Commons Sitting of 16 July 1912

Preamble
The House met at a Quarter before Three of the Clock, Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair.

PRIVATE BUSINESS.
Christchurch Gas Bill [Lords] (King's Consent signified),
Bill read the third time, and passed, with Amendments.
Herne Bay Gas Bill [Lords],
Read the third time, and passed, with Amendments.
Tees Conservancy Bill [Lords] (King's Consent signified),
Bill read the third time, and passed, with Amendments.
Wakefield Gas Bill [Lords],
Read the third time, and passed, with Amendments.
Sheffield Corporation Bill,
As amended, considered:—
Ordered, That Standing Orders 233 and 243 be suspended, and that the Bill be now read the third time.—[The Chairman of Ways and Means.]
Bill accordingly read the third time, and passed.
Swanage Gas and Water Bill [Lords],
As amended, considered; an Amendment made; Bill to be read the third time.
York United Gas Bill [Lords],
As amended, considered; Amendments made; Bill to be read the third time.
Ericht Water and Electric Power Bill [Lords],
Read a second time, and committed.
London Trust Company Bill [Lords],
Ordered, That Standing Orders 82, 211, and 237 be suspended, and that the Committee on the Bill have leave to sit and proceed on Thursday.—[The Chairman of Ways and Means.]
Norfolk Fisheries Provisional Order Bill (by Order),
Second Reading deferred till Friday.

MESSAGE FROM THE LORDS.
That they have agreed to—
Electric Lighting Provisional Orders (No. 1) Bill,
Military Lands Provisional Order Bill,
Shipley Urban District Council Bill, without Amendment.
Staffordshire Potteries Water Bill,
Gas Companies (Standard Burner) Bill, with Amendments.
Amendments to—
Brighton Corporation Bill [Lords],
Great Central Railway Bill [Lords],
Bawtry and District Gas Bill [Lords],
Hove Corporation Bill [Lords], without Amendment.

SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE ACT (IRELAND), 1877.
Copy presented of Order in Council, dated 8th July, 1912, giving effect to Rules of Court [by Act]; to lie upon the Table.
NATIONAL INSURANCE ACT, 1911, PART I.
Copy presented of Second Report of an Inter-Departmental Committee on Employment under the Crown as affected by Part I. of the National Insurance Act, 1911 [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.
IMPORTS AND EXPORTS AT PRICES OF 1900.
Copy presented of tables showing for each of the years 1900 to 1911 the estimated value of imports and exports of the United Kingdom at the prices prevailing in 1900, with an Introductory Memorandum [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.
TRADE REPORTS (ANNUAL SERIES).
Copies presented of Diplomatic and Consular Reports, Annual Series, Nos. 4900, 4944, to 4940 [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.
SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE ACT (IRELAND), 1877.
Copy presented of Order in Council, dated 8th July, 1912, giving effect to Rules of Court [by Act]; to lie upon the Table.
ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

  Persia.
  Mr. DILLONasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he could state the number and distribution of Russian troops now in Persia?
  The SECRETARY of STATE for FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Sir E. Grey): According to my latest information the total number of Russian troops at present in Persia appears to be some 12,400 men. Of these the greater part are stationed in Azerbaijan and Khorassan.
  Mr. MORRELL: Has any part of the expeditionary force which entered Persia last December yet been withdrawn?
  Sir E. GREY: I must ask for notice of that.
  Mr. DILLONasked whether the Russian Government have demanded from the Government of Persia the addition of 700 men and two Russian officers to the Cossack brigade at Tabriz; and what attitude has the British Government adopted in reference to this demand?
  Sir E. GREY: The Russian Legation requested the formation at Tabriz of a detachment of Persian Cossacks 700 strong with two Russian officers and four non-commissioned officers. The Persian Government have agreed to the request, and no action on the part of His Majesty's Government appears to be called for.
  Colonel YATE: Will the right hon. Gentlemen now apply to the Persian Government for sanction to raise a similar body of Persian troops at Ispahan under British officers for the protection of the trade routes in Southern Persia?
  Sir E. GREY: That is certainly one of the things we should have to consider if order is not restored.
  Sir G. SCOTT ROBERTSONasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether his attention has been drawn to a railway proposed to be built by Russia
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  from Djalfa to Tabriz, independently of the proposed Trans-Persian Railway; whether the Persian Government has sanctioned the construction of such a line;. and, if so, will he support as of right, under the rescript of Shah Nasr-ud-Din, the proposal of an English company to build a railway in South Persia?
  Sir E. GREY: The answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative. I do not, however, know whether the Persian Government have sanctioned the construction of the line in question. As regards the proposal respecting the construction of a line by a British firm in the South, I am already in communication with His Majesty's Minister at Teheran on the subject. If a concession for a railway is given in the North we should, in accordance with the previous undertaking, claim a corresponding concession in the South, but I must point out that a railway from Julfa to Tabriz is not a very extensive project.
  Colonel YATE: May I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether the proposed railway from Julfa to Tabriz is not at least some 80 miles in length, and whether he will now apply to the Persian Government for early sanction to the construction of the Karum Valley Railway in South Persia by a British company?
  Sir E. GREY: The railway would have been about 80 miles in length, and when I said at the end of my answer that that was not a very extensive project, I meant that 80 miles of railway is not a very large affair in Persia. An undertaking that we should have a corresponding concession in the South to any concession in the North, if limited to 80 miles, would not take us very far.

  Panama Canal (British Shipping).
  Mr. KINGasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether friendly representations are being made to the United States Government with the aim of securing generous treatment of such British shipping as will pass through the Panama Canal; and, if so, whether he can make a statement on the subject?
  Sir J. D. REESasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether any discrimination will be exercised against British or Canadian shipping using the Panama Canal; and whether he can make any statement on the subject to the House?
  Sir E. GREY: Article 3, paragraph 1, of the terms of the Treaty between this country and the United States, signed at Washington on 18th November, 1901, stipulates that the Panama Canal shall be free and open to the vessels of commerce and of war of all nations observing these rules (that is, the Suez Canal Rules) on terms of entire equality, so that there shall be no discrimination against any such nation or its citizens or subjects, in respect of the conditions or charges of traffic or otherwise. As it appeared to His Majesty's Government that some of the provisions of a Bill now before the Senate would not be consistent with this Article of the Treaty, they have thought it right to point out this objection to the Government of the United States, that it may be taken into account while the Bill is under consideration.

  Congo State.
  Sir GILBERT PARKERasked whether His Majesty's Government has recently received complaints from British subjects in the Katanga region of the Congo State regarding their treatment by Belgian officials; whether His Majesty's Government are now represented in the Katanga by a Consular Agent; and whether the Union of South Africa is also represented in that region?
  Sir E. GREY: A memorial was received on 27th April from certain British merchants at Elizabethville regarding the treatment of British subjects there, and the Vice-Consul has been instructed to furnish a report on the subject. His Majesty's Government are, and have been for some years, represented by a salaried Vice-Consul in the Katanga; the Union of South Africa are not separately represented there.
  Mr. FELL: Shall we see these Reports from the Vice-Consul in due course?
  Sir E. GREY: I should like to see them first, before I give any undertaking.

  INDIA

    COCAINE AND MORPHIA.
    Sir J. D. REESasked the Undersecretary of State for India whether he can give the House any information regarding the action taken to restrict the consumption of cocaine and morphia and their respective congeners in India; and whether the Powers concerned have accepted the recommendations of The Hague Convention in this behalf?
    The UNDER-SECRETARY of STATE for INDIA (Mr. Montagu): With a view to control the use of morphia and cocaine in India, their importation by post is altogether prohibited, and their importation by other means is severely restricted, and is limited to persons holding permits issued by prescribed authorities. The manufacture of morphia from licit opium by private persons is prohibited, and the amount of morphia which a private person may possess is limited. Transport from place to place is carefully regulated, as is also sale, both wholesale and retail. As regards cocaine its sale is restricted to chemists and druggists holding licences, and sale by them to private persons must be for bonà fide medicinal purposes and on the prescription of a qualified medical practitioner. The Hague Convention has not yet been ratified by the Powers.
    Sir J. D. REES: Are these measures effective?
    Mr. MONTAGU: I think so.

    DALAI LAMA.
    Sir J. D. REESasked whether the Secretary of State for India has any information as to the massacre of the Dalai Lama's envoys to Lhasa and of the Dalai Lama's return to India?
    Mr. MONTAGU: The Secretary of State has received no information confirming the rumour referred to by the hon. Member. The Dalai Lama is still proceeding towards Lhasa.

    ECCLESIASTICAL DIVISIONS.
    Sir J. D. REESasked whether the Government of India has any intention of rearranging the ecclesiastical divisions of India, or of making Delhi the seat of the Metropolitan?
    Mr. MONTAGU: The Government of India has made no recommendations on the subject.

  BRITISH ARMY.

    EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.
    Sir SAMUEL SCOTTasked the Secretary of State for War whether the duty of providing men to meet the wastage of war in the Expeditionary Force will fall upon the Special Reserve?
    The SECRETARY of STATE for WAR (Colonel Seely): Yes, Sir. The wastage will be met partly from the Regulars and

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    Regular Reserve left behind on the departure of the force and partly from the Special Reserve.
    Sir SAMUEL SCOTTasked the Secretary of State for War if he will state what number of officers it is proposed to take from the Special Reserves to make up the complement required for the Expeditionary Force on mobilisation?
    Colonel SEELY: As I have already explained to the House, I do not think it is advisable to make public figures regarding the composition of the Expeditionary Force.

    BAYONETS.
    Mr. JAMES HOPEasked whether, in the event of an increased demand for bayonets for the Army, private firms will be invited to tender for some portion at least of the increased number required?
    The FINANCIAL SECRETARY to the WAR OFFICE (Mr. Harold Baker): Should there be a recurrence of the circumstances in which private firms have in the past been invited to tender for bayonets, I know of no reason why similar invitations should not be issued to them in the future; but under present conditions it is unlikely that further considerable quantities of bayonets will be required.
    Mr. JAMES HOPE: May I ask for some more definite assurance that some part of the work will be given to private firms?
    Mr. H. BAKER: I have given the hon. Gentleman a very full answer. I know of no reason to suppose that if the weapons are required the previous practice will not be reverted to.

    COMPULSORY SERVICE (TERRITORIAL FORCE).
    MARQUESS of TULLIBARDINEasked the Secretary of State for War whether it is to be understood that owing to the imminence of war it is his policy to defer the question of compulsory service in the Territorial Forces, in which he believes, until after such war and possible disaster to our forces?
    Colonel SEELY: I am at a loss to understand the meaning of the Noble Lord's question.
    MARQUESS of TULLIBARDINE: May I ask if the right hon. Gentleman, or someone else—whether, indeed, it has not been stated—that it is extremely desirable that it should be obligatory upon every male in this country to learn the use of arms?
    Colonel SEELY: I think that point would be more suitable for debate. What I may have said ten years ago is a matter that I shall be very glad to deal with at the proper time. Nothing in the question bears any relation to views I have expressed at any time.

    AEROPLANE VISION.
    MARQUESS Of TULLIBARDINEasked the Secretary of State for War (16) whether in the official estimate that at a height of 5,000 feet in an aeroplane one can get a vision over 10,000 square miles he included normal weather; if so, will he inquire from the meteorological experts upon how many days during the last twelve months it would have been possible in the North Sea to see the distance indicated; (17) whether in the official estimate that at a normal height of 4,000 feet to 6,000 feet an aeroplane can obtain a vision over 10,000 square miles he based his calculations upon actual practical experiment or upon theoretical calculation of the earth's surface; if the former, upon what dates and by whom were the experiments made, and how many days in the year is it estimated that the meteorological conditions will be such as to allow approaching ships to be seen at such a distance; and what warning in point of time would an aeroplane be able to give of a raid timed to arrive at dawn after a dark night?
    Colonel SEELY: The distance of the visible horizon at sea on a clear day from an observer at a height of 5,000 feet, allowing for normal refraction at midday, is, I am informed, 93½ miles; the area under observation would thus be approximately 27,500 square miles.
    MARQUESS of TULLIBARDINE: May I ask if, as the right hon. Gentleman is going on theory only, if the statement made by him the other day that you could see 10,000 square miles, does not, if you adopt his formula, only include half of the horizon, and is it correct to include the question of refraction, which ought surely to be discounted on the basis of his calculation?
    Colonel SEELY: I have given what I think is a very full reply. I have referred to the experts at the Admiralty and elsewhere in order to verify the figures, and I think the Noble Lord will find them accurate.

    CAVALRY UNITS.
    Sir REGINALD POLE-CAREWasked whether an increase of fifty horses per Cavalry unit was recommended by a Cavalry Advisory Committee; whether that number was reduced by the Army Council to twenty; and whether the Treasury have yet sanctioned the smaller number?
    Colonel SEELY: The increase recommended by the Committee was forty horses per regiment. For various reasons it was found necessary to proceed by instalments, and provision was made in the Estimates for twenty horses per regiment this year. The recommendations in the Report of this Committee, which deals with various matters, have not yet come before the Treasury.

    WAR STRENGTH.
    Sir REGINALD POLE-CAREWasked the Secretary of State for War if he can state how many batteries of horse, field, and heavy Artillery in this country are now actually ready to take the field with their full complement of guns at war strength; how many guns are temporarily disabled in consequence of portions of their mechanism or fittings being out of repair; how many units in the Army at Home have their full complement of machine guns, range-finders, signalling apparatus, and field telephones; and how many of these machine guns and instruments are temporarily disabled?
    Colonel SEELY: To obtain the information required it would be necessary to call for detailed returns from all commands. I can, however, assure the hon. and gallant Gentleman that there is sufficient material in equipments or in reserve to replace temporary disablement. The only portion of the equipment mentioned which is not fully supplied is the new one-man range finder, which is being gradually introduced to replace the old pattern.

    QUAHTERMASTERS (ADDITIONAL PENSIONS).
    Captain GILMOURasked if it is intended to extend the privileges of the additional pension granted to quartermasters of the Regular Forces to those quarter masters of the Territorial Forces now paid by the county associations; and, if so, under what conditions?
    Mr. H. BAKER: The reply is in the negative.

    SPECIAL RESERVE.
    Mr. HUNTasked the Secretary of State for War whether, in view of the fact that the Special Reserve are a part of the Army, he will in future arrange that the average age, height, minimum and maximum chest measurement, range of expansion, and weight of recruits for the Special Reserve shall be given in the Annual Report on the health of the Army?
    Colonel SEELY: I regret that I can add nothing to the reply which I gave to the hon. Gentleman in answer to similar questions put on 7th March, 22nd April, and 7th May.
    Mr. HUNT: Why, if the Special Reserve is part of the Army, are they treated differently? What can possibly be the difficulty of doing what I ask if the men's measurements are put down when they are measured by the medical officers; is not the present method followed to make us think that the physique of these soldiers—
    Mr. SPEAKER: The hon. Member is making a speech.

    AGE OF RECRUITS.
    Mr. HUNTasked the Secretary of State for War if he will state how many of the 88,000 men taken for military training in the United Kingdom in 1910 were under the age of nineteen?
    Colonel SEELY: The figures, which can only be calculated approximately, amount to about 52,000.
    Mr. HUNT: Are we to understand that these boys are supposed to be able to carry a full kit of 59 lbs., march several miles, and fight at the end of the march?
    Colonel SEELY: I know a great many of the men under nineteen years of age who are fully fit to carry any load and then, if necessary, fight.
    Viscount HELMSLEY: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that a great many of these recruits look like boys of thirteen and fourteen; what steps are taken to verify the age given?
    Colonel SEELY: Every stop is taken to see that we do not enlist boys who state their age wrongly, and very strong action is taken where such mistakes occur. What I was asked was as to persons under nineteen. I do not call such a person a boy.
    MARQUESS of TULLIBARDINE: How many of these 55,000 young gentlemen would form part of the Expeditionary Force?
    Colonel SEELY: Such as are sufficiently old and strong to take part in it.
    MARQUESS of TULLIBARDINE: These young men of nineteen—
    Mr. SPEAKER: May I remind the Noble Lord that we shall be in Committee of Supply on the Army Estimates in a few moments.

    PROPOSED PARLIAMENTARY VISIT.
    Mr. HUNTasked the Secretary of State for War whether, in view of the fact that the First Lord of the Admiralty has arranged and carried out an inspection by Members of Parliament of our ships-of-war in fighting trim, he will let the Members of Parliament see ten battalions of Regular Infantry, ten battalions of the Special Reserve, and ten of the Territorial Force, all to be chosen by lot, and the men to carry full field-service equipment of 50½ pounds in weight, march ten miles, and then go through tactical exercises?
    Colonel SEELY: The suggestion of the hon. Gentleman will be borne in mind.

    MILITARY FARMS.
    Mr. BUTCHERasked the Secretary of State for War whether he will give the particulars of the grass farms acquired by the Government for the breeding or keeping of horses for military purposes; and will he state where the farms are situated, the acreage of each farm, and the number of the horses on each farm?
    Colonel SEELY: No grass farms have been acquired for the breeding of horses. As regards the keeping of horses for military purposes, in addition to the existing Army remount depots, a grass farm at Witley has been presented to the Government by Mr. Pinckard for twenty-one years at a peppercorn rent. The farm is about 150 acres in extent, and can accomdate 150 horses for short periods. Negotiations are pending for extending the system.
    Mr. BUTCHER: What about the number of the horses?
    Colonel SEELY: I should like to have notice as to the precise number.
    Mr. BUTCHER: It is in my question.
    Colonel SEELY: I will reply to that tomorrow or Monday if the hon. Member will put a question down.

    CENSUS OF HORSES.
    Mr. BUTCHERasked the Secretary of State for War whether he will state what steps have been taken in compiling the census of horses taken by remount officers to ascertain the prices to be paid for such horses in the event of their being taken for Army purposes; and whether such prices have been arrived at after communication with the owners of the horses; and, if not, whether the owners have been informed of such prices?
    Colonel SEELY: The price to be paid for horses taken for Army purposes on mobilisation will be the value of the animal according to the market price prevailing at that time. Should an owner object to the price tendered he has a right under Section 115 (4) Army Act to have the price determined by a county court judge.
    Mr. BUTCHER: Will the right hon. Gentleman answer my question, namely, what steps are being taken now to ascertain the prices, in order that the prices paid eventually shall not be grossly in excess of the ordinary prices paid for the horses?
    Colonel SEELY: I have given a very full answer to the hon. Gentleman. I can add nothing to it. What I state has been the law for many years, and we do not propose to alter it. We rely upon it to see that we do not pay too much or too little.
    Mr. RUPERT GWYNNE: Will the War Office see that the county court judges are equipped with the necessary knowledge?

    PURFLEET WHARF STORAGE MAGAZINE.
    Mr. HUDSONasked the First Lord of the Admiralty how long the storage magazine for explosives at Purfleet Wharf has been built; what was the cost of building it; and whether it is in good condition?
    Colonel SEELY: This magazine was originally built in 1763, but the cost is unknown. I am informed that the present magazine is in excellent condition.
    Mr. HUDSONasked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether a barge containing cordite grounded on an old pile stump or other obstruction at the Purfleet magazine wharf a short time ago, thereby causing the barge to leak and wet the bottom

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    layer of boxes of cordite; whether the boxes of wet cordite were stacked on the top of boxes of dry cordite; and has he received any Report with regard to the magazines, as to whether they are damp or dry, and the condition of the cordite stored in them?
    Colonel SEELY: Nothing is known of the occurrences mentioned in the first three parts of the question. No special report has been received as regards these magazines. They are, however, stated to be dry. The cordite stored in them is reported to be in a serviceable condition.

    Customs and Excise (Receipts).
    Mr. GRANTasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if it is with the sanction of the Treasury that subordinate officials in the Customs and Excise Department demand signed receipts from members of the public for money due to them before the money has been actually received; and, if this is so, on what grounds members of the public are required to thus sign false statements?
    The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER (Mr. Lloyd George): I understand that the practice of asking for an anticipatory receipt for payment in connection with the Customs and Excise Revenues is one of very long standing, and I believe it prevails in other Departments also. If the hon. Member can inform me of any case in which the practice has given rise to inconvenience I will inquire further.

    Housing Acts (Monmouthshire).
    Sir IVOR HERBERTasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether, in considering the question of the powers of the Public Works Loan Commissioners with reference to advances for the building of workmen's dwellings under the Housing Acts, the Government will make special inquiry into the conditions existing in the Sirhowy Valley of Monmouthshire, and into the cases which have arisen therein that have formed the subject of applications to the Commissioners?
    Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: In their consideration of the general question of these advances, the Government will not fail to take account of individual instances such as that to which my hon. and gallant Friend draws attention.

    Finance Act, 1909–10 (Land Valuation).
    Mr. FELLasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he is aware that in numerous cases the valuation forms Tinder the Land Clauses of the Finance (1909–10) Act, 1910, were returned by the recipients duly filled up in the month of September, 1910, that no acknowledgment has been received for these forms, nor has any step been taken to carry out the valuations; and if, under the circumstances, the owners may consider that the proposed valuation has been abandoned?
    Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: Owing to the great number of valuations to be made under Part I. of the Finance (1909–10) Act, 1910, the conditions mentioned by the hon. Member do in many cases exist. He must, however, be aware from statements made frequently in this House that it was never contemplated that the valuation would be completed in less than five years, of which period more than half has still to run. The answer to the last part of the question is, of course, in the negative.
    Mr. FELL: If in any ordinary business transaction you heard nothing about it for two years would you not consider the transaction at an end?
    Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: If the transaction was to be over a period of five years I should not.
    Captain CLIVE: Does the right hon. Gentleman expect it to be completed in five years?
    Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: Yes, I think so.
    Mr. FELLasked who will pay the extra expense that will be thrown upon landowners in proving the value of their land under the Finance (1909–10) Act, 1910, owing to the delay of the Government in having the valuations made in a reasonable time?
    Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: The general valuation of land under Part I. is proceeding as rapidly as possible and I do not anticipate that extra expense will be thrown upon landowners owing to the period which may elapse before particular valuations are made.
    Mr. FELL: Is it not a fact that it must necessarily be more difficult to prove the value after three years than if it was done at the time?
    Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: I do not think so, I think they have a complete record of the position at the time.
    Mr. FRED HALL: When is the whole valuation likely to be completed?
    Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: I have already answered that question.
    Viscount HELMSLEY: What does the right hon. Gentleman mean by the completion of the valuation?
    Mr. SPEAKER: Any further questions should be put down.

    Land Values Committee.
    Mr. HUNTasked whether the members on the new Land Committee own or occupy a considerable amount of land; and whether he can say about how many acres are owned or occupied by the member owning or occupying the largest quantity of land, and how many acres by the member owning or occupying the smallest amount of land?
    Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: No, Sir. I have made no inquiries as to the amount of land owned by these gentlemen.
    Mr. HUNT: How are people who neither own or occupy land to know anything about the conditions of land? What is the use of putting people to do that sort of job who do not know anything about it?
    Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: I did not say that people who do not own land do not know anything about it.
    Mr. HUNT: Does the right hon. Gentleman know anything about those people; he does not seem to know whether they own land or not.
    Mr. FRED HALLasked if the right hon. Gentleman's attention has been called to the formation of a second committee composed of Members of Parliament supporting the present Government with the object of advancing the acquisition of land by the central government and local authorities; if this committee was also formed with his sanction; and whether, as statements are being made throughout the country as to the intention of the Government to deal with the whole question of land tenure, he will inform the House what are the Government's proposals in the matter, so that Members of all sections of the House may be in a position to deal authoritatively with this subject?
    The SECRETARY of STATE for the HOME DEPARTMENT (Mr. McKenna, for the Prime Minister): I know nothing of this Committee which has been formed quite independently, and without any consultation with me. Any proposals which the Government may have to make will be announced in due course and on their own responsibility, but not (as I have already said) in the present Session.
    Mr. FRED HALL: May I draw the right hon. Gentleman's attention to the reply given by the Prime Minister a short time ago—
    Mr. SPEAKER: If the hon. Member has anything further to say he must put it interrogatively.

    FOOT-AND-MOUTH DISEASE.
    Sir JOHN SPEARasked the President of the Board of Agriculture if he will say what steps he is taking, in view of the prevalence of foot-and-mouth disease, anthrax, abortion, and red-water fever in cattle and swine fever in pigs in this country, to extend and promote scientific research, with a view to more successfully combating these diseases?
    The UNDER-SECRETARY of STATE for INDIA (Mr. Montagu, for Mr. Runciman): It is impossible within the limits of an answer to a question to give the hon. Member full information as to the work which is being done in the direction he suggests, but my right hon. Friend hopes that the following summary will be sufficient for his purpose: A Scientific Commission will leave England early in the autumn to study foot-and-mouth disease in India. My right hon. Friend does not think that anthrax requires any further scientific investigation, as its causes and the means by which it is spread are well known; the difficulty of dealing with this disease is rather administrative, and the question whether it is possible and desirable to take any administrative action is engaging my attention. A Departmental Committee on epizootic abortion has already issued two Reports and two Appendices, and is still sitting; the possibility of immunising cattle against this disease is under consideration. Much experimental work in connection with red-water fever has been carried out at the Board's laboratory with successful results, and preparations are in progress for continuing the inquiry; if the hon. Member would care to visit the Board's laboratory the officer in charge would be very glad

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    to receive him and to show him what is being done. With regard to swine fever, my right hon. Friend would refer the hon. Member to the Interim Report (Part I.) of the Departmental Committee.
    Mr. HICKS BEACH: Can the hon. Gentleman give us the names of the Commissioners who will go out to India to consider this question of foot-and-mouth disease?
    Mr. MONTAGU: I will inform my right hon. Friend that the hon. Gentleman has put that supplementary question.
    Mr. LARDNERasked how many out breaks of foot-and-mouth disease have occurred in Great Britain and Ireland, respectively, during the last ten years; what the duration of the outbreaks was in each case; and how often it was found necessary to close British ports against the reception of Irish cattle during the continuance of the outbreaks?
    Mr. MONTAGU: In Great Britain, one outbreak occurred in 1902, three in 1908, two in 1910, and nineteen last year. No outbreak occurred in Ireland during the same period. As regards the duration of the outbreaks in each case, perhaps the hon. Member will allow me to refer him to the Annual Reports presented to Parliament, which contain full information on the subject. It was not found necessary to close British ports against Irish cattle during the period named.
    Mr. PETO: Would the hon. Gentleman say whether there are any precautions taken by the Irish Board of Agriculture against the importation of cattle and sheep into Ireland not taken by the English Board of Agriculture?
    Mr. SPEAKER: The hon. Member must give notice. He can hardly expect the Under-Secretary for India to know these things.
    Mr. LARDNERasked whether cattle imported to Great Britain from Canada and South America and dealt with at British ports under the conditions set out in the Foreign Animals Order have been inspected for disease before embarkation at the American and Canadian ports; or whether his Department have any means of ascertaining the health of these cattle until the moment of their landing on British soil?
    Mr. MONTAGU: Cattle are officially inspected before exportation from Canada, the United States of America, Argentina, and Uruguay. The hon. Member is probably aware that the importation of cattle into the United Kingdom from the various South American countries is at present prohibited.
    Mr. LARDNERasked under what circumstances two lots of cattle exported from Ireland by a Mr. William Quaid, on the 18th June last, have been kept in quarantine, one lot at Aberdeen and the other at Ulverston; by what authority he was deprived of the control of his beasts; and will he state whether either of these places is within a scheduled area, at whose costs the cattle are being maintained, and how long it is proposed to continue the quarantine?
    Mr. MONTAGU: The cattle in question appear to have been detained, not in pursuance of an Order of the Board, but by the local authority acting in the exercise of the powers conferred upon them by Article 6 of the Foot-and-Mouth Disease Order of 1895. I am informed that the cattle will be released to-day, in both cases, if they are found to be free from disease.

  PORT OF LONDON (STRIKE).

    RESUMPTION OF WORK.
    Mr. FRED HALLasked the Prime Minister if his attention has been called to the statement issued by the Port of London employers on 12th July, pointing out that the present strike was ordered by the Transport Federation officials without consultation with the men, and that if the men resumed work forthwith they might depend upon their being allowed the freest submission of all grievances and just and generous consideration; and if he will take steps with a view to the unfettered opinion of the men being obtained as to resuming work at once on the assurances given by the Port Authority?
    The PRESIDENT of the BOARD of TRADE (Mr. Buxton, for the Prime Minister): The Prime Minister has asked me to say that, in the existing circumstances, it would be better to defer giving an answer to this question.

    ACTION OF GOVERNMENT.
    Mr. O'GRADY: May I ask whether the Prime Minister is now in a position to make a statement with reference to the Dock Strike in London?
    The PRIME MINISTER (Mr. Asquith): In conjunction with my right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade, I have been in communication with Lord Devonport and with Mr. Gosling and Mr. Orbell, with the result that interviews took place yesterday between them. The official record of the interviews appears in the Press to-day, and I have nothing at present to add to them, except that I understand that further interviews are likely to take place to-day.

    Common Rights (Harley Hill).
    Mr. HUNTasked whether the consent of the Board of Agriculture has been given to the enclosure of part of an alleged common known as Harley Hill, situate in the borough and manor of Presteign, Radnorshire, or if the Board has any information on the subject?
    Mr. MONTAGU: The answer to both parts of the question is in the negative.
    Mr. HUNTasked whether the Commissioners of Woods and Forests and Land Revenues possess any rights in the alleged tract of common known as Harley Hill, situate in the borough or manor of Presteign; and whether the Crown has ever consented to the enclosure of part of the land or has made a grant of any of the interests in the land?
    Mr. MONTAGU: This question ought to have been put to the President of the Board of Agriculture who asks me to say that the soil of the common known as Harley Hill was sold by the Commissioners of Woods, on behalf of the Crown as Lord of the Manor of Presteign, in the year 1870, to Mr. Thomas King Stephens, and the only rights in it now possessed by the Crown are the mineral rights which were reserved on that occasion. The sale was "subject to all existing rights of common, of turbary, and rights of way, and other rights." Except as stated above the Crown has not made any Grant or given any consent in the matter.
    Mr. HUNT: Will the hon. Gentleman inquire about the fencing that has been put across the common preventing people using it?
    Mr. MONTAGU: I will tell my right hon. Friend that the hon. Member wishes him to inquire.

  POST OFFICE.

    IMPERIAL WIRELESS STATIONS.
    Sir HENRY NORMANasked the Postmaster-General when the agreement with the Marconi Company regarding Imperial wireless stations was signed; and when it will be laid upon the Table?
    The POSTMASTER-GENERAL (Mr. Herbert Samuel): The Marconi Company's tender was accepted on 7th March last. The contract itself has not yet been signed, but I hope that the signatures will be affixed, and that I shall be able to lay it on the Table of the House in the course of the next few days.
    Sir H. NORMAN: Arising out of that answer, can my right hon. Friend say how it comes about that details could be given in a circular issued by the Marconi Company to its shareholders on 9th March last, and in a speech made by Mr. Marconi at a meeting of his company last week, when he said some time ago it would be inconvenient to give them in this House?
    Mr. HERBERT SAMUEL: The facts of the case are these. The Marconi Company put in a tender for the work required in more or less general terms, stating prices and giving a general specification, which was accepted on 7th March, and I do not think, as far as I am aware, the speech to which my hon. Friend refers went beyond the facts included in the tender; but a much more detailed specification and many more elaborate conditions are to be included in the contract itself and were contemplated by the original tender. It would have been unsuitable for me to have laid before the House an incomplete document; it must be the final document itself which is laid on the Table of the House.
    Sir H. NORMAN: Is my right hon. Friend not aware that the particulars for which I asked him regarding the duration of the royalties were on both those occasions made public, not in general terms, but in precise details, and that it was those details he told me it would be inconvenient to give to the House?
    Mr. HERBERT SAMUEL: I could have given certain details, certainly, but my hon. Friend either asked me in the course of Debate or he put down a question, "What was the period of the royalties, and the number of years?" I could have given him the number of years, but I could not have named the full conditions, and I

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    thought it was inadvisable to give information piecemeal. There was no discourtesy intended to the hon. Gentleman.
    Sir HENRY DALZIEL: May I ask whether we may expect them this week, in time for discussion before the House rises, in view of the fact that the arrangement was made in March last?
    Mr. HERBERT SAMUEL: Since March there have been many negotiations on points of detail between the Postmaster-General, the War Office, the Treasury, the India Office, and the Colonial Office, which are responsible for the delay that has taken place. I am most anxious the sanction of the House should be given before the House rises for the Summer Recess, and there must be several days' notice before the discussion comes on, and Papers must be laid in good time for Members to make themselves acquainted with them. I am pressing the Department concerned as strongly as I can, and I hope there will only be two or three days elapse before the contract is laid.
    Sir H. NORMAN: May I ask my right hon. Friend whether he will see this is not taken as exempted business after Eleven o'clock?
    Mr. HERBERT SAMUEL: On that I must consult my hon. Friend the Patronage Secretary.

    TELEPHONE SERVICE.
    Mr. GOLDMANasked the Postmaster-General whether his attention has been directed to the daily complaints in the telephone service as to subscribers being told that numbers are engaged when this is not the case, and when, in answer to calls, the local exchange has stated that the number was not wanted; to delays in getting lines cleared and in attracting the operator's attention after getting a wrong number; to delays in getting the operator's attention when desiring a fresh number; to delays in getting lines cleared after ringing off trunks; and to interruptions of conversations by questions from operators and by disconnections in the course of conversations; whether his attention has been called to delays in the installation of telephone instruments contracted for; to complaints as to indistinct and faint lines and as to intermittent and incessant ringing during heavy rains; to complaints by message-rate subscribers of being asked to make deposits far in excess
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    of likely calls, and, on remonstrating, receiving a demand for a much larger sum, in some cases as much as £5 after having asked for £2; and complaints as to the manner of conducting correspondence from exchange managers' departments and as to excess call charges; whether these complaints emanate from shortage of lines, inadequate or overworked staff, or are due to organisation on different lines to that of the National Telephone Company; and what steps he proposes taking to make the service at least as effective as it was before the transfer of the telephone took place in January last?
    Mr. HERBERT SAMUEL: The hon. Member's question raises so large a number of points that it is impossible to give an adequate reply within the limits of an oral answer. I propose, therefore, to circulate a statement with the Votes. [See Written Answers this date.]

  ROYAL NAVY.

    MEDWAY FLOATING DOCK.
    Mr. WHELERasked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether his attention has been drawn to the fact that the floating dock on the Medway was towed to its moorings by four tugs of a foreign firm; and whether the Admiralty or Admiralty contractors possess tugs capable of carrying out this class of work?
    The PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY to the BOARD of ADMIRALTY (Dr. Macnamara): The Medway Floating Dock was towed from the works of the builders, Messrs. Swan, Hunter, to its berth on the Medway by four tugs of a foreign firm. That procedure was adopted by the firm under the terms of the contract. I assume that the contractors themselves did not possess tugs capable of carrying out this class of work. Admiralty tugs are not designed for this class of work. In the case of necessity, no doubt, they could be utilised for towing the floating dock, but that would mean the withdrawal of several of the large Admiralty tugs, with a consequent dislocation of the normal work of the ports to which they are attached.
    Mr. WHELER: May I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he is aware that these foreign tugs collided with other vessels coming in, and that if local tugs had been employed to do the work this would have been avoided?
    Dr. MACNAMARA: I am not aware of the fact stated in the earlier part of the

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    question, and I cannot say whether the contention put forward in the latter part would have arisen.
    Mr. FRED HALL: May I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he is aware it is recognised a London firm could do this work as well as a foreign firm?
    Dr. MACNAMARA: No, I am not aware of that.
    Mr. WHELER: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the Admiralty tugs, whatever there were, belonging to the port, had to be called in to help the foreign tugs?
    Dr. MACNAMARA: I am not aware of that, but I will accept the hon. Member's suggestion.

    SUPPLEMEMTARY NAVY ESTIMATES.
    Mr. GRETTONasked the First Lord of the Admiralty if he will definitely state on which day the Supplementary Navy Estimates will be printed and circulated?
    Dr. MACNAMARA: Thursday next.

    ROYAL DOCKYARDS (LABOURERS' PAY).
    Sir C. KINLOCH-COOKEasked what is the highest and what the lowest amount that can be earned by the ordinary labourer in the Royal dockyards?
    Dr. MACNAMARA: The highest amount that can be earned by an ordinary labourer at His Majesty's dockyards in England is, when he is employed on piecework, on which occasions his pay may amount to 31s. a week. But I ought to say that the ordinary labourer, in comparison with the skilled labourers, does not get very many opportunities of being put on piecework, and when he does he would not often earn as much as 31s. a week. The lowest rate is 21s. for a full week of forty-eight hours on time pay.
    Sir C. KINLOCH-COOKE: Could the right hon. Gentleman say how many labourers are getting 21s. per week in the Royal dockyards?
    Dr. MACNAMARA: There are 2,000 roughly on time pay, but some of those have opportunities from time to time of earning extra.
    Sir C. KINLOCH-COOKE: Could the right hon. Gentleman give any comparison between the pay in the Royal dockyards and the pay under the Port of London Authority?
    Dr. MACNAMARA: No, I cannot answer that question within the limits of a question and answer now.

    CHIEF AND STOKER PETTY OFFICERS.
    Sir C. KINLOCH-COOKEasked whether the double-bottom pay of chief and stoker petty officers was stopped last November; why this stoppage occurred; whether the chief and stoker petty officers, have to go through the compartments and test the place and see if it is fit for men to work in; whether they are responsible for the men's work in the same manner as before pay was stopped; and are they on duty just the same as before?
    Dr. MACNAMARA: Payment to chief and stoker petty officers for supervision, only of work in double-bottoms and confined spaces is not provided for in the Regulations, and orders were issued last November for erroneous payments to cease. The question of allowing some remuneration for the service is, however, now under consideration. Article 1081 (c) of the King's Regulations places the responsibility, under the engineer officer, on the chief and stoker petty officer in charge of the double-bottom party that the air in each compartment is tested and found satisfactory before any men are allowed to enter. This, in most cases, entails the petty officer going through the compartment.
    Sir C. KINLOCH-COOKE: Are we to understand that the work done by these petty officers is the same kind of work as that done by the men themselves?
    Dr. MACNAMARA: No, I do not think so.

    H.M.S. "LION."
    Sir C. KINLOCH-COOKEasked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether he is aware of the unsatisfactory condition of the seamen's quarters in His Majesty's ship "Lion"; that the men are herded together, some sleeping on the table, some on the floor, and others in hammocks swung so close together that sleep is in many cases out of the question; that the quarters are bounded on one side by the plates of the ship and on the other by the boilers; and that there is no provision made for ventilation; whether he will take steps to have these quarters properly ventilated; and will he arrange so as to prevent overcrowding?
    Dr. MACNAMARA: No complaints have been received. The accommodation

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    provided is 10 per cent, in excess of complement requirements, the spacing between the hammocks is that normally provided, and none of the quarters are bounded by the boilers. A full service of air supply is provided. Inquiries will at once be made as to whether this has proved insufficient.
    Sir C. KINLOCH-COOKE: Can the hon. Gentleman say how long the "Lion" has been in commission?
    Dr. MACNAMARA: A very short time.

    MARINE OFFICERS' PAY.
    Sir JOHN SPEARasked the Secretary to the Admiralty if he is aware that in the year 1904, when an Order in Council was made changing the present Marine officers into naval officers, a promise of a higher scale of pay was given; and will he explain why this promise has not yet been carried out, and when it will be?
    Dr. MACNAMARA: There was no Order in Council in 1901 of the nature indicated in the question. New scales of pay for existing and future Marine officers were announced by Circular letter of the 19th December, 1902, and effect was given to them by Order in Council of the 28th March, 1903, and the 8th August, 1911, respectively.

    Dockyard Labourers' Pay (Port of London)
    Sir C. KINLOCH - COOKEasked the President of the Board of Trade what is the lowest wage guaranteed to a dockyard worker of the ordinary labourer class employed by the Port Authority of London, and what amount can the same labourer earn per week under the system of plus?
    Mr. BUXTON: I am in communication with the Port of London Authority and will inform the hon. Member as soon as I receive the desired information from the Authority.

    Scottish Education Examinations.
    Mr. WATTasked the Secretary for Scotland whether he is aware that expense and delay are caused by the custom of the Scotch Education Department in the revision of the papers of the leaving certificate and other examinations of having the candidates' papers sent from Scotland to London and thence to the various examiners instead of having all such work done in Scotland; and, if so,
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    what is the reason for this, and could he see his way to alter this practice?
    The SECRETARY for SCOTLAND (Mr. McKinnon Wood): The additional expense, if any, is of a most trifling character and I am not aware that any delay is caused by the present practice in use for the leaving certificate and other examinations conducted by the Department. Practical experience shows that the method in use is the most convenient method of collecting and distributing papers to examiners.

    Pony Breeding (Scotland).
    Captain GILMOURasked the Secretary for Scotland, if the Board of Agriculture for Scotland, having admitted delay in dealing with the application of Mr. Mackenzie, of Calgary, to lease his pony stallions to the Board, with the result that Mr. Mackenzie has been unable to let his stallions elsewhere, will compensate Mr. Mackenzie for his loss?
    Mr. McKINNON WOOD: The answer to this question is in the negative.

    Police Grants (Scotland).
    Mr. WATTasked the Secretary for Scotland whether police authorities in England receive from the Treasury to wards the expense of police pay and clothing one-half of their total approved expenditure on these, whereas in Scotland the same authorities receive from the Treasury only one-third of their total approved expenditure; if so, has his Department represented this inequality to the Treasury, and what was their answer; and does he propose to introduce legislation to rectify it?
    Mr. McKINNON WOOD: For reasons which were fully explained to my hon. Friend in reply to a question on 16th March, 1911 (22 H.C. Debates, p. 2562) I am unable to admit that in the matter of Local Taxation Grants, including Police Grant, there is any inequality as between England and Scotland.

  NATIONAL INSURANCE ACT.

    BRITISH TROOPS IN INDIA.
    Sir J. D. REESasked the Under-Secretary of State for India (11) whether deductions are to be made under the National Insurance Act from the pay of soldiers of British regiments serving in India; if so, whether the assent of the Government of India was obtained to the

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    diversion of funds provided by it for pay to other objects; and asked the Secretary of State for War (24) whether, under the National Insurance Act, compulsory deductions are made from the pay of soldiers belonging to regiments of the British Army while they are serving in India; and, if the answer be in the affirmative, whether the concurrence of the India Office has been obtained to such diversion of funds provided by that Government for the specific purpose of paying troops and not for providing benefits which for the most part cannot be enjoyed until after the return of such troops to Home service?
    Mr. MONTAGU: Under the National Insurance Act British soldiers serving in India are placed in precisely the same position, both as regards deductions and benefits, as those serving at home. This arrangement is fully concurred in by the Secretary of State for India.
    Sir J. D. REES: What is the authority for deducting pay provided by the Indian taxpayer and diverting it to some other purpose?
    Mr. MONTAGU: The National Insurance Act.
    Sir C. KINLOCH-COOKE: Will the right hon. Gentleman say whether the benefit is to be paid upon the application of the woman in England or the man in India?
    Mr. MONTAGU: I had rather my hon. Friend put a question down.

    CUSTOMS AND EXCISE OFFICERS.
    Mr. HARRY LAWSONasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether, at an interview with Customs and Excise officers in May last, he stated that officers of the amalgamated service would be called upon to perform certain duties in connection with the National Insurance Act; whether he is aware that the official National Insurance Act instructions to officers of Customs and Excise have been issued in the Customs branch only to officers of less than six years' service; whether he will cause copies of the instructions to be issued to all officers who desire to make themselves acquainted with the duties under the Act they may be called upon to perform; and whether it is by his authority that the work under the Act has been appropriated by the
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    Excise branch of the amalgamated service to the exclusion of the Customs branch?
    The FINANCIAL SECRETARY to the TREASURY (Mr. Masterman): The answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative. It is not contemplated that all officers of the amalgamated Customs and Excise service should be employed on insurance duties. In many cases it will not be possible for men to combine these duties with their ordinary work. The Board of Customs and Excise have, however, directed that copies of the instructions shall be supplied to all officers of the amalgamated service, so that if they are called upon to take up the insurance work they may be properly prepared. I am informed that the statement in the second paragraph of the question is incorrect. The distribution of copies is still in progress, and will very shortly be completed. It is not the fact that duties under the Act have been assigned to the Excise branch of the amalgamated service to the exclusion of the Customs branch. On the contrary, a considerable number of men in the Customs branch are being employed on insurance duties.
    Mr. JAMES HOPE: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that, at any rate in some large centres such as Sheffield, these officers are greatly overworked during the last few years, and will he consider whether it is absolutely necessary to put more duties upon them?
    Mr. MASTERMAN: I agree they have been worked very hard in the last few years, but there have been considerable additions to the staff, and I am not aware they have been overworked recently.

    COMMISSIONERS AND OPERATION OF ACT.
    Mr. HICKS BEACHasked whether any of the Insurance Commissioners have addressed any communication to him or to the Cabinet stating that everything is in readiness in their office for the National Insurance Act to come into operation immediately, or whether they have expressed any intimation to the effect that, unless the operation of the Act is postponed for some months, they must not be held responsible for the confusion that will consequently ensue?
    Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: The hon. Member must surely be aware that it would be wholly contrary to established adminis-

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    trative practice to publish communications passing between the permanent staff of a Department and its political Chief.

    LOCAL HEALTH COMMITTEES.
    Mr. BUTCHERasked the reasons why, in appointing provisional local health committees, it was found necessary to place on such committees persons living outside of the locality for which the committees were appointed, and in many cases having no connection with the locality?
    Mr. MASTERMAN: I would refer the hon. Member to my answer to the hon. Member for North Monaghan on Monday, 8th July. Representatives of insured persons on the insurance committees now constituted on a provisional basis were selected by the central representative bodies of friendly societies and trade unions, and by the Association of Industrial Insurance Offices. I am not aware of any cases where persons having no connection with the society have been appointed. In certain cases the persons selected by the bodies mentioned do not actually reside within the boundaries of the area for which the committee acts; but in such cases they are probably officers of friendly societies or other approved societies which are largely operating within the boundary.
    Mr. BUTCHER: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that there are many cases in which large friendly societies of about 5.000 and more have had nothing whatever to do with the appointment of these members of the provisional committees?
    Mr. MASTERMAN: The large friendly societies have had a say in the matter.
    Viscount HELMSLEY: Can the right hon. Gentleman say how the employers who wish to do so can get in touch with them, and get upon those committees?
    Mr. MASTERMAN: I do not know what the Noble Lord means by getting in touch with them. All the names are published, the meetings are published, and many of the Committees have representatives of the county councils upon them.
    Mr. BUTCHER: Are these outside persons who have been appointed nominated in every case?
    Mr. MASTERMAN: As far as I am aware—yes.

    EMPLOYER AND EMERGENCY CARDS.
    Mr. JAMES MASONasked whether, in the event of an employer stamping an emergency card in default of the ordinary card and giving it to an employé, and in the further event of his employé destroying this card, the employer is called upon to produce and stamp a fresh card on every subsequent occasion on which he pays wages to that employé?
    Mr. MASTERMAN: If an employed person persistently refused to produce his card to his employer, there would clearly be no reasonable cause for his failure to produce his card, and a breach of the regulations would be committed by him. The statutory duty of the employer to pay the contribution on each occasion would not be affected by such refusal, and it would be necessary for him in the circumstances assumed to obtain and stamp emergency cards. I may state that employers can now obtain, not only emergency cards, but ordinary Insurance cards for their employés lasting not one week only, but the whole quarter.

    SANATORIUM BENEFIT.
    Mr. GODFREY LOCKER-LAMPSONasked if the right hon. Gentleman will state what remedy an insured person will have if he is not able to obtain the sanatorium benefit for which he has paid?
    Mr. MASTERMAN: If an insured person is dissatisfied with any treatment he receives from the Insurance Committee which is responsible for arranging for such treatment he may appeal under Section 67 to the Insurance Commissioners who may decide the case themselves or authorise a referee to decide such an appeal.
    Mr. HUNT: What does a man have to do if the Commissioners cannot give him the sanatorium benefits for which he has paid?
    Mr. MASTERMAN: I do not think that arises out of the question. In the first place, he would apply to the insurance committee, and it is only if the insurance committee gives him the wrong treatment or refuse to give him the treatment he ought to receive that the appeal lies.
    Mr. HUNT: But how can any treatment be received when the sanatoria are not ready?
    Mr. MASTERMAN: As I have explained many times to the House, there is full treatment ready now.
    Mr. HUNT: Are we to understand that the sanatoria are now built?
    Viscount HELMSLEY: Are we to understand that the sanatorium benefit and medical benefit will be arranged for by time all these appeals have been heard?
    Mr. MASTERMAN: Sanatorium benefit can be given now, and medical benefit, or an alternative equivalent, will be given from January.
    Mr. WRIGHTasked if the right hon. Gentleman will say with how many and which of the seventy-six institutions designated as sanatoria in England, and how many and which hospitals, and with how many and which of the fifty-seven tuberculosis dispensaries have, arrangements been made, and by which, local insurance committees for the provision of sanatorium benefit in sanatoria and other institutions as from the 15th of July, 1912; and further, in which of the above institutions, hospitals, and dispensaries, and to how many insured persons is sanatorium benefit under the National Insurance Act now being administered?
    Mr. MASTERMAN: No Reports have as yet been received from insurance committees as to the institutions with which arrangements are proposed to be made with a view to the treatment of insured persons suffering from tuberculosis, nor as to the numbers of applications which they have received for provision of the benefit.
    Sir C. KINLOCH-COOKE: Can the right hon. Gentleman inform the House whether it is true that the Government are going to take over the Hollesley Bay Colony for a sanatorium?
    Mr. MASTERMAN: I must have notice of that question. I have not heard of it myself.
    Mr. WRIGHT: Is there any truth in the report that no arrangements have yet been made to have any of these private institutions?
    Mr. MASTERMAN: Oh, no. I think the hon. Member for Sevenoaks explained what was happening in Wiltshire, and he stated that certain arrangements had been made in that county, and that was only one example.

    CONTRACTS.
    Mr. GODFREY LOCKER-LAMPSONasked whether the National Insurance Act is to be construed as a contract between insured persons and the societies to which they belong?
    Mr. MASTERMAN: I am advised that no Act of Parliament can properly be described as a contract. There is a contract between an approved society and its members, and one term of the contract is that the society shall provide the benefits conferred by the Act.
    Mr. G. LOCKER-LAMPSON: Would a person be able to sue the society?
    Mr. MASTERMAN: I must have notice of that question.
    Mr. GODFREY LOCKER-LAMPSONasked whether the contributions of insured persons are to be construed as part of a contract or as taxes?
    Mr. MASTERMAN: Contributions are payable by virtue not of a contract, but of a statutory obligation, and inasmuch as the payments enure to the benefit of the person paying them and do not go into the Exchequer, they are not analogous to taxes.
    Sir J. D. REES: What is the distinction between an obligatory contribution and a tax?
    Mr. MASTERMAN: I think the hon. Member will find that I have stated that distinction already if he will do me the honour of studying my answer.

    LEAFLETS AND CIRCULARS.
    Mr. HARRY LAWSONasked if the right hon. Gentleman will state the number of leaflets or circulars which have been issued to the public stating that information as to the National Insurance Act can be obtained from any Customs and Excise officer; whether his attention has been drawn to a circular letter recently issued by the Customs and Excise authorities in structing the officers at certain offices in the Port of London to refer applicants to other Customs and Excise offices; how many Customs and Excise offices are thus removed from the list of approved offices at which any inquiries can be made; and whether, in view of the fact that the offices excluded lie in a thickly-populated area and amidst a population of dock and riverside workers, of whom the staff of the

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    excluded offices have a peculiar knowledge, he will cause the circular letter to be withdrawn?
    Mr. MASTERMAN: I find on inquiry that under the terms of the circular referred to in the latter part of the question there are six offices in the Port of London at which the public are referred elsewhere for information in reference to the National Insurance Act. Two of these offices are immediately adjacent to the Custom House in Lower Thames Street; and inquiries are referred to the Long Room in that building. One is immediately opposite the Customs and Excise Office at 122, Minories, where continuous attendance is given during official hours for answering inquiries, etc. Two are in warehouses belonging to the Port of London Authority, to which the general public have no right of access, while the sixth is situated in the private premises of the Post Office at Mount Pleasant, and deals exclusively with work in connection with Foreign and Colonial Parcel Mails. I see no reason for withdrawing the circular in question. These unimportant exceptions to the rule that information can be obtained from any Customs and Excise officer would obviously not have been inserted in the numerous general notices referred to by the hon. Member.

    LOCAL INSURANCE COMMITTEES.
    Mr. WRIGHTasked if the right hon. Gentleman will say how many local insurance committees have been constituted on a provisional basis by the Insurance Commissioners, in pursuance of their powers under Section 78 of the Insurance Act; and if he will explain how contracts can, even though approved by the Insurance Commissioners, be made by the insurance committees so as to be binding upon the real local insurance committees when duly appointed and approved?
    Mr. MASTERMAN: Two hundred and eighty-seven committees have now been constituted. The proceedings of these committees will not be invalidated because as contemplated by Section 78 of the Act, certain of their members have not been appointed in exact accordance with the method laid down in Section 59, which section will govern the appointment of subsequent committees.
    Mr. WRIGHT: Will the right hon. Gentleman give an answer to the last part of my question?
    Mr. MASTERMAN: The powers and duties of the committees are fully dealt with in the memorandum issued to the committees.
    Mr. WRIGHT: What section of the Insurance Act or other Acts gives these Insurance Committees power to enter into a contract of a binding character?
    Mr. MASTERMAN: I think if the hon. Member will study the memorandum he will see the limitations which are put upon their actions.
    Mr. WRIGHT: Is the memorandum more important than the Act of Parliament?
    Mr. WORTHINGTON-EVANS: Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether these provisional committees have the power to bind the final committees?
    Mr. MASTERMAN: I understand that they have exactly the same legal effect as if the committees had been constituted in the normal manner.
    Mr. CATHCART WASON: May I ask whether the memorandum so often referred to has been laid upon the Table of the House?
    Mr. MASTERMAN: I am taking every opportunity of placing all this literature before everyone who desires to have it.
    Mr. BUTCHER: Under what section of the Act have these insurance committees power to bind the final committees?
    Mr. MASTERMAN: Under Section 59 in conjunction with an Order issued under Section 78.

    FOREIGNERS' SERVANTS.
    Mr. BRIDGEMANasked whether a Foreigner coming to this country with either Foreign or English servants would be obliged to insure them immediately they arrive in the United Kingdom; and, if not, how long they could remain uninsured?
    Mr. MASTERMAN: There is no distinction as to liability to insure servants between residents in this country and foreigners temporarily visiting here. Contributions however, would only be payable when wages are actually paid in this country.

    MEDICAL BENEFIT.
    Mr. FRED HALLasked if the right hon. Gentleman can state how

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    many doctors are now known to be available in connection with the administration of medical benefit under the National Health Insurance Act; and what is the number of persons which it is estimated will have to be dealt with as regards this section of the benefit?
    Mr. MASTERMAN: It is the duty of the local insurance committees, under Section 15 of the Act, to make arrangements for local panels of doctors of those who are willing to serve on such panels under regulations made by the Commissioners. Those regulations are now under the consideration of the Advisory Committee, and until they are issued, and the committees have commenced this work it is impossible to state how many doctors will be available in connection with the administration of medical benefit. If in any district the doctors willing to serve on panels are not such as to provide an adequate medical service, the Insurance Commissioners may authorise the insurance committees to make other arrangements, or may themselves make such arrangements, as they think fit. It is estimated that some twelve millions of insured persons will be entitled to medical benefit or a monetary equivalent.
    Mr. FRED HALL: Will the right hon. Gentleman say what he means by "other arrangements" being made, because it is impossible to carry out the provisions of the Act unless you get the assistance of the doctors?
    Mr. MASTERMAN: I have explained the point many times. I cannot explain in the form of question and answer the various alternatives.

    PECULIAR PEOPLE (EXEMPTION).
    Mr. RUPERT GUINNESSasked whether it is possible for members of the sect called Peculiar People, who have conscientious objections to ordinary medical treatment, to obtain exemption under the National Insurance Act, or whether they will be eligible for alternative benefits?
    Mr. MASTERMAN: Section 15 (3) of the Act provides that an insurance committee may allow insured persons to make their own arrangements for receiving medical attendance and treatment (including medicines and appliances), and in that case shall contribute from the funds out of which medical benefit is payable towards the cost of medical attendance and treatment (including medicines and appliances).

    CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENTS.
    Mr. LARDNERasked if the right hon. Gentleman will say whether persons who are now in the Civil Service and who have applied for appointments under the National Insurance Act will be required to undergo examination again, or whether they will be transferred to the Insurance Department?
    Mr. MASTERMAN: Second division clerks and assistant clerks, if transferred in that capacity from one public department to another, do not require new Civil Service certificates, and are transferred in ordinary course without further examination. For established posts other than second division clerkships and assistant clerkships under the Insurance Commission new certificates are required, and the Civil Service Commissioners have to satisfy themselves, by examination or otherwise, that the candidates selected possess the necessary qualifications. Literary examination is, however, as a rule, dispensed with in the case of candidates who can produce evidence that they possess the necessary educational qualifications for the posts to which they are being transferred.

    OUTWORKERS (IRELAND).
    Mr. LARDNERasked what arrangements have been made for granting exemption in Ireland to certain classes of out workers who are entitled to claim exemption under the National Insurance Act; whether any orders have been made by the Commission dealing with any class of out workers in Ireland; and whether an order has been made enforcing insurance on all outworkers irrespective of the nature of their employment?
    Mr. MASTERMAN: Under Section 81 (4) employment in Ireland as an outworker, where the wages or other remuneration derived from the employment are not the principal means of livelihood of the person employed, is an employment excepted from the Act. The necessity for arrangements for granting exemption does not therefore arise at present. The, whole question of outworkers in Ireland is under the consideration of a special Committee appointed for that purpose.
    Mr. LARDNER: May I ask the right hon. Gentleman if he is aware that in certain districts in Ireland employers who only engage outworkers for part time have circulated a statement to the effect that all outworkers are forced to be insured?
    Mr. MASTERMAN: I am not aware of that. Perhaps the hon. Member will communicate with me. If such a statement has been circulated, it is incorrect.

    APPOINTMENTS (IRELAND).
    Mr. LARDNERasked the Secretary to the Treasury how many officers have been appointed or positions created up to the present under the National Insurance Act in Ireland; the nature of the appointment, rank, and sex of officers; how many positions have been allocated to existing Civil servants and the Departments to which they have been previously attached, and, in the case of non-Civil servants, what their previous occupation was; whether the appointments now made or proposed to be made are permanent or temporary, part or whole time, and the salaries paid for these offices; and what further appointments it is thought it will be necessary to make?
    Mr. MASTERMAN: I would refer my hon. Friend to the answers I gave on the 13th May and 2nd July. Any further indoor staff required will be recruited, as heretofore, subject, of course, to Treasury sanction. As regards outdoor staff, appointments will be made in accordance with the recommendations contained in the Interdepartmental Report on Outdoor Staff, Cd. 6231.

    PRECARIOUS TRADES.
    Mr. CHARLES BATHURSTasked the President of the Board of Trade whether a workman engaged in an insured trade can and should be a voluntary contributor if carrying on such trade independently and not under a contract of service, but, owing to its precarious character, liable to accept employment hereafter under another person or firm?
    Mr. BUXTON: The provisions of Part II. of the Act would not admit of any contributions being paid except in respect of workmen for the time being employed under contracts of service. Any contributions so paid would be available to establish a claim to unemployment benefit if the workman is out of work, whether or not he has in the meantime been engaged in carrying on his trade independently.

    INSURED TRADES (DEFINITION).
    Mr. BIRDasked the President of the Board of Trade whether the term "iron-founding" for the purposes of the National
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    Insurance Act, Part II., includes all castings in iron of whatever form or description; and, if so, will he say why this interpretation has been adopted in view of the declaration of the Chancellor of the Exchequer on 4th May, 1911, that the operation of Part II. of the Act should be restricted in the first instance to the building and engineering trades?
    Mr. BUXTON: The hon. Member has misinterpreted the speech made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer on the introduction of the National Insurance Bill. Ironfounding, he will remember, was subsequently expressly included by Parliament among the insured trades specified in the 6th Schedule. As to the exact meaning to be put upon the word "ironfounding," I must refer the hon. Member to decisions Nos. 11 and 20, of which I am sending him a copy.
    Mr. BIRD: In what way did I misinterpret the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer?
    Mr. BUXTON: The Chancellor of the Exchequer was speaking generally, and he pointed out that it was entirely in the hands of Parliament to add to or diminish the number of trades. The ironfounder was subsequently introduced, and engineering was made to include it with other trades.
    Mr. BIRDasked the President of the Board of Trade whether, pursuant to Section 104 of the National Insurance Act, 1911, he will, by special Order, exclude from the occupations which are to be deemed employment in an insured trade the casters of key-blanks, harness furniture, stirrups, spurs, bits, bridles, and watchguard fittings, bag furniture, and spring hooks, seeing that the manufacture of these articles does not come under the denomination of either engineering or building trades?
    Mr. BUXTON: The powers of exclusion contained in Section 104 of the National Insurance Act, 1911, are limited to the exclusion of occupations which are common to insured and uninsured trades alike, and ancillary only to the purpose of an insured trade, and occupations in businesses which though concerned with the making of parts or the preparation of material for use in connection with an insured trade are mainly carried on as separate businesses or in connection with trades other than insured trades. I have some doubt

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    if the occupations mentioned in the question come under either of these headings, but I shall be glad to consider any information that may be furnished me on the subject.
    Mr. BIRD: On what ground are casters of bedsteads excluded from Part II. of the Insurance Act, while casters of stirrups, spurs, and spring hooks, are included?
    Mr. BUXTON: I shall be glad to give the hon. Member any information he desires.

    DOCK LABOURERS' STRIKE (BIRKENHEAD).
    Mr. BIGLAND: I beg to ask the President of the Board of Trade a question, of which I have given private notice, namely, Whether his attention has been called to a serious strike amongst the dock labourers in Birkenhead, reported to have arisen owing to a belief on the part of the men that the local Board of Trade official is acting as if the Clearing House system for the registration on the docks was compulsory, and if he will state whether a Board of Trade official has powers practically to enforce a lock-out in the event of the men refusing to comply with the Regulations drawn up as a model by the Insurance Commissioners?
    Mr. BUXTON: I am aware that some difficulty—I hope of a temporary character—has impeded the introduction of the scheme for the improvement of the conditions of dock labour in Liverpool. The scheme has been framed by a joint committee representative of the employers and of the dockers' union, to which the Board of Trade are giving such assistance as is in their power. I have no reason to believe that the difficulty has arisen from any such causes as those suggested in the question. My latest information, I am glad to say, is of a hopeful character.

    CONTRIBUTION CARDS.
    Mr. WILKIE: I beg to ask the Financial Secretary to the Treasury a question, of which I have given him private notice, namely: Whether he is aware that firms have posted notices that no workman will be employed on and after 15th July unless he produces his contribution cards under Parts I. and II. of the National Insurance Act, 1911? Is he aware that firms are stating that they have been forced to issue such notice? If this is so, will he state by whose authority such instructions have been issued? In view of Circular A.S. 41,
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    issued by the Commissioners, and the difficulty in obtaining cards from the Commissioners, will he issue such instructions as will obviate any stoppage of work?
    Mr. MASTERMAN: I am not aware of such notices being posted, but it is the duty of workmen to obtain cards, which they can do without difficulty from any Post Office or from their approved societies. No pressure has been placed on any employers to adopt the course suggested in the question, but any employer is within his rights in warning his employés that they will be required to produce cards when wages are paid. If they do not, their employers can obtain for them either ordinary cards from the Commissioners or emergency cards from the Post Office.
    Mr. WILKIE: Are employers justified in asserting that they will not employ workmen after a given date if the card is not produced?
    Mr. MASTERMAN: It depends on the contract between employers and workmen. There is no reason why they should not employ the men after that date.
    Mr. WORTHINGTON-EVANS: What alternative have the employers if the men are paid by piece?
    Mr. MASTERMAN: The employers can get as many cards as they wish for emergency or ordinary occupation.
    Mr. WORTHINGTON-EVANS: Must the employers have the card on the particular day the wages are paid?
    Mr. MASTERMAN: It is the duty of the employers to stamp the card, and they can get as many cards as they like.

DISTURBANCES AT KILREA.
Mr. RONALD M'NEILL: I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland a question of which I have given him private notice—namely, whether he has received any information of an outrage on women and children committed by Nationalists at Kilrea, county Derry, on 13th July; whether the affair commenced by an attack on a child of 14 years of age, who was seriously hurt; whether the perpetrators then attacked a party of excursionists, chiefly young women, whom they pelted with stones, bottles, and other missiles; whether the miscreants were members of the Ancient Order of Hibernians;

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whether any arrests have been made; and what steps he proposes to take to protect Protestant women and children in Ulster against similar outrages by Nationalist ruffians in future?
Mr. T. W. RUSSELL (Vice-President of the Department of Agriculture, Ireland): I have received the following police report:—
"The C.I., Londonderry, reports this morning.
"Serious party disturbance took place at Kilrea on night of 13th inst., on return of Excursionists from Portrush. Two persons named Mark Reilly and Patrick Henry, wounded by revolver bullets. Several windows broken, disturbance lasted from 10.30 p.m. to 11.0 p.m. Stones, bottles and other missiles being thrown and revolver shots tired. The town is now quiet. Reports follow bzy post."
Mr. RONALD M'NEILL: Cannot the right hon. Gentleman answer the specific question, whether the disturbance began with an attack on a child of fourteen and afterwards developed into an attack on young women and children?
Mr. RUSSELL: No further information has reached the Irish Office beyond that which I have given. Perhaps the hon. Member will repeat his question.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE.
Mr. BONAR LAW: Can the Prime Minister make any further statement with regard to business?
The PRIME MINISTER: I understand that negotiations are still going on with regard to to-morrow and Thursday, and the result will be announced on the Adjournment of the House to-night.
On Friday, we propose to take the Mental Deficiency Bill.
On Monday next, Navy Vote3 in Supply, and
On Tuesday, Scottish Votes.
Mr. LEE: What Navy Vote will be put down first on Monday?
The PRIME MINISTER: I think it will be convenient to put down the Supplementary Estimate first.
Mr. EUGENE WASON: With regard to Scottish Votes, will the salary of the Secretary for Scotland be taken first?
The PRIME MINISTER: We will arrange that to suit the convenience of Scottish Members.

NEW MEMBER SWORN.
Robert Leonard Outhwaite, Esquire, for the borough of Hanley.

EAST INDIA ACCOUNTS.
Ordered, That the several Accounts and Papers which have been presented to the House in this Session of Parliament relating to the Revenues of India be referred to the consideration of a Committee of the Whole House.—[Mr. Montagu.]
Resolved, That this House will, upon Tuesday, the 30th July, resolve itself into the said Committee.—[Mr. Montagu.]
Mr. SPEAKER: I take this opportunity of announcing that the Ballot on the East India Accounts will be taken to-morrow.

SUPPLY.— [FIFTEENTH ALLOTTED DAY.]

  ARMY ESTIMATES, 1912–13.— [Progress.]
  Considered in Committee.
  [MR. WHITLEY in the Chair.]

  TERRITORIAL FORCE.
  Motion made, and Question proposed,
  4. "That a sum, not exceeding £2,780,000, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the Expense of Grants, Pay, Allowances, Training, and Miscellaneous Charges of the Territorial Force (not exceeding 319,673 men, including 5,000 Territorial Force Reserve), and Channel Islands and Colonial Militia, including the Expense of Permanent Staff, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1913."
  The FINANCIAL SECRETARY to the WAR OFFICE (Mr. Harold Baker): I ask the indulgence of the Committee on rising to speak first in the discussion on this Vote. The task should more properly be performed by my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary. If it has been allotted to me, I can only take it as a tribute to the very sincere interest I have always taken in the welfare of the Territorial Force. I also remember that I once did what I imagine a great many Members of this Committee have done—that is, I wrote a book. It was the sort of book that pretends to be useful rather than entertaining, and I can only suppose that I stand here this afternoon because my right hon.
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  Friend the Secretary for War has heard of that book, but not read it. I wish to make a general statement on the position of the Territorial Force at this moment. No doubt many points of detail will arise in the course of the Debate, and they will be answered by my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary, who has a full knowledge of these matters. Certainly, no one can complain that since last February an insufficient time has been given to the discussion of this question. We spent a considerable part of the time on the Estimates and in Supply, and we had, in addition, an evening devoted to considering the question of compulsion. Throughout all these Debates there has been a volume of criticism which has concentrated itself from time to time in the declaration that the Territorial Force is a sham. I think on one occasion we were told it was a dangerous sham, a criticism which in a more diffuse form has taken the shape of four specific allegations. We have been told that the Territorial Force is insolvent in the matter of finance; we have been told that it is insufficiently trained; we have been told that it is inadequate in numbers; and we have been told that it is unfitted for the functions it is called upon to perform. With the first two of those charges, I shall deal very briefly indeed.
  4.0 P.M.
  On the question of finance, hon. Members will no doubt recollect that last year we increased the establishment Grants, the travelling Grants, and the horse and clothing Grants to the County Associations to a very considerable amount—to a total, I think, of about £160,000. Hon. Members also have before them the very valuable Return which was asked for by the hon. Member for one of the Divisions of Dorset, which shows that, taken as a whole, the County Associations are now in a state of adequate solvency. There is a net surplus, taking the associations all through, of some £41,000. I am very glad to be able to say that the Returns for last year, so far as we have yet received them— of course, they are not yet all in—show that the improvement is not only maintained but is even increasing. On the subject of training, I shall also be very brief, because there are very few new facts to lay before the Committee. It is too early to speak about the numbers attending in camp or the efficiency returns; but I can say this, that all the reports that we received during last year show that there has been a steady

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  improvement. On the information that we have at the War Office the general standard of training in the force is very much higher than one would be led to suppose from the criticisms which are passed on it. One point in particular is very often overlooked. It is supposed that men merely comply with the qualification which is demanded from them and do their fifteen or eight days in camp and ten drills, but there are many who do very much more than that. Not of course all. On the whole, no doubt, it is not the majority perhaps. It is only the keenest, the best, and the most exceptional who do it, but there are cases, and they are not few, of men doing as many as 200 drills in one year, and that is a fact which must considerably qualify our estimate of the training of the force as a whole. That, of course, does not appear. The figures are extremely difficult to get, and would be very troublesome to make out, but I am assured by the authority most responsible that in his opinion nearly 50 per cent, do something more than is actually required of them by the legal conditions of their enlistment.
  I pass from training to numbers, and I should like to go into them in slightly more detail. The statistical year is from 1st October to 1st October, and on the 1st October of last year the Territorial Force was 254,688 non-commissioned officers and men. On 1st July this year it was 261,001. That is the highest figure that has been attained in any July since the force was started. The reason is, of course, that recruiting has been very good. It has been good in spite of good trade, and good trade is never very good either for recruiting or for attendance at camp. In the quarter April-June, 1912, we had 25,409 recruits, as compared with 14,809 only for the corresponding quarter of last year; and if you take the first three-quarters of the statistical year down to June you will find that we had 52,753 recruits, as against 35,362 for the corresponding period in the previous year. Members in all parts of the House must agree that these figures are particularly satisfactory, especially, too, when you remember that this is, in the nature of things, bound to be a year of very large discharges from the force. The force began on 1st April, 1908. The Volunteers who transferred to it transferred, many, of them, with a four years' engagement, dating from April,
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  1908, and their engagement, of course, is terminated in the quarter which has just concluded. We find then, naturally, on looking at the discharges, that during the last quarter they have numbered 24,014, as compared with only 10,911 in the same quarter of the year 1911. Fortunately, though, that has been more than counterbalanced by the excellent recruiting this year, and I think, too, we may safely say the cause is a temporary cause, and one which is likely to operate in a decreasing degree in the future. At any rate, we are fairly entitled to say that that great exodus which they so confidently predicted would take place in the force has not taken place, and, on the contrary, at one of the most difficult times in its history, we are actually able to show an increase in numbers. It is, of course, not yet possible to compare the whole statistical year with the past year, because there is one quarter still to be included, and I freely admit that for the quarter which is just ahead of us we may have to face also a considerable number of discharges. We have to deal in that quarter with recruits who were enlisted, not in April, but at later dates, and if we turn back in order to get some indication of what is likely to happen to the recruits who enlisted in 1908, which, after all, is the record year of the force, I find that from July to September 11,825 recruits were taken in. Out of that number we must expect a considerable number of discharges to fall due in the quarter just in front of us, but we have safely and satisfactorily passed through one more difficult period than that which is ahead of us, and I think there is every reason to believe and hope that we shall successfully pass through the quarter which is coming.
  I should like to say one word before leaving the question of numbers on the question of strength as compared with establishment. We have had perpetual criticisms on that point from the very first year in which the force was started. I wish to say plainly and definitely that so far as my knowledge goes—and I played a humble part in the inauguration of the force—it never was contemplated that the Territorial Force should reach the actual establishment which was laid down. It is for one reason absolutely impossible that an unpaid voluntary force which is organised on a territorial basis, district by district, could reach the fixed establishment. If you lay down a quota for districts, a quota which very properly is determined by strategical considerations, it

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  stands to reason that you must be prepared to face a deficit in one place and possibly have a surplus in another. I might define it in this way, that the 315,000, the figure which is so constantly quoted against us, is a Parliamentary maximum. It is the maximum number of men that Parliament is prepared to pay for, but it is not a military maximum, and it was never alleged that it would be. Lord Haldane, whose optimism is always being derided in this House, said that the utmost that it was humanly possible to get of that establishment was 98 per cent. Of course, Members may attempt to compare this state of things with the vast swollen corps which existed in the case of the old Volunteers, but those were under no Parliamentary control so far as numbers were concerned. Their maximum was not fixed by Parliament, and the maximum with which we have to deal in the case of the Territorial Force is a maximum which is fixed by Parliament and marks the limit of the number of men for which it is prepared to pay. What have we got of the establishment at this moment? There are several divisions which are over 90 per cent, of their establishment. One, I think the North Midland, is actually 97 per cent. There is not a single one which is below 80 per cent., and the average over the whole is 86 per cent. This, remember, is at the worst time in the history of the force, and it is a state of things which is bound to improve. We know quite well that, taking the country as a whole, and not taking it district by district, we are able to get more than the actual number of men that we have. Some units are already over 100 per cent, of their establishment. I am glad to be able to say that the Secretary of State is taking steps to introduce still more elasticity into the peace establishment, so that we may be able by that means to take advantage of the willingness which appears in certain districts and to counterbalance the difficulties which other districts, perhaps with equal willingness, are unable to overcome.
  In considering these numbers we must remember that we have behind them the Territorial Force Reserve, which is at this moment in its infancy, and behind that again we have the National Reserve. The Secretary of State recognises that in the National Reserve we have a most valuable reservoir of trained men, and he intends, with as little delay as possible, to introduce into it the necessary organisation—I do not mean an organisation of battalions in which they will take the field, but an organisation which will keep them to-
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  gether in time of peace. I am prepared to say that even with these numbers which I have quoted the Territorial Force is quite adequate for the purpose for which it is intended. We hear so much talk of inadequacy and inefficiency, but never at the same moment to we have it considered what the Territorial Force is intended to be adequate for, and for what purpose its efficiency is to be used. What is it that the Territorial Force is actually to be called upon to perform? Many of our severest critics have in their minds a picture of a large Continental army, of perhaps two or three millions, composed of men permanently associated together, perfectly trained, fully equipped at all points and capable of instantaneous mobilisation, and against that in their minds they set the picture of a few ill-trained, ill-equipped raw levies which they call the Territorial Force. Both sides of the picture are absolutely false. It is possible, of course, that the Territorial Force may be called upon to face part of a Continental army, but in dealing with a difficult matter of that sort there is one important declaration upon it which must always be referred to. It is occasionally referred to, but I am sorry to say it is seldom accurately quoted. I mean the statement which the Prime Minister made in 1909 on the Debate on the Committee of Imperial Defence. The Prime Minister then, speaking with supreme authority on that subject, laid down that there were two conditions which must be fulfilled if this country were to be secure from invasion. The first, which he called the naval condition, was that we should have an effective supremacy on the sea. The second, which he called the military condition, was that we should have a Home Army, apart altogether from the Expeditionary Force—
  "sufficient in numbers and organisation for two purposes: in the first place to repel what are called raids— that is to say, sporadic offensive expeditions which are so small in their numbers as to evade even the best and most carefully watching fleets, but which are not intended permanently to occupy the country against which they are directed, but only to inflict such serious damage as they can."
  He then passes on to the second, that is a Home Army which is adequate—
  "to compel an enemy which contemplates invasion to come in such substantial force as to make it impossible for them to evade our Fleet."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 29th July, 1909, col. 1388, Vol. VIII.]
  He rather reluctantly indicated the figure of 70,000, saying he thought it was high, and that figure was subsequently acquiesced in by the Leader of the Opposition at a later stage of the Debate. There are the two functions which the Territorial

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  Force is called upon to perform declared by the highest authority on the best advice which is in the service of this country, and it is as an instrument for these purposes, and for these purposes only, that the Territorial Force should be judged. Criticism which ignores that is entirely beside the point. It is now three years since these principles were laid down. In the interval the Territorial Force has made, undoubtedly, a considerable advance in efficiency, but, more than that, our military position, considered from the point of view of invasion, has considerably improved in the interval. My right hon. Friend referred briefly to that subject a short time ago. We must take into account in considering this question the extraordinary development of new protective mechanism of which we can avail ourselves. We have wireless telegraphy and airships which have increased both the range and speed of our information. We have again submarines which have enormously added to the defences of our coasts. I do not intend to enlarge on that question. It is one as to which the Admiralty alone can speak with authority; but I think I am not going too far in saying that the whole question of coast defence has been entirely transformed by the development of submarines. I think we should include these new factors in any consideration of our military position at this moment. They can only be ignored by someone who has a preconceived idea of the size of which our military force should consist, and of the principle on which it should be based.
  Not only have we made that great advance in mechanical advantage, but in another respect also I think we stand in a more favourable position than we did three years ago. The figure 70,000, which has often been quoted in these Debates, is after all, if hon. Members will look at the Prime Minister's words, not only the number of men who might come in one force, but the number who might come in smaller forces. We may have either to face a single force of less than 70,000 or a number of smaller forces. I freely admit that both are possible; but there are reasons at the present time for inclining to the view that what we would have to face is not one large force, but a number of smaller forces. The whole tendency of development—the whole trend of events—in the last two years has been in that direction. Instead of the Armada which we
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  expected, we must look more probably for a series of miniature Armadas. We cannot put that higher than being a reasonable probability. Every single fact of our military position is founded, and must be founded, on a reasonable probability in the circumstances. Assuming all that could happen, we have against it some 250,000 men, including the Territorial Force. The Territorial Force would be fighting for its country in its country, and is already, by a fortunate arrangement, dispersed along our maritime coasts. It is peculiarly fitted to harass and worry an invader in the circumstance to which I have alluded. An enemy coming in these circumstances will be without further supplies or ammunition, without a line of communication, and, what is even more important, without any possible retreat so far as the sea is concerned. I say for that function, which is the function laid down by the Prime Minister three years ago, the Territorial Force as it stands at this moment is adequately fitted, and it will be still better fitted next year. But in order that it may be so the one thing it does require more than anything else, is peace—peace not from an invader, but peace from its hostile critics in this country. [An HON. MEMBER: "The Labour Members."] There is a remarkable difference between the effects criticism may have on men and on an institution or organisation. I suppose we have all of us known in our experience a case where a man has been improved and strengthened by criticism directed against him; but I do not believe that is true of an organisation. On the contrary unjust criticism may be fatal, and even friendly criticism may be extremely harmful.
  The only criticism which can do any good is criticism of a kind of which we have had too little—criticism which advocates some specific reform. I am not in any way accusing the majority of hon. Members opposite. The criticism of which I speak is criticism that takes place outside of this House. It is impossible not to admit that the Debates in this House with respect to the Territorial Force have been free from party spirit, and on the whole, free from noxious criticism. In particular I would single out the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dover (Mr. Wyndham), who truly said on the last occasion this Force was discussed that he had never said one word which would do harm to the Force of which he is so distinguished a member himself. Hon. Members who are anxious that this Force

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  should succeed can do a great deal in checking the harmful and vicious criticism that goes on outside. It is bad for recruiting, and it is extremely bad for those who are hesitating whether they will re-engage or not. It is bad also for the efficiency of the force itself. You may have men who taken by themselves, are not subject to extreme sensitiveness; but make them into a body and treat them as a body and they become extremely sensitive. That is the position of the Territorial Force at this moment. They never have made a claim to be the equals of the Regulars; but they ask to be freed from destructive depreciation. I admit that the excellence—and it is a real excellence—which exists in the Territorial Force is only comparative. There, is no intention of allowing it to stay at the point at which it is. The Secretary of State in the Memorandum at the beginning of the Estimates—a document which has not always received the attention which it deserves—says that considerable improvements have been made in the past year. There is one new point, not stated there, which I might mention, namely, that we have raised the lance ranks to the establishment of the units of the Regular Army, and by that means, we shall be able to obtain a greater number of experienced non-commissioned officers.
  We are told by those whose duty carries them all over the country in connection with the Territorial Force that the general spirit and the attitude of people is increasingly sympathetic. Employers who at one time seemed to have been in difficulty about it are coming forward and cooperating in a way which I think will prove to be satisfactory, both to them and us. But the one obstacle which has stood in the way of the success of the force from the beginning lies in those who seek to change the basis on which it is founded and to substitute for voluntary enlistment a compulsory system, which would be harmful to the recruiting of our Regular Army, disturbing to the labour market, and absolutely fatal to the Territorial Force itself. There is no chance, as those who advocate it know, within any measurable time of carrying out any change of that sort. The large majority of both parties in this House and the large majority of the nation are united in favour of the voluntary principle.
  The SECRETARY of STATE for WAR (Colonel Seely): Hear, hear.
  Mr. BAKER: So long as that remains, it is only hindering and impeding the task in which we are engaged to advocate a compulsory system. I firmly believe that, for the reasons I have given, we have at this moment in the Territorial Force a force which is not only adequate to its military purpose, but which has also, to my mind, the not inconsiderable merit of being in harmony with the national character and the national tradition.
  Mr. LEE: Before coming to serious business, I would like to offer a word of congratulation to the hon. Member (Mr. Baker), largely on the ground that he is the son of a very old friend of mine in a district which I had the honour to represent in Parliament. While I differ from him in politics, I know that everyone in that district appreciates the success which he has achieved in being promoted to his present position. Coming to the substance of his speech, which is of more importance to the Committee as a whole, I venture to say that he rather spoiled his case by attributing to those who do not hold the opinions he holds with regard to the Territorial Force a tendency to indulge in harmful and vicious criticism as to that force. I entirely disagree with most of the opinions expressed in regard to the Territorial Force, and I conceive it to be my duty as a Member of this House to express my opinions with regard to it, and I should say that to maintain the sort of silence which the hon. Member asked us to maintain would be to maintain a guilty silence, and to join in the conspiracy of deceiving the nation as to the true state of its defensive arrangements. While agreeing with his idea that what the Territorial Force needs is peace, and passing by that point which I think is apparent to the whole of the Committee, I do not agree that what the Territorial Force requires is peace so far as criticism is concerned. I think it is highly important that the Territorial Force should receive a full amount of criticism in this House, and I ask the hon. Member to remember that it is not directed against the officers and men of that force, but against the Secretary of State for War, who is responsible for the present deplorable position the Force finds itself in. It is no use trying to ride off on the suggestion that we are attacking brave men who are trying to do their duty. That is not at all the case.
  We are attacking the Government of the day in so far as they do not do their duty

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  by the Territorial Force. Having said that, I come back to the head and front of the whole offending—the Secretary of State for War. While I do not hold the right hon. Gentleman responsible for all that has occurred during the past six years, I think we are perfectly entitled to attack the policy of which he is now the official exponent. He also has received a number of congratulations upon his new appointment, and while I am disposed to join in them on personal grounds, I hope I can do so also on public grounds. I happen to be one of those inappreciative individuals who have regarded the policy of Lord Haldane with very modified rapture during the past few years, and also with very great suspicion. Therefore personally I am glad of the change, and I hope the right hon. Gentleman will give us more satisfaction than his learned and distinguished predecessor did. I recognise that in previous Debates in this House the right hon. Gentleman has been somewhat at a disadvantage. He has not been really responsible for the policy followed, and he has had to voice the opinions of his chief. I do not know whether he agreed with them or not, but it would have been extremely difficult to dissociate himself from them.
  Colonel SEELY: Of course, I agree with them.
  Mr. LEE: Then that makes my task much easier. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will not maintain now in his new position some of the opinions which in the less responsible position of Undersecretary for War he enunciated in this House in recent speeches. They were well enough to amuse the House of Commons when he was Under-Secretary, but we have a right now to expect from him serious treatment of this grave and vital national problem. The Financial Secretary dealt very largely, as he was justified in doing, with details of numbers of forces, and so on; but the real big question underlying all this Territorial Army has never yet been dealt with by the present Government or any responsible head of the War Office within my recollection. At any rate, we have had no intelligible solution of the main problem. Everyone in the House knows that in the event of a serious European conflict in which unhappily we might be engaged, it would be necessary that we should, not only send, but maintain in the field an Expeditionary Force of at least 150,000 men; and that to do that
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  would absorb practically the whole of our effective Regular Army at home, and would also largely drain our second line here of the Territorial Army of officers, horses, and other things which are absolutely necessary to maintain it as a fighting organisation; and it is further admitted, I think, on all hands that that Expeditionary Force, if it was to be of any use, would have to start at once. How then is the safety of these shores to be secured against a serious raid? Various solutions have been offered. One is the naval solution. We are told that the Navy will look after that. If the Navy will look after that, what is the use of the Territorial Army? It becomes a costly luxury and an inexcusable extravagance. But, taking the Territorial Army, which is the subject of this Vote to-day, I think we are entitled to a serious answer as to how this force, widely scattered as it must be, according even to the views of the hon. Gentleman who has just spoken, ill-equipped, badly officered, and with no adequate training for war, would deal with a compact, fairly wedged invasion of trained Continental troops, which may, in the opinion of the Defence Committee, have a strength of 70,000 men. The hon. Member spoke about our fears that we might be invaded by several millions. He of course knows that no serious person ever put that forward. We are only dealing with what the Minister for War has admitted to be possible—an invasion of 70,000 Continental troops.
  Colonel SEELY: Less than that.
  Mr. LEE: It is very difficult for him to-say exactly how many would come—I do not think that he has had an opportunity of settling that—but if he prefers I will say something less than 70,000 men. No intelligible solution has yet been disclosed as to how such an invasion is to be dealt with in the absence of the Expeditionary Force, and I think we are entitled to a more serious reply from the Secretary for War on this point than we have yet received. At any rate, I trust that he will not regale us again with one of those what I can only call comic opera perorations on the lines of:—
  "Frenchman, Dutchman, little Portugee.
  One jolly Englishman beats all three."
  Colonel SEELY: I never said anything of the sort.
  Mr. LEE: Anyone will realise it who reads his speeches in the past Session; and arguments of that kind have been used in

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  the course of the present Session, which are not worthy either of him or the high office which he now adorns.
  Colonel SEELY: I did not say any such thing.
  Mr. LEE: There seems to be some difference of opinion among the Committee. I am not using the exact words. What he did say in last May was that, in the event of an invasion of 70,000 fit Continental troops coming suddenly into this country there would be left behind here 400,000 of cur troops who would simply eat up an invasion of that description.
  Colonel SEELY: Hear, hear.
  Mr. LEE: Putting aside for a moment the composition and quality of those 400,000, I venture to say that it is grossly misleading to say that there would be 400,000 troops available for the purpose of dealing with an emergency of the kind. They certainly would not be available at the point of invasion or anywhere near it and the Committee must remember that in an attack of this kind the initiative will always rest with our enemies, and where the point of invasion will be is known only to them. Therefore the defending people in this country are all obliged to scatter, and we must have our disposed forces in the advantageous manner suggested by the Financial Secretary. Indeed, Lord Haldane, who is the author of this scheme, emphasised the necessity of what he called local detachments of local forces, of the Territorial Forces, scattered all along the coast-line to prepare for these chance raids; and I think he was justified in one sense, because any invader who knew his business would make a point of making feints on a wide extent over our cost simply in order to keep our forces scattered, and to keep us guessing as to what his route would happen to be. Let us therefore consider whether these 400,000 men, on whom the right hon. Gentleman relies for the defence of the coast—
  Mr. LYNCH: How long do you think it would take to land 70,000 men?
  Mr. LEE: It depends on a great many circumstances, including weather, but that is not the point. The War Office contemplate the possibility of 70,000 men landing, whether it be in a short time or a long time. The question is how to deal with them. The late Secretary of State for War, who is responsible for this scheme, shadowed forth in the House of Lords only in November last some idea of what would
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  take place, though he did not give the actual figures, and only the War Office can know what the exact distribution of the figures is. I venture to suggest that this cannot be very far from the mark. First of all, there are forts which must be defended all round the coast, dockyards, and so on. These will take at least 200,000 men of the available garrison, Artillery, both Naval and Territorial, most of the Royal Engineers, and a large proportion of the Territorial Infantry and the Infantry of the Special Reserve. Then there is Ireland. I do not think, in view of the great extent of that country, that a garrison of 40,000 men, Territorials, would be considered excessive. Then there are these local forces which Lord Haldane says are absolutely necessary for dealing with small raids. I do not think it an outside figure to say that at least 115,000 men would be required for dealing with this vast extent of coast, the whole North-East Coast of Great Britain. You thus get 355,000 men who are told off practically for what is the sedentary defence of these Islands. That leaves you out of your 400,000 men 45,000 men to constitute the training force, the central force, as Lord Haldane calls it, which is to dash at the invader the moment he arrives and drive him back into the sea, or, as the present Secretary of State for War would suggest, eat him up.
  We realise that that force may be supplemented by the local defensive forces, and taking again an extremely favourable case we may add another 35,000 men to the 45,000, which will give you the biggest central force that you can get in the most favourable circumstances. Thus assuming what I believe not to be true, that there are 400,000 effective men ready, that will give you a central force to deal with an invasion of 70,000 of something like 80,000, all comparatively untrained and unorganised, badly officered, and armed very largely with weapons inferior to those of their opponents. And these men are expected to deal with and to masticate 70,000 picked Continental troops organised for this one purpose only of striking a swift, deadly blow at the heart of the Empire. Can anyone really, however patriotic he is, doubt what the result of that conflict would be? The Financial Secretary suggested that in addition to these land forces we have within the last few years an entirely new set of advantages on our side, that we have submarines; we have had them for eight years; that we have airships; how many airships have we got? The hon. Gentle-

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  man knows that we have practically got none at all as compared with other Powers. He is doing his best but practically nothing has been done in the past, and we must remember also that there have been other great changes in the situation during the last few years. Even since the time when the Prime Minister made a statement as to the result of the decisions of the Committee of General Defence there has been a great change in reference to the supremacy in the North Sea. There are factors to be balanced on both sides. The hon. Member spoke of the bravery of the Territorial Army, especially when fighting on their own ground, with their own fellow countrymen around them. I admit all that. However brave they may be, and however much bravery may be intensified, by the fact that it alone stands between their country and a great disaster, it is not fair to ask men in their position with their arms and training, and their numbers, to deal with a serious and possibly fatal menace of that kind. I have shown there can be but a bare numerical superiority. I know that the right hon. Gentleman will say, "But consider the lessons of South Africa. Think what the Boers did; how untrained they were, and how they met large forces."
  What was it that the Boers did in the way of defending their country? It is true that they succeeded in harassing and making things very uncomfortable for the British Army. But what was the position of the country? The whole country was divided up practically like a chess-board. Practically the whole of their towns were in the occupation of the British Forces. The whole of the national life and industries, large as they were, had come to an absolute standstill. They were holding out in remote districts against the huge Regular Army which was brought against them. It is true that they prolonged the war by holding out; but it is really impossible to contemplate, with any sort of equanimity, a similar position, or even a faintly similar position, in this country. The analogy drawn from the success of the Boers is not worthy even of being considered; at any rate, it certainly is not good enough to fit the people of this country. If the right hon. Gentleman makes an appeal to me I quite agree with him that the lessons of that war have had far too little attention paid to them. I was reading the other day a publication—I
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  must admit I did not study it very closely—which made rather a striking case as to the lessons to be drawn. I refer to the "Army Review," and the article appeared in the January part of that periodical. The right hon. Gentleman being in the position of Secretary for War has been able to obtain the July number, which I was unable to get this morning; still, for the purposes of my argument, I may refer to the January number. I presume that the War Office will not repudiate the January number because this is the month of July.
  At any rate, the "Army Review" is an official publication, the editor of which is admitted to be a very high military authority, the very best man for the job," to use the words of the Secretary for War. He is a gentleman, also, who occupies the unique position of having maintenance assured by the "Times" newspaper, under an arrangement advantageous to both; and he is enabled to move the Secretary for War in the "Times," whilst at the same time enabling the "Times" to secure from time to time information which is not available for other less fortunate newspapers. Writing in his capacity, not as "Times" correspondent, but as editor of the "Army Review" and a member of the Imperial Staff—because he is also that—he reviews a book, then recently published, on the war of 1870 and 1871 in regard to national defence, and I should like to refer to one or two passages in that review which I think are very appropriate to this discussion. He speaks about the efforts which were made by the French Government to raise a force for the further defence of their country, after the investment of Paris; and he said that everyone was ready to take their places in the ranks. He goes on to explain the arrangements which were made by abolishing every sort of exemption from military service:—
  "The remnants of the Regular Army were amalgamated with the auxiliary forces and formed into organised bodies: and, in order to obtain officers and non-commissioned officers, all existing laws regarding appointments and promotions were suspended. Equal energy was shown in providing the necessary arms and equipment. …. No sacrifice or expense was, in fact, spared by the Government in its endeavours to retrieve the situation, so the striking result that during the period from the 15th September to the end of the war it was able to place in the field no less than ten Army Corps, complete with every requisite of war. Why was it that all this magnificent work of the Government and all the splendid bravery and patriotism of the French nation were in vain? The reply of the French General Staff is to be found in the following quotation from this book:—
  "'It cannot be too often repeated that an army cannot be improvised. At first the ranks of the new formations were filled up with soldiers who were capable of meeting the enemy on something like equal

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  terms, but when the supply of old soldiers became exhausted, the results were at once apparent, and it may be said that, in spite of all efforts to instruct them, the men in the newly raised units certainly knew how to die but were not soldiers.'"
  Yet in spite of that the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War has the face to suggest that the available men of the Territorial Force, the callow Special Reservists, and such Regulars as are left behind from the Expeditionary Army as being unfit to accompany it, untrained and unorganised, will be able to eat up and dispose of 70,000 trained Continental troops invading this country. I venture to say that advice of that description is very foolish and indefensible, and would be simply mischievous and unpatriotic, and I repeat that I think it is high time that we should hear from the right hon. Gentleman the real truth about the Territorial Army. Then there is the point with regard to numbers. The Secretary for War told us that the numbers of the Territorial Force are quite adequate, in spite of the fact that, according to the figures he has just given us, they are short by something like 1,800 officers and nearly 45,000 men or thereabouts. I think that is the number, though I have not the figures.
  Colonel SEELYassented.
  Mr. LEE: The right hon. Gentleman says the numbers are adequate, but how can he reconcile that with the official answer which he gave on 11th March, in which he said that the establishment of the Territorial Army was naturally based on the requirements of the service for which it is intended. If the requirements of the service for which it is intended call for 315,000 men, how can 265,000 possibly be adequate? It is not, and the 315,000 is merely the Parliamentary maximum, and not the military maximum. But that is the number which the present Secretary for War told us is established on the basis of the requirements of the service for which the Territorial Army is intended. What are those requirements? I really think the right hon. Gentleman must give us some answer as to these absolutely conflicting statements. After all, the quickest way for him would be to frankly admit that the Territorial Army is insufficient in strength and is insufficient in training for the purposes it is intended to serve. He had really better make a clean breast of it, and appeal to the House of Commons and the country for whatever is necessary in order to put the force on a proper footing. I feel sure that if he makes an appeal, and
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  backs it up with a proper exposition of the dangers with which we may be confronted, there will be a response from the country. But it is absolutely useless for him to attempt to ride off upon the sort of argument which he used in a previous Debate, and say that the only alternative to the existing state is Continental Conscription and two years' compulsory service.
  Colonel SEELYwas understood to dissent.
  Mr. LEE: I think the right hon. Gentleman is forgetting the speeches he has, made. I do not want to detain the Committee by reading his speeches, but he said the only possible thing we can do, if once we accept the view that the home garrison of this country is open to attack by Continental troops, is, in addition to our Expeditionary Force, to have an Army trained as thoroughly as are the troops of Continental armies.
  Colonel SEELY: The hon. Gentleman persistently misquotes me. If he looks at the passage he will see that I was adopting an hypothesis. I never said that the only possible alternative was conscription and compulsory training, and I was dealing with the hypothesis submitted by the Committee of Defence.
  Mr. LEE: Does the right hon. Gentleman dismiss the hypothesis that 70,000 Continental troops are likely to land?
  Colonel SEELY: No.
  Mr. LEE: Then those are trained Continental troops. But there is another alternative, and one which he should consider, and that is not a system of two years' compulsory training, but a system of training comparable to that which the Swiss have—a much longer period of training of the Territorial Army, and the stiffening up of the force with Regular officers and non-commissioned officers, and a proper equipment and arming of that force. The right hon. Gentleman in his previous speech, said if we adopted a substantially longer time of training it would cut off completely the Colonial Forces from any co-operation with us. Really, I have not the remotest idea of what he means by that.
  Colonel SEELYagain dissented.
  5.0 P.M.
  Mr. LEE: The right hon. Gentleman apparently denies all he said. I will guarantee to produce the passage in question, but I do not wish to detain the Committee by

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  searching back. He will be able to verify it, but that is the sense of what he said. It is absurd, of course, when we consider not only the fact that the Colonial Forces should co-operate with us in South Africa, but that the conditions of their own problem at home are necessarily entirely different from those which confront us. They are not supposed to be exposed to sudden attack by European troops. Their very remoteness increases their security, and their military organisation is not suited to this country. The right hon. Gentleman in his speeches has relied to a large extent on the magnificent qualities of our men and on the common people. We all know the excellence of the common people on whom we rely, but that has no relation to the real problem which we have to consider, and it is quite useless for us to consider any form of compulsory training until after the next war. What kind of a war does the right hon. Gentleman mean? Obviously he did not mean the next frontier war, a war on the North-West Frontier of India, but he really meant the next serious Continental war in which we might be engaged. We have got to wait until after that, but when, where, and what shall we be after that war is over? Are we really to wait until our house is burned down before we take the "extreme" step of either taking out fire insurance or providing hydrants? The right hon. Gentleman in concluding his speech ended, as I think, in a sudden burst of candour. He admitted that all was not well, either with the Expeditionary Force or with the Territorial Force. Of course all is not well and cannot be well under existing conditions. It is not well because the Government have always refused so far to face the facts. It is now for the right hon. Gentleman to face the facts and tell us what his conclusions are. I think probably he may be justified in suggesting he should have assistance. I think it is impossible to face the situation on the present Estimates. If that is the case, then it is quite clear that the Estimates will have to be increased. Whilst I am certainly one who believes, and has always held that the Navy must be our first care, and our first charge upon our finances, at the same time I hope we shall not fall into the state which was so picturesquely described by the hon. Member for South Birmingham (Mr. Amery) in his admirable speech in which he said it was folly to let
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  our success at sea be neutralised and frustrated by failure on land. Therefore, whilst these great Imperial Councils are going on, I do venture to express the hope that the needs, the absolute needs of the land services, will not be overlooked owing to the necessary interest which is taken in the Navy, and that a sufficient fraction at any rate of the great increase of expenditure on armaments, which I fear is becoming absolutely unavoidable, may at any rate be devoted to removing what are worse than weak points in our present military system, and particularly as to the Territorial Army, the defects of which are so glaring, so far as officers and men are concerned. If the right hon. Gentleman is right in the opinion which he has more than once expressed, that no kind of compulsory training is now within practical politics then I say there is no alternative but that there must be an increase in the Regular Army, and the Regular Army must assume responsibility for defending this country against the serious raid of the kind I have described, whilst supplying our striking force for service oversea. In any case, whatever may be the opinion of the right hon. Gentleman about that, surely the worst of all possible policies is to lull the country by speeches such as he has delivered into a sense of false security, and to spend millions on a force which is obviously at the present time unfit to discharge the only military duty which it could be called on to perform.
  Mr. CROFT: There are one or two points which, from the point of view of the Territorial Force, I feel it is my duty to mention. I think no one will deny that it is very regrettable that so few Members of the Labour party have seen fit to attend the House on a discussion of this matter which is so important to the country. The Financial Secretary told us that the large majority of Territorials exceeded the minimum number of drills. He was saying what I thought was perfectly true when he told us that in some cases Territorial soldiers completed 200 drills. I think, however, in giving that information he was acting very unwisely in mentioning such an instance to the House. I should be very glad to hear what the corps is where such a performance is possible. I think that leads people to a wrong impression as to what is done in the way of the number of drills in this country. The hon. Gentleman also told us that it was never contemplated that the establishment should be reached, but I remember

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  distinctly hearing the late Secretary of State for War tell us that he wanted definitely this number of men. If what the hon. Gentleman now says is correct I would ask him why battalions were disbanded, and why the establishment is not increased in order that he can get the number of men Lord Haldane considered were necessary for the defence of this country. I invite the Secretary of State to consider, whether if it is true that in some districts you can get more than you require, the advisability of increasing the number of units in those districts which are able to furnish a greater number than is at present the case. I say, with great deliberation, that I believe the Territorial Army, although it is an undoubted improvement upon the old Volunteers, cannot show that improvement which would make good the loss of the Regular troops which have been disbanded during the last six years. I think that is the real point. We know there is an improvement, but we have gone back on the position as it was in 1906.
  I must say that personally I do not consider that the training of the Territorial Army is in any sense adequate. In a recent Debate in this House it was laid down by the hon. and gallant Member for one of the Divisions of Glamorganshire that it was a soldier's duty to march, to shoot, to carry weights and to perform one or two other military necessities. I interjected, and I was not given the opportunity of replying, that in none of those cases could the Territorials fulfil those expectations. I should like to immediately say that I hold that view with regard to the Territorial Army as it is to-day and not after six months' training, when, obviously, it would be able to fulfil the various duties which are necessary for a soldier. I think that we are rapidly coming to the conclusion that if ever an invasion of this country does come that it is going to be so sharp and so decisive that it will be absolutely impossible to conceive that the Territorial Army will receive six months' training. In addition we have heard in the speech of my hon. Friend (Mr. Lee), which I think it will be very difficult for the right hon. Gentleman to answer, that there are 400,000 men in this country of very doubtful character on the outbreak of war. It must, I think, be admitted that you have got all your railways and bridges to be protected as well as your garrison towns. When we heard just now that the Territorial Army is to be dispersed along our maritime coasts, undoubtedly I think
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  it is absolutely impossible to conceive that the Territorial Army alone would be able to resist an invasion of 70,000 trained troops. I think it is sometimes forgotten that the Territorial Army at the present time has this very grave disadvantage. By the time you get your men to the annual training you find them not exercised together in battalions, and frequently not exercised together in companies, and sectional detachments are brought together for the first time. For the first week in camp you never get your men fit at all, and the consequence is that you do not get that amount of training which is really necessary. Anybody who has watched Territorial manœuvres and divisional training must realise that it is absolutely impossible to take men out of an office and expect them to march long distances directly they begin training. The consequence is that the training of the Territorial Army is made impossible owing to that fact in the beginning.
  The Financial Secretary referred to the criticism of the Territorial Force, but he was kind enough to say by critics outside this House. Although I am proud to be a Territorial officer, at the same time I must say I think if we are not going to criticise and tell the truth, when it is so difficult for Regular officers to tell the truth, that we are failing in our duty in every respect to the country. I quite agree with the right hon. Gentleman that a national service scheme at the present moment is impossible. It would not be impossible if he had the courage to put it forward. Not only would he carry a large number of his own party, but he would carry those on this side probably to a man. I think it is very likely if the right hon. Gentleman was to say, as he really believes in his heart, that the defences of this country are not adequate, he would carry the whole House with him. I think he has a far greater opportunity of introducing such a reform knowing that he would have the support of the Opposition. If I might make a suggestion to the right hon. Gentleman it is this, that the first thing to improve the Territorial Army is to try to get your army fit to camp. That cannot be done under present arrangements. I want to know whether it has ever passed through his mind that if the Territorial skeleton machine is as admirable as he makes it out to be, and which I believe frankly is admirable, is he prepared to improve that Territorial machine? There are different ways of deciding these questions.

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  Everybody may not be in favour of the proposals of the National Service League, although I find in the country that they are getting rapidly more popular, but there is a half-way house and it is this. We have got to find men in this country to resist a raid probably of 70,000 men. I do not think you could successfully resist 70,000 trained European conscript troops unless you had something like 150,000 men concentrated to meet them, and I do not think they would stop them for long with your present training.
  That being the case, I would ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he has not considered the possibility of making the present Territorial scheme a universal scheme, in no way interfering with the man's profession because the Territorial Force really does not do so. You could apply the scheme generally, or if you had then too unwieldy a force you could arrange it by ballot. I believe there are two ways in which you could do this. Lord Haldane threw out a hint not long ago that we must look to the young men of the country to be trained in their boyhood. I think that is one way in which you could immediately improve your Territorial Army by 25 per cent. You are wasting the time of your drill instructors and officers teaching men to try and stand on their legs and turn about in the thirty or forty drills which a recruit undertakes in his first year. If you could have your boys taught physical and military drill on alternate days I believe you would find half this difficulty would be got over, and that you would very soon have fine material for your annual training, and would have gone a certain way in that direction. Lord Haldane's Territorial scheme is from the skeleton point of view admirable. Why is it impossible for the right hon. Gentleman to put forward a scheme by which a very much larger number of men should join that force? There is no sacrifice in Territorial soldiering. It is very good for anyone. A man does not lose his business. Most Territorial soldiers like it very much and do not leave it in a hurry. If that is so, what possible sacrifice could it be for the men of this country as a whole to be asked to go into such a scheme? It would not suit everybody; but I believe you would then have men, if not sufficiently well trained to meet the enemy on equal terms, at any rate sufficient to make it impossible for any foreign country to consider the invasion of
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  this country. From what I have seen, I do not believe that the Territorial Force is at the present time in any way adequate for the purpose for which Lord Haldane invited the country to adopt it. In the question of officers, I believe that the Territorial Force is suffering in the Infantry to an enormous extent. The officers are not the right type of men. They are not leaders of men. The right hon. Gentle man ought to turn his mind to that question, and see how a better type of officer could be got. I admit that something is being done in the public schools at the present time. It will be recognised by everyone that a battalion, officered by those who have not been through that kind of training and who are not natural leaders, although it has admirable material in the ranks, suffers. Where you have good officers even with a Territorial battalion, you see a wonderful difference. If the right hon. Gentleman really believes that national service will come after the next war—
  Colonel SEELY: I have not said that.
  Mr. CROFT: Or cannot come until after the next war, he must agree that if you cannot have national service, which in the days of his youth he so much desired to see, it would be better to have something on the lines which I have briefly sketched by which you would get a larger number of men trained. If he were to put such a proposal before the country I believe he would find that not one young man in a hundred would object to doing service similar to that of a Territorial soldier at the present time.
  Captain CLIVE: I wish first of all heartily to endorse the appeal to the Secretary of State that he should distinguish himself in his new office by having the courage to remedy shortcomings of the force where those shortcomings are pointed out beyond dispute. I remember a comparatively small matter to which I had occasion to call attention last year, in regard to which I believe the right hon. Gentleman, in his capacity as Under-Secretary, agreed with me; but his course of action was no doubt largely influenced by loyalty to his chief. He is now chief of the Department himself, and it will be possible for him, when defects are pointed out, to admit those defects without giving anybody else away, and to set to work to remedy them. I wish to concentrate my remarks upon the abolition of the railway battalion at Crewe. It is surely obvious

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  that in all future wars railways must exercise an ever-increasing influence. One side will do everything they can to destroy the railways of the other side, and the opposing force will use their utmost endeavours to repair their railways when they are damaged. In the case of the invasion of this country, which, although every endeavour will be made to make it impossible, must be looked upon as a conceivable contingency, many people suppose that as we naturally have the whole railway service loyal to us we should have no difficulty in repairing our railways when they were damaged. But unless the railway-men are organised as a military force they have no right to act in that capacity, or to take any part in repairing the railways in time of war. In that connection I asked the Attorney-General, the other day—
  "whether, under international law, men employed in repairing a railway injured by an invading force are liable, if they do not belong to a military force, to be shot if captured?"
  The answer was much more definite than I had expected. The Attorney-General said:—
  "Speaking generally, and subject always to the circumstances of the particular case, if the men did not belong to a military force and in repairing the railway were doing such acts as constituted assistance to the military operations of the enemy, such acts would come within the category of war treasons, and would, therefore, be a war crime, which may be punished by death."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 20th June, 1912, col. 1993.]
  That being the case; it is surely desirable that we should have as many as possible of our railway men organised in some military force in time of war. I mention this especially in connection with an invasion of this country. We do not hear so much about the lessons of the South African war now as we did at one time; but one of the clearest lessons of that war was that a military force cannot have belonging to it too many men who are expert in railway matters and available for railway work. I remember that the battalion with which I served in that war was twice called upon to furnish every available man who knew how to drive an engine. After that we were naturally left in a very serious predicament when, at Komati Poort, Lord Kitchener gave us an engine and enough trucks to take the battalion, and told us to find our way back to Pretoria. We were naturally unable to do so. We spent forty-eight hours doing the first 48 miles. On another occasion a different kind of railway knowledge is required. At Norvals Pont it was desired to move a battalion; an engine and trucks were forthcoming; everything was marked out, so
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  many men were allotted to each truck, and they were put on to the train. It was not until we were ready to start that we discovered that the man on the engine had been there for thirty-six hours without a break, and he declared, not unnaturally, that it was absolutely impossible for him to go on until he had had some sleep. Doubtless many hon. Members can give others instances where there were not sufficient men with a knowledge of railway matters. South Africa, however, was a country very sparsely supplied with railways. In the case of a Continental country the need would be all the more pressing. Therefore I hope the right hon. Gentleman will take the matter into consideration, and lose no time in repairing the gap which he has created by the abolition of the railway battalion at Crewe. When I asked the right hon. Gentleman a question on the subject the other day, he said:—
  "It is not proposed to form any Territorial organisation for railway work to take the place of the disbanded Crewe battalion, but enlistment is to be reopened for the specially enlisted Railway Reserve. This forms part of the Army Reserve, and the men to be enlisted will probably be drawn from several railway companies."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 4th July, 1912, col. 1473.]
  That may be good in the future. In the meantime the railway battalion at Crewe ceased to exist in March last, and, as far as I know, nothing has yet been organised to take its place. The establishment of the battalion was 600 strong, and that was a real establishment, as they not only kept up to it, but were every year over strength. They sent out three drafts to the war—the first consisting of 129, the second of 101, and the third of two sections of 25. They were uniformly well reported on, and added great distinction to the corps to-which they belonged. It is a pity that a corps with such traditions behind it should be abolished. It is not easy to ask for the retention of some corps which have been done away with because they could not maintain their strength or efficiency; but here is a corps which was not only up to strength, but over strength. Moreover, as soon as a man left the service of the railway company, he ipso facto left the service of the corps. Consequently the corps consisted only of men actually in the service of the railway and expert in railway matters. It is impossible to over-estimate the importance of such a corps in any war, no matter where it takes place. I cannot conceive what induced the War Office to do away with that corps before they had something equally efficient to take its place. This is what they did. It was organised under the Territorial system; the

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  establishment was fixed at 531 all ranks, but 60 per cent, were to be Special Reservists. No practical steps were taken by the Army Council to organise the Special Reservists, and they never came into existence. The establishment dropped to 213 of all ranks, and remained at that until the corps was disbanded in March last. The Railway Reserve also has been abolished. There is at this moment a by-election pending in the Crewe Division. The right hon. Gentleman is not so great an expert in by-elections as one of his colleagues, but I would suggest that an announcement on this question might possibly do his party some good at the pending by-election, and we would forgive it if thereby we got the railway battalion reestablished, or, at any rate, some use made of the admirable material which exists there for the organisation of a good railway battalion.
  Mr. PEEL: I am glad to see the Financial Secretary in his place, because I wish to comment upon some statements that he has made. I did not know that he had written a book on the subject. I will read it at once, as it will probably supply admirable material on which to comment in future Debates. I should like to congratulate him upon having so rapidly followed in the footsteps of his late distinguished leader. The bland optimism which marked the whole of his speech was not at all unworthy of his late master. The hon. Member complained very severely of the critics of the Territorial Army. I thought he looked with indignation at hon. Members on this side, but he suddenly switched off, and I found that his attacks were delivered at unknown persons outside the House. One's experiences show a considerable difference: my experience is exactly the other way. I have had to complain, and do complain, very much more, not of the severe and destructive criticisms, but of the panegyrics and eulogies that have been poured down on the Territorial Force. My ears have been filled with them. I do not, of course, wish to give personal experience of my own unit. That would seem to savour of presumption, but if I were to do so—and I could do so, because I have got the things written down, and it is stamped upon my memory—I could refer to things which have been said to me by various general officers of great distinction whose words would carry weight in any military circle. I must say these
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  have been the criticisms I have heard, and had to put up with, rather than this destructive criticism which the hon. Gentleman so very fiercely attacked. An hon. Member has already made some criticisms upon the Territorial Force, and I need hardly say that anything I can say about it is from a most friendly point of view, because being one's self connected with it, one does not wish to criticise too severely one's friends. One does, however, claim to have a certain knowledge which may not be shared by more distinguished persons. In following the optimistic principles of the Secretary for War the hon. Gentleman opposite has told us that the recruiting for recent months has been very good, We are very much accustomed to that style of argument. We are told that it is quite true that in the past you may not have been able to get more than 250,000 or 260,000 men, but you are asked to look at what is happening now, and to look at the future when you are going to have a much larger recruitment of men; that indeed there may be a surplus! It is true that the hon. Member had a saving clause in his speech, for he said that we do not know how many discharges there are going to be until October, the end of the year. That may make a great deduction in his observations. Let me examine for a moment how matters stand. Following out that principle of optimism which one has to criticise, it appears to be this: that whatever the numbers are, whatever the facts are, the right hon. Gentleman is going to say that they are the best possible. If you say, "I think you have not come up to your establishment of 315,000 men, you are thousands short," the reply would be, "Whoever expected that the men would come up to the first figure; 255,000 is exactly what we want" He will tell you that if you have what you require you do not want redundance; and that, moreover, precisely on military grounds the number is exactly what is wanted, and things generally are exactly what they should be. I do not quite share those feelings. I would like to know if there is to be more elasticity in recruiting the forces for the different units. It is obvious to those who know the matter that if you are going to have 315,000 men you must at least have an establishment of about 400,000, because the conditions of recruiting vary so much in different parts of the country that some of the units would be only very nearly up to strength, and others a great deal below. I did not quite hear what was proposed in the

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  matter of recruiting, as to whether or not more elasticity was to be given. The Secretary of State will tell us probably clearly afterwards, but I suppose he will allow in certain counties recruiting above strength. What is to happen on mobilisation I do not understand; whether some of these extra men are to be transferred to other units in other counties, because, if so, I do not know what effect that will have upon the county spirit—
  Colonel SEELY:. No.
  Mr. PEEL: The right hon. Gentleman says "No." Perhaps he will explain how the thing is to be done. Take the number of 244,688 non-commissioned officers and men. From that you have to make several deductions before you can arrive at what is the real force available, because there are special services and special duties to be performed apart from the Territorial Force, which will take 114 officers and 2,607 men. Then take those who will be engaged with the Imperial Forces, and who will be taken far service abroad, which means 1,140 officers and 19,302 men. Of course, you must consider that these are by no means the worst men in the Territorial Force. If you do have to send abroad an Expeditionary Force and rely upon your Territorial Force at home you must pretty well assume that you will lose these men. If you take all the men who on 11th October were below the ages of seventeen and eighteen, and account that the available men will be between eighteen and nineteen—for I think you can hardly rely for fighting purposes even on these "young gentlemen," as I think they were called, at between seventeen and eighteen—take these at 12,163; and that makes up altogether 34,072 who have to be taken out of the existing force of 255,000 men, leaving only roughly 220,000 available. This will be so even if you estimate that all these men are able to pass the severer medical test, which no doubt they would have to go through if they are to be called out in six months and to be turned into troops available for fighting. You get your force diminished in that way—and that is the truer way to look at the matter—and you deduct about fourteen divisions of the Territorial Force.
  Out of this number we have got, I suppose, only about 145,000 men who have attended more than two camps. We cannot say how many have attended these camps for eight days or for fifteen days, but putting it at the highest, these 145,000 men can hardly have more than one month's actual
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  training. If you look at the figures of attendance in camp you find out that out of the whole force to do even this meagre amount of work, but 58 per cent, attended for the fifteen days, while the other half of the force did what is regarded as the absolute minimum of training that must be done by any force to give any sort of efficiency. Those who have been out the fifteen days know the extraordinary difficulty in getting even the very small amount of work that you have to get through done in the hustle and bustle of the time. Twenty-eight per cent, spend only eight days in camp, which I regard as perfectly ludicrous; almost useless. There is the mere question of getting the men fit for work and getting them accustomed to the routine. Thirteen per cent. were absent altogether. I would just like to make an observation or two in reply to the hon. Member who said that after all these men did a great deal of work outside the camp. That is perfectly true. A great many things are done which are not alluded to, but for the purpose of training and discipline you cannot really count this work outside. The only real work of military value, I submit—and I think hon. Members who know the subject will agree with me—is that where you are training the men consecutively and effectively in camp. That is the real and valuable work.
  May I refer back to 1907, and ask what then was the training supposed to fit the men for? First of all, they were to garrison naval forts, they were to take the place of the regular garrison, of the engineers, etc., then they were to repel raids, and at the conclusion of the six months' training the men were to volunteer for service abroad. There is a great deal of discrepancy between those various duties, because if the Territorial Force has to do the work of garrisoning and repelling raids, it cannot also volunteer for service abroad. Therefore many of these different duties are really incompatible. These are very largo and multifarious duties, and I notice one other remarkable thing: that as regards some of the Special Reservists, they are not to go out as a unit, but only as a draft. I suppose the officers will be scattered to the four winds, the Regular officers probably having been taken already for the Expeditionary Force. The officers of the Special Reserve will therefore be necessary to fill up the gaps in the ordinary camps. According to the late Secretary for War we, of the Territorial

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  Force, are to go in our units, our brigades, and even in our divisions, a far more formidable and difficult thing to do than the humbler duties assigned to the Special Reserve.
  May I say one word about the military value of this force? First of all, I want to show that the force has the highest moral and social value. No one, I think, could exaggerate that. There is, no doubt, not the right attitude at which one should look at a military force, but the getting people together and preparing their minds for military subjects does arouse, and is arousing, great interest in the country, and I think it is of the very highest value to interest people in military subjects. It may also be of indirect military value in interesting a great number of persons in the Army, and tending to dispel that feeling which existed in some counties—certainly in my own—that it is disreputable to enlist in the Army. I put it down to the interest in the Territorial Force that that disposition and feeling, so far as I am able to observe, has almost wholly disappeared. The next thing, as I think, is that you really cannot expect to get any very great change in the efficiency of this force. One is always being told that this force is always improving. Possibly it is. But the improvement is very, very slight. One has to be quite clear—and the Secretary of State no doubt will advise us on this subject—that we are not going to get—I do not think it is possible even with the zeal you have—to get a very much more efficient force from a military point of view than you have to day.
  Remember this: on your Territorial Force really might be thrown the whole defence of these Islands. We have 420,000, including ourselves, Regulars and details, which are to be left behind after the Expeditionary Force goes. But I think that for all practical military forces it will be as I say. We know, first of all, so far as the Reserve goes, that will be absorbed. The Special Reserve will be very rapidly absorbed. The Special Reserve will have very few officers, because they will be required to fill up the gaps in the wastage of the Regular officers. Therefore the whole of the home defence will fall on the Territorial Forces. There comes the great danger. We were told in the Debates in 1909 that the Expeditionary Force will take some time to mobilise and start from this country, and that therefore during
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  that time this force will be getting stronger. That is precisely the danger, because if you have a more efficient Territorial Force it means that you will have a slower mobilisation of the Expeditionary Force, otherwise your Expeditionary Force mobilises very rapidly, and you will then have a force on which you cannot rely to defend the country against even such a force as 70,000 men. That is a very-great danger indeed, because you will find then that the movement of your Navy will be hampered by the fact that the people of this country, not having sufficient confidence in the Territorial Force, will insist that the Navy should be tied to our shores more than it should be in view of proper strategical considerations and dispositions. You must always remember this—which is a common-place—that the strongest chain has its weakest link, and that the sending-out of the Expeditionary Force and our naval dispositions do really rest upon the strength of the Territorial Force.
  It is for that reason that we have got to direct our attention so closely and so-forcibly to the strength, organisation, and disposition of the Territorial Force. The only reply that we have got from the Secretary of State is this: "Oh, yes, that is all very well, but if you have not had your six months' training of the Territorial Force, the Territorial Force will be getting better every month." Of course, it is true there will be a gradual improvement. Still I assume what the late Secretary of State meant was that really until six months had elapsed—that was the minimum and not the maximum time—you could not get a force that in considerable numbers and after great sacrifice, and anyhow with delay and a great deal of trouble, that would be efficient, and that it is only after this six months' training by the best and most efficient officers that you will get the best out of that system. But how are you to have that with the existing Territorial officers? I suppose the adjutants and regular staff will be drawn away in time of war, and you are to have your Territorials trained by men who themselves have not had sufficient training.
  These are, I am afraid, disagreeable facts to have to state. I should like to ask two further questions. First of all, can you mobilise this Territorial Force at all? Is it possible to mobilise one of these Fourteenth Divisions? I know, of course, that would be a purely fancy mobilisation, because they could draw their forces from every quarter, and we know what useful

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  purposes this force serves and how many people they carry upon their backs in the different fortnights of the year. How long will it take to m0obilise the Territorial Army and to get contracts fulfilled to supply all equipment? How long would it be before you could get the Territorial Army the necessary equipment for war? There are one or two other short points I wish to deal with. I know it is quite impossible to get a longer period of training under present conditions for the Territorial Forces. I recognise the immense sacrifices made by a great many men and by a great many employers also in enabling the men to get out by the time they do, therefore I do not think it is possible to have a longer period; but would it not be possible to have a longer recruiting training, as in the case of the Special Reserve? Would it not be possible to have two or three months of recruits' course, because, as hon. Members know, it is the long training at first which stamps upon the minds of the young soldier lessons of discipline, and so on, which he will never lose. I think it would make a great difference as to recruits for the Territorial Reserve, because they would be very little value if they are to go to the Reserve after four years of the present training. It is of great value if you could have a preliminary solid training. That is the first thing I should like to ask. The second thing is this, and here I speak with some hesitation, because I am not familiar with that branch, has it or has it not been shown that you can get an efficient voluntary Territorial Artillery. Knowing something about the less technical arms, I find it impossible to imagine that you can get in the short time of training an efficient volunteer Artillery, and speaking for myself and possibly for others, I would certainly have far more confidence in facing an attack if we had Regular Horse Artillery and Infantry with Regular batteries of Field Artillery, and I believe it would add 50 per cent, to efficiency and confidence. It would be like Napoleon taking 40,000 men in his own person. Would it not be better from the military side if instead of a large number of guns for the Territorial Artillery you had a smaller number of trained batteries of Field and Horse Artillery which I believe would add force and strength to our Territorial Army which we can hardly realise.
  There is another point. I have seen that a large expenditure of money is to be devoted for buildings. I would much rather myself see the money going for
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  more horses and training and technical arms, and I believe the money will be far better spent than upon expensive buildings. I do not think there is a single man in the Territorial Army who has been made a more efficient soldier because he has very magnificent quarters to go to. Then again how very ridiculous it is to have to meet men armed with swords if you have not got them yourselves. I know well that theorists explain how you descend from your horses with great rapidity, seize your rifle, and drop these men coming on you with swords when about ten yards away. The thing is absolutely childish. The mere moral fact that you know men are coming on you with swords makes the difficulty of getting off your horse extreme, and makes it almost impossible to get hold of your rifle, arrange your sights, and so on. Fifty things happen when these men are coming upon you. This must happen in enclosed countries over and over again, and if you are not going to give us any weapon of that kind it would be better to have cycles, so that we may be able more rapidly to retire when the German Uhlans come down upon us. Then, as to the National Reserve, are we to rely upon it as supplementary to the Territorial Force? I had a question asked me the other day as to whether the National Reserve should be used in collecting stations for horses and wagons in case of Territorial mobilisation. I answer that naturally by asking other questions. I want to know in time of peace who these men are, in order to be able to instruct them. Secondly, can you rely upon these men detailed in time of peace, coming in in time of war, and would they be under the command of a number of officers each commanding a particular unit?
  Incidentally this raises the whole question of horses, because, of course, if the Yeomanry can bring their horses you do not want collecting stations of old National Reservists to do it for them, but if their horses are to be taken on mobilisation by the Expeditionary Force they will either be served by the Remount Department or in some other way, and collecting stations may be required. I should like to have an answer as to what use you intend to put the National Reserves to in time of war. My last point is this. An hon. Member opposite spoke about compulsory service. I am, of course, a supporter of compulsory service. It is ludicrous to draw the distinction which the hon. Member did between the compelled man and the voluntary man. The compelled man forgets he

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  is compelled after three days. Everyone would like to go through the discipline of military training if he knew what it was. There is a certain amount of inertia about a man in regard to this matter, but give him the necessary shove and you will find him as keen, or keener, than the voluntary man. I am sorry the hon. Member has repeated the old tag, or inspiration, if you like, which he has got from his late chief, that because you would have some sort of compulsory training in this country for home defence therefore you are not going to get your stream of men for your voluntary Army, that is to my mind the height of absurdity. I believe it to be exactly the other way, and as far as we have seen it in the Territorial Force the fact that a man serves makes him interested in military subjects. I believe it would be far easier and more honourable for men then than it is now to enlist in the Regular Army, and so far from having the stream of men dried up, I believe it would swell and increase so that you would be able to take far more men than now into your voluntary army.
  6.0 P.M.
  Mr. MUNRO-FERGUSON: The hon. Gentleman who has just sat down referred to the subject of buildings for the Territorial Force. I do not know whether buildings are necessary or not in this favoured climate in the South of England, but in my own country we should be very ill off I believe, and are very ill off still, without proper buildings, and I should be very sorry if the War Office assumed that a very considerable addition of buildings were not necessary for the Territorial Force. There are some matters as to details of administration on which I understand there is to be an inquiry by the War Office, and therefore I do not propose to go into them with one exception, and that is the question of local ranges. The want of local ranges is one of the disadvantages under which the force suffers. After all training in shooting is the first need of the Territorial Force. The position now is that the onus of finding the ranges is placed upon the association. The onus of passing them is placed upon the military authority, and under such stringent regulations that no engineer officer venture to pass any range, and the force are without ranges in the country. I believe the War Office ought to take into serious consideration the matter of creating a limited number of central ranges where you could have week-end shooting
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  under camp, because, after all, the cost of getting to local ranges is often as great as getting to the distant ranges. You may get along very cheaply upon tramways or railways, but when it comes to sending men by road to local ranges, as you often have to do, the cost is very great, and I doubt whether the cost of sending men to regular ranges will be so great as it is assumed to be. One of the most serious questions affecting the Territorial Force is this question of shooting facilities, because it is not worth having a force at all if you do not teach it to shoot. Some reference has been made to-day to a half-way house in regard to physical training. I believe something more might be done in the way of drill in the schools. It is a most difficult subject, because it is not one in which the military authorities can intervene, and it is one in which the education authorities must have a perfectly free hand. The conscientious and other objections taken to any drill being given in the schools are very great, but I think there might be a great extension of physical training in the schools, and with that there might go a certain amount of drill. If school training is to become of real value it is a question of physical training between the age of fourteen years and seventeen years. That is the most critical period of life, and in the urban districts especially in regard to the habits of the youth after leaving school at fourteen and before they reach seventeen. If you go beyond that you get into the industrial difficulty, but between fourteen and seventeen years of age there ought to be facilities for physical training under a proper system of gymnasia throughout the country and the boys should have drill in which' shooting might form a part. In Scotland we have educational authorities with power to provide compulsory continuation classes, but those provisions of the Education Act are a dead letter. At the same time physical training might be instituted accompanied by drill for the boys between fourteen and seventeen years of age, and this matter deserves the most serious attention of the country, because I believe it would lead to more recruiting for the Territorial Force.
  I do not think the present number of the Territorial Force is satisfactory, because 250,000 are not enough. I doubt whether 315,000 are enough, and I should like to see the total reach 500,000 men. Undoubtedly everything possible should be done to achieve that end. I am not one of those

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  who attach such deep importance to the fear of invasion. We have not been accustomed to invasion in the past—in fact, it has rather been our custom to invade—and I very much doubt, although the Territorial Force in numbers is low, and the training somewhat deficient, that there is any serious risk of invasion in this country. At the same time I believe it would make us feel infinitely more secure if the ranks of the Territorials were filled up to 315,000, and still more if the number reached 500,000 men. I say this all the more frankly because I am an opponent of compulsory service. I do not think compulsory service is possible in this country. I do not believe in it, and I think it is wholly unnecessary. I am afraid the Army Estimates will have to be permitted to expand somewhat beyond the figures at which they have stood for a long time, and I think we shall have to spend more money on the Territorial Force as well as a little more upon the Regular Army. We cannot be tied down absolutely to the figures as they are now. I wish to mention two Services to one of which a very small Grant is given and to the other none at all—I refer to the National Reserve and to the Red Cross. We should give training facilities between the ages of fourteen and seventeen and compulsory physical training with some drill for the boys. This and the influence brought to bear on recruiting for the Territorials by the National Reserve and the influence brought to bear upon recruiting for the Territorials through the Red Cross organisation will do much to fill the ranks of the Territorial Force. I do not think that the one shilling per head given for the National Reserve is adequate, and to ask for a bounty of one guinea is quite unnecessary.
  It costs about one shilling to provide the correspondence for each recruit and other expenses, so that the whole of the one shilling allowance is spent upon enrolment and registration in the first year. The cost of administration is considerable, and a great deal of work has to be done if the National Reserve is properly organised. I think that a Grant of two shillings would meet the requirements. As to the character of the National Reserve, in one part of Scotland they have been classified and 60 per cent, of them have been found fit to serve Certainly I believe that one-half of the National Reserve would be available in a time of emergency. That is a force which is exercising the most excellent effect upon recruiting for the Terri-
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  torials. As regards the Red Cross, where a county has been well organised it possesses invaluable machinery, and it has a good influence upon recruiting for the Territorials. I think there ought to be a £5 Grant for each effective detachment of the Red Cross, and it should be paid through, the Association. It may be said that this is a voluntary service, and that therefore it should meet its own expenses; but, after all, the whole of the medical organisation depends upon it, and where should we be if the Red Cross movement were not carried out by volunteers? I think this should be a Grant going through the Association. Some further encouragement should be given to filling up the cadres of the National Reserve all through the country, and additional provision should be made for the physical training of the youth of the country.
  Major STANLEY: The Financial Secretary for War told us that the recruiting for the Territorial Force this year had gone through the most critical period of the year, and that the numbers had increased during that time. I am speaking from memory, but I would suggest that the hon. Member's statement is not quite correct. I think it is a fact that the larger number of the recruits of the Territorial Force in 1908 joined in June and July, and therefore the effect of those who may have gone out will not be felt yet, and consequently the force has not gone through the most critical part of the year in regard to enlistment. I wish to say a few words about the Territorial Horse and Field Artillery. I am not doing this in any party spirit, although I am approaching the subject with a feeling of disappointment. I am speaking on this subject as an artilleryman of some twenty years' service, and I am disappointed that the Territorial Artillery has not reached the standard which at one time I hoped it would be able to reach. I want to make it perfectly clear that I am making no attack whatever on the officers and men belonging to the Territorial Horse and Field Artillery. I agree with all those who say that they have done wonders with the limited opportunities they had, and I agree that one ought not to do anything to wound their feelings when they are spending all their time and abilities in trying to fit themselves to a most difficult task. I was adjutant of the Honourable Artillery Company, and in that company we were able to turn out two efficient batteries of our own of a very high standard of training. It was

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  my belief then that given the opportunity other batteries might achieve the same efficiency. I have been obliged to revise my opinion, because other batteries did not get the same opportunity as the Honourable Artillery Company. In the first place, there is the question of the officers. It is no good denying that Artillery work is highly technical and takes a considerable amount of training. The officers of the Honourable Artillery Company were efficient because they all came through the ranks, and we did not promote a man to an officer unless he knew his work thoroughly.
  In the case of other batteries I know they have had to get whoever they could to go in as officers, and therefore the officers are there nominally to teach the men. To make things worse, if those batteries are called out for active service their adjutants are taken away and the result is that the man on whom the Commanding Officer has been relying all through peace time is taken away just when his services are most required. I quite agree that anyone who condemns the Territorial Artillery ought to make out a case against it. I would ask first of all whether there is any prominent officer who has given an impartial opinion who has been able to say that the Territorial Force and the Field Artillery are up to the standard they should be? In reading the report of the Inspector-General of the Territorial Force I noticed that he was very careful as to what he said about the Territorial Artillery. He said that they had improved. Without wishing to say anything disparaging to the Artillery I would say that it would have been a very bad look-out if they had not improved. The Inspector-General further said that they would require a longer period of training than other troops, to make them efficient, and I think that is apparent to everybody. I would ask whether the right hon. Gentleman could possibly find a single eminent Horse or Field Artillery officer of the Regulars who would get up and say that the Territorial Artillery is up to the standard it should be. When I ask if any Regular Artillery officer can give that guarantee I do not wish to say anything disparaging of the Master-General of Ordnance in this particular case, although I would not accept his opinion, because I happen to know that the Master-General of Ordnance has had no connection with Horse Artillery for twenty-eight years,
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  and at that time, when a battery went out to shoot, they used to shoot at a target of the size of this House, and anyone could look over the site to see if the gun was laid, and if they hit the target they cheered. That is the officer whose opinion, I suppose, in the deliberations of the Army Council, carries great weight on Artillery matters.
  We have other evidence on this matter. I take the letters written by the officer who has recently retired from the command of the Territorial Horse and Field Artillery in the London district. I am sorry to say I have not got the actual quotation, but this is the sense of it: "The Horse and Field Artillery, certainly in the London district, were not up to the standard they should be." He pointed out that, as things were, he did not see any chance of their coining up to that standard, and he said, "If you do not send your batteries down to practice every year, but only every alternate year, it is very easily possible a man may be in the Territorial Force for four years, and during the whole of that time never see a shot fired." That is perfectly ridiculous to anybody who knows anything whatever about Artillery. A man cannot be properly trained until he has been down with the battery and seen a live shell fired. That is one officer who ought to know a good deal about the Territorial Horse and Field Artillery, and that is his opinion. I also knew another officer who had considerable experience in Horse and Field Artillery, and who still takes an interest in these matters. He told me he went to see three Territorial batteries practising. They were going through a very simple scheme, though they certainly had to fire behind cover, which, it is generally supposed, they would have to do in actual warfare. The best battery got off its first gun forty-five minutes after getting into action, and the worst battery fifty-five minutes after getting into action. His only comment was that, supposing Infantry had been advancing, and allowing they went two miles an hour, by the time they got off their first shot the Infantry would be through the battery and a mile the other side of it. That was not the first year of their going out. It was the last year's training. It really does seem there is no possibility, with the limited opportunities you have of training the Territorial Artillery, of getting them up to standard in the matter of rapidity of fire, and, if you do not get rapidity and accuracy of fire, then

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  your Artillery is only a source of danger to your own side. One of the arguments used in favour of the Territorial Artillery—I rather think the Secretary of State has used it himself—is that we should not have a very large amount of artillery against us in any invading force. I believe that is right. I believe any force sent over here will not be sent with a large amount of artillery. Why is it, then, we have such a large amount of Artillery in the Territorial Force? We have much more in the Territorial Force in proportion to numbers than any other Army. What is the object of having a very large amount of only partly trained troops? Is it intended to overwhelm hostile artillery by mere numbers? Unless your men can shoot, and shoot accurately, you have no chance whatever of overwhelming hostile artillery by mere weight of numbers. It seems to me it would be far wiser and better in every way to reduce the amount of Artillery in the Territorial Force, and to make absolutely certain that what you have is absolutely of the very best. It is no good thinking you are going to get the best Artillery unless you are continually working at it. Take any senior officer of the Regular Artillery, and I am perfectly certain, if he were asked, he would say he was annually learning something and could never learn too much of his work. Is it not ridiculous to suppose you are going to get men to learn as much in a fortnight's training, as other officers learn the whole year round? I feel sure it would be far better if, instead of these large masses of Territorial Artillery, we could have a smaller number on a regularly trained Artillery footing to act with that force. If you wish, do not have the battery with its full equipment, but at any rate let us have the nucleus by which we can give an efficient Artillery to our Territorial Force.
  The right hon. Gentleman knows that the work of the Artillery, and especially the Horse Artillery, is not mainly directed against artillery. The first objective of Horse Artillery is to get at the enemy's Cavalry if you can; and, again, one of the principal objects of Field Artillery is to assist the Infantry when they are driving home their attack. Anybody who has seen the result of a premature shell from their own side on Infantry or Cavalry will realise what it means. I do not wish to put the matter flippantly in any way, but the only word which I can think of to describe it adequately is to say it makes both Cavalry and the Infantry extremely "gun-shy." You cannot expect either Cavalry or Infantry
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  to push their advantage at the critical moment, or even to push on before this, unless they are perfectly certain when they need them the Artillery are going to be there to support them with all their power. I would conclude by asking the right hon. Gentleman whether he cannot see his way to having a committee of Artillery officers serving in the Regular Army who can go at all times and see all these different batteries at practice, and who will be allowed to report freely and fully upon them. If that committee reported the Territorial Artillery was not up to the standard it should be, and if the right hon. Gentleman then took his courage in both hands and did away with the Territorial Artillery, I believe he would not only have done the right thing, but I believe he would have done the bravest and best possible thing for the Territorial Force.
  Colonel WILLIAMS: I want to present one very serious aspect of the question of the provision of ranges for Territorial shooting, and that is the Sunday aspect of it. I do not think the House or the nation quite realises the extreme difficulty of getting the Territorial Force through their shooting. In London and in many big places it is almost impossible for the Territorial to qualify himself in shooting. There are two alternatives if he is to get his proper amount of shooting. One is to provide ranges, and the other is to take Sunday for the purpose. That is a plain statement of the fact, and the tendency to resort to Sunday shooting is growing, unnoticed I think by the people of England, a Christian people who owe, and know they owe, a great deal for their place in the world to our national love for Sunday and our national observance of Sunday. We are deliberately putting ourselves in this position. We are saying to ourselves the Territorials must be trained, and there are only two ways of doing it. We must either spend money or break the Sunday. A good many Members of the House know I had forty years' service with the old Volunteers, during eighteen years of which I was in command of the battalion, so I know something of the subject about which I am talking. I saw a letter the other day from a young man, an average good young man who liked to go to church on Sunday, especially in the evening, and he wrote to his father saying, "You know I am in the Territorials, and I have got to get my shooting done. I have not been able to get to church on Sunday evening for the last three

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  Sundays, because I am obliged to go shooting." Everybody knows that condition of things is perfectly true, and yet there is no compulsion. I want to say perfectly frankly how well the War Office has met this difficulty. My quarrel is not with the War Office. I know they do not want to encourage Sunday shooting; they have said so. The last time the matter was mentioned in this House a very sympathetic answer was given by the representative of the War Office. I want the House to realise the position into which we are drifting. There is no compulsion; there ought to be no compulsion, and everybody says there shall not be any compulsion. We know perfectly well if a Regular regiment went shooting on Sunday there would be mutiny, and the War Office would uphold the men against the commanding officer who ordered them to go shooting on Sunday, and would quite rightly uphold them; but, when you have to get your men through their shooting, and when, if you do not get them through it, you do not get your Grant or make your men efficient, of course there is a strong moral compulsion on these men, and, so long as there are no ranges, there must be a strong moral compulsion on the men to go shooting on Sunday.
  We are told that an integral part of the week-end camp is the Sunday service, and that men go to that service who do not go to Church at other times. That may be so, but that is not the object of the weekend camp. The object is the shooting, and it very often gets to Sunday practice. It has been advocated that the ranges should be open on Sunday. That means compulsory markers. It means compulsory service for them, and their Sunday is taken away from them. It may be said you can get volunteer markers, but how are you going to get it done with volunteer markers? Fewer men will get through their shooting, because the volunteer marking will not last long. It is said these week-end camps are for the purpose of week-end practice. The men have to be conveyed back, and that means Sunday transport, and all the other concomitants of travelling on Sunday. What is the next thing? People go out to see the men shooting on Sunday, and refreshments have to be provided. I ask anybody who is acquainted with what goes on in connection with Sunday shooting in Switzerland, if they are not perfectly well aware that the afternoon is observed as a village
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  festival, involving a considerable amount of Sunday labour. If, therefore, we go in for these week-end camps, and for the opening of the ranges on Sundays, it will be but another step in the weakening of that observance of the Lord's Day which, I believe, the English people in their hearts wish to see continued, whatever their practice may be, because they realise that the weakening of the observance of the Sunday will involve a weakening of our position in the world. I hope the right hon. Gentleman will not encourage this movement. Of course, nobody knows better than he that if you are to have good Territorial shooting and efficiency it is a question either of money or of the desecration of the Sabbath.
  Colonel GREIG: I do not propose to follow the hon. and gallant Member into the discussion of the question of Sunday shooting, but I would suggest for his consideration whether, after all, a young man who goes out for an hour or two on the Sunday might not attend a service in the camp and then proceed to fit himself for the defence of his country. I am not sure whether in the long run you would not get more young men to attend religious services on Sundays by bringing them down to the ranges than you would if they remained in town.
  Colonel WILLIAMS: At the ranges near London which are opened on Sundays there are no Sunday services. They are merely week-end camps.
  Colonel GREIG: It would be a very good thing indeed if the neighbouring clergy, should the custom extend, would take an interest in the men at the ranges. I am perfectly certain that their services would be welcomed. I want to say a few-words on some of the criticisms we have listened to this afternoon. The hon. Member for Taunton (Mr. Peel) expressed opinions of which none of us on this side could reasonably complain. He showed that he takes a keen interest in the force of which he is a member, and he did not level at it the sort of criticism which we too often hear outside this House. He did suggest that the force had not reached that standard which we all hope it will attain, but, on that, we are all agreed; those who are the firmest believers in the Territorial Force quite recognise that it has not, and may not for some time, reach the standard we wish it to. What is the use of pulling up a plant every few months to see how it is growing? Yet that is the sort of treatment which has been accorded

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  to the Territorial Force during the last few years. We can all remember how, when they were first started, the County Associations were said to be utterly unworkable machines, and yet they have proved a magnificent success. We have heard very strong criticisms to-day against the creation of an Artillery Force for the Territorial Force. One hon. and gallant Member speaking with considerable authority, declared that he was not fully satisfied with that branch of the force, but I would like to call his attention to the fact that, in the statement of the Secretary for War this year, a new departure was indicated under which a large supply of Regular Artillery officers will be available for the Territorial Force, and I believe that will be most useful in improving that branch of our Territorial Army.
  Next as to the recruiting. It was prophesied that we were going to have a very large exodus from the force at this time of the year. I hope that that prophecy will be falsified. A certain number of men will go out, but experience is showing that many entertain so much affection for the force that they will prolong their service and thus prevent any enormous exodus. The chief spot where recruiting is most unsatisfactory is in London itself. In the county of London there is a shortage of 4,000 or 5,000 men. I am not going into the causes of that, but I would suggest that hon. Members who really have at heart the welfare of the Territorial Force should bring their influence to bear on young men in London, of whom there are many, who might either take commission or go into the rank and file, and serve their country in this way. It should be pointed out to them that in this force there is plenty of room for them, and if our bosoms are swelling with patriotic emotions it is as well it should be brought home to the minds of our young men that here is the opportunity for them to prove their patriotism. I was sorry to hear the hon. Member who spoke last deprecate the expenditure of money on buildings, because I believe that that is one of the things that will help to make the force increase. You must have good headquarters for various reasons. You want the social element introduced, and it is not denied by anyone who knows anything about the matter that the introduction of this element does not deteriorate the force at all. I am glad, therefore, the War Office are pursuing a perfectly wise policy by providing good headquarter buildings.
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  Next I come to the National Reserve and the Territorial Reserve. The public are not quite clear in their minds what these two bodies are. Many think that the National Reserve is really the Reserve of the Territorial Force. Of course that is not so. The real Reserve of the Territorial Force is the Territorial Reserve, which, unhappily, at present, is very small in London. I indicated a week or two ago some of the reasons for that. I pointed out that the initial qualifications were so stringent that a number of men coming out of the Territorial Force could not comply with the conditions, and, therefore, were unable to enter the Territorial Reserve. Men are asked to undertake an obligation of service in this force, whereas in the National Reserve it is not the case. I think every encouragement should be given to join the Territorial Force Reserve even as a primary duty, and that priority should be given it over the National Reserve. At the same time I agree with the hon. and gallant Member who said it was extremely important to give a little more money to the National Reserve as the amount now given is not adequate to cover the expense. It does not enable them to launch out into schemes for the provision of drill arrangements and miniature ranges, and I am convinced, seeing that we have plenty of good material, if a shilling a head more were given it would relieve the committees in the boroughs who are working to keep up the Reserve of a good deal of financial anxiety. There has been a good deal of unfair criticism of the force, and it is that which is doing a great deal of harm. I do not want to repeat ad nauseam what has been said in these discussions, but it must be admitted that some of these criticisms are not fair and are not calculated to do the force any good. There was a speech delivered by Lord Willoughby de Broke at Haileybury College which was certainly not animated by very good feeling towards the force, and even Lord Curzon said:—
  "Because we regard the Territorial Army as hopelessly inadequate for the purpose—in equipment, officers, training, Artillery, and transport, in all that makes a force formidable - we members of the National Service League advocate the replacement of the Territorial Army by a National Army or Citizen Force."
  I do not think such criticisms as these are either fair or right. They have been repeated to-night to some extent by an hon. Member who spoke from the Front Bench opposite, and these were some of the adjectives he used: "Untrained," "unorganised," "immature force," "widely

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  scattered," "ill-equipped," "badly officered," and "no experience of war." Let me ask what question the hon. Member was addressing himself to. He assumed the invasion of this country by a force of 70,000 trained soldiers from the Continent. He assumed that our own Expeditionary Force of 150,000 men had gone abroad. But where had they gone? Had they gone on an expedition to the Antipodes, or had they gone to the country with which we were at war, and to which surely the same considerations would apply? It would have to be assumed in that case that our 150,000 trained men had been landed on the shores of our enemy.
  Earl WINTERTON: There are two millions of armed men in Germany, and they would swallow up our Expeditionary Force.
  Colonel GREIG: I do not wish to enter into that question, but I would point out that we are not likely to send a force of 150,000 men anywhere, on the Continent or elsewhere, to engage in a European war unless there are other people in the business as well as ourselves. You must assume that if your 150,000 men have gone anywhere they have gone to the country with which you are at war. [HON. MEMBERS: "No, no."] Then I would ask what nation there is on the Continent, except France, which during a period of peace extending over forty years past has had any experience of war? I suggest that hon. Members must really reconsider the fundamentals of this problem. They are assuming everything against England. They assume that our Navy has disappeared; that our 150,000 men are abroad; that all the rest of the Regulars have disappeared, and that the poor Territorials are standing in a state of blue panic waiting for the landing of this trained Continental army. I do not believe that that is quite what would happen, nor do I believe that hon. Members opposite think it would happen. What are the remedies proposed for the present system? Everybody agrees as to the desirability of improving our Territorial Force, but I waited in vain this afternoon for one single suggestion as to how it was to be done. One hon. Member suggested the Swiss system, and another hon. Member suggested the programme of the National Service League. I say quite frankly, as regards the programme of the National Service League, that I do not believe it will produce anything like so well trained a
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  home defence Army as the present Territorial system. Take the League's suggestion of four months of training service and then weekly camp for the three years following. What do you get in the Territorial Force? It is useless to say that a man does not get training outside the camp. Hon. Members opposite seem to think that the camp is the only valuable thing for the Territorial Force. I take an entirely different view. I know that the camp is most valuable, but to say that the Territorial is not trained because he does not give the whole of his fifteen days to camp is really not consonant with the facts. The man is in constant training all the year round in all properly organised regiments, and the amount of training he gets, not only at camp, but at Easter and Whitsuntide, if his heart is in his work, will give him in four years' Territorial training quite as much as any man would get under the programme of the National Service League. Therefore I dismiss that suggestion. The other suggestion was compulsion. Will any responsible Member get up and say that they are prepared to suggest compulsory service for this country?
  Mr. HUNT: I have done it lots of times.
  Colonel GREIG: The hon. Member is about the only one. Hon. Members opposite had the opportunity of doing it after the war. They had a general in office who has since been in favour of compulsory service; they had the nation in a mood to adopt it much more than they had ever got it, or are likely to get it, yet they abstained from doing it, knowing at the time that they had a force which, according to their own ideas, did not do a camp of seven days. In the face of that their own responsible Minister, the late Leader of the Opposition declined to have anything to do with compulsory service. Why should they ask us to pass it?
  MARQUESS of TULLIBARDINE: Is the hon. and gallant Member aware that the Secretary of State for War himself said that we ought to have compulsory service then, although he does not say so now?
  Colonel GREIG: I shall leave the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War to answer for himself. I have no doubt that if he did advocate anything of that sort it is perfectly explainable. The fact remains that hon. Members opposite, when they had the opportunity and the circumstances were far more favourable

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  than they have ever been since, when they had officers in office who are now in favour of it, and who could have taken the responsibility for it, did not do it. Another suggestion is that the Estimates should be increased, and that we should increase the Regular Army. The whole merit of the present system is that we have a system organised in something like a scientific way. Let me read a passage from an important organ, which reflects the views of hon. Members opposite:—
  "By transferring money from services which were superfluous to those which were necessary we have been able to double the hitting power of the first line. By rendering the Special Reserve liable to foreign service we have given ourselves the hope of maintaining the first line in the field during six months of serious war. We have organised public spirit throughout the counties by means of the associations, and ill the Officers' Training Corps we have initiated a movement of much promise for the reinforcement of the commissioned ranks. In place of the volunteer chaos we have an organised force in the second line of real value in time of emergency, and, had public feeling been less irresolute and less easily led astray by people incapable of constructive policy, we might very easily have added largely to the numbers of the second line. Never at any modern period of our history were we more formidable as a Military Power than we are to-day. We have the first Army created by soldiers that the country has ever possessed since the Middle Ages, and we have every reason to be proud of it, cavil as politicians may."
  That is from the "Times" of some time ago. It accurately represents views which, until recently, were quite acceptable to hon. Gentlemen opposite. I believe that if you treat this force fairly, criticise it as much as you like, tell your friends to come into it, do not continually suggest new methods of watering, treating and pulling it up by the roots, I am quite certain that if the necessity did arise—and I have never said that in no circumstances it might not be necessary to have compulsory service although I am sure at present that there is no need for it—the best interests of this country will be served by working on the lines we are now following.
  Mr. BAIRD: Every speech I have ever heard from the Front Bench opposite always inclines me to send in my resignation as a Territorialist. I am bound to say that all the speeches I have heard today, including the speech of the Financial Secretary—whom I congratulate upon his promotion—have shown no exception to the rule. The hon. Gentleman has fallen into line with the traditional statements from that bench. Nothing is more discouraging to persons who are anxious to have, not necessarily a Territorial Force, or any particular kind of force, but an efficient armed force for this country. I do not understand why hon. Members take it as a personal insult that we who belong to the Territorial Force, which they do not,
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  criticise it. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh! oh."] I have looked through Dod, and I find there are fifty-seven Members who sit on this side of the Committee who belong to the Territorial Force, and only thirty-seven Members from the other side of the House.
  Earl WINTERTON: And not one of the Labour party.
  Mr. BAIRD: That is so. We criticise the Territorial Force because we belong to it, and know something about it. We do not confine ourselves to reading reports, statistics and articles from newspapers and other publications. I criticise it from the point of view of an ex-diplomatist, I cannot look upon our aimed forces, naval and military, as capable of being separated into watertight compartments. You have got to have an armed force, as the right hon. Gentleman well knows, when there is a diplomatic difference, for it is arms, and not arguments, that weigh then. We had an example of that in the trouble which occurred in the year 1908, when all was going on well until the allies appeared in shining armour. That is bound to happen. In criticising the Territorial Force, I do not say one word against the men of that force. I think they are worthy of the greatest possible praise, because they do their utmost, under the most discouraging circumstances, to discharge a duty which is a fundamental duty of everybody in this country. I complain that it is impossible in the present circumstances, with the stress of competition both in peace and in war, for men to devote the necessary time to train themselves to become efficient unless that burden is shared equally by the whole nation. Take the example of an officer who also happens to be a Member of this House. He has to make up his mind whether he will miss a few Divisions and cut a bad figure before his constituents, or whether he will go off and do his training. He probably splits the difference, and does half his training, and then puts in his Divisions. Will anybody deny that his primary duty is to make himself efficient? If it were looked upon as an obligation it is just as important to discharge as paying the taxes, there would be no question as to his missing a single day's training. I do not see why you should have military service on a different footing from any other service which has to be rendered to the community by those who constitute it.
  The hon. and gallant Member who spoke last said that when this party were in

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  power there was an officer commanding who was in favour of military service, but that our party did not take advantage of the frame of mind in which the country found itself to carry compulsory service into effect. I do not know whether the hon. and gallant Member has followed the history of our party lately. If he has, he has noticed that opinions are changing, not only in regard to military service, but on other matters as well, and opinion in the country is changing in an equally satisfactory way in regard to all these matters. I hope we shall have the honour of introducing, one of these days, a Service which will be a real military service, which will be respected, not only in this country, but abroad. Nowhere would greater relief be felt if we had a real system of military training in this country, by which we could develop to the utmost extent the undeniably magnificent material we possess, and nowhere would such action arouse a more, satisfactory feeling than among our friends and allies on the Continent. That is a matter of the utmost importance. Nowhere would such a proceeding be viewed with greater disappointment than among those who, for the moment, do not see eye to eye with us. This is a serious matter. I am bound to say that, noticing the sparse attendance on the benches opposite, it is difficult to persuade oneself that hon. Members opposite do think this a serious matter. I do not think we can be satisfied with the present stale of affairs. No officer of the Territorial Force who is a civilian, who is an ordinary individual, with other avocations in life, and who looks upon it as a duty to belong to whatever form of irregular military organisation is open to him, can be satisfied with the present state of affairs.
  7.0 P.M.
  Although I said that the speeches of the right hon. Gentleman and his colleagues always inclined me to send in my resignation, still I shall continue to serve, if I can, with any organisation, even if it were only with the Royal Bodyguard in Scotland, which, armed with weapons with a rather high trajectory, is no doubt very desirable from the right hon. Gentleman's point of view. I am asking for a better opportunity to develop those latent talents which we possess, in order that we may have full effect if called upon to use them. The predecessor of the right hon. Gentleman who, I am thankful to say, is now-transferred to a sphere where his talents
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  will find better scope, evolved this lawyer-made army, which enjoys no respect whatever abroad, and very little respect in this country. It is for that reason that I venture to criticise it. To come to specific instances, the hon. and gallant Gentleman (Colonel Greig) asked why we did not introduce compulsory military training when we were in office. He has a fantastic notion as to the disposition of the Regular Forces and the employment which would be allotted to the Territorials. It is perfectly impossible to foresee where you have to send your Regular Army, because that will depend largely not only on the state of affairs within the Empire, but the state of affairs at the seat of war and the disposition of allies. The Regular Army, too, cannot be dispatched until the Territorials are in a position to take their places at home. That is the source of danger. It is perfectly impossible to advance that contention. When you come down to details you are entitled to ask why a humble individual like myself—a Territorial officer in command of a squadron—is dissatisfied with the present organisation. You cannot get more people than you have now, and if you did get them you could not train them under present conditions. In many cases certainly the men and the non-commissioned officers are probably better trained than the officers. That is a frightful source of danger. I do not know whether the right hon. and gallant Gentleman had time to peruse a book to which I will call his attention. Does he remember this passage—
  "The most promiscuous murderer in the world is the ignorant military officer."
  When one sees—as all of us have seen—troops manœuvring down into an ambush which, if they had had a little more experience, they would certainly have avoided, and when one thinks what that means if we were at war and men were shooting with bullets in their rifles, you are bound to admit the truth of that statement. The most intelligent man in the world cannot become an efficient officer unless he has an opportunity of training, and what opportunity under present conditions does a man have of becoming efficient? It is impossible for a great many people to give up the time, even if the machinery were available; but the machinery is not available. Look at the conditions which an officer has to discharge in order to get his commission: Forty drills, of which twenty must be performed before the annual training in camp, or twelve working days with a Regular unit

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  before training in camp; the annual training in camp with his unit, and a recruit course in musketry. You take that man and put him in charge of thirty or forty of his fellow countrymen who probably know a great deal more about the job than he does himself. I consider that is an iniquitous state of affairs, and you are not entitled to send men out under those conditions. Everyone knows what the subsequent training of the officers is. He has to attend drill before training in camp, and he has to go to camp two or three days before his regiment goes out. He can do anything up to three drills in a day, and a drill must not extend less than an hour. The annual training in camp is a most inadequate performance. You go into camp, your day of assembly and your day of departure are dies non; you have to have two Sundays, you have to put in troop drill, squadron drill, regimental drill, field firing, and of course a field day; and the result of it all is that every day when you come home into camp you realise that errors have been committed which ought and would have been avoided if there had been more time to learn the job. I guarantee that is the experience of every keen Yeomanry officer. You cannot look upon annual training as a refresher course, because there is nothing to refresh. If men who join the Territorial Force had gone through an efficient period of training it would be a different matter, but they have not done so, and consequently they are learning all the time, and it is a case of the blind leading the blind in nine cases out of ten. I think the men are better trained than the officers; and certainly the training of the non-commissioned officers is magnificent in a great many cases; but it is like the man who did his two hundred drills in a year. How many are there? And for one who has done that cannot we say that ten men have done no drills in a year? That is a question to be considered.
  Then there is the question of armaments, and on that I re-echo what was said by the hon. Member (Mr. Peel). I should like to know something more about the Hampshire Carbineers. It reminds me of the advice given in an old book on equitation for dealing with a weary horse, where it is laid down that it is a good thing to strike him on the head with thicky clubby and speak to him in a terrifying voice. I will grant, for argument's sake, that the Hampshire Carbineers have terrifying voices, but where is their thicky clubby? And if you are going to charge
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  it is the thicky clubby which counts more than the terrifying voice. I think we are not properly trained to engage in charges. I remember an occasion when I had the honour to gallop before an officer who commanded a brigade on Salisbury Plain, and the Hampshire Carbineers were also engaged, and against them were the Scots Greys. There was an encounter on the slope of the hill, where the Scots Greys played with the Carbineers like a cat with a mouse, and I will undertake to say that the Scots Greys would have played with any other Yeomanry regiment.
  Colonel SEELY: In order to dismiss the point about my own regiment, I say at once that this particular body of men did serve very gallantly in the South African war.
  Mr. BAIRD: No one will regret more than I do that the right hon. Gentleman should misrepresent or misunderstand me. There was a certain proportion who served in the war, probably the same proportion as we had in our regiment, and they were the backbone of the regiment. I mentioned the Carbineers because I happened to see them, but I have no doubt that the same thing would have occurred in any regiment. Supposing the Scots Greys had been a foreign regiment, that is where the trouble would have come in. If, instead of going down to see manœuvres or to visit the Fleet at the Government expense, we were sent over to go and see foreign armies and navies, there would be something more to be said for it. I wish to take up the suggestion of the hon. Member (Mr. Peel). It is a monstrous thing to have a man on the top of a hill where he is likely to be attacked by other people and to have nothing but his clubbed rifle to defend himself with. He ought to have a short bayonet or something of that kind which he could use instead of only his rifle. Then there comes the question of mobilisation. That has been gone into very thoroughly and no one has worked harder than the very efficient staff which runs the Territorial Force at the War Office. The difficulty of all Territorials, both officers and men, is the question of discipline. By lack of discipline I do not mean that they are insubordinate. Anyone who has served in a regiment knows that that crime is practically non-existent. But it is the fact that, not having been drilled and trained, there is not that faultless punctuality, that automatic performance of duties and drill and all the rest of

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  of it which can only come from discipline and training. You may have to occupy a town where there may be 4,000 Territorials in billets, each with a fiver in his pocket, scattered about in the town and then you try to enforce discipline! That is a point which deserves consideration. It is necessary that some attempt should be made to provide accommodation, hutting, or whatever it may be, in order that you should have your regiment under your hands and not scattered about in billets. In war time when the whole country is excited, and when it is a question of minutes and not weeks or months, as it was thought or rather said there would be, for the purpose of training Territorials, that is a matter of some importance.
  There is another point. One of the first duties of regimental quartermasters is to fill up the soldier's pay book. Among other things you have to say whether he is entitled to efficiency pay or not. The qualification for obtaining efficiency pay includes the possession of a third-class education certificate. For the moment it does not exist, and it is not fair to disqualify men from efficiency pay. These are details of importance. It is not a pleasant thing to criticise the military forces of the country on which the safety of the country and the successful diplomacy of the country primarily rests. I look upon the Army primarily as an instrument of peace and not an instrument of war. It is only an instrument of war when diplomacy has failed, because there is not a strong enough force to back up your diplomacy. If you keep your armed forces up to the proper standard of strength that is the best guarantee for peace that we can possibly have. But you will not get that by playing. It is no use saying we have an Army when we have not, and it is no use leading out a number of men who can wear putties and shoulder a rifle, and say, "There you are, you have a trained Army." That is not business, and it is because it is not business that I call attention to it. Will the House forgive me if I read an extract from a speech made by the German Chancellor in the Reichstag so late as 30th March, 1911? He said:—
  "If a nation will not, or cannot, spend so much on its armament that it can assert itself in the world, it moves into the second rank, it falls back into the rôle of a supernumerary. There will always be another and a stronger ready to take its place in the world. We Germans, in our exposed position, are, above all others, obliged to look this stern reality fearlessly in the face. Only thus shall we maintain peace and our existence."
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  I do not think there is a word of menace in what fell from the German Chancellor on that occasion. I think these words ought to be spoken by every self-respecting nation in the world, and it is because I do not think any British Government, certainly not the present Government, has approached the question of the military forces from the point of asking what is absolutely necessary, telling the country what is the cost, and ascertaining whether the country agrees or not, that I urge this matter on the attention of the right hon. Gentleman. The present Government have not found the slightest difficulty in spending money in other directions. Some right hon. Gentlemen opposite boast of the amount of money the Government are spending, and glory in the fact that we are a rich country and can afford it. I never heard anything of this sort in connection with the Army. I doubt very much whether there is not a feeling that there is a certain amount of unpopularity in spending money on these services. Hon. Gentlemen below the Gangway seem to think that unless there is compulsion in connection with the measures they support they are like an egg without salt. They want compulsion for land purchase and to drive men into trade unions, but they are against compulsory military service. If it is to be for the advantage of the country that more money should be spent on the Territorial Force, I do implore the right hon. Gentleman to realise that we, at any rate on this side, are ready to back him up and support him, not only with speeches, but with votes, if he will put before us a scheme which the people can conscientiously support. We believe that the scheme now before the country with respect to the Territorial Force is totally inadequate.
  Mr. WYNDHAM: My object in rising is, if I can, to focus the attention of the Secretary of State on points which have been urged but which neither he nor his predecessor has ever met. I hope he will not complain of me for pointing out defects which undoubtedly exist in our home defence. We on this side approach the question with reluctance. The criticism, even if it were captious, which it is not, which will hurt and may destroy the Territorial Force is anything in the nature of make-believe. We all agree that we have got to encourage throughout the nation a sense of national responsibility towards the Territorial Force, and in the Territorial Force a sense of responsibility

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  towards the nation on the part of every man and every unit. You cannot have that if you have an atmosphere of unreality hanging over some of the main features of your scheme, and if you allow officers and men to get filled with the suspicion that they are being made fools of or that they are making fools of themselves. I dare say the right hon. and gallant Gentleman remembers that his Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge came round on a great occasion and asked an outpost, "What are you?" and the answer was, "I am a—fool, and if it rains much more I am going home." You run the danger of making the members of the Territorial Force think that they are fools or that they are being fooled if you encourage them to believe that they know more than they know or that they can do more than they can do. First of all as to numbers, it gives an air of unreality to all our proceedings if you are told one day that the establishment is a certain number and next day that that is the Parliamentary maximum. It gives an air of unreality to find a period of complacency following upon a period of alarm.
  It gives an air of unreality to the position to have no adequate statement as to the purpose for which this force exists. Do we not all agree as to the purpose? You must have a standard to work up to. You yourselves say that the force ought to be able to prevent an invasion, or a raid, by 70,000 men or by a number of smaller forces. You can say 69,000 if you like, but stick to it, and make the men believe it is for a force of that kind that they should be prepared. You may say that is a remote contingency, but we say that it must be guarded against, however remote. In the first place, the remoteness of the contingency varies directly with the efficiency and the number of the Territorial Force. If you let it down the contingency becomes nearer and nearer. The second point is that you must discourage any Power from thinking that an attack can be made successfully, and you must have a force of such numbers and efficiency that you can take the offensive rapidly, that being the only sound foundation of defence. If your diplomacy is not supported by some proportion it buckles and may bring about a European war. Therefore the number of the Territorial Force is not a matter for Parliamentary dialectics. We should face the question frankly, and we should say that we will do all in our power to get up the requisite numbers. We ought to know what are the numbers really required for
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  the whole problem which has to be solved—the garrison in Ireland, local defence, and so forth—before you come to the central body.
  I will only enumerate the other points. There is unreality in regard to the instruction of officers. We know that they do not receive enough instruction. We know that the Yeomanry school gave better instruction than the officers receive now. We know that it did not cost a fabulous sum, and we ask, if the training of officers is to be a reality and not a sham, that they should be better instructed. It is not sufficient that the officers should know their work—and they often do not—but it is also necessary that they should be able to teach. Therefore a school for officers is a necessity if the forces are to be a reality. Another point is the question of horses. That has not been coped with in connection with the Regular Army, and it has not been dealt with in the Territorial Force. The suggestion has been made as regards the Regular Army that you mean to take horses that are six years old. Why do not you make some arrangement for the Territorial Force? It is notorious, I think, that the Territorial Force is not horsed now. You make jokes about it, but it is not a matter for laughter at all. At present you make four regiments depend on the same horses. Why do you not appoint three or four ex-officers to make terms on a large scale for the mounting of the Territorial Force? Why go pouring into the pockets of dealers money for horses until you have paid five times their value? There is an air of unreality about this, and we cannot believe that you are in earnest unless you address yourselves to the matters which year after year have been brought to your notice. It is the same in regard to ranges. You are trying but not succeeding to provide the necessary ranges. I agree with my hon. and gallant Friend that you will not get the Territorial Force to consider themselves seriously if they have only Territorial Artillery. Everyone knows that if a raid came, the force would not have a full complement of Artillery. Therefore everybody ought to infer that there will be more Artillery with the Territorial Force. As to training, I will not speak at any length, but I would say that fifteen days are not enough. Will you do away with the unreality arising out of the idea that eight days are enough? The Government must set their faces against employers who bully men out of camp at the end of eight days. A man in my own regiment

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  came to me with his discharge and stated that unless he went back after eight days, instead of fifteen days training which he wished to perform, he would lose his post. The men cannot learn firing in the field if they always play with blank ammunition. One of the hardest problems in connection with modern warfare is accurate shooting. If you only do it with a bit of paper, you will never solve that problem. The only way to learn field firing is with the use of real bullets. It is unreasonable to ask men to go into action with real bullets for the first time, and to face real bullets in the rifles of their opponents for the first time. It is risky to put a little paint on an unseaworthy vessel in which your fortunes, and perhaps your lives, are going to be embarked on the voyage.
  Colonel SEELY: It may be convenient to the Committee that I should now rise to reply to one or two points which have been raised in this Debate. I certainly do not complain of any of the speeches made from either side of the House, with two exceptions. I take exception to the speech of the hon. and gallant Member for Fareham (Mr. Lee), for reasons which I will endeavour to show, and I take some exception to a criticism of a member of the Army Council, a most distinguished officer, which was put before the House in an otherwise very interesting speech by the hon. Member for Preston (Major Stanley). With those exceptions, I must confess that the Debate has been most informing and interesting to myself, and I really believe that good cannot but come of the very valuable suggestions which have been put forward by hon Friends of mine on this side and by hon. Gentlemen on the other side, with regard to the force in which most of them are themselves serving, and to which so many of them give up time and energy for the purpose of assisting it. But I want to come to the point raised in the vehement speech by the hon. Member for Fareham. He put forward a very serious case. As I understand it it is this. First of all he said war is possible; secondly, he said that the Expeditionary Force may have to go abroad, let us say, in order to avoid any difficulties, to the defence of some distant possession like Egypt, against a barbarian foe, which no doubt is conceivable. But he takes the case that our Expeditionary Force may go, and then he says that 70,000 possible enemies from somewhere—it does not matter where—may come, and for these three things you must be prepared. Now he says a fourth
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  thing, that the troops left behind cannot compare with the 70,000 of the enemy who come, that the latter will be a compact body of the most highly trained troops in the world, and as he said in a recent speech, they will go through what is left here like a knife through butter, and therefore they will be able to strike a paralysing blow at the heart of our Empire.
  I say at once that we deny that position absolutely. I cannot be too emphatic on that point, speaking not only on my own behalf, but on behalf of the Army Council, the Board of Admiralty, and the Committee of Defence, and I have no doubt that the Member for the City of London will support us. And what is more, I am going to put it to the Committee that the hon. and gallant Gentleman, although he has put forward this view, does not himself believe it in the least, because if, a patriotic man like him, he believed it, if he thought it was possible under the arrangements which have been made, when these three things would coincide, for the enemy to strike a blow at the heart of the Empire, he would be scorning delights and living laborious days, drilling every man he could find, getting others to do the same, and trying to arouse the country to a sense of its danger. Instead of that, he leads a happy, useful, contented, and not very strenuous life for a whole long year and more, and then comes down here and asks us to believe this amazing doctrine put forward to-day that we are absolutely at the mercy of our foes. I deny that absolutely, and if I believed it for one moment, needless to say, that I would not be standing here at this box, nor would any of the Army Council be away from his post. If our position was one of such imminent peril I am perfectly certain that none of our colleagues would remain here for one moment. We would go out and denounce the system which exposes us to such danger. I will give the reasons why the Committee of Defence deny entirely the view of the hon. and gallant Member. First of all, it is almost inconceivable—I think I may put it as the view of the Committee of Defence, that it is inconceivable—that so long as we have the command of the sea at all the supposed 70,000 men can all land in one place. That is inconceivable, or, to be more cautious, I would say almost inconceivable so nearly inconceivable that it is not a danger that any sane man would wish to provide against when we have other dangers which we must also meet.
  For this reason: it is true that the submarine was invented at the time when

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  the hon. and gallant Gentleman was himself at the Admiralty, but, at all events, the submarine has advanced in a more striking measure I suppose—I say that on authority—than any other naval matter during the same period or probably in any period. The advance in the number of torpedo boats and in the accuracy of their fire has increased also with the same extraordinary rapidity, the consequence of which is, I am informed, that the difficulty and danger of this small Armada, as my hon. Friend the Financial Secretary put it, of 70,000 men—which, ex hypothesi, would have artillery, as otherwise indeed it would not be a very formidable force—the difficulty of this force of 70,000 with their artillery, and all the ships which that would take, in coming across in a body while we hold command of the sea, and eluding observation and landing all in one place, would be so great that the thing is almost inconceivable. I say that and I challenge denial from any competent authority There is one thing which no doubt is possible. I trust we shall know more of it as time goes on. I can assure the Committee that we are endeavouring to arrive at the truth of this matter, but it is most difficult to find out the truth of these matters of war. Yet we must try. What appears to us to be undoubtedly conceivable is that a small force of the enemy, unaccompanied possibly by artillery, which is so difficult to land, one or two ships, might elude observation and might have time to disembark. I put it now to the Committee, whether the number be only one ship, or two, or three—I deliberately now dismiss the proposition of the whole 70,000 landing in one place—when once landed they cannot be reinforced at the point of debarkation. Therefore anything in the nature of a gradually growing force getting more and more powerful until at last it is hurled against the force we have left in this country, and delivers a death blow, is inconceivable so long as we hold command of the sea. If once the force is disembarked at a certain spot upon the coast, it is apparent to everybody, and does not require stating, that of course a cordon will be drawn around it by our submarines or torpedo boats, or destroyers, which would make it utterly impossible for that part of their fleet to be reinforced. These considerations lead us to this conclusion, that it would be perfectly possible for an enemy to inflict grave damage upon us in the way perhaps of blowing up some important fortress or dock.
  Mr. WYNDHAM: Or dockyard.
  Colonel SEELY: I think that that would be a very difficult procedure. The kind of force that could escape our Navy while we have command of the sea would find it very difficult to attack one of the naval bases. Therefore the truth of the matter is this, that the more mobile and the better distributed your Territorial Force is the less damage these raids will do the country should we ever unfortunately be involved in war, and therefore, while we absolutely deny that there is any possibility so long as we hold command of the sea of our receiving a paralysing blow at the heart, we fully admit that we must work and work hard, to make our Territorial Force more efficient and more mobile and better distributed, in order to counteract not any of the terrible dangers I have described, but the real inconveniences and the minor dangers which these raids might cause in time of war. I hope that the Committee will forgive me for speaking with some emphasis on this matter. Everybody in this country knows that if there was the least risk of being exposed to this terrible danger the hon. Gentleman himself would be the last to say so.
  Mr. LEE: On the contrary, the more real the danger is the more necessary it is to speak out while there is time.
  Colonel SEELY: I submit with confidence, that, on reflection, the hon. and gallant Gentleman would agree with me that he would be the last to say so in public. He would come at once in private and say, "I am very dissatisfied with this terrible danger which exists in case the enemy comes, and you must take measures at once to remedy it, and if you do not take such measures then, as a last resort, I may have to tell that terrible danger to the world." I was told by a Gentleman from a friendly country the other day that nothing aggravates them more than reading in the speeches in this House, both in Army and Navy Debates, that we are on the verge of ruin, because he said it showed conclusively that we had absolutely made up our minds that we were in no danger whatever. I do not take too optimistic a view. I do take the view if it be an optimistic view, that our arrangements are such that we should assume they do not involve any risk of absolute disaster, but I do say that we must work hard to improve the arrangements we have made in order to avoid what might ultimately become disaster if

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  there were any prolonged war. Turning to the particular points which have been raised, I should say a word if I may as to the alternative to the Territorial Force. I do not wish to make any attack upon the hon. Member for Preston, but I do wish to make a defence of the person whom he attacks. He spoke of the Artillery of the Territorial Force and found great fault with it, but he said that that was not to be wondered at seeing that the chief Artillery expert at the War Office was the present Master-General of Ordnance (Sir Charles Hadden). It is perfectly true that it is many years since Sir Charles Hadden commanded a battery in the field—
  Mr. WYNDHAM: The hon. Member did not say that it was not to be wondered at. What he did say was that the Report from the Master-General of Ordnance as to efficiency would be discounted because of the great development of recent years.
  Colonel SEELY: We will put it that way. In any case it placed a very grave reflection upon this officer, and I wish to assure the Committee that in the opinion of my predecessor, and certainly of myself, and I believe also of all those who are acquainted with this highly technical question of the proper armament, Sir Charles Hadden has unrivalled knowledge, and he has unrivalled industry and the country has every reason to be grateful for the eminent services which he has rendered; and if it be true, as I believe the hon. Gentleman the Member for Fareham will be inclined to admit, that in many respects we have the finest Artillery in the world, and in all respects it is one of the finest Artilleries in the world, it is largely due I think to Sir Charles Hadden and the work which he has done. On the point of the Territorial Artillery, the hon. Member for Preston asked me would I appoint a Committee to go out and inspect the Territorial Artillery. I answered that we Eave an Inspector-General of Forces and, we have exceptional knowledge concerning it. Major-General French went out every year and inspected the Territorial Force and the Territorial Artillery. Here is his Report, the last report we have, which I will lay on the Table of the House.
  "The advance made in general efficiency during the past two years and especially during this year by Territorial units"—
  That is the Horse and Field Artillery.
  "has been surprising. I do not hold in any way with the disparaging remarks constantly inside in the Press and elsewhere as to the supposed inferiority of this arm
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  in comparison with the Infantry of the force. So far sis I am able to judge the advance has been greater in the former than in the latter. It is not generally realised that on the creation of the Territorial Force the Field Artillery of to-day was created practically de novo, the previous knowledge of transfers being confined practically in all cases to Garrison Artillery knowledge, and, therefore, valueless to a mounted corps; whereas, in the case of Infantry, no such transition took place, the change involved was almost solely change of name. It is also generally admitted that Artillery is the most difficult of all arms to improvise."
  General French is of opinion that the advance in the Infantry has been surprising, and certainly that is a result of my own humble observations in going about the country. From conversations I have had with various military officers in regard to the Artillery units, one or two have told me the same thing, that the advance has been amazing compared with what they conceived possible. I do not say that it is by any means perfection, but I do say that the Field and Horse Artillery of the Territorial Force are very valuable units which would be able to give a very good account of themselves. Another point which was raised has reference to the Yeomanry, and the hon. Member opposite reminded us of the incident of the Scots Greys. Territorial Cavalry can never have much chance in a combat with Regular Cavalry. I entirely agree with him, and least of all should I be disposed to doubt it in the case of such a regiment as the Scots Greys, with its splendid efficiency. I do think the Yeomanry have justified their existence, even since the Territorial Force came into being. It has received the highest reports from those who have inspected it, not overdrawn, and it shows that it is undoubtedly a highly efficient mounted force, considering the short period of training it has had. I agree, and my advisers agree, that the Yeomanry should have a second weapon of some kind, but I am not prepared to state exactly what form the weapon should take.
  Sir SAMUEL SCOTT: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the German Cavalry have been given a new arm?
  Colonel SEELY: I could not say offhand, but when last I was at the German manœuvres I observed that they had a sword, but I will inquire into the point raised by the hon. Baronet. The other point of detail which was raised has reference to Sunday shooting. Nobody will fail to sympathise with the view of the hon. Member for West Dorset in his plea for the maintenance of the sanctity of Sunday. I need hardly tell him that both

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  I and the War Office hold that view, and this is the principle we have laid down: There has always been Sunday shooting for the last twenty years. The difficulty is in getting men to perform the necessary musketry for efficiency, and that is the reason why so many men go to Sunday shooting. Lord Haldane—and I, too, take full responsibility—laid down these principles: first, that the shooting should be confined to places where it does not cause disturbance and distress to the locality. Secondly, it should be confined to the necessary practice for efficiency; that is to say, that you shall not have at the ranges a system of shooting matches going on all day. Thirdly, that it shall be absolutely voluntary for everyone, not only in theory but in fact, and we have taken special means to see that no man is compelled or even induced by any means to go and shoot on Sunday if he has an objection to it. If we had only enough ranges to avoid Sunday shooting altogether, I am confident the House would agree probably that to be the best of all, but so long as these difficulties exist they have to be coped with, and we have laid down conditions which I believe will keep it within proper limits. Moreover, we have tried to arrange for a religious service to be held before or after the shooting, and there is really no doubt that more go to church than they would otherwise do.
  Mr. WYNDHAM: Can the right hon. Gentleman tell us exactly what the Financial Secretary meant when he spoke of greater elasticity of the establishments?
  Colonel SEELY: I was coming to that in my remarks. We do propose to have a greater measure of elasticity in our establishment. That elasticity would not be an interchange between county and county, but only within the county itself. I am not prepared now to say exactly what form it will take, although, as the right hon. Gentleman knows, there is only one form really, to allow one unit to recruit far beyond its strength, while another unit would go below its strength, but I do not want to carry that too far, because it might cause a great deal of inconvenience. Now we have got our scheme properly established we can now with advantage to the force have a certain greater measure of elasticity. One word with regard to the National Reserve which has advanced so surprisingly in number since my predecessor last addressed the House. The National Reserve is a military asset of the
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  greatest value. If we do not lay down precisely what we should do with it in time of war it is just because we are advised by those who have been concerned in raising the National Reserve, the county association, that to lay down a rigid rule would defeat the very object in view. What we propose to do is to encourage the National Reserve to perfect its own organisation, not to try and check it at all in getting its commandant and, if need be, its own company commanders and commanding officers. But to make it quite clear we do not want this to be a third line Army, which would only compete with the Regular Force and the Territorial Force. You want an organisation of that kind, with one hundred men under a captain, and that has been a feature in Army organisation ever since the dawn of history. It is a natural thing that the organisation of the National Reserve should spring up in order to keep the register going and to keep the interest going; therefore I welcome the further organisation of the Reserve, provided always it is fully understood that that will not be their fighting organisation in time of war. If the National Reserve would agree to take an obligation something in this form I think it would be of rare value to the State. If every member of the National Reserve, in the event of national peril, were to say, "I will place my services at the disposal of the military authorities for service within these Islands," I think that would be a real advantage, and would not, I think, appreciably diminish the number.
  Viscount VALENTIA: That has been done in many cases already.
  8.0 P.M.
  Colonel SEELY: I agree with the Noble Lord. I know it has, but it has not been generally done. If the obligation is taken I think it would be of great advantage. It may be said, What would they do? A great many of them would rejoin the Regular Army. Many might join the Territorial Force, and some of them might be of enormous value in the different localities in the event of those raids which have been spoken of. Nothing can be more valuable than a force of this kind highly localised, able at once to give warning, and to concert measures for avoiding disaster. The question of uniforms for the National Reserve is one of difficulty, not only because of the expense, but because if we gave uniforms to the men of the Reserve I think the men of the Regular Reserve, who have to serve

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  all over the world, might think it a little hard that the men of the National Reserve should have the privilege of wearing the uniform while they had not that privilege. We should, if we can, make every use of the National Reserve, and in a moment of national peril they would possibly be of inestimable value to the State. It was asked by the right hon. Gentleman why we do not lay down distinctly our numbers. I have endeavoured to lay down definitely the numbers in this respect, that the more we have properly placed the safer we shall be within reason, but we are not satisfied with having 40,000 or 50,000 men short, and we are still less satisfied in having nearly 2,000 officers short. I agree with the view that those who have special privileges and advantages in the country, well-to-do young men who have not joined the force, that it should be looked upon as a disgrace that any well-to-do young man who is healthy and strong should do nothing for the defence of his country. I know I will carry the whole House with me when I say that there is a great deal to be said for the man who does not join the Territorial Force because he has his daily work to do, but in the case of the class to which I refer there is no such excuse practically, and I appeal to them to come forward and to at once fill up the officers' ranks in the Territorial Force. What is the alternative to making a patriotic appeal? Two alternatives have been put forward which I wish to examine. The first alternative, which was put forward by the hon. Member for Fareham (Mr. Lee), is to get rid of your Territorial Force, and substitute a much smaller number of a fixed addition to the Regular Army. We rule that out altogether for two reasons. In the first place, owing to the enormous expense. I have said that an attack on these shores must of necessity, owing to modern strategy, be a dispersed attack. Therefore in order to have any chance of meeting that attack you must have, not only a mobile force, but a dispersed force to do what the Territorial Force is intended to do. An addition to the Regular Forces of that kind would involve us in millions of pounds expense. I made a sort of rough estimate, and I only give it as a kind of figure for people to turn round in their minds; but I conceive, that that policy to save us from attack and from all interference along the coast would cost us £10,000,000 per year. If you had nothing
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  but Regular troops maintained for that purpose on the same scale as your Territorial Force, not in numbers, but on the same scale of fighting value. The other alternative put forward is, if you cannot induce them to come in, to compel them to come in. That is the suggestion put forward quite boldly by several hon. Gentlemen in this Debate. Much has been made of a speech that I have made. I have never dealt with it yet because I did not think my own particular views of ten years ago were of sufficient importance to put before the House. As it is so constantly raised, I think perhaps it is just as well that I should make my position clear, as I now hold the office of Secretary of State. In the year 1902, on returning from the South African war, I was very much impressed with the fact that a certain number of men came out with the later reinforcements who practically knew very little. One whom I remember probably did not know how to handle a rifle. That interested me so much I believed then, although frankly I do not believe now as I have said over and over again, that the principal military danger was the number of men who knew nothing about rifle shooting. I do not believe that now. I am convinced that is an erroneous view.
  There are other military dangers far greater than that. We have got, as we know, in the National Reserve an immense number of men in this country, men whom we really could put into our firing line for many many months or even years of war, men who know all about handling a rifle and know a great deal about drill. What we do want is better organisation in many departments, those things which the right hon. Gentleman brought before us, to always have the best gun and the best rifle. That is more important in my view. I do not believe if you adopted compulsion to-morrow on the Swiss system, with its four to six millions of expense to this country, even if the country accepted it, that you would increase your force as you would by spending the same sum in other ways. More than that, I am convinced it is impracticable and need not be discussed, because no great party in the State shows the least sign, not the least sign, of taking it up, and for the obvious reason that you have got a great body of opinion against it. You have got many of the best brains in the Navy bitterly hostile to any form of compulsion, and you have got many of the best minds in the Army

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  as bitterly opposed to compulsion for home defence in the case of the Navy, because it would divert money from the vital necessity of sea supremacy, and in the case of the Army because they believe it to be a faulty strategical conception to create a large Army limited to home defence, seeing that for the last many hundreds of years, although we have had to fight for our lives, we have never fought a battle within these islands against a foreign foe. Those are the reasons which weigh with us. I am not saying whether they are right or wrong. You have all this great body of opinion against compulsion, and frankly I think it is an idle dream to talk of it now as an alternative to our system of voluntary service.
  I believe I have made forty-nine speeches in support of the principle of a voluntary Army on military grounds. I am not going to repeat the arguments now except to say that everything that has happened in modern warfare has tended to make a voluntary army more likely to win than a compulsory army. The strain upon men now, and upon their nerves, with smokeless powder and rapid firing is, I think all will admit, greater than in the old days. Therefore it is more important to eliminate the unwilling from your army than it was in the old days. In the old days we heard that if the front rank would not go on the rear rank would push them on. If you have unwilling soldiers that is a greater danger to the army than it used to be. A voluntary army has enormous advantages which we ought not to lose sight of. I cannot engage in a campaign such as I have been invited to do to-day in favour of compulsory service. I honestly, if I believed that was where the safety of the State lay, would not hesitate to do so. I am quite sure myself, and my hon. Friends on this side would not hesitate if we believed so. I do not believe it is, and therefore we must lend our minds to the practical work, and appeal to our countrymen to induce them to undertake the patriotic duty of serving their country.
  MARQUESS of TULLIBARDINE: I am glad we have had a Debate on the Territorial Question, and especially to hear the views of the right hon. Gentleman on the question of compulsion. He gave us a definite standard by which to judge the Territorial Force, and it is by that standard I am going to try and judge it now. I think in the whole of his speech he avoided the main point at issue, and which he laid down himself, namely, the question
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  of numbers and the question of the efficiency of the training with due regard to the work to be done. The Financial Secretary did deal with that point. I take first of all, the right hon. Gentleman's own test of numbers. He admits, I think, that we might have a raid of 70,000 men under certain conceivable circumstances. I am going to say this, in order to show that I take no very biassed view one way or the other on the subject, that I am frankly one of those who is not in a very ghastly fright of invasion. I admit, certainly, if it did come we should probably be in a very serious fix in this country. I certainly do not take the view of the right hon. Gentleman on the question of invasion. He stated it would be a comical situation. I do not think it would be.
  Colonel SEELY: What I said would be a comical situation would be if our Expeditionary Force were leaving the country at the same time as a force of 70,000 were approaching these shores, and if the two sets of transports passed each other in the sea.
  MARQUESS of TULLIBARDINE: I think if the right hon. Gentleman will recollect further the question was if our Expeditionary Force was going to other parts of the Empire. I do not think now that we have not got Heligoland that it would be likely that the two forces in these other circumstances would meet or pass. I do not think there is anything comical in it. My reason for saying that I do not think we are likely to have an invasion in this country is this. Though we might be afraid of invasion in this country, I think other countries would be absolutely terrified at the thought of invasion of their countries. If we were going to fight any continental nation it is almost inconceivable we should take on any of those countries single handed. All the countries that we could possibly be afraid of have very large land frontiers, and it seems inconceivable that we should pick a quarrel with them unless we had got a strong ally which would probably have a frontier contiguous to the country we were fighting. It is obvious those countries would try to invade each other first if A invaded B it is not likely that it would at the same time seriously invade B's ally C. If B managed to invade A first, then A would have plenty to do without invading C. and if we lost command of the Sea it

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  would not be necessary to invade us. The real point at issue is that we have been told that in certain circumstances we might have an invasion of 70,000 men, and that is what we have got to prepare for. Lord Haldane, when he started the Territorial Force, laid it down that we should have an establishment of 315,000 Territorials. It is quite conceivable, as the Financial Secretary said, that he rather over-stated than under-stated; but at the same time I do not think he over-stated to the enormous amount of about 55,000 men. Our present Secretary of State is, I think he will admit, in this position, either he has got to admit now that the numbers are not adequate, or else that the Establishment is a great deal too big. Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman will tell me whether he thinks the establishment is too big, and, if so, why he does not reduce it, and why during the whole of this time he has been saying to the country we ought to have a force of 315,000, and why, if that was wrong, he does not cut it down, instead of going to the expense of organising it? On the other hand I would also like to ask him, if he thinks the force of 315,000 necessary, how he proposes to get the whole of that force? Does the right hon. Gentleman think that a force of 315,000 men is necessary for the Territorial Force?
  Colonel SEELY: I think it would be very desirable to work up to that total.
  MARQUESS Of TULLIBARDINE: Will the right hon. Gentleman tell me how it is possible, as it seems impossible under the present system? I would far rather see him get them under the present system than compulsorily; but I should like him to tell me how he proposes to do so. I think we should have an authoritative statement from the right hon. Gentleman on that point, because he has himself shown that we have got otherwise something like 80,000 fewer soldiers now than we had ten years ago, when Continental navies were not so strong as now. I think it was the Duke of Wellington who stated that Napoleon's presence in the battlefield was worth 40,000 men.
  Colonel SEELY: I thought it was Napoleon himself who said that.
  MARQUESS of TULLIBARDINE: Whichever said it the fact does not alter my argument. I want to know if the right hon. Gentleman thinks that a certain colonel in the Wax Office is worth
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  80,000 men? Otherwise I cannot put the facts he has mentioned alongside certain speeches he made some time ago. If he cannot get the numbers he wants, then, so far as I can see, what he has got to do is to try and improve the training of men. I want to ask him why really it is that he has changed his mind so greatly now from that speech of his which he mentioned a few minutes ago, and which he made some ten years ago. At that time he said:
  "I, myself, speaking as a Member of Parliament with a seat to lose, say plainly that I consider it to be extremely desirable that it should be obligatory for every male in this country to be trained to arms."
  He has not yet told us how it is that he has changed his mind, and why he does not now think it necessary that such training should be obligatory. Is his present seat now quite secure. The real point is that the right hon. Gentleman came fresh from the war in South Africa, where he had seen the appalling dangers that may happen to any country from sending out untrained troops. We both know perfectly well the kind of untrained troops we had to deal with in that war.
  Colonel SEELY: With bad organisation.
  MARQUESS of TULLIBARDINE: But the right hon. Gentleman did not deal with organisation the other day; he dealt with regiments like the South African Light Horse. He talked about a handful of farmers holding up the British Army, especially in Natal. At that time, when he was fresh from the war, he was all for compulsory training, and supported the idea that the Regular soldier was a necessity. Now we hear no such views. He referred to the South African Light Horse. Personally I saw every single action in which that corps was engaged at that particular time, and there were other regiments, such as the Bethune's Mounted Infantry, Thorneycroft's, and the Natal Carabineers. I think he meant the Imperial Light Horse, but it does not alter the facts of the case. Supposing the South African Light Horse were as wonderful as he says, and that the others I have menioned were as good. He must remember that it was at the beginning of a war in a country which these men knew perfectly well. They knew the method of warfare, and the majority of them had learnt every single thing which the right hon. Gentleman only wishes he could teach the Yeomanry in this country. They were all first-class horsemen; they were accustomed to using their eyes and their rifles. They were naturally trained

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  soldiers, and accustomed to look after themselves, and many of them had spent most of their lives fighting. It is not right for the right hon. Gentleman to say that these men went out without any training, and that therefore town-bred boys at home can go without training. That is what it amounts to. It is a very dangerous line of argument to take up. These men had had years and years of training. The right hon. Gentleman also forgets that that particular regiment had one Regular officer or non-commissioned officer for every thirty men. Therefore they had the training and leading of Regular officers. They were much better than any of our Territorials at the present moment, and yet it was thought necessary that they should have Regular officers on a far higher scale than our men can possibly get at present. Therefore it is folly to compare these men in a special place with our Territorial Force who may have to stand alone against a Continental foe and would be engaged long before we could get assistance from these other regiments. Our men have not had the same training; they are not accustomed to look after themselves. Some of them have hardly seen a horse before they join the Territorials. It is impossible to compare them. Does the right hon. Gentleman say that the Imperial Yeomanry in South Africa were as good as the South Africa Light Horse? Does he think that the Imperial Yeomanry at the beginning of the war were as good?
  Colonel SEELY: I would not dream of making any comparison, but I would ask the Noble Lord to draw a mental picture of the first Yeomanry that went out and to remember what Lord Methuen said about the Imperial Yeomanry.
  MARQUESS of TULLIBARDINE: The less the right hon. Gentleman talks about Lord Methuen and the Imperial Yeomanry the better. They nearly cost that general his life. It is impossible to say that our men have sufficient training. One excuse given was that the Dominions and the Colonies do not think it necessary to have more training. Surely we are not to have the whole of our Army policy dictated by the Colonies and Dominions, who have not, or at any rate do not realise that they have, the same serious situation to face that we have. I do not think the right hon. Gentleman was quite fair the other day when, to support his argument, he said that in Australia they have a very short period of sixteen days' drill and
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  eight days' camp. The right hon. Gentleman knows that that is not the full state of the case. He himself, in a reply to the hon. Member for Ludlow (Mr. Hunt), said that in Australia they had eighty-two days' training as cadets, followed by sixteen days for seven years—112 days for all arms, except artillery and engineers, and for those two arms it is increased to 175 days. If he will give all the boys in this country six months' training when they leave school he will be able to make a comparison with the Australian boy. The right hon. Gentleman also omitted to tell us that they have compulsion in some of the Colonies and Dominions. He said that he wished to take a lesson from the Colonies. If he takes a lesson from those Colonies which have really considered the problem and have dangers to meet, he will find that they are ahead of us in the training given to their citizen soldiers. I should have very little to grumble about if he was able to bring in the same regulations that they have brought in. What does the War Office do in regard to the boys of this country to help the Territorial Force? The Boys Brigade and the Boy Scouts are forbidden to use a drill hall under the control of the War Office. Does he think that that is the way to encourage boys to enter the Territorial Force?
  Colonel SEELY: That is so important a statement that perhaps the Noble Lord will send me details of the case.
  MARQUESS of TULLIBARDINE: I am quite accurate. I am certain it is a very big mistake to treat them this way. I know why it was done. It was because they would not be militarised and absolutely follow the training of the War Office. It was in the dark days of the attempt at over-organisation when the Territorial Force began. The right hon. Gentleman says that compulsory training is not within the range of practical politics until after the next war, and that as we have to prepare for the next war, we may save talking about compulsory service. I am not expressing an opinion upon compulsory service. After all, the right hon. Gentleman is responsible for that meanwhile. As we know, he can always give his own independent opinion, because he is not like the First Lord of the Admiralty, tied by the leg by the admirals. He knows quite well that he is under no necessity to take the advice of the Army Council. He can give his own opinion. And it would be a very good thing, I think,

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  if the right hon. Gentleman would tell us whether he is expressing his own opinion or that of the Army Council. Then, of course, we should know how to value that opinion; to put a greater or less value upon it. But he talks about waiting until after the next war. Surely that is an extraordinary statement to make. You can read it two ways. Obviously what the right hon. Gentleman meant to say was that the people of this country do not realise the danger they are in. They do not realise how untrained they are compared with trained troops, and until they have been hammered it is no use talking about it. I cannot read it in any other way. But that is a wrong attitude for any Secretary for War to take up. It is quite possible that the people would pay no attention to it. But the Secretary of State does really believe in compulsory service.
  Colonel SEELY: No, I do not.
  MARQUESS Of TULLIBARDINE: We know he made this statement:—
  "Not by spending money on ships, although the Navy must always have our first care; not most assuredly by shouting about Imperial greatness, but by personal self-sacrifice alone can this Empire be maintained. I go further. I believe that if all these warnings fall upon deaf ears, at no distant date this Empire, of which we are so proud, will fall to pieces, and that this nation will be humbled to the dust."
  Colonel SEELY: I agree with every word of that.
  MARQUESS Of TULLIBARDINE: Of course, the right hon. Gentleman agreed with it when it was spoken. He says he agrees with it still. I do not know whether he believes that it is wise that it should be obligatory that every male in this country should learn the use of arms, for he also said that in the same speech.
  Colonel SEELY: I think I have explained frankly and fully to the House how this matter stands; and I hope this House will no longer be wearied with these unnecessary details. I still believe in personal self-sacrifice if necessary. I do not believe in compulsory service. I do not propose to advocate it. I have said so again and again.
  MARQUESS Of TULLIBARDINE: The right hon. Gentleman talked like this when he was fresh from the war, but now the memories of the war are wiped out. Now that he is in, we will say, no danger of losing his seat, his mind is entirely changed. The right hon. Gentleman tells us that the Swedish system is all wrong. A few years ago he said that for countries like Sweden
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  and Switzerland a certain system was necessary, and that we might learn from it that we might have a force of 3,000,000 men for £6,000,000. Perhaps he has changed his mind about this also. It is of course very difficult to know what to do under these circumstances when he keeps changing his mind; for I support the right hon. Gentleman, and am anxious to support him.
  Colonel SEELY: The date you are quoting is 1902?
  MARQUESS of TULLIBARDINE: 14th February, 1902.
  Colonel SEELY: That is ten years ago.
  MARQUESS of TULLIBARDINE: Ten years ago, after the South African campaign.
  The DEPUTY - CHAIRMAN (Mr. Maclean): These personal reminiscences are very interesting, but I do not think they are quite in order.
  MARQUESS of TULLIBARDINE: I intend to take your ruling, Mr. Maclean. I had really finished. I was only replying to a point which had already been raised in Debate, but I want to remind the right hon. Gentleman that training is of the first importance; that it is well to teach the people that their first duty is to fight for their country if necessary, and if they are properly trained and armed then the necessity will probably never arise. I want to remind him that words similar to those I have quoted were used by the French in the sixties. Curiously enough, they got exactly the some word—that it was impracticable. Then came '70 and '71 and humiliation and defeat, and then came conscription in France. The Territorial Force has in it the makings of a splendid force. But we do not want it inefficiently trained as it is at present. Where really the great danger lies is that we do not warn the people that the training is not sufficient. It is quite impossible to train a Cavalry soldier in a fortnight. I have myself got a strong and efficient corps to a certain degree—I am not going to say it is due to my training, because the men were to a great extent trained when they came to me. They take a great interest in their work, and they had already learned their lesson like the South African Light Horse did, before they joined the corps. Nobody will blame the right hon. Gentleman if he will point out the weak points. The Territorial Force is a force that I like, and that I wish to

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  remain with as long as I can, but they are only partially trained. The truth has got to be brought home to the people. It is not fair to say they are such a magnificent force, and that they will take on anybody or everybody. Many connected with the corps are anxious to do everything they can towards its efficiency, but the difficulty is when you try to give the willing man a somewhat longer training his place may be snapped up in civilian life by the unwilling man. What we want to do is to put an equal burden on the unwilling man, or to give some extra reward to the willing man, so that those willing to serve their country shall not have put on them burdens when they are trying to do so. That is really the point I wish to make. I speak my own personal experience when I say that the Territorial Force are really not sufficiently trained as they are at present to meet a Continental force. I would far rather, if necessary, see fewer men, but well trained. I do not want to see an untrained mob in preference to smaller forces properly armed and perfectly confident. We can then let our Regulars go out and we do not mind where they go. As it is we cannot have confidence in this country if things go on as at present.
  Mr. ARTHUR STRAUSS: I rise to complain of the order given by the Secretary of State for War which must have a very serious effect on recruiting in this country. I refer to the disbandment of the Paddington Rifles. This order has caused the greatest possible indignation in in the locality; indignation which is daily increasing. The men who belonged to the corps look upon the order as a slur upon them, and an insult after the infinite trouble they have taken during the last two years. The battalion consists of a strength of 560 men. That is an increase of 230 in the last two years. In addition to which about 115 men during the last three years have joined the Regular Army. I mention these figures because it was on account of the strength of the battalion that, as I understand it, the order for disbandment was given. As regards the camp again, last year out of 490 men 414 went to camp for the first week. It is quite true that in the second week that number was considerably reduced, but when I asked the Under-Secretary the other day whether he had inquired into the cause of the reduction, which was well known in Paddington, he told me he
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  not done so. It seems me rather strange, that such a drastic measure as disbandment should be taken without first making the fullest inquiry into the cause of the reduction of this camp. The real cause of the battalion not having attained its full strength I admit that in spite of the effect of the local committee the numbers are unsatisfactory—is undoubtedly the unsatisfactory state of headquarters. The attention of the county association as well as the War Office has been called to that over and over again, not only by the local association, but also by the adjutant, by the colonel, and by others. Nothing was done. The armoury was in a dreadful state. The rifle racks were full of mildew; the sanitary arrangements of the headquarters were disgraceful, and would not be permitted in any private dwelling; and as for the rifle range it could hardly be called a rifle range, because the wet was coming through the roof and the place was dripping with water and men could not properly lie down to shoot. The fact has also been forgotten that while probably the progress of recruiting was slow during the last year, during the last three months before the order was signed no less than eighty-five recruits joined the battalion, and on the very day on which the order reached fifteen or twenty recruits more were anxious to join. So much for the feeling in Paddington; but the question is much wider than one simply of locality.
  The Secretary for War will admit that it is of the utmost importance that the county association and the local association especially should work in harmony with the War Office, and unless that is accomplished the whole Territorial movement must ultimately fail. What has the War Office done in respect of consulting and conciliating the county association? Early in October a communication reached the London County Association that the battalion was not satisfactory, and giving intimation that it might possibly be disbanded. Thereupon the county association immediately appointed a sub-committee to thoroughly investigate matters independently. They went to Paddington and made full inquiries, and then handed in a report to the War Office after full investigation, to the effect that the whole blame of the numbers not increasing fast enough was owing to the unsatisfactory state of the headquarters, to which attention was directly called; that the spirit of the corps was excellent, and that the efforts made by the local

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  association could not be better, and that finally they considered disbandment would be a grave mistake. I believe these were the very words. That was on 28th November. It took the War Office six weeks to answer the letter. Early in January the County of London Association received a reply, in which it was stated that there would be a conference on 19th January to discuss this matter of disbandment. That conference never took place. A sort of informal discussion, I believe, took place between the secretary of the county association and the authorities of the War Office, but no Conference was held, and the next step which was taken was a message sent to the county association that the corps would be disbanded on the 20th May. Anyhow, on the 20th May, news reached the London Association. The Paddington Association asked the War Office if they could not suspend the Order before the matter was discussed with the War Office. The answer was a letter of the 13th June. As soon as possible after that, the 13th June, there was a meeting of the London County Association, in which this matter was discussed, and the following resolution, which was adopted, was sent to the War Office:—
  "That in the opinion of the Territorial Association of the County of London the action of the Army Council in disbanding the 10th Battalion of the London Regiment against the well-considered recommendations of the association is not warranted by the facts as stated by them and is calculated to strike a severe blow at the authority of the association, and to militate against the active co-operation of the local authorities in raising and maintaining the Territorial Forces in London. The association are of the opinion that the whole matters should receive reconsideration by the Army Council."
  The very same evening I raised the question on the Adjournment of the House, and I asked for reconsideration. Unfortunately the Secretary of State for War was enjoying himself elsewhere, conducting his electioneering campaign. The answer of the Under-Secretary, given in the name of his chief, was that the door was closed. So strong was the desire expressed on both sides of the House that the matter should be reopened that at last the Under-Secretary declared he never knew the door that was closed that could not be reopened. What happened as regards the County of London Association? The next communication was on the 28th June, fifteen days after they passed their resolution, in which it was stated in reply thereto:—
  "I must inform you it is now impossible to rescind the decision of the Army Council, which was only reached after most careful consideration of all the circumstances."
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  So that the resolution was absolutely ignored and flouted, and this created the greatest indignation amongst the members of the County of London Association. What about the Paddington Association? They were asked to meet Lord Haldane on the matter early in June. On the day on which the meeting was to take place Lord Haldane was no longer Secretary of State for War, so it was not possible for them to meet him. Then they asked to see the Secretary of State for War, but, though I am sure it was not his fault, he could not receive them. Then, after his return to this House, the right hon. Gentleman received one or two letters, and it was only this morning, I believe, he consented to receive a deputation from the Paddington Association. What I complain of is that this decision, which was a very important decision, and an insulting decision, should have been taken in view of the resolution of the County of London Association, which declared from the beginning, in the most explicit terms, that it would be most detrimental in its effect upon recruiting, and that this decision should have been taken before receiving a deputation from Paddington. The action of the War Office in coming to this decision is certainly calculated to damage recruiting in London, especially where recruiting is of the utmost difficulty, and I would urge strongly upon the Secretary for War that he should not take action which is resented by the County of London Association. As regards the Paddington Association and the excellent spirit which was shown by the people of Paddington, I think the right hon. Gentleman might now decide to give them headquarters, and if he does I am sure he will find the local committee ready to pay half the expense of the necessary alterations. This would enable the Paddington people to show that spirit of patriotism which they are so anxious to show.
  Colonel SEELY: I will not now enter into the question of the Paddington Rifles, because I shall have great pleasure in meeting a deputation on this subject on Friday. I am most anxious to work in cooperation with the county association and other public bodies, and we shall welcome any patriotic assistance they can give which will conduce to military efficiency. I would respectfully suggest to the Committee that it might be convenient if we now pass to the Special Reserve Vote. Although the Territorial Vote has been

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  discussed on several occasions, very little has been said about the Special Reserve.
  Mr. HUNT: The right hon. Gentleman has told us that in regard to an invasion of this country there is no danger of a blow at the heart. The late Secretary for War said that any nation anxious to attack us would be sure to try and deliver a blow at our heart in London, and so end the war at once.
  Colonel SEELY: He did not say they would do it.
  Mr. HUNT: He said they would be sure to try. The right hon. Gentleman also said that it is a very good thing to eliminate the unwilling. What the right hon. Gentleman is doing under this scheme is eliminating an enormous number of willing people who are anxious to serve but cannot do so because the conditions imposed will not allow them. That is the real state of the case. On the 4th July this year the right hon. Gentleman said:—
  "I know that the hon. Member opposite is anxious that we should adopt a system of compulsory military training."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 4th July, 1912, col. 1403, Vol. XL.]
  Then the right hon. Gentleman went on to say:—
  "I think all will agree that that question is out of the range of practical politics until after the next war, and as we have to prepare for the next war now we ought to save our time talking about compulsory service."
  That is what the right hon. Gentleman said when he had a seat in the Cabinet of the King, but in 1902, when the right hon. Gentleman was an ordinary Member of the House, he said, in speaking of our military weakness, although we had at the time he was speaking 80,000 more serving soldiers than we have now:—
  "That universal compulsory military training was extremely desirable, and five-sixths of our people would welcome it."
  Can the right hon. Gentleman tell us when we are in comparison with other nations so very much weaker at sea than we were ten years ago, and therefore so much more in need of a well-trained Army for home defence, how it is that he now goes dead against the very policy he advocated so strongly ten years ago, when we are in a worse position than we were then, when we have less soldiers, and in proportion far less ships? I ask, can it possibly be for any other reason except that the right hon. Gentleman puts his politics and his prospects and salary far before the safety of his country? The Army is now in his charge, and it is in his charge that the military safety of the country has been placed. I am really sorry to be obliged
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  to put the matter so plainly, because, after all, the right hon. Gentleman is not only a soldier but he is a white man associated with our best military traditions. The only reason for this I can think of, is that the Radical microbe is so powerful that it corrupts even our very best soldiers. As we have got 80,000 less serving soldiers than in 1902, I suppose our margin of safety must be made up in some other way. The right hon. Gentleman will remember that the Duke of Wellington and Napoleon—
  The DEPUTY-CHAIRMAN: Those are all matters of general military policy, and they are not at all relevant to the Vote we are now discussing.
  Mr. HUNT: May I point out with all respect that this matter has been mentioned before and no trouble was made about it?
  The DEPUTY-CHAIRMAN: They were general references and the hon. Member is now going into details.
  Mr. HUNT: We seem to have very little freedom in this House to talk on military training, and I really do not know what I may be allowed to say. I do not know whether I may say that the Radical papers dare not publish letters advocating universal military training—
  The DEPUTY-CHAIRMAN: There is no mention of that matter in this Vote.
  9.0 P.M.
  Mr. HUNT: Is it out of order to mention a Radical paper? [HON. MEMBERS: "Try again," and "Give it up."] As I cannot go into the question of Napoleon and Wellington I may perhaps say that I cannot agree with the Secretary for War in the comparison he made in regard to our Territorials. An hon. Member has already shown how men who live the wild life in our Colonies have learned a great many of the duties of war, and that remark applies to the Imperial Light Horse of which the right hon. Gentleman spoke. I do not know whether the right hon. Gentleman noticed in the "Times" a few days ago that 20,000 cadets had joined the ranks of the militia in Australia. It makes an enormous difference to the training of men when they have had years of teaching just at the time when they are most likely to learn. Really, in proportion to the number of people in this country we ought to have 200,000 trained cadets ready to go into our home Army every year. The right hon. Gentleman said:—
  "The Government is taking every precaution for the safety of the Empire."

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  I ask, is the Territorial Force really adequate for the defence of the country? Does he really mean to tell us that? The right hon. Gentleman laid it down that 70,000 men might be landed, but that the landing of a larger force was inconceivable. On 8th March, 1909, Lord Haldane said between 70,000 and 100,000 was the force we must guard against. He gives us another 30,000 men. Then the right hon. Gentleman said we depended on our submarines. Does he remember that a submarine is practically blind, and that one was injured by a yacht when we were looking on the other day in the daylight? The right hon. Gentleman practically says 70,000 men cannot be landed in this country in one place. If they are landed in two or three places near enough to join when they had landed, it does not make much difference. The right hon. Gentleman says this invasion by large numbers of men is impossible. I would remind him that Napoleon said in war the unexpected usually happens. The late Secretary of State for War persuaded Mr. Fortescue to write a separate volume dealing with the defence of this country. Of course, he is a very well-known man and a very good historian. This is what he says:—
  "The true basis of any organisation for defence is national training."
  Lord Haldane himself, in introducing the Army Estimates of 1909, said:—
  "A nation in arms is the only safeguard for public interests."
  If that means anything, it means the late Secretary of State for War wanted every sound man to learn enough to defend his country. You spent on the Territorial Force last year £1,000,000 more than you spent on the old Volunteers. You have got less numbers, and, as far as anybody can tell, they are no better trained, although I am bound to admit their organisation is better. You have pinched £1,000,000 away from the Regular soldiers to give to this Territorial Force, which is really no better for fighting purposes than the old Volunteers. It is admitted the Territorial Force is full of defects. You are about 2,000 officers short, and they are resigning at the rate of ninety-four a month. After four years you have got no reserve, and now you are attempting to make out the National Reserve is going to take their place; but it will not, because you are afraid to ask them to serve under Territorial officers and non-commissioned officers. There has lately been a recruit-
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  ing boom. I daresay it has been very well managed, but I want the House to look at the result of it. Your Territorial Artillery is supposed to be of some use, but take the 6th Battery of the Second London Brigade. In order to make up the establishment of 145 non-commissioned officers and men 120 recruits had to be brought in this year. What use is that battery going to be for the next year or two with nearly all the men recruits? I want to ask about the discipline in the Territorial Force. There were forty-one officers and 6,700 men odd absent altogether from camp in 1911, and, as I understand, no punishment at all was meted out to them. How can you possibly have discipline when you are afraid to enforce it because the force would dwindle? What has been done to get rid of the defects pointed out by Sir John French? Has the Yeomanry training been longer? Do they train at all except when in camp? Sir John French asked this question:—
  "Are nine days enough for learning fire tactics, fire discipline, rapid mounting and dismounting, mutual support, advance to and retirement from position under cover, security, protection, scouting, despatch riding?"
  All that is done in nine days—the very thing that Sir John French complained about. Sir John wanted the Field Artillery trained longer. I want to know whether the Government have done anything in that matter. The real fact is that the Government cannot remedy the really important defects pointed out by the Inspector-General of the Forces. The right hon. Gentleman knows that perfectly well, and so, too, does the War Office. They dare not tell the country, and for very good reasons, because they would either have to find more money or they would have to go in for compulsory military training. That is how the case stands. I want to call the attention of the Government to this matter. Surely it is a perfect scandal that the House of Commons, which has charge of the public purse, should vote its Ministers in some cases thousands of pounds a year, and its Members £400 a year, while a subaltern in the Army has to put up with less than £40 a year, after paying his mess bill.
  The DEPUTY-CHAIRMAN (Mr. Maclean): The hon. Member is now discussing the question of Army pay.
  Mr. HUNT: I apologise. I got over the line in my forgetfulness. The only way in which to get a satisfactory Army for the defence of the country is to make the people realise that it is the duty of every sound man to learn enough to enable him

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  to defend his country, his women folk and his children in times of national peril. Even the late Sir Henry Campbell-Banner-man went so far as to say that this is more important really than anything else. Why the Government will not face it, I cannot understand. There would be no opposition from this side of the House. I asked the Prime Minister the other day if he would inquire of the Leader of the Opposition whether he would agree to make this a non-party question. He refused, although he has said he is quite willing to make women's franchise a non-party question. I think it is a very bad sign when any party takes up such an attitude, and puts justice and the safety of the country far behind its own party political prospects. Yet that is what right hon. Gentlemen opposite are now doing. They know perfectly well that if they wish to have a really good well-trained and sufficiently numerous Territorial Army, suitable for home defence, they must see that their men are trained from four to six months, and thus ensure a regular supply of trained men to fill up the gaps in the Army each year as it comes round. Surely that is a reasonable proposition. It is said that the National Service League have no plans. That is our plan. We want to fill up your Territorial Force and to make it a success, and I am absolutely certain you cannot do it in any other way than that which we propose.
  Question put, and agreed to.

  SPECIAL RESERVE.
  Motion made, and Question proposed.
  3. "That a sum, not exceeding £715,000, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the Expense of the Pay, Bounty, etc., of the Special Reserve (to a number not exceeding 91,363, including 1,300 Militia and 150 Militia Reserve), and of the Officers' Training Corps, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1913."
  Sir A. GRIFFITH-BOSCAWEN: I wish to ask one or two questions about the Special Reserve. I am entitled to refer to this matter; because this Special Reserve, which is a very important factor in our military system, has not been discussed for a good many years in this House, and those of us who are interested in the force, and hold commissions in it, are desirous of finding out the intentions of the Government in regard to it. We want to know, in fact, what particular rôle the Special Reserve is designed to play in our
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  military system. Let me refer for one or two moments to the history of the creation of this force. In the year 1907, when Haldane's system was introduced, the old Militia was abolished. I am bound to say that that abolition was a very doubtful experiment. You had a force that has played a great part in the history of the country. It was an old constitutional force, which was able in emergency to go out as units. In the South African war the force performed very good service. I would remind hon. Members that no fewer than 126 separate battalions of Reserve Infantry were embodied during the South African war; sixty-one served in South Africa, nine in the Mediterranean, and fifty-six did duty in garrisoning the various fortress towns in this country. The special feature of the old Militia was that they came out as units. I am not casting the slightest reflection upon the Territorial or any other force, but the point was that the old Militia could come out as units, and by garrisoning the fortresses of this country, and by maintaining the lines of communication in South Africa, by releasing a large number of Regular battalions from Mediterranean stations, it made it possible for us to send to the front a very large number of officers and men who could not otherwise have been dispatched there. The Militia was abolished. What have we got in its place? We have the Special Reserve, but how many of those battalions could go out as units and take their places with the Regular battalions in emergency at the present time? At the outside we have twenty-seven special battalions—that is to say, fourth battalions of the Special Reserve in the place of the 126 that did duty during the South African war.
  I am prepared to make one admission with regard to the change which was made when the Militia was turned into the Special Reserve, namely, that the general efficiency of the Special Reserve is considerably greater than that of the old Militia. I admit that as regards the men the fact that they have to do five months' preliminary drill before they can serve in the Special Reserve and come out of training, is a great improvement. I am prepared to admit also, as regards the officers, that the fact that they have to go for six months' probationary work in a Line battalion gives them a great education, and creates greater efficiency than existed before. I am also glad to acknowledge that the presence of Regular establishment

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  officers during the training is of great advantage to Special Reserve battalions. I know there were some people who regarded that experiment as a very doubtful one. It was thought that the existence of Regular officers with older Militia officers might cause friction and trouble. So far as my experience is concerned, that has not been the case, and I gladly admit the great help that has been rendered by the Regular establishment officer. But when we come to numbers, and, after all, that is the important point, the position of the Special Reserve is most unsatisfactory. Let me give the facts. The establishment of the Militia, when I first joined, was about 130,000. As a matter of fact something in the neighbourhood of 100,000, or rather more, went out for training every year. What is the position now. The establishment of the Special Reserve, instead of being 130,000, is, according to the Votes that have been circulated this year, only 89,913, which is a decrease of 1,300 since last year. When we come to actual strength, and that is far more important than the establishment, what do we find? The actual strength is only 61,951. In other words, the Special Reserve, with this very reduced establishment, is nearly 28,000 men short at the present time. Every single battalion is short.
  The result to anybody who has done his training is apparent. We have to train with skeleton companies. It is impossible to recognise nowadays what is a company and what is a squad? The establishment has been reduced from twelve companies to eight companies. At the last training, about a month ago, I was out in a big camp with five Special Reserve battalions. Every single one was under strength. The battalion that was most under strength was one of the fourth battalions, one of the twenty-seven extra special battalions which are supposed to be able to come out as units, like the old Militia did. Their establishment is 750 non-commissioned officers and men, whereas the establishment of the third battalion is only 580. The fourth battalion, which was out with us, was the weakest battalion in the whole camp. If these extra special battalions are to come out as units, how on earth are they to do their duty in relieving a Line battalion in the way the old Militia did? Their weakness is perfectly apparent. The force is really rapidly disappearing. The establishment has been cut down, and
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  the numbers do not anything like equal the establishment. I ask the Government what they propose to do, to bring up the Special Reserve to anything like the establishment that it ought to be; and what particular function do they assign to the Special Reserve under present conditions in the general military scheme of the country. The position is really most serious. The fourth battalions—these twenty-seven regiments—cannot possibly fulfil their duty of coming out as units and going abroad. They are very weak. You have increased their establishment, but you have not got the men. If they go abroad after having shed 10 per cent., we will say, of immature youths and so on, they will be battalions of no more than 300 to 400 strong.
  As to the rest, the third battalions, what is going to be their position? We are told they are depôt battalions, and are going to be used as drafts to make up the wastage of war in the Regular battalions. What is the strength of the drafts they can send? The total strength of the Special Reserve at the present time is about 61,000. From the drafts that you can send to a Regular battalion going abroad you have to deduct the twenty-seven extra specials, which is really about 14,000. You have to deduct again what has been called the Special Contingent of the Expeditionary Force. According to a speech made by Lord Lucas in the House of Lords on the 15th November, 1910, 15,175 Special Reservists are required for what is called the Special Contingent of the Expeditionary Force. You have then to deduct the number who pass from the Special Reserve into the Line. According to Lord Haldane, 47 per cent, of the Special Reservists are really recruits going on from the Special Reserve into the Line. We will put them down as about 15,000. You have then to deduct another 10 per cent., who are immature lads who could not possibly be fit for drafts into a Line battalion in time of war. What is the result? Leaving on one side these twenty-seven extra special battalions, you have only about 12,000 men to use as drafts to make up for wastage of war in the course of a campaign. What do the Government propose to do? I know that last year, taking, the Memorandum which was circulated with the Army Votes, the Government proposed to increase the numbers of the Special Reserve by enlisting a large number of ex-soldiers, men who had completed their twelve years with the colours

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  and the Reserve, and so stiffening them with old soldiers. But they have not got these men. I understand they are not forthcoming. How are you going to make up your number? I confess it is very difficult to make a suggestion, but I would humbly suggest this as a possible means. I would amalgamate what is called Section D of the Army Reserve with the Special Reserve. Instead of having a Section D, those men who have served their twelve years and who can go on for another four years should only be allowed to go on for another four years if they train with the Special Reserve.
  Sir F. BANBURY: On a point of Order. Is my hon. Friend in order in suggesting a plan of that description? Would it not be necessary to introduce a Bill to enable that to be done; and, if so, is he not out of order?
  The DEPUTY-CHAIRMAN (Colonel Lockwood): I do not think the hon. Member is out of order at present.
  Sir A. GRIFFITH-BOSCAWEN: I was only taking the liberty to throw out a suggestion.
  Sir F. BANBURY: You must not if it requires a Bill.
  Sir A. GRIFFITH - BOSCAWEN: Whether it be embodied in a Bill or a Vote later on, I am not one of those who are prepared to come here and criticise generally without making some suggestion. It seems to me that I am quite in order in suggesting that one way, at all events, would be to amalgamate Section D of the Army Reserve with the Special Reserve and to enlist men when they join the Army to serve for so many years with the Colours, so many years with the Army Reserve, and afterwards, we may say, for four years with the Special Reserve. In that way, at all events, they would get some lien upon the men and they might be able to get that stiffening of old soldiers which the Government attempted to get last year, and which apparently they entirely failed to get when they put their proposal into practice. Now we come to the officers. It is really a most serious state of affairs. According to the establishment the officers of the Special Reserve, excluding the Regular establishments, are 2,843. The actual numbers, according to the Votes circulated with the War Office Memorandum, are only 1,607. In other words, there is a deficiency of officers of no less than 1,236. Some battalions are most extraordinarily weak. I took the trouble
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  to look into the case of three or four battalions the other day. One battalion I find out of an establishment of nineteen subalterns has only three, another out of a total establishment of twenty-six officers has only got eleven; another battalion, which is a fourth battalion and therefore has a higher establishment, out of twenty-nine officers has only got thirteen. What do the Government propose? Are they satisfied with that state of affairs? Are they not prepared to propose something to try to improve it? I read the other day an article in the "United Service Review" which said that the whole matter was the fault of commanding officers, and unless commanding officers got more officers for their battalions they were not worthy of their pay, and ought to be turned out.
  The difficulty of getting officers under present conditions is enormously great. I spend an enormous amount of time myself in endeavouring to get officers. All the time I can spare from defending the Church in Wales and trying to induce the Government to do something for the housing of the working classes, I spend in trying to get officers for the 3rd Battalion of the Royal West Kent Regiment. I am better off than a good many commanding officers, but under present conditions it is very difficult, and I can tell the Government some of the reasons. In the first place, by abolishing the Militia and substituting what is called the Special Reserve you have destroyed the county connection of the old Militia force. Up to the time that the Militia was altered it was the old constitutional force of the county, and there was a large number of people who always went into the county Militia. No one knows what on earth the Special Reserve is. I am frequently asked, "What do you belong to now?" I say, "I belong to the old Militia." They say, "We thought it was abolished." I say, "It is abolished and they call us the Special Reserve." When I say we are called the Special Reserve they generally say, "Are you Territorial?" And I say, "No; we are not Territorials." They then ask, "What on earth are you?" And so you have a complete disconnection of the old county connection between the Militia and those old county families who used to find the officers for the Militia force. It is not only that. Let me give an example. The county connection is entirely destroyed. Instead of being the Militia of a particular county we are now the third battalion of a regiment which may be a very good regiment, but one

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  which has no particular connection as regards officers with that special county. To take an example, Cumberland men went into the old Cumberland Militia. They are not now the Cumberland Militia, but the third battalion of the Border Regiment. That conveys absolutely nothing to the class of men who used to go into the Cumberland Militia. Take another case—the old Denbighshire Militia, whom I used to know very well. They are now the third battalion of a very distinguished regiment—the Royal Welsh Fusiliers—but their Denbighshire connection in name and so one has entirely gone, and that is one great reason why we cannot get officers now. The best thing the Government can do if they wish to officer the Special Reserve is to restore to the battalions their old county names and the name of the Militia. I do not in the least see why a battalion should not be called the Militia of a particular county, and yet do all the functions which are assigned to the Special Reserve at present.
  One great difficulty is getting subaltern officers. In the old days we used to get a great many subaltern officers, young men who came into the Militia with a view to getting into the Line. The Militia in those days, apart from Sandhurst, was practically the only way by which young men could get into the Line. That is entirely destroyed now. You can get in through the universities and through the Territorials and by various other ways. I am not complaining, and I do not think any alteration is possible; but still that is one great difficulty in the way of getting subaltern officers for the Special Reserve. Another difficulty is the six months' probation. It is frightfully difficult to get young men now to agree to go for six months to a Regular battalion. You cannot do it unless you catch a man the moment he leaves school or college. Only the other day an excellent young man, who would have done admirably for a Special Reserve battalion, came to see me in this House I was willing to give him a commission, but when I told him he would have to go for six months to a Line battalion he said it was impossible. He had just got some work in the city of an important character. He could do the month's training all right, but he could not possibly do his six months' probation with the Regular battalion first. It is difficult to make any suggestion, because I am bound to admit that the six months' probation adds enormously to the efficiency of the officer. The
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  only difficulty I have is that after six months' probation the subalterns are so infinitely more efficient than the senior officers. What I would suggest is that the Government should put the Officers' Training Corps into much closer relation with the Special Reserve. No doubt if we could catch these young men the moment they leave Oxford or Cambridge or the moment they leave a public school, and before they go into any other kind of business you might be able to get them for six months' probation. But if you miss that opportunity the chance is gone.
  I can tell the Under-Secretary an experience I had. A few months ago I circularised every officers' Training Corps in the country, every public school, and each of the universities, and asked if they had any boys or men leaving the university who lived in West Kent who had been in their training corps and was willing to do a little soldiering and serve in the Special Reserve. I got a very scanty response, and was rather disappointed to start with. Some of them did not answer; but only last week I got a communication from one of the great public schools recommending a particular boy who was leaving that school who had been in the Officers' Training Corps and wanted to go into the Special Reserve; and I am glad to say I have been able to recommend him for a commission in my battalion. If the War Office could put us, who command Special Reserve battalions, in more direct communication with the Officers' Training Corps, it would make it easier to get officers in the future. One other difficulty is this. Notwithstanding all that has been done, and all the simplification that has taken place, the amount of red tape and difficulty made by the War Office is often very serious. I will give an example of what occurred to me the other day. An ex-officer brought his son to me, and asked me to recommend him for a commission in the 3rd West Kent. I saw the young man, and recommended him, and in the ordinary course he had to go before a medical board. The Board found him fit in every way, except that he had a varicocele. It was pointed out that if he had an operation the varicocele might be removed, and he might receive a commission. He went through an operation. What happened then? He had to go before another board, and he was spun in respect of general debility. That was caused as the result of the operation. That is perfectly heart-rending. On account of the rigid rules drawn up by

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  medical boards, young men who are otherwise perfectly fit, and who would make good officers in the Special Reserve, are taken from us. What are the remedies with a view of getting more officers? I have already said that one of the best things we can do would be to restore the name Militia, with the old county titles. If that were done, I think we should find officers in future as in the past. In the next place, if you want to get the number of officers required for the Special Reserve, and I understand you do want them—it is not only a case of officering the existing battalions, but you expect each of the existing battalions to send four officers to the Regular Force to make up the deficiency in the Regular battalions—you should give them a bigger retaining fee than at present.
  Mr. HAROLD BAKER: That means more money.
  Sir A. GRIFFITH - BOSCAWEN: More money, exactly. What do you do now? You give a retaining fee of £20 up to the age of thirty-five. I do not know why officers after thirty-five are excluded. It is apparently thought that after that age they are of no use whatever. I do not ask a retaining fee for myself, but what I do say is that if you gave these officers a bigger retaining fee, and continued it after thirty-five, you would be more likely to get officers. I suggest that it should be increased to £30 or £40, and not cut off at thirty-five, as at present. In the next place you ought to make the life and training in the Special Reserve as economical as possible—certainly less expensive than it is now. I am not for a moment saying that life in the Special Reserve is extravagant now. Far from it. My experience is exactly the opposite. I knew a captain who could live on his pay during the training. Unless he drinks champagne every night, a subaltern can live on his pay, taking into account his retaining fee. But the Government put on officers all kinds of unnecessary expenses which have to be met, and which make the training far more expensive than it ought to be.
  Take the case of bands. It may be said that is a very trumpery and minor point to mention, and that in considering the expense of the Special Reserve and the importance of their place in the general military efficiency of the country we ought not to talk of such a small matter. My belief is that the existence of a fairly respectable band in a battalion is most useful
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  from the point of view of recruiting both men and officers. At all events, the Government recognise the value and importance of a band by giving £25 a year towards its expense. That amount is absolutely inadequate. The Government give £25, and require that a sergeant drummer and eight musicians, or permanent staff drums, should be provided. With £25 a year no man on earth can have an efficient band. Then they say we can have two days' pay. That gives £21 a year, and, with £46 a year and with only eight permanent staff drums, we have got to have an efficient band during training. It simply cannot be done, and the result is that in order to maintain a band of a certain number the officers, who are better off than others, have to put their hands very deeply in their pockets. It is absolutely wrong that they should have to do that. If the Government think it necessary to have a band—and apparently they do—they ought to give an adequate amount without putting the expense on the officers, but the War Office apparently never consider these matters. They have no touch with the realities of the situation. Two years ago the Government said, "We will help you to solve the question of bands. We will make it legal for you to enlist musicians." It sounds so easy. What does it amount to in practice? You have got to enlist musicians for four years. You cannot buy them out by paying £3 discharge for each man. As a matter of fact a civilian musician will not enlist for four years. His life does not tend that way. He may be playing at the Empire one week, then he may be turned over for the Special Reserve training, and after that he may go on a ship like the poor fellows who were on the "Titanic." Their lives are so diversified that they will not enlist for four years. We cannot find them out at each training. You could buy a discharge for £1 formerly, but it is now £3. What I do say is that if the Government think it important that we should have a band at all they ought to make proper provision for it without putting the expense on the officers of the battalions.
  There are various other small criticisms I would like to make. Let me give one or two examples of the way in which the Special Reserves are badly treated. I do not want to institute any invidious comparison with the Territorials whose work I greatly admire, but I want to know why a Territorial field officer should be exempt from having to serve on juries while a Special Reserve field officer is not exempt.

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  The Special Reserve field officers perform an important national function just as much as the others. I am not arguing that the Territorial officers should not be exempt, but I argue that the Special Reserve officer should have similar exemption. Take another case. A Territorial adjutant, if a subaltern when appointed, obtains the temporary and local rank of captain, but a Special Reserve adjutant, if a subaltern, remains a subaltern, and does not get the temporary rank. I should like to know why that is so. At the present moment my adjutant, who is a subaltern, remains a subaltern, but his junior in the Service who is an adjutant in the Territorial Force has obtained the rank of captain. These are no doubt small points, but all points contributing either to the efficiency or inefficiency of the Special Reserve. It is because I am most anxious in every way that the Special Reserve should be given a fair chance to make itself as efficient as possible, and to do the functions assigned to it in the Government's scheme, that I ask the Government for a sympathetic consideration of these points. I make these criticisms in no spirit of hostility or complaint. We are quite prepared to do our duty in the sphere in which we happen to be placed, but we do feel at the present moment that the force is falling off in numbers, that the difficulty of getting officers is increasing, and that we have a difficulty as to what particular way the Government intend us to act. We say that our extra special 4th Battalion are not able to do the work which the old Militia did of mobilisation, we feel that the 3rd Battalions are miserably weak, and we do think that the time has come when we ought to have some explicit statement from the Government as to what rôle in particular we are intended to fill, and that we ought to have a little more encouragement from the powers that be to make the Special Reserve more efficient.
  Colonel BOLES: I view with some alarm the shortage and the continuous shrinkage of the Special Reserve, and I refer particularly to the Infantry. In 1909 the shortage of infantry was 3,729. In 1910 it was 9,577. According to the latest returns it was 15,851. Let it be noted that these latest returns are figures in January when the Special Reserve is at its strongest and the largest number of recruits is being trained at the depot at that time. These same recruits, some 60 or 70 per cent. of
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  whom are counted in the Special Reserve, go also to increase the satisfaction of the Assistant Adjutant-General for recruiting in making up the annual report for recruits for the Regular Army. It would be noticed that in his Army Estimates the Secretary of State for War did not lay stress upon the shortage of the Special Reserve, but merely pointed out that there were 1,800 less than last year. This is a very important matter, and the question which the War Office has to decide at the present time is: How can the Special Reserve units be brought up to establishment both as regards officers and men? It is interesting to note that in none of the speeches on the Government side in the Debate on the Army Estimates, was there a single suggestion as to how this could be done. Are we to attribute it to the fact that their whole attention was devoted to the Territorial Force, or is it because they realise—and I think everyone will agree with me that this is the reason—that under present conditions or under any other conditions short of compulsory service or enormous pay it is quite impossible.
  I would like to make one or two suggestions which I do not claim will in any way bring this force up to proper establishment, but which may in some way tend to check the terrible shrinkage that is going on at present. I would urge the Secretary of State for War to give a separation allowance to the married privates in the Special Reserve. If a Territorial requires a separation allowance for fifteen days, why does not the Special Reservist require it for twenty-seven days? It is not an argument to say, though I believe it is often said, that the Special Reservist gets a bounty while the Territorial does not, because I submit that the bounty which the Special Reservist gets is given to him on account of extra risks he is prepared to run, in other words for foreign service obligations. This money, or the greater part of it, could be saved by not giving to the Special Reserve recruit, who turns over to the Line at the conclusion of the Special Reserve training and very often before the conclusion of that training, the 30s. bounty. That bounty, I submit, is a reward for Special Reserve recruit training. If a man turns over to the Line at the end of that training in what respect is he different from the ordinary man who enlist in the Line, the ordinary Line recruit, training at the depôt, on enlistment? And yet that man does not receive a bounty. Another method by which to a certain extent this

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  shrinkage may be prevented is by increasing the price for the purchase of a discharge. Three pounds is ridiculously low, when you think that the 30s. bounty which the recruit receives goes towards half of it, and I may say the Line training bounty would supply the whole of it. I would suggest that in addition to the £3 which a man has to pay to buy his discharge, he should also be called upon to refund the 30s. bounty. Perhaps it is hopeless in these days to suggest that the numbers of men who turn over to the Line should be limited annually, as it was in the case of the old Militia, to check this decrease.
  Still I do not see why men should be allowed to turn over until they have done one training with the Special Reserve battalion. I lay great stress on that. I think it is most important that these men should be obliged to do one training with the Special Reserve battalion. At present the Special Reserve is largely a paper strength, since a large percentage of it is composed of recruits who have turned over. If they had to do one training, and then wished to turn over, say at the conclusion or shortly after the conclusion of the training, which I think would be the case, the strength, as at present reckoned, would be largely increased, since all the recruits joining from the end of one July to the beginning of next July would be on its books. Again, I say that it would have this effect, that the men who would join the Army would not join so young, for in many cases they would have to put in several months' service with the Special Reserve. I think this may be looked upon as an advantage by the Line battalions, for instead of getting these men who turn over in driblets throughout the year, they would get them more or less at one time.
  I can assure the Committee that it would certainly please the Special Reserve commanding officer and the company commanding officers that they would have someone to command. I will be corrected if I am wrong, but I am given to understand that men employed in the Post Office, if they wish to join the Special Reserve at all, must give up their holidays to the training. While, if they join the Territorials they can train without having the period taken from their holidays. If this is the case, I only hope that it will be looked into and that those men who wish to join the Special Reserve will have the same advantages as those who wish to join the Territorial Force. My hon. Friend has referred to the shortage of officers so ably and so fully that I will not dwell upon that subject. He
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  has also referred to our bands. I associate myself with every word he said. I believe that the band of the regiment is a great asset. I am perfectly certain that it does a lot of good for training and for recruiting. The better band you have the more likely it is to get engagements in the county at flower shows, horse shows, and whatever may be going on; besides which a good band gives a regiment a good name. I urge the Secretary for War to be a little more generous with his Grant for the bands. The sum of £25 is nothing, and eight permanent staff drummers as a nucleus to the band is ridiculous. I do hope we may get a little more consideration for the bands, and that a little more will be given towards them. In the remarks I have made I have put nothing forward in a party spirit. I take a very great interest in the Special Reserve, and I am sure I am speaking on behalf of all Special Reserve commanding officers when I say that they are most willing and able and anxious to do all they can to help forward and to make the force fit.
  10.0 P.M.
  Sir COURTENAY WARNER: I should not have entered into this Debate if I had not had a very considerable experience for over a third of a century in the Special Reserve and the Militia. I know the difference between the old force and the modern force. There is no doubt about it that the modern force is very much more efficient than the old Militia. I have commanded in both, and I have some knowledge of both, and there is an enormous difference between the old force and the new. Reference has been made to the shortage of officers. When the Special Reserve was first introduced, I submitted to Lord Haldane, who was then in this House, that the regulations he made for giving the officers two years' training were quite impossible, and that he would get no officers on those terms, or not nearly enough. My words have come true, and I believe it will take some time to get the stream of men back, and get the county men to take up the work as they used to do in the old days. The Yeomanry is now much cheaper than it was, and takes a class of men who used to go into the old Militia, and the Territorials take some of them also; but, at the same time, I believe that with the increase of population and so on, there are enough men to draw from if we give them proper consideration. One of the suggestions made is that the

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  exemption of Territorial officers from serving on juries is an exemption which should be extended to the Special Reserve, who are now really treated as Regular soldiers. They ought to have, and I think they have, in many cases, exemption from serving on juries. That cannot be disputed. The hon. Gentleman opposite shakes his head, but I think if he will take the point to the Law Courts he will find that it is so. I know that I was exempted from serving on juries on that plea many years ago, in the old Militia days, and I think it is the law that the Special Reserve officer is exempt from jury service. [An HON. MEMBER: "NO."] It is a lawyer's question, but I think if anybody cares to carry it to a Law Court it will be found that I am correct in what I say. I quite agree that we are short of officers, and I do not think that the payment of £20, £25, or £30 per year would induce men to come in. The Grant of £25 a year did not bring a single man into the Special Reserve, and I do not think that is the sort of thing which will bring officers into the Special Reserve at all.
  In regard to the regimental band, I know that it is a question of great difficulty. Where you have a good band that can secure local engagements there is not so much difficulty about it, but the real difficulty is that even if they have one of the best bands they do not get enough local engagements, and even £30 or £40 a year more would not affect the matter. The only way in practice is to borrow a band from the regiments which are training at the same time, or from the Territorials. [An HON. MEMBER: "You have got to pay for them."] Yes, you have got to pay for them, but the sum is very much smaller than you would have to pay for a band of professional musicians. I think, with a little encouragement given in the way I suggest, the bands for peace establishment could be greatly improved, and could be made very much better than they are to-day. But the moment we come to the question of embodiment there is no difficulty about the band at all. The band enlists as soldiers, and stand on the same footing as the men in the Regular battalion, and the difficulty disappears. There is no difficulty once you mobilise, The difficulty is in the peace establishment, and the only way to carry the matter out successfully is by borrowing the band belonging to two or three battalions, the band of the Territorial Regiment or the band of the Special Reserve Regiment. I
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  think that is feasible, and could be done in many cases, where there are local engagements. The hon. Member for West Somerset touched on the real difficulty, that of recruiting. The hon. Member for Dudley also referred to it, and various suggestions were made. The payment of a separation allowance, the same as is paid in the Territorials is one suggestion. But we are not in the same position as the Territorials, and the case of the postmen is evidence of that. The Special Reserve man goes out twenty-eight days, and the Territorial for fourteen days. It is very easy to give a man a holiday of fourteen days, but very difficult to give twenty-eight days. That, of course, militates against the recruiting, not only of Government servants but of men employed in factories and so on. We have got to do something to remedy that. The great thing that encourages recruiting is not the future benefit but the immediate benefit a man gets when he joins. If the suggestion of taking away the 30s. from the man who leaves the Special Reserve to join the Army was partially carried out, and, say, 10s. taken and the other £1 given on joining the Special Reserve, you would get more recruits. An enormous number of those men join the Special Reserves and the Army when they are in some pecuniary difficulty. They want to get away from home, and pay some small debt, and if they knew they would get £1 or 30s. straight off you would get hundreds or thousands of recruits.
  The real mistake in the bounty system at present is that the man does not get the benefit at the time of joining. If he did it would enable him to get out of his trouble. The bounties are very good in their way, and attract a good class of men, but they do not encourage recruiting. Let me give a word of warning against the idea which was advanced to-night, namely, to check them going into the Army in order to keep up the numbers. That is all very well, but you check recruiting for the Army very considerably, and you do not get what you want for the Special Reserve, that which is the backbone of it, namely, the men who are thoroughly well known to their officers. The Special Reserve battalions will have to act as units in the future. It is quite true they will send drafts to the link battalions, but at the same time they will get from them men who have served through the Special Reserve who are willing to go abroad. On mobilisation they will be very strong battalions. You want in those battalions not merely the men who serve for a year, but the men

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  who are old-fashioned Militia men, who know their officers thoroughly, and stick to the Special Reserve battalion right through. The more you get of those men the stiffer and stronger you make the battalion. The way to get the men is to give them when they join part of the bounty. It is well known that boys join a Special Reserve to see how they would like soldiering. If they do they go into the Army, and it is not the 30s. that induces them. There are a few it might affect, but if you gave that 30s. when they first joined I am quite sure it would make up all deficiency both for the Regular Army and in the recruiting for the Special Reserve. I hope that point will be taken into consideration. I have always thought a larger sum of money ought to be given on first joining. It is no good giving a man 5s. to bring in a recruit. The recruit is generally in low water financially, and if he got something which he could give to his family to help them it would be a great inducement. He could then tell his family that he was going into the Army to make his career, and he has got a very fine career before him. I think in that way the real difficulty of recruiting will be got over.
  Captain PEEL: I beg to move to reduce the Vote by £100.
  I move this Amendment as a great number of points have been mentioned, and I desire to call particular attention to them. We have derived a great deal of benefit from the admirable speeches we have heard on the question of the Special Reserve. For my own part I was very pleased that the Special Reserve had a chance of being heard for the first time since I had the honour to be a member. Questions with regard to the Army and the Navy should be above the range of party politics. Therefore, as we are all agreed that what we want is to see the Special Reserve complete in numbers, in equipment, and in preparedness for war, I desire to approach the question from a national and not a party point of view. The former Secretary of State (Lord Haldane), undoubtedly increased the efficiency of the old Militia when he changed that Militia to what is now known as the Special Reserve. The old Militia used to go up for sixty-one days' preliminary training and a month's training. The Special Reservist came up for six months on enlistment in exactly the same way as the Line recruit when he joined the depot of the Line battalion. He then went out for three weeks' training every year. That was satisfactory. When the clean broom
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  passed over the Militia we were given Line officers with Regular engagements belonging to the 3rd Battalion, which added to our efficiency, and we were also given a larger number of non-commissioned officers. All that was very satisfactory, but, unfortunately, possibly on questions of expense, it did not last very long. I think it was only for one year, although it may have been possibly for two, that the Special Reserve recruit was trained for six months. At any rate, at the beginning of the last financial year another system came into vogue. The Special Reserve consists of Special Reserve Battalions and the extra Reserve Battalions which are the 4th Battalions. The first step in the downward path which Lord Haldane took was to lessen the period of preliminary drill for the recruits joining the 4th Battalions.
  I may describe the different functions of these battalions in this way. The third battalions in time of war are to be used to fill up the ranks of the Line battalions, and to act as reservoirs for the young soldiers who are not taken out by the Line battalions to the war. The fourth battalions, on the other hand, in time of war, will go as units, either to garrison towns in England and relieve the Line battalions there, or to garrison the Mediterranean ports or to act on the lines of communication. One would think that battalions with these functions should have at least the same permanent staff as battalions which are to act merely as reservoirs for the youth of the Line battalions. But not at all. What happened on 1st April last year? The fourth battalions were deprived of their Line officers, and they have never had the permanent staff that the third battalions have. The establishment of the fourth battalions is 750, while that of the third battalions is 580, and yet the fourth battalions have a permanent staff of only twenty-seven, as compared with the third battalions' permanent staff of ninety-six. The fourth battalions have no Line officers, the third battalions have four. In time of active service the third battalions have to find four subalterns for their Line Battalion; the fourth battalions have to do the same. Since the fourth battalions go out as units, they ought at least to have the same permanent staff as the third battalions. If we are not allowed to have Regular officers—because there is a difficulty in their being in two places at once—I should like to have a larger staff of non-commissioned officers in the fourth battalions. I am

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  quite willing not to have the extra Regular officers in the fourth battalions if I can have an increased permanent staff. At present I am only asking for the same permanent staff for a battalion of 750 men as the third battalions have in addition to their officers with a battalion of 580 men.
  As regards recruiting, the third battalions have a distinct pull over the fourth battalions. The fourth battalions have to be ready on mobilisation to go out as units—they have no reserve at all. What happens in regard to recruiting? Many men in casual employment in the big towns join the Special Reserve when they do not want to join the Army. They join the Special Reserve because they want to get a job at once. Under the new Regulations the third battalions take their recruits for five months on enlistment, and therefore recruits go to the third battalions in preference to the fourth battalions, where they have only three months on enlistment. There is another very important question in regard to recruiting, and that is that now that we have no Regular officers in our fourth battalions the training of our recruits is carried out by officers of the third battalion. I should like the men of the fourth battalion to have the opportunity of being trained under their own officers—that we should have the authority of the War Office to call up the fourth battalion officers. It would be an all-round benefit to both officers and men. In the old Militia days when would-be officers desired to get into the Army, and the stiff examinations caused some of them to fail, the keen men went into the Militia for a period. They do not get depot employment now because of the permanent officers of the Special Reserve. I do not quarrel with these officers, but I do say that the officers of the fourth battalion of the Special Reserve should be assured of employment in the course of the year. We ought at all events to have our own instructor in musketry for the recruits. This year I recommended an officer, but he was not allowed to do the work, and I believe it was because the War Office found it cheaper to employ some officer of a Line battalion who was a supernumerary for a short time, though, no doubt, he had to be paid out of Army funds.
  In regard to the recruits there are three points which may be difficult in regard to the fourth battalion. One of them is the length of the preliminary drills. We do not get the same time as the third battalion.
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  The second point is a very important point in regard to recruiting for the Special Reserve, and that is that there is no separation allowance. Why does not the Special Reserve have separation allowance? They are the cheapest form of semi-Regular soldiers that any country can produce. They are perfectly wonderful in view of the training they get. If we read the annals of the British Army you will find the old Militia were always there, and the Special Reserve is, I believe, if anything, better. They have more education and more keenness. What does this lack of separation allowance mean? It means that instead of joining the Special Reserve the men join the Territorials. At first sight it may appear that the recruits for the Special Reserve and the recruits for the Territorials are different classes of men. In addition to these classes to which I have referred, you get another class of men who formerly went into the Special Reserve and who now join the Territorials because there is a separation allowance given to them. I should like to know if the Government would consider giving our men in the Special Reserve a separation allowance. Then there is the question of the bounty. I say to my old soldiers: "I hope you are coming back next year," and they reply: "We hope to come back next year, Sir, and for many years"; but it is difficult to get any more men because of the two things I have mentioned—the separation allowance in the one case, and that in the old Militia they got a bounty of 30s., whereas they now get £1 in the Special Reserve.
  It is extraordinary how conservative in a way soldiers are even in their grievances. I find these points I have mentioned always in the way when I am trying to get recruits. I take these three points, the limited period of drill in the fourth battation compared with the third, separation allowance, and bounty as the three great difficulties in connection with recruiting. There is the fourth but minor point of drilling by their own officers. When I joined the fourth battalion many years ago we paraded 1,000 strong. This year we were 400. I do not quarrel with the pay the men receive, I pointed out over and over again that for a month's training they are extremely well paid. I think if you wanted to make out a recruiting poster you could well set forth what you pay them for the month's training. But there are one or two grievances. To touch on the point I put before I should like

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  to see a permanent staff for the fourth battalion as you have for the third, and I should like to see a chance of employment given to the fourth battalion officers. As my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley said, the public hardly recognise the Special Reserve. They know the Army and the Navy and the Territorials, but if you speak of the Special Reserve they imagine they are some form of Army Reserve. I think there is a great deal in a name. There are even right hon. Gentlemen in this House who seem to be unaware of the existence of the Special Reserve. I studied the Insurance Act and I find no reference to the Special Reserve in its pages, nor does it state who would be held to be the employer during the training period. If the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War looks through the Act, as no doubt he has done on many occasions, he will, I think, not find there any mention of the Special Reserve in the Act. I think it is important that something should be done to have brought to the notice of the public, not only what the Special Reserve have done in the past, but that they are ready with encouragement or without encouragement to do their work in the future as carefully and as successfully as in the past.
  Viscount WOLMER: It has been said, not only upon the other side of the House but upon this side, that in many respects the present Special Reserve is a considerable improvement upon the old Militia. I must say that I have not been able to see it. As far as my experience goes, the present Special Reserve, in regard to its annual training, is nothing but a farce, and a very expensive farce at that. I want to give a matter-of-fact account of what happens to any individual in the Special Reserve Battalion going out to training under the present system. Take my own regiment, the 3rd Battalion the Hampshire Regiment. That battalion is composed of eight companies, and it looks very well on paper. The establishment is 580 men, thirty officers, two machine gun detachments, scouts, etc. There is a battalion alleged to be ready to take the field in time of war, and said to be a very considerable improvement on the old Militia. What are the facts? How many men did this battalion parade on the last day of training this last year? There were only 270 men in camp out of an establishment of 580 men, and when it came to parade you had to deduct from that the detachments with two machine guns, the scouts, and the cooks. In the old days in the
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  Militia we had the police and the sanitary squad. Now, owing to the paucity of numbers, the police have had to be amalgamated with the sanitary squad, and therefore they have to be deducted. The result is at the end of the training not more than 200 men go on parade, divided into eight companies. I want the Committee to realise the practical difficulties of drilling battalions constituted on those numbers.
  The whole of the system on which the organisation is based is on the assumption that the battalion is at least about 600 men strong. When you have only got one-third of that strength the whole principle on which the organisation is built absolutely collapses. Our companies were twenty-five men strong. The strength of a company in the Regulars is supposed to be 120. Now every company has to be divided into four sections, and those sections are six men each instead of being thirty, as they ought to be. I ask the Secretary for War what is the use of telling a solitary man to form fours? You cannot do it. In the training of the last two or three years I have seen matters worse than that, because one company has paraded eleven men with three officers to drill them. Those eleven men are expected to form two half-companies, four sections, and two squads to every section, and we are supposed to go out on parade ground and do company training. The whole thing is a disheartening farce. The officers come on parade and we are simply a skeleton army. We are forced to form up in an organisation devised for numbers three times as great as we can muster, and it is impossible for us to conduct company or battalion training on the numbers we have got under the present system. I am aware that when this question was raised before Lord Haldane said, "That was all very well, but the present Special Reserve was only a nucleus, and was only the core around which you could form an efficient battalion when war actually broke out." I wish to point out to the right hon. Gentleman that that is not the case, because the present system prevents the Special Reserve from being even an efficient nucleus. How can your men be properly trained, and how can your officers be properly trained if every time they go out on parade you have to put three or four companies together in order to do company drill at all, put men under officers who do not belong to their company, leave three or four officers standing idle if there is a surplus of officers, or put your officers to command

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  men they do not know, if there is not a sufficient number of officers? The whole system on which your organisation is built up breaks down, and when you go to war you have a mass of 200 or 300 men who have not been trained together, and who have not been allowed to work in the company unit, as it was intended when the organisation of the Army on its present basis was originally mapped out. You have not got the start to make an efficient neucleus in your Special Reserve; they are simply a conglomeration of so many men and so many officers, the number of men being absolutely insufficient in order to do company or battalion drill. The whole organisation has to be discarded, and therefore you do not get an organisation at all; you simply get a conglomeration of individuals. Therefore, I submit your present Special Reserve is inefficient and useless, even as a nucleus in time of war.
  There is another criticism I want to make. Not only are you not getting more than a third of the men you want, but the men you are getting are not of the right sort. Go and look at any Special Reserve battalion out training, and you will see that three-fourths of the men are not men at all; they are simply boys, who are ultimately going into the Army, boys who are just trying to see what a military career is like. The result is that not only is the Special Reserve not a force of men at all, but you are not building up a reserve of men. The men who go into the Special Reserve go into the Army; they do not go back into civil life available for call in case of war. They simply go into the Army and the great function originally ascribed to the Special Reserve of building up among our civilians a reserve of men who have had some military training is not served when you get the sort of men you get at the present time, simply boys whose object is to go into the Army later on. In the days of the old Militia we did have a sprinkling of ancient tramps to season our battalion. I do not think in the history of the force we have ever had a sufficient number of men in the prime of life. We have never had a proper number of men in regular employment. No man can go away from his employment a month in every year without running the danger of being discharged. Of course, the ancient men have been struck out under the present system, and the result has not been to increase the efficiency of the Special
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  Reserve. It has simply been to delete a certain number of individuals from the number of Special Reservists. The result is that the Special Reserve to-day is not only wholly insufficient and inadequate in numbers, but it is composed of the merest raw boys who are absolutely unfit to take the field against any conscript army, and who do not form any reserve among our civilians, but who for the most part pass into the Army afterwards.
  It has been said there is a great shortage of officers, and the merest glance at the Estimates will show that that is so. The number of officers in the Special Reserve is probably even less than is shown on paper. My own battalion happens to have considerably more officers than most battalions. It has twenty-seven officers, and several of these at the end of the training were drafted to do another training with another reserve regiment. When we are told that 1,267 officers did training last year, one would like to ask how many individual officers did two trainings. The present Special Reserve is in danger of falling between two stools. It is neither an efficient force nor an efficient recruiting ground—or nucleus in times of stress, it is in fact a very extravagant and insufficient arm of the service at the present moment.
  Mr. WYNDHAM: The right hon. Gentleman has been informed by persons competent to speak for the Special Reserve that that part of our defensive system suffers from not having enough officers and enough men. I am sure there is no dispute between the Government and the Opposition as to the important place which the Special Reserve occupies in our system of defence. Even if it be argued that the other parts of that system are equally good and valuable, still the importance of the Special Reserve is more immediate. Only three years ago the Government declared this to be a matter of importance and urgency. There was a Memorandum published in 1909 which laid it down in express words that the Expeditionary Force itself was the smaller part, and that the more important part was the making provision for dealing with the wastage of war. There can be no dispute that this body suffers from a lack of officers and lamentably so from a lack of men. Thus here we have a gap in our system of defence which both sides of this House must be equally eager to fill in if it can be done. In respect of the Special Reserve we must recognise if there is that gap there is no use glazing it over.

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  The Special Reserve does not receive half the attention it deserves. It is the first attempt to embody the best ideals arrived at after the Napoleonic war. It is an integral part of Lord Cardwell's system, which was never allowed to be completed—it provides a third battalion as a feeder. There must be unanimity of affection and respect for this ancient body. There must be unanimity of effort to make provision for the wastage of war. On this question there can be no difference of opinion. I beg the Government to address itself and I promise it the support of the Opposition if it does address itself to make up the deficiency in the Special Reserve. It is admittedly of great and immediate importance to make good the deficiency of officers in the Special Reserve. We have heard it stated, and I am sure it is true, that the allocation of the post of musketry instructor makes a difference. It was suggested—I am only taking this as an illustration—that this post was given to a Regular officer because some economy could be effected. Granting, for the sake of argument, that you have to economise where matters are less important, it is not one of those places where you ought to economise. If that be true, or anything like it be true, so, too, in the case of the men. We heard it stated by an hon. and gallant Member, who, I think, knows, and it is certainly true of the old Militia, that the class who go into that part of our system of defence prefer a long to a short period of training. If, therefore, the Initial training has been cut down for the sake of economy, that is a vital error. You must not economise on officers of the Special Reserve, and you must not economise on the length of training of the Special Reserve. On this part of our defensive system, immediate as it is important, we ought to make good the defect if we can.
  The UNDER-SECRETARY of STATE for WAR (Mr. Tennant): I wish, at the outset, to express to the Committee and to the right hon. Gentleman opposite the agreement of the Government as to the importance of the Special Reserve, and as to our desire to fill in what he calls the gap in this part of the defences of the country. The hon. Member for Dudley (Sir A. Griffith-Boscawen) opened this Debate in a most instructive speech, and I should like to express to him my thanks for the suggestions which he made. He said he would offer us suggestions, and we welcome those suggestions. I wish to
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  express the acknowledgments of the Government for them. He asked me to give to the Committee some kind of description of what was the special role to be occupied by the Special Reserve in time of war. I believe that really the hon. Gentleman does not require that information from me, because he is in possession of it himself. If he is not, he received it from the hon. Member for Woodbridge (Captain R. F. Peel), and, I think, from the Noble Lord (Viscount Wolmer). The fact is that the Special Reserve is a most important part of the Army for the filling up of the wastage of war, and for going abroad as units themselves, to which I know that hon. Members attach great importance. The hon. Member for Dudley asked me how many of the units could go out as units. My answer is, all.
  Sir A. GRIFFITH-BOSCAWEN: All of the fourth battalions, or of the Special Reserve battalions?
  Mr. TENNANT: All of the fourth battalions. The hon. Member also asked me a question as to the six months' probation of officers, and whether some alteration could be made in that period. The answer is that officers will come from the Officers' Training Corps. There is a special provision that if they pass the A examination they are reduced to five months, and if they pass the B examination they are reduced to three months. That makes a considerable difference.
  I must say one word on the numbers of the force generally. The Noble Lord, referring to his battalion, said it was a farce, and an expensive farce. I rather regret that he should have used quite such strong language in regard to a force with which his family have been connected for a great many years. I regret that they are short of numbers, but he went on to say they were boys. The Noble Lord enjoys the distinction of having been born in the year 1887, and he might have admitted that they would improve with time. The numbers, it is true, are deficient, but they have been and are improving, and we hope we have reached bottom, though at is impossible to say. I will give one reason. In May of this year a bounty of £1 was given for re-engagement. A large number of the men will have completed their time very shortly; they were transferred to the Militia in 1908, so therefore their four years will be up at the end of this summer. We find that the £1 bounty which has been given on re-engagement has already had

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  a very considerable effect in diminishing the decrease. Again, let me say as regards the commissioned officers, that the officers' training corps system, which has only just come into force, will have very considerable effect. In 1910 298 were appointed to the Special Reserve of Officers, in 1911 304, and in six months of this year 207 up to date, which is a considerable increase, because in 1911 we only had 161 in the first six months. In 1910 we got 48 officers, and, in 1911,107 from the Officers' Training Corps, and in that first four months of this year 47, compared with 29 in the first four months of last year. We shall get more and more officers from the Officers' Training Corps as time goes on. We shall not be able to judge the full results of the scheme until 1914 or 1915.
  The hon. Member (Sir A. Griffith-Boscawen) complained of the abolition of the Militia. I think the hon. Gentleman himself admitted that the change of the Militia into the Special Reserve was a good thing for the Militia when it was done. His colleagues also have admitted that that was so. The hon. Member for Woodbridge (Captain Peel) said that it had increased the efficiency of the Special Reserve. An hon. Member complained that the names, particularly of Territorials, had been done away with and new names substituted. He mentioned by way of illustration that the Cumberland Militia was now known as the third battalion of the Border Regiment. I do not think there is any great hardship in that, because Cumberland is not very far from the border. I do not think any fair-minded man can object to the alterations which have been made as regards names. The hon. Gentleman suggested that there might be more direct duplication of the officers with the regimental units. That is a matter which I will represent to the Secretary of State, with the view of bringing about some greater co-operation. As to the suggestion made by the hon. Member for North-West Somerset, that the Post Office should give facilities regarding the Special Reserve, I will represent that to the Postmaster-General, and see if anything can be done. We are very grateful to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dover (Mr. Wyndham) for his co-operation with us in endeavouring to complete our numbers of this force. In carrying out the reforms which are required in order that it may be brought up to strength we shall certainly ask him to help us.
  Mr. HICKS BEACH: I wish the hon. Gentleman could have given a little more attention to, some of the suggestions made upon-this side of the House, which we honestly believe would be for the advantage of the Special Reserve. He has promised that careful attention will be given to some of the suggestions which were made. My hon. Friend beside me made one or two very pointed suggestions, one of them having reference to the granting of separation allowance to members of the Special Reserve. Surely that would be one method of increasing the numbers of the Special Reserve if he could hold out some hope that there would be a chance of the Special Reserve getting this allowance—
  And, it being Eleven o'clock, the Chairman left the Chair to make his Report to the House.
  Resolution to be reported to-morrow; Committee also report Progress; to sit again to-morrow (Wednesday).

  THURSDAY'S SITTING (ROYAL GARDEN PARTY).
  Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—[Mr. Gulland.]
  The SECRETARY of STATE for the HOME DEPARTMENT (Mr. McKenna): My right hon. Friend the Patronage Secretary, after consultation with the Noble Lord opposite (Lord Balcarres), and the leaders of other parties in the House, has decided to put down to-morrow, as the first Order of the day, the Home Office Vote. I am bound to say that this proposal is made in order to enable me to fulfil an engagement of long standing which I have for Thursday next—an engagement which it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for me to postpone. On Thursday we propose that the House should be invited to meet at Seven o'clock— [HON. MEMBERS: "In the morning?"]—in the evening, in order to enable hon. Members to take full advantage of the opportunity afforded of paying their respects to His Majesty at Windsor Castle. The business after Seven o'clock will be the continuation of the Debate on the Second Reading of the Finance Bill. If there is anything further which any hon. Member wishes explained, I shall be very glad to explain it.
  Question put, and agreed to.
  Adjourned accordingly at Five minutes after Eleven o'clock.