HC Deb 26 July 1909 vol 8 cc855-973

Motion made and question proposed, "That a sum, not exceeding £3,148,200, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the expenses of the Personnel for Shipbuilding, Repairs, Maintenance, etc., including the cost of Establishments of Dockyards and Naval Yards at Home and Abroad, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1910."

The FIRST LORD of the ADMIRALTY (Mr. R. McKENNA)

The form in which the Navy Votes were introduced in the early part of the year—a form which, I think, under the circumstances, was convenient—has required that I should make some brief statement to the Committee before the general discussion on the Vote opens. Provision was made in the ordinary way in the Estimates for four large armoured ships. These four ships were definitely announced in the programme, and money was taken in the Vote for the early stages of their building. In addition, however, to these four ships, a contingent programme was referred to in the Estimates of a further four large armoured ships; the Government, in the Estimates, specifically asked for powers, or rather, they gave notice that they would ask for powers to expedite the construction of these second four large armoured ships, although no monetary provisions for them was actually made. It has been from time to time promised that a definite announcement should be given of the official decision of the Government as regards these second four ships when Vote 8 came to be discussed. This novel form has, amongst other advantages, given occasion for the exercise of a considerable amount of wit and ingenuity. We have had the classical couplet of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dover (Mr. G. Wyndham), and we have had various epithets ascribed to these four ships, such as "phantom ships," "hypothetical ships," and "mythical ships," which were meant, I think, to cast ridicule upon the method which had been adopted by the Government. Now, how does this form of procedure actually stand? No matter what had been in the Estimates when laid on the Table in March, 1909, no action would have been taken up to the present moment in respect of these second four ships. It would have been a perfectly idle declaration of intention if they had been included, no action following upon the decision. We have in past years seen the result of this definite laying down of programmes in anticipation of the requirements of the moment. In each of the years 1903–4, 1904–5, 1905–6, and 1906–7, after a programme had been definitely declared to Parliament, it was substantially reduced later in the year by the Government of the day. A programme which is decided and presented to Parliament in February or March of one year and has not to be concluded until the March of the year after, must necessarily always be open to amendment and alteration. There is a further circumstance in the present year which strengthens the case for this method of procedure. I have not looked into the facts, but I should say, for the first time within the memory of any hon. Member of this House, the Government are not only laying down battleships in the course of the financial year, but it is their hope and expectation that two of those battleships will be launched as well as laid down in the course of the year; that is to say, they have made their programme is immediate and real as possible. Ships have not been put in the programme upon which money is only to be expended in the last month of the financial year. One ship has already been laid down this month, and another is to be laid down in the course of the next ten days; and in respect of those ships ample financial provision has had to be made in the course of the present year. The one vital thing in presenting the programme to the Committee is that the presentment should not be delayed beyond the moment at which the final definite order ought to be given. I am able to assure the Committee this moment has not yet passed—whatever view the Committee may take as to the final decision which the Government has come to in regard to their programme, I can assure the Committee that the delay has not been in the least injurious. After very anxious and careful examination of the conditions of shipbuilding in foreign countries, the Government have come to the conclusion that it is desirable to take all the necessary steps to ensure that the second four ships referred to in this year's programme should be completed by March, 1912. They propose to take all the necessary steps in the way of the preparation of plans, getting out specifications, and invitations to tender, and, finally, giving orders which will procure the delivery of these ships at the time I have named. As was stated in the month of March, there will be no need to lay down the keels of these ships in the course of the present financial year. It will be quite time enough if the keels are ready in the month of April next. It is also not certain—although liability in respect of these ships will be incurred—that any payment will have to be made in the course of the present financial year, but if any such liability becomes due for discharge before 31st March, a Supplementary Estimate will be, in due course, introduced next February or March, in order to authorise the payment of the necessary money.

The examination of the state of foreign shipbuilding programmes, to which I have referred, I think is bound to lead the minds of hon. Members of this Committee to the conclusion that the Government had no other course open to them. The Committee had stated to them last March very amply what was the condition of foreign shipbuilding up to that date. Since then the development of shipbuilding in foreign J countries has proceeded apace. Two countries—Italy and Austria—have now declared a definite programme of four large armoured ships of the latest type. In Italy one of these ships has already been laid down, the second is to be laid down immediately, and the remaining two are to be laid down the course of the present year. With regard to the Austrian programme, sceptics may say that they will not believe in it until as, in the case of Italy, they see (the keels laid down. But the fact remains that every earnest has been given of the determination of the Austrian Government in this matter. Two large slips have been prepared for the construction of battleships of the larger size, and a floating dock, capable of lifting 23,000 tons, is actually under construction by the Austrian Government at this moment. These facts all point beyond doubt to the conclusion that the Austrian programme of four battleships of large size is, like the Italian programme, an actual reality.

Then, as regards later information on the subject of the type of ship, I have to inform the Committee that with regard to type a change has been introduced in the programme of the Admiralty since last March. I think, although I have not turned up the reference, I then stated it was proposed that the two July ships and the two November ships should be battleships. The Admiralty has now come to the conclusion that one of the November ships should not be a battleship, but should be an improved cruiser. We have information of cruisers which are more powerful and faster than the "Invincibles" and the "Indomitables," and I think the Committee will agree that, as the safety of our commerce depends on our being able, if necessary, to outrun and capture any hostile cruiser, it is incumbent upon us to build cruisers of even greater speed than the leviathans we have at the present moment. I do not propose to say anything with regard to our intentions as to the hypothetical ships which have now become real, because, as no order will have to be given for a considerable time in respect of the hulls of these ships, it is undesirable to bind ourselves at the present moment.

Mr. JOHN DILLON

May I interpose a question? Have the Germans anticipated, or have they adhered to, their understanding given to the Foreign Office in regard to shipbuilding?

Mr. McKENNA

I did not think it desirable to go into these matters, but the hon. Member has addressed a question to me and I will answer it very briefly. Three years ago a most earnest expression of desire was made on behalf of the British Government of the day to curtail and restrict the rapid growth of armaments both in this and in foreign countries. It is evident that no individual country can stand by itself in that, except in the minds of some persons who have more sanguine views of the possibilities of international relations than I regret to say than I am able to myself hold.

Mr. MURRAY MACDONALD

To what is the right hon. Gentleman referring?

Mr. McKENNA

I am referring to the speeches made by the late Prime Minister, who, on more than one occasion—and I believe in that he was joined by the present Prime Minister, who was then Chancellor of the Exchequer—expressed a most earnest desire that there should be a curtailment in the rate of shipbuilding.

Mr. MURRAY MACDONALD

That was two years ago, not three?

Mr. McKENNA

I am speaking of the year 1906–7. The British Government not only expressed its desire, but by something much stronger than words showed its determination to give the lead in restricting armaments, and for three successive years the British Government did its utmost to convince the world of the futility of its race in armaments and of the desirability of curtailing construction. During those three years the British Government laid down eight large armoured ships; three in the first, three in the second, and two in the third. During the same period the German Government has laid down eleven large ironclads, one in the first year, five in the second, and five in the third. In the third year of that time four belonged only to the programme of the year, the fifth was laid down last year under the programme of the current year. That was an acceleration, and here I reply to the hon. Gentleman who put a question to me—that was an acceleration, which is admitted, and of which the only j possible explanation that can be given is, I that it was desirable, in the opinion of the German Government, to have the ship I completed as early as possible. We have; laid down, as I say, in the last three years eight large armoured ships, as against the German eleven.

It is possible to continue upon the same lines, to go on year after year in pursuance of the highest aim, and to await the development that might occur, at the end of 10 or 12 years, but it is perfectly obvious that if starting from a given date we continue to lay down, let us say, no more large armoured ships than a foreign power, then in 10 or 15 years from that given date our superiority at sea will have disappeared. I do not say that in the year 1909, as the result of our having laid down eight ships as against the German eleven, there is the faintest ground for alarm. Our superiority is such that we can afford to wait, and we can afford to show the earnestness of our desire to decrease armaments without running any ultimate risk, but I submit to the general judgment of the Committee that after three years' experience it would not be safe to continue, and that the time has now come, failing arrangement—an arrangement which this Government are always willing to make—that failing arrangement we are bound to take the necessary steps to secure our predominance at sea, not only now, but in the future. It is on that ground, and that ground alone, that I shall venture at the conclusion of this day's discussion to ask the Committee to sanction the Vote which has already been introduced to them.

Mr. ARTHUR LEE

I wish sincerely that it were within my power unreservedly to congratulate the Government upon the decision which they have just announced to the Committee. It is true that they have now carried out the letter of the undertaking which they gave to the House in March, but I cannot think that they have carried out that undertaking in the spirit in which it should have been carried out, still less can I say that they have satisfied the opinions and the demands which have been put before the country by those sitting in this section of the House. The right hon. Gentleman has told us, it is true, that the Government has now decided or, at any rate, has now announced for the first time that they propose to make the four contingent—hypothetical ships, I think the right hon. Gentleman called them—the four hypothetical ships a certainty, but he has also told us that the keels of those ships will not be laid during the present financial year. I would go with the right hon. Gentleman to this extent—I would say it is better than nothing, but I do not think it is what it should be, and I will proceed to develop that argument in a few moments. Let us come to the facts. The right hon. Gentleman has said that the keels of these four extra ships will be laid after the end of the present financial year, but he has admitted that no money is provided for them in the Estimates of this year, but if any money should be spent—so I understood him—a Supplementary Estimate will be brought in. May I deal here, parenthetically, with the ridiculous and dishonest charge which has been brought against us on this side of the House who have been demanding that these whole eight ships should be laid down at the earliest possible moment, that we have been asking for the ships and we have been unwilling to pay. To adopt the language of the right hon. Gentleman, the charge really contains neither wit nor ingenuity. No, Sir; it is not true, nor is it worthy, I think, of being dignified as a classic couplet. We have not been asked to pay for any of these ships in the Budget which is now before the House; not one single shilling has been taken in the present Estimates to pay for these ships, and even if there were, I do not think we are bound in any case, because we want some ships, to endorse any wild cat schemes for raising the money, which the Government choose to introduce. At any rate, with regard to the announcement which the right hon. Gentleman has just made, I hope he will excuse me if my suspicions are somewhat aroused, because I do not really know how—I doubt whether any Member of the Committee knows—whether these four extra ships belong to this year's programme or next year's programme. A very prominent journal that supports right hon. Gentlemen opposite, the "Manchester Guardian," has distinctly stated that when the announcement is made the four ships belong to next year's programme, that will reduce us to the position that the whole programme of the Government would consist of four battleships this year and possibly four next, which we should regard as an utterly inadequate provision. The right hon. Gentleman says the Government has been doing everything that is desirable, and that if necessary they will introduce a Supplementary Estimate. What the right hon. Gentleman did not tell ns was when the orders for these ships were going to be given, and, if the orders are given and preparations are to proceed, he did not tell us how these preparations are to be paid for. Are they going to be paid for by the contractors? Are contractors going to advance the money to the Government during the interval between now and next Parliament?

Mr. McKENNA

If any money becomes payable we shall have a Supplementary Estimate. I stated that.

Mr. ARTHUR LEE

The right hon. Gentleman also told us that the keels were going to be laid about the 1st of April. Obviously a great deal of work has to be done before that, according to the Memorandum which he issued last March. Who is going to pay for the work? Is it to be paid for by the Government beforehand, or is the money going to be advanced by the contractors? I really think the right hon. Gentleman might enlighten us a little with regard to the finance of this question. It seems to me that the proposal which he has made is hopelessly unbusinesslike, and I am not even sure that it is perfectly honest, because if the money is to be advanced it is quite certain that ultimately the taxpayers will have to suffer by the increased cost of these particular ships. There is one other possible solution to which I refer with the greatest reluctance. Are these four extra ships, or any of them, to form part of the ships which may be provided by the Colonies? We have heard nothing more since the Government accepted in a tentative way the spontaneous and generous offers which were made by the Colonies. Are the Government going to take advantage of these offers, not to increase the total strength of the Navy and the Empire, but to relieve their financial necessities during the current year? Then the right hon. Gentleman has given us a very serious and alarming picture of the progress of shipbuilding in foreign countries. What are the reasons, because he advanced none, why the commencement of these ships should be postponed until the next financial year? The right hon. Gentleman told us in March last that an interval of three months would have to elapse between the giving of the order and the actual laying down of the ship, and I understand from the answer to a question to-day that that interval was corroborated in the case of two ships which were to be laid down in July this year. They were ordered, I understand, in March. If the Government is going now to collect materials and give orders and so forth, why is the actual laying down of the keels to be postponed until one day after the end of the present financial year? If they were ordered now, as they might well be, there is no reason why their keels should not be laid, at any rate, by the beginning of November, in which case these four ships might be actually ready by November, 1911, which is the beginning of the critical period about which so much was said in the Debates of last March. A further advantage of that would be that they would, by taking that action, relieve, at any rate to a small extent, the crushing burden which is now bound to fall upon the Naval Estimates of next year and the year following.

In connection with this matter, we feel that there are three main counts in the indictment which we feel it our duty to bring against the Government, and they deal with three different periods. In the first place, there was the original starving of the shipbuilding programme during the years to which the right hon. Gentleman has referred with, I think, a great deal of unnecessary satisfaction, 1906–7, 1907–8, and 1908–9, during which the Government saw fit to mutilate what was known as the Cawdor programme. Very extraordinary language has been used about the Cawdor programme by prominent Members of the Government during the last few months. The Prime Minister went so far as to describe it as an electioneering pamphlet. Does it look like an electioneering pamphlet? I have not studied the electioneering literature on the right hon. Gentleman's side, but it must be very dull reading if it is of that description. It is almost as appropriate to describe the Budget as a political squib. But that was nothing to the language which was used by the first Lord of the Admiralty in reply to a question during the last fortnight or so. I do not wish to accuse him of deliberate misrepresentation, but it is very difficult to account for the language which he used with regard to the Cawdor programme. He said, by dropping it as the Government have done, you have only lost one ship. The Cawdor programme only referred to four ships for one year, and if it had been maintained we should at present have had, either completed or under construction, only one more ship than we have. Of course it is known by everyone—I think the Prime Minister boasted of it—that by not following the programme we have not constructed four ships, which we should otherwise have constructed.

Mr. McKENNA

On page 7 of the Cawdor programme these words occur:— The Board have come to the conclusion that the right policy is to make up their programme of shipbuilding for the next year only.

Mr. ARTHUR LEE

That is a very characteristic remark of the right hon. Gentleman. He takes one portion of one paragraph, and tries to make out that that is the whole of the case. I have page 7 of the Cawdor programme, and it says:— At the present time strategic requirements necessitates the output of four large armoured ships annually, and unless unforeseen contingencies arise this number will not be exceeded. Then the passage to which the right hon. Gentleman refers, it is scarcely believable after his interruption, was merely used as a reason for not exceeding the number of four ships, because it went on to say that if the occasion for a bigger programme should arise our facilities will enable us to deal with it. I am really beginning to be sorry I acquitted the right hon. Gentleman of deliberate misrepresentation. Then I come to the second count of the indictment, that is, the unaccountable inaction of the Government during the period from November, 1908, when they first knew, according to their own account, of the German acceleration, until March, 1909. I will not discuss that now, because we dealt with it fully in March. I come now to the third point, the inexcusable inaction of the Government since March of this year. Various Members of the Government made speeches in March, which were not only informing to the House of Commons and the country, but excited very genuine and justifiable alarm, and surely these speeches, in which they revealed the facts of foreign shipbuilding programmes, should have been followed by immediate and strenuous action. I cannot see what possible excuse there was for those speeches unless the perils which the Government then revealed were to be instantly dealt with, and steps taken to meet them. What is the excuse for the delay which is now taking place? What is the excuse for postponing the construction of those four ships until next April? The right hon. Gentleman tells us that delay will be in no sense injurious. Of course we are not in possession of the facts which the Government have, but we are not at all reassured by what the right hon. Gentleman has told us about foreign shipbuilding programmes. He has done nothing to lessen the impression which was created by his own speech, by the speech of the Prime Minister, and by the speech of the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, when we learned not only of the acceleration of the German programme, which was serious enough in itself, but, still more, of the immense increase in the German capacity which had been created in the course of the last few years.

The right hon. Gentleman has just told us that during the last few years the British Government has only laid down eight battleships, whilst one Power, Germany, has laid down eleven. Surely there is nothing in that to allay our fears. The Government told us in March that the laying down of these four extra ships was-contingent upon the German acceleration being realised, but the right hon. Gentleman at this point is reticent, no doubt very properly, and does not tell us to what extent these anticipations have been realised. He does not tell us what is the position to-day, but if, as we gather from his remarks, and still more from his subsequent silence, that anticipation is as serious as the Government feared, I cannot see what possible excuse the Government has for this delay of several months in commencing the four extra ships. The right hon. Gentleman has not told us what the Admiralty has been doing during these four months. We have been glad to hear at Question-time to-day that the two July ships had either been laid down or were to be laid down immediately, and it was hoped they would be completed by July, 1911. As regards the November ships, he only told us that one of them was to be of a new and improved type. I do not wish to cross-examine him on that point, but he did not tell us whether the orders had been given, and, if so, when the ships would be completed. But what is of far more importance than the question of these individual ships is what has the Government done in the meantime, since they made those alarming speeches, to expand the national shipbuilding plant, and particularly in this controlling matter of gun-mounting? I presume the Government must have done something, and the right hon. Gentleman might have extended his remarks sufficiently to tell us what they have done. But whatever the Government has done in the way of expanding the plant, that plant cannot be maintained in an efficient condition without orders and without work being given out. The Germans have realised that sufficiently well, as we know from the case of Krupp. We hear at last that the Government have given a trial order to a great English firm, but we do not know yet what the extent of the order is. I think the right hon. Gentleman ought to have given us some information upon this point, which is really of far greater importance in the whole of its potentialities than the mere question of the four ships, or the actual date at which it is proposed to lay them down.

But there is one thing which the Government has done since March; they have practically and publicly abandoned the two-Power standard. At any rate, they have deprived it of all meaning by mischievous qualifications, which I do not believe are understood by any Member of this House, and still less understood in the country. We are in this discussion necessarily confined to-day within certain narrow limits, because it is not in order to discuss anything which does not appear within the limits of the Vote. We have to keep strictly to the question of shipbuilding. I am aware that we shall be met later on with the statement that "Dreadnoughts" are not everything. We shall hear a great deal about the pre-"Dreadnought" ships, and whilst, of course, it is an undeniable fact that "Dreadnoughts" are not everything, I think it is also becoming quite clear that the advent of the "Dreadnought" has prematurely aged the ships which came before it. There was a very interesting reply given to the hon. Member for King's Lynn the other day in regard to this question, and I feel bound to refer to it because I shall not have another opportunity pro- bably of taking part in this discussion. I refer to it because it is against the argument which is being used by the opponents of a larger shipbuilding programme for the present year. It has become clear from the answer which the right hon. Gentleman gave that the life of a pre-"Dreadnought," which has already I think been put at much too long a time—it has been called 20 years—has been very materially shortened by the advent of these new ships. In the particular reply which the right hon. Gentleman gave he disclosed a very interesting and serious fact, and that is, that the bulk of our pre-"Dreadnoughts" are older than the bulk of the pre-"Dreadnoughts" of our chief rival. I do not wish to trouble the House with figures, but whilst we have 40 pre-"Dreadnoughts" at the present moment, taking the line of obsolescence which now comes down just below the "Majestic" class, which, therefore, stands about 15 years, we shall have only 26 ships above that line in 1912, and not 40. We shall have only 14 in 1914, and only nine in 1917. At the same period there will be individual foreign powers which will have a larger number of these pre-"Dreadnought" ships of efficient life than we shall have. Therefore, whilst it is perfectly true that we have a marked superiority in this class of ship, our superiority is not going to be maintained, or even maintained relatively, and therefore it becomes unfortunately the fact that we are- coming nearer and nearer such an evolution of fleets that in the matter of battleships "Dreadnoughts" alone will count, and that I think forces upon the Government the necessity of proceeding at the last possible moment and without any unnecessary delay to establish superiority in that class of ship. What are they doing? They are proposing at the best, even with these' four ships which are to be laid down, a margin of superiority of only three of those ships over one Power in the spring of 1912. Twenty is the number the Government expect to have at that time. They admit that Germany will have 17.

Mr. McKENNA

Is this the minimum?

Mr. A. LEE

I do not say whether that is the maximum or minimum. Surely the Government are not going to take risks, of that description. They say that the Germans may have 17. It is also a great question whether upon the time-table off building the Government are adopting they will have 12 ships by March, 1912. If they look at the time taken to build the last battleships of this class they will find that the time required to build is nearer two years and five months than two years. That is an additional reason why we feel that if these ships are necessary—and the Government have given overwhelming reasons why they are—in March, 1912, they ought to be begun not later than October of this year. Our delays in this matter of shipbuilding are becoming chronic. The ideal period of two years which the Admiralty has professed has never been realised in practice except in the case of the "Dreadnought" itself, which, as is well known, was constructed on an experimental method of building. We hear now that the later ships, "St. Vincent" and "Collingwood," are delayed also, and there is no indication from the experience of the past that these ships will be ready in less than two years and five months. But another reason which we have for beginning these ships at the earliest possible date is that they really constitute arrears in our shipbuilding policy. There is one ship of the 1906–7 programme, one ship of the 1907–8 programme, and two ships of the 1908–9 programme which would have been laid down under the terms of the Cawdor Memorandum which have still not been built, and whilst the Prime Minister congratulates us on the fact that these ships are not built, it nevertheless does not alter the fact that they are not built, and are still in the nature of arrears.

That brings to me what is really, I believe, the vital point in this question of our shipbuilding programme. If these ships are not cleared out of the way at the earliest possible moment, our shipbuilding plant, which, as we know, is limited, and which is certainly not greater in its potentialities than that of Germany, will be clogged in future, and should it become necessary, as we hear it may, that we should have to meet a sudden spurt on the part of a rival with shipbuilding powers equal to our own, we would have our shipbuilding plant partially clogged by the work of these arrears. Surely it is essential that we should on the first opportunity clear the decks in order that we should have the whole of our shipbuilding plant available to meet any sudden extension it may be necessary to make in reply to any further accelerations that may take place in the German programme, but we shall not be able to do that, now that our shipbuilding capacities are approximately equal, unless we get rid of all arrears in the meantime. The Cawdor Memorandum claimed, and I think it was correctly claimed at the time it was written, that we could always overtake foreign programmes in consequence of our resources and power of rapid construction. Unfortunately that is not true now.

I think, therefore, the whole key of the situation, upon which too much attention cannot be concentrated, is the relative building capacities of this country and our chief foreign rival. With regard to that the Government admit now, whatever they admitted in the month of March, that they did not know, as they thought they did, what the German shipbuilding capacity was. They think they know now, but have they any certainty as to what is possible in the way of output? The information was difficult enough to get then, and I imagine it is more difficult to get now. At any rate, we know for certain that the German capacity has got up to a point where it can turn out in every particular eight "Dreadnoughts" a year, and I am afraid it is even greater than that. Are we really to assume that that plant and that capacity could never and will not be used? Is it not, therefore, vital that we should be prepared with unencumbered plant to meet any sudden spurt which a foreign Power might engage in in 1910? The Government said, "We cannot afford to take any risks." I venture to suggest that they are taking very serious risks, because the First. Lord of the Admiralty said in March that neither this nor any Board of Admiralty can foresee what may possibly happen this time next year, or even in two years' time. And yet, in spite of this, the Government appear to have ignored any possibility of this German expansion. They, with their eyes open, admitted that they knew in 1906 that this great expansion was taking place in Krupp's works. They stated that they knew it at the time, and that it has been going on continuously ever since, and yet they took no action whatever, apparently, to provide against it, or to make any provision for any sort of counteraction. Did they make any corresponding expansion of our plant, particularly in the matter of gun-mountings? Did they make any arrangements with private firms for making a larger output of those essentials in the production of battleships? No, Sir, so far as I can make out, all they did was this: They knew there was a private firm which had, perhaps, the most up-to-date plant for the construction of gun-mountings in the country. They left it idle for three years, and refused any kind of order, and it is only to-day that they have announced that they are going to give a trial order to that firm. There is one thing they did at that time. Since they first heard definitely in 1906 of the German expansion they reduced our Cawdor programme in the manner I have already indicated. They were aware of the German expansion, but took no action. What greater encouragement was it possible to give to an ambitious and determined rival? I do think that the Government are greatly to blame in this matter. They knew the circumstances according to their own statement. They knew that owing to the advent of the "Dreadnought" it was inevitable that a large portion of the difficulties of our rivals for catching up had been removed, and they then went in deliberately for the paralysing of our shipbuilding programme, which removed another portion of the difficulties of our rivals. It seems to me that their action was a direct incentive and a sufficient justification of the German spurt. Of course, we cannot expect that any foreign Power is now going to reduce the statutory programme which is part of their law, but I think if the Government now make it clear that they mean business, an end might be made to these foreign accelerations of programmes, and we might hope that when it is shown that we are wide awake we shall not be face to face in ensuing years with such a situation as we are surrounded with now, when we have to embark in one year on an unprecedented shipbuilding programme simply to make up for the arrears of the last three years. The Foreign Secretary told us in March that we were confronted with the task of rebuilding our entire Navy. Surely, if that is the case, it is high time that we began, and without any unnecessary delay; but yet the Government is proposing, according to the announcement made today, to delay another five or six months before they begin the next four ships, which are so necessary to maintain our position. The most alarming feature of the whole matter to me is that in all their calculations and programmes the Government appear to contemplate only a one-Power standard; they are working to a small margin of superiority over one-Power. They are not even doing that in the amount of money they are spending on shipbuilding, because, in the present year, we are spending less upon shipbuilding and armaments, which go together, than one of our rivals, that rival being Germany. "We say that in this matter the Government have betrayed what was hitherto our national policy—a two-Power standard—and their provision is not only insufficient, but really grossly inadequate, in view of the fact that it is almost incredible that we should be opposed in time of war, if that should unhappily come, by only one Power single-handed. They leave no margin whatever for the unexpected. According to their own account, they have left a margin of only one "Dreadnought" over one Power during the greater portion of the year 1911, and they are now providing for a probable—I will put it as high as that—margin of superiority of three of these ships over one Power in 1912. They are making no allowance at all for such likely contingencies as strikes, disasters at sea, or foreign accelerations of programme. They are allowing no margin whatever for a possible superiority in foreign designs, about which we know very little; for such matters as the ultimate destination of the three Brazilian ships; or for the Austrian and Italian programmes, which the right hon. Gentleman to-day tells us have become actual realities. Under these circumstances I think I am justified in saying that the Government are working not to a two-Power standard or anything like it, but, at the best, to a small margin of superiority over one Power, and that Power our chief naval rival in Europe.

It has been said, and said very truly, that battleships are not everything. If time permitted, a good deal might be said about the deficiencies of the Admiralty in regard to other types of ship, but I do not wish to delay the Committee by dealing with matters which are, after all, of subsidiary importance, and to deal with which other opportunities may occur. I will only say that in the matter of destroyers it appears to me that the Government have neglected their duties in a way which is perfectly unaccountable. The right hon. Gentleman has not thought the matter even worthy of being mentioned this afternoon in connection with this Vote, upon which alone it can be discussed. He has given no explanation whatever why practically the whole of the destroyer programme of this year has been postponed until next year. He does not tell us why he has taken only a token sum in the Estimates, or why, although the Government have sanctioned 43 destroyers during the time they have been in office, only two or three have been completed, only two or three more have been launched, and 20 have not even been laid down. He told us nothing about that, and yet the shortage of our Navy in that class of ship available for service in the North Sea is not only most serious, but notorious.

Our main charge against the Government is that, although they appear from their speeches to appreciate, and, indeed, have rubbed in with almost brutal emphasis, what are the perils of the situation, they are taking no adequate steps to provide against them. They are taking risks which would be inexcusable even in ordinary business competition, but which are positively criminal when the safety of the Empire is at stake. The unfortunate thing is that the Government apparently do not, or will not, realise that in this matter of naval expansion they are face to face with competitors who are absolutely impervious to sentiment, and who not only mean business but stick to it. The margin upon which the Government are proceeding is so narrow, even after their announcement of to-day, that it constitutes a national peril; and the menace is so real that these methods of optimism and false economy can no longer be tolerated. It is now forced upon us, not merely as a nation but as a united Empire, that we must not only work together for our mutual defence, but, if we are to be secured against the perils which the Government themselves have laid before us, embark upon a mutual scheme of defence—a scheme which I hope may possibly be worked out in the conference that the Government has just called, and one which will provide us, I hope, in the near future, with the power and the means to carry out a duty which this Government, for some reason or other, have not been able to assume.

Mr. JOHN ELLIS

I rise to move a reduction of the Vote by £100 for the purpose of discussing the expediency of the policy of the increase in Vote 8. I do not think it is necessary for me to refer in detail to the speech just delivered. There seemed to be a superabundance of strong adjectives running through that speech, in which the hon. Gentleman (Mr. A. Lee) called the policy of the Government "unbusinesslike," "dishonest," and so on, and if I appreciated the speech aright there was rather a craven note running through it all. Surely this great people have not lost their virility. Surely we do not want to stand up in this House with the note of fear and trembling which ran all through the speech of the hon. Gentleman opposite. We are face to face with a very serious occasion this afternoon. The question I wish to put to the Committee is, What is the road we are travelling; where do we mean to go? As the First Lord has already pointed out, during the last five or six years we saw for three years a diminution in what the Prime Minister has termed the "horrible, devastating, and sterilising expenditure upon armaments." Then two years ago we took another turn, and this year our total Navy Estimates have gone up by 8 per cent., and Vote 8 itself by 10 per cent., on the Estimates of the year. We have listened to what I will call, in contradistinction to the hon. Gentleman opposite, the very businesslike statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty, with grave concern. He announced that the Government were to lay down these four extra ships. I was glad to note that his speech was not quite on the plane of the speeches to which we listened from that bench on March 17th. At all events, I think the Navy scare is dead. It was an unworthy scare which put this great country in the eyes of foreign nations in a most humiliating position; but I am thankful to say that in the parts of which I know most, especially in the division which I represent, there is no Navy scare.

To return to the question which I wish to ask the Committee, Are we going back or forward in this matter of peace? In connection with this Shipbuilding Vote, which is, after all, the crux and core of the whole situation, it is needful to make a rather wider survey. In 1856, after the Crimean War, our naval expenditure stood at £19,000,000; and such was the determination of our forefathers in the direction of retrenchment, to which I hope the Prime Minister still yields the allegiance I have heard him utter, that within four years those Estimates were reduced by 38 per cent. Then came the days which many of us remember, when, standing in this very place, Lord Randolph Churchill announced himself a martyr to his view of economy. In 1889 our naval expenditure was only £13,000,000. In 1894 Mr. Gladstone felt himself unable to go on as a Member of the then Government because it was proposed to raise the Navy Votes. In 1897 we had the great military paraphernalia through the streets in connection with the Diamond Jubilee, and I well remember Sir John Mowbray saying to me, "Our good country will suffer for this military mania," and suffer it did, for in less than two years the Government had entered upon that most unhappy struggle in South Africa. Then we come to what I may call the modern epoch, 1903, when the naval expenditure was £31,000,000. In 1904 Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, also standing in this very place, who had been Chancellor of the Exchequer for more years than any Minister since the days of Mr. Pitt, said that he was unable to go on in the Government of the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Balfour) because of their reckless extravagance. [Mr. A. J. BALFOUR indicated dissent.] Do I understand the right hon. Gentleman to dissent?

Mr. BALFOUR

It is the first I have heard of it.

Mr. J. ELLIS

I have the words here, which I will read:— I had protested as Chancellor of the Exchequer for years against the growth. I had protested to my colleagues. I had protested to this House and I had endeavoured to show the country what I thought were the main dangers to our finances of that growth, because it must never be forgotten that that growth has been far in excess of the automatic growth of our revenue. My protests and my sermons were received with indifference. Had they been met with more sympathy I might not now be addressing the House from this place.

Mr. BALFOUR

I very well remember my conversations with my Noble Friend from the time I first became Prime Minister to the time he left the Administration of which he had been so long a Member, and there never was any controversy between us as to Naval matters.

Mr. J. ELLIS

I am quoting the words of Sir Michael Hicks-Beach:— Had they been met with more sympathy I might not now be addressing the House from this place. Surely this proves my case. There is nothing sacrosanct in these Naval Estimates in the actual figures that come before the House nor in the particular £15,800,000 that comes before us now. How are these figures arrived at? First, they go through the mill of the experts. We know what experts are. We know what Sir Robert Peel said about overwhelming this country in time of peace; and also the words of Lord Salisbury, that if we listened to experts we might soon be garrisoning the moon in order to protect it from Mars. I very well remember in one of the few private personal conversations which I had the honour of having with the late Mr. Gladstone what he said about experts in the services:— Throw reins on the neck of the services and they will ride you to destruction, and it is necessary to say these words here in this House about experts because of the astonishing claims that have been put forward in the public Press. We have been told actually that if the Board of Admiralty says that we must have a certain thing which was to cost a certain figure that was to settle the matter and wipe out the Cabinet altogether. The old doctrine was—and I give my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister credit for this that there will be the same doctrine under this Government—that the services must serve. Of course, I do not wish that we, as Members of Parliament, should attack in any way those members of the Civil Service, or the advisers of the Admiralty, or the War Office here in this place. It is these gentlemen on the Front Bench who are responsible, and who accept all responsibility, and it is with them that we must have our differences of opinion. Therefore I come to the Cabinet. Those who know most about what passes in the Cabinet speak about it the least, and it is marvellous how Cabinet secrets are kept seeing that soon afterwards they are known to 30 or 40 individuals, if you take the private secretaries into account. But without knowing what passes in the Cabinet nothing will ever persuade me that these Estimates come before the Cabinet and leave them in the same shape. Therefore there is no question, or at least the presumption is that this figure now before us has been altered, and when it comes down to the House of Commons it can be altered again. We have some bond of duty to criticise this figure. I come again—and I hope the right hon. Gentleman will not interpose once more—to Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, when he was an unofficial Member with no access to Cabinet secrets, and he said in this place, with regard to those estimates of 1904:— We have again seen an increase in the present year of £2,750,000 in the naval Estimates for which I am bound to say, in my opinion, sufficient reason has been given. I want to dispel the idea that things which come from the Ministers come in the form in which they must not be altered at all. That is not the old Parliamentary idea either in Debate or in Lobby.

Mr. BALFOUR

I do not wish to interrupt, but at the same time I do not wish that there should be any misconception. I quite admit that when he was Chancellor of the Exchequer, and after he ceased to be Chancellor of the Exchequer the present Lord St. Aldwyn never ceased to protest against the growth in the expenditure, and to say that he regarded it as a serious national danger. I hope my former interruption does not convey that this was not so. He always held that view. What he thinks of the present expenditure, I do not know.

Mr. J. ELLIS

The right hon. Gentleman has not dispelled anything that I have said. I am not going to enter into a detailed examination of this Vote for several reasons. In the first place I am no expert, thank Heaven; but this increase amounts to a very serious item. I have no doubt that there will be hon. Members following me. No doubt the hon. Member for King's Lynn (Mr. Bellairs) will probably show some defects even as it stands, but I do not enter into an examination of the details for another reason, because, as I understand, these matters of Navy and Army, and so on, are not, after all, very technical or departmental. Lord Randolph Churchill made a statement, which I will read—and I have it from a person, whose name I will not mention, that there never was anybody who went to the Treasury who so rapidly mastered all the details—and this is what he said:— The great question of public expenditure is not so technical or departmental as might be supposed by a superficial critic. Foreign policy and free expenditure upon armaments act and react upon one another … A wise foreign policy will extricate England from Continental struggles and keep her outside of German, Russian, French, or Austrian disputes. I hare for some time observed a tendency in the Government attitude to pursue a different line of action which I have not been able to modify or to check. This tendency is certain to be accentuated if large Estimates are presented to and voted by Parliament. The possession of a very sharp sword offers a temptation which becomes irresistible to demonstrate the efficiency of the weapon in a practical manner. I remember the vulnerable and scattered character of the Empire, the universality of our commerce, the peaceful tendencies of our democratic electorate, the hard times, the pressure of competition, and the high taxation now imposed, and with these factors vividly before me, I decline to be a party to encouraging the military and militant mode of the War Office and Admiralty to join in the high and desperate stakes which other nations seem to be forced to risk. Those words are as true to-day as they were when they were written. Happily, under Lord Lansdowne and Sir Edward Grey, our policy has been in the direction of peaceful and happy relations with foreign countries. Bead over the King's and Queen's Speeches for the last fifty years—the most authoritative declarations of the policies of the Ministers—and you cannot find four or five years during which these documents have been so saturated with assurances of peaceful and friendly relations abroad. The King's Speeches during the last four years have been a long catalogue of conferences, conventions, and agreements calculated to preserve peace.

As to Germany, I am bound to say I think it most unfortunate that we have drifted in a few weeks of this Session into this particular detail, into a comparison of the naval powers and capacities and internal affairs of a friendly foreign Power. Really, the spectacle of the present Prime Minister and the past Prime Minister getting up and explaining to one another and trying to make one another understand the particular number of ships that Germany was laying down is what I have never seen in this House of Commons before. It is most lamentable. As we have introduced Germany, let me remind the House that there is no quarrel between the two people. We have had international visits of Members of Parliament, municipal representatives, representatives of the Christian churches, trades unionists, and those who are supposed to represent more particularly the labourer; and then we have had the King. I do not want to introduce his name here. Still, do these things count for nothing? What is the outlook in this matter? Why is not it given? The one thing that is always visibly growing under our eyes is the solidarity of the people. Every year nations are becoming more and more dependent upon one another, feeding one another, clothing one another, financing one another, and sharing each other's ideas in philosophy and literature, exchanging the results of each other's discoveries in science, applying each other's advances in philanthropy to the protection of the weak and the uplifting of humanity. The possible occasions of war between them have been reduced rapidly by arbitration treaties. Their citizens have a common interest in utilising the fruits of their labour in the common struggle against poverty, crime, intemperance, and disease. I venture to press this aspect of the matter upon my hon. Friends. After all, we should not view this £15,000,000 entirely as a Shipbuilding Vote. It is the attitude of mind that counts, and, I regret to say, that through the hon. Gentleman's speech there was running a note of fear and of alarm. All through every sentence there was fear, jealousy, suspicion of our own neighbours. I suppose that the inhabitants of Mercia did not believe the word of a man in Northumbria, and a Welshman and an Englishman at one time did not believe one another. It we live in an atmosphere of suspicion, not £8,000,000 or £15,000,000 would be required for shipbuilding, and not £35,000"000 would be needed for the Navy, but £50,000,000 or £100,000,000 will become necessary. There is not only the increase of the figures this year, but there will be a great deal higher figures next year. We are entering upon a road of which no man can foresee the end. On the other hand, if we put down resolutely and firmly this demon of suspicion, I believe even now, at the eleventh hour, or if that hour has struck, even half an hour later, some effort should be made in the direction of international agreement. I was very glad to hear my right hon. Friend the First Lord say that the Government were always willing to keep an open ear in this matter. The situation in Europe reminds me of an incident which occurred in this House. Two hon. Members, as sometimes is the case, rather lost their self-control, and they wrangled one with the other, using very strong language, and looking at each other like angry dogs. Mr. Gladstone, I remember well, said: "He does himself most honour under present circumstances who first holds out the hand of friendship." I think that is the position among the nations of Europe. I commend that most respectfully and earnestly to the attention of my right hon. Friend, and ask him even now to consider the possibility of taking that course. I make this Motion with some reluctance in one respect. It is 15 years since I embarked on a similar enterprise, if I may use the word, and in making the present Motion I am sitting behind a friendly Government. I appreciate the arduous labours of the Cabinet in respect of this matter, and the high sense of responsibility with which they come to it. But we also have our responsibilities, and, with those in my mind, I, without the slightest hesitation—and with the conviction that I am doing not only my individual duty, but a duty I hold to those who have stood by me in Nottinghamshire for more than 20 years—make this Motion.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That a sum, not exceeding £3,148,100, be granted for the said service."

The PRIME MINISTER

I do not in the least degree complain of the Motion which has been made by my right hon. Friend. We all know the consistency and sincerity with which, now for more than twenty years, he has pleaded in this House for the cause of peace and friendly relations between nations. I am sure my right hon. Friend will believe that I and my colleagues are not in the least degree out of accord with the general sentiments which he has expressed. I have used, I think, as strong language as anybody in characterising this class of expenditure on the Army as well as on the Navy, and I do not believe that at this moment there is a more unproductive and wasteful form of expenditure going on in the world, or one which in the long run is more likely to tend to arrest the course of progress, and, I am sorry to add, to promote bad instead of good feeling between the nations. That is a view which I sincerely hold. I entirely agree with what my right hon. Friend said as to the impolicy, and the worse than impolicy if it can be avoided, in these matters when you are drawing— as I shall show in a moment you must draw—comparisons between the relative armaments of different peoples, of basing those comparisons on any assumption, either that they are or are likely to be animated by hostile sentiments, one to the other. Nothing can be further from the truth. The right hon. Gentleman said that the Leader of the Opposition and I occupied a considerable time in exchanging— —

Mr. JOHN ELLIS

I did not say "considerable time."

The PRIME MINISTER

Some little time, in what I can assure him was the most uncongenial task of exchanging figures as to German shipbuilding. The Leader of the Opposition will speak for himself, but for myself, I can assure my right hon. Friend that, so far from using those figures as containing any sort of indication that any conflict between Germany and ourselves was imminent, probable, or, I will venture to say, even reasonably conceivable, the conditions being as they are at the present moment, I was, on the contrary, most careful to say, as I think was the right hon. Gentleman himself, that there is not between us and Germany at this moment any quarrel of any sort or kind throughout the length and breadth of the civilised world, and if our diplomatic relations are conducted, as I hope they will be, with common consideration one for the other, there is no reason upon the horizon, as far as I can scan it, why any such difference should arise. My right hon. Friend will say, "If that be so, why do you not try to arrange for some kind of permanent basis of accommodation which will obviate the necessity for this great and growing and"(as I have described it) "sterilising expenditure?" We have tried it. That is exactly what we have been trying, and trying hard, to do during the last three years. Some people think we have overstepped the limits of what is prescribed by what is called "national dignity" in the efforts which we have made in that direction. I do not share that view. I think we did what was right. My lamented predecessor, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, had the strongest possible feeling on the subject, as everybody knows. My right hon. Friend the present Foreign Secretary has an equally strong feeling, and has done his best diplomatically to give expression to it. If our efforts have hitherto been frustrated, it has been through no want either of zeal or of effort on our part, and as my right hon. Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty said in his opening statement to-day, not only is the door still open, but we are anxious and even eager, if we can, to come to some arrangement as between ourselves and other Powers, which will prevent us year by year from coming to the House of Commons and making demands which are as unwelcome to us as they can be to any Member sitting on these benches. When I make that statement I am stating what is historically indisputable.

Let me go further. In this very matter of naval expenditure, since the present Government came into power, everyone must have observed, who listened to the speech of the hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Lee), that we have considerably contracted the scale at which expenditure was going on, and was mounting up at the time we came into office. If we had followed the prescriptions of the Cawdor Memorandum—I will not quarrel with the hon. Gentleman as to whether or not I was accurate in describing it as an electioneering manifesto—we should have laid down in the last two years a great many more battleships than we actually have done. It is one of the counts of his indictment against us that we fell short of the Cawdor Memorandum, with the reservation that each year, in the long run, must be left to judge for itself what the Cawdor Memorandum prospectively put forward as being the minimum of shipbuilding expenditure that this country ought to incur. I believe in so doing we were perfectly right, and that if we had followed the literal prescriptions of the Cawdor Memorandum, and automatically built four "Dreadnoughts" year after year, we should have been building in excess of our requirements, and we should now be very much beyond the point at which national safety requires us to be. We should have also run the risk, and a very serious risk in these days of the constant advance of science and invention, of having ships which in the course of a few years would have become, or would have been in danger of becoming as obsolete as the hon. Gentleman now describes the ships of the pre-"Dreadnought" period to be. I mention that fact to show my right hon. Friend and those who think with him that we have not been slow to put our professions into practice. Let me add one further point. When comparisons are made between the Navy Estimates of, say, this year or last year and those of five or six years ago, those figures, as I have had occasion to point out more than once, taken by themselves, are apt to be very misleading, because by discontinuing the policy of raising money by loan we have put on the Estimates of the year sums which have previously not appeared there at all, while, on the other hand, we are paying in the shape of interest and redemption of principal for expenditure which was incurred in past years, and for which we have no responsibility at all. All those facts must be taken into account, and I think will be taken into account, by any fair-minded man when he estimates what degree of sincerity there is in the professions we have made in this matter. While I not only admit all that, I claim to agree heartily with my right hon. Friend. Let me ask him: Suppose he were sitting on this Bench and were a Member of the Cabinet; supposing he shared the collective responsibility which the Cabinet have of maintaining the safety of these islands and of this Empire, what would he do? How would he arrange his shipbuilding programme? Solidarity is an excellent thing; I wish there were a great deal more solidarity than there is.

Mr. JOHN ELLIS

The right hon. Gentleman will remember Sir Robert Peel's maxim, "Never prescribe until you are called in."

The PRIME MINISTER

A most excellent maxim. It saves those who profess it a great deal of trouble, and enables them sometimes to escape from embarassing problems. I am not putting the question to my right hon. Friend with the intention of eliciting an answer from him; but I am asking him, as a man of imagination and a great deal of sympathy, to put himself, in imagination, in the position of those who sit on this Bench and are collectively responsible for the safety of this country. The Navy Estimates would come before him as a Member of the Cabinet, and he has to determine whether they are adequate or inadequate for our necessities. By what standard is he going to answer that question? He cannot answer it by the standard of sympathy; he cannot answer it by thinking how much better it would be if the nations of the world would turn their swords into ploughshares and give up building big battleships. You have got to answer it according to the actual facts and prospective facts, and there is no other way in which you can do it. What are the facts, actual and prospective, which are material to such an inquiry? They can only be the shipbuilding facilities and programmes of other peoples of the world. There is no other standard by which you can determine—in the event of these dangers and these contingencies which every statesman responsible for the safety of the Empire is obliged to contemplate, much as he may deplore it, and unlikely as he may think them in practice to occur—the length and breadth of your own naval and military programme. It is for that reason, and that reason only, that we are obliged in duty to consider what Germany is doing, what Austria is doing, what Italy is doing, what France is doing—all friendly nations, some of them bound to us by the closest ties of intimacy, cordiality, and even affection, and with whom I am thankful to acknowledge and believe that we have no actual and no probable cause of quarrel. We have got to insure this Empire against risks which may come; I hope they will not come, but which sometimes come, as all history shows, from the most unexpected causes, and at the most unforeseen moment. What account could we render at the bar of public opinion, or still less in history, if from a desire, and a heartfelt desire, to promote goodwill among men, and to preserve the cause of peace, we ignored the possibility of those risks, and made no provision against them, and left this country unprepared? We should be condemned, and rightly condemned, as unworthy of the trust reposed in us, and as having sacrified to too amiable sentiment the first requirements of public and national good.

If that is so, we must look at what other nations are doing. First of all, we have tried to get them to hold their hand. They will not. They are not in a mood for it. There is no ground for complaint. It is a matter which they themselves have got to determine in view of their own interests, and in the state of public opinion in their own country. They will not do it. As my right hon. Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty observed, during the last three years we have laid down in this country eight battleships, while Germany has laid down 11. I do not complain of that. Germany is perfectly entitled to do so, but it is impossible to say that that is a fact which the Government of this country is entitled to ignore when one is considering how many battleships we should lay down. I do not think it is possible to do so, looking at all the canons of prudence and statesmanship. As my right hon. Friend must gather from the speech from the Front' Opposition Bench a few moments ago, charges were made against us, not by experts, but by those who have closely studied the matter, that in laying down battleships now we are laying them down too late, a charge with which I shall be able to deal later. Before I do so, I do want someone to tell us, some critic, friendly critic like my hon. Friend—and I do not complain of his criticism; I know the spirit in which it is given, and in which it is cheered by those who sit behind him—but I do want some critic to rise in the course of this Debate and to tell us by what standard we are to arrange our shipbuilding programme of this country if we are to leave out what is being done by other nations, with whom we have no quarrel, and with whom we hope we never shall have a quarrel, who are arming themselves every year on a greater scale with more perfect weapons of attack possibly. Observations from a totally different point of view were made by the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Lee) opposite. In the first place he asked us why these four extra ships—I do not think he has seriously asked that more than four extra ships should be ready during the present year—why they are not being commenced earlier. I think, if he will permit me to say so, that there is a fallacy lurking in the word "commence." What does he mean by "commence"? He apparently means by commencement the laying down of the keel.

Mr. A. LEE

Completion.

The PRIME MINISTER

Completion and commencement are two entirely different things. I agree with him as to completion and not commencement. Our object is that these ships shall be completed, and when I say completed I mean ready for a commission and for active service by the spring of the month of March, 1912. Commencement and completion are as different, I should have thought, as the two poles.

Mr. A. LEE

I am sure the right hon. Gentleman does not wish to misrepresent me. I said if the Government propose to complete those ships early, by March, 1912, and I suggested if they wished to do so that they would have to commence them earlier.

The PRIME MINISTER

That is the point. What does the hon. Gentleman mean by "commence"? Does he mean the laying down of the keel? What we mean by "commence" is to give effective orders, and to put in hand the execution of the effective orders, which will enable the ships whenever the keel is laid down—the precise month of laying down the keel is practically unimportant—on the day when they are wanted. That is the very power we are now asking the House to give us. As my right hon. Friend has said, he proposes to give those orders and give them without delay. The thing, as was pointed out in these Debates last March, which is really important, and which is really the cause of delay in modern shipbuilding, is not so much what is done to the hull of a ship, but it is in the provision of the turrets and gun-mounting, which constitute these ships from mere idle hulls into effective instruments of war. When I carefully looked into this matter, the impression was strongly made on my mind not that this country is behind Germany in any way as regards capacity for shipbuilding. On the contrary, I believe our capacity to be substantially greater than that of Germany, and not that our capacity relatively to Germany was inferior in the matter of providing machinery for the ships—I mean propulsion of the ships' engines, and so forth. The point, which seemed to me and my colleagues, that we are in a position not of real danger but in a position in which it was desirable largely to increase our facilities for the purpose of turning out, and with rapidity, was as to those gun-mountings which are the effective part of one of our great modern battleships. Steps have been taken, and, I am glad to say, have been completed, and whatever deficiencies have been in this respect, they have been completely made good, and these orders, or what I call the real commencement of these ships, these orders in regard to those essential and all-important parts of the equipment of a vessel, and which transform them into real instruments of war, are to be given without delay. That is the effective date for the commencement of the ship. I think I have made myself clear, and that is what I call commencing the ship, and from that point of view, when the hon. Gentleman says that we did not commence the ships in time, I say that is exactly what we are doing. The mere fact that the keel will not be laid down till some date in the month of April next does not in the least degree affect in our view the probability of the completion of the ship at such a date that she will be ready for effective commission in March, 1912. So much as to that.

Then the hon. Gentleman (Mr. A. Lee) asks whether those ships are included or are treated as part of next year's or this year's programme. That question was answered most fully by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, speaking in this House on 29th March last. I will read his answer from page 65 of the OFFICIAL REPORT of that date, as follows:— We are asking the House to give, us powers, if need be, to order four ships in advance, in addition to those already in the Estimates. Let the House be quite clear what it means. If we do order those ships in advance, it does not mean a limitation of next year's programme it is without prejudice to next year's programme. I strongly deprecate being obliged at this time, in July, 1909, to say what the programme of 1910–11 will be. I say it is independent of these ships, and must be considered by reference to the circumstances at that time when you have all the material facts—the Admiralty and the Government—in their possession and at their disposal, and when they are framing the Estimates for the next financial year. That, I hope, is a sufficient answer to the hon. Gentleman's question on that point. I will not go back, because I think it is not really relevant to the issue now before the Committee to the charges or some of the charges which the hon. Gentleman made against us in regard to laches in the past. I have said something about the Cawdor programme already. The hon. Gentleman asked us why in the years, roughly, 1906–7–8 there were reductions from the figure prescribed by the Cawdor programme when we knew—or ought to have known—that Ger- many was increasing her facilities for production. My answer is, on the contrary, and I recall what I said, and what I think the First Lord of the Admiralty said, when I spoke in this House in the month of March, 1908, when, if I remember rightly, I said that we had an indisputable superiority over Germany in rapidity of construction, amongst other things, and that between that date and November or December of the same year the situation was changed. It did change, and it was in consequence of that change, which was brought about during that interval, and which came to the knowledge of the Government without any undue delay and without any want of diligence on the part of those responsible for giving the information—it was in consequence of that change that the Estimates of the present year were framed in the form they ultimately assumed, and that we asked for power, if it became necessary to exercise it, to construct not only four ships, which in any event we would have put into the programme, but the four hypothetical ships which we are beginning now to construct.

Mr. A. LEE

The First Lord of the Admiralty stated on 17th June that the German expansion was known at the Admiralty in 1906.

The PRIME MINISTER

I think we are not talking of the same thing. The expansion of which I am talking, as the hon. Gentleman knows quite well, is the expansion which went on in connection with Krupp's works, and which took place last year—1908.

Mr. ASHLEY

Is it not a fact that repeatedly, from May of 1906, it was brought to the notice of the Admiralty officials and the First Lord at the time as to this great expansion of Krupp's works, and it was not, I think, until last year that it was brought to the notice of the Government as a whole and as distinct from the Admiralty.

The PRIME MINISTER

Some expansion, no doubt, was going on, but, so far as our knowledge is concerned, this great expansion did not take place until, I think, the summer, or nearly the summer, of 1908, and certainly did not come to our knowledge until the autumn of that year. The hon. Gentleman may take that from me. I am speaking for the Government and myself, and I believe the Admiralty also.

Mr. ASHLEY

My point was that the Government did not know, but that the Admiralty did know.

The PRIME MINISTER

The Admiralty have never been in the habit of withholding any information from the Cabinet. Speaking on behalf of the Cabinet, I take full responsibility for the Cabinet, as a whole, for everything the Admiralty has done or left undone. Speaking with strict accuracy, the material expansion, the expansion which made it necessary for us to reconsider our position in this respect, did not take place until the date I mention.

Captain FABER

Here is an answer given in February, 1908, as to this expansion in Krupp's works.

The PRIME MINISTER

I have already said I am speaking of that which is material to the case. That will be my answer. If that is true, of course that is a complete answer to the suggestions which the right hon. Gentleman has made. As to the Colonial ships, I do not complain at all about the hon. Gentleman raising that question. I would rather wait to give an answer to that when we have had an opportunity of consulting the delegates to the Conference who are meeting on Wednesday of this week, and with whom we would like to enter into consultation before we come to a conclusion which can and will be announced to this House as to the precise form which the Colonial gifts will take. I am most anxious that the proceedings of the Conference should not in any way be prejudiced by a premature declaration either in one form or another. We have all recognised with the deepest gratitude not only the generosity and loyalty which has prompted the Colonies, but also the disposition which they have shown to accommodate the form which their offer will ultimately take to the real requirements of the Imperial Navy and the situation generally. They are anxious to do that, and we are most anxious to meet them. By getting around a table, and talking it over in that way, we shall arrive at a result which will be satisfactory.

As regards the two-Power standard, the matter was debated at great length in this House a short time ago. I stated, and the First Lord stated, the view that the Government take of that matter, and that was approved by a very large majority of this House. The hon. Gentleman (Mr. A. Lee) says it was not understood. I believe it was perfectly understood. I do not see any reason to suppose that it is not understood at the present moment by all interested in this matter.

I come back to the Amendment of my right hon. Friend behind. I would like to make an appeal to my right hon. Friend. I do not ask him to withdraw his Motion if he thinks it necessary to press it to a Division, but I do ask him to believe in the Government, with their record, with the professions sincerely made by them when they came into office, with the attempts which I made when Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the attempts made by my successor—and by Sir Michael Hicks-Beach in his time—to cut down, wherever it was possible to do so consistent with the national safety, the expenditure on these great fighting Services. I do ask him to believe that if we put forward this programme now it is not in any spirit of aggressiveness, nor with any desire to be provocative to foreign nations; it is because, after the most careful and anxious examination, after weeks, and, I might say, months of deliberation, we have reluctantly, but unanimously, come to the conclusion that this is the only programme which, consistently with our duty to the country, and our primary regard for the safety of the Empire, we can honestly ask Parliament to accept.

Mr. BALFOUR

The Prime Minister has spoken under the inevitable disadvantages which attend any Minister who is being attacked on both flanks. His friends behind him think that he has done and is doing too much. His critics on this side think he is doing too little, and that what he is doing he is doing late. I also am so far in a difficulty that I have to deal with two sets of arguments, quite different and quite inconsistent with each other. The arguments advanced by the right hon. Gentleman, who represents a considerable section of sentiment, if not opinion, below the Gangway, and on that side of the House, and with the Prime Minister who agrees with the sentiments, but differs from the opinion which the right hon. Gentleman has put forward on behalf of himself and his friends. I confess that though, of course, like everybody else, like every sane man, I regret that we should have to spend taxes upon armaments, and like every sane man I should regard war as the greatest of national calamities; while I suppose there is only one opinion, not merely on the benches of this House, but throughout the whole of this Kingdom on these commonplaces which verge on platitudes; whilst there is an absolute agreement on these things, there is a very great disagreement as to the steps which the present Government are proud of having taken to bring European nations to view their armaments in the same light as we do. The right hon. Gentleman, who moved the Amendment told us that the speech of my right hon. Friend near me supported a scare, and had in it a craven note. Those are strong words. Have they any meaning behind them at all? The right hon. Gentleman went on to object to our counting the forces to which we may conceivably be opposed in time of war. Has that criticism got any meaning behind it? If we are not to estimate the forces with which we have got to deal, why do we have armaments at all? What is the use of spending the millions that unhappily we do spend, and have to spend, unless it be to deal with certain possible national dangers, and to meet certain national opponents? How are you to estimate the forces which those national opponents can bring against you unless you set to work to count those forces. If the right hon. Gentleman thinks we have been occupied in calculations too narrow and refined—as to whether it be one or two ships—then I say that the people who are responsible for that kind of discussion across the floor of the House are the Government who allow us only so narrow a margin that we have to estimate, as it were, gun by gun, and ship by ship. The responsibility lies with the Government who have in one qualification or another abandoned the two-Power standard in the sense in which it always used to be held, and in my opinion are not keeping up the two-Power standard as they hold it in its modified and qualified form.

You have the right non. Gentleman, who moved the Amendment, complaining of our commenting on the German shipbuilding programme. Nobody has commented upon it in the sense of complaining of Germany doing what she has a perfect right to do. We have commented on it, not as criticising Germany, but of explaining what our own Government ought to do—what it is incumbent upon them to do. If we do not count what Germany and other Powers have in their shipbuilding and financial capacity to do how can we form any reasonable estimate at all of the burdens, military and financial, likely to be thrown upon this country by the course of events? I think that this criticism, in commenting upon the internal affairs of Germany, came very strangely from a right hon. Member so many of whose friends below the Gangway occupied themselves within the last 56 or 60 hours in commenting upon the internal affairs of a great Empire which has nothing whatever to do with any Vote to be passed by this House, with the money or Estimates of this House, or with the national safety. To look upon what armaments other nations are preparing, which, if there should arise difficulties between them and their neighbours, may conceivably be employed to our detriment, appears to the right hon. Gentleman a craven and foolish proceeding. I say it is a proceeding of ordinary common-sense. As the House will readily understand, my complaint against the Government is not that they have done their best to make these estimates of the power of foreign navies, but that they have not acted upon the information which their investigations have unquestionably and undoubtedly disclosed. The point which is constantly being brought up in these Debates is in regard to the peace-loving character of the present Government and those who support it. In his speech this afternoon the first Lord of the Admiralty boasted—instead of carrying out the Cawdor programme—that in order to persuade foreign countries of our sincerity in desiring mutual disarmament, we reduced our programme from four to three ships in two years, and to two ships in the third year. That was his case. Well, I do not know what case there is for the claims made by the Government, because the First Lord, in answering questions, has always explained that the difference between the actual shipbuilding programme carried out by the Government, and that contemplated in the Cawdor programme was only one. That is very characteristic.

Mr. McKENNA

I have always declined to regard the Cawdor programme as a programme referring to any other than the one year for which it was made.

Mr. BALFOUR

Both the First Lord and the Prime Minister have within this last few minutes either directly, or by implication, said just the contrary. The Prime Minister just now stated quite distinctly that the difference was three, four, several ships, and he rejoices that that should be so. He said we can build much better ships now than we could have built if we had carried out the Cawdor programme. Now, that also is characteristic. I remember in the earlier days the same curious inconsistency was used about disarmament whenever the Government or hon. Gentlemen were thinking about foreign nations. They said, "We let down the level of national defence in order to convince you that we are a peaceable nation; to induce you, if possible, to follow our peaceable example." When they have to defend their action in the House they say, "It is true we did not keep up the level of the Cawdor programme, but see how much stronger we are in consequence, and how much more efficient and effective for war is the British Fleet." Then hon. Gentlemen are surprised when they discover that foreign nations occasionally think that our loud professions of virtue in this House have about them some flavour of hypocrisy. I do not propose to add anything to what I have said in support of the Prime Minister against the right hon. Gentleman who moved this Amendment.

I now turn from the critics of the Government on that side of the House to suggest certain criticisms that we feel disposed to make, and comments that we feel disposed to put forward, and which We desire the House to weigh before they approve of the general shipbuilding programme of the Government. I think that what the Government have done is entirely inadequate. I think that the principle laid down by the Prime Minister to-day in his statement of our responsibility is one to which I have nothing to add, and certainly I cannot improve the language in which he has stated that view to the House. My commentary upon the Government is that they have not themselves sufficiently recognised in practice the maxims to which they give such eloquent expression upon the floor of this House. What is really the history of the last two or three years, and what are the claims put forward by the Government at the present time? The claims put forward at the present time are that we have overwhelming strength because we have so many ships of the pre-"Dreadnought" type in addition to the "Dreadnought" ships we are building. In other words, the Government tell us their present strength depends upon what their predecessors did, and we can live upon that for some time longer without asking any great sacrifices from the British taxpayer; but what have they been doing? What does it avail if they have been living upon the stores, both in the technical and in the widespread sense, upon the accumulated stores of naval I strength left by their predecessors? I think they have been showing themselves very neglectful of their national responsibilities.

They became conscious as far back as 1906 that there was a development going on in Krupps. They must have known be fore that that the connection between Krupps and the Government was very close, and that the development which began in 1906 in Krupps, and which has been going on rapidly ever since, they must have been aware that that development was one closely connected with Governmental policy, and could not be disassociated from the accumulated strength of the German Navy. And that was the moment they began to diminish the number of capital ships which they were asking this country to build. That in itself is surely the most extraordinary position for the Government to take up. We come now to 1907 and 1908. In 1908 the danger from Krupps was immense. The extension of Krupps—I will not say the danger, but at any rate the immense and revolutionary change made by the development in Krupps of the relative strength and capacity of shipbuilding in the two countries that appears in July, or rather last year, came home to the Admiralty and the Government as a pressing and insistent menace. In November they discovered that the German programme had been actually anticipated. They were face to face, there fore, with a legal programme which had been anticipated, and could be anticipated in the future, by a country which had at its command powers of shipbuilding practically equal and, in some respects, superior to our own. That was the situation in November. I am not going into dates and figures—the Government must have more minute knowledge than anybody else of these matters—but it is perfectly evident that in July last, when they first be came acquainted or cognisant of the immense development of Krupps, instead of then giving orders that would have enabled our works to keep pace with Krupps, and bring us up to date, they did nothing at all. In November last they got a fright, but again they did nothing. I cannot make out from the statement of the Prime Minister and the First Lord of the Admiralty, who give us the very best and most favourable interpretation of their own acts, I cannot make out that even then, by their own account, they saw the contractors earlier than the spring of this year— —

Mr. McKENNA

Oh, yes. At the end of last year.

Mr. BALFOUR

I think if the right hon. Gentleman will go back to his own statement at the time he will see that the month talked of was February.

Mr. McKENNA

No; I said last year.

Mr. BALFOUR

I am very loath to dispute about these things. It is the broad issue I want to keep to. Were any precise definite orders in black and white given to any of the great contractors in the course of last year, telling them to augment the plant for turning out their gun-mountings? I do not believe there were any such orders. I am practically confident that no such order was given, and I am bound to say that, after what the Government knew of Krupps in July, and what they knew of the anticipated programme of Germany in November, I think it was a case of gross neglect, and, of course, we know what did go on. We know there were disputes in the Cabinet as to the amount of expenditure upon shipbuilding and as to the degree of national peril which the new development brought upon us. We know—no one denies it—that the actual plan the Government are now carrying out is a Government compromise. Some compromises are good; I think this is admirable. It is much better, of course, that we should have the ships proceeded with in the way of collecting materials this year, and their keels laid down early in the next financial year; it is better to have that done than that nothing should be done. But how can you justify putting it off so long or how can you justify the possibility of cramming 12 "Dreadnoughts" into next year and keeping only four "Dreadnoughts" this year, when you knew a year ago of the development of Krupps, and when you knew eight months ago what Germany had done to anticipate its programme? How that can be justified nothing put forward in this House by the head of the Admiralty or the Prime Minister has shown to those who are anxiously waiting to know what the defence of the Government was. The right hon. Gentleman who moved the Amendment talked of the enormous sums that we were spending upon this Vote. He said this Vote has increased by 10 per cent, upon what it was last year. Does lie know that the Building Vote in this country and the Armament Vote, taken together in our Estimates, numbers 8 and 9, are £500,000 less than the corresponding Votes in the case of Germany? [An HON. MEMBER: "£600,000."] I believe there is no question about it. I say on the face of it, if nothing else was known about the expenditure of this country in connection with these vital interests of Imperial and national safety, it would be enough to condemn the policy of the Government.

But observe—and I do not think it has been sufficiently observed—that, as my hon. Friend pointed out to-day, the Government, who rely to fill up these gaps upon pre-"Dreadnought" ships, never told us, or at any rate remind us, that we should lose in pre-"Dreadnought" ships at a very much greater rate than foreign Powers, especially Germany. That is to say, if you cut off ships of the earlier type equally for both countries you will find in a very few years that the difference in the number of pre-"Dreadnought" ships between this country and Germany is wiped out altogether, and if you turn to another class of ships, on which I do not think we have said enough this year, simply because this controversy about battleships has inevitably and necessarily taken up so much of our time, if you turn to another class of ships which are absolutely necesary for the efficiency of any fleet, what answer do you make to the statement of my hon. Friend, namely, that you have not even built up to your own views of the necessities of the situation? You have sanctioned torpedo destroyers which you have never built. You have put before us a paper programme in respect of destroyers which has never become anything but a paper programme.

Mr. McKENNA

The right hon. Gentleman himself did that; we did not. Would the right hon. Gentleman be kind enough to say when it was that we put forward a paper programme of destroyers which we have not executed? It is the right hon. Gentleman himself who did that.

Mr. BALFOUR

Even in this year, if the information which reaches me is in any way correct, we are very deficient in this class. Even this year, instead of using your building capacity to supply that deficiency, you put down a total sum— —

Mr. McKENNA

I will answer that when the time comes, but it is another point.

Mr. BALFOUR

I beg the right hon. Gentleman's pardon, it is my point. Year after year we pressed the Government upon this question of destroyers, and year after year they gave us most unsatisfactory answers. I am afraid, if we really had an examination of the position of the Navy, we should find that the stores have diminished, that we were deficient in all these secondary crafts, secondary and auxiliary if you like, but which are as necessary to a fleet of battleships as cavalry is to infantry. In all these you have not kept up to the mark, while in your battleships you have entered upon a path which, instead of finding this country as it was four years ago, with a full two-Power standard and more, finds us now occupied in anxiously counting ships to see whether we are, in battleships of the best type, really going to maintain a superiority over one Power. What a change in these three years, and what a change for the worse! I quite agree that some part of the change is due to the fact that this new type was introduced. I quite agree in that, and that it might not have occurred if no such change took place; but it would have occurred in a far more aggravated form if somebody else, if some foreign Power introduced the change. But this is irrelevant to the main contention, which is this, whereas three or four years ago we had a two-Power standard absolutely beyond dispute in all classes of vessels, we now find ourselves with a maritime responsibility such as no other country has to deal with. We have to cover a space of ocean, a space of sea, which no other country has got to deal with, and we see our margin of superiority disappearing before our eyes. Just take merely as a test this question of battleships. You will have only got a margin of one, so far as I can see; you will only have a margin of one over Germany in this particular kind of ships in the middle of 1911. I think that has been worked out from figures given by the Government.

Mr. McKENNA

We have 14 building; at the present moment and Germany; has11.

Mr. BALFOUR

If the right hon. Gentleman looks at some of his own calculations he will find, in some of the later middle months of 1911, the margin of this, country, by his own calculation, is only I one "Dreadnought" until November. By their own calculation the Government in March, 1912, are only going to have a margin of three "Dreadnoughts." That is 20 to 17.

The PRIME MINISTER

That is assuming Germany will build hers.

Mr. BALFOUR

Yes, assuming that. Germany builds hers.

Mr. THOMAS LOUGH

Have not all these calculations been corrected since our Debate in March? I think we ought to have this point cleared up. I think we have had a statement from the Admiralty that those figures were wrong, and what my right hon. Friend now says is that Germany can only have 11 in any part of 1911.

Mr. BALFOUR

I do not think that is the statement of the Admiralty, but no doubt the First Lord will speak again. My information is that at a certain period in 1911 our margin in this particular class of battleship will be only one, and even the Government do not claim that in March, 1912, our margin will be more than three.

Mr. LOUGH

But those figures have been corrected.

Mr. BALFOUR

That is assuming Germany does her best and that we do our best. But supposing Germany does her best and we do not. Supposing there are strikes, accidents, and difficulties—some of those obstacles which have prevented any first-class British battleship, except the "Dreadnought," being built in two years—supposing those accidents happen, where will your margin be? It is a margin far too narrow as it stands, and a margin which may easily be far more perilous than is represented in Debates in this House. I ask the Committee most respectfully to consider whether the very fact that we are driven to discuss these questions upon so narrow a margin, and with regard to one Power alone, is not in itself a sign of the perilous and difficult position in which we stand? Remember what the naval responsibilities of this Empire are. I am not saying now that we depend entirely upon our Navy. It is, of course, true that our Navy is the first line of defence, but that is a common-place which I do not need to insist upon now because I am on another point. Remember the extent of maritime responsibilities which we have got. They do not consist merely in keeping in Home waters in the North Sea, in the Channel, and neighbouring waters an adequate fleet to meet any fleet which may be put against us in those waters. It means that we may have to keep a fleet in those waters adequate to meet, with conclusive superiority," any fleet that may be brought against us there, and besides this we have got to maintain our trade routes and our position in the Mediterranean— and in the Mediterranean, as we have just been told, two other Powers are building battleships of the most powerful type. How can you run upon narrow margins when you reflect that you have to protect what I may call this gigantic frontier against possible opponents, who may concentrate all their efforts upon one single portion of that frontier? You talk as if you had not got your trade routes to protect, or the Mediterranean, and that every ship you have could be concentrated in the North Sea, if need be. But that is not the case. That is not the fact, and merely to work out your margins of superiority against a single Great Power in the North Sea is to ignore the historic responsibilities of the British Empire, responsibilities from which you cannot now recede. One of those great ships of which the right hon. Gentleman spoke is not going to be counted in the battle fleet at all—it is for commerce protection. This new and improved "Invincible" is not to take its part in fleet actions, but to take its share of commerce protection against some other mighty cruiser which is being built in the foreign port by a foreign nation. I only mention that to show that it is a responsibility which very likely can only be carried out by ships of a new type moving with great rapidity, great coal endurance, and very powerful armaments, and, in so far as they are used for commerce protection, they are useless for fleet action. A ship cannot be doing two things at once.

The PRIME MINISTER

That is equally true of Germany.

Mr. McKENNA

It is only our answer to Germany.

Mr. BALFOUR

But, again, does the right hon. Gentleman not see that that is only an extension of the argument I used just now that we are acting on the defensive, and we have got this enormous area to protect? We have to keep up our actual battle superiority, we have to protect an ocean-borne commerce which far exceeds that of Germany, rapidly as her oversea commerce is growing; we have to do all that and maintain an overwhelming superiority in the waters which flow around our own coasts. Those things must be taken into account, and, when they are, the margin proposed by the Government is a very narrow one—I think it is too narrow. When I further reflect that the Government were seized of this peril more than a year ago, that it was brought home to them in a most striking manner by the German anticipatory programme six months ago, I must honestly say that to defer, as they have deferred, taking instant action upon it shows, I will not say carelessness or neglect, because I doubt whether it was carelessness or neglect, but it shows that they have been unduly influenced by those Members of the Cabinet and those among their own supporters who regard the sort of case I am endeavouring to put before the Committee as mere panic-mongering and unworthy fears on the part of those whom it is supposed love armaments for their own sake. May I ask the First Lord of the Admiralty one or two more questions? He says that if any money becomes payable in this financial year there will be a Supplementary Estimate. According to the Prime Minister the amount of work which is going to be done on those ships will be very great, and, therefore, will be very costly, and by somebody or other—by the contractor if not by the Paymaster-General—immense sums will have to be expended on the April ships. Surely the Government and the House must see that this putting off of the laying down of ships is a mere Parliamentary device to enable those who wish to say that the Government are building in this year four, and not eight, ships. It is a mode of reconciling Gentlemen below the Gangway to a programme which, if put forward nakedly, goes far beyond their wishes, although it falls short of mine. I think they ought to have pressed on the eight ships as fast as they could, and at once.

An HON. MEMBER

That is what they have been doing.

Mr. BALFOUR

They have been doing nothing of the kind. Does anyone seriously mean to say that if, on the first news either that Krupp's works had been extended or the Germans had anticipated their programme, the Government had set to work to build, we should not have been in a far better position than now? No, they put off these four ships. They are only going to lay down the keels and to make hypothetical payments, because, I suppose, it was a sop to some Gentlemen below the Gangway to ease their anti-military consciences to be told that only four ships were being built instead of eight. It would have been much more simple, and, I should have thought, much more in accordance with the traditions of financial directness and honesty, if we had ordered the ships as soon as we wanted them, and paid for them as soon as they were built. But all these arguments about the mode of payment seem to me to be a dodge, and unworthy of the ingenious and fertile brain that has laboured to contrive them. And observe the inconvenience of the procedure; it is not merely that you are violating the technical proprieties of finance; it is not merely that you are pre tending you are not building when you are; it is the delay which enables you to carry out that species of fraud—I say it without offence—that colourable de vice, and it has this great collateral disadvantage: It prevents you starting your building of these extra ships as soon as you might have done, and it will, therefore, involve you in occupying your slips on which the ships are being built beyond the period when they would have been occupied had you chosen to begin as soon as the ships were found to be necessary. The result of that would be that while we are only building four ships this year and collecting material, next year we shall have to build 12 ships. That is to say, that instead of dividing the 16 ships necessary in two years into two even lots of eight, 12 will be begun in the second year, whereas only four are begun in the first year. That is not the way to use your shipbuilding plant to the best advantage, and if the German programme is really pressed forward—that, I suppose, will depend on causes we cannot control in this country—it may put you to very great disadvantage when next year comes. It is perfectly vain for the Government to say that all this is done without prejudice to the programme of next year; it must be done with prejudice to the programme of next year. I hope it may be otherwise, but if it should turn out that you ought to have built at the rate of 16 of these ships in the two years then your distribution of the ships is in the highest degree inconvenient and inexpedient, and it is folly to cram into next year's programme the building of 12 ships when you might, if you had used the information that you will not deny you had at your disposal, made all your preparations, collected your material, and laid down your keels months earlier than you propose to do. These are the broad reasons why I confess that from my point of view I am as much disposed to criticise the Government as the right hon. Gentleman who moved the Amendment. He moved it from an entirely opposite point of view from me. He seems to think it is foolish, discreditable, and even cowardly to try and make some estimate of the forces with which we have to contend.

Mr. JOHN ELLIS

Those are not my words.

Mr. BALFOUR

I do not think I have perverted or misrepresented the right hon. Gentleman's view, and I thought that was the substance of what he said. I take entirely the opposite view. I think what the Government have done is to calculate to the best of their ability what the forces are with which they might in certain conceivable contingencies have to deal; but absolutely to refuse, even on their own showing, to make that amount of naval preparation, both with regard to battleships, cruisers, and torpedo-destroyers, which would enable us in the North Sea, the Mediterranean, and wherever the commercial flag of England flies, to be secure against any possible or, at all events, against any easily conceivable combination of opponents, and to abandon—it has compelled them therefore to abandon—if not in words, at all events in deed, any attempts to maintain the two-Power standard in its integrity, or even in that watered and mutilated form which it took in the formula given by the Prime Minister a few weeks ago—it seems to me even in that formula, and with all those qualifications, if you add up in your minds what foreign countries are doing and what we arc doing, even the right hon. Gentleman who moved the Amendment (Mr. John Ellis) will, I think, on reflection, feel, so far from the Government having done enough to meet the national perils, and enough to make us, in the words of the First Sea Lord, "all sleep easily in our beds and look forward with perfect contentment to what the years 1911, 1912 and 1913 can bring forth," there is not a man, I think, who looks round the horizon who does not feel there may be perils which in directness and magnitude we shall have to deal with in the not distant future compared with which there are no perils which either we or our grandfathers can ever remember in the history of this country.

Mr. JOHN DILLON

I sincerely hope the speech to which we have just listened will convey a lesson to the Government as to the futility of their attempting to buy off the Opposition by any such concessions as they have made to-day—and they have made very large concessions. You might as well try and buy off a man-eating tiger with a small dose of blood; the more you give them the more they will demand. It is not this concession, which will add two millions a year to the Naval Estimates, which will moderate the fury and vigour of the Navy League. On the contrary, it adds fuel by giving them the assurance that by keeping up their storm of abuse they may yet hope for further concessions. One of the most peculiar phenomena I have observed in contemporary politics has been the change of tone which has come over our Imperialist friends. I take these words of the description given at the great City meeting held in April last, at which the Leader of the Opposition was the chief speaker. "The Times," in describing that meeting, said the Lord Mayor's phrase that "we shall maintain regardless of cost the position of a strong man armed," produced an exceptional demonstration. A change has passed over the spirit of the dream, and even today there is a change, us compared with April and March last. It was then "we want eight and we will not wait"; it is now "we want eight, but we certainly will not pay for them." I am bound to say that I think the statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty, by which this Debate was inaugurated to-night, must have taken the House very much by surprise. We were distinctly told, and I wish to recall this to the memory of all hon. Members, in the course of the Debate on the Vote of Censure last April, that these four "Dreadnoughts," these four ships of a class which are to be more expensive than "Dreadnoughts," and which have been announced to-night, were not to be built unless the necessity arose. The House was undoubtedly given to understand that unless some new circumstance took place to alter the judgment of the Government, it would not be called upon to sanction the building of these vessels on 1st April next. It was on these lines that the whole Debate went, and the Loader of the Opposition, who was then, I thought, somewhat insincerely playing the part of keeping the Navy out of Party politics—a task in which he has shown great weakness in the capacity of carrying through—made an appeal to the Government: "Will the Government go so far as to say we promise these contingent vessels?" The Secretary of Foreign Affairs (Sir E. Grey), who was very properly put up to answer, because the question of Naval expenditure turns on foreign affairs, replied distinctly, "No, the Government would not undertake to build these ships unless circumstances arose to justify the demand." What were the circumstances and the whole circumstances? It was the alleged intention of the German Government to anticipate its programme, and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs made use of very remarkable language. I think it must have escaped the memory of the Government. The language was so remarkable that I ask the House to listen to it. He said:— We have been informed verbally, but quite definitely, that Germany will not accelerate her naval programme of construction, and will not have 13 'Dreadnought' until the end of 1912. This has been told us, not in the form of an undertaking, but as a declaration of intention from the most authoritative source. I understand the meaning of this will he that 13 ships will be ready for commission as distinct from trials at the end of 1912. He then says he accepts this declaration without any reserve whatever. It does not bind the German Government; it leaves them liberty to change their intention, but it dies dispose of the idea that they ate preparing to have 13 ships ready by 1910. No Government preparing to have 13 'Dreadnoughts' by 1910 would have voluntarily made that declaration. We all expected the First Lord of the Admiralty to commence his speech by a statement whether that declaration by the German Government had been loyally adhered to. I invite the attention of hon. Members opposite to the fact that not one word fell from the lips of the First Lord, nor from the Prime Minster himself, who spoke afterwards, as to the proceedings of Germany. There were at that time charges hurled against the people and Government of Germany inside this House, and outside it infinitely worse, which have done much to endanger the peace of the world. This language was used of Germany, and was enthusiastically adopted on these benches: "By an act of moral treachery the Government of Germany have stolen a march upon the people of this country," an act of treachery which it was stated in great newspapers and on public platforms would justify the Government in repeating the feat of Copenhagen and destroying the German ships without warning. That language was used, and in the course of those Debates charges were made by responsible Members of the Opposition against the good faith of Germany that I think never ought to have been made by responsible statesmen. It is most extraordinary that this Debate is allowed to go on without any statement from the Government as to whether these pledges have been loyally observed or not. In the month of April, when that Debate took place, the Foreign Secretary said, "I accept this assurance from Germany without reserve." Does the Government still accept it or have they any cause to change their opinion, and, if not, why have they steered absolutely clear of this main and dominating question as regards these contingent ships? I think it is a monstrous treatment of the Committee. What did the First Lord of the Admiralty say? He left Germany altogether, and he betook himself to Austria and Italy. Are we now building against Italy? The thing is perfectly absurd and monstrous. In the remote and uncertain future it is said Austria intends to build four battleships. Why? Because we are building eleven, and because Austria is building against us in the Mediterranean, are we dropping the whole German scare to fall back upon Austria and justifying these contingent ships from the fact that Italy is building against Austria? The fact that the details of German construction have been made the subject of discussion has been deeply deplored. Who first brought them in? The First Lord of the Admiralty and the Prime Minister himself. They first started this question, and it is monstrous, having started it, that they should not have given us any information on the subject. Am I not reasonably justified in assuming that the reason they abstained from giving us information is that they had no information to give which would justify the building of the four "Dreadnoughts." Another point I wish to ask of the authorities of the Admiralty is what about the Beresford inquiry? Lord Charles Beresford, who is known to hold very different views from some placed before this House by the Admiralty as regards the value of these big ships and on questions which are vital to this whole controversy, put his views before the. Prime Minister, and a Special Committee was appointed to inquire into them. Several questions have been asked as to the result of that inquiry, and the Government intimated that the result would be published some time for the information of the House. Surely we ought to have had that information before tonight, in order to decide us on this Vote. I think that is a very serious cause of complaint also. The Prime Minister, when making an appeal to his followers on the other side of the House, asked this question: "By what standard should responsible Ministers who were charged with the defences of this country settle their programme?" That is a very difficult question to answer. I do not know whether he adheres to what is known as the two-Power standard—one of the most fatal and absurd boasts this country ever made, which has been largely responsible for all this outrageous race of armaments all over the world. Whatever was judged to be by the responsible Ministers of the Crown in this country the necessary measure of the naval forces in England, they ought never to have set up the insolent and braggadocio proposal that they should be equal to the two greatest Powers of the world, except England, with a 10 per cent, margin. That is being gradually abandoned; in fact, I think I may safely say it is abandoned. It was an absurd programme. Why not a three or a four-Power standard. It was an absolutely absurd proposition, and a proposition calculated in the highest degree to exasperate other countries and create fatal rivalries in building ships. The Prime Minister asked by what standard he is to judge the necessities of the naval defence of the country. I say the responsible Ministers of the Crown should make up their minds and come down to the House to tell them. If they are going to build the four ships now announced tonight, it would have been better for the credit of the Government had they made the announcement in March last, and not yielded, as it were, to the pressure of the Opposition. They should have come down in March and told this House that, in their judgment, it was necessary; they should have stood by that, and they should not have allowed an agitation in the country to force their hand.

But let me turn to the larger issues involved. It is a striking instance of the fact that armaments depend upon policy. You cannot get away from that. If you are going to embark on any great policy of European alliances and interference in the quarrels of Europe—such as England embarked upon at the beginning of last century—you may want, not only these four ironclads, but a great many more. It will probably be three times that number. And experience will tell you also these ironclads are of no use for such a policy unless you also have a conscript army, which is part and parcel of their plan. You will, in fact, have to make up your mind before you decide on the naval necessities of this Empire what policy you are going to carry out. If you are going to fight Germany, and to go into a triple alliance with France and Russia, then I daresay this will be necessary. The language used in this country with regard to Germany has been, in my opinion, absolutely disgraceful. It is of no use for the Prime Minister to get up and talk about the affection and goodwill of this Government towards the German people, when the language used by a large and influential section of the community is utterly at variance with it. A responsible Member of the Opposition, the Member for one of the Divisions of Sheffield (Mr. Samuel Roberts), went down to his constituents and said:— It was the same 300 years ago when the Spanish Armada was being built in the ports of Spain. Sir Francis Drake saw the danger and ran his ships into the ports of Lisbon and Cadiz and destroyed the Spanish galleons. If Queen Elizabeth had allowed him to have his way not a Spanish ship would have left the Spanish shore, because every one would have been destroyed. He (the speaker) was not at all sure that that policy did not apply now, because if we wish we could stop them building. It might not be in accordance with the principles of modern civilisation, but it was an alternative that our statemen must bear in mind. This language was reported in Germany; it was language on the part of a responsible man; and it was not an isolated case, because I have read in many organs of opinion in this country similar sentiments, and, in private conversations, it is a common assertion that the time to strike is now, and that we should go into the ports of Germany and sink their ships. Now, that kind of language cannot be used without producing national consequences. There is an able article in a German paper, in which the writer says that the whole of the German programme and the great increase in the German Navy would never have taken place but for the Jameson Raid. The immediate result was the introduction of the Naval Bill into the German Parliament, under which provision for the "Dreadnoughts" were made. The writer goes on to say that experience showed to the Germans the absolute necessity of defending their commerce when they saw German vessels held up during that war; and he further points out that we are not content with a Navy superior to that of Germany by three to two, but are agitating for the adoption of a system of compulsory military service. He adds:— It seems to us that such a demand can only be put seriously forward by those who wish to dominate the Continent, and to render effective military and naval aid to those who you choose to regard as your allies. Further, the writer says:— An England pacific—Gladstonian, free trading, relying upon voluntary service for her armed force— such an England may have as large a fleet as she pleases without exciting any alarm But an England that is aggressive, Protectionist, armed to the teeth by conscription, is another proposition altogether; against the latter England we must, in self defence, push on our naval defensive forces with the utmost rapidity. That point emphasises what I was just saying, that on this question of naval defence, by the use of outrageous language, you are spreading abroad an idea that you are organising a great federation against the German people, and you are encouraging the German Government to make these great exertions.

I have heard a great deal about the naval scare, although that has been somewhat damped by the Budget. I believe no utterances made in the course of this discussion have had more to do with promoting that naval scare than the speech delivered by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on the Vote of Censure. In my opinion the words he used did incalculable harm—the more so because the right hon. Baronet is looked upon as a cool, level-headed, able man, very self-restrained and self-possessed, who only uses language which he means to convey. Now, he said:— A new situation is created for this country by the German programme, whether that programme is carried out quickly or slowly the fact of its existence makes a new situation. When that programme is completed, Germany, a great country close to our own shores, will have a fleet of 33 'Dreadnoughts.' That fleet will be the most powerful the world has ever seen. That was a very sensational thing to say. What was the need to create the panic by declaring that fact? Then he goes on to say:— It is true there is not one of them in commission yet; hut it is equally true that the whole programme comprises what I have stated, and that fleet will be the most powerful fleet the world has yet seen. That imposes upon us the necessity of which we are now at the beginning—excepting so far as we happen to have? 'Dreadnoughts' already—of rebuilding the whole of our fleet. That sentence has been emphasised and commented upon and used as a text on innumerable platforms in this naval agitation. Then he went on to say:— That is the situation. What we do not know is the time within which we shall have to do it. That is the element of uncertainty. There is no dispute as to the issue that in order to meet the German fleet when that is completed we shall have to build a new fleet of our own more powerful than any we have yet had. Evidently the right hon. Gentleman was not alluding to a new situation which had arisen in recent years. He was not alluding to the increased facilities for building. He was alluding to the avowed intention of the German Government to build a certain number of ships when he used the words, "This imposes on us the necessity of rebuilding the whole of our Navy." I say that that was an absurd suggestion. What is Great Britain doing, year in and year out, but rebuilding? Every great Power is constantly rebuilding its Navy. The right hon. Gentleman suggests that a new situation has arisen, but that suggestion, in my opinion, is most wanton and entirely unjustifiable. Of course, one must take the condition of things in connection with language used, and I have here some sentences from a leading article in "The Times." The right hon. Gentleman may think that I am foolish in regarding "The Times" as a seriously written paper. I do not think so. I think there are no more serious documents published in this country than the leading articles in "The Times." The paper, no doubt, has recently passed under strange control, and does not possess the same power as it did under Mr. Delane's editorship; but, whether rightly or wrongly, "The Times" is supposed to be in close touch with the Foreign Office of this country, and foreigners undoubtedly do take the view that the articles contained in it are inspired by special knowledge. What does "The Times" say on this subject? It is referring to recent events in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and it says:— Russia has been compelled for the moment by sheer necessity to submit to Germany's dictation and we are not prepared to question the wisdom of the heavy sacrifice which she has made, and which she may yet be forced to make, in order to avert bloodshed. But a proud empire with the resources of Russia does not forget her traditions or easily forgive those who have forced her temporarily to depart from them. Neither will the Slav world forget or forgive. Even the Powers less directly interested cannot ignore the rebuff: which has been inflicted upon them at the moment when they were pursuing, by the ordinary methods of diplomatic negotiation, the same purpose, save that of public humiliation. I was taken to task by the Secretary of State for saying the very thing which has been reproduced in an article in "The Times." I say, therefore, that in my opinion the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs took a very heavy burden of responsibility upon himself when he used those words about the necessity of rebuilding our fleet in order to meet the programme of Germany. Let me turn for a few moments to another aspect of this matter. What actual proof have we had from the beginning of these Debates up to the present that the Government are on the right tack from the scientific point of view in regard to their construction? The least the Government can do is to give us some effective statement of the opinions of experts as to whether they are wise in building these "Dreadnoughts." What is the opinion of Lord Charles Beresford? He made a speech in which he intimated that he looked upon these "Dreadnoughts" as a very defective class of ships, and he was very doubtful whether the smaller ships, the "King Edwards," would not be as powerful, and he used this extraordinary language: He said that those who first started building "Dreadnoughts" in this country had inflicted the gravest injury upon the country, because, he said, the Government were building these "Dreadnoughts," and bragging and boasting that they were fit to sink any number of the ships of foreign nations, and they were responsible by that insane boasting for the whole of the present disaster of competition which had resulted. Let me also read an extract from one of the great experts on shipbuilding. It is from a statement of Sir William White, who was once the Naval Constructor of this country. He said:— The heroic programme of shipbuilding which has been declared absolutely necessary is based upon an opinion that our maintenance of naval supremacy depends chiefly upon our continued possession of superior numbers of ships, on the 'Dreadnought' and 'Invincible' lines, with successive improvements, and that view has been shown to be both narrow and erroneous. That comes from Sir William White, who was for years responsible for building our ships, and it shows that there is a considerable body of naval opinion, which is adverse to this view, and which does not approve of these armaments. That is a very important opinion, and it is shared by Lord Charles Beresford. Then, again, I find an extract from a speech delivered in the last few days by Sir Percy Scott, another distinguished admiral, who says:— The relative value of ships and fleets for fighting must, in his opinion, depend more upon their hitting power than upon numbers; for example, the 'Indomitable,' with eight guns, made double the number of hits that the 'Dreadnought' made with ten guns. There is, therefore, a considerable divergence of opinion among naval experts as to whether this expenditure is wise; and yet the House of Commons is asked by the Government to go blindfold into an expenditure of vast sums of money without a single reason being given to justify this new departure, of deciding to build these new ships next year. We are asked to agree to this without the Government letting us know what has been the result of the inquiry, which is still sitting, in regard to the Navy. That is, I think, a most unreasonable attitude for the Government to take up. In my opinion, I can only say it is a very serious parting of the ways for the Liberal party. You went to the country at the last election on the cry of "Peace, retrenchment, and reform," and you knew at the time of the last election just as much about the German naval programme as you know now—not one item has been altered.

Mr. McKENNA

Yes; it has been twice altered.

Mr. DILLON

I understood it was just the same. But, at all events, to-night no fresh fact has been laid before us, who will have to face our constituents very shortly, and I am curious to know what are the placards and the programmes and the literature that these Gentlemen are preparing for the Liberal party at the next general election, because how can they take the platforms of this country on a programme of "Peace, retrenchment, and reform" when it can be proved that they are only at the beginning of this expenditure, because, having made this surrender to-night, you must make many more surrenders, and how can you go to the country again, under those circumstances, and raise the old familiar cry of "Peace, retrenchment, and reform"? No, Sir, I think the Liberal party will find themselves in an extremely awkward position. We know what the opinion of America is perfectly well, from the letters written by the representatives who went to the Peace Conference last autumn, and there is one particular letter to which I would particularly refer, by a gentleman who was an English delegate, and who wrote a letter to "The Times" saying that he and several other delegates had endeavoured to impress upon the American people that England was not responsible for this race in armaments, and to his great surprise, he found that the whole of the peace delegates, and the whole of the Press of America, laid the blame upon England in spite of all he could do or say. And I think they laid it justly, because, in the words of Mr. Andrew Carnegie, who knows his own country:— Although our industrial republic has nothing to covet, and has repeatedly refused to give The Executive more than one-half the battleships demanded, it may be impossible to prevent even her from increasing her fleet rapidly like the others. Although they have refused to sanction more than half the warships demanded by every Government, yet they are yielding, and this policy of England, which comes before this House to-night, will do much to force on the American people, in this insane competition, and if you drag America into this business you will very soon get rid of the two-Power standard. Then, again, take such letters as I read the other day from Mr. Amery, a Protectionist candidate for the North of England or the Midlands, who wrote a furious attack to "The Times" because he thought there was an inclination on the part of the Prime Minister to eliminate America from the two-Power standard. He says, in effect, that the Prime Minister assumes that the only possible circumstances under which we should fight the Americans at sea would be if their ships sailed up the Channel, and he asks, "What will become of us if we cannot sail across the seas and assail America in her own waters?" That is the kind of language which is used by the Navy League, and if that kind of language is used much more you will find America with a navy which will keep you at home, and you will have no two-Power standard. It is most terrible that the Liberal party, which has stood firm and fought for economy so long against the agitation which we are now facing, should lower their flag as they have done to-day, and take that first fatal step, under the coercive policy of the Opposition, which will lead them, I fear, after all that has happened, into extravagances which will in after years be thrown in their teeth.

Mr. J.T. MIDDLEMORE

The hon. Gentleman seems to suppose that the history of Europe for the next 50 or 55 years will be different from the history of Europe during the past 50 or 55 years. In that period we have had seven or eight great wars, and it must be borne in mind that Prince Bismarck himself prophesied that the first half of this century would not be a peaceful one, and all the Members on this side of the House claim is that we should be prepared to meet the dangers and contingencies which are ahead of us. The hon. Gentleman forgot the preamble of the German Navy Bill of 1900, in which emphasis is laid on the fact that she is to have a sufficient Navy to attack successfully the mightiest naval power in the world, and when he speaks of foreign nations in regard to naval matters he ignores the fact that it is we who have reduced our Navy during the last four years, and that we are the only country that has done so. I think without a doubt that the country will feel some pleasure and some relief at the hypothetical programme of the Government ceasing to be hypothetical, but I think that our minds would be far more at rest if these ships could be begun at once, and if we had docks to put them in, and also if we had adequate destroyers—ocean destroyers of high calibre, if we had scouts, and if we could feel confident that our stores were being maintained. Considering the information which I know the Admiralty have, I do not see what other course they could have taken than that which they have taken. If they had not consented to lay down these four extra "Dreadnoughts," they would be yielding their policy and their conduct entirely to the control of the little navy party. The policy of this country since the present Government has been in office has been remarkable for its naivete; for having originally insisted on maintaining a four '"Dreadnought" policy, they invited Germany to reduce her standard—a standard which she deliberately adopted—a standard which she had announced to the world by the Acts of 1898 and 1900. I spoke of information which the Government have, and I am prepared to read some of it, but before doing so I should like to read the First Lord's statement of March 16th of the present year. Two years ago, anyone familiar with the capacity of Krupps would have ridiculed the possibility of their undertaking the supply of nil the component parts of eight battleships in a single year; to-day this productive power is a realised fact, etc., etc. The information which reaches me, which has been cast about very freely, and which was sent to the Admiralty in May, 1906, is in the form of a letter:— Are you aware of the enormous expenditure now going on at Krupps, for the purpose of manufacturing very large naval guns and mountings quickly. We find that Krupps have filled up the output of ail the big machine tool makers for the next year or two. We estimate that at the present time Krupps are expending at least a further £3,000,000, this is in addition to the immense works they already possess. Their whole scheme seems to be speed of production. For instance, they are making immensely powerful lathes which will bore and turn a 12-in gun simultaneously, which they estimate will save at least one-third of the time. They seem to have ordered five machines for turning up the roller paths and turn tables for very large mountings, each of these machines costing £5.300; there is nothing nearly so good in this country. These extensions, etc., will give them a possibility of output far in excess of the whole capacity in Great Britain. That was sent by an expert to the Government in May, 1906, and has passed from hand to hand so that hundreds have read it.

Mr. McKENNA

From what is the hon. Member reading?

Mr. MIDDLEMORE

I was reading from a letter which was first addressed to the War Office. It was passed on to the Admiralty, and was discussed by them with several outsiders. In spite of this information the Government had the childishness to approach the German Government and ask them to reduce their programme, to reverse their policy, to discharge their men and to keep their machinery idle. What could the Germans reply to so absurd a proposal? I have other information which I presume the Admiralty has. The first piece is this:— To organise an output of guns and gun-mountings equal to the combined capacity of some 14 slips would appear impossible, and yet that is exactly the arrangement that was then made with the firm of. Krupps. Obviously the ultimate scheme being the completion of 14 battleships within such a time as it would be impossible for England to reply and so to suddenly reverse the balance of power.

Mr. McKENNA

What is the hon. Member quoting from? I do not know the document.

Mr. MIDDLEMORE

I should be happy to send it to the right hon. Gentleman and to tell him how I obtained it.

Mr. McKENNA

Who is it from?

Mr. MIDDLEMORE

That I will communicate to the right hon. Gentleman if he wishes to know. Again, I have another extract:— It is not suggested that a fleet could be completed without anyone knowing anything about it but anyone who has had practical experience of endeavouring to ascertain what is going on in German shipyards and in Krupps' works would know that it is quite possible for construction to have advanced to such a stage that it would be 'childish,' considering the preliminary steps which would have to be undertaken, to attempt "to have ships ready in reply. Again:— Few in England are aware of the steps taken in Germany to ensure privacy. A detachment of soldiers with responsible officers is told off to watch the shops in Krupps, where heavy mountings are made and intruders are rigorously excluded. The shipyards are even more carefully protected, and cases are known where for months it was kept secret whether a ship being constructed was a war or mercantile vessel. To sum up, the position of Krupps' works to-day maybe realised from the fact that the 62,000 men employed in 1905 have been increased to over 100,000, forming an organisation far greater than that of Woolwich Arsenal, and of all the ordnance and armament makers in England combined. In view of all this information, what have the Government done? They reduced the programme to three during 1906, while Germany maintained theirs at three. They maintained it at three again in 1907, while Germany did the same. In 1908 they went one better. They reduced it to two, and the Germans went two better. They increased theirs to four.

Mr. McKENNA

Germany only had one in 1907.

Mr. MIDDLEMORE

I was speaking of 1908. I believe never economy was so false or so uneconomical. If it is true, as the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the Forest of Dean (Sir Charles W. Dilke) told the House at the beginning of this century, that our supremacy at sea was being deliberately challenged by a great foreign Power, I think our right course would be to make no complaint, but to accept the challenge and not to go on our knees to induce those who have made it to withdraw. We have lost, of course, our two-Power standard. That is gone absolutely and entirely. I do not presume the Government would dispute that. Now our one-Power standard is in most definite and real peril. Certainly in 1911 we shall not exceed the Germans, as I work it out, by more than one ship, but they can outbuild us in the essential part of the ship, in gun-mountings, and it is in their power not only to equal us, but to surpass us by two or three "Dreadnoughts" In view of these facts, I cannot help thinking that the Government have been offering to the country a political rather than a strategic programme. I firmly believe in my conscience that we are rapidly drifting into a period of the greatest possible danger.

Mr. H. C. BELLAIRS

One fact struck me very forcibly in the course of the Prime Minister's speech when he said that the date of laying down a ship was immaterial. If that is so, why should not the point contended for by the Opposition be conceded I Why should the ships be postponed until April Fool's Day next year? If again the date of laying down is immaterial, why did the First Lord give statistics of ships laid down during the last three years? If the important point is when the ships were ordered, why did not the First Lord give us the statistics of when the ships were ordered? He told us that in three years we had laid down eight ships to Germany's eleven. If he had given us the important point as to what Germany had ordered and what we had ordered in those three years, he would have had to tell us that we had ordered only eight and Germany had ordered twelve, making the case even worse against the Government than it appears. I do not wish to score simply debating points, and it is not a debating point that I am going to make now, when I say how much I regret that the Prime Minister should still try and lead the House to believe that his definition of the two-Power standard accords with the definitions which have been given by all his predecessors and all previous First Lords of the Admiralty. We had in the House of Lords the statement made by Lord Tweedmouth on 18th March, 1908, that:— According to what is recorded in the Admiralty I find that my predecessors have always taken the two-Power standard as meaning the two next strongest Powers abroad plus 10 per cent., a clear arithmetical standard. He said that was the standard the Government adhered to, and he identified the late Prime Minister and the present Prime Minister with that statement. But that is not the standard we have heard of in this Debate. In the course of the right hon. Gentleman's speech there was a statement made to which the Leader of the Opposition drew attention, and which, I think, we shall heir a good deal of in the future. He said one of the ships which is to be laid down is to be an improved "Invincible" instead of a "Dreadnought," because foreign nations are building speedier "Invincibles," and we require this improved "Invincible" for the defence of commerce. This is the first time I ever heard of a £2,000,000 ship being utilised for the defence of commerce. I think when that statement comes under the criticism of naval officers we shall hear a good deal more about it. But where does this lead us? You have stated a case for us in which we shall have 20 "Dreadnoughts" and "Invincibles" as compared to 17 for Germany. The German total consists of 13 "Dreadnoughts" and four "Invincibles," and the British corresponding total will now consist of 15 "Dreadnoughts" and five "Invincibles"—possibly more will be "Invincibles." If, presuming on information which you obtain in the course of a war, perhaps false information, you detach your "Invincibles" to go and look for the German "Invincibles" which are supposed to be roving on the ocean, it is conceivable that you would detach the whole of your "Invincibles" on false information for the purpose of defending commerce, and you would find your total, irrespective of all the demands of the Mediterranean, reduced to 15 "Dreadnoughts," perhaps in face of a complete total for Germany of 13 "Dreadnoughts" and four "Invincibles." There is no plan by which you can be absolutely certain of the information which you receive by wireless, and so forth, and if you hear of four "Invincibles" having escaped and marauding on our commerce, it may be with other armoured cruisers, it is quite conceivable that on that false information, if you are going to defend commerce with "Invincibles," you will have the whole of these vessels detached.

Mr. McKENNA

I never said anything of the sort.

Mr. BELLAIRS

I am suggesting a hypothetical case. You state that an improved "Invincible" is to be built because of the speedier "Invincibles" being built abroad, and you proceed to reinforce your argument by stating that we have commerce to defend, and that our commerce will be open to attack by the speedier "Invincibles." That is precisely the case which I am taking. When one cruiser escapes you must send at least two to look for her if you do not know her exact position, and it is quite conceivable that you will find yourself with an inferior fleet of "Dreadnoughts" to the Germans owing to the "Invincibles" which you have detached.

I desire to deal with a point which has been raised in the course of the Debate, and which has been raised many times before. It has been contended in the course of the Debates on the Budget that this Budget is to pay for the Navy. The hon. Member for the Fareham Division (Mr. Lee) dealt with that point. So far from the Budget being necessitated in any way by the expenditure on the Navy, it is a fact shown by the details of the Navy Estimates and by the statement given on page 1 of the Estimates that the four additional "Dreadnoughts" now sanctioned will not cause any extra expenditure this year. In all probability they will not. If they do, the First Lord of the Admiralty says that he will have a Supplementary Estimate in February. In all probability-he will not then have a Supplementary Estimate. The total of the Navy Estimates this year, according to page 1, is £2,300,000 less than when the Unionist Government were in office. How can you contend with any show of right on your side that the Budget is in any way necessitated by the demand for naval armaments so far as this year is concerned? During the same period your own official figures show that since the Unionist Government were in office the expenditure of Germany on the Navy has increased £8,240,000. That is to say, there is a relative increase, adding the British decrease to the German increase of £10,540,000 per annum. What does that mean construed in terms of "Dreadnoughts"? The total cost of a "Dreadnought," allowing for replacement and interest on first cost, and allowing also for all the charges connected with docks, repairs, pay of the crew, and pension is £250,000 per annum. That is to say, the permanent cost for replacing a "Dreadnought" at the end of 20 years is the sum I have named. Therefore, if the sum by which the German Navy Estimates have increased in comparison with our own is equivalent to a fleet of 42 "Dreadnoughts" main- tained in full commission, then the British decrease is equivalent to nine "Dreadnoughts" maintained in full commission, and the German increase to 33 "Dreadnoughts" maintained in full commission, a sum total of 42.

The question arises, What is this German Navy being built up for? We find that since 1905–6 the borrowed money has increased to £5,371,000 for this year. That is to say, there has been an increase in the amount borrowed since 1905–6 of £3,075,000. Construed in terms of "Dreadnoughts," that is equivalent to the full maintenance and replacement of a fleet of 12 "Dreadnoughts" on the increase of borrowed money alone. I believe it is the case that the Austrian "Dreadnoughts" have also to be paid for by borrowed money. Borrowed money is only applied by nations for the purpose of permanent works, or for the purpose of meeting war expenses. My opinion is that this money which is being borrowed is conditional on affairs to exist at any time between 1912 and 1915, and that it is borrowed with the view to a war against some nation. I would like to recall the Committee to what is the exact difference between the Treasury Bench and the Front Opposition Bench in regard to the bringing of these four additional "Dreadnoughts" right into the programme this year and the laying of them down, or rather, I should say, the ordering of them as soon as possible. There is a vital difference as to the number of "Dreadnoughts" necessary for the safety of the country. There is also a pecuniary difference between the two Front Benches in considering the safety of the country. I would ask the Committee to remember that we have got to avoid a state of affairs in which you will have a congestion of building at a future date. At all hazards you ought to avoid congestion of building at high prices. By bringing the "Dreadnoughts" into the programme of this year as much as possible, I think we shall avoid the great danger on account of congestion of enabling shipbuilders to name almost any price for their contracts. When I come to the pecuniary difference between the two benches, I find it is a mere bagatelle of about £15,000. I will tell the Committee why. The Government practically propose to expend nothing this year. We will concede that point. I believe that the Opposition want to spend a sum of £700,000 this year. That is an outside figure. If the Government do not spend the money this year, they are going to spend it next year, and, therefore, the difference between the Opposition and myself on the one hand and the Treasury Bench on the other is the interest on £700,000 for a term of six months. That at about 3 per cent, would amount to £10,500, and that is the sole pecuniary difference between the two sides of the House. Therefore I ask myself what object the Government have in postponing the laying down of these ships until April Fool's Day next year. I can only conceive that it is owing to differences in the Cabinet and differences existing in the Liberal party. They desire to revive the controversy as to whether these four "Dreadnoughts" belong to the programme of next year or not. I think that is a very disastrous state of affairs. It means that the flood of talk about the Navy is to go on, and it means that the agitation in the country is to go on. Although it may seem paradoxical, I for one think that all this talk does an infinity of harm. If the Government of the day would only command the confidence of the country by bringing forward an adequate programme, the talk would cease at once. At a former period of our history Lord Chatham gave instructions to the British Ambassador in Paris to avoid giving cause for every hireling pen to inveigh against the maritime intentions of England. I wish that we could reach that halcyon day again, and that the whole of this talk about the Navy might cease. If the Government would put the Navy in a healthy condition, I guarantee that the talk would cease. For the small sum of £10,500, which represents the difference between the Treasury and the Opposition, the Government could cause the agitation about the Navy to cease at once. In regard to all this talk about the Navy, I quite acknowledge that both parties are to blame. There was too much tendency in the last Government to use battleships to do the work of dinghies, or, to apply another metaphor, to use a sledge hammer to drive in a tin tack. The hon. Member for East Mayo (Mr. Dillon) called attention to the case of the Kruger telegram. That was a case in point. When the German Navy was not so large as it now is it was unnecessary to call out a special fleet in connection with that incident. The greatest humiliation was in that way put on Germany, and that did harm. On the other hand, the leaders of the Liberal party seem to me invariably to go out of their way to exaggerate the strength of the British Navy. Their statements are quoted on the Continent, and they naturally lead to an increase in armaments on the Continent, where they talk about the overweening maritime pretensions of England. In exaggerating our strength the Chancellor of the Exchequer used very florid language as to navies to resist nightmares and about building eight "Dreadnoughts" at large cost to meet mythical Armadas. I would remind the Committee of the last time that word was used. It was in the French Parliament prior to the Franco-German War that a Minister talked about the mythical battalions of Germany. I find also that the Treasury Bench invariably exaggerate what they intend to do. They give pledges which are not maintained subsequently. We had three autumn promises by the Prime Minister in regard to the two-Power standard. I cannot interpret his recent declarations as being in accordance with these pledges. We had a pledge by the late First Lord of the Admiralty in the House of Lords, and also by the representative of the Admiralty in this House, that in the event of the failure of the Hague Conference this Government would take immediate steps to maintain our relative strength. The Hague conference was followed by a programme of three battleships as against four "Dreadnoughts" and "Invincibles" for Germany. In the following year this Government ordered only two ships in 1908 as compared with six ordered by Germany. That was not carrying out the promise to maintain the relative naval strength. At the same time every excuse is resorted to for what is done by the Government. We had the disarmament excuse at one time, and that is exploded now. We had the excuse about our greater building power, and that also is exploded. The next excuse was as to pre-"Dreadnoughts," and the hon. Member for Fareham, in my opinion, completely exploded that excuse, and showed that as years advance you will have practically an equality with one Power and a large inferiority as to the two-Power standard in pre-"Dreadnoughts." When you come to consider "Dreadnoughts" alone, the Government are satisfied with a margin of only three—20 against 17. The hon. Member for East Mayo (Mr. Dillon) called attention to the moderation of Lord Charles Beresford's demands. But Lord Charles Berssford wants, not only six more "Dreadnoughts" than Germany, but four more if the Austrian programme is carried out, and the First Lord of the Admiralty has told us that the Austrian programme is to be carried out. Presumably, if Italy is to be considered, we must get four more. In that case you will get practically a two to one standard for future building.

But is there any reason in this idea that we can be satisfied with a margin of only three? No naval officer in the world will contend that we can be satisfied with a less margin than two in ten for coaling and refitting alone. No naval officer with the experience of the Japanese War will allow that we can be satisfied with a margin of less than two in ten for accidents and casualties. I do not believe that any naval officer would be satisfied on the day of battle if he is to win a victory with a margin of less than three ships in 10. Therefore, taking two in 10 for coaling and refitting, two in 10 for casualties, and three in 10 for supremacy on the day of battle, you require 17 "Dreadnoughts" and "Invincibles" to the ten of the enemy. That is a proportion of 28 to 17, instead of the 20 to 17 with which the Government are satisfied. I have heard hon. Members in this House jeer at naval officers who demand anything more than equality with the enemy on the day of battle. But we are face to face with a new condition of affairs, in that the German Navy is a thoroughly efficient Navy. Our principal rival does not possess an inefficient Navy, and that is a state of affairs which, to my mind, has not existed since the great War of American Independence, when the French Navy had its Royalist officers and was thoroughly efficient. If hon. Members search the history of that war they will find that there was not one single case in which the British won with an inferior force. There was one case in which the French in the East Indies won with an inferior force; but on all occasions in which we won we had a complete superiority over the enemy. When we examine the margin of only three ships we find it is dependent on a rule of building which the Admiralty themselves, through no fault of their own, have broken repeatedly. When it is said that we can complete a ship in two years from the date of laying down no margin is allowed for strikes; while a great shipbuilder like the chairman of Messrs. Vickers, Sons, and Maxim tells us that his firm can arm and fit ready for service in every respect three battleships of the "Dreadnought" type in three years from the date of approval of the drawings. I acknowledge that we can build individual ships in two years from the date of planning, but if you are to have four ships laid down next April, and then find yourselves compelled to lay down four more ships within a few months, the chances are very much against your being able to build and equip your ships in two years from the date of laying down.

I would turn for one moment to the argument, put forward on behalf of the Admiralty, that we have a great superiority in pre-"Dreadnoughts" The Government have told us that the "Neptune" is 30 per cent, better than the original "Dreadnought" that the new ones to come are to represent a great superiority over the "Neptune," and both Governments have stated that the "Dreadnought" was so superior to the pre-existing ships that it tended to render all those ships obsolete. If the newest "Dreadnoughts" are so immensely superior to the original "Dreadnought," what becomes of the pre-"Dreadnoughts"? It must have the effect, as the Admiralty themselves have told us, of considerably shortening the lives of the pre-"Dreadnoughts" Therefore you are not justified in reckoning ships of more than 10 or 12 years of age amongst the pre-"Dreadnoughts" in our strength for the years after 1912. The statistics which the Admiralty have given me show that when April, 1912, is reached we shall have only nine pre-"Dreadnoughts" under ten years of age as compared with eight of Germany and 12 of the United States, and 14 under 12 years of age as compared with 12 of Germany and 13 of the United States; while, even if you allow such a length of life as 15 years, the Government state that we shall have 26 in April, 1912, as compared with 18 of Germany and 16 of the United States. There is no great margin t in pre-"Dreadnoughts" unless you include all the pre-"Dreadnoughts" which are 20 years old, and then what becomes of the argument that the lives of the pre "Dreadnoughts" have been considerably shortened. The two things cannot go together. You cannot include pre-"Dreadnoughts" 20 years old when 1912 is reached. As illustrating how these ships fall obsolete, I would direct the attention of the Committee to a statement made by a great authority, Mr. Trevor Dawson, of the firm of Messrs. Vickers, Sons, and Maxim, who in the course of a recent lecture said that the muzzle energy of hits in a ten minutes' engagement of a "Dreadnought" compared with a battleship of 25 years ago is 30 times as great. That statement affects guns only, but armour, speed, and other factors have changed in like proportions. At a time when the Dominions are at our doors, not as beggars for boons, but as guests bringing gifts, I could wish that, the Government had announced that the policy of the two-Power standard was to be maintained to uphold the naval supremacy of this country in all waters, instead of, as the President of the Board of Trade has announced, for the defence of these islands only. When Sir Joseph Ward, Prime Minister of New Zealand, made his offer of two "Dreadnoughts," which the First Lord of the Admiralty has since pointed out amounts to £4 per head of the existing population of New Zealand, he also stated, in a letter, that the object of New Zealand was that Great Britain should maintain the command of t be Pacific, and he warned us of the problems threatening war in those waters. What has been the history of the last five years? It has been a history of continual retreat from foreign waters. We abandoned the Far East, except for cruisers; we abandoned coaling stations and dockyards abroad; we considerably reduced the Mediterranean Fleet, and in the last two months we have abandoned the Mediterranean altogether except for a ship under repair. We have now declared, through at least one Member of the Government, and other Members have used similar language, that the two-Power standard exists for the defence of these islands against aggression. You cannot get to a lower level than that unless you adopt the policy of Charles II. and lay up the ships altogether and depend on the shore alone. All this has been done as a surrender to the forces of the Little Englanders, and to the crack of the whip of men like the editor of the "Nation," who, on 20th March of this year, writing of the Members of the present Government, said.— Finally, if we have a Palmerstonian Prime Minister press the case for enlarged armaments, we have, thank God, a Gladstonian Chancellor of the Exchequer labouring valiantly, and not alone, in the double cause of economy and peace. It was always the view of the parrots that if you stamped anyone as an eagle you thereby damned him. I quite understand that the editor of the "Nation" thinks that by calling the Prime Minister a Palmorstonian he thereby damns him. I hold no brief for the defence of the Prime Minister, or of anybody on the Treasury Bench. My position is quite clear in re- gard to all this failure of the Government to do its duty—the failure of the Government to get these "Dreadnoughts" ordered at once, to get an adequate cruiser and destroyer programme, and to bring up the stores. My position to-day, as compared with my position four years ago, is one of utter disillusionment. In those days we heard speeches of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Secretary of State for War, in which they pledged the Government to keep up our armaments, and gave no hint of any reduction in the Navy—in fact, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs found fault with the Unionist Government for reducing the Navy, and I scarcely know whether it is a fit subject for tears or for laughter when I look back to those days when I thought my leaders were statesmen.

Mr. G. N. BARNES

I shall certainly vote for the Motion of the right hon. Member for the Rushcliffe Division (Mr. J. Ellis) if it is pressed to a Division. I have heard no case made out for the proposed increased expenditure. That increase seems to me to be wholly unnecessary; it will lay additional burdens upon the peoples of the world, and, I believe, increase the danger of war. What is the case of the Government? The position seems to me to be somewhat illogical. We are told that power is to be obtained for the building of four additional "Dreadnoughts," but that those ships are not to be put down until 1st April next year, or thereabouts. If that be so, it seems to be rather illogical to come and ask now for leave to build those vessels if no money is to be taken for them this year. I should like to know therefore, whether these vessels are really an additional four to be built over and above next year's programme? I take it that they are, and I am confirmed in that view by the speech of the Leader of the Opposition, who assumed that there were four previously sanctioned, four more under discussion today, and four to be put into building next year, making twelve altogether. That being so, I take it the four under discussion are an additional four—additional to the programme of this year as well as to the programme of next year. What is the justification for that put forward by the First Lord of the Admiralty? I may say that I have never heard a weaker speech and a worse case put up for the expenditure of £8,000,000 during the three years I have been in this House. He said that after anxious and full inquiry as to the ship- building in foreign countries the Government had decided for the completion of the four additional ships in the March of 1912. An additional reason which he vouchsafed in regard to this foreign shipbuilding is that Austria is building four ships and Italy is also building another four ships. I think this House has a right to know when these four ships of Austria and the other four of Italy are to be completed. I can well understand if there were eight first-class battleships to be added to the fighting forces of the world within two or even three years there might be some justification for taking some steps to cope with that situation. But, so far as I have heard, we are simply given the bald statement that Austria is building four ships and that Italy is building four ships, and that therefore we should build an additional four. They may not be built for ten years. Each of the two Powers is building against the other and we are asked to build against both. I do not accept that as a justification for the expenditure of £8,000,000.

I should like to emphasise what was said by the hon. Member for East Mayo (Mr. Dillon) in regard to the reasons which were urged three or four months ago as to the increased expenditure There was nothing then about Austria or Italy. We were told then that Germany was the enemy. It seems to me that all those whispered conferences, those dialogues across the Table from one Front Bench to the other, in bated breath if not in whispering humbleness—all these things have passed away into the mists. It is admitted practically or tacitly now that what was said about the accelerated programme of Germany has not been borne out in fact. There is no mystery about the German shipbuilding programme. As I understand, a certain programme was carried through Parliament in the year 1900, according to which, I believe, there were to be 11 first-class ships, corresponding to our "Dreadnoughts," finished by the year 1912. Additions have been made since, not in any spirit of hostility to us, so far as shown. In 1906 there was an addition made to the programme after due discussion and debate, and as a result of this five additional cruisers were sanctioned, and probably some of these are already in commission. Last year, as I understand, in consequence of considerations of the ordinary life of a warship, it was determined also to augment the programme by five additional warships, and, as I gather, only two of those will be, or can be, in commission by the year 1912. Therefore, so far as the German programme is concerned, and only affecting these large first-class battleships corresponding to the "Dreadnought," there can be no more in the normal condition of things—and I am assuming that the programme now being carried out is the normal one—than 13 of these battleships in Germany by the middle of 1912; and I think there is some doubt as to whether they can have them even then. So far as I understand our programme, we have already either built, or have building, a dozen. We have the ordinary four ships apart altogether from these four under consideration, which will be completed at least by the end of 1911. So that at the end of that year, which has been frequently spoken about, as the critical time, we shall have 16 of these ships and Germany 13 at the most; and, with these additional four asked for to-day, we shall have 20. A great deal has been said about the proper margin of safety, and the Leader of the Opposition has referred to the margin now as being a narrow margin. I would suggest to hon. Members that no margin would satisfy the requirements of the Leader of the Opposition. He speaks of our great responsibilities—and they are great, no doubt. He speaks of the necessity of protecting our trade routes, and protecting our commerce in the Mediterranean, and he also made use of a large phrase about all the eventualities that might come about, and I think he even mentioned the complications that might arise in the Pacific owing to the economic and racial policy of the Australasian Colonies. If we are going to lay ourselves out to some standard based upon those considerations, which would definitely include America in the calculation—because America lies near several of the Australasian Colonies—if we are going to accept that as a basis of our calculations, it is not a two-Power standard, as generally understood, that we shall have to go in for, but something much more than a two-Power standard.

I would suggest that the bare consideration of these great difficulties and complexities in the future ought to induce us to go in for a reconsideration of the whole matter; and that is what we stand for on these benches. It is nothing new that I am putting forward. I put this forward on 18th March last before the House, and I said on that occasion that it was not only our view but also the view of the parties in foreign countries corresponding to the Labour party here, which parties had consistently and persistently adopted the same policy as we had done in this House. Almost immediately afterwards, or to be precise, on the 29th of the same month, the Social Democratic party of Germany tabled a resolution demanding a conference with the view of discussing the lessening of armaments and the immunity of ships at sea in time of war. And the significance of that is enhanced when it is remembered that, after all, the German Social Democratic party represents over 3,000,000 voters in the German Empire, and is the only political party which is a growing party. It may be said, and with perfect truth, that numerous as are the members of the Social Democratic party in Germany it is not yet a dominating party in Germany. That is no reason why we in this House, as representing the same interests and the same classes as that party does represent, should not avail ourselves of every opportunity of putting in our plea in favour of reduced armaments, and therefore of peace and social reform and goodwill among the nations. But I do not admit for one moment that even the Government classes or authorities in Germany are in any way unfriendly to us. It has been my privilege to be in Germany quite recently, along with many of my colleagues. We met not only the working people of German Government. Even if they were up in the councils of the German nation, and everywhere we had the same cordial assurances of goodwill on the part of the German Government. Even if they were unfriendly I think there has been a great deal in the blatant jingoism in this country, in the false alarms that have been raised, and in the provocative speeches of men who have filled responsible positions in this country, to account for it. Take the speech of the hon. Member for Dulwich (Mr. Bonar Law), who I think on the 19th of last March playfully suggested that the German Government authorities were deliberately lying on the floor of their own Parliament in order to mislead us, or take even the wilder statement from the hon. Member for Fareham (Mr. Arthur Lee), who stated that Krupps were now in a position to turn out more guns and gun-mountings and turrets than Woolwich Arsenal, Vickers-Maxim, Armstrongs, and all the others in this country, both public and private.

Mr. A. LEE

I did not say guns. I said gun-mountings. I was very distinct.

Mr. BARNES

He said on March 17th:— We also know that the great firm of Krupps hare developed under the fostering care of the German Government during the last few years; that their output of guns, gun-mountings, turrets, and some other essentials of that kind, exceeds that of Armstrongs, Vickers-Maxim, Coventry Works, and our whole national resources put together.

Mr. ARTHUR LEE

I did not say guns. It was gun mountings I referred to.

Mr. BARNES

I accept the disclaimer of the hon. Gentleman so far as that is concerned, but he goes on to another matter, which is not so easy to dispose of, and I should like him to disprove that statement. He said: I would ask the House whether they are aware of the fact that the employe's of Messrs. Krupps have increased by 38,000 men during the last twelve mouths, or an increase of 60 per cent, in their total strength? I assert, without the least hesitation, that that is not the fact, but is a grotesque exaggeration. I have been in communication with certain friends of mine in Germany since that time. I have been in communication with a Gentleman in Düsseldorf who lives close to the Essen works, and I have been in communication with an ex-Member of the Reichstag and the editor of a German newspaper, and he tells me, and he proves it by reference to figures, that far from having been any increase in the men employed by Krupps during the last 12 months there has been a decrease. I know perfectly well of the increase during the last three or four years. I have heard the figures given tonight from the mystic paper read by the hon. Member for Birmingham (Mr. Middle-more), the authorship of which he did not disclose. I know of the increase in the number of Krupps' employés during the last four years; but there has been an enormous increase in the employés of many of our firms. But I have it on the assurance of my friend in Germany who knows the fact, that not only has there not been an increase of 38,000 men during the last twelve months, but that there are actually less than 38,000 men employed in Krupps altogether in the manufacture of gun mountings and things of that kind. And my correspondent, in whom I have every faith, goes on to describe the statements made by the hon. Member as sheer moonshine; and I think he would have been amply justified if he had used a much stronger phrase. But seeing that the increased expenditure here has been largely justified by the alleged activity in Germany—although we find the ship-building in Austria and Italy mentioned to-night— I have made some little inquiry into that matter.

I have some information as to the actual position of things in Germany at the very time when these inflammatory speeches were being made by our professional scaremongers and by those hon. Gentlemen who have filled high offices in the Government in times gone by, and who do not seem to realise that that fact invests their speeches with a good deal more importance abroad than is attached to them at home. Take, for instance, a German shipyard (Bloehm and Voss), where eight of the largest ships in the German Navy have been built. At the very time these inflammatory and provocative speeches were being made the number of men actually employed in that yard was 1,200 less than in the year before. On 10th April I find that there was a meeting of the workers at the Imperial yards at Kiel protesting against—I am quoting now the terms of the resolution—"the wholesale discharges," and it was stated that only the month before 300 men had been discharged, and 100 were on notice. The workers demanded as an alternative to these discharges a system of short time. In fact, I have reports from all the yards that have built these warships, in Germany. Only in the naval shipyard at Dantzic there has been an increase of men reported for the last year, and in the report of the metal workers and shipbuilders of Germany, issued at the beginning of April, it was stated that acceleration of work had been ordered so as to alleviate unemployment. It seems to me that no doubt it was accelerated by the end of last year or the beginning of this year, and here we have the germ of that foolish scare which seemed to pass over our country some few months ago; here we have the microscopic base on which was reared that superstructure of foolishness and those jingoistic speeches made in this House and elsewhere.

I was in Germany just about that time, and I came in contact with, among others, not with Germans, but with men who had gone out from this country, and I can testify from actual knowledge of the facts related to me, that this country suffered in reputation very largely as the result of this scare which passed over it. The hon. Gentleman laughs at that statement. I say it is a statement of fact borne out by interviews I had with men in Düsseldorf and all the towns adjacent and right away across to Berlin. I can assure hon. Members that it is not a laughing matter; this country really did suffer in reputation, and, perhaps worse, what happened here encouraged the Jingo party in Germany. What have the Government done or said to-night to justify this further expenditure? If there is any acceleration, let us know of it to-night, before we go to the Lobby. I have listened to this Debate during the last three or four hours, and I have not heard a single word on either side, so far, to justify any assumption that there has been any acceleration of that programme in Germany which was deliberately set out in 1900, and in regard to which there is no secrecy or mystery. I should like to know if there is any justification for these alarmist statements that emanated from the Front Governmental Bench last March, and which were taken up on the Front Opposition Bench and reechoed by every jingo outside. I should like to know if there is any justification for the statement then made, and if there is no justification for it, or if there was no justification for it at that time, then I think it is due to this House, and due to Germany, that it should be quite frankly withdrawn.

Where is it going to end? I very often ask myself that question. I was reading a speech of John Bright delivered in the year I was born, 1859, in which he, in his own inimitable language, put the position so far as the expenditure of this country on war and the preparation of war was concerned. He said that 1,000 millions, since Waterloo, up to that time had been wasted on war or in the payment of debts caused by war; and he imagined what could have been done with that money in improving the homes of the people. He went on to say that the expenditure on the Army and Navy together was £22,000,000, compared with about £12,000,000 20 years before. Here we are to-day, notwithstanding all that has been done in the way of education, spending on our Navy alone, as I understand it, if we sanction these four additional "Dreadnoughts," something like £35,000,000 this year; and during the last 10 years—I repeat the statement made in the last Debate because it has a bearing on our position between ourselves and Germany—this country has spent on the Navy alone more than three times, or about three times, the whole expenditure of the German people. In the name of common-sense, if not of humanity, we on these benches say it is now time that a halt should be called. Another question that might be asked is this. It is very often said by our opponents that this vast expenditure upon the Navy is to put us in a better position to meet war if it comes. The facts of the situation all disprove that assertion. What are we told by hon. Gentlemen on these benches? That we are less secure than ever we were. That has been the burden of the four or five speeches we have heard from these benches this afternoon—we are less secure than ever we were, notwithstanding that we are spending £35,000,000 a year, or thereabouts, instead of about £11,000,000 25 years ago, and notwithstanding that we have spent three times as much as Germany during the last 10 years. When we are told that we are less secure than ever we were, it seems to me that it must be so. Consider the matter for a moment from the point of view of what might be called the psychology of the gun. It seems to me that there is a subtle relation between guns and the use of them, which is very often forgotten by hon. Members. Give a little boy a toy pistol he wants to shoot something with it, even if it be only an old bottle. In the same way, if you train a man to fight he will not be at all affected, practically, by the consideration with whom he fights or what he fights about. The significance of this is realised when we come to remember that we have now in the Navy 128,000 fighting men as against about 70,000 only about 28 years ago. I met an officer of the Navy to whom I was introduced, and he, without the slightest hesitation, began to glory in the fact that our Navy could blow the German navy out of the water. This man, physically strong, trained to fight, and proud of the Navy, felt anxious to use those forces. I am glad to know that at all events a movement is going on amongst the German workmen which has for its object the lessening of expenditure and the promotion of a more friendly feeling between this country and Germany. Let me read a letter which has been addressed to my Friend the Member for Leicester, dated 20th July, from the Secretary of the Trade Union Commission in Germany, who happens at the same time to be a Member of Parliament for the town of Kiel. In that town many are employed in the Imperial dockyards, and many of them are building these warships. Addressing the hon. Member for Leicester, the writer said:— Our friends in Kiel, the well-known harbour—this town belongs to my constituency—desire to organise a big meeting where an English friend would speak on the urgent necessity of good and friendly relations between both nations, and the limitation of armament I would be much obliged if you would make it possible to accept this invitation to attend the meeting, or, if this would be impossible, if you will be good enough to induce one of your friends to come to Kiel. That, I venture to say, is a significant feature of the situation in Germany. They have increased their expenditure to some extent because of their growing commerce, but I believe also to some extent because of our expenditure. They are feeling it now to be a burden upon them. They desire to get rid of that burden and to be good friends with us. I am going to reciprocate such feelings on the part of our fellow workmen in Germany by demonstrating in the only way open to us—in the Lobby—against the Government and against the expenditure of £8,000,000 upon these four "Dreadnoughts." I should vote in that way if I voted alone, but I rejoice to know I shall not vote alone. I rejoice to know that there is a large number in this House, and a larger number outside, who on this matter believe that the Government have been false to the trust reposed in them three and a half years ago. I believe that an increasing number of people outside think that these immense navies are a danger instead of being a means of safety. I believe that a very large number outside think with us on these benches that the enemy we have to fight is not composed of the navies and armies outside of our own borders, but that the great enemies we have to encounter inside our own borders are poverty, disease, dirt, and vested interests. We are going to attack these evils and vested interests found amongst us to-day, and we believe that in proportion as we do that we shall be acquitting ourselves well to our constituents. We believe that in so far as we reach the mind and conscience of our fellow countrymen we shall be doing well; and we shall win in the long run, because it will be found ultimately that righteousness, not big navies, is the defence as well as the exaltation of a nation.

Mr. W. W. ASHLEY

I did not propose to read an extract from a newspaper called the "Clarion," which I believe is in the interests of hon. Members below the Gangway—[An HON. MEMBER: "You are wrong"]—but the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Barnes) having stated that the agitation on behalf of a strong Navy was one by professional scaremongers and people who held high offices, I think it is only right to show that those who are prominently in the counsels of hon. Members below the Gangway—[HON. MEMBERS: "No, no."]—think the same as we do. [An HON. MEMBER: "He is a soldier."] It is a letter which appeared in the "Clarion" from Mr. Robert Blatchford, who is a gentleman of very advanced Socialistic tendencies. He says:— I am accused of insulting Germany. I am accused of hostility to the German people. One correspondent, a German, asks me to what Germany I allude when I say Germany means to make war upon England. In reply I allude to the Germany which attacked and smashed Austria in 1866; to the Germany which attacked and crushed France in 1870; to the Germany which humiliated France by a threat of war at the time of the troubles in Morocco; to the Germany which has just humiliated Russia by a threat of war in connection with the troubles in Servia; to the Germany which is building battleships for service in the North Sea. I believe that the danger is a real danger and a growing danger. I claim that the march of events has justified all I have said dining the last five or six years. To me it seems that there are only three possible courses open. (1) To abolish the Navy and the Army and take the consequences. That apparently is what hon. Gentlemen below the Gangway would like.

Mr. BARNES

I think the hon. Gentleman is not justified in misrepresenting us, and especially myself. He has put this forward as coming from a man in our counsels. I want to say he has nothing at all to do with our counsels, and we have no connection with him.

Mr. ASHLEY

As I stated, this is an advanced Socialistic newspaper. He went on:— (2) To adopt immediately defensive measures of so bold and adequate a nature that the Germans will abandon the race— [That is what we propose] and (3) to equip the whole Empire for war and light it out. I should not have brought out that letter if it had not been for the statement of the hon. Member for Blackfriars (Mr. Barnes), and to prove that there are other people in this country who take the same view as we do on these benches. I really do not think that the right hon. Gentleman who moved this reduction, or the hon. Member for Blackfriars, or the hon. Member for East Mayo (Mr. John Dillon), really need persist in their Motion, because I hope to prove to the Committee that the Government is so deficient in its shipbuilding programme, and that if they really consider the Government's proposals they will see that the Government is carrying out the Navy programme as they would desire in their heart of hearts; and that therefore all these attacks made on the Government by hon. Gentlemen below the Gangway and on the other side are not really justified. It is doubtless true that the Government do wish to stand well with the people of this country, because, despite what hon. Gentlemen below the Gangway say, I am convinced that the vast majority of the people of this country arc determined that we shall be supreme at sea, and that the two-Power standard shall be maintained, and that they will not stand any tampering with it. In order to afford a bye-wash for the people of this country the Government have during the present summer had an unusually large number of naval reviews. They had one at Spithead and one in the Thames, and are going to have another in the Solent at the end of the year. [An HON. MEMBER: "Showing the flag."] Showing the flag, no doubt, in "foreign" waters perhaps. But though in all those reviews there will be and have been a very large and efficient fleet, I would ask the Committee to consider how many of those ships have been provided by this Government, or for which this Government is responsible. Last week, in the Thames, we had 23 battleships, 24 cruisers, four scouts, and 48 destroyers, or 99 in all. Out of the 23 battleships how many were this Government responsible for—only three, out of 24 cruisers only one, and out of 48 destroyers only three. So that out of the whole 99 ships this Government had only provided seven, or 7 per cent, of the whole. [An HON. MEMBER: "Who paid for them?"] We did. They virtually went to the country and said, "There is no need for any naval agitation to increase our shipbuilding, because we have provided such a magnificent fleet, as you see here."

I wish for a moment, in order to calm the fears of hon. Members below the Gangway and opposite, to compare the Navy policy of the late Government and the present Government. When they have heard the figures I am quite confident they will not persist in their Motion, because the Government policy must commend itself to them. In the last year of the last Government there were 64,000 men employed in the construction of armoured ships, and in the present year the number is 38,000. Surely that is enough to satisfy them. In the 11 years of the last two Unionist Administrations—1895–1905— the Conservative party provided 71 armoured ships, or an average of 6½ per year. During the four years this Government has been responsible for the government of this country they have only provided 12 armoured ships, or an average of three per year, or not half what the Conservative party provided. The late Government provided an average of 103,000 tons of sea going ships, and in the four years of the present Administration the average is 83,000 tons. Surely that is a very satisfactory reduction for hon. Members below the Gangway. Finally, to show what the result of this most unwise and dangerous reduction on the part of His Majesty's Government during the last four years has been. The increase in the German navy, while the Conservatives were in office, was 20,000 tons yearly, and since the present Government have taken office it has risen to 80,000 tons per year. Directly they see that we reduce our shipbuilding programme, they, naturally and obviously, quadruple their shipbuilding programme in order to try and catch us up or put themselves in a better position. That ought to satisfy hon. Members below the Gangway as to the bonâ fides of the Government. Another question in which the hon. Member for Chelmsford (Mr. Pretyman) takes a deep interest, and which has only just been touched upon, is as to destroyers. I think on that point I shall be able to prove to hon. Members opposite that we have not got a two-Power standard or not a one-Power standard, and that, therefore, they ought to be amply satisfied with what the Government has been doing. On 31st March last, built and building, and under 12 years old, and laid down since 1897, or launched since 1898, in the German navy there were 96 destroyers. What number had we on 31st March last fulfilling the same conditions? The number in the British Navy was 83. Surely it is very satisfactory to hon. Members opposite that we have got less torpedo - boat destroyers. It shows how ardently we desire peace, but if war came it might not be so satisfactory to the people of this country to have 83 destroyers to 96 of Germany. Of these 83 in the British Navy 33 are 25½knot boats, and there is not a single destroyer of the Germans under 12 years so slow. We have come to this conclusion with regard to the German destroyers; the Germans have 13 more destroyers under 12 years old, and we have got 33 boats, which are slower than any boat of the Germans. I am not taking an unreasonable course in eliminating all the boats over 12 years old, as shown by the fact that the German Government have officially declared that they would scrap all destroyers over twelve years old, and the Dilke Return, issued by the right hon. Gentleman opposite, eliminates all German boats over 12 years old, and shows that the Government accept as correct the assumption that over twelve-year-old destroyers are for all practical purposes only worthy to be put upon the scrap-heap. Not only is the position as dangerous in regard to destroyers as I have shown to the Committee—because these figures, so far as I make out, show that to further exhibit the goodwill of the Government they in the three years, 1906–7–8, laid down only twenty-three destroyers to Germany's 36—very little more than half. I would point out this to the Committee also that all the destroyers of the 1907–8 German programme are now in commission, and have been for two or three months, while not one single one of ours will be in commission until October, and 50 per cent, not till next year. I know it is perfectly true that the building has been delayed by strikes, but then you cannot eliminate the possibility of strikes when you are reviewing a shipbuilding programme. That is why I do wish to impress upon this Committee the great danger of relying upon the superiority of one or two ships one way or another in comparison with foreign shipbuilding programmes, especially now that we have thrown over the two-Power standard, and are dealing with only a one-Power standard. The Germans in their 1907–8 (destroyer) programme laid down between April and December, 1907, vessels that were completed between December, 1907, and December, 1908. Therefore, it is perfectly obvious that one was completed in nine months, and the last in twenty months. The hon. Gentleman, who will probably reply, may point out that the Admiralty have been delayed with strikes, but may I point to him that the Admiralty do not contract for anything under twenty months against the Germans' nine, fifteen and twenty months. That being the position at the present time, if there are 83 against 96 built and building, what are the Government doing? They propose to lay down, I think, 20 to the German 16. Our ships are going to be laid down in November and completed in 20 months. What is Germany doing? We, in this financial year, which goes up to the end of March of next year, are only going to spend on each of our 20 vessels, £5,500. You cannot make very much progress with torpedo-boat destroyers in the time if you only spend that amount of money on them. What are the Germans going to do with their 16 destroyers? They are going to spend before the end of their financial year, that is December, £41,000. On each of their destroyers they are going to spend eight times what we do. I would ask the Committee to consider this seriously, and to ask themselves: Is it satisfactory that we should have to-day fewer sea-going destroyers built and building than Germany. In answer to questions I have put the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty has said he was considering this question, but this afternoon he has said nothing as to the effect of those considerations. I presume that this most unsatisfactory state is going to continue. I pass from destroyers to cruisers, which have not been very fully dealt with in this afternoon's Debate. Take the small fast cruisers, which, after all, are a most important type of ship, and which it is essential that we should have, just as it is essential that we should have big cruisers and destroyers. When this year's programme is completed, Germany will have 29 small fast cruisers, over 21 knots, against our 27. Does the hon. Gentleman think it satisfactory that when their programme is completed that one great Power should have 29 against our 27? I would point out this, too, that that is not all, because eight of our cruisers of the scout class have a maximum coal capacity of not more than 380 tons, while every one of the German small cruisers has a maximum coal capacity of 580 tons. The Committee will realise what an immense advantage a fleet of 29 ships with that maximum coal capacity must have over a fleet of 27, in which eight have not got storage room for more than 380 tons of coal. The effect is considerably to reduce the effective action of the latter vessels, and more or less tie them to within a reasonable distance of some coaling station. Of course, to be perfectly fair, if we take armoured cruisers built since 1899 we have got an overwhelming superiority. That is the thing which saves us.

Dr. MACNAMARA

Hear, hear.

Mr. ASHLEY

The hon. Gentleman says "Hear, hear," but surely we are not going to rely upon one particular type of ship to pull us out of any difficulty. Surely they ought not to have a duty placed upon them that should be performed by the others. I have endeavoured to point out to the Committee that we have a grave deficiency at the present time in small cruisers and destroyers, and that the Government are taking no steps whatever to redress that grave deficiency. As the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition very properly pointed out this afternoon, it is no use having "Dreadnoughts" and armoured cruisers unless you have the auxiliary services complete in every respect, just as it is no use having an Army with infantry and artillery unless you have cavalry to make the whole complete. It is a point to which I do not think sufficient attention has been drawn in all these Navy Debates. We began talking about "Dreadnoughts," and have gone on talking about them. "Dreadnoughts" are essential, but they are not the only ships that we must have, for it is necessary that we shall have the other services ready to help the "Dreadnoughts" in time of war.

There is another very important matter, and one to which I wish the Committee would pay a little attention. That is the protection of our trade routes. I believe, from what I have heard, that the matter has received the attention of the Admiralty for some years, and is still receiving the attention of the Admiralty. No effective action has been taken. It is a most important point. Imagine for a moment what, if war broke out to-morrow, would be the position of this country? We should have telegrams coming from all parts of the world stating that certain ships laden with grain, cotton, and everything necessary for this country had been sunk by hostile cruisers. Imagine the panic which would occur. Imagine the commotion in commercial circles if we suddenly found that our merchant ships had been sunk or captured! There is no class of trade more susceptible to panic than the shipping trade. Imagine the state of confusion in trade all over the United Kingdom if these ships were sunk or captured, and sunk or captured they certainly would be, because what is the position at the present time. Since the First Sea Lord came into office—I do not intend to criticise him—it is to those representing the Admiralty in this House that I have to address my remarks—but for the last four or five years the policy has been to withdraw all our cruisers from foreign stations. At last it began to dawn upon the Admiralty, as it had dawned upon many eminent officers long before, that this was a very wrong and a very unwise policy, and the Admiralty began in the last few months to send out cruisers to foreign stations from which all cruisers had been withdrawn since 1904. Why? because it came to their knowledge that the Germans in the exercise of their rights have taken steps to arm a certain number of their merchant ships, whether they carried their guns in their holds or not, at any rate they have them ready at certain stations, and directly they receive a telegram that war has occurred they are quite ready and prepared. The captain has his commission on board ship; he has his pennant and uniform. The crews of the vessels are German naval reserve men, and on receipt of a telegram this peaceful German ship can be turned into a German cruiser.

I do not know whether the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for the Admiralty when he comes to reply will deny this, but assuredly we ought to pay as much attention as possible to our cruisers to go out to these foreign stations to defend our merchant ships in time of war, and, also, we ought to pay attention to the manning of these vessels, because as things are at the present moment the special service available to protect our trade routes cannot go cut until war has practically been declared. The crews cannot be put on board until the Reserves are called out. I think that is a point very worthy of the consideration of the Committee. May I say one word now on the question of "Dreadnoughts," which has been dealt with fairly exhaustively to-day and very exhaustively in March of this year? I think it will not be denied that on 1st April, 1911, we shall have 12 "Dreadnoughts" or "Dreadnought" cruisers. That is practically agreed to; in fact, it has been so stated by the Prime Minister and the First Lord of the Admiralty, but I think I heard it said by hon. Members in this House this afternoon that the Germans cannot possibly have more than 11 "Dreadnoughts" and "Dreadnought" cruisers in commission at that time. I cannot believe how hon. Members can take that point of view. Surely it is perfectly obvious that we will have 12 on 1st April, 1911, and that Germany will have 13? We have it from the Prime Minister and the First Lord of the Admiralty that they knew that in November last year materials for the four ships which would make up the 12 had been collected. I believe one of these cruisers were laid down in December or March this year, and the other three ships I do not know, but they are supposed to be officially laid down on 1st April. Therefore I think the whole 13 ships of the German programme were laid down by 1st April this year, and preparations began in October or in November last year. In the Debate of March last the First Lord of the Admiralty stated that the Germans could build practically as fast as we could; he also said that the ships which will be laid down this month will be completed in 24 months or 27 months if we give three months' preparation. Therefore I cannot conceive how it can be denied, if the Germans build as fast as we do, and the Germans began in October last year and had laid down on 1st April, that the whole of the 13 should not be ready in 1911. Therefore we are in this position: that in 1911 we shall have 12, against Germany's 13. In July we shall have 14, against Germany's 15; in November 16, to Germany's 17; on 1st April, 1912, with these four additional ships laid down now we shall have 20, to 17. But hon. Members opposite think it impossible that because Germany accelerated in the year 1909 her programme that there will be acceleration again in the year 1910, and if the Germans accelerated their 1910 programme in the same way as they did their 1909, who can tell that they may not have 15 ships ready in 1911? Therefore we are in this position: that all along the line the Germans have one more ship than we have. Is that a situation which hon. Members opposite think satisfactory? If that is a position which the country thinks satisfactory I should feel very much surprised. I should also like to press upon the Government the advisability of laying down these additional ships not on 1st April next year but in November of this year. If you do that you will have in November, 1911, your 20 ships, and you will spend very little more money in doing that, and we shall be practically secure in the period, which is a very dangerous one. Finally, I would point out to the Committee that this position in which we are now has occurred before in the history of this country, and probably will occur again. In 1861 we were very nearly in the same position with regard to France as we are at the present time in regard to Germany. Then the Emperor of the French and the French nation were building for all they knew to try and have more ships than we had, and we were naturally at our wits end to maintain our maritime supremacy. It was only the other day that I was looking up "Punch" of 1861, and I came across a very appropriate cartoon which appeared in the publication of that day, where the Emperor was playing cards with Lord Palmerston. The game they were playing was called "Beggar my Neighbour," and Lord Palmer- ston was made to say, "Is not it time, your Majesty, to stop this foolish game?" There are some verses underneath in which Lord Palmerston is made to say:— Throw up your cards, I will throw up mine, And cease this fruitless labour. There's better work for each to do Than beggaring his neighbour. I agree there is better work for us to do than beggaring our neighbours, but we must look after our own safety and make ourselves secure. I hope the Government will approach Germany on this question, but the arrangement must be that if we reduce our programmes England must remain Mistress of the Sea.

The PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY to the ADMIRALTY (Dr. Macnamara)

With regard to the withdrawal of the fleet and the concentration of cruisers in Home waters, I must say that I dislike these questions raised from a party point of view, and I will not discuss the merits of the withdrawal of these cruisers. But I may say that what the hon. Member has complained of was inaugurated under the auspices of the late Government. I was sorry to hear the disparaging references made to the recent Naval displays, because they give the people a chance of seeing the fleet they pay for and the bluejackets they love. Supposing we got a request for some ships to be off Blackpool, what would the hon. Member's position be then? The hon. Member divided the recent ships into two categories, one built by the present Government and the other by the late Government. The division of the Navy into Tory ships and Radical ships is a thing which I very much deplore, and I can hardly take it seriously. I believe, however, the hon. Member was serious with regard to destroyers. I will give him a few facts from the statement made on 24th March by the First Lord of the Admiralty in reply to the hon. Member for Hereford:— Of ships launched in or since 1903, or provided in recent programmes. Great Britain has a total of 81 destroyers of from 540 to 990 tons, with the 'Swift' of 1,800 tons, and two just purchased from Messrs. Palmer, making 84 altogether. Germany has 72 of from 400 to 660 tons; France has 60 of from 298 to 703 tons. Of older destroyers Great Britain has 65 30-knotters launched between 1896and 1901, of from 310 to 470 tons and the 'Velox.' Germany has 24, launched between 1897 and 1902, of 394 tons, France has 16, launched between 1899 and 1902, of from 295 to 306 tons. I have not referred to the 40 27-knot British destroyers of earlier date.

Mr. ASHLEY

Could the hon. Member give us a summary of that statement?

Dr. MACNAMARA

This is a summary. Then again, there was the question: "How many destroyers are there in the British, French, United States, and German Navies with a trial speed of 30 knots or over?" On 13th July, 1909, the First Lord of the Admiralty said the numbers were as follows: "Great Britain, 67; France, 9; United States, nil; Germany, 27." I must say the hon. Member's anxiety with respect to cruisers and destroyers is rather curious—and again I do not want to treat this as a party matter—because under the policy of the late Government in 1904–5 they put 13 destroyers in their programme and did not proceed with them; in 1903–4 there were three third-class cruisers in the programme which were not proceeded with; in 1904–5 they did not proceed with a fourth armoured cruiser, and in 1905–6 a fourth armoured cruiser was not proceeded with. I remember reading in "The Tames" on 16th March a statement by the Navy League, containing a pronouncement on the estimates, signed by R. A. Yerburgh (president of the Navy League), Lord Elcho (chairman of the Executive Committee), Mr. C. Belliars (vice-chairman), issued after a meeting of the committee of the League, at which Lord Elcho presided. I take an extract:— With the cruiser and destroyer programme the Navy League has no fault to find. I think I may very well leave the subject with such a handsome testimonial from such a quarter. The hon. Member for Fareham, and several other hon. Members who have endorsed the same view, has charged us with having entirely failed to live up to the two-Power standard, and it is said we have only a bare margin of one vessel of the "Dreadnought" type in regard to a single-Power standard as represented by one great country. That statement was made by the hon. Member for Fareham, and repeated several times and endorsed in substance by the last speaker. With the greatest possible respect, I do not think that statement is accurate, and we should not let it go by default. Take the "Dreadnought" type only, and take them to-day. There are seven of them, namely, the "Dreadnought," the. "Temeraire," the "Bellerophon," the "Superb," the "Invincible," the "Indomitable," and the "Inflexible." They have all been experimented upon on the high seas. The "Dreadnought" has been nearly three years in commission, and I suppose she has cruised between 30,000 and 40,000 miles, and the experiments made with her and her sister ship have been invaluable to us in dealing with the designs of later ships of the same type. There is not another country in the world which has a single "Dreadnought" at this time in commission. The two German vessels—the "Nassau" and the "Westfalen"—will not be in commission until the close of this year, and even then they are untried ships. I will pass to this time three years, namely, the middle of July, 1912. We shall then have 20 "Dreadnoughts," and the Germans, as far as I can see, will certainly have 13. They may possibly have 17, and it is very curious to note the extraordinary conflicts in the conjectures as to how many the Germans are going to have at a certain time. The Leader of the Opposition insisted earlier this year that the Germans were to have 21 by 31st March, 1912, and might have 25. If they had 25, what is the good of asking for eight? If he sincerely thought they would have 25, he ought to ask for 13 this year. The Leader of the Opposition says Germany will have 21 by 31st March, 1912. Lord Charles Beresford says they will not have 21 until 31st March. 1914.

Mr. C. BELLAIRS

Lord Charles Beresford stated he was not providing for acceleration.

Dr. MACNAMARA

I do not want to misrepresent the noble and gallant Lord, but, at any rate, Germany will have 13, and may have 17. France may have six. They are not exactly "Dreadnoughts"; they have not single-calibre man gun armament. I should call them very much improved "Lord Nelsons." The United States may have eight, Italy two, and Austria two. Let the hon. Gentleman add any of those two together, and see whether 17 does not represent really much more than living up to a single-Power standard in a matter of this sort. We have been told, and shall be told again, that some of these figures I have quoted are conjectural, and that, though it is at any rate far beyond a one-Power standard, it is not anything like a two-Power standard in "Dreadnoughts" three years hence. I am not sure of that. I am not sure that this country may not when the time comes have a two-Power standard in "Dreadnoughts" alone. The Member for Fareham said on July 13th, 1908: You ought to lay down two keels of capital ships for every one laid down by your chief rival. I notice the Leader of the Oppositiou came very near the same proposition en 26th May this year. He said:— If the Government will not have the old two-Power standard with a margin, let us have a new standard twice, let us say the naval strength of any other large or the next largest Power. I again, on that proposition, turn to Lord Charles Beresford. "What," he asks, "do these wild men want? They want us to lay down two 'Dreadnoughts' to every one Germany lays down. There is no lunacy I have ever heard of equal to that." I think I may safely leave these good people to settle the point among themselves. I admit at once that, even with 20 "Dreadnoughts" in July, 1912, there are remotely conceivable two-Power combinations, which might leave us either with a narrow margin of "Dreadnought" superiority, or with that superiority even not quite reached. That, however, assumes in the first place a very great expedition in building, secondly a most unlikely combination, and thirdly this country without a single ally in the whole world. You have to face the assumptions that do underlie that state of things. I have often asked, in the course of these Debates, and I ask it now I hope for the last time: Assuming the case with regard to "Dreadnoughts" alone, and assuming those wild assumptions take actual fact, what has become of all the fleet which used to be so powerful before the "Dreadnoughts" were built? Is it all on the scrap heap or at the bottom of the sea? I put that statement to a gentleman who was examining me on this point, and he said, "I daresay a great many of the pre-"Dreadnoughts" are very good, but they have no 12-inch guns." I am not sure that many people have not the same idea. It is quite a mistake. With the exception of the two "Swiftsures," which have 10-inch guns, all the 10 pre-"Dreadnoughts," which will be 20 years old or under by the middle of July, 1912, mount four 12-inch guns. I am quite satisfied that in three years we shall have an effective two-Power standard in capital ships, and I cannot allow the statement to go by default, that so far a two-Power standard we living up to a one-Power standard.

Mr. ASHLEY

We shall not have a two-Power standard against Germany and the United States.

Dr. MACNAMARA

The more I see of the British Navy the more I am convinced you do not get the real or comparative strength by a tabulation of ships, guns, type, tonnage, horse power, and armour plate. I am perfectly sure you do not get the real strength until you see the men who man the Fleet. We are the only long-service Navy in the world, and in mere numbers alone are twice the strength of any possible combination.

Mr. E. G. PRETYMAN

What, twice the strength of any possible combination.

Dr. MACNAMARA

I think you will find, if you look at the figures, there are 128,000 active service ratings, and that is equal to any two Powers. I mean, put any two Powers you like together.

Mr.PRETYMAN

The hon. Member says double the numbers of any possible combination. Surely he does not mean that?

Dr. MACNAMARA

What I meant was it is at least a two-Power personnel.

Mr. PRETYMAN

Yes, that is clear.

Dr. MACNAMARA

I confess, so far as I am concerned, I find it quite impossible not to sympathise with those who are wringing their hands at the crushing burdens which civilised and Christian communities are heaping upon themselves. Where it will all end I do not profess to foretell. I observe everything is much more costly in armaments than 10 years ago. Ten years ago a first-class battleship cost under a million; to-day it costs about two millions. Ten years ago a first-class cruiser cost about half a million, to-day it costs from one million to 1½ millions. Ten years ago a destroyer cost about £60,000, to-day costs about £150,000. Ten years ago a submarine cost about £40,000; today the cost of a submarine is getting on to double that amount. Not only are we more costly in matters of ships, but more costly in all the attendant circumstances. There is a graving dock outside the Admiralty Superintendent's office at Portsmouth. I was walking past it the other day with an officer who remembered seeing the "Victory" in the dry dock. To-day it takes a couple of submarines, or at most a couple of destroyers. Not only is everything larger and more costly, but it reaches the scrap heap more rapidly. I should think the "Victory" cost about £150,000; at any rate, the old measure of the cost of ships was about £1,000 per gun. The "Victory" was 40 years old at Trafalgar, and she had another commission after that. A "Dreadnought" will cost about £2,000,000, in addition to about a quarter of a million yearly for maintenance and depreciation; in about 15 years she will be on her way to Motherbank, and a year or so after that she will fetch about £l for every £100 spent upon her. The other day we sold two vessels, each about 20 years old. They cost us from first to last £1,730,000. They fetched £42,000! Notwithstanding all this, I am bound in the matter of national defence to take the world as it is—we cannot afford to take it as it ought to be. We must work towards ideals, but we cannot overlook existing facts. We all loathe and detest war, and would no doubt willingly beat our swords into ploughshares forthwith if we could. I do not think there is a man in this Committee who has any shadow of suspicion of ill-will against any people in the world. Certainly aggression is not in the dictionary of the British Navy. But, after all, we are an island people, and immunity against attack is quite as vital to the working classes as to any other class, for four out of every five loaves of bread they eat is made from wheat grown abroad. Four-fifths of the imports brought over here are food and raw material, and to interrupt that supply for a week where will be your mills, your factories, your workshops, and your cupboards? There is another point of view to be borne in mind. The British Mercantile Marine registers 10,823,816 tons—more than the whole of the Mercantile Marine of the rest of Europe put together. We are bound to keep our Navy in an unchallengable position to defend that as much in the interests of the working classes as of any other class of the community. If it is looked at from the point of view of the protection of commerce and measured by tonnage of the Mercantile Marine to be protected, it will be seen that the British Navy is not, after all, a particularly costly charge. The cost of the German Navy per ton of the German merchant shipping is £5 6s. per ton. In the case of the Italian Navy it works out at £6 2s. In the United States it is £6 10s., and in France it is £10 10s., while in the British Navy it is about £3 per ton. Therefore from the point of view of the protection of commerce it cannot be said that the British Navy is very costly. I have quoted these figures roughly, but they are fairly accurate. We do not want to build "Dreadnoughts" for the mere morbid satisfaction of building them, but we have to build them in order to put the daily bread and the daily occupation of the working classes of this country beyond anxiety, and I believe that in this matter the working classes, much as they may deplore this expenditure, quite agree with the propositions I am putting forward.

Mr. MURRAY MACDONALD

I desire to refer to the statement made at the opening of this Debate by the First Lord of the Admiralty. I confess I listened to that statement with astonishment when I remember what occurred in March last. We were then told by the Government that they proposed to build four ships contingently on the acceleration of the programme by Germany. The right hon. Gentleman stated that German construction had been so accelerated that the four ships of the 1908–9 programme will be completed, not in February 1911, as had been anticipated, but in the autumn of 1910. He stated, secondly, that; the four ships of the 1909–10 programme would be completed in 1911 instead of 1612: and, thirdly, that the four ships of 1910–11 programme would be completed by April, 1912, and that by that date Germany would have 17 "Dreadnoughts." It was on that ground the right hon. Gentleman based his justification for the exceptional powers he asked the House to give to the Government.

Mr. McKENNA

Is my hon. Friend quoting me? I think ho will find it is not quite as he puts it.

Mr. MURRAY MACDONALD

As a matter of fact, I was summarising the right hon. Gentleman's statement, and I do not think I was unfairly doing so. I think if the right hon. Gentleman will refer to the Report, he will see he stated that ships which were expected to be completed in February, 1911, would, in fact, be finished in the autumn of 1910.

Mr. McKENNA

If the hon. Gentleman will look at the bottom of page. 934 he will see the precise language I used.

Mr. MURRAY MACDONALD

The words are:— I am informed, moreover, that the collection of materials, and the manufacture of armament, guns, and mountings, have already began for four more ships which, according to the Navy law, belong to the programme of 1909–10, and we have to take stock of a new situation, in which we reckon that not nine, but 13, ships will be completed in 1911.

Mr. McKENNA

May be completed.

Mr. MURRAY MACDONALD

Yes, may be completed, not in 1911, but in 1912 such further ships, if any, as may be begun in the course of the next financial year. Will the right hon. Gentleman look again at the top of page 936. He says:— The German law provides for four more ships to be laid down in 1910–11. If the construction of the ships were to be accelerated I understand the four ships of the 1909–10 programme would be completed by April, 1912, and at that date Germany would have 17 'Dread- noughts' and 'Invincibles.' But oven if no acceleration takes place before April, 1910, this number would be completed in the autumn of 1912. I say that, according to that statement, the right hon. Gentleman and the Government did rest their case in favour of the four contingent ships on the supposition that Germany would have by the middle of 1912 not 13 but 17. The Prime Minister made that perfectly clear in the statement which he made to the Committee on the same day—the day the Navy Estimates were introduced. He observed, referring to German figures in the middle of 1912: I said 17 was a possibility—13 is a certainty. It is because 17 is a possibility that we are taking this power, otherwise we should not take it at all. That was the statement made in March in this House in referring to the exceptional powers asked for by the Government, and the right hon. Gentleman gets up to-day and makes a statement in support of the proposal now laid before the Committee, to lay down these four ships on 1st April next year, and in that statement there is not one word of the justification originally given. The justification made in March has broken down. The Foreign Secretary—speaking on behalf of the Government in the Debate on the Vote of Censure on 29th March—said that he accepted as given in perfect good faith the declaration of the German Government, and since then we have had the statement made by the Chancellor in the German Reichstag that the German Government had no intention of accelerating their programme, and that they would not have 17 "Dreadnoughts" in the middle of 1912, nor would they have 13 "Dreadnoughts" in the middle of 1912, but 13 "Dreadnoughts" at the earliest at the end of 1912. It is not merely that the Government has accepted that declaration as sincere and as given in good faith, but the right hon. Gentleman stated, in reply to a question put to him on 27th June, that so far as the information of the Admiralty went, the German Government had up to that time laid only one of the "Dreadnoughts" of the 1909 programme. If that is so, I contend that the case which was made by the Government in March has absolutely broken down. Surely if there were need for any proof of that, the mere fact that the right hon. Gentleman makes the statement in the House to-day in favour of carrying out the proposal of the four contingent ships, without any reference at all to the justification made in support of that policy, gives the proof of it. The right hon. Gentleman was interrupted in the course of his speech by the hon. Member for Mayo, who, when he saw that no reference was going to be made to the statement given in March, asked, "What about the acceleration of the German programme?" The right hon. Gentleman gave a reply which indicated that we had during the last three years reduced our shipbuilding programme for the express purpose of persuading foreign Powers to reduce theirs, and because we had failed the Government was justified in proposing to construct the four contingent "Dreadnoughts." I could at any rate draw no other inference at the time, and I asked the right hon. Gentleman on what authority he made that statement, and he quoted the late Sir Henry Camp-bell-Bannerman and the present Prime Minister, but I venture to say that there never was a statement made by either of them that we had reduced our programme of 1906, 1907, and 1908 in order to give an example to other Powers. The facts are not really as slated by the right hon. Gentleman. The Cawdor programme was framed in 1905 in accordance with the statement which itself contains of the proposal of foreign Governments to construct seven ships of the "Dreadnought" type—three by Prance, two by Germany, and two by the United States. It was that programme on the part of the foreign Powers that led to the suggestion by the Government at that time that we should construct four battleships annually. When the Vote came on and was discussed in this House in July, and the then Secretary to the Admiralty, Lord Lochee, stated that not one of those ships had been laid by any foreign Powers, and he said that because not one of those ships had been laid the Government thought our requirements will be met by building three ships of that type, and there never was any variation in the justification for the dropping of the single ship. The reduction of the programme was not made with the intention of influencing any foreign Power, because foreign Powers were not at the time laying "Dreadnoughts."

Mr. BELLAIRS

The Secretary to the Admiralty on the 7th of July, 1906, directly stated that the amount of construction in 1907–8 was to be limited to a small sum in order to emphasise to the Hague Conference the good faith of the present Government in their desire to bring about a reduction of armaments.

Mr. MURRAY MACDONALD

But that has nothing to do with the point, and I will reply to that in a moment. I am dealing with the case of 1906. It is perfectly true that the Secretary to the Admiralty made that statement, but it had no reference to the 1906, but to the 1907–8, programme. There is no question at all as to what the reason was. Lord Lochee, then Secretary to the Admiralty, stated perfectly clearly that the reduction was made solely because not another Power in the world had laid any new ships that had been referred in the Cawdor Memorandum of 1905. When the Estimates for 1907–8 were being prepared in the autumn of 1906 the Admiralty found that then not one of the seven ships planned by those foreign Powers had been laid, and when the Estimates were presented to the House early in March of 1907, Lord Lochee told the House that the Government believed that three ships would amply meet our requirements. But he said that if The Hague Conference would consent to a proportionate reduction in "Dreadnoughts" we would build not three but two. That was the state of the case in 1907. In 1908, when we built only two ships, the Secretary to the Admiralty made a careful calculation of what would be the ships in Commission belonging to the chief Powers of the world in the year 1910, and he then stated that two ships laid by us in 1908 would keep us up abreast of the two-Power standard. I have referred to that because the right hon. Gentleman has more than once, not only in the House but outside, stated that we definitely reduced our shipbuilding programme during these three years for the express purpose of setting an example to other Powers, and that as that example had not been followed we were justified now in building the programme which the Government has laid before the country. The Prime Minister, following the right hon. Gentleman, and accepting the view given by him, gave it as a proof that the Government was absolutely sincere and honest in its desire to reduce expenditure or armaments. I have no doubt at all as to the sincerity of the desire of the Government to reduce expenditure, but I think they have not, in the three years in which the Government has been in existence, kept due control over the expenditure in connection with armament.

The right hon. Gentleman made no reference to Germany in his statement, but he did refer to Austria and to Italy. When I heard him make that reference I hardly knew what to think. Surely it was obvious from his own statement that, as the case for these four contingent ships, as laid before the House in March, has broken down, he turned to Austria and Italy as giving a colourable pretext for the proposal to give actual effect to the powers asked for. Austria and Italy are not building against us, and although no doubt the right hon. Gentleman might reasonably enough contend that they are in alliance with Germany, and that their naval power might be combined with the power of Germany against us, it is a kind of danger that I think we have been too ready to provide against during the last 10 or 15 years, and it is a kind of danger which, if we are always going to be prepared to defend ourselves against it, must necessarily bring disaster to this country. We have heard lately, both inside and outside the House, that the Navy which was constructed under the auspices of the late Government was far in excess of the two-Power standard. Lord Charles Beresford stated that it was equal to a four-Power standard. I do not know whether that is true or not, but I am perfectly willing to accept it as true, but what I am certain of is that the late Government, from 1895 to 1905, was spending money on our Navy which would have been far more usefully and far more beneficially spent in furthering the education of the people of the country. They were constructing ships far in excess of our requirements, and I think the present Government is following in the path of the late Government in that respect. The Prime Minister challenged my right hon. Friend to tell the House what kind of programme he would suggest if he were responsible for the defence of the country. My right hon. Friend was wise enough to decline to accept the challenge, and I am not going to take it up. He referred in his speech to our capacity for shipbuilding and the making of guns. He repeated practically the words used by the Foreign Secretary in his speech on the Vote of Censure in March, that our capacity to build hulls and propelling machinery was in excess of any capacity possessed by Germany, and that the capacity for the making of guns and gun-mountings would be looked into by the Government, and that in a few months we should be, in that respect also, in a position of superiority. I think that is perfectly reasonable. It is a sound policy for the Government to pursue. It is essential that our capacity to build ships and construct guns and gun-mountings should be greater than that of any foreign Power, but, given superiority in these respects, I cannot see that the Government has in any way justified the proposal to construct the contingent four ships, and though I do not accept the challenge of the right hon. Gentleman to lay down a programme, I think we might reasonably enough have been contented with the four ships in this year's programme.

I want to say a word or two on the more general aspect of the question. Lord Rosebery, in the speech he delivered to the members of the Imperial Press, stated that there was at this moment in Europe and in the world at large an absolute absence of any questions which ordinarily lead to war. All forebodes peace, and yet, he added, there never was so threatening and so overpowering preparation for war. That statement was endorsed a few days later by the Foreign Secretary (Sir E. Grey). Both Lord Rosebery and the Foreign Secretary indicated that it is preparation for war in the absence of any real cause for war that makes the situation so hopeless. The Foreign Secretary, in a speech delivered in this House on the Vote of Censure, said that a decrease in naval expenditure on the part of England and Germany will immediately produce a feeling on the part of the world of increased security and peace. But he added, "Germany must lead the way." I venture to suggest that if every Power in the world is going to wait until some other Power leads the way in the reduction of expenditure on armaments, which is to lead to peace and security, then I say that peace and security are never likely to become assured. One Power must lead the way, and I say it would be consistent with the traditions of this country, and consistent also with, I think, the truest statesmanship, if we now led the way, and boldly and definitely determined, in the interest of peace and security, to reduce our expenditure on armaments. It would be a small thing, in view of the statement given by the Foreign Secretary, that those four contingent ships should not be built. I suggest that we should not, by building them, increase the ill-spirit between ourselves and Germany, as we inevitably will do by pursuing the policy we propose to pursue. I say, in the interest of peace and security, I will vote for the Amendment now before the Committee.

Mr. WILLIAM REDMOND

I only desire to occupy a short time, and I would not speak at all but for the fact that I have always made it a practice since I came into this House of raising my feeble voice in protest against all those proposals to increase the naval strength of this country. I have the fortune or misfortune of being, like my hon. Friend the Member for East Mayo (Mr. John Dillon), rather an old Member of this House, and I must confess that I feel perfectly appalled when I look back year by year upon the steady growth of the expenditure for naval armaments in this country. I have seen that expenditure more than doubled since I came into the House, and, as far as one can judge by what one hears and what one reads in the newspapers, there is not the slightest immediate prospect of any check being put to this increase in expenditure. When less than half the present sum was spent on the Navy, this country was quite as secure as it is to-day, and the extraordinary part of the whole proceeding is that, while the expenditure on the Navy has increased, as far as I can judge at any rate, the distress in this country has also increased in the same way. We remember 20 years ago, when the expenditure on the Navy was very little more than half of the sum expended at the present time, there was not anything like the distress there is in this country now, and yet even the present Government, which goes to Hyde Park and demonstrates, which speaks of peace, retrenchment, and reform, and which calls itself the friend of the people, is now pledged to an expenditure greater and more extravagant than any Government, Liberal or Tory, was ever pledged to in the past. I say that that is an appalling state of affairs. For my part I am lost in wonder at the extraordinary patience exhibited by the masses of the taxpayers of this country.

Mr. J. D. REES

It is their sense, not their patience.

Mr. WILLIAM REDMOND

The hon. Member for the Montgomery Boroughs is such a constant exponent of the most absolute good sense in this House! His interruptions are sometimes a little embarrassing, because they are the kind of interruptions which one expects from the Opposition side of the House. I am constantly lost in wonder at the extraordinary patience exhibited by the taxpayers of this country at the way in which they seem to be so easily gulled by the jingo war cries and prophesies indulged in from day to day. Anything more lamentable than the efforts which have been made to stir up a war feeling in this country against Germany it would be impossible to imagine. Anything more cringingly cowardly than the outcries that are constantly being raised in the Press and on the public platform as to the alarming danger that is to come to this country from an attack by Germany, and anything more ludicrous it is almost impossible to conceive. All the evidence goes to prove that the vast majority of the people of Germany, like the vast majority of the people of this country, are anxious and eager for peace, and if war ever comes to curse the people engaged in it, it will be the fault, not of the masses of the people of any nationality, but of the scaremongers, and particularly of the military party in this country, who seem never to tire in their efforts to arouse the war feeling and fever, and who are always prophesying dangers which can never come to pass if only this country sets a proper example to the world. The hon. Member for Falkirk Burghs (Mr. Murray Macdonald) has said that in this question of disarmament some country must lead the way. I do not say what country that should be, but I do say that the whole world would honour for all time to come the democracy of that country which showed itself sufficiently confident in righteousness and in good feeling to set such an example, and that that country would be perfectly immune from attack.

But, after all, my friends and I from Ireland take part in Debates such as this from a different point of view from other Members of the House. Conservatives and Liberals look at these questions entirely from the point of view of England. I am far from saying that they are not actuated by the most sincere motives in the opinions they express; I believe that the majority of them are, though I believe their opinions are mistaken. Whether this enormous expenditure is really necessary for the Protection of this country is a legitimate matter for difference of opinion and discussion; but, speaking for the vast majority of the Irish people, I say that, so far as were are concerned, there is no room for argument at all. The people of Ireland cannot see the slightest necessity for such expenditure. They do not believe that any power in the world dreams of attacking them or of interfering with their country. If there be danger of a war in the future in which Ireland would be involved, it cannot be because of anything in her own position; it will be simply because of her connection with this country. We know that there are many independent, free, and prosperous nationalities in Europe. They cannot think of competing with the great Powers of the world; but they are free, their people are happy and contented, and they are not endangered in any way. We believe that this expenditure is unnecessary for you; but for ourselves we can see no justification whatever for it, and in the name of every Nationalist in Ireland I protest in the strongest and most emphatic manner of which I am capable against calling upon the Irish people to bear the slightest share of this increased expenditure upon naval armaments. If the people of this country consider it necessary to build up a fleet of such gigantic proportions, by what right do they call upon, the poor and needy people of Ireland to bear part of the cost? In almost every direction our country is languishing for the expenditure of money in the interests of the people. Education is absolutely starved; the industries of the country receive nothing like adequate encouragement or help; even our fishermen are not assisted to exercise their calling as they might be under a Government of their own; and when we return to Ireland we are obliged to admit that large sums are taken out of our people's pockets every year to build up a Navy which they never see, for which they have no use, and from which it is almost impossible to get a single ship to guard their coasts against foreign fishermen. It may be an extremely unpopular thing in this House to express disregard for the Navy; but I would ask hon. Members who represent English constituencies, where the wealth and position of the people are intimately better than in Ireland, to put themselves in the position of Irish Members who, like myself, represent large constituencies where the people have only the scanty means of living provided by the land, or where round the coast they fight from one end of the year to the other an unceasing war with want and privation in the endeavour to make a living from the ocean. These people have no interest in the Navy. They ask constantly for piers to be built to help the fishermen, and for other assistance of that kind; but we are obliged to tell them that, while millions of money are voted even by Liberals and democrats for warlike purposes, it is almost impossible to get any- thing for the benefit of Ireland. Even hon. Gentlemen who represent the Unionist party in Ireland, and who will support any increase in the Navy, come and beg for comparatively small sums to drain the land, in order that the people may have an opportunity of making a living on the soil, and yet the rivers in the North as well as in the South of Ireland are neglected. At certain periods of the year large stretches of the country are inundated, and yet nothing is done; but still we are called on to bear an increased share in the cost of the Navy. I say it is an outrage and a shame. I say that if the whole connection of Ireland with this country had nothing else to condemn it, it stands condemned in this infamous attempt—it is nothing else—to drag from the poverty of the Irish people large sums of money for the maintenance of these extraordinary armaments. The people of Ireland hate and detest the very name of war. Wherever there are jingoes, there are no jingoes in Ireland. The majority of the Irish people have no greater ambition, no greater desire than to live at peace with mankind in every part of the civilised globe, and in the name of common justice and fair play I ask English Members in this House is it not a reasonable demand that the Irish people make, that if Britain desires to maintain a fleet of this particular description she should do it at her own expense, and her own expense alone? Is it reasonable of her to include the Irish people in an expenditure of this kind? We hear a great deal, particularly in these days, of the spirit of Imperialism. We are told constantly what magnificent fellows our kith and kin from the Colonies are. We heard from the Prime Minister this afternoon that next Wednesday there is to be a conference, representative of the whole Empire, composed of statesmen and delegates from every part of the world. It is very easy for these gentlemen from the Colonies— against whom be it far from me to say one word—to talk about Imperialism and to express their loyalty; but they do not pay one single farthing towards the increase in our naval expenditure. If they wish they may start a subscription to pay for a "Dreadnought" in Australia or New Zealand; but there is no compulsion upon them. Your tax-gatherer does not go to the Canadian, to the New Zealander, to the Australian, or to the South African, and say to him, "You must pay your share towards the maintenance of this fleet. We will multiply 'Dreadnoughts.' We will say what is to be spent, and you will have to pay your share." No; anything they do is done voluntarily.

It is different with us in Ireland; we have practically no voice in these matters. We have no power of saying how many "Dreadnoughts" there should be. We have no power of saying whether this country is to go on in this suicidal competition of fleets with all the world. We are powerless, but we are compelled to bear a full share of all these expenses, and I say that to any reasonable or fair-minded man in this House this must seem to be an unjust proposition. At any rate, let it not be said that we did not make the strongest and most emphatic protest in our power against this suicidal policy, this policy which ought to make hon. Gentlemen calling themselves Liberals on the other side of the House blush for very shame. When the next election comes I believe that many hon. Gentlemen who tonight will vote in favour of this policy will receive a stern and severe rebuke at the hands of the electors. I wish there were more representatives in this House of the type of the Labour party. I believe that those Gentlemen, few in numbers though they may be, are representative of the opinion of the overwhelming majority of the people of the country. I believe that if the real voice of the people were to be heard, that if their will could be made known to-night, there would be no leave given to the Government to embark on this policy of playing beggar my neighbour with the whole world in this expenditure. At any rate, we in Ireland loathe and detest it, and we will have nothing to do with it from the point of view of making known throughout the world the feelings of the Irish taxpayers, who are already considerably overtaxed, and upon whom this fresh expenditure will impose additional burdens.

Mr. PRETYMAN

The hon. Member for East Clare (Mr. W. Redmond) has not studied history as much as he might have done.

Mr. WILLIAM REDMOND

As much as you.

Mr. PRETYMAN

Because a large proportion of the invasions which have been directed against this island in the first instance descended upon his native country.

Mr. W. REDMOND

They did not stay-there very long.

Mr. PRETYMAN

It may not be very wise from that point of view to point out the extraordinary lamblike and easy qualities of the Irish people, as otherwise it might tempt the invader to make a fresh onset in that direction. In this Debate there is a curiously different feeling in the House from that which was manifest in the Debate that took place on the same subject in March last. Perhaps the most remarkable feature in the speeches of the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty and the Prime Minister on that occasion was the way in which the Little England bottle was corked. We heard hardly one word in deprecation of the necessity for a strong Navy. These facts which were laid before the House seemed then to me to convince hon. Members below the Gangway who can be patriotic. It is not for us to deny their claims. We can only judge of their right to it by their action; and I am bound to say that in March last they did appear to feel that a case had been made out which justified them as patriots in withholding opposition from any expenditure which was shown to be necessary to maintain the absolute security of this country against any possible enemy.

Mr. T. LOUGH

It was pointed out that the statements were not true?

Mr. PRETYMAN

The statements of the Prime Minister and the First Lord of the Admiralty were not true?

Mr. LOUGH

Of the Leader of the Opposition.

Mr. PRETYMAN

It is obvious, and is within the recollection of the House that the statements which were made, and which had that great effect on the opinion "both of this House and outside it, were not the statements of the Leader of the Opposition, who could not speak with official authority. No doubt on an occasion like that great weight might be attached to much which was said on this side of the House, and particularly to what was said by the Leader of the Opposition, but it is obvious that the greatest weight must attach to the statements made by the Prime Minister and the First Lord of the Admiralty, who speak with official-information and who have the latest information at their disposal. I am certainly correct in stating that it was their speeches which had such a great effect on the opinion of this country and upon the course of Debate in this House, and I can see that the hon. Member below the Gangway does not deny it.

Mr. W. P. BYLES

It was denied by Admiral von Tirpitz in the Reichstag next day.

Mr. PRETYMAN

The conclusion may have been denied, but not the facts. This is a question of degree, a question of acceleration, and it is one which it is naturally very delicate and very difficult to disall these preparatoins make it extraordinarily difficult even for the First Lord of the Admiralty, with all the information at his disposal, to give to the House very accurate information. I need not go info details. It is obvious that it must be so. The date of giving out orders, what preparations are being made to commence the work, gun-mountings, and the nature of all these preparations make it extraordinarily difficult to say exactly to what extent preparations have been carried on. But can we afford to take chances? That surely is at the root of the matter. This is a matter in which we can take no chances, and we must assume the worst. Nothing that has been said either inside or outside this House since the Debate in March last has modified public opinion in this country, and I cannot see how it could have modified the opinion of hon. Members below the Gangway. My point is that I cannot understand the change from the attitude which in March last they explicitly stated, namely, that after the statements made from the Front Bench they could not see their way to move any reduction of the Estimates; whereas now they have moved a reduction, and, mark you, a reduction of the Estimates in which no provision whatever is made for these extra four "Dreadnoughts." So that I think the country and the Committee have a right to know what standard hon. Gentlemen below the Gangway desire to work upon. It is quite obvious that, unless we are to have a Navy which is capable to meet any call which is likely to be made upon it, it is a mere waste to have any Navy at all. Surely the position of hon. Members below the Gangway would be far more logical if they said that they did not like to fight, and they preferred to pay a war indemnity. Instead of building ships they would allow us to be at the mercy of the foreign foe, and they say, "Trust in your goodness, gentleness, and inoffensiveness, and, if they do attack us, it is better to pay a war indemnity than to build ships." But the attitude that you do take, namely, that you are patriotic, involves having a Navy, and it is strange to refrain from moving a reduction of the Navy Estimates in March and then to come here and move a reduction when, if anything, the facts clearly show that the necessity is greater than ever. [An HON. MEMBER: "No!"] Yes; the necessity is greater than it was in March last. That is clearly shown, and the time has been running ever since. Months more have gone, and nothing has been done in this country, but a good deal has been done over the water, and I cannot follow, and I do not think the country will be able to follow, the attitude of hon. Members who now bring themselves to support the reduction moved by the right hon. Gentleman opposite.

I listened very carefully to the speech of the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. John Ellis), and I heard nothing from beginning to end of it except general opposition to heavy expenditure on armaments, quotations from eminent authorities who criticise the heavy expenditure upon armaments. The right hon. Gentleman repeated that opinion himself. There is not a man in this House or out of it who does not agree with that general proposition. The right hon. Gentleman never attempted to show—he never touched upon it—that the number of ships proposed in these Estimates was more than required to meet the present naval situation of this country. We had no argument from him to that effect, he gave no reason, he gave no figures. I do not see that any hon. Member in this House can fairly vote in favour of reducing the present Estimates; rather I would say you ought not to vote in favour of such a proposal, but that a Motion should be made for increasing these Estimates which are now put before the House. I cannot see any other ground for the proposed reduction than that it should be distinctly shown that we are providing more ships and incurring more expenditure than are necessary for the needs of the country at present. What is the Government's position with regard to that? I am sure everybody will agree that nothing would be more unfortunate than that naval matters should be made a party question at all; but whose fault is it? I suppose that question involves a party argument. In March last the Government came to this House and made these statements to which I have referred. It is clear that in 1906 they were informed that a certain acceleration was being started in Germany. Between 1906 and 1908 the information gathered in strength, and by the middle of 1908 they were aware of what was going on. In March last they came down and took the House and the country into their confidence. Even then, if they had accepted the consequences of their own statements and had forthwith stated what was the building capacity of the country, and that that building capacity would be employed to its fullest extent to meet the needs of the situation, there would have been no need to make any party question of this at all. But they have not got even now the support of hon. their own statement. They have halted between two opinions, and, therefore, it is that which, in my opinion, has made this a party question. The Government have not got even now the support of hon. Members below the Gangway. It seems to me that in endeavouring to purchase that support, they have taken a course which denies them the support of us on this side of the House, who do not desire to make a party question of this. On what ground is it necessary to say that you will not lay down these ships until next March, next financial year? What do you gain by it? There is no money in it; there is hesitation in it, which has a bad effect. In that respect, may I call attention to the statement made by the hon. Member for the Blackfriars Division of Glasgow (Mr. Barnes), when he quoted—no doubt in absolute good faith and with every belief in the justice of the opinion he expressed—what he believed to be the German view of this question. Surely whatever opinion may be expressed on either side of this House, we need go no further than this one fact, that the German Reichstag voted Navy Estimates this year, including, as has been pointed out, the expenditure of half a million more than the expenditure in these Estimates which we are discussing to-day, sub silentio.

Mr. DILLON

That was the effect of threats made in this House.

Mr. PRETYMAN

I want to contrast the attitude of the German Reichstag, in voting those enormous Estimates in excess of our own Estimates without a word of Debate, with the attitude which is being adopted to-day by the right hon. Gentleman who has moved this reduction, and by hon. Members below the Gangway, and in answer to that statement of the hon. Member for Mayo. What did the First Lord of the Admiralty tell us now, and what did he show? During the three years our shipbuilding programme was reduced it was not a question of talk, it was a question of deeds. They took the line recommended by the hon. Member for East Mayo, and our building programme was reduced below that of Germany. Did that induce them to build less ships? Did acceleration follow that or precede it? It followed it, and so what becomes of the hon. Member's innuendo that the acceleration of the German programme and of the German Reichstag voting those Estimates without discussion was a consequence of our energetic action in this House. Exactly the contrary was the case. It is obvious what we have to face, and we cannot conceal from ourselves—and I say it, and anybody may say it without the slightest offence, because every country has a right to build as it chooses for it own needs, and no other country has a right to criticise that action, that is obvious. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Nottingham (Mr. Ellis) said that to put a sharp sword into the hand of a man was a temptation to him to use it.

Mr. JOHN ELLIS

I was quoting the exact words of Lord Randolph Churchill.

Mr. PRETYMAN

I do not care whose words they are; the right hon. Gentleman quoted them with approval. What I say is this, is it not a greater temptation to throw your sword away and stand naked? And that is what the right hon. Gentleman suggested this country should do. I say that this country, in its Navy, has had in its hand for the past century the sharpest sword possessed by any country in the world, and it has never used it for aggression. What is the position in regard to Germany? Germany has an army which places her absolutely outside aggression from this country. Giving Germany credit for the most pacific intentions towards us, is it fair to Germany that she, having an army such as hers is, should also be placed in a position of having a fleet as strong or stronger than ours? Taking the relative position of the two countries in the world, and with the most friendly feelings towards Germany, will the right hon. Gentleman and his friends say they are prepared to put the British in the position of standing before the world with our Army bearing no proportion to the German army, and with our Navy no stronger than the German Navy? Are we prepared to put ourselves in that position? We are in danger of finding ourselves in that position. This is not a party question, nor is it a question of to day, or of our strength to-day. It is a question of a few years hence. I do not wish, or I do not think it is germane to this Debate, to go into the figures to prove in what particular month the greatest danger is going to arrive.

Mr. LOUGH

You did that m March.

Mr. PRETYMAN

Yes, it was necessary to make the case clear, and we stated those figures which are now so thoroughly understood and discussed that we can take it on the broader ground that whatever particular month it may arise we do stand in this position, that in the course of the next five or six years, unless we very largely increase our future programme, not as is being done now by waiting to start until some moment hence; we want to start now, and not only for material results but for moral results. It is obvious that if we in this country allow it to be thoroughly understood that we are going to keep a long lead of Germany in naval strength, and that no expenditure will deter us; that there is no real division of opinion in the country, that we are absolutely united on that point—that at the same time we are as much as Germany or any other country alive to the necessity for spending these millions upon armament—all will be straight. We dislike the situation, but it is a matter of existence with us. It is not a question of whether we wish to do it. We must do it. If it is understood that the whole country realises that fact—if once that is realised in Germany, and throughout the world, and, above all, throughout the whole of the British Empire—surely it is realised, as has been proved by the offers which have been made to us from different portions of the Empire—it is obvious that the fact is realised there—if it is clear to Germany that the loyalty to the interests of the Empire, and the determination to preserve them is as great in this country as it has proved to be in New Zealand and Australia, then I think we shall find that there will be more opportunity in future years to reduce the Navy Estimates than there will be if the policy of hon. Gentlemen below the Gangway is followed now. I am sorry to have detained the Committee, but I should like to say one word or two about the destroyers. I think there are some in the Admiralty who will perhaps be rather glad to have escaped a good deal of the discussion on minor points which are generally raised in these Debates, on account of the whole attention of the House and the country having been concentrated on the question of "Dreadnoughts." But with regard to the de- stroyers we are woefully behind at the present. Again I will not go into figures. I think the Financial Secretary to the Admiralty steered his destroyer flotilla into a fog and left it there! I think he will not deny this, that some of the destroyers on our 1905–6 programme are not yet commissioned; that we at the present time are very short of efficient destroyers, and that when the right hon. Gentleman proposes 27 new destroyers he is surely aware that they are not fit for work in the North Sea? I will tell the Committee what I saw myself in the first destroyer flotilla. I saw the "Afridi," a new destroyer, capable of 36 knots, lying side by side with the "Panther," whose highest speed at that particular time was 14 knots. So short were the Admiralty of really efficient destroyers that in that first destroyer flotilla—our very first line of defence—a 14-knot destroyer was included. I am aware that there have been difficulties; that there has been the question of oil versus coal, and I do not wish to go into detail, because there is no time. But I do earnestly beg the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty to devote his most careful attention to these matters; to do all that he can to bring our destroyer flotilla up to date. We are behind. I believe it is true to say at the present moment our destroyer flotilla is actually weaker than the German flotilla.

Mr. McKENNA

I believe that any impartial observer of the Debate to-day would not fail to have a certain amount of sympathy with the Board of Admiralty. We have been attacked quite impartially by hon. and right hon. Gentlemen and by some of my hon. Friends below the Gangway. I hope the impartial observer will come to the conclusion that perhaps, after all, the Board of Admiralty have adopted a sane and sober policy, that they are really providing for the security of the country without exaggeration, and that they are not allowing the security of the country to be endangered by circumstances which I will not describe as only possible, but which I regard as probable. Before I go into the general discussion I would like to reply to one or two quite minor points. The hon. Member for Fareham (Mr. Arthur Lee) has charged me with misrepresentation with regard to a reply of my own as to the Cawdor programme. I shall be glad if the hon. Member would always use the same word in the same sense. When he speaks of the Cawdor programme, I understand the Cawdor programme could only mean the shipbuilding programme of the year. When he speaks of the Cawdor programme as meaning the Cawdor policy covering a number of years, I think he is speaking of something entirely different. If the Board of Admiralty, under Lord Cawdor or anybody else, assumed the right to lay down the shipbuilding programme which was to be a guide for future Governments, then the Board of Admiralty of that day was assuming a function which it had no right to do. I have always understood the Cawdor programme to be the programme of the year, and, although Lord Cawdor's policy may have been to lay down four ships a year, not only for that year but for all future years, I should speak of that as the Cawdor policy and not of the Admiralty shipbuilding programme.

Then the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition said that there would come a time when our superiority in pre-"Dreadnought" ships would disappear. I am sure the right hon. Gentleman would not wish to make any statement of that kind, which would be extremely alarming if true, unless he had been misinformed as to the facts. So far from that being the case, there can be no period when our superiority in pre-"Dreadnought" ships will not still continue. We have in every year, and at every stage of their lives, superiority both in numbers and in power of pre-"Dreadnought" ships. I do not know if the right hon. Gentleman thinks it necessary for me to give him the names, but I can assure him that, taking the latest German ships of the "Deutsch-land" class, the earliest of them are no later than our ships, the two "Lord Nelsons," eight "King Edwards," two "Swiftsures," and the "Queen" and "Prince of Wales"—fourteen ships, every one of which, with the exception of the "Swiftsures," is more powerful than the most powerful of the German ships. In this answer that I gave the figures are: Great Britain 16, as against Germany 13; Great Britain 9, as against Germany 8; Great Britain 14, as against Germany 12.

Mr. BALFOUR

I admit that with regard to pre-"Dreadnoughts," but I was asking upon the two-Power standard generally.

Mr. McKENNA

I took down the right hon. Gentleman's words, and he said—I am sure he did not intend to do so, and it is most desirable that this impression should not go abroad to create a scare which we do not wish to create. As regards every other individual Power our superiority in pre-"Dreadnoughts" exists, and will always continue at any moment of time. Even taking the dates selected by the hon. Member for King's Lynn, we have always a superiority in numbers and a marked superiority in power.

Mr. BALFOUR

I think I must have imperfectly expressed myself. What I desired to convey is that if we are arguing on the two-power standard in pre-"Dreadnoughts" we shall be inferior to the next Power in two years.

Mr. McKENNA

I do not wish to answer that argument on the spur of the moment. I think the answer I have given is perfectly clear. The two Powers alluded to are Germany and the United States. The Prime Minister has repudiated on behalf of the Government, and I think on behalf of nearly every hon. Member who supports the Government, the idea that this country can or ought to build ships numerically equal to the number that may be built by Germany and the United States.

Mr. BALFOUR

I was talking of ships that have been built by those Powers.

Mr. McKENNA

It is perfectly obvious that the responsibility for not building enough must rest with the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Balfour). We are now speaking of pre-"Dreadnought" types. No ship of the pre-"Dreadnought" type has been laid down by the present Government, and all the ships of that type up to 1906 were built by the right hon. Gentleman and his friends. The right hon. Gentleman asks how the April ships are to be paid for, and the hon. Member for Fareham seemed to imply that the Government were guilty of some meanness in throwing upon the contractors the cost of supplying materials and building gun-mountings. The hon. Member is entirely wrong, and he appears to have forgotten the experience which he acacquired at the Admiralty. We do not pay for the goods we order with the order, but we pay by instalments after certain parts have been put down. When the first instalment becomes payable in the ordinary course in respect of gun-mountings we shall pay for it, and we shall ask Parliament to sanction it by a Supplementary Estimate, but it is quite possible that no instalment will be payable before 31st March, and in that case no Supplementary Estimate will be necessary. The hon. Member for Fareham asked what do you gain by not laying down your ships before April, and he pointed out with great truth that if our desire had been to gain the support of some of our hon. Friends who hold very strong views on this subject our desire had been frustrated. Much as we wish to retain the support of some of my hon. Friends who do not agree with our policy in this matter, I can assure the hon. Member and the Committee that it was not on the ground of obtaining their support that we do not propose to lay these ships down in the present financial year. We do not lay them down because it is not necessary. Our object is to have them ready in March, 1912, and we should not facilitate our purpose one iota by laying them down before the month of April. In the month of July we have two ships in our programme, the "Colossus" and the "Hercules," one of which was laid down last week, and the other has not yet been laid down. It will not be laid down until some time early next month. Both these ships are delivered at the same time in July, 1911. The fact that one is laid down a few weeks earlier than the other will not make the slightest difference in the time of delivery of the ships. The real difficulty of getting delivery of ships is not the difficulty of building the hull, which dates from the laying down of the keel, but in getting the gun-mountings, and we could perfectly well postpone the laying of the keel a still further two or three months and, notwithstanding, be absolutely secure of getting the ships, so far as the hull is concerned, in March, 1912, but we might not be sure of getting our gun-mountings. The hon. Member for Fareham made considerable play with the fact that our ships have taken more than two years to build in the past; and he asked how we could rely upon their completion within two years now? The answer is we are not relying upon completing them in two years. The actual orders will be given in the course of the next two or three months, but we propose to take the preliminary steps which lead up to giving the orders immediately, and we shall be engaged, not in building the hull, but the contractors will be engaged in making parts of these ships, not for a period of two years, but for a period of something like two years four months or two years six months. We are taking all the necessary steps to secure the delivery of these ships to time. I cannot help regretting that the hon. Gentle- man should have found it necessary to use such strong language as he did without taking the trouble to inform himself, in the first instance, as to what was the actual course which the Government were adopting in this matter. Let me turn to the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for the Falkirk Burghs. His argument was that in March last the Government justified a programme of four ships and a contingent programme of four more ships on the ground of certain acts done by the German Admiralty, and he went on to say that the Government had been mistaken in what they stated last March, and that my silence in introducing this Vote this evening was a further proof or was an admission that we had been mistaken. I can assure my hon. Friend that the view which he takes cannot be supported by the facts. So far from admitting that any statement I made in March last was not justified, I would reassert here and now that I am prepared to stand by every statement which I then made. I do not withdraw one single word of what I then said. I gather from interruptions that there is a belief that Admiral von Tirpitz has contradicted in some essential matter something I stated. Last March I said with regard to the German programme of 1909–10 that the programme had been anticipated, that at the date of which I spoke one ship had been actually laid down, beginning 1st April, 1909; that, as regards two more ships, they had not been laid down; and that, as regards the fourth, I did not know whether it had been laid down or not. That statement I then made is admittedly true. I stated also that orders had been given for certain parts of ships for the 1909–10 programme before 1st April. I adhere to that statement, and I know of no ground on which my hon. Friend can challenge the strict accuracy of anything I said as to what had occurred.

Mr. BYLES

Did not Admiral von Tirpitz and did not von Bülow both say that there had been, and would be, no acceleration of the German programme?

Mr. McKENNA

Neither one nor the other, as far as I recollect, stated that. I repeat here that the vessel laid down before 1st April, 1909— —

Mr. MURRAY MACDONALD

I do not dispute the facts the right hon. Gentleman has quoted, but I say the four ships were expressly stated to be contingent on the possibility of there being 17 in April, 1912.

Mr. McKENNA

I have nothing to withdraw as to what I have stated as to what had occurred. What may happen in 1912 is obviously a matter of conjecture. Let me say what my duty is in defending the security of this country. After all, that is a matter for which I am responsible—I have to consider what precautions I have to take—what risks I may be willing to run. The "Nassau" was laid down in August, 1907. It is expected to be completed in October this year; the period of construction is two years and two months. The "Westfalen," the "Posen," and another vessel were laid down in August, 1907; they are also expected to be completed this year, the period of construction allowed being two years and five months. There were five ships laid down last year—in October, 1908, and January, 1909. When does my hon. Friend think that they will be completed? If we are to judge by the rate of construction of the ships actually being built at the present moment, we must expect them to be completed at the outside two years and six months from the laying down of the keels. I can only judge by what I see going on. I have to guide myself not by conjectures as to what may be but by what I see being done. There are at this moment 11 ships of the "Dreadnought" type building in Germany. We have got fourteen. 16 is impossible for me, it is impossible for anybody, to say, who is outside the councils of the German Admiralty, what number of further ships are going to be laid down in the course of the next two years. We know the limit; we can say it is impossible to lay down more than a certain number of ships, because it would be impossible to finish them within a period of time, which would make it worth while laying them down, but having regard to what has taken place it would be absurd for this country, whose very existence depends upon our maintaining our lead and superiority at sea—it would be absurd for us to run risks. My hon. Friend the Member for Falkirk Burghs (Mr. Murray Macdonald) says, if every Power is to wait till another leads the way, we shall never have a reduction in armaments. I think my hon. Friend must have forgotten the history of the last two years when he made that statement. Although he would admit as readily as anybody that our interest in the sea power is overwhelmingly greater than that of any other nation, nevertheless we have spent last year and this year altogether less than Germany has spent in new construction. Does not that look, as I have said before, as if we had shown our willingness to lead the way.

The speech of my Noble Friend, Lord Lochee, quoted by the hon. Member for King's Lynn (Mr. Bellairs), proved that it was the declared intention of the Government to lead the way in the reduction of armaments, and is it fair for my hon. Friend to say: "Why does not England lead the way and show Germany how necessary it is to reduce armaments?" We have done it. Are we to go on for ever leading the way? Are we to go on, until the time comes when our superiority in sea power would be gone? No, Sir; although this Government has shown, by every means in its power, its sincere devotion to the cause of peace, its most earnest desire to reduce armaments, its willingness to make almost any sacrifice to bring about a better state of feeling between the nations of the world, they will never make a sacrifice of the security of this country. My hon. Friend may rely upon this: that we shall always be open, always most anxious, to come to an arrangement whereby these unnecessary armaments may be curtailed—they are only rival armaments, it is pure waste of money to build one against the other, and if you can only agree to drop a portion of your armaments, you would be exactly as well off as you were before. We have shown our recognition of this, and our willingness to act upon it, but my hon. Friend must not expect us to show our willingness to act when it meets with no response. I submit that our Naval Estimates are reasonable, and required by the circumstances of the moment, and upon that ground I ask the Committee to support them.

Mr. BALFOUR

We were accused, when we brought forward a Vote of Censure some few months ago, of having used the Navy as a Parliamentary weapon. I then ventured to point out to the House and to the country that the difficulty of raising this question from our point of view upon Supply was almost insuperable, because we desire that there should be an increase of this Vote, and by the Rules of the House it is not possible for us to propose an increase. And if we differ from the Government the only possible Amendment we can put on the Paper is to reduce me Vote—in other words, an Amendment identical in form with that moved by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Nottingham (Mr. John Ellis), although the reduction is exactly what we do not want to see in Votes 8 or 9. The very embarrassing position which my friends foresaw when the Vote of Censure was moved has now come upon us, and we have, in the first place, the Estimates of the Government, which we think inadequate; and, in the second place, the Amendment, which, if carried, would make it more inadequate still, and, apart from that, an Amendment which is moved on behalf of a large section of the House, who dissent altogether from the view which the Government and we hold in common, namely, that there must be a great increase in the activity of our building, as we think in the matter of capital ships and other ships, and as the Government think in the matter of capital ships. That is the exact situation. It is difficult to know how we are to vote in such a matter. Everyone will see that the difficulty is real. In ordinary circumstances, I take it the Opposition would simply abstain. They would say, "It was no affair of ours, but a controversy between the Government and their friends, and the Government must manage it their own way. We do not agree with the Government, still less with their recalcitrant followers. We cannot give a vote which actually expresses our own opinions, and we will therefore give no vote at all." That, I think, would be a perfectly legitimate and constitutional practice on such an occasion as this. But I am informed that the number of Gentlemen in the House not belonging to the party of which I am a Member who dissent from the Government, is a very large one. I do not think it would be right that any impression should get abroad in this country or elsewhere that the House of Commons was doubtful as to the opinion it should express on the necessity of further shipbuilding. Nothing can wipe out the past. Nothing will make me believe the Government have not been guilty of serious laches in what they have, not done up to this time, but I understand the Government mean to get on with the new ships as fast as they can. On that understanding, and putting that interpretation upon the speech of the First Lord of the Admiralty, I shall support the Government, not because I do not think they have not been guilty of most serious negligence in the past, because on the whole it is clear that their policy is, at all events, much better than the alternative policy presented to them by the right hon. Gentleman, and because for the reason I have stated I am unwilling to take any action either by vote or abstention which would suggest to anyone in the country that we desired a party victory in the House, or to any foreign country that we are not prepared to support the Government in a controversy with a certain section of the House as to whether they should or should not build further ships. In these circumstances I hope it will not be supposed that the vote I mean to give is a vote condoning the culpable neglect of the Government in the past. It is a vote directed against the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. J. Ellis) who moved the Amendment, and a vote to express to the best of my ability the strength of the feeling I have that urgency, patriotism, and every sense of public duty require, and that this House and the country require, that we should push forward the building of ships, large and small, so as to keep our naval supremacy at the unquestioned level at which it was when we left office and in which it is not now.

Mr. J. JENKINS

I wish to express my deep regret that some questions which arise on this Vote have not been touched to-day. In particular I refer to the question of the conditions of the workmen in the dockyards. I therefore beg to move, "That the Chairman do now report Progress, and ask leave to sit again."

The CHAIRMAN

I do not think that is a Motion that I can take.

Mr. JENKINS

Is the Motion in order?

The CHAIRMAN

It is in my discretion whether I take it or not.

Mr. JOHN WARD

During the Debate to-day we have had it declared that the peoples of this country and of the countries of Europe have no wish to create difficulties and to make war one upon another. I have not the slightest doubt that everyone who has travelled and who has any knowledge of the subject will quite agree with that statement of the case. We recognise that it is not the peoples of the different countries who have really the deciding of questions of peace and war. I am afraid that there are some countries in Europe where as a matter of fact the policy of the Government seems not to go in accordance with the expressed will of the people, but very often is in complete opposition to it. We have been told that we ought to lead in this question of disarmament. I quite agree; but I do not think it is with that branch of the service with which we are dealing to-night that we could begin to experiment with a reduction in armaments. I agree that probably we could do that with the standing Army; but it is a moral certainty that a kingdom like ours, with frontiers on the sea, must think twice before they do anything to weaken the first line of defence. For that reason I am going to vote in favour of the Government, and for the Estimates presented to the House. I believe also that in doing so I am representing the best feeling of Englishmen.

Question put, "That a sum, not exceeding £3,148,100, be granted for the said service."

The Committee divided: Ayes, 98; Noes, 280.

Division No. 367.] AYES. [11.0 p.m.
Abraham, W. (Cork, N.E.) Dillon, John Lough, Rt. Hon. Thomas
Alden, Percy Donelan, Captain A. Lundon, T.
Baker, Joseph A. (Finsbury, E.) Esmonds, Sir Thomas Luttrell, Hugh Fownes
Barlow, Sir John E. (Somerset) Everett, R. Lacey Macdonald, J. R. (Leicester)
Barnes, G. N. Fenwick, Charles Macdonald, J. M. (Falkirk Burghs)
Barry, E. (Cork, S.) Ffrench, Peter Mackarness, Frederic C.
Bertram, Julius Flavin, Michael Joseph MacVeagh, Jeremiah (Down, S.)
Boland, John Flynn, James Christopher MacVeigh, Charles (Donegal, E.)
Brunner, J. F. L. (Lancs., Leigh) Fullerton, Hugh M'Callum, John M.
Brunner, Rt. Hon. Sir J. T. (Cheshire) Gibb, James (Harrow) M'Kean, John
Burke, E. Haviland- Gilhooly, James Maddison, Frederick
Burt, Rt. Hon. Thomas Gooch, George Peabody (Bath) Meagher, Michael
Byles, William Pollard Hardle, J. Keir (Merthyr Tydvil) Meehan, Francis E. (Leitrim, N.)
Cameron, Robert Harvey, A. G. C. (Rochdale) Meehan, Patrick A. (Queen's Co.)
Clancy, John Joseph Hayden, John Patrick Mooney, J. J.
Clough, William Hazleton, Richard Murnaghan, George
Collins, Sir Wm. J. (St. Pancras, W.) Hodge, John Murphy, John (Kerry, East)
Condon, Thomas Joseph Hogan, Michael Nolan, Joseph
Cooper, G. J. Holt, Richard Durning Nuttall, Harry
Crean, Eugene Hope, W. H. B. (Somerset, N.) O'Brien, K. (Tipperary, Mid)
Cullinan, J. Jowett, F. W. O'Brien, Patrick (Kilkenny)
Davies, Timothy (Fulham) Kennedy, Vincent Paul O'Connor, T. P. (Liverpool)
Devlin, Joseph King, Alfred John (Knutsford) O'Dowd, John
Dickinson, W. H. (St. Pancras, N.) Law, Hugh A. (Donegal, W.) O'Kelly, Conor (Mayo, N.)
O'Kelly, James (Roscommon, N.) Redmond, William (Clare) Walsh, Stephen
O'Malley, William Richards, T. F. (Wolverhampton, W.) Watt, Henry A.
O'Shaughnessey, P. J. Roberts, G. H. (Norwich) White, Patrick (Heath, North)
Parker, James (Halifax) Robertson, J. M. (Tyneside) Wilson, Henry J. (York, W.R.)
Pointer, J. Roche, John (Galway, East) Wilson, John (Durham, Mid)
Ponsonby, Arthur A. W. H. Rutherford, V. H. (Brentford) Wilson, J. W. (Worcestershire, N.)
Power, Patrick Joseph Scott, A. H. (Ashton-under-Lyne)
Rea, Walter Russell (Scarborough) Sheehy, David TELLERS FOR THE AYES.—Mr. J. Ellis and Mr. Cobbold.
Reddy, M. Smyth, Thomas F. (Leitrim, S.)
Redmond, John E. (Waterford) Taylor, John W. (Durham)
NOES.
Acland, Francis Dyke Dickson-Poynder, Sir John P. Lambert, George
Acland-Hood, Rt. Hon. Sir Alex. F. Dickson, Rt. Hon. C. Scott- Lambton, Hon. Frederick William
Adkins, W. Ryland D. Dilke, Rt. Hon. Sir Charles Lament, Norman
Agar-Robartes, Hon. T. C. R. Dobson, Thomas W. Law, Andrew Bonar (Dulwich)
Agnew, George William Douglas, Rt. Hon. A. Akers- Leese, Sir Joseph F. (Accrington)
Ainsworth, John Stirling Du Cros, Arthur Philip Lehmann, R. C.
Allen, A. Acland (Christchurch) Duncan, C. (Barrow-in-Furness) Lever, A. Levy (Essex, Harwich)
Allen, Charles P. (Stroud) Duncan, J. H. (York, Otley) Levy, Sir Maurice
Arkwright, John Stanhope Duncan, Robert (Lanark, Govan) Lewis, John Herbert
Ashley, W. W. Dunne, Major E. Martin (Walsall) Lockwood, Rt. Hon. Lt.-Col. A. R.
Ashton, Thomas Gair Edwards, Sir Francis (Radnor) Long, Col. Charles W. (Evesham)
Asquith, Rt. Hon. Herbert Henry Elibank, Master of Lowe, Sir Francis William
Astbury, John Meir Essex, R. W. Lynch, H. B.
Atherley-Jones, L. Evans, Sir S. T. Lyttelton, Rt. Hon. Alfred
Balcarres, Lord Faber, George Denison (York) MacCaw, William J. MacGeagh
Baldwin, Stanley Fardell, Sir T. George Maclean, Donald
Balfour, Rt. Hon. A. J. (City, Lond.) Fell, Arthur Macnamara, Dr. Thomas J.
Balfour, Robert (Lanark) Ferens, T. R. M'Arthur, Charles
Banbury, Sir Frederick George Ferguson, R. C. Munro McKenna, Rt. Hon. Reginald
Baring, Godfrey (Isle of Wight Fetherstonhaugh, Godfrey M'Micking, Major G.
Barker, Sir John Fletcher, J. S. Mallet, Charles E.
Barlow, Percy (Bedford) Forster Henry William Marks, G. Croydon (Launceston)
Barran, Rowland Hirst Foster, Rt. Hon. Sir Walter Marks, H. H. (Kent)
Barran, Sir John Nicholson Fuller, John Michael F. Marnham, F. J.
Beale, W. P. Furness, Sir Christopher Mason, A. E. W. (Coventry)
Beauchamp, E. Gibbs G. A. (Bristol, West) Mason, James F. (Windsor)
Beaumont, Hon. Hubert Gladstone, Rt. Hon. Herbert John Massie, J.
Beck, A. Cecil Glen-Coats, Sir T. (Renfrew, W.) Menzies, Sir Walter
Beckett, Hon. Gervase Goddard, Sir Daniel Ford Micklem, Nathaniel
Bellairs, Carlyon Goulding, Edward Alfred Middlebrook, William
Benn, Sir J. Williams (Devonport) Greenwood, Hamar (York) Middlemore, John Throgmorton
Benn, W. (Tower Hamlets, St. Geo.) Griffiths, Ellis J. Mildmay, Francis Bingham
Bennett, E. N. Guinness, Hon. R. (Haggerston) Molteno, Percy Alport
Berridge, T. H. D. Guinness, W. E. (Bury St. Edmunds) Mond, A.
Bethell, Sir J. H. (Essex, Romford) Fulland, John W. Money, L. G. Chiozza
Bethell, T. R. (Essex, Maldon) Haldane, Rt. Hon. Richard B. Montagu, Hon. E. S.
Birrell, Rt. Hon. Augustine Harcourt, Rt. Hon. L. (Rossendale) Montgomery, H. G.
Boulton, A. C. F. Harcourt, Robert V. (Montrose) Morgan, G. Hay (Cornwall)
Bowerman, C. W. Hardy, Lawrence (Kent, Ashford) Morgan, J. Lloyd (Carmarthen)
Bramsdon, Sir T. A. Harmsworth, Cecil B. (Worcester) Morpeth, Viscount
Branch, James Harrison-Broadley, H. B. Morrison-Bell, Captain
Brigg, John Hart-Davies, T. Morton, Alpheus Cleophas
Brocklehurst, W. B. Haslam, James (Derbyshire) Murray, Capt. Hon. A. C (Kincard.)
Brodie, H. C. Haworth, Arthur A. Murray, James (Aberdeen, E.)
Brooke, Stopford Hazel, Dr. A. E. W. Napier, T. B.
Bryce, J. Annan Hedges, A. Paget Newnes, F. (Notts, Bassetlaw)
Burdett-Coutts, W. Holme, Norval Watson Nicholls, George
Burns, Rt. Hon. John Hemmerde, Edward George Nicholson, Charles N. (Doncaster)
Buxton, Rt. Hon. Sydney Charles Henderson, J. M'D. (Aberdeen, W.) Norman, Sir Henry
Carlile, E. Hildred Henry, Charles S. Nussey, Sir Willans
Carr-Gomm, H. W. Herbert, T. Arnold (Wycombe) Oddy, John James
Causton, Rt. Hon. Richard Knight Higham, John Sharp O'Donnell, C. J (Walworth)
Cave, George Hill, Sir Clement Parkes, Ebenezer
Cecil, Lord R. (Marylebone, E.) Hills, J. W. Partington, Oswald
Chance, Frederick W. Hobart, Sir Robert Pearce, Robert (Staffs, Leek)
Cherry, Rt. Hon. R. R. Hobhouse, Rt. Hon. Charles E. H. Pearce, William (Limehouse)
Clive, Percy Archer Holland, Sir William Henry Pearson, Sir W. D. (Colchester)
Clyde, J. Avon Hooper, A. G. Pease, Herbert Pike (Darlington)
Coates, Major E. F. (Lewisham) Horniman, Emslie John Peel, Hon. W. R. W.
Compton-Rickett, Sir J. Hunt, Rowland Perks, Sir Robert William
Corbett, C. H. (Sussex, E. Grinstead) Hyde, Clarendon G. Philipps, Owen C. (Pembroke)
Cornwall, Sir Edwin A. Jenkins, J. Pickersgill, Edward Hare
Cory, Sir Clifford John Jones, Sir D. Brynmor (Swansea) Pretyman, E. G.
Cowan, W. H Jones, William (Carnarvonshire) Priestley, Arthur (Grantham)
Cox, Harold Kekewich, Sir George Radford. G. H.
Craig, Charles Curtis (Antrim, S.) Kennaway, Rt. Hon. Sir John H. Rainy, A. Rolland
Craik, Sir Henry Kerry, Earl of Randies, Sir John Scurrah
Crossley, William J. Keswick, William Raphael, Herbert H.
Davies, David (Montgomery Co.) Laidlaw, Robert Rawlinson, John Frederick Peel
Dewar, Arthur (Edinburgh, S.) Lamb, Ernest H. (Rochester) Rees, J. D.
Remnant, James Farquharson Soares, Ernest J. Wason, Rt. Hon. E. (Clackmannan)
Rendall, Athelstan Stanier, Beville Wason, John Cathcart (Orkney)
Renwick, George Starkey, John R. Waterlow, D. S.
Roberts, Charles H. (Lincoln) Steadman, W. C. White, J. Dundas (Dumbartonshire)
Roberts, Sir J. H. (Denbighs) Stewart, Halley (Greenock) White, Sir Luke (York, E.R.)
Roberts, S. (Sheffield, Ecclesall) Stewart-Smith, D. (Kendal) Whitehead, Rowland
Robertson, Sir G. Scott (Bradford) Strachey, Sir Edward Whitley, John Henry (Halifax)
Robinson, S. Talbot, Lord E. (Chichester) Whittaker, Rt. Hon. Sir Thomas P.
Roch, Walter F. (Pembroke) Talbot, Rt. Hon. J. G. (Oxford Univ.) Wiles, Thomas
Rogers, F. E. Newman Tennant, H. J. (Berwickshire) Wilkie, Alexander
Ronaldshay, Earl of Thomas, Sir A. (Glamorgan, E.) Williamson, Sir A.
Ropner, Colonel Sir Robert Thomson, W. Mitchell- (Lanark) Wills, Arthur Walters
Rowlands, J. Thornton, Percy M. Wilson, Hon. G. G. (Hull, W.)
Runciman, Rt. Hon. Walter Tillett, Louis John Wilson, P. W. (St. Pancras, S.)
Rutherford, Watson (Liverpool) Tomkinson, James Wilson, W. T. (Westhoughton)
Salter, Arthur Clavell Toulmin, George Winterton, Earl
Scarisbrick, Sir T. T. L. Trevelyan, Charles Philips Wolff, Gustav Wilhelm
Schwann, C. Duncan (Hyde) Ure, Rt. Hon. Alexander Wood, T. M'Kinnon
Schwann, Sir C. E. (Manchester) Valentia, Viscount Wortley, Rt. Hon. C. B. Stuart-
Scott, Sir S. (Marylebone, W.) Verney, F. W. Wyndham, Rt. Hon. George
Sears, J. E. Walker, Col. W. H. (Lancashire)
Seely, Colonel Walters, John Tudor
Simon, John Allsebrook Ward, John (Stoke-upon-Trent) TELLERS FOR THE NOES.—Mr. Joseph Pease and Captain Norton.
Smith, Abel H. (Hertford, East) Ward, W. Dudley (Southampton)
Smith, F. E. (Liverpool, Walton) Warner, Thomas Courtenay T.

Original Question again proposed.

And, it being after Eleven of the clock, the Chairman left the chair to make his Report to the House.