CLAUSE 4.—(Definition of Premises for the Purpose of the Valuation of Licensed Premises.)

HC Deb 11 December 1911 vol 32 cc1989-2061

The following definition shall be substituted, as from the first day of April, nineteen hundred and eleven, for the definition of premises contained in Section fifty-two of the Finance (1909–10) Act, 1910:—

The expression "premises" in relation to the annual value of licensed premises includes any offices, courts, yards, and gardens which are occupied together with and are within the curtilage, or in the immediate vicinity, of the house or place where the liquor is sold, except any such offices, courts, yards, or gardens as are proved to the satisfaction of the Commissioners to be used exclusively for any trade or business which is entirely distinct from the trade or business carried on upon the premises by the licence holder as such, and also includes any building or place which though not within the curtilage, or in the immediate vicinity of the house or place where the liquor is sold, is used by the licence holder for receiving or storing liquor or, which in the opinion of the Commissioners is used by him, otherwise than occasionally, for any purpose in connection with the sale of liquor.

Mr. HAROLD SMITH

I beg to move, after the word "premises" ["the expression 'premises' in relation to"], to insert the words "means the house in which the liquor is sold and."

I submit that this Clause, which purports to give a definition of the expression "premises," does not, as a matter of fact, give a definition. I would ask the Solicitor-General to look carefully at the words of the Clause. I think, if he does so, he must agree with me that the wording of the Clause does not do what it purports to do. I would call the attention of the Committee particularly to the words "trade or business carried on upon the premises." That, to my mind, begs the whole question of the so-called definition, because it has never defined what the premises are to include. On the question of drafting alone the Clause requires some revision by the Government. In order to show that this is really a very important point, I would like to call the attention of the Committee to what the effect of this failure to define the word "premises" would be. I would remind the Committee that many difficulties may arise through this failure to define the word. The Solicitor-General will remember that Section 8 of the Revenue Act states that the annual value of premises for the purpose of Licence Duty is discovered in one of three alternative ways. The first way the annual value is arrived at is for the Inhabited House Duty value to be taken as the basis. If that Inhabited House Duty is not applicable, Income Tax is taken as the basis of value, and if Income Tax is not applicable, the Commissioners of Customs and Excise come in and determine the annual value themselves. The Commissioners have great powers, and there is no right of appeal from their decisions by an aggrieved person.

I suggest that very serious questions may arise as to whether the premises to be assessed for Licence Duty are the same as those assessed for Inhabited House Duty, whether they are more or less, and whether they ought or ought not to be included. When any such question arises the Commissioners of Customs and Excise would step in and insist that the assessment should be arrived at, not as for the purpose of Inhabited House Duty or Income Tax, but in the way they themselves decide. They would have the very arbitrary power of deciding whether the property in question was or was not part of the premises. I am sure under these circumstances the Committee will see how essential it is that the wording of the Clause should be accurate and clear. I would remind the Committee that the definition of "premises" in this Clause is entirely different from that given in the Act relating to Inhabited House Duty, and therefore the property to be valued will obviously be considered a different property from that liable for Inhabited House Duty. If the definition is left to the Commissioners of Customs and Excise, no trouble will arise in simple cases, but in difficult and complicated cases it is obvious that trouble will arise under this Clause as it stands. When you are leaving these matters to be decided by the Commissioners without appeal you do not in your own Bill direct what is the meaning of the word "premises." Without clear instructions from the Government I think it is exceedingly probable—I do not say wilfully or deliberately—that injury would result to those who are being assessed. The Government may reply that it is impossible or impracticable to further define the word "premises." My answer to that is that it is not impossible. The word has been defined in several Acts of Parliament and I think satisfactorily. For instance, in the Excise Licenses Act of 1825 we find the definition "dwelling house in which such persons reside or retail beer, etc., together with offices, courts and gardens." In the Inland Revenue Act of 1830 we find "premises" defined as "dwelling house in which the retailer shall reside or retail spirits, together with offices, courts and gardens." I quite appreciate that the words "dwelling house" would not be appropriate in this case, but on the other hand it is perfectly appropriate to keep within these limitations, and instead of using the words "dwelling house" the words "the house in which the liquor is sold" could be used. I do submit, first of all, that the Clause as drafted is not a proper way of defining what is meant, and, in the second place, that seeing the Commissioners have these wide and arbitrary powers they ought to have the strictest instructions in the definition on which they are acting. Further, I say that there is ample precedent for a clear definition of the word "premises." I hope that the Government will accept the Amendment, which is simply intended to clear away difficulties that must arise through not giving the Commissioners of Customs and Excise a very clear understanding as to what is intended in the Bill as regards the definition.

Mr. FELL

I beg to second the Amendment. I know myself from experience that very grave difficulties have arisen with respect to the word "premises." The Government in this Clause are attempting to define "premises." Then, when we come to it, we do not find that the definition is one which will assist hereafter the definition of it by the Commissioners. I know that the difficulties are now under consideration by the Commissioners, and I think that the Solicitor-General should consider this point now and see if the Clause could not be amended in some such form as is suggested by my hon. Friend.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL (Sir John Simon)

The hon. Gentleman who has moved this Amendment has stated very fairly and frankly that his object is to make this definition clearer than it is in the Bill, and if what he proposes would have no unintended consequences, and make the matter clearer the Government would have no objection to accept his proposal. I cannot help thinking, however, that he has not had present to his mind all the classes of case to which this expression "premises" would be applied. He desires, as I understand, to make this Clause run at the beginning: The expression 'premises' in relation to the annual value of licensed premises means the house in which the liquor is sold and includes—— He will see, therefore, even in the form of wording which he has suggested, a little later on he is going to commit what he would conceive to be the drafting error of using the expression "includes"; he is postponing the moment in which that expression is going to be used. I quite agree, as a matter of strict definition, that if you are trying to define something it is much better to say what the thing is than to say what it includes. But when you are dealing with a matter so variable it is not possible to use this particular form of drafting. If the hon. Gentleman had looked into the earlier Acts of Parliament, as I am sure he has, dealing with this subject, he will agree that I am right when I say that in every single case up to now the definition of premises for these licensing values has run "premises includes." I have checked it myself, and I think that is so.

Sir GEORGE YOUNGER

made an observation which was inaudible.

Sir J. SIMON

That is a different point. Those engaged in drafting, and most of all those draftsmen who are continually employed in the public service realise that it is much better to say "means" rather than "includes," but they do come across cases, and this is one of them, where it is really necessary to say "includes," because it is so difficult otherwise to be sure that you have covered the ground accurately. What the hon. Baronet opposite meant was, I think, that it was much less important in the old days to define it exactly, because the duty was calculated in a different form. It is quite true that my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer promised, when this Bill was introduced earlier in the year, that he would have a Clause which would cut down an unfortunately wide application of the definition as it stood, and it in pursuance of that promise that these words are introduced. I have carefully examined the Debates on the subject, and whatever else may be said as to the definition it really is intended to, and does, cover the ground which the Chancellor marked out as the ground to be covered. I may point out that we have to bear in mind amongst other things that you have many places licensed which are not houses, and do not include a house at all. For instance, very often you find that there is a licence connected with a cricket ground. It is probably a shed or a couple of sheds in a cricket ground, and it would be quite inapplicable and lead to confusion to say in a case like that that the license attached to a house. There is no such thing; and it is to cover cases like that all over the country that those who have advised us think it is better to keep to the form which has been used up to the present.

I come now to the other criticism which has been made by the hon. Member, and I am most anxious to show myself reasonable in this matter. I think he makes a good point here. He says, "your definition has this demerit, that it is, so to say, arguing in a circle. It sets out to explain what 'premises' mean and in the course of the explanation you use the expression you are endeavouring to explain." That is a perfectly just criticism. This Clause, as drafted in the Bill, runs: "The expression 'premises' in relation to the annual value of licensed premises, includes any offices, courts, yards, and gardens which are occupied," and so on "or in the immediate vicinity of the house or place." We use the expression house or place to cover such cases as the cricket ground where liquor is sold and I think the hon. Gentleman is quite right when he says, later on, that it is really illogical to go on and say: "Except any such offices, courts, yards, or gardens as are approved to the satisfaction of the Commissioners, to be used exclusively for any trade or business which is entirely distinct from the trade or business carried on upon the premises." I think that that is a perfectly legitimate point. I shall be quite prepared to strike out the word "premises" in order to put in some such words as "in the house or place," so that we shall not commit the technical error of using the word we are trying to explain in the course of our explanation. For the reason which I have given, I am sorry that I cannot accept the actual proposal of the hon. Gentleman. I confine myself to that proposal now because he has other Amendments, and I do not wish to embarrass him in any way by dealing with the other Amendments at this moment. The promise of the Chancellor of the Exchequer was to tighten up and limit the description of premises as it occurs in the Finance Act of 1909–10, and for that purpose we desire to keep to the same framework, though, as the Committee knows, we have been careful to cut it down in various directions.

Mr. GRETTON

The main object of my hon. Friend has been to attempt a certain definition of what licensed premises are, and I think that he is perfectly right. The objection of the hon. and learned Gentleman to the word "house" seems to me to be not at all forcible, because actually, in his own drafting, he is obliged to employ the words "house" or "place." As to the difficulty which the hon. and learned Member suggested, that there may be a licence for another place than the house, it really to my lay mind does not convey any very serious obstacle whatsoever; because a licensed place must be attached to something, to a building of some kind or another, whether a railway refreshment room, or any other kind of licensed house, or hotel. A licensed place must be attached to a building of a more or less permanent character. So far as I follow it, I think my hon. and learned Friend (Mr. Harold Smith) has made out a good case, and in the interests of everybody, the Government, the officers of Excise, and even those whom you tax, it is desirable that there should be some complete definition in this Clause of what is meant by "licensed premises." It is admitted that the Licence Duties are now raised to the very highest possible point, and it is desirable, in the interests of justice, in the interests of these taxes, and also in the interests of the officers who have to administer the regulations under the law, that the words "licensed premises" should be made as clear as possible, so that all those who are affected may know where they are and with what they have to deal.

Mr. J. M. HENDERSON

I think my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor-General will really see that something must be done about this matter if the licensing authorities and the Inland Revenue are to run on parallel lines. I have here a case which illustrates the point under discussion in a very simple manner. It is that of a small inn in a country district where the occupier carries on the business of a farmer as well as that of the landlord of a public-house. Close adjacent to the licensed premises there is a hall and cloak-room; there are also turnip sheds, byres, farm stables, public stables, cart sheds, etc. The whole of these buildings are included in the assessment. The licensing authorities, be it remembered, do not license the landlord to sell liquor in all parts of those premises which I have enumerated; it limits the licence to the premises on which the liquor is sold, and they do not grant it in respect of the adjacent buildings. If the licensing authority licensed to sell on all the premises, cadit quœstio, but they do not do that. On the other hand, you draw a tax from all these buildings which I have described, while the licensing authorities limit the licence to one part of the premises. Great confusion arises, in Scotland particularly, even amongst the Excise officers themselves. The hall to which I have referred is sometimes used for entertainments of one kind and another, and the occupier of the licensed premises has been accustomed, as his licence only pertains to the house, to apply for a special licence.

Mr. H. SMITH

On a point of Order. I wish to ask whether the question which the hon. Member is discussing does not arise on the further Amendment which I have to move, and which directly touches upon the point which he is now raising. I should certainly be glad of his argument and his assistance in regard to that further Amendment.

Mr. J. M. HENDERSON

If that is so, I will take the opportunity of discussing the matter afterwards.

Sir G. YOUNGER

My hon. Friends and I raised this very point of the definition of licensed premises at the time when the Act passed through this House. We said that there was no proper definition of the words, and that they are capable of the widest possible construction. As a matter of fact we are now able to show the House that the construction of those words has amounted almost to a scandal, and that the pledge or undertaking which was given—I think by the Finance Secretary to the Treasury rather than by the Chancellor of the Exchequer when we last debated this Bill—went at all events further than the Clause now goes. I can quite understand the hon. and learned Gentleman's difficulty, but the hon. and learned Gentleman and his Friends exist for the purpose of solving difficulties, and I am sure no one is more competent to arrive at a solution than the Solicitor-General if he takes the trouble. I therefore say to him, if he can show us any way under which we can get rid of this extreme difficulty, I think the least he can do is to tell the House. He has refused to accept the Amendment of my hon. and learned Friend, and I ask him to suggest words which will simplify the situation and make it more clear. We have submitted an Amendment which is not accepted, and it would relieve the situation very much if some kind of definition were given on which the authorities could act. There are authorities and authorities, and there are Excisemen and Excisemen; and it is not every Exciseman's judgment which reaches the supreme authority or is reviewed by the supreme authority. I admit that the supreme authority when they have had cases of particular hardships brought before them have invariably tried, with great discretion and fairness, to deal with the matter. There are many people who have a holy terror of the Exciseman—I never have myself—and they submit to injustice and hardship without their case ever reaching the source from which relief could be obtained. Therefore, something plain and clear should be put into this Clause.

Mr. MAURICE HEALY

I have read the Clause several times in the Act, and I must confess personally that some definition is required.

Sir J. SIMON

I will take the opportunity to explain the scope of the Clause, but the Amendment, which is now under discussion, does not raise the point to which the hon. Gentleman refers.

Mr. MAURICE HEALY

I will raise the point on the Amendment which the hon. and learned Gentleman intends to move.

Mr. NORMAN CRAIG

I do not wish to say anything at this moment providing the matter may be discussed at large on the later Amendment. This Amendment is a necessary part of a group of Amendments. If I understand the hon. and learned Gentleman says that the matter is at large on future Amendments I have nothing to say, but I am anxious that we should be protected.

Mr. H. SMITH

In view of the fact that I have got an Amendment which opens up the greater question I desire to withdraw.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Mr. C. BATHURST

I beg to move, after the word "gardens" ["yards and gardens"], to insert the words "(but not stables used for posting)."

I move this with the object of removing from the definition of the word "premises" that part of the hotel premises the stables which are used for posting purposes. I take the opportunity of putting these words in the forefront of the definition in order to get some statement from the Government as to whether they include the stables within the definition of premises, and which in most country hotels are used for purposes wholly unconnected with the sale of drink. I have instances in my own district in Gloucestershire of country inns, which are described, I believe, in the trade as "family and commercial hotels," used in a somewhat rural sense, where commercial travellers go to stay during the time they are in the district in order to carry on their business over a large rural area, and where other persons, connected it may be with the local education authority or other county authorities, reside for a time while they are carrying out their official duties. Those hotels do a comparatively small amount of trade in the sale of liquor, but do a large amount of trade in the way of housing temporary guests, and taking them by means of their posting facilities to the different parts of the large area in which they conduct their business, or in which their official duties lie. It cannot be intended surely that those conveniences, which are an almost necessary adjunct to hotels of this character, should be in any way penalised, because in the houses to which they are attached there happens to be a certain amount of drink sold even to those who are residents, or, rather, temporary guests, within the licensed premises. Those same people, as no doubt the Committee is aware, as a rule provide what is required for the purpose of funerals in the districts which they serve, and also provide station facilities in the form of a 'bus which runs between the village and the station, particularly if the station is not very close to the village. I have two instances in my own district, and I have no doubt there are many others where the innkeeper has asked to have the stables taken entirely off his hands because of the additional duty which he has to pay owing to the stables adding to the annual value of the premises. I do not in any way represent the trade, and, on the other hand, I represent the other side of the hotel keeper's business, which is a very essential and very important one in country districts, particularly in places which are not well served with railways, where good posting is absolutely essential to provide for the amenities of the place in order to meet the convenience of those who are staying temporarily as guests in such hotel. I have one or two other Amendments very specifically making clear this definition shall not extend to stables used for these purposes. I now move this Amendment mainly with the view of eliciting from the Solicitor-General, as representing the Government, what the views of the Government are on the matter.

Sir J. SIMON

The hon. Gentleman has moved the Amendment, as I understand him, rather with the object of getting an explanation than because he really wishes to recast the Clause in this particular way. I make no complaint of that, but perhaps it will be convenient if I asked you to consider what is the point at which it would be convenient to take what I may call a substantial discussion, because it is obvious we do not want to deal with the thing in a hundred pieces. I am certainly desirous that the hon. Member for Warrington (Mr. H. Smith) and my hon. Friend below the Gangway should have the opportunity of dealing with the suggested proposal as a whole. It has occurred to me probably there are no Amendments after this one which would take any considerable time, though I do not wish to belittle them, until we come to the proposal of the hon. Member for Warrington, in which he moves, after the word "Commissioners," to insert the word "not." That really introduces the substantial framework of the Clause, and I suggest that probably it is a convenient point at which to get a general explanation and a general discussion.

Mr. PRETYMAN

I rather agree with what the hon. and learned Gentleman has said, and I attach great importance to the Amendment moved by my hon. Friend. It will be very difficult to discuss this particular Amendment without travelling over a wider area which the Amendment does not cover. Therefore if my hon. Friend will assent to the course suggested, having made his point, it would be open to the Solicitor-General to deal with the matter, and either to accept it wholly or in part.

Sir J. SIMON

That is what I should wish to do.

Mr. C. BATHURST

I have not sufficiently studied the Amendments to know exactly whether this one which the Solicitor-General has referred to will cover the case. What I should like to safeguard myself as to is if the Solicitor-General is unable to accept the much wider Amendment, which I understand is going to be moved, that it shall not in any way prejudice the narrower question on which I feel very strongly, and, not being in any way connected with the trade, I should not like to have it thought that I am moving it for any other motive or interest than that which I have stated.

Sir J. SIMON

I am sure we all understand it, and I will be most willing. The actual proposal which the hon. Gentleman makes, is as I take it, an illustration of a sort of difficulty which we should meet in discussing it in general terms. I am bound to point out to him, certainly, that for some years past this so-called definition of premises has always begun: "Premises in this connection includes any offices, courtyards, and gardens." The object of those who are trying to get the definition a little tighter is not to recast these introductory words, but rather to see that the qualifications on those words are sufficiently strong. It appears to me that when we come to discuss qualifications we shall in substance do what the hon. Gentleman has so clearly raised.

Mr. C. BATHURST

After that statement, I beg leave to withdraw.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Mr. H. SMITH

I beg to move, to leave out the words "or place" ["house or place where the liquor is sold, except"].

The Clause is supposed to limit, to some extent, the definition of premises for the purpose here in view; but I suggest that the words "or place" indefinitely extend the definition. I would remind the Solicitor-General of the trouble which many of our learned judges have had in defining what is a place. I suggest that he is only adding to the difficulty by putting these extremely vague and wide words in a Clause which purports to define what licensed premises really mean. His suggested difficulties in reference to exhibitions and cricket grounds, if applicable at all, would perhaps be more applicable to this Amendment than to the other. But I do not think they are applicable at all. In all such exhibitions or cricket grounds which have such a licence there would be a house, or building, or shed, or pavilion, or something which would represent the licensed premises. I suggest that these words are very vague and unsatisfactory, and ought to be omitted.

Sir J. SIMON

I hope the hon. and learned Member will not press this Amendment. We are on the eve of what I regard as his substantial proposal, and really, whatever else may be said about the words "or place," they do not one way or the other affect the burden which the hon. and learned Member is rightly concerned carefully to measure and adjust. It is clear that we cannot be content with the word "house," because, as a matter of fact, there are some places not accurately described as houses in which none the less liquor is sold. There is no hidden mischief in these words. They are only intended to cover the place or building when it is not a house—the shed or pavilion, or whatever it is.

Mr. PRETYMAN

Will the Solicitor-General accept the word "building" or "house"? The word "place" is very wide. I remember on one occasion a lady's lap was defined by a Court of Justice as being a place.

Sir J. SIMON

The hon. Member's recollection is no doubt correct, but he is not applying it very relevantly. The question is whether a "place where the liquor is sold" is liable to be misunderstood. You cannot sell it except in a place which has a licence for its sale. I cannot accept the word "building," because there would be, for instance, such a question as whether it includes a tent.

9.0 P.M.

Mr. GRETTON

The Government mean a building, a house, a structure, a premises, a permanent or semi-permanent structure to which the licence is attached, where the convenience for carrying on the business is erected, and where the liquor is kept for sale. But they are not satisfied with that. They will not put in words that anybody will understand, because they are afraid something will escape their taxation. Therefore they put in the very vague word "place," but they do not mean "place" at all. A licence holder is very often squeezed unjustly, or he has to go to the Law Courts for a remedy. I suggest that it is very desirable if a man is to be taxed that he should have some clear idea of how he is going to be taxed. The law should be framed so that it can be understood by all. I object to these vague words being introduced. It is clear that the Government do not mean a place; they mean a building. My hon. and learned Friend is perfectly right. As a matter of convenience the word "place" ought not to stand; the word "building" would be much better.

Mr. MAURICE HEALY

The word "place" greatly extends the possible meaning of this Clause. The word "house" or "building" appears to me to serve all the purposes of the Government by fixing the centre from which the valuation is to start. If you put in the word "place" you allow the radius to extend so far that you may be any distance from the central point before you end the valuation. If you say the house or building where the liquor is sold, it is quite plain; but if you say the place where the liquor is sold, it may mean London or Dublin or Cork. It may mean any area of which those names would be a proper description. If the Government were in a difficulty, if there was not always a central building of some kind from which to start the valuation, I could understand their saying, "We cannot dispense with the word 'place,' because 'house' or 'building' will not do." But you must have a building to start from. It is quite inconceivable that you can have a licence without a building. That being so, I cannot conceive, while you might have buildings which are not houses, how you can have a licence for a building which was not at the same time a house. Even granting that the Government do want to have something besides the word "place," all the requirements, it seems to me, are fully met by using the word "building." That being so, I do not understand why the Government want to retain this extraordinary word "place." The illustration has been given that in a cricket ground if you happen to have a store half-a-mile away at the other end of the cricket ground, it would all be included in the licence.

Sir J. SIMON

It is not a place where liquor is sold?

Mr. MAURICE HEALY

Yes, but it is in the vicinity of the place where liquor is sold, and that is the whole question. As I have said a place where liquor is sold is a house, no doubt, but it is in the cricket ground; also in the town, also in the city, and also in the island! That being so, it appears to me that the right hon. Gentleman is carrying his definition very far when he says that you cannot get on unless you have the word "place."

Mr. J. M. HENDERSON

Why not follow the words of a previous Clause, and say "a house or premises where liquor is sold." There is there no difficulty about the word "place," and it will be remembered that a place has been held to be a man standing up in the paddock and making a bet; you cannot licence a man to sell beer or spirits in a yard standing by himself!

Mr. NORMAN CRAIG

It appears to me that the Solicitor-General made one point in the case of a temporary licence. Manifestly the word "place" is objectionable. It is far too vague, and incidentally it is altogether out of touch with the rest of his own Clause. His own Clause presumes premises which Mould include "place" in this definition. His own premises are such premises as might have offices, courts, yards, or gardens attached. How in the world is a "place" going to comply with these conditions? The word "place" is far too wide, vague, and indefinite. If the right hon. Gentleman wants to meet the possible case of a temporary licence, a marquee, or a tent, there are surely words in the English language which would meet the case? Why not use the word "building," and make it indicate something such as a "structure" or "erection"? The word "place" in an Act of Parliament of this kind is a word which already has considerably lost caste. I do suggest to the right hon. Gentleman, without in any degree limiting the width of his definition, that for all practical purposes, it should be quite sufficient instead of the word place to say "structure or erection." That would cover not only permanent but also temporary buildings which are the subject-matter of licences.

Mr. PRETYMAN

The learned Solicitor-General has suggested that his difficulty was in regard to a temporary structure such as a tent. I would ask him when he replies if he can name a single case or instance where a permanent annual licence is given to a structure like a tent? I am right, I think, in saying that this Clause applies only to an ordinary annual licence, and also that no ordinary annual licence under any circumstances is given except to a house which is thoroughly satisfactory structurally to the licensing bench? Therefore I would like the Solicitor-General to say under what possible conceivable circumstances a licence affected by this Clause could be granted to anything except a house or a structure, which means a house. There may be, I admit, a pavilion on a cricket ground, but that is a permanent structure, and should certainly be, I should say, regarded as a house. It is quite unnecessary to introduce such a word as the word "place," as my hon. Friend behind me has pointed out. I cannot understand how an office, courtyard, or garden, can be attached to a "place." They can only be attached to a house. My objection to this word is from a drafting point of view. The Solicitor-General surely will agree that immense trouble is being caused with the taxpayer nowadays by the complicated legislation into which vague terms are introduced with the idea of covering all possible considerations, seen or unseen, under which it might be possible for somebody to escape from a small fraction of a tax. The consequence of that is that the Revenue Department who are bound to try and interpret the Act in the strictest possible sense, and get the last penny out for the revenue, make a claim under the word Act, which is naturally resisted by the taxpayer, who looks at the general principle on which the Act is based. Then we have the expense of cases in the Law Courts, simply because the Government of the day cannot make up their minds exactly what they want taxed, and say so clearly in the Clause which imposes the tax. I do not put this matter forward from the trade point of view at all, and if the Solicitor-General can tell us of an actual concrete case which the word "house" or "building" would not meet, then I think he has made good his case. If he cannot do that, then I think the Committee will be justified in refusing to accept the vague word, for which no real case can be made out for the Government, and we shall confine the tax to a "house" or "building," which is the only conceivable place to which an annual licence can be granted.

Mr. J. M. HENDERSON

I do not think I ever knew of a cricket pavilion being licensed. They come in as clubs.

Sir J. SIMON

I can assure hon. Gentlemen, after applying my best judgment to the matter, that if I thought there was obscurity in the words, or any advantage in changing them, on the suggestion from hon. Gentlemen opposite, I should have no pride in the matter at all. All I want to do is to see that this Bill is properly framed. With great respect, may I just point out that these words are not chosen with any malicious desire either to create vagueness or difficulty of interpretation. If hon. Gentlemen will do me the kindness to look at the way in which these words are used in this Clause, they will certainly see that the last half-hour's discussion has not been upon a point of very great importance. The question is not whether "place" is a vague word. The hon. Gentleman has given us his reminiscences of cases in which the word "place" received very wide construction. This is not a point as to whether or not anybody will misunderstand a word. We mean a place where liquor is sold. No one can sell intoxicating liquors unless they have a licence. All that is meant by the word "place" is to take in a case which might not be covered by the word "house." It is no use to suggest a particular case. I can imagine that, in one sense of the term, a hotel is not a house. It is not a house for the purpose of Inhabited House Duty. There are many cases that would only produce argument in the future. May I point out, in confirmation of what I have already said, that these words are not used maliciously or to make difficulty, that, as a matter of fact, this very word "place" occurs again and again in the Licensing Acts of all Governments. I find it in the Licensing Act of 1872. There is a prohibition of illicit sale. That provision is, that a person is exposed to a penalty for illicit sale if he sells in any place in which he is not authorised by the licence to sell.

Mr. MAURICE HEALY

That is liquor. A man might be selling it in the street!

Sir J. SIMON

Exactly the same words were introduced by the Joint Committee upon which the hon. Baronet (Sir G. Younger) and I sat. The expression used in the Licensing Act of 1902 is the same, and there is an actual interpretation of a public place. We have really occupied a good deal of time on a point of no substance. You cannot be sure, but some person, I will not say a lawyer, because there is nothing so technical as some legally minded laymen talking law, will contend that some place is not included in the word "house" and starting a definition of "house."

Mr. AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

Would the hon. and learned Gentleman tell me whether the definition he has referred to would be the governing definition of "place" in this Bill?

Sir J. SIMON

I am much obliged to the right hon. Gentleman. I do not want to suggest that. I am dealing now with the suggestion made that the word is introduced here for its vagueness. I am only suggesting that when one uses the word "house" or "place" where liquor is sold, it is not a fair criticism to say that it is done for vagueness, and then to press upon the Minister who is for the moment responsible that he should substitute some other word. You are creating, quite unintentionally I am sure, a possible difficulty, because the words you suggest may not cover what is intended to be carried in it. There is a real point coming on in the next Amendment in the name of the hon. Member (Mr. Harold Smith). It raises a point that is worth discussing on its merits. I suggest we have spent a long time on the question whether the word "house" or "place" where liquor is sold is not a sufficiently clear description of a point covered by authorities. The hon. Gentleman (Mr. Pretyman) asked me a question whether, on reflection, I suggest that a temporary structure would be a proper subject for a full on-licence, I think his question is a fair one. I am not aware that there is anything legally impossible in a place having a full on-licence which is not necessarily of a permanent character. With regard to cricket grounds, mentioned by the hon. Member (Mr. J. M. Henderson), it is a pretty question what they should have to pay.

Sir G. YOUNGER

I think this Amendment raises the question whether these words are not doubtful, and the fact that if they are introduced into the Clause they may give the Commissioners of Inland Revenue an excuse for further extending the meaning, with a view to roping in premises outside the law at present. If the hon. and learned Gentleman will assure us that the words "or place" will not give them any further foundation for that, perhaps my hon. Friend will be satisfied. Certainly that is the intention and reason with which this Amendment was moved. We want some distinct understanding.

Mr. NORMAN CRAIG

I desire to add a word, not as a legally-minded layman, but as one who hopes to be a lay-minded lawyer. The point is one of more importance than the hon. and learned Gentleman seems to think. One does not want in a case of this sort indefiniteness. The hon. and learned Gentleman says "house" is not sufficient. I do not know whether it is worth while appealing to him in the sacred name of tradition or precedent, but both in the Excise Licensing Act of 1825 and the Inland Revenue Act of 1830 the word "house" was the only word included, and I never heard that "hotel" was excluded on the ground that it did not fall within this definition. If there is no point as regards permanent and temporary structures, if the word "building," which is certainly wider than the word "house," would include an hotel, surely for the sake of simplicity and for the understanding of laymen it is undesirable that we should use vague words which nobody can defend and nobody can understand, and least of all His Majesty's Government. I hope the matter will not be passed by in this way.

Sir J. SIMON

Perhaps I may add that in what I have been saying here I have been expressing what I know to be the views entertained by the heads of the Department. I am perfectly confident what I have said represents their view, and when their view has been called for it has on the whole been fairly applied. If the hon. Gentleman accepts that from me and withdraws this Amendment and proceeds to the substantial matter lower down, I shall by no means shut my mind against the point he raises.

Mr. H. SMITH

I am not in the least convinced or satisfied, but, nevertheless, as the other Amendment perhaps covers this point I shall ask leave to withdraw this Amendment.

Mr. WATSON RUTHERFORD

Before the Amendment is withdrawn I should like to congratulate the Government in sticking to the word "place." Having regard to the profession to which I belong, I think it is a most delightful word to put into an Act of Parliament. It has in it all the essence of fruitful litigation for many years to come, out of which the profession can hope to be richly rewarded, and on behalf of that profession I feel entitled to thank the Solicitor-General for adhering to his decision to keep in this word "place," because of the emoluments which are bound to come to the legal profession in consequence.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Mr. C. BATHURST

I beg leave to move, after the word "yards" ["offices, courts, yards or gardens"], to insert the word "stables." I should like the opinion of the Solicitor-General as to whether the words "offices, courts, yards or gardens" can be construed to include stables.

Sir J. SIMON

May I point out that the inclusion of the word "stables" as proposed does not quite make sense of the Clause. As regards the question put to me by the hon. Member, I should have thought myself that "offices" in the abstract might be taken to include stables. One of the objects of this Clause is to try to draw a line between those cases where stables ought to be included and where they ought not to be included.

Mr. C. BATHURST

If "offices" can be deemed to include stables, well and good, but I do not consider the Solicitor-General's answer is quite sufficient, and I should like a definite assurance from him that the term "offices" includes "stables."

Sir J. SIMON

I am quite ready to give that assurance, although I do not mean to say that every set of stables comes within the definition of premises, but offices undoubtedly is intended to include stables.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Mr. H. SMITH

I beg to move, after the word "Commissioners" ["satisfaction of the Commissioners"], to insert the word "not." It will be convenient perhaps that I might be allowed to draw attention to other Amendments which are consequential upon this Amendment, and which are set out on the Amendment Paper. I would also call attention to the Clause which I put down in order that hon. Members might appreciate what would be the effect of my Amendments if carried. The principle involved in this series of Amendments is a very important one. It really involves the question which has already been raised in different parts of the House as to whether outbuildings, such as stables, should come within the assessment for Licence Duty. In short, it is a question whether a stable which is occupied by a tenant for a business entirely distinct from the business which is carried on should be assessed for Licence Duty. One would naturally ask why should a stable which is close to premises which are licensed be included in the assessment of the licensed building. It seems to me that it is utterly indefensible where you have a stable, as suggested by my hon. Friend used as a posting business that it should be assessed for Licence Duty. As I understand the present proposition is that if the licensee has sublet his stables, then it is not included for the purpose of the Licence Duty, but if it falls empty then it comes within the assessment of the Licence Duty. I think that is indefensible, and I wish to put a real case. I submit to the Solicitor-General that the livery stable business fulfils a public want, and I submit also that it does not increase the custom of the house. I submit that point strongly. I will take a place which supplies in the main taxi-cabs and hansoms. I am sure the Solicitor-General would not say that that posting business brings increased business or profit to the house, but even if it does, that does not support this proposal in the least. If it does bring increased business in the house that is taken into consideration when the house is reassessed.

I will give an example. I will take licensed premises valued at £100, and the licensee imagines that by using his stables for a posting business he can increase his business and does so, and by so doing increases the annual value of his premises from £100 to £120. It is increased in value in this way, in addition to the extra rates and taxes in respect of Income Tax under Schedules A and B. So that the extra benefits through the increased business are directly assessed by increased assessment. If the stables are included in assessing the value for the Licence Duty then the Excise authorities get extra duties not only on the extra value of the licensed property, but also on the value of the stables. They get not only the increased duty on the £20, but the increased duty which is caused by the addition of the stables to the premises. Another point is that the yard, or shed, or building, or place is not licensed. The hon. Member for Ayr Burghs (Sir G. Younger) pointed out last year that these places are not licensed, and if the licensee desires to sell a glass of beer on any part of these outside premises which are rated as though they were licensed, he could not do so. I suggest that either his stables are licensed or they are not, and if they are not you have no right to assess them on the basis that they are licensed. You must either let the man sell liquor in those stables or buildings whatever they are, and of course rate him accordingly, or you must deprive him very properly of the right of selling liquor, and not do him an injustice by assessing him on the basis that he can sell liquor in them.

I want to put a specific case to the Solicitor-General. I wish to refer him to a house known as The Windmill, in High Street, Lambeth. Here stables were sublet to a gentleman of sporting instincts, and he used them for his trotting horses. Owing to a change in the neighbourhood, it became impossible for him to use them, and his tenancy expiring, he let the premises. Those stables have been empty now over nineteen years, and they have been going through a process of decay. There are no rates, of course, although they are assessed for rating purposes at £15. Since 1909 they have collected in repect of those tumble-down stables a sum of £7 10s. in Licence Duty. They have collected that on that which was once a stable, but which is now nothing more or less than a tumble-down building. That is a specific case. If the licensee could find a tenant, which he cannot, not only would he get rent, but he would be immune from duty, and because the man cannot find a tenant for stables, which, I believe, are now scarcely fit to be used as stables, he loses his rent, and he also has to pay this Licence Duty. That means that the Excise Authorities are penalising this man for his inability to let his property. I do really think it is impossible for the Solicitor-General to oppose the principle of my proposal, unless he is prepared to stand at that box and justify the Treasury penalising a man because he cannot let his stables for the purpose for which they were once let.

I want to bring to the notice of the Solicitor-General another case, the case of the Redcliffe Arms, Fulham Road. I notice he pricks up his ears. There were some places adjacent to the licensed house. They have been let to the London General Omnibus Company for the last twenty years at £12 per annum. On September 29th this year, two days previous to the Licence Duty becoming payable, the proprietors vacated the premises, and the authorities made a demand for an increased rental value of the stables to the extent of £12, necessitating an increased Licence Duty of £6. A letter appeared in some London paper drawing attention to the iniquity of this, with the result that the very day the letter appeared the authorities notified the licensee they had made this demand in error. It was just before enternig this House this evening I received notice that the authorities have withdrawn their claim. Why have they withdrawn? I do not want to make a suggestion I ought not to make, but I cannot help thinking their withdrawal has something to do with the fact this letter stated that the case was going to be cited in the House of Commons. The day that letter appeared the authorities came to this tenant and told him they had made this demand in error, and would not press it. But why? They pressed it in the case I have given to the Solicitor-General, the case of The Windmill, High Street, Lambeth, and I could give him many others. It is only a question of time. I believe one could cite dozens and, yes, hundreds of similar cases without any doubt at all. I cannot understand why, in the case of the Redcliffe Arms, they should withdraw their claim the very day this letter appeared, stating it was going to be raised in the House of Commons, and why they should go on pressing their claims in respect of hundreds of other cases throughout the country.

Finally, I have two or three Amendments, such as to leave out the word "exclusively" and the words "entirely distinct from the trade and business." May I deal with those as they are all consequential? I would point out that none of these Amendments would exclude or protect the case where stables are used directly for trade purposes. In a case where a stable is used for trade purposes, of course I would not think, and I am sure no hon. Member would think, of asking it should be excluded from the assessment of Licence Duty. If they were used simply as a place where the licensee kept his van and horse for the purpose only of delivering the goods he sold in his public-house, then I would say such premises were used in a business directly concerned with the trade for which the tenant was licensed, and in such a case I would consider the Solicitor-General would be justified in saying it ought to be rated, though I do not say I would agree with him. There would at any rate be some justification for him saying so, and my Amendments would not exclude such a case, but they would exclude from the assessment for Licence Duty premises which are in the main used for posting business. Just think what the present position means. A man who, as in the case I cited in my own Consituency, supplies, or mainly supplies, the posting business of the town, would probably be immune from assessment, providing he never used a cab or a taxi from his own yard for one of his customers or for someone staying in the house. The very moment he uses, say a cab, for one of his guests or customers, then from that moment the Commissioners can come down and say these premises are not entirely distinct from the trade or business for which the tenant is licensed. That, I suggest, is an impossible position. How often is there a 'bus attached to the village inn, and how often is that 'bus used by the proprietor of the inn to carry, say, cricket teams to and from the station? The moment he does that for his guests, then you are no longer able to say the posting business is absolutely and entirely distinct from the business of his licence. I do trust the Solicitor-General will see there is urgent need for some such proposal as I have suggested. I do not think my words are too wide, and I do suggest to him and to the Committee something ought to be done. The present position is indefensible. It is inconsistent, and it is grossly unjust. It rates a man where he ought not to be rated, and it refuses him privileges which such rating ought to confer upon him. This point has been raised in this House I think for several years past, and I do hope this year, if I am right—and I think I am right—the Solicitor-General will see his way to making an Amendment which I think in all justice ought to be made. I am only asking for justice where I think justice is demanded, and I do urge my Amendment on the Solicitor-General.

Sir J. SIMON

I am sure Members of the Committee are indebted to the hon. and learned Gentleman for the clearness with which he has explained a very complicated matter in regard to the tests which he proposes to substitute for those contained in the Government Clause for the purpose of measuring premises, the annual value of which is material for arriving at the amount of Licence Duty. I think it would be for the convenience of the Committee if I point out to what extent the Government proposes to make a change in the existing law. The hon. Gentleman himself, in the course of his argument, was compelled to abandon the very principle upon which that argument was founded. The principle which he laid down was that you should not, for the purpose of ascertaining what the premises are, the annual value of which measures the amount of duty, have regard to anything except premises in which liquor is authorised to be sold. That was the principle he laid down. It no doubt would greatly simplify matters if that principle were adopted, as undoubtedly it would materially contract the revenue and put it in the power of the licence holder to pay more or less in the way of Licence Duty accordingly as he selected the part of the premises in which liquor would actually be served. But the hon. Member has abandoned that principle. When he got to close quarters with it he did not dispute it would not be unreasonable to include stables in the premises which are to be regarded for the purposes of Licence Duty.

He has printed on the Paper the language of the Clause as it would read supposing we adopted his proposals. He himself proposes to start this definition by saying that the premises "include any offices, courts, yards, and gardens, which are occupied together with and are within the curtilage or in the immediate vicinity of the house where the liquor is sold." But the hon. Gentleman surely does not mean that a man may sell liquor in the garden. The result is that his own definition which he recommends to the Committee as though it carried out simply the principle he laid down, really fails to satisfy his own tests. Whatever the tests you are going to apply we cannot accept the hon. Gentleman's tests. What we do desire to do is to cut down the width of the definition as it stands at this moment in order that we may exclude from the premises for this purpose certain places which I quite agree, in the circumstances, should very properly be excluded. My hon. Friend the Member for one of the Divisions of Aberdeen put the case of a farmer who happens to hold a licence, and asks, "Is it fair to include the farm stables in the area of the premises, the annual value of which you are going to arrive at for the purposes of assessing the Licence Duty?" Ono of the objects of the proposal which the Government has put down is to exclude such a case as that.

In order to get at the real definition it is necessary to refer to two or three Acts of Parliament, and I hope the Committee will excuse me if I occupy some little time in referring to these. The idea that you should include in your premises, offices, courts, yards, and gardens, therewith occupied is not an innovation. It is a definition to be found in the Act of 1880. Whether it is right to continue that or not is a fair matter for consideration, but, at any rate, it is a case of continuing an old definition and not imposing a new definition of serious moment to the trade. The definition is embodied in the Finance Act of 1909–10, which occupied a good deal of time in passing through this House, I think I am right in saying that in the course of the passage of that Act there were some words added to the definition of premises with a view to limitation. That Bill, as introduced, reproduced the language of an old Act of Parliament, and in the course of the Debate it was pointed out that it would hardly be fair to continue that wide definition, the reason being that if you rearrange your Licence Duties to make the duty depend exactly and proportionately on the annual value of the premises it was absolutely necessary to have a clear definition, and therefore it was laid down that the expression "premises" with relation to licensed premises should include any such offices, courts, yards, or gardens, occupied together therewith, except any offices, courts, yards, or gardens as are proved to the satisfaction of the Commissioners to be used for any trade or business which is entirely distinct from the trade or business carried on on the premises by the licence-holder as such.

The hon. Member for North-East Cork (Mr. Maurice Healy) has suggested that that definition would not bring in farmers' stables. I must confess I am not quite sure that that is so. It is highly desirable we should make it clear that it does not bring them in, but my strong impression is that the technical reading of these words might involve their inclusion, although I am aware that, in the administration of the Section, it has been common in many cases not to include them. But as long as you have a definition of that sort you make no distinction between premises which are I close by, what I may call the centre of sale, and premises which may be further off, because premises which are in the immediate vicinity of the centre of sale, perhaps in the same appurtenance, might very well be reckoned as having an effect on the business carried on by the licence-holder, because he has got a licence. I think also that this definition of 1909–10 does not very clearly distinguish between the cases of offices, such as stables, which are part of a hotel-keeper's premises, the hotel-keeper being a licence-holder, and stables which happen to be occupied by a man who holds a licence, but is not running his premises in any sense as an hotel, but simply as a small public-house, and who happens to have stables for a business totally unconnected therewith. It has been our object, in strict pursuance of an undertaking given earlier in the year, to introduce such an Amendment into the existing law as will deal with both of these points. That is to say, on the one hand we make a distinction between the areas which are in the immediate vicinity of the centre of sale as contrasted with the areas which are at a distance from the centre of sale; and on the other hand, we make a distinction between offices, stables and the like, which are normally associated with the carrying on of the business under the licence, and the offices, stables, and the like which are not.

I say we have been careful strictly to carry out our undertaking, and I have fortified myself by reading carefully the Debate which took place when the Resolulutions were introduced earlier in the year. When that happened, not only my right hon. Friend the then Financial Secretary to the Treasury, but the Chancellor of the Exchequer also, on 16th May, both made statements, which are quite consistent one with the other, showing they desired to make a distinction between these remote areas and the areas in the immediate vicinity, and showing also that they desired a distinction between cases where the stables were associated with the business going on under the licence and cases where they were not. Will the Committee be so good as to look at the Clause as we propose it. The Clause, as we propose it, is necessarily a long Clause, and I am not saying that it is very easy to follow it, but the key of the Clause is to be found by observing that it deals with two things, which are dealt with in the two separate limbs of the Clause: first of all, the case where the subordinate premises are close to the centre of sale, and, secondly, the case where the subordinate premises are at a distance. The principle on which the Clause is constructed is this, that as regards the first half of the Clause, which deals with the subordinate premises close to the centre of sale, we lay down the general principle that they ought to be included in the premises, but there is a provision for exclusion; whereas when we deal with premises which are at a distance from the centre of sale, the general principle is that they are excluded, with a special provision for inclusion. If the Committee will follow me they will see this is the way in which the Clause runs, the Clause provides, The expression "premises" in relation to the annual value of licensed premises includes any offices, courts, yards, and gardens which are occupied together with and are within the curtilage, or in the immediate vicinity, of the house or place where the liquor is sold, except any such offices, courts, yards, or gardens as are proved to the satisfaction of the Commissioners to be used exclusively for any trade or business which is entirely distinct from the trade or business carried on upon the premises by the licence holder as such. Under that exception, if I may say so to the hon. Member for West Aberdeenshire (Mr. J. M. Henderson), I am confident that the farm stables that he referred to would be excluded. I do not want to say that the stables of an hotel would be excluded by this Clause—at any rate, in all cases. I hear the hon. Baronet (Sir G. Younger) say he is sure they would not. I go further and say that they are not intended to be. The Clause is designed to draw a distinction between cases where the stables are, as I have described them, necessarily associated with the business that is actually being carried on by the man who holds the licence—which is the common case of hotels and stables—and the cases where the licence is that of a mere public-house as distinguished from an inn, and the fact that stables are attached to it does not have any direct relation to the business that is being carried on.

Mr. AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

Suppose the stables are habitually used in connection with the farm, but are occasionally and exceptionally used for the accommodation of the customers of the house, what is the position then?

10.0 P.M.

Sir J. SIMON

I am much obliged to the right hon. Gentleman. I only venture to enter this caveat. I am far from saying that it is within my power—I do not think it is within anybody's power—at a moment's notice to give a confident opinion on every hard case, but I think the answer to the case put is one which may fairly be arrived at by considering whether or not in that case the stables are proved to be used exclusively for any trade or business which is distinct from the trade or business carried on upon the premises.

Sir G. YOUNGER

Entirely distinct.

Sir J. SIMON

Yes. I rather agree with the right hon. Gentleman that the case he puts is probably the case in which, under the Clause as drawn, the stables will be included. The Committee will see that the idea of the first limb of the Clause is to bring them in, but to make exclusions in a certain limited class of cases. I wish to be quite frank about its being a limited class of case. Will the Committee now turn to the other half of the Clause. It reads, and also includes any building or place. I am much relieved to find that the hon. Gentleman opposite also used the words "other building or place."

Mr. H. SMITH

It is a very convenient word to use in debate, but a very inconvenient word in an Act of Parliament.

Sir J. SIMON

I understood that the hon. Gentleman was proposing to substitute his words for ours in this Act of Parliament. I did not understand him as merely raising debate. The Clause says, and also includes any building or place which though not within the curtilage, or in the immediate vicinity, of the house or place where the liquor is sold, is used by the licence-holder for receiving or storing liquor, or, which in the opinion of the Commissioners is used by him, otherwise than occasionally, for any purpose in connection with the sale of liquor. The last words would, I think, cover just that sort of instance which the hon. Gentleman gave in the course of his speech. It would cover the case of stables which may be at a distance, which were habitually used to house vans used for the distribution of liquor sold under the licence, but the substantial case is covered by the earlier words "place for receiving or storing liquor." That is the general scheme of the Clause. I say with a good deal of confidence that the Clause as drawn is a Clause which does carry out what has been our sincere desire to carry out, the representations which were made when this matter was discussed earlier in the year. The sum mentioned by the Chancellor of the Exchequer as involved in this concession was £50,000. In fact our advisers tell us that more than £50,000 is probably involved. The proposal the hon. Gentleman makes would involve a much greater loss to the Exchequer, and it is a loss which we could not in the circumstances consent to make by accepting his Amendment. I do not say that these words will meet every difficulty which the ingenuity and knowledge of my hon. Friends can put forward, but I do say that they provide a very fair working rule. I do say they are a great improvement on the words now on the Statute Book, and I say with great confidence that they carry out those undertakings which were given in the month of May last.

Mr. AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

I entirely accept the Solicitor-General's statement that the words which he has proposed are in fact, as they are in intention, an execution of the pledge given in May by the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the then Secretary to the Treasury. I have not referred to these words, but I take it from him that they meet the intention in the fullest way, and do whatever has been promised. That does not settle the whole question which is before the Committee. It is not a question whether the form proposed by the Government does what they promised, but it is a question whether that form is sufficient to meet the justice of the case. I desire to deal with that portion of the Clause which is concerned with premises close to what the hon. and learned Gentleman called the centre of the sale of liquor. On what terms are they to be exempt? Only if they are proved, to the satisfaction of the Commissioners, to be used exclusively for a trade which is entirely distinct from that of the sale of drink. That is a tremendous test. I took the case put by my hon. Friend, not so much because I was doubtful of the effect of the words, but because I wanted to ascertain the intention of the Government. I think it was legitimate, and the hon. and learned Gentleman made no complaint about it. I wanted to know before I argued this whether the Government words were incomplete, or whether they intentionally included such a case as that within the limits of taxation. Take a man who has licensed premises and stables. The stables are in connection with a farm, but from time to time a customer arrives in a trap or on horseback, and he puts the horse up in his farm stable. He would not have the stables at all if he had not got the farm, but, having the stables, he is able to accommodate the man's horse. At once these stables, though necessary for the work of the farm, though he will have had them quite apart from the licensed premises, become liable to Licence Duty. Then take the case of a man who has a posting establishment. The moment he supplies one of his cabs to a customer or to a person in the house it becomes assessable for Licence Duty. Surely the Government cannot pretend that that is just. Still less can they pretend that it is just when they see the practical effect of the law.

I own licensed premises which have stables attached. I sub-let the stables to my hon. Friend, who does a posting business there. If that posting business brings increased custom to the house, I am taxed because I do an increased business, but I am not taxed on the value of the premises as long as I let them to him and he does the business. But if he throws up the lease, and I neither can find another tenant to continue the business nor myself carry it on, I become taxable. I lose the rent and I lose the additional profit, if there was any, which the posting business, carried on in stables appurtenant to the licensed premises, brought to the licensed premises and I become taxable. That cannot be just. It cannot be defended except on one of two grounds. One is that it will cost the Treasury too much to do justice and the other is that it is impossible to find any form of words which will do justice. I do not think the first plea is open to the Government when this injustice arises really from the result of increased taxation which they themselves have imposed. The hon. Gentleman said these provisions were of old standing, but were of little consequence under the old licencing law and valuations as they were then carried out. They have become of enormous importance to the people concerned with the new licensing law and the new scale of duties, and if you are to have that very high scale of duty on the premises you ought to discontinue them the moment these anomalies are pointed out. The injury is twofold. You tax the man if he gets increased profit in his licensed premises by reason of his business, and you tax him twice over for that increased business. You tax him on the premises which bring it to him and you tax him on the increased trade which he does in his original premises. You have in addition the injustice that, if the same addition of business is brought to him by a lessee, he escapes all taxation. It is only if he carries on the two businesses that the premises in which his second business is carried on become taxable.

There is one wider question still which I am not sure is correctly raised by my hon. and learned Friend. I doubt profoundly the wisdom of our present procedure in regard to assessing for Licence Duty the appurtenances of a public-house from the point of view of temperance legislation. The effect of the Clause on the existing law and the law as the Government propose to amend it, is to tax a publican for providing better accommodation or an alternative to mere drink. The idea, no doubt, of temperance reformers in pressing successive Governments to take that step has been that all these additions act as an incentive to increased consumption of liquor. I do not believe that is true. I think it is possible that they bring more men to the public-house than would otherwise come, but I think that, instead of tending to excessive drinking, they tend to less excessive drinking. The bane of our present public-house is that there is nothing to do but drink. There is a constant pressure on a man to drink, and if a man does not drink his room is more desirable than his presence. A public-house must be conducted with a view to the sale of drink, but you want to encourage them to supply their drink under conditions which do not tempt a man to drink too much, and which allow him to linger long over his one glass instead of drinking a great deal. I am quite sure if we devoted more attention to that, though we might not reduce the actual amount of liquor sold, we should reduce the amount of drunkenness. I believe foreign example has a great deal to teach us in this matter which we would be wise to follow. That is a criticism on the Amendment as much as on the Clause. It is travelling outside the scope of what the Amendment proposes to effect, but I mention it partly because of the interest of the subject itself and partly because it brings me to this conclusion, that really the basis of our present taxation on the sale of liquor is wrong. You want to tax in proportion to the liquor sold, and not in proportion to the value of the premises in which it is sold. You cannot make that change all of a sudden. It is a very big affair. I am sorry the Chancellor of the Exchequer did not proceed on those lines when he was enormously increasing the taxes which were imposed upon the sellers of excisable liquor. But as he did not proceed on those lines, then I do not suppose it is possible for him to undertake it in the month of December, 1911. I do say that the fact you cannot now make a more perfect system of that kind is no reason why you should not remedy such obvious imperfections as my hon. and learned Friend has pointed out in moving the Amendment. I really do not think it can be pretended by the Government that their form of words will meet the cases put by my hon. and learned Friend and myself. Nor do I believe that the Solicitor-General, or the Chancellor of the Exchequer himself, would pretend that the action of the law as it stands, or as it would stand under the proposal of the Government, would meet such cases. I think the Solicitor-General has spoken in a reasonable frame, of mind, and I would appeal to him to be more generous and to accept the form of words which my hon. and learned Friend has proposed, if he cannot find a better form himself. I would ask the Committee to bear in mind that the hon. and learned Gentleman showed no cause why the Amendment should not be accepted. I do not know whether he intended to do so, but as a matter of fact he sat down without adducing a single argument against the adoption of the Amendment of my hon. and learned Friend, except that it did not go so far as the Mover of it laid down as necessary.

Sir J. SIMON

I think I said that there was this distinction between the hon. and learned Gentleman's Amendment and the Government proposal, that his Amendment went further than our proposal, that it involved greater loss to the Revenue, and that it went further than we ought to go.

Mr. AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

The hon. and learned Gentleman certainly did say something about the loss of revenue. If this were an old-established tax there would be great force in saying, "We cannot deal with these cases at once." But this is the first opportunity the House of Commons has had of reviewing this tax in practice. The Government admit the great hardship which is caused, and they further admit that there are cases which their proposal will not cover. I think, therefore, the Government ought to widen their proposal so as to include these admitted cases of hardship.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE

I have a great deal of sympathy with the general argument of the right hon. Gentleman that the present, system of assessing Licence Duty is illogical. I do not think it is very conducive to the encouragement of temperance. I acknowledged the defects of the system some two or three years ago, and I think, at any rate. I laid the foundation of a better system by some provisions which I introduced into the Finance Bill with the view of getting a valuation which would get approximately at the value of the premises for trade purposes, the basis of that being the quantity of excisable liquor sold. In fact there were two methods which I introduced very largely for the first time which carried out the idea of the right hon. Gentleman opposite, though imperfectly, I admit. The first was that special conditions were given where the trade represented one-third of liquor and two-thirds of something else. That was a great advance on the old system, because under this new idea that was introduced in the Budget of 1909 you can take posting into account and the sale of refreshments other than excisable liquor in ordinary village inns and houses of that kind. To that extent, I think, we have advanced considerably along the line indicated by the right hon. Gentleman, but I propose to go much further than that. You should get as the basis of your assessment something approximating to the quantity of liquor sold at any given house. The system of assessing on the size of the house and on a valuation for purposes other than the sale of liquor is, I think, a vicious system. You get little houses sometimes in the country with no accommodation for anything, barely accommodation for drinking, with people packed in a small room, and doing an enormous trade. On the other hand, you get a very large house where the sale of liquor is comparatively small. I was amazed at figures given me by some of the London publicans about well-known houses in London—I do not care to name them: I have no right to do so—houses which are really very well known, and if I had not known the gentleman with whom I was dealing I could scarcely have accepted the figures, the quantity of liquor sold was so small in proportion to the reputation of the houses as public houses; and, on the other hand, you will probably get in a slum district a wretched little house selling five or six times as much liquor as these great houses that you have got in prominent corners in London.

That is a thoroughly bad system. I said then to the brewers who owned these houses, "Cannot you agree on some basis? I want just this much money from the licensed trade. I do not care on what basis it is as long as it is fair. If you agree upon a fair basis of distribution I will accept it." The first thing I found was that there was hopeless disagreement between London and the provinces. The provincial publicans would not even come into conference. Nobody knows that better than the hon. Member for Ayr Burghs (Sir G. Younger). He knows that we could not get the London brewers and the provincial brewers to agree. We could not get them to come on a common platform. What suited London did not suit the provinces, and what suited the provinces did not suit London. London wanted to be taxed on the basis of the trade done, because the rateable value was so high here, and very often the business was small. When you go to the provinces it was just the other way about. The rateable value was low, and business was very considerable. In those conditions I failed to get any sort of agreement among the brewers of the country who owned these great houses as to the basis of assessment. The next best thing that I could do was to provide for some sort of systematic valuation. I did not get very much assistance from the publicans in that respect. I am not blaming them. I do not say that it was a refusal on their part. It was because they do not keep books. A very small proportion of publicans keep books. They simply reckon upon the barrels that come in and the account to the brewer, but there is no real systematic book-keeping by the majority of the publicans as far as I could see. Therefore they could not give me the information that I wanted to establish a new basis. I have carefully gone through the returns, and I do not think that half the publicans have sent them in.

Sir G. YOUNGER

Seventy per cent. of those in Scotland have sent them in.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE

I have no doubt that the Scottish publicans keep a very careful account. I am taking the whole country and not merely Scotland. That may be sufficient to enable us to form some sort of a basis, but it would be a mistake to tinker at it, because you can really make out a case which is much worse than this. The case made out by the right hon. Gentleman. I do not deny; I think compared with other houses it is unfair, but not nearly so unfair as some of the things I have mentioned—a big house with splendid accommodation, but not doing a great trade in liquor, and a wretched little house with no accommodation, which is there purely for slopping and drinking, and which does an enormous trade. I think the grievance is much greater for a big house of that description, conducting its trade respectably, with fine accommodation, and showing some sense of responsibility towards the public. The right hon. Gentleman says, "Here is one grievance." We deal with it. What happened? We have given away about £300,000 or £400,000 of revenue, largely due to the blandishments of the hon. Member for the Ayr Burghs.

Sir G. YOUNGER

And the Law Courts.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE

No; I can assure the hon. Gentleman that we already had that Amendment prepared before the case came before the Law Courts. It was before the Wrigglesworth judgment, I believe, that an agreement was made between ourselves and the brewers.

Sir G. YOUNGER

No.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE

That is my recollection. The hon. Gentleman says it was not, and, of course, I accept his statement. My own recollection is that it was agreed before the case came into Court. If we begin by making one concession after another, the revenue goes, and by the time we come to recast the whole basis of valuation, we shall, as it were, have to rebuild our Licence Duty when we have to get revenue. For the moment, I think I have gone as far as I am justified, and I have gone beyond the statement I made to the House in May. The right hon. Gentleman will bear me out that I have gone as far, though I am assured by my advisers that I have gone a little beyond. I think it is as far as I can reasonably be expected to go in giving away revenue until we come to re-open the whole question. I shall be very glad when it is possible to consider the whole thing from the point of view of taxing on the basis of the sale of intoxicating liquors. It would be more encouraging to those who try to keep good houses, and I am sure would be more conducive to the best interests of temperance. That is really what I am aiming at, but in the meantime I do not want to see my revenue frittered away by £50,000, £100,000 and £200,000 at a time.

Mr. MAURICE HEALY

With great respect to the right hon. Gentleman, I think the discussion has been diverted from the Amendment to a Debate on the general principle. Both right hon. Gentlemen have made something in the nature of Second Reading speeches. The Solicitor-General promised that when this Amendment was reached he would explain the Clause and exactly what purpose it is intended to serve. I got up earlier in the Debate, and I said, having read this Amendment, that I professed myself unable to say whether it lessened the burden on licensed premises or whether it increased them. In reply to that suggestion or complaint, the hon. and learned Gentleman promised that when we came to this Amendment which, he said, went to the whole root of the Clause, he would give us a full statement on that subject. I am sorry to say that when he rose—or, rather, when he sat down—we were as ignorant on the point as when he rose. This is the year 1911, and the Act of Parliament which we are seeking to amend was passed as lately as the year 1910. In the year 1910 the Government passed a wholly new definition of licensed premises, and in the year 1911 they come down to the House and repeal that definition and substitute for it something wholly different. Is it unreasonable, under those circumstances, if we ask the hon. and learned Gentleman in charge of the Bill to tell us what defect they have found in the existing definition, and how they mean to amend that definition. The hon. and learned Gentleman and the right hon. Gentleman who spoke last told us that one of the objects of this Clause was to give away £50,000 (I do not know whether I am correct in my figures). I began, as I say, by being in some doubt as to what this new Clause does, but I am no longer in doubt. I am quite satisfied that this new Clause does not give away one brass farthing. The right hon. Gentleman makes a contemptuous gesture, but I will endeavour to prove what I say. To give the hon. and learned Gentleman the Solicitor-General the opportunity of deal- ing with the point, I put a question in the course of the Debate. The hon. and learned Gentleman proceeded to put the case of a farm and public-house, and I asked the question in that case would the stables on the farm be taxed under this Clause for the purpose of the licence. The Solicitor-General answered that that was one of the objects of the Clause to prevent those stables from being taxed. Thereupon I interrupted him in Debate and pointed out that the point which he suggested this Clause met was already met in the Act of last year. I have the Act here, and it is as plain as light, and on the terms of that Act it is made abundantly plain and clear that the stables in the case which the hon. and learned Gentleman raised would not be taxed and that no Amendment of the law is necessary to meet that case. The Act of last year says, The expression premises in relation to the value of licensed premises includes any offices, courts, yards, and gardens, occupied together with the house in which the liquor is sold, except any such offices, courts, yards, or gardens as are proved to the satisfaction of the Commissioners to be used for any trade or business distinct from any trade or business carried on in the premises of the licensed owner. Under those circumstances, if the stables were purely farm stables, they would not be taxed under the old Act. Consequently so far as that particular point is concerned it is abundantly plain that we need no Amendment of the law. While it does not amend the law so as to relieve the publican in that case, it amends the law in order to relieve the Treasury of difficulties on no less than two points. First and foremost in the definition of the Act of last year the word "exclusively" was not used. The law is tightened under this Clause. Under the Act of last year you might say, "I am using these stables as farm stables," and the Commissioners could not say to you, "Yes, but you must show us that you are using them exclusively for that purpose." Under this Clause, which is inserted by way of a concession, when the farmer-publican goes before the Commissioners to seek exemption for his stables he must prove that he is using them, not merely mainly, but exclusively, for the purposes of his farm. Secondly, not only must the publican seeking exemption prove that the premises are used exclusively for some second trade or business, but that that trade or business is entirely distinct from the trade or business of the publican. There, again, the law is made stricter.

Finally, the new Clause goes out of its way to make it perfectly plain that, no matter how remote from the licensed premises may be some other premises winch the publican happens to use as ancillary to his trade or business, they are now to be included in the definition of premises, and taxed on their valuation. Under the old Act the publican could not be taxed upon any additional premises wholly severed or at some distance from the licensed premises, notwithstanding that he used them in connection with the public-house. Take the case of premises a street away used in some way in connection with his trade or business. No one will contend that they could be included in the valuation of the public-house; but under this Clause, passed under pretence of being a relief to the licence holder, it is made perfectly plain that, no matter how remote the ancillary premises may be from the main premises, they are to be included in the valuation. On these three distinct points the law is made stricter against the publican and easier for the Treasury. I have searched in vain for one syllable or comma in which the Clause gives relief to the publican or in any way lightens his burden. When the Government were seeking to amend the definition which they advisedly adopted only last year, they might have favoured us with a clear statement as to what was in the new definition that was not in the old, and what in the old that was not in the new. My interest in this matter is purely an Irish interest. There is no difference, so far as this Clause is concerned: it will hit the publican in England and also the licence holder in Ireland. [An HON. MEMBER: "No, no."] That is my argument. I may be quite wrong, but I have failed to extract from the right hon. Gentleman the Solicitor-General any single particular in which this will be otherwise. The point he made clear is in the Act of Parliament already. The new law instead of making the law clearer for the publican makes it clearer against him.

Mr. J. M. HENDERSON

I was very pleased to hear what fell from the Chancellor of the Exchequer. I am glad he has been converted. In 1909 I told him that rent as the basis of assessment for Licence Duty was entirely wrong. I cited the case of a £50 house actually doing more business than a house of £500. The right hon. Gentleman has struck the difficulty. Some of us have always agitated for a percentage on the sale. The difficulty is the provincial brewer and the tied house. I appeal to him to carry out a scheme for valuation according to sales which is the only just way. The Solicitor-General was good enough to say that the case I sent to him would be met—that of farm buildings. It is necessary, I submit, for the Treasury to come to some understanding on this point, because there is a very great muddle and difficulty, and the difficulty arises in this way. There are two authorities. There is the Inland Revenue, who say, "We want the assessment for Duty of such and such premises," and there is the licensing authority, who say, "These are the premises on which you actually sell the liquor." I cited a case. The man was assessed for the whole block, offices, farmsteading and everything. On complaining he got a letter from the assessors:— With regard to your application for repayment of licence duty, the Board direct me to acquaint you that they are advised that the whole of the farm buildings.… should be included in the valuation for 1910–11. In these circumstances the current annual value for Licence Duty was so much and the Duty has been paid on the annual value. The Board are unable to make any repayment of publicans' licence duty for this year. So that, assuming my hon. Friend the Solicitor-General is right, and that this case I cited to him will be exempt this year, it is quite clear it was not exempt last year. Mark what followed. This collector could not blow hot and cold; he could not say the whole were included, yet when, the previous August, this farmer asked for a special licence for some sort of entertainment in his hall, the collector claimed a licence of 10s. In the circumstances, however, they have sanctioned the repayment of the occasional Licence Duty in respect of the hall. Then the letter goes on to say:— As regards 1911–12, the case will require to be considered with reference to the new definition of premises' proposed in the Finance Bill now before Parliament; but the decision cannot be come to until the Bill becomes law. Meantime, the duty will be accepted on deposit upon the annual value. That shows the whole thing is in a muddle. I had another case of a man in the country with a hotel and stables who had an entertainment, and wanted to put up a tent in his garden. He asked the superviser whether he would want to take out a licence, and he said he did not know. The Solicitor-General, as I understood him, said that if the premises are part of the building or immediately contiguous to the building, the duty will be charged, but if they be at a distance—how far I do not know, whether a hundred, or two, three, four, or five hundred yards—they are not to be rated. Why? I suppose the only possible reason you can include stables is because they are ancillary to the business, and that they bring people there. That is quite true. But what about the London hotels? They spend thousands of pounds upon advertisements to bring people to them. Are they to be taxed upon that expenditure? In your 1904 and 1909 Acts you are forbidden to take anything else but the liquor sold. If that is so I want to know what the argument is as to what the "place" is to be. The Solicitor-General said the "place" was one that acted and had effect upon the trade——

Sir G. YOUNGER

The Solicitor-General said it was distinctly intended to rope in these places wherever they were.

Mr. HENDERSON

That makes the case still worse. I fail to see why that should be. In any case, let us be quite fair about the thing. If you are going to charge this Licence Duty then the man is entitled to sell liquor on the premises. [HON. MEMBERS: "NO."] Why not? What is the equity in saying to a man, "Here you have stables at a rent of £50; we are going to charge you Licence Duty on £25, but we are not going to allow you to sell a single glass of beer in them?" What is the justice of that? My hon. Friend (Mr. Leif Jones) is largely responsible for this Licence Duty. I want to know can anybody justify it? I have asked a lot of these men, and they say, "We do not agree; if you are going to charge us Licence Duty for the stables we shall claim the right to sell liquor in the stables." Then the justices come in and they say, "No, you must not sell liquor in the stables," although the Government are going to charge for selling liquor in the stables. The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that the rent ceased to be a criterion for the Licence Duty, and that is the difficulty. What law are we under? If it is the rent let us understand it, but I find in the North that it is not the rent, but they are going upon a sort of hybrid mixture of the annual licensing value and the rent. This shows how difficult and how mixed up it is, and how absolutely necessary it is that we should have some proper basis. To ascertain the licence value, you are forced to include all your posting receipts. If that is so in order to arrive at a proper proportion he will he able to reduce his annual licence value or his compensation value.

Sir G. YOUNGER

This has nothing to do with the annual licence value at all.

Mr. J. M. HENDERSON

If you are going to charge a Licence Duty on the stables, it is only right that a man should be able to return his total receipts so much less in order to show that he is not under this special Clause. I do not think that these stables should be included in the licence-value Clause unless the man is going to have a free hand to sell in the stables or other places, and the Licence Duty should be confined to the portion of the premises on which the licensing authority allow drink to be sold. They allow drink to be sold in certain premises, and those premises alone should be subject to Licence Duty. Immediately you bring it beyond that you will create a great deal of trouble, muddle, and dissatisfaction to the people. The only remedy by which you can destroy these anomalies is to get a proper system of charging a percentage.

11.0 P.M.

Mr. GRETTON

The hon. and learned Gentleman complained that my hon. Friend the Member for Warrington (Mr. Harold Smith) had stated his whole case, and then proceeded to set up an Amendment which upset his whole argument. That is exactly the position to which we are driven. We have no other course. The whole case has been stated by the hon. Member for Aberdeen (Mr. J. M. Henderson). It is a manifest injustice which cannot be defended that Licence Duty should be charged for portions of premises which are not licensed. That is our case, and it has been before the House on many occasions. The Government have been forced to deal with it at last, and on the Revenue Bill this year they made an undertaking they would do something in their Finance Bill to deal with it. This Amendment is drafted carefully to carry out as well as can be done the undertaking which the Government itself gave. It does not go beyond that. The Amendment in the Bill, as drafted, is in some respects worse than the law as it stands. There is now a doubt in some cases, and the licensee gets the benefit of the doubt. This Clause is very largely going to do away with those doubts, and I can assure the House that the expert advisers to the licensed trade think the position under this Clause will be rather worse than if the Clause were not passed. Is that what the Government mean? I thought, after all the arguments and the Debates we have had, they were really going to do something, and this Amendment of the hon. Member for Warrington, as I venture to assure the Committee, is not going beyond the undertaking of the Government itself. Conferences have taken place, and I think I am entitled to say they ended as every argument addressed to the Government in this House ends, and as it has ended to-night, in this: "We are only going to give up so much money, whatever the justice of the case may be; we have got the money in our pockets, and we are not going to give it up." That is a very extraordinary principle. The Chancellor of the Exchequer takes his proposals largely out of the purview of the House, and the Budget is becoming an automatic machine for grinding taxes out of the taxpayer. We have no opportunity of reviewing its provisions unless they can be raised in the form of new Clauses in the Finance Bill. This question, at any rate, has been raised, and the Government promised to deal with it. After careful conference and careful discussion they have broken their promise because they are afraid of losing a little more money. If you take the arguments of the Chancellor of the Exchequer and of the hon. Member for Aberdeen, and pursue them to the end, then all Licence Duties should disappear, and their only course is to fall back upon the article itself. That is an enormous confession of failure. The Government set out to tax licences, and now they are obliged to admit their whole process has broken down. That is a very remarkable position, and I do not know how they are going to get out of it. Two cases were taken as test cases in regard to the new Licence Duties. There were a vast number of cases, but the Treasury decided to take two of them as test cases The Government lost both those cases, and judgment was given in no uncertain terms against them.

Sir J. SIMON

The hon. Gentleman is entirely wrong. The decision, in point of fact, was in the Government's favour. That, however, does not alter the fact that we are carrying out what had been previously stated in this House.

The CHAIRMAN

I do not think this is pertinent to this particular point.

Mr. GRETTON

I was led into the matter by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The Wrigglesworth case was antecedent to the Budget of last year. It was decided on appeal against the Government on every material point, and they had to put Amendments in their Bill to meet what the courts decided. The Government are now acting on the advice pressed upon them from the Benches behind them. Although they desired to make some slight concession in this matter, they have been misled into doing nothing whatever.

Mr. LEIF JONES

The speech to which we have just listened is a very ungrateful one to the Government. I would like to ask the hon. Member whether he wishes the Government to withdraw the Clause which is now before the Committee?

Mr. GRETTON

Personally I am quite indifferent whether the Clause is passed or not. It is really of very little benefit.

Mr. LEIF JONES

I wish the Chancellor of the Exchequer were here to hear that. Personally I have no desire to press the Clause, and I do not know that anybody on this side has desired it. The Clause is proposed in fulfilment of an undertaking given to the hon. Members opposite.

Mr. WATSON RUTHERFORD

It is not in fulfilment.

Mr. H. SMITH

It is an attempt at fulfilment.

Mr. LEIF JONES

We claim it is a fulfilment, and the Solicitor-General, speaking with the full authority of his office, claims that it is a fulfilment of the undertaking that was given. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for East Worcestershire (Mr. Austen Chamberlain) accepted it as a fulfilment. [HON. MEMBERS: "When?"] To-night.

Mr. H. SMITH

The hon. Gentleman is entirely misconstruing my right hon. Friend's assent. He accepted the statement of the learned Solicitor-General that it was the desire of the Government by this to fulfil the pledge which the Government had given. The right hon. Gentleman nodded his head, but he did not accept it as a fulfilment.

Mr. LEIF JONES

My own recollection is that he said he would take it from the Solicitor-General that so far as the legal interpretation of the words went it was a fulfilment of the pledge that the Government had given. It would be interesting to know whether or not the Opposition really wish the Government to withdraw the Clause.

Mr. WATSON RUTHERFORD

Certainly.

Mr. MAURICE HEALY

How does this Clause improve the law so far as Ireland is concerned?

Mr. LEIF JONES

Ireland is subject to a special valuation, and until the revised valuation comes in force, Ireland is exempt.

Mr. MAURICE HEALY

The hon. Member is quite wrong. No doubt Ireland is governed by the existing valuation but this Clause fixes what is to be valued.

Mr. LEIF JONES

I think the Opposition have displayed singular ingratitude towards the Government. The Government have made considerable concessions over the whole assessment.

Mr. WATSON RUTHERFORD

What concessions?

Mr. LEIF JONES

In the interpretation of the words.

Mr. WATSON RUTHERFORD

Where?

Mr. LEIF JONES

The result is estimated in this case to be £50,000 or thereabouts, less to be taken from licence holders, but that comes on top of £400,000 conceded at the beginning of the year; altogether close upon half a million which has been taken off the Licence Duties. I think the present system of assessing the licences is a very unsatisfactory one. Those familiar with the discussions we had in 1909 know that I have never been an ardent defender of the present system of assessing the duties. I think it would be better to assess them on a basis measured by the amount of alcohol consumed on the premises. But while the present system exists, and until a schedule of licence values is drawn up, I am bound to say the hon. Member is one of the difficulties in the way. The speech which he has made is not helpful towards getting on to the basis of alcohol consumed, which, I think, nearly all who give fair consideration to this question have come to the conclusion is the only satisfac- tory basis of the assessment of Licence Duties. Until we can do that it does seem to me we are bound to maintain the system in something like its present form. A great deal has been made by the Mover of the Amendment as to the case of stables auxiliary to licenced premises. I quite admit that in certain cases it does seem very hard indeed that the stables are to be included in the valuation and assessed for Licence Duties. But, on the other hand, they do undoubtedly increase the value of the licence, and if you did not include the stables close to the licensed premises you would not reach the true value of those premises, I can imagine the hon. and learned Member for Warrington when applying for a licence for a house adjoining posting stables pointing to the fact that these stables brought a large number of people there, and consequently justified him in asking for a licence.

Mr. H. SMITH

I can assure the hon. Gentleman I should not use such a stupid argument.

Mr. LEIF JONES

I cannot say what argument the hon. and learned Gentleman would use, and therefore, perhaps, I was wrong in putting into his mouth an argument which most counsel, even with greater experience than the hon. and learned Gentleman would use, and which I have very frequently myself heard—Gentlemen of his own profession quite as much entitled to lay down the law as the hon. and learned Gentleman.

Mr. HAROLD SMITH

Is it in order for the hon. Gentleman to allude to me in my profession without my having the right to point out that the allusion is entirely wrong, and why it is wrong.

The CHAIRMAN

Not by way of interruption, certainly. Unless the hon. member gives way the hon. and learned Gentleman must wait.

Mr. LEIF JONES

Another point is this: In a compensation case, if the licence were going to be taken away from the licensed premises undoubtedly evidence would be adduced to show that the value of the licence was greater because of the neighbourhood of the stables as part of the business carried on in the premises, and it really seems to me, though it is very easy to raise difficult cases, and I think there are many difficult cases under the present assessment, we shall never get rid of them until we get on to the other scheme of assessment. The Opposition ought to recognise that the Government have tried to clear up some of the difficulties at present in the wording of the law and have made certain concessions. Having said that, I want to appeal to the Government to recognise that the whole House really feels that the present system is a very unsatisfactory system of assessing the duty to be placed on licensed premises. It evidently does a great injustice to some of the large London houses, and it equally does injustice in the case of provincial houses, sometimes the other way. We want to get down to a basis which will do justice all round. The hon. Member (Mr. J. M. Henderson) referred to me in a very pointed way as having helped to increase the duty on licensed premises. I do not deny that. I am quite ready to do it. I am not prepared to say the limit is reached now. It is in the amount of the duties that I want to deal with them. I want to have an assessment perfectly fair between house and house. I think that assessment is not perfectly fair on the present system, and I appeal to the Government to fulfil the expectation they held out when discussing this question in 1909, that they would have a basis of licence value which would enable the duty to be assessed practically in proportion to the amount of alcohol consumed on the licensed premises. When that is done, all the difficulties with which our time is taken up year after year on the present system of assessment, would disappear and be placed upon a simple basis, and I think justice would be done all round, and the Government which did it might find a certain amount of criticism from the opposite side of the House, but they would find very general agreement that that was a sound basis on which to assess the Licence Duty.

Mr. C. BATHURST

This question is always discussed as if it were one for brewers and distillers, and it is most unfortunate that it should be so. The hon. Gentleman has expressed sympathy with the view, and I wish he would persuade the Chancellor of the Exchequer to translate it into legislation, that these Licence Duties should be based upon the actual sale of the liquor. That is the only fair basis. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has expressed the view that his difficulty lies in the assessment of licence values in the provinces. I do not think that difficulty actually exists. He thinks it exists because he has only consulted the brewers, but if he considered the fact that the bulk of the small country hotels are just those premises which are not in the hands of the brewers, and are not tied houses, he would be better able to estimate the hardship which is being suffered in these cases. I feel particularly interested in the case of stables. It is the main case of hardship in the country districts where a large amount of posting is done quite irrespective of the trade of the house. The hon. Gentleman opposite thought the fact that there were stables was a reason why there should be increased value in the house. I could cite several cases where the existence of stables since the passing of the Finance Act of 1909–10, so far from increasing the value of the house, has actually decreased it. There are cases to-day in my own neighbourhood where stables are being deliberately taken away to the great detriment of the village and neighbourhood, and the bar is being increased in order to make the place a more saleable proposition to some brewing company. Is that satisfactory?

It seems to me that the tendency of licensing legislation and of Finance Acts which affect licences, so far from putting a premium upon temperance, has actually put a discount upon temperance and a premium upon drinking. It has driven free houses, which are largely posting houses, into the hands of brewing companies. The only suitable proposition for the brewery companies to take them over is to have them converted into mere drinking shops instead of allowing them to remain places for the accommodation of travellers. I know two cases in Gloucestershire where there were attached to the country hotel cowsheds, the cows being milked to provide the travellers who were staying at the hotel with the milk they required. Both of these cowhouses were closed because they added to the value of the house for Licence Duty. Is that desirable? It is putting, if I may say so to the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Leif Jones) who is intensely interested in the development of temperance, a discount upon temperance and a premium upon drinking. Take the ordinary case of stables attached to a country inn or hotel. The Solicitor-General suggested that these stables might be used to accommodate carts which would carry about barrels of beer or bottles of whisky which were to be sold by the licensee to the outside public. I have lived in the country all my life and I have never seen any hotel cart or carriage carrying about barrels of beer or bottles of whisky for outside customers. What the hotel keepers do carry about in their carriages are the travellers they accommodate or else they cater for the convenience of the travelling public who do not choose always to travel by rail. Why should you add to the Licensing Duty the amount the hotel keeper gets for carriages or carts provided for the convenience of the travelling public? If he does not use them actually for trade purposes, there is no reason for putting an additional tax on these stables as part of the licensed premises. I should have preferred that this Amendment should be restricted to the case of stables, because there is an unanswerable case. I hope oven now at the eleventh hour the right hon. Gentleman will see his way to make some concession as regards stables in country districts. If the Government wish to know something about the conditions of country hotels they should not go to the brewers to find out their facts.

Captain MURRAY

I agree very much with what has been said with regard to stables. I had intended to press several cases upon the attention of the Government this evening, but there is one, at any rate, to which I should like to draw attention. The valuation was made early in the year of a particular hotel. I will not give the name. In that valuation upon which Licence Duty was assessed there were taken into account farm buildings to the extent of £10. Inquiry was made into the matter some few months afterwards, and the valuation of the farm buildings was taken off, thus reducing the valuation for the purpose of assessment by £10. That does show that there appears to be no certainty as to how the valuation is going to be made. If the Amendment introduced by the hon. and learned Gentleman is to give some certainty to the matter I think a great advance will have been made. So far as the stables are concerned, I do think that the case has been made out. In fact, the Chancellor of the Exchequer agreed himself. But he said he did not think it wise or expedient at the present moment to fritter away money here, there, and everywhere before the principle of levying taxes on the amount of liquor sold was adopted. Seeing what he said in this House to-night and the measure of agreement there appears to be from every quarter of the House as to the principle upon which the taxes on liquor should be levied, and that something ought to be done, surely much lip service is paid by many hon. Members all round to this principle, for year after year we are told that something will eventually be done, and yet year after year the Finance Bill goes through and nothing is done. [An HON. MEMBER: "Change the Government."] I am not certain even if we changed the Government of anything being done. The Chancellor of the Exchequer stated as his reason for doing nothing that London and the provinces were opposed to each other. It seems to be quite evident that if the Chancellor of the Exchequer is going to do anything he will have to throw over London or the provinces. Personally, I am not much concerned which he throws over so long as he gets something done. I do urge on the Government that they should take this seriously in hand in order to carry out next year, if possible, what is evidently the desire of the House.

Mr. NORMAN CRAIG

I am afraid that I shall have to disappoint the hon. Member for Wiltshire (Mr. C. Bathurst) if he imagines that I am rising to express gratitude to the Government. My political Christianity is not sufficiently advanced to enable me to bless a Government for what I believe to be an entirely mischievous proposal. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has not said one single word really directed to the Amendment before us. He has made a great many observations, and I regret that he has been followed by a number of hon. Members on both sides of the House, in what might be Second Reading speeches as to what might be the proper policy with regard to the sale of intoxicating liquors. He has not touched at all the real grievance which it is the design of this Amendment to cure. I invite the Committee to redirect its attention to the particular Amendment. It is not, as the right hon. Gentleman said, an attempt to tinker at a new system. This Clause, however, while not tinkering at a new system, does aggravate an old and a bad system. This so-called redemption of a pledge by the Government to give relief is no true relief, but an aggravation of what existed before. The Clause of the Act of 1909, as originally introduced, was to the effect, that "licensed premises" included any offices, courtyards, gardens, etc., occupied together with the house itself in which the liquor was sold. It was pointed out to the then Solicitor-General (Sir Samuel Evans) that this was unfair, and the Committee will have noticed what Sir Samuel Evans then promised the House should be done. He said he would provide words which would make it perfectly clear that any part of the premises shown to the satisfaction of the Commissioners to be used for a trade or business separate and distinct from the business authorised by the licence should be excluded from the annual valuation. That pledge was given, and that pledge was not carried out.

When the Finance Bill of 1909–10 was passed Section 52 added words which did not give effect to the pledge of the then Solicitor-General, because it did not limit the definition to businesses which were pursuant to the authority of the licence. That is the real point to which attention should be directed. It is quite right to include in the tax any property that enhances the value of the licence, because it is in connection with and by virtue of the licence; but in the case of property which stands outside the licence, which is entirely distinct from it and the business which it authorises, it would be entirely unfair. But the definition in the Clause is very much worse than the definition in the previous Clause. In the first place you have in it two objectionable adverbs. The licence holder has to prove that the premises have been used "exclusively" for some trade or business. That is new, and that is the grievance. In the second place he has to prove that the business is "entirely" distinct from the licensed business. Here, in this Clause, you have these two new adverbs, "exclusively" and "entirely," which are an aggravation and not a definition.

The first part of the Clause deals with the property in the curtilages and the property in the vicinity coming under the same occupation. But you get a very much worse case than that when you come to the second part of the Clause, which deals with property outside the curtilage, and not in the immediate vicinity. Then you introduce what has never been introduced into the definition of licensed premises before, not only the premises within the curtilage or in the vicinity but neither in the curtilage or in the vicinity, and not occupied in the curtilage but used "in connection with." User as a test of the value of licensed premises has never been applied. You are now introducing it without any sort of limitation. It may even not be in the same area. You may get this position that there are a dozen houses in the same hands and in different parts of the country, and you may have a central store or distilling place. That store may be in Birmingham and the houses in London and yet the store is to be thrown on to the licence. The hon. and learned Gentleman is introducing into this Clause a great aggravation of anything which has ever occurred in a definition of this kind before, namely, user as distinct from occupation, and user of other premises outside the occupation and any distance from the premises. The hon. Member for Rutland (Mr. Gretton) has said he does not care whether or not this Clause goes through. I quite understand that he may not only be anxious that it should not go through, but may really think it is an aggravation instead of an amelioration of the former conditions. It overlooks what the pledge of 1909 was directed to, and it makes it more difficult to give proof in demanding exemption, and introduces an element of annual value which has never been introduced, and irrespective of the fact as to whether the premises are in the same area or at any distance. For my part I regard this Clause as infinitely more mischievous than any of the various definitions for the purpose of annual value which have preceded it.

Mr. AINSWORTH

I think hon. Gentlemen opposite are unnecessarily alarmed at this Clause. Its last words provide anything connected for any purpose in connection with the sale of liquor. Surely it is clear the licences are granted and authorised for the sale of liquor and premises which are used in connection with that ought to be included in the definition, and therefore in the valuation. How do the authorities distinguish between a hotel business and a public house business? If we could settle the licence value by the amount of liquor sold it might be fair; but in the meantime we have to ask, Does the income arising from the liquor sold on the premises amount to more than one-third of the total receipts of the licensed premises? If it does not the premises are licensed as a hotel on the lower scale; if it does, the premises are regarded as a public house, and pay at the higher rate. To get his premises licensed as a hotel, the licence holder must include in his receipts every possible source of income. In the Highlands of Scotland there are many roadside inns where visitors stay for fishing, coaching, and so on. It is the object of the occupier to get his place licensed as a hotel, and if he is allowed to include the receipts from boating, posting, fishing, and so on, surely it is only fair that there should be included in the word "premises" everything in connection with the hotel which enables him to draw money from those different sources. I have brought a number of these cases before the authorities, and I should like to take this opportunity to tender my sincere thanks to the authorities at Somerset House for the continuous trouble they have taken to enable the tenants of these houses to establish themselves on the more favourable basis. I sincerely hope the Government will adhere to the Clause which confers an enormous benefit on the trade as a whole.

The CHAIRMAN

May I remind the Committee that the Debate has run into rather wide questions of licensing reform. I would invite hon. Members to endeavour to bring it back to the question of the definition in this Clause.

Sir G. YOUNGER

I shall endeavour to follow your ruling, but I am bound to say that my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer has gone rather wide.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE

I was answering the right hon. Gentleman opposite.

Sir G. YOUNGER

I wish we all had the same latitude as the right hon. Gentleman, but, of course, we cannot, under the circumstances, ask for it. My objection to the Clause is that it does not carry out the undertaking given by the Chancellor of the Exchequer on the Second Reading. It is quite unintentional, of course. It appears to do so in the first half of the Clause, but the second half renders the first half nugatory. The Commissioners of Excise and Customs by this Clause can, and will, if possible, rope in the extreme cases of premises contiguous to a public-house. The Solicitor-General told us distinctly that it was not intended in any kind of way to exempt the associated buildings, however remote they may be from the licensed premises. The hon. Gentleman the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr. Leif Jones) said that people would pay more for a licence where there was a stable, because it brought more trade to the House. But I can tell him of a case where the hotel stable brought more trade to another house. This stable, in fact, was so far from the house it belonged to that the other house derived the benefit. It shows how absurd and ridiculous it is to rope in the stables——

Mr. LEIF JONES

It really proves my point—that, the stable did bring business. In this particular instance, through the stable being nearer to the second house, it brought the trade to it. Still it did bring business.

Sir G. YOUNGER

I have in my mind a case of a little hotel in Aberdeenshire. There is attached to it a five-stalled stable. The proprietor had four horses stalled for the purposes of his farm, and one empty stall. This he allowed to be used occasionally on Sundays by some of his friends for putting up their horses. The Customs and Excise immediately roped in the whole of the buildings. That case is included by this Clause. I am perfectly certain that the right hon. Gentleman quite honestly tried to carry out his obligation, but I do not think he has succeeded in doing so. To do so needs some modification of the wording of the Clause. I do not know whether we are to have the Budget crammed into the corner of the year. One has not time to consider the thing; the Government itself has not time. There may only be a few moments between the Committee and the Report stages. You cannot do this sort of thing. This is just one of the cases which show how the absurdity and scandal of putting off the Budget so long, affects adversely the interests so important. I ask the right hon. Gentleman to look most carefully into this matter and to believe that we are advised by those whom we can trust, that this Clause as it stands does not carry out the obligations. My withers are unwrung by the right hon. Gentleman's plea of poverty. The figures he gave us some time ago of the proceeds shows he has got more money than he estimated. He has no right to take more than £600,000 a year. On his own showing he has got a good deal more than his due proportion. The right, hon. Gentleman shakes his head; he is very lavish in throwing away money sometimes, but he does not give any back. Whether the right hon. Gentleman has the money or whether he has not he ought to carry out his obligations. Under the Clause as it stands the authorities and their subordinates will be able to include ridiculous cases in the future as in the past.

Sir FREDERICK CAWLEY

If the right hon. Gentleman gives favourable consideration to the case made on both sides of the House he will meet an undoubted injustice. The Chancellor of the Exchequer's speech came to this, "It is practically an injustice but I cannot do away with this injustice because there are a lot of other injustices, and if I did away with this one I should have to do away with the other injustices as well." I do not think that is a fair argument.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE

I cannot accept that version of what I said. What I did say was I thought the whole present basis of assessment of Licence Duly was not a right one and it would be far better if we went on the basis of trade, but if you begin to haul it to pieces here and there the result would be you would lose all your revenue.

Sir F. CAWLEY

I think that is very much what I said after all. It is not very much consolation for a man who has to pay perhaps £5 or £10 too much in practice to be told, "Oh we know it is an injustice, but the whole thing is wrong." I suggest to the Chancellor that there might be some words put in not perhaps so stringent as the words of the hon. Member opposite. I think his words are too wide. I think you might put in the words "or mainly" after the word "exclusively." I do not think the words are just as they stand, because disused stables or stables built of old beer barrels and stables that have not been used for twelve months may be roped in. I do not think that ought to be. I think the Chancellor might accept the word "mainly" and leave the matter to the discretion of the Commissioners. They would see justice done. I hope the Chancellor of the Exchequer will favourably consider some such Amendment as I have suggested.

Mr. WATSON RUTHERFORD

I hope, as the result of this very long Debate the Government may see their way to withdraw this Clause altogether. This is supposed to be given us as a concession, and when it comes to be examined it is found that it is not a concession at all, but something which will considerably tighten and increase the burden of taxation. A pledge was given first of all on this matter by the former Solicitor-General, Sir Samuel Evans, who gave it in Committee when the point was first raised. The same point has been raised several times in subsequent debates, and almost on every occasion the Government has ended off by giving a distinct pledge that this question would be considered, and something done upon it. This is the first time we have had an opportunity of seeing what the concession is to meet the pledge which they had previously given. What is the point we are discussing? I am bound to ask that because on both sides of the House we have indulged in a general discussion of licensing taxation which has nothing to do with this particular Amendment. The point is the including in licence taxation such things as stables, stock rooms, bowling greens, motor houses and carriage sheds, frequently found associated with licensed houses, which are just as often dissociated from the licensed premises and may be situated on the opposite side of the road, and in some cases they may be adjacent to the licensed premises and let to a separate tenant.

It is in these circumstances that we get into a bit of a fog with regard to the exact way of expressing the meaning of a Clause, and a considerable amount of injustice may be done in this way unless we are very careful as to the way the provision is worded. What is the law at the present moment? It is that where there are a number of buildings or holdings such as I have referred to in the same occupation and assessed on the same occupier, they are all roped in for licence duty upon this high scale. This did not make very much difference until the right hon. Gentleman's extra duty was imposed, and it then became very important to see what were the licensed premises that ought to pay. Under the Finance Act of last year but one the position is that if it is the same tenant and the buildings are in the same occupation, and the premises are contiguous, they all have to pay. Supposing there are gardens on the opposite side of the road occupied together with the hotel or part of the same occupation, they are not assessed to-day provided they are not in the same assessment on the rate-book. I will give an illustration of a corresponding difficulty the other way. Where a hotel has a lot of stables behind it which are let to a separate person they are not assessed, although they may be occupied in connection with the hotel just as much as if they were actually in the occupation of the man who keeps the hotel itself. The extraordinary anomaly has arisen in this way. If the tenant happens to give up the occupation of the stables one day before the arrangements are made for imposing the licence tax, then the owner of the hotel, the licensee, has got to pay his Licence Duty upon the value of the stables, just because his tenant has left. It has been stated by speakers on both sides and by the right hon. Gentleman that the present state of affairs is open to a great many objections and some criticisms which cannot be defended, but in order to get exemption for any part of the curtilage of licensed premises such as a bowling green or stables, he proposes that you should have to prove to the Commissioners they were occupied for some business that was entirely distinct from that of the licensed house. I venture to think that is impossible. If you have got stables behind a licensed house, even if sublet to another tenant, it would be impossible for the licensee to prove they were being used entirely distinct from that licensed house.

12.0 M.

If one of the stablemen were to go into the licensed house or if an old barrel were rolled out of the house and put into the stable, it would be sufficient to show the stables were not entirely distinct from the licensed house. I venture to think that part of the new Clause makes the law infinitely worse and more oppressive on the licensee than it was before. That is not all. When we come to the last eight lines of the now Clause, we find something else now is to be roped in which was not in the taxation before. If it can be shown that the licensee for any possible purpose connected with the sale of liquor uses some other premises, however far they may be from the house, even if they are in another county, they are liable to be taken into account and increase the value for the purpose of the licence duty on that particular house. Let me give a case. Supposing the licensee has got a printing place, and he prints some show cards for the purposes of his business, do you mean to tell me it would be reasonable, and that there would be the slightest possible ground of public policy for saying you can go to the printing place and take the value of it, the machinery, and the business done there, and, because it is used to some remote extent in connection with the business of the licensed house by printing a few cards, you can include those premises in the assessment of the licensed house? It would be a most preposterous position, and it was only necessary to put such a case forward to show at once that it would be absurd. It would be straining the connection between one set of premises and another to a point which has never before been done. These are the concessions offered. The Government made a distinct pledge that they would take into consideration the gross injustice which they have admitted is done to licensees by the existing inequalities in the assessment of parts of the property not used for the sale of alcohol. They gave us a pledge to remedy it, and they now seek to carry it out by inflicting a further gross injustice in the direction I have indicated. When they pretend to give concessions, which instead of being concessions make matters worse, I think we are justified in protesting against this way of carrying out pledges. If the Government can do no better than that, then the simpler course would be to withdraw the Clause altogether.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE

I rise not to continue the discussion, but rather to appeal that we should come to some decision after the long debate we have had. I cannot withdraw the Clause after the promise I gave to representatives of the trade on the subject. They might not be altogether satisfied, but I could not withdraw it without their authority. Our view is that over £50,000 a year is lost to the revenue by our amended proposal, and I cannot undertake the responsibility of withdrawing it. I may say there has been an arrangement to get through the Committee stage to-night, on the express condition that the new Clauses of the Government will be taken on Report.

Mr. WATSON RUTHERFORD

It is impossible. We shall have to sit up all night.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE

If I had known that the pledge was not to be carried out, of course I should have felt it incumbent to put down one or two very important Clauses. But I refrained from doing so because I understood the arrangement was that we should have the Committee stage to-night, the Report stage to-morrow night, and the Third Reading on Wednesday. The arrangement was made through the usual channels.

Mr. BONAR LAW

I am bound to admit that there was an arrangement somewhat of the nature mentioned by the right hon. Gentleman entered into by my Noble Friend the Member for Chorley, who is not here, however, to explain the reasons—no doubt good ones. I do not think this is the right time for me to say what I should like to say about the discussion of the Budget at all at this time of the evening. I have no doubt those views will find adequate expression from these benches when we come to the Third Reading Debate. But I wish to point out to my hon. Friends behind me that a bargain has been made. I perfectly recognise that it cannot be kept if hon. Members on this side of the House insist—as I am sure the right hon. Gentleman will admit they are entitled to do—on considering and discussing various points. I would submit to the right hon. Gentleman there has been no attempt at obstruction in the Debate to-night, and while he makes an appeal to us I think it would be more to the point if he would ask his own Friends to refrain from discussing the Bill.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE

My appeal was directed to the whole House.

Mr. BONAR LAW

I hope my hon. Friends will be willing to carry out the arrangement to finish the Committee stage to-night on the understanding that the new Clauses will be taken on the Report stage, and will be put down in the exact form and order in which they now stand. I think considering everything that is the best arrangement that could be made, and I hope hon. Members on this side will agree in that view. Let it be clearly understood that while I make that suggestion, I do not propose that we should stop now, or that anyone who has points to raise should not be allowed to make them. It is no part of the bargain, that we should not sit late. That is all I wish to say. So far as we on this bench are concerned, we shall carry out the compact. Of course, anyone who has points to raise will feel that he is at liberty to raise them.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE

I understand the suggestion is that we should conclude the Amendments to the Bill as submitted to the House by the Government, that the Debate upon the new Clauses should be postponed until to-morrow, and that arrangements should be made whereby the new Clauses shall appear on the Paper to-morrow in the order in which they appear to-day. So far as I am concerned I shall readily assent to that suggestion. I understand there will be no difficulty in carrying it out.

Mr. SANDERSON

Will it be necessary for Members to hand in their Clauses again?

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE

I am informed it will not be necessary. They will be put down by the Opposition Whips and our own.

Sir G. YOUNGER

Is it possible to include in the arrangement some sort of understanding that Clauses which the Government are willing to accept might be indicated by the Government also placing them on the Paper? For the last three years we have been precluded, by the operation of the Guillotine, from bringing forward many proposals which I believe the Government would have been likely to accept. I know of one of which the Chancellor of the Exchequer, on the Committee stage of a former Budget, said he thought he could accept it from me if I put it down on Report in different words. I did so, and Mr. Speaker ruled it out of order. There are things which are not contentious at all. I have one in my mind, which the right hon. Gentleman is actually administering now. Why cannot he put it down himself?

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE

I am not sure that hon. Members who have new Clauses on the Paper which are likely to be accepted would agree to have them being put down in the name of the Government. They like to have the credit of putting them down.

Sir G. YOUNGER

You can put down mine if you like.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE

I generally find that that suggestion comes from hon. Members who have Clauses down which the Government are not likely to accept. For instance, the hon. and gallant Gentleman (Mr. Pretyman) has some Clauses down the Government will agree to, and I think he would rather move them.

Mr. H. SMITH

With regard to my new Clause, will the right hon. Gentleman consult the Secretary to the Treasury as to whether it will be accepted. I for one will be glad to give way and save the time of the House.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE

I rather think that that can be accepted, but I will let the hon. Gentleman know before the end of the sitting.

Mr. CATHCART WASON

I wish to make a strong appeal to the right hon. Gentleman to carefully consider this matter before Report with regard to the question which has been brought before him so repeatedly by my colleagues from Scotland. It is absolutely necessary for the good of the whole community. If he would consider whether that could be done on the Report stage it would make the thing very much easier for the Government to carry out the pledge which it is generally understood was given in regard to this very vexed question of taxing premises which are not used for the sale of drink—stable accommodation, motor

houses, and suchlike. It would very much mitigate some of the evils which at present exist.

Mr. PETO

I have new Clauses down, and I should be very glad to know which if any of them would be accepted by the Government.

Question put, "That the word 'not' be there inserted."

The Committee divided: Ayes, 103; Noes, 128.

Division No. 438.]	AYES.	[12.15 a.m.
Agg-Gardner, James Tynte	Greene, Walter Raymond	Peel, Captain R. F. (Woodbridge)
Aitken, Sir William Max	Guiney, Patrick	Peto, Basil Edward
Anson, Rt. Hon. Sir William R.	Guinness, Hon. Walter Edward	Pole-Carew, Sir R.
Anstruther-Gray, Major William	Gwynne, R. S. (Sussex, Eastbourne)	Pretyman, Ernest George
Ashley, Wilfrid W.	Hall, D. B. (Isle of Wight)	Pryce-Jones, Col. E.
Baird, J. L.	Hall, Fred (Dulwich)	Raphael, Sir Herbert H.
Banbury, Sir Frederick George	Hambro, Angus Valdemar	Remnant, James Farquharson
Banner, John S. Harmood-	Healy, Maurice (Cork)	Roberts, S. (Sheffield, Ecclesall)
Barrie, H. T. (Londonderry, N.)	Helmsley, Viscount	Rolleston, Sir J.
Bathurst, Charles (Wilts, Wilton)	Henderson, Major H. (Berkshire)	Rutherford, Watson (L'pool, W. Derby)
Benn, Arthur Shirley (Plymouth)	Hope, Harry (Bute)	Salter, Arthur Clavell
Bigland, Alfred	Hope, James Fitzalan (Sheffield)	Sanders, Robert Arthur
Boscawen, Sir Arthur S. T. Griffith-	Horne, Edgar (Surrey, Guildford)	Sanderson, Lancelot
Boyle, W. Lewis (Norfolk, Mid)	Hunt, Rowland	Sandys, G. J. (Somerset, Wells)
Boyton, James	Jardine, Ernest (Somerset, E.)	Smith, Rt. Hon. F. E. (L'p'l, Walton)
Brassey, H. Leonard Campbell	Kerr-Smiley, Peter Kerr	Stanier, Beville
Bridgeman, William Clive	Kerry, Earl of	Stanley, Hon. G. F. (Preston)
Bull, Sir William James	Larmor, Sir J.	Stewart, Gershom
Burn, Colonel C. R.	Law, Rt. Hon. A. Bonar (Bootle)	Sykes, Mark (Hull, Central)
Butcher, John George	Lewisham, Viscount	Talbot, Lord Edmund
Carlile, Sir Edward Hildred	Locker-Lampson, G. (Salisbury)	Thompson, Robert (Belfast, North)
Cassel, Felix	Lonsdale, Sir John Brownlee	Thynne, Lord Alexander
Castlereagh, Viscount	Lowther, Claude (Cumberland, Eskdale)	Tobin, Alfred Aspinall
Cave, George	MacCaw, Wm. J. MacGeagh	Tullibardine, Marquess of
Chaloner, Colonel R. G. W.	Mackinder, Halford J.	Walker, Col. William Hall
Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. J. A. (Worcr.)	Macmaster, Donald	Wheler, Granville C. H.
Courthope, George Loyd	McNeill, Ronald (Kent, St. Augustine)	White, Major G. D. (Lancs., Southport)
Craig, Captain James (Down, E.)	Malcolm, Ian	Worthington-Evans, L.
Craig, Norman (Kent, Thanet)	Mason, James F. (Windsor)	Wortley, Rt. Hon. C. B. Stuart-
Croft, Henry Page	Mildmay, Francis Bingham	Yate, Col. C. E.
Eyres-Monsell, Bolton M.	Morrison-Bell, Capt. E. F. (Ashburton)	Younger, Sir George
Fell, Arthur	Newman, John R. P.
Gilhooly, James	O'Brien, William (Cork, N. E.)
Gilmour, Captain J.	Paget, Almeric Hugh	TELLERS FOR THE AYES.—Mr. Harold Smith and Mr. Gretton.
Goldsmith, Frank	Parkes, Ebenezer
Goulding, Edward Alfred	Pease, Herbert Pike (Darlington)
NOES.
Abraham, William (Dublin Harbour)	Craig, Herbert J. (Tynemouth)	Harmsworth, Cecil (Luton, Beds)
Adamson, William	Crumley, Patrick	Harvey, W. E. (Derbyshire, N. E.)
Agar-Robartes, Hon. T. C. R.	Dalziel, Sir James H. (Kirkcaldy)	Haslam, Lewis (Monmouth)
Ainsworth, John Stirling	Davies, Timothy (Lincs., Louth)	Havelock-Allan, Sir Henry
Baker, H. T. (Accrington)	Dawes, James Arthur	Haworth, Sir Arthur A.
Baker, Joseph Allen (Finsbury, E.)	De Forest, Baron	Hayden, John Patrick
Balfour, Sir Robert (Lanark)	Doris, William	Hayward, Evan
Baring, Sir Godfrey (Barnstaple)	Duncan, C. (Barrow-in-Furness)	Henry, Sir Charles
Barton, William	Edwards, John Hugh (Glamorgan, Mid)	Higham, John Sharp
Beck, Arthur Cecil	Esslemont, George Birnie	Hinds, John
Benn, W. W. (T. H'mts, St. George)	Falconer, James	Howard, Hon. Geoffrey
Bentham, G. J.	Ffrench, Peter	Jones, Edgar (Merthyr Tydvil)
Bowerman, C. W.	Gelder, Sir W. A.	Jones, H. Haydn (Merioneth)
Brunner, John F. L.	George, Rt. Hon. David Lloyd	Jones, Leif Stratten (Notts, Rushcliffe)
Bryce, J. Annan	Gill, Alfred Henry	Jones, William (Carnarvonshire)
Byles, Sir William Pollard	Gladstone, W. G. C.	Jones, W. S. Glyn- (T. H'mts, Stepney)
Carr-Gomm, H. W.	Glanville, Harold James	Keating, Matthew
Cawley, H. T. (Lancs., Heywood)	Guest, Hon. Frederick E. (Dorset, E.)	Kellaway, Frederick George
Chancellor, Henry George	Gwynn, Stephen Lucius (Galway)	Kennedy, Vincent Paul
Clough, William	Hackett, John	King, Joseph
Clynes, John R.	Hancock, J. G.	Lambert, George (Devon, S. Molton)
Collins, Stephen (Lambeth)	Harcourt, Rt. Hon. L. (Rossendale)	Law, Hugh A. (Donegal, West)
Cotton, William Francis	Harcourt, Robert V. (Montrose)	Lawson, Sir. W. (Cumb'rld, Cockerm'th)
Levy, Sir Maurice	Pearce, Robert (Staffs, Leeks)	Taylor, John W. (Durham)
Lundon, Thomas	Pease, Rt. Hon. Joseph A. (Rotherham)	Tennant, Harold John
Macdonald, J. R. (Leicester)	Pollard, Sir George H.	Toulmin, Sir George
Macpherson, James Ian	Price, C. E. (Edinburgh, Central)	Trevelyan, Charles Philips
M'Curdy, Charles Albert	Rea, Walter Russell (Scarborough)	Wadsworth, J.
McKenna, Rt. Hon. Reginald	Reddy, Michael	Walters, John Tudor
M'Laren, Hon. F. W. S. (Lincs., Spalding)	Richardson, Thomas (Whitehaven)	Ward, W. Dudley (Southampton)
Mason, David M. (Coventry)	Robert, Charles H. (Lincoln)	Wason, John Cathcart (Orkney)
Meehan, Francis E. (Litrim, N.)	Robertson, John M. (Tyneside)	Watt, Henry A.
Meehan, Patrick A. (Queens Co.)	Roch, Walter F. (Pembroke)	Webb, H.
Menzies, Sir Walter	Rowlands, James	Wedgwood, Josiah C.
Munro, Robert	Rowntree, Arnold	White, J. Dundas (Glasgow, Tradeston)
Nannetti, Joseph P.	Samuel, Rt. Hon. H. L. (Cleveland)	White, Patrick (Meath, North)
Nolan, Joseph	Samuel, S. M. (Whitechapel)	Whitehouse, John Howard
Nugent, Sir Walter Richard	Scott, A. MacCallum (Glas., Bridgeton)	Wiles, Thomas
O'Brien, Patrick (Kilkenny)	Seely, Col. Rt. Hon. J. E. B.	Wilson, W. T. (Westhoughton)
O'Connor, John (Kildare, N.)	Sherwell, Arthur James	Wood, Rt. Hon. T. McKinnon (Glas.)
O'Doherty, Philip	Shortt, Edward
O'Malley, William	Simon, Sir John Allsebrook	TELLERS FOR THE NOES.—Mr. Illingworth and Mr. Gulland.
O'Shee, James John	Smith, Albert (Lancs., Clitheroe)
Parker, James (Halifax)	Stanley, Albert (Staffs, N. W.)

Amendment made: Leave out the words "upon the premises" and insert instead thereof the words "in the house or place."—[Sir J. Simon.]

Mr. SANDYS

I beg to propose at the end of the Clause to add the words: but does not include any dwelling-house which does not internally communicate with the house or place where the liquor is sold. This is to meet that special case which came to my attention in my Constituency and is probably not an exceptional case, but represents a large number of instances of hardship occurring all over the country. In the definition which is substituted in Clause 4 there is an exemption made in the case of "any such offices, yards, courts, or gardens, which are used exclusively for any such trade or business." If it is fair that these courts, gardens, etc., should be exempted, there is all the more reason why premises not used for trade or business purposes at all should therefore not go to increase the value of licences, but should be exempted in the same way. The case to which my attention has been drawn is a case of a wine merchant in an old house in a small country town, to which house subsequently was added a small building in which he carries on the business of a wine merchant. There is no communication whatever between the premises in which he lives and the premises in which the business is carried on, and if it was not for the fact that between the door of his house and the door of the premises where the business is carried on, there is not a public road but a private road, he would only be assessed for that portion of the premises in which the business actually takes place. But owing to the fact that the road is not a public one, but a private one, the whole of the building in which he lives is included in the assessment, and consequently he has to pay over 50 per cent. more than he would do in different circumstances. This is a case of very extreme hardship, and it is one which would be met by this Amendment, which would exclude a dwelling-house which did not communicate internally with the licensed premises in which the business was acutally carried on.

Sir J. SIMON

I hope the hon. Gentleman will not persist in this Amendment. The hon. Member has in mind his particular case, which he says is a hard one. That may be so; but whether it be a hard case or be not a hard case, there really is no justification for introducing into the language of this definition special words to meet his hard case compared with other people's hard cases. The house without internal communication with a place where liquor is sold is either like other offices, court yards, or gardens—the whole taken together—premises where liquor is sold or it is not. If it is not, of course, it is outside the definition. If it is, then it may be shown that the house comes within the exception which the Clause provides. It may be that it does; I do not say it does not; all I say to the hon. Gentleman is that it is really no justification for introducing into what is really a general Clause the special exemption of a house without internal communication, because this Clause has nothing to do with internal communication. It is perfectly general as to subject matter, and it would not be proper to introduce those words.

Question put, "That those words be there inserted."

The Committee divided: Ayes, 80; Noes, 114.

Division No. 439.]	AYES.	[12.30 a.m.
Agg-Gardner, James Tynte	Goldsmith, Frank	Pease, Herbert Pike (Darlington)
Aitken, Sir William Max	Goulding, Edward Alfred	Peto, Basil Edward
Anson, Rt. Hon. Sir William R.	Greene, Walter Raymond	Pole-Carew, Sir R.
Ashley, Wilfrid W.	Gretton, John	Pretyman, Ernest George
Baird, J. L.	Hall, D. B. (Isle of Wight)	Pryce-Jones, Colonel E.
Banbury, Sir Frederick George	Hambro, Angus Valdemar	Remnant, James Farquharson
Banner, John S. Harmood-	Helmsley, Viscount	Roberts, S. (Sheffield, Ecclesall)
Barrie, H. T. (Londonderry, N.)	Henderson, Major H. (Berkshire)	Salter, Arthur Clavell
Bathurst, Charles (Wilts, Wilton)	Hope, Harry (Bute)	Sanders, Robert Arthur
Benn, Arthur Shirley (Plymouth)	Hope, James Fitzalan (Sheffield)	Smith, Rt. Hon. F. E. (L'p'l, Walton)
Bigland, Alfred	Horne, Edgar (Surrey, Guildford)	Smith, Harold (Warrington)
Boyle, W. Lewis (Norfolk, Mid)	Hunt, Rowland	Stanier, Beville
Boyton, James	Jardine, Ernest (Somerset, E.)	Stanley, Hon. G. F. (Preston)
Brassey, H. Leonard Campbell	Kerr-Smiley, Peter	Stewart, Gershom
Bridgeman, W. Clive	Kerry, Earl of	Sykes, Mark (Hull, Central)
Burn, Colonel C. R.	Larmor, Sir J.	Talbot, Lord Edmund
Butcher, John George	Law, Rt. Hon. A. Bonar (Bootle)	Thompson, Robert (Belfast, North)
Carlile, Sir Edward Hildred	Lewisham, Viscount	Thynne, Lord Alexander
Cassel, Felix	Locker-Lampson, G. (Salisbury)	Tobin, Alfred Aspinall
Castlereagh, Viscount	Locker-Lampson, O. (Ramsey)	Tullibardine, Marquess of
Cave, George	Macmaster, Donald	Walker, Colonel William Hall
Chaloner, Col. R. G. W.	McNeill, Ronald (Kent, St. Augustine	Wheler, Granville C. H.
Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. J. A. (Worc'r.)	Malcolm, Ian	White, Major G. D. (Lancs., Southport)
Courthope, George Loyd	Mason, James F. (Windsor)	Younger, Sir George
Craig, Captain James (Down, E.)	Morrison-Bell, Capt. E. F. (Ashburton)
Craig, Norman (Kent, Thanet)	Newman, John R. P.	TELLERS FOR THE AYES.—Mr. Sandys and Mr. Croft.
Eyres-Monsell, Bolton, M.	Paget, Almeric Hugh
Gilmour, Captain John	Parkes, Ebenezer

NOES.
Abraham, William (Dublin Harbour)	Harcourt, Robert V. (Montrose)	O'Shee, James John
Adamson, William	Harmsworth, Cecil (Luton, Beds.)	Parker, James (Halifax)
Agar-Robartes, Hon. T. C. R.	Harvey, W. E. (Derbyshire, N. E.)	Pease, Rt. Hon. Joseph A. (Rotherham)
Ainsworth, John Stirling	Haslam, Lewis (Monmouth)	Pollard, Sir George N.
Baker, H. T. (Accrington)	Havelock-Allan, Sir Henry	Price, C. E. (Edinburgh, Central)
Balfour, Sir Robert (Lanark)	Haworth, Sir Arthur A.	Raphael, Sir Herbert H.
Barton, William	Hayden, John Patrick	Rea, Walter Russell (Scarborough)
Beck, Arthur Cecil	Henry, Sir Charles	Reddy, Michael
Benn, W. W. (Tower Hamlets, St. Geo.)	Higham, John Sharp	Richardson, Thomas (Whitehaven)
Bentham, G. J.	Howard, Hon. Geoffrey	Roberts, Charles H. (Lincoln)
Bowerman, C. W.	Jones, Edgar (Merthyr Tydvil)	Robertson, John M. (Tyneside)
Bryce, J. Annan	Jones, H. Haydn (Merioneth)	Rowlands, James
Carr-Gomm, H. W.	Jones, Lief Stratten (Notts, Rushcliffe)	Samuel, Rt. Hon. H. L. (Cleveland)
Cawley, Sir Frederick (Prestwich)	Jones, William (Carnarvonshire)	Samuel, S. M. (Whitechapel)
Cawley, Harold T. (Heywood)	Jones, W. S. Glyn- (T. H'mts, Stepney)	Scott, A. MacCallum (Glas., Bridgeton)
Clough, William	Keating, Matthew	Seely, Col. Rt. Hon. J. E. B.
Clynes, John R.	Kellaway, Frederick George	Sherwell, Arthur James
Collins, Stephen (Lambeth)	King, Joseph	Shortt, Edward
Cotton, William Francis	Lambert, George (Devon, S. Molton)	Simon, Sir John Allsebrook
Craig, Herbert James (Tynemouth)	Law, Hugh A. (Donegal, West)	Smith, Albert (Lancs., Clitheroe)
Crumley, Patrick	Lawson, Sir W. (Cumbrl'd, Cockerm'th)	Stanley, Albert (Staffs, N. W.)
Dalziel, Sir James H. (Kirkcaldy)	Lundon, Thomas	Strauss, Edward A. (Southwark, West)
Dawes, J. A.	Macdonald, J. R. (Leicester)	Taylor, John W. (Durham)
De Forest, Baron	Macpherson, James Ian	Tennant, Harold John
Doris, William	McKenna, Rt. Hon. Reginald	Toulmin, Sir George
Duncan, C. (Barrow-in-Furness)	M'Laren, Hon. F. W. S. (Lincs., Spalding)	Trevelyan, Charles Philips
Esslemont, George Birnie	Meehan, Francis E. (Leitrim, N.)	Ward, W. Dudley (Southampton)
Falconer, James	Meehan, Patrick A. (Queen's Co.)	Watt, Henry A.
Ffrench, Peter	Menzies, Sir Walter	Webb, H.
Gelder, Sir W. A.	Munro, Robert	Wedgwood, Josiah C.
George, Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd	Murray, Captain Hon. Arthur C.	White, J. Dundas (Glas., Tradeston)
Gill, A. H.	Nannetti, Joseph P.	White, Patrick (Meath, North)
Gladstone, W. G. C.	Nolan, Joseph	Whitehouse, John Howard
Glanville, Harold James	Nugent, Sir Walter Richard	Wiles, Thomas
Guest, Hon. Frederick E. (Dorset, E.)	O'Brien, Patrick (Kilkenny)	Wilson, W. T. (Westhoughton)
Gwynn, Stephen Lucius (Galway)	O'Connor, John (Kildare, N.)	Wood, Rt. Hon. T. McKinnon (Glasgow)
Hackett, John	O'Doherty, Philip
Hancock, John George	O'Dowd, John	TELLERS FOR THE NOES.—Mr. Illingworth and Mr. Gulland.
Harcourt, Rt. Hon. L. (Rossendale)	O'Malley, William

Mr. HAROLD SMITH

I beg to move at the end of the Clause to add "any decision of the Commissioners upon any question to be determined by them under this Sec- tion shall be subject to the like appeal as that to which the determination by the Commissioners of Inland Revenue of the amount to be paid for compensation under Sub-section (2) of Section 20 of The Licensing (Consolidation) Act, 1910, is subject under that Act."

I may summarise this Amendment by saying that it gives a right of appeal against a decision of the Commissioners of Customs and Excise. Many of us feel very strongly on this subject, and I may remind the Committee that the principle involved was raised last week during the discussion on the Insurance Bill. It is a very serious step to take, as was pointed out in the case of the Insurance Bill, to leave it to Commissioners to decide questions in an arbitrary and perhaps an unreasonable manner without giving the subject any right of appeal to a higher tribunal. I submit to the Committee that under the provisions of this Section many serious difficulties may well arise. I have already reminded the Committee, when speaking on a previous Amendment to-night, of the manner in which an assessment for rating purposes is arrived at, but I may perhaps be allowed to repeat that in order to arrive at such an assessment the basis which is taken in ordinary cases is the basis taken for the purposes of the Inhabited House Duty. If that is not applicable for any reason then the basis taken is the basis taken for Income Tax and if that is not applicable, then the Commissioners of Customs and Excise step in and determine the annual value. The result of that will I am sure, be seen by the Committee at a glance. In the simple cases there is no need for the Commissioners to interfere, because in those cases the basis that will apply will be either that of the Inhabited House Duty, or of the Income Tax. It is only in the really difficult cases that the Commissioners step in and have this arbitrary power.

In the assessment for Inhabited House Duty or for Income Tax—that is in the cases in which there is no complication—the person assessed has a right of appeal on both law and fact to the general Commissioners, and on questions of law he can go to the High Court and the House of Lords. If we have said that the subject should have that right of appeal when his property is assessed for Inhabited House Duty or Income Tax, then how can we say that in the difficult cases there should be no appeal, but that the decisions of the Commissioners shall be final? I suggest that that is indefensible and I appeal to the right hon. Gentleman, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, to give way on this point which is one of real substance. I am not using platform rhetoric when I ask the right hon. Gentleman to give us that freedom which after all, we do boast of as one of the proud privileges of our country—the freedom and right to go to the law courts. That is a right which we have always demanded and one which, I think, we always shall demand.

May I give a case which will illustrate my contention. Suppose a house is valued for Inhabited House Duty at £100 and the Commissioners come in and say "These stores or stabling—in other words, this particular outbuilding—must be included in the valuation for licence duty." We have discussed the definition of "premises" to-night, and the Committee will appreciate the great difficulty of the Commissioners in ascertaining what comes within that definition and what does not, as well as the great difficulty of the person who is being assessed in arriving at the same conclusion. But the Commissioners can come in and say with regard to this particular property, "This must be included in the value for Licence Duty." though it is not included in the assessment for Inhabited House Duty. The consequence is that in such a case premises valued for Inhabited House Duty do not correspond with premises to be valued for Licence Duty. Now, what is the result of that? The result is that not only is there no appeal from the ruling that stores or stables must be included, but the Commissioners of Customs and Excise can come in and say the Inhabited House Duty is too low, and may add another £50 for Licence Duties, plus £50 for stores or stables, and against that decision there is no appeal.

I think it is monstrous that they should have the right to take the consideration of the question out of the hands of the Inhabited House Duty valuation or Income Tax valuation, and by so doing deprive people of any right of appeal, and put up their assessment how they like in respect of any premises they like, so long as they happen to be near the licensed premises. The result of that is that the Commissioners are able to rule that the Inhabited House Duty is not high enough, thereby defeating the concession made to us in the Revenue Act of 1911, and that the House Duty valuation should govern the Licence Duty. I do ask the right hon. Gentleman to give this right of appeal to the publican. I think it is only just to him, and it is just, I believe, to the Commissioners of Customs and Excise that they should not have these great responsibilities thrust upon their shoulders. I am not going to press the point further to-night, but I cannot resist reminding the Committee of a few words which were spoken by Lord Farwell in the case of Dyson against the Attorney-General. The public interest is all in favour of a speedy access to the Courts by any of His Majesty's subjects who have any real cause of complaint through the exercise of Statutory powers by Government departments and Government officials, having regard to their growing tendency to claim the right to act without regard to legal principles, and without appeal to any court. Those words were uttered before we gave these great powers to the Commissioners of Customs and Excise without any right of appeal, and I do say this is a serious tendency of the Government to deprive the people of access to the Courts, and to place these great and arbitrary powers in the hands of persons over whom we in this House have little control. I beg the Solicitor-General really sympathetically to consider this appeal I make. I do not think anyone will be so foolish as to stand up here and suggest, in spite of the smiles of one or two hon. Gentlemen opposite, that this appeal is being made because of any grist it is going to bring to the profession to which I belong. If anybody suggests that one is urging this because of the profession to which he belongs, I think that it is a very wrong suggestion indeed. I move the Amendment in my name.

Sir JOHN SIMON

I certainly shall not encourage any imputation being made against the hon. and learned Gentleman as to the motives which have caused him to move this Amendment. I have no doubt it is a matter which ought to be discussed, but the hon. and learned Gentleman must allow me to say, however, that one argument which he used in support of it is really not well founded. He seems to think it is due to some special malevolence on the part of the present Government that there is no appeal to the Courts of Law from the decision of the Commissioners. On the contrary, that has been the situation, so far as I have been able to trace it, from the beginning. That has certainly been the situation since 1880, and since that time there have been abundant opportunities for Governments not suspected of these foibles and prejudices to put it right if considered wrong. But, in point of fact, it is not wrong. It is quite right. The question here is, what premises are going to be included in the area to be valued?

May I point out that is quite distinct from another question, which in his speech the hon. and learned Gentleman seemed to treat as the same? The question in the Revenue Act, 1911, is not what is the area that is going to be valued, but this: When you know the area, what is its value? That is quite a distinct question, but the hon. and learned Gentleman talked about the two as if they were the same. You must leave the Commissioners to exercise their honest best. Sitting next to the hon. and learned Gentleman I see the hon. Baronet (Sir G. Younger), and I recollect that earlier in the debate to-night he bore testimony to the fact that the Commissioners of Customs and Excise in this matter had applied a fair mind to questions of this sort, and if the Committee will observe the sort of question that is to be determined, they will see how singularly inappropriate it is that the House of Lords sitting as a judicial body should have to determine a question of this sort. It would necessitate a visit to view the particular premises. The examination of premises raises questions involving the words "to the satisfaction of the Commissioners," and you can hardly appeal to a Court of Law to ascertain whether the Commissioners are satisfied. It is really a matter of business.

Mr. H. SMITH

It is on a question of law only that appeal would lie to the Courts of Law.

Sir JOHN SIMON

I am quite aware of that, but I might point out that the questions which arise in common practice are not questions of law at all. I will not say it is inconceivable that questions of law will arise, but I do say that in substance questions that do arise have to be determined to the satisfaction of the Commissioners. While for my part I sympathise with the hon. and learned Gentleman when he asks that in certain directions—not, I think, this direction—it is desirable to preserve an appeal to the Court, and nothing I have ever said in this House has ever justified a contrary view of my opinion. I do suggest this is hardly a case for that. There is no appeal to the Courts at present. The object of this Amendment is not to change or elaborate the machinery, but to lay down rather more definitely the rules by which they are to be determined, and this is hardly an occasion for starting a brand new appeal.

Mr. AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

I really do not quite follow the right hon. Gentleman's argument. Under the Licensing Clauses of the Act of 1910 every one interested in licensed premises is entitled to have a copy of the valuation on which he is assessed by the Commissioners, and if he feels himself aggrieved by the valuation of the Commissioners he is entitled to take that valuation to the High Court. These are the provisions of Section 44 of the Act of 1910. The amount may be unjust not because the premises which are valued are inaccurately assessed, but because premises are taken into the valuation which ought to be left out. Why should he not have exactly the same appeal in those circumstances? Only one reason is suggested by the hon. and learned Gentleman, and that an astounding one. He says it would be necessary that the House of Lords go down to view the premises. Does the hon. and learned Gentleman suppose that the Commissioners go down to view the premises?

Sir J. SIMON

The difference is this: The Commissioners are acting as a Department, not as a court of law, and are entitled to act on information as to matters of fact which is put before them. As

the right hon. Gentleman knows, if you make this a matter for the courts it has to be dealt with on the strict lines of evidence.

Mr. AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

Surely that is an argument in favour of the Amendment of my right hon. Friend. As long as you keep it in the hands of the Commissioners they exercise judicial discretion, but after all they are not governed by the rules of evidence; they can accept information which is not good enough for a court of law; and that is the ground on which the hon. and learned Gentleman defends the decision of the Government to refuse access to a court of law to an aggrieved subject. I do not recollect any complaint being made against the Commissioners of Customs and Excise. There has been serious complaint, however, made in this House—and not without good reason—in recent times of the action of others. The reason which has been given is no good reason for refusing the subject access to the courts of law.

Question put, "That those words be there inserted."

The Committee divided: Ayes, 76; Noes, 111.

Division No. 440.]	AYES.	[12.55 a.m.
Agg-Gardner, James Tynte	Goldsmith, Frank	Parkes, Ebenezer
Aitken, Sir William Max	Goulding, Edward Alfred	Pease, Herbert Pike (Darlington)
Anson, Rt. Hon. Sir William R.	Greene, W. R.	Peto, Basil Edward
Ashley, Wilfrid W.	Gretton, John	Pole-Carew, Sir R.
Baird, John Lawrence	Hall, D. B. (Isle of Wight)	Pretyman, Ernest George
Banbury, Sir Frederick George	Hambro, Angus Valdemar	Pryce-Jones, Col. E.
Banner, John S. Harmood-	Helmsley, Viscount	Remnant, James Farquharson
Bathurst, Charles (Wilts, Wilton)	Henderson, Major H. (Berkshire)	Roberts, S. (Sheffield, Ecclesall)
Benn, Arthur Shirley (Plymouth)	Hope, Harry (Bute)	Salter, Arthur Clavell
Bigland, Alfred	Hope, James Fitzalan (Sheffield)	Sanders, Robert Arthur
Boyle, W. Lewis (Norfolk, Mid)	Hunt, Rowland	Sandys, G. J.
Boyton, James	Jardine, Ernest (Somerset, E.)	Smith, Rt. Hon. F. E. (Liverp'l, Walton)
Brassey, H. Leonard Campbell	Kerr-Smiley, Peter Kerr	Stanley, Hon. G. F. (Preston)
Bridgeman, W. Clive	Kerry, Earl of	Stewart, Gershom
Burn, Colonel C. R.	Larmor, Sir J.	Sykes, Mark (Hull, Central)
Carlile, Sir Edward Hildred	Law, Rt. Hon. A. Bonar (Bootle)	Talbot, Lord Edmund
Cassel, Felix	Lewisham, Viscount	Thynne, Lord Alexander
Castlereagh, Viscount	Locker-Lampson, G. (Salisbury)	Tobin, Alfred Aspinall
Cave, George	Locker-Lampson, G. (Ramsey)	Tullibardine, Marquess of
Chaloner, Col. R. G. W.	Macmaster, Donald	Walker, Col. William Hall
Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. J. A. (Worc'r.)	McNeill, Ronald (Kent, St. Augustine)	Wheler, Granville C. H.
Courthope, George Loyd	Malcolm, Ian	White, Major G. D. (Lancs., Southport)
Craig, Captain James (Down, E.)	Mason, James F. (Windsor)	Younger, Sir George
Craig, Norman (Kent, Thanet)	Newman, John R. P.
Croft, Henry Page	Morrison-Bell, Capt. E. F. (Ashburton)	TELLERS FOR THE AYES.—Mr. Harold Smith and Mr. Stanier.
Eyres-Monsell, Bolton M.	Paget, Almeric Hugh
Gilmour, Captain J.
NOES.
Abraham, William (Dublin Harbour)	Bowerman, C. W.	Dalziel, Sir James H. (Kirkcaldy)
Adamson, William	Bryce, J. Annan	Dawes, James Arthur
Agar-Robartes, Hon. T. C. R.	Carr-Gomm, H. W.	De Forest, Baron
Ainsworth, John Stirling	Cawley, Sir Frederick (Prestwich)	Doris, William
Baker, H. T. (Accrington)	Cawley, H. T. (Lancs., Heywood)	Duncan, C. (Barrow-in-Furness)
Balfour, Sir Robert (Lanark)	Clough, William	Falconer, James
Barton, William	Clynes, John R.	Ffrench, Peter
Beck, Arthur Cecil	Collins, Stephen (Lambeth)	Gelder, Sir William Alfred
Benn, W. W. (Tower Hamlets, St. Geo.)	Coton, William Francis	George, Rt. Hon. David Lloyd
Bentham, G. J.	Crumley, Patrick	Gill, Alfred Henry
Gladstone, W. G. C.	Lundon, Thomas	Robertson, John M. (Tyneside)
Glanville, Harold James	Macdonald, J. Ramsay (Leicester)	Rowlands, James
Guest, Hon. Frederick E. (Dorset, E.)	Macpherson, James Ian	Samuel, Rt. Hon. H. L. (Cleveland)
Gwynn, Stephen Lucius (Galway)	McKenna, Rt. Hon. Reginald	Samuel, S. M. (Whitechapel)
Hackett, John	M'Laren, Hon. F. W. S. (Lincs., Spalding)	Scott, A. MacCallum (Glas., Bridgeton)
Hancock, John George	Meehan, Francis E. (Leitrim, N.)	Seely, Col. Rt. Hon. J. E. B.
Harcourt, Rt. Hon. L. (Rossendale)	Meehan, Patrick (Queen's Co.)	Sherwell, Arthur James
Harcourt, Robert V. (Montrose)	Menzles, Sir Walter	Shortt, Edward
Harmsworth, Cecil (Luton, Beds)	Munro, Robert	Simon, Sir John Allsebrook
Harvey, W. E. (Derbyshire, N. E.)	Murray, Captain Hon. Arthur C.	Smith, Albert (Lancs., Clitheroe)
Haslam, Lewis (Monmouth)	Nanneti, Joseph P.	Stanley, Albert (Staffs, N. W.)
Havelock-Allan, Sir Henry	Nolan, Joseph	Strauss, Edward A. (Southwark, West)
Haworth, Sir Arthur A.	Nugent, Sir Walter Richard	Taylor, John W. (Durham)
Hayden, John Patrick	O'Brien, Patrick (Kilkenny)	Tennant, Harold John
Henry, Sir Charles S.	O'Connor, John (Kildare, N.)	Toulmin, Sir George
Higham, John Sharp	O'Doherty, Philip	Trevelyan, Charles Philips
Howard, Hon. Geoffrey	O'Dowd, John	Ward, W. Dudley (Southampton)
Jones, Edgar (Merthyr Tydvil)	O'Malley, William	Webb, H.
Jones, H. Haydn (Merioneth)	O'Shee, James John	Wedgwood, Josiah C.
Jones, Leif Stratten (Notts, Rushcliffe)	Parker, James (Halifax)	White, J. Dundas (Glas., Tradeston)
Jones, William (Carnarvonshire)	Pease, Rt. Hon. Joseph A. (Rotherham)	White, Patrick (Meath, North)
Jones, W. S. Glyn- (T. H'mts, Stepney)	Pollard, Sir George H.	Whitehouse, John Howard
Keating, Matthew	Price, C. E. (Edinburgh, Central)	Wiles, Thomas
Kellaway, Frederick George	Raphael, Sir Herbert H.	Wilson, W. T. (Westhoughton)
King, Joseph	Rea, Walter Russell (Scarborough)	Wood, Rt. Hon. T. McKinnon (Glasgow)
Lambert, George (Devon, S. Molton)	Reddy, Michael
Law, Hugh A. (Donegal, West)	Richardson, Thomas (Whitehaven)	TELLERS FOR THE NOES.—Mr. Illingworth and Mr. Gulland.
Lawson, Sir W. (Cumb'rid, Cockerm'th)	Roberts, Charles H. (Lincoln)

Question, "That the Clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill," put, and agreed to.