GREECE AND TURKEY. (Hansard, 13 June 1921)

§ Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY
I rise to take this opportunity—for there are few opportunities in this House of raising matters of the greatest public importance—of asking the Leader of the House or other Minister if they have any information in regard to the situation in Asia Minor, particularly Turkey in Asia. I refer, of course, to the fact of the hostilities between Greece and Turkey. I wish very briefly to lay before the House the reasons why this matter should be settled as soon as possible, and why the Government should strain every nerve to bring about peace at the earliest possible moment. The question seems to me to fall under three particular heads. In the first place it is the fact that the hostilities between Turkey and Greece are most injurious to British trade. I can well remember the time when the Port of 182 Smyrna was full of British ships. Anatolia was the great market for British goods, particularly textiles, and there was the transport of all sorts of agricultural machinery and so on, and particularly textiles. To-day, owing to the effect of the fighting, and also the state of uncertainty, trade obviously is almost impossible. In the few districts where the Kemelists have restored tranquillity, owing to our dubious attitude during the last eighteen months, they are refusing British merchants to land, or British ships to approach their coast. Therefore from what I call the lowest point of view these questions are of tremendous importance to us.
Might I say in passing that those politicians in this country, and in this House, who look to a great Hellenic Empire being established in Asia Minor seem to forget that the Greek merchants consistently undersell and outwit our own merchants in Turkey and Greece; our trade has suffered in the past from their depredations, and is likely to do so in the future? On the other hand, our trade in relation to the Turks, and the inhabitants of Turkey in Asia, has been good in the past, and extraordinarily valuable to this country. From that point of view alone it would not be an unmixed blessing by any means if Greece was turned out of Asia Minor. There is another point, and that is the danger of Great Britain being drawn into this struggle and further expenditure being incurred. We have at Constantinople a small garrison, and we have other posts, I believe, in various places along the shores of the Sea of Marmora. The possibility may arise any day, in fact it has already arisen, of these posts being seriously menaced by the Kemalist forces. Obviously they will have to be supported, and possibly reinforced, and then withdrawn in the face of hostile forces and possibly with great loss. In any case the situation is full of menace, the papers are talking about a new war, but it is a war that has continued ever since the Armistice, and the longer it continues the greater the menace. This is no time to embark upon new expenditure.

§ Mr. STURROCK
I beg to call attention to the fact that 40 Members are not present.

§ Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY
I quite appreciate the kindly thought of the 183 hon. Member for Montrose Burghs (Mr. Sturrock), and I shall probably have an opportunity of returning his compliment when he finds himself in a similar position to that in which I am now placed.

§ Captain ELLIOT
Is this not rather ungracious on the part of the hon. and gallant Member, because if we had not kept a House for him he would not have been able to make his speech?

§ Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER
The hon. Member may argue that point as a matter of taste, but not as a matter of Order.

§ Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY
Then there is the question of humanity involved. The Kemalists must be badly supplied with medicines and drugs of all sorts, and we know how British prisoners suffered from this cause. I think the Noble Lord the Member for Hastings (Lord E. Percy) might consider that aspect of the matter. The sanitary conditions behind the Turkish front must of necessity be very serious in a wild country like Anatolia. The world is absolutely sick of all this fighting. We cannot point to one good result of all the fighting we have had for the last seven years. These two peoples are now locked in deadly struggle in Asia. I have asked repeatedly since we assembled what steps the Government were taking to bring an end to this state of affairs, and the answer has always been that the Greeks and the Turks are being left to fight this matter out. I submit that without covert promises and some measure of moral support the Greeks would not have persisted with this policy, and that support, I believe, comes from this country.
The French and the Italians are opposed to Greek imperialism in Asia Minor. The Italians have withdrawn their troops from Adana, and they are in a position of great favour and friendship with the Turks themselves, and the Turkish merchants and business men are benefiting accordingly. I think it is time that we took a leaf out of the Italians' book. I think we should be well advised to withdraw our garrisons from Constantinople. We may not be able to withdraw all the naval squadrons, but they should be cut down as low as possible. After all, we are the rulers of the greatest number of Moslems of any 184 country in the world. Again, I wish to reiterate what I believe is the determination of the people of this country not to be drawn into any further squabbles in Asia Minor, and for these reasons I think I am justified in asking for further information from the Government.

§ Colonel WEDGWOOD
For once I find myself not in complete agreement with my hon. and gallant Friend who has just spoken. It is somewhat a matter of indifference to me whether the Greeks and the Turks are cutting each other's throat. My feeling in the matter is that I do not want them to start cutting the throats of our troops. The British Army on the eastern side of the Bosphorus runs the risk of being mixed up with these squabbles in Asia Minor. The Greeks, in spite of the assistance of King Constantine, may find themselves engaged in actual warfare with the Turks without the Government in Downing Street being able to interfere or enter into the argument at all. So long as the Greeks were in any way our Allies, and so long as they were guided by M. Venizelos, there was a certain amount of community of interests between us and the Greeks, but I do not think there is one man in a million now who would give to King Constantine either moral or material support in this trouble. It would be intensely unpopular in this country if in any way we were involved in this struggle in Asia Minor side by side with the Greeks against the Turks. It has got to be recognised that King Constantine, being so closely connected with the Hohenzollerns and the sympathies of the common people of England, at any rate, being distinctly hostile to that Royal House, we will not support him, morally or materially, in his fight against the Turks. This is no new feeling. Another consideration we have to take into account is, that both the French and the Italians have withdrawn, or undertaken to withdraw, their troops from Asia Minor. We see in to-day's paper that an agreement has been come to between the Kemalists and the French. The Italians have also come to terms. In my opinion discretion would have been the better part of valour, and it would have been wiser for us to follow the example of the French and the Italians by clearing out of that cockpit of Asia, leaving the Greeks and Turks to settle 185 their disputes between themselves. My hon. and gallant Friend alluded to one consideration which does not appear to have been taken into account by the Foreign Office in the moral support they have given to the Greeks. Daily the Government receive agonised entreaties from the Government of India to stop their present conduct towards the Turks and to assist in handing back Smyrna and Thrace to Ottoman rule, so as to assist the work of the authorities of India in dealing with the Khalifat agitation by taking a broad Mussulman attitude in these negotiations. That consideration does not affect the French or the Italians, but it does affect us very much, indeed, and it is an additional reason for prompt consideration on the part of the Government.
As to what can be done in the present situation in Asia Minor, there are three courses only open to the Government. One is to definitely form an alliance with Constantine and to co-operate with our troops in Asia Minor to stiffen the Greek defences on the Isthmian Peninsula. That would be a definite policy, and the War Office would be able to tell the Government how many divisions would be required, while the Government could inform the House how much additional money would be necessary in order to carry out that policy. It is not a policy which I would recommend, but at any rate it is a forcible, determined, and clear policy. The second policy is the one which the Government are following—waiting on events. It is a gambling policy. They do not know from day to day whether the Turks are going to drive back the Greeks or whether the Greeks will succeed in defeating the Turks. But meanwhile they are risking the lives of our men out there. They are courting a disaster which might involve us in an expensive and bloody war far from our base in Asia Minor. It might be a cheaper policy or it might eventually prove a more expensive policy. The third alternative is one which I imagine the hon. Gentleman would follow if he were permitted, and in which he would have the almost unanimous support of the House, as well as the unanimous support of the Government of India. It is to withdraw our troops across the Straits from Constantinople and Thrace, and to induce the Kemalists to agree to the 186 surrender of Smyrna and to the autonomy of Thrace. We have suggested terms to these two combatants which neither of them has accepted. Yet we still have our troops there. I should say we could now bring the necessary pressure to bear by telling the Greeks that unless they consent to these terms and to the surrender of Smyrna and Thrace—unless they agree to meet the Kemalists on these lines, the British forces will be withdrawn from Turkey in Europe and in Asia, as well as from Constantinople. If that pressure was not enough it should be remembered that they owe us very considerable sums of money, and we could make it clear to the Greeks that so long as the Constantine rule continues in that country, and so long as they persist in turning down Venizelos, they can expect no assistance from us. They must first come to terms with the Turks on the lines we have laid down. I cannot understand what madness it is that makes us, both in Constantinople and outside, consistently support a policy which is not ours and which runs counter to the interests of a very large body of British subjects. The situation is daily becoming more acute, and I hope the Government will come to a thoroughly sound decision to withdraw British troops at once unless the Greeks come to terms with the Kemalists.

§ Mr. A. WILLIAMS
It is a great pity that the example of France and what she is doing in Silesia should have been held up by our Government as an example which they ought to follow. What France is doing in Silesia is to clear out of the country and leave the subject races there, whom she had undertaken to defend, to suffer any fate and to be exterminated at the will of the Kemalists. I hope that such an example will never be followed by our Government. We have heard a great deal about this matter this evening, but we have had nothing said with regard to the obligations which we undertook in the War to these subject races. They were our Allies, and they suffered greatly for it. They suffered the most horrible punishment on account of their alliance with us. I sincerely hope that the Government in any policy they may decide to pursue will bear in mind the obligations under which they are to these subject races, and will remember that they have again and again pledged them- 187 selves in express words to see that these people are delivered from the savage tyranny of the Turks, and that they will not simply, because it is more convenient and cheaper, withdraw our troops from Constantinople and leave the Turks once more to lord it in these regions and do what they like with the subject races. That is what this proposal comes to. It might be a cheap policy at the moment, but it would not be honourable and it would not conduce to the prestige or future happiness of this country. On the contrary, I am certain it would mean terrible suffering to these races in the future, terrible expense to ourselves, and the utmost loss of honour to Great Britain.

§ The UNDER-SECRETARY of STATE for FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Mr. Cecil Harmsworth)
I am not quite clear why the hon. and gallant Member (Lieut.-Commander Kenworthy) has raised this question this evening. It is, as the House is aware, an exceedingly delicate question. I do not want, in replying on Foreign Office questions, to insist top often that the occasion is not the most appropriate one for discussing a question of policy, but undoubtedly the situation as between the Greeks and the Kemalists is such that no advantage can be derived at the present moment from its discussion in this House or, I venture to say, in any other Assembly of the Allied and friendly nations.

§ Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY
We have been told that for 18 months.

§ Mr. HARMSWORTH
Yes, but the situation has not always been what it is at present. Such a diversity of opinion has been expressed among the three hon. Gentlemen who have addressed the House that they really have left but little to reply to. It was refreshing to find my two hon. and gallant Friends, for the moment at least, in dissension upon a subject of foreign policy, while the hon. Member (Mr. A. Williams) differs in toto, as I gather, from both of them. It is really wrong to suppose, as my hon. and gallant Friend (Colonel Wedgwood) seems to think, that this matter has only just now, even if it has already, engaged the earnest attention of the Government. My hon. and gallant Friend said, in terms of the utmost solemnity, that the situation really 188 requires prompt attention on the part of the Foreign Office and of His Majesty's Government.

§ Colonel WEDGWOOD
It is getting worse.

§ Mr. HARMSWORTH
My hon. and gallant Friend knows enough about the Foreign Office to be able to assure himself that this subject has engaged the most earnest, and anxious attention of the Department which I have the honour to represent, and of the Government as a whole, for a long time past. It is not necessary for me to remind the House why that should be so. It must be clear to every hon. Member that the settlement sought to be achieved under the Treaty of Sevres is in jeopardy in consequence of recent developments in the Near East. The situation, as my hon. and gallant Friend (Lieut.-Commander Kenworthy) says, is unquestionably full of menace, and I am disposed to agree that in all probability there is a great deal of suffering behind the lines of the Kemalist Army, and generally in the whole theatre of war. But my hon. and gallant Friend should not, I think, have suggested that there has been covert support from this country to the one side or the other. I do not know exactly why the word "covert" should be used, or how it can with propriety be used in a discussion in this House. What does my hon. and gallant Friend mean by "covert support"?

§ Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY
As I am asked, may I say that what I mean is that it has not been divulged to this House or to the public, like many other acts of the Foreign Office or of the Prime Minister's Secretariat in Foreign Affairs.

§ Mr. D. HERBERT
It does not exist.

§ Mr. HARMSWORTH
My hon. Friend behind me gives the only possible answer, namely, that it does not exist.

§ Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY
King Constantine said that he had our moral support.

§ Mr. HARMSWORTH
I am afraid that that saying has not reached me. I do not know whether my hon. and gallant Friend was in the House this afternoon when the Lord Privy Seal replied to certain very searching and direct questions on this very point.

§ Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY
I asked one myself.

§ Mr. HARMSWORTH
I thought so. That makes it all the more surprising to me that my hon. and gallant Friend has raised this question this evening, and that he should suggest, after the statement of the Lord Privy Seal, that there has been any kind of covert support to one side or the other.

§ Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY
I could not get an answer. We were told that there was no financial or military support. I asked whether there were other forms of support besides loans and the supply of munitions or soldiers. I then asked whether there were any other forms of support, and the answer was rather evasive. I make no complaint, because it was a supplementary question.

§ Mr. HARMSWORTH
According to my recollection, the answer given by my right hon. Friend—which I followed, as in duty bound, with the very greatest care—was a most definite statement that His Majesty's Government had observed neutrality throughout these proceedings, which excludes the possibility of the sort of covert assistance to which my hon. and gallant Friend refers; and, moreover, that the Government were engaged, according to the best of their ability and in concurrence with the Allies, in bringing about an accommodation between the contending parties. I should be the last to deprecate any free discussion of foreign policy when that can be conducted without injury to the purpose that we all have at heart. I am not myself in the least in favour of any kind of obscurantist policy in regard to foreign affairs, but I would suggest to my hon. and gallant Friend that nothing is really served by raising a point of this kind in such a Debate as this, especially after the quite categorical assurances given by the Leader of the House this afternoon.