§ Order for Committee read.
§ Mr. JAMES HOPEhad on the Paper the following Notice of Motion:—"That it be an Instruction to the Committee that they have power to insert provisions for altering the Constitution of either House of Parliament."
§ Mr. SPEAKERThe Instruction in the name of the hon. Member for the Central Division of Sheffield appears to me to be beyond the scope of the Bill.
§ Mr. JAMES HOPEOn the point of Order, I venture to submit that this Bill deals with the relations of the two Houses of Parliament. The relations of the Houses must depend in some degree on their composition, and to change their composition or Constitution might be the best way of harmonising opinion. Therefore I submit to you that the Instruction that the Committee should have power to insert provisions for altering the Constitution of either House is in order.
§ Mr. SPEAKERI do not think so. It is one way of dealing with the difficulty, but not the way proposed by this Bill.
§ Colonel GRIFFITH-BOSCAWENI beg to Move, "That it be an Instruction to the Committee that they have power to divide the Bill into two Bills, the one dealing with the powers of the House of Lords as to Money Bills, and the other with the restriction of the powers of the House of Lords as to Bills other than Money Bills and with the duration of Parliament, and that the first Bill be reported to the House before the other is proceeded with."
The two parts of the Bill are, I think, quite distinct, and should naturally be dealt with separately, namely, the part which deals with the House of Lords as regards finance, and the other part which deals with the powers of the House of Lords as regards general legislation, and the question of the duration of Parliament which is involved in the question of general legislation. I submit that the course I am recommending is one which would be to the convenience of the House and to the convenience of the country. In the last few months, in dealing with this question in the country, I have met very many people who hold that there ought to be some further limitation, at all events some definition by reducing them to writing, of the powers of the Second Chamber with regard to finance. But, at the same time, I have found that many of those same people feel very strongly that there ought not to be that great curtailment of the powers of the Second Chamber with regard to general legislation which is proposed in the latter part of the Bill. In fact, the feeling is that while we may rightly curtail the powers of the Second Chamber as to finance, we ought to preserve strong powers to the Second Chamber as to matters of legislation, and not to reduce that Chamber to absolute impotence, as the present Bill proposes to do. For that reason I think it would be far more convenient that we should separate the Bill into two portions. I venture to think that course would be convenient not only to the House and the country, but also to the Government. As I understand the position it is this. The Government and the party who support them are entirely agreed as to the desirability of the first part of the Bill, and they have made up their minds that they are going to take away altogether from the House of Lords power over finance. They have gone further and said, in the words of the Home Secretary, that this diminution of power is to apply not merely to the present House of Lords, but to any 1817 Second Chamber that may arise in future under the words of the Preamble. These are his words on 31st March, 1910:—
We, by our Resolutions, take the view that this House should be invited to exclude deliberately and by law the House of Lords or any other Second Chamber from any control in the business of finance."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 31st March, 1910, col. 1574.]4.0 P.M.While it is quite clear on the question of finance that the Government take that view, do they take the same view with regard to general legislation? Will those limiting powers given in the second Clause of the Bill apply not only to the present House of Lords, but also to any future Second Chamber that may arise? That is a very important point. We will not even know until the Preamble is passed, and after that we will not know whether there is to be a Second Chamber at all. We know that the Government say there ought to be a Second Chamber, and we know that the Foreign Secretary (Sir Edward Grey) has said that for his party to advocate a One-Chamber system as regards general legislation would spell disaster, death, and damnation. But while we know that is the view of the Government with regard to the Second Chamber and the necessity for it, we also know that hon. Members below the Gangway on the other side distinctly say that there should be no Second Chamber, even for general legislation, let alone finance. As regards hon. Members from Ireland below the Gangway on this side—I do not wish to misrepresent them—I believe I am expressing their opinion rightly when I say that they are perfectly indifferent whether there is a Second Chamber or not, provided that they get Home Rule for Ireland. It is clear that while on one question all the supporters of the Government are agreed, on the other question there is such a diversity of opinion that surely it would be far more convenient not only for the country but for this House, and also for the Government themselves, that they should take the opportunity of dividing the Bill, proceeding with that part on which there is agreement among their own supporters, and postponing for further consideration that part on which there is so much division among themselves. As there were many people who held that some limitation on the question of finance in the relations of the House of Lords to the House of Commons was a perfectly proper position to take up, I may remind the House that Lord Lansdowne, dealing with this very question on a Resolution in the House of Lords, abandoned for that House 1818 the power of finance. The Resolution declared with regard to Money dills such provision would be on the following lines: "The House of Lords are prepared to forego their constitutional right to reject or to amend Money Bills which are purely financial in character, provided that effectual provision is made against tacking." And then follows a long further explanation of what particular Amendments would be necessary to make it clear who was the person or who were the persons to decide what was a Money Bill, and also what tacking was, whether it was merely overt tacking of a Clause not financial which was simply there in a Money Bill, or whether it included the far more subtle kind of tacking which consists of including non-financial measures in the garb of financial propositions.
When we find not only on that side, but even on this side, that the Leader of the Unionist party in the House of Lords is prepared to abandon the financial position of the Lords, but not their general legislative position, surely the obvious course for the Government to take is to divide the Bill in the manner that I have suggested, and to deal with that part upon which there may be some general agreement, and postpone for further consideration that other part of the Bill, which is far more contentious and far more difficult for this House to decide. The proposition I am making is in accordance with the practice of our Colonies and of all foreign countries whose constitutions I have had an opportunity of studying. And it is also in accordance with precedent in this House. In our Colonies today and in nearly all foreign countries the Second Chambers have practically equal powers with the First Chambers in matters of ordinary legislation. But there are restrictions of varying degree with regard to the position of Second Chambers in matters of finance. That is the case in Austria, France, Italy, Prussia, and even in the United States, though in the United States the restrictions on finance placed on the Senate are very slight indeed. It is the same in our Colonies. In Canada, Australia, and South Africa the Second Chamber has equal power with the first on matters of general legislation, but there are restrictions in regard to finance. Coming to this House the proposition I am making is strictly in accordance with precedent. Over and over again in the history of this House declaratory Resolutions have been passed limiting the power 1819 of the House of Lords with regard to finance. In the beginning of the year 1671 the celebrated Resolution was passed which has often been quoted here, "That in all Aids given to the King by the Commons the rate or tax ought not to be altered by the Lords." Passing on from thence there are similar Resolutions in 1678 and 1689 and down to 1860, when very strong Resolutions were passed by this House on the rejection by the House of Lords of the Bill repealing the Paper Duty. The House of Commons has attempted by Resolution to deprive the House of Lords of certain powers in regard to finance, but, with the solitary exception of the Campbell-Bannerman Resolution of three years ago, no attempt has ever been made by this House to deal with the general legislative functions of the House of Lords. I say, therefore, it would be in accordance with precedent that you should follow the suggestion made in my Resolution, and that before we deal with the far bigger and more contentious questions we should attempt to deal with the powers of the House of Lords with regard to finance.
There is another reason which I would like to submit. My proposal would exactly enable the Government to meet the political situation which has arisen at the present time. What has been the cause of all the agitation in the country, and in this House during the last eighteen months, and the cause of the great crisis we have had? The cause has been one thing only—namely, the rejection by the House of Lords of the Finance Act in the year 1909. [An HON. MEMBER: "That was the last straw."] If it had not been for that fact should we have had the General Election of January, 1910? Should we have had the Resolution brought in to this House by the Prime Minister on the assembling of the new Parliament? Should we have had the Conference last year? Should we have had even the more mysterious General Election of December, 1910? Or should we have this Bill now? No. The reason why this Bill has been brought in is on account of the interference of the House of Lords with the question of finance. The right hon. Gentleman practically said so in introducing his Resolution into this House condemning the action of the House of Lords. On that occasion he said that the Motion was made because the House of Lords had made a breach of the Constitution and the usurpation of the rights of the Commons. And he went on to point 1820 out that the action of the House of Lords in this matter differed in kind from their action in other matters, because by interfering in finance and rejecting a Budget they had practically interfered with the Executive Government, and taken upon themselves the right to compel a Dissolution. I submit, therefore, that this crisis has arisen in consequence of the rejection of the Finance Act by the House of Lords. Hon. Members opposite may take a different view, but I ask them whether on other occasions when the House of Lords have not dealt with the Finance Act, when they have dealt with general legislation, have we ever had a measure of this sort proposed to the House of Commons?
I was a Member of this House in the year 1893, when the House of Lords rejected the Home Rule Bill, a Bill in many respects of greater importance than the Budget of 1909. The right hon. Gentleman was a Member of the Government then. Did he or his colleagues come down to the House with a Bill for abolishing the legislative action of the House of Lords? Not at all. There was a little agitation in the country, and then the Government quietly proceeded to pass the Parish Councils Bill. Again, in 1906, when the House of Lords interfered in general legislation and amended the Education Bill brought in by the present Chief Secretary for Ireland, the House of Lords on that occasion, as the Government said, causing them to drop the Bill, did the Government then bring in a Bill for abolishing the legislative power of the House of Lords? So far from that, they quietly proceeded for several years with their Government, and two years later they actually included in another Education Bill most of the Amendments made by the House of Lords in their first Education Bill. In the year 1908 the House of Lords rejected the Licensing Bill. Did the right hon. Gentleman then come down here with a measure to destroy the legislative power of the House of Lords and set up Single-Chamber Government? Not at all. There was no agitation in the country then. The chief thing that I remember was a big dinner in the National Liberal Club, at which the right hon. Gentleman made a great speech, and said that the House of Lords would occupy a prominent position in the party programme of the future. No measure was brought forward to deal with the House of Lords, and I think my proposition therefore is absolutely correct that had it not been for the rejection of the Budget by the House of Lords in 1909 we should not 1821 have had these two General Elections, we should not have had this agitation in the country, we should not have had the Resolution of last year, and we should not have this Bill at the present moment. If that is so, if the power of the House of Lords with regard to finance is to be curtailed, if they committed a crime and an outrage when they rejected the Finance Bill, if they are to be punished for that, then let the punishment fit the crime. If you are to deal with the weak spot in the Constitution which enables the House of Lords to upset the Executive Government and to force a Dissolution, then you ought to confine your Bill to questions of finance and you ought to define exactly what are to be the relations of the Second Chamber to finance in the future.
I submit therefore that it would be for the general convenience of all parties that we should divide this Bill into those two portions into which it naturally falls. There are a great many people in this country, people belonging to all parties, moderate men on both sides, who hold that no lasting and no permanent settlement of this great crisis can be arrived at except by consent. I fully realise that the Government can if they like force the whole of this Bill by their big composite battalions through this House, and I recognise that they may also be able to force it through another House. If they have got those guarantees we used to hear so much about, though we never hear about them now, they may by sheer force of their majority be able to force this measure through both Houses and make it the law of the country. I submit that if they do that, if they use their majority in that way, they will effect no lasting and no peaceful settlement. A system which provides practically One-Chamber Government is a system which this country, I am sure, will never tolerate. The country may tolerate the taking away of the power of finance from the Second Chamber. It will not tolerate that Cabinet despotism which will follow if the House of Lords or any Second Chamber is to have no power over general legislation. I submit that the proposition contained in my Instruction is a proposition which may lead to a settlement of this question on friendly lines. The lines are there. I have already read the Resolution of Lord Lansdowne offering, on behalf of himself and the Unionist party in the House of Lords, to abandon their power over finance. There is the obvious making of a settlement. If the Government accept my In- 1822 struction, and I hope they will, I say there is the possibility of a settlement at this initial stage of the Committee proceeding on this Bill. If they do not we must fight it out in Committee. For these reasons I venture to move the Instruction which stands in my name.
§ Mr. JAMES HOPEI beg to second the Motion.
I would point out to the House that the genesis and origin of the first and second Clauses are entirely different, and they are also different in regard to subject-matter. My hon. Friend stated, and rightly stated, that the origin of this Bill was entirely due to the rejection by the House of Lords of the Finance Act of 1909. It was wholly that action of the House of Lords which resulted in the present critical situation, and we were told that such a state of things as then resulted could not be allowed to exist in future, for the reason that it would make the Executive Government dependent not upon one House but upon two Houses. That is an argument which has to be met. It was admitted that the House of Lords, when they took that action with reference to the Budget, did so under very special and extraordinary circumstances, and it was only those very special and extraordinary circumstances which justified their so taking it. Personally, I think we have to meet the question, that if the Second Chamber is to have power over finance, it might put in jeopardy the stability of the Government if the Government does not command a majority in the other House. We are ready to admit and to agree to that proposition. But Clause 2, which has relation to general legislation, has a wholly different origin. It goes back, certainly in recent times over a number of episodes in regard to which at different times the two Houses have found themselves in disagreement. It arises, of course, out of the Resolutions that were carried by Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman in 1907, consequent upon the failure of the Government to pass the Education Bill a year before. It affects general legislation, and proposes to make a far wider change in the old practice of Parliament. It is perfectly true that the House of Lords seldom rejected a purely financial proposition, but it has during many generations of Parliamentary Government, over and over again, rejected or amended general legislation. Therefore, the change proposed by a Clause of that sort goes far further against the old Parliamentary position 1823 than does Clause 1. Certainly, whatever we may think of Clause 1, we have to admit that the difficulty of the Executive in the two Houses may lead to very grave embarrassment, if, as we are told by hon. Gentlemen opposite, the Second Chamber could produce a Dissolution of Parliament, so long as it has a majority against the Government. That, of course, is obvious, but I think it fair to assume that we could find a measure of agreement. Therefore I submit that the financial question had better be considered first, and reported in a separate Bill to be sent up to another place. If that were done, I have no doubt that as regards Clause 1 a settlement might be arrived at without much difficulty.
§ The PRIME MINISTER (Mr. Asquith)I need not say that the Government cannot recommend the House to assent to this Instruction. Its object is practically to confine this Bill and the present discussion of it until the Report stage, to these provisions which deal with the relations of the two Houses with regard to finance. I recognise, with much pleasure and satisfaction, the admissions which have been made, admissions of which we shall take note, by both the Mover and Seconder of this Instruction, that this situation, as created by the action of the House of Lords in the year 1909, is not one which any House of Commons can be advised to submit to. I recognise, very gladly, that that shows a very considerable advance on the position taken up by hon. Gentlemen opposite at the General Election of January, 1910, when, throughout the country, they vindicated the action of the House of Lords. [HON. MEMBERS: "NO, no."] Some of them are doing it now—as representing the real opinion of the people, and strictly within the ambit of its own recognised Constitution. That position is not tenable by any of those who support this Instruction on the grounds submitted by the Mover and Seconder. The hon. Gentleman who moved the Instruction has somewhat misread and rather inverted the true history of this situation. It is perfectly true the action of the House of Lords in the rejection of the Budget made the question of the relation between the two Houses one of acute political controversy. But the controversy was of much older standing than the rejection by the House of Lords of the Budget. As the hon. Member reminded us, my predecessor, 1824 Sir Henry Campbell - Bannerman, in 1907, when it was common ground between us that the House of Lords would never venture to deal with finance, moved the resolutions upon which the main part of this Bill is founded. In point of history, it was not the action of the House of Lords in regard to finance, it was their action on general legislative questions which brought the relations between the two Houses to the forefront of political controversy. But while I note with satisfaction the admission that the claim put forward in 1909 by the House of Lords in regard to finance is no longer going to be sustained—[HON. MEMBERS: "NO, no"]—I am in the recollection of the House, and the House will bear me out in that; I think the hon. Member even quoted the declaration of Lord Lansdowne, which, if I understand the meaning of English, was in exactly the same sense—while I recognise with satisfaction that that position has now been completely abandoned—[HON. MEMBERS: "NO, no"]—it is not abandoned; it is the basis of the Instruction——
§ Colonel GRIFFITH-BOSCAWENPerhaps I may be allowed to explain. I never made the admission the right hon. Gentleman says I made. All I said was that the Government view was that the House of Lords had gone beyond their sphere. That was the Government view. The contention I put forward, and always have put forward, was that the view of the House of Lords was that the Bill of 1909 was not a pure Finance Bill.
§ The PRIME MINISTERThen why did the hon. Gentleman quote Lord Lansdowne in the citation to which I have already referred? I certainly do not understand the logical process that was in the hon. Gentleman's mind. But, quite apart from that, it must be obvious that the Motion for the division of this Bill into two parts at this stage is altogether impossible. Why should the Bill be divided? Let me take for a moment the hon. Gentleman's view, that it is possible for people to think that the powers of the House of Lords in regard to finance are to be curtailed, circumscribed, and defined by Act of Parliament, and at the same time its powers with regard to general legislation ought to be left where they are. That I take to be his view. But that can be done perfectly well, if it is the general opinion of this House, which I do not believe it is, without any division of the Bill at all. How? In the simplest 1825 possible way. You can pass Clause 1, with such Amendments as the House sees fit to introduce in it, and you can reject Clause 2, and then the result which the hon. Gentleman seeks to obtain will have been achieved. The only other effective operative Clause in the Bill is the Clause which limits the duration of Parliament.
§ Colonel GRIFFITH-BOSCAWENWill the right hon. Gentleman accept an Amendment to reject Clause 2?
§ The PRIME MINISTEROf course I shall not. I am pointing out that this Instruction is totally unnecessary, because if it be the general opinion of the House that the Bill ought to be confined to the reconstitution of the relations between the two Houses with regard to finance, then, without a division of the Bill, you can carry out that intention by passing Clause 1 and rejecting Clause 2. Therefore, upon any view of the case, the Instruction is totally unnecessary. But I take it further than that: In the view of the Government the Bill is not a separable Bill. When you are dealing, as this Bill proposes in its title, with reconstruction, with a new definition, with a new circumscription of the relation between the two Houses of Parliament, you must deal with the matter as a whole. It is quite true that different considerations apply to finance from those we apply to ordinary legislation; but they are correlative one with the other; they are part and parcel of a single scheme that has been discussed over and over again inside and outside this House, and, as we believe, they are parts of a political scheme approved by the electors of the country. I again say that we cannot submit to any separation of the Bill, and, upon these grounds, which I think are practical and most logical grounds, the Government must ask the House to reject the Instruction.
Mr. BALFOURThe right hon. Gentleman's speech was divided under two heads, in one of which he criticised my hon. Friend (Colonel Griffith-Boscawen), and in the other of which he laid down the policy to which the Government are prepared to adhere. I dissent from the right hon. Gentleman under both heads. In the first place, he entirely misrepresented the view taken by my hon. Friend. The right hon. Gentleman seemed to think that if anybody is of opinion that, while the relations between the two Houses are under consideration, some modification ought to be made in those relations on financial matters, that carries with it the view that 1826 the House of Lords exceeded their constitutional powers when they asked the people to decide upon the merits of the Finance Bill of 1909. The House of Lords may have been wise or unwise in that action. I remember the right hon. Gentleman the other day, in a very eloquent passage of a speech he was then making on the subject, declared that the House of Lords had been extremely unwise, and that their action amounted to suicide. He then took an entirely different view from the one which he has just propounded to the House. He then took the view that if it had not been for the action of the House of Lords with regard to the Budget of 1909, the policy which we are now asked to discuss might never have been brought to a practical issue. I dissented from him then, and I am inclined to dissent from my hon. Friend now, because my hon. Friend in his speech took exactly the same historic view that the right hon. Gentleman took a few weeks ago, and which the right hon. Gentleman has now wholly abandoned. The right hon. Gentleman now says that it is quite true that the House of Lords are greatly to blame for exceeding their constitutional powers in 1909, but that that was not the origin or genesis of the policy now proposed to the House; that the policy was started by Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman in 1907, and even further back if you like; at all events it was more or less formulated in 1907, during the continuance of the present Government, and that was done long before the provisions of the Budget of 1909 had entered into the fertile brain of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The right hon. Gentleman has changed his view. I do not think it is very relevant or very important to the issue now before us. At all events the right hon. Gentleman thought it worth while to attack my hon. Friend for having in his historical aspect of the question held precisely the opinion which the right hon. Gentleman himself held only a very short time ago.
For my part I adhere to the view which I always held. I think that on this subject the present party came into power determined to destroy the Constitution, that they have been looking for an issue, and, indeed, while the General Election of 1906 was going on they began the policy of looking for a cause of quarrel. They found cause of quarrel in every modification of a Bill by the House of Lords, in every rejection of a Bill by the House of Lords, and, finally, in the rejection of the Budget 1827 they thought they had got sufficient cause for quarrel, and they are happy and satisfied.
That is the historic aspect of it, What we are now called upon to decide has really no direct relation to that historic aspect at all. What we have now got to decide on the Motion which you, Sir, put from the Chair, is whether it would be desirable or advisable or not to divide this Bill into two and treat the first Clause as a separate measure from the second Clause. Why does the Prime Minister object to that? The objections to that, if I understood him rightly, are because, in his own words, the Bill is not separable, that the Bill contains one undivided and indivisible policy, and to treat it as two Bills would be to separate that which neither in logic nor in policy ought to be separated. I think the right hon. Gentleman is absolutely precluded from pursuing that line of argument. In the first place, from the Government's own point of view, the Bill is not complete. They admit in their Preamble, and in their speeches, that this is merely a stage in the general revolutionary course which they desire to pursue. My hon. Friend does not ask them to maim and mutilate an admirable and coherent scheme of policy, but a policy which is avowedly incomplete and avowedly inchoate, and he says if you cannot take it all at once you had better divide it into logical and convenient sections, and if yon carry out that view you will have to divide Clause 1 from Clause 2. If that argument is not sufficient, is not the Preamble sufficient? Consider the relation of the Preamble to the two Clauses. The Preamble of the Bill is one which is almost a revival or antiquated relic of a legislative age which had for ever gone until the Government have chosen to revive it. How have they revived it? They have put forward a Preamble which is by way of governing all the Clauses in the Bill. What relation, however, has it to the first Clause of the Bill? What possible relation has it to the first Clause of the Bill? What the Preamble says is that you must have a Second Chamber, that it should be a poular Second Chamber, and that the time has come when you should create that Second Chamber, and that you should decide exactly what its powers are to be. But this Clause has nothing whatever to do with the relations between the two Houses in modifying Money Bills. It says that the House of Lords should not touch a Money Bill at all. It shuts out the 1828 House of Lords completely, reformed or unreformed, and as the policy of the Government is that no future House of Lords should touch pure Money Bills at all, therefore, what has the Preamble got to do with Clause 1? What on earth has the Preamble got to do with a Clause which (undoubtedly excludes a Second Chamber, reformed or unreformed, from touching Money Bills. Clearly it has got nothing to do with it. The Preamble, if it has got to do with anything has got to do with Clause 2.
It seems to me by the way the Government have constructed their own Bill that it is clearly shown that my hon. Friend is proceeding on perfectly logical lines when he suggests that Clause 1 should be taken and treated separately altogether from the very controversial matters contained in Clause 2. The right hon. Gentleman has referred to Resolutions passed at the instance of Lord Lansdowne by the House of Lords, and he stated that, as an admission on the part of both Lord Lansdowne and my hon. Friend who moved this Motion, that the House of Lords were wrong in their action in 1909. That is not so. There was no admission of error on the point, but the question practically considered, and which was considered by the House of Lords, is whether there should be some change in the relation between the two Houses in that respect, a change which would, no doubt, go to eliminate the House of Lords as a controlling factor. Under the circumstances I want to know how the Government themselves can defend these two Clauses as belonging to an inseparable fraction of this great controversy. You may put the two Clauses together, and the Government are not acting out of order in doing so; but they do not pretend that their scheme is a complete one or that Clause 2 depends on Clause 1, or that Clause 1 depends on Clause 2. Under those circumstances, considering the magnitude of the conflict and controversy which lies before us, I think my hon. Friend was well advised in suggesting that, in the first place, we should limit our discussion to that part of the general Government proposal on which we seem to be nearer agreement than we are likely to be if other Clauses be joined with Clause 1.
§ Mr. WALTER GUINNESSI think the statement of the Prime Minister has thrown a new and very alarming light on the intentions of the Government. He has told us that this Bill is inseparable, that the scheme foreshadowed 1829 is one whole, and cannot be in any way modified. For a long time we have been pressing on this side to find out whether the Government intend permanently to deprive the House of Lords of any effective Veto in general legislation as opposed to financial legislation. For the first time this evening we have the Prime Minister throwing over what I understood to be the meaning of a statement of the Home Secretary that that distinction would take effect, and that there was to be different treatment as to financial powers in the new House of Lords in comparison with general powers. The Home Secretary said on 31st March last year:—
We, by our Resolutions, take the view that the House of Commons should be invited to exclude deliberately and by law the House of Lords or any Second Chamber from any control in the business of finance,That is to say, the financial control is to be permanently invested in the House of Commons and in the House of Commons only. The Preamble of the Parliament Bill shows, or it might be argued to show, that the Government did not intend to extend this disability to all legislation. The Preamble says:—Whereas provision will require hereafter to be made by Parliament in a measure effecting such substitution for limiting and defining the powers of the new Second Chamber. …You are to limit the powers of a Second Chamber as regards finance for ever, and, presumably, the Preamble, if it means anything, applies only to the other general parts. If the Government really mean the Preamble earnestly and do intend in good faith to reform the House of Lords and to give it back effective powers, then it would be a sound matter of drafting to divide the Bill into two parts. The financial provision being permanent and the general provision being temporary, surely it is best to keep them in separate Bills, so that you would have one Bill dealing with finance, which is to be entirely untouched, and another Bill which would deal with those powers of the House of Lords which would be affected by the Veto.
§ Lord HUGH CECILThe answer of the Prime Minister rose in my mind, as in the mind of my hon. Friend, who has just spoken, some surprise. I was not surprised, of course, that he repeated all the old story about whether we have admitted or do not admit that the House of Lords was wrong in 1909. That point of controversy is necessarily over. In my view the House of Lords acted quite constitutionally, and I have never been able to understand how anyone who looked into the 1830 precedents could doubt their constitutional action. The question whether it is desirable for the House of Lords to take action of that kind, and whether it is desirable that it should be taken from them by Act of Parliament is a wholly different controversy. It is with that controversy we are now concerned. My hon. Friend argued very properly on the admissions of the Government, and on the position of the Government themselves set up, the question of the taking away of the power of the House of Lords in respect to Money Bills took priority, and was indeed the essential point in this Bill between the two Houses. Certainly that corresponds to the language used by the Prime Minister in the beginning of the Session and by the Noble Viscount who has recently left us for another place, and who, when he was a member of this House, very emphatically stated, and I think he said, that if the House of Lords had left the Government alone that the Government would have left the House of Lords alone, a view not very dignified for constitutional reformers, but that is by the way. The striking thing which impresses me, as it did my hon. Friend, is that the right hon. Gentleman proposes, as I understand it, that even if they have an elective Second Chamber that they would give us no power in matters of finance. That is, of course, utterly without precedent in the world. There is no elective Second Chamber that has no powers in finance. I can understand persons arguing in favour of or against an elective Chamber, but I cannot understand being in favour of an elective Second Chamber, and saying that it ought not to have power in finance. The whole case against the House of Lords on that depends on the character of its constitution. If you alter its constitution to be a purely elected body, then naturally it should have powers as to finance. The Instruction says that the Government ought to separate the Bill, because it is perfectly clear if you are going to treat the financial part of the Bill as permanent and the rest as temporary then it is very much better to have two Bills. If part of the change is to be permanent and to go on for ever, and part merely temporary, how can it be argued that it is desirable to deal with the whole matter in a single Bill?
There is another argument which ought to weigh with the Government, and it is this. It is conceded, indeed, and so far understood, that the disagreement on the first Clause between the two parties in 1831 this House and throughout the country is very slight. The Unionist party have been prepared to make great concessions on the point of finance. Therefore, it would probably be possible to adjust an agreed Bill so far as Clause 1 is concerned. Supposing you separated this Bill into two Bills, you would have your agreed Bill carried through both Houses and passed into law. That would be a great step towards settlement, and by consent one great part of the subject would be out of the way and would be satisfactorily settled. If therefore the Government really approached this subject with a view of making a settlement and not fighting a party battle, and if their intention were really to approach the matter patriotically—— [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] am not surprised that hon. Members below the Gangway opposite, having a much more intimate acquaintance with the Government than I have, should regard any suggestion as to their patriotic action as merely derisory. The way I have suggested, however, would be the way if they wanted a national settlement. They would take the financial part of the Bill separately, carry it through both Houses, probably rapidly, and pass it into law, leaving the remaining matters to be threshed out at leisure. That is the way to secure a national settlement, but it is not the way the Government propose to proceed. They do not want to make a national settlement. What they want is to reform the Constitution in the interests of their own party. They are engaged on a gigantic gerrymandering job, and they will not accept any instructions or any Amendment that would interfere with the fundamental purpose—that is, the gerrymandering purpose—which the Bill has in view. The only question the Government have ever asked themselves in this controversy is this: "Does the Constitution as it now exists inconvenience our party I If so, how can it be made to inconvenience our party less? We want a Constitution that will work for the Liberal party and against the Unionist party. That is all we want." The party opposite would never agree to any measure which tended to arrive at a settlement by consent. They do not want a settlement by consent. They want a party victory. Hence they go on fighting, with a great deal of bombastic talk about their courage, the mandate of the people, and so on, and phrases of that kind come 1832 readily to their lips if the Government take a single step towards making a businesslike and workmanlike settlement.
§ Sir ALFRED CRIPPSI wish to make an appeal to the Prime Minister regarding this Bill as a constitutional reform, in order that he may modify his attitude on the question of dividing the Bill into two parts. It is quite clear that the questions of reform in the first Clause are entirely different from those which arise in the remainder of the Bill. In reference to Money Bills, the Prime Minister himself has stated very often that the constitutional principle is that as subsidies are given by this House and all money provisions are initiated in this House, the Second Chamber, whatever it may be, ought to have no power whatever with regard to such Bills. Whether we agree with that or not—and I think that historically it is not true—a constitutional principle is involved. It may be a proper constitutional principle that as regards Money Bills this House, and this House alone, should interfere. That is the principle which is involved in the first Clause of the Bill. I would say in passing that if the Second Chamber is hereafter to be elective, the basis on which Money Bills have been dealt with in this House alone is, of course, immediately undermined, because the whole principle on which money powers are exercised by this House alone is that we are an elective and representative Chamber. The theory is that no one in this country is taxed except by his own consent, and that he gives that consent through his representative. No one knows at present what the view of the Government is as regards the Second Chamber, but if it were altered as the Preamble suggests into an elective Second Chamber the whole basis of the constitutional principle governing the control of Money Bills by this House alone would be altered, because the Second Chamber being elective would have equal rights with the House of Commons, and ought to have equal powers and privileges in regard to Money Bills. It is a most difficult matter, unless this Bill is divided as proposed, to determine whether as regards Money Bills the old powers of this House ought to be asserted to the extent of giving the Second Chamber no power at all, or whether in the event of our having an elective Second Chamber we ought not to realise that that Chamber will then be as representative as this, and 1833 will have as good a right as this to deal with money as well as other matters of legislative concern.
The second reason why I think this Instruction should be agreed to is that as regards legislative matters the question of interference depends on a wholly different principle. It depends not on the rights of this House at all, but on the principle whether or not the Second Chamber is so constituted that you ought to give it real and substantial powers in matters of legislation. Everyone who has any knowledge of constitutional principle and of the constitutional laws of this country ought to realise that we are proceeding absolutely in the teeth of all Liberal principles if we propose as regards matters of general legislation to have a uni-cameral system instead of the bi-cameral system which in days past has been in the forefront of the protection of our civil and religious liberties. Let us assume for the moment that, as regards matters of finance, as a constitutional principle, this House should be supreme. I do not agree with that principle myself, but I take it for the purpose of my illustration. Coming, then, to questions of legislation, what is proposed in the Bill? It is said that at some time or other there is to be a Second Chamber. In the meantime there will be an interregnum. That means that for a period of time—and in my opinion a very long period if this Bill is once passed—the Cabinet and the majority in this House will have an absolute tyrannical power to pass any legislation they like, without any restraint either from a Second Chamber or from the possibility of an appeal to the will of the people What do the great political philosophers like Burke say? They say that the glory of our Constitution is that you do not find this absolute power vested in any single individual or in any single body; whereas if the proposal of the Government is passed you will have an autocracy greater than that which is known in any other civilised country in the world. Surely we ought to separate great legislative questions from the entirely different question of whether it is a proper constitutional principle that this House should be supreme in money matters, and that no Second Chamber, however constituted, should be allowed to interfere. Let me ask the Prime Minister this question, as I should lay great weight on his view on any question of constitutional principle. Is it not a fact that historically, as regards constitutional principle, there has always been a clear dis- 1834 tinction between matters of finance and matters of general legislation? Has it not been part of his argument that it is because of their undue interference in matters of finance it has become necessary to deal with the House of Lords? I do not want to rule out the other matters of legislation to which he has called attention; but they depend on an entirely different principle. The Prime Minister complains that the existing Second Chamber has been one-sided. That that is so in one sense I as a Member of the Unionist party, entirely agree, and I am one of those who sincerely hope that drastic reforms may be carried out. But the two questions stand on an entirely different footing. I ask therefore, on constitutional principles, that whatever may be done in the matter of finance these legislative questions should never be put under the tyrannical power of a particular Cabinet, without any control from a Second Chamber or from the chance of an appeal to the electorate. On these grounds I strongly support the proposed Instruction, and I hope that some further reply will be made on behalf of the Government.
Sir HENRY DALZIELThe outstanding feature of this Debate has been the unanimity with which hon. Members opposite seem to have agreed that the financial aspect of this measure is now practically accepted on the other side. [Several HON. MEMBERS: "No."] I gathered from the speeches that we have heard that it was now common ground, and that the taking away of financial control from the House of Lords was accepted by both parties, provided that no tacking took place. [Several HON. MEMBERS: "No."] Then I would suggest to the Sub-committee in charge of the Amendments that they ought to agree to a common policy in an important matter of this kind, so that the Debate might have a more fruitful result. Undoubtedly the Mover of the Instruction accepted that position, and from that point of view I congratulate the Government on the improved prospect of their measure. If that is the position of the Opposition, I do not see why we should not pass Clause 1 without any very great delay. I rose particularly to enter my protest against the assumption that this Bill is only a temporary measure. Is it to be assumed that we have had two General Elections on a measure which is only of a temporary character? Is it to be assumed that the limitation of the Veto is to apply only to legislation and not to finance? We 1835 on this side are supporting a Bill which we hope and believe will be of a permanent character. We hold that the limitation of the Veto will apply to legislation under any Second Chamber that may be constituted, and that the absolute control of finance will rest with this Chamber, no matter what the constitution of the future Second Chamber may be. Let us, therefore, have no misunderstanding on that point. From that point of view I support the Government in opposing this Instruction.
§ 5.0 P.M.
Mr. PEELI think the hon. Member opposite has a curious misunderstanding in regard to Members on this side. I speak only for myself, but it seems to me that there are two points in connection with the question of financial control. One is the question of tacking, about which a great deal will be heard in connection with Clause 1, and the other is the question of whether the Second Chamber, reformed or unreformed, should have the opportunity of saying "No" to the whole of the financial legislation. On that point I am entirely unrepentant in reference to the action taken by the House of Lords in 1909 in referring the Finance Bill to the people. In fact, I do not know whether I do not go further than some of my hon. Friends, because I am one of those who think that if the House of Lords had not referred that Bill to the people it would have deserved for that reason to have had its functions abolished; because I do not think it would be a fit Second Chamber to deal with this large question. I go further than that. I have always been in favour of some change in the composition of the Second Chamber. I am far more strongly in favour of it now than before. When this action of the House of Lords was taken it seemed to be suggested that it was improper. I then said to myself that that action and those powers were what a Second Chamber ought undoubtedly to take and to possess. If the Second Chamber is not thought a proper Chamber to possess those powers and to exercise them, then the sooner you reform the composition of that Chamber the better, and give us a Second Chamber which, like every Second Chamber in other countries, has the power in the last resource of dealing with finance. After all——
§ Mr. SPEAKERThe observations of the hon. Member are not relevant to the point at issue.
Mr. PEELI apologise. I was really replying to the point taken by the hon. Baronet opposite. I will deal more exactly with the Instruction which has been moved. One of the reasons that I support this Division is precisely because of the very great attention that I have paid to the distinction between financial and ordinary legislation. As a Member of the House of Commons, which has and must have the chief control over matters of finance, I think it is a great pity that the distinction should not be clearly laid down in the very Bill which deals with the powers and limitations of the House of Lords. I think you ought to draw the distinction more clearly than you can draw it in one Bill. The distinction between financial and ordinary legislation ought to be emphasised by being dealt with in two Bills. Moreover, when you are going to deal with these great constitutional changes, surely it is enough at first to take one great change by itself. The change advocated in Part I. is a very great change. I hold it is a great change in the Constitution, and it is enough for this House of Commons to deal with in one Session. I question the desirability of going further on further grounds. I believe myself that this Bill is itself and as it stands one of the worst examples of "tacking" ever sent up to the Upper Chamber. I believe, with many of those who have spoken already, that what the country is most interested in is the question of finance, and that generally the people did not imagine when this Bill was going to be brought forward that it would contain in addition to these regulations about finance, such enormously extended further powers of the House of Commons in regard to general legislation. I think the right hon. Gentleman will agree with me, so far, that it is enormously important for him to carry this country with him in his great constitutional changes. I would submit, therefore, that the first Clause of this Bill should first be dealt with as one; Bill, and then—I won't say that it ought to be submitted to the country—but that some considerable interval should elapse before the passing of the second portion, in order that the country may be perfectly clear upon it. And after all, the right hon. Gentleman knows that such a course would enhance a good deal the value of the Bill; when the country may have the opportunity of saying whether it is satisfied by the first constitutional change, or whether it wishes to go on to the further and larger constitutional change dealing with legislation.
1837 There is one more point arising out of the speech of the right hon. Gentleman opposite. The right hon. Gentleman talked about "a perfect whole." You can have a very good whole if you follow the suggestion put forward, because during the interval that I have proposed, and which I hope the right hon. Gentleman will accept, he will have an opportunity of maturing his second portion of the Bill for reform in the constitution of the House of Lords. Then he would have a measure which would be a whole. You would have a measure that deals with the legislative powers of the Second Chamber, and at the same time says what the composition of that Chamber has to be. If you are going to proceed with this measure now you lay yourselves open to a terrible charge. I think it is a most discreditable charge against those who are wishful of altering our Constitution. That charge never has been, and never could have been, brought before against any of those persons, who in the past have made great changes in our Constitution, that is that they were going to make a change, and at the same time going to take advantage of the opportunity, for party purposes, to put two Bills through in the interregnum which they otherwise would not have passed. If you are going to make a great constitutional change, let it at least be made with some sort of decency and decorum. Let not that charge be levied at it that may truly be levied against right hon. Gentlemen opposite. Let them, by the method I have suggested, the method embodied in the Instruction of my hon. Friend, take the second part of their measure and unite with it reform of the House of Lords. Then no one can say in the future: "What is the validity of these Bills that you have passed; what is the validity of your Bills about licensing, Welsh Disestablishment, Education, and all those matters which you are going to rush through whilst unshaped is that Second Chamber which you yourselves say ought to exist?" If this Bill passes before the House of Lords is reformed, those measures that you will pass are really revolutionary measures, passed in the interregnum. They cannot have that same moral validity—whatever legal validity there may be—as measures which have been passed by two Chambers. I ask the right hon. Gentleman, therefore, to remove from his party, from those who are accepting this great constitutional change, the possibilities of the charge being levied against them, that they are 1838 making constitutional changes for other than great national reasons. If the right hon. Gentleman does that, I believe he will get a perfect whole more worthy of him than this will be.
§ Mr. MALCOLMI am not quite sure that the speech of the hon. Baronet the Member for Kirkcaldy (Sir Henry Dalziel) is not really directed against the members of his own household. He asks whether the Bill is to be temporary or permanent, and trusts that it will be permanent. That will not carry conviction in the House at all until the Preamble has been got rid of. The Bill is a wolf in sheep's clothing. If the Preamble is got rid of we will have the wolf in its own clothing. That is really what this Bill is—a Single Chamber measure. The hon. Baronet tried to make us believe, as he apparently himself believes, that the country is in favour of a measure of this kind, because, he said, the people had twice declared for such a Bill. I am afraid that that has very little effect upon my mind. What I judge from these elections really is only this: that after the Budget had been thrown out by the House of Lords the majority of hon. Gentlemen opposite was reduced to fifty-two. When the second election came last year the Government was returned to power with only a bare majority. I do not, therefore, think they can say that they base the strength of this Bill upon any great support in the country itself.
§ Mr. SPEAKERThe hon. Member is not discussing the Instruction at all. He is dealing with the general question.
§ Mr. MALCOLMI am sorry. As for the Instruction itself the House is advised to a certain course of action by the Prime Minister. I think it would be better advised by my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Colonel Griffith-Boscawen). I have heard of Instructions being accepted which have made some difference to the passing of a Bill. I have never heard, in a Bill which only consisted of three operative Clauses, that it was the wise course to take to throw out the second, and perhaps the most important of the three Clauses. The better course, surely, is that we, a practical assembly, should accept the Instruction to divide the Bill. It is perhaps obvious that the Prime Minister does not intend to take any Amendment. His Bill is virtually inspired, I suppose, from the beginning to the end, and no Amendment or Instruction will be accepted from this side of the House. But perhaps 1839 he would listen to the appeal which I consider was made to him from far off Dundee the other day by no less a person than a colleague of his own, the Lord Advocate, whose speech I read in this morning's "Times." I find the right hon. Gentleman says:—
Though the House of Lords might be quite indefensible on paper, it might work well in practice, and he refused to rail at an institution, which, honestly speaking, he had very few faults to find with. He did not know of a Second Chamber in the world that did its work so well as our Second Chamber. There was no sloppiness or slovenliness in the way it revised its Bills or discussed public questions.
§ Mr. SPEAKERThat has nothing to do with the Instruction.
§ Mr. MALCOLMI regret exceedingly having transgressed the second time, but the point I would like to make in regard to this is that whereas the Instruction invites the House to divide the financial operations of the House of Lords from other legislative matters, I was trying to bring the Lord Advocate on to my side to show that on those legislative matters the House of Lords was a fair and efficient body. We therefore ask in this Instruction that whatever may be done with regard to the financial side of the Parliamentary Bill, general legislation shall be left to the House of Lords as it is until it is reformed. I call the Lord Advocate on our side to witness that at the present time the House of Lords as to general legislation is very effective. I hope the appeal of the Lord Advocate will not fall in vain on the ears of the Prime Minister.
§ Mr. HARRY LAWSONI must be allowed to congratulate the Member for Kirkcaldy upon having broken the silence that seems to have settled upon benches opposite. It is a great testimony to the discipline of the heterogenous combination that supports the Government that he is the only Member who has risen from those benches opposite to take part in this Debate. He has expressed a belief that all the measures of this Bill should be permanent. I suppose he is the only Member that could entertain that idea. He got up, as the Home Secretary would say, to "ginger up" the Government. At the same time, how he could imagine that this Bill, which is the most transient and embarrassed phantom which has ever crossed the floor of the House, should be permanent is to myself beyond the possibility of belief. I do not suppose that there is a Member on our side who does not in his heart believe that the 1840 Second Chamber which is to be constituted ought to have the same powers over finance that every one of those legislatures which we have prescribed for colonies by our own direct order has. After all, finance, as the Prime Minister has often said, is the most elastic instrument of government. To say that no Second Chamber ought to have any power of dealing with finance is virtually to abandon a great part of the sphere of government and men's affairs in the future. I do not believe there is a man upon this side who does not think a Second Chamber ought to have that power, and I do not suppose the Prime Minister, who knows as well as anybody in this House constitutional precedent, thinks we ought not to give to a reformed Second Chamber exactly the same powers as we give, and as we were careful to insert in laws conferring self government upon our Colonies which passed through this House. The power over finance possessed by a Second Chamber is the general reserve of the Constitution. It is not its exercise, but it is the existence of that power that has the real effect, and I am bound to say I think the financial powers of the Second Chamber is worth a good deal more legislation than is proposed in this one bare Clause. Nothing could be more curt or unsatisfactory than the Clause in this Bill dealing with the financial powers of a Second Chamber. I cannot imagine that the Government realise that they are going to disfranchise the whole of the Members of the Upper House so far as finance goes, and this Clause ought to be followed by others, pointing out in what way the Peers, who pay a considerable part of the taxation of the country, will be able to deal with finance, or why they should be selected for disfranchisement—why they should be put outside the Constitution in regard to that which touches men far more closely than any other question of legislation.
The Clause as it stands is almost insulting in its brevity. There ought to be some provision for the Peers. I can understand in a reformed Second Chamber, not based upon hereditary principles, it would be generally thought all men represented here, would have their views on finance; but as at present proposed the Peers are to be really outside the Constitution in regard to finance, and there has not been a single word mentioned in the change of status in this Bill, which is a good reason for the Amendment. The question of finance is so vastly important, it is worth a good deal more consideration 1841 than is given to it here, and I do not know whether any Amendment introduced will show that at least so far as the Peers are concerned, it is only of a suspensory character. I think if there is to be a reformed Constitution, the Peers having their votes for representatives in this House will exercise the same pressure upon their representatives as any other class. But that is not in this Bill and, the subject is so important, there ought to be some mention of it. I cannot help contrasting the way in which we are approaching this question with the way in which the makers of the American Constitution approached theirs. Finance was considered by them, not merely by rhetorical artifice, but upon the great principle of Government, and debates took place which lasted days; while in the recasting of the Constitution here, we seem to have no reverence for it at all. We are going to deal with finance in one Clause, and we are going to turn out the Peers and prevent them having any voice in taxation. In the old days the Peers taxed themselves. Up to the time of Henry IV. each estate used to tax itself. But the Peers are not to tax themselves now, we are to tax them and they are to be deprived of saying a word upon the subject. It is all very well to say that power was only latent, but it was always there, and in days gone by it acted as a check upon Chancellors of the Exchequer using Finance for other than its own proper purpose; they did not use it in those days for social reform, they used it simply for the purposes of revenue. The Prime Minister has told us that Finance is elastic, but the Peers who have to pay are to have no voice either in the passing of the Finance Bill or in the election of representatives who are to vote away the money. I think this matter is worthy of much more legislation than is proposed to be given it in one Clause, and if we had a tithe of the reverence for our Constitution that the Americans have, we should not attack it in this haphazard way.
§ Mr. MARTINI oppose this Instruction because I support the Bill in its entirety. I could understand if this were intended to be a permanent Bill, there might be something in the assurances we have had from the other side that they were prepared to support the Finance Clauses in this Bill and to make it a matter of agreement while desiring to oppose Clause 2. I entirely repudiate the suggestion made by the hon. Member for Kirkcaldy. He said he supported the Bill because it is going to be 1842 a permanent measure. If he supports it on that ground it seems to me he cannot support it at all, because the Government have made it very clear indeed that they are in favour of two Chambers, and they do not propose by this Bill to change the Constitution of this country into a Single Chamber, and when my hon. Friend tells the House that this is a permanent Bill which is to last for all time he is quite mistaken.
Sir HENRY DALZIELMy hon. Friend misrepresents me. I said nothing about the Preamble of the Bill or about the Government's intentions. What I said was that at this moment we have had no word from the Government that the limitation of the Veto is not to be permanent. It has nothing to do with the Bill at all.
§ Mr. MARTINIf the hon. Gentleman thinks a Second Chamber, such as is promised in the Preamble of the Bill, which is to have no Veto power, is to be a real Second Chamber, then I am entirely against him. I listened very carefully to the speech of the Prime Minister, and it was very clear and explicit, as his speeches always are. He said the Government are in favour of a Second Chamber. Now it must be clear to every Member of this House that this Bill, if it is to be a permanent Bill, so far as doing away with the Veto of the other Chamber, would mean the creation of a Single Chamber. That must be perfectly clear.
§ Mr. SPEAKERThat has really nothing to do with the Instruction. It is a separate issue altogether.
§ Mr. MARTINThen, Sir, may I ask this question. How it can be, that the speech of the hon. Member for Kirkcaldy is absolutely in order and that my speech, in which I endeavoured to answer him, is not in order?
§ Mr. SPEAKERIt may have been through my negligence that I allowed the hon. Member for Kirkcaldy to make his speech, but the fact that one hon. Member has been out of order is no reason why every other hon. Member should be. I think I have allowed the hon. Member some latitude to reply, and I now invite him to keep to the Instruction.
§ Mr. MARTINI shall endeavour, Sir, to keep to your ruling. I oppose the Instruction because I believe this is a temporary Bill. If it was to be part of the permanent Constitution of the country, I think 1843 the Instruction would be reasonable, but we have the assurance of the Government that this Bill is to be only a temporary measure until the Government have an opportunity of bringing before the House a Bill which would constitute a real and effective Second Chamber based upon democratic principles. If this Bill was to be a permanent one, and was to provide that the House of Lords was to have nothing to do with legislation except to delay it for a short time, then I would support the Instruction and would, in fact, oppose the Government Bill, but it is because I support this Bill from one end to the other, and because the Bill was submitted to the people of the country during the last General Election, and was approved not alone the provision which takes away from the House of Lords the right to Veto, but also the more important provision, as I understand it, which shows that the Government intend at the earliest possible moment to introduce a measure which will give an effective Second Chamber to this country, that I support it, and no Chamber can be effective unless it provides an effective Veto for measures passed in this House. For that reason I oppose the Instruction, and I hope this Bill will be passed. I quite appreciate the position of the Government; they desire that there should be a Second Chamber for this country, they desire that that Second Chamber should be constituted by the people of this country as representing this country and not by the House of Lords.
§ Mr. WATSON RUTHERFORDI look upon this Instruction as an extremely valuable one, and if it were accepted by the Government it would very much facilitate business. I do not go so far as to adopt what has been said by some of the speakers on this side. I do not say for a moment that if the Bill was divided it would be possible for those of us on this side, or for any large number of us to accept Clause I as it stands, but I think we would be able to discuss these important matters better separately, and we should have a fair discussion upon the very important question as to what should be done with purely financial measures. I venture to think if the Government could see their way to look at the subject from that point of view, it would help the real solution of the question we have before us. This Bill consists of three distinct matters. It is very curious, as has been 1844 already pointed out by one or two hon. Members, that the Preamble of the Bill does not seem to have anything to do with either of these two Clauses. The Preamble, of course, simply deals with the one question as to reform of the House of Lords. There are no operative words whatever, as it turns out, in the Bill itself upon that particular point. Then, when you come to the Bill you find it deals with two distinct topics. One topic dealt with is that in Clause 1 as to the procedure which should be adopted when the measure is exclusively a Financial Bill.
It will be agreed that if we could find out at a very early stage of any Bill whether it was exclusively a Finance Bill, and if there was more attempt to give a proper definition of what were exactly Finance Bills, it would be better. It would be very difficult in the scope of one Clause to really deal with all these conflicting questions connected with the defining of a Finance Bill, and what is perhaps even more important—the exact point of time in the course of the passing of a Bill at which the question ought to be decided whether it is a Finance Bill or not. It must be evident we ought to know in this House and in the other House at a very early stage, if any such Bill is being considered, whether it is being taken as a Finance Bill or not, because the procedure would be entirely different. I will give a very simple illustration. There are many remedies for disease that had very much better be taken in separate parts. When one part is taken it displays its effect. There is the familiar illustration of the Blue Pill and Black Draught. If we take the Blue Pill first—that is, the financial portion—and get rid of that, we would find whether it will be necessary to take the Black Draught later on. I think the hon. Member for Kirkcaldy said he had not read the Preamble of the Bill. If he had read it he never would have made the astonishing speech he did, in which he said the Bill was to be a permanent one because we are to read the Bill both with regard to the financial portion and the other, which is only to operate until the constitutional House of Lords is elected.
I join in urging upon the Government the very great desirability of dividing this Bill into two parts. The very important question of what is purely financial could then be disposed of in a separate measure, whereas if the two are kept together it will take a long time. It would create very great confusion and difficulty in 1845 dealing with the Clauses from a practical point of view in Committee if the two are forced through together.
§ Question put, "That it be an Instruction to the Committee that they have power to divide the Bill into two Bills, the one dealing with the powers of the House of Lords as to Money Bills, and
1846§ the other with the restriction of the powers of the House of Lords as to Bills other than Money Bills and with the duration of Parliament, and that the first Bill be reported to the House before the other is proceeded with."
§ The House divided: Ayes, 186; Noes, 271.
1847| Division No. 104.] | AYES. | [5.32 p.m. |
| Acland-Hood, Rt. Hon. Sir Alex. F. | Fleming, Valentine | Newman, John R. P. |
| Anson, Sir William Reynell | Fletcher, John Samuel (Hampstead) | Newton, Harry Kottingham |
| Anstruther-Gray, Major William | Foster, Philip Staveley | Nield, Herbert |
| Archer-Shee, Major M. | Gardner, Ernest | Norton-Griffiths, J. |
| Ashley, Wilfrid W. | Gastrell, Major W. Houghton | O'Neill, Hon. A. E. B. (Antrim, Mid) |
| Astor, Waldorf | Gilmour, Captain John | Orde-Powlett, Hon. W. G. A. |
| Bagot, Lieut.-Colonel J. | Goldsmith, Frank | Ormsby-Gore, Hon. William |
| Baird, John Lawrence | Goulding, Edward Alfred | Pease, Herbert Pike (Darlington) |
| Baker, Sir Randolf L. (Dorset, N.) | Grant, J. A. | Peel, Capt. R. F. (Woodbridge) |
| Balcarres, Lord | Guinness, Hon. Walter Edward | Peel, Hon. W. R. W. (Taunton) |
| Baldwin, Stanley | Haddock, George Bahr | Peto, Basil Edward |
| Balfour, Rt. Hon. A. J. (City, Lond) | Hall, D. B. (Isle of Wight) | Pole-Carew, Sir R. |
| Baring, Capt. Hon. Guy Victor | Hall, Marshall (E. Toxteth) | Pollock, Ernest Murray |
| Barlow, Montague (Salford, South) | Hambro, Angus Valdemar | Pretyman, Ernest George |
| Barnston, H. | Hamersley, Alfred St. George | Quitter, William Eley C. |
| Barrie, H. T. (Londonderry, N.) | Hamilton, Lord C. J. (Kensington) | Rawlinson, John Frederick Peel |
| Bathurst, Hon. Allen B. (Glouc., E.) | Hardy, Laurence | Rawson, Colonel Richard H. |
| Beach, Hon. Michael Hugh Hicks | Harris, Henry Percy | Remnant, James Farquharson |
| Benn, Arthur Shirley (Plymouth) | Henderson, Major H. (Berkshire) | Rice, Hon. Walter Fitz-Uryan |
| Benn, Ion Hamilton (Greenwich) | Hickman, Colonel Thomas E. | Roberts, S. (Sheffield, Ecclesall) |
| Bennett-Goldney, Francis | Hill, Sir Clement L. | Ronaldshay, Earl of |
| Bentinck, Lord Henry Cavendish | Hillier, Dr. Alfred Peter | Rothschild, Lionel de |
| Beresford, Lord Charles | Hills, John Waller | Rutherford, John (Lancs., Darwen) |
| Bird, Alfred | Hill-Wood, Samuel | Rutherford, Watson (L'pool, W. Derby) |
| Boscawen, Col. A. S. T. Griffith- | Hoare, Samuel John Gurney | Salter, Arthur Clavell |
| Boyle, W. Lewis (Norfolk, Mid) | Hohler, Gerald Fitzroy | Samuel, Sir Harry (Norwood) |
| Boyton, James | Hope, James Fitzalan (Sheffield) | Sanders, Robert Arthur |
| Brassey, H. Leonard Campbell | Horne, William E. (Surrey, Guildford) | Sandys, G. J. (Somerset, Wells) |
| Bull, Sir William James | Houston, Robert Paterson | Sassoon, Sir Edward Albert |
| Burgoyne, Alan Hughes | Hunt, Rowland | Scott, Leslie (Liverpool, Exchange) |
| Burn, Col. C. R. | Hunter, Sir Charles Rodk. (Bath) | Smith, F. E. (Liverpool, Walton) |
| Butcher, John George | Jessel, Captain Herbert M. | Smith, Harold (Warrington) |
| Campion, W. R. | Joynson-Hicks, William | Stanier, Beville |
| Carlile, Edward Hildred | Kerr-Smiley, Peter Kerr | Stanley, Hon. G. F. (Preston) |
| Carson, Rt. Hon. Sir Edward H. | Kerry, Earl of | Starkey, John Ralph |
| Cassel, Felix | Kimber, Sir Henry | Staveley-Hill, Henry |
| Castlereagh, Viscount | Kinloch-Cooke, Sir Clement | Steel-Maitland. A. D. |
| Cautley, Henry Strother | Knight, Captain Eric Ayshford | Stewart, Gershom |
| Cave, George | Larmcr, Sir J | Strauss, Arthur (Paddington, North) |
| Cecil, Evelyn (Aston Manor) | Law, Andrew Bonar (Bootle, Lancs.) | Swift, Rigby |
| Cecil, Lord Hugh (Oxford Univ.) | Lawson, Hon. H. (T. H'mts., Mile End) | Sykes, Alan John |
| Chaloner, Col. R. G. W. | Lee, Arthur H. | Terrell, George (Wilts, N. W.) |
| Chambers, James | Lewisham, Viscount | Thynne, Lord Alexander |
| Clay, Captain H. H. Spender | Locker-Lampson, G. (Salisbury) | Tobin, Alfred Aspinall |
| Clive, Percy Archer | Lonsdale, John Brownlee | Touche, George Alexander |
| Courthope, George Loyd | Lowe, Sir F. W. (Birm., Edgbaston) | Tullibardine, Marquess of |
| Craig, Charles Curtis (Antrim, S.) | Lyttelton, Rt. Hon. A. (S. Geo. Han. S.) | Walker, Col. William Hall |
| Craig, Captain James (Down, E.) | Lyttelton, Hon. J. C. (Droitwich) | Ward, A. S. (Herts, Watford) |
| Craig, Norman (Kent, Thanet) | MacCaw, Wm. J. MacGeagh | Warde, Col. C. E. (Kent, Mid) |
| Craik, Sir Henry | Mackinder, Halford J. | Weigall, Captain A. G. |
| Crichton-Stuart, Lord Ninian | Macmaster, Donald | Wheler, Granville C. H. |
| Cripps, Sir Charles Alfred | Magnus, Sir Philip | White, Major G. D. (Lancs., Southport) |
| Croft, Henry Page | Malcolm, Ian | Williams, Col. R. (Dorset, W.) |
| Dalrymple, Viscount | Mallaby-Deeley, Harry | Wilson, A. Stanley (York, E. R.) |
| Dalziel, Davison (Brixton) | Mason, James F. (Windsor) | Winterton, Earl |
| Dickson, Rt. Hon. C. S | Middlemore, John Throgmorton | Wolmer, Viscount |
| Douglas, Rt. Hon. A. Akers- | Mildmay, Francis Bingham | Worthington-Evans, L. |
| Eyres-Monsell, Bolton M. | Morpeth, Viscount | Yate, Col. C. E. |
| Falle, Bertram Godfray | Morrison-Bell, Capt. E. F. (Ashburton) | Yerburgh, Robert |
| Fell, Arthur | Morrison-Bell, Major A. C. (Honiton) | Younger, George |
| Finlay, Sir Robert | Mount, William Arthur | |
| Fitzroy, Hon. Edward A | Neville, Reginald J. N. | TELLERS FOR THE AYES.—Viscount Valentia and Mr. H. W. Forster. |
| Flannery, Sir J. Fortescue | Newdegate, F. A. | |
| NOES. | ||
| Abraham, William (Dublin Harbour) | Ashtcn, Thomas Gair | Barran, Sir J. (Hawick Burghs) |
| Acland, Francis Dyke | Asquith, Rt. Hon. Herbert Henry | Barran, Rowland Hirst (Leeds, N.) |
| Agar-Robartes, Hon. T. C. R. | Atherley-Jones, Llewellyn A. | Barry, Redmond John (Tyrone, N.) |
| Ainsworth, John Stirling | Baker, H. T. (Accrington) | Barton, William |
| Allen, Charles Peter (Stroud) | Baker, Joseph Allen (Finsbury, E.) | Beauchamp, Edward |
| Anderson, Andrew Macbeth | Balfour, Sir Robert (Lanark) | Beck, Arthur Cecil |
| Benn, W. (Tower Hamlets, St. Geo.) | Isaacs, Sir Rufus Daniel | Pollard, Sir George H. |
| Bethell, Sir John Henry | Jardine, Sir John (Roxburghshire) | Ponsonby, Arthur A. W. H. |
| Birrell, Rt. Hon. Augustine | Johnson, W. | Power, Patrick Joseph |
| Boland, John Pius | Jones, Edgar (Merthyr Tydvil) | Price, C. E. (Edinburgh, Central) |
| Booth, Frederick Handel | Jones, H. Haydn (Merioneth) | Primrose, Hon. Neil James |
| Bowerman, C. W. | Jones, Leif Stratten (Notts, Rushcliffe) | Pringle, William M. R. |
| Brocklehurst, William B. | Jones, William (Carnarvonshire) | Raffan, Peter Wilson |
| Brunner, John F. L. | Jones, W. S. Glyn- (T. H'mts., Stepney) | Rainy, Adam Rolland |
| Bryce, J. Annan | Jowett, Frederick William | Raphael, Sir Herbert Henry |
| Burke, E. Haviland- | Joyce, Michael | Rea, Rt. Hon. Russell (South Shields) |
| Buxton, Noel (Norfolk, N.) | Keating, Matthew | Rea, Walter Russell (Scarborough) |
| Buxton, Rt. Hon. S. C. (Poplar) | Kellaway, Frederick George | Reddy, Michael |
| Byles, William Pollard | Kennedy, Vincent Paul | Redmond, John E. (Waterford) |
| Carr-Gomm, H. W. | Kilbride, Denis | Redmond, William (Clare, E.) |
| Cawley, Sir Frederick (Prestwich) | King, Joseph (Somerset, North) | Richardson, Thomas (Whitehaven) |
| Cawley, H. T. (Lancs. Heywood) | Lambert, George (Devon, S. Molton) | Roberts, Charles H. (Lincoln) |
| Clancy, John Joseph | Lambert, Richard (Wilts, Cricklade) | Roberts, George H. (Norwich) |
| Clynes, John R. | Lansbury, George | Roberts, Sir J. H. (Denbighs.) |
| Collins, Godfrey P. (Greenock) | Law, Hugh A. (Donegal, West) | Robertson, Sir G. Scott (Bradford) |
| Collins, Stephen (Lambeth) | Lawson, Sir W. (Cumb'rld., Cockerm'th) | Robertson, John M. (Tyneside) |
| Compton-Rickett, Rt. Hon. Sir J. | Lewis, John Herbert | Robinson, Sidney |
| Condon, Thomas Joseph | Logan, John William | Roch, Walter F. (Pembroke) |
| Corbett, A. Cameron | Lough, Rt. Hon. Thomas | Roche, Augustine (Louth) |
| Cornwall, Sir Edwin A. | Low, Sir Frederick (Norwich) | Roche, John (Galway, E.) |
| Cory, Sir Clifford John | Lundon, Thomas | Rose, Sir Charles Day |
| Cotton, William Francis | Lyell, Charles Henry | Rowlands, James |
| Cowan, William Henry | Lynch, Arthur Alfred | Runciman Rt. Hon. Walter |
| Craig, Herbert J. (Tynemouth) | Macdonald, J. R. (Leicester) | St. Maur, Harold |
| Crawshay-Williams, Eliot | Macdonald, J. M. (Falkirk Burghs) | Samuel, J. (Stockton-on-Tees) |
| Crumley, Patrick | MacGhee, Richard | Scanlan, Thomas |
| Dalziel, Sir James H. (Kirkcaldy) | MacNeill, John Gordon Swift | Schwann, Rt. Hon. Sir Charles E. |
| Davies, Ellis William (Eifion) | MacVeagh, Jeremiah | Scott, A. MacCallum (Glasgow, Bridgeton) |
| Davies, Timothy (Lincs., Louth) | M'Callum, John M. | Seely, Col., Rt. Hon. J. E. B. |
| Davies, S. W. Howell (Bristol, S.) | McKenna, Rt. Hon. Reginald | Sheehy, David |
| Davies, M. Vaughan (Cardigan) | M'Laren, H. D. (Leices.) | Sherwell, Arthur James |
| Dawes, J. A. | M'Laren, F. W. S. (Linc., Spalding) | Shortt, Edward |
| Delany, William | M'Laren, Walter S. B. (Ches., Crewe) | Simon, Sir John Allsebrook |
| Dickinson, W. H. | M'Micking, Major Gilbert | Smith, Albert (Lancs., Clitheroe) |
| Donelan, Captain A. | Markham, Arthur Basil | Smith, H. B. Lees (Northampton) |
| Doris, William | Marks, George Croydon | Smyth, Thomas F. (Leitrim, S.) |
| Duffy, William J. | Martin, Joseph | Snowden, Philip |
| Duncan, C. (Barrow-in-Furness) | Mason, David M. (Coventry) | Soares, Ernest |
| Edwards, Enoch (Hanley) | Masterman, C. F. G. | Spicer, Sir Albert |
| Edwards, Sir Francis (Radnor) | Meagher, Michael | Stanley, Albert (Staffs, W.) |
| Edwards, John Hugh (Glamorgan, Mid) | Meehan, Francis E. (Leitrim, N.) | Strachey, Sir Edward |
| Elibank, Rt. Hon. Master of | Meehan, Patrick A. (Queen's Co.) | Strauss, Edward A. (Southwark, West) |
| Elverston, Harold | Menzies, Sir Walter | Sutherland, John E. |
| Esmonde, Dr. John (Tipperary, N.) | Millar, James Duncan | Tennant, Harold John |
| Esmonde, Sir Thomas (Wexford, N.) | Molloy, Michael | Thomas, Abel (Carmarthen, E.) |
| Essex, Richard Walter | Molteno, Percy Alport | Thomas, J. H. (Derby) |
| Esslemont, George Birnie | Money, L. G. Chiozza | Thorne, G. R. (Wolverhampton) |
| Falconer, James | Mooney, John J. | Thorne, William (West Ham) |
| Ferens, Thomas Robinson | Morgan, George Hay | Toulmin, George |
| Ffrench, Peter | Morrell, Philip | Trevelyan, Charles Philips |
| Fitzgibbon, John | Morton, Alpheus Cleophas | Ure, Rt. Hon. Alexander |
| Gelder, Sir W. A. | Muldoon, John | Verney, Sir Harry |
| Ginnell, Laurence | Munro, Robert | Walton, Sir Joseph |
| Glanville, Harold James | Munro-Ferguson, Rt. Hon. R. C. | Ward, John (Stoke-upon-Trent) |
| Goddard, Sir Daniel Ford | Neilson, Francis | Ward, W. Dudley (Southampton) |
| Goldstone, Frank | Nicholson, Charles N. (Doncaster) | Wardle, George J. |
| Greenwood, Granville G. (Peterborough) | Nolan, Joseph | Waring, Walter |
| Greig, Colonel James William | Norman, Sir Henry | Warner, Sir Thomas Courtenay |
| Griffith, Ellis Jones | Norton, Capt. Cecil W. | Wason, Rt. Hon. E. (Clackmannan) |
| Guest, Hon. Frederick E. (Dorset, E.) | Nugent, Sir Walter Richard | Wason, John Cathcart (Orkney) |
| Gwynn, Stephen Lucius (Galway) | O'Brien, Patrick (Kilkenny) | Watt, Henry A. |
| Hackett, John | O'Brien, William (Cork) | Webb, H. |
| Hancock, J. G. | O'Connor, John (Kildare, N.) | Wedgwood, Josiah C. |
| Harcourt, Rt. Hon. L. (Rossendale) | O'Connor, T. P. (Liverpool) | White, Sir George (Norfolk) |
| Harcourt, Robert V. (Montrose) | O'Doherty, Philip | White, Sir Luke (York, E.R.) |
| Harvey, T. E. (Leeds, W.) | O'Dowd, John | White, Patrick (Meath, North) |
| Harvey, W. E. (Derbyshire, N. E.) | Ogden, Fred | Whitehouse, John Howard |
| Haslam, Lewis (Monmouth) | O'Grady, James | Whittaker, Rt. Hon. Sir Thomas P. |
| Havelock-Allan, Sir Henry | O'Kelly, James (Roscommon, N.) | Whyte, A. F. |
| Hayden, John Patrick | O'Malley, William | Wiles, Thomas |
| Hayward, Evan | O'Shaughnessy, P. J. | Wilkie, Alexander |
| Henderson, Arthur (Durham) | O'Sullivan, Timothy | Wilson, Hon. G. G. (Hull, W.) |
| Henderson, J. M. (Aberdeen, W.) | Palmer, Godfrey Mark | Wilson, Henry J. (York, W.) |
| Herbert, Col. Sir Ivor | Parker, James (Halifax) | Wilson, W. T. (Westhoughton) |
| Higham, John Sharp | Pearce, Robert (Staffs., Leek) | Winfrey, Richard |
| Hinds, John | Parce, William (Limehouse) | Wood, T. M'Kinnon (Glasgow) |
| Hodge, John | Pease, Rt. Hon. Joseph A. (Rotherham) | Young, William (Perth, East) |
| Holt, Richard Durning | Phillips, John (Longford, S.) | Yoxall, Sir James Henry |
| Horne, C. Silvester (Ipswich) | Pickersgill, Edward Hare | |
| Howard, Hon. Geoffrey | Pirle, Duncan Vernon | TELLERS FOR THE NOES.—Mr. Illingworth and Mr. Gulland. |
| Hughes, Spencer Leigh | Pointer, Joseph | |
| Hunter, William (Lanark, Govan) |
§ Mr. SPEAKERThe next Instruction standing in the name of the hon. and learned Member for South Bucks (Sir Alfred Cripps) proposes "That it be an Instruction to the Committee that they have power not to proceed with the consideration of the Clauses of the Bill until the Constitution of the Second Chamber mentioned in the Preamble has been determined." With regard to that, I should say that the hon. and learned Member's proposal seems to me to negative the decision to which the House came when it passed the Resolution "that this Bill be now read a second time." If the Instruction of the hon. and learned Member were passed the Bill would be set aside, and none of the Clauses could be considered, and some other Bill not yet introduced would be taken up; therefore, I think the Instruction is not in order on those grounds. With regard to the Instruction standing in the name of the hon. Member for Banffshire (Captain Waring), it proposes "to limit the scope of the Bill to such measures as are set out in the Preamble thereof." This limitation can be imposed without any Instruction, and the Instruction is, therefore, unnecessary. The next Instruction, standing in the name of the hon. Baronet the Member for Wandsworth (Sir Henry Kimber), contains two parts. The first part deals with a proposal "to insert provisions for the rectification of the representation of the people in this House by a redistribution of the seats," and that is beyond the scope of this measure. The second part of the hon. Baronet's Instruction provides "That the remainder of the Bill shall not take effect until after a General Election and the adoption of the Bill by a new Parliament." That is out of order, because it can be done by process of limitation in Committee. There is another Instruction, standing in the name of the hon. Member for Enfield (Mr. Newman), which deals with the composition of the Lower House, and that is beyond the scope of this Bill. With regard to the Instruction standing in the name of the hon. Member for Carlisle (Mr. Denman) it proposes "To add provisions further adjusting the relationship between the two Houses of Parliament by removing the disabilities which prevent Peers from being elected Members of the House of Commons." That is beyond the scope of this Bill, and the same remark applies to the Instruction standing in the name of the hon. Member for South Devon (Mr. Mildmay), which proposes "To insert provisions enabling Peers to vote at Parlia 1850 mentary elections." That is beyond the scope of this Bill.
§ Mr. MILDMAYAs this Bill places a peer in the position of being subject to taxation without representation, may I urge, Mr. Speaker, that it is within the scope of the Bill to correct a position which I think every hon. Member of this House will regard as being impossible to last permanently.
§ Mr. SPEAKERThat is a point on the merits which the hon. Member can urge as a reason against the Clauses of the Bill. I must also point out to the hon. Member that his Instruction is out of order because it is a mandatory Instruction, and you cannot give mandatory Instructions to a Committee of the whole House.
Bill considered in Committee.
§ (IN THE COMMITTEE.)
§ [Mr. EMMOTT in the Chair.]
§ Mr. GINNELLOn a point of Order. I desire to call your attention to three Amendments to the enacting Clauses—not the Preamble—which are incorrectly printed on the last sheet of Amendments. One of them stands in my name. It proposes——
§ The CHAIRMANIf that is the case we will deal with it when we come to it. It is not the occasion now for asking questions about an amendment to which we have not come.
§ Mr. GINNELLMy point of Order is to ask you——
§ The CHAIRMANIf the hon. Member is dealing with the enacting words, they are not open to Amendment.
§ Mr. GINNELLIs it your ruling that a Committee of the whole House is incompetent to touch the enacting Clause?
§ The CHAIRMANWe do not deal with the enacting words.
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cc1850-939
- CLAUSE 1.—(Powers of House of Lords as to Money Bill.) 39,004 words, 2 divisions