IRAQ.

HC Deb 21 December 1925 vol 189 cc2076-153

The PRIME MINISTER

I beg to move, That this House approves the action taken by the representatives of His Majesty's Government at Geneva in accepting the award of the Council of the League of Nations on the Iraq boundary. This Motion which has been put on the Paper deals only with the approval which i ask the House to give to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Secretary of State for the Colonies for their recent action as Geneva in accepting, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the award of the Council of the League of Nations on the question of the Iraq boundary. Their action in this matter has, however, only been a continuation of action taken by a series of successive Governments, and the approval of the House, if given, should in equity include our predecessors as well as ourselves. The undertaking to accept the award of the League, as deciding the question of the Iraq frontier, was given in the first instance by Lord Curzon when he signed the Treaty of Lausanne two years ago, and by any right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition when he was responsible for the ratification of that Treaty in the following year. The undertaking was explicitly renewed at Geneva by Lord Parmoor in September last year on behalf of the late Government.

That undertaking does not stand by itself as a particular policy adopted by us with reference to a particular dispute. It is only one instance of the application of a principle to which all parties have been committed ever since the Covenant of the League of Nations was included in the Treaty of Versailles—I mean the principle of extending the use of the League of Nations as an instrument for the peaceful settlement of international difference and strengthening, by our support, its authority for that purpose. Hon. and right hon. Members who recently were sitting opposite were prepared to give that principle a much wider application than we believe to be practicable. They were ready to enter into a Protocol by which they would have engaged this country, not only to submit all possible disputes of its own to arbitration, but also to go to war with any other country which did not fulfil a similar obligation, however remote the conflict might be from any conceivable British interests. We have been less ambitious, but we have, in the Treaty of Locarno, applied the same principle to the settlement of all possible disputes affecting a particular frontier in which we are profoundly interested. The present instance is one of an even more restricted character. It affects the settlement of one particular dispute, expressly referred to the League in a Treaty barely a year old. If we were to reject the application of that principle to so clearly defined and limited an issue, what real value would the world attach to our general professions of our desire to strengthen the machinery of the League of Nations; and if we weaken the authority of the League in so explicit a case submitted to them, how are we to rely on that authority in future to give real effect, in some wholly unforeseen crisis, to the Treaties of Locarno or any other treaties which may develop on similar lines?

It is for these reasons that I regard this Motion as, in effect, one of general approval of the whole attitude which successive Governments have taken up, not only on the Iraq frontier question, but on even wider issues, and I venture to express the hope that it may have the unanimous support of this House. I do not, in making that suggestion, wish for a moment to suggest that this House should be committed by to-night's discussion to the actual terms of the Treaty which we will endeavour to conclude with the Iraq Government in pursuance of the award. While the power to ratify such a Treaty is one which, constitutionally, does not depend on the vote of this House, we have no intention of ratifying the proposed Treaty until the House at its re-assembly has had an opportunity of discussing, far more adequately than it could to-night, the actual provisions of that document. It is only the general principle of the acceptance of the award of the League that I am asking the House to confirm to-night and it will be confirmed, I trust, in such a manner as will most effectively show the genuineness of our determination to pursue the policy of sustaining the authority of the League as an instrument of world peace. It is, I know, alleged that the conditions coupled with this award are conditions which involve both the assumption for a very long period of time of unnecessary costly and dangerous commitments, and the violation of assurances and pledges given by this House with regard to the termination of our responsibilities in Iraq. Let me deal first briefly with the latter accusation. I have been charged again and again, mainly in certain organs of the Press, with having broken a definite pledge given by myself on 3rd May, 1923, that we should wash our hands for good and all of any responsibility for or interest in Iraq after August, 1928. As evidence of that pledge, they have reproduced in type of every conceivable magnitude one or two sentences out of a statement made in Bagdad by Sir Percy Cox which I read out to the House us embodying the policy of His Majesty's Government. These sentences run as follow: Both parties being equally anxious that the commitments and responsibilities of His Majesty's Government in respect of Iraq should be terminated as soon as possible, it is considered that the period of the Treaty in its present form can conveniently be shortened…. It is understood … that the present Treaty shall terminate upon Iraq becoming a member of the League of Nations, and in any case not later than four years from the ratification of peace with Turkey. I wonder how many of those who have read these sentences, reproduced by themselves apart from their context, as a statement of our policy at that time have realised that the very next sentence of that declarati'on—which I also read out in this House—went on to say: Nothing in this Protocol shall prevent a fresh agreement from being concluded with a view to regulate the subsequent relations between the High Contracting Parties; and negotiations for that object shall "— not "may"— be entered into between them before the expiration of the above period."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 3rd May, 1923; cols. 1598–1599, Vol. 163.] In other words, the Protocol, which brings the existing Treaty to an end in 1928, definitely pledges us to endeavour, before 1928, to replace it by another Treaty for the future. There is another obligation which the Government—any British Government—has to keep in view, and that is the obligation towards our fellow-members in. the community of nations, the obligation which we undertook when we accepted a mandate, for Iraq. It is too late in the day now to go back on that and to ask ourselves whether, in the first place, we were wise to accept that mandate or not. That was done. But having undertaken the mandate, with the approval of this House, no mandatory is entitled simply to throw up his mandate and leave chaos in its place.

The termination of a mandate, as well as its establishment, is a matter in which the League of Nations is directly interested, and with regard to which it has a right to be consulted. This was fully recognised by our successors in office, and when they, in September, 1924, submitted the Treaty with Iraq in its present shortened form to the League as a fulfilment of our mandatory obligations towards the League, they definitely undertook that if the Treaty came to an end before Iraq was admitted to the membership of the League, we would invite the Council of the League to decide what further measures would be required to give effect to Article 22 of the Covenant. That meant, and it is so interpreted in the report to the Council of the League, on which its present decision has been taken, that if Iraq was not admitted to membership of the League by August, 1928, then the British Government was pledged to the League after 1928 until such time as Iraq was considered eligible for admission to the League, to make such provision as the Council would approve of for continuing to fulfil its mandatory obligations to the League in respect of Iraq.

There has really been no inconsistency, let alone breach of faith, in the policy pursued by successive Governments in this matter. They have all been, as we are to-day, determined that the period during which the. British taxpayer should be burdened with expenditure upon Iraq should come to an end as soon as possible. We laid down a definite date by which we intended that this expenditure and the special military liabilities bound up with it should come to an end, and we believe we can substantially fulfil our intentions in this respect, but neither the Government of which I was head in 1923, nor the Labour Government which succeeded us, contemplated that the special connection between ourselves and Iraq should or could come to an end in 1928, either in our relationships towards Iraq or in our relationship towards the League of Nations unless we were able before that date to prove that Iraq had reached a position of stability in government which would justify her admission into the League of Nations.

That brings me to the second charge, that we are unnecessarily undertaking now costly and dangerous obligations in respect of Iraq. I think I have already made it clear that those obligations are not new but are only giving effect at a somewhat earlier date to undertakings which we have given both to Iraq and to the League of Nations in respect of our relations with that country, if by 1928 she has not entered the League of Nations; and at this; point I should like, with the permission of the House, to read them a short statement of policy which has guided and is guiding the Government in this very difficult matter. Acting on this statement of policy, the Foreign Secretary and the Colonial Secretary did their work in Geneva.

The undertaking we have given is not for a definite 25 years, but for what I believe, as the Secretary of State for the Colonies stated to the Council, will be a far shorter period, namely, until such time as we can make it clear to the League of Nations that Iraq has acquired the stability which justifies its admission to membership of the League. It is not an undertaking to spend money on, or to keep troops in, Iraq, either for the maintenance of internal order or for its defence against external aggression, but to continue our co-operation and advice in maintaining a stable system of government.

It may be asked what will be our responsibility for the defence of Iraq if, after the expiration of the present Treaty, that country should be attacked by any foreign Power. It is obvious that the responsibility which we should have towards Iraq, if, as a fellow member of the League of Nations, she were the victim of unprovoked aggression, would certainly not be diminished by any Treaty relationship with us which continued our mandatory position, but the League itself has a special responsibility towards a State over which it exorcises a mandatory supervision, and if the aggression in question were directed to the forcible overthrow of the boundary fixed by the Council of the League itself, the responsibility of the League, as the authority directly challenged and affronted, would obviously be the primary and dominant one. Our responsibility in any future situation must necessarily depend on the circumstances of that situation. The action which we should take and the measure and extent of any support which we might give in a particular case cannot be fixed in advance or be a. matter of prior obligation. They must be determined by the Government of the day, if ever the case arises, in the light of the then existing circumstances of world peace and the general interests of the Empire.

I will say a word or two on that statement. The conditions which the League has laid down do not affect in any way our policy of making Iraq stand on its own feet in respect to its expenditure or the provision for its external and internal security. These are matters us between ourselves and Iraq, with which the League does not concern itself, any more than it concerns itself with the expenditure or with the military measures taken by ourselves or by any other mandatory Power in other mandated territories. The conditions are those contained in our existing obligations to the League, as covered by the present Treaty and by the assurances given last year to the Council by our predecessors. They refer in the main to certain general principles of administration which are already in force in Iraq, and all that the Council wishes to secure is that we should continue our co-operation and advice in maintaining a stable system of government in accordance with those principles.

The House itself will be able to judge of the precise extent of the obligations involved in accepting the conditions of the League when it has the actual terms of the new Treaty before it, and it can then judge whether it will or will not endorse the policy of the Government in respect of that Treaty. I can say this, at any rate, that the conditions laid down by the League in no way commit us to spend money on or to keep troops in Iraq beyond the term of the present Treaty expiring in 1928. The last sentences which I read of the statement of policy answer a hypothetical question, that is, the question of a possible invasion of Iraq, and I must insist that it is a purely hypothetical question. We have been engaged in completing a Treaty of Peace, and the line we have taken is the one which, I believe, is the one best calculated to preserve permanent peace in the Middle East. Our one desire is that all the nations and States of that part of the world, not only the young Iraq nation, for which we hold a special responsibility, but also our former Turkish adversaries, should recover in peace from the ravages of the War, and under new conditions reach a higher level of prosperity than before.

We are only too anxious that Iraq should live in relations of neighbourly amity and co-operation with Turkey. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has already, at Geneva, given expression to his readiness to endeavour to find ways and means, consistent with the fulfilment of our obligations towards Iraq, of arriving at some such agreement as will build, upon the League's recognition of Iraq's just claim for the retention of her territory, the superstructure of a mutually acceptable and binding settlement, and in order to give effect without delay to that statement of the Foreign Secretary, I am inviting the Turkish Ambassador to meet me to-morrow to pursue this question. For this task, we need the support of a united country, and I would, in all seriousness, appeal to those who have criticised our policy so vehemently in public to consider weather the prospects of a peaceful and friendly settlement will be improved or damaged by an 'agitation which con- sistently misrepresents the policy which we are pursuing, and which is calculated outside this country to create doubt, both as to our resolution to honour our obligations and as to the sincerity of our desire for peace.

Mr. RUNCIMAN

No more important or solemn declaration could be made by the head of the British Government than that to which we have just listened, for it involves not only the immediate negotiations that must be carried on with another Power, but may involve this country in obligations stretching throughout a whole generation. It is with the object of ascertaining how far those obligations carry us, and how far the Government have foreseen the methods by which they will be able to carry out their mandatory duties that I venture respectfully to ask some questions of the Government. In the first place, the Prime Minister has informed the House that these obligations are not new, that they do not date from Geneva in this month, but are inherent in the Treaty of Lausanne. I do not know how far the Treaty of Lausanne commits us to every or any decision which may be taken by the Council of the League of Nations, but it is certainly of the first importance that the Colonial Secretary, when he speaks, should make it quite dear how far he and his Government felt bound by the Treaty of Lausanne to accept the decision of the Council of the League of Nations, no matter what that decision might be, for I observe that when the right hon. Gentleman was in Geneva he took great care to make it clear that Great Britain. while prepared to carry out her mandatory responsibilities on the present lines, that is to say, for the renewal in three years' time of the Treaty with Iraq, would not commit herself to 25 years.

That was on the 4th September. That was a very important declaration made by the Colonial Secretary, and I presume that when he made that declaration he was in no way infringing the obligations under which we were working under the Treaty of Lausanne. He was indeed declaring what would be the policy of the present Government in complete loyalty to the Treaty of Lausanne of two years ago, and indeed it appears that the League Commission on Mosul itself contemplated that the freedom of the British Government to arrive at its own decision in this matter was unfettered. Under the circumstances, an; we to take it that the Government view is that by the Treaty of Lausanne we put ourselves in the hands of the League of Nations and left to them the ultimate decision? I know it may be said that we can throw over the decision of the League, but, as the Prime Minister has pointed out, if we are under any obligation to accept that decision and then throw it over, we prejudice the power cf the League to deal with difficult questions in the future, and may to some extent compromise ourselves, compromise our good faith in our relations with the League. That, the Prime Minister has not cleared up. He has otherwise made a very definite speech, and on that point we should like really to understand whether the League of Nations has the right, to think for us in these matters and, secondly, if it has the right to think for us. whether we must act in accordance with its decision, whatever may be the opinion of the Government at home here or of the House of Commons to which if is answerable.

The next question I want to ask is this: The Prime Minister has said that our obligations could be fulfilled, as I understand, by our giving advice to the Iraq Government, and possibly by giving contributions to the Iraq Exchequer, but that we are not committed to defend the Iraq frontiers any more than are any of the other signatories to the Versailles Treaty, that indeed the obligation to defend the Iraq frontiers is net one peculiar to ourselves but must be undertaken by the other member? of the League as well. May I ask if that is the east, for that, again, is a matter of the first importance? If the duty of defend in the frontiers is to be left to as. I would inquire how we are to defend them.

The PRIME MINISTER

I do not know whether my right hon. Friend wishes for an answer now, or whether is would be more convenient that all the points he raises should be replied to by the Secretary of State for the Colonies. The question of responsibility is one that does require some explanation, as my right hon. Friend knows, and I think it would be much better if it were answered in full later on.

7.0 P.M.

Mr. RUNCIMAN

I can appreciate the difficulty, for instance, of discussing what are our duties under the Treaty of Lausanne, and of explaining it at length, but there are some questions which can be answered now, and, if they are not answered now, I fear the rest of the discussion will be carried out without the House having the requisite information. The one question I ask now is, Are we expected under these duties to undertake the defence of the Iraq frontier alone, or is that a duty which must be performed by the whole of the members of the League of Nations? The answer to that question will naturally have a great effect on public opinion here and upon our decision as to whether or not we can support the proposals under discussion.

The PRIME MINISTER

I understand the point the right hon. Gentleman is touching on. It was answered briefly in the statement I read out, and it will be dealt with fully by my right hon. Friend the Colonial Secretary later on. The statement of policy I made covers that point.

Mr. RU NCIMAN

If the right hon. Gentleman can give a short answer I think probably it will affect the whole course of the Debate. I do not know whether he can answer that.

The PRIME MINISTER

This is the passage in ray statement—it applies after 1928— It is obvious that the responsibility which we should have towards Iraq, if as a fellow-member of the League of Nations she were the victim of unprovoked aggression, would certainly not be diminished by any treaty relationship with us which continued our mandatory position, but the League itself has a special responsibility towards a State over which it exercises a mandatory supervision, and if the aggression in question were directed to the forcible overthrow of the boundary fixed by the Council of the League itself, the responsibility of the League as the authority directly challenged and affronted would obviously be the primary and dominant one. Our responsibility in any future situation must necessarily depend on the circumstances of that security. Probably my right hon. Friend remembers the remainder of the passage. I think it is quite clear.

Mr. RUNCIMAN

I am much obliged, but I am not sure that it does entirely clear up the point. The point that I had in mind and which was in the minds of a great many people who are not unfriendly either to the Government or to Iraq, and which is the point of our anxiety, is this. If the frontiers of Mosul and Iraq are violated, how are we to defend those frontiers? If the defence of the frontiers is to be by our Army or Air Force, I need hardly say that raises a whole crop of anxious questions which have not been dealt with to-day, and I think it would be very difficult, in the minds of those the remember what has happened in the past in Iraq, to avoid anxiety to restrict our obligations at present. I know it has been argued that we can exercise sufficient influence on Turkey through Constantinople to save us from the risk of military adventures or obligations in Mosul. I should like to inquire on that whether the Government have consulted their military advisers, who are much more aware of the extent to which they can, in Constantinople, exercise military or naval pressure, than are some of those who have defended this policy enthusiastically outside. Have their military advisers been consulted as to the obligations which are now being incurred in Mosul, and how far do they think it is possible for them to be carried? I do not ask for an immediate answer, but I hope the Colonial Secretary will be able to deal with this point when he comes to reply.

When we enter into this obligation for 25 years, although it is stipulated that that period may be shortened when Iraq has a, sufficiently stable Government to enter the League of Nations, the proviso carries little or no weight in the public mind. The Iraq State has passed through many vicissitudes in its short life. It did for one or two years balance its Budget, but for the last two years it has been in a state: of financial doubt, and it is more than likely that this year, having to bear its portion, of the Ottoman Debt, and some other charges, there will be a very heavy deficit. Such, I understand, was the Report brought back by the right hon. Member for Norwich (Mr. Hilton Young), who was sent there on a mission of official inquiry. The Iraq State is not likely, as far as one can. foresee, to be stable or strong enough to be admitted as a member of the League of Nations within this period of 25 years. We should be foolish in any case in attempting to consider this matter without realising that before that period had expired, we may find our obligations have to be honoured, under different circumstances, and in times which may not be altogether convenient to us.

I do not need to remind the House how easily these troubles arise on these frontiers. There is a military incident, and some officers and men are killed. The number may be very small, but we find it necessary to take steps against those who are the offenders. The thing grows. Public opinion is excited here at home, and although the other members of the League of Nations may, as the Prime Minister has pointed out, be under an obligation, the whole obligation will in fact fall on us. Public opinion would demand it. Some of our men had been killed, our flag had been outraged and our honour offended. We should not wait for action under Article 15 of the Covenant. We should have to take immediate action.

That is one of the risks that we have to foresee, and I need not tell the Prime Minister that in criticising this I do not follow in the footsteps of those who have been conducting an intensive campaign against himself on the subject. I am sure he will permit me to say this is a much larger and more extensive topic, and we ought to discuss it quite apart from the personal charges which have been bandied about. But there is one thought in many people's minds, though it may not have been expressed in the Press, and that is, if the risks I have described actually come to pass and we find we have to take military action in Iraq or Mosul, how can we operate 600 miles from our base without embarking on something which is a great deal more than a minor war? There are many of us who have always held that the sooner we get back to Basra the better, and we have believed that was the best way of limiting our liabilities. When operations have to be conducted 600 miles from the nearest seaport, there is the difficulty of keeping up lines of communication, at immense expense of men and treasure, and risks of disaster are increased, and a disaster in that region would be as serious to our prestige, or far more so, than if we were at the present time to say we would not undertake this prolonged obligation after 1928. That is the anxiety which is in our minds, and if the Prime Minister and his Government can soothe the public mind, by all means let them do it at the earliest possible moment, for I can assure him that not only among civilians but in military quarters the matter has been discussed for a very long time past, and it is of first importance that we should know exactly where we are before entering into obligations which are vague or based on theories which we cannot put into practice.

The other point I want to put to him— and I will be very brief—is one which discloses the main line of thought in many people's minds. If we can dispose of our duties in Iraq by money contributions, by a loan of some of the beat of our advisers, by the assistance we can give personally in the bringing up of a young and inexperienced Government—if we can give our assistance in that way and by that means, why should not the Government make it clear now that this is the direction in which we are prepared to undertake the Mandate which is to be handed over to us by the League?. If that were done I for one would have much less reason to be disquieted by the step we are taking to-day, but if it is not done, and we are left still with military liability, I look with grave disquiet on the proposals which have been made, and I hope that the Government will see to it that in framing their Treaty they do everything they can to curtail the obligations into which they enter and reduce thereby the liabilities of this country.

Captain EDEN

It is not for nothing that the countries of the Middle East were once the cradle of the human race. Many centuries before this island emerged from a state of barbarism rulers and statesmen were confronted with problems of race and religion, of pride and prejudice, in those lands which we now call Iraq. It is all the more important that, as in the speech of the right hon. Gentleman who has just sat down, we should be able this evening to make suggestions and criticisms that shall be both constructive and helpful. Nothing could be more unfortunate than that we should bring into Debates on this none too simple topic any of the controversy which is raked in journalism outside.

There are really two separate decisions which the House has to consider this afternoon, essentially separate, although the League of Nations has made them contingent for reasons into which we need not enter now. Those decisions are the fixing, in the first place, of Iraq's northern boundary and the extension, in the second place, of the maximum period of our mandatory responsibility. With regard to the first decision there can be no question, and it is. no exaggeration to say, that the fixing of a boundary somewhere in the neighbourhood of the Brussels Line was vital to Iraq. It is much more than a question of a few square miles of territory, however valuable', being transferred from one government to another. Briefly put, it means the changing of a short, easily defensible mountain boundary into a long non-strategic boundary, incapable of defence, even by an army many times larger than Iraq can ever afford. In other words, to have conceded any considerable portion of territory in the old Mosul Vilayet, which is now part of Iraq, would have made Iraq's national existence strategically a contradiction in terms. For Iraq it is a question of vital importance. For Turkey the possession of Mosul or even of the whole of the old Mosul Vilayet is not a question of vital importance. It is not even a question of importance at all. I do not believe that the Turkish Republic to-day would add anything to its strength by the possession of any section of this territory, and I believe the wiser heads among the Turkish people realise and appreciate that. The only service which it could render Turkey would be to give that Republic a weapon over Iraq, and that is a purpose which neither the League of Nations nor any other people or government are anxious to encourage.

The second decision is that of which there has been more criticism, namely, the extension of the maximum period of our Mandate. That criticism is, I suppose, based on the assumption that had this new maximum period not been established, we should have been able to cut short our obligations in the year 1928. Our responsibilities would—I presume that is the contention—have been finished and closed. So far as I know, there is no responsible public opinion, no section of opinion in Iraq or anywhere else, that believes that Iraq had any chance of securely establishing herself by 1928. That really is the gist of the position: The fact that everything was uncertain after 1928 was a brake on Iraq's progress. The country needs capital, foreign initiative and development from abroad. It may even need increased population from abroad. It can get none of these things until there is political security, and— it may sound a paradox, but it is none the less true—the very extension of the maximum period of our Mandate is the best instrument we could have of the likelihood for an early curtailment of our responsibilities.

It is the same on the financial side. More revenue is needed by the Government of Iraq. The country is being taxed to-day—as can been seen from the report of the right hon. Member for Norwich (Mr. Hilton Young)—as far as a newly-established country can bear taxation. New sources of revenue will only be opened up as capital is encouraged to come to the country by the security of Government. I would suggest to the House, that though, for my part, I do not deny how very strong are the reasons against our remaining for any long period in Iraq, how urgent are the reasons for curtailing our commitments there, nearly all the reasons brought forward are reasons which would have been equally operative against our ever going to Iraq at all. I admit that the past history of our dealing in Iraq is not, perhaps, altogether fortunate. To a large extent we were forced by circumstances. We were trampled under foot by the march of events, but we are in this position, and it is the present and the future which we have to discuss, and not the past. There can be no question either, I would remind hon. and right hon. Members on those benches, of our obligation to the people of that country. The right hon. Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George), speaking in this House, made that point abundantly clear. In 1923 he stated that The intention … was not merely to conquer Mesopotamia and hand it over to the Arabs, but to conquer Mesopotamia, found an Arab State, and uphold it by British support. Again, he said later: The obligation to the Arabs was an obligation to found a State for them, and to uphold it."—[OFFICIAL REPORT. 20th March, 1923; cols. 2453 and 2454, Vol. 161.]

Captain WEDGWOOD BENN

Did he mention that many millions had been spent in dealing with the so-called rebellious instinct of those Arabs?

Captain EDEN

I am not going to follow the hon. and gallant Gentleman in discussing public opinion in Iraq. I only gave what is, after all, a perfectly clear and definite pledge by the Leader of his party. I would not press it any more than that, but I would remind the House —and I do not want to over-state the argument of prestige; it is a dangerous argument, and can be easily over-stated— that although we might, perhaps, be able to leave Iraq under normal circumstances, having discharged our obligations, without any serious loss of prestige, I do say that no words, however strong, could exaggerate the harm which we should do to our reputation not only in Iraq, but throughout the East, if we were now to scuttle, like flying ours, at the sight of our own shadow. Hon. Members know that if we pursued a course like that, our name would be a jibe in the mouth of every tavern-lounger from Marakesh to Singapore. It might take centuries to recover our prestige. The East is a land of memory. I have read somewhere, though I cannot remember where, an Eastern saying somewhat to this effect: that bravery consists of ten parts, and that one part consists in running away, and the other nine consist in never coming in sight of the enemy. Excellent though that definition may be, we do not want our name in the East associated with it.

One criticism I would respectfully address to my right hon. Friend. I am not myself enamoured of Western forms of government in Eastern lands. I have always been a little sceptical of the wisdom of trying to set up democratic institutions in Eastern countries. With us, democracy, whatever its merits or demerits may be, is at least a plant of natural growth. In the East it is a forced growth, an importation, and foreign to the soil. Consequently, it needs many years more to develop and many years more to grow to be understood by the people. We have asked a great deal of Iraq. We have asked her to do what, I believe, even a Western nation in their position could not have done, and in fairness, and in fulfilment of our obligation to the people, we must give to Iraq a full time to adapt herself to our democratic peculiarities. We have placed the country with its forelegs in one civilisation and its hind legs in another. We have extricated it from one form of civilisation, which is not, perhaps, very exalted, but, at least, we are surely bound to replace it with another form of civilisation which shall be; stable.

I will only ask those hon. Members who are still critical of the Government's decision, to visualise for one instant what would happen if we were to adopt a policy of scuttle in Iraq. The State of Iraq cannot hope to stand by itself. There would be raids by neighbouring Arab tribes. Before very long the Turkish flag would fly once again over the capital of the Caliphs. All the blood which had been spilt, all the money which had been spent, would have been in vain. The country would sink back once more into a state of apathy, eventually breeding death and despair. And, then, I would ask hon. Members on those benches, what of the Christian minority? So long in our history books have we read of the efforts made by the great Liberal party n the past, the party of which hon. Members on those benches are the worthy, if exiguous, remnant? So often have we heard of the efforts they have made to secure toleration and freedom from persecution for minorities within the Turkish Empire! How many, speeches have been made in the past in that cause? How many scats have been won by the Liberal party? How many Liberal majorities life been returned to this House on a wave of popular indignation? And those minorities were not under British rule, but were within the Turkish Empire. The minorities of Iraq are Christian minorities for whom we have a direct responsibility. Hon. Members opposite know as well as I what would happen if we were so leave them to their fate. Are we to leave those minorities to the fate which must inevitably be theirs? I have always looked upon the hon. and gallant Member for Leith (Captain Benn) as the one real Liberal in this House, he is so delightfully inconsistent. I hope most devoutly, if I may respectfully say so to him, that the shadow of Mr. Gladstone's oratory is hovering over him this evening.

I will only say one word with reference to our relations with the Turkish Government. I have been accused in the past of being pro-Turk. I do not exactly know what that means, but if it means that I am anxious that this country should have friendly relations with Turkey, then I have no objection whatever to the name. I am not, and never have been, in favour of a bag-and-baggage policy. I can see no reason why Turkey should not have territory in Europe that is not operative against the British nation having territory in Asia, and I would only say this to the Government, that I hope, while rightly they stand fast by their bond with Iraq, they will at the same time—as the Prime Minister has already indicated that he will—extend the hand of friendship and conciliation to Turkey. If I might, I would respectfully suggest to him that, perhaps, it would not be amiss at this stage that we should send some diplomatic representative of really high standing nor to Constantinople but to Angora.

I am convinced a gesture of that kind would have real effect with the Turks, and I will only say in conclusion that, as far as I am aware, there are only two forces which are now encouraging the Turkish people to adopt more foolish courses. One of those is the agents of the Bolshevik Government of Russia and the other—I have, no doubt, from different motives—is a section of our own Press.

That is, indeed, an unholy alliance, a marriage bed upon which even the most hardened of us must blush to look, and we may well wonder how far this alliance is to go. Are we to see Bolsheviks perusing the columns of the "Daily Express," and Noble Lords bustling to Fleet Street in Russian boots? In any event, I think this House should assure our Turkish friends, should they need the assurance, which I hope they do not, that this Press in no sense represents the public opinion of this country. The hand may be the hand of Esau, but the voice is quite undoubtedly the voice of Jacob, and I would suggest that should—as I do not believe will happen—our relations with Turkey in the near future in any sense go awry, then the responsibility must rest, in a very large measure, upon those organs of the Press which have been carrying out so unscrupulous a propaganda. There are some sacrifices which cannot in honour be made even upon the altar of circulation. I trust that the Government will, as the outcome of the declaration of the Prime Minister this afternoon, extend a hand of friendship to Turkey so that we may in the years to come, as in the past, live in a spirit of amity, mutual respect, and goodwill with the Turkish Republic. We desire nothing else, and I believe the Turkish people desire nothing Let mischief makers, remain away. It is in that hope that I ask the House to give a unanimous approval to the Resolution of the Government.

Sir ROBERT HUTCHISON

Under the Treaty of Lausanne, I understand, we are bound to accept the decision of the League of Nations, in other. words, when. the question of frontiers under that Treaty was left to friendly collaboration between the Turkish Government and ourselves, and when we failed to reach a, settlement in nine months, the matter was referred to the League of Nations. What I want to be clear in my mind on is this:1 Are we bound to the Treaty of Lausanne us signed by Lord Curzon? Now that the matter has come to the point, are we hound under this decision to defend the frontier in Iraq for 25 years, or does it lead us to the year 1928 only? If we are bound by that Treaty, we on this side of the House as well as the other will always keep our contract. The question then arises whether it was a wise and proper thing to make those contracts. If those contracts have been made, it loads us on to a discussion of whether we can carry them out. Under the present decision of the League we accept a frontier which is well known in military circles to be a bad frontier, from a military point of view. A frontier, if drawn further north, would undoubtedly have been a very much better frontier.

Here we have the decision of the League given purely as a compromise between what we want and what the Turks want. We are given a position to hold which, in the opinion of a great many soldiers, is an indefensible one. We soldiers have got to carry out all the duties placed upon us by the Government. The country's policy is laid down by His Majesty's Government, but that policy is very seldom formulated from the point of view of the amount of force or power necessary to carry it out. Here we have a policy being laid down for more than a generation which we have to carry out without a sufficient force. How can the nation expect economy in armaments if we accept; obligations of this sort?

It is not so very long ago that we accepted obligations under the Treaty of Locarno. I pointed out to this House then that we had not the power to implement the guarantees we have given in that contract. Here we are undertaking guarantees over a territory which may at some distant time involve us in very serious commitments, and undoubtedly the opportunity, if other commitments in other parts of the world which we have already accepted, are called up, then our enemies will take advantage of that calling up undoubtedly.

Everyone knows that the East is ruled fey prestige. Our Indian shores and the Gulf were threatened by German submarines, and we were drawn inland during the War up to Bagdad, and again further North because we had a reverse. It will be so always. If you meet with a military reverse this country will go on until our military honour is achieved. Undoubtedly, as we have accepted this obligation 600 miles from the coast, if a disaster takes place and our officers and men are killed, we will go on and retrieve the situation. It is no good saying that you are going to refer this matter to the League of Nations, because the nation would not allow that. Those on the spot have to meet the possibilities of disaster in those regions. Ever since I have studied that problem I have found every chief of staff that I have had the privilege to talk to bitterly opposed to commitments so far removed from the salt water.

Again and again we have had experience of what the population in Iraq is like. We have had a recent experience during the revolt in which General Haldane had such hard work to recover our position there. The Arab population in those areas is not a population like an Indian population. It cannot be governed in the same way. They are a, war-like people, people that again and again have proved that they can do us the greatest amount of mischief and give us much trouble. Therefore, it seems to me before we undertake an occupation of this sort for any long length of time, for 25 years, we should seriously consider whether we can meet the obligations of that occupation. Anyone who has followed the operations which took place in Mesopotamia during the War knows the terrible hardships which our officers and men had to undergo. We know perfectly well that if these operations are undertaken again we shall have similar troubles to contend against. The railways can be easily cut. We shall have to fall back again on river transport. We are right away many miles beyond where we have the usual reinforcements and succour, right in the very heart of the country which is difficult, which is very vulnerable, and which, I venture to say, no military commander would like to hold for any length of time without a considerable reinforcing force close up.

As I understand it, the policy of the Government is in July. 1928, to hand over the protection of that country to the Government of Iraq. It is inconceivable that we should hand over the defence of the interior of that country to the Government of Iraq. If we have the responsibility for the Mandate, we must have the responsibility for law and order, and in addition we must have the responsibility for guaranteeing these frontiers. Therefore you are placing yourselves in a position in that area in which there are potential enemies and in which you may be hit hard at a very inopportune moment for yourselves. The argument that you can squeeze another point if you are pressed in that area does not hold good, because, if you take the past tradition of the Turks, you will find that demonstrations against Constantinople will not be so effective as they were in the past. Therefore you have to face that situation when you undertake these obligations.

The Turk is notoriously a bad ruler. But a friendly Turk to us is almost a necessity. If we are to have any success at all under this mandate which we have undertaken for 25 years, or are about to undertake, we must have an agreement with the Turks. Given an agreement with the Turks we can undoubtedly do a very great deal. Without an agreement with the Turks our position is absolutely hopeless and untenable. I do beg the Government, when they approach this question of an agreement with the Turks, that they will not do, what I may call, press for more than we want. Get an agreement arrived at, an agreement by which we get a friendly Turk. In other words I would much prefer to give up a part of Mosul area if we could get a friendly Turk. I know under this decision of the League of Nations that we are bound now to a special line. It seems to me conceivable that that line can be amended by an agreement. Therefore you should have an arrangement with the Turks because without a friendly Turk you cannot administer and run that country with advantage.

From what the Prime Minister has told us we are bound by the Treaty of Lausanne. The great objection is that we Are committed to a policy which is going to cost us dear, not only in men but in money, for many, many years to come. The question arises whether this country can carry out its obligation. I know that the Colonial Secretary puts his case extremely well at the League of Nations. I only hope he will be able to put his case as well with the Turkish Government, because, after all, without an agreement with the Turkish Government this actual agreement which we have arrived at at Geneva is worthless. Although I am not one who says that we should scuttle and run out of Iraq altogether, I do think that in the frontier which we have accepted, which we are guaranteeing, which we have got to defend, we should consider what our soldiers and airmen can defend. What is the force that we have available? After all, if we accept a policy we have got to pay for that policy. It is no good coming along and saying "You have to cut down your Army and your Air Force," if you have these obligations hanging over you. In other directions I see great difficulty before the Government because the economic condition of this country is such that we cannot afford the commitments which we have or potentially are pledged to.

Therefore, in relation to these proposals which are before us to-night, though I for one will not vote against this Resolution, I do think that everyone in the House should seriously put their views to the Government and show how seriously they feel this situation, and how seriously they realise our position. After all, we soldiers and airmen do not get much support until disaster comes along, and then we are generally blamed for it. Supposing you can have arrangements made on the lines I have indicated, they should be made. Therefore, I do hope that in the negotiations to come the Government will do everything they can to get a friendly settlement with the Turks over this area.

Major GLYN

The House has just listened to a very interesting speech from the hon. and gallant Member the Member for Montrose (Sir R. Hutchison), who speaks with knowledge of the military problems. Those of us who were in this House when the late Sir Henry Wilson was a Member will remember that on the Army Estimates he quoted what were the dangers to a great Empire in accepting large frontiers and being unwilling to supply the money to maintain adequate forces to defend them. To-night I think it is unnecessary to say much on this question of frontiers.

There is, however, one point of very great importance connected with the frontier that ought to be mentioned. Had the other part of the Opposition remained in its place in the House to-night, I think that the point I have in mind would probably have formed the main subject of their speeches. Far too much has been said about oil in connection with Mosul. As far as I can see, the action of the Government in regard to Mosul and the frontier is absolutely unconnected with oil. The Socialist party will not believe that, and a certain number of Turks will not believe it. It was very unfortunate that when the negotiations were carried on for working oil—if oil indeed exists, which no one knows for certain—a company called the Turkish Petroleum Company was formed in which America and others were interested. The Turks say it-was adding insult to injury to call this company the Turkish Petroleum Company, and that they, being interested in that part of the world and close neighbours of the oil fields, should have been asked to co-operate. If it is not too late, I hope that when negotiations are in progress for a treaty with Turkey, the question of oil and of Turkish participation in it will be considered.

Another matter to which we ought to draw particular attention is the question why the Turks should ever want to go back into Iraq. It seems to me that if the Turks go back into Iraq they will have to re-establish the Caliphat. They would inevitably be thrown back to the old ideas of the past. Yet, from the little that I have seen, it seems to me that the "New Turks" are absolutely different from the "Old Turks" or the "Young Turks." They are a collection of men who have set themselves to rebuild Turkey in Anatolia. They are men who, I believe, look to us with great hope to co-operate with them in developing their territory. I believe they feel that without us they will inevitably be pushed into the arms of Russia. It is a fact that Russia has made strenuous efforts to get hold of the Turks, and that the Turks have so far resisted. I do not believe that the Turks want us to leave Iraq; I believe they want us to remain there. I often feel, especially in Debates on Turkey, how much we miss the voice of that great friend of all of us and of the Turks, Aubrey Herbert, who sat for so long in this House and made so thorough a study of the East. One can almost see him under the back gallery holding on to a pillar and addressing the House as a friend of the Turks. It would be a very good thing for the Turks to know that although Aubrey Herbert has gone there are plenty of us in the House who want to believe that, just as the post-War situation has changed many nations and peoples, so the Turkish 'mentality has to some extent been changed.

I suppose that if we carry out what may be thought to be an anti-Turkish policy from a diplomatic point of view, it will be largely due to the fact that there have been monstrous and horrible massacres of Christians, and deportations. How can we help the Christians the most? By having a hostile Turkey or by having a Turkey which will walk step by step with us? I believe that if we can join up with Turkey and prove to Turkey, by acts and words, the sincerity of our policy, she Trill see the folly of these persecutions of non-Moslem subjects. The deportations along the frontier recently were horrible. The officer who was in charge was recalled to Angora, and I believe that he had a pretty bad time at the hands of the Turkish Government. One reason why the Turks are determined to proceed upon lines different from those of the days of the Sultans is that they know that they will never had the sympathy of the Western races if this frenzy is allowed to get out of bounds. The right hon. Member for the Scotland Division of Liverpool (Mr. T. P. O'Connor) has for many years been the great defender —for which we all admire and respect him.—of the Christian minorities in that part of the world What he has done is as well known out there as it is here. I am convinced that if he were to go out to-morrow to Turkey and to talk to the Turks, he would see that they realise that the atrocities do harm to Turkey, and that, therefore, they are the very things which Turkey's worst enemies would wish her to do.

I believe that Turkey wishes to live at peace with her non-Moslem subjects. She wishes to recognise that we, by occupying Iraq and developing Iraq, are building, up a great organisation on modern lines which will co-operate with Turkey in her own development. I feel convinced that if this Treaty can be carried through in the very near future, we shall build up a bulwark behind which Iraq will be developed, for the good of our trade in this country, for the good of the Arabs and fur the good of the Turks, and also for the great assistance of Persia. No word has so far been said about Persia. It might be worth while in this Debate to say one thing. The trouble in the whole of this question does not lie on the frontier. It does not lie in questions of email minorities. It lies in the great Kurdish problem. Until the Kurdish question can be settled there will always be difficulty. At present the Kurds are split up between Persia, Iraq and Turkey. Turkey has always had trouble, with the Kurds. If the Kurds are going to live a prosperous life under the administration of Iraq, it will mean that the Kurds in Turkey will be discontented and will probably rise against the Turkish Government and say, "Why cannot we be like our brothers in Iraq?" In Persia the. Kurds have certainly established a position superior to that under the Turkish régime.

If we in Iraq can show that we can do something for the benefit of the Kurds, I believe that those benefits will spread to other sections of the Kurds, and, once the Kurdish problem is solved, there is indeed hope of peace in that particular part of the world I believe that the present is an opportunity to come to terms with the Turks—such an opportunity as we refused in 1911 under different circumstances, and which, if it had not then been refused, might have altered the War. It was because the Turks suspected us of being animated by feelings hostile to their ideas that they threw themselves under the tutelage of Germany. Let us see to it that by our actions now and in the near future we do not force the Turks under the tutelage of Russia. I fear that that is the danger. If we hold out the hand of friendship, as the Prime Minister has said, and if the Prime Minister himself, in consultation with the Turkish Ambassador in London, can make a beginning, I would urge one small point on the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and that is that so far we have not thought it worth while to recognise the sincerity of the Turkish Government by having a permanent representative at Angora. That is an unfortunate fact. It would be a good thing to have a permanent representative of Great Britain at Angora, which is the Turkish seat of Government and is likely to remain so.

With the conclusion of the Treaty I hope that someone, a special mission, will be sent out to Angora with full powers to treat, and that the matter will not be dealt with solely through the ordinary diplomatic channels. The chance which has now come to our country has come as so many chances come—more or loss by a fluke. I believe that if we can seize this opportunity of making a friendly Turkey, Iraq will develop without a penny cost to the British taxpayer. Once you give confidence and security to Iraq, she will develop fast and Turkey will develop fast. These will then provide a market for our goods. It will be up to us to send out experts of all kinds, not concession hunters for oil, who do much harm, but experts who will go out to help the development of the wonderful natural resources of that most interesting part of the world.

Lieut. - Colonel Sir FREDERICK HALL

I think that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Colonies must be satisfied with the way in which the Debate has developed so far. I am sorry to find that the benches of the Labour party are empty, because I believe that matters of such high importance as that now under discussion should be debated altogether outside the pale of party politics. I would like to say here and now that I am rather disappointed that there should be a proposal for us to continue in Iraq for a period of 25 years. I listened with close attention to the careful and concise statement of the Prime Minister. I agree with him that when the Treaty was entered into it was for a period of four year's, to end in 1928. It was agreed that after that there would be an interregnum. It was never suggested that it should be for such a long period as that now indicated. I remember that in a speech in July of last year the hon. and gallant Member for Central Hull (Lieut.-Commander Kenworthy) intimated that there was a question of remaining in Iraq for a period of, perhaps, 20 years. The hon. Gentleman who is now the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies at once retorted with a most emphatic "No," from which one gathered that it was his opinion that we were not to be committed for any such period as 20 years. We have by question and answer raised this point in the House, and only last week it was indicated that the suggestion of 25 years was "romance." I do not see any romance about it.

8.0 P.M.

I recognise the difficulties with which the Government is faced. I would be the last to say, "Let us throw up the sponge and clear out of the whole place." I believe there were many Members of this House who, two years ago, would have said, "You must clear out of Iraq forthwith." I have never accepted that suggestion, as made by an important organ. I cannot help wondering what is the position of those hon. Members who were in such a hurry to say "Clear out," notwithstanding what our obligations may he, or are likely to be, and what they are feeling to-night. What I should like to ask my right hon. Friend is: There are certain obligations that we entered into with regard to the Treaty and the Protocol. We have undertaken military responsibilities and we have made ourselves responsible for the cost of these troops being maintained there. I should like to ask him, Is it to be a continuance of the policy, that this Government are to be responsible for the maintenance of law and order in Iraq, as far as, at any rate, military operations are concerned I Or, on the other hand, after 1928, is the cost of these necessary troops and their maintenance there to be borne by the Iraq Government?

I think it is in the Schedule that it is referred to as the "expansion," and I find in 1925 and 1926 that an expansion, apparently, of the troops, will be required. I grant that there is a suggestion that there should be a reduction in the 1926–27 programme. What I want to ask my right hon. Friend is. considering the enormous obligations for which we are responsible, is it necessary, if you are going to make this Treaty and you are going to enter into terms with Turkey, which I trust will be the case? I follow the remarks made by my right hon. Friend, who has just sat down. I am out for having a Turkey that is friendly disposed to us, because I think that is going to facilitate matters very much indeed. If you hope to have a Turkey which is friendly—and I have no doubt that after the careful handling, if I may be permitted to congratulate my right hon. Friend on the manner in which he has carried out what must have been a very difficult task, in conjunction with the Foreign Secretary—and if he has been successful so far, cannot he go one step further, and use his influence to get the Government to use their influence with Turkey, in order that we may be able to have them more or less, if I may use the word, "Allies" with us? You have to consider there is Turkey, there is Iraq and Persia, and if something can be done to bring them into one undertaking under your Treaty, then, I venture to say, you have gone a long way towards obviating the necessity for increasing your troops, as suggested in the Schedule, in 1925–26.

Then, may I ask my right hon. Friend, when he is replying, to say what is the position at the present time with regard to the railways? We own them, and we have undertaken not to dispose of them, except in conjunction and in agreement with the Iraq Government. Are these railways paying? Have we received anything; is there a credit balance standing to us, or, on the other hand, have we received nothing from them? What is going to be done? It is of the utmost importance that, if we are to enter into an arrangement—and undoubtedly we shall have to enter into an arrangement; I do not want to run away from any treaties that have been entered into, because I have indicated that after the four years there would be an interregnum— with the big obligation that we have there, it is of the utmost importance that the taxpayer should have some idea of what the financial obligations are, and what they are going to be. Might I therefore press my right hon. Friend, with regard to the railways, to say what is the position in which they stand to-day and what is the outlook?

We do not want to get back upon what we have expended—I think I am right in saying it is 150 millions. I am never one to adopt the principle of trying to go backwards, but I am endeavouring to look ahead and see what is going to be the position in the future. I think I am right in saying that, according to the last figures we had, it cost us 4,700,000 odd pounds. Is there likely to be a continuance of that expenditure in the future, and for what period? I am sure my right hon. Friend will readily recognise that if the taxpayer of this country is to be committed to, say, £4,000,000 per annum, if you take it with compound interest at 5 per cent.—I have not calculated the figure—it appears to me it would be something like 250 to 300 millions sterling. It is all very well to enter into these obligations and consider the cost afterwards, but I want my right hon. Friend in his reply to say what in his opinion, if he does not mind me pressing him, is going to be the financial outlook between this country and Iraq, during the next decade. I am one of those who strongly hope that, although we have had the indication of this 25 years, yet, notwithstanding, it will not be necessary. I hope the Government will not enter into any fixed bargain for a period of 25 years without considering the matter carefully, as they have done in the past. When you have entered into an obligation, and you have said: "We will review that before 1928"; in a like manner I say that surely it is not necessary at the present juncture to say you are going to commit yourself without knowing what is going to be the expenditure, because you cannot tell exactly what it is going to be. You may have hopes and anticipations, you may be able undoubtedly to form some estimate, but I venture to hope that the Government will give very careful consideration, before they commit themselves to such a very long period.

What is the position of Iraq at the present time? Is she able to pay her way? Although we have had to pay a very considerable sum, because we have undertaken certain responsibilities, for which we have got to pay, I want to see Iraq put in a position that it is able to discharge its own obligations. Let us assist in the development of the country, because, having put our hand to the plough, I am not one of those who say: "Let us turn back and leave it as it is!" Let us consider what is going to be, or anticipated to be, the position under the Iraq budget during the next few years, and then what prospects we have of terminating any special obligations within a shorter period than that referred to.

I do not believe it will be found necessary, from the speeches I have heard this evening in the House, to have any Division on this Motion at all. The people outside that sent us to this House look upon it as our duty to bring these matters clearly before the Government, because they never expected that it would have been necessary to undertake these obligations for such a long period. I am sure my right hon. Friend will recognise that we have, unfortunately, in our midst so much unemployment under which we have to provide, and rightly provide, for those who are not able to obtain work; but, on the other hand, the taxpayer has got to meet all these obligations, and the taxpayer naturally considers: "What is the amount that I am going to be responsible for, in obligations in countries in which we are now interested?"

I hope my right hon. Friend, in replying, will say that, in completing any arrangements they have, he will be good enough, and I believe he will, to consider these various points. I hope that when he comes to the House next time, when we assemble next year, he will be able to say, after considering all these matters, that the Government has not found it necessary to commit themselves for such a period.

I finish as I started, by congratulating my right hon. Friend once more on the care and precision with which he has carried out this task, and I hope that any little criticism we have made of these matters he will not take as of a factious nature, but simply that we are desirous to bring our views before him, for what they may be worth, in order that he and the Government may give them, consideration.

Mr. T. P. O'CONNOR

I wish to say only a very few words, but I weigh those words as carefully as I can. The Prime Minister has made an announcement this evening of importance, namely, that he has invited the Turkish Ambassador to meet him to-morrow. It certainly would be far from my intention to say anything to embarrass him and the Turkish Ambassador in this meeting, which may be full of omen. I congratulate my right hon. Friend the Colonial Secretary on the reception of his proposals in the House to-night. It will certainly be in the interests of peace, if the Turkish Government is convinced—and I think the proceedings to-night ought to convince the Turkish Government and the Turkish nation—that we stand as a united nation and a united Parliament.

Nothing could be more prejudicial to peace, if peace be at all threatened, than the idea, propagated with mendacity and a want of scruple and an almost vitriolic fury, that a large portion of the public opinion of the country is against the policy of the Government. I do not believe it, and I think if there were to be war—and I have not and never had the idea that there was going to be war— the main responsibility would be on the heads of those who carried on propaganda of this kind so entirely hostile, so misrepresentative of the public opinion of the country and of the House of Commons. As an old journalist, I felt ashamed, as I read that these articles, so misrepresentative of the opinion of the country, were actually circulated on the spot among the Turks. What better incitement could there have been to the Turkish authorities to proceed to violent and hostile action against this country? I have heard criticism of the policy of the Government. I want to ask, What is the alternative? The policy of the Government is clear. We know exactly what it is, almost to the smallest detail. What is the alternative? It may be fortunate or unfortunate, right or wrong, that we went into Mesopotamia at all, but we are there.

We incurred a certain responsibility, above all, we incurred responsibility to certain minorities. What is the alternative? To scuttle? I will say nothing of the prejudice to our prestige, which largely depends on transactions and policies in Mesopotamia, but what about our obligations of honour? I am careful, as I said, not to embarrass the Government, especially in view of the important negotiations between the Turkish authorities and our own Government, but I ask, if we scuttle—and that is the only logical policy in hostility to the policy of the Government—what will become of the Christian and other minorities in Iraq? Am I to be asked, especially by the heirs of Gladstone in these traditions, to give up people between whom and massacre we alone stand? Am I to be asked to do that in the name of Liberalism? Will anybody give a single fact in proof of the desire of any section of the people of Iraq to be put under the Government of Turkey? Is there one single section? The Arabs are against it. All the different sects of the Christians are against it. Did hon. Members in the House read that long list of telegrams of congratulation received by the Secretary of State for the Colonies this morning? Every class, every race and every creed is represented, and the unanimous voice of all these different creeds and peoples is one of almost incredible relief at the prospect of not being put back under the government of the Turks. The Jewish race are a practical race, interested in the commercial relations of every country, and interested in good government. One of the telegrams received by my right hon. Friend was from, I believe, a very representative man of the Jewish people in the district. I ask my friends of the Liberal party, is there any gospel which holds a higher place in their policy and tradition than the gospel of self-determination? In face of that I am asked to restore to the people of Iraq a Government against which all the people there protest, and which they hate. I never have heard a more ridiculous contradiction between principle and performance.

I would have dwelt on other phases of this question, but I do not want to occupy the time of the House. The sufferings of these poor Christians I could detail to-night, not on the evidence of irresponsible people, but from reports of Commissions appointed by the League of Nations. I could harrow the feelings of the House by recapitulating those things, but I put restraint upon myself for the reasons I have already given. That I should have to contemplate the dishonour of my country in giving up these poor people who are suffering because they supported us in the War— that I should have to contemplate such an act of national dishonour is to me unthinkable, and incredible. I congratulate the Government and, especially, I congratulate my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Colonies. There is no man from whom I differ more widely in general politics, nor whom I regard as a more potentially mischievous adviser on general questions of policy, but I congratulate him on the courage, the moderation and the self-control with which he has carried out his policy in this matter.

Captain BENN

I do not think that what we on the Liberal benches have been saying need necessarily incur the displeasure of my right hon. Friend the Member for the Scotland Division (Mr. O'Connor) with whom, on this occasion, I have the first difference in the course of 20 years' fellow membership of the. House of Commons. There are two very-strong points which make a great appeal to us on these benches. The one is the prestige of the League of Nations, and the other is the fate of the Christian minorities. Both these make appeals which it is difficult to resist, but I will give an answer to the right hon. Gentleman—the answer we should make in both eases. Of course it cannot come from the Treasury bench to speak about Christian minorities, because in the Treaty of Lausanne, as my right hon. Friend knows very well, the interests of the Armenians were sacrificed at every turn by our negotiators in their desire for a general settlement. But no-one is better justified than the right hon. Gentleman in raising his voice again, as he has for many years past, on behalf of these unfortunate people. As far as I am concerned, and I think I speak for others on these benches, we would willingly vote any sum of money for the removal of these people, to whom we have given pledges, to a place of safety. Any scheme of that kind would receive willing support from these benches; but we say it is not for to use our pledges to them in their obvious difficulties and distress as an argument for a scheme and commitments of which we disapprove.

As to the prestige of the League of Nations, I fail to understand how the future of the League of Nations is dependent upon our willingness to assume any responsibility which they wish to place upon us. I can understand their saying that if they give a decision against us we ought to accept it; we would; but I do not understand what the Government case is. Is it that if the League were to say, "We ask you to accept the mandate for this or that territory," that honour to the League and loyalty to the League compel us to accept it? Suppose they said, "Things are disturbed in Arabia, and we understand that the King of the Hejaz will be glad if you will take a mandate in order to protect the rather amorphous territory which he controls. "Would it be thought necessary that in loyalty to the League we must accept that mandate? I do not think so, and moreover the Commission, the First Commission—I am not speaking about General Laidoner's Commission—under, I think, Count Teleki, did suggest an alternative plan, and there is not any substance in this plea that we are somehow affronting the League in taking the view we do. If we made it clear that a concession in the boundary would meet that trouble and the League would be willing to adjust its decision, we- might at the same time secure the friendship and co-operation of the Turks, which is absolutely essential to preserve peace in those parts.

What is it exactly that we are asked to do? We fire asked to commit ourselves in; Iraq for an indefinite period and we are told it may be 25 years. I do not Suggest that in the statement he has made. on this question the Prime Minister is guilty of any breach of faith, but I would point out that almost every Government since the last Coalition Government would have been glad to get out of Iraq, and I know that Mr. Bonar Law would have been very glad to get out of it. but what prospect is there that we fill all be able to shake ourselves free in 25 years' time? We should weigh very carefully our responsibilities in Iraq before incurring any more financial obligations there.

Since the Armistice we have spent £170,000,000 in Iraq, enough money to build 300,000 or 400,000 houses and give them away to the people. We have spent enough money there to relieve British industries from the crushing burden of heavy taxation. It has been stated that our financial commitments in Iraq have been reduced from £7,000,000 down to £4,000,000. and the Colonial Secretary-very ingeniously says of that £4,000,000 £2,000,000 is required for the Air Force out there which under other circumstances we should have to spend, but that is not so. Is the Government's policy going to be that we cannot reduce our present military expenditure whatever our responsibilities may be? If we do not eventually require an Air Force in Iraq surely there is £2,000,000 capable of being saved. It is not so much this £4,000,000 only, even assuming that that is to be the annual charge. We know there is to be a deficit next year. We know that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Norwich (Mr. H. Young) asked the House to undertake new financial obligations upon this subject, but that is not the point.

What we have to consider is if something happens what commitments shall we be responsible before? The hon. and gallant Member for Montrose (Sir B. Hutchison) speaks with great authority upon any military situation, but I do not think it is quite fair to say that the main burden of defending Iraq will not fall on this country if anything happens because it is bound to do so. No doubt the members of the League of Nations will be ready to fulfil their obligations under the Articles of the League to the best of their ability, but I do not think hon. Gentlemen opposite will deny that the main burden in the end is sure to fall upon this country. Soldiers tell us that it is impossible to defend this frontier 600 miles from the Persian Gulf. Therefore, you have the possibility of an enormous military and financial burden liable to fall on this country, and I think we should be well advised not to take any risk of that kind. We have adopted a cruiser programme costing £58,000,000. The Singapore base is estimated to cost £10,000,000, and is more likely to cost nearer £20,000,000.

We all know what the early Estimates of the cost of the Rosyth Dockyard was, and we know how it compares with the final cost which shows that all this kind of military expenditure grows as time goes on. Consequently we are being committed to indefinite military and financial commitments. We ought to take a business like survey of the situation and ask ourselves whether by undertaking all these financial obligations we are not loading up the country with a burden which it cannot support. Iraq is not a settled part of the world at all arid the whole thing is in a ferment. Let us look round at the history of this place, First of all you had a rebellion in Syria and we are told that 7,000 men had been killed since the French took command. Then we had the revolt of the Druses and other Moslems the extent of which it is impossible to foretell. You have also European troubles. It is all very well to sketch out foreign policies for us to pursue, but these schemes sometimes go wrong.

There is no one who knows more about Arabia than the Under-Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs. He knows all about the plans made during the "War, how we backed the Hashimite family and put King Hussein on the throne. Now King Hussein has been dethroned and Ibn Saud is in his place, and we have been in conflict with him two or three times. Then we had trouble with the Wahabis and Abdulla, in Transjordania and he is receiving some support from us, and his defence depends upon our armed forces. Nobody can foretell what will be the end of it it all. I have no information except such as is derived from a study of what appears in the Press and perhaps the Under-Secretary for the Colonies may be able to tell us something on these points. The whole thing is in a ferment. It may be that in Iraq we may experience some of the trouble the French are having in Syria or like the Spaniards have had to encounter with the Riffs, or the French in Morocco. Early in the attempt to set up the Iraq State the scheme was to set up a republic, but there was a man there caused trouble and had to be deported. Then we had the intervention of the Chancellor of the Exchequer who gave oil as the reason for staying there. We have been told by outside critics that it was the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) who gave oil as the reason for staying in Mesopotamia and he said that "Mosul is a country with great possibilities." In 1922 the Chancellor of the Exchequer told us that we might look forward to the time for some return for our expenditure in these parts by the development of valuable oilfields.

Mr. WARDLAW-MILNE

Did either of those two right hon. Gentlemen express the definite statement that we were there because of oil?

Captain BENN

I think from what I have said we are quite justified in stating at any rate that there is oil behind the Turkish claim, although in this country there are plenty of clean politicians who have kept clear of all this danger. We do know, however, that evil influences are at work in this matter. The Chancellor of the Exchequer went to Cairo, and in March, 1921, we were told that if we were permitted to go to Cairo we should be planted there by the forces we put behind us. Only a short time before the people whose interests we were going to defend rose against us and many thousands of pounds were spent in repressing them. In view of all these things, in view of the potential disturbances and dangerous military commitments, I am sure many people in this country would welcome a policy which would get us out of all these obligations in the Near East. We have social services in this country clamouring for funds. In regard to education we are now making little economics in a service which we wish to see extended, and this is being done on account of financial stress. We are always having regard to what we owe to the League of Nations and our loyalty to the Christian minorities. For these reasons I say without hesitation that I am opposed to the Motion which the Prime Minister has moved to-night.

Mr. WARD LAW-MILNE

I was very interested and somewhat surprised to hear the statement which fell from the hon. and gallant Member for Leith (Captain W. Benn) on the subject of the references made in this House by the two right hon. Gentlemen whom he quoted. I am bound to say that, in the Course of a very careful study of the references made to Iraq and our occupation, or partial occupation, of that country, I have not come across any such references. I can quite understand that remarks might have been made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer or by the hon. and gallant Member's Leader on the subject of oil possibilities in Iraq, but the, as I understand it, definite statement that we were In Iraq because there was oil there, is one that I personally have not found, and I should be very grateful if the hon. and gallant Member could give me the reference to it.

Captain BENN

I read it out. On the 25th March, 1920, my right hon. Friend the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs paid: I cannot understand withdrawing partly, and withdrawing from the more important and more promising part of Mesopotamia. Mosul is a country with great possibilities. It has rich oil deposits."— [OFFICIAL REPORT, 25th March, 1920; col. 662, Vol. 127.1

Mr. WARDLAW-MILNE

I am very grateful to the hon. and gallant Gentleman, but, if I may say so, even on that reference, although it goes very much further than my knowledge or views go in reference to the possibilities of oil in Mosul, or than any knowledge which exists in the world at large as to the possibilities of oil in that region of Iraq, I still think he is not justified in stating that those right hon. Gentlemen said we were in Iraq because of the oil that was there. There is no person capable of saying definitely at the present time that there is oil in Iraq. It is very likely that there is, and I very hope much that there may be, because, if there is, it will be very much to the benefit of the kingdom of Iraq and will help its finances; but I should like to say at once, as far as I am concerned, or, as far as I know almost every other Member of the House, that we are not in Iraq because of oil or anything to do with oil whatsoever.

I think the subject we are discussing to-night really resolves itself into two heads. Firstly, whether we could get out of Iraq if we wanted to do so—whether we are able to get out because of our pledges; and, secondly, whether it is desirable that we should get out even if we could. With regard to the first point, I think it was made perfectly clear by the hon. and gallant Member's present Leader, and also by Lord Oxford, who was his Leader in past years, that we cannot in honour get out whether we want to or not. I would remind the House that perhaps the first occasion on which this matter was discussed was when the pledge was given in 1915, and in 1916 the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs quoted from a document, signed by Sir Edward Grey, in which it was perfectly definitely and clearly laid down that our intention at that time was not merely to conquer Mesopotamia and hand it over to the Arabs, but to conquer it and found an Arab State upheld by British support. It was clearly laid down then and in subsequent speeches that we could not, until the Arabs were in a position to maintain a stable State, by themselves, get out of Iraq and stand before the world as having carried out our pledges.

The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs went a good deal further. He told the House quite definitely why we entered into this commitment, namely, that we had entered into an agreement with the Arabs because of the very definite assistance which we got from them at the time when the arrangement was originally made, and he told us that it was not the slightest use suggesting now that we should not remain. We got that military assistance at the time, and because of it we gave certain pledges, which we must carry out. Another eminent Liberal statesman—no less than the late Secretary of State for India, Mr. Montagu—definitely referred to these pledges in 1920 as follows: It will lay on them"— that is to say, on His Majesty's Government— the responsibility for the maintenance of internal peace and external security. There is one other point to which, I think, reference should be made. I well remember that, something over a year ago, Lord Oxford—he was then Mr. Asquith —speaking in this House, said that in his opinion we had carried out our pledges in Iraq, but I do not think he could have been aware of that other pledge, given in 1916, to which I have just referred, when he made that statement. Again, on the 9th March, 1922, Mr. Asquith said: I will never be a party to any policy which has in intention or in effect the reestablishment of Turkish rule over large bodies of Christian populations."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 9th March. 1922; col. 1558, Vol. 151.] That is another aspect of the matter which is sometimes forgotten. If we are to carry out our pledges in that connection, it is equally definite and clear that we cannot, at this moment at any rate, clear out of Iraq. The second point is as to whether, if we could clear out, it would be desirable that we should do so. No one in this House realises more than I do the necessity and desirability of a friendly arrangement with Turkey. I am most anxious that we should do nothing to offend Turkey, that we should do everything we possibly can to bring her to such a frame of mind that she will see that it is to her advantage as well as ours that we should have stable conditions in Iraq; but I venture to say that nothing would be gained, in treating with Turkey, by any indecision in our policy, and, above all, nothing would be gained in treating with Turkey if there is any doubt in Turkish minds as to our intention to stand by the pledges which over and over again we have given.

I agree with an hon. Member who spoke on this side that it is extremely doubtful whether Turkey is at all anxious that we should clear out of Iraq. There are, as most Members of the House know, two distinct parties in Turkey at the present time. There is a Moderate party, anxious to work peacefully with us and with other nations of the world, and there is also an extremist element there, as in many other countries, probably, to some extent at any rate, under Russian influence. I think it would be a tremendous leather in the cap of the Government if we could bring about a satisfactory solution with Turkey In regard to Mosul and Iraq. But I say to them, even if it be only necessary to say it to emphasise it, that it is not to be got by any apparent policy of doubt or by putting forward any programme with any shadow of doubt as to our intention to adhere absolutely and literally to the words of the pledges we have given.

I do not want to take up the time of the House by entering into the possibilities which lie before us in Iraq. No one who has seen a good deal of that country can doubt its wonderful possibilities—not in regard to oil; oil is a pure speculation; but in the non-speculative aspect of Iraq, which is irrigation. Even on the question of irrigation, and the wonderful agricultural developments which may come from it, I do not know that we really have very up-to-date information. I do not know, for example, whether there is anyone competent to say to what extent that wonderfully fertile soil has been affected by the deposits of salt throughout the centuries. But whether there are great possibilities in Iraq, commercial or otherwise, is not, to my mind, the point that is before the House to-night. The point is, firstly, that we cannot get out if we would, and, secondly, that it is not desirable that we should get out, not because of commercial possibilities, but because a secure Iraq is absolutely essential to the peace and security of the world.

Throughout all the thousands of years that have passed, that one portion of country has been the scene of countless fights, of countless battles of all kinds. I believe that, as long as nations are in a state of desiring each other's territory, of putting unfriendly, eager and covetous eyes upon each other's territory, the area now called Iraq will always loom large in human history. If we can only get security there, if we can only make it clear, not only to Turkey but to all the nations of the world, that we want nothing for ourselves in Iraq which we are not willing to give to anyone else, but that, above all other things, we will not allow that part of the country to become again a battlefield, we shall get, not only security in the Near East, not only security in India, but security and peace to some extent in Europe. No one who has studied the history of the last great War can have the smallest doubt, to my min3, that the main object of German ambitions lay in the desire to get to the East. It has been stated, not only by many German writers before the War, but it was agreed that that was the case by great statesmen of all nations at the time of the War. That idea of pressing on to the Persian Gulf, in the hope of eventually getting world dominion, was expressed in many German writings when they said that if only Great Britain could be hit at in Egypt, if only that neck at Egypt could be cut, Great Britain's power in the East must decline.

I think what we are all aiming at now is that these dreams of the past should be passed for ever. We want to get in Iraq a settled country, a country which we shall be able to say we have stood by, in accordance with our pledge, until it is able to stand by itself. When it is able to stand by itself it must treat with all nations on an equal basis. Above all it must be a bulwark against further ambitious dreams on the part of any European power. I have said before— and when I said it some three years ago I am afraid I was rather a voice crying in the wilderness—that this situation in Iraq has a great bearing upon our position in India, and even further East. It is perhaps too strong to say that politically Iraq is the real frontier of India, but I go this length and I say, especially with the condition of Europe as it is now, you are always in danger if you have, down that strip of country between the rivers, the possibility of an advance through neutral or friendly territory from any enemy in Europe,. I do not think there is any doubt that this country, which is the high road of the railway and the air of the future, is going to be of the very greatest importance. It is a country that we want at peace, and if the world is ever going to be made safe for democracy, I say quite fearlessly that it cannot be made safe unless that area of the world's surface is made clear and free from the ambitions of any Power in Europe who may feel they can extend their Empire by moving out towards the East through that country.

Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY

I should like to congratulate the Prime Minister on the political subtlety with which he has drawn this Motion. Naturally those of us who object to the Imperialist policy are put in a difficulty by being made to appear to be voting against the action of the Government in accepting the findings of the League of Nations. In spite of that, at any rate some of my party will vote against the Motion, and will do it with every conviction of which we are capable. The Prime Minister is to-morrow going to see the Turkish Ambassador. It is a very great pity he did not, see him many months ago, especially before his swashbuckling Colonial Secretary went to Geneva and made the kind of speeches he has been making. I understand the Turks will be prepared to come to an arrangement with us something on these lines. They recognise that part of the Vilayet of Mosul is necessary to the rest of the so-called province of Iraq for irrigation purposes, and the Diala area they propose to give to us in any case. I am putting these terms to the Prime Minister because I think they form a good basis for negotiations.

They propose a militarised zone on either side of the frontier to be agreed upon. That, I think, is a very important matter. They have publicly declared that they are prepared to enter into a pact of security between Turkey, Persia, Iraq, and this country guaranteeing the independence and security, as far as they are concerned, of Iraq in perpetuity. They are prepared to come to terms with us about oil. I do not charge this Government with being actuated by economic considerations. I do not join with those critics who declare that they are actuated only by a desire to help certain oil companies. But at the same time I have been putting forward what I understand are terms that the Turks are prepared to discuss. If there is oil— and there are two opinions about that— they are prepared that we should exploit it, coming to a proper business-like arrangement with the people of the country, and if they are in charge of that country with themselves. If the oil areas extend into their area they are quite prepared to come to terms with us.

With regard to the Eastern Question, I quite agree with what my right, hon. Friend the Member for the Scotland Division (Mr. T. P. O'Connor) has said —we all abhor the massacres that have been perpetrated, except this, that I think massacre is equally horrible, whether perpetrated against Moslems or Christians, and when the Greeks landed at Smyrna, I was one of the few Members of the House—I am glad to say some of the party opposite were with me— who protested against the, excesses committed by the Greeks then. I should like to have seen a little protest by hon. Members opposite at such acts as the bombardment of Damascus. I think that is equally horrible when committed against a Christian or a Moslem town. On this question of the Christians on either side of the frontier that must eventually be drawn, they propose an exchange of population, an exchange of Christians, and I presume they will offer us also the devil worshippers, if we want them, for Kurds and Turks who are left in the territory over which we should have a mandate. The exchange of populations is open to many abuses and, undoubtedly, entails much hardship in that part of the world, but in view of the trouble which will accrue as the result of the present Government's policy, it would be as well for us to see whether that exchange could not take place.

I understand there will be in any case about 10,000 Christians and other non-Moslems to the North of the Brussels Line. I think we ought to agree with the Turks in this matter if we can, and negotiate peace with them, because the present Brussels Line from a military point of view is a bad one. It would have been better to have the line further off along the range of mountains to the North and North-West of the line. The present line is absolutely indefensible. Those are the terms we are offered, and that is what we are asked to give in exchange. That part of the vilayet of Mosul which is inhabited by a preponderant majority of Kurds and Turks, including the city of Mosul. I think it would be a very good policy if the Turkish Ambassador could be approached on those lines by the Prime Minister to-morrow.

The policy which we have pursued so far is not only dangerous, but inept and inane. Who would have believed it if it had been said 10 years ago that the results of the policy of this Government, which I do not altogether blame, and of the policies of successive British Governments, would be to range against us at the same time two of the most ancient enemies in the world, Russia and Turkey? We have managed to quarrel with both of them, and the prospect is extremely serious. I am sorry that the Prime Minister has left the House, but perhaps what I am going to say will interest the Secretary of State for Air. There is a sort of belief in Europe—I do not think the matter has been seized very clearly in London yet—that both sides in this matter are bluffing, that the Turks are bluffing us with threats of war, and that we are bluffing them. That is a very dangerous game, when the stakes are the lives of men.

I think the Turks are bluffing as regards immediate war, but there will always be the danger of hostilities. They will begin to build roads, and roads are cheaply made by cheap labour, but they cannot easily be destroyed from the air. Perhaps the Secretary of State for Air will direct his attention to this matter. If military roads are built we shall have the same sort of haunting fears which confronted Victorian Conservative, statesmen in the time of our fathers, when the Russians were building military roads towards the north-west frontier of India. If the Turks begin building roads, as I believe they will, down this indefensible military frontier, we shall always know when we find ourselves in difficulties in any part of the world that our potential enemies will realise that we shall have to bind down so many squadrons of aeroplanes and so many battalions of troops for the defence of this country, nipped like a nut-between the crackers of the Turks on one side, and of Ibn Saud, who has already wiped out one of the princes of the Shercfian House, to the South.

I congratulate the Under Secretary for the Colonies on the tremendous success of his policy and this policy of his party in backing the Sherefian dynasty so far. It has brought us nothing but trouble and disappointment. He may remember that in 1919 he was so good as to honour me by replying to a speech of mine in which I ventured to express doubts of the then policy of making one of the Princes of the Shcrefian dynasty the King of Iraq and Khalif (Kaliph) of Islam. My statement has proved correct, and perhaps on this occasion I may be right.

Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER (Mr. James Hope)

The hon. and gallant Member Is travelling some distance from the Motion.

9.0 P.M.

Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY

I will not controvert your ruling. It is well known that the Wahabi have declared their intention of making an end of the Sherefian dynasty in Arabia. We have one of that dynasty. on the throne of Iraq, propped up by our bayonets. I regret very much that the pacific policy of the Prime Minister is not shared by the Colonial Secretary, or, so far as we know, the Foreign Secretary. The whole policy pursued has been one of extreme danger, and the latest manifestation— namely, that as our part of the bluff we are threatening the Turks with an alliance with Italy and an Italian descent on Smyrna, I consider to be most dangerous. If that should be attempted, if we have a British-Italian alliance against Turkey, the Russians will inarch into Bessarabia, and we shall have to take up all over again the question of peace in Europe.

Instead of the Government getting their vote by an overwhelming majority, for reasons which I hope will be clearly understood, I hope the country will realise that the present Government is actually in a minority of votes in the country, whatever their artificial majority may be, and whatever their special majority may be to-day, owing to the circumstances that have arisen. In spite of that, in spite of their vote of confidence, I say that the Colonial Secretary-has committed us to this policy without the consent of Parliament, and instead of getting this vote he ought to have been impeached at the Bar of the House.

Captain CAZALET

The very few observations which I wish to offer to the House arise out of a somewhat extended tour which I made throughout the Kingdom of Iraq and surrounding countries a few months ago. It seems to me that the hon. and gallant Member for Central Hull (Lieut.-Commander Kenworthy) envisages a situation in which Turkey and ourselves are playing a gigantic game of bluff at poker. If he deludes himself into thinking that we have only a couple of pairs in our hands, he is greatly mistaken. We have a royal straight flush. If I wanted any other reasons than those which I am going to suggest for supporting the Motion, it is that we are simply carrying out the mandate from the League of Nations. We originally accepted the mandate, and therefore it is not our business now to quibble when certain additional responsibilities have been put upon our shoulders.

I sincerely hope that we shall be able to negotiate with the Turks, and perhaps by means of offering them a loan in the City of London on easy terms we may compensate them for the loss of dignity which they have suffered perhaps at Angora in not being able to alter the boundary of Iraq. I am certain that a loan such as I have suggested would be of far more practical use to the Turks than any alteration of the boundary or, in fact, the whole vilayet of Mosul itself. I want to make a few remarks in regard to Mosul. Apart from being the most beautiful city in the whole of the Middle East, it has one other remarkable aspect, namely, that in the neighbourhood of Mosul are to be found the only stone quarries in the whole of Iraq. If in the future, as we hope will be the case, Bagdad and all the big cities are going to advance and improve, this stone, which is known as Mosul marble, will be of great utility to the whole country.

I am leaving out this evening the question of the strategic importance of Mosul. I think it has been definitely and very clearly laid down in the evidence given to the League of Nations, and this evening in this House, that without Mosul the Kingdom of Iraq cannot possibly exist. To suggest, as I think the right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Swansea (Mr. Runciman) did that we could retire to Basra and limit our expenditure to that area simply demonstrates that the right hon. Gentleman cannot possibly appreciate the situation. We could not possibly either defend the Anglo-Persian oil fields or maintain the independent Kingdom of Iraq by doing so. Around the district of Mosul as we have heard, there are some hundred thousand Christians made up of Nestorians, Jacobites, Assyrians, and Chaldeans, and all these different sects of Christianity, strange to say, live in perfect peace and tranquillity, and further north there are the devil worshippers or the Yezidis, and we find that these people also are only too anxious to remain under the Government of Iraq with the support and assistance of the Christian mandate of Great Britain. I should like to emphasise what has been said already in regard to oil. I took a considerable amount of trouble to find out the facts of the situation when I was in Iraq. It is not absolutely accurate to say that there has been no definite finding of oil in Iraq up to date, because in one of the transferred territories, namely Kanikin, on the Persian border, wells have been found, but the place belongs to the Anglo-Persian Company and has nothing to do with the Turkish Petroleum Company, and as a matter of fact I see. in to-day's newspaper that this oil is going to be utilised for the local and domestic purposes of the Kingdom of Iraq.

Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY

The hon. Member says it has nothing to do with the Turkish Petroleum Company, but am I not right in saying that the Anglo-Persian Company owns about 25 per cent. of the Turkish Petroleum Company?

Captain CAZALET

I believe that is perfectly Correct, but the Khanikin oil wells is something totally separate from any negotiations which have been taking place with the Iraq Government in regard to oil. As regards the hon. and gallant Member's point about the oil which is supposed to exist around Mosul, I would point out that the only method of using oil for commercial purposes is to transport it across the desert by means of a pipe-line to the Mediterranean, and this would entail an expenditure of some £10,000,000. Therefore, in order that oil should be made an economic proposition it is obvious that it will be necessary to get a tremendous quantity of it. So far I understand no one has ascertained whether or not the oil is there in sufficient quantities, and even if it is there in large quantities, it is doubtful it it will be of the quality which is desired and necessary in order to make it a commercial proposition. I think more nonsense is talked in this House, and more insinuations are made on this point than on any other subject, namely, in regard to the Government's action being animated by the question of oil. One might imagine that oil was the only thing in Iraq, because Iraq is never mentioned in this House without the question of oil immediately arising. In the country itself, however, the question of oil is hardly ever mentioned except among a very few people indeed.

I do not think any speaker has paid sufficient attention to the work which the British nation through its civil servants has done and is doing in Iraq. I defy anyone who visits that country not to come back a supporter of the Motion which is before the House. I think that there we are avoiding the mistakes which we made in Egypt. The ordinary procedure of Great Britain, when for one reason or another we find ourselves in an Eastern country, is on the following lines. We impose upon the people a standard of civilisation, a certain code of morals, honesty and justice, and we hold out to them the ideal of a democratic Government. All these are totally foreign and contrary to the nature of the people. The result is that we have to stay there and support this higher standard of civilisation by military force or we clear out of the country, and chaos ensues. In Iraq the Royal Air Force controls the whole country very efficiently and is as popular with the people of Iraq, as it is essential for the safety and security of their frontiers. I think I am the only Member of this House who was present at the opening of the Iraq Parliament last year. Among other things which were of interest in connection with that event, I was impressed by the total absence of any sign of British domination or interference. It was also worthy of note that in Iraq one saw the British constitution, almost exactly as we know it in this country, put down in writing for the first time in history and an effort made to carry it into effect.

We have even gone so far as to show that we conform to the idea of the independence of the Iraq people both in letter and spirit, and now the Englishmen who are there no longer call themselves advisers, but assistant inspectors out of sympathy with the wishes of the Iraq people, and never do we on any occasion, except occasions of vital interest to the whole Kingdom, interfere in the local internal affairs of Iraq. It is impossible to exaggerate the work that we have done in Iraq, and I do not think that since the days of Nebuchadnezzar has this country enjoyed such peace and good government. You may wander as I did by the water of Babylon, and your peaceful meditations will only be disturbed by the whistle of the trains or the hooting of the motor cars as they speed their way across the desert from Hillah to Bagdad. One might safely say to-day that it is possible to drive mules laden with gold from Basra in the South to Mosul in the North without interference. I visited what are the third and fourth most sacred cities of the Mohammedan world, namely, Nejir and Kebala, formerly hot-beds of sedition, and where no foreigner formerly could show himself. I want there without any protection when there was no European within 50 miles, and I can assure hon. Members that one was much lees likely to be molested walking around the native bazaars there than if one were walking through Hyde Park to-day.

Iraq is the lynch-pin of the Middle East, and unless you have peace in Iraq you will get no trade or commerce throughout the whole of that region. As regards the future, I am perfectly certain now that we are going to get a definite settlement of our position in regard to Iraq, that with perhaps increased loans and more irrigation, the possibilities are incalculable. There is one Reason why trade has not flourished more between Iraq and Persia. A mere glance at the map shows how these two countries must inevitably be linked together—in fact all the produce which we in Europe sent to Persia has almost inevitably to go through Iraq. One of the reasons why trade has not flourished hitherto is because the Persians did not know what was going to happen in Iraq in four years' time, and their attitude towards us might be expressed in this way. "You came to Iraq during the war, and you conquered the land by force of arms. Therefore, you have the greatest right that we know in the world."

Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY

We advanced and took the vilayet of Mosul when we had agreed to remain within our lines.

Captain CAZALET

That does not affect my point. We went to Iraq during the War, and everybody knows we expended much in conquering that country. The Persian regards that as sufficient reason for possessing the country and taking it over ourselves. We govern it for two or three years after the War and then we suddenly announce that we are going to leave in four years time. The Persians said: "We are not going to make a commercial arrangement with a Government of a country that we think will fail if you leave it in four years' time." But to-day, as a result, on the one hand, of Persia having got a very able, energetic, and absolutely honest Shah in Riza Khan, and, on the other hand, of the settlement that, I hope, will be concluded between this country and Iraq, I believe there will be a very large increase indeed in the trade between these two countries, to the betterment of trade generally, both in this country and throughout the whole of the East.

Therefore, I would plead with the House, to support the Motion on the following grounds: First of all, because of our promises to the Arabs under the Anglo-French Protocol in 1918; secondly, because upon it depends the whole peace and prosperity of the Middle East; thirdly, because, I think, of the Christian sects in the Kingdom of Iraq, to whom we are under an obligation not to be measured in pounds, shillings and pence; fourthly, from an Imperial point of view, because, I think, it is essential that we should have in Iraq, which lies on the main air route between England and India, a place where we can land and keep our stores and supplies; and, fifthly, for two other and, to my mind, very practical reasons. If we do not accept the decision arrived at recently at Geneva, it means that in a few years' time we shall have to leave Iraq, and that means that we shall then have to leave Palestine, and if we leave Palestine the whole of our policy in Egypt will have to be reconsidered. That, I think, brings up problems which are too serious even for consideration. Finally, I, personally, believe, and I am informed on good authority, that it is far cheaper for us, from the point of view of actual cash, to remain in Iraq under present arrangements than to try and withdraw. If we did so, we should have to bring up several divisions from India, and the cost which it would entail would be far in excess of anything that we are now under guarantee to spend in Iraq in one year.

I hope the House will do nothing to impede the steady progress and prosperity of this small country, because the only alternative is that it will be handed back to the withering yoke of the Turk. Last year, at Ur of the Chaldees, in the heart of Mesopotamia, certain tablets and remains were found, which proved, I was informed, that somewhere about the year 7000 B.C. there was a government in Mesopotamia which was a model of all the virtues, and that law and order and prosperity reigned throughout the land. Since that date Iraq has seen innumerable empires rise and fall within its territories, but it is only under the Turks that it finally lost its last vestige of glory and renown. Yet to-day at Babylon, Ctesiphon, and Hadra she still retains landmarks of her ancient glory, and I believe that to-day, under the protection of the League of Nations, and with the assistance of Great Britain, she may regain, if not surpass any former period of, her prosperity. Nothing but the refusal of this House to sanction the decision recently arrived at at Geneva can prevent this.

Captain W. SHAW

I think it was rather ill-becoming the hon. and gallant Member for Central Hull (Lieut. Commander Kenworthy) when he remarked that he thought the Prime Minister ought to have consulted the Turkish Embassy long before with regard to the position in Iraq. I would like to remind him that there was such a thing as the Treaty of Sevres, whereby the old Turkish Empire was dismembered. That would have been settled if it had not been for the right hon. Gentleman the Mem- ber for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George). The Government in power after the War refused to have anything to do with or to recognise the plenipotentiaries that came over on behalf of Turkey, and, therefore, our position right away through the Greek imbroglio to the present moment is largely, if not altogether, due to that remissness on the part of the then Government. That brought us into direct conflict with those who took over the Turkish Empire, namely, the representatives of Angora. We endeavoured to come to some terms with them, and we did so finally in the Treaty of Lausanne. It will 'be within the memory of this House what very great trouble there was in connection with that matter, because it was feared that even at the twelfth hour Lord Curzon, who was then representing this country, would not be able to effect a settlement, and I believe, if my memory serves me aright, that he even ordered a train to take him back again, (because he felt that the Turks did not intend to sign any treaty with our Government. Eventually, however, they did, and by that Treaty Turkey renounced all right and title over the various States controlled under the Mandate that we had from the League of Nations. One of those Mandates was, of course, that over Iraq.

We know that, though that Treaty was accomplished, there was one thing that was left in dispute because no settlement could be arrived at, and that was the question of the frontier between Iraq and the present Turkish Empire, namely, Angora, It was, however, settled by the Treaty of Lausanne that that question of the decision of the northern frontier of Iraq should be settled by the League of Nations. Therefore, we ourselves, with Iraq, referred that question of the boundary as against Angora to be settled by the League of Nations, and the League appointed a Neutral Boundary Commission,, which was, let us remember, of a purely advisory character. The hon. and gallant Member for Leith (Captain Benn) stated that if we refused to accept the decision of the League of Nations, he did not see how it would affect the League's credit or our own. I think it would have affected both very much, because we ourselves had referred it to the League of Nations, and when we have referred as a nation to the League of Nations anything of a questionable nature which cannot be decided between two opposing parties, it is certainly up to our honour that we shall accept that which the League decides for us, because we said we would accept it.

The Neutral Boundary Commission which was appointed unfortunately matte use of an unfortunate term, that certain newspapers, especially one, got hold of, when they said that the Northern territory was Turkish territory. To the -uninitiated that presented difficulties, but we have got to remember that under international law, any territory which has belonged to a Power still remains an integral part of that Power until it has been renounced or in some otter way has been given up Therefore, that Northern part of Iraq still under international law did constitute a part of Turkey in exactly the same way that certain of the lands that belong to Germany, and which we took, still belonged to Germany under international law until the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, when she publicly renounced them, and then they became ours immediately.

I noted very carefully what the Prime Minister said with regard to our undertaking with regard to Iraq. We certainly have got to bear in mind that this country is bearing very heavy taxation and that it is of very special interest to the taxpayers of this country that we shall not commit ourselves further than we are already committed. We are already terribly handicapped, and it is most important that if the Government are to retain the confidence of the country they should not commit themselves to any further financial obligations: than those to which we are already committed. Therefore I noted particularly that the Prime Minister stated that the undertaking after 1928 is not to spend money or to leave troops in Iraq but that the situation will be governed by the League of Nations. I trust that that will prove so because in our altruistic attitude we have still got to remember that we have got the interests of the taxpayer to consider.

Another point which we have to bear in mind are the proportions of the population of Iraq. I was interested by the Prime Minister's statement in his answer to a question about the population of Iraq. He said that the population con- sisted of 166,000 Arabs, 61,000 Christians, and only 38,000 Turks. I cannot see, therefore, what interest Turkey has in Iraq, because it is the Arabs who are far the largest number and who control the situation. We are under a promise, after all, that we would support the Arabs until such time as they are able to govern themselves as a separate entity.

Sir ALFRED MOND

I intervene for a few moments before the right hon. Gentleman replies to invite him to make clear one or two points of importance in this Debate, and also perhaps to make some statement on the general position of Iraq which has not; loomed very largely in the Debate so far as I have heard it. The first point of importance which arises is about our obligation under the Treaty of Lausanne. As far as I understand the sense of that Treaty, although we agreed with Turkey that if we could not come to terms regarding the boundary of Iraq in nine months we would refer the matter to the Council of the League of Nations, I cannot find that any question beyond the delimitation of the boundary itself was to be referred.

If that is so it is difficult to understand in what way the Council of the League felt that it had any power or authority to attach any condition about the mandate to the delimitation of the frontier itself. They are two really separate propositions. Attaching a condition for the prolongation of the mandate for a considerable number of years has placed the House in considerable difficulty to-night. The delimitation of the frontier of Iraq is not a question between us and Turkey but between Iraq and Turkey. When you couple with it an obligation that may involve the British taxpayer in very considerable liability for 25 years it seems to to me pub us in a very difficult and somewhat unfair position.

We are none of us anxious, I am sure, in any quarter of the House to do anything which would look like a repudiation of an award by the Council of the League. Nothing would be more unfortunate or more disastrous for the League than if we appealed for an award, they gave it, and then we repudiated it. If we took such a step it seems to me that the whole authority of the League ever afterwards would be infinitely diminished and our own position in all League discussions would be very much suspect. I will not take the responsibility of voting against the decision come to by the Government.

If we look at it after all from the standpoint of the British taxpayer and the British people we are entitled to know— and I think my right hon. Friend will be able to satisfy them—how far this 20 years' mandate obligations arise under a treaty we have already sanctioned and how far they are new obligations. A. great deal of our Debate to-day largely turns upon the interpretation of the treaties and the decision of the Council of the League. There is another aspect about which I hope the Colonial Secretary will tell the House and the country more. That is the question of Iraq itself. Everybody is confident that this frontier on that line is a necessity for its continued existence. It seems to be assumed by many people that this vast territory whose ancient ruins show a teeming population and a high state of civilisation is incapable of being made not a liability but an asset. It is assumed that the British taxpayer is bound to go on bearing a heavy burden for a long number of years in order to enable this country to become once again self-supporting. Many people doubt whether even at any length of time you can ever restore it to its former prosperity.

I do not profess to be an expert on that subject. I have never had an opportunity of visiting the country, although I have met a good many people who have known it all their lives and are intimately acquainted with it. It seems so far as I can gather to be in the general position of many countries once fertile, now neglected, through bad administration and bad government, fallen into a state of neglect which to a superficial observer appears hopeless. Our general experience is that with a stable Government and sufficient capital they become very valuable assets. Therefore, I do not think we should lightly throw away the opportunity in these days of giving the guidance, protection and security for development, which we alone can give in Eastern countries, to a very important part of the world which may prove to be in time to come one of the few remaining open sources for the growing of cotton, the growing of wheat, the growing of other produce which we shall want, and a market for our industrial goods and for our industrial population.

Again, I do not think we can altogether ignore the fact that this country is somewhat of a key position, a direct route to the great empire of India, and a link in the great air service we Rope to see established. From that point of view, I feel that it would be useful, and, in fact, invaluable, in view of the kind of representations which have been made so often, if we could have some authoritative expression of opinion, because with British taxpayers so greatly harassed, economy is much the order of the day, and it would be interesting for us to know what real economy in money would be, effected by the withdrawal of the Air Force, which, I take it, would not be disbanded, but merely transferred somewhere else; also how long it is considered necessary, in regard to our relations with Turkey, to come to a decision, which, I was glad to hear from the Prime Minister, he was personally endeavouring to bring about. Surely, if that be successful, as we all hope, and the country, as I am told, is settling down and developing, we ought to be able to look forward to a reduction of our military forces, and a reduction which would lift a very heavy burden from ourselves.

We cannot afford to play fast and loose with these big imperial problems. The British Empire was never brought up on a policy of running away. It may be we have one of two decisions to make—to maintain or give it up. So far as I am concerned, I will never give a vote in this House or anywhere else which would in any way jeopardise, endanger or minimise the great Empire which has done so much for the progress of order and civilisation. It is easy for people to talk about going away, but if they were to see those countries and the influences of a few British in creating order, sanitation and education, and realise the chaos that would result from their withdrawal, they would come to the conclusion that we cannot afford not to proceed with our great mission. Therefore, I hope my right hon. Friend, when he comes to speak, will address himself, or a few words at any rate, to what may be considered not only the League of Nations aspect, but that imperial aspect which, I believe, 'will still appeal to the people of this country, still appeal to all who feel we still have a mission to fulfil, that we must still go on until it is realised that our word, our contract, is as sacred are ever. It is at once our strength, our glory, and you might say our expense.

I am not one of those who believe that because we are passing through heavy economic difficulties, we should be terrified about thinking of the future which must lie before the people of this country; just as little as I believed, in the business with which I am connected, that when depression came that was the time to shut up, disband my staff, disorganise my business and cease operations. Quite the contrary; it was a time for bending one's mind to enlarging one's market, to increasing one's efficiency and to going on with a view to future development. The British people, therefore, should not listen to the counsels of those who despair of the future, and who insist on saving at any cost to our national honour or future development.

Holding these views strongly, clearly and decidedly, I am glad to think we shall, at any rate, have a unanimous decision on Mosul to-night. [HON. MEMBERS: "NO!" and "Yes!"] There may be still some who do not agree, but we shall be nearer unanimity than this House has ever been in my experience, and I hope that we shall have the satisfaction of knowing that His Majesty's Government will obtain in the field of conciliation results which are so often obtained in that direction. We ought to try, at any rate, to live at peace with Turkey. We cannot very well avoid doing so. We shall never do so by running away from them. We shall never do so by leaving the impression that, whatever happens, we at any rate will not defend anything we think proper to defend.

Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY

No one suggests running away.

Sir A. MOND

I am merely stating what I believe to be a fact. You cannot negotiate by giving the other man the impression that he can get whatever he asks. I have no doubt that we can leave that in the hands of the Prime Minister. On the other hand, I think we ought to avoid some of our tactics in diplomacy which have caused trouble in the past, in sometimes trying perhaps to be too clever, and sometimes too overbearing. I think we should at least convince the Turks of our sincerity and of our strength, and I think we might come to some lasting arrangement, and on that lasting arrangement could be based a reduction of expenditure with profit and advantage to ourselves. At the same time maintaining our loyalty to the League, our pledge to the population of Iraq and the dignity of our country, we shall emerge successfully from one of the most difficult problems which has ever harassed successive Governments—and I say "successive" deliberately—causing difficulty and anxiety unless the golden opportunity is taken now in order to arrive at a solution.

The SECRETARY of STATE for DOMINION AFFAIRS (Mr. Amery)

The speech to which we have just listened is, I think, typical of the whole tone in which this subject has been discussed this evening. It has been thoughtful and considerate, in some instances no doubt critical, but always worthy of an Assembly not unmindful of its great Imperial responsibilities. That tone is very different, indeed, from the tone in which this question has been discussed in certain quarters outside. The Prime Minister, in his statement, made it clear that so far as our attitude in accepting the award of the League of Nations was concerned, and the conditions with which that award was coupled, it was only the attitude which every successive Government has taken up on this question since the matter of the Iraq frontier was first raised by the Turks three years ago.

My right hon. Friend opposite has asked me to say something on the broader question of the whole position in Iraq. There, too, the policy that the present Government is pursuing is only the policy which every Government has pursued since the War. It is not we who were first confronted with the problem, the grave, anxious problem of the responsibilities which we undertook in Iraq during the War. The pledges and assurances which were given at various stages of the War have been quoted in this House on more than one occasion. Some of them have been quoted to-night. I do not think it is necessary for me to quote them, and I shall sum them up in a phrase used by Lord Curzon at Lausanne in January, 1933. Lord Curzon then said: The British Government are under a very definite pledge, first of all to the Arab nation to whom they promised that they should not be returned to Turkish rule; secondly, that to the Arab King who' was elected by the whole country, including Mosul, and with whom we have entered into an obligation; and, thirdly, to the League of Nations, without whose consent we cannot abandon our mandate over a large portion of mandated territory. Those obligations may be inconvenient. So were other obligations which we incurred in the War. But we cannot afford to dishonour them. The problem which has been before us ever since the Armistice is how we should discharge those obligations honourably without at the same time imposing on the taxpayers of this country burdens wholly beyond their capacity to bear. That is a problem which is not a new one. The light hon. Gentleman the Member for West Swansea (Mr. Runciman) gave expression to his anxieties in this matter. They were shared by those members of his own party who took part in the Coalition Government, and who were confronted with the problem then. They were faced with impossible expenditure in the occupation of Iraq. Figures have been quoted freely, I know, which are intrinsically absurd. We have been told that Iraq has cost £175,000,000. That is a figure which includes the vast expenditure on demobilisation which we had to incur there just as much as we had to incur many tens of millions of the same kind of expenditure in France, Italy and other places. It also included the heavy cost, of an unfortunate rebellion. Even so, it is undoubtedly true that the administration of Iraq was imposing an altogether unduly burdensome task upon the British taxpayer.

The Coalition Government was the first to make an attempt to grapple with the problem. The present Chancellor of the Exchequer when he occupied the post that I hold to-day went out to the East to see what it was that made the position in Iraq so difficult and so costly. He found out that there were two causes which affected Iraq. One was the attempt we were making to hold a vast open territory, devoid of almost all means of communication, with slow moving ground troops. The other was the fact that, contrary to the spirit of our pledges, we were endeavouring to impose upon Iraq a system of administration unsuited to the conditions of the country, profoundly unpopular with the people, and essentially and inherently costly. With great courage and with great insight my right hon. Friend grappled with that problem. He decided on the military side that our great forces there should be resolutely reduced, and the main burden and responsibility for the maintenance of internal and external security of the country should be laid on the new, and for that purpose, the untried weapon of the Air Force.

He also decided that we should sweep away the system of direct administration, and substitute for it a system of free cooperation with the people of the country and the trusted members of their own Government, and with their own support and under their own free constitution, we should support and help and guide them through the medium of a Treaty of Alliance. A Treaty, from the point of view of Iraq, was that to which they were more susceptible, and in which they would take more pride, and at the same time, so far as our obligations to the League of Nations was concerned, would carry out all the essential elements of our mandatory obligation. That was the situation in 1021. In the following year that Treaty was signed between the British Government and the Government of Iraq.

There was a change of Government. A new Government had to face a new situation. The situation at the beginning of 1923 was graver than at any time before or since. We were confronted with a Turkey flushed with victory and of internal re-organisation which to-day confront the statesmen of Angora. We were confronted with a difficult state of affairs in Iraq. In face of that situation a new Prime Minister (Mr. Bonar Law) asked his Cabinet to reconsider the whole situation from the beginning. For months we discussed the problem, asking ourselves whether it might be possible to solve it by abandoning our responsibilities in Iraq. We studied the problem. We came quite definitely to the conclusion that any immediate withdrawal from Iraq would not only be more costly but, from a military point of view, more difficult to achieve. It would involve the downfall of the kingdom of Iraq. It would be regarded throughout the Eastern world as a breach of faith towads Iraq, and would inflict irreparable damage on British honour and prestige throughout the East. That was the view taken by a Government which approached this problem in a sceptical spirit, for it was only too anxious to get rid of obligations which they thought irksome.

But when they studied the problem they came to the same conclusion as their predecessors, namely, that it was not to be solved by any short cut, not by scuttling or running away, but by a resolute, manful endeavour to build up as rapidly as possible in Iraq, and by the help of the people of the country, a condition of things which would enable Iraq to stand on its own feet, and by so doing enable us to discharge our obligations and to regard our Responsibilities as fulfilled. In discussing that problem the Cabinet did consider very seriously how soon the financial and military commitments which we had undertaken in Iraq could honourably and safely be brought to an end. The Treaty which had been signed was one of 20 years, and the military and. financial agreements attached to it and extending to the same period dad stipulate expressly that Iraq should, at the earliest possible date, accept full responsibility, both for the maintenance of internal order and for the defence of Iraq from external aggression. But, on the other hand, beyond that general stipulation, no definite date within the 20 years' currency of the Treaty had been laid down for the fulfilment of these essential conditions.

To remove the not unnatural apprehension which that created in the House of Commons at the time, the Cabinet came to the conclusion that the Treaty, whose ratification it considered could not honourably be withheld, should be supplemented by a Protocol which terminated the main provisions of the Treaty, and, more particularly, our military and financial obligations, within a much shorter period, but which at the same time, as the Prime Minister made abundantly clear earlier to-day, expressly laid down that negotiations should be entered into for the conclusion of a future Treaty embodying our permanent relations, when they should become relations of mutual assistance and help and no longer a purely one-sided dependence on the part of Iraq on this country. That was the attitude taken up by the former Unionist Government.

But, as the Primes Minister pointed out this afternoon, that attitude was equally the attitude of the Labour Government that succeeded. When they had to face, not only their obligations towards Iraq, but their obligations towards the League of Nations, they gave an assurance to the League of Nations that if Iraq had not entered the League by 1928, then the Government of this country would leave it to the League to decide what further measures might be required for carrying out our mandatory responsibility. in the face of that assurance, given, not by a Government on this side, but by a Government which for the moment does not grace the Labour benches opposite, it is really difficult to understand the meaning of the Motion on the Paper in the name of the right hon. Gentleman who should be opposite: That in the opinion of this House the period for which this country assumed responsibility for Iraq should not be prolonged. Why? Only a year ago they pledged themselves to the League of Nations that they would prolong that responsibility. I am not surprised, in view of that fact, that they prefer to avoid having to explain the discrepancy between the Motion they have put on the Paper and the Resolution which by their own record they are bound to support.

10.0 P.M.

A question which my right hon. Friend opposite has asked is, how is that policy of successive Governments actually working in Iraq? I had the privilege a few months ago, in company with my right hon. Friend the Secretary for Air, to visit Iraq, in order that we might try to see for ourselves how that policy was working, and how the progressive reduction of expenditure which that policy contemplated was being carried out, and how, if possible, it could be accelerated.

We found that that policy, laid down by the present Chancellor of the Exchequer and carried on by successive Governments, is a policy that is working. We found that as regards defence, in spite of the enormous reduction of forces, complete peace and order prevailed from one end of that country to the other; that the Air Force, with a small but keen and efficient police, with an administration understood by the people, had established a state of affairs that that country had not known for a thousand years. I do not think that anyone who has been there could fail to be proud of the work which the Air Force has done in Iraq. I venture to say that that Air Force, for its keenness, for efficiency all round, for continuous flying experience, is a force the like of which does not exist in the world elsewhere. And that success has been achieved consistently with a continuous and rapid reduction of expenditure.

May I give the House a few figures to show how progressive the reduction has been. In the year 1920–21 we were spending £32,000,000 a year in Iraq. In 1921–22 the figure was £23,000,000. In 1922–23 after the new policy had begun to take effect, the figure had been brought below £8,000,000; in the following year below £6,000,000; and in the year after that below £4,750,000. The current Estimates are a little over £4,000,000. That is expenditure in Iraq. But it is not by any means all expenditure on Iraq. The House of Commons knows perfectly well that we spend very large sums in Malta for the Navy. We do not credit those sums as the cost of Malta to the Imperial taxpayer. For the sake of effecting these reductions the present Chancellor of the Exchequer four years ago put all expenditure in Iraq upon the Middle Eastern Vote. Of the present expenditure of £4,000,000 about half is actual expenditure on Iraq, expenditure which need not recur once Iraq is capable of taking it upon its own shoulders; and the other £2,000,000 represents expenditure upon that wonderful Air weapon which is at this moment being maintained in that particular area.

I do not think that anyone will suggest that if it were not maintained there the whole of it would disappear or simply be incorporated in our home defence. A great part of it, at any rate, would be required somewhere in those regions, and I confess that I know of no part of the Middle East where it could be maintained in such efficiency and in so central and effective a position. Be that as it may, the conviction with which the Secretary of State for Air and I came back from that visit was that, given a settlement to the frontier question, given security and a permanent policy, we should be able to make greater progressive reductions during the next two years, and be able to arrive, by the time laid down in the present treaty, or at any rate very nearly within that time, at a stage when Iraq no longer required financial or military support from the Imperial taxpayer, and when it could stand on its own feet and pay its own way.

That is the military position. I may add that Iraq is perhaps a little nearer to paying its own way than is usually realised. It pays the whole cost of the Civil administration, pays for the whole of the force of 7,000 police and for a rapidly growing and improving army of 8,000 men, and within a very few years will be able to take over the whole of the ground expenditure now incurred in that country, and, I believe also, pay towards whatever air expenditure is required for the actual security of the country itself. I have given credit to the Air Force for what was done, not undeservedly. I should like to add that its success cannot be dissociated from the success of the political policy that has been followed under the guidance of men like Sir Percy Cox and Sir Henry Dobbs, who understand the people of the country, and who like the people of the country, aided by a little handful of British officials. We have built up a machinery for native self-government in that country which, I venture to say, we here, in this old country can well be proud of.

Nothing, even in the early days of Egypt, in the time of Lord Cromer or Lord Milner, equals the fine, noble work that little body of British officials have done out there, with very little recognition, with no certainty of tenure for themselves, with a sense of duty towards the country in which they were working, and a pride in the Empire on whose behalf they held its lonely outposts. They have worked in a spirit which I believe may avoid some of the mistakes we made in Egypt in the earlier days, in a spirit which has done marvels, not only in peace and security, but in health and sanitation, and education, and which has aimed at doing it, not by the suppression of the native administration, but by a true spirit of brotherly co-operation. Nothing more interested me, than what I saw of the real whole-hearted friendship and co-operation between the Iraq officials in the country and the British counsellors and advisers, who worked by their side, and never lost an opportunity of giving them full chance of doing the work.

We may be asked, is that system of government stable? The Commission set up by the League of Nations were inclined to doubt its permanency. I believe it has already made far more progress towards real stability than anyone here realises. It has the making of a true national life, patriotic, keen and yet tolerant in that, country, and you have there a people who are really anxious to make their way. I know that the financial position is still a difficulty. The burden of the Ottoman debt imposed upon Iraq is not a. small thing for a struggling little country to tackle, but I am convinced that Iraq will not only pay its way during the next few years, but will steadily shoulder, as I have already said, the burdens that we are carrying for her.

From the economic point of view, I entirely agree with what fell from my right hon. Friend opposite. It is a country capable of immense results. After all, it once was one of the richest and most powerful countries in the world. The city of Bagdad, when. Hulagu sacked it 700 years ago, contained more people than the whole of the country contains to-day, and if Iraq is derelict, was not Egypt nearly derelict 50 years ago when we first took it in hand? Is there any prophecy about the futility of our attempts in bring about regeneration in Iraq which was not made by critics about Egypt in those days? The whole system of irrigation has been allowed to fail; great tracts of land want draining; great capital expenditure may be required before the rivers of Paradise can be harnessed and made fruitful like Father Nile: but it can be done, and nothing will bring that nearer than security, than a clear knowledge of our intentions. A very true word was said by the hon. and gallant Member for Warwick and Leamington (Captain Eden) when he said that the longer and the more definite the obligation we undertake for Iraq, the speedier will the day come when we can clear off that obligation altogether.

There is one other economic point which I might mention in that connection, because it is alluded to so often by more than one hon. Member in a wholly misleading sense, and that is the part that the development of oil will play in the future prosperity of the country. I need not repeat that no interest of any sort directly concerned with oil has influenced the policy of the British Government, or of any British Government. But it is undoubtedly true that if oil should be discovered in considerable quantities, it will undoubtedly bring development and revenue to the country. The contract between the Turkish Petroleum Company and the Iraq Government is a more favourable contract to a Government than any oil contract I know of elsewhere, and if—and the matter is not yet proved —oil should be proved, then the Iraq Government may get an increase of revenue which will enable it to find the money for dealing usefully with that far more important liquid, the water of the country, the irrigation.

Another thing we found when out there was that all development was waiting to know clearly what our intentions were. On every hand by the people of Iraq and our officials we were asked: "Is it the intention of the Government to carry out the pledges given in the Protocol, and after 1928 to remain in treaty alliance and in co-operation with Iraq or not?" The other thing for which development was waiting was the settlement of the dispute as to the frontier.

On the question of the frontier, I should like—I trust I am not trespassing too long—to say something. When the War came to an end with the Armistice, we were a few miles out of Mosul. We had already occupied the greater part of Mosul province. In accordance with the terms of the Armistice, we occupied Mosul itself, and the rest of what was Mesopotamia up to what was the natural frontier. We advanced to the mountain range, the natural, geographical, commercial and racial frontier of Iraq. We made no attempt to advance an inch into anything which could be considered Turkish territory in any proper sense of the word. From that time on Iraq has been, within its present frontier, regarded as a unit, both by the world outside and by its own people. All the arrangements between the great Powers and before the League of Nations for the assignment and establishment of a Mandate dealt with the country in its present territory. The present frontiers substantially were accepted by Turkey in the Treaty of Sevres, signed in August, 1920.

Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY

Not by Turkey, but by the Sultan.

Mr. AMERY

The Government of the Sultan was then the legal Government of Turkey. I shall come later to the new revolutionary Government, which took its place, and which repudiated it; but in any case that Government accepted that frontier. Internally, Iraq has been a unit from that time. It is an economic unit, as the Commission of the League clearly showed. Its whole trade works together, and Bagdad and Mosul naturally work together on a single trade system. It took part as a single country in the election of its present monarchy, in the election of the Constituent Assembly which framed the constitution under which it lives, and in the election of the present Assembly which has declared its desire to remain in treaty relationship with us; and it has developed as a single unit on lines of progressive administration which in a few years have made it an utterly different country either from what Iraq was before the War or from what any part of the Turkish State is to-day.

The Turkish demand which would take away from Iraq an essential and integral part of its territory, the richest of its provinces, is essentially a demand for a complete reversal of the order of things set up after the War—not only territorially, but because it entirely reverses the spirit of a settlement on national and racial lines on which the system since the War has been based. For that claim there is no justification from the point of view of defence. The present frontier is an admirable defensive frontier from the Turkish point of view, as it is from our own. There is no justification from the point of view of race. There are practically no Turks in that province. A little scattered island of Turkomans, kindred in race and language, live at the other end of the province, most remote from the frontier.

There is no case, either, to be founded on the wishes of the inhabitants; the last-thing the people of Iraq wish is to be put back under Turkish rule. More than that, there is no legal claim for the restoration to Turkey. I want to dwell on that point, because it is one which has been so systematically misrepresented in some of the Press. The Commission of the League pointed out, in what I cannot conceive to be very happy legal phraseology, that till the final Treaty of Peace settled the frontiers, the original sovereignty of Turkey, in some sense, still subsisted over all the regions that had belonged to her. The Hague Court, a legal authority which I think no one in this House will query, put the thing more correctly when it said that under Article 16, of the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey had renounced all rights and claims outside the frontiers laid down in . the Treaty, and that in respect of the Iraq frontier, pending the actual fixing of the frontier, that renunciation was still, in a certain measure, in suspense.

It will no longer remain in suspense when we have carried out the conditions which the League has coupled with its award, and from that moment all shadow of Turkish suzerainty will disappear. Whatever that shadow may be, it extends to Mosul no more than it does to Bagdad or Basra. The legal right of Iraq to Mosul is in every respect as good as its light to Bagdad. In face of these facts it is interesting to notice in the hysterical Press this morning the statement that our presence in Mosul is an offence against justice. I venture to say that that statement is an offence against truth, and an offence truly characteristic of the systematic and deliberate misrepresentation of a campaign which I confess seems to me to be only intelligible on one. motive, that of wishing to incite Turkey to war with this country.

I think I have made it clear that the claim on the part of Turkey to reverse the system established since the War has no justification, but, however little justified it might have been, I can assure this House that the Government of this country, with its many responsibilities, would not. have been afraid of negotiating or offering a compromise with regard to that claim if we thought it would improve the relations between the two countries. But the facts are such that any concession to this unjustified claim would be impossible. The present frontier is the one easily defensible frontier in the country, and any frontier drawn back from the present one would be an indefensible one, and one which would involve Iraq and us in much heavier military expenditure. At the same time, to go back would deprive Iraq of some of its richest territory and best recruits, and would leave that country crippled in her resources with a much heavier task before her. Therefore, any retreat from the present frontier is one that so far from lightening the burdens of the taxpayer would increase them, and would defer for many years the period which we hope will soon come when Iraq will stand on its own. It would mean more than that. It would mean an injustice to the State of Iraq, and it would mean a great injustice to the peoples whose interests we should have to sacrifice more immediately.

Does anyone think that the Kurds who now enjoy a certain measure of political toleration, who can appoint their own local officers and use their own language, would welcome the steam roller of the uniform levelling Turkish machine across the border? Does anyone think the Arabs of Mosul, one of the chief cities of the-Arab world, would wish to be reduced to the level of a Turkish provincial town? Again we have a responsibility, and a very definite responsibility, towards the 70,000 or 80,000 Christians in that province who live immediately up against our frontier. I think most hon. Members have read the White Paper which gives the story of the manner in which certain deportations were curried out across the frontier. It is a horrible story. I am not going to harrow the feelings of the House by repeating anything that is contained in that terrible indictment; but, after all, have we any right to expose the people whom we liberated, to whom we have given a measure of freedom, self-government and toleration that they have never known before, to a return to that state of things?

I am not one of those who think that it is the duty of this nation to carry on a crusade in every part of the world. Terrible things have happened in many parts that we were powerless to prevent, and with which we could not have dealt except at the cost of creating worse disasters. But here are responsibilities which we have undertaken, and which we are in honour bound to carry out, and in that case I think we are entitled to let some weight rest in the scale of our responsibility towards a people who enjoy happiness and freedom now, but who might suffer unspeakable misery if any change were made. One thing that is certain is that if we gave up that territory these hapless people would come down to us as refugees, and we should be forced to spend vast sums in sustaining them. We have already spent millions after the War in sustaining refugees, and I do not think we wish to be faced with that burden again.

I venture to think that the claim which is put forward that we should reverse the whole present system in Iraq is one that we are bound to resist. We might quite well have stood on the frontier and refused to enter into any discussion; but we took a different and, I believe, a better course. We showed our faith in the justice of our cause, and our desire to promote the principle of peaceful settlement, by submitting the whole of that question to the arbitrament of the League. That was the original view embodied in the Treaty of Lausanne; that was the view of the Labour Government which followed, and it was not we, but the Labour Government, who after spending a certain number of months in endeavouring to arrive at a direct settlement with Turkey, during which negotiations they steadfastly refused to make any concession which would from their point of view prejudice the safety or the well-being of Iraq—it was they who referred the matter to the League in September, 1924, and definitely announced that they pledged themselves beforehand to accept the judgment of the League. I may add that, on that occasion at any rate, the Turkish representative equally pledged his Government to obey the decision of the League. It was on the strength of that assurance that the Commission of the League was sent out. That pledge has been repudiated since—unwisely, as I think—but it still stands on record as what Turkey believed to be the situation only a year ago.

It was on the strength of these assurances that the League sent out its Commission of three. That Commission reported very much what I laid before the House just now—that the Province of Mosul belonged naturally to Iraq, and that its people wished to remain united with it. The Commission was also profoundly impressed by what impressed myself and the Secretary of State for Air, namely, the wish of every section of the people of the country that British influence and guidance should remain associated with the Government of Iraq. It was for that reason that they coupled, with their recommendation that Iraq should remain intact, a stipulation that the present state of affairs, the present influence and guidance upon the course of Iraq policy, should continue for a long period of years.

That may be an inconvenient and awkward condition to attach, but, surely, it is a great compliment to the work that England has done in Iraq. Was ever such a compliment paid to a nation before by a body of neutral visitors as the statement that the stability and prosperity of the people of that country, from the point of view of the wishes of the people themselves, were coupled with continuous help and support from a foreign Power? That recommendation faced the Government of this country with a very direct question, whether it did in fact mean to carry out the terms of the Protocol with Iraq and the declaration the last Government made at the Council of the League a year ago. Now my right hon. Friend says that was a rather irrelevant and unfair question. I am not sure. They were asked to settle the frontier in the interest of the people concerned, and they believed that interest would be best served by the present frontier and by the present political co-operation of the British in Iraq.

When the question was put, what possible answer could there be? Let me remind the House that we had pledged ourselves both to Iraq and to the League to continue in treaty relations after the present Treaty expired. Let me also remind the House that by the whole course of our policy we are pledged to support Iraq's claim to its present territory—not this Government only but the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Derby (Mr. Thomas), the late Colonial Secretary, in July of last year had it publicly announced in Bagdad and throughout Iraq that His Majesty's Government had no intention whatever of abandoning their support to the frontier claim which had been brought forward on behalf of Iraq at Constantinople. What answer could we give? We were pledged to prolong the Treaty. We were pledged to support the claim of Iraq. Was I, on behalf of the British Govern-to say to Iraq, "We are bound by two pledges, one to continue in treaty relationship with you after 1928, the other to defend your frontier"?

"We are prepared to refuse to honour the first pledge in order that we may have an excuse for dishonouring the second." Or was I to go to the League of Nations and say, "The late Government pledged itself to continue mandatory relations with Iraq if necessary. We believe a certain decision which you wish to give to be the only just and fair one, but we will go back on the pledge of our predecessors in order to enable you to give a decision which we know to be unjust, which we know will be disastrous to the people concerned, which we know will wreck the future of the young State we have been building up under the auspices of the League, and which we also know will for all time make it impossible for this country to get quit of its responsibilities in Iraq either with honour or with advantage."

That at any rate was not the answer my right hon. Friend and the Cabinet instructed me to give. I gave the answer I gave on 3rd September to the League of Nations, that we were prepared, within the maximum limit of 25 years—I made it quite clear I believed Iraq would be ready for admission to the League of Nations long before that, and indeed the period was mentioned by the League not as a probable or certain period of the termination of our responsibilities but as a maximum period. I said then that for the maximum period we were prepared to continue our co-operation in maintaining the present administrative system in that country. I gave that declaration then. It was not asked of me again on the present occasion because, instead of that, the Council of the League announced its decision, and made that obligation a condition of the award.

The right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Swansea (Mr. Runciman) asked whether we were not in fact free to reject the award. I say in one sense we are free to reject it as it was, coupled with a condition which we can reject, in which case there may be some other award which the League can give. What I do say is that any other award would be disastrous for Iraq and this country, and the refusal of the conditions would be going back directly upon the whole policy which every Government has pursued in this country since the War.

May I turn to the actual obligations which the League demands? The Prime Minister has made it abundantly clear that those obligations are not concerned with the question of what money we spend in Iraq, or whether we spend any money there at all. It has nothing to do and interferes in no way with the fulfilment of our policy of reducing expenditure in Iraq to a minimum, and, indeed, to vanishing point in the next few years. It has nothing to do with the question of what troops we maintain in Iraq.

That, again, is one of those questions which the League of Nations never dreams of asking of any mandatory Power in regard to any territory. These are matters of our own responsibility. When it comes to the question of the future defence of that country, that is hypothetical, as the Prime Minister pointed out. Under the terms of the Military Agreement attached to the present Treaty, we are, undoubtedly, directly bound as allies to assist in the defence of Iraq against external aggression up to August, 1928. As regards the situation afterwards, I think the Prime Minister made it perfectly clear what that situation would be. If Iraq were, a perfectly independent State, a member of the League of Nations, we should have a certain obligation to prevent its territory from being wantonly violated.

If the League of Nations means anything, it means that all nations in the League are bound to take some action in case of unwarrantable and unprovoked aggression. Certainly that obligation would not be the less during the years in which on behalf of the rest of the League of Nations we acted as mandatories in Iraq. In that case, as the Prime Minister made clear, the obligation which we have is one in which the League of Nations would be associated with us, and associated with us in a particular sense in respect of a violation of the decision which the League of Nations has come to in regard to the boundaries. In any case, in matters of that sort one cannot deal with hypothetical questions of the defence of any country in unforeseen circumstances. We have world-wide interests and there are many places where we could neither say to-day that we shall spring to their aid if they are attacked, with unlimited troops, nor that we shall regard invasion of their territory as a matter of indifference-. These are matters which must depend upon the circumstances at the time.

I believe that when, we have settled this question, when Iraq is allowed to develop itself within its natural frontiers, the frontiers of natural political equilibrium, that aspect of the problem will not present itself again. After all, I believe that what we are concerned with in this matter, and that is what the League of Nations is concerned with, is not the problem of defence against some hypothetical attack, but with certain general principles of administration which the League wishes to see preserved in any territory in which it takes specific mandatory interest.

The questions with which the League is concerned—and I shall deal with that matter more fully when the actual Treaty comes before the House—are such questions as the continued enforcement of the Organic law, prescribing a constitutional system of government, guaranteeing freedom of conscience, freedom of worship and equality of treatment for all races; the rights of communities to their own schools: reasonable safeguards for the interests of foreigners and a number of things of that sort which are of great importance from the point of view of the League. Nearly all these are things which we can secure quite easily through the presence of British officials and for which neither great expenditure of money nor the presence of armed forces is required.

I will only say two things more. The Government have been charged, and I have been charged in particular, in this matter with taking up an unconciliatory and uncompromising attitude. I think the House will realise after the explanation I have given that as long as Turkey claimed a great province which we believe belongs of right to Iraq there was no common ground on which compromise could start. It was only when the question of right and. principle was settled that we got a datum line from which we could start and from which we could enter upon friendly discussion. I do not think anyone can suggest that either the Foreign Secretary or the Prime Minister lost a moment in showing their readiness, from the starting point of the recognition of Iraq's right to its own territory, to negotiate with Turkey for any adjustment or arrangement, whether territorial, financial, economic or political which would make the present settlement any easier for them and which would base it upon mutual agreement and a mutual willingness to co-operate.

I have endeavoured to summarise—I know at somewhat great length—the whole sequence of policy of every British Government towards Iraq. It has been a policy of honouring our obligations, facing our responsibilities, and of endeavouring at the same time by practical measures to build up a state of affairs in that country which would make it possible for us at the earliest possible moment to regard those obligations as discharged and fulfilled. It is a policy which has already in large measure succeeded. Our expenditure in Iraq has been enormously reduced, and will be rapidly reduced in the next few years. Economic development is proceeding, and it may be something much greater than anyone has realised.

There is also the great political fact. Surely it is no small thing that we have created in that country a system of government progressive, and yet essentially Oriental, a system of government which is national, and yet tolerant of minorities and which appreciates the help and support we have rendered. I believe it is a wonderful experiment on which we have started in that Near Eastern part of the world, and it may well be that we may yet reap an unlocked for reward for our efforts. I believe a strong and prosperous Iraq, with a healthy, independent national life of its own but closely associated in voluntary and even affectionate union, with the British Empire, may yet be an unforeseen source of economic and political strength to this country. But, believe me, a great problem like this cannot be solved by running away from it. It must be faced with forethought, with patience, with perseverance, with conciliation, and, if need be, with courage. Stumbling steps and wavering knees will never lead us to our goal, nor is it always prudent to turn back at the roar of every lion in the path. After all, some of these lions are very much like the lions which affrighted Christian at the entrance of the Palace Beautiful, chained—chained to the columns of their own newspapers, and incapable of doing the slightest harm to any wayfarer who walks resolutely in the middle of the path. There are other dangers, that may be more real, but with regard to these I do not believe that a lasting peace can ever be won by surrendering to menaces the just rights of those who trust you. I believe, on the contrary, that in this matter, from first to last, the present Government and every preceding Government have given evidence both of their wholehearted and sincere desire for peace and of their determination to honour

their obligations. We shall, I firmly believe, find our way out of our present difficulties, create a permanent and lasting peace in the Near East, and, by doing so, win our reward for carrying through and fulfilling a task which has, I know, been anxious and difficult, but which is, I believe, a great task, worthy of a great Empire.

Question put, That this House approves the action taken by the representatives of His Majesty's Government at Geneva in accepting the award of the Council of the League of Nations on the Iraq boundary.

The House divided: Ayes, 239; Noes, 4.

Division No. 505.]	AYES.	[10.48 p.m.
Acland-Troyte, Lieut.-Colonel	Colfox, Major Wm. Phillips	Herbert, Dennis (Hertford, Watford)
Agg-Gardner. Rt. Hon. Sir James T.	Cope, Major William	Herbert, S (York, N. R., Scar. & Wh'by)
Alexander, E. E, (Leyton)	Courtauld, Major J. S.	Hoare, Lt.-Col. Rt. Hon. Sir S. J. G.
Alexander, Sir wm. (Glasgow, Cenf't)	Courthope, Lieut.-Col. Sir George L.	Hogg, Rt. Hon. Sir D. (St. Merylebone)
Allen, J. Sandeman (L'pool, W. Derby)	Cowan, Sir Wm. Henry (Islington, N.)	Holland, Sir Arthur
Amery, Rt. Hon. Leopold C. M. S.	Craig, Ernest (Chester, Crewe)	Holt, Capt. H. P.
Applin, Colonel R. V. K.	Craik, Rt. Hon. Sir Henry	Hopkins. J. W. W.
Apsley, Lord	Croft, Brigadier-General Sir H.	Hopkinson, A. (Lancaster, Mossley)
Ashley, Lt.-Col. Rt. Hon. Wilfrid W.	Crookshank, Cpt. H. (Lindsey, Gainsbro)	Howard, Captain Hon. Donald
Ashmead-Bartlett. S.	Cunliffe, Joseph Herbert	Hudson, Capt. A. U. M.(Hackney, N.)
Astor, Maj. Hon. John J.(Kent, Dover)	Curtis-Bennett, Sir Henry	Hudson, R. S. (Cumberl'nd, Whiteh'n)
Atholl, Duchess of	Curzon, Captain Viscount	Hume, Sir G. H.
Baldwin, Rt. Hon. Stanley	Davidson, J. (Hertf'd. Hemel Hempst'd)	Huntingfield, Lord
Balfour, George (Hampstead)	Davies, Dr. Vernon	Hutchison, G. A. Clark (Midl'n & P'bl's)
Barclay-Harvey, C. M.	Davies, Maj. Geo. F. (Somerset, Yeovil)	Inskip, Sir Thomas Walker H.
Barnett, Major Sir Richard	Dawson, Sir Philip	Jackson. Lieut.-Colonel Hon. F. S.
Barnston, Major Sir Harry	Dean, Arthur Wellesley	James, Lieut.-Colonel Hon. Cuthbart
Benn, Sir A. S. (Plymouth, Drake)	Eden, Captain Anthony	Jones, G. W. H. (Stoke Newington)
Betterton, Henry B.	Edmonson, Major A, J.	Joynson-Hicks, Rt. Hon. Sir William
Birchall, Major J. Dearman	Edwards, John H. (Accrington)	Kennedy, A. R. (Preston).
Bird, E. R. (Yorks, W. R., Skipton)	Elliot, Captain Walter E.	King, Captain Henry Douglas
Blades, Sir George Rowland	Elveden, Viscount	Kinloch Cooke, Sir Clement
Blundell, F. N.	Erskine, Lord (Somerset, Weston-s.-M.)	Lamb, J. Q.
Bourne, Captain Robert Croft	Falie, Sir Bertram G.	Leigh, Sir John (Clapham)
Bowater, Sir T. Vansittart	Falls, Sir Charles F.	Lister, Cunliffe-, Rt. Hon. Sir Philip
Bowyer, Capt. G. E. W.	Fanshawe, Commander G. D.	Lloyd, Cyril E. (Dudley)
Boyd-Carpenter, Major A.	Ford, P. J.	Locker-Lampson, G. (Wood Green)
Brassey, Sir Leonard	Fremantie, Lieut.-Colonel Francis E.	Loder, I. de V.
Bridgeman, Rt. Hon. William Clive	Galbraith, J. F. W.	Looker, Herbert William
Briscoe, Richard George	Ganzoni, sir John	Luce, Maj.-Gen. Sir Richard Harman
Brocklebank, C. E. R.	Gates, Percy	Lumley, L. R.
Brooke, Brigadier-General C. R. I.	Gee, Captain R.	Macdonald, R. (Glasgow, Cathcart)
Buckingham, Sir H.	Gilmour, Lt.-Col. Rt. Hon. Sir John	McDonnell, Colonel Hon. Angus
Bull, Rt. Hon. Sir William James	Glyn, Major R. G. C.	McLean, Major A.
Bullock, Captain M.	Goff, Sir Park	Macmillan, Captain H.
Burgoyne, Lieut.-Colonel Sir Alan	Gower, Sir Robert	Macnaghten, Hon. Sir Malcolm
Burney, Lieut.-Com. Charles D.	Greene, W. P. Crawford	McNeiil, Rt. Hon. Ronald John
Butler, Sir Geoffrey	Greenwood, Rt. Hn. Sir H.(W'th's'w, E)	Macquisten, F. A.
Butt, Sir Alfred	Gretton, Colonel John	Maitland. Sir Arthur D. Steel-
Cadogan, Major Hon. Edward	Guinness, Rt. Hon. Walter E.	Makins, Brigadier-General E.
Campbell, E. T.	Gunston, Captain D. W.	Malone, Major P. B.
Cayzer, Sir C. (Chester, City)	Hacking, Captain Douglas H.	Margesson, Captain D.
Cazalet, Captain Victor A.	Hall, Vice-Admiral Sir R. (Eastbourne)	Merriman, F. B.
Cecil, Rt. Hon. Sir Evelyn (Aston)	Hammersley, S. S.	Meyer, Sir Frank
Cecil, Rt. Hon. Lord H. (Ox. Univ.)	Hanbury, C.	Mitchell, W. Foot (Saffron Walden)
Chadwick, Sir Robert Burton	Harrison, G. J. C.	Mitchell, Sir W. Lane (Streatham)
Charters, Brigadier-General J.	Hartington, Marquess of	Mond, Rt. Hon. Sir Alfred
Christie, J. A.	Harvey, G, (Lambeth, Kennington)	Moore, Lieut.-Colonel T. C. R. (Ayr)
Churchill, Rt. Hon. Winston Spencer	Harvey, Major S. E. (Devon, Totnes)	Moreing, Captain A. H.
Churchman, Sir Arthur C.	Hawke, John Anthony	Morris, R. H.
Clarry, Reginald George	Headlam, Lieut.-Colonel C. M.	Murchison, C. K.
Clayton, G. C.	Henderson, Capt. R. R.(Oxf'd, Henley)	Nail, Lieut.-Colonel Sir Joseph
Cobb, Sir Cyril	Henderson, Lieut.-Col. V. L. (Bootle)	Neville, R. J.
Cochrane, Commander Hon. A. D.	Heneage, Lieut.-Colonel Arthur P.	Newman, Sir R. H. S. D. L. (Exeter)
Cockerill, Brigadier-General G. K	Henn, Sir Sydney H.	Nicholson, O. (Westminster)
Cohen, Major J. Brunei	Hennessy, Major J. R. G.	Nield, Rt. Hon. Sir Herbert
Nuttall, Ellis	Samuel, A. M. (Surrey, Farnham)	Tryon, Rt. Hon, George Clement
Oakley, T.	Samuel, Samuel (W' dsworth, Putney)	Vaughan-Morgan, Col. K. P.
O'Connor, T. J. (Bedford, Luton)	Sandeman, A. Stewart	Wallace, Captain D. E.
O'Connor, Thomas P.	Sanderson, Sir Frank	Ward, Lt.-Col. A.L.(Kingston-on-Hull)
Oman, Sir Charles William C	Sandon, Lord	Warner, Brigadier-General W. W.
Ormsby-Gore, Hon. William	Sassoon, Sir Philip Albert Gustave D.	Warrender, Sir Victor
Pennefather, Sir John	Savery, S. S.	Watts, Dr. T.
Penny, Frederick George	Shaw, R. G. (Yorks, W. R. Sowerby)	Wells, S. R.
Percy, Lord Eustace (Hastings)	Shaw, Capt. W. W. (Wills, Westh'y)	White, Lieut.-Colonel G. Dairymple)
Perring, William George	Sheffield, Sir Berkeley	Williams, C. P. (Denbigh, Wrexham)
Philipson, Mabel	Sketton, A. N.	Wilson, R. R. (Stafford, Lichfield)
Pilcher, G.	Smith-Carington, Neville W.	Winby, Colonel L. P.
Pilditch, Sir Philip	Smithers, Waldron	Winterton, Rt. Hon. Earl
Power, Sir John Cecil	Somerville, A. A. (Windsor)	wise, Sir Fredric
Pownall, Lieut.-Colonel Assheton	Stanley, Lord (Fylde)	Wolmer, Viscount
Ramsden, E.	Stott, Lieut.-Colonel W. H.	Womersley, W. J.
Reid, Capt. A. S. C. (Warrington)	Streatfeild, Captain S. R.	Wood B. C. (Somerset, Bridgwater)
Remer, J. R.	Stuart, Crichton-, Lord C.	Wood, E. (Chet'r, Stalyb'ge & Hyde)
Rentoul, G. S.	Stuart, Hon. J. (Moray and Nairn)	Wood, Sir Kingsley (Woolwich, W.).
Rhys, Hon. C. A. U.	Sueter, Rear-Admiral Murray Fraser	Woodcock, Colonel H. C.
Rice, Sir Frederick	Tasker, Major R. Inigo
Ruggles-Brise, Major E. A.	Thomson, F. C. (Aberdeen, South)	TELLERS FOR THE AYES—
Russell, Alexander West (Tynemouth)	Thomson, Rt. Hon. Sir W. Mitchell.	Commander B. Eyres Monsell and
Rye, F. Q.	Tinne, J. A.	Colonel Gibbs.
Salmon, Major I.	Titchfield, Major the Marquess of
NOES.
Benn, Captain Wedgwood (Leith)	Garro-Jones, Captain G. M.	TELLERS FOR THE NOES.—
Fenby, T. D.	Harris, Percy A.	Mr. MacKenzie Livingstone and Lieut.-Commander Kenworthy.

Question put, and agreed to.

Resolved, That this House approves the action taken By the representatives of His Majesty's Government at Geneva in accepting the award of the Council of the League of Nations on the Iraq boundary.