly, and I should like very much to have some further elucidation of this question.
The CHAIRMAN of WAYS and MEANS (Mr. James Hope): There is no question of policy whatever in this Motion. It is merely a matter of convenience for all those who have to take part in Private Bill precedure. The truth is, that long-established companies, and perhaps local bodies also, have a very great number of Acts, and when they come before Parliament with some new Bill, all those engaged, whether in support or in opposition, counsel, Parliamentary agents and Members of this House, have to search through a number of Acts in order to find out the exact position. The whole object of this

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Motion is to facilitate the consolidation of Acts in those cases, whereby everyone concerned may know exactly what the law is, without this endless digging up of old Statutes. For example, the Gas Light and Coke Company have a large number of Bills, and although they consolidated their Acts in 1868, they have had no less than 23 Acts or Orders since. The South Metropolitan Gas Company have had 16 Acts from the time of their foundation; and so on. It is purely a matter of convenience for Committees, and those who have to appear before Committees, that this Motion is made. I think that I can best explain the scope, in answer to my hon. Friend, by laying emphasis upon the actual Motion. It is:
"That it is expedient that in the present Session all Private Bills for the exclusive purpose of consolidating the provisions of existing Private Acts of Parliament be referred to a Joint committee of both Houses of Parliament."
That is to say, no Bill will go there if it seeks to change the law. It must be exclusively for purposes of consolidation. Then I come to the second part:
Mr. ERNEST BROWN: It seems to me that the wording there is rather difficult. I am not clear, as it is worded, whether the emphasis is on the word "Petition," or on the word "Bill." If it is on the word "Petition," and it means "any Petition seeking to alter the law," I could understand it, but if the emphasis is on the word "Bill," it seems to contradict the first part of the Motion.
Mr. HOPE: There is a conceivable cause for misunderstanding here, and I was coming to that. I should have no objection, if the hon. Gentlemen wants to move an Amendment, to accept it. I cannot go through the whole question of the North Metropolitan Supply Company, but if that Bill seeks to change the law, or can be alleged to seek to change the law, my hon. Friend's local authority will not be debarred from asking for a locus, and appearing before the Court of Referees as they can to-day. On the other hand, if they think it does not change the law, I am quite sure that no Court of Referees would give a locus to them now, though they would have to come and argue their case. It sometimes happens that, when a new Bill comes forward, people who have an old standing grievance with a company or an authority
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promoting a Bill, think that they have a chance to come in, but if that Bill does not in fact change the law, the position really, I think, will be the same, because I am certain that the Court of Referees will not give a locus in this respect. The Joint Committee will have to satisfy themselves that these Bills are really consolidating Bills and do not seek to alter the law. If I were convinced that any Bill did any more than consolidate and continue the existing law, it would be my duty to come down to the House and move, that the Order be discharged, and that the Bill be committed afresh to a Private Bill Committee in the ordinary way.
Mr. BROWN: I am much obliged to the Chairman of Ways and Means for his explanation, but, as I read the Motion now, it does seem as if the emphasis can be either on the word "Petition" or on the word "Bill;" and, if it means "any such Bill," the House ought not to pass it, but if the Chairman of Ways and Means says that the wording makes it quite clear that it is the Petition which must not seek to alter the law, I have no wish to move. To make it quite clear, however, I would like to move an Amendment to insert the word "Petition" after the word "which."
Mr. HOPE: I find a difficulty in accepting such an Amendment, because that would be trying to correct the grammar of the House of Lords.
Mr. BROWN: It is not a matter of grammar, hut of importance, I think, in the construction of the Motion. I am a child in these matters, but it seems to me that as the Motion reads now, any Bill which seeks to alter the law cannot be petitioned against. I am quite sure that that is not the intention of the Motion, and as it is now worded, it is not only a matter of grammar, but of construing the intention of the House of Lords.
Mr. HOPE: If the hon. Member will look at the two parts of the Lords Message, he will see that the construction he suggests in the latter part would be a contradiction in terms, for a Bill which seeks to alter the law would not be a Bill exclusively for consolidating existing Acts of Parliament. I do not think that there is really anything in it.
Question put, and agreed to.
So much of the Lords Message considered accordingly.
Resolved, "That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Resolution."—[The Chairman of Ways and Means.]
Message to the Lords to acquaint them therewith.

SUPPLY.
Again considered in Committee.
[Mr. JAMES HOPE in the Chair.]

CIVIL ESTIMATES, 1928.
Postponed Proceeding resumed on Question:
"That a sum, not exceeding £116,700, be granted to His Majesty, to complete the sum necessary to defray the Charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1929, for the Salaries and Expenses of the Department of His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs."
Mr. RENNIE SMITH: When I was interrupted, I was speaking of the reception of the Kellogg proposals in this country. The three parties in this House have made very clear and definite declarations on the subject, and practically the whole of those voluntary societies in the country which are concerned with the consideration of international affairs have lined themselves up in asking the Government to give an unqualified welcome to those proposals. I need only mention that bodies like the League of Nations Union, the newly constituted Women's British-American Crusade, which is holding meetings in all parts of the country on this special subject, the Society of Friends, and the whole of the societies affiliated with the National Council for the Prevention of War have taken up practically a common attitude in pressing upon the Government the advisability of taking hold of this remarkable offer of the American Government without reserve. Therefore, I want to assure the Foreign Secretary that, in taking up the position that he has done this afternoon, not merely is he expressing the point of view of his own party, but he has behind him the considered national judgment of the country. We who have been considering these proposals over the last two months feel that their most important aspect is that they say, without cavil, that the American Government and the other five Governments concerned, and
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all the other Governments in the world if they follow suit, agree that the time has come completely to renounce war as an instrument of national policy.
The Foreign Secretary has emphasised that the important position now taken up in international affairs carries with it no conflict with the spirit of the Covenant of the League of Nations, nor anything that is contrary to the principles underlying the Pact of Locarno. Indeed, if we understand these proposals aright, they would lead to an amplifying and clearing up of all those parts of the Covenant of the League of Nations which have to do with the question of war, if these proposals were accepted without reserve. All the members of the League of Nations would then be in the position where they would say to one another that under no circumstances would they resort to war as an instrument of national policy; that is to say, that if the machinery of the Council of the League of Nations broke down and the three months' respite which is provided for under the Covenant had expired, we should not feel ourselves free, as a contracting party, to use the method of war for the settlement of a national dispute. Not only do the American proposals not conflict with the spirit of the Covenant and the principles of the Pact of Locarno, but, on the contrary, they carry the most important reinforcement of those principles that we have had since 1919.
I know there is the criticism that these proposals carry with them no kind of machinery for dealing with a deadlock which may conceivably arise, that there is no suggestion either for the increased use of the World Court, the further development of conciliation machinery, the increased use of the method of arbitration, or the further extension of the habit and practice of international conference. It has been a complaint that the American Government prefer to stand in the position of deadlock in the event of a breakdown and do not contemplate any kind of machinery for handling the situation at that point, but it seems to me to be of importance for us in Great Britain to remember what very great strides the American Government have made in these positive directions of building up the machinery. With regard to the method of arbitration, for example, it is clear that in the recent Pan-American Conference the United

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States Government gave very great evidence of a desire to apply methods of arbitration for dealing with what is, roughly speaking, an American League of Nations, and they have shown through that Pan-American Conference the steady purpose, with detailed points of application, of using arbitral machinery for the settlement of Pan-American disputes. We had, too, in America last year the very remarkable development of arbitration arrangements as between Mexico and the Government of the United States.
The Under-Secretary will know that he is at the present time assisting in negotiations for a new Anglo-American Arbitration Treaty, and that there are very great possibilities of building up between America and Great Britain further stages in the use of arbitral and conciliation machinery. indeed, I would like to say that it would he a very happy development if His Majesty's Government would, in relation to the Anglo-American Treaty, which we hope will come into operation after the 4th June next, make the suggestion in words that, if the Bryan conciliation machinery should break down and the 12 months' cooling-off period should lead to no fruitful settlement, there should be inserted a Clause in the new Treaty laying down clearly and definitely that Great Britain and America will not under any circumstances resort to the method of war for the settlement of an Anglo-American dispute. It is well known that the American nation, in the last two years particularly, have taken up with increasing seriousness the question of the World Court, and while they are not participating in that Court, there has been a very steady growth of opinion in that direction.
So far as the method of international conference is concerned, nothing, I think, has been more impressive than to witness the steady way in which American foreign policy has associated itself with the practice of international conference that has been growing up in Europe since 1919. I was told a few weeks ago that the American Government have taken part in no fewer than 40 of the Commissions of the League of Nations, and I think we may be quite sure that, although these proposals carry with them no suggestion of machinery for the
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handling of disputes, we have a very large and growing amount of evidence that the American people have made up their minds that the best way in which to contribute to the peace of the world is to have a definite share in the processes of international government. Perhaps the most important part of this proposal of the American Government is the open confession that American public life has now definitely reached the stage where, if only from the point of view of their business interests and their own rapid industrial development, they have no alternative but to come out frankly and take an open and positive share in the business of building up international government.
A few months ago the situation with regard to American public opinion was very precarious, from a British point of view. Immediately following the breakdown of the Coolidge Naval Conference, there was a proposal put forward in the United States to construct 71 new warships, with a very large expenditure of money, as the immediate reply to the worsened relations created as a result of that breakdown. Anyone who has followed American public opinion since that time knows that to-day that whole programme for 71 warships has been reduced to 17, thanks to the remarkable reaction of American public opinion. I have had a considerable correspondence which makes it clear that there have been few occasions indeed when Senators and Congressmen have been so inundated with letters, telegrams and resolutions from all parts of America, asking them to do nothing, at this critical stage in the development of Anglo-American affairs, which would give the slightest colour to the view that they were setting up anything like competition with us in regard to naval affairs; and the modification of this American naval programme from 71 vessels to 17, spread out over three years, is the clearest possible proof that Mr. Kellogg, in putting forward these proposals, is not a voice crying in the wilderness, but that he has behind him the solid backing of the best and most deeply concerned body of American opinion.
I, therefore, rose to express my deep satisfaction at the statement of the Foreign Secretary this afternoon, and, along with other speakers, I hope that

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he will follow this up, not with a spirit of exploring in a niggling way all kinds of possible reservations, but that he will use this occasion for further developing the principles of the renunciation of war which were adumbrated in the Covenant of 1919. Let him make it clear that the British people realise that this co-operation of America is the most important step. that has been taken since 1919, and that we will do everything that lies in our power to lay, firm and deep, those foundations of Anglo-American cooperation which will give the League of Nations a new spirit and a new vitality, and make it what a great but now departed American President once believed it would become, namely, an instrument of complete world organisation, an international organisation of all the States in the world pursuing the great cause, negatively, of the prevention of war and, positively, of the organisation of all the possibilities of peace.
8.0 p.m.
Rear-Admiral BEAMISH: I do not take any exception to, but, on the contrary, agree with a great deal of what we have just heard from the hon. Member for Penistone (Mr. Rennie Smith). There is a great deal to be said for the point of view which he has expressed. But I rise for a special object, and that is to draw attention to the suggestion which was made by the hon. and gallant Member for Central Hull (Lieut.-Commander Kenworthy). I particularly hope that the right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary and his representative on the Front Bench, the Under-Secretary for the Foreign Office (Mr. Locker-Lampson) will take particular notice of the fact that the hon. and gallant Member for Central Hull made a special request, and I trust most sincerely that it will not be acceded to. There is a risk, and it may be a serious risk, that the views he put forward may appear in the foreign Press, and even in our own Press, as being the views of the whole of the Labour party, and I am under the impression that that is not the case, at any rate in this particular matter. The hon. and gallant Member, while accepting in the main the suggestions put forward by Mr. Kellogg for the multilateral pact, proposes to complicate and undermine the prospect of this pact by introducing a thorny and
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complicated subject before a conference with the representatives of the United States concerning, as he said, the necessary revision of international law at sea.
No greater disservice could possibly be done to the prospects of this multilateral pact than to introduce a juridical question such as the alteration, or bringing up to date, call it what you will, of international law at sea. It is particularly concerned with blockade and with belligerent and neutral rights during war. But Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations accedes to and accepts the principle of blockade, and that brings into its ambit everything that is concerned with what is called the freedom of the seas. It includes the rights of belligerents during war. We are definitely pledged in certain respects, under Article 16 of that Covenant. I do not hesitate to say that, if we were to give up our maritime rights, of which I have just spoken, we should be delivering a real blow at the League of Nations, which has accepted the principle that, in certain serious circumstances, nations are justified in using their power to bring a recalcitrant nation to its senses by means of blockade. In that connection, may I quote from the "Manchester Guardian" weekly of 3rd February. The "Manchester Guardian" has for some considerable time recently been publishing articles on this particular subject. I quote this as showing that that journal recognises, as indeed every thoughtful journal does, that there are two sides to such a question. This is what it says on the subject of blockade and of one nation bringing pressure to bear upon another nation in war—I am particularly thinking of naval war:
"All through those melancholy months, the War was certainly being won, but it was being won at sea, where our blockade was breaking down Germany's power and will to endure and strike, not on land, where the combatant nations did little more in fact than bleed each other whiter and whiter and lay deeper and more surely the foundation of their post-War poverty and discontent."
I quote that only as showing that the "Manchester Guardian," or whoever wrote in that journal, realises to the full the necessity, in certain serious eventualities, of using maritime rights. It may be said, and no doubt the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Central Hull would say—and there is

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something in it—that there is an idea to be thought about, and that possibly in the future, but certainly not now, we might have some other conference and produce something in the nature of the Declaration of London or the Declaration of Paris. If anything of that sort were brought into existence, we should be deceiving ourselves, we should be deceiving our friends, and we should be acting dishonestly by and with any nation with whom we made any pact of that kind. We found it quite impossible during the last war to adhere to the Declaration of London.
Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY: I did not propose anything so circumscribed as the Declaration of Paris or the Declaration of London. I want the right of private blockade to go the way of private war. There should be international action for the enforcing of covenants.
Rear-Admiral BEAMISH: Anything that would have the effect of tying our hands in regard to maritime rights would have the most serious and far-reaching effects, so far as we are concerned, and we would not be justified in doing anything in that direction which would tie the hands of any Government that might follow, if we had the misfortune to have to carry out our duties in regard to the Covenant of the League of Nations, or if we got involved in war of any kind with any other country. So far as I am concerned, I have nothing but delight in, and, if I may say so, praise for those who are concerned in pushing forward by all possible means the prospects of this multilateral pact. Nothing could he better. I think it is, so to speak, a psychological advance in regard to the study of the methods of preventing war, and nothing could possibly be better. I only hope that we shall not complicate it by anything in the nature of any round-table conference that most certainly would imperil its success.
Captain CAZALET: When experts disagree, it is always difficult for an amateur to know which side to take. We have heard the pros and cons of the naval situation which may be created by this new American treaty discussed, on the one hand by an Admiral, and on the
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other band by a, Commander of the Navy, and they apparently are not quite agreed as to what the result may be. I should like to say a word with regard to what the last speaker from the Socialist benches said, namely, as to the extraordinary difference in public opinion which has taken place during the last six months in America with reference to the building of the American Navy. Anyone who has followed, even casually as I have done, the Americant Press, must have noticed this difference. The great commercial Middle West has made its influence and its opinion felt. The people there are beginning to ask the same question as we want to ask in this country: Is not the Admiralty slightly excessive in its demands, and may it not be that they are slightly extravagant? After all, it has been one of the main cries of the Republican party, which has to face the electorate at the end of this year, that they are the party of economy, and are they prepared now to throw away all the advantages of their economy in building a fleet at the cost of some thousand million dollars?
There is very much less inclination to-day in the American Press to indulge what is called in America "twisting the lion's tail" and "baiting John Bull," and I think we in this country have corresponded to a certain degree by cancelling the two cruisers. I was delighted to hear the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs accept with so much hope the proposals put forward by Mr. Kellogg. Of course, there must always be difficulties in a question of this kind when you are dealing with a country that is not a member of the League of Nations. No doubt the influence of the United States will be more of a negative than of a positive character. But suppose that a situation arose in which there was a demand being made to enforce certain economic sanctions against an aggressive State in Europe. Our whole problem in the past has been, what could we do in regard to a blockade if the Americans refused to take the same side as we did? If, however, such a situation arose to-day, and we could be certain that America would be not only neutral but sympathetic towards these economic sanctions which were being applied, then I do believe we would have removed to a very

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great degree all those obstacles which have existed both in this country and in America to the cause of the reduction of armaments. If some arrangement could be made along those lines, and if the Dominions endorse the opinions stated by the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to-day, I believe we shall have taken an important step forward in disarmament.
It is of the first importance that America should definitely take an interest in European affairs, and she will have to do so very shortly, whether she likes it or not. Under the present debt settlement, the United States of America will soon be receiving 67 per cent., or nearly three-quarters, of all the reparations that are paid by Germany. If, as has been suggested, the Dawes payments are reduced by one-third, she will not be receiving 67 per cent., but 100 per cent. Every single penny that Germany pays in reparations will be sent straight across to the United States of America. Therefore, it is of vital importance and interest to her to preserve peace in Europe. There is one other point in regard to Germany which I should like to put before the hon. Gentleman who represents the Foreign Office. Is it not possible now to remove those few remaining British troops from the occupied territory of Germany? We say to-day that Germany is our equal and that we are the best friends of Germany in Europe to-day. She is equal with us and a member of the League of Nations. If foreign troops were quartered in Kent or Cornwall, we would not feel the same towards the nation which had put those troops there, as we would if our country were free from such occupation.
In regard to Egypt, I think everybody on these benches would agree that the Leader of the Opposition, when he was conducting the affairs of this country, dealt with the Egyptian crisis which arose during his tenure of office with tact, patience, firmness and efficiency. Having listened to his speech to-day and heard the comments and criticisms upon it by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George), I think we have little fault to find with what the Leader of the Opposition said. It is apparent, however, that some of his followers are as far removed
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from his point of view as from ours, and it is to them that I should like to address some remarks. It is some years ago since the late President Roosevelt exploded a bomb in the City of London by saying, in reference to our presence in Egypt, that we should either govern or get out. Years have intervened and circumstances have changed, and we still have very definite responsibilities in that country, not only towards our own people and foreigners there, but also towards the Egyptian people. Certain people in this country, particularly certain politicians, seem to think that the only people who matter in Egypt are the Egyptian politicians. I ask them to remember that in any of these Middle East countries, for £10 you can raise a riot at any time of day or night, on behalf of or against any cause you wish. I do not imagine it costs much more to turn the votes at the elections which take place there.
What would be the result if the Government decided to follow the dictates of certain Members of the Opposition? Supposing we gave in to all the demands of the Egyptian Nationalists, what would be the result? Does anybody imagine that if the British influence were to depart, Egypt would be left alone and independent? Her geographical position makes such a possibility extremely remote. Some few years ago—I think in 1924—there was a question as to whether we should not return our mandate in respect of Iraq to the League of Nations, and while that question was in abeyance Italy made known that if we did so she was prepared to take up the mandate. [An HON. MEMBER: "I wish she would!"] Circumstances arose which, fortunately, or unfortunately, for ourselves and the people of Iraq, prevented that issue from arising. If we were to leave Egypt, it is inconceivable that either France or Italy—I do not wish to say that it would be the one or the other—would not immediately take up the position that we occupy to-day. Who can argue that such a situation would lead to harmony among the great Powers of Europe, or to increased prosperity and happiness among the Egyptian people?
I turn now to a different sphere, namely the Balkans, and I want to refer to that little-known Republic of Albania. It is obvious to anyone who has followed the course of Balkan politics in the past two

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years that it will never be possible again to isolate Balkan incidents. The pact of Tirana, followed by the Treaty between France and Yugoslavia, has made it quite definite that if and when trouble arises here, all the great Powers of Europe will be immediately concerned. The situation in Albania to-day appears to be better than it was a few months ago. There is political peace, and a degree of economic prosperity, but there is one vital question which may at any moment explode into flames, namely, the question of the Greco-Albanian minorities. I raise this question now because it is coming up for discussion at the League of Nations in a few days' time, but I do not ask the Under-Secretary to give me an answer on this occasion because I did not give him notice.
The facts of the situation are that on either side of the southern frontier of Albania there are 20,000 to 30,000 Greeks living in Albania and Albanians living in Greece. In 1926 Albania and Greece gave certain pledges to the Council of the League that they would carry out certain stipulations in regard to the minorities in each country. Up to the present, Albania has carried out all her pledges. There are no fewer than 65 schools in Albania devoted to the Greeks and costing the Albanian Government 70,000 gold francs a year. There are two Greek deputies in the Albanian Parliament and the Greeks have not been molested in their houses or their territory. When we turn to the other side of the picture we find that the Greeks have done absolutely nothing to carry out the pledges which they gave. They have molested the Albanians in their midst, and expropriated them, the compensation offered being one-fifteenth of the value of the land to be paid 30 years hence. There are no schools for the Albanians, their cases are not allowed to come up in the law courts and they are refused passports to leave the country. The Albanians have asked the League of Nations to take the matter up and either to put in a Commission to see that the Greeks carry out their pledges or make some arrangement for the transfer of the populations. I hope the Secretary of State will give his assistance to the plea of the Albanians in this matter.
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On the question of Hungary, I realise that it is almost impossible to get any official statement from this Government or any other, but in view of the disturbances which are occurring in Rumania the question of Hungary may arise at any moment. Hungary has two friends in this country, the House of Lords and the "Daily Mail"—or, perhaps, I should say, the "Daily Mail" and the House of Lords. There is a traditional friendship between Hungary and this country which was augmented by the extremely good treatment meted out to the British interned in Hungary during the War. There has been, for many years, a mutual sympathy between our nation and the Hungarians. On several occasions since the War I have visited Hungary and Transylvania and have seen what maladministration can accomplish in a few years. Transylvania, for its size, should be one of the richest countries in the world and certainly one of the greatest grain exporting countries in Europe. What is her situation to-day? She has to import wheat, and I have seen what were the finest farms in Europe, which people came from all over the world to inspect, ruined through maladministration and idiotic laws.
It is difficult to blame those who framed the Treaties in the atmosphere which existed immediately after the War. No one, I imagine, in this country or elsewhere, is prepared to go to war, or to pay anybody else to go to war, to alter existing frontiers. One cannot imagine that Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia would stand idly by and watch Rumania being despoiled of any territory. But the grievance of Hungary is so real and obvious, it is such a case of glaring injustice, that until it is settled it must constitute a danger to the peace of Europe; and I feel that it cannot be very long before it is reconsidered by the Powers of Europe. I realise that there is only one real solution which will bring about peace in the Balkans, and that is the creation of a Balkan Locarno, political and economic. Free Trade on both sides has always been, or should be, the first step towards breaking down the barriers of nationalism. Hon. Gentlemen opposite will note that I say "Free Trade on both sides," and I trust the Secretary of State in his continual visits to Geneva will impress on the representatives of the Balkan States the necessity for some kind

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of federation on this lines. I do not believe that permanent peace in the Balkans can be established on any other basis than that of a local Locarno, founded on the same ideals and principles as those which were the foundation of the other Locarno Treaties, for which the Secretary of State was so largely responsible.
Mr. SCRYMGEOUR: I am sorry that I was not able to be present, when the Secretary of State and the Leaders of the Opposition parties opened this Debate. It is also a great regret to me that this Debate should, strangely enough, have been arranged to take place on the day of a meeting in the City concerning the Egyptian question, to which a considerable number of Members of the House and particularly of the Labour Opposition were invited. From the appearance of the benches at present, it does not seem that much interest is being taken in this stage of the Debate. Speaking for myself, I must express a sense of disappointment that there does not seem to be very much, if any, disagreement, between the Leaders of the Government and the Opposition, according to a summarised statement of the Debate which has been given to me. [Interruption]. I have it from a well-known Member of the House that there is little or no disagreement in regard to the position in Egypt.
Miss LAWRENCE: Strong disagreement!
Mr. SCRYMGEOUR: Is there any Amendment by the Opposition expressing disagreement? There is none. Silence. Well, that is enough for me. We had an opportunity this afternoon of hearing the case of the Egyptians. I think it right to hear the views of people who are directly representative of that country. But before I went to that meeting I had read in the Press that his Lordship, Lord Birkenhead, had in this connection, as in the case of the Indian Commission, been exchanging bouquets with the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Aberavon (Mr. R. MacDonald). To me that is disappointing. The trouble which arose recently appears to me to concern a subsidiary issue. It should not have been necessary to send warships from Britain to deal with a small country which has little or no army, and cer-
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tainly no means of combating a navy, over a mere question of police administration. That is preposterous. The real crux of this trouble is that we are still maintaining in Egypt a British army, although our Government have repeatedly given an undertaking that evacuation would take place. That undertaking has never been fulfilled, and there is no promise that it will be fulfilled. In Article 7 of the draft Treaty it is stated:
"In order to facilitate and secure to His Britannic Majesty the protection of the lines of communication of the British Empire, and pending the conclusion at some future date of an agreement, by which His Britannic Majesty entrusts His Majesty the King of Egypt with the task of ensuring this protection, His Majesty the King of Egypt authorises His Britannic Majesty to maintain upon Egyptian territory such armed forces as His Britannic Majesty's Government consider necessary for this purpose. The presence of these forces shall not constitute in any manner an occupation and will in no way prejudice the sovereign rights of Egypt. After a period of ten years from the coming into force of the present Treaty the high contracting parties will reconsider, in the light of their experience of the operations of the provisions of the present Treaty, the question of the localities in which the said forces are to be stationed."
The comment made by the Egyptian representatives in their official report is that the occupation is the question regarding which Egyptians are most sensitive. During the last 46 years Egyptians have constantly protested against the occupation, and the British Government repeatedly pledged itself to an early evacuation. That has not taken place.
Article 10 states:
"His Britannic Majesty will use his good offices for the admission of Egypt to the League of Nations."
Egypt welcomes its inclusion in the League of Nations, but it must be noted that whereas the admission of Iraq to the League of Nations would automatically terminate the British mandate, that of Egypt, according to Article 7, would merely perpetuate and render permanent the British army of occupation of Egypt, for the Treaty concedes to the League, not the power to arbitrate as to whether after 10 years the British army should remain or be removed, but whether it should be stationed in Cairo on the Suez Canal or elsewhere. Egypt will not gain by its admission to the League while there is a British army

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quartered on its soil. I submit that here is an unfortunate situation confronting the League of Nations. If we cannot through the League of Nations adjust a matter of this kind, it must have a very damaging effect upon the influence of the League of Nations in our country.
Some few years ago when we were discussing this matter I had occasion to make similar references, speaking on that occasion from the other side of the House. On that occasion it was the decision of the Leader of the Government, the Labour Government, that he could not see his way to place the matter unreservedly in the hands of the League of Nations. Therefore I have to-day again to express my very distinct feelings of discouragement and disappointment regarding the situation. We have given the Egyptians the semblance of a democratic Parliament, we have given them opportunities to try to manage their own affairs, and to say that on a simple matter of police supervision in the case of public meetings, an occasion has arisen for us to act in the peremptory and aggressive fashion we did is an appalling confession.
Leaving this question, I wish to express a feeling of great satisfaction that the Government are favourable to the American proposals. That is generally recognised as an encouraging feature of the international situation. It was a deep satisfaction to me to have the privilege of listening to Earl Grey speaking in favour of this proposal about a week ago in one of the Committee rooms upstairs. I recognise, however, as his Lordship did, that there is a feeling of uncertainty growing up as to whether this plan will be altogether effective, by reason of emergencies which may arise. There is no doubt about the advantage of bringing the nations together on a basis of this kind, but it is necessary to get things so tightened up as to secure the confidence of the nations concerned. Certain factors are at work, financial factors and commercial factors and the questions raised from the opposite side as to our maritime rights is another indication of difficulties which are being brought forward. Under the present system, in which there is no co-operation, in which there is conflict, in which there is competition and in which there is the
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cutting-out policy of peoples against peoples, our nations will, from their own standpoint, feel gravely concerned about this plan, or any other plan. Some speak of enterprise, others term it exploitation, but whatever it is called, it is the conflict of the forces of nationality even in what is called peacetime. I submit that that is where the danger lies. Under any such plan as that which is now under review, and which we certainly want to support in every possible way, there will still be underlying forces, electrifying forces, which may lead to that upheaval which we all, theoretically, at any rate, deplore in advance.
That brings us to the essentials, and I think it is right that we should emphasise these essentials, because we hear from many platforms that there is no possibility of peace in reality while the factors which I have indicated are in operation. Only by the force of spiritual, moral and intellectual reasoning power, exercised through the League of Nations, can the plans and schemes for getting rid of armaments be made effectual and can we deal with the causes which are responsible for the difficulties which are envisaged. From this vantage ground of Parliament I wish to say that speakers on pacifist platforms are urging the necessity for us to make it plain to our Governments that we must not go to war and that on no account are we going to have war. But our people in the mass—without taking into account the people of other countries—are not giving serious attention to the great issues which are presented to us in this House. The attention of certain sections of the people are being directed to them, because the Churches and other bodies are concerning themselves with these issues, but the mass of the people, unfortunately, while agreeing with the general attitude that nobody wants war, are themselves giving little attention to spiritual and moral principles. They are occupying themselves with recreations and amusements, with anything of a trivial and, easy-going character, and the Press are encouraging it and making money out of it. The big things, the great issues, the mighty things that concern humanity at large, are being treated very lightly by the mass of the people, as though they were insignificant affairs.

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Personally, I deplore that we should make attacks upon statesmen and politicians generally about what is felt to be their compromising tendencies and their great readiness to adopt expedients. When people from many platforms demand that sort of thing, the answer is that our statesmen, politicians and public representatives largely take their cue from the great body of the people. Our statesmen in these matters should be the leaders and the exemplary men of our country, and they should not seek to square the vicious circle. Those who have the influence ought to stand for the things that are right, irrespective of what may be the temporal results; and they should lead in the narrow path that leads to righteousness and peace.
Sir ALFRED HOPKINSON: The hon. and gallant Member for Chippenham (Captain Cazalet), who speaks with direct. personal knowledge on certain subjects, dealt with four main points. There are four points in the hon. and gallant Gentleman's speech which ought to be emphasised, and I hope that the representative of the Government will take care to see that those points are not lost sight of. The first point is the desirability at the earliest possible moment of evacuating British troops from the Rhineland. Those who know anything about the conditions which exist on the borderland between France and Germany will be anxious to see that evacuation carried out as soon as possible. I also hope that what has been said about Egypt will not be forgotten. In Egypt the Government has shown its determination to carry out the treaties by which we are bound, even if those treaties are in some respects detrimental. The great work done in Egypt by Lord Cromer was not so much for the benefit of this country as for the benefit of the labouring population of Egypt. It ought not to be forgotten that the Government are bound by the treaties since made, and have shown how entirely their policy aims at carrying out the engagements made, both as regards the Egyptian Government and our duties to nationals of other countries resident in Egypt.
A third important point is raised by what the hon. and gallant Member said about Albania. We all recognise the danger of any condition of unrest in any
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of the Balkan and Central European States. In parts of Greece there is an Albanian minority speaking a different language and of a different race, and it is of vital importance as between the Greeks and the Albanian population that justice should be done. The grievances of the Albanians should be carefully considered by the League of Nations. This may seem a small matter, but the consequences of neglecting it may be most serious, and might have far-reaching effects. Fourthly, the hon. and gallant Member mentioned the case of Hungary. Hungary was deprived, after the War, of a part of its territory, and the treaties are binding. The present position, however, is unstable. There is a line of policy which may be indicated and which may lead to a better state of things. The barriers created by tariffs stopping trade between countries divided by no natural frontiers might be removed, and there might be something in the nature of a Zollverein. In that way it might be possible to bring clown some of the partitions which are now so mutually injurious to those contiguous States. Between Jugo-Slavia and Hungary, Rumania and Hungary, and Czechoslovakia and Hungary, there might be agreements for open doors and joint action, especially as regards transport, which would be of great benefit to trade and industry in all those countries. If a policy of confederating some at least of these States had been followed before the War, there might have been no war at all. It is known that the Archduke might have carried out such a. policy before the War. He had a definite policy, which he pursued to the best of his ability, but it was prevented by sinister influences of one kind and another, and it could not be inaugurated before the fatal event which immediately preceded the outbreak of war. That policy was, in effect, to have a kind of confederation of various countries in Central Europe and in the Balkans, in which even Serbia, and possibly other Balkan States, might have been included. Events prevented the carrying out of such a policy, and Heaven knows what exactly were the influences which prevented it. That policy cannot be revived in its entirety, but some common agreement as regards tariffs, transport, and other matters affecting trade and commerce might even now be possible.

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I think there is almost general agreement throughout the House that the policy pursued by His Majesty's Government having regard to the conditions under which they are working at the present time and the Treaties by which they are bound, is a wise policy both as regards Egypt and also as to the peace proposals made by America. We were very glad to hear from the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) that he was in agreement with the policy of the Government in this respect, and almost all have the same ultimate object in view, that is to say, the peace of the world. It is difficult for anyone who does not know exactly all the special circumstances of the moment to form a correct judgment as to the details of the steps to be taken immediately, but there are certain things with regard to general principles and policy upon which it is possible for those who stand outside official circles to form sound opinions, provided always that they have given some careful study to them during and since the War, and have devoted some attention to the questions of international law and policy which are involved. We must realise that we are bound by certain agreements, that we shall honour our bond, and that the Government must carry them out, even when they are injurious; but it is quite possible that outsiders may give words of warning as to the future which are worth consideration, and which may, if heeded, prevent trouble hereafter.
There are certain warnings which it is right that we should express in the clearest language that we can possibly use, in view of the fact that there are a number of very excellent benevolent people going about at present urging us to enter into new commitments. The first principle that we ought to lay down is that all these agreements to go to war to prevent war, except under known or defined conditions, are things from which we ought to keep ourselves free. The best friends of peace realise that to enter into general bargains to go to war, it may be at the instance of other people and under unforeseen circumstances, is one of the worst ways of promoting peace. Let us keep free from these entangling engagements as to the employment of our armed forces. That principle was pointed out before the
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League of Nations came into existence, and before any Covenant was made. Lord Bryce pointed out the difficulties in the House of Lords, when the necessity for sanctions such as the employment of troops and ships was urged again and again as necessary in order to enforce peace. The speech that he made in the House of Lords when the question of the League of Nations was first mooted in the summer of 1914, and the warning he then gave should be remembered. Unfortunately, such warning was disregarded, and we undertook a very serious and dangerous engagement in the Covenant of the League of Nations.
By entering into that Covenant we are under a moral obligation, possibly, to go to war under conditions which we could not foresee. It was such engagements, more than anything else, that kept America out of the League of Nations. We know that as a fact. In Mr. Page's Memoirs it will be found distinctly stated that, of the causes which kept America out, the most potent was the fact that America refused to be bound by anything of the nature of this part of the Covenant of the League of Nations They were right. We, unfortunately, are hound by that Covenant, and we shall adhere to it, because we always perform our agreements, but let us go into no more of such commitments. I do not wish to take up the time of the Committee in discussing the dangers of commitments at length, but let me take a practical case. Bolivia and Peru are both members of the League of Nations. Suppose that there is a dispute between them. Peru, perhaps, takes some Bolivian citizen and ill-treats him. Bolivia sends forces at once. They may know that if delay occurs some of their subjects may be killed, and send armed forces for their protection. Who is to say which is the aggressor? Would it be the one which first sent troops, and should not we, under the Covenant, be obliged to send ships over to South America in order to fulfil the Covenant. Would the Americans stand by in spite of their Monroe doctrine? It may be doubted whether any ships that we sent out to enforce the views of the League in the Western Continent would ever come back again.

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These commitments to go to war under conditions not foreseen are things that we ought to bar in the future. The speech that was made not very long ago by the Foreign Secretary, showing that at all events we were thinking carefully before we went into any more of these commitments ought to be heartily welcomed. That is the first and the most important point—let us avoid these engagements to go to war in order to promote peace. The second point is that we should never look upon the League of Nations as a super-State which can dictate to us or any other member of the League. We have entered into our definite bond, and will carry it out, but we should not impair our national freedom of action, except so far as we are bound by definite and limited engagements. Does that in any way make it appear that the League of Nations can do nothing? Not for a moment. What the League of Nations can do effectively is to enable the nations to learn to co-operate together in doing some useful work. Directly that is done, we may be certain that a spirit of good will and friendship will spring up. Wherever two sets of people are working together, whether they be two nations or two bodies of people of any character acting together and doing some useful work, they will become friends in a way that nothing else can secure.
By the League of Nations such work can be done. It can deal with questions like those of the law affecting international commerce, extradition and shipping, with the white slave traffic, with questions of scientific investigation of all kinds, in which the nations can help each other and get into the habit of helping each other. In that way they can accomplish far more than by all the sanctions that can possibly be put forward, and it will be found that people who have been enemies will become fast friends by working together. Let us also be careful, when we are dealing with any question of dispute, that we provide a means by which that dispute can be settled judicially, if it cannot be settled by mutual agreement, and let the judicial tribunals he kept distinct from political influences. That is necessary at home. There have been lately, unfortunately, indications that that principle may be interfered with here in England. While the League
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of Nations itself and its Council may be a body of conciliation, a body doing various kinds of useful work, it is not a judicial tribunal, and cannot properly be made into one. We want a strong Court free from political influences, like the Hague Tribunal, keeping the judicial side distinct from the political.
Above all, if we do have agreements for deciding disputes that cannot be settled by negotiation between the parties, let us have it clear in any such agreement that those disputes shall be settled by a judicial tribunal, whether it be the Court at the Hague or whether it be one of the mixed tribunals set up under the Treaties of Versailles and of Trianon. Any policy that interferes with the action of such tribunals is a fatally unfortunate policy. We have seen what the mixed tribunals can do in deciding disputes day after day. Hundreds of disputes have been settled by the various Mixed Arbitral Tribunals. Let us make sure that, wherever such tribunals are provided for under any Treaty, they shall function as freely and as completely as possible. Although we approve heartily of the action that they are now taking under existing Treaties, and under present conditions, we may express the hope that those general lines of policy which I have ventured to indicate will not be forgotten when new events arise and new steps have to be taken.
Mr. PONSONBY: The hon. Gentleman who has just sat down has given expression to sentiments with which I am in hearty agreement. In fact, his speech might have been made from these benches. There was one point he particularly emphasised, which was also emphasised by the hon. and gallant Member for Chippenham (Captain Cazalet) in a very interesting speech, with which I should like to deal for a moment. Both these hon. Members pressed for the evacuation of the Rhineland by the troops now quartered there, and I should like on behalf of my friends on this side of the House to support that plea. We have always felt that Germany being now a member of the League of Nations, should be on a footing of complete equality with other Powers. There are two conditions which prevent that at present. The first is that Germany is disarmed ever since 1919 down to a certain standard of dis-

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armament, and the other is that German territory is occupied by foreign troops. I will not dwell now upon the first of these conditions, which puts Germany on a different footing, because the considerations connected with it are too large. But the second is really a perfectly simple matter. It is a matter of the withdrawal from the Rhine of a force which is of no sort of use, which is serving no purpose whatever that can help in good relations between the countries, which is an expense in itself, which is demoralising to the soldiers who have to serve in this force, and which ceases to be of any value.
We had expected, after the French elections, that possibly the policy of the French Government with regard to this matter might have taken a step in advance. The time is coming, I think in two years, when the period during which the troops are by Treaty to remain there will terminate; but surely we need not wait for other Powers when our troops are involved? Cannot the Government take a lead in this matter, and make advances to the French Government, which is now formed, and say that the time has come to terminate this arrangement before its actual term? I should like to ask the Under-Secretary whether any steps are being taken in that direction and, if not, whether he will communicate these views to the Secretary of State. With regard to the two most important questions which have occupied the attention of the Committee to-day, a great deal has been said and little remains perhaps for me to say. But there are one or two points which require consideration.
I should like to say a few words with regard to our attitude towards Oriental nations. We go on, year in, year out, pursuing little policies here and there, without really tackling the problem from a very much larger point of view. The East and the West meet in these countries, and we have adopted a certain line of policy, be it in India, in Turkey, in Persia, or in Egypt, which has become a sort of British tradition. That policy is to show these Oriental countries that in order to become civilised like we are they should adopt a Parliamentary and representative form of government, and we proceed to transplant this very tender growth of Parliamentary government,
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which has thriven in this country because now it is some 700 years old, into a perfectly different soil, in perfectly different conditions, and we blame the Orientals if their Parliamentary system does not succeed. I have always agreed with the sentiment expressed by a former Prime Minister in this House that good government is no substitute for self-government. I think we have made a mistake in these Oriental countries in trying to force on them Western methods and Western ideas.
The right hon. Member for Marylebone (Sir R. Rodd) who made an interesting maiden speech and has had a very rich diplomatic experience, stated that we very often look upon Parliaments and Government offices in Egypt, and things which we have the same name as we give them here, very much in the light of our own Parliament and Government offices. Their tradition is absolutely different. Their method is different. They do not understand that form of Government. Their students read of it in books, and we teach them that it is the right thing to adopt, and I really believe the time has come, in the 20th century, when we should revise our methods and allow these Orientals to govern their country in their own way, even if they make a mess of it. I am not advocating a bag and baggage policy in Egypt. Of course, we cannot do that. I know perfectly well that in the last 40 years there have grown up great obligations which we are obliged to discharge. But I know more than that. I know that if you went to the present or to any Egyptian Government and said "We will clear out all our troops; we leave to you the protection of the foreigner: we let the Suez Canal go: and we hand over to you the Sudan in the next month"; there is no Egyptian Government that would accept that proposal.
That brings us to the Orient method of diplomacy, which I do not think we understand. Sarwat Pasha came over here and negotiated with the Foreign Secretary. As it turned out, he did not represent his Government. I should have thought a well-informed British High Commissioner in Cairo would have known that and would have informed the Foreign Secretary. That Oriental method has been adopted before. I think it will be within the recollection of the Com-

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mittee that the negotiations that went on previous to the entry of Turkey into the War were conducted precisely in that way. Sarwat Pasha came over here friendly towards the views of the right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary, and when he got back he found that his Government did not agree with him. I think that Lord Lloyd, the British High Commissioner in Cairo, ought to have known perfectly well that Sarwat Pasha would not be able to carry that Treaty through with his Government in that country, and ought to have given a proper warning to the right hon. Gentleman here in London. Negotiations which are opened and then fail make eventual settlement more and more difficult. The right hon. Gentleman read out the complimentary letter of Nahas Pasha, the present Prime Minister. He also said that Sarwat Pasha parted from him after the negotiations had broken down in the friendliest possible spirit. My right hon. Friend the Member for Aberavon (Mr. Ramsay MacDonald) parted from Zaghloul Pasha in 1924 after their negotiations had broken down in the friendliest possible spirit.
The Oriental is very friendly. He is clever. The Oriental has this particular method that we do not in the very least understand, and because we fail to understand we always blame him, when really the clumsiness rests with us. Then because negotiations stopped and because the Egyptian Parliament wanted to pass a certain Measure of legislation, and because we warned them that we did not want them to do that, we had not the patience to go on, and we sent out battleships. I do not think that in the course of the Debate to-day it has been made sufficiently clear to the Government how very strongly we disagree with that blundering method of threatening force. With the orders for the ships from the pen of the Foreign Secretary hardly yet dry, he comes down to the House and says that this country has never used war as an instrument of policy. Really, one does regret the opportunities that are given to the foreigner to point to us as hypocrites.
The right hon. Gentleman, in dealing with the outlawry proposal of Mr. Kellogg, made the statement that this country has never used war as an instrument of national policy. This
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country has never been the aggressor. It was the French, it was the Russians, it was the Turks, the Germans, the Austrians, the Zulus, the Afghans, the Boers during the last 100 years who always attacked us, and we were always on the defensive. Anybody speaking in any other Parliament of the world would say exactly the same thing. No country has ever confessed that it was the aggressor, and every country will declare with a perfectly clear conscience in its Parliament that it has never used war as an instrument of national policy. That is exactly where the trouble is. We do it from our point of view, and we forget that other people are doing the same thing in their own country. I am sure we are glad that the Foreign Secretary has given what must be for the moment, until he gets confirmation from the Dominions, a reserved but nevertheless a cordial welcome to the Kellogg proposals. I hope that the dangers and difficulties to which he refers Null not stand in the way of a wholehearted acceptance of this very important move in the direction of peace.
His Majesty's Government have, up to now, been inclined to cast shadows and throw doubts on the attempts of other nations in the direction of peace. His Majesty's Government have not had the imagination to contribute any sort of suggestion of their own. Let us hope, anyhow, that on this occasion there will be a really cordial and sincere response to this suggestion. Of course, in the League of Nations it is always extremely difficult to make any advance. We do not expect too much of the League of Nations. We know not only of the different points of view, as represented by the different individuals and different States, but that the individuals who go to the League of Nations very often do not know whether their Government is sufficiently stable to send them there on future occasions. Therefore, you get at Geneva, necessarily, very slow progress. I agree with what an hon. Member said with regard to America's reluctance to hind herself by the sanctions of the Covenant of the League. I heartily endorse what was said with regard to those sanctions.
Here we have something that comes from outside Geneva, something that introduces the fresh air of a nation that

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has been anxious to help but has—and very rightly has—doubted the sincerity of the European nations. The moment has come when this has been launched, and I think that we ought to remember, that while we give Mr. Kellogg and the Government of the United States of America every possible credit for having brought forward the proposal in its present form of a multilateral treaty, 1 do not think we ought to forget that it was M. Briand who first of all said to the American Government, "France is willing publicly to engage itself with the United States to put war as between the two countries outside the pale of the law." I do not think we ought to be too hasty in condemning France and in thinking that France is to be a spoke in the wheel which will bring this to a fruitful conclusion. I hope very much that M. Briand will be restored to health, because I believe he is the real friend of peace. I am perfectly certain that when he has an opportunity to speak he will, as he always has, up to now, move in the direction of making the acceptance of the American proposals free and unhampered and not overloaded with reservations and restrictions.
The message that has gone out to-day from the House of Commons is one that is already vibrating in all the capitals of the world. Great Britain has spoken—not yet enthusiastically, except in the speech of my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition. The Dominions had to be consulted, and I would like to ask this question. I hope that the consultation with the Dominions is being effected by telegram, and that it will be a matter of days and not weeks before their reply is received. But this news has gone out and the voice of Great Britain in this matter is an important voice. What we say does matter. I think the world has been watching these last 10 years for a British lead, and that British lead has not come. The lead has come from the United States of America. Let us, as cousins, give it the warmest possible welcome. Germany has spoken, and our welcome ought not only to be an acceptance, but at the same time a willingness, expressed with friendliness and affection, to bring this matter a stage further, to ease the steps which may yet be rather difficult imme-
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diately in advance, and so to invite the other great Powers and the smaller nations who will be only too ready to follow the lead, into a path which, as the second quarter of the 20th century dawns, may at last lead the nations to real peace.
The UNDER-SECRETARY of STATE for FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Mr. Godfrey Locker-Lampson): The difficulty which anyone has to meet in winding up a Debate is to try to find replies for the various questions which have been put to him, but my difficulty this evening is that there is very little to answer in the speeches which hon. Gentlemen opposite have made. In fact, I do not think I have ever witnessed such practical unanimity as has been shown in the House this evening. It is true that certain hon. Gentlemen opposite have made certain rather vague complaints in regard to past actions of ours, but on the whole really the voice of controversy has practically been hushed this evening. I do hope that the voice of controversy will be hushed in regard to this American proposal until the matter has been settled. The Government welcome the proposal which has been made by the United States of America, and we are whole-heartedly going to do our best to make it a success. The hon. Gentleman asked just now a specific question as to whether our communications with the Dominions were going to be by telegram and whether we should know the result of their answers within a few days. Our communications, so far as I know, are being made by telegram, and I very much hope that the result will be known within a very few days. Anyhow, we shall not be lacking in every possible endeavour to get the answers as soon as we can and let the House know the results.
The hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Central Hull (Lieut.-Commander Kenworthy), who is not here in his place now, made what to my mind was an interesting contribution to the Debate. He said that we ought to negotiate with the United States with regard to maritime rights at sea in time of war, and he thought that if we did so, and could come to some successful issue on that point, the United States would probably do their best to prevent their nationals from breaking a blockade insti-

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tuted by the League. That is an interesting suggestion which deserves consideration, but, after all, we have got enough on our hands at the moment. We have one negotiation, and a very big negotiation, on our hands, and if this Treaty develops, as we hope it will, and has the immense effect which we hope it will have, I believe it will go a long way towards solving very many of the problems which have proved so difficult of solution in the past.
The hon. Gentleman who has just sat down asked one other specific question, and that question was also raised by the hon. Gentleman the Member for Chippenham (Captain Cazalet) and by the hon. Member for the English Universities (Sir A. Hopkinson), in regard to the evacuation of the Rhineland. I agree that this is a very important question, but the hon. Gentlemen must remember that we have very considerably reduced our military forces in the Rhineland during the last year or two. I have not got the figures here at the moment, because I did not know the question was to be raised, but we have reduced our forces by several thousands during the last year. This occupation, after all, is under the Treaty of Versailles, and until the period under that Treaty comes to an end, we are, under the Treaty, legally entitled to keep our troops there. But I agree with the hon. Gentleman that nothing would be better, if it were possible, than to withdraw our troops altogether from the Rhineland. You have to remember two things. One is that we act in concert with our former Allies, Belgium and France, and the other is that the question of occupation is very largely bound up with the question of reparations. It is very difficult to separate these two questions altogether. The problem of reparations, I hope, is much nearer some kind of practical solution than it was a years ago. All I will say is this: We are watching this question of the occupation of the Rhineland very carefully, and nobody will be more pleased than we shall be, as a Government, if the occupation of the Rhineland comes to an end sooner than a few years ago it was thought to be possible.
The hon. Gentleman asked me one other definite question, relating to the visit of Sarwat Pasha to this country at the time of the negotiations with my
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right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary, and he was very surprised that Lord Lloyd had not warned us—he asked whether Lord Lloyd had warned us—that there was no chance of that Treaty passing the Egyptian Parliament. As a matter of fact, Sarwat Pasha himself was almost certain that on his return to Egypt he would be able to get the Treaty through the Egyptian Parliament. Therefore, if Sarwat Pasha, who was the Prime Minister of Egypt, thought that this Treaty had that good chance, I think that anyhow we cannot be blamed for having thought also that it would have a good chance. I was very disappointed, and I am sure all Members of the House were, that that Treaty did not go through. It very nearly did go through in the last resort, before Sarwat Pasha found that it would be definitely rejected, there were only two minor points outstanding, the question of the police and that of certain English officers functioning in the Egyptian army. Those were the only two outstanding points. They had practically been settled when the leaders of Wafd made up their minds that they could not accept the Treaty. I still hope that one of these days we shall see the resurrection of that Treaty, or something very like it. If we can get that kind of understanding, we shall be able to go forward to a period of continued peace.
I have nothing to add to what my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said with regard to Egypt and the American Note. I listened very carefully to the Debate for any specific points to which I might have to reply, but I failed to note any, except one. It would, therefore, not be worth while keeping the House by covering the old ground once more. There was, however, one specific point in the speech of the Noble Lord the Member for Oxford University (Lord Hugh Cecil) to which I should like to reply. The Noble Lord is not in his place but he will probably look in the OFFICIAL REPORT to-morrow to see whether his question has been answered. He expressed the hope that the Government would do something to contribute to the Armenian Refugees Settlement Fund. Questions have been put to the Foreign Office on this subject during the last year, and I think my Noble Friend had not in his mind the fact that we have already contributed

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over £1,000,000 to the Armenians in Iraq. At the present time I believe there is a scheme promoted by Dr. Nansen for the benefit of the Armenians in Armenia, and there is another scheme promoted by the French for the Armenians in Syria and a third scheme for the Armenians in South America. In the case of Syria, I think it is for the French to look after the Armenians in that part of the world, because they have a mandate for Syria. As we have already contributed over £1,000,000 towards the Armenians in Iraq, I do not feel that in our present state of national finance we can at the moment do more.
The Debate this evening has been an example for us to follow in future Debates, and as near as possible to treat foreign questions from a non-controversial point of view. As far as the Foreign Office are concerned they have no complaints whatever to make about the tone which has been exhibited in the Debate to-day, and I can say, so far as my right hon. Friend and myself are concerned, that we are very anxious that foreign affairs should not be treated as party politics. There can be no doubt that directly foreign affairs are treated from the point of view of party politics they are apt to engender dangerous questions, which may have very serious repercussions abroad. Therefore, I am delighted to think that in our Parliament these foreign questions are treated in a nonpartisan spirit, and on their own merits.
Mr. SAKLATVALA: I agree that up to now the Committee has been, more or less, like a prayer meeting, with hon. Members pronouncing mutual benedictions upon one another. I hope the Committee will permit me to carry on the usual function of discussion in my own way, without feeling offended. With regard to Egypt, the very fact that our relations with that country are conducted through the Foreign Office means that that country is as much a foreign country as France and America, and not a colony or dependency; and yet Great Britain in her relations with that foreign country, through the British Foreign Office, maintains her own Army, her own hired police officers and her own rights of insistence upon her wishes being observed, even in the conduct of Parliamentary Government in that country. That, in itself, ex-
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poses the methods of Great Britain in running imperialism in disguise. The Committee ought to be perfectly fair and honest. If we do not mean Egypt to be an independent country and a free country, why leave Egypt under the Foreign Office? Why not place Egypt under the Colonial Minister, or create another Secretary of State, like the Secretary of State for India, or adopt some other method to show the type of Egyptian independence in the eyes of this country as compared with the independence of other countries with whom the Foreign Office deals.
I am not surprised, but a little puzzled in trying to differentiate between the two policies of the Government and the Labour party. If my hon. Friends in the Committee will allow me the indulgence to explain my difficulty, without getting offended, I should like to say that the Government policy, so far as I understand it, is a warship diplomacy, while the policy of the British Labour party, as I understand it, I may be wrong, is the policy of telling the people of Great Britain that we shall remain the undoubted masters, with the last word, in Egypt, and at the same time attempting to tell the Egyptians that we are going to keep Egypt in subjection, but without warships. I appeal to my Friends of the Labour party to explain the position to the Egyptians much more clearly. The hon. Member for Shoreditch (Mr. Thurtle) explained that the, policy of the Labour party was not akin to the policy of the Government, and I understood that clearly: but I felt rather puzzled as to whether the policy which he enunciated was the policy of the Labour party in Shoreditch or the policy of the Labour party in Aberavon. That in itself would show that probably there are contradictory policies in foreign affairs and in colonial affairs which pass under the name of Labour party policy.
I am not saying these things in any spirit of sectional controversy in this country but I am merely trying to impress upon the Committee the necessity of making these points clear from the viewpoint of the Oriental countries about which so much has been said of sympathy and pathos. If the Labour party are agreed that a British Commissioner must be in Egypt, and if they are agreed that even under democratic Parliamentary

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machinery, that even a Parliament like that in Egypt has no right to pass a law because Great Britain objects to it, and if, on the other hand, the Egyptian people say, "We are going to pass this law, and you have no right to interfere in our internal affairs," how is a British administration to be maintained in Egypt I How is the right of Britain to be in Egypt to be exercised and maintained 1 It is no use trying either to bamboozle yourselves or the people of Egypt and say that we have got some method in a silk hat which we will produce to control Egypt without warships or armaments. These two things are impossible, whether it be in Egypt, China, Iraq, India, or anywhere where foreign control has to be maintained. If you agree that it is to be maintained, then it is no use saying that warships will not be used, or aeroplanes or armaments will not be used. I believe that the experience of Iraqians in 1924 is that armaments are sometimes used to exercise the right of a foreign Power in another country. These things ought to be explained, and if anybody has a prescription of how one Power can dominate in the country of another Power without using forces or warships or police officers, the world would be the richer for the discovery of such a method. But the Egyptian people and we all believe that there is not such a method. There is no foreign Power which can hold a dominating sway in another country which can come out in pubic and pretend that it does not want to use the army.
We were told by the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition that it was his conviction that it was not possible to get away from Egypt immediately, and to try and give independence to Egypt, because some other Power would go in; and if another Power should not go in, the Egyptians would make a muddle of their own affairs. Why is not some other Power taking Belgium? Belgium is a small Power. Why can Belgium be independent? If the neutrality of Belgium can be held by independence, why cannot the independence of Egypt be equally held? If Denmark can enjoy peace and independence, or Switzerland or Holland, why is it that it is only Oriental countries to which this fictitious Imperialistic argument is going to be used by the Labour party? If it is their honest conviction, they should explain
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the difference between Egypt and Denmark, Holland, Belgium or Switzerland. If it is the fear that if Great Britain does not occupy a weak Power somebody else will, why does not Great Britain take these small European Powers? With regard to the ability of Egyptians to govern their own country, what are the evidences to show that Egyptians cannot carry on their government? If this Parliament were subject to an outside interference, so that whatever Parliament discussed would not become law unless some Chinaman or Egyptian or Indian approved of it, Parliamentary government in this country would not be able to function smoothly or really successfully. To talk of councils in India or Parliament in Egypt as not functioning successfully, and then to attribute it to an inherent fault of the people, passes all comprehension.
The Leader of the Opposition has said that the policy of the Labour party is to get over the transition period. What is the transition period? Who fixes it? On what does it depend? The Noble Lord the Secretary of State for India told the country quite openly the other day that, even if the Egyptians postponed this Bill, not for a few months, or for a few years, or for 10 years, Great Britain would find it to her interest to interfere. In the opinion of the Noble Lord, the transition period is not even visible. The Foreign Secretary told us that it is the geographical position of Egypt that makes it impossible for Great Britain to withdraw. The Egyptians certainly would like to know what the identification ought to be of this conception of a transition period. Does the Labour party also believe that the transition period means the period while Great Britain is the master of India and must control the Suez Canal Do they also believe that the transition period is not within the next 10 or 20 years, and that it is dependent upon Egypt's geographical position? Will they also wait for some earthquake or ice-age to carry away Egypt to the Pacific Ocean or somewhere else? Does the transition period depend upon all the boys and girls of Egypt going to some school and passing an examination, or does it depend on something that the Egyptians are asked to do and do not do?

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What is the line of demarcation between Egyptian freedom and British right to interfere in the Egyptian field? I believe, at least, that the people of Egypt, with whom we have this funny sort of foreign relationship, are entitled to know, when somebody fixes a transition period, upon what it is based. Upon what standard is it based, so that the people can make an effort to satisfy the particular standard?
Apart from this position, there is the entire outlook of British politics towards these Asiatic countries. There are many events which happen outside a country for which Great Britain insists upon an unnatural foreign policy with that particular country. Sometimes they are afraid of Russian Bolshevists, and immediately they start bullying Persia or Afghanistan. The poor Afghans or Persians are perfectly innocent, but because the British have some suspicion about Russian Bolshevism, they start bullying them. If they have some fear of something going wrong in India, they want the military routes to India to be kept clear, they want their air service to pass through Persia or their control centred over Egypt, and similarly, depending on their policy in China, several other States in Asia have to suffer for the Foreign Office of Great Britain. These Asiatic countries have a right to know when the British Foreign Office is going to give up its habit of playing the bully and the pirate in Eastern seas. They invent all kinds of excuses about British interests, but there are Egyptian interests in this country, and there are Egyptian citizens living here. Can any Egyptian battalion be posted in Kensington for their protection?
I wish to draw the attention of the Foreign Office to another important feature which has occurred in Germany, and that is the role of a self-appointed Foreign Minister for this country played by the galloper Secretary of State for India. When the Egyptian situation is at its most critical moment, it is not the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs who declares his opinion, but the Secretary of State for India, who pompously says he has decided that even if this particular Bill is postponed for 10 years, Egypt will have no right to pass it. We want to know exactly how
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far the Secretary of State for India is permitted to act as a sort of kite flyer or deputy for the Foreign Secretary. He went recently to Germany, and we were told by the Prime Minister that he was out on a holiday. It is well known, however, in Germany that he did put forward five specific points to the German Government, on behalf and in the name of the British Government, to break their trading relations with Russia, to give up some of their concessional rights, to stop the, credits to Russia; and not only so, but it is well known all over Germany that he discussed certain military points as between Germany and Great Britain.
I would like to know whether the Noble Lord plays this part as a rival to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, with whom he disagrees, or whether he is just saying things out of a sense of higher diplomacy which he thinks the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should not say, and that he should take part in an important political intrigue or any kind of a plot in foreign countries, and that he should do so when he is out on holiday. It is really opening up a very serious departure in the foreign relations of this country for a Cabinet Minister, whose job it is to deal with India, to pronounce mischievous opinions publicly and bombastically on foreign affairs generally. Is it done in a spirit of rivalry, and is the Prime Minister not able to put him down?
10.0 p.m.
There has been nothing said in this Debate with regard to the present situation in China. There is still, not only a war atmosphere there, but occasionally irregular warfare is carried on, sometimes by this country, sometimes by another country; and the British policy towards the people of China is not made clear. We quite realise the argument that there is no one specific authority in China with whom the Foreign Office can deal, but events prove that the British Foreign Office has at times a distinct partiality for certain groups and events. Questions have been asked in this House with regard to the handing over of Chinese refugees. When a lot of tears are shed about Armenian refugees, the same British Government has no scruple in handing over Chinese refugees to war generals, who do nothing with them but chop off their heads. It is certainly very economical. There is

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a sort of hidden policy in China, arid why cannot this country make clear what is her settled policy there? At the present time there is a very significant example that where the Japanese Government have provoked warlike operations the Chinese are retaliating. When the British Government are holding neutrality, the Chinese have not done any harm to British interests, and that is proof that the foreign interests in China are jeopardised when some foreign Power becomes the aggressor and provokes retaliation from the Chinese. Some pronouncement of a clearer character ought, to be made as to what are the real intentions of Great Britain towards the movement in China for the real freedom of the lower masses and not of the few mandarins who can treat with foreign Powers.
There was a question raised about the Eastern Christians, and that reminds me of some of the Eastern non-Christians. The other day I asked a question of the Foreign Office, and I was given hope that after investigation by the India Office I might get some answer. I am not particularly interested in any religious propaganda by one religion into the province of another religion, but this is a matter of foreign policy. Christian missionaries are not only allowed but are helped to go out to China, Africa, India and other countries, and Great Britain has always insisted on freedom for these missionaries to go out and preach and make converts. If the people do not like it, they are not compelled to be converts, but the missionaries are not to be molested. I drew the attention of the Foreign Office the other day to the question of a party of Hindu missionaries having entered the territory of the Portuguese Government in India, where the original Hindu population had been converted by Christian Catholic missionaries to the Christian Catholic religion. The Hindu missionaries went out there, they did not break any law, they created no trouble whatever, and then they started preaching Hinduism; and as a result of it a few hundred men or women were converted to Hinduism.
The CHAIRMAN: Where is the responsibility of the Foreign Office? I understand that certain Hindu missionaries entered into Portuguese India, did the hon. Member say?
Mr. SAKLATVALA: Yes.
The CHAIRMAN: But how can the British Foreign Office be responsible for what happens in Portuguese territory?
Mr. SAKLATVALA: I am putting it to the British Foreign Office that these men were banished and told that if they again entered to preach Hinduism in those Catholic villages, they would be imprisoned for life. They were banished and translated back to British territory, and this was distinctly an occasion where the British Foreign Office ought to make representations to the Portuguese Government. If Christian missionaries were turned away from China or from an African village, would the British Foreign Office make no representations? I would draw the attention of the Foreign Office to that matter not as one which has any religious consequence to me or to anybody else, but as a matter of the same fair and equal protection being extended to Hindu missionaries as would be given to British Christian missionaries. With regard to America, on a previous occasion I made a suggestion which was laughed at, and I will risk being laughed at again. The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition said, "If war between America and Great Britain is unthinkable, why not put your pledge on paper and sign it?" That is a very fine and right challenge to give; but we know that the world is full of signed pledges which were accompanied by as many wars. I have been suggesting for the last two or three years that, if you are really serious about no war between your country and America, great economy could le accomplished, and much of the war spirit could be abolished if you had one common navy between America and Great Britain for common purposes, and if the personnel of each ship were half British and half American.
The CHAIRMAN: I would remind the hon. Member that the cost of the Navy is not covered by the Foreign Office Vote.
Mr. SAKLATVALA: I was not referring to the financial side of the question, but to the peace side. The best foreign policy would be to have a common Navy in partnership with America, and a common Air Force in

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partnership with France. With regard to Russia, I suppose my words will be wasted, but I again put it to this Committee that your attitude to that country is not one of spiting your face by cutting off your nose by disturbing friendly relations with Russia, but it all arises out of an insidious enmity towards the workers' republic. That spirit is upsetting Great Britain's relations with various other countries. It is making relations with Germany complicated and confused; it is partly an intrigue against France, partly an intrigue against Poland, and partly an intrigue against Belgium, simply because of your Russian nightmare. The policy of Great Britain towards Italy is also involved and confused by the Russian nightmare. It is the same in your policy with Afghanistan. The Amir of Afghanistan was here, and people went on their knees and bowed before him, but the Amir of Afghanistan understands quite well that it was all because of the nightmare of Soviet Russia. Relationships are vitiated and confused and have become mere intriguing and mystery on account of this bogey of the first workers republic. When Great Britain makes up its mind that that workers' republic is to live; that, after mistakes and hardships, it is going to build up a new life for the workers which has not been known hitherto to the world; that it is to be an example of Socialism, then Russia is bound to be studied in all its details. It would be foolish not to study it. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear!"] If a new capitalist scheme were launched in America, some of those "hear, hearers" opposite would be gloating over it, and would want to study it in every detail and to go across and find out what was going on. When the workers of Great Britain, of Germany, of France, and of Italy find out that the workers of Russia have done what the British Labour movement taught for 15 years, they are bound to study it, to exchange finance, to exchange delegates, and to exchange literature. There is nothing unnatural about it; there is nothing conspiratory about it. The Liberal party is now imitating us.
The CHAIRMAN: I would ask the hon. Gentleman what this has to do with foreign policy.
Mr. SAKLATVALA: I am speaking about the Liberal party's policy.
The CHAIRMAN: What the House is discussing now is the foreign policy of the Government.
Mr. SAKLATVALA: I was only giving an example that we are not going to interfere with Russia, and I was pointing out that Liberals have come from various other countries to confer in England with British Liberals and probably to form a world Liberal International. They have made an exchange of finance, of literature and of views; but the British Government are not going to alter their policy of foreign relationships with other countries on account of that Liberal International Federation. I do not see why, because of a Communist International Federation and Communist activities openly carried on, Britain should take her foreign policy out of the right plane and try to suppress anything that happens in a workers' republic. I again appeal to the Committee with very little hope; but I appeal to the Government to give up that angle of vision and to re-establish their foreign relations with all other countries on a natural basis, regardless of any intrigue against the Soviet Republic. Whatever we may try to do, the Soviet Republic and Sovietism as a system will succeed and become a world power.
Sir MARTIN CONWAY: After the torrent of words to which we have just listened, it is a little difficult to turn one's attention to practical matters. I am sorry that the Under-Secretary has made his speech in reply, as there are one or two points which I wish to put to him in reference to passports, and I presume it will not be possible to have them answered to-night. Ministers and permanent officials of the Government, when they go abroad have no practical experience of the discomforts which the ordinary man suffers in reference to passports. Hundreds of thousands of people from this country who travel are unnecessarily annoyed by the complications of the passport system. At the Sixth Assembly of the League of Nations, a resolution was unanimously passed to the effect that the abolition of passports should be brought about by gradual stages, with a view to the suppression to the widest possible extent of the pass-

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port system. There have been various passport conferences. There was one in 1920 at which the representatives of Great Britain led in the direction of an improvement in the passport system, but at the last passport conference, in 1926, every proposal for modification of the system put forward by foreign countries was blocked by the British representatives.
For instance, France proposed that the general control of travellers at frontiers should be gradually discontinued and their representative explained that the purpose of the proposal was to restore pre-War conditions, under which it was the business of the police to watch persons reported as suspects. That proposal was emphatically repudiated by the representatives of Great Britain. I take it, therefore, that passports must be regarded as a permanent institution in this country, and that any desire that may be expressed that compulsory passports should be done away with or any effort in that direction will meet with the opposition of the Government. Therefore, we have to take that as a thing settled. If, then, we are to regard passports as a regular part of our system, the whole business of obtaining and renewing passports should be made as simple and as easy as possible. First of all, what we want more than anything else is to have visas abolished. Visas have been largely abolished but I think they still exist as between this country and the United States. I have a list of the various prices of visas as between the United States and different foreign countries. I will not read them to the Committee, but as far as Great Britain is concerned, the visa costs £2. I understand the United States is willing to abolish the visa and that it is we who are standing in the way.
One of the things we have always tried to do is to promote tourist traffic between foreign countries and Great Britain. If we desire to do that, one of the first things we have to do is to make it easy for citizens of the United States to come to this country. Those who do visit us have to pay a sum, in respect of the visa, corresponding to that which we pay on going to the United States, and not only that, but if they remain here for any length of time there are various regulations which they have to follow. Every-
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thing done to facilitate the visits of United States citizens to this country and of people from this country to the United States helps to bring together the two peoples on whose co-operation the peace of the word depends. Everybody, I think, is agreed that visas might be done away with, except perhaps in the case of Russia, but coming to passports and regarding them as inevitable, the first thing to do is to make them as cheap as possible.
Nowadays people of relatively small means make short visits to the Continent of a week, 10 days or a fortnight. They travel in groups for a very small price. A matter of £5 will take a man abroad and bring him back again, but the passport costs him 7s. 6d. He must also have himself photographed and pay visits to offices which take up his time. The result is that though his total expenses otherwise are only about £5, he is put to an expense of 10s. or 12s. in England before he can start. That is a considerable matter to people of small means. We want to make our passports as cheap as possible. What is the object of a passport It is simply to say that the person whose photograph is on the card is named so and so and is a British subject. Why should that cost a man 7s. 6d. and be available only for five years; and why should it cost 2s. to renew a passport? Why should there be only one or two places in England—London and Liverpool and one or two other places—at which one can obtain passports? In many foreign countries passports are issued by the head of the police of the district, who surely is more likely to know, or can more easily find out, the character of the person applying than can a Foreign Office official in London. Why should not a passport cost half-a-crown and be obtainable locally anywhere? That would do away with a great deal of the objection there is to passports. Again, in the case of groups of people going abroad together, why should not there be a collective passport for the whole lot of them? Nothing could be safer than to have a group of people travelling together. They cannot very well separate, and they keep an eye upon one another, and one passport for the whole lot would be most suitable.
Then there is another little detail. When you get a passport you are asked to what countries you wish to go, and

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they are entered on it. On getting abroad you always find that you wish to go to some other country which you have forgotten. I had 25 countries put on my passport, and then I had forgotten Egypt. I was on my way to Palestine. Of course, it did not matter, because nobody ever looks at a passport, and the omission was not found out, and so my passport carried me through; but it might have been troublesome, and if I had wanted to have Egypt added to it, I should have had to send my passport to the Foreign Office and pay 2s. Then it happened that I wanted to go to the Kingdom of Persia, and I had forgotten to include Persia. Why should not passports, as was recommended by the Passport Commission at Geneva, be available universally? It is nothing more than an identity card, and the statement that John Jones is a British subject is just as true in France as in Belgium or Holland or India or the United States. Why should a man he put to the trouble of having entered on his passport every country to which he wishes to go and be charged 2s. if he wishes to add another country, and 2s. apiece if he wishes to add half-a-dozen others? I would intercede with the Foreign Office to try to do something to make it easier for people to come home from abroad. If you are returning by way of Calais and Dover, from the moment you get out of the train at Calais to the moment you get into the train at Dover, it is like a football squash. At Calais you are herded through a passage in order that your passport may be inspected; then you are herded through another too small chamber to have your luggage examined. Why it should be necessary to examine the luggage when you are leaving France I cannot make out.
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Then the passport has to be examined again at Dover, and, of course, the luggage also. All that makes the journey the most uncomfortable two hours that it is possible to conceive. If anybody had set to work to organise a really uncomfortable entrance to England from France he could not have done better. I beg the Foreign Office to see if something cannot be done to facilitate travelling in this respect. It is terribly hard on invalids, and on old people like myself, to have to go through this football squash. Any success which the Foreign Office can achieve in rendering the passage of people coming home a little easier will be received with satisfaction by hundreds of thousands of passengers who now suffer this great inconvenience.
Mr. LOCKER-LAMPSON: I did not know that my hon. Friend was going to raise this subject. I have got a careful note of all he has said, and I will report it to the Passport Office, and we will see what can be done.
Motion made, and Question, "That the Chairman do report Progress, and ask leave to sit again," put, and agreed to.—[Commander Eyres Monsell.]
Committee report Progress; to sit again To-morrow.
The remaining Orders were read, and postponed.

ADJOURNMENT.
Resolved, "That this House do now adjourn."—[Commander Eyres Monsell.]
Adjourned accordingly at Twenty-eight Minutes before Eleven o'Clock.