Commons Sitting of 3 November 1911

Preamble
The House met at Twelve of the clock, Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair.
NEW WRIT.
For the Borough of Oldham, in the room of the Right Honourable Alfred Emmott (Chiltern Hundreds).—[Master of Elibank.]

NAVAL PRIZE BILL.
As amended in Standing Committee, considered.
Mr. BUTCHER: I beg to move that the following new Clause be read a second time:—
(Postponement of Act.)
"This Act shall not come into force unless and until the consent of all the Powers who are signatories to the Convention set out in the First Schedule to this Act has been obtained to a modification of Articles 10 to 21 of the said Convention, and the table annexed thereto, which will provide that the International Prize Court shall be composed of eleven judges only, of whom eight shall be appointed by the Powers mentioned in Article 15 of the said Convention."
By this Bill we are asked, for the first time in history, so far as I am aware, to place the rights and interests of British subjects all over the world under the control of a foreign tribunal, and we are further asked to say that the whole powers of British courts throughout the world are to be put in operation to enforce any orders which that foreign tribunal may choose to make. I need hardly say that the foreign tribunal to which I refer is the International Prize Court which is to be set up under the terms of the Convention which is the First Schedule to the Bill. I submit to the House that before the rights and interests of British subjects are to be governed by any foreign tribunal we ought to be absolutely satisfied that that foreign tribunal is composed in a manner in which this House and British subjects all over the world can have confidence. Unless we are satisfied on that point we should be grossly wanting in our
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duty to respect and preserve British rights. There are two points to consider in regard to this tribunal. The first is its constitution. Is its constitution likely to deal out complete justice in accordance with our ideas of maritime law and what is reasonable in itself? The second point is the law which the tribunal is going to administer. The second question is not touched by my Amendment, but will be the subject of later discussion.
What I am proposing now deals with the constitution of this new tribunal, which is to have these gigantic powers, and whose decrees British subjects all over the world are to obey. It is to consist of fifteen judges. Of these fifteen, according to Article 15 of the Convention—a Convention not yet ratified—eight will be appointed by the eight great Powers of the world, Germany, the United States of America, Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and Russia. It is a serious question whether we, the greatest naval and maritime Power in the world, ought not to have more than one judge out of the fifteen on that tribunal. Let me assume for the moment that it would be right to give one to each of the great Powers. By whom are the others to be appointed? They are to be appointed in rotation by Powers, some of whom it is difficult to regard in this connection without a smile; Powers who have not the remotest interest in the sea. Most of them have not got a war ship; most of them have certainly no commercial interests whatsoever on the sea. They have no commercial navy, no subjects engaged in the carriage of goods, or in over-seas commerce at all, and yet every one of these Powers is to have the right, to be exercised in the mode prescribed, of appointing a judge to sit upon this tribunal and adjudicate upon matters of the most vital importance that can come before any tribunal as regards our commercial interests. That is the Convention His Majesty's Government have agreed to through their representatives at The Hague. I ask, by this Amendment, that the House do not allow the Act to come into operation unless the Powers which are signatories to this Convention agree to a radical alteration in the constitution of the tribunal which will give us some degree of fair play, if not all the fair play we desire. In the first year the Powers to appoint judges are Argentina, Columbia, Spain, Greece, Norway, the Netherlands, and Turkey, and the deputy-judges are to be appointed by, first of all, Paraguay. I

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hope the Foreign Secretary will tell us what vital interest Paraguay has and what right, from the point of view of our interests, she has to appoint a judge or a deputy-judge. The other Powers are Bolivia, Spain, Roumania, Sweden, Belgium, and Persia. In the second year there are a number of others Powers brought in to appoint deputy-judges—Panama, Roumania, Belgium, Luxemburg, and Costa Rica. Again, perhaps, the Foreign Secretary will give us some explanation of the commercial interests of Costa Rica. As regards the appointment of judges in the second year there is a new Power introduced—Uruguay. In the third year the countries to appoint judges are, amongst other, Venezuela and Brazil, and the Powers to appoint deputy-judges are, amongst others, Santo Domingo and Haiti. It may be pertinent to inquire whether there are many gentlemen in Haiti or Santo Domingo who have given that lifelong study to the question of international law which alone would entitle them to have a seat on such a tribunal as this.
Then we come to the fourth year and one new Power is introduced—Peru—and some other new Powers are introduced for appointing deputy-judges who have not appeared in the list up to now. Amongst those are Guatemala and Honduras, and in the fifth year we have other Powers coming in appointing judges who did not appear before. We have Bulgaria, Chili, Mexico, and Persia. Then, appointing deputy-judges, we have Montenegro, a gallant little State for whom everyone will have the utmost respect for the way in which they have maintained their liberty in the past. As Mr. Gladstone said, living in the rocky mountains of Montenegro they have defended their liberties splendidly, but no one has yet heard that, either by their commercial interests or by their previous history, they are much interested or ought to be entitled to have a voice in an International Prize Court Tribunal. Nicaragua, Cuba, and China also come, in for the first time. In the sixth year one or two other countries come in for the first time—Salvador and Equador. These are the countries which are to appoint the seven judges who for the time being may be in a majority on this tribunal which has to deal with British interests. I do not think, so far as my researches have gone, that a proposition of this character was
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ever put before a British House of Commons before. Here we are for the first time asked to place the enormous maritime interests of this country, both as neutrals and as belligerents, under the control of a tribunal thus constituted, which, without desiring to say anything in the slightest degree disparaging to any of the Powers I have named, must inevitably be totally unable to deal with the subjects presented to them. On these grounds I say that this House ought not to sanction, as it does by this Bill, the setting up of a Court so constituted, and certainly we ought not to pass into law an Act which will give British Courts all over the world the power and duty to enforce the decrees of a tribunal so constituted.
Mr. PEEL: I beg to second the new Clause. I think the House will agree, merely from the recitation of some of the names, that this tribunal is really one of the most grotesque which has been set up, certainly under any convention or even in any country. The representation that we get on this Court is ludicrous if you compare it not only with our great naval power and with the fact that we own something like half the shipping of the world, and considering that this Court has got to deal with all sorts of intricate mercantile and commercial questions, and has got to decide whether, under various circumstances, merchant vessels have been properly captured or not, or whether compensation shall be paid to them. Really, to say that out of a Court of fifteen we should only have one representative, it is almost impossible to believe that any public body would ever agree to anything of the sort. If you have a Court of this kind it is a great thing that its composition should be settled and fixed, but that is the last thing that you have in this Court. It is desultory and constantly changing. You have not the slightest security that the same set of men will be dealing with a difficult question which will come before them, and that you will have the best experience you can get from all these countries. Just think of the variety of this Court. It is composed first of all of men of every colour. You get white men, black men, yellow men, half-coloured men, and, in fact, men of all colours of the rainbow, and you get men of every sort or kind of experience.
Eight of these judges are supplied by the great Powers and the other seven are on a curious shifting panel of this motley

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assembly of various other smaller Powers and nine form a quorum, so that it is perfectly possible, under this curious system, that you might have a very few representatives of the great Powers and the rest of the quorum shall be made up by these representatives from Guatemala, San Domingo, and San Salvador. Again, I suppose this Court will come to its decisions by a majority. We know that in other places than Courts small minorities have remarkable power, and it is quite possible that, in these cases, many of which are most difficult, you will have, indeed you are bound to have, differences of opinion and divisions between the judges of the great Powers, and you are likely to have questions affecting our position in time of war decided by one vote of some South American Republic. I am not going into questions as to what the Bill does with regard to the principles and the administration of justice and equity, but I do ask the House to observe this. Here you have a number of Powers which are going to appoint judges, Powers which have been defaulting Powers, and some of them bankrupt Powers, during the last forty or fifty years. I ask what are the notions of justice and equity of a Power that refuses to pay interest on its national bonds? And yet these are the gentlemen who are going to be put on this international tribunal, and who are to have the same voting power as a judge who comes from this country. After all, what is this wonderful Prize Court going to do? You have to look at other portions of the Bill to see that. To this Court appeals will go if not decided in two years, and when they go there, what happens? The decision of that Court on the appeals from our Prize Court are final, and not only that, but when the decree has been given it becomes the duty of every Court in this country to enforce the decisions. You may have a decision by the Supreme Court on a question not covered by the Declaration of London, or the existing rules of international law, and it is based on ideas of justice and equity. The judges of tins international tribunal might take an entirely different view on questions of justice and equity, and what happens? The Courts of this country have to enforce decisions which in their opinion and in the opinion of the Prize Courts of this country—and everybody knows the reputation they have had in the past—are contrary to justice and equity. If that is so let us have at least a tribunal so composed that we may have some confidence in it. Let
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it be confined, or largely confined, to the representatives of the great Powers—great civilised countries like France and Germany, which we know have great jurists and on whose decisions we would have some sort of reliance, but to say that such questions of justice and equity are to be decided by these coloured gentlemen from the South American Republics is so great a travesty that it is really almost impossible for me to understand how the Foreign Office should ever have consented to such a thing.
This tribunal, so constituted and so remarkably equipped for deciding high legal points, is going to have questions of the most delicate kind, questions of the highest complexity, referred to it. What has it got to do? It has got to deal with three sets of law. First of all you have got all those rules drawn up under the Declaration of London. Now one question arises at once—namely, whether the commentary of Monsieur Renault on these rules—
Mr. SPEAKER: The discussion of that question would not be in order.
Mr. PEEL: I do not want to go into the rules. I only want to point out that the composition of this Court is singularly inefficient for dealing with those delicate questions. I only wish to point out the class of questions this tribunal will have to decide.
Mr. SPEAKER: If there are delicate questions, the hon. Member will be able to make that clear without discussing the rules.
Mr. PEEL: I will assume that the House is well aware of the questions which will come up under the Declaration of London. I say, with great respect, that I only wish the country also had as full information on the subject, because then I do not think there would be the slightest question whether this Convention should pass. On your suggestion I shall refrain from dealing with, enumerating, or referring to all the particular questions which this Court will have to decide, and I shall confine myself entirely to the composition of the Court. I think I have shown that it is really an amazing thing that these decisions, on which the life of this country depends in time of war, and that the rules which are going to bind naval commanders in time of war, and on which the supply of food to this country depends in time of war, are to be taken away from our

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Courts, and that their decisions are to be handed over to a foreign tribunal composed in such a manner, and consisting of such extraordinarily incongruous elements, drawn from South American Republics and countries which have no seaboard of their own. Their representatives cannot be seized with the knowledge of prize law which has been acquired by study on the part of those representing countries like our own, which have followed the sea for a thousand years.
The FINANCIAL SECRETARY to the TREASURY (Mr. McKinnon Wood): I think it appeared quite clearly from the speeches of the Mover and Seconder of the Amendment that this is really a root and branch Amendment which is intended to destroy the whole principle involved in the establishment of an International Prize Court. That is a point which was settled on the Second Reading of the Naval Prize Bill, but I think it is necessary to discuss the merits of the objections to this Court. The House will appreciate that the intention of the Powers which met at this great Conference in London was to set up a Court which should represent all the nations of the world. That, to the hon. Member for Taunton (Mr. Peel) seems a ludicrous position. We will examine whether it is ludicrous or not. That was the intention, and the proposal that was made to give representation on this Court in proportion to maritime interests was not a proposal that commended itself to the great maritime nations represented in London. The House will remember that it was the great maritime nations which drew up the constitution of this Court—the nations who alone ought to be represented according to the views of these two hon. Members. They said "No, it is not a sound position. We must bring all the nations of the world into this agreement," and I think I shall be able to show a very strong case for bringing in many of these nations and the absurdity of the argument that they should not be brought in.
Mr. BUTCHER: The right hon. Gentleman must not misrepresent me. I did not say that nations outside should have no representation at all. What I proposed is to give them three instead of seven.
Mr. McKINNON WOOD: The interruption is quite irrelevant and has nothing to do with my argument. The argument was that the great maritime Powers seriously
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considered the proposition of dealing with the matter in some such way as that proposed by the hon. Member and rejected it. They came to the conclusion that all the Powers should have some sort of representation on this tribunal. The general reasons why they came to that conclusion are not reasons which I need labour with the House. If you adopt this Amendment you reject the Prize Court Convention; but the object of the Amendment is to reject it. It is because hon. Members object to an International Prize Court that they are raising these objections. That is why I think that the objections of the hon. Member for Taunton (Mr. Peel) in which he used very strong words such as "travesty," "fantastic," and so on are themselves fantastic. It might have occurred to the modesty of the hon. Member that the great maritime nations would not have put forward a fantastic court against their own interests. This is not a thing that was contrived by the influence of the smaller Powers, but the deliberate decision of the great maritime Powers. I think I can leave that point, but I may point out this—that a great many of those nations, though they are not great maritime Powers, have a tremendous interest in oversea commerce. No one can deny that the Argentine Republic has an enormous and growing interest in oversea commerce, much to the benefit of Great Britain. The hon. Member for York (Mr. Butcher) referred in terms of derision to the composition of the Court. He took the first year. I will do the same. It will be composed as to a majority of the eight great maritime Powers. Who are the next Powers? The Netherlands, an important maritime Power; Norway another; Spain—surely Spain has a right to a voice in this matter; and the Argentine to which I have referred. Surely all these Powers have a right to a voice on a question which will affect them—not because, perhaps, they are great naval Powers, but because they are very much interested in the transit of goods oversea. And it is quite a delusion to suppose that because a Power may be what is called a minor Power it cannot produce a good jurist. Look at the names of some of the men who are members of the permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague. One is M. Lohman of Holland. M. Gram of Norway is another eminent jurist. Sweden and Greece has each another. Nobody doubts the competence as a jurist of M. Drago who represents the Argentine Republic. Belgium

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has another eminent international jurist. The whole argument is a fallacy. And then when you come to these minor Powers upon whom ridicule has been cast, when it comes to an international agreement, I do not see why ridicule should be cast upon any Power or upon the colour of its people.
Mr. PEEL: I did not east ridicule on their colour. I merely said that these gentlemen were not highly educated on international law.
Mr. McKINNON WOOD: The hon Gentleman said they represented all the colours of the rainbow. It is not good ridicule, but it is ridicule. It does not follow that they are obliged to appoint any jurist other than they choose. They are not obliged to appoint a jurist of their own if they have not got one. When you come to these deputy judges hon. Members can see that these deputy judges will only act in the absence of the judge, and therefore the whole of that argument is a perfectly trivial argument and amounts to nothing at all. I would like to direct attention to one other consideration. The whole objection is to an International Prize Court. What is the practical alternative? It is to have the case considered in the Court of the belligerent which has done the damage. Is the alternative before the House, the International Prize Court to whom you only apply if you are dissatisfied with the decision of the belligerent's Court, a disadvantage? I cannot imagine how any man who will look fairly at the subject for a moment will allege that it is. How can it be a disadvantage to us if, after we have gone into the Court of some foreign country and got a decision against us, we have an appeal to an International Court, and, mark you, by the constitution of the Court, a Court chiefly composed of neutrals, and therefore perfectly independent and able to give an unbiassed judgment on the matter? The Division on this Amendment will decide an important question, whether or not the international agreement that sets up an International Prize Court is to be ratified by this country or not, whether we are going to go back to a state of affairs in regard to prizes which everybody who knows anything of the subject admits to be as unsatisfactory as can be, or are going to make the great advance which this international agreement will bring about.
Sir ROBERT FINLAY: If this Bill is to be carried I think it ought to be advocated in speeches of a somewhat different tenour
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from that to which we have just listened. There is absolutely nothing in the speeches of my hon. Friends who moved and seconded this Amendment to lead to the sort of treatment which the right hon. Gentleman thought fit to extend to them. He says that their objections are trivial, but he had very little to say in justification of that attitude, and he seems to think that any opposition to this Bill hardly requires any answer at all. It is to be carried through, and any discussion is a mere empty formality. The real thing is the voting which is to take place. The right hon. Gentleman has said that this Court was constituted in virtue of the consent among the nations, that what was desirable was a Convention or Court representing all the nations of the world, if that was the aim, surely, in a body of the kind, some adequate regard should have been paid in the matter of representation to the magnitude of the interests which each country had at stake. The principle has been neglected in the composition of this tribunal. The right hon. Gentleman put it as if this Court was to be a sort of little parliament representing all the nations of the world. If that were the proper idea the interests of the nations of the world ought to be measured and considered in the composition of the Court. But that is not the idea which ought to have been applied by those who were engaged in this Convention. What they were engaged in considering was a Court. They were not engaged in considering a parliament, and what they had to endeavour to secure was that they should have a Court of thoroughly good composition whose judgments would command the confidence of the civilised world. No one can say of this Court that its judgment would command the confidence of the world. The right hon. Gentleman repeated the charge which he made on a former occasion that the real objection was to the Internatoinal Court of Appeal. A more unfounded charge was never made.
Mr. McKINNON WOOD: Did you hear the speech of the hon. and learned Member who moved the Amendment?
Sir R. FINLAY: I heard a good deal of it, and I heard nothing to justify what the right hon. Gentleman said.
Mr. McKINNON WOOD: The right hon. Gentleman will excuse me. I referred to the opening sentence of the hon. and learned Member's speech, which the right hon. Gentleman did not hear.
Sir R. FINLAY: I did not hear the opening of the speech, but I should be very much surprised if it expressed a general objection to the principle of a Court of International Appeal. I would respectfully point out to the right hon. Gentleman that the real question to which he ought to address himself is the composition of this Court, and whether it is adequate to discharge its high functions, in such a manner as to give satisfaction to this country and the other countries of the world. I venture to say that the wit of man could not have devised a worse tribunal for this purpose than the tribunal which is constituted by this Bill; and its bad composition is largely explained by the revelation which the right hon Gentleman has made to this effect, that what we are considering is not how to constitute a good Court composed of eminent jurists whose decision would command respect, but to have a representation of all the countries of the world. That is not the way to constitute a Court that would be competent to deal with points of detail and with questions of very great difficulty and of very great complexity. The principle of the composition of this Court is absolutely vicious. It is a great deal too large. Fifteen judges is an absurd number. This Amendment is at all events a step in the right direction. It is extravagant to suppose that you could get fifteen jurists of established reputation, thoroughly cognisant of international law, and competent to deal with such questions. But, more than that, the Court is to be fluctuating in its composition, nine members are to constitute a quorum, and you do not know which of the nine will be sitting, and a Court of that kind is not the sort of Court you want to deal with such questions. You want a Court constant in its composition, and much smaller in size, for this reason, that as soon as you have a large body it is impossible to suppose that its members will all be of the same standing that you could secure if it were more limited in its numbers.
What will come before this Court? I am not going to review the composition of the Court, as my hon. and learned Friend the Member for York has already done that, but what I want to point out is this: You will have on this Court a balance of seven judges appointed in rotation by the minor Powers. Of the whole Court of fifteen, eight will be appointed by the great Powers and seven by the minor Powers. Some great question of policy comes before that Court involving vital interests of this
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country as against some other maritime Power, it may be. When the question is going to be decided there is some difference of opinion among the great Powers on the point. Some of the great Powers may think with us. The interests of others might be in an opposite direction. Will there be any confidence with this floating balance of seven people appointed from among the minor Powers, that there will not be a vast amount of intrigue and influence brought to bear to secure the votes of these Powers in one way or other. If it had been desired to set up a Court whose decision would not command confidence, you could not have set to work in a more effectual way than by creating such a tribunal as that which is embodied in this Convention. The blunder was made when you had the true model before your eyes. The right hon. Gentleman said that there was an objection to the principle of international arbitration and an International Court of Appeal. We have before our eyes The Hague Tribunal of Arbitration, and the admirable work it has done. How is it that The Hague Tribunal has worked so well? It is because it is not too large in composition. It has consisted usually of five members, and on that tribunal you have secured the services of jurists of acknowledged eminence. You ought to have followed that model, and provided in this Convention for a tribunal of relatively small numbers, and taken security that it should consist of men whose position as jurists is such as to command the confidence of the whole world. Although the Amendment is an improvement of the Bill, it leaves the Court too large. It reduces the representatives of the minor Powers to three, and that would be a great improvement. But, in my view, even on the model of The Hague Tribunal, the Court ought to consist of five members, and you ought to have on that Court only men who are competent to do the work. You do not want a sort of Convention fluctuating between the idea of a Court and a sort of Parliament of the nations. When you have two objects in view, the result is that the work is badly done. I trust the House will pause before it lends its sanction to submitting our most vital interests to the final decision of such a tribunal as this.
The SECRETARY of STATE for FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Sir Edward Grey): The Amendment before the House is that the Court should be reduced from fifteen to eleven members. The right hon. and

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learned Gentleman opposite (Sir R. Finlay) has supported the Amendment by arguing that the Court ought to be composed of five persons. I should doubt whether that is very relevant to the Amendment before the House; but whether he argues for five members or the hon. and learned Member for York argues for eleven, either of those Amendments and views are really fatal to any Prize Court Convention at all. Take the argument of the hon. and learned Member for York, who demurred to the construction put on his speech by my right hon. Friend (Mr. McKinnon Wood). But really the construction of my right hon. Friend was not an unfair one, and the same construction applies to the hon. Member (Mr. Peel) who supported him. He took the particular cases of individual countries, and he asked with regard to those countries, What knowledge have they of international law, what interests are they likely to have in the questions which come before the Court. If that is an argument at all it is an argument for saying that certain countries ought to be ruled out of the possibility of any representation at all. You can only get a Prize Court Convention by international agreement, and you will not get agreement between any large number of Powers at any Hague Conference to set up a Court which draws such an invidious distinction as to rule out individual nations of the world from any possibility of being represented upon even the minority. I doubt whether you would get a single other nation to vote with you. Even if all that was said against this Court was true, and I do not for a moment admit it is, but supposing it were, it would still be a Court on which the majority was composed of neutrals, and it would be more favourable to commercial shipping which has grievances than a Court solely composed of the belligerent, and which is necessarily the Court of somebody who is judge in his own Court. That is really what brought the nations to meet together at The Hague to devise the Prize Court Convention. The decisions of the Court of the belligerent are bound to be unsatisfactory in commercial cases. If they go in his favour of course he is satisfied, but they do not, and, as a rule they do not go in favour of the plaintiff unless a very strong case is made out. You cannot expect the party aggrieved to feel confidence with the judgment of the Court of the belligerent. From that Court at present there is no appeal. Nations may admit an appeal in a particular case where it
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arises now from a belligerent Court to The Hague Tribunal, but you can only bring a case before The Hague Tribunal by agreement between the belligerent and the neutral who is complainant that there shall be an appeal in that particular case. Once a case has arisen and a belligerent Court has decided, and we found this in dealing with the Russian Government, you cannot get an appeal. The only way you can get an appeal from a belligerent Court to an impartial Court, in which the belligerent is not to be judge in his own case, is by a Prize Court Convention, to which the nations agreed in advance that they will refer cases. That is a great gain on existing practice. The right hon. and learned Gentleman (Sir R. Finlay) said that he is not opposed to the principle of arbitration, but that it is to the number he is opposed, and to the only way by which the principle can be applied. The whole thing threshed out at The Hague Convention was this, and in no other way than this can you get an agreement to have an International Prize Court. The great Powers have the majority on this Court. They stipulated for that. The representation which is given to the whole of the Powders of the world outside the Powers named in Article 15 of the Prize Court Convention is less than is given to the few Powers named in Article 15, precisely because the interests of those Powers are considered to be greatest in the question. That is not all. Whatever hon. Members may argue with regard to admitting the smaller Powers to this Court, I think they must admit you cannot have an International Prize Convention unless you have agreement amongst the great Powers. We should have got no agreement at The Hague Conference except on the lines of this Prize Court Convention. They took the risks of unfavourable decisions. They are content with a tribunal assuring them of a majority, but giving a representation of seven to the other Powers you will not get their consent to anything else than that, and if you do not get the consent of the great Powers you will not have a Prize Court Convention at all. The right hon. and learned Gentleman has really been arguing against the whole Prize Court Convention by bringing forward counsels of perfection. He wants to have a tribunal whose decisions will, he says, command the consent of the civilised world, and for that tribunal he wants to have five persons only, of such distinction and such eminence that their decisions will

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command the consent of the whole civilised world. That means a Court on which you have five Powers represented.
Sir R. FINLAY: Why?
Sir E. GREY: You cannot have more than five in a Court in which you have five.
Sir R. FINLAY: They are not representatives, they are judges. Several Powers can agree upon a judge, and to treat them as representatives is, I submit, a complete misconception.
1.0 P.M.
Sir E. GREY: I quite see the point, but they must be drawn from some nation. I do not speak of them as representing a particular nation on the tribunal, but representing a nation in the sense of being drawn from it. As a matter of fact, the majority will always be neutrals, and in that sense not representative of any nation in any case to be tried before the Court, but five can only be drawn from five nations. If you have a much more limited Court, which the right hon. Gentleman recommends, you have one composed of individuals, however distinguished, drawn from a very limited field, and on which the bulk of the smaller Powers of the world can have no chance of representation. However eminent those individuals may be, you will have a Court that, which by its prestige and general competence, will command the confidence of the civilised world. You must have a Court drawn from a comparatively wide area, if it is to be such that its decisions are to command universal assent, and if it is to be such as to get the assent of the nations to a Prize Court. Our representatives went into this at The Hague Conference, and it was discussed with all the great Powers exhaustively. We were all in favour, for the reasons which I have stated, for something which would put an end to the really intolerable condition of affairs under which you have no appeal from the decision of the Prize Court of the belligerents themselves. And, after discussion amongst the nations of the world, this was arrived at by agreement between them. This is, I believe, the best tribunal to which you can get international assent, and without which you can have no tribunal at all. I would urge the House to reject the comparatively small consideration put forward of reducing the Court from fifteen to eleven, but which, although it is comparatively slight, would absolutely
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upset the agreement come to at The Hague Conference, and be fatal to the establishment of a Prize Court.
Sir ALFRED CRIPPS: There are two points dealt with by the right hon. Gentleman (Sir E. Grey) to which I should like to refer at once. In the first place, he has taken this argument, which I suggest as a very bad one, in a matter of this kind. He said if you cannot get a Convention, this is the substance of it, with a Court that is satisfactory, it is better to have a Convention whatever the constitution of the Court may be.
Sir E. GREY: I did not say the Court was not satisfactory. I considered it was satisfactory. I was arguing against the possibility of devising a more satisfactory Court. It is not fair to say that I did not say it was satisfactory.
Sir A. CRIPPS: I do not want to draw an unfair inference, but I put the substance of his argument as that. You have a Convention which many of us indeed think has constituted a very unsatisfactory Court, and the question we are now raising is as to the constitution of that Court. I do not think it is an answer to that argument to say that you are bound to take the Court because the Convention has agreed to it, and that if you do not accept this Court that you cannot, for the moment at any rate, have any International Prize Court at all. I think that is a wrong way of looking at it, as I shall point out by and by. We are bound at the outset, as the greatest maritime nation, with the greatest interests, both of commerce and of war, not to submit our interests to a Court which in our view is not satisfactory, and cannot therefore be trusted. I start from that basis, and may I deal with the other argument which the right hon. Gentleman addressed to the House. His argument was that the rights of neutrals would be better protected by the international tribunal than by the tribunal of a particular belligerent. I say that is not at all right so far as we are concerned. They may in some instances no doubt be right. Take the position of England and the English Courts. On every single point our law as we apply it is more favourable to neutrals than the law to be applied by the Internationl Court. I cannot go into the matter in detail, but in regard to foodstuffs, the question of contraband, the conversion of merchantmen during voyage into war vessels, and the sinking of neutrals; in short, in regard to every question

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with which the International Court will have to deal, the law administered by this International Court will be less favourable to neutrals than the law administered at the present time by English Courts on English principles. I challenge anybody to make any answer to that allegation. Our maritime law is the admiration of the civilised world.
Mr. McKINNON WOOD: The statement of the hon. and learned Member may be true as regards the interests of foreigners, but British ships appear not before British Prize Courts, but before foreign Prize Courts. The important question for British ship-owners is whether the practice of foreign Prize Courts is better.
Sir A. CRIPPS: There is a three-fold answer to that. In my view there has always been a misapprehension in the mind of the right hon. Gentleman on this point. As a matter of fact and practice, the influence of English decisions has been so immeasurably greater than the decision of any other Prize Courts that the gradual tendency has been even for belligerents to approach our system. That is a most important fact. There is another point in regard to which there has always been misapprehension. When you get an international code laid down by various decisions, it will override what I may call the municipal code of the various countries represented on the International Court. That is an extremely serious matter so far as we are concerned. It means that our maritime law, which is undoubtedly most favourable to neutrals, and it is greatly to our honour that it is so, will be superseded by a harsher code, and we shall be compelled to put that harsher code in force against neutrals, although we consider it inconsistent with justice and equity. We shall have to do that in our own Courts, because after the International Prize Court has given its decision, that decision will be sent to this country, and it is part of the system of an International Court that its decrees shall be enforced in this country. The right hon. Gentleman is under a misapprehension if he gathered from the speeches of the Mover and Seconder of the Amendment that they were directed against the constitution of an International Prize Court. I agree that if you could get a properly constituted Court and lay down a satisfactory code to be administered by that Court it would undoubtedly be an advantage to all countries, as far as maritime matters are concerned, to have an International Code
1170
and an International Court. No Court ought to be constituted on the doctrine of representation as against the doctrine of the efficiency of its members. In country we have always done all we could to prevent our judges being elected as representatives; we have always contended that they should be jurists, and as jurists approach every question from an impartial and juridical point of view. There has been a difference in that respect between our Courts and the Courts in America. In no country in the civilised world is there more respect for the Courts than there is in the United Kingdom, the reason being that our judges represent no one, but are chosen for their great juridical knowledge and act impartially as regards all interests.
Mr. KING: Ridley.
Sir A. CRIPPS: I do not know whether that ought to be withdrawn?
Mr. SPEAKER: I think that the hon. Member made an offensive suggestion respecting one of His Majesty's judges. I do not know if the hon. Member has anything to say?
Mr. KING: I withdraw unreservedly, I regret I made any remark.
Sir A. CRIPPS: As regards the extremely important question of the constitution of this Court, I do not want to reiterate or to attempt to reinforce what has been said. No one who has the least experience of Courts can conceive that you can have an efficient Court consisting of fifteen members. In such a Court every member shirks responsibility. You want a sufficiently small Court that every member can appreciate the responsibility that is thrown upon him individually. That is a crucial matter in the constitution of a Court of this kind. The hon. and learned Member for York (Mr. Butcher) does not dissent from the proposition that the smaller Powers must be consulted as regards the constitution of the Court. What he said was—and it has not been answered—that, taking the Court as at present proposed, seven members coming from the smaller Powers and nine being a quorum, in most important cases decisions binding all maritime law in the future might be given by those who have no interest themselves in these great questions. There is no disputing the fact that, as at present constituted, without calling in-question particular countries, you might

1171
have a decision of the most vital interest to us as a maritime country, which would bind us for so long as this Court is in operation—I assume we shall follow the code which the Court will lay down—and that decision might be given by the representatives of countries which have no navy and no commerce, such as Luxemburg or a large number of the smaller South American Republics, for whom one has every respect in one way, but at whose discretion one has never put the rights of humanity or the rights of this country.
It would not be in order on this Amendment to deal with the special points with which this Court will have to deal, but there are two general considerations which cannot be put out of sight when dealing with the constitution. The first is that you will get a maritime code which may be most disastrous to the interests of this country; because I presume that when that maritime code has once been laid down it will be the duty of the First Lord of the Admiralty and others who have to deal with our Navy to give instructions in accordance with that code. In many respects that would be a most disastrous thing to do. Secondly, I know that the hon. and learned Gentleman opposite has a subsequent Amendment upon that point. It is an extremely serious thing when you consider that there may be a conflict between this maritime Court and our own municipal Courts. Are we going to put upon these Courts the enforcement of principles from which for centuries we have dissented, and dissented, not only on selfish grounds and when they were advantageous to us, but on far wider grounds. As neutrals we have taken the most lenient view: we have taken the widest view in order that the commerce of the world in the case of war should be interfered with as little as possible. I am one of those who think that foodstuffs ought to be free imports under all conditions. It would be to our interest as a great Power, but when you go in the other direction, in a reactionary way, when you adopt word for word, really the principles of Russia as against our own on the question of neutral vessels, then we should take the greatest care that the Court administering these great duties and having this great responsibility should be constituted in the best possible manner. It is impossible to say that the Court constituted as it is by this Convention should be satisfactory—at any rate, to those who are used to the
1172
Courts of this country, our own method of procedure, and our own important position.
Mr. KING: The whole argument of the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for South Bucks (Sir A. Cripps) seemed to proceed on the supposition that we, as neutrals, will be under the new Court and new conditions in a very much worse position than we are at present.
Sir A. CRIPPS: I said "all neutrals."
Mr. KING: "All neutrals" would include ourselves; therefore we, when neutrals, will be in a very much worse position than we are at present. I hope I have the hon. and learned Gentleman's assent that I am not—
Sir A. CRIPPS: I will not repeat my arguments, but I cannot assent to that.
Mr. KING: At any rate, the whole basis of the hon. and learned Gentleman's argument has been on the supposition that we are neutrals. I would like to remind the House of the Second Reading Debate. The whole opposition to the Bill then was on the supposition that it would damage us when we are belligerents. In the course of that Debate we were frequently told by learned Members on both sides that if it were only the question of considering our position when we were neutrals the Bill would be satisfactory. I remember in particular the very long and learned argument from the hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. Leslie Scott), an argument based on the very considerable practice that he has in these matters in the Law Courts. He distinctly laid it down that if we were only required to contemplate Great Britain as a neutral Power in future wars this Bill would be found satisfactory. If he and other Members on the opposite side of the House used that argument on the Second Reading, what becomes of the argument that we have heard from the hon. and learned Gentleman who has just sat down? The real fact, of course, is that we shall be in a much better position as neutrals than, we have ever been before. For one thing, we shall know exactly where we are. We shall get the same treatment from all countries. The hon. and learned Gentleman (Sir A. Cripps) said we as neutrals should be very much worse off, and he referred incidentally to the action of Russia. Let me remind him of the cases of the "Knight Commander" and the "Oldhamia," cases which I have no doubt he and most Members of this House know

1173
perfectly well, and which were most unsatisfactory to us. These things occurred in the course of a war in which we were neutrals. These cases could not possibly arise under the present circumstances.
Let me call the attention of the House to a very important matter which has not been referred to in this Debate. I refer to the actual wording of Article 15 of the First Schedule. This seems to me to remove a great deal of misconception when it is properly understood. It reads:—
"The judges and deputy-judges appointed by the other contracting Powers sit by rota, as shown in the table annexed to the present Convention; their duties may be performed successively by the same person. The same judge may be appointed by several of the said Powers."
That contemplates the notion that when Powers like Salvador, Honduras, and Ecuador and other distant Powers have to appoint a judge or deputy-judge they will appoint, not some lawyer from their own State, but some man of recognised European and international ability, who will be easily accessible to sit at The Hague. Such has already been the practice in certain arbitrations and other cases that have been raised at The Hague. It is to raise a prejudice against this Bill that it is supposed that we shall have men, yellow, black, and other colours, as suggested by the hon. Gentleman the Member for Taunton (Mr. W. Peel), and it seems to me quite beside the mark. It raises entirely wrong and false prejudices. Why should men of different colour to ourselves be less capable of acting just as justly and as capably as men of like colour to ourselves? Secondly, and more important, it entirely ignores what is undoubtedly going to be the practice under this Bill when it becomes law, and that is that the Prize Court judges will be selected. Again and again undoubtedly the same men will be selected by different Powers, because of their world-wide reputation as jurists, and because of their ability for the position. The more I go into this Bill the more I feel that it is a just and great measure, and that the criticisms which have been directed against it this afternoon have utterly broken down.
Mr. DUKE: The hon. Member who has just spoken is in the happy position of being able to contemplate this country in a state of permanent neutrality. If that
1174
were likely to be the case, one would not, perhaps, feel the same concern about the Court that it is to regulate these maritime laws, because all the questions that would arise would be in the main commercial questions; and probably after a lapse of years, if not in the first instance, by some reasonable adjustment between the Powers, we should arrive at a state of normal justice in dealing with these questions. But the tribunal which is to sit is not to sit in a state which will by any means be that of permanent neutrality for this country. It is not only to regulate the conduct of British navies in time of war, but it is to regulate the maritime law for this country so long as it exists. This tribunal which is to be set up is not only to be an administrative tribunal, but a legislative tribunal. Outside of matters which are settled by the Declaration of London in regard to naval warfare and naval prizes, there is a considerable area of contentious questions which will remain open, because the interests of this country and the policy of this country are so diametrically opposed to the interests of Continental Powers and other foreign Powers, and the views of policy of those various Powers, that we could not come to a settlement. What is to become of those questions? What becomes of open questions? This tribunal to be set up is to deal with them in the manner it thinks just and equitable, and the tribunal under the Bill having laid down its decision of what it thinks just and equitable on these questions, the Prize Courts of this country are to enforce it. That is a position it seems to me impossible to contemplate with indifference, and one has to look at the interests affected and the nature of the tribunal to deal with them, and the laws which that tribunal has to administer and the position of this country in respect of them. In regard to these questions—I am not speaking of the settled questions covered by the Declaration of London, some of them not decided very favourably to the past policy of this country—I am speaking of the unsettled questions. Those questions all the experts in naval warfare tell us are questions upon which the policy of this country has been guided by a greater experience in maritime warfare than that of any other Power. Our prize law has not been law settled by Parliament upon its view of what was just and right, or settled by students or by casual discustions. Our prize law was worked out by Lord Stowell and other eminent men

1175
during a period in which this country was fighting for its existence, and there is no rule in which our law differs from Continental law which does not spring from the British policy embodied in our law—policy which in the long run would work for the maintenance of our position. Apparently it is regarded as a desirable thing that this country, having held its own in the past in face of the tremendous maritime difficulties which it had to face, having attained an undoubted maritime supremacy, being at present confronted with very serious competitors, should put out of the hands of the British Courts and of the British Parliament the decision of what is right in maritime law, and should leave it to a body which cannot be properly described as a Court but is rather a delegation of the Powers. That is a way we should not consent to deal with the most vital British interests. With regard to the constitution of the Court, if it was a Court of the nature of The Hague Tribunal, these great interests might at some time come to be regarded as subordinate to the interests of international peace. But we are not upon the threshold, so far as anyone can see, of international peace, yet we are to frame great administrative Acts which are prepared for a state of international war for which we cannot hope to escape ourselves.
In that state of the matter is it reasonable that Parliament should consent to substitute for judges, and for a code which at any rate has worked with the very highest practical benefit to this country, judges who are not in truth judges, but who are delegates, and delegates not selected, as far as we are aware, with any view to their particular qualifications, with the tremendous responsibility to be imposed upon them, not in an international sense selected by the various nations of the world, but who are nominated as judges by the various countries with a view to what they imagine is their own interest? I do not imagine any Continental Power is going to select a judge that takes the British view upon this question. Would anyone say that any of the nations of the Continent would take the British view as to whether it is just and equitable to convert a merchantman upon, the high seas into a ship of war? That is the kind of question that will have to be dealt with. How is it possible there should be confidence in the decisions of
1176
Powers who take an adverse view to ours upon that matter? I say nothing about the particular Powers who are to nominate judges: observations will occur to everybody on reading that list of a Power which it is not necessary to name. I wonder who is there when dealing with a matter, say, of commercial interest, who would find it difficult to say the direction in which this Power would choose its judges in such a vital matter? But leaving apart questions of the particular nominators or the security you would have for anything in the nature of a judicial tribunal outside the names of those Powers, neighbours of our own, in whose desire to do the best they can do we are all agreed, outside of these all you would provide is that fifteen judges should be nominated by a very great body of the nations of the world, and there you leave the matter. To my mind there is no urgent national necessity which warrants this country at the present time for stepping out of the proved security of its own institutions in matters of prize law to the insecurity and peril of this future in which it is to be at the mercy of its critics and competitors. With regard to this subject and to the position and magnitude of the tribunal, which is to be a kind of exaggerated jury, with no qualification for its disinterestedness, I venture to submit to the House we are not at present in a position of certainty which justifies us in making this great new departure. We are not certain with regard to the law to be administered and the judges to be ascertained. We are not ready to leave the administration of the law to a body of unascertained persons sitting with very little control, so far as we are concerned: If it is a question of retaining this International Court because it is the best that we can have, then, for my own part, I think that, highly desirable as it is in view of the peace of the world that every possible question should be submitted, to arbitration, we are not justified in submitting to this tribunal the great questions which will be in issue when this Court is set up.
Mr. STUART-WORTLEY: The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs seems to be very hard to please. I think it is possible to meet any serious objection he puts forward to this Clause. It is quite possible to any man reading this Clause to propose Amendments, so that instead of saying "the Prize Court shall be composed of eleven judges only, of whom eight shall be

1177
appointed," and so on, you might say a smaller number of judges, or shall consist of jurists of repute, if we should reach the stage at which such an Amendment can be moved. I do not know whether the House would give leave to my hon. and learned Friend to withdraw the Clause as it stands and move it in an amended form. It is quite clear by some such formula as that we could meet the difficulty put forward by the right hon. Gentleman. It has been said that you cannot by invidious distinctions rule out the representatives of smaller Powers. The answer to that argument is that you have already set up those invidious distinctions in the Schedule and the list of contributory Powers, and it is too late to say that you could not exclude some of the Powers brought in to participate. If you have a Court of this magnitude it will not be a tribunal at all, but a mere international conference for the alteration and not for the declaration of the law. If we are to have these smaller Powers, why not have Tunis? I have known a conference where Tunis was represented. Why do we have Luxemburg? Is there any doubt about the way the representative of Luxemburg will vote? If we are to have an international tribunal at all it is open to us to ask in the case of the great British decisions of the early part of the nineteenth century and the end of the eighteenth century how can it be shown that those decisions have been against neutrals. In what way can it be shown that this Court can give any decisions in favour of neutrals which are more favourable than the tendency of those decisions? In what way can it be shown that the decisions of this tribunal will not consistently be worse to the interests of this country, which depends upon foreign supplies for food and raw materials, and which may be acting on its own defence against foreign naval Powers? Those are my objections to this tribunal as it stands. The principle of representation is radically at fault. The body you are setting up will not be judicial, and it will not even be a tribunal, but a mere conference. Its decisions will be inspired and influenced by the principle not of reasoning, and still less of experience, because the inexperienced Powers will be in the majority; it will be inspired by a principle which I may call the principle of gravitation. Its sympathies, and eventually its decisions, will be attracted to and gravitate around the interests of the Powers which are the most active and aggressive. I do not speak
1178
without experience, and my experience has been that where you have international conferences the general result is to level down both the sense and justice of any international law you may be seeking to amend, and to level it down to the standard of the least experienced, and by no means to obtain a higher standard of justice.
Mr. HUNT: The argument of the right hon. Gentleman opposite appeared to be that you must have this particular Bill, otherwise foreign countries would not agree to have the Convention at all. I think it would have been very much better to have had no Prize Bill at all than have one which will do a great deal of harm. We have a right to have more than one representative out of fifteen, considering that we own half the shipping of the world, and yet we have only got this one vote, and our great Colonies, which, after all, have Governments of their own and great seaboards and a very considerable amount of commerce, have no representation at all. It cannot be right to select Luxemburg with one vote because it has only a few hundred thousand inhabitants, and it is situated within the German Zollverein. How is she going to vote? There can hardly be any doubt about that. Then there is the place called Costa Rica and Switzerland. Neither of them have a seaboard, and they have got no ships, and yet you have islands like Australia and New Zealand and enormous countries like Canada with no representation at all. I submit to the right hon. Gentleman that he would have done much better to have disagreed with the Powers, and said "No, if you cannot agree to give us fair representation in accordance with our population and our shipping, we will not have anything to do with the Convention at all." Surely the right hon. Gentleman has given his country away. We were fighting for our lives hundreds of years ago, and does the right hon. Gentleman think for a moment that this country would have stood a thing of this sort. In my opinion they would either have been hung or sent to a lunatic asylum. It certainly seems to me that the right hon. Gentleman has no business to give his country away, and our Colonies and shipping as well, without this subject going before the people of this country. I hope that hon. Gentlemen opposite will just for once in a way think first of their own country and afterwards of other countries.
Mr. FALLE: I want to say a few words upon the composition of this tribunal, which appears to me to be nothing less than an outrage. Remember that some of these countries which are going to appoint judges to this tribunal are not allowed to judge white strangers within their gates. This is a question of life and death to a great country. Several of the nations included—I need not mention them by name—are not allowed to judge in the very simplest matter which may arise in the case of a white man in their country. The representatives of such countries are to be put on the Courts which are to decide matters of life and death to this country and this Empire. The right hon. Gentleman has spoken of Luxemburg and the kind of judge who will be appointed to represent that country. There is no question as to the sympathies of Luxemburg, because that country would be practically forced to appoint a judge with German sympathies. Can any man say that the so-called Republic of Panama would appoint anyone who was not in sympathy with American ideas and the Munro Doctrine? If such States as I have mentioned, which are not in any sense independent, are to appoint judges, why should such great independent countries like Canada Australia, and South Africa be altogether left outside the scope of this Prize Bill? The right hon. Gentleman the Financial Secretary has said that all Powers should have a right to be on the tribunal and the Foreign Secretary said you cannot rule out individual nations. Then why have individual nations been ruled out? I do not profess to know as much geography as the right hon. Gentleman opposite, but I have heard of Abyssinia, It is an independent country, but it is to have no vote, while Haiti is to have a vote. I have also heard of His Majesty of Afghanistan. He also is to have no vote. There is the Sultan of Oman and Muscat, but he is to have nothing to say. The smaller nations on the Court are not obliged to appoint their own countrymen. They are practically under the dominion or in the scope of the Triple Alliance, and it appears to me they will appoint judges to please nations whom they want to please, and upon whom their existence practically depends. You cannot see Luxemburg, Panama, Haiti, and Santo Domingo appointing judges in whom we can have any confidence whatever, and for those reasons I hope this will go to a Division, in which case I shall be in the Lobby against the Clause.
Colonel GREIG: The hon. Member who has just spoken referred to the omission of the great Dominions and Colonies of this Empire. May I remind him that at the recent Imperial Conference the code this Court is going to administer was brought up and the whole of the Colonies and Dominions with a single exception approved of the Declaration of London and obviously approved of the composition of the Court which is to administer that code. Sir Wilfrid Laurier—
Mr. FALLE: Yes, he has gone.
Mr. SPEAKER: We are not discussing the Declaration of London.
Colonel GREIG: The composition of the Court and the law the Court is to administer was before the Premiers at that time, and they approved of the Court and the manner in which it was to be constituted. This Court is not going to be put in the place of the National Courts of the different countries. It is a Court of Appeal. We have now only the National Courts. If we are a neutral we have to go to the Prize Court of the belligerents. Is it not much more likely that a Common Court with a large proportion of neutrals upon it would give decisions in favour of neutrals than do the National Courts at the present time? An observation has come from hon. Gentlemen opposite that the law the Court is going to administer will be less favourable to us on the whole, but if you look at the code that has been adopted for it you will find our view of that law has in most cases been adopted. [HON. MEMBERS: "No, no."] It is only in one or two outstanding matters that our view has not on the whole been carried. Is it not more likely in a case where justice and equity is to be the rule that a Court composed very largely of neutrals would give a decision in favour of neutrals. It does not seem to have been recognised that upon this Court, as well as the judges who are to take part in the decision, Article 18 gives this right:
"The belligerent captor is entitled to appoint a naval officer of high rank to sit as assessor… A neutral Power which is a party to the proceedings, or the subject or citizen of which is a party, has the same right of appointment."
I submit, therefore, that on the whole the Court as it is to be constituted is far more likely to give decisions in favour of our views of neutral rights, just the same as if you look at the code you will find that in the main our view of those subjects has been adopted.
Lord CHARLES BERESFORD: The right hon. Gentleman opposite seemed to think that on this side of the House there was an objection to an International Court. There is no objection on this side of the House to an International Court. Personally, I think it would be a good thing if the Court was fair, but I do not think this Court, as it is proposed to be constituted, is a fair Court to us, looking at the predominant interests we have at sea compared with other countries. There is another point. Nearly every single point or every point of importance to British interests which was produced at the Conference in London to determine the code was hardly discussed or was thrown over by the foreign delegates. First of all, it handed the whole of our British maritime interests to a foreign Court. The point of importance, of course, from the naval officer's point of view is that it does not forbid privateering on the high seas, and that will amount to piracy.
Mr. McKINNON WOOD: The Declaration of Paris did that.
Lord C. BERESFORD: When this question was brought before the Conference and the Convention, the foreign delegates refused even to discuss it. It is an important point to us. I want to give my vote for this Amendment, because those who have thought over this question object to the constitution of the Court on the ground that it is not a Court at all parallel to our interests at sea, which are predominant over those of other nations; that they have got no code, and whenever any subjects are presented at Conference in which British interests are concerned the Conference either will not discuss them, or will vote in a direction totally adverse to British interests. That is why I give my vote for the Amendment.
Question put, "That the Clause be now read a second time."
The House divided: Ayes, 81; Noes, 151.

Division No. 362.]

AYES.

[1.50 p.m.

Agg-Gardner, James Tynte

Finlay, Rt. Hon. Sir Robert

Pretyman, Ernest George

Archer-Shee, Major M.

Fletcher, John Samuel (Hampstead)

Ratcliff, R. F.

Ashley, Wilfrid W.

Forster, Henry William

Rawlinson, John Frederick Peel

Bagot, Lieut.-Colonel J.

Gilmour, Captain John

Richardson, Thomas (Whitehaven)

Baird, John Lawrence

Greene, Walter Raymond

Roberts, S. (Sheffield, Ecclesall)

Balcarres, Lord

Gretton, John

Rolleston, Sir John

Barnes, George N.

Hardie, J. Keir (Merthyr Tydvil)

Rothschild, Liorel de

Barrie, H. T. (Londonderry, N.)

Henderson, Major H. (Berkshire)

Sanders, Robert Arthur

Bathurst, Charles (Wilts, Wilton)

Hill, Sir Clement L.

Sandys, G. J. (Somerset, Wells)

Benn, Arthur Shirley (Plymouth)

Hill-Wood, Samuel

Stanier, Beville

Benn, Ion Hamilton (Greenwich)

Houston, Robert Paterson

Steel-Maitland, A. D.

Beresford, Lord Charles

Hunt, Rowland

Stewart, Gershom

Burdett-Coutts, William

Ingleby, Holcombe

Swift, Rigby

Campion, W. R.

Kerry, Earl of

Talbot, Lord Edmund

Carlile, Sir Edward Hildred

Kinloch-Cooke, Sir Clement

Terrell, George (Wilts, N. W.)

Chaplin, Rt. Hon. Henry

Kirkwood, John H. M.

Thomson, W. Mitchell- (Down, N.)

Clay, Captain H. H. Spender

Locker-Lampson, O. (Ramsey)

Thynne, Lord Alexander

Cooper, Richard Ashmole

Macmaster, Donald

Touche, George Alexander

Craig, Norman (Kent, Thanet)

Malcolm, Ian

Valentia, Viscount

Cripps, Sir Charles Alfred

Mason, James F. (Windsor)

Ward, A. S. (Herts, Watford)

Croft, Henry Page

Newman, John R. P.

Weigall, Captain A. G.

Dairymple, Viscount

Newton, Harry Kottingham

White, Major G. D. (Lancs., Southport)

Dickson, Rt. Hon. C. Scott

Nicholson, William G. (Petersfield)

Wood, John (Stalybridge)

Doughty, Sir George

O'Grady, James

Wortley, Rt. Hon. C. B. Stuart-

Duke, Henry Edward

Pease, Herbert Pike (Darlington)

Yate, Col. C. E.

Eyres Monsell, B. M.

Peto, Basil Edward

Falle, Bertram Godfray

Pole-Carew, Sir R.

TELLERS FOR THE AYES.—

Fell, Arthur

Pollock, Ernest Murray

Mr. Butcher and Mr. Peel.

NOES.

Abraham, William (Dublin Harbour)

Cawley, H. T. (Lancs., Heywood)

Dewar, Sir J. A.

Acland, Francis Dyke

Chancellor, Henry George

Doris, William

Allen, A. A. (Dumbartonshire)

Chapple, Dr. William Allen

Duffy, William J.

Armitage, Robert

Collins, Godfrey P. (Greenock)

Duncan, C. (Barrow-in Furness)

Balfour, Sir Robert (Lanark)

Collins, Stephen (Lambeth)

Edwards, Enoch (Hanley)

Beck, Arthur Cecil

Compton-Rickett, Rt. Hon. Sir J.

Edwards, Sir Francis (Radnor)

Benn, W. (Tower Hamlets, S. Geo.)

Condon, Thomas Joseph

Edwards, John Hugh (Glamorgan, Mid)

Boland, John Plus

Cotton, William Francis

Elibank, Rt. Hon. Master of

Bowerman, C. W.

Crooks, William

Falconer, James

Brocklehurst, William B.

Crumley, Patrick

Farrell, James Patrick

Bryce, J. Annan

Davies, M. Vaughan- (Cardigan)

Ffrench, Peter

Burns, Rt. Hon. John

Dawes, J. A.

Gelder, Sir W. A.

Byles, Sir William Pollard

De Forest, Baron

Gill, A. H.

Cameron, Robert

Denman, Hon. R. D.

Gladstone, W. G. C.

Carr-Gomm, H. W.

Devlin, Joseph

Glanville, Harold James

Goldstone, Frank

Martin, Joseph

Robertson, Sir G. Scott (Bradford)

Greenwood, Hamar (Sunderland)

Mason, David M. (Coventry)

Robertson, John M. (Tyneside)

Greig, Colonel James William

Masterman, C. F. G.

Robinson, Sidney

Grey, Rt. Hon. Sir Edward

Meagher, Michael

Roche, John (Galway, E.)

Guest, Hon. Frederick E. (Dorset, E.)

Meehan, Francis E. (Leitrim, N.)

Ross, Sir Charles Day

Gwynn, Stephen Luclus (Galway)

Molteno, Percy Alport

Samuel, Rt. Hon. H. L. (Cleveland)

Hackett, John

Mooney, John J.

Sherwell, Arthur James

Harcourt, Robert V. (Montrose)

Morgan, George Hay

Shortt, Edward

Harmsworth, Cecil (Luton, Beds.)

Morrell, Philip

Simon, Sir John Allsebrook

Harvey, T. E. (Leeds, W.)

Munro-Ferguson, Rt. Hon. R. C.

Smith, Albert (Lancs., Clitheroe)

Haslam, Lewis Monmouth

Murray, Capt. Hon. Arthur C.

Snowden, Philip

Havelock-Allan, Sir Henry

Nannetti, Joseph P.

Soames, Arthur Wellesley

Hayden, John Patrick

Nellson, Francis

Strauss, Edward A. (Southwark, West)

Henry, Sir Charles

Nicholson, Charles N. (Doncaster)

Sutton, John E.

Herbert, Col. Sir Ivor

Nolan, Joseph

Thorne, G. R. (Wolverhampton)

Hinds, John

Norton, Captain Cecil W.

Ure, Rt. Hon. Alexander

Hoit, Richard Durning

Nugent, Sir Walter Richard

Walsh, Stephen (Lancs., Ince)

Horne, Charles Silvester (Ipswich)

O'Brien, Patrick (Kilkenny)

Ward, John (Stoke upon-Trent)

Howard, Hon. Geoffrey

O'Connor, John (Kildare, N.)

Ward, W. Dudley (Southampton)

Hunter, William (Lanark, Govan)

O'Dowd, John

Warner, Sir Thomas Courtenay

John, Edward Thomas

Palmer, Godfrey Mark

Wason, Rt. Hon. E. (Clackmannan)

Jones, William (Carnarvonshire)

Parker, James (Halifax)

Wason, John Cathcart (Orkney)

Jones, W. S. Glyn. (T. H'mts, Stepney)

Pearce, Robert (Staffs, Leek)

Watt, Henry A.

Jowett, Frederick William

Pearce, William (Limehouse)

White, Sir George (Norfolk)

Joyce, Michael

Phillips, John (Longford, S.)

White, J. Dundas (Glasgow, Tradeston)

King, Joseph (Somerset, North)

Pirie, Duncan Vernon

Whitehouse, John Howard

Lambert, George (Devon, S. Molton)

Pollard, Sir George H.

Whyte, A. F.

Lambert, Richard (Wilts, Cricklade)

Ponsonby, Arthur A. W. H.

Wiles, Thomas

Lawson, Sir W. (Cumb'rld, Cockerm'th)

Price, C. E. (Edinburgh, Central)

Williams, John (Glamorgan)

Leach, Charles

Price, Sir R. J. (Norfolk, E.)

Wilson, W. T. (Westhoughton)

Lewis, John Herbert

Pringle, William M. R.

Wood, Rt. Hon. T. McKinnon (Glas.)

Lundon, Thomas

Radford, George Heynes

Young, William (Perth, East)

Macdonald, J. Ramsay (Leicester)

Raffan, Peter Wilson

Macdonald, J. M. (Falkirk Burghs)

Raphael, Sir Herbert H.

McGhee, Richard

Rea, Walter Russell (Scarborough)

TELLERS FOR THE NOES.—

Macnamara, Rt. Hon. Dr. T. J.

Richardson, Albion (Peckham)

Mr. Illingworth and Mr. Gulland.

M'Micking, Major Gilbert

Roberts, Charles H. (Lincoln)

Part I.
  COURTS AND OFFICERS.
    THE PRIZE COURT IN ENGLAND.

      CLAUSE 1.—(The High Court.)
      (1) The High Court shall, without special warrant, be a Prize Court, and shall, on the high seas, and throughout His Majesty's Dominions, and in every place where His Majesty has jurisdiction, have all such jurisdiction as the High Court of Admiralty possessed when acting as a Prize Court, and generally have jurisdiction to determine all questions as to the validity of the capture of a ship or goods, the legality of the destruction of a captured ship or goods, and as to the payment of compensation in respect of such a capture or destruction.
      For the purposes of this Act the expression "capture" shall include seizure for the purpose of the detention, requisition, or destruction of any ship or goods which, but for any convention, would be liable to condemnation, and the expressions "captured" and "taken as prize" shall be construed accordingly, and where any ship or goods have been so seized the Court may make an order for the detention, requisition, or destruction of the ship or goods and for the payment of compensation in respect thereof.
      (2) Subject to rules of Court, all causes and matters within the jurisdiction of the High Court as a Prize Court shall be assigned to the Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Division of the Court.
      Amendments made: In Sub-section (1), leave out the words "requisition or destruction."
      Leave out the word "thereof," and insert instead thereof the words "of any such ship or goods which have been requisitioned or destroyed."—[Sir J. Simon.]

      CLAUSE 12.—(Rules of Court.)
      His Majesty in Council may make rules of Court for regulating, subject to the provisions of this Act, the procedure and practice of the Supreme Prize Court and of the Prize Courts within the meaning of this Act, and the duties and conduct of the officers thereof, and of the practitioners therein, and for regulating the fees to be taken by the officers of the Courts, and the costs, charges, and expenses to be allowed to the practitioners therein.
      Mr. ATHERLEY-JONES: I beg to move, to leave out the words "and of the practitioners therein" ["the officers thereof, and of the practitioners therein"].
      I do not understand the words "and of the practitioners therein." It may be a

      1185
      very small point and the words may be innocuous, but I know of no precedent for the introduction of such words, which might be used to the detriment of the freedom of the bar and of solicitors. It may be a very small or a very large matter according to how it is used. Unless we have some explanation from the Government as to what is meant by these words I shall be disposed to press the Amendment.
      Mr. PEEL: I beg to second the Amendment.
      The SOLICITOR-GENERAL (Sir J. Simon): My hon. and learned Friend says that he is unable to find a precedent for the words he moves to omit, but if he will look at the printed copy of the Bill, at the very Clause on which he moves this Amendment, he will see the marginal note refers to 57 and 58 Victoria, chap. 39, s. 3. If he will look at that Statute he will see it is the Prize Courts Act of 1894. The words which are now criticised by his Amendment are words which are reproduced from the Prize Courts Act of 1894, which in its turn, I believe, reproduces the Statute of 27 and 28 Victoria. I have the words of the existing law before me, and I will read them. The present law runs as follows:—
      "Her Majesty the Queen in Council may make rules of Court for regulating, subject to the provisions of the Naval Prize Act, 1864, and this Act, the procedure and practice of Prize Courts within the meaning of that Act, and the duties and conduct of the officers thereof, and of the practitioners therein, and for regulating the fees to be taken by the officers of the Courts, and the costs, charges, and expenses to be allowed to the practitioners therein."
      So far as I am able to check them, I do not ascertain any distinction between what we propose to put in this consolidating Act and what has stood unchallenged on the Statute Book since the last Act was passed.
      Mr. ATHERLEY-JONES: The Solicitor-General cannot have looked at the matter with great care, because there are no words in the Act he has quoted as to the conduct of practitioners in Court.
      Sir J. SIMON: If the hon. and learned Member looks at my copy of the Act he will see that the conduct of practitioners in Court are the words in the existing law.
      Mr. BUTCHER: The fact that these words are in the existing law is not conclusive on this question. We are accustomed to alter laws when we think them bad, and I have heard no defence from the Solicitor-General for the proposal in the Bill except that a similar enactment exists. Perhaps he will consider it on its merits. The Clause enacts that His Majesty in Council may make rules as to the duties and conduct of the practitioners in Prize Courts. Why should Orders in Council be made for that purpose? I quite agree that it is right that orders should be made as to the procedure and practice in Prize Courts, but I submit that the conduct of practitioners in the Court is a matter for the judge to deal with, just as it is left to all other tribunals. Unless there is some attempt made to justify the words proposed to be left out I shall certainly support the Amendment. I see no reason on the merits why the words should be left in.
      Mr. JOSEPH MARTIN: I would like to draw the attention of the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs to the interest of the Colonies in regulations of this kind. I suppose that ordinarily the practitioners before these Courts would be those entitled to practice in the respective countries who are parties to the arrangement. In connection with this country there are a number of Colonies who have persons in them entitled to practise law. They are not entitled to practise law in this country. I would ask that in making these regulations the scope should be widened, so that a lawyer in Canada, in Australia, or in any other of the self-governing Colonies should be entitled to the same right to appear before a Court of this kind as an advocate, as are the barristers of this country itself. I think it is a great shame now that a practitioner in Canada or any of the Colonies is not allowed to appear in any Courts of this country, and that there is no way he can get that right except by becoming an ordinary student of law here. In this matter the Government can help the practitioners in the Colonies by seeing that these regulations are wide enough to include everybody in the British Empire who is entitled to practise law.
      Mr. ATHERLEY-JONES: In order to save the time of the House I would say that I agree that there is apparently a precedent in the Act of 1894. I think that the Solicitor-General will agree that the words may possibly be objectionable. I

      1187
      merely speak in the interests of the profession. If the Solicitor-General will indicate that the matter will be considered I shall not press the Amendment.
      Sir J. SIMON: I shall be glad to give that undertaking.
      Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

      CLAUSE 13.—(Prohibition of Officer of Prize Court Acting as Advocate, etc.)
      It shall not be lawful for any registrar, marshal, or other officer of the Supreme Prize Court or of any other Prize Court, directly or indirectly to act or be in any manner concerned as advocate, proctor, solicitor, or agent, or otherwise, in any prize appeal or cause.
      Mr. W. PEEL: I beg to move, at the end of the Clause, to add the words "on pain of dismissal or suspension from office by Order of the Court."
      The prohibition in this Clause is very strong and very wide. I suppose that the intention is that the prohibition shall be carried into effect, but I cannot see anywhere in the Bill any penalty at all. It can hardly be assumed that these gentlemen will take the suggestion of an Act of Parliament as a sufficient hint to them not to act in this direct or indirect way. I therefore propose to add these words by way of penalty at the end. Some penalty is necessary to enforce the rule.
      Mr. BUTCHER: I beg to second the Amendment.
      Sir JOHN SIMON: I hope my hon. Friend will not press the Amendment. It would, of course, be in the nature of things an offence which could be dealt with in a disciplinary manner if need be, and I suggest to the hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. Butcher), more particularly as a practising member of the profession, that it is not desirable that we should, on the face of the Act of Parliament, describe exactly the penalty when we do not know the extent of the offence. I suggest to the House that if the matter is left as it stands we have a quite effective prohibition. There is no difficulty in enforcing it if only as a matter of contempt of court. I should have thought in the interests of legislation it would be better not to try and prophecy before the event, but to leave a certain latitude for the case to be dealt with when it arises.
      Mr. BUTCHER: The Solicitor-General suggests that a breach of the enactment of this Clause should be dealt with as contempt of court. I am not going to put my opinion against his, but I have never heard of such a case of contempt of court, and I have heard of a good many. I think it is exceedingly doubtful whether it could be dealt with as contempt of court.
      Sir J. SIMONwas understood to concur.
      Mr. BUTCHER: If it is not contempt of court how is it to be dealt with? The Solicitor-General says in a disciplinary manner. I suppose there might be an inquiry, at any rate in this country, before the Discipline Committee of the Law Society. That does not seem to me to be a proper way of dealing with it. In putting down this Amendment my hon. Friend has followed a precedent which I think is of some value, that of the Naval Prize Bill which was brought into this House, and ordered to be printed on 16th May, 1902. It does not follow that because an officer of the Court commits this offence therefore he would be dismissed or suspended. All that is provided by the Amendment is that if he commits this offence he does it on pain of dismissal or suspension; in other words, that a motion has to be made before the Court for his suspension or dismissal, and if the Court thinks it a proper case they will dismiss him. I appeal to the Solicitor-General as to whether it is not desirable on the face of the Bill to point out to the officer that this provision is not a mere brutum fulmen, but is meant to be enforced, and will be, if necessary, by suspension.
      Mr. POLLOCK: I quite feel the weight of what the Solicitor-General has said in respect, of some of these officers who are referred to in Clause 16, but that does not meet the case of a registrar or marshal or other officer of the Supreme Prize Court, because it must be recollected that this Statute itself is setting up a Supreme Prize Court. It is a new name which is introduced by virtue of Clause 1 of the Act, and no doubt, in the case of the High Court as it exists at present, there will be no difficulty and there would be a disciplinary power over the offending person. I doubt whether all the cases which are required under Clause 13 are met by the hon. and learned Gentleman's observation. Perhaps he may consider it worth while considering whether in regard to the new person who is set up by this Act, namely, the registrar

      1189
      of the Supreme Prize Court and other persons, it may be necessary to have some such words as those suggested.
      Sir J. SIMON: Of course, I should be very glad to see that consideration is given as my hon. and learned Friend asks. In some sense the proposal made just now by my hon. and learned Friend (Mr. Atherley-Jones) bears on the present point because the Clause we have just passed as it stands at present, amongst other things, empowers rules of court to be made which will regulate the proceedings and conduct of practitioners, and, no doubt, those rules might be available for the purpose of enforcing the contents of Clause 14. I promise that I will consider whether it is right to keep these words in, and if we did not keep them in I should have felt that there was great force in the suggestion. The two things are related. I think the right thing to do would be to deal with the two things together, which I promised to do, covering the marshal and the registrar.
      Mr. W. PEEL: I saw that relation, but I had some doubt as to whether those words would go as far as the Solicitor-General thought. Of course, if he thinks so, I will withdraw.
      Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

      CLAUSE 16.—(Custody of Ships Taken as Prize.)
      Where a ship (not being a ship of war) is taken as prize, and is or is brought within the jurisdiction of a Prize Court, she shall forthwith be delivered up to the marshal of the Court, or, if there is no such marshal, to the principal officer of Customs at the port, and shall remain in his custody, subject to the orders of the Court.
      Mr. W. PEEL: I beg to move, after the word "forthwith" ["she shall forthwith be delivered"], to insert the words "and without bulk broken."
      The result of the Amendment will be that when a vessel is taken and is brought within the jurisdiction of a Prize Court she shall forthwith, and without bulk broken, be delivered up to the marshal of the Court. It is very important that some such words as those should be introduced, because, after all, the evidence on which the case has to be decided may be contained within the ship herself, and it is of the utmost importance to prevent frauds and, in dealing with either the cargo or the ship's papers, that there shall be a distinct
      1190
      prohibition against tampering in any way or dealing with the contents of the ship. There will be of course very great temptation to do so, both as regards the papers and as regards the cargo. Article 40 of the Declaration of London bears very closely on the matter. It says:
      "A vessel carrying contraband may be condemned if the contraband, reckoned either by value, weight, volume or freight, forms more than half the cargo."
      Of course, if the cargo in some of these respects approaches that mystic half, and perhaps it is a question whether there might be a little over, there would be a very great temptation, if possible, to remove some of the cargo in order to bring it under the half, and in that case the vessel might be saved from condemnation as contraband. That is only one instance. I submit on general principles that it is very important that there should be no opportunity for fraud, and that there will be better security if these words are inserted.
      Mr. GRETTON: I beg to second the Amendment.
      Mr. McKINNON WOOD: The object with which these words were originally inserted, I am told on good authority, was to prevent excesses on the part of privateers, but I think if I explain the reason why they are omitted the hon. Member will be content to withdraw the Amendment. Under modern conditions it is quite impossible to examine the cargo of a ship for contraband without breaking bulk. It is necessary in the interests of the naval service that these words should not be inserted. If they were put in they would impose a restriction on a naval officer in discovering contraband. I hope the hon. Member will be induced to withdraw the Amendment. Of course, we have great interest in discovering contraband in case of war
      Mr. BUTCHER: I think the explanation given by the hon. Gentleman is hardly sufficient. A ship is taken into port in time of war, and it may be necessary at the time of capture to examine her in order to find out whether there is contraband on board. I quite agree, but that is not the point referred to by my hon. Friend. He refers to a later period altogether. In the first stage you take the prize, and for that purpose you make any examination that is necessary, and then at the second stage, when the ship is brought within the jurisdiction of the Prize Court, my hon. Friend says, that

      1191
      "she shall forthwith and without bulk broken be delivered up to the marshal of the Court." The explanation of the hon. Gentleman does not meet that case. There is going to be no restriction on a naval officer at the time of capture, but what my hon. Friend proposes is that once the ship is brought within the jurisdiction of a Prize Court it should be handed over to the marshal intact. I should like that the question should be considered from that point of view. If there is an answer from that point of view I shall be glad to hear it.
      Mr. GRETTON: The Amendment does not mean cargo being turned over in the ship's hold. It means that no portion of the cargo shall be removed out of the ship to another place. That is to say, in the ordinary sense of the commercial term that bulk shall not be broken.
      Mr. PEEL: I have not the slightest intention by this Amendment to prevent the capturing of a ship.
      Mr. KING: Is the hon. Member in order in speaking twice?
      Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER: The hon. Member has the right of reply in the case of a Bill which has come from a Grand Committee.
      Sir A. CRIPPS: I do not know whether I shall be in order in speaking after the hon. Member has replied.
      Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER: The hon. Member could only speak then by leave of the House.
      Sir A. CRIPPS: I only want to say that everyone on this side of the House sympathises with the statement that nothing should be done to interfere with the proper discretion of a naval officer of this country. But if we look at the Clause we find that it refers to a ship brought within the jurisdiction of a Prize Court. Therefore the question does not arise here as to what is done at the moment of capture by the captain. Surely, after the ship has been brought within the jurisdiction of a Prize Court, bulk ought not to be broken. I agree that at an earlier stage it might be necessary to break bulk.
      Mr. PEEL: I only want to get an answer upon this point. The hon. Gentleman's answer met really a wrong point. There is not the slightest intention by this Amendment to prevent the capture of a ship. The captain who takes the vessel
      1192
      examines the cargo. Perhaps the Solicitor-General, who is ready with an answer upon every point, will state the objection to my proposal.
      Sir J. SIMON: It appears to us extremely doubtful whether the construction suggested by the hon. Gentleman would necessarily be the right one if these words were inserted. I hope the Committee will not regard this as a technical point raised by lawyers. It is a plain and simple rule. I say that the other view is the natural one to take, that a ship (not being a ship of war) should, when brought within the jurisdiction of a Prize Court, forthwith be delivered up to the marshal of the Court. In this matter we are anxious to avoid misunderstanding, and we desire to have a rule which will work for the advantage of good administration and in the country's interests in time of peril. We think it is not desirable to lay down such a hard and fast rule as that proposed by the hon. Member. If these words were put in it might be considered that a captain could not examine cargo at the time of capture.
      Mr. PEEL: If the Solicitor-General takes that view I will withdraw the Amendment, because my hon. Friend (Mr. Butcher) has another Amendment which I think expresses what I mean without any manner of doubt.
      Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
      Mr. BUTCHER: I beg to move, after the word "forthwith," to insert the words "in the state in which she and her cargo then are."
      By that Amendment we will secure the result we desire, that after a ship has been captured and brought into the jurisdiction of a Prize Court, she shall be delivered up to the marshal of the Court. That will prevent any tampering with the ship after she is brought within the jurisdiction, and the Amendment is not open to the objections which have been stated by the Attorney-General.
      Sir J. SIMON: I know that there is some difficulty in drafting an Amendment at a moment's notice, and I trust that the hon. Member will not ask me to accept those words, as they are capable of being understood as something very little short of a pleonasm. I quite understand what the hon. and learned Gentleman means, and it will be considered. But I would ask him not to press those words, because we

      1193
      must consider the right form in which to put anything, if, indeed, anything is needed.
      Amendment negatived.

      CLAUSE 17.—(Bringing in of Ship Papers.)
      (1) The captors shall in all cases, with all practicable speed, bring the ship papers into the registry of the Court.
      (2) The officer in command, or one of the chief officers of the capturing ship, or some other person who was present at the capture and saw the ship papers delivered up or found on board, shall make oath that they are brought in as they were taken, without fraud, addition, subduction, or alteration, or else shall account on oath to the satisfaction of the Court for the absence or altered condition of the ship papers or any of them.
      (3) Where no ship papers are delivered up or found on board the captured ship, the officer in command, or one of the chief officers of the capturing ship, or some other person who was present at the capture, shall make oath to that effect.
      Mr. BUTCHER: I beg to move, at the end of Sub-section (1), to add the words,
      "and such registry shall transmit to the Secretary of State for War and the First Lord of the Admiralty copies of any such papers as contain military, naval, or political information affecting the war, and shall, if required by a Secretary of State, hand over such papers to a Secretary of State."
      The object of this Amendment is plain on the face of it. It may be that amongst the ship's papers are State documents or other papers containing important information disclosing the enemy's plan of campaign, the disposition of the ships, and other matters which are extremely important to be known by the executive of the other belligerent. If such papers are found they should be sent at once to the proper authority in order that the information so afforded may be utilised. I would ask the Government, unless they can give some good reason for not doing so, to accept the Amendment.
      Sir A. CRIPPS: I beg to second the Amendment.
      Sir J. SIMON: Again, the object of the hon. and learned Member is a good one, but again I suggest that it is not desirable and it is certainly not necessary that we should insert these words. So far as they have any positive effect they merely
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      require to be done that which in proper circumstances would be done, and so far as they have a negative effect they might conceivably have a restrictive effect. The King's Procter represents the Crown for the purposes of this Clause, and if documents were found of this character which it was desirable, not only for these important members of the Cabinet but for any member of the Cabinet to see, of course they would see them. I hope the hon. Gentleman will not suggest a form of words which might have some restrictive effect.
      Mr. BUTCHER: I have had no information as to how they could have any restrictive effect. Is this Court only a Court in this country?
      Sir J. SIMON: It is a British Court.
      Mr. BUTCHER: So I thought. In other words you might have these important documents locked up in a Court in Australia or Canada, or any other British Possession. My object is to secure that these papers should be sent to the central authority in London, where they can be dealt with.
      Sir J. SIMON: Does not the hon. Gentleman see that he might deprive the admiral on the station of the opportunity of seeing them, because they have got to be sent across to Europe?
      Mr. BUTCHER: That objection could be met easily by saying that before they are sent, the admiral on the station should be afforded the opportunity of copying them, but I venture to think that the suggestion is only thrown out in despair as an argument against this proposal. I have heard no word of explanation as to how this Amendment is in any way restrictive, but if the Government choose to add any words to enable the admiral at the station where the Prize Court is, to have copies of them, I should, of course, accept it.
      Mr. HAMAR GREENWOOD: I oppose the Amendment on the ground that it is redundant, and redundant words in a Statute are dangerous. May I point out to the hon. and learned Gentleman that under the words of the Statute the captors in the case would be British naval officers, and the first thing they would secure would be the ship's papers, and they would naturally search through them. Their instructions are to find out any information bearing on the war that is going on. Their first duty would be to communicate with their superior officers or other

      1195
      officials at home and the information which the hon. and learned Gentleman wishes to be given to the executive would be sent on without any express words having to be added here.
      Mr. RIGBY SWIFT: I think that the hon. Member is perfectly right in saying that if the captain of a British ship were left alone the first thing he would do would be to send any papers he found to the British executive, but the Clause with which we are dealing deprives him of the right to send papers to the British executive, and provides that in all cases he should send them to the registry of the Court. When they are brought into the registry of the Court I presume that the Court would have to keep them, and will have to account and be responsible for them, and all that the Amendment proposed by my hon. Friend suggests is that the Court shall be empowered when the occasion necessitates to send copies of those documents over to the executive. The learned Solicitor-General said that difficulty would arise by taking the documents away from one side of the world to the other, but all that the Amendment suggests is that copies of the document should be sent across the world. The originals would stay where they were unless they were applied for by the Home Secretary. The Amendment can do no harm, but it makes clear what the powers of the registry are with these documents. As the Clause at present stands, it makes the Court responsible for them, and it will be very reluctant to part with them.
      Amendment negatived.

Part III
  INTERNATIONAL PRIZE COURT.

    CLAUSE 23.—(Appointment of British Judge and Deputy Judge of International Court.)
    (1) In the event of an International Prize Court being constituted in accordance with the said Convention or with any Convention entered into for the purpose of enabling any Power to become a party to the said Convention or for the purpose of amending the said Convention in matters subsidiary or incidental thereto (hereinafter referred to as the International Prize Court), it shall be lawful for His Majesty from time to time to appoint a judge and deputy judge of the Court.
    (2) A person shall not be qualified to be appointed by His Majesty a judge or
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    deputy judge of the Court unless he has been, at or before the time of his appointment, the holder, for a period of not less than two years, of some one or more of the offices described as high judicial offices by the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1876, as amended by any subsequent enactment.
    Sir A. CRIPPS: I beg to move, to leave out Clause 23.
    This Clause raises the question of the constitution of the Court, and that has already been dealt with so fully that I do not propose to refer to that topic again. But, in dealing with the constitution of the Court, it was pointed out that the question of the powers of the Court would arise at a subsequent stage. The question really arises upon this proposal to leave out Clause 23. I object to any judge being appointed from this country to administer a law which, according to the principles heretofore held in this country, is unjust and reactionary. In substance, I object to any judge being appointed to a Commission or Convention where the law is not only in opposition to the law of this country, but is reactionary and harsh as compared with the maritime law hitherto exercised here. I will take the illustration as regards conditional contraband. I think the question of conditional contraband, particularly in reference to foodstuffs, is a matter of vital importance to this country, and I do not want a judge of this country to administer a law which is different from the law which is now being administered in our own Prize Courts, and which, as compared with that law, is, I think, both harsh and reactionary. At the present moment the question of conditional contraband, in regard to the law of this country, depends on the destination of the cargo and on the destination of the ship. As regards conditional contraband, we have the same principle which we have with regard to absolute contraband, namely, the law of continuous voyage.
    What is the result of the law to be administered by the judge under the international code? When administering the law in our own Courts, in the first instance, we have to administer a different law altogether from what we have to administer in the International Court, and that raises a most crucial question. I assume that it is admitted that the law of conditional contraband as regards foodstuffs is of vital importance to this country. I am not going into the details, but that will be accepted as a self-evident proposition.

    1197
    What will be the class of questions which will come before the International Court, and with reference to which I think we ought not to appoint any judge at all? Take the case of a neutral vessel bringing goods to this country. Take such a port as Glasgow to illustrate what I mean in respect of the general principle. The right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary pointed out some time ago—and I think no one could dispute his dictum—that whether for instance, foodstuffs coming to Glasgow—I am speaking of a state of war—were contraband or not, would depend on the question of fact whether Glasgow came within the words "base of operations" or not. So you have a question of a most crucial kind at once. You cannot have a more crucial question than that of whether the great ports of this country—
    Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER: I am afraid that the hon. and learned Member is proceeding to discuss the whole Convention, while this Clause deals with the appointment of the judges. It would not be in order on the question of the appointment of the judge to go into the merits of the whole question.
    Sir A. CRIPPS: I do not desire to go further than to discuss the question of the powers of the Court. I quite understand the objection to my going further if I sought to discuss the Declaration of London on this Clause. But is it possible to discuss the question whether it is advisable that a judge should be appointed in this country to the International Court to consider the class of questions with which the Court will have to deal? I quite admit it would not be competent for me to raise the whole question of the Declaration of London, and I quite see the objection to that. But in dealing with the question of sending a judge from this country to this International Court it seems to me that I must refer to the powers which the Court will exercise. If I cannot do that under your ruling, Sir, I will sit down. The powers which the Court will exercise may have been defined in great part by the Declaration of London, but that happens to be a coincidence so far as my argument is concerned. If I cannot go into the question of the nature of the law to be administered by the International Court, then it will be useless to proceed further with my argument.
    Sir R. FINLAY: I very respectfully submit that while it would be out of order to go into details in the way of discussing
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    the Declaration of London, one element is whether it is proper that this country should join in the setting up of this Court in view of the nature of the functions which the Court has to discharge. I submit for that reason that it is open to any speaker to point out objections to our joining in the constitution of such a Court which will have functions of a certain nature to discharge, and that element cannot be excluded from consideration. Without going into details, I submit that the general duties of the Court cannot possibly be excluded.
    Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER: As the hon. and learned Member said, it is a matter of degree. He is entitled to emphasise the importance of the matters the judge will have to decide, but not by way of illustration to really reargue the merits of the Declaration of London. Under cover of his illustrations he appeared to me to be attempting this.
    Sir A. CRIPPS: I think it would be quite possible for me to submit what I wish to say within your ruling, Sir, and in fact I apologise for not having kept within it. It was not my intention to raise the general question of the Declaration, but to refer to the point whether it was advisable or not, in view of the duties of the International Court to appoint a judge. If we do not appoint one of the judges upon it, so far as we are concerned we do not come under the jurisdiction of the International Court.
    Sir E. GREY: No.
    Sir A. CRIPPS: That is necessarily so. I should be astonished if the Foreign Secretary said that, although we are to have no voice in the Court at all in the sense of appointing any judge or deputy-judge in connection with it, yet it is to have a maritime jurisdiction affecting the vital interests of this country.
    Sir E. GREY: I do not wish to say that for a moment. All I wish to point out is that the effect of the hon. and learned Gentleman's Amendment would be to place us in that position. If this Clause goes, we are bound by the International Prize Court, but we could not have any representative upon it.
    Sir A. CRIPPS: I do not want to argue that point further. We have been told several times that the Convention must be accepted as a whole and taken as one document. I think I am right in saying so.

    1199
    Therefore if this House determined to alter one of the terms of the Convention, and a very crucial term, I understand the Convention itself would fall. I do not want to argue that further at the present time, but it is incidental to my general argument, and I would ask the Foreign Secretary to explain how a vital principle of this kind can be excepted from the Convention, and yet that the Convention can stand.
    Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER: If it cannot, that would appear to make the hon. Member's present Motion out of Order.
    Sir A. CRIPPS: The same would apply to the new Clause. I desire to put this other point. What this Court would have to deal with would be some question of law of a very complex character, and some questions of fact of a very complex character, and may I illustrate what I mean as to the nature of those complex questions of fact and law in which the law administered by the international tribunal would be different, and, I think, reactionary, as regards the law as administered in this country. Suppose, for instance, you had to consider whether a neutral ship had been properly sunk, or, in the exigencies of the naval officers in naval operations. That is a question which could never come before the Supreme Court of this country, because we do not allow that as an excuse at all in connection with the sinking of the ship. Yet a point of that kind, one of the most difficult to deal with, and of great complexity, would, according to the new code—a reactionary code—come before this International Prize Court. There again I say that one of His Majesty's judges ought not to be appointed a member of a Court which has to consider a matter of that kind, and which, according to my view, is wholly reactionary and improper as regards the fair rights of neutrals. Another very important principle which is established in our Courts is the abolition of privateering. We have nothing more to do with that, as it has been abolished, but if you allow the principle of a merchant vessel being changed on the high seas into a vessel of war, then at once you begin the whole question over again. However we look at what this International Prize Court has to decide, we find not only great complexity of questions, but we find questions which are not dealt with by judges in our Courts at all, because for centuries, I might say, or at all
    1200
    events, for many years, we have ruled those out of our Courts and decided in the opposite direction. It comes to this, that after all this is a new tribunal, which will lay down a new maritime code of vital importance to this country, and in many respects reactionary as regards the past policy of this country. It is on that ground, as well as on the ground of the constitution of the Court, a question which I need not reargue, that I move the Amendment.
    3.0 P.M.
    Mr. POLLOCK: I beg to second the Amendment. I think it very important that before this Clause is adopted by the House some fuller explanation should be made of the circumstances and the purposes of this Court. We find by Article 15 that the Judges appointed by eight Powers are always summoned to sit and that the same judge may be appointed by several of the Powers. What will be the position of the composite judge appointed under Clause 23? The decisions of the Court under Article 43 are to be arrived at by a majority of the judges present. I desire to ascertain whether or not the judge appointed by several of the Powers will have a vote for all the Powers he represents or simply one vote. The point I desire to put to the Foreign Secretary is as to a statement contained in his dispatch from the Foreign Office of 27th February, 1908, when he said:—
    "His Majesty's Government are deeply sensible of the great advantage which would arise from the establishment of an International Prize Court, but in view of the serious divergencies which the discussion at The Hague brought to light as to many of the above topics after an agreement had practically been reached on the proposals for the creation of such a Court, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for His Majesty's Government to carry the legislation necessary to give effect to the Convention unless they could assure both Houses of the British Parliament that some more definite understanding had been reached as to the rules by which the new tribunal should be governed."
    I do not know that we have had that assurance given in this House or in the other House. Has that understanding been reached? If it means that the understanding is obtained by the Declaration of London then I shall ask the Foreign Secretary kindly to say whether this country has at present ratified that Declaration, and what other countries have ratified it, because his statement that it would be difficult, if not impossible to carry this legislation through the British Parliament without such definite understanding, I think gives a pledge which I am entitled to ask the right hon. Gentleman to fulfil at the present time. So far as my knowledge

    1201
    goes, and indeed I think that of a great many other hon. Members, we do not know whether or not this country and the other countries Which will be concerned in this Court have at the present time ratified the Convention, and so we have all the foreign countries and this country getting a Court without some more definite understanding as to the rules by which the new tribunal should be governed. The Financial Secretary to the Treasury said that many other countries had the right to a voice on that, and that this portion of the Act is intended to give us a judge who would speak for this country, and that without this Clause it would be impossible for this country to be represented. Agreed that that is so, but at the same time we want to know what is the law which shall hereafter be administered by this Court. In the past this country has, certainly under the Treaty of Washington of 1871, made more stringent Clauses in respect of its own country than many other countries have assented to. In seconding the Amendment I ask the Foreign Secretary to give the assurance which he said was absolutely essential, that by passing this Clause we are not appointing a judge to go to a Court which has not at present a real code of law which can be exercised by the Court.
    Mr. McKINNON WOOD: I should like to bring the House back to the Amendment. The Clause begins with these words, "In the event of an International Prize Court being constituted in accordance with the said Convention … it shall be lawful for His Majesty to appoint a judge or deputy-judge of the Court." The Amendment is to the effect that in the event of an International Court being set up it shall not be lawful for. His Majesty to appoint a British judge. I am sure hon. Members do not want to pass that Amendment. The fact of the matter is that the object of the hon. and learned Member was entirely different. His argument was that as the Declaration of London and the Convention establishing a Prize Court must be taken as one instrument, therefore you could bring in those two instruments in discussing every Amendment on every Clause of this Bill. That is an impossible position. Though the hon. and learned Member avoided discussing these things, the whole of his argument was that, as he disapproves of the Declaration of London, it ought not to be lawful for His Majesty to appoint a
    1202
    British judge on this Court. I do not think it is fair to take up the time of the House at any great length discussing that. I hope the House will allow us to get to the other Amendments which really deal with the substance of the Bill. This is simply an Amendment to wreck the Bill, and there is no point in moving it on this Clause.
    Sir R. FINLAY: It would be impossible to misunderstand the Amendment or the argument of my hon. and learned Friend more completely than the right hon. Gentleman has done. The Amendment does not provide that in the event of an International Court being set up it shall sit without an English judge. The object of my hon. and learned Friend is to prevent this International Court in its present form being set up at all. He moves to leave out the whole of Clause 23, and it would follow if that were carried that the other Sections relating to the setting up of the Court would be left out. It is really trifling with the subject to speak in that way. The right hon. Gentleman says that the argument of my hon. and learned Friend was that because he disapproved of the Declaration of London the International Court should not be set up. That was not the argument of my hon. and learned Friend at all. [An HON. MEMBER: "He admitted it."] He admitted that he disapproved of the Declaration of London. So do I. But that is not the point. What he suggested was that the questions involved were of such a nature that it was highly undesirable that there should be an International Court to which we should submit ourselves dealing with such subjects. The question is not whether or not the provisions of the Declaration of London are good, but whether it is desirable that a Court, consisting of representatives of all the nations of the world, to use the right hon. Gentleman's phrase, should be set up to deal with questions of such difficulty and delicacy. The Amendment and the argument of my hon. and learned Friend have met with absolutely no answer.
    Sir E. GREY: The right hon. Gentleman opposite has frankly admitted that the object of this Amendment is to prevent an International Prize Court being set up—
    Sir R. FINLAY: In this form.
    Sir E. GREY: If the right hon. Gentleman had only allowed me to finish my sentence I was about to add the words "in this form." Surely that was the object

    1203
    of the new Clause which we discussed earlier in the afternoon. Are we to discuss that on every possible Clause? I really think that in the interests of the proper discussion of the Bill the time has been reached when we should confine ourselves in argument, as far as the Government are concerned, strictly to the operation of a particular Amendment on a particular Clause. This Clause does not set up the International Court. It simply says, if an International Court is set up, not that His Majesty should be obliged to appoint a judge, but that it should not be unlawful for him to do so. What would be the effect if the Amendment were accepted? The right hon. Gentleman says that consequentially we should not be able to go on with the International Prize Court. Yes, but that is a Second Reading point. I do not see how he can fairly ask to make that point on every particular Amendment on every particular Clause. I respectfully submit to the House that the Government are really serving the purpose of having a discussion on the details of the Bill by confining themselves to the effect of the Amendment, and by pointing out that if carried it would not prevent the setting up of an International Prize Court in this form, but simply make His Majesty powerless to appoint a representative on that Court.
    Mr. IAN MALCOLM: I have no objection whatever to a judge being sent to take part in this International Prize Court provided the Court is of such a character that we can have any confidence in it at all. The Secretary to the Treasury has rather shaken my belief in the Prize Court by a certain remark that he made. He said in regard to these minor Powers that if they had no jurists of sufficient eminence they might appoint them from other nations. I do not know by what instrument, or whether by instrument or by international tradition, that is allowed. Herein lies a great danger which largely vitiates the composition of this Prize Court. It occurs to me that very possibly eventualities might arise by which these three minor Powers might appoint as their judges members of a nationality which by alliance or tradition was very friendly to one of the belligerent Powers. That would
    indeed pack the bench. If I were assured that the bench could not be packed by such an operation as that, which is quite a conceivable operation, I should see no objection whatever to a British judge sitting upon the Prize Court. I invite the Government's earnest attention to that point in order to see that that danger is not allowed to continue.
    Mr. SANDYS: If my hon. Friend goes I to a Division, I shall certainly support him, not only on the grounds that he has urged in support of this Clause being deleted, but on the other grounds brought forward by other speakers. In regard to the qualification and disqualification of the judges and deputy judges which are mentioned in Sub-section (2), as I read it I understand the judges or deputy judges of the Court shall not be appointed unless as follows:—
    "A person shall not be qualified to be appointed by His Majesty a judge or deputy judge of the Court unless he has been at or before the time of his appointment the holder for a period of not less than two years of some one or more of the offices described as high judicial offices by the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1876, as amended by any subsequent, enactment."
    With regard to that particular restriction, the point which I wish to draw attention to is, that as far as I can see, in spite of the fact that obscure countries, such as Ecuador, Salvador, and so forth, will be represented, Colonial judges will have no opportunity of taking their place as representatives of—
    Mr. SPEAKER: The proper place to raise that point is when we reach Subsection (2).
    Mr. SANDYS: Is it not the whole Clause that is to be deleted by the hon. and learned Gentleman's Amendment?
    Mr. SPEAKER: Yes, but I have only put the Amendment to leave out down to the word "or."
    Question put, "That the words proposed to be left out, down to the word 'or,' stand part of the Clause."
    The House divided: Ayes, 168; Noes, 78.

    Division No. 363.]

    AYES.

    [3.20 p.m.

    Abraham, William (Dublin Harbour)

    Baker, H. T. (Accrington)

    Birrell, Rt. Hon. Augustine

    Acland, Francis Dyke

    Balfour, Sir Robert (Lanark)

    Boland, John plus

    Allen, Arthur A. (Dumbarton)

    Barnes, G. N.

    Bowerman, C. W.

    Armitage, Robert

    Benn, W. W. (T. H'mts., St. George)

    Brocklehurst, William B.

    Brunner, John F. L.

    Horne, Charles Silvester (Ipswich)

    Power, Patrick Joseph

    Bryce, J. Annan

    Howard, Hon. Geoffrey

    Price, C. E. (Edinburgh, Central)

    Burns, Rt. Hon. John

    Hunter, William (Lanark, Govan)

    Price, Sir Robert J. (Norfolk, E.)

    Byles, Sir William Pollard

    Jardine, Sir John (Roxburgh)

    Pringle, William M. R.

    Cameron, Robert

    John, Edward Thomas

    Radford, George Heynes

    Carr-Gomm, H. W.

    Jones, William (Carnarvonshire)

    Raphael, Sir Herbert H.

    Cawley, H. T. (Lancs., Heywood)

    Jones, W. S. Glyn- (T. H'mts, Stepney)

    Rea, Walter Russell (Scarborough)

    Chancellor, Henry George

    Jowett, Frederick William

    Redmond, John E. (Waterford)

    Chapple, Dr. William Allen

    Joyce, Michael

    Richardson, Albion (Peckham)

    Collins, Godfrey P. (Greenock)

    Keating, Matthew

    Richardson, Thomas (Whitehaven)

    Collins, Stephen (Lambeth)

    Kelly, Edward

    Roberts, Charles H. (Lincoln)

    Compton-Rickett, Rt. Hon. Sir J.

    King, Joseph (Somerset, North)

    Robertson, Sir G. Scott (Bradford)

    Condon, Thomas Joseph

    Lambert, George (Devon, S. Molton)

    Robertson, John M. (Tyneside)

    Cotton, William Francis

    Lambert, Richard (Wilts, Cricklade)

    Robinson, Sidney

    Craig, Herbert James (Tynemouth)

    Lawson, Sir W. (Cumb'rld, Cockerm'th)

    Roche, John (Galway, E.)

    Crooks, William

    Leach, Charles

    Rowlands, James

    Crumley, Patrick

    Lewis, John Herbert

    Samuel, Rt. Hon. H. L. (Cleveland)

    Davies, M. Vaughan- (Cardigan)

    Lundon, Thomas

    Scanlan, Thomas

    Dawes, James Arthur

    Lynch, Arthur Alfred

    Scott, A. MacCallum (Glas., Bridgeten)

    Denman, Hon. R. D.

    Macdonald, J. R. (Leicester)

    Seely, Col. Rt. Hon. J. E. B.

    Devlin, Joseph

    Macdonald, J. M. (Falkirk Burghs)

    Sherwell, Arthur James

    Dewar, Sir J. A.

    McGhee, Richard

    Shortt, Edward

    Donelan, Captain A.

    Macnamara, Rt. Hon. Dr. T. J.

    Simon, Sir John Allsebrook

    Doris, William

    Macpherson, James Ian

    Smith, Albert (Lancs., Clitheroe)

    Duffy, William

    M'Micking, Major Gilbert

    Snowden, Philip

    Duncan, C. (Barrow-in-Furness)

    Martin, Joseph

    Soames, Arthur Wellesley

    Edwards, Sir Francis (Radnor)

    Mason, David M. (Coventry)

    Spicer, Sir Albert

    Ellbank, Rt. Hon. Master of

    Masterman, C. F. G.

    Strauss, Edward A. (Southwark, W.)

    Falconer, James

    Meagher, Michael

    Sutton, John E.

    Farrell, James Patrick

    Meehan, Francis E. (Leitrim, N.)

    Ure, Rt. Hon. Alexander

    Ffrench, Peter

    Menzies, Sir Walter

    Verney, Sir H.

    Flennes, Hon. Eustace Edward

    Molteno, Percy Alport

    Walsh, Stephen (Lancs., Ince)

    Flavin, Michael Joseph

    Mooney, John J.

    Ward, John (Stoke-upon-Trent)

    Gelder, Sir W. A.

    Morgan, George Hay

    Warner, Sir Thomas Courtenay

    George, Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd

    Morrell, Philip

    Wason, John Cathcart (Orkney)

    Gladstone, W. G. C.

    Munro-Ferguson, Rt. Hon. R. C.

    Wason, Rt. Hon. E. (Clackmannan)

    Goldstone, Frank

    Murray, Capt. Hon. Arthur C.

    Watt, Henry A.

    Greenwood, Hamar (Sunderland)

    Nannetti, Joseph P.

    White, Sir George (Norfolk)

    Greig, Colonel James William

    Nicholson, Charles N. (Doncaster)

    White, J. Dundas (Glas., Tradeston)

    Grey, Rt. Hon. Sir Edward

    Nolan, Joseph

    White, Patrick (Meath, North)

    Guest, Major Hon. C. H. C. (Pembroke)

    Norton, Captain Cecil W.

    Whitehouse, John Howard

    Guest, Hon. Frederick E. (Dorset, E.)

    Nugent, Sir Walter Richard

    Whyte, A. F. (Perth)

    Hackett, John

    O'Brien, Patrick (Kilkenny)

    Wiles, Thomas

    Harcourt, Robert V. (Montrose)

    O'Dowd, John

    Williams, John (Glamorgan)

    Hardie, J. Keir (Merthyr Tydvil)

    O'Grady, James

    Wilson, W. T. (Westhoughton)

    Harmsworth, Cecil (Luton, Beds.)

    O'Shaughnessy, P. J.

    Wood, Rt. Hon. T. McKinnon (Glasgow)

    Harvey, T. E. (Leeds, W.)

    Palmer, Godfrey Mark

    Young, William (Perthshire, E.)

    Haslam, Lewis (Monmouth)

    Parker, James (Halifax)

    Yoxall, Sir James Henry

    Hayden, John Patrick

    Pearce, Robert (Staffs, Leek)

    Henry, Sir Charles

    Pearce, William (Limehouse)

    Herbert, Col. Sir Ivor

    Philips, Col. Ivor (Southampton)

    TELLERS FOR THE AYES.—

    Hinds, John

    Phillips, John (Longford, S.)

    Mr. Illingworth and Mr. Gulland.

    Hoit, Richard Durning

    Ponsonby, Arthur A. W. H.

    NOES.

    Archer-Shee, Major M.

    Fletcher, John Samuel (Hampstead)

    Mason, James F. (Windsor)

    Arkwright, John Stanhope

    Forster, Henry William

    Newton, Harry Kottingham

    Ashley, Wilfrid W.

    Gastrell, Major W. Houghton

    Nicholson, William G. (Petersfield)

    Baird, J. L.

    Gilmour, Captain J.

    Peel, Hon. W. R. W. (Taunton)

    Balcarres, Lord

    Goldsmith, Frank

    Peto, Basil Edward

    Barrie, H. T. (Londonderry, N.)

    Gretton, John

    Pole-Carew, Sir R.

    Bathurst, Charles (Wilts, Wilton)

    Hall, Marshall (E. Toxteth)

    Pretyman, Ernest George

    Beach, Hon. Michael Hugh Hicks

    Hambro, Angus Valdemar

    Ratcliff, R. F.

    Benn, Arthur Shirley (Plymouth)

    Harris, Henry Percy

    Remnant, James Farquharson

    Bennett-Goldney, Francis

    Henderson, Major H. (Berkshire)

    Rolleston, Sir J.

    Beresford, Lord Charles

    Hill, Sir Clement L.

    Rothschild, Lionel de

    Bigland, Alfred

    Hill-Wood, Samuel

    Sandys, G. J. (Somerset, Wells)

    Boscawen, Sir Arthur S. T. Griffith-

    Hoare, Samuel John Gurney

    Stanier, Beville

    Boyton, James

    Houston, Robert Paterson

    Stewart, Gershom

    Brassey, H. Leonard Campbell

    Hunt, Rowland

    Swift, Rigby

    Butcher, John George

    Ingleby, Holcombe

    Talbot, Lord Edmund

    Carlile, Sir Edward Hildred

    Kerr-Smiley, Peter Kerr

    Terrell, George (Wilts, N. W.)

    Cooper, Richard Ashmole

    Kinloch-Cooke, Sir Clement

    Thomson, W. Mitchell- (Down, N.)

    Craik, Sir Henry

    Kirkwood, John H. M.

    Touche, George Alexander

    Croft, Henry Page

    Locker-Lampson, O. (Ramsey)

    Ward, A. S. (Herts, Watford)

    Dairymple, Viscount

    Lockwood, Rt. Hon. Lt.-Col. A. R.

    Weigall, Captain A. G.

    Dickson, Rt. Hon. C. Scott

    Lonsdale, Sir John Brownlee

    White, Major G. D. (Lancs., Southport)

    Doughty, Sir George

    Lyttelton, Rt. Hon. A. (S. Geo. Han. S.)

    Winterton, Earl

    Eyres-Monsell, Bolton M.

    Macmaster, Donald

    Yate, Col. C. E.

    Falle, Bertram Godfray

    Magnus, Sir Philip

    Fell, Arthur

    Malcolm, Ian

    TELLERS FOR THE NOES.—

    Finlay, Rt. Hon. Sir Robert

    Mallaby-Deeley, Harry

    Sir A. Cripps and Mr. Pollock.

    Question, "That those words be there inserted," put, and agreed to.

    Mr. ATHERLEY-JONES: I beg to move, in Sub-section (1), to leave out the words "or for the purpose of amending the said Convention in matters subsidiary or incidental thereto."
    Parliament is asked to establish a tribunal which is to be constituted under certain conditions, and what is asked is that the Crown may from time to time appoint judges and deputy-judges to exercise their functions upon this tribunal in this Court as we have knowledge of its procedure and principles and organisation as they are at present composed. This Clause, as it at present stands, enables the Crown, by a subsequent Convention, to alter entirely the constitution of the Court. What I want to point out is this: You may enter into a Convention which may entirely alter the constitution of that Court, and yet, as this Bill leaves this House, all power of Parliament over the constitution of the International Prize Court ceases, all power for the payment of judges ceases, and the power of controlling the continuance of judges. Parliament parts absolutely with all control over this international tribunal. That, to my mind, is a more serious matter, and the Amendment which I am moving, I suggest to the Foreign Secretary, is merely an attempt to protect the interests of this country against any folly or anything of that kind which the Convention may enter into, and to protect us from acquiescing having no power whatever in the appointment of judges.
    Mr. SANDYS: I beg to second the Amendment.
    Mr. McKINNON WOOD: I hope my hon. and learned Friend will see his way to withdraw this Amendment, and I will explain to him what happened in the Committee.
    Mr. ATHERLEY-JONES: I was excluded from the Committee.
    Mr. McKINNON WOOD: What happened in the Committee was this: When we were considering the Clause as it originally stood the point made by my hon. Friend was argued, and to meet the wishes of the critics the words were inserted in Committee, "in matters subsidiary or incidental thereto." The whole object is to provide for small Amendments. For instance, it is agreed in the Convention that the meetings should be at The Hague. Circumstances may arise to make it necessary to remove the
    1208
    meeting to another place. If for small changes of that sort you insist on setting up a Prize Court all over again that would be a very unsatisfactory position. I think the substantial purpose was met by the words inserted, "Amending the said Convention in matters subsidiary or incidental thereto." The Convention only lasts twelve years, and it would be very unsatisfactory if the whole matter had to be put into the melting pot any time in those twelve years so that small alterations should be made. It would render it very difficult to make small alterations which everybody may agree upon, but which are not of sufficient importance to have the trouble of dealing with the whole subject afresh.
    Sir A. CRIPPS: In reference to what has been said by the right hon. Gentleman opposite, with a great deal of which I agree, it is as well to consider that these words would make no substantial alteration in the Bill, such as altering the way in which the various countries are represented. If it is merely incidental matter, I see no objection to the Clause as it stands, but I should like some assurance from the Solicitor-General that this would not give power to make such alteration as, for instance, would alter the proportion of representation by the various countries.
    Sir R. FINLAY: A really important question arises from what the right hon. Gentleman has said. Who is to decide whether the alteration is merely subsidiary or incidental? What is subsidiary or incidental? A charge is made which may refer to procedure, and underlying that there may be questions as to the constitution of the Court or questions of principle, and the effect of these words is that for the period of the Convention—that is, twelve years—the House parts absolutely with all control. It not only passes this Bill for the purposes of the Convention, but for the purposes of any Convention amending it on subsidiary or incidental matter. There ought to be some means of enabling the House to see whether changes are really subsidiary or incidental.
    Mr. BUTCHER: I think there is great force in what has been urged by the right hon. and learned Gentleman. Who is to decide whether these questions are subsidiary or incidental? Supposing an alteration is made when His Majesty's present Government axe in office. They may say, "This is a mere trifling thing; it is really subsidiary and of no importance," but

    1209
    others may think it is of importance, and who is to decide between them? I say the wording of this Clause is extremely unsatisfactory. The right hon. Gentleman opposite says if the Convention is altered in matters subsidiary, the control of this House need not be exercised, but what are matters subsidiary? They are not necessarily what the right hon. Gentleman calls small matters; very often they may be important matters. The main object of this Convention is to set up an International Prize Court. There are matters subsidiary to the main object which may be very important indeed, yet if we pass this Clause in this form, we lose all control by this House of the International Prize Court. Let me suggest to the Foreign Secretary that if these words are accepted, there will be no empasse whatsoever. Let us suppose the Court is constituted and then that there is an alteration in the Convention in matters subsidiary or otherwise, if legislation is necessary that this House should continue that International Prize Court, then let the Government of the day ask for it. If it is reasonable they ought to get it, and they will get it, but if it is unreasonable they will not get it; but do not let us, who are trustees of the rights of our own fellow-subjects, part with the control of this Bill and the International Prize Court Set up in subsidiary matters of which we know nothing.
    Mr. JAMES MASON: I think the right hon. Gentleman said words were introduced on Committee limiting this provision to subsidiary or incidental matters. May I call attention to the fact that the right hon. Gentleman has an Amendment on the Paper which seems to me to bear considerably upon this point. In that Amendment he contemplates the possibility of another Convention replacing the Convention we are now speaking about. Unless I am mistaken in that altogether, it seems to me difficult to contemplate the two Amendments apart from each other. If he contemplates the possibility of a new Convention entirely replacing this, then the effect of these limiting words would be completely altered.
    Sir E. GREY: I understand these words were inserted in Committee to meet this particular point, and were agreed to. I understand they were intended to safeguard the Convention from having substantial and material alterations made in it. The question whether the words carry out that particular intention or not is more of a legal question. If the Government
    1210
    join the International Prize Court Convention, and a question arises whether it is more convenient to sit at Amsterdam or The Hague, the Government would not be able to assent without coming to the House of Commons for legislation. No other country would be placed in that position. The judge appointed under this Clause would represent the Government. If that power is withdrawn and if small changes are introduced of a subsidiary and incidental character in the Convention itself, the Government would be in the position of having to come to the House every time. I think in matters of this kind the reasonable thing is that the House should remain in possession of the control which it always has over the Executive of the day. The Government has executive power to carry out acts of different kinds, and a whole treaty may be passed by them. The House trusts and has confidence in the Government of the day, and now considers it fit to be trusted with discretion in the gravest executive acts, and certainly in small matters subsidiary and incidental to a Prize Court Convention. If the Government does what the House would not approve, the House has always the opportunity of raising the question. Considering that that is the general basis on which the relations between the House and the Government rests, and on which the confidence of the House rests, even in great things, in a small matter like this I think the House ought to leave it to the discretion of the Government to deal with subsidiary or incidental matter, without giving the House an opportunity of expressing an opinion upon it. We were asked whether a change in the composition of the Court would be considered a subsidiary and incidental change. After the Debate in this House and the stress which has been laid upon the composition of the Court I will say that a change of that kind would not be one which the Government of the day ought to make without giving the House an opportunity of considering it.
    Mr. ATHERLEY-JONES: After what has fallen from the right hon. Gentleman I am perfectly certain he will act in a right and proper sense in this matter, and I ask leave to withdraw my Amendment.
    Mr. POLLOCK: I moved this Amendment in Committee, and the learned Solicitor-General was good enough to consider what words he could introduce in order to obviate the point I had in mind, and in order, at the same time, to preserve a

    1211
    right for a small Amendment which might be considered necessary in the case of certain Powers. He told the Committee that in the case of certain Powers whose time had elapsed there might be some difficulty in coming into the Convention, and the Solicitor-General offered these words in place of the Amendment which I moved, introducing "in matters subsidiary and incidental thereto." I thought at the time those words were sufficient, and I accepted the Amendment of the Solicitor-General.
    Mr. PEEL: May I comment upon the very remarkable statement which has just been made by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He has been challenged as to the importance of particular changes and upon one particular change, namely, the question whether an extra judge should be appointed or some alteration made in the representation of some of the Powers. The answer the Foreign Secretary gave was that there has been a great deal of discussion in the House of Commons upon this point, and that being so he said it would not be considered a subsidiary point. Now, if that point had not been raised, it is quite clear it would have been considered a subsidiary point. I want to point out that there are a great many points which, in order to save time, have not been raised this afternoon which are quite as important as that. There is the question of appeal in which the class of persons is laid down by whom appeals may be brought. Is that a subsidiary question? At any rate it is a very important question. Simply because we have not discussed this question will it be considered subsidiary? May I suggest to the Foreign Secretary that, as I have mentioned this point, he will not consider it subsidiary. After all, a question may be subsidiary and yet be an exceedingly important and substantial matter. I think the House of Commons ought to be the judge in these matters.
    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
    Mr. McKINNON WOOD: I beg to move, in Sub-section (1), after the word "thereto" ["subsidiary or incidental thereto"], to insert the words "or with any Convention replacing the said Convention, subject to any modifications which are subsidiary or incidental only (which court is."
    This is really nothing more than a drafting Amendment. The reason it is thought desirable to add these words is that it is
    1212
    the practice of international conferences very often, even when they make only small alterations in a Convention, instead of passing an amending Convention to abolish the old Convention and re-enact another. Hon. Members will remember what happened at the second Peace Convention. It revised all the Conventions previous to the conference, and although some of them were altered only in matters of detail they re-enacted the whole of them in the new Convention. It is proposed to add these words in order to meet that point, and these two things really go together.
    Question proposed: "That those words be there inserted."
    Sir R. FINLAY: This Amendment is subject to the objection which was raised on the previous Amendment.
    Sir A. CRIPPS: I cannot help thinking these words as they stand are exceedingly dangerous. It may be perfectly true words of this sort may be convenient for minor alterations, but at the same time as the words stand they might have the very largest and widest interpretation. Let us take the words as they are in the first instance: "or with any Convention replacing the said Convention." Of course, so far the words would be absolutely general. You might have a Convention totally distinct from the present Convention, and yet so far as Parliament is concerned we should have no voice in it at all. Then take the words, "subject to any modifications which are subsidiary or incidental only." I really do not see primâ facie how those words attach. You are to have a Convention replacing the said Convention. Presuming you had a substantially different Convention, the new Convention might again be subject to modifications which are subsidiary or incidental only. I am not disputing those words in that sense, but as it stands the Convention which replaces the said Convention might be different from top to bottom. Every single word and every single feature in it might be different. When you have got the new Convention, then you might modify it in matters which are subsidiary and incidental only. I protest in the most strongest terms against words of this kind. They would give a free hand to the Executive to tear up the Convention altogether and make an absolutely and wholly new one without any restraint by Parliament at all. I am sure the right hon Gentleman does not mean that.
    Mr. McKINNON WOOD: No, I do not.
    Sir A. CRIPPS: I therefore suggest that you withdraw these words, because as they stand they carry that power, and it would be a most dangerous innovation. We have heard this afternoon about the control of this House over the Executive. That is of a very shadowy character, but I hope the House will not give the Executive a free hand, contrary to the whole spirit of our Constitution, to make a new Convention without coming to this House at all. If the Financial Secretary really only means to modify, I think he and the Solicitor-General might suggest words of a less wide character.
    Mr. MALCOLM: I should like to support what has fallen from my hon. and learned Friend. Perhaps the Solicitor-General would explain why, after all the discussion, he has put in these words to so enormously widen the scope of Clause 23. I agree there is a great deal to be said for delegating our powers to the Executive to allow them to so arrange affairs that alterations can be made for others to become parties to the said Convention or for amending the Convention in subsidiary matters. It is, however, enormously enlarging the scope of the Bill to say, in the words of the Financial Secretary, an Amendment may be made with regard to any Convention replacing the said Convention. The House of Commons is losing very largely its control over national affairs, and, if it means to keep its control over international affairs, this Amendment cannot possibly be allowed.
    Mr. JAMES MASON: I confess the words of the Amendment have entirely misled me. They do not seem to me in the least what the right hon. Gentleman intended, but if he altered them so as to make them read "subject to such modifications being subsidiary and incidental only," I think they would carry out what he means.
    Sir A. CRIPPS: I do not think those words would.
    Sir J. SIMON: We are all at one in intention. The difficulty is one of language. I do not think it is possible at a moment's notice very prudently to choose the most apt words. This does not indicate any change of front on the part of those who proposed the Clause. An hon. Gentleman opposite in Committee pointed out that the original language of the Clause seemed dangerously wide, and we thought we had
    1214
    chosen words which actually brought it within reasonable limits. It is now pointed out—and we agree—that if you are going to make a trifling change in an existing arrangement you may do it in two ways. You may make a supplementary or modifying Convention or you may tear up the old one and repeat it in the same language with these trifling alterations. The object of the Amendment is simply to ensure we cover both those cases instead of confining it to one. If the hon. Member who spoke last will allow me to consider his suggestion—and I will take any others—I will certainly see before this Bill receives final consideration elsewhere that the words shall be such as to carry out the intention we all have.
    Sir R. FINLAY: We are all at one in one sense, but we are not at one in thinking this is a good Clause. I entirely object to it, for reasons I gave on another Amendment. Would it not carry out our intention if we made the words read "or with any Convention replacing the said Convention, provided that such new Convention contains no modifications which are other than merely subsidiary or incidental."
    Sir J. SIMON: If the right hon. Gentleman cares to move words in that form I will accept them now without pledging myself that I may not have to consider them again in another place.
    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
    Sir R. FINLAY: I beg to move, in Subsection (1), after the word "thereto" ["amending the said Convention in matters subsidiary or incidental thereto"], to insert the words "or with any Convention replacing the said Convention, provided that such Convention contains no modifications which are other than merely subsidiary or incidental."
    Mr. SANDYS: I beg to propose to leave out Sub-section (2).
    Of course, very grave matters will have to be decided by this Court, and it is evident very great care will have to be exercised in the choice and selection of the one representative of the British Empire amongst the fifteen representatives of other Powers. It seems to me that by making the very close restriction laid down

    1215
    by this Sub-section we are unnecessarily restricting ourselves. Have we any guarantee that similar restrictions will be exercised by other Powers in the selection of their representatives? Have we any guarantee that countries like China, Ecuador, Calvador, and Costa Rica will exercise the same care and place the same restriction on the choice of those who are to represent those countries on this International Prize Court? Again, from the terms of this Sub-section, no person is to be qualified unless he has been, at or before the time of appointment, the holder, for a period of not less than two years, of some one or more of the offices described as high judicial offices under the Appellate Jurisdiction Act of 1876. That appears to entirely prevent any great Colonial jurist being ever appointed as our representative on this Court. The high judicial offices referred to in this Clause of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1876, include both the Lord Chancellor of Great Britain and Ireland, paid judges of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, or the judges of one of His Majesty's superior courts in Great Britain and Ireland. That seems to me to impose a complete disqualification upon any Colonial representative taking his place as a representative of the British Empire on this International Prize Court. It is a most unsatisfactory state of affairs. It is very undesirable indeed that these restrictions should be insisted upon, especially when we remember that encouragement has been given by the Government of this country to Canada and Australia to start navies, and that, in the future, they will probably take part in naval operations. Added to this there are the responsibilities of these Colonies with regard to their mercantile marine. Those responsibilities are every year increasing, and, under these circumstances, it seems most undesirable that, from this Court, there should be permanently excluded representatives of those countries from this International Prize Court. I therefore move that this Sub-section be omitted.
    4.0 P.M.
    Mr. MITCHELL-THOMSON: I am very glad to Second the Amendment of my hon. Friend. I quite agree with what he said with regard to the folly of setting up a permanent bar against the inclusion in this Prize Court of Colonial jurists of reputation. It is ludicrous to talk about this Court representing the whole world. One continent
    1216
    is altogether excluded, so, too, is the half of another continent, and a quarter of still another continent. To talk about this being a Court representative of the world is to reduce argument to a, farce. I wish to ask the Government what is the necessity for putting in a test of this kind at all? It may be said it is done as a guarantee of good faith to other countries. But what guarantee are we getting from those other countries? Something has been said about Hayti and Venezuela. I know something about the internal economy of those places, and I venture to suggest it is perfectly ludicrous to suppose that those countries can appoint as their representative to this Court men of equal standing with our own jurists. A Court of this character, to be effective, must be composed of great international jurists. There is one great jurist in Argentine, but he is not a judge in the sense defined under this Sub-section. Again, another great international jurist is Professor Holland, than whom, we could not have a better representative for this country on the Court, but, under this Sub-section, we are absolutely precluded from appointing him as the British representative. I want the Government seriously to consider whether this Sub-section is necessary. A moment ago we were advised to trust the Government. I do not know how far that is a good maxim. I do not know how far it is possible to take action against the Government or the Executive when one does not agree with the action of that Government or Executive. But, however that may be, if we are to trust the Government at all surely we have a right to suppose that the Government will do its duty and will not appoint jurists who will disgrace the reputation of British International Law. I am sure that any Government would see to it that the British representative was a jurist of preeminent reputation, and I do not think it is necessary to have it in black and white in the Bill what shall be the status of that representative. The Government might reconsider the point as to whether it would not, be wise to leave out this Subsection.
    Mr. HAMAR GREENWOOD: I am in complete sympathy with the Mover and Seconder of the Amendment. If it is to stand at all this Sub-section should be so widened as not to restrict the choice of any Executive to those high officers set out at the end of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1876. I support the Amendment for three

    1217
    principal reasons. First, that all these high judicial officers referred to in that particular Statute are paid judges in the main, whose duties are clearly defined, and who ought not to be asked to give up duties, which take up all their time, to go to sit upon some international tribunal. Secondly, this Sub-section precludes the possibility of the appointment of not only Professor Holland but any other distinguished gentleman who may speak with more force, more effect, and wider knowledge of international law, and who has greater prestige among other nations than many of the higher judicial officers under the Appellate Jurisdiction Act. Thirdly, if this Sub-section is not widened, no Colonial judge can be appointed. Let us not forget that since the Alaskan Arbitration Award the Canadian Government have made it perfectly clear that never again would the interests of Canada be entrusted to any arbitrator unless that arbitrator was selected and approved by the Canadian Government. That feeling is growing, and rightly growing, in all the Overseas Dominions. At the recent arbitration at The Hague, the Canadian Government selected the Chief Justice of the Dominion, Sir Charles Fitzpatrick, to represent the Dominion. In order to meet this point, I suggest that we should add at the end of the Sub-section the words "or is a jurist of repute." That will meet the arguments advanced by the Mover and Seconder of the Amendment.
    Sir J. SIMON: I think there has been a very useful discussion, because undoubtedly some of the considerations which have been urged by the hon. Members are considerations which we all recognise have great weight in matters of this sort. It is no part of the intention of those who framed the Bill to exclude from the great service which a distinguished jurist may render to his country in taking part in an International Court, those who come from the Dominions Overseas. If that is the effect of these words then I do not think the words are sufficient. As a Member of this House who happens to be a Law Officer, and who is supposed to be able to answer all the technical questions put to him, I am afraid I am not in a position to state with confidence whether any Amendments to the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1876, affect the matter. Be that as it may, I think the right course in the circumstances would be to omit the Sub-section at this stage. For my own part, I shall be
    1218
    sorry if we do not do what we can to show that we in this country consider the circumstance that the Court is international is no reason why those who are appointed by one or other of the Powers concerned in it should bring to the discharge of their duties a biassed mind. Inasmuch as we can set up for our own country a standard of judicial fairness, I am sure everybody will wish it to be done. Whether other people follow our own ideas in this or not is in no way under the control of this Act of Parliament. At any rate it is not undesirable that we should recognise it ourselves. Be that as it may, I feel the force of the arguments of the hon. Members opposite and my hon. Friend behind me, and I think the right course will be to accept the proposal to omit the Sub-section, it being understood that if we can find a form of words we may have to propose some limiting words to set up the standard we desire.
    Sir R. FINLAY: I quite agree that the best course is to keep out these words altogether. If the Sub-section could impose any guarantee as to the appointments by other Powers it would be most useful. I think some such qualifying test, if it were possible to devise it and impose it, would be most useful and might mitigate the strong objection I feel, but there is no possible reason for imposing a test upon ourselves, and, moreover, looking at the definition in this Act—so far as I know it has not been amended—it does not in the least follow that because a man has held one of these offices, he has that experience in international law which is required for this purpose. Our judges in all these tribunals are much, more concerned with municipal than with international law. I think the test is not a good one, and, further, no test is required at all. Surely we can trust ourselves.
    Mr. HOLT: This point is really dealt with in the Convention itself. Article X. stipulates that the judges must all be jurists of known efficiency and of the highest moral reputation. Surely these words, which are to guide both us and other Powers ought to be sufficient in the eyes of the Government.
    Sir J. JARDINE: Might I suggest the propriety of including in any new list that may be made the judges of such Courts as the High Courts of India and of the great Crown Colonies like the Straits Settlements, and in very many maritime places the presiding judges of some of the great

    1219
    Consular Courts might be as qualified as any others which have been named or suggested.
    Amendment agreed to.
    Mr. SPEAKER: The next Amendment is out of order on this stage, as it imposes a new charge.
    Mr. ATHERLEY-JONES: Might I ask a question for the guidance of hon. Members. I gather the Amendment is out of order, because we have reached the Report stage. Would it have been competent for me to move it had it been in Committee?
    Mr. SPEAKER: The proper place to move it would have been in Committee of the Whole House when the Resolution was first taken. Failing that, the hon. and learned Gentleman would have had an opportunity in Committee upstairs if he had been fortunate enough to have a place on it.

    CLAUSE 25.—(Appeals to International Prize Court.)
    In cases to which this Part of this Act applies an appeal from the Supreme Prize Court shall lie to the International Prize Court.
    Mr. JAMES MASON: I beg to move, at the end of the Clause, to add the words "save in respect of questions upon which no agreement exists in the Declaration of London."
    The object of the Amendment is to limit the jurisdiction of the International Prize Court to a certain category of questions dealt with in the Declaration of London. I think it has always been agreed, maintained, and supported that in order that an International Prize Court should be successfully set up you must have a code of law which it will be its duty to administer. I think that has never been denied. In this case a code has been devised, called the Declaration of London, which it is thought will be sufficient for the International Prize Court to administer. But we must remember it has been laid down that where the Declaration of London does not deal with a particular point the International Prize Court can judge in accordance with the principles of justice and equity—in fact, that the International Prize Court should make law for itself as it goes along. It appears to me that if appeals are to be allowed on any conceivable subject of international law, apart
    1220
    from any laws laid down, the result may be very injurious to this country, and may lead to a position of considerable difficulty. Let us take, as a case, the contention of a good many nations that the conversion of merchant ships into warships should be legal. We have always refused to acknowledge that, and we still refuse to do so, and that question of the conversion of merchantmen is ostentatiously left out of the Declaration of London and is not in any way dealt with. The International Prize Court may very easily deal with that question, and make its own laws as it goes along, and in a manner extremely disadvantageous to this country. Holding the view that this country does, that the conversion of merchantmen into war ships is illegal, it is quite obvious that if that view is denied by other countries, it will be open for us to treat them as pirates, but the International Court may lay down rules which would make it easy for other nations to carry out the conversion. Bear in mind that under this Bill we undertake in our own Courts here to enforce the judgments of the International Prize Court, and we may therefore find ourselves obliged to enforce judgments given by the International Prize Court dealing very leniently with the conversion of merchantmen, while we are maintaining in our own Courts that the conversion of merchantmen is entirely illegal. Therefore I think the Clause should be so altered as to limit it to matters in the Declaration of London, and to exclude the particular case I have just referred to, and others.
    Sir A. CRIPPS: In seconding this proposal I should like to call attention to Article 7, which states that if no positive rule is laid down, then judgment is to be given in accordance with the general principles of justice and equity. The general principles of justice and equity used in that indefinite sense give no test whatever. Of course, when you are dealing with justice and equity applied in accordance with the views of a particular Court you know what you mean. The learned Selden, who is often quoted as an authority, said that a principle of justice and equity, if it is merely the Chancellor's statement, might mean in a great many cases the grossest injustice and the grossest iniquity. If you have no proper test to determine justice and equity, in this case it means the test which the representatives of each country like to apply as regards their own case. There is no such thing here as principles of justice and

    1221
    equity. They all differ. But when you come to the conduct of a Court where for a series of years certain principles have been laid down for the guidance and conduct of justice, it is an entirely different thing. In the absence of that it is quite wrong that a Court should be given a power of this kind, more particularly an International Court, the majority of which is composed of representatives of foreign countries, before which extremely important questions may arise. On those grounds I support the Amendment of my hon. Friend.
    Sir J. SIMON: It was difficult to decide whether my hon. Friend (Mr. Mason) was considering the case which may unhappily arise of this country being a belligerent or the case of this country as a neutral, because he raises the question, what would be the result if an Amendment is not accepted upon the claim of this country to deal as it pleases with an enemy which chooses to convert merchant ships on the high seas? The answer is that the Declaration of London does not confer upon any Power that is belligerent, the right to appeal to the International Prize Court at all. The rights of belligerents in this matter stand where they did, and so far is it from being to the point to say that the Declaration of London limits our rights, we expressly reserve the view which obtains now, and always has obtained, that the conversion of merchantmen on the high seas is improper, and those who do it against this country must take the consequences of their action. That question does not arise at all. What does arise is, what is the position of a neutral ship if you exclude this element from the jurisdiction of the International Court? The situation now is that if, this country being neutral, the owner of a British merchantman considers he has grounds of complaint, because one of two belligerent Powers, by means of converted merchantmen, has damaged or sunk his ship, the only tribunal to which he can appeal is not an International Tribunal, not his own tribunal, but is the tribunal of the very Power which has commissioned the merchantman and authorised the destruction that has taken place. In this instance what prospect is there of a British owner getting satisfaction in the only tribunal to which he can go? If the hon. Member's Amendment were carried it would remain the only tribunal to which he could go. The real effect of the hon. Member's Amendment is that the British
    1222
    owner, who has hitherto felt that he was labouring under a gross hardship, would have to submit to the decision of the foreign belligerent Court of Appeal against the belligerents themselves who had authorised the Act of which he complained. The result of the Amendment would be to leave him in that position, whereas we, by the Declaration, and by the proposal carried in this House, provide that he should have, at any rate, this remedy, the only possible remedy, that he can appeal from that hostile tribunal to a Court which consists of a majority of neutral representatives. Are we to deprive the owners of British commerce, British ships, and cargoes of that portion of that right of appeal? It is only by confusing the position of this country when we are neutrals with the position of this country when we are at war that any plausible argument can be presented in the opposite direction. If it is true that when this country was at war and might be engaged in fighting for its life, then in those circumstances it would have to submit itself to the belligerent's action by appealing to an International Court, there would be immense force in the argument of the hon. Gentleman. But that is not true.
    The position is that, if this country was at war, it claims a right to deal with its enemy if that enemy converts merchantmen on the high seas, as it pleases, when it pleases, and where it pleases. There is nothing in this Act of Parliament or the Declaration of London which in the least degree modifies that; on the contrary, it is the topic on which at the time we were discussing this matter with foreign countries, the Foreign Office and those who represented this country expressly reserved our full rights so to act. As to the position of the country when at peace, with its enormous commerce, surely it is not desired to deprive the owners of our own ships of this right. It might be that at this moment two Powers, each friendly to us, are unhappily engaged in war. Surely it is not desired that we should deprive the neutral British owner of the opportunity of taking his case from a hostile Court to an International Tribunal where, at any rate, he he appears before a majority of judges appointed by the neutral Powers, and where he is not appealing to the very body which has authorised the wrong of which he complains. The attempt to cut down appeal on those matters which the hon. Gentleman includes in his Amendment is a proposal which I hope the House will not support. Can anything be more inconvenient

    1223
    than that a neutral appellant should find the jurisdiction of the Appellate Tribunal is to be narrower than the jurisdiction of the tribunal from which you appeal? In the nature of things you cannot have any superior body to decide the exact boundaries of that jurisdiction, and surely the natural and proper thing to do is to say, that the neutral, whether subject or State, should have the right of appeal to this Court and to argue his case before the International Tribunal by the same arguments which it has urged before the belligerent Court.
    Sir R. FINLAY: My hon. Friend by his Amendment deals only with appeals from our own Prize Courts. Making a Supreme Prize Court in this country is for the purpose of accommodating ourselves to this Convention. I suggest that we could not decently give an appeal to any foreign tribunal from the King in Council, and we have created the judges who advise the King in Council to a new Court, to be called the Supreme Prize Court. That change has been made in order that an appeal may lie. The question is not one as to an appeal from the courts of foreign countries who are the wrong-doers in the case put by the Solicitor-General. The question is whether we should legalise appeals from our own Privy Council to the International Court in certain cases, which I will deal with presently. The Solicitor-General made some remarks which I think require some observations on the subject of the conversion of merchantmen into men of war. He said there is nothing in the Declaration of London about it. Of course there is not. There is a separate Convention with regard to this subject, which contains nothing but the most absolute platitudes, and the only thing of any importance in it is the statement that the Powers were totally unable to arrive at any agreement as to the circumstances under which conversion might take place on the high seas. But the Solicitor-General forgets that a neutral might bring an appeal to the International Prize Court on the subject of the validity of a capture by a converted cruiser, and when the International Prize Court laid down the law, that law as so laid down would pass into a principle or rule, which would be binding on us. The law will be laid down for us, and, with very great deference, I think my learned Friend is wrong in saying that our position will not be most seriously affected. It will be affected by this
    1224
    circumstance if this Bill passes with regard to the International Prize Court, that you may have a principle of law settled according to the discretion of that Court, without any code, in a manner which would be binding on us.
    The Solicitor-General said, "We reserve our rights to deal with those converted cruisers as we think fit." How does the Solicitor-General propose to deal with them? He can do nothing more with them than with any enemy's ship. I remember on the Debate on the Second Reading the Foreign Secretary said, "We will destroy them, we will destroy every enemy's ship." What more could we do? Do they propose any special penalties upon the men found on board those converted cruisers. They have no power to do anything of the kind. Do they propose to try and hang them as pirates. I do not think this subject has really been thought out before this Convention. "We reserve our rights" said the Solicitor-General. That reservation of rights is of no use to us at all, because we may have a law laid down in the International Prize Court which would tie our hands absolutely. The statement that we are going to destroy them or do something dreadful, which nobody has ventured to approach a definition of, is one that really can carry no weight whatever. I submit to the House that there is a great deal to be said for this Amendment. It is in the recollection of everybody that when this Convention was entered into for the creation of an International Prize Court that at that time there was no code whatever, and there was a general outcry in the country. Everyone said it is preposterous to refer questions of such magnitude to an International Prize Court without providing a code for its guidance, and accordingly an attempt was made to provide a code for its guidance. If it was reasonable to say that an International Prize Court should not be allowed to act without a code, and to deal with a certain class of subjects, every argument that was used against allowing the Court to decide without a code on those subjects is equally valid against allowing it to deal with matters with which that Convention failed to deal. The general words which the Government have used about destroying these cruisers or doing something to them which nobody can define do not advance the discussion one little bit.
    There is another remarkable thing with regard to this appeal from His Majesty in

    1225
    Council, for that is what it really comes to, although an attempt is made to disguise it by calling it the Supreme Prize Court. Annexed to the Convention is a Protocol stating that by the Constitution of the United States no appeal lies from the Supreme Court of the United States to any other tribunal. Accordingly there is to be no appeal at all from the Supreme Court of the United States, but an endeavour is to be made to secure the opinion of the International Prize Court by instituting a fresh suit before it, and damages are to be paid in accordance with the decision of the Court. It puts this country in a very different position compared with the United States. In August last an hon. Member on this side put a question on this very subject to the then Under-Secretary of State. I will read the question and the very remarkable answer:—
    "Mr. Eyres-Monsell asked the Prime Minister whether his attention has been given to the statements in the Blue Books [Cd. 4554, pp. 103 and 71, and Cd. 4555, p. 253] relating to the proceedings of the Naval Conference of London at which the Declaration of London was signed; is he aware that the effect of those statements is that, whereas in cases of naval prize an appeal is to lie from the Supreme British Prize Court to the International Prize Court at The Hague, yet no such appeal is to lie from the United States Supreme Court; and can he undertake that, in this respect. Great Britain will be put in as advantageous a position as the United States before ratifying the Declaration of London or the Convention relative to the establishment of an International Prize Court?
    "The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. McKinnon Wood): The hon. Member is no doubt aware that the arrangement foreshadowed in the statements to which he has called attention has been embodied in the Additional Protocol of 19th September, 1910, which has now been signed by all the Powers Signatories of the Prize Court Convention, and which has been laid before Parliament in the Blue Book, Cd. 5564. Under this Protocol, the rights secured under the Convention, either to individuals or to their Governments are in no way impaired. The alternative procedure by way of a direct action for damages is not, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, more advantageous than that by way of appeal from the National Courts. On the contrary, it involves the risk, with all the attending practical inconveniencies, of a conflict between the judgments of the National Courts and the judgments delivered in the same case by the International Court. It is only by the system of direct appeal that this difficulty can be overcome, and for this reason His Majesty's Government do not consider the system disadvantageous as compared with the alternative procedure under the Protocol."—[OFFICIAL RHPORT, 10th August, 1911, col. 1347.]
    I rather resent the position in which the Privy Council—our Prize Court of unrivalled authority—is put as compared with the Supreme Court of the United States. The right hon. Gentleman seemed to consider it an actual advantage that we should be liable to have our decisions reversed, and be compelled to model our law upon the decisions of the International Prize Court, whereas the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States are to stand, the only redress being in a
    1226
    collateral action for damages before the International Prize Court. The matter deserves attention, and I submit that the position in which the Privy Council is put under the Convention is most unsatisfactory. We ought not to have judgments of the Privy Council remitted to a Court of this kind to deal with at their pleasure and according to their notions of equity and good sense. This Amendment of my hon. Friend, I submit, is one which does not deserve the strictures which have been passed upon it.
    Mr. PEEL: There is one point, perhaps it is rather of a technical nature, which I should have thought was of great importance, and which the Solicitor-General only mentioned at the end of his speech, if, indeed, he did attach any importance to it. It was that it was rather an absurd system to have an International Court whose jurisdiction was narrower than the Courts from which the appeal lay.
    Sir J. SIMON: I did not quite say that.
    Mr. PEEL: I so understood the Solicitor-General, but I accept his disclaimer. I think that the attitude of the Government to this particular Amendment throws a very peculiar light upon their whole attitude in this matter of the Declaration of London. May I remind the House why the Declaration of London came into being at all? This Court was agreed to at The Hague. Then it was said, and said very rightly, "What is the use of a Court if you do not know what or what law it is going to administer?" The British Government said, "Very well, we will call this Conference of London, who will decide what the law is going to be." After all, if justice and equity were not enough there were plenty of international laws flying about the world, and every Court and every country took a different interpretation on a great many points. If justice and equity had been enough it would have been quite sufficient for the Government to say, "We will have an International Court, and it shall decide according to the principles of justice and equity." The Government felt that the position was absurd, and that the law must be more closely and more clearly defined, and it was for that reason that they agreed upon something by the Declaration of London. They found that on a considerable part of law they would come to no agreement at all.
    The Government go back upon their former position, and say, "Oh, you do not

    1227
    want law; justice and equity is quite enough: this Court will be able to decide upon the principles of justice and equity" on a subject which perhaps is more vital to this country than almost any other question involved. I say on this subject, because, of course, our advantage lies in the fact that we have bases all over the world, and as the Powers interpret their right under this particular proviso they can put themselves on an equality with us as regards bases—because neutral ports become the bases of the enemy. The right hon. Gentleman says, "Oh, yes, when we are belligerents how shall we be worsened? We shall have the right to destroy these vessels or to treat them as pirates." My right hon. Friend has dealt very clearly with the question of how you are going to deal with these pirates. After all, is not the proposition impossible? You have cases decided by this Court. This Court will decide possibly that there is a right to convert in this way on the high seas. Does anyone, this Court having laid down the law on this subject, really suggest that this Government, if we were at war, would have a right to treat as a pirate anybody who is merely following out what the law has been declared to be as laid down by this International tribunal? The thing is impossible! And then I take the other side of the question, when we are neutrals. The Solicitor-General says "you gain when you are neutrals, although you may not gain particularly when you are belligerents, because you are confining the power of doing damage, and you have a right to this International Prize Court, but you would have to look at the composition of the Court." The Court is composed of representatives of these very Powers who refuse to come to any agreement as to the conversion of merchantmen on the Declaration of London. Why? Because they knew right well it would be very much against their interests as naval Powers to limit their rights of converting merchant vessels. They knew there was no right which they claimed which put them more on an equality than that. Then the Solicitor-General says you go to this International Prize Court. What chance is there of this International tribunal taking the view Great Britain takes?
    Mr. HAROLD CAWLEY: The majority of the Powers do take that view.
    Mr. PEEL: Not a majority of the Powers who are to be represented upon
    1228
    this tribunal. I do not wish to make any suggestion about the judges, but after all, when it is the interests of the majority representing the Powers at that Court to support their right of conversion, do you think it likely that the Court is going to take notice of a British claim that these vessels shall not have the power of converting themselves into war vessels, and when they like re-converting themselves into merchant vessels. That is a great blot upon the Convention and the Court. We are left in a worse position than before, as we may have to declare by the Supreme Court that this right which we always contested is the true interpretation of national law.
    Sir EDWARD GREY: It is absolutely necessary to controvert the arguments used by hon. Members on the other side, and to enter a very distinct caveat against the conclusion, which I believe to be absolutely without foundation, that they are laying down. In the first place they are assuming that the International Prize Court is going to decide that merchant vessels may be converted on the high seas. It is to their interests to make the assumption that they want the International Prize Court to decide that way, and I do not believe there is any ground for that assumption.
    Sir R. FINLAY: I did not assume so.
    Sir E. GREY: I was dealing with the speeches that preceded his. I quite agree with what the right hon. and learned Gentleman said upon that point, but I do deprecate using language which will be quoted afterwards, that they expect the International Prize Court would take that view. The right hon. and learned Gentleman put the point that the International Prize Court might not take the view we hold about merchantmen being converted on the high seas. I would like to lay down what the powers of this International Prize Court are. They are going to decide the rights and merits as between belligerents and neutrals, not as between belligerent and belligerents. If a belligerent catches a merchant vessel converted on the high sea and treats it in any way it pleases there is no appeal whatever to this International Prize Court. That is a question between belligerents. Hon. Members opposite say "Yes, but supposing in a war in which we were not concerned between two Powers, one of these Powers converted a merchantman on the high sea, and then

    1229
    seized a neutral carrying contraband, and the neutral ship which is carrying contraband carries an appeal to the International Prize Court against its seizure by a merchantman converted on the high seas, and the International Prize Court gives its decision that the neutral is not entitled to compensation—I think that is stating fairly the case the right hon. Gentleman is presuming—all the International Prize Court has decided is what is to stand and hold good in any appeal which comes before it as between a neutral and a belligerent. That is what I wish to lay down, and as far as this country is concerned, we should refuse to be bound in our action as belligerents against belligerents by things which may have been decided as to what is right between belligerents and neutrals. We have made it perfectly clear all through that we were not going to have our views with regard to converting merchantmen on the high seas prejudiced, and I would enter the strongest protest against it being assumed in this House that any decisions which may be taken by the International Prize Court between belligerents and neutrals are going to curtail our rights when we are belligerents in dealing with belligerents.
    Sir R. FINLAY: Does the right hon. Gentleman say that if the International Prize Court laid down principles of law we should not be affected afterwards by them?
    Sir E. GREY: I should lay down that the rights between belligerents and neutrals are not to be taken as binding between belligerents and belligerents.
    Sir R. FINLAY: That is not the point. My point is, in case the International Prize Court decided that the conversion of merchantmen on the high seas was lawful, does the right hon. Gentleman say we should pay no regard to that principle of law.
    Sir E. GREY: I should say certainly as belligerents dealing with belligerents, we were not bound by that, and the whole proceedings all through have made it clear that whatever we agreed to we were not agreeing to anything which is going to circumscribe our rights as belligerents in dealing with belligerents.
    Mr. BUTCHER: The doctrine laid down by the Foreign Secretary is of such an extraordinary character that it is certainly new to us on this side of the House. The doctrine which has just been laid down by the right hon. Gentleman that we are
    1230
    to pay no respect to the principles of law laid down by the International Prize Court when we are belligerents dealing with belligerents appears to me to be contrary to every principle of justice. If the Foreign Secretary is right and intends to abide by that it might be advantageous to us, but I think he ought to embody it in this Convention and put it in some form in which foreign, countries will respect it. If it is simply stated in this House upon the authority of the Foreign Secretary I am sure foreign countries will take very great objection to it when you propose to act upon it in practice. I have to look at this question from the point of view of British interests and British interests only, a point which I think was insufficiently attended to when the Convention was drawn up. From that point of view I should like to say a word or two about justice and equity, which are very pleasant words and sound most admirable. What I want to know is, when the right hon. Gentleman says that there is no rule of international law to go upon and that the International Prize Court has to decide upon the principles of justice and equity, does he mean anything more than this: That this International Court will decide exactly as they think is the best. The words "justice and equity"—admirable words—differ enormously in systems of jurisprudence from this to Peru and from Eucador to Great Britain, and what seems justice and equity in this country according to the settled laws which have been laid down by great judges like Stowell and others may be exceedingly different from what recommends itself to gentlemen nominated by the Great Powers of Europe, and still more by the smaller nations of the world. When, therefore, we use the words "justice and equity" as governing the decisions of the International Prize Court, do not let us delude ourselves into the belief that they afford any protection for the reasonableness of their decisions. Let me assume a case where we are neutrals. A belligerent arms a merchantman and sends it out on the high seas to make a capture. The belligerent Court decides that the capture is quite right, and the neutral appeals to the International Prize Court. The international Prize Court lays it down as a broad principle of international law that it is perfectly right for a belligerent to arm a merchantman, and perfectly right for that belligerent to capture a neutral ship. I say if that is decided as a question of international law we should have

    1231
    to abide by it, and it would most gravely hamper us. That will be the position if the Amendment is not accepted.
    Supposing the Amendment is accepted, the Court of the belligerent may decide it is perfectly lawful for an armed merchantman to capture a neutral ship, but that decision would have no effect on our action whatsoever when we were a belligerent. We should be able to act and deal with cases of armed merchantmen on the seas as though no such decision had ever been given. We are not affected by decisions of other nations, and we should pay no attention to them if we thought they were wrong. If, however, you have that priciple laid down by the International Prize Court, I say not only would we be bound to respect it, but we should be most gravely prejudiced by the decision. For those reasons I attach the greatest possible weight to the words of the Foreign Secretary, and if his decision, as Foreign Secretary, is to pay no attention to principles laid down by the Court to be constituted under this Bill, and that we are going to be the judge, then I do urge he should make that quite clear to foreign countries, and get their consent before he proposes to act on that principle. I admit if he gets that consent he will remove one of our objections, but, if he does not, it is one of the strongest reasons possible for assenting to the Amendment.
    Sir E. GREY: The Government recognise we cannot bring the proceedings to a close this afternoon. May I appeal to the House, therefore, to get to the end of Clause 27 as soon as possible, on the understanding that the Government will give another short day to the further proceedings on the Bill?
    5.0 P.M.
    Sir R. FINLAY: Is the proposal of the right hon. Gentleman to give another short day intended to cover the remaining Amendments on the Report stage and the Third Reading?
    Sir E. GREY: Yes.
    Sir R. FINLAY: The right hon. Gentleman should remember that this is practically the first discussion on the Naval Prize Bill, as by arrangement the Debate on the Second Reading was almost entirely confined to the Declaration of London. I would respectfully submit it would not be dealing rightly by the House to give one
    1232
    short day for finishing the Amendments on the Report stage and the Third Reading. We should have a day for the Third Reading alone.
    Mr. STUART-WORTLEY: It might be unwise and unpatriotic to make any assumption against the decisions of the Prize Court on the grounds of equity and justice, but we cannot shut our eyes to the fact that in the case of Powers with small navies or no navies at all their interests will conflict with questions of equity and justice. It may be to the interest of a small Power to fit out a merchanman capable of being converted on the high seas. It may be said we have reserved to ourselves the power to deal summarily with belligerent vessels of that kind. The Solicitor-General, adding confusion to confusion, said that that was a very valuable thing for us, but I submit that it may go against us, as in the case of a British private owned ship being sunk by the converted cruiser of another Power and taking his case to the International Prize Court, the highest probability is he would be reminded of that power reserved by the British Government.
    Lord C. BERESFORD: This is the most important Amendment in the whole Bill. It is this question of converting merchant ships on the high seas and reconverting them at will into merchant ships that started the agitation in the country. I think, in the light of to-day's Debate, that the position looks worse than ever. The Secretary of State told us that, provided we are neutral and two belligerents are fighting, if one chooses to arm her merchant ships and sunk our vessels there would be nothing for us to do. But suppose the Turks so armed six ships and sunk thirty of our ships in the Mediterranean, should we have nothing to say? I venture to think we should not stand it; we should repudiate such a position, and we ought not to assent to such a proposal as this, knowing that under certain circumstances we would repudiate it. I do not think for one moment that this country would stand such a proceeding as that which, according to the right hon. Gentleman, could occur under these Courts. The right hon. Gentleman says: "Oh, we are all right, if we are belligerents." How are we all right? And what are you going to do with these people and the ships which are armed at sea?
    Mr. H. CAWLEY: What would you do with them?
    Lord C. BERESFORD: I would hang them as pirates. I should probably be hanged myself. They are pirates, and you are legalising pirates, and I do not think your officers and men will stand it; they would see what ought to be done, whatever their orders were. The hon. Gentleman asked me what I would do, and I have told him pretty straight. On 4th May I asked the First Lord of the Admiralty of those days whether, in view of the official statement that the Government do not admit the right of foreign nations to convert merchant ships into men-of-war on the high seas, he will state to the House what action the Government will take if foreign merchant ships are so converted, and whether, in the event of such ships preying upon our mercantile marine, they will be treated as pirates when caught? What did the right hon. Gentleman reply? For once he was not evasive. I must not say too much against him, because he is not here. [HON. MEMBERS: "Yes he is."] Where is he? What did the right hon. Gentleman say? "The action to be taken will be a matter for the decision of His Majesty's Government when the occasion arises." That, to a landsman, might be very clever, but to a seaman it is important to know what he meant. Our argument and that of those who have been excited about this question of the Declaration of London is that the trade routes are not properly defended, that you have not got enough cruisers, and that you had sixty and now you have twenty-two. If these ships are armed, and they take the trade routes, we cannot do anything. If the trade routes are snipped you will get a panic in this country, and what would be the use of sending out afterwards? It is like putting a fire service into a house after it is alight. If the trade routes are not guarded, they may be cut by these pirates, and then the right hon. Gentleman says he is going to do something afterwards. That is the real danger.
    You had a strike the other day in this country, and I am informed that you were within two days of starvation in London. You would have had riots if you had had starvation in London. You have no right to be in that position at all so far as your defences are concerned. This is the most important Clause in the whole Bill, and this is the most important Amendment that has been raised, and it raises the whole question of what I describe as, piracy. Whether you are a belligerent or whether you are a neutral you are almost in equal danger with regard to your trade routes, because they are not properly defended, and I shall certainly vote for the Amendment.
    Mr. SANDYS: I cannot understand the right hon. Gentleman's statement that in the Bill as it stands there is nothing to curtail our rights as belligerents. It seems to me this is the most important question, of all as to our position as belligerents. Though the right hon. Gentleman may say it does not curtail our right, our actual interests undoubtedly must be seriously affected by the action of armed merchantmen attacking neutral vessels engaged in carrying food to this country. There is no question that in the event of war this neutral commerce between foreign countries supplying us with food would be very largely increased indeed. A large quantity of our food supplies would come from neutral vessels, and, therefore, if those neutral vessels were liable to attack by the armed merchantmen of either of the belligerents, it is perfectly obvious that although our rights might not be curtailed, our national interests in the result of war might be very largely affected unless the Amendment is accepted.
    Question put, "That those words be there inserted in the Bill."
    The House divided: Ayes, 64; Noes, 136.

    Division No. 364.]

    AYES.

    [5.10 p.m.

    Arkwright, John Stanhope

    Coates, Major Sir Edward Feetham

    Hambro, Angus Valdemar

    Ashley, Wilfrid W.

    Cooper, Richard Ashmole

    Harris, Henry Percy

    Baird, John Lawrence

    Cralk, Sir Henry

    Henderson, Major H. (Berkshire)

    Balcarres, Lord

    Dalrymple, Viscount

    Hill, Sir Clement L. (Shrewsbury)

    Barrie, H. T. (Londonderry, N.)

    Dickson, Rt. Hon. C. Scott

    Hoare, Samuel John Gurney

    Benn, Arthur Shirley (Plymouth)

    Eyres-Monsell, Bolton M.

    Houston, Robert Paterson

    Benn, Ion Hamilton (Greenwich)

    Falle, Bertram Godfrey

    Hunt, Rowland

    Bennett-Goldney, Francis

    Fell, Arthur

    Kerr-Smiley, Peter Kerr

    Beresford, Lord Charles

    Finlay, Rt. Hon. Sir Robert

    Kirkwood, John H. M.

    Boscawen, Sir Arthur S. T. Griffith-

    Fletcher, John Samuel (Hampstead)

    Lewisham, Viscount

    Boyton, James

    Forster, Henry William

    Locker-Lampson, O. (Ramsey)

    Bull, Sir William James

    Gastrell, Major W. Houghton

    Lockwood, Rt. Hon. Lt.-Col. A. R.

    Butcher, John George

    Greene, W. R.

    Lonsdale, Sir John Brownlee

    Cecil, Evelyn (Aston Manor)

    Hall, Marshall (E, Toxteth)

    MacCaw, Wm. J. MacGeagh

    Macmaster, Donald

    Rolleston, Sir John

    Welgall, Captain A. G.

    Mallaby-Deeley, Harry

    Sanders, Robert Arthur

    White, Major G. D. (Lancs., Southport)

    Ormsby-Gore, Hon. William

    Sandys, G. J. (Somerset, Wells)

    Wilson, A. Stanley (York, E. R.)

    Pease, Herbert Pike (Darlington)

    Swift, Rigby

    Wortley, Rt. Hon. C. B. Stuart-

    Peel, Hon. William R. W. (Taunton)

    Talbot, Lord Edmund

    Pole-Carew, Sir R.

    Terrell, George (Wilts, N. W.)

    Pollock, Ernest Murray

    Thomson, W. Mitchell- (Down, North)

    TELLERS FOR THE AYES.—

    Ratcliff, R. F.

    Touche, George Alexander

    Mr. James Mason and Mr. Malcolm.

    Roberts, S. (Sheffield, Ecclesall)

    Warde, Col. C. E. (Kent, Mid)

    NOES.

    Abraham, William (Dublin Harbour)

    Grey, Rt. Hon. Sir Edward

    O'Brien, Patrick (Kilkenny)

    Acland, Francis Dyke

    Guest, Hon. Major C. H. C. (Pembroke)

    O'Connor, John (Kildare, N.)

    Baker, H. T. (Accrington)

    Hackett, John

    O'Dowd, John

    Beauchamp, Sir Edward

    Harcourt, Robert V. (Montrose)

    O'Grady, James

    Benn, W. W. (Tower Hamlets, St. Geo.)

    Harmsworth, Cecil (Luton, Beds)

    O'Shaughnessy, P. J.

    Birrell, Rt. Hon. Augustine

    Harvey, T. E. (Leeds, W.)

    Palmer, Godfrey Mark

    Boland, John Plus

    Haslam, Lewis (Monmouth)

    Pearce, Robert (Staffs, Leek)

    Bowerman, C. W.

    Havelock-Allan, Sir Henry

    Phillips, John (Longford, S.)

    Brocklehurst, William B.

    Hayden, John Patrick

    Pirie, Duncan V.

    Brunner, John F. L.

    Hayward, Evan

    Power, Patrick Joseph

    Bryce, J. Annan

    Henry, Sir Charles S.

    Price, C. E. (Edinburgh, Central)

    Burke, E. Haviland-

    Herbert, Col. Sir Ivor

    Price, Sir Robert J. (Norfolk, E.)

    Burns, Rt. Hon. John

    Hinds, John

    Pringle, William M. R.

    Byles, Sir William Pollard

    Horne, C. Silvester (Ipswich)

    Raphael, Sir Herbert H.

    Carr-Gomm, H. W.

    Howard, Hon. Geoffrey

    Reddy, Michael

    Cawley, H. T. (Lancs., Heywood)

    Hunter, William (Lanark, Govan)

    Richardson, Albion (Peckham)

    Chancellor, Henry George

    Jardine, Sir John (Roxburgh)

    Roberts, Charles H. (Lincoln)

    Chapple, Dr. William Allen

    Jones, William (Carnarvonshire)

    Robertson, Sir G. Scott (Bradford)

    Collins, Godfrey P. (Greenock)

    Jones, W. S. Glyn- (T. H'mts, Stepney)

    Roche, John (Galway)

    Collins, Stephen (Lambeth)

    Joyce, Michael

    Rose, Sir Charles Day

    Compton-Rickett, Rt. Hon. Sir J.

    Keating, Matthew

    Rowlands, James

    Condon, Thomas Joseph

    King, Joseph (Somerset, North)

    Samuel, Rt. Hon. H. L. (Cleveland)

    Cotton, William Francis

    Lambert, Richard (Wilts, Cricklade)

    Scott, A. MacCallum (Glas., Bridgeton)

    Craig, Herbert James (Tynemouth)

    Lawson, Sir W. (Cumb'r'ld, Cockerm'th)

    Seely, Col. Rt. Hon. J. E. B.

    Crumley, Patrick

    Leach, Charles

    Sherwell, Arthur James

    Dalziel, Sir James H. (Kirkcaldy)

    Low, Sir Frederick (Norwich)

    Shortt, Edward

    Davies, Timothy (Lincs., Louth)

    Lundon, Thomas

    Simon, Sir John Allsebrook

    Dawes, James Arthur

    Lynch, Arthur Alfred

    Strauss, Edward A. (Southwark, West)

    Denman, Hon. R. D.

    Macdonald, J. Ramsay (Leicester)

    Sutton, John E.

    Donelan, Captain A.

    Macdonald, J. M. (Falkirk Burghs)

    Ure, Rt. Hon. Alexander

    Doris, William

    McGhee, Richard

    Ward, John (Stoke-upon-Trent)

    Duffy, William J.

    Macnamara, Rt. Hon. Dr. T. J.

    Ward, W. Dudley (Southampton)

    Duncan, C. (Barrow-in-Furness)

    M'Laren, Walter S. B. (Ches., Crewe)

    Wason, Rt. Hon. E. (Clackmannan)

    Edwards, Sir Francis (Radnor)

    M'Micking, Major Gilbert

    Wason, John Cathcart (Orkney)

    Edwards, John Hugh (Glamorgan, Mid)

    Mason, David M. (Coventry)

    Watt, Henry A.

    Elibank, Rt. Hon. Master of

    Masterman, C. F. G.

    White, J. Dundas (Glas., Tradeston)

    Esmonde, Sir Thomas (Wexford, N.)

    Meagher, Michael

    White, Patrick (Meath, North)

    Falconer, James

    Meehan, Francis E. (Leitrim, N.)

    Whyte, A. F. (Perth)

    Farrell, James Patrick

    Menzies, Sir Walter

    Wiles, Thomas

    Ffrench, Peter

    Munro-Ferguson, Rt. Hon. R. C.

    Williams, John (Glamorgan)

    Flavin, Michael Joseph

    Murray, Captain Hon. Arthur C.

    Wood, Rt. Hon. T. McKinnon (Glasgow)

    Gelder, Sir William Alfred

    Nannetti, Joseph P.

    Young, William (Perth, East)

    George, Rt. Hon. David Lloyd

    Nolan, Joseph

    Yoxall, Sir James Henry

    Glanville, Harold James

    Norman, Sir Henry

    Goldstone, Frank

    Norton, Captain Cecil W.

    TELLERS FOR THE NOES.—

    Greenwood, Hamar (Sunderland)

    Nugent, Sir Walter Richard

    Mr. Illingworth and Mr. Gulland.

    Greig, Colonel James William

    Question put, and agreed to.

    CLAUSE 28.—(Enforcement of Orders of International Prize Court.)
    "The High Court and every Prize Court in a British Possession shall enforce within its jurisdiction all orders and decrees of the Internatonal Prize Court in appeals and cases transferred to the Court under this Part of this Act."
    Mr. ATHERLEY-JONES: I beg to move, to leave out the Clause.
    Sir E. GREY: I would suggest to the hon. Member that he should develop his argument when we resume consideration of the Bill. I beg to move, "That the further consideration of the Bill, as amended (in
    1236
    the Standing Committee), be now adjourned."
    Bill, as amended (in the Standing Committee) to be further considered upon Monday next (6th November).
    Whereupon Mr. SPEAKER, pursuant to the Order of the House of 24th October, proposed the Question, "That this House do now adjourn."
    Adjourned accordingly, at Twenty-two minutes after Five o'clock, until Monday next, 6th November, 1911.

PETITIONS PRESENTED DURING THE WEEK.
The following Petitions were presented during the week and ordered to lie upon the Table:—
MONDAY.
National Insurance Bill—Petition from Liverpool and other places, for alteration.
TUESDAY.
Disorderly Houses Bill—Petition from Hackney, for alteration.

WEDNESDAY.
Ignacius, A.—Petition of A. Ignacius, for redress of grievances.
Kalooram, Nehalchand—Petition of Nehalchand Kalooram, for inquiry into his case.
Kone, Kanagasabapathi—Petition of Kanagasabapathi Kone, for redress of grievances.
Naidoo, Sankaria—Petition of Sankaria Naidoo, for redress of grievances.
Vathalingam, Canther—Petition of Canther Vathalingam, for redress of grievances.

THURSDAY.
Ignacius, A.—Petition of A. Ignacius, for redress of grievances.
Licensing Acts—Three Petitions from Liverpool, for alteration of law.
National Insurance Bill—Petition from Glasgow, for alteration.

FRIDAY.
Diseases of Animals (Consolidation) Bill—Petition from Renfrew County Council, in favour.