CRIMINAL APPEAL BILL.

HC Deb 29 July 1907 vol 179 cc587-693

Order read, for resuming adjourned Debate on Amendment proposed to thy Bill on Consideration, as amended (be the Standing Committee) [July 19th].

Which Amendment was— In page 3, line 1, to leave out paragraph (6) of Clause 3."—(Mr. Rawlinson.)

Question again proposed, "That the words 'with the leave of the' stand part of the Bill."

MR, AKERS-DOUGLAS (Kent, St. Augustine's)

thought there was a general opinion in the House in. favour of an appeal on a question of law. His hon. and learned friend the Member for Cambridge University argued this matter out very ably upon the last occasion when the Bill was considered, and he did not think they could make much progress with the debate until they had heard the view of the Government upon the point. He asked the Attorney-General to say whether he was prepared to accept the Amendment.

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL (Sir John Walton, Leeds, S.)

said thas the aim of this Bill was to establish an effective tribunal of review; to constitute a Court of Appeal, and then to confine it within hard legal limits would entirely destroy its usefulness. To say that the Court should hear arguments on points of law, and treat all findings of fact as conclusively established, would be to reduce the Court to futility. The effort to discriminate between questions of fact and questions of law was legally, if not intellectually, impossible. The two regions of law and. fact were so closely intermingled that to attempt to discriminate would seriously hamper the efforts of the tribunal they were creating under this Bill. If this Amendment were made, and if the Court came to the conclusion that there was no evidence in support of a particular proposition, they would have to quash the conviction. But if they came to the conclusion that there was some evidence, however untrustworthy and insufficient, they would be compelled to sustain the verdict. All such matters as the misapprehension of the Judges, and the misleading of the jury, that made criminal trials sometimes unsatisfactory and that were every day considered by the Home Secretary, would be excluded from the purview of the Court.

*MR. CLAVELL SALTER (Hants, Basingstoke)

said he desired to place before the House one ground on which he was resolutely opposed to any appeal on facts, as distinguished from law, in criminal cases. Putting aside all the many other legal reasons which could be urged with considerable strength against an appeal on fact, the one ground which conclusively weighed with him was the effect which he was satisfied it could not fail to have on the attitude with which a jury would approach the trial of any doubtful case. At present it was the undoubted and happy fact that juries in this country in criminal cases did in fact acquit in doubtful cases. It was always said that they did so because they were so instructed by the Judge, but he was quite satisfied himself that the reason why juries invariably acquitted in doubtful cases was not in the least because they were instructed to do so by the Judge, but because it was the easiest and most natural course for them to take in the circumstances. If they imagined a jury debating a doubtful case, it was obvious that those of the jury who were in favour of acquittal must ultimately prevail against those who were inclined to a more serious view. The main reason was that the verdict they were about to pronounce was a final verdict. If the verdict they were about to pronouce was not to be final, not only did they remove the present tendency to acquittal, but they substituted for it a very strong tendency to convict. They enlisted on the side of conviction that very tendency to take the line of least resistance which now produced the tendency to acquit. The jury would say to themselves:" If in this case we acquit our verdict is final. Half our number are inclined to think that the man has been proved to be guilty, and that if we let. him off we shall be failing in our public duty. That will be the result if we acquit; but that will not be the result if we convict. The man will not go to prison except for a day or two, after which he will be out on bail running about preparing his defence. The question which is puzzling us as to his guilt or innocence will be shifted from our shoulders on to the broader shoulders of gentlemen in London who exist for the purpose of settling these knotty points." That was the way in which a jury would argue so soon as a one-sided appeal on fact was allowed—an appeal open to the accused, but not open to the prosecution. It was because he was satisfied it would produce that result, and, in so doing, take away an all -important safeguard which we had in our criminal administration at the present time that he should persist to the last in his opposition to any attempt to introduce an appeal on fact.

LORD R. CECIL

said he had the misfortune to differ from his hon. and learned friend on this point, and he trusted that the Government would adhere to the provision in the Bill. He personally had a very limited admiration for trial by jury. He had never thought that trial by jury was a particularly good method of arriving at the truth in many cases. It had its advantages, because it diminished the responsibility; it divided the responsibility that rested on any individual man by twelve, and that was an advantage, at any rate, when they had to deal with serious matters. It had other advantages of a technical nature which he need not describe. He doubted whether a jury were ruled by the elaborate and scientific reasoning which necessarily appealed to his hon. and learned friend. They did not consider, he did not suppose that they knew, whether their verdict was or was not final. What they would consider was the effect which the evidence made upon them, and the effect, possibly in a lesser degree, of counsel's speeches, but the most important effect upon them was that produced by the presiding Judge in summing up. Therefore, if they wanted to arrive at what the result of the change proposed by the Attorney-General would be, they must consider much more what would be the effect on the Judge of setting up a Court of Appeal than upon the jury. His opinion was that the fact that there was an appeal in cases where there was a conviction would be to make the Judge more careful in advising a jury to convict than at present. A Judge disliked to have his judgments reversed on appeal, and he would not care in criminal cases to have convictions quashed on appeal. He did not say that this would make any impartial man keep awake at night, but it would make a Judge more careful than at present not to run the risk of convicting a man if there was any reasonable doubt of his guilt. Therefore the effect of the Bill would be to make the Judge more careful and not to have an appreciable effect on the jury. Might he enter a slight protest against the phrase "tendency to acquit"? After all, it was not their object to have a tendency to acquit or a tendency to convict; it was their object to get a perfectly fair decision. He believed the appeal would be quite as valuable on matters of fact as on matters of law, and he should support the Bill as it at present stood.

VISCOUNT TURNOUR

said that he understood the Attorney-General to say that it was quite impossible to discriminate between questions of fact and questions of law. He asked tow, if that was the case, at the present moment it was possible to discriminate between questions of law and fact in cases of appeal to Quarter Sessions?

SIR JOHN WALTON

was understood to say that the tribunal to be established would be an efficient tribunal of review. In civil cases there were rules by which a discrimination was made between questions of fact and questions of law; but it would destroy the whole value of the new tribunal if those rules were made applicable to criminal cases.

*SIR W. ANSON (Oxford University)

said he was by no means averse to an appeal on matters of fact subject to limitations. If this Amendment were carried the Government would have to limit and define the right so as to secure that it would be only in important cases that an appeal on matters of fact should be allowed. The Bill as it stood at present gave a perfectly unlimited right of appeal. He confessed he was surprised to hear the Attorney-General say that it was difficult to distinguish between questions of law and facts in criminal cases. He should have thought that for generations the provinces of the Judge and of the jury were sufficiently distinguishable. The Attorney-General seemed to hold that there was no distinction in principle between cases in which a Judge would now declare that there was no evidence of a particular kind to go to the jury, and cases in which the Court of Appeal might lay it down that there was not sufficient evidence to convict the prisoner. These were two quite different things. In one case the Judge defined the crime and settled a question of law; in the other the Court considered the amount and value of evidence and decided a question of fact. He did not agree that an appeal on matters of fact was desirable unless in special circumstances. What effect, he asked, would this measure have on the responsibility of the Judge and the jury? His noble friend said that the main responsibility was with the Judge when he came to sum up. No doubt there was a great deal of responsibility on a Judge in summing up; but he maintained that the jury likewise possessed a heavy sense of responsibility in coming to their decision, because they knew that it would be final. But if the jury knew that the whole matter would come up for revision before the Court of Criminal Appeal, whether they were right or wrong, they would have a comfortable sense that, if they went wrong, no great harm would ensue. His objection to this right of appeal to a new tribunal was that it was indiscriminate. He thought that it was a pity this matter had been taken up by lawyers engaged usually in important cases of the character of causes célébres, and not in small criminal business.

SIR JOHN WALTON

said that he had practised at Quarter Sessions for seven years, and he ought to know.

*SIR W. ANSON

maintained that the Bill as it stood gave a perfectly unlimited and therefore a dangerous right of appeal. He did not agree that appeals in matters of fact were desirable unless in special circumstances. Would the Court of Criminal Appeal be effective if at the outset it was clogged with an enormous number of appeals? He could not help feeling that this general offer of an appeal would be taken advantage of by every class of criminal and not merely by those concerned in important and intricate cases worthy of the consideration of the Court. If that was so, then though there might be three Courts, and it was possible for them to sit at the same time, they would have their hands full of business, and appeals would be delayed and the other business in which these Judges should have been employed would be set aside. Thus they would not merely weaken the responsibility of juries, but they would damage the character of the Court at the outset from the delays that would ensue.

MR. J. O'CONNOR

said the House had witnessed a very pretty duel between the man of theory and the man of practice. He thought their decision should be in favour of the man of practice. The hon. Member for Oxford University had admitted that he would be in favour of a Court of Appeal if there were limitations. He ventured to point out that there was a very serious limitation which was appeal for leave to appeal. There was no reason why the distinction between law and fact should be maintained any longer because it could, and would, be got rid of from time to time. This Amendment was supported by hon. Members who had prepared hundreds of notices of appeal, and in every case they had been able to convert questions of fact into questions of law. The clause gave the protection asked for by the Member for Oxford University in the limitation contained in the words "with the leave of the Court of Criminal Appeal."

MR. LYTTELTON(St. George's, Hanoversquare),

said he was strongly in favour of the Amendment. He had really heard no answer throughout these debates to the unworkable and costly character of this measure if appeals on the facts were to remain in. Unworkability and costliness had been brushed aside in these debates as being of no weight as compared with justice and clemency, and if it were a fact that an appeal to the Court of Appeal would be in favour of the convicted man, and in favour of clemency, he agreed that those arguments should be thrust aside. But his firm conviction was that the present form of criminal law was all in favour of the convicted man, who not only had all the advantage which arose from the rigidity of the system with regard to evidence in the Court, but all the advantage of the less rigid and more flexible system of the inquiry by the Home Office. The suggestion was made by learned Judges that the criminal should have the right of referring these questions to a Court of law and that the public should have an opportunity of demanding some explanation. That was what was done in the case of Mr. Beck. He did not press too much the unanimous judgment of the Judges on the point, but what he proposed was that they should try this plan and see if it would abate public dissatisfaction, before they sent all these cases which dealt with questions of fact to a Court of Criminal Appeal, took the risk of making our present system unworkable and giving rise to the scandals which arose from delay in trials in America and elsewhere by reason of time being taken up in appeal. He believed that the course proposed would diminish the responsibility of both Judge and jury and that it would be shaken. His noble friend began by saying that he had very little opinion of or admiration for juries, but then he did not seem to have an overwhelming admiration for Judges either, because he seemed to suggest that in future they would, if this Bill were passed, conduct criminal trials with more care because of the fear of their decisions being reversed. For himself, however, he thought that a criminal case doubled the attention of the tribunal because the result was final. That fact had a great effect upon both juries and Judges, He thought that by this Bill they were running a great risk of diminishing that sense of responsibility. Nobody with knowledge of human nature, who had had the experience of criminal trials, would deny that at the close of a long sitting and at the end of a complicated case, if this Bill were passed there would not be that shrinking from finding a connection between the prisoner and the crime where there was an element of doubt that there now was, as there would be the knowledge that the decision would be open to revision. He therefore supported the Amendment.

*MR. PICKERSGILL (Bethnal Green, S.W.)

thought the Government were well advised in giving the Bill the wide scope that they had given it. Some years ago he himself had introduced a Court of Criminal Appeal Bill into the House, which was based on the recommendation of the Judges, but in the course of the debate it became clear that even the House of Commons of that day was in favour of a wider Bill.

MR. LANE-FOX (Yorkshire, W.R., Barkston Ash)

said that at the present moment behind the jury they had the Home Secretary, who was able to sift the evidence in a case by whatever means he pleased, and he thought that that position of things was better than would be secured by the possession of a Court of Criminal Appeal. At present the Home Secretary was not bound by any rules of evidence as a Court of Criminal Appeal would be. Of course a good deal depended upon who was Home Secretary, and no doubt it was a great responsibility to put upon one individual, but it seemed to him that if a man in the position of Home Secretary entered upon the inquiry into these matters without any trammels which would be imposed upon a Court of Criminal Appeal, he would be more able to get at the true inwardness of a case than such a Court would be. There seemed to him to be no power in the Bill under which the Court of Criminal Appeal could hear fresh evidence, but the Home Secretary could, if he desired it, go into fresh evidence and discover from it what the real truth and inwardness of a case was. The question as to the lessening of the responsibility of the jury was a very serious one. It was obvious that their responsibility would be weakened if they knew that they had a Court of Appeal behind them. That was a point of view which had been held by many others, and it certainly impressed itself upon him.

MR. BOTTOMLEY (Hackney, S.)

said that on this occasion he found himself in the unique position of being a warm supporter of the Government. The proposal before the House was that there should be an appeal on questions of law only, but as he understood it this right did exist at present, although the Judge might refuse to reserve the point of law for the consideration of the Court for Crown Cases Reserved. All they wanted if the amendment was to be accepted was that the Court for the Consideration of Crown Cases Reserved should have the right by mandamus to compel the people to state a case for their opinion. In that case the present Bill would be unnecessary. But what the country demanded was that a man whose liberty was imperilled should have as much right to appeal as a man who had been mulcted in a £10 note.

MR. BUCKMASTER (Cambridge)

said he was a confirmed opponent of a principle which allowed an extensive right of appeal on questions of fact. To his mind the division between questions of fact and questions of law was clear and distinct. It was perfectly true that all questions of law must have application to questions of fact, but the principles of law that they applied were totally distinct from the facts to which they addressed them, and no better illustration could be given than that which occurred every day in the civil Courts in the findings of fact by a jury, upon which questions of law were argued before the Judge. The distinction was one which was more familiar to the Attorney-General than to any other Member of the House, and he was amazed that the hon. and learned Gentleman should say that the line of distinction between questions of law and questions of fact was so shadowy that it was impossible to distinguish them for the purposes of this Bill. If that were so, why was it that at the present time there was an appeal on questions of law, provided they got the sanction of the Judge, before whom the man was tried, for stating a special case? There was no appeal on questions of fact at all, and no difficulty with which he was acquainted had ever arisen in defining, for the purposes of a special case, the questions of law it was desired to raise. Further, if they took the case, which undoubtedly created a great public sensation, and which he could not help thinking was present to the minds of hon. Gentlemen who were supporting this Bill—the case of Mr. Beck—they would at once find that the distinctions between questions of law and questions of fact were marked in a most prominent way. Had an appeal on questions of fact existed Mr. Beck might have appealed but he would have appealed in vain. He had studied the evidence with some care, and he said without hesitation that there was no lawyer who had ever been acquainted with the work of the Court of Appeal who would have ventured to have advised an appeal on a question of fact in that case. But, had there been an appeal on a question of law, the man would have been free, because the miscarriage of justice was due to the fact that the learned Judge, who was trying the case, mistakenly refused to admit certain evidence that was tendered to him, and declined to state a special case as to whether or not it was admissible. It was purely and simply a question of law entirely divorced and dissociated from any question of fact whatever. If these things were distinct, as he thought they were, then there must be some special reasons for the opposition to appeals on questions of fact. These reasons had been stated on previous occasions, and he had never heard an answer to them. It was idle for his hon. and learned friend who sat on the bench opposite to say that the objection to the Bill arose from men of theory and not from men of practice. He greatly doubted if there was in that House a man better acquainted with the practice and administration of the criminal law than the hon. and learned Member for the Kingston division, and yet he believed the hon. Gentleman was as strong an opponent as he was himself of this provision. And again, the hon. and learned Member for the University of Cambridge was a man who had administered the criminal law as Recorder of Cambridge for years past, and he also was opposed to it. The hon. and learned Gentleman who had just spoken had no mean practical experience of the administration of the criminal law, and he likewise was opposed to it. It was idle to suggest that they were divided in that House between men of practice and men of theory. It was not so, or if it were so, the men of practice were the men who took the same view as he took himself, and he admitted that his view was to some extent tainted by a theoretical and not a practical knowledge. The main objection to this appeal on a question of fact could be stated in a few sentences. There were in all cases, in all sessions and assizes and criminal Courts, clear and distinct classes of cases. There was the case of the man who was clearly innocent and the case of the man who was clearly guilty, and between the two there was a dim and uncertain border, and in the shadows of which it might be that many a guilty man escaped, but in which the innocent were not involved. If they passed this Bill and allowed appeal on questions of fact they would take away those shadows, and the innocent man would run great risk of being convicted, when at the present moment he would undoubtedly escape. Let such a thing arise, and no Court of Appeal would ever set it right. They could not possibly by any Court of Appeal in the world readjust difficult and complicated questions of fact upon which a jury had once pronounced. That was the reason which influenced him in opposing the Second Reading of this Bill and in supporting, as he was bound from his conviction to support, the Amendment which the hon. and learned Member for Cambridge University had brought forward.

MR. NIELD (Middlesex, Ealing)

said the Court of Appeal must at any rate receive an application before it decided whether the appeal was on a question of law or a question of fact. They knew by experience that the jurisdiction which had recently been thrown on the Court of Appeal to hear applications for leave to appeal from chambers or from an inferior Court, or from the Divisional Court, frequently took up a great deal of time; often three-quarters of an hour or an hour was consumed in hearing ex parte applications for leave to appeal. These were cases where they had already had applications made and refused either by Judges in chambers or by whatever was the tribunal from which they appealed. When they regarded for a moment the whole criminal jurisdiction of this country and all the prisoners who would have a right of appeal, he ventured to point out that they would have list upon list occupying this new Appeal Court day by day, in order to ascertain whether there was a prima facie case on which to give leave to appeal in order to get such an investigation of the facts as had hitherto been done perfectly satisfactorily by officials of the Home Office. Therefore, in the interests of public time, they ought to interpose some authority to prevent haphazard appeals which would come up from Quarter Sessions, from every petty sessional bench, and from every Assize Court. The Court would be flooded with applications, and their time would be taken up in each case in deciding whether an appeal was on a question of fact or on a question of law. Anybody who knew the attitude of convicted prisoners knew how frequent were the applications to the Home Office by petition for a revision of the sentences. Those who were acquainted with the facts knew that numbers of prisoners in gaol applied to the Home Office or to the visiting magistrate for revision on the ground that their sentences were wrong; and these cases alone, if they were taken to the Court of Appeal, would at once speedily overwhelm it with work, and it was therefore necessary that they should consider the condition of things which would be brought about by this Bill if it were passed as it stood.

*MR. RUFUS ISAACS (Reading)

said the proposition of his right hon. friend. the Member for St. George's, Hanover Square, was that this Bill, with this provision as it at present stood, would be unworkable, but he had found it difficult to understand his arguments why it would be unworkable. It should be borne in mind that no appeal could be presented to the Court of Criminal Appeal until that Court had had established to its own satisfaction that a prima facie case had been made out for investigation by that Court. Once that had been established then there was proper subject matter for discussion before the Court of Criminal, Appeal. In a civil case there would be no difficulty. Certain views would have to be presented upon which a discussion would be pronounced. Why should there be any difficulty in applying the same principle in a Court of Criminal Appeal with proper safeguards against' appeals which were frivolous, or vexatious? The Court of Criminal Appeal would take great care, in determining such matters, that a prima facie case was established upon the evidence presented when the application was made.

MR. LYTTELTON

said that would very often be a longer job than hearing the case.

*MR. RUFUS ISAACS

said he would like to remind the right hon. Gentleman of applications which he had made a great many times based upon similar materials which had to be presented to the Court. In applications of the character he alluded to, the Court did not go at great length into these matters, because counsel had had an opportunity of digesting the facts, and consequently the case was presented to the Court in such a manner that it was not difficult to determine whether a prima facie case had been made out. He submitted to his right hon. friend that there would be no difficulty in the matter. He agreed that probably some time would be occupied, but the point was that it would be usefully occupied. It was necessary in criminal cases that there should be some right of appeal to an open Court and not to the Home Secretary, who had to determine cases on material which they never saw. Such appeals should be decided upon material presented to a Court which would deal with the matter judicially, and it was because the Government had come to the conclusion that it was necessary that the same right should be extended in criminal cases, with the limitations imposed as in civil cases, that this clause had been introduced. He submitted that the arguments which had been presented against this section of the Bill made the case of the Government stronger. He had been much struck by the arguments of the hon. and learned Member for Cambridge University, who said that he failed to understand how there would be any difficulty in distinguishing between questions of law and questions of fact. Under this Bill, and in numberless cases which would occur to the hon. and learned Member, the question which might arise was one of mixed law and fact. How in that case would they distinguish between what was law and what was fact? It would at once be seen how difficult it was in some cases to draw the line between the two. He agreed that in a great number of cases there would be no difficulty. There would be the point of law arising upon a certain set of facts, but they might have a set of facts, upon which there would be real difficulty in determining at what precise point the question discussed ceased to be a question of fact and became a question of law It was in order to get over those niceties that this clause had been introduced, so that justice might be done without paying an over-sensitive regard to those rules which applied in civil cases. When an an appeal was given not only on a question: of law but on a question of fact, the Court could pronounce a judgment which would be in accordance with the justice of the case. The Court might come to the conclusion that the law as laid down was right and that the findings as to the facts were wrong. Under this Amendment, in spite of the Court having come to the conclusion that the finding upon a question of fact was wrong, although the finding as to law was right, the Court of Criminal Appeal could not interfere to redress that injustice, although every member of the Court was of the same opinion. They ought to remember that this was not a question for lawyers at all, and he protested against its being regarded as a matter upon which lawyers only should speak. They were seeking to establish a safeguard so that no innocent man should be convicted. If they appealed to those who were not already steeped in the practice of the law; if they appealed to the general public and to the minds of jurymen and magistrates the reply would be that if they wished to do justice in a case of criminal appeal they must be able to try both questions of fact and questions of law. The experience of those who had practised in Courts of law was that questions of fact were very often more difficult to determine than questions of law, and the sifting of the evidence upon which a question of fact was to be determined was often a matter of the greatest nicety. It should be borne in mind that the Court of Criminal Appeal must have regard to those rules and principles upon which the Court of Appeal decided in civil cases and consequently there was no danger. He did not think that ultimately there would be many appeals on fact. He was ready to concede that at the outset there might be a number of such appeals. It would be found in criminal cases that appeals on questions of fact, would be dealt with on the same principles as appeals on fact in civil cases. Arguments had been addressed to the House based upon the want of responsibility in juries if once this Criminal Appeal Bill became law. He was astonished to hear an argument which fell from the lips of his right hon. and learned friend the Member for St. George's, Hanover Square, who seemed to think that a jury in a criminal case, being anxious to get home, would convict a prisoner—whereas, otherwise they would have acquitted him—because there was a Court of Criminal Appeal which might set the matter right. Surely that was doing a great injustice to jurymen. He ventured to say that the experience of those who practised before juries was that hitherto the juries, if in doubt, would come to the conclusion, and rightly so, that the prisoner must be acquitted, not because he must have "the benefit of the doubt"—a very objectionable phrase—but because the prosecution had failed to bring home to the prisoner the guilt which it set out to establish against him. He believed, as he had said, that the argument which had been used did a great injustice to those who sat as jurymen and assisted in the administration of justice in this country. He was convinced that this Bill as presented by the Government would really work justice, and he asked the House to come to that conclusion and to reject the Amendment.

MR. RAWLINSON

said that the Bill, as the hon. and learned Member on the other side had said, had been before the House on previous occasions, though in a slightly different form. On both those occasions the opinion of the Judges was before the opinion of the House was taken asked for, and, surely, if anybody had practical knowledge of the working of the criminal law the Judges had. He asked hon. Members' could they find a single Judge who was in favour of an unlimited right of appeal? He had put before the House three reasons for adopting the Amendment. The first was that the unlimited right of asking for leave to appeal rendered the Bill unworkable; secondly, it weakened the responsibility of juries; and, thirdly, it was against the interests of prisoners, because it weakened the position of the Home Secretary in dealing with prisoners who had been convicted. As regarded the first reason, the hon. and learned Member for Reading, if he might say so with respect, missed the point. The hon. and learned Member said that there would be very few appeals in these cases. Very likely, but there was an unlimited right to apply for leave to appeal. Referring to what his right hon. and learned friend had said as to the length of time that might, be taken up by the applications, the hon. and learned Member said that counsel would have it in their power to shorten the proceedings. He appeared to have forgotten then, however, that no counsel would be before that Court. The prisoner would be in gaol, and he would have no right to come before the Court unless the Court themselves gave him leave. Of course if he had money enough that prisoner could pay a couple of counsel, but the strong probability was that in the vast majority of cases prisoners would not be able to do this. As he had pointed out, one of two things would happen. Either cases would be gone into in a perfunctory way, in which case the whole thing would resolve itself into a sham, or else there would be a block of work which would make the system impossible. He wished to deal with one other point referred to by the hon. and learned Member for Reading, and also by the learned Attorney-General. The learned Attorney-General pointed out that there would be the greatest difficulty in discriminating between a point of law and a point of fact. He would like with the permission of the House to read a few words from a speech made by the Attorney-General in days when he was nearer the seven years experience of practice in Quarter Sessions of which he had told the House. The hon. and learned Gentleman was dealing with the Bill of 1898. He said— But it cannot be argued that you need to establish a Court of Criminal Appeal in order to ensure the serious and efficient conduct by the Judges of this country of criminal proceedings. If there should be any misconduct on the part of a Judge charged with the administration of criminal law, there is an ample remedy in the functions discharged by the Secretary of State for the Home Office. It cannot be argued that this Bill is necessary in order to prevent errors of law on the part of the tribunal existing. The hon. and learned Attorney-General went on to say in that speech that the existing machinery was amply sufficient. Then he continued— I am sure I shall be borne out by my hon. and learned friends familiar with the administration of the law when I say that the difficulties arising owing to the construction of the statutes are so few, and the administration of the criminal courts, in so far as it involves questions of criminal law, so easy that no practical necessity can justify the present proposal. Therefore, the sole ground upon which the proposed legislation rests is, that there should be a Court of Appeal for the purpose of correcting errors of fact.

MR. SWIFT MACNEILL

That was before the Beck case.

MR. RAWLINSON

Yes; it was in 1898. If the hon. and learned Attorney-General found no difficulty in differen- tiating between points of law and points of fact in 1898, how could he know say that there was a very great difficulty? But it was not only upon the question of differentiating between questions of law and of fact that the hon. and learned Attorney -General had altered his opinions. Since he moved his Amendment he had had an opportunity of reading the speech of the hon. and learned Attorney-General. He did not propose to detain the House at that late hour by reading it in full, but he was bound to say that no stronger or better speech could have been made in pointing out the dangers of granting an appeal on questions of fact. Perhaps he might be permitted to read this much more from the hon. and learned Attorney-General's speech to the House— If you compare the system of procedure in its civil aspect with the system in its criminal aspect, you will find that in civil procedure the issue is practically defined for the first time, and evidence is laid for the first time when the case is heard. In such a system the equity and fairness of allowing some review with the object of correcting a wrong step is strong and almost irresistible when put forward in the shape of a demand. But in criminal procedure there are various preliminary investigations with the very object of giving finality to the trial. It would, therefore, be a very serious step for this House to interfere with the finality of that procedure. It would be mischievous in any system if there were no means of preventing error; and if no such means existed, and the proposals of this Bill were the only method of correcting mistakes, the argument in its favour would be conclusive: but you have a method of procedure, and all that this Bill proposes is to substitute a different method, a different procedure. You have now the operations of the Home Office. It may be said that the Home Office does not exercise any appellate function, and, theoretically, I do not know that it is necessary for me to contest that proposition. But the Home Office constantly does examine into the case which has been made against a prisoner and the suggestions made in his favour, and does, in effect, exercise an appellate jurisdiction. The hon. and learned Attorney-General then spoke as to his experience of the excellent work done by the Home Secretary, and continued— If that man (referring to a particular case) had been brought before the proposed new tribunal, there is no doubt but that his sentence would have been carried out. I am quite aware that the prerogative of mercy would still rest with the Home Secretary, but if a prisoner appeals to the Court of Appeal the hand of the Home Secretary will be temporarily stayed, and if the sentence is con. firmed by the Court of Appeal his hand will be finally stayed, because the Home Secretary will feel that, as the conviction rested not merely on the evidence adduced at the trial, but on the investigation by three judges, it would not be proper for him to advise Her Majesty to remit or alter the sentence If you erect this Court of Appeal which can only be enlightened in accordance with the strict rules of evidence you will do so at the cost of a procedure infinitely more elastic, more subtle and efficient in its administration, and infinitely more in the interest of the accused person No words could put better the arguments in favour of the Amendment. He thought that possibly a good many hon. Members did not fully realise the immense importance of the administration of criminal law in England. It was certainly the most important branch of the legal work done in England, and those who had a practical knowledge of the working of the criminal law had the greatest fear of any alteration in the finality of the verdicts of juries. When that fear was coupled with such remarks as those of the Attorney-General which he had just read to the House, hon. Members must hesitate before they changed their minds in the way the Attorney-

General had done. Coming to another of his reasons, they were, as he had said, weakening the position which the Home Secretary had in these matters at the present time. If they passed the Bill the Home Secretary would be unable to interfere before a man had appealed. If a man had appealed, the Home Secretary would be in a much more difficult position as to interfering than he was at present. For the reasons he had stated he asked the House to hesitate before tampering with legal machinery the outcome of years of successful experience. The one part of the English law of which the British public was proud was the administration of the criminal law, and any attempt to destroy the finality of the verdicts of juries who performed their duties honestly would, he was convinced, be attended by unfortunate results. He begged to move the rejection of the clause.

Question put.

The House divided:— Ayes, 200; Noes, 67. (Division List No. 338.)

AYES.
Acland, Francis Dyke	Cheetham, John Frederick	Ffrench, Peter
Agnew, George William	Clough, William	Findlay, Alexander
Ainsworth, John Stirling	Clynes, J. R.	Flavin, Michael Joseph
Alden, Percy	Cobbold, Felix Thornley	Freeman-Thomas, Freeman
Allen, A. Acland (Christchurch	Collins, Stephen (Lambeth)	Fuller, John Michael F.
Asquith, Rt Hn Herbert Henry	Collins, Sir Wm. J.(S Pancras, W.	Gill, A. H.
Astbury, John Meir	Cooper, G. J.	Gladstone, Rt Hn. Herbert John
Baker, Sir John (Portsmouth)	Corbett, CH (Sussex, E. Grinst'd)	Glover, Thomas
Balfour, Robert (Lanark)	Cornwall, Sir Edwin, A.	Goddard, Daniel Ford
Baring, Godfrey (Isle of Wight)	Cotton, Sir H. J. S.	Grayson, Albert Victor
Barker, John	Craig, Herbert J. (Tynremouth)	Greenwood, G. (Peterborough)
Barry, Redmond J. (Tyrone, N.)	Crean, Eugene	Grey, Rt. Hon. Sir Edward
Beauchamp, E,	Cremer, Sir William Randal	Gulland, John W.
Bellairs, Carlyon	Crosfield, A. H.	Haldane, Rt. Hon. Richard B.
Benn, Sir J. Williams (Devonprt)	Crossley, William J.	Hardy, George A. (Suffolk)
Benn, W.(T'w'r Hamlets, S. Geo.	Cullinan, J.	Harmsworth, Cecil B. (Worc'r.)
Bennett, E. N.	Dalziel, James Henry	Haworth, Arthur A
Berridge, T. H. D.	Davies, David (Montgomery Co.	Hedges, A. Paget
Birrell, Rt. Hon. Augustine	Davies, Ellis William (Eifion)	Henderson, Arthur (Durham
Black, Arthur W.	Davies, Timothy (Fulham)	Higham, John Sharp
Bottomley, Horatio	Delany, William	Hobhouse, Charles E. H.
Boulton, A. C. F.	Dewar, Arthur (Edinburgh, S.	Hodge, John
Bowerman, C. W.	Dewar, Sir J. A. (Inverness-sh.)	Hogan, Michael
Bramsdon, T. A.	Dickson-Poynder,Sir John P.	Holland, Sir William Henry
Brigg, John	Duffy, William J.	Holt, Richard Dinning
Bright, J. A.	Duncan,C(Barrow-in-Furness)	Horniman, Emslie John
Brocklehurst, W. B.	Dunn, A. Edward (Camborne)	Howard, Hon. Geoffrey
Brunner,J.F.L.)Lancs., Leigh)	Dunne,MajorE Martin(Walsall)	Hudson, Walter
Burns, Rt. Hon. John	Edwards, Enoch (Hanley)	Hyde, Clarendon
Causton,RtHnRichard Knight	Elibank, Master of	Illingworth, Percy H.
Cawley, Sir Frederick	Evans, Samuel T.	Isaacs, Rufus Daniel
Cecil, Lord R. (Marylebone,E.)	Everett, B. Lacey	Johnson, W. (Nuneaton)
Chance, Frederick William	Fenwick, Charles	Jones,SirD.Brynmor (Swansea)
Channing, Sir Francis Allston	Ferens, T. R.	Jones, Leif (Appleby)
Jowett, F. W.	Norton, Capt. Cecil William	Shipman, Dr. John G.
Kilbride, Denis	O'Connor. John (Kildare, N.)	Silcock Thomas Ball
Kincaid-Smith, Captain	O'Grady, J.	Smith, F.E.(Liverpool, Walton)
Laidlaw, Robert	O'Shee, James John	Soames, Arthur Wellesley
Lambert, George	Parker, James (Halifax)	Soares, Earnest J.
Lamont, Norman	Partington, Oswald,	Strachey, Sir Edward
Law, Hugh A. (Donegal, W.)	Pearce, Robert (Staffs. Leek)	Straus, B. S. (Mile End)
Layland-Barratt, Francis	Pearson, W. H.M.(Suffolk, Eye	Strauss, E. A. (Abingdon)
Leese, Sir Joseph F.(Accrington)	Philipps, Owen C. (Pembroke)	Sutherland, J. E.
Levy, Sir Maurice	Pickersgill, Edward Hare	Taylor, John W. (Durham)
Lewis, John Herbert	Pirie, Duncan V.	Taylor, Theodore C. (Radcliffe)
Lloyd-George, Rt. Hon. David	Pollard, Dr.	Tennant, Sir Edward(Salisbury)
Lough, Thomas	Price, C.E.(Edinburgh Central)	Thompson, J.W.H.(Somerset, E
Lupton, Arnold	Radford, G. H.	Toulmin, George
Luttrell, Hugh Fownes	Rainy, A. Rolland	Trevelyan, Charles Philips
Lyell, Charles Henry	Raphael, Herbert H.	Verney, F. W.
Macdonald, J. R. (Leicester)	Rea, Walter Russell(Scarboro'	Walters, John Tudor
MacNeill, John Gordon Swift	Rees, J.D.	Walton, Sir John L.(Leeds, S.)
MacVeagh, Jeremiah (Down, S.)	Renton, Major Leslie	Waring, Walter
MacVeigh, Charles (Donegal, E.)	Richards, T.F.(Wolyerh'mpt'n	Warner, Thomas Courtenay T.
M'Crae, George	Rickett, J. Compton	Wason, Rt. Hn. E(Clackmannan
M'Kenna, Rt. Hon. Reginald	Roberts, G. H. (Norwich)	White, George (Norfolk)
M'Micking, Major G.	Roberts, John H.(Denbighs.)	White, Luke (York, E. R.)
Maddison, Frederick	Robertson, Sir G. Scott(Bradf'rd	White, Patrick (Meath, North)
Mallet, Charles E.	Rogers, F. E. Newman	Whitley John Henry (Halifax)
Manfield, Harry (Northants)	Rose, Charles Day	Wilkie, Alexander
Marks, G. Croydon (Launceston)	Runciman, Walter	Williams, J. (Glamorgan)
Marnham, F. J.	Rutherford, W. W. (Liverpool)	Wills, Arthur Walters
Massie, J.	Samuel, Herbert L..(Cleveland)	Wilson, P. W. (St. Pancras, S.)
Micklem, Nathaniel	Scarisbrick, T.T. L.	Winfrey, R.
Montagu, E. S.	Schwann, C. Duncan (Hyde)
Morgan, G. Hay (Cornwall)	Seaverns, J. H.	TELLERS FOR THE AYES—Mr.
Morgan, J. Lloyd (Carmarthen)	Shaw, Rt. Hon. T. (Hawick, B.)	Whiteley and Mr. J. A.
Morrell, Philip	Sherwell, Arthur James.	Pease.
NOES.
Acland-Hood, Rt Hn. Sir Alex. F.	Craik, Sir Henry	Morpeth, Viscount
Anson, Sir William Reynell	Dalrymple, Viscount	Nield, Herbert
Arkwright, John Stanhope	Douglas, Rt. Hon. A. Akers-	Pease, Herbert Pike (Darlington
Balcarres, Lord	Faber, George Denison (York)	Rawlinson, John Frederick Peel
Banbury, Sir Frederick George	Faber, Capt. W.V (Hants, W.)	Remnant, James Farquharson
Banner, John S. Harmood-	Fell, Arthur	Ridsdale, E. A.
Barrie, H.T.(Londonderry, N.)	Fethertonhaugh, Godfrey	Scott, Sir S.(Marylebone, W.)
Beach, Hn. Michael Hugh Hicks	Fletcher, J.S.	Smith, Abel H. (Hertford, East)
Beckett, Hon. Gervase	Forster Hendry William	Starkey, John R.
Bertram, Julius	Gretton John	Staveley-Hill, Henry (Staff'sh.)
Bowles, G. Stewart	Hardy, Lawrence (Kent, Ashford	Talbot, Lord E. (Chichester)
Boyle, Sir Edward	Helmsley, Viscount	Thomson, W. Mitchell-(Lanark)
Bridgeman, W. Clive	Hervey, F.W.F.(Bury S.Edm'ds	Turnour, Viscount
Buckmaster, Stanley O.	Hill, Sir Clement (Shrewsbury)	Valentia, Viscount
Bull, Sir William James	Hills, J. W.	Warde, Col. C. E. (Kent, Mid)
Carlile, E. Hildred	Hunt Rowland	Willoughby de Eresby, Lord
Castlereagh, Viscount	Lambton, Hon. Frederick Wm.	Wilson, A. Stanley (York, E. R.)
Cavendish, Rt. Hon. Victor C.W.	Lane-Fox, G. R.	Wortley, Rt. Hon. C. B. Stuart-
Cecil, Evelyn (Aston Manor)	Lockwood, Rt. Hn. Lt.-Col.A.R.	Younger, George
Cochrane, Hon. Thos. H. A. E	Lowe, Sir Francis William
Corbett, A. Cameron (Glasgow	Lyttelton, Rt. Hon. Alfred	TELLERS FOR THE NOES—Mr.
Corbett, T. L. (Down, North)	Magnus, Sir Philip	Cave and Mr. Salter.
Courthope, G. Loyd	Meysey-Thompson, E. C.
Craig, Charles Curtis(Antrim, S.	Mildmay, Francis Bingham

MR. S. T. EVANS moved to insert after the words "with the leave of" in Paragraph (b) the words "the Court by whom the person is convicted or." He would not at that hour detain the House, but what he objected to was the necessity of coming to the Court of Appeal in London. The Amendment was, he

thought, both reasonable and necessary on various grounds. In the first place it was necessary on the ground of expense. He commended it also to the House on the score of expedition, and everybody was agreed that if they were to have appeals they should be as expeditious as possible. The only objection

he thought which had been offered to the proposal was made by the Attorney-General in Committee, when he argued that it would be unseemly that immediately after the verdict was passed and sentence imposed, especially if it was a serious sentence such as the capital sentence, the person who was defending the prisoner should at once jump up and ask for leave of the Court to appeal. Personally he (Mr. Evans) thought it desirable that, on the two grounds he had stated and on the ground of relieving the prisoner from anxiety, the Court of first instance should be empowered if they thought fit to grant the necessary leave.

Amendment proposed to the Bill— In page 3, line 1, after the words 'the,' to insert the words 'court before whom the person is convicted or of the.' "—(Mr. Evans.)

Question proposed, "That those words be inserted in the Bill."

*SIR JOHN WALTON

said his hon. and learned friend had stated the grounds upon which he (the Attorney-General) had opposed the Amendment in Committee. He thought the House would be satisfied, that there was something in the view he had expressed. It was all-important that the criminal law should be administered with full solemnity. If immediately after verdict and sentence it were open for counsel for the prisoner to rise, and, it might be, with some attempt at dramatic effect, suggest that the verdict of the jury was entitled to no weight, the scene would tend to disparage the administration of justice. He did not think the prisoner's position was in the least degree prejudiced by the plan of the Government. It would be the duty of the Judge to communicate with the Court of Appeal in the form of a report, and there would be little doubt that if that opinion were in favour of an appeal leave would be granted. Applications

for appeals should always be matters for consideration; it was very desirable that before any such application was made there should be some opportunity for reflection.

MR. LYTTELTON

thought the Attorney-General had given a very strong argument against his own Bill. He had with the greatest justice spoken in favour of the solemnity of criminal trials and had asked the House to reject the Amendment because he imagined there might be a dramatic scene at the end of every criminal trial. That was not a likely occurrence. He had heard a good many dramatic ends to trials but anybody making such an application would do so with due respect. The position the Attorney-General had placed them in was that beneath the consciousness of every single man in the Court there would be the conviction that the sentence which had just been pronounced could be appealed against. He would go further than that. He would go so far as to say that the Judge while he had the knowledge of the gravity of the crime might say: "But you must remember that the jury and I may have been wrong, and this question which has been tried with so much solemnity may go before these Judges in London." He thought it was worth while mentioning that although he did not agree with the machinery of the Bill the Amendment which had been moved by his hon. and learned friend was recommended by the Royal Commission in 1879, by another Select Committee of that House in 1883, and by the Association of Chairmen of Quarter Sessions last year, and was accepted by the Lord Chancellor in the House of Lords last year. The Amendment therefore ought to be treated with some respect.

Question put.

The House divided:—Ayes, 67; Noes, 162. (Division List No. 339.)

AYES.
Acland-Hood,RtHn.SirAlex.F.	Beach,Hn.Michael HughHicks	Carlile, E. Hildred
Anson, Sir William Reynell	Beckett, Hon. Gervase	Castlereagh, Viscount
Arkwright, John Stanhope	Bertram, Julius	Cavendish,Rt.Hon.VictorC.W.
Balcarres, Lord	Bottomley, Horatio	Cecil, Evelyn (Aston Manor)
Banbury, Sir Frederick George	Boyle, Sir Edward	Cecil, Lord R. (Marylebone.E.)
Banner, John S. Harmood-	Bridgeman, W, Clive	Corbett,A.Cameron(Glasgow)
Barrie,H.T.(Londonderry, N.)	Bull, Sir William James	Corbett, T. L. (Down, North)
Courthope, G. Loyd	Hunt, Rowland	Smith,Abel H.(Hertford. East)
Craig,CharlesCurtis(Antrim,S.)	Lambton, Hon. Frederick Wm	Smith,F.E.(Liverpool, Walton)
Craik, Sir Henry	Lane-Fox, G. R.	Starkey, John R.
Dalrymple, Viscount	Lockwood,Rt.Hn.Lt.-Col.A.R.	Staveley-Hill, Henry (Staff'sh)
Davies, Ellis William (Eifion)	Lyttelton, Rt. Hon. Alfred	Talbot, Lord E. (Chichester)
Douglas, Rt. Hon. A. Akers-	Meysey-Thompson, E. C.	Turnour, Viscount
Faber, George Denison (York	Morpeth, Viscount	Valentia, Viscount
Faber, Capt. W. V. (Hants,W.)	Nield, Herbert	Warde, Col. C. E. (Kent. Mid)
Fell, Arthur	Pease,HerbertPike(Darlington	Williams, J. (Glamorgan)
Fetherstonhaugh, Godfrey	Radford, G. H.	Willoughby de Eresby, Lord
Forster, Henry William	Raphael, Herbert H.	Wortley, Rt. Hon. C. B.Stuart-
Gretton, John	Rawlinson, John FrederickPeel	Younger, George
Hedges, A. Paget	Remnant, James Farquharson
Helmsley, Viscount	Ridsdale, E. A.	TELLERS FOR THE AYES—Mr.
Hervey.F. W.F. (BuryS. Edm'ds	Salter, Arthur Clavell	Evans and Mr. Watson
Hill, Sir Clement (Shrewsbury)	Scott, Sir S. (Marylebone, W.)	Rutherford.
Hills, J. W.	Sloan, Thomas Henry
NOES.
Acland, Francis Dyke	Everett, R. Lacey	Maddison, Frederick
Agnew, George William	Fenwick, Charles	Mallet, Charles E.
Ainsworth, John Stirling	Ferens, T. R.	Manfield, Harry (Northants)
Allen,A.Acland(Christchurch)	Flavin, Michael Joseph	Marks,G.Croydon (Launceston)
Asquith,Rt.HnHerbert Henry	Freeman-Thomas, Freeman	Marnham, F. J.
Astbury, John Meir	Fuller, John Michael F.	Massie, J.
Balfour, Robert (Lanark)	Gill, A. H.	Montagu, E. S.
Baring,Godfrey(Isle of Wight)	Gladstone,Rt.Hn. HerbertJohn	Morgan, G. Hay (Cornwall)
Barker, John	Glover, Thomas	Morgan,J.Lloyd (Carmarthen)
Barry,Redmond J. (Tyrone,N.)	Goddard, Daniel Ford	Morrell, Philip
Beauchamp, E.	Greenwood, G. (Peterborough)	Norton, Capt. Cecil William
Beaumont, Hon. Hubert	Grey, Rt. Hon. Sir Edward	O'Connor. John (Kildare. N.)
Bellairs, Carlyon	Gulland, John W.	O'Grady, J.
Bennett, E. N.	Haldane, Rt. Hon. Richard B.	Partington. Oswald
Berridge, T. H. D.	Hardy, George A. (Suffolk)	Pearce, Robert (Staffs. Leek)
Birrell, Rt. Hon. Augustine	Hardy,Laurence (Kent,Ashf'rd	Pearson, W.H.M. (Suffolk, Eye)
Black, Arthur W.	Harmsworth, Cecil B. (Worc'r)	Philipps, Owen C. (Pembroke)
Boulton, A. C. F.	Haworth, Arthur A.	Pickersgill, Edward Hare
Bowerman, C. W.	Hazleton, Richard	Pirie, Duncan V.
Bowles, G. Stewart	Henderson, Arthur (Durham)	Pollard, Dr.
Bramsdon, T. A.	Higham, John Sharp	Price,C.E. (Edinb'gh, Central)
Brigg, John	Hobhouse, Charles E. H.	Rainy, A. Rolland
Bright, J. A.	Hogan, Michael	Rees. J. D.
Brunner,J.F.L.(Lancs.,Leigh)	Holt, Richard Durning	Renton. Major Leslie
Burns, Rt. Hon. John	Horniman, Emslie John	Richards,T.F. (Wolverh'mpt'n
Causton,Rt.Hn.RichardKnight	Howard, Hon. Geoffrey	Rickett, J. Compton
Cave, George	Hudson, Walter	Roberts, G. H. (Norwich)
Cawley, Sir Frederick	Hyde, Clarendon	Roberts, John H. (Denbighs.)
Chance, Frederick William	Illingworth, Percy H.	Robertson,Sir G.Scott (Br'df'd
Channing, Sir Francis Allston	Isaacs, Rufus Daniel	Rogers, F. E. Newman
Cheetham, John Frederick	Johnson, W. (Nuneaton)	Rose, Charles Day
Clough, William	Jones,Sir D.Brynmor (Swansea	Runciman, Walter
Cobbold, Felix Thornley	Jones, Leif (Appleby)	Samuel,Herbert L. (Cleveland)
Collins,SirWm.J.(S.Pancras,W.	Kilbride, Denis	Scarisbrick, T. T. L.
Cooper, G. J.	Kincaid-Smith, Captain	Schwann. C. Duncan (Hyde)
Corbett,CH(Sussex,E.Grinst'd)	Laidlaw, Robert	Seaverns. J. H.
Cornwall, Sir Edwin A.	Lambert, George	Shaw, Rt. Hon. T. (Hawick B.
Cotton, Sir H. J. S.	Lamont, Norman	Sherwell. Arthur James
Craig, Herbert J.(Tynemouth)	Law, Hugh A. (Donegal, W.)	Silcock, Thomas Ball
Crean, Eugene	Layland-Barratt, Francis	Soares, Ernest J.
Crosfield, A. H.	Leese,Sir Joseph F.(Accrington	Strachey. Sir Edward
Cullinan, J.	Levy, Sir Maurice	Straus, B. S. (Mile End)
Dalziel, James Henry	Lewis, John Herbert	Strauss, E. A. (Abingdon)
Davies,David (MontgomeryCo.	Lough, Thomas	Sutherland, J. E.
Davies, Timothy (Fulham)	Lupton, Arnold	Taylor. John W. (Durham)
Dewar,Arthur (Edinburgh, S.)	Luttrell, Hugh Fownes	Taylor, Theodore C. (Radcliffe)
Duffy, William J.	Lyell, Charles Henry	Tennant,Sir Edward (Salisbury
Duncan,C(Barrow-in-Furness)	Macdonald, J. R. (Leicester)	Thompson.,J.W.H. (Somerset,E
Dunn, A. Edward (Camborne)	MacNeill, John Gordon Swift	Toulmin, George
Dunne,MajorE.Martin (Walsall	MacVeagh, Jeremiah (Down,S.	Verney, F. W.
Edwards, Clement (Denbigh)	M'Crae, George	Walters. John Tudor
Elibank, Master of	M'Kenna, Rt. Hon. Reginald	Walton, Sir John L. (Leeds, S.)

Warner, Thomas Courtenay T.	White, Patrick (Meath, North)	TELLERS FOR THE NOES —
White, George (Norfolk)	Whitley, John Henry (Halifax	Mr. Whiteley and Mr. J. A. Pease.
White, Luke (York, E.R.)	Wilson, P. W. (St. Pancras, S.)

MR. RAWLINSON moved

"In page 3, line 1, to leave out the words 'Court of Criminal Appeal,' and to insert the words ' Secretary of State for the Home Department.'" He said the clause would then read: "With the leave of the Secretary of State against his conviction on any ground of appeal which involves a question of fact alone or a question of mixed law and fact or any other ground which appears to the Court to be a sufficient ground of appeal." He ventured to submit that this was the real solution of the difficulty, and the proper basis for a compromise on which those who differed on the question involved in the Bill should meet. The present position was that there was no appeal on questions of fact, save the formal one to the Home Secretary. He had read the Home Secretary's speech in praise of the work that was being done, and he thoroughly endorsed all that was said in it; but in the Amendment he was pressing for all the advantages which they got from the careful scrutiny the Home Secretary exercised, and all the informal advantages to be derived from the fact that the Home Secretary was not confined by the rules of legal evidence, while on the other hand involving all the disadvantages which he had indicated in the Bill, disadvantages which had led many practising lawyers to believe that the Bill would be unworkable, if unrestricted power to ask for leave of appeal were granted. He submitted that as a sifting tribunal the Home Secretary was far preferable to the Court of Criminal Appeal. The Home Secretary had a staff at his command and was best able to say whether there was a prima facie case for the appeal. If the Home Secretary thought there was a prima facie case he could refer it to the Court of Criminal Appeal and get rid of the responsibility. As the Bill stood the Court of Criminal Appeal was not a suitable tribunal to inquire into the fact whether there was a prima facie case for appeal. The Court of Criminal Appeal was composed of men accustomed to receiving the assistance of counsel and to hearing people put the facts before them for one side or the other. That was not a suitable tribunal to which a prisoner should send up shorthand notes and leave them to indicate the real points. Such work would be better done by the Home Secretary's department, and in a case where there was the slightest doubt the Home Secretary would undoubtedly have the power to refer the case to the Court of Criminal Appeal. He ventured to press most strongly that the Amendment should be accepted in order that they would be able to obtain what the Bill was intended to obtain. They were taking under the Bill what everybody in the House must admit was an experimental step—it had been referred to by the Attorney-General in a previous Bill as an experiment in criminal law—and if they gave unrestricted right of appeal they were making a step which was irrevocable. Could there be any harm in taking the first step cautiously? Could there be any harm in giving the right of appeal subject to the sanction of the Home Secretary? If the Amendment worked badly in any way, then it would be time enough for the House to deal with the matter, and extend it if they thought necessary. He came across the charge to the grand jury of an eminent judge of the King's Bench Division the other day. That Judge was in favour of the Bill taken as a whole. He said they agreed that they should give the power of appeal on questions of law and power to enable the Home Secretary to refer cases to the Court of Criminal Appeal. But he (the Judge) could not help thinking that it would be unwise for the present, until there had been a little more experience of the Court of Criminal Appeal, that a universal right of appeal should be given on questions of fact. He (Mr. Rawlinson) ventured to submit that no possible harm could be done to the Bill itself or to. the objects which he felt sure the learned Attorney-General meant to carry out by the measure, by adopting this Amendment. He was certain that the Home Secretary could be trusted thoroughly to refer any prima facie case to the Court, and the acceptance of the Amendment would save the Court from becoming blocked by an overwhelming rush of applications. The Home Secretary would exercise his discretion in a wise way, and feeling that to be the case he begged to move his Amendment.

MR. CAVE

said that they had in the Home Office machinery already set up and a staff already experienced in dealing with matters of this kind. He did not know whether hon. Members realised it, but he thought they would find on examination that the number of petitions to the Home Office against sentences and convictions in the country already exceeded 2,000. The Home Office dealt very clearly and efficiently with those applications under rules laid down by the officials after long experience. The rules were set out in a well-known memorandum, and he thought that everybody who was acquainted with the procedure knew that it was satisfactory in its results. The Home Office did not content itself with merely considering the evidence at the trial; but, of course, the Court of Criminal Appeal would be confined to the evidence at the trial, unless some new facts were brought forward. The Home Office did not take that course. It made inquiries, and where new facts were even suggested it made its own investigation into the facts. In that way the department very often ascertained new facts that were not brought out at the trial. That was an elastic and an informal procedure, but

it operated in many cases to the advantage of the person accused. Where new facts of that kind were found out by the Home Office—often by the police—they were brought to the notice of the judge or the chairman who tried the case. The judge or chairman, as the case might be, was asked to say whether if he had known those facts he would have been satisfied with the ve dict or would have imposed the sentence which he had done on the prisoner. Very often the Home Office was able, after procedure of this kind, to remit the whole or a portion of the sentence imposed upon a prisoner, or to take some other steps such as the circumstances of the ease appeared to warrant. All that was embodied in the Amendment was that the same kind of procedure should be followed under the Bill. It was proposed that the Home Office should first be appealed to. It should still have the power of dealing with an appeal summarily, but if it thought that there was a doubt about the verdict or the sentence it could give leave to go to the more formal tribunal—the Court of Criminal Appeal— where the matter could be thrashed out. The Amendment admitted the principle of the Bill, but suggested a machine simpler, less expensive, and more to the advantage of the accused than the machine suggested by the Bill. For those reasons he supported the Amendment.

The House divided:—Ayes. 200; Noes, 67. (Division List, No 340.)

AYES.
Aignew, George William	Bramsdon. T. A.	Dalziel, James Henry
Ainsworth, John Stirling	Brunner, F.J.L. (Lancs.,Leigh)	Davies, Ellis William (Eifion)
Allen,A.Acland (Christchurch)	Burns, Rt. Hon. John	Dewar, Arthur (Edinburgh, S.)
Astbury, John Meir	Causton,Rt.Hn. Richard Knight	Duncan. C. (Barrow-in-Furness
Balfour, Robert (Lanark)	Cawley, Sir Frederick	Dunn, A. Edward (Camborne)
Baring,Godfrey (Isle of Wight)	Chance, Frederick William	Dunne,Major E.Martin (Wals'll
Barker, John	Channing, Sir Francis Allston	Edwards, Clement (Denbigh)
Barry,Redmond J. (Tyrone,N.)	Cheetham, John Frederick	Elibank. Master of
Beauchamp, E.	Clough, William	Evans, Samuel T.
Beaumont, Hon. Herbert	Cobbold, Felix Thornley	Everett, R. Lacey
Bennett, E. N.	Collins,Sir.Wm.J.(S.Pancras,W	Fenwick, Charles
Berridge, T. H. D.	Cooper, G. J.	Ferens, T. R.
Birrell, Rt. Hon. Augustine	Corbett,C.H. (Sussex,E.Gr'st'd	Flavin, Michael Joseph
Black, Arthur W.	Cornwall, Sir Edwin A.	Fuller. John Michael F.
Bottomley, Horatio	Cotton, Sir H. J. S.	Gill, A. H.
Boulton, A. C. F.	Craig, Herbert J. (Tynemouth)	Gladstone,Rt.Hn.Herbert John
Bowerman, C. W.	Crean, Eugene	Glover, Thomas
Goddard, Daniel Ford	Lough, Thomas	Rogers, F. E. Newman
Grayson, Albert Victor	Lupton, Arnold	Rose, Charles Day
Greenwood, G. (Peterborough)	Luttrell, Hugh Fownes	Rutherford, W. W. (Liverpool)
Gulland, John W.	Lyell, Chalres Henry	Samuel, Herbert L.(Cleveland)
Haldane, Rt. Hon. Richard B.	Macdonald, J. R. (Leciester)	Scarisbrick, T. T. L.
Hardy, George A. (Suffolk)	MacVeagh, Jeremiah (Down,S.	Schwann, C. Duncan (Hyde)
Harmsworth, Cecil G. (Worc'r)	M'Kenna, Rt. Hon. Reginald	Seaverns, J. H.
Haworth, Arthur A.	Maddison, Frederick	Shaw, Rt. Hon. T. (Hawick, B.
Hazleton, Richard	Mallet, Charles E.	Sherwell, Arthur James
Hedges, A. Paget	Manfield, Harry (Northants)	Silcock, Thomas Ball
Henderson, Arthur (Durham)	Marks,G. Croydon (Launceston)	Smith,F.E. (Liverpool, Walto
Higham, John Sharp	Marnham, F. J.	Strachey, Sir Edward
Hobhouse, Charles E. H,	Massie, J.	Straus, B. S. (Mile End)
Hogan, Michael	Morgan, G. Hay (Cornwall)	Strauss, E. A. (Abingdon)
Holt, Richard Durning	Morgan, J. Lloyd (Carmarthen)	Sutherland, J. E.
Horniman, Emslie John	Morrell, Philip	Taylor, John W. (Durham)
Howard, Hon. Geoffrey	Norton, Capt. Cecil Milliam	Taylor, Theodore C. (Radcliffe)
Hudson, Walter	O'Connor, John (Kildare, N.)	Thompson, J.W.H(Somerset,E
Hyde, Clarendon	O'Grady, J.	Toulmin, George
Illingworth, Percy H.	Partington, Oswald	Verney, F. W.
Isaacs, Rufus Daniel	Pearce, Robert (Staffs. Leek)	Walters, John Tudor
Johnson, W. (Nuneaton)	Pearson, W.H.M. (Suffolk, Eye)	Walton, Sir John L. (Laeds, S.)
Jones. Sir D. Brynmor (Swansea	Pickersgill, Edward Hare	Warner, Thomas Courtenay T.
Jones, Leif (Appleby)	Pirie, Duncan V.	White, George (Norfolk) O
Kilbride, Denis	Pollard, Dr.	White, Luke (York, E. R.)
Kincaid-Smith, captain	Price.C.E. (Edinb'gh, Central)	White, Patrick (Meath, North)
Laidlaw, Robert	Radford, G. H.	Whitley, John Henry (Halifax)
Lambert, George	Rainy. A. Rolland	Williams, J. (Glamorgan)
Lamont, Norman	Raphael, Herbert H.	Wilson, P. W. (St. Pancras, S.)
Lardner, James Carrige Rushe	Rees, J. D.	Wilson, W. T. (Westhoughton)
Law, Hugh A. (Donegal. W.)	Renton, Major Leslie
Layland-Barratt, Francis	Richards, T. F. (Wolverh'mp'n	TELLERS FOR THE AYES—Mr.
Leese, Sir Joseph F.(Accrington Levy, Sir Maurice	Rickett, J. Compton	Whiteley and Mr. J. A.
Levy, Sir Maurice	Roberts, G. H. (Norwich)	Pease.
Lewis, John Herbert	Roberts, John H. (Denbighs.)
NOES.
Acland-Hood RtHn. Sir Alex.F.	Craig, Charles Curtis(Antrim,S.	Pease, HerbertPike(Darlington
Anson, Sir William Reynell	Craik, Sir Henry	Remnant, James Farquharson)
Arkwright, John Stanhope	Dalrymple, Viscount	Ridsdale, E. A.
Banbury, Sir Frederick George	Douglas, Rt. Hon. A. Akers	Salter, Arthur Clavell
Banner, John S. Harmood	Fell, Arthur	Scott, Sir S. (Marylebone, W.)
Barrie, H.T.)Londonderry, N.)	Forster, Henry William	Sloan, Thomas Henry
Beach, Hn.Michael Hugh Hicks	Hardy, Laurence)Kent, Ashf'rd	Smith, Abel H. (Hertford, East)
Beckett, Hon. Gervase	Helmsley, Viscount	Starkey, John R.
Bertram, Julius	Hervey, F.W.F(BuryS. Edm'ds	Staveley-Hill, Henry (Staff's)
Bowles, G. Stewart	Hill, Sir Clement (Shrewsbury)	Talbot, Lord E. (Chichester)
Boyle, Sir Edward	Hills, J. W	Valentia, Viscount
Bridgeman, W. Clive	Hunt, Rowland	Warde, Col. C.E. (Kent, Mid)
Carlile, E. Hildred	Lane-Fox, G. R.	Wortley, Rt. Hon. C. B. Stuart
Castlereagh, Viscount	Lockwood, Rt. Hn. Lt.-Col.A.R	Younger, George
Cavendish, Rt. Hn. Victor C. W	Lyttleton, Rt. Hon. Alfred
Cecil, Evelyn (Aston Manor)	Magnus, Sir Philip	TELLERS FOR THE NOES—Mr.
Corbett, A. Cameron (Glasgow)	Meysey-Thompson, E. C.	Rawlinson and Mr. Cave
Corbett, T. L. (Down, North)	Morpeth, Viscount
Court-hope, G. Loyd	Nield, Herbert

Question proposed, "That the words Court of Criminal Appeal,' stand part of the Bill."

VISCOUNT TURNOUR

said that this was really a very proper Amendment, under which the Home Secretary would be called upon to exercise powers of a far less responsible character than those he now exercised. He did not know that at this stage in the history of the present Parliament much good was done by taking the views of any member of His Majesty's Government, and comparing them with the views he expressed before taking office. He might point out, however, that the learned Attorney-General himself said in a previous debate on this subject that he doubted whether there was a case made out for the substitution of a tribunal consisting of three Judges for the machinery which was at present at the disposal of the Home Secretary, and which had worked with entire satisfaction. He sympathised with the Home Secretary regarding the method which had been adopted by the Press of both Parties in attacking that machinery. He thought the Home Secretary had a very justifiable ground of complaint on that score, but the point he wished to emphasise was that by refusing to accept the Amendment the right hon. Gentleman was really yielding to that popular clamour. While he believed that the attacks which had been made on the Home Office had had some unfortunate effects, he did not think that they had really shaken confidence in the position of the Home Secretary and in the machinery which the right hon. Gentleman had at his disposal for dealing with these matters. It would be a great pity if the action of the Government should be interpreted as a confession of cowardice to be attributed to the very often unscrupulous methods used by the Press on both sides in attacking the Home Office. He would be glad to hear for once in a while whether the views expressed by the Attorney-General before he came into office were not thought to be better than the views to which he had given utterance since he came into office. Nothing had occurred since 1898 to materially alter the views which were then so admirably expressed by the Attorney-General. It was because he believed that this Amendment would not put too great a burden upon the Home Secretary, but would act as a necessary drag on the wheel, and would prevent too many applications for leave to appeal coming before the Court that he supported the Amendment of his hon. and learned friend.

MR. JAMES O'CONNOR

said that he did not agree with the noble Lord in thinking that this was a very small matter. It was a very serious matter, and he, for one, objected strongly to erecting the Home Office into a Court of law. The Home Office, as all knew who had served in Parliament, was at the present time overburdened with work. Not only had the Department as much work as it could do, but it had even more than it could do efficiently, and was labouring under the stress of too much work. Therefore, he thought the House of Commons should halt before it imposed any further serious obligations upon the Home Office. The present pressure upon the Department was one reason why he objected to turning it into a Court of law to decide most important matters. His next reason for objecting to the Amendment was of a very different character. The prisoner was to be considered, and no matter how humane the Home Office or the Home Secretary might be, still the Department was always considered by the prisoner as his gaoler. Could there be anything more absurd than to suppose that the prisoner could appeal with confidence to his gaoler to decide in his favour on the question of as to whether he should have an appeal or not? He had had some little experience of the feelings of a prisoner, and he submitted that it would not be a wise proceeding to throw this burden on the Home Office and to let it appear to the prisoner himself that he was dependent upon his gaoler for justice in a matter of that kind. For those two reasons he must oppose the Amendment and support the Bill as it stood.

SIR JOHN WALTON

said the Amendment was really an alternative proposal to the Bill. It was an alternative proposal because it suggested a different method altogether of dealing with the matter. He desired to remind the House that the Home Secretary retained under this Bill all the powers which at the present time he possessed. He had the right at any time to obtain the assistance of the Court of Appeal with a view to eliciting an answer which might be of some guidance to him in the discharge of his important functions. The Amendment proposed that there should be no appeal except at the instance of the Secretary of State, and destroyed altogether any direct right of appeal which was proposed under the Bill. He had had the experience, which many of them no doubt had had, of listening to speeches he delivered some years ago in that House in reference to proposals bearing some resemblance to these. He congratulated the noble Lord the Member for Marylebone (Lord R. Cecil) on the rewards which had attended his industry. He had exhumed out of the dreary catacombs of Hansard ancient and unsavoury deliverances which he (the Attorney-General) made nine years ago.

LORD R. CECIL

It was an excellent speech.

SIR JOHN WALTON

said he stated that the Home Secretary discharged the functions of a Court of Appeal, and they had had numbers of Home Secretaries who were lawyers of the greatest distinction, and who did apply their highly-trained instincts to these questions where they raised problems of fact and law. There was a feeling that that method of appeal was satisfactory and adequate. Considerable light, however, was thrown upon the machinery of the Home Office by the Beck case. The Commission in that case reported that the machinery of the Home Office was quite inadequate to examine and decide upon the immense number of questions which were presented for every-day consideration. The alternatives were the reorganisation of the whole machinery of the Home Office to constitute it a Court of Appeal as well as a Government Department, or to constitute such a tribunal as that which that Bill proposed to set up. The conclusive objection to building upon the foundation of the Home Office was that the proceedings took place in secrecy. There was no representation of the accused. There was no argument, no evidence, no publicity. It was impossible, after the experience of the last two or three years in relation to cases which he did not need to mention, to say that any proposal to build upon the machinery of the Home Office would have given anything like the public satisfaction which he was convinced was necessary. He invited his hon. and learned friend to recognise that such a scheme would have no chance, even if it were perfected so as to meet the views of the Committee which sat on the Beck case, of being accepted. As matters stood it was still more unsatisfactory. A tribunal which sat publicly, heard all that was to be heard, sat in the light of day and gave a judgment found on reasons and argument would satisfy everybody that all had been done that could be done to get to the bottom of the case and would be infinitely more satisfactory than the Home Office could be.

SIR WILLIAM ANSON

contended that there was no direct right of appeal given under the Bill. The prisoner must obtain leave to appeal. The Amendment merely substituted the Home Office for the Court of Appeal. In spite of all the Attorney-General had said they had the evidence of a great number of years during which the Home Office had worked in this question of appeal to the satisfactorion of all parties. The Home Office, as those who had any experience of its dealings with criminal matters knew, was prompt. Its methods of inquiry were convenient because they were not bound by strict rule and precedent, and, what was rather important, there were no costs to stimulate the small practitioner. They had heard that night, and more on the Second Reading, one great argument for appeal being assigned to the Court and taken away from the Home Office and that was the relief to the Home Secretary's feelings, which were very much pained and lacerated by the comments of the Press in recent cases.

THE HOME SECRETARY (Mr. GLADSTONE, LEEDS, W.)

My feelings were not lacerated.

SIR WILLIAM ANSON

said that unless he misunderstood the Home Secretary's remarks on the subject of the use of the Royal prerogative, the Home Secretary felt very much the action of the Press.

MR. GLADSTONE

What I said was that if a man took the office of Home Secretary he must take what he gets. I did use the word "intolerable," and I adhere to it, because my opinion was, and is, that the fact that the Home Office cannot reply makes the position intolerable from the point of view of administration. That has nothing to do with my own personal feelings. I think I can stand the racket.

SIR WILLIAM ANSON

said he did not suggest the right hon. Member was less able to stand the attacks of the Press or the criticisms of the public than other people. Other Departments of the Government had had some experience of these attacks. The present and the late President of the Board of Education had suffered attack from the Press.

MR. GLADSTONE

They can answer.

SIR WILLIAM ANSON

said the Amendment put the Home Office in the position of preparing a case for the Court of Criminal Appeal. It would be a great advantage to that Court if the matters coming before it were put into shape, if the Home Office decided whether the matter was worthy of the attention of the Court of Appeal. The Home Office was as capable as the Court would be to determine whether or no a prima facie case had been made out for appeal. Acceptance of the Amendment would mean not only that there would be a limit, and a reasonable limit, put upon the number of these appeals, but that there would be a very great economy of the time of the Court. The learned Member for Reading said the matter would be settled by a few words of counsel addressed to the Court. He could hardly have read the procedure contemplated by the Bill or pictured what would happen. The prisoner would not be there, counsel would not be there. What would happen would be that the depositions, the Judge's notes and the like would be laid before the Court. These the Court would have to wade through and determine the question one way or the other. The Amendment proposed that instead the Home Office should decide whether or not a prima facie case existed.

MR. GLADSTONE

said he would like to point out that the Amend- ment really imposed new duties and new functions upon the Home Office. At present the Home Office action was based on the prerogative of mercy. Now it was proposed that the Home Office should prepare cases for the Court of Appeal. Indeed if the Amendment were adopted the Home Office would be changed into a Court of Appeal of first instance. The duties of the Home Secretary and the Home Office would be seriously and dangerously widened. At present, the Home Secretary in certain cases examined into the question whether or not a man had been rightly convicted and decided to the best of his ability. The Amendment made the Home Office responsible in all criminal cases of appeal for ascertaining whether a prima facie case had been made out. For his own part he protested against these new constitutional duties being imposed upon the Home Office. There was another question. Supposing the Amendment were accepted and the Home Secretary had practically to advise the Court of Appeal as to whether a prima facie case had been made out for appeal, and supposing he refused an application and was asked in that House to state why he had refused. Was he to state his case? It seemed to him it would be extremely difficult to refuse. It was not like the present case where he necessarily refused to give information because he could not disclose the information at his disposal. When it was a matter of deciding whether or no there was a prima facie case for appeal he did not see how he could refuse his reasons. If he were to state his reasons there were evident disadvantages. He hoped the House would not accept the Amendment.

MR. LYTTELTON

said he did not share the view that the Home Secretary had presented on the matter. The Amendment of his hon. and learned friend was almost the most important Amendment to the Bill and was well worthy of the attention of the House, if only for the reason that the Judges had unanimously recommended the proposal some years ago. His view of the Amendment was that it would provide that the Home Secretary, when cases of importance were brought before him, should have an opportunity for taking action. There were cases where it was desirable, not merely in the interests of justice, but also to allay dissatisfaction, that he should have the opportunity of bringing the case to the Court of Criminal Appeal. He thought the Amendment of his hon. and learned friend gave the Home Secretary that opportunity. He was afraid he disagreed with the hon. Member for Cambridge University. He did not think it meant that there should devolve on the Home Secretary the duty of finding out whether there was a prima facie case for appeal, but, in ninety-nine cases out of 100, the Home Secretary and his staff were competent to deal with the question. There might be exceptional cases where the Home Secretary and his staff thought they were of such gravity and perplexity, and where the public took so much interest, that they would wish the proceedings to be public. The Amendment gave them the necessary power to ensure that. That was his reading of the Amendment. He confessed he would like to hear a reconsidered opinion from that which the Attorney-General gave. He would not read it as it was given nine years ago, but it was immensely forcible. The Attorney-General then said that he had actually known a case of murder tried at Leeds where a verdict of guilty was given, and was strongly supported by the Judge, and he imagined it would be strongly supported by any Court of Appeal. The Home Secretary sent a Commissioner to Leeds who discovered by methods outside the law that the case was a genuine one, and a free pardon was given. He would like to know how the Attorney-General now regarded the argument which he then brought forward in favour of the Home Office as against a Court of Appeal.

SIR JOHN WALTON

said he made special provision for the Court of Appeal to deal with special cases by sending down Commissioners to take the evidence and to report on the evidence to the Court.

MR. LYTTELTON

said he was extremely surprised to hear what the Attorney-General had said. He took his word for it that provision had been made in the Bill for evidence to be taken in the way which the Home Office now took it, but what the Attorney-General now said negatived that altogether.

SIR JOHN WALTON

said they took the depositions.

MR. LYTTELTON

said the Attorney-General knew that he was arguing for the possibility of an informal inquiry, and he led the House to believe some moments previously that such powers were contained in that Bill. That was entirely wrong. No such powers were contained in the Bill. He challenged the Attorney-General to contradict him. Would the Commissioner who was to make an inquiry under that Bill be entitled to go outside the ordinary rules of evidence? He thought not. He thought the Attorney-General would agree that the Commissioner was not and therefore his interruption was entirely unfounded. His argument was that justice was more likely to be attained by an informal inquiry by the Home Office going outside the legal rules of evidence. If he was right then he was afraid that in the case the Attorney-General argued nine years ago the man would have been hanged.

MR. EVANS

thought the right hon. Gentleman had entirely mistaken the scope of the Amendment. It did not raise the question whether or not the functions of the Home Office should be extended, but merely the question of giving a man's right to appeal to the Court of Appeal. The Amendment simply said that if they wanted leave to appeal they must not go to the Court of Appeal. Under the Bill no power which the Home Secretary now had was taken away from him. All the functions the Home Secretary now had would still remain to him. If the Bill altered those functions at all, it was to extend the powers he now had. It was not a question whether Judges had recommended this or that, that they had to consider. They were not dealing with the matter as lawyers. He had often said, and he said again, that when they were dealing with questions of legal reform Judges were not the persons as to whose views they ought to inquire. Instances in support of that view could be quoted without number. Fifty or sixty years ago all the Judges in a body declined to allow reform of the law, in order to allow prisoners' counsel, in cases of felony, to address the jury, and one of the Judges went so far as to say that if that law was passed he would resign. The law was passed, but he did not resign. It was entirely wrong in dealing with legal matters to ask what the Judges thought should be done.

MR. WILLIAM RUTHERFORD

regretted that on the present occasion in regard to the Amendment he found himself out of sympathy with his hon. friends on his own side of the House. It seemed to him that if, as they suggested, a prisoner wishing to appeal must apply to the Home Secretary for leave to appeal, they might have gone so far as to suggest that if he did that he deprived himself of the prerogative of mercy, and all those rights and duties which were inherent in the Home Office of inquiring into the whole case. If he understood it, it did nothing of the sort. All the Home Secretary's rights were to be left alone exactly as at present. The Home Office was going to hold the same inquiries, take the same informal evidence, not bound by the rules, and to do the same amount of justice in the future as in the past; but there were cases such as the Beck case where the Home Office would have refused leave to appeal, the Home Office actually had refused leave to appeal, and it was that case and one or two others of the same kind which had awakened the public conscience on that question which had caused the Bill to be brought forward, and which had caused the Attorney-General to change his mind with such effect. As an illustration of what would happen in such eases would suffice to show that the Amendment ought not to be adopted. If it was adopted and a prisoner applied to the Home Office for leave to appeal, the Home Office would make an inquiry taking three or four months. If the man were innocent there was no sense in keeping him waiting for two or three months to know whether he had a right to appeal. The practice the Bill proposed to set up was that the prisoner by means of notes or through his counsel should ask the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal. The permission should be granted or refused in the course of a very few minutes. If counsel got up and attempted to put a case and had no proper evidence that there was any such right to appeal he would be stopped. He ventured to say, that, as in cases at present, where leave to appeal was refused, it would be impossible for counsel of respectability to prolong his application before the Court if he had got no case. It was only in cases where there was a real right to appeal that counsel would insist on his right that any length of time should be consumed. It was only in those cases, where it was the right and proper thing that such applications would be made. If a prisoner was to have the right to appeal he should have the right to go to the Court and ask for it without losing his liberty. That permission to appeal should rest with the Home Secretary was absurd. He felt that he was obliged to vote against the Amendment.

MR. RAWLINSON,

in reply to the various points that had been raised, said objection had been taken to reference being made to the Report of the Commission on the Beck case, which went into the facts of the Beck case, and to reference being made to the Reports of the Judges in 1892 and 1895 on the grounds that the Judges took a conservative view. Who were they to go to? Were they to go to the people who had administered the law on a question of machinery like this? He ventured to intervene because the Home Secretary seemed to misunderstand the purport of the Amendment, the purport of which was easily explained. They did not propose to alter the functions of the Home Secretary in any way. At the present time anyone who was dissatisfied with his conviction sent his application to the Home Secretary, and if the Amendment were passed the Bill would permit him to do exactly the same as he did now. In any case where there arose a point of law or of fact, or mixed points of law and fact, then the Home Secretary would give leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal. Many people shared the feeling that a Court composed of three Judges was not a good tribunal to deal with cases in which application was made for leave to appeal—cases in which documents and copies of evidence were sent before the Court. The Home Office, it was believed, would do the work much better than the

tribunal proposed, and wherever necessary there would not be the slightest difficulty in referring cases to the Court of Criminal Appeal.

Question put, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Bill."

The House divided:—Ayes, 151; Noes, 52. (Division List No. 341.)

AYES
Acland-Hood, RtHn.SirAlex.F	Acland-Hood, RtHn.SirAlex.F	Roberts, G. H. (Norwich)
Anson, Sir William Reynell	Anson, Sir William Reynell	Rutherford, W. W. (Liverpool)
Arkwright, John Stanhope	Arkwright, John Stanhope	Salter, Arthur Clavell
Banner, John S. Harmood-	Banner, John S. Harmood-	Scott, Sir S. (Marylebone, W.)
Barrie, H. T. (Londonderry, N.	Barrie, H. T. (Londonderry, N.	Sloan, Thomas Henry
Bertram, Julus	Hervey, F W F (Bury S Edm'ds)	Smith, Abel H.(Hertford, East)
Bottomley, Horatio	Hill, Sir Clement (Shrewsbury)	Smith, F. E. (Liverpool, Walton
Bowles, G. Stewart	Hudson, Walter	Starkey, John R.
Bridgeman, W. Clive	Hutton, Alfred Eddison	Staveley-Hill, Henry (Staff'sh.
Carlile, E. Hildred	Lane-Fox, G. R.	Talbot, Lord E. (Chichester)
Castlereagh, Viscount	Lockwood, Rt. Hn. Lt.-Col. A. R.	Taylor, John W. (Durham)
Cave, George	Lyttelton, Rt. Hon. Alfred	Valentia, Viscount
Cavendish, Rt. Hn. Victor C. W.	Macdonald, J. R. (Leicester)	Warde, Col. C. E. (Kent, Mid)
Cecil, Evelyn (Aston Manor)	Magnus, Sir Philip	Wilson, W. T. (Westhoughton)
Cecil, Lord R. (Marylebone, E.)	Meysey-Thompson, E. C.	Younger, George
Corbett, A. Cameron (Glasgow)	Morpeth, Viscount
Courthope, G. Loyd	Nield, Herbert	TELLERS FOR THE AYES—
Craig, Charles Curtis(Antrim, S.	Pease, Herbert Pike (Darlington)	Mr. Laurence Hardy and Mr. Hills.
Craik, Sir Henry	Remnant, John Frederick Peel
Dalrymple, Viscount	Remnant, James Farquharson
Douglas, Rt. Hon. A. Akers-	Renton, Major Lesile
NOES.
Agnew, George William	Craig, Herbert J. (Tynemouth)	Illingworth, Percy H.
Ainsworth, John Stirling	Crean, Eugene	Johnson, W. (Nuneaton)
Allen, A. Acland (Christchurch)	Dalziel, James Henry	Jones, Sir D. Brynmor (Swansea
Astbury, John Meir	Davies, Ellis William (Eifion)	Jones, Leif (Appleby)
Balfour, Robert (Lanark)	Duncan, C. Barrow-in-Furness)	Kilbride, Denis
Baring, Godfrey (Isle of Wight)	Baring, Godfrey (Isle of Wight)	Kincaid-Smith, Captain
Barker, John	Dunn, A. Edward (Camborne)	Lamont, Norman
Barry, Redmond J.(Tyrone, N.)	Dunn, Major E Martin (Walsall	Lardner, James Carrige Rushe
Beauchamp, E.	Evans, Samuel T.	Layland-Barratt, Francis
Beaumont, Hon. Hubert	Everett, R. Lacey	Leese, Sir Joseph F.(Accrington)
Bennett, E. N.	Fenwick, Charles	Levy, Sir Maurice
Berridge, T. H. D.	Ferens, T. R.	Lewis, John Herbert
Boulton, A. C. F.	Flavin, Michael Joseph	Lough, Thomas
Bowerman, C. W.	Fuller, John Michael F.	Lupton, Arnold
Bramsdon, T. A.	Gladstone, Rt. Hn Herbert John	Luttrell, Hugh Fownes
Brunner, J. F. L. (Lanes., Leigh	Goddard, Daniel Ford	Lyell, Charles Henry
Burns, Rt. Hon. John	Grayson, Albert Victor	MacVeagh, John Gordon Swift
Causton, Rt. Hn Richard Knight	Gulland, John W.	MacVeagh, Jeremiah (Down, S.)
Cawley, Sir Frederick	Hardy, George A. (Suffolk)	M'Crae, George
Chance, Frederick William	Harmswroth, Cecil B. (Worc'r)	M'Kenna, Rt. Hon. Reginald
Channing, Sir Francis Allston	Haworth, Arthur A.	Maddison, Frederick
Clough, William	Hedges, A. Paget	Manfield, Harry (Northants)
Collins, Sir Wm. J. (S Pancras, W	Higham, John Sharp	Marks. G. Croydon (Launceston)
Cooper, G. J.	Hobhouse, Charles E. H.	Marnham, F. J.
Corbett, CH(Sussex, EGrinst'd	Holt, Richard Durning	Massie, J.
Cornwall, Sir Edwin A.	Howard, Hon Geoffrey	Morrell, Philip
Cotton, Sir H. J. S.	Hyde, Clarendon	Norton, Capt. Cecil William
O'Connor, John (Kildare, N.)	Roberts, John H. (Denbighs.)	Toulmin, George
O'Grady, J.	Rogers, F. E. Newman	Walters, John Tudor
Partington, Oswald	Rose, Charles Day	Walton, Sir John L. (Leeds, S.)
Pearce, Robert (Staffs. Leek)	Samuel, Herbert L. (Cleveland)	Warner. Thomas Courtenay T.
Pearson,W. H.M.(Suffolk, Eye)	Scarisbrick, T. T. L.	White, George (Norfolk)
Pickersgill, Edward Hare	Seaverns, J. H.	White, Luke (York, E.R.)
Pirie, Duncan V.	Shaw, Rt. Hon. T. (Hawick, B.	Whitley, John Henry (Halifax)
Pollard, Dr.	Sherwell, Arthur James	Williams, J. (Glamorgan)
Price, C. E. (Edinburgh, Central	Silcock, Thomas Ball	Wilson, P. W. (St. Pancras, S.)
Radford, G. H.	Strachey, Sir Edward
Rainy, A. Rolland	Straus, B. S. (Mile End)	TELLERS FOR THE NOES—
Raphael, Herbert H.	Strauss, E. A. (Abingdon)	Mr. Whiteley and Mr. J. A.
Richards, T. F.(Wolverh'mpt'n	Sutherland, J. E.	Pease.
Rickett, J. Compton	Taylor, Theodore C. (Radcliffe)
Ridsdale, E. A.	Thompson, J.W.H (Somerset,E.

MR. BOTTOMLEY

moved, "In page 3, line 8, at end, to add the words, 'Provided that any person convicted on indictment upon a charge involving sentence of death shall be entitled to appeal under this Act to the Court of Criminal Appeal against his conviction, on any ground of appeal which involved a question of law alone, or a question of fact alone, or a question of mixed law and fact.'" He believed that to submit any Amendment to the House under the circumstances then obtaining was a work of some futility, as one had to contend against, not only the unsuitability of the hour, but the despotism of the Treasury Bench, which seemed to regard every clause of the Bill as sacred. Adopting the common form used in regard to most of the Amendments, he ventured to submit that this was at least one of the most important Amendments that the House was called upon to consider. The Bill as it stood gave an absolute right of appeal upon any question of law, and it gave a right of appeal on questions of fact, or mixed questions of law and fact, by leave of the Court of Criminal Appeal. His Amendment proposed that in the case of any person convicted upon a charge involving a sentence of death that person should be entitled as a right without the necessity of fulfilling any technical forms or applications to an appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal. His submission to the House was that given a Court of Criminal Appeal it was almost unarguable that they should shut out from that Court by any technical barrier a person sentenced to death. The noble and learned Lord the Member for Marylebone said earlier in the debate that he maintained an unlimited admiration of trial by jury. Whatever the noble Lord might think about trial by jury, he (Mr. Bottomley) certainly did not maintain an unlimited admiration for the present judicial bench. He had. heard a Judge who was at present on the bench when dealing with a trial for murder dwell during the greater part of his summing up upon the moral delinquencies of the prisoner and a lady who was not his wife. Everyone had heard or seen cases in recent times where Judges did not give satisfaction to the general public by their method of administering the criminal law. A man under sentence of death would have no point of law to appeal upon, because it was very rarely indeed that a point of law arose in a criminal case. Every schoolboy knew the distinction between law and fact in a criminal case. A person under sentence of death scarcely ever had a right of appeal on a point of law, although on almost every ground that could be named that right should undoubtedly be his Even if he could have claimed an unlimited admiration for the judicial bench, which, as he had said, he could not, he would still have been unable to claim unlimited admiration for the wisdom of modern counsel. He had seen many a man's case lost in Court by the inability, sometimes the inexperience, sometimes the overworking, of the learned counsel to whom it had been committed. He had seen counsel who had done their best, but had very often put the case in a light which could only have one result, namely, to obtain the conviction of the prisoner. Considering all these things, he put it to the House very earnestly that in a Court of Criminal Appeal they ought to give a person who was under the death penalty the right of appeal without any restriction. When he put the point in Committee the Attorney-General dismissed it on the ground that there was no logic behind it. That would apply to many provisions in the Bill. On the question of logic they might even object to providing, on questions of law, that the members of the Court should give their judgments separately, which would interest lawyers only, while, on questions of fact, the one judgment alone was given. He desired to put this further consideration. In the matter of the death penalty many of them entertained a very strong view indeed as to the serious and solemn character of the jurisdiction of the State. So long as we had capital punishment as part of our penal code we had no right to deprive any person under sentence of death of every opportunity known to the law to establish his innocence. He summarised his argument thus, that the attitude of the Judge sometimes, the attitude of counsel frequently, the atmosphere of the case constantly led to convictions where a man was innocent. The solemnity of the matter was quite sufficient to recommend it to the conscience of the country. He had had many opportunities of discussing the matter, and in no case had there been any serious exception taken to the proposal.

LORD R. CECIL

seconded. The Amendment in his view was very desirable.

SIR JOHN WALTON

said the Government were prepared to accept the Amendment.

Amendment proposed— In page 3, line 8, at end, to add: 'Provided that any person convicted on indictment upon a charge involving sentence of death shall he entitled to appeal under this Act to the Court of Criminal Appeal against his conviction on any ground of appeal which involves a question of law alone or a question of fact alone or a question of mixed faw and fact.'

Agreed to.

MR. F. E. SMITH

moved in page 3, line 11, to leave out from the words "jury" to ''or,'' in line 13, and to insert the words "is under all the circumstances unsafe or unsatisfactory." The Amendment, he said, was one which had some relation to the Amendment moved by the Member for Cambridge University which the House had rejected. That was an Amendment which would have excluded from the operation of the Bill the right of appealing on issues of fact. In his opinion the House rightly rejected that, but he wished it to be made quite clear how far the right of appeal which was proposed by the Bill was of any value. The question was extremely difficult for laymen to understand. As it stood at present the clause which dealt with the matter allowed an appeal on any ground on which the verdict of the jury might be set aside in a civil case. But the permissible range of appeal in civil cases was very narrowly circumscribed. There was the case, well known in the profession, of the Metropolitan Railway Company against Wright. Let him remind the House of the issue in that case. The issue in a nutshell was whether, when the Court of Appeal was of opinion that the verdict of the jury in the Court below was wrong, that it was such a verdict as they would not have arrived at, they had a right to interfere. On the one side it was contended that it was the duty of the appellate tribunal in such a case to interfere, on the other that, before the Court of Appeal interfered, they must be satisfied that the verdict was such as no twelve reasonable men would ever have come to. These were the two contentions each of which were strenuously insisted upon in the House of Lords. The second carried the day. He would read the House what was said by some of their Lordships on the matter. Lord Selborne said there must be such overwhelming preponderance of evidence as to make the verdict so unreasonable as to be perverse, such a verdict as no jury, instructed and assisted properly by the Judge, could return. Lord Herschell said a verdict ought not to be disturbed unless it was one which no jury reviewing the whole of the evidence reasonably could with propriety find Lord Halsbury went further. He said that if a reasonable man might find the verdict which had been found, no Court had jurisdiction to disturb the decision on fact which law had confided to juries. He asked the House to consider what was involved in that. At once it became clear that if the practice in civil matters were imported into criminal matters by the clause under the Bill, they had very small security indeed that those injustices in criminal matters which had so much exercised the minds of the people in the last twelve months would be dealt with at all under the new Bill. Let him take as an instance the Edalji case. He was not going to argue that case for a moment, but he would remind the House what the Committee in it said, that owing to the circumstances they thought the conviction was "unsafe and unsatisfactory." They said it was a conviction which ought not to stand and it had been altered with the consent of all parties. The point was that under the Bill the decision in the Edalji case would not have been altered. Unsafe, no doubt, conceded to be unsatisfactory, but no one would say it was a verdict which a reasonable man could not have found. The Home Secretary could not say so, because he reminded the House only the other night of the character and description of the jury and of its competence. A reasonable jury could have found the verdict in that case and did find it. It was merely because on review it appeared to be unsafe and unsatisfactory that it was dealt with. If this Amendment was not passed it was just those cases which required it most that would not receive the benefit of the Bill. All his Amendment did was, to adopt the words of the Committee in the Edalji case, to adopt their finding that the verdict of the jury was unsafe and unsatisfactory, and to apply that principle to the Bill, instead of saying that an appeal should be allowed only in such cases as would enable a civil appellate Court to reverse the decision. Wherever the verdict of the jury appeared to be unsafe or unsatisfactory it was perfectly intelligible, and the appellate tribunal should be enabled to deal with such cases on appeal. If the Amendment was accepted the House would have what it believed it was getting and what the country desired that the House should have, a really effective appeal on matters of fact where there had been a miscarriage of justice in the Court below.

MR. CLAVELL SALTER

said in seconding that, that was the first Amendment which did not seek in some way to destroy the value of the Bill, so far as it rested on questions of fact. He was strongly in favour of an effective appeal on the question of fact. With regard to the reason of the Amendment he thought the whole clause must be looked at, because it might be said in connection with the second part of the clause that it to some extent at all events, if not almost entirely, would provide what his learned friend wished to bring about. He did not think that was really so, on any grounds on which the verdict of the jury could be set aside. He was not quite sure that he understood the draughtsmanship of the clause, or that he knew what the draughtsman meant when he talked about a wrong decision of fact. There could not be a wrong decision of fact, unless it was made by the jury. Those Members of the House not thoroughly acquainted with the technicalities of the question ought to understand that the present position was that they could only appeal on the question of fact as in civil cases. They might have a question of fact decided by a jury or by a judge. If it were decided by a judge they might appeal from his decision, and if the Court of Appeal was dissatisfied with that decision, it had full power to reverse it, and frequently it did. But on the question of fact tried by a jury the House of Lords had in recent years laid down a purely artificial rule that unless the verdict of the jury was such that even a perverse man could not have arrived at it, they would not consider it. If there was any evidence that a reasonable man could possibly find that verdict that settled the matter. The effect of that was that if they had a jury in a civil case they were practically unable to appeal at all from an unsatisfactory decision, unless they were able to move for a new trial. That was not a case for a new trial. He did not think that would come in at all. The verdict of the jury could only be set aside altogether if it was a perfectly perverse finding, or in the case of new trials where there had been misdirection or something of that kind. Those who wanted appeals on questions of fact wanted those appeals apart altogether from misdirection, and his view was that the words of the clause as drawn would prevent that Bill being successful in any of the cases where there had been a desire for the Bill. The words read, "The Court of Appeal shall allow the appeal if they think that the verdict of the jury can be set aside on any ground on which the verdict of a jury may be set aside in an appeal in civil proceedings, or on the ground of a wrong decision of any question of law or fact, or of mixed law and fact." That was the only case which would be dealt with. He was afraid that if the first part of the section remained as it was the Court would interpret a wrong decision of fact as a decision which they could upset on appeal, and in order to upset it on appeal it would have to be a decision such as they could upset in a civil case. If the Attorney-General and the Government were anxious that there should be a really effective Court of Appeal which would not be bound by hard legal lines, and if they wished that the appeal on the question of fact should be an effective appeal such as would allay the feelings of anxiety in the country which had given rise to the Bill, he hoped the Attorney-General would insert some such words as those that had been suggested. The words could not possibly do any harm, all that they said was that the verdict of a jury might be set aside which was unsafe or unsatisfactory. If that was not a case where the appeal should be allowed he did not know what was.

SIR JOHN WALTON

said he felt some sympathy for the feelings of anxiety displayed by his hon. and learned friends that the Court of Appeal should not feel itself fettered by rigid rules, and that in considering whether a conviction should be sustained or quashed it should have a wide discretion; but on the other hand it was important to remember that under our constitution the tribunal for deciding the question of fact was the jury. There had been a rule for adjusting the relations between the Court of Appeal and the jury in civil procedure which had the immense advantage of being formed on scientific precision. They understood what that rule was, but the Amendment erred in the direction of being loose to the point of obscurity and of being unscientific, inasmuch as they would have no precision. He would be very glad to accept words which would have the advantage of some scientific precision and which would avoid the dangers attached to the words suggested. He asked the House to consider the rule which applied to civil cases and which he thought should apply to cases of the kind under discussion. The Court of Appeal had to recognise that it was dealing with a tribunal specially competent to deal with the question of fact, and if the issue had been clearly and fairly put before the jury, if they had understood it, if they had applied their minds to it, and if they were not influenced by misdirection or bias, then the Court of Appeal might say, "We should have come to a different conclusion," but neither judges nor the Court of Appeal were judges of fact. The jury were the judges of fact, and if they were to disturb the findings of the jury then they must find some better rule than that which the House of Lords had laid down. If the Court of Appeal thought that reasonable men properly instructed could not have arrived at the conclusion at which the jury had arrived then they might set it aside, but only then. If the Court of Appeal thought that the jury might reasonably have come to that conclusion on the evidence then the verdict could not be disturbed, but if they thought that they could not reasonably have come to that conclusion having regard to the evidence and the danger of misdirection and misapprehension, then there were grounds for setting the judgment aside. His hon. and learned friend suggested the insertion of the words "unsafe and unsatisfactory." He wondered where he had got them from. He did not think his hon. and learned friend would get them from a lawyer, and he rather gathered that he got them from the report of the Edalji Commission. He did not know what meaning they should attach to the words. He believed that if they were inserted it would afterwards be held that unsafe must be used in connection with some canon of safety, that in point of fact there must be a danger to public safety under the conditions in which the law was being administered. The word unsatisfactory was equally open to doubt, because it might be said, he thought it would be said, that an unsatisfactory verdict meant a verdict to which the existing standard of the House of Lords was applied and which showed that the verdict did not conform to that standard, therefore it must be unsatisfactory, and it might be held that it was unsatisfactory having regard to the circumstances. He was very anxious that the matter should not be left obscure, and if his hon. and learned friend was prepared to accept the clause as it then stood he would agree that in another place the matter should be dealt with fully, and if words which were more satisfactory could be framed they should be. In answer to his hon. and learned friend behind him he wished to point out that there were questions of fact which the Court had to determine before the evidence became admissible. They might also get judgment of facts. He remembered a case in which the late Lord Chief Justice addressed three questions to the jury and they found the prisoner guilty.

MR. F. E. SMITH

said if he rightly understood the Attorney-General he gathered that he did not dissent from his view, but that he objected to the wide meaning of the words he had suggested and of the manner in which they might be interpreted. He would ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

MR. LAURENCE HARDY

said that he objected to the withdrawal of the Amendment because he wished to raise the question as to whether that was not a time when it would be desirable to adjourn the debate. He did not think anyone could say that the discussion that night had been in any sense of a Party or obstructive character. If the division lists were looked into he believed it would be found in every case that there had been a real division of opinion on all sides of the House, and not merely a Party division. It was not desirable in the small hours of the morning to go into the details of an important Bill like that, especially when they realised, as they must do after the instance they had just had, that there were many points which had still to be adjusted. He thought on every ground that it was undesirable for a Bill of the character and importance of this one to be discussed in the way it must be if the Government were determined to complete the Report stage at that sitting. He therefore moved the adjournment of the debate.

MR. GEORGE WHITELEY

said that he did not think the hon. Member knew exactly the circumstances of the case. The House, perhaps, would take it from him that the Government intended to put the Bill down on Friday last. The hon. and learned Member for Cambridge University saw him, however, and represented that it was a Bill in which the lawyers who were Members of the House took a very great interest. He said that it was not possible for them to attend in any large number on Friday last, and he, himself, having a large number of Amendments down on the Paper, could not be there to undertake the duty of moving them. He told the hon. and learned Member that it would be impossible to put down the Bill at any other time than at eleven o'clock at night, and he understood from him that when it was put down the discussion would not be of a highly critical or controversial nature, but it would only take about two hours to finish the whole of the proceedings on the Bill. The hon. and learned Member would no doubt substantiate that statement. He believed he (Mr. Whiteley) said nearly the same thing to the hon. Baronet the Member for the University of Oxford. He told him that the Bill could only be taken at eleven o'clock at night and that the Government preferred to keep to Friday, although they were prepared in order to meet the views of hon. Gentlemen opposite to take it at eleven o'clock. He appealed to hon. Members whether, under the circumstances which he had narrated, it was quite fair to ask for the adjournment of the debate. The Government had gone out of their way to oblige hon. Members opposite, and he himself had had to overcome some great difficulties, as it had been necessary to rearrange practically the whole of the business in order to meet the wishes of the Opposition.

LORD R. CECIL

said he was quite unaware of any of the circumstances to which the Patronage Secretary had alluded. He thought that the hon Gentleman had overlooked one aspect o the case that ought to be considered that was whether it was really possible under present conditions to discuss effectively the very important Amendments to the Bill which still remained on the Paper. As the House knew he was strongly in favour of the Bill, but he thought it was a measure which required most careful consideration, as it made a colossal change in our criminal law system—a change which he thought a very proper one. Though the Bill was discussed in Committee upstairs, he must say that the discussion was not a very thorough one. There did not happen to be any very strong opponents of the Bill present except the hon. and learned Member for Cambridge, with the result that the discussion was on friendly lines. It was eminently a Bill that ought to be discussed by the House at large. Though there had been a great number of different opinions expressed on each of the questions that had been raised, he did not think anyone would say that the discussion that night had not been perfectly legitimate and also useful, and that it had not been directed entirely to improving the Bill. He hoped that they would not be forced to discuss the Bill until five or six o'clock in the morning, as that would be an unfortunate result. With reference to what was done last Friday, might he point out that if the Bill had been set down on that day it would have come on at four or five o'clock in the afternoon? That would not have been the disadvantage to the legal profession that was contemplated by his hon. and learned friend. But if the present Bill had come on at five o'clock the result would have been that the Government would not have been able to get their Butter Bill through, and then they would have been obliged to take it at eleven o'clock at night instead of this Bill. The fact was that it was owing to the backward state in which business was that the Government were compelled to take important Bills like this at eleven o'clock at night. It was very unfortunate, and he thought that the Government should show the House some mercy. He earnestly hoped that the Government would consent to the adjournment of the debate and would not insist on the Bill being further discussed at that juncture.

MR. RAWLINSON

said that the Patronage Secretary had rather appealed to him, and he took that opportunity of thanking the hon. Gentleman for the way in which up to the present he had met him in connection with that Bill. The measure came on unexpectedly for Second Reading and after it had been discussed for a short time the debate was adjourned. The next time the Bill came on the day was a Friday, and the Second Reading took place at a time when practically no legal Gentlemen interested in the question could be there. The measure then went to a Committee upstairs, and he was sure the Attorney-General would bear him out when he said that the discussion was conducted in a most friendly way. The Committee only took two days over the Bill and he himself never pressed for a division on any of his Amendments, but always said that the big points of principle would have to be discussed in the House. On the last day he made a request to the Attorney-General in open Committee that the Bill on the Report Stage should not be put down on a Friday. The Attorney-General said that it was a very reasonable suggestion, and after the way in which the business had been got through before the Committee he would see that the request was granted. He was sure that the Attorney-General and the Patronage Secretary had no means of helping it, but the Bill did come on rather late upon a Friday—about a quarter past three—and the debate was adjourned in the ordinary way at five o'clock. After that he said the Patronage Secretary who was exceedingly kind and asked whether it would be more convenient that the Bill should come on again upon the next Friday or at eleven o'clock at night. He (Mr. Rawlinson) replied that if he was given the choice of two evils he would rather have the Bill taken at eleven o'clock at night, but he did not think he was sufficiently an optimist to estimate that two hours would suffice for the discussion, but on the contrary he was under the impression that he put it at about three hours.

SIR WILLIAM ANSON

said that as the Patronage Secretary had mentioned him he would intervene just for one moment. He thought the Patronage Secretary had forgotten the circumstances under which he spoke to him (Sir William Anson) on the subject. What he said had no reference to a sitting after eleven o'clock at night. The Patronage Secretary came to him on the afternoon of last Friday week, after he had made a protest against the Bill being taken when legal Members of the House could not attend. The Patronage Secretary told him the difficulty there was in arranging to take the Bill at any other time and made a suggestion that some portion of time should be taken from the Committee Stage of the Evicted Tenants Bill and given to this measure, if arrangements on those lines could be come to. As the House knew, however, that was not done.

MR. CAVE

thought the Motion for the adjournment of the debate ought to be supported, not at all on the ground

of the convenience of Members—and least of all those who sat on the Opposition side—but entirely on the question as to whether it was right or fair to discuss a Bill of that importance at the then hour of the night. If they took one of the speeches they had just listened to, it was quite clear that the hon. and learned Member had not made up his mind whether the Amendment under discussion should be accepted or not. He did not think such matters ought to be considered after three and a half hours of a very serious and earnest debate on the merits of the Bill. It was only right that they should have another opportunity of discussing the Amendment, and if the debate were adjourned he did not think it would be necessary to devote more than two hours more to it on some future night after eleven o'clock. He himself told the Patronage Secretary that he thought the debate would take about five hours, and he held that estimate would be much more likely to be realised if they adjourned the debate at that juncture than it would be if they continued till the end of the Bill was reached. The Motion was really a fair one, because it could not be denied that the House ought to have an opportunity of discussing the rest of the Bill at a reasonable hour.

The Committee divided:—Ayes, 57; Noes, 120. (Division List No. 342.)

AYES.
Acland-Hood, Rt Hn.SirAlex.F.	Douglas, Rt. Hon. A. Akers	Remnant, James Farquharson
Arkwright, John Stanhope	Forster, Henry William	Ridsdale, E. A.
Banner, John S. Harmood	Greenwood, G. (Peterborough)	Scott, Sir S. (Marylebone, W.)
Barrie, H. T. (Londonderry,N.	Hardy,Laurence(Kent, Ashf'rd)	Sloan, Thomas Henry
Bertram, Julius	Helmsley, Viscount	Smith,F. E. (Liverpool, Walton)
Bowles, G. Stewart	Hervey,F. W.F. (Bury S. Edm'ds	Starkey, John R.
Carlile, E. Hildred	Hill, Sir Clement (Shrewsbury)	Staveley-Hill, Henry (Staff'sh.
Castlereagh, Viscount	Hunt, Rowland	Talbot, Lord E. (Chichester)
Cavendish.Rt.Hon.Victor C. W.	Lane-Fox;, G. R.	Valentia, Viscount
Cecil, Evelyn (Aston Manor)	Lockwood, Rt. Hn. Lt. Col A. R.	Younger, George
Corbett, A. Cameron (Glasgow)	Lyttelton. Rt. Hon. Alfred
Courthope, G. Loyd	Magnus, Sir Philip	TELLERS FOR THE AYES—
Craig. Charles Curtis(Antrim, S.	Morpeth, Viscount	Mr. Salter and Mr. Cave.
Craik, Sir Henry	Pease, Herbert Pike(Darlington)
Dalrymple, Viscount	Rawlinson, John Frederick Peel
NOES.
Agnew, George William	Astbury, John Meir	Barry, Redmond J.(Tyrone, N.)
Ainsworth, John Stirling	Balfour, Robert (Lanark)	Beauchamp, E.
Allen, A. Acland (Christchurch)	Baring, Godfrey (Isle of Wight)	Beaumont, Hon. Hubert
Bennett, E. N.	Harmsworth, Cecil B. (Worc'r)	Partington, Oswald
Berridge, T. H. D.	Haworth, Arthur A.	Pearce, Robert (Staffs. Leek)
Bottomley, Horatio	Hedges, A. Paget	Pearson, W. H.M. (Suffolk, Eye)
Boulton, A. C. F.	Henderson, Arthur (Durham)	Pickersgill, Edward Hare
Bowerman, C. W.	Higham, John Sharp	Pirie, Duncan V.
Bramsdon, T. A.	Hobhouse, Charles E. H.	Pollard, Dr.
Brunner. J. F. L. (Lancs., Leigh)	Holt, Richard Durning	Price, C. E.)Edinburgh, Central)
Burns, Rt. Hon. John	Howard, Hon. Geoffrey	Rainy, A. Rolland
Causton, Rt. Hn. RichardKnight	Hudson, Walter	Raphael, Herbert H.
Chance, Frederick William	Hyde, Clarendon	Renton, Major Leslie
Clough, William	Illingworth, Percy H.	Richards, T. F.(Wolverhampton)
Collins, Sir Wm. J.(S. Pancras, W.	Johnson, W. (Nuneaton)	Rickett, J. Compton
Cooper, G. J.	Jones, Sir D.(Brynmor (Swansea)	Rogers, F. E. Newman
Corbett, C. H. (Sussex; E. Grinst'd	Jones, Leif (Appleby)	Samuel, Herbert L. (Cleveland)
Cornwall, Sir Edwin A.	Kilbride, Denis	Scarisbrick, T. T. L.
Cotton, Sir H. J. S.	Lambert, George	Seaverns, J. H.
Craig, Herbert J. (Tynemouth)	Lamont, Norman	Shaw, Rt, Hn. T. (Hawick B.)
Crean, Eugene	Lardner, James Carrige Rushe	Sherwell, Arthur James
Dalziel, James Henry	Layland-Barratt, Francis	Silcock, Thomas Ball
Davies, Ellis William (Eifion)	Leese, Sir Joseph F.(Accrington)	Strachey, Sir Edward
Duncan, C. (Barrow-in-Furness)	Levy, Sir Maurice	Straus, B. S. (Mile End)
Dunn, A. Edward (Camborne)	Lewis, John Herbert	Strauss, E. A. (Abingdon)
Dunne. Major E. Martin(Walsall	Lough, Thomas	Taylor, John W. (Durham)
Elibank, Master of	Luttrell, Hugh Fownes	Taylor, Theodore C. (Radcliffe)
Evans, Samuel T.	Lyell, Charles Henry	Thompson, J. W. H (Somers't, E).
Everett, R. Lacey	Macdonald J. R. (Leicester)	Toulmin, George
Fenwick, Charles	MacVeagh, Jeremiah (Down S.	Walters, John Tudor
Ferens, T. R.	M'Crae, George	Walter, Sir John L. (Leeds, S.)
Flavin, Michael Joseph	M'Kenna, Rt. Hon. Reginald	Warner, Thomas Courtenay T.
Fuller, John Michael F.	Maddison, Frederick	White, George (Norfolk)
Gill, A. H.	Manfield, Harry (Northants)	White, Luke (York, E. R.)
Gladstone, Rt. Hn. Herbert John	Marks, C. Croydon (Launceston)	Whitley, John Henry (Halifax)
Glover, Thomas	Marnham, F. J.	Wilson, W. T. (Westhoughton)
Goddard, Daniel Ford	Massie, J.
Grayson, Albert Victor	Morrell, Philip	TELLERS FOR THE NOES—
Gulland, John W.	Norton, Capt. Cecil William	Mr. Whitley and Mr. J. A.Pease.
Hardy, George A. (Suffolk)	O'Connor, John (Kildare N.)

MR. RAWLINSON

moved, "To insert after 'entered' in Clause 4, page 3, line 25, 'or may order a new trial at such time and place as they see fit to direct.'" Under the Bill as it stood he contended there was no power given to the Court of Appeal to order a new trial. They must convict or acquit. He ventured to submit that the power to order a new trial should reside in the Court. He would give one or two instances. There was the case where new facts came to the knowledge of the tribunal after the conviction of the prisoner; where, when a man was tried and convicted on evidence, and after his conviction other evidence was forthcoming on such a question as a defence of an alibi or something of that sort. At the present time the tribunal that was to determine the matter was a tribunal of three Judges in London. The case perhaps occurred in Northumberland, Wales or Cornwall. That, he submitted, was unconstitutional and entirely wrong. In such circumstances he submitted the Court ought to have power to order a new trial so that the jury might decide on the value of the fresh evidence. For the first time under this Bill it was sought to take a way the power of trying a case in this way by jury. In a case where the Court of Appeal came to the conclusion fresh facts came forward, a jury should try the case and not the Court (Sub-clause 4 of Clause 5), by which in certain cases, if the Court thought fit, though they found a man guilty on the evidence, they could if they thought he was insane at the time the act was committed order him to be locked up during His Majesty's pleasure. It was most monstrous that the Court without the verdict of a jury should have power to find on their own initiative that a man who had been charged with an offence was insane at the time. If the Court came to the conclusion that the man might be mad they ought to have power to try by a fresh jury to determine the question whether he was mad. There were other more complex points raised in the same sub-section. It was as follows:— Where an appellant has been convicted of an offence and the jury could on the indictment have found him guilty of some other offence and on the finding of the jury it appears to the Court of Criminal Appeal that the jury must have been satisfied of facts which proved him guilty of that other offence, the Court may, instead of allowing or dismissing the appeal, substitute for the verdict found by the jury a verdict of guilty of that other offence and pass such sentence in substitution for the sentence passed at the trial as they think proper. This was a most monstrous proposition. Let him give a concrete example. A man was charged with murder. The jury convicted him of manslaughter. The case came before the Court of Appeal. That Court must necessarily, and from the finding of the jury probably would, come to the conclusion that he had been guilty, that the man should have been convicted of the crime of murder. If they followed the provisions of the Bill it would be their duty to convict him on the evidence. There were other cases of a less extreme character in which the Court had power to convict of some other offence of which by the finding of the jury they gathered he must have been found guilty. It was unnecessary to indicate more fully his reasons. His Amendment simply gave power to the Court to order a new trial. There was one ether point. Throughout the Bill the idea had been to assimilate, as far as practicable, appeals in civil cases to those in criminal cases. It was impossible to imagine an appeal in a civil case in which a new trial could not be got. In the case of a verdict being unsatisfactory the Court of Appeal would, of course, order that a fresh jury should try the case and the case would be re-tried. The analogy had been pressed far too strongly between civil and criminal cases. There was a wide distinction in practice, but to that extent he thought powers should be assimilated in criminal cases and civil.

MR. CLAVELL SALTER,

in seconding, said the Amendment was regarded with great interest, and he thought with great approval by a considerable number of people outside that House who were much interested in the Bill. It was a proposal to allow the Court of Criminal Appeal to exercise what they, in this country, understood to be the essence of a Court of Appeal. He did not think perhaps hon. Members who were not lawyers quite realised how novel was the function they were proposing to entrust to the new Court of Criminal Appeal. The ordinary function of a Court of Appeal was the function of a Court which was not charged with ascertaining the truth of the matter which came before it, but which had to inquire whether a Court below it had gone wrong; an entirely different function. That Court for the first time in dealing with the verdict of the jury had not merely to say if the Court below had gone wrong, but had to proceed on its own responsibility to deal with the case. The proposal was that in a proper case, but only in a proper case, the Court of Criminal Appeal should be allowed to exercise the ordinary functions of the Court of Appeal. It seemed to him to be only reasonable. By the practice and procedure of the Civil Court of Appeal, they ought to allow it in the proper case to discharge the ordinary functions of a Court of Criminal Appeal He supported the Amendment on the ground of convenience and of expense. He did not think the bulk of hon. Members, who strongly, and perhaps rightly, supported the Bill, who were not versed in the law, had realised for one moment how great was the amount of inconvenience and expense in which, unless the Bill was amended, they were involving the country. He thought hon. Members would agree with him that the Bill would involve the constant re-trial of a large amount of ordinary criminal work. It was an unthinkable thing that any Court of Appeal would reverse the verdict of a jury, and set at liberty a man whom the jury had convicted without seeing the witnesses. Therefore, the practical question before the House was: Should this re-trial of all ordinary criminal business, which would be a constant feature of our law, take place always in London, or, for the most part, in the localities in which the crime, or alleged crime, was committed. Hon. Members had got the Beck case and the Edalji case in their minds, and they had got the impression that the new Court was going to be mainly, if not entirely, occupied in trying cases of great interest, and great public importance. Nothing could be further from the truth. There was no relation between difficulty and importance in legal matters. The cases which came before this Court would not be the important cases, but the difficult cases, and the great bulk of them would be the ordinary run of ordinary criminal work. He hoped the House would not be wearied if he illustrated what he meant, though one tried with some difficulty to deal with matters of that kind at that hour. He would ask hon. Members to follow him for a moment in considering a typical case such as would form the work which the new Court would be called on to do. A man had been convicted at quarter sessions in Northumberland of having stolen three hens. The evidence was not conclusive. The man was seen in the neighbourhood, some feathers were found in his coat pocket, there was some blood on his trousers, he made a damaging admission to a farmer's wife who was a neighbour, and there was certain other evidence of a circumstantial character. At the quarter sessions the man called three or four persons to give evidence as to his presence some considerable distance away. That kind of case would have taken a well-meaning bench and jury a day to try, and it would have involved the attendance away from their business of from twenty to twenty-five people of all kinds and degrees. The jury had convicted the man and the Court of Appeal had sufficient doubt to give leave to appeal. The Question he wanted to put now to hon. Members of the House in all good faith, was, did the Attorney-General or did anybody think that the score of witnesses and the counsel should go before the Judges in London? Where was the need for it? Where was the occasion to take all these unhappy people to London? There would be the local surveyor who had made the plans, the local doctor who had examined the blood-stains, the local parson who had discovered the three feathers in the pocket of the coat, the farmer's wife to whom the damaging admission was made, to say nothing of the unfortunate witnesses for the alibi. He ventured to say that it was approaching an absurdity to suggest that all these people were to be brought up to London it a heavy cost. Was it not more reasonable to give the Court of Appeal the power so say if they had any doubt about that verdict that the case had better be retried at the next assizes in Northumberland. One of the great objects of the Bill was said to be to satisfy public opinion, and he would urge on hon. Members that cases in which public opinion was excited throughout the land in regard to a criminal trial were exceedingly rare. The feeling was often purely local, and any public opinion which had been excited in Northumberland over the case he had mentioned would be far better satisfied and set at rest by a local trial on the spot, rather than by calling all these people to London, where the local papers could not come, and in regard to which the people interested would have to depend on what the witnesses told them. He ventured to urge the matter not only on the grounds of convenience and expense, but on behalf of the witnesses who, whether they were a dozen or twenty would be put to considerable trouble. Hon. Members did not realise what a large interest was concerned. He urged it also in the interests of the convicted man, because there was no doubt that if the Court of Appeal in London was compelled to have people up from the ends of the earth, they would be very chary of doing so. They would be much more likely to listen to cases if they had the power to order a local re-trial. If the sessions were far away, if the case was near London, or if it was a matter in which there was great public interest, it could be heard in London in the ordinary course. Such cases were small in number and nine-tenths or ninety-nine-hundredths of the work could be done in the manner he had suggested. If they did that they would be seeking the best way to satisfy public opinion, and would be greatly adding to the effectiveness of the machinery they were creating.

SIR JOHN WALTON

said his hon. friend was quite right in describing it as a serious Amendment, and he wished to explain the grounds on which he could not accept it. He thought it would be a very great misfortune if they were to vary the provisions of the Bill as it now stood. Broadly, in reply to the opposition which had been propounded, he might say that the new Court of Appeal was only asked to do what the Home Office had been doing for years, to see whether convictions were to be maintained or to be set aside. It was in his opinion most desirable that no new development should take place in any Criminal Court, that the State should not be put to the cost of putting all that machinery right for the second ordeal, and that the witnesses should not be subject to the trouble and the prisoner to the ordeal of a second trial. His hon. and learned friend seemed to him to be under a complete misapprehension as to the procedure to be adopted by the Court of Appeal in ordinary cases. He had with dogmatic vigour more than once said that there must be a re-trial of these complicated issues. He altogether protested against the opinion that any such ordeal was necessary. The Court of Appeal in London was constantly dealing with vexed questions of fact in civil proceedings, and in his experience, though they had power under existing rules to have witnesses called before them, it was exceedingly rare that they ever had them called. In criminal cases the evidence that had already been taken, the speeches of counsel, and the summing up of the learned Judge would constitute the materials which the Committee would be called upon to consider. If it was suggested that there were new witnesses who could throw a new light on the case, he supposed that either their affidavits would be produced or the Court would have a statement taken by some competent official. The Court would consider whether those statements were reliable or not, and whether they materially affected the issues which had already been formed, and they would be able to deal with them as materials coming before them for consideration. Then, said the hon. and learned Member: "Oh, but you may have a trial in which it is suggested that a number of the witnesses ought to be sworn over again," and he assumed that the only method under the Bill itself would be to summon all those witnesses and to examine them again. It was possible, however, that the Court might send one of its own members to hear the statements of these witnesses and to form an opinion upon their reliability, with power to communicate his views to his fellow members, or the Court might send a Commissioner who might take the evidence of the witnesses on oath and subject them to cross-examination. It would be a great hardship if a number of local witnesses had to be called to London in order that the whole trial might be gone through afresh. The result of the examination of the materials by the Court of Criminal Appeal would be to elicit vital facts and points, and if on those points it was suggested that new evidence could be collected the Court had power to collect that evidence. If it was suggested that the examination of some witness who was present at the trial would throw considerable light on the inquiry, he might be called. So that the House would see, there was ample machinery to enable the Court to do all that the Home Secretary could do at the present time. His right hon. friend the Home Secretary seemed to think that it was quite foreign to the practice of the Home Office to go through that process of retrial. They did not have all the witnesses up and reconstruct the case in the manner which had been suggested. If that was not necessary in the case of the Home Office—the ideal tribunal of his hon. and learned friend—why was it necessary for this Court of Criminal Appeal? As a matter of fact the Court would have ample power to get at the truth in the way they thought proper, and he did not think the argument which had been advanced was a good one. What were the objections to a new trial? He submitted in the first place that it was desirable in the interests of criminal justice that there should be one trial, and one trial only. There should also be a Court of review with the responsibility of deciding whether that trial had been satisfactory and whether the conviction should be quashed or not. The objection to the alternative method of his hon. and learned friends was that it was derived purely from civil proceedings. In civil proceedings they had two parties who were struggling to establish some right which was in controversy. The Court of Appeal might come to the conclusion that the trial by a jury had been for some reason unfairly or unsatisfactorily conducted. They might say to the parties, "If you are deter- mined to litigate to a conclusion you must submit to a new trial." That analogy, he submitted, had no parallel in the criminal law. There were no parties in the sense he had described. There was no struggle for an issue. There was the State represented by the Crown which was bringing an accused person to justice, and the accused person had the right to have his guilt determined by the verdict of the jury. If the verdict of the jury had convicted him his rights were all exhausted as the law now stood. In the absence of some error on the part of the tribunal the door was closed, and there was no hope for him except by an appeal to the clemency of the Crown through the Home Secretary. What was suggested was that they should try to see if something more could not be done; and if so, was not the proposal in the Bill the best that could be done for the accused person? What was the proposal? What the Government said was this: If a prisoner wished that his case should be subjected to review by three of the most trained judicial intellects that the country can bring to bear on it he must ask for leave to appeal and the Court must examine the evidence, must consider the summing-up of the judge, and must take all the steps which were necessary to satisfy themselves whether the verdict of the jury was so far satisfactory that the executive would be justified in enforcing it. If they came to the conclusion that it was a satisfactory verdict there was no reason why they should not give effect to that view, and they would, as a matter of fact, express that opinion. If, on the other hand, they concluded that the verdict could not be regarded as satisfactory they would express an opinion to that effect. That was what was offered by this Bill. He did not think it was unsatisfactory. It certainly afforded no ground for complaint on the part of the prisoner, and he thought it would ensure to the satisfaction of the community that public justice was being done. He asked them to think for a moment of the scandal of this suggested new trial. Suppose they had a criminal cause like a great murder trial which occupied several days, and in the course of which a vast amount of evidence was submitted. The jury, came to a particular conclusion, and it might be that public sympathy was considerably moved in connection with the case. But because of that was all that ordeal to be gone through over again? Was it desirable that, having once tried and once convicted that person under such painful circumstances, they should go through all that form, again in the interests of some abstract standard of justice? He thought that I when the jury had convicted a prisoner and he was given an opportunity of having the materials fully reviewed by a competent body, which decided that there was no ground for disturbing the verdict of the jury, then they should I have confidence in leaving the man in prison. If they thought that there had been on the part of the jury a misconception of the issue as it was left to them by the judge, or that the judge had directed the attention of the jury to what were really subsidiary and not critical considerations, and that therefore the trial had not been satisfactory, then it might be set aside. What did his hon. and learned friends say? They said that, having arrived at that conclusion, the Court were not to have the power to give effect to it; that the verdict ought to be quashed and that they must hand the question over to be tried again. He used the word "must," because he took it that the "may" of his hon. and learned friends might mean "must." He believed that if a new trial was provided for there would be a tendency to have a repetition of criminal trials in a great number of cases. His hon. and learned friends must consider this difficulty. They were in this dilemma. It was perfectly clear that no new trial could be ordered unless there was serious doubt and unless in the opinion of the Court of Appeal justice demanded it. If the Courts sent down a case to be tried again because there was such a doubt in it that justice demanded it should be tried again, the prisoner was entitled to the benefit of that doubt and would get it as a matter of course. So that the very ground on which a new trial was ordered would entitle him to get clear upon the ground that the doubt existed.

MR. RAWLINSON

Or if there are fresh facts.

SIR JOHN WALTON

said that, apart from fresh facts, they would have the defence of prisoners in these cases reduced to a common formula. They would be told that a former jury convicted, and that the Court of Appeal having examined the evidence had come to the conclusion that the verdict was unsatisfactory, and had ordered a new trial. They would be told that there was a doubt, and an irresistible plea would be made to the jury to give the prisoner the benefit of the doubt. The result was that in many crises the acquittal of a prisoner who had been ordered to be tried again would follow almost as a matter of course. Then in the case of fresh evidence, was it wise to have a new trial with all the disadvantages of costs and the difficulty attending that investigation? If they had fresh evidence that evidence must be brought before the consideration of the Court of Appeal. It would be collected in the various ways he had indicated. It would be the subject of affidavits obtained either by a commissioner or by a member of the Court. The Court would then see whether the evidence had a bearing on the trial, whether it was reliable, whether it was likely to have weight, and whether they were satisfied that it was true. Having ascertained all those points, why should not the Court of Appeal give effect to that evidence? They knew all the issues, and they knew how the jury had decided. Why should they not, just as well as a jury, consider the bearing of that new evidence on the issues which had already been ascertained? The jury had found against the man, and he was now before as competent a tribunal of either law or fact as could be found in either this or any other country. He could not see why they should hesitate to accept the findings of the Court on the question of whether the new evidence it was proposed to introduce would alter the statements or not. There would be no danger to the community and no unsatisfactory operation of the criminal law. There was only one other observation, and it was this: The practical difficulty in the way of providing for new trials was enormous. In the first place, a man could not be tried over again at his own expense. He must be defended at the expense of the country. Witnesses must all be kept for an indefinite period at the expense of the country, and if the assizes were held in the West of England, say, in February and November, during the whole of this interval a large number of persons would have to be kept more or less in hand (many of them boarded and lodged to prevent them going abroad) ready for the new trial. Not only were the practical difficulties in the way of arranging for a new trial so very great, but in his opinion that was demanded neither in the interests of the accused nor in the interests of justice. They were under no obligation to have a man tried twice over by a jury who had once had his right of trial by jury exhausted. The provision of the Bill was the simplest, safest and most satisfactory remedy the Government could offer.

MR. LANE-FOX

said the right hon. Gentleman had argued very vigorously against the proposal, but his arguments might have been used in a more emphatic form against the proposal in the Bill of the previous year. In that Bill they had not an optional proposal as was suggested. The trial was made obligatory. The Home Secretary had power just now to alter sentences. If this Bill passed there would be nothing whatever between letting a man off altogether or leaving his conviction to stand. It seemed, therefore, to him the presumption would be against the man, because unless the Court was satisfied the evidence was such that they could acquit him they would be bound to leave the conviction as it was. There would be no chance of intervention like the Home Secretary's. He spoke, of course, under correction. The question of expense was also dealt with by the Attorney-General, who used words about the abstract standard of justice, and rather contemptuously applied them to the objection which was being urged against the clause. It seemed to him there was considerable expense now in cases where the jury disagreed. Still, if by re-trial they gained pure justice it was worth a considerable amount.

MR. GREENWOOD

said he had an Amendment on the Paper on the subject of whether the Court of Appeal in criminal cases should have the power of ordering a new trial. His Amendment was to the effect that where new facts, material to the issue of the guilt or innocence of the prisoner were brought before the Court of Appeal which were not before the jury in the Court below, in that case, at any rate, the Court of Appeal should have in their discretion the right to direct a new trial. Did hon. Members realise what a change was being brought into our criminal law administration? That particular Bill was a unique Bill. If differed from all previous Bills establishing a Criminal Court of Appeal. He did not think it lay with the Attorney-General to put on one side as preposterous the idea of granting a new trial in criminal cases, because provision had been made for a new trial in every previous Bill establishing such a Court. It was so in the Criminal Code Bill of 1878, introduced by Sir James Stephen and other great authorities, in the Bill introduced by the Lord Chancellor in the other House last year, and in every intermediate Bill. But the Bill before the House provided in no case that there should be granted a new trial. The Amendment gave discretion to the Court to order a new trial when there were new facts. A case could easily be conceived in which new and material facts might be brought before the Court of Appeal which were quite sufficient to raise doubt and yet not sufficient to make it clear that the prisoner's conviction ought to be quashed. What was to happen in that case? The Judges might be divided. He had heard it said that in any such ease where there was a doubt the Judges would quash the conviction, and that had been spoken of as if it was the natural thing to do. If that were so it would be very bad for the law. It was better that ten guilty men should be acquitted than that one innocent man should be convicted, but it was also a saying in the law "Judex damnatur cum nocens absolvitur." Supposing the Judges were all of one mind in favour of upholding the conviction, what would happen? The prisoner would have no trial by jury at all on the new matters. The Judges were put in the place of the juries.Ex hypothesi the new facts were material facts which were not brought before the attention of the jury. There was a very well-known saying of Lord Hardwicke's that it would be a very bad day for the administration of law in this country if ever the separate functions of Judge and jury got confused. The Judge's function was to determine the law and the jury's to define the facts. Might he bring before the House what the late Mr. Montagu Williams used to say was the most remarkable case he had ever known— The Hatton Garden Case. The facts might be put very briefly. An Italian was put on his trial for the murder of a man in a fracas in a public-house in Hatton Garden. He was brought to trial and convicted on what seemed the clearest possible evidence. The murder was committed by an Italian—he was the only Italian. Several witnesses swore they had known him for years and he was actually taken to the death-bed of the man who was murdered and identified by him. He was sentenced to death. Shortly afterwards suspicion fell upon another man. He was brought back back and put on his trial for manslaughter and he was convicted. They had the extraordinary case of a man being convicted of murder and sentenced to death and another man being convicted on the same facts of manslaughter. Well, they could not have that fresh trial under the present Acts, and it would mean that the Judges would have to say whether the two men were guilty or not. That was a responsibility which they ought not to put on the judges. For that reason he would, if his hon. and learned friend pressed the matter to a division, support him in the lobby.

Motion made, and Question put, "In page 3, line 25, at end, insert the words 'Provided that if the appeal shall be allowed on the ground that the verdict of the jury ought to be set aside the Court may, in lieu of directing a verdict of acquittal, order the appellant to be retried on the indictment by such Court and at such time and place as shall be specified in the order, and thereupon the appellant shall be re-tried accordingly.'"

The Committee divided:—Ayes, 41: Noes, 116. (Division List No. 343.)

AYES.
Arkwright, John Stanhope	Gill, A. H.	Salter, Arthur Clavell
Banner, John S. Harmood	Glover, Thomas	Scott, Sir S. (Marylebone, W.)
Barrie, H. T. (Londonderry, N.)	Hardy, Laurence (Kent, Ashford	Sloan, Thomas Henry
Bottomley, Horatio	Helmsley, Viscount	Smith, F. E. (Liverpool, Walton)
Bowles, G. Stewart	Hervey, F. W. F. (BuryS. Edm'ds	Starkey, John R.
Carlile, E. Hildred	Hill. Sir Clement (Shrewsbury)	Staveley-Hill, Henry (Staff'sh.)
Castlereagh, Viscount	Hunt, Rowland	Talbot, Lord E. (Chichester)
Cave, George	Lane-Fox, G. R.	Taylor, John W. (Durham)
Cavendish. Rt. Hn. Victor C. W.	Lockwood, Rt. Hn. Lt.-Col. A. R	Wilson, W. T. (Westhoughton)
Cecil, Evelyn (Aston Manor)	Lyttelton, Rt. Hon. Alfred	Vounger, George
Corbett, A. Cameron (Glasgow)	Magnus, Sir Philip
Courthope, G. Loyd	Morpeth, Viscount	TELLERS FOR THE AYES—Sir
Craik, Sir Henry	Pease, Herbert Pike)Darlington	Alexander Acland-Hood and
Dalrymple, Viscount	Rawlinson, John Frederick Peel	Viscount Valentia.
Douglas, Rt. Hon. A. Akers-	Remnant. James Farquharson
Forster, Henry William	Renton, Major Leslie

NOES.
Agnew, George William	Gladstone, Rt. Hn. Herbert John	Massie, J.
Ainsworth, John Stirling	Goddard, Daniel Ford	Morrell, Philip
Allen, A. Acland (Christchurch)	Grayson, Albert Victor	Norton, Capt. Cecil William
Astbury, John Meir	Gulland, John W.	O'Connor, John (Kildare, N.)
Balfour, Robert (Lanark)	Hardy, George A. (Suffolk)	Partington, Oswald
Baring, Godfrey (Isle of Wight)	Harmsworth, Cecil B. (Worc'r)	Pearce, Robert (Staffs. Leek)
Barry, Redmond J. (Tyrone, N.)	Haworth, Arthur A.	Pearson, W. H. M. (Suffolk, Eye)
Beauchamp. E.	Hedges, A. Paget	Pickersgill. Edward Hare
Beaumont, Hon. Hubert	Henderson, Arthur (Durham)	Pirie, Duncan V.
Bennett, E. N.	Higham, John Sharp	Pollard, Dr.
Berridge, T. H. D.	Hobhouse, Charles E. H.	Price, C. E. (Edinburgh. Central
Boulton, A. C. F.	Holt, Richard Durning	Raphael, Herbert H.
Bowerman, C. W;	Howard, Hon. Geoffrey	Richards, T. F)Wolverhampt on)
Bramsdon, T. A.	Hudson, Walter	Rickett, J. Compton
Brunner, J. F. L. (Lanes., Leigh)	Hyde, Clarendon	Ridsdale, E. A.
Burns, Rt. Hon. John	Illingworth, Percy H.	Rogers, F. E. Newman
Causton, Rt. Hn. RichardKnight	Johnson, W. (Nuneaton)	Samuel, Herbert L. (Cleveland)
Chance, Frederick William	Jones, Sir D. Brynmor (Swansea	Scarisbrick. T. T. L.
Clough, William	Jones, Leif (Appleby)	Seaverns, J. H.
Collins, Sir Wm. J(S. Pancras, W.)	Kilbride, Denis	Shaw, Rt, Hon. T. (Hawick. B.)
Cooper, G. J.	Lambert, George	Sherwell. Arthur James
Corbett, CH (Sussex, E. Grinst'd.)	Lamont, Norman	Silcock, Thomas Ball
Cornwall, Sir Edwin A.	Lardner, James Carrige Rushe	Strachey, Sir Edward
Cotton, Sir H. J. S.	Layland-Barratt, Francis	Straus, V. S. (Mile End)
Craig, Herbert J. (Tynemouth)	Leese,Sir Joseph F. (Accrington	Strauss, E. A. (Abingdon)
Crean, Eugene	Levy, Sir Maurice	Taylor, Theodore C. (Radcliffe)
Dalziel, James Henry	Lewis, John Herbert	Thompson. J. W. H.(Somerset, E)
Davies, Ellis William (Eifion)	Lough, Thomas	Toulmin, George
Duncan, C. (Barrow-in-Furness	Luttrell, Hugh Fownes	Walters, John Tudor
Dunn, A. Edward (Camborne)	Lyell, Charles Henry	Walton, Sir John L. (Leeds, S.)
Dunne, Major E. Martin(Walsall	Macdonald, J. R. (Leicester)	Warner, Thomas Courtenay T.
Elibank, Master of	MacVeagh, Jeremiah (Down, S.	White, George (Norfolk)
Evans, Samuel T.	M'Crae, George	White, Luke ((York, E. R.)
Everett, R. Lacey	M'Kenna, Rt. Hon. Reginald	Whiteley, John Henry(Halifax)
Fenwick, Charles	Maddison, Frederick
Ferens, T. R,	Manfield, Harry (Northants)	TELLERS FOR THE NOES—Mr.
Flavin, Michael Joseph	Marks, G. Croydon (Launceston)	Whiteley and Mr. J. A. Pease.
Fuller, John Michael F.	Marnham, F. J.

MR. LYTTELTON

said he thought the time had arrived when the debate should cease. During the last hour and a half they had had two Amendments moved by his hon. friend behind him which the Attorney-General was compelled to ad- mit were required, for he had admitted that the Bill as it stood required Amendment, and promised to amend it. With regard to the Amendment of the hon. and learned Member for Cambridge a second admission was made in the fullest and frankest terms, and was bound to be made by the Attorney-General, that the subject was one of the greatest importance. They had now debated the Bill for nearly five hours. The Patronage Secretary seemed to be pleased at that, he would remind him that an understanding was given by the Attorney-General that the Bill should not be taken on a Friday if it could possibly be avoided, and therefore the understanding which the Patronage Secretary had endeavoured to put forward that night really did not exist in fact at all.

MR. GEORGE WHITELEY

said the understanding was with the hon. and learned Member for Cambridge University who had endorsed all that he had said. The right hon. Gentleman could not get behind that, while the Attorney-General had denied more than once that he had given any pledge.

MR. LYTTELTON

said he had never said there had been a pledge. He had said there had been an understanding that the matter should not be discussed on a Friday, therefore, it was only in the natural course of events that the Bill

should have been adjourned till eleven o'clock. No one who had heard the debate could possibly charge anyone with obstruction. If such charge were made it would have to be made against hon. Members opposite as well as against the Opposition, for in every division and every discussion they had had the support of some Ministerialists. Considering that the matter had been repeatedly declared by the Government to be of importance, and considering that the Attorney-General recognising in the Committee upstairs that he had been extremely well treated by the Opposition, he thought it was straining the powers of the Government to continue the debate. It was the only debate they had had since the Second Reading which was on a Friday, and the entirety of it had been taken between the hours of eleven and four o'clock. He moved the adjournment of the House.

Question put, "That the further consideration of the Bill, as amended, be now adjourned."

The House divided:—Ayes, 42; Noes, 110. (Division List No. 344.)

AYES
Acland-Hood. Rt Hn. Sir Alex. F.	Craik, Sir Henry	Richards, T. F.(Wolverhampton
Arkwright, John Stanhope	Crean, Eugene	Scott, Sir S. (Marylebone, W.)
Banner, John S. Harmood	Forster, Henry William	Staveley-Hill, Henry(Staff'sh.
Barrie, H. T. (Londonderry, N.)	Henderson, Arthur (Durham)	Talbot, Lord E. (Chichester)
Bowles, G. Stewart	Hervey, F. W. F. (Bury S. Edm'ds	Taylor, John W. (Durham)
Carlile, E. Hildred	Hill, Sir Clement (Shrewsbury)	Valentia, Viscount
Castlereagh, Viscount	Hudson, Walter	Wilson, W. T. (Westhoughton)
Cavendish, Rt. Hon. Victor C. W.	Hunt, Rowland	Younger, George
Cecil, Evelyn (Aston Manor)	Lardner, James Carrige Rushe
Collins, Sir Wm. J. (S. Pancras. W.	Macdonald, J. R. (Leicester)	TELLERS FOR THE AYES—Mr. Rawlinson and Mr. John O'Connor,
Cotton, Sir H. J. S.	Morpeth, Viscount
Courthope, G. Loyd	Pease, Herbert Pike)Darlington
NOES.
Agnew, George William	Bowerman, C. W.	Dalziel, James Henry
Ainsworth, John Stirling	Bramsdon, T. A.	Davies, Ellis William (Eifion)
Allen, A. Acland(Christchurch)	Brunner. J. F. L. (Lanes.,Leigh)	Douglas, Rt. Hon. A. Akers-
Astbury, John Meir	Burns, Rt. Hon..John	Duncan, C.(Barrow-in-Furness)
Balfour, Robert (Lanark)	Causton, Rt. Hn. RichardKnight	Dunn, A. Edward (Camborne)
Baring, Godfrey(Isle of Wight)	Chance, Frederick William	Dunne. Major E. Martin)Walsall
Barry, Redmond J.(Tyrone, N.)	Clough, William	Elibank, Master of
Beauchamp, E.	Cooper, G. J.	Evans, Samuel T.
Beaumont, Hon. Hubert	Corbett, A. Cameron (Glasgow)	Everett, R. Lacey
Bennett, E. N.	Corbett, C. H.(Sussex, F, Grinst'd	Fenwick, Charles
Berridge, T. H. D.	Cornwall, Sir Edwin A.	Ferens, T. R.
Bottomley, Horatio	Craig, Herbert J.(Tynemouth)	Flavin, Michael Joseph
Boulton, A. C. F.	Dalrymple, Viscount	Fuller, John Michael F.
Gladstone, Rt. Hn. Herbert John	Levy, Sir Maurice	Ridsdale, E. A.
Goddard, Daniel Ford	Lewis, John Herbert	Rogers, F. E. Newman
Grayson, Albert Victor	Lockwood, Rt. Hn. Lt.-Col. A. R.	Salter, Arthur Clavell
Greenwood, G. (Peterborough)	Lough, Thomas	Samuel, Herbert L. (Cleveland)
Gulland, John W.	Luttrell, Hugh Fownes	Scarisbrick, T. T. L.
Hardy, George A. (Suffolk)	Lyell, Charles Henry	Seaverns, J. H.
Hardy, Laurence (Kent, Ashford	M'Crae, George	Sherwell, Arthur James
Harmsworth, Cecil B.(Worc'r)	M'Kenna, Rt. Hon. Reginald	Silcock, Thomas Ball
Haworth, Arthur A.	Maddison, Frederick	Starkey, John R.
Hedges, A. Paget	Manfield, Harry (Northants)	Strachey, Sir Edward
Helmsley, Viscount	Marks, G. Croydon (Launceston)	Straus. B. S. (Mile End)
Higham, John Sharp	Marnham, F. J.	Strauss, E. A. (Abingdon)
Hobhouse, Charles E. H.	Massie, J.	Taylor, Theodore C. (Radcliffe)
Holt, Richard Durning	Morrell, Philip	Thompson, J. W H(Somerset, E.)
Howard, Hon. Geoffrey	Morton, Alpheus Cleophas	Toulmin, George
Hyde, Clarendon	Partingson, Oswald	Walters, John Tudor
Illingworth, Percy H.	Pearce, Robert (Staffs. Leek)	Walton, Sir John L. (Leeds. S.)
Johnson, W. (Nuneaton)	Pearson, W. H. M. (Suffolk, Eye)	White, George (Norfolk)
Jones, Sir D. Brynmor (Swansea)	Pickersgill, Edward Hare	White, Luke (York, E. R.)
Jones, Leif (Appleby)	Pirie, Duncan V.	Whitley, John Henry (Halifax)
Lambert, George	Pollard, Dr.
Lamont. Norman	Price, C. E.(Edinbugh, Central)	TELLERS FOR THE NOES—
Lane-Fox, G. R.	Raphael, Herbert H.	Mr. Whiteley and Mr. J. A. Pease.
Layland-Barratt, Francis	Renton, Major Leslie
Leese, Sir Joseph F.(Accrington)	Rickett, J. Compton

MR. RAWLINSON

proposed, "In page 3, line 29, after the word ' other' to insert the words' less severe.'" The effect of the Amendment, he said, was this: As the Bill stood now, if a man appealed from his sentence the Court of Appeal could reduce his sentence or they could increase it. The object of the Amendment was to prevent the Court increasing sentences; that was to say, they must either leave a sentence as it was, or they must reduce it. The Amendment was in accordance with the ordinary rules of fair-play and of English justice in the criminal law as it stood at the present time. If a man wished to appeal from a sentence because he believed that, say, a term of six months imprisonment was an excessive sentence, then the Bill stepped in and held out a threat to him so as to prevent him using this right of appeal. The idea appeared to be to make the man believe that he had better not appeal in that way, because if he did he might get his sentence increased to nine months. Unless a man had the gambling spirit he would probably take his six months and say no more about it. Was that a fair way of dealing with prisoners under the criminal law? He submitted that it was not. He believed that the House of Commons would not lend itself lightly to such a proceeding. If they accepted the Amendment which he suggested, it would prevent the Court of Appeal increasing a sentence simply for the purpose of deterring other persons; from appealing in the same way. The speech of the present Lord Chancellor put in stronger language than he could do the undesirability of appeal in the form at present in the Bill. The Lord Chancellor said it was not necessary to introduce an artificial limit such as the Bill (that was the Bill of the hon. Member below the gangway) proposed, to the effect that the Court of Criminal Appeal should have power to increase sentences. That was repugnant to the entire spirit of the criminal law. The spirit of the criminal law always inclined towards mercy rather than severity. Let the Courts diminish sentences as much as they pleased, but to increase them was revolting to everyone and to the custom and the temper of our Courts of Justice. That speech of the Lord Chancellor's, the hon. and learned Member continued, expressed the distinct arguments which he was putting before the douse. It was revolting to the ordinary principles carried out in our Courts of Justice at the present time that such extraordinary powers should be given to the Court of Criminal Appeal.

MR. JOHN O'CONNOR

seconded the Amendment. He had noticed that for a long time past in that House they had been following wherever they could Continental procedure. They had in many cases amended to advantage their procedure by following the example of the Continent. For example, they had given a right to the prisoner to go into the witness-box and to testify in his own behalf. But if there was one thing more than another in Continental procedure that the legal mind of this country disapproved of, it was the power to increase the sentences given in Courts of First Instance. It was because he believed that power would be repugnant to those engaged in the practice of law in this country that he seconded the Amendment.

Amendment proposed to the Bill— In page 3, line 29, after the words 'other,' to insert the words 'less severe.'"—(Mr. Rawlinson.)

Question proposed, "That those words be there inserted in the Bill."

*SIR JOHN WALTON

said that he did not think the Amendment was necessary in order to give effect to the very natural wishes of the hon. Gentleman who had just spoken, that a man who appealed on the ground that his sentence was too severe was to have the severity of the sentence increased. He submitted, however, that the Bill, as it was now drawn, was in its proper form; because one must consider how the question arose. When an appeal was brought on the part of a convicted person who said that he had been improperly or excessively punished, he was dissatisfied with the opinion of the tribunal which had sentenced him. He said either that period of imprisonment had been too long, or that it was a case in which the sentence ought not to have been inflicted at all, or that he ought to have been sentenced as a misdemeanant in the first class. What did that proceeding mean? Its effect was that a petition was addressed to the Court of Appeal to substitute its view for the view of the tribunal whose decision was challenged. When they appealed to Cæsar and asked for Cæar's opinion, surely they must accept it. When a man said that he was dissatisfied with his sentence on one of the grounds stated, the Court of Appeal were entitled to consider the sentence. The practical result was this, that they applied to the case principles of general application. It was because the ap- pellant complained that the principles of general and just application were not present in the tribunal from which he appealed that he asked the Court of Appeal to apply these principles. Was penal servitude more or less severe than imprisonment with hard labour? In the general opinion of the profession two years imprisonment with hard labour was infinitely more severe than three years of penal servitude, and it became a question of opinion whether the Court below pronounced a sentence which was more or less severe. The Court might say, "You have been sentenced to penal servitude. We think the class of offence demands a sentence of twelve months imprisonment." Probably the accused would rather have, say, three years penal servitude than the far more rigorous sentence of one year's imprisonment. It would result in this, that the Court of Criminal Appeal would have to ask the accused person which he would prefer and they would have the accused person exercising a choice. That was an anomalous and undignified situation. He would suggest that the better way was that if an appeal was brought against the sentence the Court of Criminal Appeal should have full and not restricted powers of dealing with it. They should be able to inflict an alternative sentence which in their opinion was appropriate.

MR. AKERS-DOUGLAS

said that so far as he read the Bill, it was entirely in the option of the Court of Criminal Appeal to give a more or less severe punishment. He was bound to support the Attorney-General. They did not want to encourage unnecessary appeals, and the Amendment would do so.

MR. BOWLES (Lambeth, Norwood)

said he could not help thinking the Amendment would turn out to be of considerable practical importance. After listening to the speech of the Attorney-General he had come to the conclusion that the weight of argument in this matter was in favour of the Amendment. As had been pointed out, the matter was not one for lawyers primarily, but for laymen. The man whom the Bill concerned was not the lawyer, but the man in the dock. Hon. Gentlemen on both sides would agree that the number of lawyers who found themselves in that position was for some inexplicable reason singularly small. What they suggested was that it should be specifically guaranteed to the man who appealed against his sentence that justice should not turn against him so that he was put in a worse position than if the Court had never existed. The Attorney-General did not see that any security was necessary. He thought it would rarely, if ever, be necessary. In other words he confessed that the man might find himself in a position which every man in the House would agree ought not to be possible. The hon. and learned Gentleman said he could scarcely imagine such a case. The case would be very hard, very remarkable, very rare. But if it could occur, they ought to make the small alteration which was suggested. The Attorney-General said that when a man appealed to Cæsar he must abide by the decision of Cæsar. Yes, but it was that House that was Cæsar. It was for that House to set up that Court, and theirs was the responsibility in connection with it. Finally, the hon. and learned Gentleman used an argument which, with all respect, was unworthy, when he said it was a matter of conjecture and opinion whether or not one sentence was more severe than another. If that was so, the words proposed to be taken out should be taken out if only on the ground that they were on the hon. and learned Gentleman's own showing, meaningless.

*MR. CLAVELL SALTER

considered the Government were perfectly right in resisting the Amendment. It was not a question of a more merciful or severer sentence, but of a just sentence. If a man asked for a just sentence the Courts ought to pass a just sentence without respect to a sentence in another Court. If the Amendment were carried there would be a number of frivolous appeals.

MR. RAWLINSON

said the Court was to take the place of the Home Secretary as regarded revision of sentence. The Home Secretary had power to alter a sentence at the present time, but none to increase. He supposed the Home Secretary knew what sentence was more and less severe. If the Bill was really to be in favour of prisoners, prisoners ought not to be placed m a worse position than before.

*MR. CAVE

moved to leave out subsection 2 of Clause 5. He thought the best argument he could use in favour of the Amendment was to read the subsection. It would some what surprise those Members who had not read it. It was— Where an appellant hits been convicted of an offence and the jury could on the indictment have found him guilty of some other offence, and on the finding of the jury it appears to the Court of Criminal Appeal that the jury must have been satisfied of facts which proved him guilty of that other offence, the Court may instead of allowing or dismissing the appeal substitute for the verdict found by the jury a verdict of guilty of that other offence and pass such sentence in substitution for the sentence passed at the trial as they think proper. This was one of the most extraordinary provisions in the Bill. The effect of it was that a man who had been tried for a certain offence and had been convicted and sentenced, and who appealed, and satisfied the Court of Appeal that he had not been properly convicted of that offence, could yet without a further trial be sentenced for another offence. If the Court of Appeal came to the conclusion that he was not guilty of offence A, they might yet convict him of offence B, an offence with which he had never been charged, and for which he had never been put on his trial, and sentence him for that offence. If the man had been. charged with the second offence he might have been able to defend himself and the facts material to that charge would have been considered and brought before the jury. But under this provision the man was never given a chance of taking this course. The Court might be satisfied that the jury must have thought the prisoner guilty of the second offence, but the jury had not found a verdict to that effect, and it seemed improper that the man should be convicted of an offence of which he had never in fact been found by a jury to be guilty. Surely the proper remedy was to order a new trial. He was informed that in Committee the sub-section was insisted on, but he hoped the Government would see fit to omit it now.

Amendment proposed to the Bill.

"In page 3, line 38, to leave out Sub-section (2) of Clause 5."—(Mr. Cave.)

Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Bill."

MR. JOHN O'CONNOR

said he would like to know whether the Attorney-General could so alter the sub-section as to make it certain that there should be no increase of the sentences. There were many cases where if a man was indicted for a serious offence such as murder he might be found guilty of manslaughter, but if a man was brought before the Court of Appeal after being found guilty of manslaughter the verdict could be increased to murder, according to the words of the clause. In like manner a man was often charged with a serious offence of firing at with intent to kill, or with assault and was found guilty of a lesser offence. He thought that it was the spirit of the proposed law that sentences should not be increased, but according to the wording of the clause the sentence might be increased. He did not say he would go into the lobby with his hon. friend, but he would like some assurance that the Court would not be able to take the action he had mentioned. He wished to hear what the Attorney-General had to say in regard to the matter before making up his mind which lobby he would go into.

*SIR JOHN WALTON

said ho was astonished that his hon. and learned friend should have not only failed to understand that clause of the Bill, but suggested that it was unreasonable and incapable of defence. His hon. and learned friend had overlooked the whole category of cases with which the clause proposed to deal. It was essential that a Court of Criminal Appeal should have power to take some action in the cases contemplated. In a charge of murder in which the jury might have found the prisoner guilty of manslaughter, the case might be one in which the question whether murder could or could not have been found was still open to argument, the Court of Appeal might come to the conclusion that the verdict for murder could not stand, but the minor offence of manslaughter was committed. Without the clause the Court of Appeal must set that man free, which would be reducing their functions to an absurdity. It was not necessary that there should be a second count in the indictment. He had appeared in many cases where there had been no second count. On the count of murder it was possible to find manslaughter, on a charge of rape it was possible to find criminal assault or indecent assault. It was obvious that the Court of Appeal must have the power to. arrive at the conclusion that the larger offence involved the lesser. On that principle they ought to be able to punish a man for the less offence. He really did not know a case in which the relationship between the larger and the smaller case was not a relationship of larger and less. But in order to prevent any element of opinion arising there they simply put in the words, "shall pass such sentence in substitution of the sentence passed at the trial." If they wore to put in the words "such less sentence" or "in relation to such less sentence," in the clause it would raise questions of opinion. For instance, in connection with the case of a charge of larceny, was felonious receiving to be considered a less offence or a greater offence? Was receiving a greater offence than stealing, or a less offence? He had heard different opinions expressed on that point, and therefore he thought it necessary to say that the two offences must be different, but not necessarily "greater" and "less." Still in finding a man guilty of one the Court must clearly find that the jury considered him to be guilty. There was a very large category of cases to which this section applied. They were all of the same nature. For example, on a charge of obtaining money by false j pretences they could find a man guilty of larceny by a trick. The facts must be such that the Court could come to the conclusion that the jury put a wrong construction on the case. In his view that was clear, and he opposed the Amendment.

MR. BOTTOMLEY

asked the hon. and learned Attorney-General if he would be good enough to enlighten the House on one specific point he wished to put to him under this subsection. Would it be competent for the Court of Criminal Appeal sitting on a case of manslaughter to find the appellant guilty of murder?

SIR JOHN WALTON

said that in his opinion it would clearly not be possible. He thought if the hon. Member looked at the section he would see that they could not do so. The only case that could arise was that of an indictment for murder and a conviction for murder. The Court of Appeal must fin that the jury must have decided the prisoners guilt of manslaughter, which was the other offence of which, under the Statute, the jury could have convicted him of.

MR. BOWLES

remarked that the hon and learned Attorney-General had said that under this section as it stood it would be competent to turn a jury's verdict c murder into a verdict of manslaughter He said, however, that it would not be competent for the Court of Appeal to reverse that process. He had no doubt that since the Attorney-General assure them that it was so, it was so, but from merely reading the section he did no gather that opinion. The Attorney General appeared to assume that the jury; in putting its wrong construction upon the facts always put too harsh a construction. What he thought the House would like to have an assurance from the Attorney-General upon was this: What was to happen in the Court of Criminal Appeal when the jury in the Court of Firs' Instance put a construction on the facts which was not too harsh, but too lenient The jury having found on a certain set of facts, for reasons of their own, that a case was one not of murder but of manslaughter, was there anything in this section which under those circumstances would prevent the Court of Criminal Appeal from acting in the reverse direction? Was there anything to prevent the Court of Appeal saying, "It is true that the jury said that in their opinion it was only manslaughter; but we are lawyers, we are much wiser on this matter of fact than the jury from the locality which tried the case. We say as lawyers, the facts have been found to be so and so, that it must be held to be murder." That surely was a serious matter. It was a matter as regards which they were entitled to something more than a mere assertion of the hon. and learned Gentleman, because it was evident that the section might work both ways. They would therefore have an avowal by the House of Commons for he first time in the history of the country that a man might be convicted and punished not by the unanimous agreement of a jury of his fellow countrymen, but by agreement of a majority of Judges sitting in London, The opinion of the lawyer was set above the opinion of the lay juror—above what was usually the reasonable and sound a opinion of twelve men taken from the e district haphazard. When they allowed that instructed legal opinion, acting without a jury, to produce results of that kind he maintained that the House of Commons was clearly bound to be quite sure on the point that this Court, which might work such great changes in lightening sentences under this section, would not work far more dangerous changes in the way of increasing sentences.

SIR W. J. COLLINS (St. Pancras, W.)

said that while he was in favour of the general principle of the Bill, he confessed that the last two Amendments had raised rather disquieting considerations in his mind. After reading over the section he was bound to say that it appeared to him that if the Court of Appeal could reduce the major offence to the minor offence, there was no reason why they should not act in the opposite direction. The Bill was intended to work for the amelioration of the law, but this clause and the preceding clause might, it seemed to him, work in the direction of aggravating the severity of the administration of the law. He repeated that he felt somewhat disquieted by the considerations raised in connection with this Amendment, and he trusted that the clause might be modified in accordance with it.

*MR. CLAVELL SALTER

confessed that he had great difficulty in seeing that the meaning attached to the sub-section by the hon. and learned Attorney-General was the only meaning. Let them assume the case of a man who was indicted for rape. Upon that indictment the jury could, if it pleased, find a man guilty of indecent assault. Let them suppose that on that indictment the man was found guilty of indecent assault, and that against that conviction he appealed. The Court of Appeal on hearing the ease are satisfied not only that there was an indecent assault, but that there were present in fact all the essential facts of rape. In those circumstances how would the matter stand under this sub-section? The appellant had been convicted of the offence of indecent assault and the Court of Appeal had found him guilty of some other offence—namely, that of rape. On the finding of the jury it appeared that the Court of Criminal Appeal must be satisfied that it was proved he was guilty of rape. The Court of Appeal would then substitute for the verdict found by the jury a verdict of guilty of rape, and would pass such sentence in substitution for the sentence passed at the trial as they thought proper—that was, a severer sentence. It appeared to him to be very difficult indeed to be satisfied with the view expressed by the Attorney-General that the only meaning of the sub-section was the meaning he had put upon it. If he substituted the word "lesser" for the word "other" throughout the sub-section he would amply secure the end that he aimed at.

*SIR JOHN WALTON

did not see the least difficulty in construing this section in the spirit of the speech which he had addressed to the House. He had avoided the use of the expression "lesser" or "greater" because it imputed a difference of opinion. He had already given the House various instances m which this element of opinion might be introduced. He thought they could not discriminate by using as an alternative expression "major" and "minor," but they might in his view discriminate by using "other offence" and "the other offence." If hon. Members looked at the first part of the sub-section they would see that it only applied to cases in which by reason of the statute the jury might find a man guilty of some other offence than that with which he was charged. If the finding of the jury was murder, the jury must have been satisfied that the man was guilty of manslaughter. If he was indicted for murder they had in manslaughter that other offence. It was idle to talk of the man as being convicted by the Court without having been convicted by the jury in such a case, because the jury had convicted him of the major offence.

MR. BOWLES

What of the reverse case?

SIR JOHN WALTON

said there was no reverse case. The only case provided for was where on an indictment for the major charge the man might be found guilty on the minor: where, on a charge of murder, manslaughter might be found; on a charge of maliciously wounding, unlawfully wounding; on a charge of infanticide, concealment of birth; on a charge of rape, indecent assault. The words were in the Bill as originally introduced, and if there was any obscurity about them a change could be effected.

MR. JOHN O'CONNOR

asked if the case did not arise where the Court might consider the jury were satisfied as to facts which involved in a verdict of murder when they found manslaughter?

MR. J. MACVEAGH (Down, S.)

said the debate had raised considerable doubt in his mind as to the effect of the clause. The Attorney-General said the only appeal contemplated under the clause was from a conviction for a major offence which the prisoner sought to have reduced to a minor. Was there anything in the Act that prevented the Court of Appeal from turning a conviction on the minor offence into a, conviction on the major? Was there any clause that prevented the Court of Appeal increasing a conviction from manslaughter to murder? That raised an entirely new principle in British law—that a man could be convicted on a charge possibly not made against him at all, in regard to which, indeed, no evidence might have been brought before the jury.

MR. RAWLINSON

said he had raised the point on Second Reading and in Committee, and it had not yet been answered. The case he put was this. A man was indicted for murder. The jury found him guilty of manslaughter. He appealed and the facts indicated to the Court of Appeal that the man was guilty of murder. Let them read the section. It appeared that where an appellant had been convicted of an offence—say manslaughter—and a jury could on an indictment have found him guilty of some offence—murder—and when on the finding of the jury it appeared to the Court of Criminal Appeal that the jury must have been satisfied of' the facts which proved the man guilty of that other offence—murder—the Court might substitute for the verdict found by the jury— manslaughter—a verdict of guilty of that other offence—murder.

THE SOLICITOR-GENERAL FOR IRELAND (Mr. Redmond Barry, Tyrone, N.)

said that the difference between manslaughter and murder was the absence or presence of malice as a fact. If the jury found a man guilty of manslaughter they must be taken as having negatived the fact of malice.

*MR. CAVE

said the Attorney-General endeavoured to lead the House to believe that he (Mr. Cave) had so little experience in connection with the Criminal Law that he had overlooked the whole class of cases

to which this sub-clause related. He did not claim to be learned in the Criminal Law, but he certainly knew the very elementary rules which the Attorney-General had put before the House. He was also in the habit of applying the principles of fair play, and he held that to enable a Court to alter the verdict of a jury in the manner proposed was an infringement of those principles of the fair play which were a part of British law. He had moved his Amendment knowing perfectly well the facts to which the Attorney-General had referred, and he thought the speeches afterwards made had justified his action. He thought that it was his duty to press for a division.

Question put.

The House divided:—Ayes, 91; Noes, 44. (Division List No. 345.)

AYES.
Agnew, George William	Gladstone, Rt. Hn. Herbert John	Pearce, Robert (Staffs., Leek)
Ainsworth, John Stirling	Goddard, Daniel Ford	Pearson, W. K. M.(Suffolk, Eye)
Allen, A. Acland(Christchurch)	Gulland, John W.	Pickersgill, Edward Hare
Astbury, John Meir	Hardy, George A. (Suffolk)	Pirie, Duncan V.
Balfour, Robert (Lanark)	Haworth, Arthur A.	Pollard, Dr.
Baring, Godfrey(Isle of Wight)	Hedges, A. Paget.	Price, C. E. (Edinburgh, Central)
Barry, Redmond J.(Tyrone, N.)	Henderson, Arthur (Durham)	Raphael, Herbert H.
Beaumont, Hon. Hubert	Higham, John Sharp	Richards, T. F (Wolverhampton)
Bennett, E. N.	Hobhouse, Charles E. H.	Rickett, J. Compton
Berridge, T. H. D.	Holt, Richard Durning	Rogers, F. E. Newman
Boulton, A. C. F.	Howard, Hon. Geoffrey	Samuel, Herbert L. (Cleveland)
Bowerman, C. W.	Hudson, Walter	Scarisbrick. T. T. L.
Bramsdon, T. A.	Illingworth, Percy H.	Seaverns, J. H.
Brunner, J. F. L. (Lanes., Leigh)	Johnson, W. (Nuneaton)	Sherwell. Arthur James
Burns, Rt. Hon. John	Jones, Sir D. Brynmor (Swansea)	Silcock. Thomas Ball
Causton, Rt. Hn. RichardKnight	Jones, Leif (Appleby)	Strachey, Sir Edward
Chance, Frederick William	Lamont, Norman	Straus, B. S. (Mile End)
Clough, William	Layland-Barratt, Francis	Strauss. E. A. (Abingdon)
Cooper, G. J.	Leese, Sir Joseph F. (Accrington)	Taylor, John W. (Durham)
Corbett, CH(Sussex, E. Grins' td)	Levy, Sir Maurice	Taylor, Theodore C.(Radcliffe)
Cornwall, Sir Edwin A.	Lewis, John Herbert	Thompson, J W H (Somerset, E.)
Craig, Herbert J.(Tynemouth)	Lyell, Charles Henry	Toulmin, George
Dalziel, James Henry	Macdonald, J. R. (Leicester)	Walters, John Tudor
Davies, Ellis William (Eifion)	M'Crae, George	Walton, Sir John L. (Leeds, S.)
Duncan, C.(Barrow-in-Furness	M'Kenna, Rt. Hon. Reginald	White. George (Norfolk)
Dunn, A. Edward (Camborne)	Maddison, Frederick	White, Luke (York. E. R.)
Dunne, Major E. Martin (Walsall)	Marks, G. Croydon (Launceston)	Whitley, John Henry (Halifax)
Elibank, Master of	Marnham, F. J.
Evans, Samuel T.	Massie. J.	TELLERS FOR THE AYES—
Everett, R. Lacey	Morrell, Philip	MR. Whiteley and Mr. J. A. Pease.
Fenwick, Charles	Norton, Capt. Cecil William
Ferens, T. R.	Partington, Oswald
NOES.
Acland-Hood, Rt Hn. Sir Alex. F.	Carlile, E. Hildred	Corbett, A. Cameron (Glasgow)
Arkwirght, John Stanhope	Catslereagh. Viscount	Cotton, Sir H. J. S.
Barrie, H. T.)London Jerry. N.)	Cavendish. Rt. Hon. Victor C. W.	Courthope. G. Loyd
Bottomley, Horatio	Cecil, Evelyn (Aston Manor)	Craik, Sir Henry
Bowles, G. Stewart	Collins, Sir Wm. J. (S. Pancras, W.	Crean, Eugene
Dalrymple, Viscount	Lane-Fox, G. R.	Scott, Sir S. (Marylebone, W.)
Douglas, Rt Hon. A. Akers-	Lardner, James Carrige Rushe	Sloan, Thomas Henry
Flavin. Michael Joseph	Lockwood. Rt. Hn. Lt.-Col. A. R.	Starkey, John R.
Forster. Henry William	MacVeagh, Jeremiah(Down, S.)	Talbot, Lord E. (Chichester)
Grayson, Albert Victor	Magnus, Sir Philip	Valentia, Viscount
Hardy, Laurence(Kent, Ashford	O'Connor, John (Kildare, N.)	Wilson, W. T. (Westhoughton)
Helmsley, Viscount	Pease, Herbert Pike (Darlington	Younger, George
Hervey, F. W. F.(BuryS. Edm'ds	Rawlinson. Sohn Frederick Peel
Hill, Sir Clement (Shrewsbury)	Renton, Major Leslie	TELLERS FOR THE NOES—MR. Cave and Mr. Staveley Hill.
Hunt, Rowland	Ridsdale, E. A.
Kilbride, Denis	Salter, Arthur Clavell

MR. RAWLINSON

said the next Amendment he had to move was a purely technical one to leave out the word "verdiet," and insert the word "finding." He would not trouble the House to divide on it, but he could not imagine where the wording came from. He imagined it was meant to apply in the case where a jury had found a special finding. It was, however, purely a question of drafting. He imagined the Attorney-General would accept it.

Amendment proposed to the Bill— In page 4, line 9, to leave out the word verdict' and insert the word "finding.' "—(Mr. Rawlinson.)

Question proposed, "That the word ' verdict' stand part of the Bill."

SIR JOHN WALTON

said he did not know where his hon. and learned friend had got his information as to drafting of Acts of Parliament. The word used was the right word, and was used advisedly, not in the sloppy, wishy-washy way the hon. and learned Gentleman supposed. It was proper that the word should be there.

MR. RAWLINSON

wished to point out that possibly if the Attorney-General had gone on reading he would have found that the special verdict was a technical point. He did not, however, wish to detain the House with the matter.

Amendment negatived.

MR. RAWLINSON

moved to leave out Subsection, 4. The effect of the section as it stood was that when a person who was charged with an offence appealed against the sentence the Court of Appeal might come to the conclusion that he had committed the offence, but was mad at the time he committed it. By that clause the Court had power to detain him during His Majesty's pleasure. The power they were giving to the Court of' Appeal was that the Court could come to the conclusion that the man was insane at the time he committed the act and bring in a verdict to that effect. It was one of the points he had brought before the House in connection with the granting of a new trial. Quito apart from the question of trial by jury he submitted that it was absolutely wrong that a man should be found insane who never set up that defence and did not wish that defence set up.

Amendment proposed to the Bill— In page 4, line 17, to leave out subsection (4) of Clause 5."—(Mr. Rawlinson.)

Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out, to the word 'that,' in page 4, line 18 , stand part of the Bill."

SIR JOHN WALTON

said he could not accept the Amendment. It very often happened that counsel put forward the defence with a view to getting the prisoner off.

Amendment negatived.

MR. BOTTOMLEY

said he had a slight Amendment to propose in Section 7 which said that anyone desirous of appealing to the Court of Criminal Appeal must do so within ten days of the conviction. The section went on to say that the Court of Criminal Appeal might extend the time for the application for leave to appeal, but there was this extraordinary limitation in the words "except in the case of a conviction involving sentence of death." That meant that if the day before the ten days was up the prisoner under sentence of death was in a position to produce important evidence if he was given a few days time, the Court of Appeal could not extend the time for a week or ten days. It might be the case that there was a witness on the sea coming over to prove the man's innocence, but the proceedings could not be delayed. He therefore moved to leave out the words referred to.

The Amendment was not seconded.

Amendment proposed— In page 5, line 39, after the word 'sentence' to insert the word 'only.' "—(Mr. Cave.)

SIR JOHN WALTON

said he accepted the Amendment.

Amendment agreed to.

MR. RAWLINSON

moved an Amendment which, he said, proposed to give power not only to the Court of Appeal, but also to the Court which tried the case, to give legal assistance to the appellant prisoner if they thought it right to do so. Assuming a man was convicted in a distant part or country he could not perhaps come up to the Court of Appeal to lay his case before them. Under the Bill they were the only tribunal which could grant legal aid and he now proposed to give power also to the court which tried the case if they thought there were facts about the case which warranted them in exercising it. That power would in such case be placed in the hands of the Chairman of Quarter Sessions or the Judge of Assizes if they thought fit to certify legal aid to the prisoner. Magistrates had power to grant legal aid to prisoners whom they were committing to quartet sessions or assizes and his Amendment was a most reasonable one.

Amendment proposed to the Bill— In page 7, line 7, after the word 'appeal' to add the words, 'or the Court that has tried the criminal.'"—(Mr. Rawlinson.)

Question proposed, "That those words be there inserted in the Bill."

SIR JOHN WALTON

said the House had already decided that leave to appeal was to be given by the Court of Appeal and not by the Judge who had tried the case. The proper person to assign the counsel or solicitor to give legal aid was the person who gave the leave to appeal. Care would no doubt be taken that the prisoner had proper legal assistance.

MR RAWLINSON

said that he did not desire to press the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

MR. RAWLINSON

moved an Amendment to Clause 11 (right of appellant to be present) to provide that the appellant should have the right to be present at the hearing of the application for leave to appeal as well as at the hearing of the appeal. The Amendment, he said, was one that he should be inclined to press on the Attorney-General. He thought the House would be of opinion that the Amendment should be accepted seeing that its object was to ensure that an appellant, who, notwithstanding that he was in custody, was entitled to be present on the hearing of his appeal, should be entitled also to be present at the application for leave to appeal. It had been decided that the only tribunal which could give a prisoner that leave on a question of fact was the Court of Appeal, and it seemed to be in accordance with all known traditions of justice that the prisoner should be allowed to attend before that Court, because if he was refused leave, his rights of appeal were entirely dead. Once the Court had been persuaded into giving leave to appeal, the probability was that they would have been almost won over on the side of the prisoner. As the Bill stood now the prisoner had no right to appear in Court himself, but he could be detained in custody at the place where he was in any part of the country. Surely he was entitled to be present, being a most important party to the proceedings.

Amendment proposed to the Bill,

"In page 7, line 14, after the word "of," to insert the words 'his application for leave to appeal and on the hearing of. '"—(Mr. Rawlinson.)

Question proposed, "That those words be there inserted in the Bill."

*SIR JOHN WALTON

said he could not accept the Amendment. He thought that the prisoner should be present as a matter of course and of right on the hearing of his appeal, but when the question was whether the prisoner should get leave to appeal or not his presence should be allowed only if it was necessary or desirable. He did not think that the prisoner should appear as a mere matter of course, because his attendance could only be secured at the cost of the Crown, and in many cases it would not be required.

MR. BOWLES

did not agree with this barring out of a man from an action in a Court of Justice which might mean absolutely life or death to him. The application would be of enormous importance to the prisoner, almost of more importance than the trial. The man might have no counsel to represent him. He was not to be assigned a solicitor or counsel in the Court that had tried

him. It was quite conceivable that the application for leave to appeal might be made before the Judges not only in the absence of the prisoner, but in the absence of anybody to represent him. He did not know what machinery was really contemplated; but it seemed to him, in view of the fact that this might be an overwhelmingly important matter to the unfortunate man, a very strange thing that the application was to be decided in his absence.

Question put.

The House divided: —Ayes, 30; Noes, 106. (Division List No. 343.)

AYES.
Acland-Hood, Rt. Hn Sir Alex. F.	Dalrymple, Viscount	Rawlinson, John Frederick Peel
Arkwright, John Stanhope	Douglas, Rt. Hon. A. Akers	Scott, Sir S. (Marylebone. W.)
Barrie, H. T. (Londonderry, N.)	Forster, Henry William	Sloan, Thomas Henry
Carlile, E. Hildred	Helmsley, Viscount	Starkey, John R.
Castlereagh, Viscount	Hervey. F. W.F.)BuryS. Edm'ds	Staveley-Hill. Henry (Staff'sh.)
Cave, George	Hill, Sir Clement)Shrewsbury)	Talbot, Lord E. (Chichester)
Cavendish, Rt. Hn. Victor C. W.	Hunt, Rowland	Valentia, Viscount
Cecil, Evelyn (Aston Manor)	Lane-Fox, G. R.	Younger, George
Corbett, A. Cameron (Glasgow)	Lockwood, Rt. Hn. Lt.-Col. A. R.
Courthope, G. Loyd	Magnus, Sir Philip	TELLERS FOR THE AYES—
Craik, Sir Henry	Pease, Herbert Pike(Darlington)	MR. Salter and Mr. Bowles.
NOES.
Ainsworth, John Stirling	Flavin, Michael Joseph	Maddison, Frederick
Allen. A. Acland (Christchurch)	Fuller, John Michael F.	Manfield, Harry (Northants)
Astbury, John Meir	Gladstone, Rt. Hn Herbert John	Marks, G. Croydon (Launceston)
Balfour, Robert (Lanark)	Goddard, Daniel Ford	Marnham, F. J.
Baring. Godfrey (Isle of Wight)	Grayson, Albert Victor	Massie, J.
Barry, Redmond J. (Tyrone. N.	Gulland, John W.	Morrell, Philip
Beauchamp, E.	Hardy, George A. (Suffolk)	Norton, Capt. Cecil William^
Beaumont. Hon. Hubert.	Harmsworth, Cecil B. (Worc'r.	O'Connor, John (Kildare, N.)
Bennett. E . N.	Haworth, Arthur A.	Partington, Oswald
Berridge. T. H. D.	Hedges, A. Paget	Pearce, Robert (Staffs. Leek)'
Boulton, A. C. F.	Henderson, Arthur (Durham)	Pearson. W. H. M.(Suffolk, Eye)
Bowerman, C. W.	Higham, John Sharp	Pickersgill, Edward Hare
Bramsdon, T. A.	Hobhouse, Charles E. H.	Pirie, Duncan V.
Brunner. J. F. L. (Lanes., Leigh)	Howard, Hon. Geoffrey	Pollard, Dr.
Burns, Rt Hon. John	Hudson, Walter	Price, C. E. (Edinburgh, Central)
Causton. Rt. Hn. RichardKnight	Hyde, Clarendon	Raphael, Herbert H.
Chance, Frederick William	Illingworth, Percy H.	Renton, Major Leslie
Clough, William	Johnson, W . (Nuneaton)	Richards, T. F. (Wolverh'mpton
Collins, Sir Wm. J.(S. Pancras, W.	Jones, Sir D Brynmor (Swansea)	Rickett, J. Compton
Cooper, G. J.	Jones, Leif (Appleby)	Ridsdale, E. A.
Corbett, CH (Sussex, E. Grinst'd)	Kilbride, Denis	Rogers, F. E. Newman
Cornwall, Sir Edwin A.	Lambert, George	Samuel, Herbert L. (Cleveland)
Cotton, Sir H. J. S.	Lamont, Norman	Scarisbrick, T. T. L.
Craig, Herbert J. (Tynemouth)	Lardner, James Carrige Rushe	Seaverns, J. H.
Crean, Eugene	Layland-Barratt, Francis	Sherwell, Arthur James
Dalziel, James Henry	Leese, Sir Joseph F. (Accrington)	Silcock, Thomas Ball
Duncan, C. (Barrow-in-Furness	Levy, Sir Maurice	Strachey, Sir Edward
Dunn, A Edward (Camborne)	Lewis, John Herbert	Straus, B. S. (Mile End)
Dunne, Major E Martin(Walsall	Lyell, Charles Henry	Strauss, E. A. (Abingdon)
Elibank, Master of Evans, Samuel T,	Macdonald, J. R. (Leicester)	Taylor, John W. (Durham)
Everett, R Lacey	MacVeagh, Jeremiah (Down, S.)	Taylor, Theodore C. (Radcliffe)
Fenwick, Charles	M'Crae, George	Thompson, J. W. H (Somerset, E.)
Ferens, T. R.	M'Kenna, Rt. Hon. Reginald	Toulmin, George
Walters, John Tudor '	White, Luke (York, E. R.)	TELLERS FOR THE NOES—Mr. Whiteley and Mr. J. A. Pease.
Walton, Sir John L. (Leeds, S.)	Whitley, John Henry (Halifax)
White, George (Norfolk)	Wilson, W. T. (Westhoughton)

COLONEL LOCKWOOD

moved the adjournment of the debate. The Government surely did not intend to continue the debate on so important a subject with Committees beginning at eleven o'clock. He was perfectly indifferent on the matter himself, as he was not concerned in any of the Committees to which he referred; but he could not conceive it as consistent with the dignity of the House for furthering the object the Government had in view that they should go on any longer.

Several Members rose to second, and Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER (Mr. Caldwell) put the Question, that further proceedings on consideration be adjourned, when

VISCOUNT HELMSLEY

said he hoped the Government would see their way

MR. JOHN O'CONNOR

I submit the Question has been put from the Chair. The Motion was put, and was seconded by no fewer than three people. One of them must have caught your eye. I submit the hon. Member would not be in order in addressing the House. In asking you to rule on this point, Sir, will you allow me to say that we who have been here all night desire that this Bill should go through?

*MR. DEPUTY-SPEAKER (Mr. Caldwell)

Undoubtedly the Motion was seconded by several hon. Members, whereupon I put the Question from the Chair. If the noble Lord says he did not second it, then he can speak.

VISCOUNT HELMSLEY

asked which of the three gentlemen the Deputy-Speaker had called upon to second.

*MR. DEPUTY-SPEAKER (Mr. Caldwell)

If the hon. Gentleman says he did not second, he can speak.

VISCOUNT HELMSLEY

Who did second?

*MR. DEPUTY-SPEAKER

Several hon. Members rose at the same time and seconded.

VISCOUNT HELMSLEY

hoped the Government would see their way to accept the adjournment Motion. It was perfectly obvious that it was impossible for the House to conduct its business in that fashion. He did not know if hon. Members were aware that there were two most important Committees which met at eleven o'clock.

MR. AINSWORTH

On a point of order, MR. Caldwell, I should like to ask you, Sir, has the Motion for adjournment been seconded?

*MR. DEPUTY-SPEAKER (Mr. Caldwell)

The Motion has been seconded and put from the Chair.

MR. AINSWORTH

If the Motion has been seconded who has seconded it?

*MR. DEPUTY - SPEAKER (Mr. Caldwell)

The noble Lord is speaking to the Motion properly put from the Chair, and it is not in order to interrupt, and go back on the seconding.

MR. AINSWORTH

Will you tell the House who has seconded?

*MR. DEPUTY-SPEAKER

(Mr.Caldwell) It is not necessary at this stage to tell the House. It is.sufficient that the Motion has been duly seconded.

MR. CLAUDE HAY

If several people have seconded the Motion, are they all out of order if they desire to address you?

*MR. DEPUTY-SPEAKER (Mr. Caldwell)

That Question is not in order just now.

VISCOUNT HELMSLEY

said he was pointing out that there were two of the most important Committees to sit at eleven o'clock that day. It was perfectly preposterous for any Government to ask the Members of the House to sit almost continuously from one day to another. It was perfectly impossible for Members to do their work adequately on those Committees when the House sat till that hour of the morning. The Government had altered the whole system of procedure to facilitate business. These Committees were set up to bring about some sort of devolution. If the net result was that not only were they to have the additional work entailed by the Committees but late sittings at that period of the session as well, the strain upon Members was one which it was most unfair of any Government to impose. It was all very well for the Government, and for Members on that side of the House, who were far greater in numbers, and who had been quite recently reinforced; it was far more easy for them to bear the strain of the sitting than it was for the members of the Opposition who were smaller in numbers and who had to take a more active part in the debate than members of the Government majority, whose sole duty was to register the opinions of the Member in charge of the Bill. Having regard to the state in which business had arrived he hoped the Government would accept the Motion.

*MR. GLADSTONE

hoped the House would consent to finish the Bill. Very little remained to be done. If it had not been for the three Motions for

AYES.
Acland-Hood, Rt Hn Sir Alex. F.	Dalrymple, Viscount	Scott, Sir S. (Marylebone, W.)
Arkwright, John Stanhope	Douglas, Rt. Hon. A. Akers	Sloan, Thomas Henry
Barrie, H. T. (Londonderry, N.)	Forster, Henry William	Starkey,.John R.
Bowles, G. Stewart,	Hervey, F. W. F. (BuryS Edm'ds)	Staveley-Hill, Henry (Staffsh.)
Carlile, E. Hildred	Hill, Sir Clement (Shrewsbury)	Talbot, Lord E. (Chichester)
Castlereagh, Viscount-	Hunt. Rowland	Valentia, Viscount
Cave, George	Lane-Fox. G. R.	Wilson, W. T. (Westhoughton)
Cavendish, Rt. Hn. Victor C. W.	Morpeth, Viscount	Younger, George
Cecil, Evelyn (Aston Manor)	Pease, Herbert pike (Darlington)
Corbett, A. Cameron (Glasgow)	Rawlinson. John Frederick Peel	TELLERS FOR THE AYES— Colonel Lockwood and Viscount Helmsley.
Courthope, G. Loyd	Renton. Major Leslie
Craik, Sir Henry	Salter. Arthur Clavell

NOES.
Ainsworth, John Stirling	Crean. Eugene	Hyde, Clarendon
Allen. A. Acland (Christchurch)	Dalziel, James Henry	Illingworth. Percy H.
Astbury, John Meir	Duncan, C (Barrow-in-Furness)	Johnson, W. (Nuneaton)
Balfour, Robert (Lanark)	Dunn. A. Edward (Camborne)	Jones, Sir. D Brynmor (Swansea)
Baring, Godfrey (Isle of Wight)	Dunne, Major E. Martin(Walsall)	Jones. Leif (Appleby)
Barry. Redmond. J (Tyrone, N.)	Elibank. Master of	Kilbride, Denis
Beauchamp, E.	Evans, Samuel T.	Lambert, George
Beaumont. Hon. Hubert	Everett, R. Lacey	Lamont, Norman
Bennett. E. N.	Fenwick. Charles	Lardner, James Carrige Rushe
Berridge, T, H. D.	Ferens. T. R.	Layland-Barratt, Francis
Boulton, A. C. F.	Flavin, Michael Joseph	Leese, Sir Joseph F(Accrington)
Bowerman, C. W.	Gladstone. Rt. Hn. Herbert John	Levy, Sir Maurice
Bramsdon, T. A.	Goddard, Daniel Ford	Lewis, John Herbert
Brunner, J. P. L(Lanes, Leigh)	Grayson, Albert Victor	Lyell, Charles Henry
Burns, Rt. Hon. John	Gulland, John W.	Macdonald, J. R. (Leicester)
Causton. Rt. Hn Richard Knight	Hardy, George A. (Suffolk)	MacVeagh, Jeremiah (Down, S.)
Chance, Frederick William	Harmsworth. Cecil B. (Worc'r)	M'Crae, George
Clough, William	Haworth, Arthur A.	M'Kenna. Rt. Hon. Reginala
Collins, Sir Wm. J. (S. Pancras, W.	Hedges, A. Paget	Maddison, Frederick
Cooper, G. J.	Henderson, Arthur (Durham)	Manfield, Harry (Northants)
Corbett, CH(Sussex, E. Grinst'd)	Higham, John Sharp	Marks, G. Croydon (Launceston)
Cornwall, Sir Edwin A.	Hobhouse, Charles E. H.	Marnham, F. J.
Cotton. Sir H. J. S.	Howard, Hon. Geoffrey	Massie, J.
Craig, Herbert. J. (Tynemouth)	Hudson, Walter	Morrell, Philip

the adjournment they would already have finished. His hon. friend had said he did not mind going on, but that he was thinking of his friends. He hoped the hon. Gentleman's friends would be prepared to go on.

MR. JANE-FOX

said the right hon. Gentleman had alluded to the three Motions for the adjournment. He wished to say that the three Motions were perfectly justified, because it was an absolute farce that they should be asked to discuss a Bill of that importance during the small hours of the morning. There had been absolutely no obstruction, and no member of the Treasury Bench could say there had been any sign of obstruction. He thought the right hon. Gentleman had no right to complain of the adjournment Motions.

Question put.

The House divided:—Ayes, 36 ; Noes, 102. (Division List No. 347.)

Norton, Capt. Cecil William	Rogers, F. E. Newman	Toulmin, George
O'Connor, John (Kildare, N.)	Samuel, Herbert L. (Cleveland)	Walters, John Tudor
Partington, Oswald	Scarisbrick, T. T. L.	Walton, Sir John L. (Leeds, S.)
Pearce, Robert (Staffs. Leek)	Seaverns, J. H.	White, George (Norfolk)
Pickersgill, Edward Hare	Sherwell, Arthur James	White, Luke (York. E. R.)
Pirie, Duncan V.	Silcock, Thomas Ball	Whitley, John Henry (Halifax)
Pollard, Dr.	Strachey, Sir Edward
Price, C. E. (Edinburgh, Central)	Straus, B. S. (Mile End)	TELLERS FOR THE NOES—Mr. Whiteley and Mr. J. A. Pease.
Raphael, Herbert H.	Strauss, E. A. (Abingdon)
Richards, T. F (Wolverhampton)	Taylor, John W. (Durham)
Rickett, J. Compton	Taylor, Theodore C. (Radcliffe)
Ridsdale, E. A.	Thompson, J. W H(Somerset, E.)

*MR. CAVE

moved in Clause 13, to leave out "an" and to insert "a successful." He said his object in moving the Amendment was to ascertain how it was proposed that the expense of an unsuccessful appeal should be met. If they looked at Sub-section 2, which he was seeking to amend, they would find that all the expenses of the appellant should be defrayed in the same manner as the expenses of a prosecution in cases of felony. He was not sure he was right, but it appeared to him that the appellant whether he succeeded or not would draw on the county funds for his costs of the appeal. The fact was that whether he had an absolutely frivolous ease or not the appellant only had to apply for leave to appeal and he got the whole of his costs out of county funds. It seemed to him that that was a great encouragement to frivolous appeals. He thought that where there was a good case for the appeal the costs should come out of public funds, but where there was not a good ease they should not. As it was the Bill was an encouragement to every prisoner to try his luck on an appeal, for he could not lose anything, while he might get something by it.

Amendment proposed to the Bill— In page 7, line 41, to leave out the word 'an,' and insert the words 'a successful'"— (Mr. Care)—instead thereof.

Question proposed, "That the word 'an' stand part of the Bill."

SIR JOHN WALTON

said he did not think he could allow it to be said that a convicted prisoner would have appealed, but was too poor to pay his expenses. They ought to give the right of appeal even in the poorest cases. Only a small sum would be necessary.

Amendment negatived.

Amendments proposed— In page 8, line 19, to leave out the word 'or,' and insert the words 'and subject to any directions which the Court of Criminal Appeal may give to the contrary on any appeal, the time during which the appellant."' In page 8, line 25, after the word 'shall,' insert the words 'subject to any directions which may be given by the Court as aforesaid.' "—(The Attorney-General.)

Amendments agreed to.

MR. RAWLINSON

said the meaning of his next Amendment was easily explained. As the Bill stood at: the present time, if a man appealed directly he was in custody, from the moment his appeal started he was kept in custody, but in a different class from that in which he would be were he sent to hard labour or anything of that kind. The time he was kept waiting for his appeal, which must be a month or more, did not count as part of his sentence. The Amendment sought to alter that. It ensured that that period of time should count as part of the sentence, and that the court should allow it to be so taken. Remarks which he had made on a previous Amendment applied in a lesser degree to this one. The object of the Bill in its present form appeared to be to deter people from appealing. That was hardly fair. If a man did not succeed in his appeal the result might be that; he would be kept in prison another month, because, as he had said, no account was taken of the time which he spent in custody while waiting for his appeal to come. That was not a fair way of proceeding, and he therefore hoped that the House would agree to the; Amendment.

SIR SAMUEL SCOTT (Marylebone, W.)

seconded the Amendment.

Amendment proposed— In page 8, lines 27 and 28, leave out the words 'the appeal is determined' and insert the words 'the sentence is passed.'"—(Mr. Rawlinson.)

Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Bill."

*SIR JOHN WALTON

rather objected to one observation which had fallen from the hon. and learned Member on two or three occasions during the discussion. He had said that various provisions had been put in the Bill with the object of deterring persons from appealing. That was not the object of this provision. If a prisoner said he had been wrongly convicted, and desired to get leave to appeal, he had a right to have that question determined. If, therefore, he had been sentenced to a term of penal servitude, they could not put him under the regimen for the period of time while he was awaiting the appeal that he would be under if he was fulfilling his sentence in the ordinary way. He was not, as a matter of fact, at that time serving the sentence. The sentence had been arrested, and therefore he must be dealt with on a different principle. When the matter was in Committee he agreed to the insertion of the words which he had just moved, and which would give the Court power to say whether that period should count as part of the sentence or not. If the Court thought it right to make that period count, it would of course be a relief to the prisoner. He thought the words in question which were suggested when the Bill was in Committee upstairs, met the views generally of those Members who were present.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

*MR. CLAVELL SALTER

moved an Amendment to exempt from the work that may be done by a single Judge in Chambers the power of giving leave to appeal. His object in moving the Amendment, he said, was entirely to secure the general convenience of people concerned. Section 17, the House would see, gave the Court power to delegate to a Judge in Chambers, being one of their own body, certain matters. The powers which might be exercised related to a series of minor matters which it would be proper to deal with in Chambers. As the Court would be constituted by three Judges it would be a very great inconvenience that one Judge should break up the work of the Court. Therefore, the Chamber work, which would be considerable under the Act, would have to be performed by one of the other eight King's Bench Judges who would be members of the Court. One of the Judges of the King's Bench Division was always sitting in Chambers. It would, therefore, be by far the most economical and convenient course that the Chamber work under the Act should be done by the ordinary Judge in Chambers of the King's Bench Division. It would be the best plan to choose for Chamber work in the King's Bench Division one of the eight Judges who were members of the Court sitting in Chambers, and who would be able to deal with matters which arose under the Act in the ordinary course of his duties. The system proposed under the Bill would be very wasteful and costly. It would really be a farce and a waste of time and money to try to get the Judge in Chambers to hear applications for leave to appeal, because in the great majority of cases he would refuse relief, and the man would have the right of taking the case to the Court of Appeal. He ventured to suggest to the learned Attorney-General that it would be much more convenient in every way to confine the Chamber work under the Bill to the smaller matters which that section prescribed.

MR. BOULTON (Huntingdonshire, Ramsey)

considered that the application for leave to appeal ought to be made in the first case to the full Court. That might save a great deal of time and also two applications. In every case where the application was refused by the single Judge, it would afterwards be made to the three Judges.

Amendment proposed to the Bill— In page 10, line 18, to leave out the words 'to give leave to appeal.' "—(Mr. Salter.)

Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Bill."

SIR JOHN WALTON

felt that there was a great deal of force in the argument which had been used, but he thought it was an argument that might be addressed to the Rule Committee of the Judges who would have to settle the procedure for the administration of the Act. It would be an advantage to leave the Bill as it was, trusting to such modifications being made in smaller matters as the Judges in Chambers might resolve upon.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendments proposed— In page 11, line 6, after the word ' being,' to insert the words "the Registrar of the Court of Criminal Appeal. In page 12, line 2, after the word ' inquisitions,' to insert the words 'and in cases where a person is dealt with by a court of quarter sessions as an incorrigible rogue under the Vagrancy Act, 1824.' In page 12, line 7, to leave out the word 'Appeals," and insert the words "Notwithstanding anything in any other Act, an appeal shall lie.' In page 12, line 7, to leave out the word 'convictions, 'and to insert the words 'a conviction.' In page 12, line 7, to leave out the word 'indictments,' and insert the word 'indictment.'"—(The Attorney-General.)

Amendments agreed to.

MR. RAWLINSON

moved in Clause 20, after the word "law," to insert the words "whether tried in the King's Bench Division or at the assizes or at the quarter sessions." As the section stood at the present moment he said it might lead to a considerable amount of litigation.

Amendment proposed to the Bill—

"In page 12, line 8, after the word 'law,' to insert the words 'whether tried in the King's Bench Division, or at the assizes, or at quarter sessions.'"—(Mr. Rawlinson.)

Question proposed, "That those words be there inserted in the Bill."

SIR JOHN WALTON

did not think it was necessary to add the words.

Amendment by leave, withdrawn.

Amendments proposed—

"In page 12, line 9, to leave out from the word 'river,' to the word 'in,' in line 10, and to insert the words 'in whatever Court the indictment is tried.'"

"In page 12, line 10, to leave out the word 'convictions,' and insert the word 'conviction.'"

"In page 12, line 11, after the word 'action,' to insert the words ' tried at assizes.'"

"In page 13, line 3, to leave out the word. twenty-fifth day of December,' and to insert the words 'eighteenth day of April.'"

"In page 13, line 3, to leave out the word 'seven, and insert the word 'eight.' "—(The Attorney-General.)

Amendments agreed to.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Bill be read a third time."— (Mr. Attorney-General.)

MR. PIKE PEASE

asked the Government to reconsider their decision in regard to Third Reading. They had had a very interesting debate and an able discussion. In the circumstances ho hoped they would not be asked to pass the Third Reading.

*MR. GLADSTONE

asked the House to read the Bill a third time. There was a very full discussion on the Second Reading, a quite-satisfactory debate in Grand Committee, and they had now had eight or nine hours discussion on Report. There was nothing more to be said on the principle, and as they all knew the House of Lords was anxious to have Bills as soon as possible, in these circumstances he hoped the House would consent to read the Bill a third time.

MR. FLAVIN

appealed to the Government not to ask the House to sit up another night, but to take the Third Reading now.

MR AKERS-DOUGLAS

said he was in favour of the Bill, but protested it was rather a strong order to ask the Opposition to give the Third Reading there and then. A good many Members wanted to discuss the Bill on the Third Reading, and he could not press them to assent that night.

Question put.

The House divided:—Ayes, 102; Noes, 28. (Division List No. 348.)

Cooper, G. J.	Hyde, Clarendon	Price, C. E. (Edinburgh, Central)
Corbett, C. H (Sussex, E Grinst'd)	Johnson, W. (Nuneaton)	Raphael, Herbert H.
Cornwall, Sir Edwin A.	Jones, Sir D. Brynmor(Swansea	Renton, Major Leslie
Cotton, Sir H. J. S.	Jones, Leif (Appleby)	Richards, T. F.(Wolverhampton
Craig, Herbert J. (Tynemouth)	Kilbride, Denis	Rickett, J. Compton
Crean, Eugene	Lambert, George	Rogers, F. E. Newman
Dalziel, James Henry	Lamont, Norman	Samuel, Herbert L. (Cleveland)
Duncan, C. (Barrow-in-Furness)	Lardner, James Carrige Rushe	Scarisbrick, T. T. L.
Dunn, A. Edward (Camborne)	Layland-Barratt, Francis	Seaverns, J. H.
Dunne, Major E. Martin (Walsall	Leese, Sir Joseph F. (Accrington)	Sherwell, Arthur James
Elibank. Master of	Levy, Sir Maurice	Silcock, Thomas Ball
Evans, Samuel T.	Lewis, John Herbert	Strachey, Sir Edward
Everett, R. Lacey	Lyell, Charles Henry	Straus. B. S. (Mile End)
Fenwick, Charles	Macdonald, J. R. (Leicester)	Strauss, E. A. (Abingdon)
Ferens, T. R.	MacVeagh, Jeremiah (Down, S.	Taylor. John W. (Durham)
Flavin, Michael Joseph	M'Crae, George	Taylor, Theodore C. (Radcliffe)
Fuller. John Michael F.	M'Kenna, Rt. Hon. Reginald	Thompson, J. W H (Somerset, E.)
Gladstone, Rt. Hn Herbert John	Maddison. Frederick	Toulmin, George
Goddard, Daniel Ford	Manfield, Harry (Northants)	Walters. John Tudor
Grayson..Albert Victor	Marks, G.Croydon(Launceston)	Walton, Sir John L. (Leeds, S.)
Gulland, John W.	Marnham. F. J.	White, George (Norfolk)
Hardy, George A. (Suffolk)	Massie, J.	White, Luke (York, E. R.)
Harmsworth, Cecil B. (Worc'r)	Morrell, Philip	Whitley. John Henry (Halifax)
Haworth. Arthur A.	Norton, Capt. Cecil William	Wilson, W. T. (Westhoughton)
Hedges, A. Paget	O'Connor, John (Kildare, N.)
Henderson, Arthur (Durham)	Partington, Oswald	TELLERS FOR THE AYES—Mr
Higham, John Sharp	Pearce, Robert (Staffs. Leek)	Whiteley and Mr. J. A.
Hobhouse, Charles E. H.	Pickersgill, Edward Hare	Pease.
Howard, Hon. Geoffrey	Pirie, Duncan V.
Hudson, Walter	Pollard, Dr.

NOES.
Acland-Hood Rt Hn. Sir Alex. F.	Forster, Henry William	Scott, Sir S. (Marylebone, W.)
Arkwright, John Stanhope	Helmsley, Viscount	Sloan, Thomas Henry
Barrie. H. T. (Londonderry, N.	Hervey.F. W. F (Bury S.Edm'ds	Starkey. John R.
Bowles, G. Stewart	Hunt, Rowland	Talbot, Lord E. (Chichester)
Castlereagh, Viscount	Lane-Fox, G. R,	Valentia, Viscount
Cave, George	Lockwood. Rt. Hn. Lt.-Col. A. R.	younger, George
Cavendish. Rt. Hon. Victor C. W.	Morpeth, Viscount
Corbett. A. Cameron (Glasgow)	Pease, Herbert Pike)Darlington	TELLERS FOR THE NOES—MR.
Craik, Sir Henry	Rawlinson, John Frederick Peel	Courthope and Mr. Staveley-
Dalrymple. Viscount	Ridsdale. E. A.	Hill.
Douglas, Rt. Hon. A. Akers	Salter, Arthur Clavell

Bill read the third time and passed.