Commons Sitting of 4 February 1904

Preamble
The House met at Two of the Clock.

UNOPPOSED PRIVATE BILL BUSINESS.
Acton Improvement Bill. "To confer upon the Urban District Council of Acton further powers with regard to the supply of electricity and the improvement, health, local government, and finance of the district; and for other purposes," presented, and read the first time; and ordered to be read a second time.
Amersham, Beaconsfield, and District Water Bill. "To extend the limits of supply of the Amersham, Beaconsfield, and District Waterworks Company, Limited, and to confer further powers upon that Company," presented, and read the first time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.
Arlesey Gas Bill. "For extending the limits of supply of the Arlesey Gas Company for the raising of additional capital; and for other purposes," presented, and read the first time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.
Baker Street and Waterloo Railway Bill. "To authorise the Baker Street and Waterloo Railway Company to acquire additional lands; to confer further powers; and for other purposes," presented, and read the first time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.
Barnet District Gas and Water Bill. To enable the Barnet District Gas and Water Company to acquire additional lands, construct additional works, and raise further capital; and for other purposes," presented, and read the first time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.
Bexhill Water and Gas Bill. "To extend the limits of supply of the Bexhill Water and Gas Company; to authorise the Company to raise additional capital, and to construct additional waterworks; and for other purposes," presented, and read the first time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.
Birkdale Improvement Bill. "To authorise the Urban District Council of Birkdale to acquire land to construct an outfall sewer, and to make further provision in regard to the health, local government, improvement, and finance of the urban district; and for other purposes," presented, and read the first time; and ordered to be read a second time.
Bishop's Stortford and District Gas Bill. "For incorporating and conferring powers on the Bishop's Stortford and District Gas Company," presented, and read the first time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.
Blyth and Cowpen Gas Bill. "To confer further powers on the Blyth and Cowpen Gas Company," presented, and read the first time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.
Brixham Gas Bill. "For incorporating and conferring powers on the Brixham Gas Company," presented, and read the first time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.
Brymbo Water Bill. "To authorise the Brymbo Water Company to extend their limits of supply, to raise additional capital; and for other purposes," presented, and read the first time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.
Carlisle Corporation Bill. "To extend the boundaries of the city of Carlisle, to consolidate the parishes in the city into one parish, to make further and better provision for the health, good government, and improvement of the city; and for other purposes," presented, and read the first time; and ordered to be read a second time.
Charing Cross, Euston, and Hampstead Railway Bill. "For conferring further powers upon the Charing Cross, Euston, and Hampstead Railway Company; and for other purposes," presented, and read the first time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.
Cheshire Electricity and Power-Gas Bill. "For incorporating and conferring powers on the Cheshire Electricity and Power-Gas Company; and for other purposes," presented, and read the first time; and ordered to be read a second time.
Chippenham Gas Bill. "For incorporating and conferring powers on the Chippenham Gas Company; and for other purposes," presented, and read the first time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.
Colney Hatch Gas Bill. "To authorise the Colney Hatch Gas Company to raise additional capital, to acquire lands, to enlarge their works, to alter name of company, to amend their existing Acts; and for other purposes," presented, and read the first time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.
Corbridge Gas Bill. "For incorporating and conferring powers on the Corbridge Gas Company," presented, and read the first time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.
Corporation of London (Southwark and other Bridges) Bill. "To empower the Corporation of London to rebuild Southwark Bridge, and to confer other powers upon them with respect to that and other bridges; and for other purposes," presented, and read the first time; and ordered to be read a second time.
Croydon Gas Bill. "To change the name of Croydon Commercial Gas and Coke Company to the Croydon Gas Company,' and to confer further powers on the Company with respect to the raising of additional capital, the construction and maintenance of additional gas works; and for other purposes." presented, and read the first time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.
Crystal Palace District Gas Bill. "To alter the provisions of the Acts of the Crystal Palace District Gas Company with respect to the illuminating power of gas supplied by them and the testing of g s; to change the name of the Company to 'the South Suburban Gas Company'; and for other purposes," presented, and read the first time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.
Doncaster Corporation Bill. "To confer further powers upon the Mayor, Aldermen, and Burgesses of the Borough of Doncaster with reference to their water, gas, and electricity undertakings; to make further and better provision with regard to the improvement, health, local government, and finance of the said borough; and for other purposes,"

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presented, and read the first time; and ordered to be read a second time.
Donegal Railway Bill. "To authorise the Donegal Railway Company to raise further moneys by the creation and issue of guaranteed preference stock for the purpose, amongst others, of completing the Ballyshannon Extension, and to empower the Company to own and work motor-cars and other vehicles; and for other purposes," presented, and read the first time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.
East London and Lower Thames Electric Power Bill. "For incorporating and conferring powers on the East London and Lower Thames Electric Power Company," presented, and read the first time; and ordered to be read a second time.
Felixstowe Gas Bill. "To incorporate and confer powers upon the Felixstowe Gas Light Company," presented, and read the first time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.
Gas Light and Coke and other Gas Companies Acts Amendment Bill. "To amend the Gas Light and Coke and other Gas Companies Acts Amendment Act, 1880; and for other purposes," presented, and read the first time; and ordered to be read a second time.
Gomersal Gas Bill. "For consolidating the capital of the Gomersal Gas Company; for enabling that Company to raise additional capital; and for other purposes," presented, and read the first time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.
Great Central and Midland Joint Railways Bill. "To constitute as a separate undertaking certain Railways of the Sheffield and Midland Railway Companies' Joint Committee and certain other Railways authorised to be constructed by the Great Central and Midland Railway Companies jointly; and for other purposes," presented, and read the first time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.
Great Central Railway Bill. "To authorise the construction of new works and the acquisition of lands by the Great Central Railway Company in connection with their undertaking; the construction of new Railways by the Cheshire Lines Committee and the Seaforth and Sefton Junction Railway Company respectively,
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and the acquisition of lands by the Great Western and Great Central Railways Joint Committee and the Manchester South Junction and Altrincham Railway Company respectively in connection with their respective undertakings; the acquisition by the Great Central Railway Company of the undertakings of the Wrexham, Mold, and Connah's Quay and Buckley Railway Companies; and for other purposes," presented, and read the first time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.
Great Eastern Railway Bill. "For conferring further powers on the Great Eastern Railway Company; and for other purposes," presented, and read the first time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.
Great Eastern Railway (Steamboats) Bill. "To amend the powers of the Great Eastern Railway Company with respect to the use of steam vessels," presented, and read the first time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.
Great Northern and City Railway (Extension of Time) Bill. "To extend the time for the completion of railways; and for other purposes," presented, and read the first time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.
Great Northern Railway Bill. "To confer powers on the Great Northern Railway Company with reference to the construction of works and the purchase of lands; to extend the time limited for the compulsory purchase of certain lands by the Company; to empower the Company and the Great Central Railway Company to purchase lands, and to extend the time for the compulsory purchase of certain lands by those Companies; and for other purposes," presented, and read the first time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.
Hampton-in-Arden Gas Bill. "To incorporate the Hampton-in-Arden and Meriden Gas Company, and to enable that company to supply with gas certain parishes in the county of Warwick," presented, and read the first time; and ordered to be read a second time.
Harrow Road and Paddington Tramways Bill. "To confer powers on the Harrow Road and Paddington Tramways Company for widening and altering roads

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and acquiring lands in the counties of Middlesex and London; to authorise the sale of the undertaking of the company to the Metropolitan Electric Tramways, Limited, and to provide for the dissolution and winding-up of the Company; and for other purposes," presented, and read the first time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.
Humber Commercial Railway and Dock Bill. "To empower the Humber Commercial Railway and Dock Company to construct a new dock with connecting railway and other works and entrance into the River Humber; to abandon the dock and works authorised by The Humber Commercial Railway and Dock Act, 1901; and for other purposes," presented, and read the first-time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.
Kettering Improvement Bill. "To make further and better provision with regard to the electric light undertaking of the Council, and for the improvement, health, local government, and finance of the district; and for other purposes," presented, and read the first time; and ordered to be read a second time.
Kirkby-in-Ashfield Urban District Gas Bill. "To empower the Urban District Council of Kirkby-in-Ashfield to supply gas and to provide for the transfer to the Council of so much of the gas undertaking of the Sutton-in-Ashfield Urban District Council as is situate within the urban district of Kirkby-in-Ashfield; and for other purposes," presented, and read the first time; and ordered to be read a second time.
Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway (Steam Vessels) Bill. "To authorise the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company to provide and work steam vessels between the ports of Goole and Hull and certain Continental ports; and to subscribe to the funds of steamship companies; and for other purposes," presented, and read the first time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.
Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway (Various Powers) Bill. "To authorise the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company to construct new railways; to widen certain existing railways, and to construct other works; to acquire
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additional lands: and to raise additional capital; and for other purposes," presented, and read the first time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.
Leeds Corporation (Consolidation) Bill. "To consolidate, with amendments, certain of the local Acts in force within the city of Leeds; to make further provision in regard to the various undertakings of the Corporation, and to make better provision for the health and local government of the city; and for other purposes," presented, and read the first time; and ordered to be read a second time.
Leyton Urban District Council Bill. "To authorise the Urban District Council of Leyton, in the county of Essex, to construct and work tramways, and to confer further powers on the Council in regard to their tramways undertaking and their electrical undertaking; to empower the Council to execute certain street widenings. to provide for vesting in the Council certain lammas lands as open spaces and recreation grounds: to make further provision for the improvement, health, and local government of the district; and for other purposes," presented, and read the first time; and ordered to be read a second time.
Lincolnshire and Yorkshire Electric Power Bill. "For incorporating and conferring powers on the Lincolnshire and Yorkshire Electric Power Company," presented, and read the first time; and ordered to be read a second time.
Littlestone-on-Sea and District Water Bill. "For incorporating the Littlestone-on-Sea and District Water Company and empowering them to construct works and supply water; and for other purposes," presented, and read the first time; and ordered to be read a second time.
London and India Docks Company Bill. "To facilitate the passage of traffic to and from the docks of the London and India Docks Company; to extend the time for the compulsory purchase of lands required for and for the completion of certain works; and for other purposes," presented, and read the first time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.
London and North Western Railway Bill. "For conferring further powers upon the London and North Western Railway Company in relation to their own undertaking, and upon that Company and the Great Western Railway Company in relation to their joint undertaking; and for other purposes," presented, and read the first time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.
London, Camberwell, and Dulwich Tramways Bill. "To define the widening of Rye Lane, Peckham, referred to in the Peckham and Bast Dulwich Tramways Act, 1885 and 1887; and to confer further powers upon the London, Camberwell, and Dulwich Tramways Company," presented, and read the first time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.
London County Council (General Powers) Bill. "To empower the London County Council to acquire lands for various purposes; to make provisions with respect to sanitary and other like matters; to authorise the exchange of certain lands at Tooting Bee Common; to empower the Council of the Metropolitan Borough of Woolwich to purchase lands for various purposes; to change the name of the Metropolitan Fire Brigade; to confer various powers upon the London County Council and upon the Councils of Metropolitan Boroughs; and for other purposes," presented, and read the first time; and ordered to be read a second time.
London Port and Docks Bill. "To impose rates on goods imported into the Port of London, and to make provision for the improvement of the dock accommodation at, and the navigation of, the said Port; and for other purposes," presented, and read the first time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.
London, Tilbury, and Southend Railway Bill. "To confer further powers upon the London, Tilbury, and Southend Railway Company," presented, and read the first time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.
Lytham Improvement Bill. "To authorise the Urban District Council of Lytham to acquire Land to erect a Town Hall, to make further provision in regard to their gas undertaking, and to
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the health, local government, improvement, and finance of their district; and for other purposes," presented, and read the first time; and ordered to be read a second time.
Midland Railway Bill. "To confer additional powers upon the Midland Railway Company and upon that; Company and the Great Eastern Rail-way Company and upon the Midland and Great Northern Railways Joint Committee and the Norfolk and Suffolk Joint Committee, for the construction of works and acquisition of lands; and for other purposes, "presented, and read the first time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.
Mullingar, Kells, and Drogheda Railway Bill. "To empower the Mullingar, Kells, and Drogheda Railway Company to make a deviation railway in the county of Westmeath and an extension railway in the county of Louth, and to enable that Company and the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company to enter into working and other agreements; and for other purposes," presented, and read the first time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.
North and South Woolwich Electric Railway Bill. "For incorporating the North and South Woolwich Electric Railway Company, and for empowering them to construct a railway from North Woolwich to South Woolwich, in the counties of London and Essex; and for other purposes," presented, and read the first time; and ordered to be read a second time.
North Staffordshire Railway Bill. "To confer further powers on the North Staffordshire Railway Company," presented, and read the first time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.
North-Western Electricity and Power Gas Bill. "For conferring further powers on the North-Western Electricity and Power Gas Company; and for other purposes," presented, and read the first time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.
Norwich Water Bill. "To empower the City of Norwich Waterworks Company to raise additional capital; and for other purposes," presented, and read the first time; and referred to the

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Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.
Plymouth and North Devon Direct Railway (Abandonment) Bill. "For the abandonment of the Plymouth and North Devon Direct Railway," presented, and read the first time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.
Plymouth Corporation Bill. "To confer further borrowing powers upon the Mayor, Aldermen, and Burgesses of the borough of Plymouth," presented, and read the first time; and ordered to be read a second time.
Radcliffe Tramway and Improvement Bill. "To confer on the Urban District Council of Radcliffe further powers with regard to their tramways undertaking; to construct new tramways and street improvements; to extend the Town's Yard; and to make further provision in regard to the supply of electricity, and for the improvement, health, local government, and finance of the district; and for other purposes," presented, and read the first time; and ordered to be read a second time.
Reading Corporation Bill. "To authorise an increase in the public libraries and museums' rates in the borough of Reading; to provide for the establishment of a superannuation fund; to make further provision in regard to the health, local government, and improvement of the said borough; and for other purposes," presented, and read the first time; and ordered to be read a second time.
Rickmansworth and Uxbridge Valley Water Bill. "For extending the limits of supply of the Rickmansworth and Uxbridge Valley Water Company; and for other purposes," presented, and read the first time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.
Ryde Gas Bill. "For conferring further powers upon the Ryde Gaslight Company," presented, and read the first time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.
Saddle worth and Springhead Tramways (Abandonment) Bill. "For the abandonment of the Saddleworth and Springhead Tramways; and for other purposes," presented, and read the first time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.
St. Marylebone Electric Lighting Bill. For conferring further powers upon the Mayor, Alderman, and Councillors of the metropolitan borough of St. Marylebone with regard to the supply of electricity; and for other purposes," presented, and read the first time; and ordered to be read a second time,
Selby Urban District Council Bill. "To enable the Urban District Council of Selby to construct new waterworks and to make further provision with regard to their market, water, and gas undertakings, to enable them to rate and acquire Selby Bridge, and for the improvement, health, and local government of the district," presented, and read the first time; and ordered to be read a second time.
Sheffield, Laughton, and Maltby Railway Bill. "For making railways in the West Riding of the county of York; and for other purposes," presented, and read the first time; and ordered to be read a second time.
Sheppy Gas Bill. "For consolidating the capital of, and for conferring further powers on, the Sheppy Gas Company," presented, and read the first time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.
Skipton Water and Improvement Bill. "To authorise the Urban District Council of Skipton to construct additional waterworks; to extend their limits of supply; and to make further provision with regard to the supply of electricity; and for the improvement, health, local government, and finance of the district; and for other purposes," presented, and read the first time; and ordered to be read a second time.
Soothill Nether Urban District Tramways Bill. "To enable the Soothill Nether Urban District Council to make and maintain tramways and street improvements; to acquire land for the purpose of a refuse destructor; and for other purposes," presented, and read the first time; and ordered to be read a second time.
Southend-on-Sea Gas Bill. "For conferring further powers on the Southend Gas Company," presented, and read the first time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.
Southend Water Bill. "To empower the Southend Waterworks Company to

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raise further capital; and for other purposes," presented, and read the first time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.
South Shields Gas Bill. "To confer further powers upon the South Shields Gas Company," presented, and read the first time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.
South Western and Isle of Wight Junction Railway (Extension of Time) Bill. "To extend the time limited for the compulsory purchase of lands for and completion of the railways and works authorised by the South Western and Isle of Wight Junction Railway Act, 1901; and for other purposes," presented and read the first time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.
Strabane, Raphoe, and Convoy Railway Bill. "To empower the Strabane, Raphoe, and Convoy Company to construct railways in the Counties of Tyrone and Donegal; to change the name of the Company; and for other purposes," presented, and read the first time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.
Surrey Commercial Dock Bill. "To authorise the Surrey Commercial Dock Company to raise further capital; and for other purposes," presented, and read the first time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.
Sutton Gas Bill. "For conferring further powers upon the Sutton Gas Company," presented, and read the first time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.
Swindon Corporation Bill. "To enable the Corporation of the Borough of Swindon to make new Tramways, and to make further provisions with reference to markets, and for the health, local government, and improvement of the borough; and for other purposes," presented, and read the first time; and ordered to be read a second time.
Thames River Steamboat Service Bill. "To provide for the acquisition and construction of piers and landing places on the River Thames in the Administrative County of London by the London County Council, and to make provision for a service of vessels for passengers and parcels; and for other purposes," presented, and read the first time; and ordered to be read a second time.
Thames Steamboat Trust Bill. "To incorporate trustees for the maintenance of a service of steamboats on the River Thames, to transfer to them the undertaking of the Thames Steamboat Company (1897), Limited, to provide for the transfer to them of certain piers on the River Thames, and for the guarantee by the London County Council of interest on moneys to be borrowed by the trustees; and for other purposes," presented, and read the first time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.
Thurles Urban District Council Water Bill. "To authorise the Urban District Council of Thurles, in the County of Tipperary, to construct waterworks for the supply of the district; and for other purposes," presented, and read the first time; and ordered to be read a second time.
Tottenham Improvement Bill. "To confer further powers upon the Urban District Council for the District of Tottenham in the County of Middlesex," presented, and read the first time; and ordered to be read a second time.
Watford and District Tramways (Extension of Time) Bill. "To extend the time for the compulsory purchase of lands, and for the construction of the Tramways authorised by The Watford and District Tramways Act, 1601; and for other purposes," presented, and read the first time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.
Wellington (Somerset) Gas Bill. "For incorporating and conferring powers on the Wellington (Somerset) Gas Company; and for other purposes," presented, and read the first time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.
Whitby Gas Bill. "To confer further powers upon the Whitby Gas Company," presented, and read the first time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.
Wolverhampton Corporation Bill. "To empower the Corporation of Wolverhampton to construct tramways, and to make further provision in regard to their tramway, electricity, and market undertakings, and the health, local government, and improvement of their borough; and for other purposes," presented, and read the first time; and ordered to be read a second time.

PETITIONS.

  LICENCES (RENEWAL).
  Petitions against alteration of law: from Trelewis; Leeswood (two); Nerquis; Bryndu; Appledore; Gravesend; Radcliffe Close; Kirkconnel; Penpont; Eaglesfield; Frawsfynydd; Halifax (five); Rochester; Aberdeen; New York; Willesden; Evenwood; Northumberland; Ffynnon Greew; Cilcain; Tavistock; Ashton-under-Lyne; Honic-knowle; Liverpool (five); Billy Row; Marske; Hutton; Exeter; Alexandria; Kirkintilloch; Kilpatrickin; Renton; Leven; Dalmuir; Thornhill; Peterborough; Hopkinstown; Hafod; Todmorden; Midgley; Porth; Kilbrandon; Thornley; Hull; Cilcain; Northwich; Thornhill; Whiteparish; York; Deal and Walmer; Barnstaple; Vriog and Fairbourne; Corwen; Blaenan; Millom; Blantyre; Tamworth; Egremont; Oxford; Sunderland; Driffield; Frodingham; Tarvin; Tarporley; Ramsbottom; Hey wood; Aintree; Stockton; Lochee; St. Leonards; Lincoln (three); Swansea (four); Sydenham; Lee; Rehoboth; Rhiwlas; Llandynan; Bryn Eglwys (two); Llansannan; Nantyr; Hyfrydle; Conway; Colwyn Bay; Eirienallt; Henhan; Caistor; Scunthorpe; Brigg; North Kelsey; Carmarthen; Chasetown; Manley; Salford (three); South Cardigan; Penpark; Altrincham; Bucklow Hill; New Delaval; Thornton; Saffron Walden; Newquay; Queen's Dewsbury; Ore; Roche; Falmouth; Dalton in Fur-ness; Chorley; Lytham; Stirling; Glasgow (two): Oban; Strachur; Bideford; Coombe Martin; Muddiford; Ilfracombe; Barnstaple; Appledore; Rowland's Castle; Warsash; Fareham; Hayling Island; Netley; Lynton; Congleton; Stokesley; Stockport (three); Pumpher-ston; Gainsboro'; Swanage; Bournemouth; Burslem; Bristol; Willenhall; Thornaby-on-Tees; East Greenwich; Willington Quay; Throckley; Gosforth; Whitehaven; Silver Stream Tent; Edinburgh (four); Royston; Shafton; Gainsborough; Chipping Norton; Dalry; Kilmaurs; Springside; Clevedon; Bristol; Barnsley (two); Rutherglen; Renfrew; Mapplewell; Worthing; Birstall; Wyke; Haverton Hill; St. Helens (four); Askam; Llangefni; Penygarned; Brynsiencyn;
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  Llangoed; Lesmahagow; Strathaven; Leadhills; Stonehouse; Douglas Water; Douglas (two); Carluke; Boothtown; Bewdley; Batley; Rushden; Mickley Square; Law; Hexham; Corbridge; Ovington; Penrhyn Dendreeth; Trawsfynydd; Harlech; Llandrillo; Glannan Tryweryn; Llandanwg and Llanfair; Bala; Tent No. 2735 Independent Order of Rechabites; Maentwrog; Blaina Festiniog; Towyn Corris; Dolgelley (three); Arthog; Gwydelwern; Machynlleth; Cefnddwysam; Aberdovey; Chudleigh; Llandderfel; Carlin How; Kingsteignton; Teignmouth; Kingskerswell; Chagford; Newton Abbott; Brotton; Lustleigh; Shaldon; Heathfield; Madog; Beulah; Brynmair; Dartmouth; Choppington; Nomansland; Amesbury; Lanivet; Saltash; Wideawake Tent; Lostwithiel; Pelynt; Bodmin; Birmingham (two); Ferryden; Plymouth (two); Coseley; Bilston; Carlingcott; Radstock; Retford; Llannwchllyn; Derby; Redcar; Newcastle on Tyne; Penmacline; Aspatria; Glazert Bank; Keighley; and Denholme; to lie upon the Table.

  SALE OF INTOXICATING LIQUORS ON SUNDAY.
  Petitions for prohibition: from Plymouth; Bideford; and Barnstaple; to lie upon the Table.
RETURNS, REPORTS, ETC.
  INEBRIATES ACTS, 1879 TO 1899 (REGULATIONS FOR STATE INEBRIATE REFORMATORIES).
  Paper [presented 2nd February] to be printed. [No. 20.]
  DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION (IRELAND).
  Return [presented 2nd February] to be printed. [No. 21.]
  WAGES AND EFFECTS OF DECEASED SEAMEN.
  Account [presented 2nd February] to be printed. [No. 22.]
  EAST INDIA (SUGAR).
  Return [presented 2nd February] to be printed. [No. 23.]

  RAILWAY ACCIDENTS.
  Copy presented, of Returns of Accidents and Casualties as reported to the

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  Board of Trade by the several Railway Companies in the United Kingdom during the nine months ending 30th September, 1903, together with Reports of the Inspecting Officers, Assistant Inspecting Officers, and Sub-Inspectors of the Railway Department to the Board of Trade upon certain Accidents which were inquired into [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.

  ALIEN IMMIGRATION.
  Return presented, relative thereto [ordered 3rd February; Mr. Gerald Balfour;] to lie upon the Table, and to be printed. [No. 24.]
  TRADE AND NAVIGATION.
  Return presented, relative thereto [ordered 3rd February; Mr. Gerald Balfour;] to lie upon the Table, and to be printed. [No. 25.]
  DISEASES OF ANIMALS ACTS, 1894 TO 1903.
  Copy presented, of an Order, entitled The Foreign Animals (Amendment) Order of 1903 (No. 3) [by Act]; to lie upon the Table.
  DISEASES OF ANIMALS ACTS, 1894 TO 1903.
  Copy presented, of an Order defining a foreign animals quarantine station at the port of Southampton [by Act]; to lie upon the Table.
  POST OFFICE (MONEY ORDERS).
  Copy presented, of the Postal Order (Inland) Amendment Regulations, 1903, dated 14th September, 1903 [by Act]; to lie upon the Table.
  CIVIL CON TINGENCIES FUND, 1902–3.
  Return presented, relative thereto [ordered 3rd February; Mr. Victor Cavendish;] to lie upon the Table, and to be printed. [No. 26.]
  SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE (IRELAND).
  Return presented, relative thereto [ordered 3rd February; Mr. Victor Cavendish;] to lie upon the Table, and to be printed. [No. 27.]

  NATIONAL GALLERY (REPORT).
  Return presented, relative thereto [ordered 3rd February; Mr. Victor
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  Cavendish;] to lie upon the Table, and to be printed. [No. 28.]

  CIVIL SERVICES AND REVENUE DEPARTMENTS (APPROPRIATION ACCOUNTS).
  Appropriation Accounts presented, for the year ending 31st March, 1903, together with the Reports of the Comptroller and Auditor-General thereon and certain Reports upon Store Accounts [by Act]; to lie upon the Table, and to be printed. [No. 29.]
  ROYAL PARKS AND GARDENS.
  Copy presented, of Provisional Rules for the Royal Parks and Gardens in connection with the Regulations prescribed by the Parks Regulation Act, 1872 [by Act]; to lie upon the Table.
  HOLYROOD PARK.
  Copy presented, of Rule for Holyrood Park in connection with the Regulations prescribed by the Parks Regulation Act, 1872 [by Act]; to lie upon the Table.
  BIRTHS, DEATHS, AND MARRIAGES (SCOTLAND).
  Copy presented, of forty-seventh De- tailed Annual Report of the Registrar-General of Births, Deaths, and Marriages in Scotland (Abstracts of 1901) [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.

  PAPERS LAID UPON THE TABLE BY THE CLERK OF THE HOUSE:—
  1. Bank of England. Accounts of Exchequer Bills and other Government Securities purchased, and of the amount of Balances of Sums issued for the Payment of Dividends, &c, for the year ending the 5th January, 1904 [by Act]; to be printed. [No. 30.]
  2. Building Societies. Copy of Ninth Annual Report by the Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies of the Proceedings of the Registrars under the Building Societies Acts, &c, [by Act]; to be printed. [No. 31.]

ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
  QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS CIRCULATED WITH THE VOTES.

    Notices for Recovery of Income Tax in Scotland.
    MR. M'CRAE: To ask Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he is aware that notices for recovery of

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    income tax within ten days have been issued in Scotland; whether this is in accordance with recent Treasury instructions; and whether similar notices have been issued in England.
    (Answered by Mr. Austen Chamberlain.) The issue of the notices in question commenced, both in Scotland and England, on 22nd January, this date being in accordance with the instructions to which the hon. Member refers.

    Issue of Transvaal Loan.
    MR. LOUGH: To ask Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer how long the Government have agreed to postpone the issue of the first instalment of the new loan to the Transvaal Government which the late Colonial Secretary said on the 27th July last would be placed on the market probably in January, 1904; and whether the agreements as to underwriting will still hold good.
    (Answered by Mr. Austen Chamberlain.) It is not possible to say when the conditions of the money market will become favourable enough to ensure the successful issue of the loan. The postponement of the issue does not affect the agreement as to underwriting it.

    Extinction of Debt.
    MR. BUCHANAN: To ask Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer what steps he proposes to take for the paying off of debt during the current Year, in view of the fact that the £10,000,000 due from the Transvaal under guarantee has not been paid.
    (Answered by Mr. Austen Chamberlain.) I do not propose to take any step which will interfere with the Sinking Fund arrangements made last session.

    Sudbury (Ontario) Nickel Mines.
    MR. NORMAN: To ask the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether his attention has been called to communications which have been received at the Colonial Office from Canadian official authorities regarding the future control of the nickel mines in the Sudbury District of Ontario; and, if so, will he say whether any replies, and if so, what, have been made to such communications; and whether His
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    Majesty's Government proposes to take any steps to facilitate and control the use of this nickel for Imperial purposes.
    (Answered by Mr. Secretary Lyttelton.) The communications to which the hon. Member refers were duly forwarded to the Admiralty, and the inquiry should be addressed to the representative of that Department.

    Amount of Unfunded Debt.
    MR. BUCHANAN: To ask Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer what is the present amount of the unfunded debt, specifying the amount of Treasury Bills and Exchequer Bonds outstanding, the rate of interest and period for which these securities have been renewed.
    (Answered by Mr. Austen Chamberlain.) There are £21,000,000 Exchequer Bonds outstanding, bearing 3 per cent. interest, of which £7,000,000 fall due next August, and the remainder in December, 1905. There are £21,133,000 Treasury Bills outstanding, of which £16,633,000 are twelve months' Bills bearing interest that varies from £3 4s. 4d. to £3 15s. 10 d. per cent.; £4,000,000 are six months' Bills bearing interest that varies, from £3 4s. 2d. to £3 15s. l0d. per cent., and £500,000 are three months Bills bearing interest at £4 2s. 3d. per cent. These Bills are exclusive of any Ways and Means Advances raised by Treasury Bills, which are necessarily paid off before the end of the financial year.

    Release of Mrs. Maybrick.
    MR. JAMES O'CONNOR: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, whether Mrs. May-brick has been released from penal servitude; and, if so, on what conditions.
    (Answered by Mr. Secretary Akers-Douglas.) Mrs. Maybrick has been granted a licence under the Penal Servitude Acts, and is at present in a home, which she will be allowed to leave towards the end of the summer. In accordance with the wishes of the authorities of the home, and with Mrs. Maybrick's own earnest desire, which is, I think, entitled to consideration, I do not propose to make public further details as to time or place.

    Magistrates and Passive Resisters.
    MR. CHANNING: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he is aware that in a number of instances benches of magistrates have directed that persons summoned for refusal to pay that portion of the rates which is applied to denominational schools should be placed in the prisoner's dock; and whether he will issue a circular or otherwise represent to magistrates that this course is illegal and should be discontinued.
    (Answered by Mr. Secretary Akers Douglas.) My attention has not been drawn to any case such as the hon. Member indicates. It is certainly not a usual practice to put persons summoned for non-payment of rates in the dock, and except in very special circumstances I do not think it would be right to do so. But no question of law is involved, nor have I any authority to issue instructions to magistrates in the matter.

    Beer Poisoning—Standard of Purity.
    SIR CUTHBERT QUILTER: To ask the President of the Local Government Board whether his attention has been called to the confirmation by the Royal Commission on Arsenical Poisoning of the opinions expressed in the Minority Report of the Beer Materials Committee issued five years ago, prior to the outbreak of the beer poisoning epidemic, that legislation or other provision was necessary to prevent the use of deleterious substances in the manufacture of beer, and that a court of reference, as recommended by the Committee on the adulteration of food products (a recommendation since endorsed also by the Food Preservatives Committee), should be established for fixing standards of purity for the purposes of the Sale of Food and Drugs Acts; and, if so, will he say what action it is proposed to take to give effect to the recommendations of the Royal Commission, more especially as regards the protection of the public against the use of injurious ingredients in beer, and the fixing of a standard of purity.
    (Answered by Mr. Walter Long.) I had, before the issue of the Report of the
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    Royal Commission on Arsenical Poisoning, had under consideration the expediency of promoting legislation with a view to the constitution of a court of reference for the decision of certain scientific questions in relation to food of the kind referred to in the Question, and I had been in communication with the Board of Trade and the Board of Agriculture on the subject. I am continuing to give attention to the matter, but having regard to the large and important recommendations of the Arsenical Commission, I think it will be necessary that a conference should be held of representatives of the Government Departments concerned before a decision as to the course to be adopted can be arrived at.

    Employment in the United Kingdom and Ireland.
    LORD GEORGE HAMILTON: To ask the President of the Local Government Board if, with the object of testing the assertions recently made that employment, in the aggregate, has fallen off in the United Kingdom and Ireland, he would have a Return made from the census tables of 1881, 1891, and 1901, giving, under a few general heads, the total number employed, including all in Government or municipal service, together with the total population of each period, and the percentage the employed bear to the population of each period.
    (Answered by Mr. Walter Long) The Census Returns do not give the numbers of the population that are employed or unemployed at the date of each census, but only show the occupation usually followed by each individual when employed. I regret, therefore, that it is not in my power to cause the Return desired by my noble friend to be compiled.

    Causes and Effects of Tariff Wars on the Continent.
    LORD GEORGE HAMILTON: To ask the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he will lay upon the Table of the House the information recently received from His Majesty's Representatives and the Consular service abroad, relating to the causes and effects of the tariff wars between France and Italy,

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    France and Switzerland, and Germany and Russia.
    (Answered by Earl Percy.) The Reports received on this subject will be laid upon the Table and distributed in a few days.

    Alleged Atrocities on the Congo.
    MR. CHANNING: To ask the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether any official or other confirmation has been received of the statements recently made by the Rev. T. H. Weeks, Baptist Missionary, in the West African Mail, writing from the Monsembe Station on the Congo, to the effect that a number of men, women, and children have been killed in villages in that district for failure to pay their taxes; and, if not, whether inquiry will be directed into these allegations.
    (Answered by Earl Percy.) This sub ct is dealt with in the Report from His Majesty's Consul for the Congo which is shortly to be laid before Parliament.

    Preferential Tariffs—Views of Indian Government.
    LORD GEORGE HAMILTON: To ask the Secretary of State for India if any reply has been received by the India Office from the Government of India in response to a telegram sent on 7th August, 1903, by the then Secretary of State asking for the views of the Indian Government upon the subject of preferential tariffs; and, if so, would he lay it upon the Table of the House.
    (Answered by Mr. Secretary Brodrick.) I have received the reply of the Government of India, and I will lay the Papers on the Table of the House.

    Crown Law Officers—Salaries and Fees.
    MR. LAMBERT (Devonshire, South Molton): To ask the Secretary to the Treasury whether he will state what were the total amounts, including salaries and fees, paid to the Attorney-General and Solicitor-General respectively for the year ending 31st March, 1903; also, for the same period, the amounts paid as salaries for the department of King's Proctor, Solicitor, and Director of Public Prosecutions.
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    (Answered by Mr. Victor Cavendish.) The following [amounts were paid to the Law Officers respectively for the year ending 31st March, 1903, viz.:—

    Salary.

    Fees.

    Total.

    £

    £

    £

    Attorney-General

    7,000

    4,816

    11,816

    Solicitor-General

    6,000

    3,701

    9,701

    The salaries for the department of King's Proctor, Solicitor, and Director of Public Prosecutions for the same period (exclusive of payments for copying work) amounted to £21,912. The office of King's Proctor is at present held by the Solicitor to the Treasury and Director of Public Prosecutions, but it is altogether a separate office, and Lord Desart receives under existing arrangements no salary for performance of the duties of that office.

    Exeter Education Authority—Removal of Children from One School to Another.
    MR. H. C. RICHARDS: To ask the Secretary to the Board of Education if his attention has been called, or the consent of the Department given, to the notice recently issued in the city and county of Exeter by the education authority to the effect that no child be allowed to be removed from either of the elementary schools under the control of the education authority to another unless the consent of the authority be first obtained; if so, will he state upon what authority this notice was issued; and what steps he proposes to take to prevent the issue of similar circulars.
    (Answered by Sir William Anson.) My attention has only this morning been called to the notice referred to, a copy of which reached the Board of Education yesterday. The notice would appear to be designed simply to meet the difficulty caused by capricious and frequent removals of a child from school to school. I will communicate with the local authority in question as to the methods proposed to be adopted for attaining the end in view. The Board hold that as a general rule it should rest with a parent to decide which school his child shall attend, and any complaint by a parent

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    as to undue restriction of this freedom would receive the careful consideration of the Board.

    Operation of Labourers Acts in Ireland.
    MR. KENDAL O'BRIEN: To ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether, in view of promised legislation in connection with Irish labourers, he will, for the information of the House, issue as a Parliamentary Paper the reports which he has received from the Local Government inspectors on the operation of the existing Acts and the direction in which they think new legislation may be most advantageously applied.
    (Answered by Mr. Wyndham.) The reports furnished by these inspectors are confidential documents, and as such it would not be in accordance with practice or precedent to publish them.

    Strength of Volunteer Force.
    SIR HOWARD VINCENT: To ask the Secretary of State for War if he will state what is the present strength of the Volunteer Force, and how it compares with the state of affairs on 1st February, 1901; and what is the present deficiency in officers.
    (Answered by Mr. Secretary Arnold-Forster.) As regards the totals of all ranks, the returns being rendered quarterly, the latest figures available are for 1st January of each year, and are as follows:—1901, Strength 277,910; 1904, Strength 241,280. As regards the officers the present establishment is 9,454, and the deficiency on the 1st February was 2,333; this includes 184 seconded or supernumerary officers.

    War Office Reorganisation Committee— Circulation of Report.
    MAJOR EVANS-GORDON: To ask the Secretary of State for War whether the Interim Report of the Committee on War Office Reorganisation, which was supplied to the Press on Monday, will be laid upon the Table and circulated to Members.
    (Answered by Mr. Secretary Arnold Forster.) This Report will be laid upon the Table and circulated to Members.

    Transport of Government Stores to Gibraltar and Malta.
    MASTER OF ELIBANK: To ask the Financial Secretary to the War Office if he will state the nature of the shipping contracts for the transport of Government stores to Gibraltar, the name of the shipping company employed, the freight charged, whether tenders are invited from various shipping companies; and whether, in view of the amount of consignment of stores to Gibraltar and Malta, the Department contemplates employing special Government vessels for this purpose.
    (Answered by Mr. Pretyman.) The contract for the conveyance of Army and Navy stores to Gibraltar is in the hands of Messrs. J. Hall, Junior, and Company. It is terminable at a month's notice, and the Government reserve the right to convey stores also in His Majesty's ships, hired transports, mail packets, or vessels wholly chartered for the purpose. Competitive tenders were last obtained in 1894, when Messrs. Hall again secured the contract, the terms of which have, however, been revised from time to time to meet Government requirements. It is not usual to publish the rates paid under Government contracts unless special reasons exist for doing so. It is not considered desirable to employ special Government vessels for conveying stores to Gibraltar, as such a course would involve the collection of full cargoes, and would thus cause great practical difficulties. It would, moreover, be a very expensive course to adopt, as, owing to the small amounts of stores consigned home, the vessels would return practically empty.

    Condition of Malta.
    MR. BOLAND: To ask the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether he will lay upon the Table the Papers relative to the condition of Malta which have been received since the issue of the last Blue-book.
    (Answered by Mr. Secretary Lyttelton.) No Papers of importance have been received since the issue of the Blue-book in July last, and it is not proposed to lay any further Papers at present.

    Colonial Civil Servants and Political Demonstrations.
    DR. SHIPMAN: To ask the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether, in view of the fact that under the civil service regulations of most colonies, officers of their Governments are forbidden to participate in any proceedings of a political character, he will consider the advisability of making representations to the Ministries of self-governing colonies as to the impropriety of their Agents-General actively participating in British politics, or becoming members of an avowedly political organisation in this country.
    (Answered by Mr. Secretary Lyttelton.) As the Agents-General for the Colonies under responsible government are entirely under the control of the Colonial Ministers who appoint them, the matter is one for the Colonial Governments to consider, and I should not be disposed to interfere.

  QUESTIONS IN THE HOUSE.

    The Aalesund Disaster.
    CAPTAIN NORTON: I beg to ask the Secretary to the Admiralty whether, in view of the fact that a shipment of about 500 tons of clothing and food, &c, were prepared for despatch from the Deptford Victualling Yard to the inhabitants of the town of Aalesund on the 25th of last month; and that H.M.S. "Hearty" has been lying idle outside the yard since that date, he will state the cause of the delay.
    THE SECRETARY TO THE ADMIRALTY (Mr. PRETYMAN,): The fact of the Aalesund disaster became known at the Admiralty on Monday morning, January 25th, and a telegraphic inquiry was at once sent to the Norwegian Government, through His Majesty's Minister at Stockholm, asking whether it would be of use to send one of His Majesty's ships with blankets and provisions. His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General at Christiania telegraphed on the 26th to say that the Norwegian Government was making inquiries as to whether help was required, and later on the same day again telegraphed request-
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    ing on behalf of the Norwegian Government that acceptance of the offer might be postponed till it could be seen whethet the local authorities could cope with the situation with the assistance already supplied. In the meantime orders had been given for stores to be held in readiness at His Majesty's Victualling Yard, Deptford, and a vessel of war was detailed to embark them. She arrived off Deptford on the 27th, and is still there awaiting the decision of the Norwegian Government.

    Officers' War Gratuities
    CAPTAIN NORTON: I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War if he can state why the gratuities to officers specially taken into employment during the South African War, as laid down in the Royal Pay Warrant, paragraph 601B, have not yet been paid, and when they are likely to be paid.
    THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (Mr. ARNOLD-FORSTER, Belfast, W.): I am afraid that the hon. and gallant Member is under some misapprehension. These gratuities have been paid as they became due. In some cases, however, they have been altogether withheld owing to the unsatisfactory nature of the service of the officers concerned; and in a few cases they have been held back where the officers' accounts were not satisfactorily rendered.
    CAPTAIN NORTON: If I give the big cases in which they have not been paid will he inquire into them.
    MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER: Yes.

    Officers' Saddlery.
    SIR CARNE RASCH: I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War whether his intention has been called to paragraph (c), page 6, Report on the Officers' Expenses, recommending that military saddlery shall be issued to all officers of mounted corps; and, if so, whether he will explain why the Department has declined to carry out this recommendation, in view of the time that has elapsed since the Committee reported.
    MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER: The issue of saddlery to mounted officers was

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    authorised by Army Order 4 of January, 1904. It was not considered expedient to publish any decision to this effect until sufficient stock had been obtained to enable an issue to be made.
    SIR CARNE RASCH: Does the Order not apply to the Indian Government, which has refused to supply saddlery to officers?
    MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER: It does not apply.

    The 2nd Essex Regiment.
    SIR CARNE RASCH: I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War whether, seeing that the 2nd Essex is under orders for the Mediterranean, that they came home in 1902 after twenty years continuous foreign service, and have only had sixteen months at home, he will arrange that battalions which have had ten years home service previous to the South African War shall go out before the Essex.
    MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER: Owing to the present exigencies of the service more than half of the battalions of the line are required abroad, and it has accordingly been found necessary to curtail the period of home service. The claims of the various battalions who have been selected to proceed abroad have been most carefully weighed, and I am afraid that it is impossible to amend the selection without unfairness to others.

    British Made Pom-Poms Sold to the Boers.
    MR. FREDERICK WILSON: I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War if he can state the number of pom-poms supplied to the Boers by English manufacturers, and the dates prior to the war at which these guns were supplied.
    MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER: The number of pom-poms of British manufacture supplied to the Boers before the war was twenty-two. I am not in a position to state the exact dates at which these guns were supplied.

    Quick-Firing Guns for the Army.
    MR. FREDERICK WILSON: I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War if he can state the number of quick-firing guns which have been purchased by the War Department in Germany, and whether any pattern of quick-firing gun has yet been decided on at our Government factories.
    MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER: The number of quick-firing guns purchased in Germany was 108. As regards the new quick-firing gun no pattern has as yet been approved. It is hoped that a large number of the new pattern quick-firing guns will be manufactured during the next financial year.

    Aldershot Sham Fight—Use of Ball Cartridge.
    MR. FYLER: I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War whether his attention has been called to a sham fight in the vicinity of Aldershot, on 18th December last, in which a private soldier was injured by one of several ball cartridges that were fired, and during which continued firing took place on the public roads at Camberley; and, if so, will he say whether this was in acccordance with War Office regulations; whether an inquiry has been held into the occurrence; and whether steps can be taken to prevent the recurrence of this inconvenience to residents in the district.
    MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER: My attention has been drawn to this case. The matter was referred to the general officer commanding, who stated that the circumstances as reported were greatly exaggerated, that he had already dealt with the case and had taken such steps as were possible to prevent any recurrence. The regulations in regard to firing on public roads are as follow:—"Firing on a public road will not, as a rule, be permitted; but when a road is unoccupied by the public, with no horses or carriages near, a single shot may be fired to mark the position."

    India—Official Secrets Bill.
    MR. HERBERT ROBERTS: I beg to ask the Secretary of State for India whether he has received from India a reply to the memorial

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    against the Official Secrets Bill presented to the Secretary of State on the 12th of November last; and whether, in view of the objection taken to the Bill by Indians and Anglo-Indians, he is in a position to state that its provisions will be confined to the case of Naval and Military secrets.
    THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOE INDIA (Mr. BRODRICK, Surrey,): I forwarded to the Government of India the memorial to which the hon. Member refers, but I have not received a reply. The Bill is now under consideration by a Select Committee, and if it is passed by the Legislative Council will be reported to me in due course with all the debates and discussions. I can meantime give no pledge that its provisions will be confined to Naval and Military secrets.

    The Mission to Thibet.
    MR. HERBERT ROBERTS: I beg to ask the Secretary of State for India whether he will make a statement setting forth the objects and reasons for the present expedition to Thibet; whether he can give an assurance to the House that there is no intention of annexing any portion of Thibetan territory; whether he will state the strength of the military force employed, and the estimated cost of the expedition; whether the whole of the expense will be borne by the Imperial Treasury; and whether he will lay Papers upon the Table of the House.
    MR. BRODRICK: A full statement of the reasons for and objects of the political mission to Thibet iscontained in the Blue-book which will shortly be in the hands of hon. Members. The object of the mission is not to annex any portion of Thibetan territory, but to prevent a recurrence of the difficulties arising from the attitude of the Thibetan Government in respect of the Convention of 1890. The force employed, as I stated in my reply to the hon. Member for King's Lynn yesterday, is some 3,000 men. A preliminary estimate of the expenditure for four months from the 1st November is £108,400, but owing to difficulties of transport this will probably be exceeded. The charge will be borne by Indian revenues.
    MR. HERBERT ROBERTS: Arising out of that, may I ask whether it is likely that the Blue-book will be issued before the debate on the Amendment to the Address dealing with the mission.
    MR. BRODRICK: I hope the Blue-book will be ready by Monday or Tuesday. I am doing all in my power to expedite its issue.
    MR. GIBSON BOWLES: I beg to ask the Secretary of State for India what is the nature of the expedition sent from India to, and now in, Thibet; what is the total number of men composing it; has the Government of Thibet given permission for the expedition to enter the country; have any military operations been undertaken by this expedition; why was the expedition ordered and what end is it intended to attain; and will Papers be laid showing the causes which led to the despatch of the expedition.
    MR. BRODRICK: A political mission has been sent to Thibet with an escort to provide for its safety. The escort consists of 400 men, with a seven-pounder gun and a machine gun, and a supporting force has been placed at various points to preserve the communications of the mission. The total of the troops employed on the escort and on the communications, according to my present information, is about 3,000 men. The mission has been sent in consequence of the failure of the Thibetan Government to carry out its obligations under the Treaty of 1890, and the neglect of the Thibetan Government to meet the British representatives as arranged by the Chinese Government, who are the Suzerain Power. No military operations have been undertaken. Papers will shortly be laid showing the circumstances which have made the despatch of a mission necessary.
    MR. GIBSON BOWLES: That is no answer to my Question whether the Thibetan Government have given permission for this expedition to enter their territory.
    MR. BRODRICK: The Chinese Government, who entered into these negotiations in the first instance, arranged

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    for a meeting of the representatives of the Thibetan, Chinese, and Indian Governments in Thibetan territory. The Government of Thibet have hitherto failed to comply with the arrangement made by the Chinese Government, and therefore they have not given permission to the mission to enter their territory.
    MR. LOUGH: Can the right hon. Gentleman say exactly where the mission now is, and whether the members are suffering from the inclement weather?
    MR. SPEAKER: Order, order! Notice must be given of that Question.

    Tibetan Expedition.
    MR. NORMAN: I beg to ask the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether communications passed between His Majesty's Government and the Russian Government regarding the expedition to Thibet before it was despatched, if so, will he state their purport; and can he lay the correspondence upon the Table.
    THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (EARL PERCY,: The answer to the first Question is in the affirmative, the Papers are included in the correspondence which will shortly be laid.

    Chinese Labour in the Transvaal Mines.
    MR. SYDNEY BUXTON: I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Colonies when he will be in a position to lay upon the Table of the House a copy of the Labour (Importation of Asiatics) Ordinance (or any Paper relating thereto) recently passed through the Transvaal Legislative Council; and whether he will undertake that the Government will not finally decide the question of the allowance or disallowance of the Ordinance until after the House has had an opportunity of discussing and deciding the question on its merits. May I point out that the Government have already promised to give an opportunity for a full discussion of this question.
    MR. BRYCE (Aberdeen, S.): At the same time may I ask the Secretary of State
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    for the Colonies whether, before arriving at any decision upon the Ordinance permitting the importation of Chinese into South Africa, which is now being considered by the Legislative Council at Pretoria, he will, in case that Ordinance should be passed in the Council, cause the text of the Ordinance to be laid before this House, and arrange that this House shall have an opportunity of fully discussing it. I also wish to ask the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether he will cause to be presented to Parliament the evidence taken before the Commission which recently sat in the Transvaal to examine into the question of labour for the mines. It is of extreme importance that we should have this.
    THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES (Mr. LYTTELTON,): The Papers which were published yesterday contain a draft of the Asiatic Labour Ordinance as introduced in the Legislative Council of the Transvaal, and a telegraphic report of the Amendments made in Committee. These Papers will afford the hon. Member the means of examining the details of the proposed legislation; and I am taking steps to obtain, at the earliest possible moment, the official text of the Ordinance as actually passed, which will be published as soon as it is received. In reply to the second part of the hon. Member's Question, I have announced, in answer to an inquiry addressed to me, that His Majesty's Government will defer giving their final sanction to the Ordinance for the introduction of Asiatic labour into the Transvaal until Parliament has had an opportunity for full discussion of the subject. This announcement, which was made with the concurrence and approval of the Prime Minister, was in consequence of, and was designed to meet, a request of the Leader of the Opposition to the effect that, inasmuch as debate was sure to take place on this subject on the Address, this legislation should not be an accomplished fact before the meeting of Parliament. In order to carry out the pledge which was thus given, I have instructed Lord Milner to introduce into the Ordinance a clause suspending the operation of the Ordinance pending further instructions. I have to point out, however,

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    that, as is evident from the Blue-book, the question is one of great urgency, and His Majesty's Government cannot undertake to postpone their decision longer than the termination of the debate on the Address. A Question has been asked me with reference to the publication of the evidence. I have to say that the evidence is now in the printer's hands and will be laid on the Table of the House. I anticipate that we shall be able to place advance copies of the evidence in the library either on Saturday or Monday next.
    MR. JOHN ELLIS: When will the House see the actual words of the Ordinance as finally passed.
    MR. LYTTELTON: I cannot definitely say as to a day. Hon. Members have already in the Blue-book the amended Ordinance, and they have further Amendments which have been introduced and which will be placed in the Blue-book. Hon. Members have, therefore, the opportunity of consulting the full Ordinance as we believe it has passed; but by Saturday or Monday my hon. friend will certainly have the official text of the document.
    SIR H. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN: I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his evident desire to meet the wishes of the House; but those who are interested in this subject are anxious, before the House proceeds to discuss, consider, and pronounce an opinion on this matter, that they shall be in possession of the whole of the materials. It is quite obvious that the actual evidence given before the Commissioners is an essential part of the case. I think perhaps the most convenient way will be to hang the matter up until we get the evidence and the other documents required. I think the right hon. Gentleman will also see that, after we have these materials actually placed in our bands, hon. Members must have a little time to master and understand the situation before them.
    MR. LOUGH: I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether, in view of the promises on behalf of
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    the Government that Chinese labour should not be introduced into the Transvaal against the wishes of the population, he can see his way, either by means of the referendum or some other plan, to obtain the opinion of the people before giving his sanction to the Ordinance which the Transvaal Government have approved.
    MR. LYTTELTON: In view of the vote and debate in the Legislative Council and of the other evidence contained in the Blue-book, on which Lord Milner's advice to His Majesty's Government has been based, His Majesty's Government are of opinion that the introduction of Asiatic labour is in conformity with the wishes of the people of the Transvaal. They are not able to agree that the expedient of a referendum should be adopted.

    The Transvaal Loan.
    MR. LABOUCHERE: I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether there are any official documents explaining the arrangement which was entered into between the late Secretary of State for the Colonies and certain capitalists regarding the pledge of the latter to subscribe £10,000,000 sterling of the issue of a Transvaal loan of £30,000,000, one third of which was to be issued during the present month; and, if so, whether he will lay them upon the Table.
    MR. LYTTELTON: I have to refer the hon. Member to the Blue-book published yesterday.

    Native Labour in the Transvaal Mines.
    MR. HERBERT SAMUEL: I beg to ask the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether the attention of the Foreign Office has been drawn to the statement, quoted in paragraph 66 of the Majority Report of the Transvaal Labour Commission, to the effect that the natives of the British Central Protectorate, imported into the Transvaal to work in the mines, have proved very unsatisfactory as labourers, and have been dying of pneumonia at a rate which is equal to a rate of 28 per cent. per annum; whether this mortality still continues; and whether the

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    Foreign Secretary will prohibit the recruitment of other labourers in British Central Africa, and will arrange for the repatriation of the survivors.
    EARL PERCY: We are aware of the statement alluded to. The Question has formed the subject of personal investigation by Lord Milner since his return to South Africa. His report shows that of the deaths which had occurred up to December 31st amongst the British Central African natives in the mines, a large proportion was due to an epidemic of influenza which broke out at the time of their arrival. The tenor of his report and of others previously received is not such as in the opinion of the Secretary of State would justify him in altogether prohibiting further recruiting under adequate safeguards, and this opinion has been confirmed by the evidence of the Protectorate officer who accompanied the last recruits. Some of the earlier emigrant? have already returned to the Protectorate. The rest will return at the expiration of their year's contract.
    SIR. JOHN GORST: Will papers on this subject be laid on the Table of the House immediately?
    EARL PERCY'Sanswer was inaudible.

    Congo Free State Administration.
    MR. HERBERT SAMUEL: I beg to ask the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs when Mr. Casement's Report on the Administration of the Congo Free State will be presented to Parliament, and whether the correspondence between His Majesty's Government and the Governments of other Powers relative to the Congo Free State will be published at an early date.
    EARL PERCY: Mr. Casement's Report on the Administration of the Congo State will be presented to Parliament at an early date, together with certain other correspondence on the same subject.

    Macedonia.
    MR. GIBSON BOWLES: I beg to ask the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign
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    Affairs has any information been received by the Government as to the intention of the Governments of Servia and Bulgaria shortly to join with the Macedonian insurgents in hostilities against Turkey, and have His Majesty's Government taken any steps to secure the execution of the provisions of the Treaty of Berlin by the creation of autonomous provinces in the Balkans under the suzerainty of the Sultan, or in any other manner to secure the maintenance of peace in European Turkey.
    EARL PERCY: His Majesty's Government have received no information of the nature indicated in the first paragraph of the Question. The steps taken by His Majesty's Government with a view of securing the maintenance of peace in European Turkey are fully described in the Papers which have just been presented to the House. They have devoted their efforts to supporting and strengthening the schemes of reform advanced by the Austro-Hungarian and Russian Governments, and urging that those reforms should be promptly put into execution.
    MR. GIBSON BOWLES: Have the Government considered the propriety of calling a conference of European Powers on the subject?
    EARL PERCY: I must ask for notice of that Question.

    The Far East—Russia and Manchuria.
    MR. JOSEPH WALTON: I beg to ask the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he can make any statement to the House in regard to the situation in the Far East; and whether, with the view of averting war between our Japanese allies and Russia, any joint or separate representations have been made by His Majesty's Government and the Government of the United States of America to the Russian Government pressing for the prompt evacuation of Manchuria, in accordance with their repeated assurances.
    EARL PERCY: Having regard to the present state of the negotiations between Russia and Japan it would obviously be

    345
    improper that I should offer any observations to the House upon this subject. Frequent representations have been made to the Russian Government by His Majesty's Government with regard to the delay in the evacuation of Manchuria.

    Niu-chwang Customs Staff.
    MR. JOSEPH WALTON: I beg to ask the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether the native customs at Niu-chwang, which under the protocol to which Russia was a signatory are to be administered by the Maritime Customs, have been removed by Admiral Alexieff from the control of Sir Robert Hart by the dismissal of the Russian in charge who was appointed by Sir Robert Hart, and the appointment instead of a Russian Government official from Dalny; and, if so, what steps His Majesty's Government are taking with a view of securing the due observance of the provisions of the protocol.
    EARL PERCY: We have heard that the Russians have removed the member of the Maritime Customs staff from the administration of the native customs at Niu-chwang and replaced him by a nominee of their own. Representations have been made to the Russian Government.

    Chinese Labour in the Chincha Islands.
    MR. LABOUCHERE: I beg to ask the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether, seeing that an agreement was entered into some years ago between the Chinese Government, or certain Chinese agents with the permission of that Government, and the Government of Peru, or certain persons connected with the guano deposits in the Chincha Islands, to export to these islands Chinese indentured labourers to work on the guano deposits, and that this trade was eventually forbidden by the Chinese Government owing to representations made by Her Majesty's Government, he will lay upon the Table of the House all documents in connection with this matter, together with any Reports of His Majesty's representatives in Peru in regard to the fate of the indentured Chinese labourers who reached the Chincha Islands.
    EARL PERCY: Full particulars of the matter referred to will be found in the "Correspondence upon the subject of Emigration from China" presented to the House of Commons in pursuance of their address of April 30th, 1855.

    Extinction of Debt.
    MR. BUCHANAN: I beg to ask Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer what steps he proposes to take for the paying off of debt during the current year, in view of the fact that the £10,000,000 due from the Transvaal under guarantee has not been paid.
    MR. AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN: I do not propose to take any steps which will interfere with the Sinking Fund arrangements made last session.
    MR. BUCHANAN: Are we to understand that no attempt will be made by the Government to make a special effort to reduce the Debt during the current year?
    MR. AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN: The hon. Gentleman is to understand that the arrangements made by my predecessors last year and the year before are to remain in force. I must decline to make any further statement on the subject until the time comes for dealing with the Budget for the coming year.
    MR. BUCHANAN: Did not the right hon. Gentleman's predecessors state that the particular way in which they intended to reduce the war debt was by the employment of this sum of £10,000,000 from the Transvaal?
    MR. AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN: No, Sir; that is not an accurate recollection of the statements of my predecessors. They did intend to employ the money which they expected to recover in this way in further reduction of the Debt; but they restored the Sinking Fund and increased it quite apart from this contribution from the Transvaal.
    SIR JOHN GORST: Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether his predecessor did not inform the House that this £10,000,000 would be repaid within the financial year?
    MR. AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN: I have not the words of my predecessor before me. But he did anticipate that the loan would be raised in the early part of this year. This is no longer possible.

    Income Tax.
    MR. M'CRAE: I beg to ask Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he is aware that notices for recovery of income tax within ten days have been issued in Scotland; whether this is in accordance with recent Treasury instructions; and whether similar notices have been issued in England.
    MR. AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN: The issue of the notices in question commenced, both in Scotland and England, on 22nd January, this date being in accordance with the instructions to which the hon. Member refers.
    MR. M'CRAE: Will the right hon. Gentleman say whether ten day notices have been sent out in England?
    MR. AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN: I have said they commenced sending them out at the same date in both countries.

    British Trade Statistics.
    MR. HENRY HOBHOUSE: I beg to ask the President of the Board of Trade what steps he proposes to take to supplement and complete the Memoranda on British Trade [Cd. 1761], which are stated in the prefatory note to be incomplete, fragmentary, and hastily prepared.
    THE PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD OF TRADE (Mr. GERALD BALFOUR,): Inquiries are continually in progress by the Commercial, Labour, and Statistical Departments of the Board of Trade with a view to supplement and complete the information contained in the Blue-book referred to. The question of publication of some of the material thus collected in a suitable form will be considered at a later stage.
    MR. HENRY HOBHOUSE: Can the right hon. Gentleman say about when the information will be published?
    MR. GERALD BALFOUR: I am not prepared to say.
    MR. JOSEPH WALTON: I beg to ask the First Lord of the Treasury whether His Majesty's Government will lay upon the Table the questions and inquiries addressed to the Board of Trade, in response to which the Memoranda, Statistical Tables, and Charts [Cd. 1761] 1903, were prepared with reference to various matters bearing on British and foreign trade and industrial conditions.
    MR. GERALD BALFOUR: No, Sir. These questions and inquiries were confidential, and I am not prepared to lay them on the Table.

    Merchandise Marks Act—Pearson's Christmas Extra.
    MR. LABOUCHERE: I beg to ask the President of the Board of Trade whether he is aware that a publication called Pearson's Christmas Extra, issued at the close of last year, was partially printed in Holland, and that no intimation of this fact was printed thereon as required by the Merchandise Marks Act; and whether he proposes to take any action against the publishers, as provided for under such circumstances by the said Act.
    MR. GERALD BALFOUR: The attention of the Board of Trade has been informally drawn to this case, and the informant has been told that the procedure of the Board of Trade in such matters is governed by the regulations made under Section 2 of the Merchandise Marks Act, 1891. Any complaint made to the Board in accordance with these regulations will, of course, receive their careful consideration.
    MR. LABOUCHERE: If I call attention to it in my individual capacity as a humble taxpayer——
    MR. GERALD BALFOUR: It must be done in the proper form.
    MR. LABOUCHERE: Will the Board of Trade prosecute?
    MR. GERALD BALFOUR: It is impossible to answer that until the application is considered.
    MR. LABOUCHERE: How can I lay it before the Board of Trade?
    MR. GERALD BALFOUR: I shall be happy to forward a copy of the regulations to the hon. Gentleman.

    Historical Manuscripts Commission.
    SIR THOMAS ESMONDE (Wexford, N.): I beg to ask the Secretary to the Treasury if he will state what steps are being taken by the Historical Manuscripts Commission with a view to the publication of the manuscripts of the Irish Franciscans.
    THE FINANCIAL SECRETARY TO THE TREASURY (Mr. VICTOR CAVENDISH, Derbyshire, W.): I regret to learn from the Historical Manuscripts Commissioners that the gentleman engaged by them to transcribe the manuscripts has, owing to ill-health and other causes, not made very rapid progress. He has now been relieved of his duties; and a new Inspector will proceed to Dublin next week to press the work to completion.

    Island of Lewis.
    MR. WEIR: I beg to ask the Secretary for Scotland if he will state when he proposes to deal with the recommendations contained in the Report on the Social Condition of the Island of Lewis.
    THE SECRETARY FOR SCOTLAND (Mr. A. GRAHAM MURRAY,): The Report to which the hon. Member refers contains many recommendations of value, to which I am giving careful consideration. I have consulted the several Boards through whom action must be taken, and I am in correspondence with the convener of the Committee. I should like to add that many of the more important recommendations cannot be accepted unless the Bill which I am about to introduce to amend the Congested Districts Act of 1897 should receive the sanction of Parliament.

    Scottish Board of Manufactures.
    SIR J. STIRLING-MAXWELL: I beg to ask the Secretary for Scotland whether he will
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    state what action he proposes to take during the present session on the Report of the Committee on the Board of Manufactures.
    MR. A. GRAHAM MURRAY: I am glad to be able to inform the hon. Member that the Treasury are able to give immediate effect to part of the recommendations in the Report, as will be seen in the Estimates. There are, however, questions of great complexity and magnitude raised by the Report to which I am giving my careful consideration, but on which it would be obviously premature to attempt to give any statement as to the course of action to be followed.
    SIR J. STIRLING-MAXWELL: Has my right hon. friend anything to say with regard to the constitution of the Board itself?
    MR. A. GRAHAM MURRAY: No, Sir, and I think that is obviously a Question which I ought not to be asked to answer at present.

    Irish Labourers Acts—Mullingar Rural District Council.
    MR. HAYDEN: I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland whether he is aware that the Mullingar Rural District Council have passed a resolution protesting against the award of the arbitrator appointed under the Labourers Acts in the Mullingar rural district; and that the amounts allowed landlords for their interest in the plots of land proposed to be taken under the scheme now in course of promotion, are greatly in excess of those hitherto allowed; and, if so, whether he can state the reason for the increase; and whether, seeing that the arbitrator is a professional land agent, he will say whether it is usual to appoint land agents to such a position involving the fixing of the amount to be paid for the interest of a landlord in land; and whether he will state the average number of years purchase awarded in the last award in this rural district and similar averages in the previous awards in the same district, also the number of arbitrations of this class in which this gentleman had been previously engaged.
    THE CHIEF SECRETARY FOE IRELAND (Mr. WYNDHAM,): The arbitrator who made the award of which the District Council complains is the Official Land Commission Valuer for County Leitrim. The Local Government Board has every confidence in his impartiality. The Board does not consider that the holding of a land agency should of itself disqualify a person from appointment as arbitrator when the Board is otherwise satisfied as to his qualifications and impartiality. In the present award the compensation averages £23 an acre. In the previous award it represented £20 an acre. The present arbitrator was employed in one previous case in Longford, when no complaint was made.
    MR. HAYDEN: Can the right hon. Gentleman say the number of years purchase.
    MR. WYNDHAM: I have not that.

    Irish Landowners' Convention and the Land Purchase Act.
    CAPTAIN DONELAN: I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland whether his attention has been directed to a statement at a meeting of the Cork branch of the Irish Landowners' Convention, held in Cork on Saturday last, by the chairman, to the effect that the provisions of The Land Purchase (Ireland) Act, 1903, did not permit trustees to invest in 4 per cent. securities; and, if so, whether he will consider the advisability of introducing, if necessary, legislation to make clear the provisions of the Act relating to the investment of trust funds.
    MR. WYNDHAM: Under the provisions of Section 51 of the Act of 1903, trustees are empowered to invest in a large number of securities yielding 4 per cent. at par. Many of these are at a premium, and consequently do not yield that rate of interest, but there are a number which can be purchased to pay 4 per cent.
    CAPTAIN DONELAN: May I ask if I am to understand the right hon. Gentleman to mean that the statement in the Question is inaccurate?
    MR. WYNDHAM: Yes, Sir, that would be so.
    CAPTAIN DONELAN: Then will the right hon. Gentleman consider the desirability of furnishing the Irish Landowners' Convention with a copy of the Act, to enable them to study it?
    [No answer was returned.]

    Wicklow Magistracy.
    MR. JAMES O'CONNOR: I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland if he will state the number of Protestants who have been appointed to the Commission of the Peace for the county of Wicklow since the 1st July, 1895, and the number of Roman Catholics who have been appointed magistrates for the same county and during the same period; and, also, the total number of Protestants and Roman Catholics who at the present time hold the Commission of the Peace for the said county of Wicklow.
    MR. WYNDHAM: The numbers referred to in the first paragraph are 36 and 3; and in the second paragraph 106 and 22.
    MR. JAMES O'CONNOR: Does the right hon. Gentleman consider that an equal division?
    [No answer was returned.]

    Evicted Tenants.
    MR. J.P. FARRELL: I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland how many applications from evicted tenants for restoration to their holdings have been received under the Land Purchase Act of 1903 by the Estate Commissioners; and whether the Commissioners, with a view to restore these tenants to their own or equivalent holdings, have yet made any overtures or inquiries as to the purchase of untenanted lands in county Longford.
    MR. WYNDHAM: Fifty-one such applications have been received from the county Longford. No untenanted lands in the county have yet been offered for sale to the Commissioners.

    Granard Union—Workhouse Master.
    MR. J. P. FARRELL: I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland whether his attention has been

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    called to the removal for neglect of duty of Mr. Leamy from the office of master of Granard Union Workhouse, to which position he had been appointed by the Local Government Board against the wishes of the local guardians, who favoured and requested the old master, Mr. O'Beirne, to be retained in the office; and whether he will, in order to restore peace in Granard Union, now direct the reappointment of Mr. O'Beirne to the office from which he was removed.
    MR. WYNDHAM: Mr. Leamy has been required to resign on account of his failure to report a serious breach of discipline in the Workhouse. The former master is not eligible for re-election. The guardians propose to give him a superannuation allowance on the ground that he is permanently incapacitated by ill-health from the discharge of the duties of master.
    In reply to a further question,
    MR. WYNDHAMsaid he understood that this very regrettable dispute was approaching a satisfactory termination.

    Coolegreaney Estate.
    SIR THOMAS ESMONDE: I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland if he can give the House any information regarding the settlement of the Coolegreaney Estate in county Wexford.
    MR. WYNDHAM: Negotiations for the sale of this estate have not yet been closed; they will, it is expected, be very shortly completed. When this desirable end is reached the Estates Commissioners will be in a position to restore immediately some twenty evicted tenants to their former holdings. For others of this class land will be sought elsewhere. The landlord himself restored twenty-five evicted tenants before negotiating with the Commissioners.

    Forestry in Ireland.
    SIR THOMAS ESMONDE: I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland if the Government propose to take any steps towards the development of forestry in Ireland.
    MR. WYNDHAM: The Department of Agriculture has had under consideration for some time the question of assisting the development of forestry in Ireland. Investigations are still in progress, and the Department is not at present in a position to say definitely what measures it may recommend should be adopted.
    MR. FLYNN: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that a large number of county councils in Ireland are most anxious to co-operate in this direction?
    MR. WYNDHAM: I am very glad to hear it.

    The Wreck of the "Albert."
    SIR THOMAS ESMONDE: I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland if he will communicate with the proper authorities with a view to the removal of the wreck of the "Albert," off Curracloe, county Wexford, which is an impediment to the fishing industry in the locality.
    MR. WYNDHAM: My attention has not previously been drawn to this matter. I am making inquiry and will communicate the result to the hon. Baronet.

    Seed Potatoes for Small Occupiers in Ireland.
    MR. HAYDEN: I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland whether his attention has been called to resolutions passed by the Castlerea Rural District Council pointing out the necessity of supplying seed potatoes to the occupiers of small agricultural holdings in the district, owing to the almost total failure of the crop in the last season, the bad quality of the available seed, and the advisability of a change of seed; and whether he is in a position to make any statement as to the intention of the Irish Government on this subject.
    MR. WYNDHAM: The resolutions have been received. In respect to the second part of the Question I would refer to my†reply to the similar Question addressed to me yesterday by the hon. Member for North Roscommon.
    †See page 192.

    Drogheda Disturbances.
    MR. SLOAN: I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland whether his attention has been called to an attack made upon the private residence of a Mr. Pearson, Palace Street, Drogheda, on the 22nd and 24th of January last, and to the fact that stones were thrown at the house and doors smashed; and, if so, if he can say what action has been taken in the matter.
    MR. WYNDHAM: NO attack was made on this gentleman's house on the dates mentioned. But on the 14th January some stones are alleged to have been thrown at the house. The police are pursuing their investigations in the matter.
    MR. SLOAN: Is Mr. Pearson under police protection?
    MR. WYNDHAM: I must ask for notice of that.

    Labourers' Cottages in Ireland.
    MR. O'SHAUGHNESSY: I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland if he will grant the Return standing on today's Notice Paper relating to labourers' cottages in Ireland.
    MR. WYNDHAM: I have communicated with the hon. Member on the subject of the proposed Return.
    The Return is as follows:—
    Return showing the number of Cottages applied for in every Poor Law Union in Ireland under the latest completed scheme in connection with the Labourers (Ireland) Acts, together with the number of applications for extra half acres to cottages already built under the Acts under said scheme; how many of these applications for cottages and extra half acres were sanctioned; the amount of expenses connected with such scheme; and in what way applied.

    Irish Town Tenants.
    MR. FIELD: I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland whether the
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    Government will consider the advisability of introducing a Bill to safeguard the town tenants of Ireland in their holdings at reasonable rents, and to prevent the loss of their improvements under the terminable leasehold system.
    MR. WYNDHAM: The Government cannot hold out any hope of introducing legislation in the direction suggested in the Question.

    Longford Post Office.
    MR. J. P. FARRELL: I beg to ask the Postmaster-General whether any steps have yet been taken to fulfil the promise of his predecessor to supply horse haulage for mails and parcels between Longford Post Office and the railway station; and, if not, can he state the reason why the promise of his predecessor has not been given effect to.
    THE POSTMASTER-GENERAL (Lord STANLEY,): As stated to the hon. Member in a letter from the Post Office dated the 8th October last, I have sanctioned the employment of a horse and cart on the service in question. I am not aware that any difficulty has since arisen in the matter, but I am making inquiry and will communicate the result to the hon. Member.

    Corry Postal Arrangements
    MR. HAYDEN: I beg to ask the Postmaster-General whether he is aware that the inhabitants of Corry, in the county of Westmeath, have memorialised the postal authorities requesting the establishment of a post office in that place; and whether, in view of the inconvenience caused by the absence of such an office and of the fact that letters reaching the nearest office for the district on Saturdays are detained till Monday morning, he will meet the wishes of the inhabitants by complying with their request.
    LORD STANLEY: I have not as yet received any memorial asking for the establishment of a post office at Corry, but the question shall be considered and an answer sent to the hon. Member.

    West Limerick Mail Service.
    MR. O'SHAUGHNESSY: I beg to ask the Postmaster-General if he can state

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    what is the reason for the dislocation of the mail service in West Limerick, seeing that, owing to the mail cart system, the mails have been frequently late in parts of the district to the inconvenience of the public.
    LORD STANLEY: I regret that there has recently been irregularity in the mail service in West Limerick. Part of the delay has occurred on the railway to Limerick, and representations on the subject have been addressed to the company; but the principal cause of the irregularity has been loss of time by the mail cart contractor. I have accordingly found it necessary to terminate his contract, and I hope that a better service will be afforded in future.
    In reply to a further Question,
    LORD STANLEYsaid a motor-car service had been tried, but had not proved a success.

    Irish Post Office Audit.
    MR. FIELD: I beg to ask the Postmaster-General whether he intends, with a view to promoting economy and efficiency, to arrange that in future the audit, clerical, and printing work arising out of postal business in Ireland shall be done in that country.
    LORD STANLEY: The work of auditing the accounts of Irish post offices, so far as the audit is conducted by the post office, is done in Ireland, except as regards certain branches of business where centralisation is expedient. The arrangements for the audit conducted by the Auditor-General are entirely under his control. Clerical and printing work arising out of postal business in Ireland is done in that country so far as is consistent with economy and efficiency.

    Irish Manufacturers and Army Tenders.
    MR. FIELD: I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War whether he will consider the advisability of arranging that the receiving depôt already established in Dublin shall in future be utilised for the reception of tenders and samples of Irish manufacturers desirous to tender for Army supplies; whether he will arrange that civilian tradesmen will be more largely employed in the construction
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    and repairs of all work in connection with cavalry outfits.
    THE FINANCIAL SECRETARY TO THE WAR OFFICE (Mr. BROMLEY DAVENPORT,): The general questions involved have been the subject of considerable discussion in the past. It is believed that the expense and other disadvantages of the system proposed would outweigh any advantages it might present. The matter, however, shall receive further consideration.

    Contracts for Imaal Military Camp.
    MR. JAMES O'CONNOR: I beg to ask the Financial Secretary to the War Office if he can state whether all or any of the contracts for provisions and forage supplied to the camp at Imaal, county Wicklow, are in the hands of local traders; and whether any of the contracts are in the hands of firms situated outside Ireland; and, if so, what provisions or forage are supplied by such firms.
    MR. BROMLEY DAVENPORT: The camp at Glen Imaal exists during the summer only. At the last camp the contracts for provisions and forage were held by Irish firms, and none were held by firms situated outside Ireland. As regards local traders, it must be remembered that Glen Imaal is in the depths of the Wicklow Mountains, and that there are no local traders capable of carrying out large contracts.
    MR. JAMES O'CONNOR: Are there no traders in Dublin capable of carrying out such large contracts?
    MR. BROMLEY DAVENPORT: The policy of the Department is to give the contracts to local traders.
    MR. JAMES O'CONNOR: Then why are they sent out of Ireland?

    Fiscal Debate.
    SIR M. HICKS BEACH: I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether His Majesty's Government will afford facilities for an adequate discussion of the fiscal question on a substantive

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    Motion, if, in the absence of the First Lord of the Treasury, Amendments to the Address on that subject are withdrawn. I may say in explanation that from what I hear I fear it is not at all probable that my right hon. friend the Prime Minister will be in his place on Monday, for which day notice has been given of an Amendment to the Address by the right. hon. Gentleman the Member for Montrose. I think that, under the circumstances, the House will generally feel that a discussion on that subject would be quite unsatisfactory. [Opposition cries of "No."]
    THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT (Mr. AKERS DOUGLAS, Kent, St. Augustine's): The request of my right hon. friend is somewhat of an unusual character, but I frankly recognise that the absence of the Prime Minister creates a situation of temporary embarrassment in connection with the particular debate in which the House is anxious to take part. On the whole I am disposed to think that the suggestion of my right hon. friend is a reasonable one—[Opposition cries of "No,"]—and therefore if it meets with the general agreement of the House to transfer the debate on the fiscal question from the Address to some subsequent date, I will endeavour to find time for such discussion when, as we all hope, the Prime Minister will be able to be in his place. At the same time, if right hon. Gentlemen opposite insist, as they have an undoubted right to insist, upon their title to discuss this matter upon the Address, then I must be released from my offer to give special facilities for a debate upon the same subject.
    Sir M. HICKS BEACH: I do not know whether I will be in order, but I should like to ask the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Montrose whether, in the circumstances, he will accept the offer and withdraw his Amendment?
    LORD HUGH CECIL: May I ask the Home Secretary whether, if the course suggested were taken, it would be understood that no Amendment would be made to the Resolution expressing disagreement with the policy of the right hon. Member for Birmingham, but that a
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    fair issue should be allowed without any interference from the Government one way or another so that the House might pronounce its opinion freely, without pressure?
    MR. AKERS DOUGLAS: Of course I cannot bind the House in any question of this sort. It is entirely in the discretion of any Member to move any substantive Motion or Amendment thereto.
    MR. JOHNMORLEY: In answer to the appeal of the right hon. Baronet, I am, of course, aware of the considerations which were probably present to his mind, but looking at all the circumstances, of last year for example, and the difficulties that seemed then to be interposed—I do not now examine how they arose—considering the great eagerness and expectancy in every quarter of this House, and certainly in the mind of the country, and considering further that, though the Prime Minister may be absent, on Monday or Tuesday next, still there are present on the Front Bench opposite six or eight members of the Cabinet, who must be taken to possess a thorough grasp of all the arguments at the back of what is called the policy of the present Government, I regret very much to disappoint the right hon. Baronet, but I think I should be disappointing a much larger number of Gentlemen in the House, and certainly a larger body outside, if I were to comply with his request. Therefore, on whatever may be the most convenient day, I shall be bound to move my Motion.

    Government Tariff Policy.
    MR. GIBSON BOWLES: I beg to ask the First Lord of the Treasury, when do His Majesty's Government propose to make a statement of their intentions with regard to their tariff policy; and do His Majesty's Government intend to exclude taxation on food from their programme.
    ME. AKERS DOUGLAS (for Mr. A. J. BALFOUR) said: Any statement on the subject of the Government policy had better be deferred, I think, until the return of the Prime Minister.
    MR. GIBSON BOWLES: Will the right hon. Gentleman state that he is neither empowered on behalf of the Prime Minister to make a statement nor is he himself aware of the policy of the Government?
    MR. AKERS DOUGLAS: I am perfectly aware of the policy of the Government, but, as I have said, I think it would be more satisfactory to have a statement made by the Prime Minister.

KING'S SPEECH (MOTION FOR AN ADDRESS).
[THIRD DAY.]
Order read, for resuming adjourned debate on Question (2nd February),"That an humble Address be presented to His Majesty, as followeth:—
"Most Gracious Sovereign,
"We, Your Majesty's most dutiful and loyal subjects, the Commons of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, in Parliament assembled, beg leave to offer our humble thanks to Your Majesty for the Gracious Speech which Your Majesty has addressed to both Houses of Parliament."—(Mr. Hardy.)
Question again proposed.
MR. HUGH LAWcontinued the speech interrupted at midnight yesterday. He said that in the course of a journey he made in that part of Europe he found that not only had a great number of villages been burnt down, but the population of others had been forced to fly over the Bulgarian frontier. He could not understand the reason of their exclusion from the Austro - Russian scheme of reform. Was it due to their proximity to Constantinople, or to the fact that no insurrection had broken out in that part? It was a matter of great regret that up to the present not a single word seemed to have been said as to the propriety of including the Adrianople vilayet in any further pro posals for reform in European Turkey. There seemed to be a want of machinery for putting the reform scheme into operation. He did not wish to labour the discussion on that point, but events had already shown that so long as there was a Turkish governor, whether Christian
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or Mohammedan, at one end of the telegraph wire and the Sultan at the other, so long would there be delay and obstruction, and so long would the reforms be unable to penetrate down to the people to whom they ought to apply. He believed that the Government realised, but he was anxious that the House should realise, how serious and urgent the question was. In eight or nine weeks from now they might expect something to happen. He believed that—things had so long drifted—unless some very active steps were taken it would be absolutely impossible to prevent a fresh insurrection. There was no doubt whatever that the leaders were ready for a fresh insurrection. His own opinion—possibly it did not coincide with that of the noble Lord opposite—was that they had to face the fact that in a few weeks time that part of the Peninsula would again be ablaze. The losses of the insurgents had been insignificant, inasmuch as the Turkish Troops had followed the dangerous policy of chasing the bandits into the mountains and of burning and exterminating their villages. He was informed on very good authority that their losses would not be more than 5 per cent. These losses would be much more than made up by recruits from the tens of thousands of refugees—the men who had lost everything close to the Bulgarian frontier, and who were only too ready to start upon a course which promised the recovery of their property.
Apart from the danger of an insurrection, there was the still greater danger of a Turco-Bulgarian war. His own belief was that it would be difficult to avert a Turco-Bulgarian war. It was very easy to blame the Bulgarians for what was called their provocative attitude, but he very much questioned whether any other nation in the world would have stood quiet so long. For many years past, owing to the uncertainty of life and property in European Turkey, a crowd of people had emigrated every year from Macedonia into Bulgaria. At the present moment they were supported by Government contributions and private subscriptions, the refugees were estimated by The Times correspondent at Philippopolis as early as September at 30,000. The Bulgarians desired to avoid war, because they knew they had a good

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deal to lose, but he did not believe that if there were fresh massacres it would be possible for the Government of that country to avoid war. What was the British Government going to to? A report from one of our Vice-Consuls stated that the Turks were ready for massacre, and that it was commonly reported in every Turkish barracks that, in the event of an insurrection and a Turco-Bulgarian war, they would burn and destroy every village on their march so as to leave no enemies behind them. The House was entitled to ask, in view of these facts, what His Majesty's Government proposed to do to prevent those horrors which otherwise must certainly ensue. His firm conviction was that nothing would really be effective short of occupation by all the Powers, such as was successful in Crete. A mere interchange of papers between the different Embassies, with their gendarmerie scheme, however well intentioned, and with the appointment of assessors, however able, could not possibly prevent an insurrection or attain the end which Lord Lansdowne laid down as the end to be sought, namely, that the people themselves should no longer join or sympathise with the operations of insurgent bands. He believed that no reform could be made effective, in that sense, short of actual occupation of that country by the great Powers. But if His Majesty's Government were not prepared for that, he thought the House had a right to ask, in view of the gravity of the situation, that they should distinctly formulate their policy.
THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Earl PERCY, Kensington, S.): I understand it is the general wish of the House to proceed before long to the discussion of another subject, and perhaps it will be for the general convenience that I should reply to the speeches delivered on the very important question of the situation in Macedonia. In the first place I should like to pay a tribute to the spirit in which all the speakers who have taken part in the debate up to this point have addressed themselves to the subject, and to their recognition of the efforts which have been made by His Majesty's Government. It is, of course, very easy to point out defects in the present reform scheme. The hon.
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Member who has just sat down alluded to one of them when he said that it did not include the Adrianople vilayet in which a great deal of disturbance has recently occurred. The Sultan volunteered his own intention some months ago of expanding the present scheme so as to include the Adrianople vilayet, and we may trust that the result of the application of these reforms to other provinces will strengthen the Sultan in his laudable decision. There are a great many defects which can be pointed out in the present scheme, but I think it should be remembered that that scheme is not ours, and that although we have from time to time suggested amendments and alterations, all of which have been in the nature of improvements, and most of which have been ultimately, if somewhat tardily, accepted, yet we have no desire whatever to claim credit for the authorship of that scheme. In the preparation of that scheme we were not ourselves consulted, and the credit as well a the responsibility for that scheme rests in the first instance upon the two Powers who have assumed the initiative with the full approval and concurrence of all the Powers signatories to the Treaty of Berlin. I think that some hon. Members who have spoken in this debate have expressed regret, which is, I think, also felt by the leaders of the revolutionary movement, that the authority of Europe should, so to speak, have been put into commission in this way, and that we should have delegated a kind of Power of Attorney to Austria and Russia to deal with a situation which arose out of a settlement originally international in its character. Well, whatever may be said in favour of that view, I think it is a view which cannot with propriety be urged by those who on so many occasions have poured contempt and ridicule upon the delays—on the interminable delays—which are associated with the machinery of collective intervention by all the European Powers. But however that may be, it has been throughout our policy to actin conjunction with Austria and Russia. We have frequently stated the reasons that determined us to act in that manner, and I think they are reasons which, on the whole, have commended themselves to the common sense of the country. In the first place it is our duty to put British

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interests in the foreground, and it is not our opinion that British interests are so vitally concerned as to demand our taking the initiative ourselves. In the second place we think the objects we have at heart are objects which can probably be better fulfilled by the action of Austria and Russia than by any other method.
What are those objects? In the first place we desire to avert a violent disturbance of the existing condition of things which must awaken many difficult questions, open a great many vexed international controversies, and possibly arouse a wide-spread conflagration. That view was nowhere more strongly or emphatically expressed than in the aide-memoire which was presented by the two Powers to the Porte on the occasion of the formulation of the second reform scheme. In that aide-memoire they were very careful to emphasise the fact that they had spared no effort to meet the susceptibilities of the Porte by confining the period of their intervention in the reform scheme to two years, and by maintaining at the head of the administration a Turkish official. But the object of His Majesty's Government is not confined to the maintenance of the status quo. We desire, as every humane man must-desire, to obtain a real and, if possible, a permanent amelioration of the condition of the population of the European provinces of Turkey. That amelioration can only be produced under two conditions. Turkey must recognise that, however excellent her laws may be in theory, the actual practice of her administration is one which her best friends cannot defend, which constitutes a glaring violation of her solemn treaty engagements, and which is at once a menace to the security of her own rule and to the peace and tranquility of the neighbouring provinces. But there is another condition, and that is that the European Powers should be able to convince the law-abiding element of the population—which comprises, I believe, the large majority, if not all, of the non-Bulgarian element, and which I would fain believe comprises a large proportion of the Bulgarian population also—of the determination and ability of Europe not only to procure for them securities against misgovernment in the
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future, but also to protect them against that kind of tyranny and terrorism by which political agitators for months past have sought to prolong the disturbances and to make the introduction of any real reforms in the provinces impossible. These being the objects of the Government, I think it is manifest that they can best be secured by the two Powers Austria and Russia. They are the two Powers who have most to fear from a reopening of the Eastern question; they are nearest to the scene of action, and, therefore, in the best position to bring material pressure to bear; and, owing to racial and religious affinity, they have the best cause to sympathise with, and the best means of understanding, the sufferings and requirements of the population on whose behalf intervention is sought.
So much for the policy of resigning the initiative to the Austrian and Russian Governments. But His Majesty's Government have always insisted at the same time, and their claims have been frankly met by both of these Governments, on their right to suggest amendments and alterations. These have been directed hitherto to improvement of the details of the scheme, and not to vital changes in its principle. The principle of the scheme we have accepted, and in the opinion of persons best qualified to judge, that principle is well adapted to meet the requirements of the situation. That, at all events, is the opinion of Sir Nicholas O'Conor, our Ambassador at Constantinople; and I understand from a document published by the Balkan Committee at home in The limes only two months ago that they do not themselves dissent from that view. Of course, if these hopes and expectations should unfortunately be falsified it will be the duty of the Government and of all the European Powers to reconsider their position; but I do not think that we should be justified in allowing our hands to be forced, or in assuming as a sufficient proof of the failure of the reform scheme the mere fact of the continued hostility of political irreconcilables who, it appears, if they are to be judged by their actions, would regard the success of the reform scheme as the main obstacle to the realisation of their political ambitions.

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That that is so I am afraid we have had only too much evidence already. The fact that under the first reform scheme those who profited by the amnesty took the first opportunity of rejoining the insurgents; the fact that, as in the case of the Armenian reform scheme, the Bulgarian element almost entirely stood aloof from the reorganisation of the gendarmerie, and that, at all events in one instance, and I am afraid it will be found in more than one, those Bulgarians who have already enlisted have paid the penalty of their temerity with their lives—these facts show to my mind only too clearly the motive of the political pressure which has been brought to bear.
So far as the action of His Majesty's Government is concerned, I think we may make two claims. We may claim that if there has been any delay in the execution of these reforms—and there certainly has been a very regrettable delay—the responsibility for that delay does not attach to us. We have throughout insisted that in our opinion it is far more important that an imperfect reform scheme should be applied promptly and at once, than that we should waste precious time before applying any reform scheme at all. I think we may claim, in the second place, that we have anticipated by our advice many of the best features in the reform scheme as it now stands, and that some of our suggestions might with very great advantage have been adopted at an earlier period. I refer more especially to our proposal that European officers should be allowed and invited to accompany the Turkish troops during active operations. If that proposal had been accepted at once it might have had the effect of very largely checking the excesses and irregularities on the part of the Turkish soldiers, and it would certainly have had the effect, which the Turks themselves ought to welcome, of furnishing Europe with authentic information gathered on the spot, and not with garbled and exaggerated versions of massacre and outrage. That proposal was first made by Sir Nicholas O'Conor at the very beginning of August. On the 28th of that month he was still able to report that, although there were as many as 200,000 Turkish troops in the field, on the whole discipline had been very fairly
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maintained. In that connection I cannot pass over without mention a remark made last night by my hon. friend who raised this subject. Without in the least seeking to palliate or excuse any of the outrages or excesses committed by the Turkish troops—for they admit of no excuse or palliation—and without seeking to estimate the relative guilt of outrages perpetrated by men who are suffering under a sense of great grievances and outrages inflicted by an army which is in a state of great exasperation and has suffered long and deliberate provocation, yet at the same time I do not think that the hon. Member was justified in saying that, whatever might have been the action of the committees, they had not been guilty of the appalling outrages on women and children which had been committed by the Turkish troops, regular and irregular. I do not deny that that has been the case as regards the Turkish irregular troops, but anyone who reads candidly and carefully the last Blue-book but one will see perfectly clearly that the nature and character—I do not say the extent—of the outrages committed by the revolutionary troops have been exactly on all fours with the nature of the outrages committed by the Turkish troops. Up to the last week in August discipline had been fairly maintained. The greater part of the excesses of the Turkish troops dated from the beginning of September, when the irregulars were called out to cope with the invasion of the vilayets of Kossovo and Salonica. When His Majesty's Government made this proposal with regard to the officers it was rejected by the Russian Government as somewhat premature. It was renewed on two subsequent occasions, when we had the support of the Italian Government. On the 29th September we were informed that the principle was to be embodied in the new reform scheme, and we at once took steps to warn the officers whom we ourselves intended to employ.
Our action has been the same in regard to the gendarmerie reorganisation and the employment of European advisers in the chief administrative and judicial departments. Both proposals were pressed upon the Sultan by Sir Nicholas O'Conor as far back as the close of 1902, before any

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reform scheme had been formulated by the European Powers, and when the Sultan had himself taken the initiative by appointing an inspector-general with a committee to sift evidence, and by laying down rules for the admission of a Christian element into the gendarmerie. It has always been the opinion of the Government that what is required in the Turkish provinces is not political change so much as thorough administrative re-organisation. Turkey does not possess the class of men who have the requisite expert knowledge and experience to carry out such a task as that, and for her to come to Europe for trained assistance involves no more derogation of her sovereign rights than is already involved in the admission of European management in the case of the Ottoman Bank and the control of the Ottoman Debt, or in the reorganisation by Europeans of the Turkish army. The necessity and importance of financial reform was explicitly recognised by Austria and Russia in their first reform scheme, in which they laid down that a budget was to be drawn up for each of the Macedonian provinces, that the revenues of those provinces were to be checked by the Imperial Ottoman Bank, and that the expenses of administration were to form a first charge on the provincial revenues. It is a source of great regret to His Majesty's Government that the opportunity was not taken at the time of the elaboration of the second reform scheme to work out those provisions in detail, but we have been assured that their importance has not been lost sight of. At this moment I believe that the inspector-general, in company with the two European assessors, is sitting at Salonica in order to draw up a detailed scheme of financial and administrative reorganisation. Financial reform lies at the root of real administrative improvement, and it will become more and more imperative every day with the great additional expenditure which will be cast upon Turkey by the adoption of reforms, as, I think, we have sufficient evidence already in the large extra taxation, amounting to £2,000,000, which has been recently imposed. The Government trust that the Sultan will himself recognise before it is too late that
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it is the absence of financial reform which makes judicial and administrative corruption inevitable, which has already reduced the Turkish Empire to the verge of penury, and which, if allowed to continue, will certainly bring it to ruin.
I do not know that I can give any further information beyond stating the position in which the reform scheme stands. The inspector-general has occupied his post for some months, and, according to information which has already been published in the Blue-book, has not laid himself open to the kind of censure which seems to be implied in the speech of the hon. Member for West Donegal. On the contrary, he has shown very conspicuous energy and a praiseworthy determination to do whatever he can to make the reforms a reality. Two assessors—both of them possessing a large experience of Eastern affairs—have been appointed, and have taken up their work. As regards the scheme for the reorganisation of the gendarmerie, the Italians have already selected a general who is to take command. All the Powers have appointed their staff officers, and I believe that, with the possible exception of the German staff officer, they have arrived at Constantinople and will immediately enter upon their duties. Colonel Fairholme, the officer whom His Majesty's Government has appointed, is military attaché at Vienna. These staff officers will consider the details of the scheme of reorganisation which has been drawn up in consultation by the two military attaches of Russia and Austria. As regards the non-commissioned officers, a certain number of European officers, belonging chiefly to the minor European States, were enrolled in the Turkish service some months ago. Four Belgian officers were employed in Macedonia, and since then additional Swedish and Norwegian officers have been engaged. It will be necessary that each of the Powers should depute probably a fairly large number of noncommissioned officers to assist their respective staff officers in the actual work of reorganisation. His Majesty's Government are awaiting the report of their delegates on the scheme of reorganisation before sending out the officers whom they intend to depute. I can only say,

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in conclusion, that it is the determination of His Majesty's Government to use their most earnest, constant, and uninterrupted endeavours to press forward the execution of the provisions of the reform scheme in their entirety. If we do not at the present juncture discuss the question of an alternative policy it is because we desire to emphasise the solidarity of the European Powers, because we are reluctant to admit the failure of a scheme which, if failure there be, must entail untold misery and suffering, whatever the ultimate result, upon the whole Christian population of Macedonia, and because, in the last place, we certainly do not desire to offer any pretext to the Turkish Government to allege as an excuse for reluctance to apply the reform scheme at once, the idea that any concession made to the Powers will only be the prelude for further demands.
MR. BRYCE: The Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs has admitted that this Macedonian question has never been made in this House the means of any Party attack whatever. The discussions in the country which have occupied the minds of the people to a large extent were conducted without any reference to Party. Therefore we are now in a favourable position for discussing the matter. The troubles in Macedonia have arisen from long continued misgovernment of the Turkish Empire. It has been nothing but the existence of abominable oppression and tyranny that has given other Powers an opportunity to come into the field at all. The Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs appears to have very greatly minimised the horrible atrocities committed by the Turkish troops. and he has compared them with what has been done by the insurgents, and compares them favourably. He seems to ignore altogether the fact that the Turkish atrocities have been committed upon innocent subjects. In one case given in Sir Nicholas O'Conor's report, it is shown that a village was surrounded by regular Turkish troops, and the people were set upon by a number of Bashi-Bazouks, who slaughtered everybody with the exception of about two men. I do not think all the acts of cruelty perpetrated by the insurgents can parallel that one case.
EARL PERCY: The right hon. Gentleman must remember that I did not compare the scale on which these atrocities had been committed. What I said was that the attacks upon women and children had been made by the insurgents in exactly the same way as by the Turkish troops.
MR. BRYCE: I submit that they cannot be considered as acting in the same way as the regular Turkish troops. As regards provocation the case is entirely different, for in the cases of cruelty by Turkish troops there was no provocation at all, and many of the outrages perpetrated by those troops have been accompanied by horrors which it would not be right to mention in this House. They consisted of outrages upon women, and acts of savage and incredible cruelty for which there is no parallel in the conduct of the insurgents. Apart from these points I have no criticism to make. Let me now state what I believe to be the broad outlines of the position. In the first place, no one can have followed this story and read these Blue-books without seeing from the first that Austria and Russia have been entirely half-hearted in this matter. What the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs has said about the special interest of Austria and Russia is perfectly true, and it might have been the case before 1902, but the experience of the last two years has shown that they have no desire to remove discontent in those parts. The inhabitants there have lost confidence in the promises of Austria and Russia, and are endeavouring now to seek safety in some other quarter. In the next place, the Turks are absolutely incorrigible. They have gone on in their old way, repeating the same kind of conduct and the same cruelty which shocked Europe in 1870. There is nothing to choose between their conduct now and their conduct in 1870, and the most complete proof of this is that these things are being done with the approval and connivance of the Sultan, because nobody has ever been punished for these outrages except in the case of the murder of the Russian Consul. There have been many cases of the grossest possible outrage where the perpetrators have not been punished; all the evils which went on last summer are still going on. The burnt villages have not been rebuilt and taxes are being

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levied upon the inhabitants of some of these burnt villages. According to the report of the Consul of Monastir there are 14,000 refugees homeless there at the present moment. The first scheme was confessedly useless, and was accepted by the Sultan because the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs said he knew it would be so. There was no intention of applying the present scheme in the vilayet of Adrianople. In the fourth place, the danger at this moment is very great. We know that the insurgent bands are still in the mountains, that there is great excitement in Bulgaria, that the present Bulgarian Government has got a large majority in favour of war, and we know that it will be extremely difficult for them to restrain these bands or their own people unless there is some substantial improvement within the course of the next six weeks. I suppose the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs admits that to be the fact. Therefore there is a very serious danger that the insurrection will begin afresh, and be accompanied by the outbreak of a war between Turkey and Bulgaria.
But there is a new feature in the situation which very greatly aggravates it. I am sure everybody in this House must hope that there will be no war in the Far East between the two Powers which are now watching one another with so much suspicion. We must, however, contemplate the eventuality of the outbreak of a war between Russia and Japan as being possible. What will the resut of that be in the Balkan Peninsula? It is desired both by Turkey and Bulgaria because they believe if Russia were occupied elsewhere she could not put that restraint upon their action which she now can, and the Turks think they could finish off the Macedonians and reduce Bulgaria to her old rule I think those who have followed the reports of Continental nations will agree that it is generally believed over Europe that the danger of war in the Near East would be greatly aggravated if war was to break out in the Far East. In these circumstances surely this is an exceedingly difficult position before this country. We must all agree with the aim which the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs has set before us. Everybody desires, I am
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sure, that peace should be preserved, that the reforms should be proceeded with, and the danger of a European war averted. But have the Powers taken the best means to secure that end? I do not complain of what has been done by Lord Lansdowne, for he has shown an earnest desire to improve and strengthen these reform schemes as much as possible. Where his suggestions have not been accepted it would have been a good thing if they had been, and if he had taken even a stronger line than he has taken, and insisted upon the necessity of improving the scheme, I think we should have been in a better position to-day. We do not know from the Blue-books whether he has communicated with the Governments of France and Italy in reference to what will be done in case this scheme should fail. I am sure the House will feel that the Government ought to have considered those eventualities, that they ought to feel that if this scheme fails owing to the difficulties being thrown in its way, an excessively dangerous crisis will arise, and it will be necessary for the Government to consider, along with the Governments of France and Italy, what should be done. Any improvements of the schem should include the super session of direct Turkish rule in Bulgaria. Therefore, I would urge the Government to consider the advisability of arriving at some arrangement with the other European Powers which will provide for the case of the failure of this scheme, and which will enable them when there is a danger of war breaking out, say in the month of April, to arrest it by announcing the scheme which will stop the insurrection and keep Bulgaria quiet That would be a far better course than the continual wrangling of the Turks over this scheme. While acknowledging what. Lord Lansdowne has done, I believe if he takes a still firmer tone he will have, as was shown by the meetings which went on during the autumn, and by everyone who has spoken in this House, the general and hearty support of the people in adopting a decided line in this matter. It will be to the honour of England if we are able at this moment to save Eastern Europe from a perpetuation of her present troubles and from the danger of a Continental war.
SIR MARK STEWARTwho was indistinctly heard, said there were one or two points which he should like to refer to with regard to this very serious question. They could treat this matter from a non-Party view because in every quarter of the House there was nothing but horror and detestation for the cruelties which the Turks had committed. But those who had investigated these matters, and had seen with their own eyes what had happened, declared that things were far worse than had been described in the Blue-books. Whilst thanking the Government for what they had done, he still thought they might have done a little more. He was quite of opinion that unless they acted in a stronger way than they had hitherto done war would break out again in that quarter. The people there had made up their minds to fight; there were plenty of men and rifles; their houses had been burnt down and their property taken from them. Consequently they had nothing to lose, and were determined to wreak their revenge in a bloody war and do everything they could against their enemies. That was the state of things, and whilst Russia was indifferent to these reforms, Turkey was quite indisposed to entertain anything whatever of the kind. If they looked at these matters from that point of view the position was very serious. Russia was entirely indifferent and apathetic in regard to moving in this matter of reform in order to prevent suffering and further war. He was quite sure that Lord Lansdowne and the Foreign Office would do their best; he agreed that they had a very difficult part to play, and they had an alternative policy at their hand. He trusted that His Majesty's Government might see their way very shortly to produce this alternative scheme if the present scheme was not carried out.
MR. ROBSON: Mr. Speaker, I rise to move the Amendment standing in my name. That Amendment charges Ministers who were in office at the period of the war with negligence in relation to preparations for the war and its subsequent conduct. That is a serious charge and a personal charge; and I am sorry, and the entire House will be sorry, that I have to make it under Parliamentary exigencies which I cannot control, in the
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absence of the Prime Minister, who undoubtedly would have been here to meet it had he been able. I shall certainly say nothing against the Prime Minister that may not be dealt with by his colleagues. The charge I make is a failure on the part of Ministers to perform the first duty incumbent on a Government—namely, to provide for the safety of its territories in view of threatening attack. This is not merely a complaint of general un-preparedness for some unexpected contingency. It is a more serious and specific matter than that. It is alleged against the Government that it failed to take precautions and to exercise ordinary foresight and care in spite of ample, distinct, and repeated warnings. Before I deal with the details and instances of the negligence which I allege against the Government, let us first of all endeavour to clear our minds as to the precise scope of the duties in regard to which negligence is alleged. The Prime Minister himself has helped us very materially in this task. In his speech at the Hotel Cecil he pointed out the nature of the problem which faces an English Government in the matter of Imperial and National defence; and when we understand what he regards as the great difficulty we are helped to some definition of the duty thrown on the Government. The Prime Minister says that whereas French and German Ministers are quite familiar with every possible theatre of warlike operations to which they might be required to send troops, and while they also know the number and quality of the troops against which they may be called upon to operate, to an English Minister the problem is indeterminate. The Prime Minister pointed out that we cannot know from day to day and from time to time when we may be required to send our troops or in what climate they may be required to work, nor do we know far in advance the precise quality of the foe we may be called upon to meet; and further that even with our own material for war there is some uncertainty, because it is a vountary army and we cannot quite predict its quantity or cost. No one could phrase the general proposition better than the Prime Minister has done. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Birmingham has, I think, put it a little less pleasantly, and I hope also a little

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less accurately. He says we are always unprepared. I should be sorry to accept that as being true in its fullest extent; but no doubt there is a certain sense in which that phrase is entirely true. If we are always unprepared it is well, however, to remember that a statesman who intervenes in an international dispute which might lead to war would require apparently a double dose of caution and of courtesy in dealing with such situations, because if we are always unprepared obviously one aim of our diplomacy must be to give our soldiers time for preparation. One can scarcely imagine under such circumstances anything more perilous or more dangerous than what used to be called the new diplomacy, a mode of diplomacy which insisted on the instant publication of highly controversial despatches which inflamed public feeling in such a way as to make it almost impossible to secure a lengthy diplomatic pause if our soldiers happened to require it. I think we shall see as the story develops with what deadly effect that method of diplomacy operated to quicken the pace and precipitate the catastrophy against which our soldiers were warning us.
The first duty, therefore, which appears to lie on a British s atesman may be gathered from the utterances of the First Lord of the Treasury and the late Colonial Secretary. It is undoubtedly this. As soon as any Government is warned of a definite urgent and imminent danger it ought at once to set its soldiers to consider in a thorough and systematic way the military necessities of the situation. I do not say that with a vast Empire like ours the British Government should be always scenting war. On the contrary, I think it would be a very dangerous temperament for any Minister to possess. I do not suggest, although many do with a fair show of justice, that we should have plans of campaign for all conceivable conflicts. But where a Minister has been amply and repeatedly warned that some other country is preparing for a conflict with us, then he should at least have a plan of campaign for that contingency. That seems to me to be a very modest standard of a Minister's duty. That duty I hope to show, and show as briefly as I may, was neglected, and gravely neglected. I am
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not sure that even the word "neglect" adequately describes the omission, because when one speaks of neglecting a duty, it rather implies that, although undertaken, the duty was badly done. But this duty was never, in any substantial sense, undertaken—it was omitted. That is the point, and it is a very serious point. It is almost impossible to imagine one more grave. That is the foundation of the charge brought against the Government by their own Commission. During all these years of hostile negotiations, though warning after warning was given, there never was, from first to last, any plan of campaign in operation in South Africa. That, then, is the first duty by which I propose to test the conduct of the Ministry. The second can scarcely be mentioned without some appearance of irony. It is that an English Government warned of an impending conflict should take the trouble to consider, and should even go so far as to decide, what its attitude should be with regard to other Powers, and whether it would have to fight one Power or two or more Powers, because until the Government had done that, the soldiers could not prepare a plan of campaign. I ask the House to keep that fact in mind. An effort has been made to cast the responsibility for our mistakes and mischances upon the Army. Let us then remember the dominant fact that a plan of campaign had of course, in the first instance, to be ordered by the Civil Government; and that it cannot be laid down at all until you know where you are going to fight and who you are going to fight. Up till the last moment, indeed until it was too late, the Government omitted to tell the soldiers what enemies they had to prepare a plan of campaign against, and until that was done the soldiers had to wait for the decision of what was indeed a purely political question. The third duty which I venture to submit is incumbent on every Minister lies in the fact that, having regard to what the Colonial Secretary describes as our perennial unpreparedness, he should keep diplomacy and military preparations in something like accord. He should take care that military preparations did not unduly lag behind diplomacy; but, above all, he should take care that diplomacy did not outrun a necessary state of preparedness.

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In any test, then, as to the performance of these duties let us bear in mind the speech of the First Lord of the Treasury at the Hotel Cecil, to which I have already referred. He there sought to create in the minds of his audience the impression that this was only another instance of the general unpreparedness with which the English nation was prepared to be content; and that Ministers could not be expected to know the theatre of operations or the precise kind of enemy our soldiers would be called upon to meet. Nothing could be more inaccurate. In this case all uncertainty was absolutely removed. The Government knew, none could know better, exactly where the theatre of operations would be, and the character of the war. It has been assiduously sought to create in the mind of the British public that Ministers were unprepared through no fault of their own. That impression has now no right to be held in the public mind after the publication of this Report; and I am very glad that the time has come at last when public justice may be done to the work of the Intelligence Division. That great and admirable division of the War Office and its work has been alternately neglected and maligned, and something like justice has been done it by the Report of the Commission. But I do not think that even the Commission has done adequate justice to the extraordinary excellence of the work of the Intelligence Department. I venture to say that, although in this war one had a great deal to lament and to criticise, the work of the Intelligence Department seems to be almost above criticism. When one looks at the warnings it gave and the information it supplied one is disposed almost, even now, to ask, looking back on the war and all we have to regret and to learn, was there anything which the Government needed which the Intelligence Department did not tell them Certainly so far as facts were concerned, almost nothing. The only criticism that could be made against the Department was that in one or two particulars it did not seem to express a right opinion; but as regards the supply of material facts there is no criticism to be made. Take, for instance, the Report of the Intelligence Department immediately after the Jameson Raid. The Department seem to have appreciated the significance of that raid.
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They exercised to a certain degree an intelligent anticipation as to the consequences that might ensue, and they therefore began at once to warn the Government. Major Altham pointed out what the result of the raid had been on the relations between the Orange Free State and the Transvaal, and there were no less than a series of twelve other full and admirable reports from the Intelligence Department in 1896 to 1899. They are brought up to date in June, 1899, and that is the report I have in my hand. This is by no means the last, but I take this as being one which is teeming with warnings and information. It begins by giving an elaborate account of all the physical difficulties of the Dutch Republics for military operations, and then it goes on to speak of their armament. We remember, when the war broke out, one of our Ministers expressed pained surprise at the excellent arms and guns these Boer peasants possessed. That with most people conveyed the impression that the Government were really surprised, but the Intelligence Department, year by year, ever since 1892, gave statistics of every gun the Boers possessed, and the only error which they committed was to make the warning they gave rather stronger than it need have been. The Intelligence Division warned the Government that the Boers had 107 guns. There was therefore no uncertainty; the problem was not indeterminate. With regard to men, the whole military organisation of the Transvaal is described with a lucidity that is simply marvellous. Great stress is laid on their mobility. Another Minister expressed surprise that not only had the Boers guns but that they were mounted. Yet that was one of the maters upon which the Intelligence Division was most precise. I would ask the House to listen to one sentence that might have been written after instead of before the war—
"As regards mobility it must be recollected that the force which was defeated at Laings Nek and Ingogo was operating on foot, and with practically no mounted troops, against men whose hunting experience had taught them to get the utmost use out of their horses in approaching, surprising, and surrounding large herds of wild antelopes. Moreover, South Africa is of all countries perhaps the most dangerous in the world for infantry to

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operate in without a screen of mounted troops in the near front and on their flanks."
And then it goes on to describe their tactics—tactics which we all became painfully aware of during the course of the war—
"The tactics employed by the Boers were in fact such as they had learnt by hunting experiences on the veldt. Alike in attack and defence they acted on the same principle, containing the enemy's front, with a thin but well posted body of skirmishers they utilised every fold of ground to gallop unseen round his flanks, and then leaving their horses, which are trained to stand without holders under cover, gradually concentrated a ring of overwhelming fire on their objective."
There is the origin of a good many of those painful surrenders which it pains us even now to remember or mention. That was a very precise warning as to the mode in which these surrenders were likely to be brought about. The Report goes on to explain the skill with which they take advantage of cover and concentrate this overwhelming fire on their opponents without practically the loss of a single life. Turning over the page, one scarcely knows what extracts to take from it, I find this—
"At the outset of war they would, no doubt, boldly take the offensive against Cape Town or Kimberley, a serious engagement would necessarily ensue before our columns had penetrated far into the Republican territory. Defeat in such an engagement would, as has been already said, involve such disintegration of the Boer forces as to terminate the war."
Then there is this piece of information, and I wonder what we should have thought if we had known that the Government knew this before the war—
"General Joubert said in conversation in March, 1898, that a scheme for such offensive action had been drawn up by a German officer, but was not yet approved. A report from a reliable source dated June, 1899, states that the present Boer plan of campaign contemplates a concentration with the Free State forces west of the Drakensberg and an advance on Lady-smith through Van Reenans Pass."
So that before the war broke out we had the Intelligence Division foretelling the advance against Ladysmith; foretelling its method and the danger of such an advance to this country. So much for means and methods, though I might go further and point to the amount of ammunition they had accumulated almost to a round, and the sites where that ammunition was stored. I counted myself something like twenty-three places,
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which would have indicated to anybody except the Ministers on that Bench that a guerilla warfare was contemplated.
I now desire to draw attention to the Report in one particular respect, which, I think, outweighs all other considerations. The most material thing to be considered by the Government. both in directing operations or in moulding their diplomacy, was the attitude of the Orange Free State. That is the matter on which their ignorance seems now to be most complete and profound. They knew nothing of the organisation or the military armaments or men of the Transvaal, but their ignorance of the Orange Free State is most black. Just let me tell the House how matters stood in the Orange Free State—that is a very important fact—after the peace in 1881. In 1881 there was a treaty, offensive and defensive, between the Orange Free State and the Transvaal, by which the Orange Free State bound itself to assist the Transvaal if it thought the cause of the Transvaal was just. After the Jameson Raid that treaty was revised; it was made again in a somewhat different and a slightly stronger phraseology. In 1897 there were the same conditions, entirely, except that the Orange Free State was to be at liberty to withdraw from offensive and defensive operations with the Transvaal if they thought the cause was unjust. That is to say, in 1897 the Orange Free State bound itself to act with the Transvaal unless it could show or prove the quarrel was unjust. That was the only condition on which the Orange Free State could avoid the obligations cast on it by this treaty. That was in 1897. Afterwards came a long period of hostile negotiations, right down to 1899, and in June, 1899, a very important event took place which had the greatest bearing on the matter. In June, 1899, there was the Bloemfontein Conference. The proposal made at that Conference came to be considered in the Free State Raad. Then was the time for the Orange Free State to make its treaty absolute or let it go altogether. If the Orange Free State had said, We think Mr. Kruger's cause is unjust, then the treaty goes. But after the Bloemfontein Conference the Orange Free State Raad passed a resolution affirming its agreement with Mr. Kruger on his propo al. Nobody could doubt

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for a moment then that Mr. Kruger's view-was also the view of the Orange Free State. That was the state of circumstances in June, 1899, and, as all of us know, the war broke out in October of that year. That only states in a short way that which is stated over and over again in the course of these reports, that the Orange Free State intended to throw in their lot with the sister Republic, and Sir John Ardagh said that this agreement was no dead letter. Ample provision was made for joint operations, and Sir John Ardagh goes on to say that apart altogether from these treaties there was already ample provision made for | joint operations, and that in fact the Orange Free State was being armed at the cost of the Transvaal with armaments and ammunition. They had worked out their scheme completely. Sir John Ardagh sent a copy of a resolution, passed apparently in secret session of the Transvaal Raad, that they must arm others besides themselves. There was no question, therefore, in June, 1899, as to the attitude of the Orange Free State. These two States were in a condition of absolute solidarity. What then did the soldiers ask His Majesty's Government for? They wanted to know what the route was to be in order to approach the Transvaal, and that question was not settled until too late. On 28th November, 1899, the First Lord of the Treasury made a speech at Dewsbury in which he explained what he understood to be the state of things with regard to the Orange Free State. The right hon. Gentleman said—
"If I had been asked two months ago whether it was likely we should be at war with the Orange Free State, I should have said that you might as well expect us to be at war with Switzerland. They were local friends from whom we had nothing to fear, and who had nothing to fear from us."
This was said of a State that had made an offensive and defensive alliance for combined offensive operations against us, and had intimated that they made their own the casus belli of their neighbour. In January, 1900, the First Lord of the Treasury repeated the same statement. Some colleague, perhaps some colleague connected with the Colonial Office, might surely have warned the right hon. Gentleman that he was wrong. The right hon.
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Gentleman, addressing his constituents a Manchester, referred to the intention of the Boers to precipitate a struggle from which they hoped to gain some national advantage, and then he goes on and observes—
"This was not a question on which the Government had, could have, or ever pretended to have, special means of information. There have been, and there may be, European questions on which the public cannot be taken into the confidence of the Government of the day. The Government of the day may know perfectly, and secretly, facts about the intents of this or that foreign Government which impose on them a certain policy which they cannot communicate in any fulness of detail to their fellow countrymen. But in this case there were no secrets, everybody was on an equality. The man in the street knew as much as the man in the Cabinet. If I held the view that peace was a possibility, I held it with the great mass of public opinion."
Just imagine a statement like that with these twelve reports lying apparently undusted upon the shelves of some Government Department. There is no parallel in English history to this case of a Government receiving warnings like these year after year, month after month, touching Imperial peace, and neglecting them, so as to show in the end a state of hopeless and helpless ignorance such as the First Lord of the Treasury showed at the end of 1900. He was not the only member of the Cabinet who did not appreciate the situation. I do not wish to trouble the House with extracts, but you remember a speech of the late Prime Minister on this matter. I think the Duke of Devonshire also intimated that so far as he was concerned he had not been made acquainted with the imminence of the danger arising from the Orange Free State. Here we have got the First Lord of the Treasury, who was a member of the Cabinet Committee of Defence, and it would appear that these reports were not laid before that august body. I daresay, like other bodies which are to be constituted under the new reform scheme, that body became too august to be active. Neither were the reports asked for by the First Lord of the Treasury. Of course they would have been produced, but the right hon. Gentleman seems to have forgotten the existence of the Intelligence Department altogether. It was no momentary lapse of memory such as might occur with

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anyone engaged in the absorbing duties of First Lord of the Treasury and Leader of this House; it was a forget fulness that continued for three and a half years of anxious and perilous crises; it was not only forgetfulness, it was a feat of forgetfulness. He may have asked for them and been told that there were none. I do not think that is likely. It would have been a grave mistake if such a thing happened in this case, and one would have nothing more to say about the First Lord of the Treasury. He might in that case have been expected to ask why there were none, but further than that I could not push my criticism. There is a third alternative which I mention only to exclude, that the Prime Minister might have read these reports and have failed to appreciate their importance. That certainly would be an admission of incompetence greater than any charge I have dared to make. We have further to ask how it came that these reports were unknown to Ministers of such importance as the Prime Minister and others? They were sent, in the first instance, to the Colonial Office, and then to the War Office, with covering letters drawing attention to their contents and enforcing the gravity of the situation.
MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN: I do not know whether it is of importance to the hon. Member's argument, but he must be entirely mistaken. There may be some particular report which came to the Colonial Office first, but reports of the Intelligence Officers go to the War Office.
MR. ROBSON: I have no doubt whatever that the right hon. Gentleman is correct as to the first step, but that does not touch my argument at all, I only mention the subject for the purpose of saying that the letters accompanying the documents showed that the Colonial Office appreciated the gravity of the reports. The Colonial Secretary, however, might have consulted the First Lord of the Treasury or the Duke of Devonshire. Was that done at all? One cannot understand how, if there was anything like specific or explicit consultation between the Colonial Secretary and the First Lord of the Treasury, the
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First Lord of the Treasury should have remained as ignorant as he did of the information contained in the reports. But the ignorance—I do not use the word I offensively, but I cannot think of another adequate to the occasion—of the First Lord of the Treasury with regard to the intentions of the Orange Free State was symptomatic, because we will see that the soldiers were kept waiting for the Government policy with regard to that Republic. The question of the Orange Free State never seems to have been put forward in any form so as to invite the collective consideration and action of the Cabinet. There seems to have been a remarkable silence and reserve between the Departments concerned with regard to this vital matter. How comes it that it was not more fully discussed between the Colonial Secretary and the First Lord of the Treasury? It might be said that the Colonial Secretary did not in those days habitually consult his colleagues. That is his way. That may be so. I am not going to criticise his action on any matter of that sort. That is a matter which affects the self-respect of his colleagues. But there is another point of view—the point of view of the colonies and this country. Remember that the Colonial Secretary was responsible for colonial defence. The Colonial Secretary, therefore, with the War Office, ought to have insisted on having adequate supplies of money in order to provide that that defence was not neglected. He could not possibly expect the Treasury to make adequate grants of money unless he did his best to make them realise exactly the state of affairs. No criticism except of a favourable character can be passed on the letters which the Colonial Secretary passed to the War Office. He points out that the colonies are not prepared to meet attack, and that if an attack was made there will be great humiliation and expense to the Empire. He was warned that there would be great loss of prestige to the Empire unless these warnings were heeded in due time. He knew the danger. Did that exhaust his duty or end his duty? I venture to submit it was only the beginning. The danger was pointed out in 1897 and again in 1898; they could not escape knowledge of it. These reports were made—whether to the

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Colonial Office in the first instance or not, certainly they were brought to the knowledge of the Department. Therefore he knew the danger. I ask the House to consider whether, in the events that followed, he did his duty in making his colleagues realise the danger as it was communicated to him? Collective responsibility should have been invoked, for this question lay near the root of all other delay. Let me follow to a finish this story about the Orange Free State. We see at a very much later stage—in 1899—General Buller begins to grumble about the delay of the Government in making up their minds. He was informally appointed in June, 1899, when he was at Aldershot, a busy man and engaged in his duties as Commander there. His formal appointment was not made till 9th October—two days before the outbreak of the war. This is what he said in that interval—
"I thought the question of the Orange Free St ate should be settled, and that until we could make a plan of campaign we could not get on. I was always grumbling to Wolseley about it. I was always told to leave the orange Free State out of account."
Lord Lansdowne says that he did not tell him that, and I am quite sure that we accept Lord Lansdowne's word as to the best of his knowledge and as likely to be correct. But he never told General Buller to take the Orange Free State into account. And remember, almost contemporaneous with General Buller's informal appointment was the resolution of the Orange Free State Raad, which made it perfectly clear that we would have to fight the Orange Free State if we entered into hostilities with the Transvaal. Therefore he was not told the plans of the Government. What are the concluding dates on this point? There was a report in June, 1899, andon the 8th Augustafresh memorandum from the Intelligence Department by Major Altham, pointing out—I need not read it; it was the same in substance—the danger that lay in our path in regard to the Orange Free State, and the urgent importance of deciding at once what the English policy in regard to the Orange Free State should be. No act on is taken until at last we get to the 23rd September. On that day General Buller says he was "suddenly told he might put forward his views as to the route" to be taken. War broke out on 11th October; and on 25th September
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there appears, so far as the evidence is concerned, the first glimpse of a Cabinet consultation on this subject. A Minute is laid before the Cabinet by Lord Lansdowne, in which he says—
"The question of the Orange Free State ought, I think, now to be faced without further delay."
So that after three years of inexplicable and inexcusable delay we get at last this decision; and even then war had been thought inevitable for at least three weeks. In another part of the evidence Lord Lansdowne was asked when he thought war inevitable, and he said 5th September Now we turn from this statement of facts which may be excused—we may be overwhelmed with rhetoric, but these facts cannot be denied. We turn from that to the Ministerial defence. That Ministerial defence appears to be put forward by the Prime Minister in the Hotel Cecil in November last. I venture to say that rarely—never in the history of this country—has any Ministerial speech excited such deep, universal, and bitter resentment among all ranks of the English Army as that speech. The Prime Minister bewail by saying that—
"The root of every complaint was that we under-rated the military task before as."
What he means by "we" will be seen in a succeeding extras He continues—
"All the so-called failures of the war arose out of that miscalculation."
and—
"The impression left on many gentlemen after reading the Report is that the War Office authorities bad not taken advantage of the information given by the Intelligence Department, and that if they bad thought a little more about their plan of campaign that miscalculation might have been avoided. Personally"(says the First Lord of the Treasury),"I differ from that."
One does not wonder that he should differ from that. Mark what the right hon. Gentleman says. Here is a charge made against the Government of not having made up their minds on a political question in order that the soldiers might set to work to study the military question—
"Observe,"(he says),"that in so saying I am offering a defence not for the Government but for their military advisers."
and—
"We thought the soldiers were better judges than ourselves."
MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN: Hear, hear!
ME. ROBSON: The right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Birmingham says "Hear, hear." Well, if he says that he thought the soldiers were better judges than himself he should have followed their advice. I do not think the right hon. Gentleman thought the soldiers were better judges than himself. The First Lord of the Treasury continued—
"I mean to do my best to defend them."
Then this very remarkable defender goes on to speak of "the error the soldiers made." He says—
"That they made the error common to all regular forces 'of undervaluing men not organised as a regular army. The mistake is in the first place one of which the whole British military profession were alike guilty, if guilty be the word.'"
I think "guilty" is the word; but not as applied to the British Army. Let us consider the Prime Minister's action in saying that he has defended the Army. He is directly charged with making a serious blunder, and he turns to his military advisers and says—"I will not go into the dock, but if you go in I will defend you." That is a very ingenious method of defence, and one which this House should very carefully consider. Of course we know that in effect all Ministers are responsible for their advisers; and we know that that responsibility is disregarded by the House and the country if it can be shown that Ministers have been misled by their advisers. Now can that be shown here? Let me take the advice they got. First of all we have the Intelligence Department. In the beginning of 1897, as the result of the Jameson Raid, Sir J. Ardagh said that they ought to increase the South African garrison by 20,000 men. That advice was not taken. Then the Intelligence Department goes on to warn them in 1897 and 1898 and tells them precisely the forces that ought to be sent out. In April, 1897, the Intelligence Department advised the Colonial Office that there ought to be at least three regiments of cavalry and two batteries of artillery. The Colonial Office communicates that advice to the War Office. That advice is considered by the Colonial Secretary and by his colleagues, and Lord Lansdowne
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Points out that it would cost half a million of money, and he says—
"The matter was discussed by Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Lansdowne with colleagues and the expense was thought greater than was justified by the circumstances."
So only £200,000 was given, including a sum of £36,000 already spent. But he adds—
"This would not be a mobile force and it could make no pretence of anticipating the Boers at the numerous points indicated by Sir John Ardagh."
So that you have the Intelligence Department and the soldiers warning the Government at the earliest possible date and indicating the necessity of what no doubt was a serious force. I am not going to argue here how the serious political situation had been brought about: but here you have the Government saying—"No, the expense is too great, and instead of £500,000 we cut it down to £200,000. and even that is to include £36,000 you have already spent." That was in 1897. The garrison was substantially increased in 1897 and slightly diminished in 1898. In the latter year the warnings began again to the Colonial Office and the War Office, and there was some small provision of regimental transport, but nothing further was done.
We now take the soldiers. Lord Wolseley began in June. 1898, to warn them and suggested that the Government should set about unobtrusive preparations and that they should send out certain transport which would be unnoticed. Lord Wolseley also recommended the immediate mobilisation of an army corps and a cavalry division of 35,000 men on Salisbury Plain. Of course that was a very serious step. but he suggested that colour might be given to it as being a part of our ordinary military operations. It had long been thought desirable that we should have an experimental mobilisation of an army corps, and he thought that even if such an excuse were not believed, why then at least the mobilisation would; have a wholesome moral effect on the Boers. I only call attention to these facts to point out what the soldiers thought of the situation. That was in June. On the 7th July, Lord Wolseley

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returned to the fray. In the recommendations which he made in his June Memorandum was one that contingents should be invited to co-operate with us from Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. I think he is entitled to the credit of that. In July he gets urgent, and says that he would recommend at a very early date the despatch of 10,000 men. He also recommended the Government to commence the purchase of ponies. That was a very practical recommendation. How much was lost by its having been neglected? He also said it would be advisable to get a transport corps ready, and that if there were mobilisation it would greatly increase the effectiveness of our force in the field. He followed these recommendations up with subsequent recommendations about buying ponies, carts, mules, and wagons. Anyone can see that in June and July of 1899 the military advisers of the Government did-not under-rate the task before them. So far from under-ratiag it, they put it as being one of such magnitude that it was thought by the Government to be out of all reason. They were afraid because of political considerations to follow the advice of the soldiers; and these are the very Ministers who are now seeking to throw unmerited blame for the disasters of the war on the soldiers. What happened in July? By way of showing how urgent the situation was, the Boers sent 100 cases of ammunition into the Orange Free State, and rifles and ammunition were landed at Port Elizabeth for the Orange Free State and sent on by Mr. Schreiner. These were public facts; and why in face of them were not Lord Wolseley's recommendations adopted? What excuse can the Government give? It might be said—and it is an excuse to which I would listen with the greatest deferencs—that it was very desirable not to make provocative preparations. That is in general circumstances a sound excuse. It would never do to interfere with the course of peaceful diplomacy by sending out an armed force if it was desired to have any fruitful results from that diplomacy. But remember in adopting that line and leaving your frontiers unprotected in order not to be provocative you must keep your diplomacy in accord. But so far from this being anything like a valid
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excuse, the Government as a fact did send out more men in August. After all these warnings they got as far as to send out 1,744 men to defend our borders against attack. Everybody knew that such a force was ludicrously inadequate; but it was sent out, according to the admission of the Government, in order to strengthen their diplomacy. That is an end of all the talk of keeping back reinforcements lest it might seem provocative. You sent out 1,700 men; but Lord Wolseley and the War Office were making great efforts to get more. I think Lord Lansdowne offered a battalion for Natal, and then he said they could only have half a battalion, and all this time our borders were lying absolutely undefended. There was some arrangement made in July, not involving any substantial expenditure, for supplying transport duties, but the 10,000 men Lord Wolseley asked for, and asked for at once, were not even ordered until the 8th of September. On the 18th August—I am following the dates, as that may be better than arguing in general terms—Lord Wolseley wrote again urging the despatch of 10,000 men, and saying that it would cost £500,000 but that it was well worth it. He pointed out that the Transvaal continued to make preparations for war. In August it is only fair to mention that there were certain hopeful intervals in the negotiations, but these intervals were very short, and were practically closed on the 21st when the terms which Mr. Kruger attached to his proposals became known to the Government, because they were regarded by the Government as wholly inadmissible. On the 24th August Lord Wolseley wrote a Memorandum to which I invite the attention of the House. He said—
"At this moment, we are not, locally prepared for war, so if it comes under present, circumstances we shall surrender the initiative to Kruger, and in no recent, case would that initiative be more likely to injure our national prestige."
That was sent to the Colonial Office, and on the 26th August we had from the then Colonial Secretary a speech which I am sure the House will not forget. He used in it the metaphor about the squeezed sponge. Remember what the situation was at the time that speech was made by the Minister responsible for colonial defence, who had been told that

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our colonies were unprepared to meet an attack, and moreover, that if any such attack were made it would be disastrous, not merely to our soldiers but also to our Imperial prestige. He was told also that our enemy was well armed, well mounted, and resolute to defend his national existence by force of arms, yet on the 26th August we have the then Colonial Secretary making a speech in the highest degree provocative and almost certain to precipitate a situation full of peril to ourselves. We have him flouting the commonsense advice of the soldiers, and remember it was the soldiers who were the men of business of the situation. They knew the burden of responsibility that would fall upon them, and not only that, but their very lives were at stake, as well as the honour of the Army, and consequently they were entitled to be considered, and we had a right to expect that a Minister would not precipitate and provoke war by a speech of that character. Soldiers by no means object to a firm front, but they want a front made firm by preparation, not a paper front consisting of provocative speeches. The public were eager for war—they thought that speech was the speech of a man of action, but they did not know that behind all this platform energy there were the greatest administrative omissions, and they did not know that the colleagues of the then Colonial Secretary had actually been left for years in blank ignorance of the elementary dangers of the situation. They did not know that by this very speech, and speeches like it, the soldiers were being prevented from getting time for which they were vainly asking. What right had the Colonial Secretary or any other Minister, in view of the warnings from the soldiers, to precipitate the situation against them and to force the pace at a time when they were asking of diplomacy that it should be carefully moderate?
See what followed. One cannot help wishing that instead of hectoring the Boers the right hon. Gentleman had hectored his colleagues, or that even without hectoring them he had given them a little more information. On the 5th September a very important minute was received from Sir Redvers Buller in which he said—
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"There must be some period at which the military and diplomatic forces are brought into line."
There was a diplomatic force at work here which it was very difficult to bring into line.
"Before diplomacy," he added. "proceeds to an ultimatum the military should be in a position to enforce it."
What an astounding statement to make to this Government. It had never occurred to them. The War Office did not know how fast diplomacy was moving. Then General Buller added—
"We must know the line on which we arc to advance,"
And he said that if they were to take the Natal route 50,000 men would be required, leaving the Orange Free State out of account. That was before our disasters, which greatly increased the magnitude of our task. No soldier contemplated such a delay in the preparations as would allow the enemy to take the initiative against which Lord Wolseley warned us, nor were the military authorities made aware that a force would be required not only for the defeat but the annexation of the Transvaal, and on these differences as to the amount of men, you have General Buller's message which he sends direct to the Prime Minister. On the same day he sends one to Lord Wolseley, and there he seems to speak of the order that is to be adopted. He says—
"Early in July I suggested to Lord Lans-downe that the officers commanding in South Africa should be invited to say what troops they required to enable them to protect our Colonies from invasion by the Orange Free State or the Transvaal. So far as I know this has not been done."
Who was the officer Commanding-in-Chief during the time? It was General Butler. What is the first thing that would suggest itself, not to a Cabinet Minister but to the man in the street, who is the final judge of appeal? That, at least, if you wanted to know the magnitude of your task you should write to the Commander-in-Chief in South Africa. He was not consulted at all, although I suppose he has fallen under the ban of the Prime Minister like the whole of the military service for whose miscalculation he suggests we are now suffering. Lord Wolseley's minute of the same day is—
"First intimation that our negotiations have readied an acute stage from Buller."

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Was this treating the soldiers fairly? Lord Wolseley then says—
"Cannot we stave off hostilities for five or six weeks?"
That was on the 5th September. Any Parliamentarian would have told him that you cannot stave off hostilities, that there are other forces pushing the pace. And then he goes on to say—
"We have committed one of the very greatest blunders in war, we have given our enemy the initiative."
Whose was the blunder which brought about our initial losses? Were the soldiers responsible? Is there a single Member of this House who does not recognise the sense of fairness in Lord Wolseley's minute about the initiative? That blunder and the failure to follow-up that warning which was the root of our failure was a politician's blunder. It was the Cabinet's failure. What followed after this request for five or six weeks delay. There followed on the 8th of September a most important despatch which set out our proposals in their final form, with a minor indication that if they were not accepted there would be further steps taken which were not very obscurely veiled. One might call that despatch very nearly an ultimatum. That was three days after Lord Wolseley's request for five or six weeks more time. So that within three days of Lord Wolseley's request war was deliberately brought nearer. Lord Lansdowne said then he thought it was inevitable, and on that date 10,000 troops were ordered out. Lord Wolseley thought first of all 10,000 would be sufficient with one army corps. But, in advising only 10,000 men, he had in view the rapid mobilisation of an army corps. Ten thousand men with the rapid mobilisation and despatch of an army corps is a very different thing to 10,000 men sent unsupported. Lord Lansdowne says Lord Wolseley pledged his word that the borders of the colonies were now safe until the arrival of reinforcements, but Lord Wolseley was never asked as to this by the Commissioners, and although I do not doubt Lord Lansdowne's word, I think too much has been made of that. But did the 10,000 get out there before the outbreak of war? Not completely.
LORD GEORGE HAMILTON (Middle-sex, Ealing): Yes, they were, the hon.
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Gentleman is confusing the Indian troops with the 10,000. The Indian troops were there before the outbreak of the war.
MR. ROBSON: I am not confusing anything. There were out of the 10,000, 5,600 who came from India. The rest came from the Mediterranean and home ports. The date of the arrival of the troops which came from India were between the 5th and the 13th October, and the troops from the Mediterranean and home ports between the 17th and 30th. The battle of Elands-laagte was fought on the 21st, and the war broke out on the 11th. But even supposing they were there before, they were not at the front, but at Durban. So that the arrivals go on right up to the 30th October, after some of the most vital battles had been fought. To what extent the troops were delayed after arrival in getting to the front I am not expert enough to say but Durban is a long way from the front. They ought to have been sent out when the general at the front could make good dispositions of them, but you have them arriving after the date when one of our most successful generals tells you 5,000 men might have changed the whole aspect of the war. I am quite indifferent, if it can be shown that these men were in South Africa on such a date, if it cannot be shown that they were at the front fit for service.
Now I take the question of the army corps. Very few facts indeed will be enough to show how the matter stands. It was asked for in June, and passed over through July, August, and September. It was never ordered until the 7th October. It took four months to prepare, and its arrival in South Africa was not completed till after our worst defeats. It might have been prepared in three months with the expenditure of one million of money, but the money required for the army corps was not obtained until 22nd September, nineteen days before the war broke out, and even when the money was provided it was not the whole amount but £600,000. The whole of the money was not sanctioned until the 29th. Is that fair to Lord Wolseley? It is not fair when you consider the burden

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of responsibility cast upon him. I do not blame the Treasury. I think anyone who goes through this evidence will rise from it with an increased feeling of respect for that Department. The Treasury are the properly constituted guardians of the public purse, and there is no case throughout all the evidence of the Treasury being responsible for any niggard treatment when they had been made acquainted with the danger of the situation. But the Treasury did not know much about the danger. That has been my complaint against the then Colonial Secretary, that he did not invite or compel the collective action of his colleagues so that they would have put before the Treasury representations which would have secured more prompt and generous expenditure. That finishes all I have to say with regard to Lord Wolseley, and I have only a word to add in reference to two other soldiers, who, I think, ought to have something said for them. The first is General Duller. General Buller made one recommendation after another. On 5th July he said—
"You should strengthen the garrisons to the extent that the local authority there think sufficient."
That was not done. The local authority—General Butler—was not consulted, General Penn-Symons is said to have been consulted and to have recommended some small addition, but he was killed, and therefore we have not heard his evidence on the point. The next recommendation made by General Buller is, "Make up your mind as to the route." The third was, "Commence mobilisation." Not one of those three heads of advice was carried out by the Government so far as General Buller was concerned.
Then as to General Butler. A more remarkable circumstance than that connected with the name of General Butler is hard to imagine. He was the officer commanding-in-chief there; he knew the theatre of operations; he had been requested in December, 1898, to draw up a local scheme of defence, and he had done it. It was not a scheme of defence adequate to meet invasion. No request of that sort was ever made to General Butler or anybody else in South Africa, he was simply asked to formulate
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a scheme of defence upon existing conditions and with the materials then in South Africa. That is the ordinary method. Colonial governors and generals are not allowed to frame schemes of defence as if they had an unlimited command of troops; they have to frame their schemes according to the troops at their command—to cut their coat according to their cloth. He was never asked to make a considered estimate as to what force would be required in view of the contingencies of war and annexation which were then appearing on the horizon. Why he was not asked I do not inquire. He told the Commission that in conversation with his staff he had often expressed the opinion that 50,000 or 100,000 men would be required to deal adequately with the South African situation. It is a thousand pities the Government did not ascertain his opinion and the grounds for it.
These are the facts. I need not add to them by rhetoric; they speak for themselves. But I would add this word of warning. Are these Ministers fit to be chosen as the Ministers by whom even our commerce, and trade, and industry are to be turned into sub-departments of the War Office—because that is what we have got to expect. I hope the incompetence and neglect which is now made clear will not be allowed to pass without the English people and this House profiting by it. It is perfectly idle for us to listen to such a story as the Commissioners have unfolded and say, "Oh, let bygones be bygones." That will not do. We see already from the new proposals for the reconstruction of the War Office that you cannot let bygones of this sort be bygones. The Prime Minister who knew nothing about the Orange Free State is now to be almost Commander-in-Chief, and the Ministers who have proved themselves so negligent and reckless in dealing with Imperial peace are now to be invited to deal on War Office principles and methods with the industry and subsistence of the English people. Let us take care that the negligence which has been disclosed in one Department is not allowed a free hand to operate in all Departments. I beg to move.
DR. MACNAMARA: I should have been glad if I could have seconded this Amendment from the Government Benches, because then I should have escaped any charge of partisanship. But I can honestly disclaim any Party motive, as the matter involves the gravest national and patriotic issues, and I feel with my hon. and learned friend that if we pass over the defects which have been disclosed our future as a nation is sealed. We cannot afford to let bygones be bygones. The Secretary of State for War, speaking at Liverpool on 21st January last, said—
"Some people may interest themselves in assigning the particular responsibility for what is good or for what is evil under the circumstances which are commented upon in that Report. I do not myself take a very lively interest in that task of distributing the responsibility. In the first place, J do not think really that the public at large very much care. They are very sorry it happened, but I think the thing they cure about least is to go back now to the question of responsibility."
I think the right hon. Gentleman is entirely wrong. The public do care about fixing the responsibility. The Prime Minister much more accurately summed up the situation when he said on November 27th last—
"What is the view at the present moment of the man in the street.…I think his view is that the recent war and the Commission which has sat upon the war have shown, at all events, if they have nothing else, that before the war there was culpable negligence, and that during the war there was a deplorable breakdown."
That is exactly what the man in the street does say, and with great justice. He cannot fail to remember that 25,000 of his sons and brothers were either killed in action or died of wounds or disease; that another 25,000 have come home broken in health and constitution to be a burden to themselves and their relatives for all time; and that of those 50,000 a very large number were time-expired reservists, who before the war broke out had left the colours, entered into civil occupations, and had wives and families dependent upon them for support. Moreover, he thoroughly agrees with the finding of the Commission on page 57 where it says—
"It certainly appears now that with a greater amount of forethought in arrangements generally, in the provision of stores and equipment, and with the addition of perhaps another Brigade, the situation in Natal might have
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been so strengthened that the whole course of the war must have been altered."
I ask Members of the House to carry their memories back to the dark opening days of January, 1900. The war had been raging for three months; 6,000 British troops lay dead on the fields of Glencoe, Belmont, Graspan, Modder River, Stormberg, Magersfontein, and Colenso; Mafeking, Ladysmith and I Kimberley were invested, and the people in this country were filled with surprise, disappointment, and despondency. They were asking one another how it was that we did not know the enormous character of the Boer preparations; and, above all, with regard to the investment of Lady-smith, they were asking one another, "How is it the Government was not advised of the possession by the Boers of the Long Tom guns which outclassed our guns every time?" The Prime Minister at the close of that dark week addressed his constituents, and his first answer to the criticisms was that he did not think the Boers would fight. His words were—
"If we were wrong in thinking war improbable, we erred with the great mass of opinion instructed on South African affairs."
The same position was taken up by the late Colonial Secretary. Let us see if we comprehend how the matter stands. My hon. and learned friend might with advantage have gone into greater detail with regard to the remarkable statement of the Intelligence Division. Lieut.-General Sir W. G. Nicholson handed in this statement—
"The Intelligence Division prepared and submitted during years 1896–99 reports concerning—

(a) The military preparations of the Boers, including their armaments and forts.

(b) The number of fighting men the Boers would place in the field at the commencement of hostilities.

(c) The political and military relations existing between the South African Republic and the Free State.

(d) The offensive plans of the Boers and the probability that Natal and Kimberley would form their objectives.

The Intelligence Division urged repeatedly, from a military point of view, the expediency of defensive preparations in South Africa."
Then I read later on—
"A memorandum written by Sir John Ardagh in October, 1896, entitled 'The Transvaal Boers from a military point of view' examined the existing situation in South Africa. It pointed out that the South African Republic was spending that year

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£2,350,000 on military preparations, including the provision of artillery, rifles, ammunition, and fortifications, 'that this large expenditure can have no other explanation than an anticipation of war or an intention of aggressions against this country and its supremacy in South Africa.'"
That was in 1896. During the whole of 1896–97–98–99, practically weekly, despatches giving the most precise descriptions of the Boer forces, were coming home from South Africa. I am sorry the late Colonial Secretary is not in his place, because he challenged the statement that they were sent direct to the Colonial Office. I think he must have been in error there, because the great bulk of them are headed: "Sir A. Milner to Mr. Chamberlain." They are too voluminous to go into in detail, but one of them before me is worth reading.
Here is the substance of what Mr. Greene said on 7th February, 1898—
"I am told that there are now 105,000 rifles in the magazine at Pretoria, independent of stock in district magazines, and it is therefore difficult to understand how any further supplies can possibly be necessary. It is, however, clear that the Government do not share this view, for they recently dispatched an order to Messrs. Kynoch for 8,000 rifles, as reported in my secret dispatch of the 16th ult., and I am told that they now propose to place another order for arms with Messrs. Webley of Birmingham, a member of that firm to be invited to come out here and enter into a contract. Moreover, the Government are, I hear, prepared to give orders for the latest improvements in field artillery, and quick-firing guns—the orders for artillery to go to Germany, and those for small arms to Birmingham."
That is a characteristic despatch, and the despatches in 1896, 1897, 1898, and 1899 are full of statements of that nature. I am taking no evidence that has been challenged or contradicted, or that has in any way been impugned in the course of this Commission. Take the evidence of Sir William Butler. In question 136l7 Viscount Esher asks Sir William Butler—
"What was the essence, in one sentence, of the whole of your advice to the Government?"
And his reply was—
"Following the close of the Bloemfontein Conference, I sent. a series of telegrams and despatches to the War Office, in which I extended to the utmost limits of official language my warnings of what war with the Dutch Republics
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and the Dutch race generally in South Africa would mean. I think I am within the meaning of those communications when I aver that the gravity of the warnings therein given could no easily have been greater."
I turn now to Vice-Admiral Harris, who was in command at the Cape in 1889–90 He was asked by the Chairman the following questions and gives the following answers—
"In 1899, were any preparations made for the war on its outbreak?—From a naval point of view, yes.
"18959. At what date were those preparations made?—About August I began to assemble the ships in my squadron and put them all through a thorough course of docking and repair in readiness for any emergency.
"18960. Was that on instructions from home?—No, I did it on my own initiative, on what I imagined was coming. Of course, I was in consultation with Lord Milner as well.
"18961. But there were no instructions from home?—There were no instructions from home until immediately before the outbreak of the war.
"18962. What preliminary knowledge then had you of the matter?—It was a matter of very common conversation in Cape Town that the Boers were preparing for war. That was in June; and on July I was shooting near Port Elizabeth and met several English farmers of that district who told me that they were absolutely certain from what they knew of their Dutch colleagues that they were preparing for war. Following that up again I went up the River Maputa, on a shooting expedition nominally, but for another purpose really, and there I came across a Dutch farmer named Kotse, who travelled constantly in the Orange River State and the Transvaal, and he asked to speak to me privately. He said to me, 'Well, Admiral, I may tell you this in confidence. The Boers are certain to make war directly the grass comes in October.' I said, 'What is your reason?' And he said, 'I travel about from farmhouse to farmhouse, and they all tell me war is coming.' I naturally made a note of that and telegraphed it to Lord Milner."
I turn from Vice-Admiral Harris to Sir Andrew Noble, the Chairman of Sir William Armstrong, Whitworth and Co. On page 484 of the same volume of evidence he says—
"Naturally, I heard a good deal from Continental makers of artillery and from other sources of what was going on in the Transvaal; but I believe that information was open to almost everyone who cared to take an interest in the subject. Having, moreover, served in South Africa myself, I knew something of the country and I saw the authorities at the War Office, and pointed out that the guns that were being imported into the Transvaal could be intended to be used against no country except this country."

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And later on he says—
"I had known, certainly for three years, of the preparations going on, and I had supposed, perhaps ignorantly, that the same information was at the disposal of the Cabinet."
And then Sir George Goldie says to him—
"If that information was at the disposal of the Cabinet, do you think they ought to have made some further preparations earlier than at the time at which you spoke? Sir Andrew Noble replied: That was what I pressed."
Then the Chairman said to Sir John Ardagh on page 213—
"I think we had it in the statement from the Intelligence Division that the Secretary of State for the Colonies, having had reports communicated to him, expressed his acknowledgments of their value on two occasions in 1897?—Yes, the Intelligence Department was in very constant communication with the Colonial Office, in fact, it always is, but at that time more so than usual.
5047. So that the Government, so far as your is concerned, were fully informed of the view responsibility that you took of the position in South Africa?—I think I may say that they were quite fully informed."
Now let me take one extract from Lord Lansdowne. The Chairman asked him the following question—
"21101. So that the Cabinet were aware, as is brought out in these papers, that the Boers were making warlike preparations which could only be intended for war with this country as early as 1898 at any rate?—Lord Lansdowne's reply is: Certainly.
In the Report itself, paragraph 56, page 30, it is recorded—
"The consideration of the official records and the relative evidence sufficiently establishes the main fact that for at least three years before the outbreak of the war the Intelligence Department of the War Office had been fully aware of the warlike preparations in the Republics, and had recognised that the only object of these preparations could be to provide for hostilities with the British Government. If then the outbreak of war found us unprepared, it is necessary to discriminate between the causes which contributed to unpreparedness."
What I cannot understand is how, with the information at their disposal, the Prime Minister and the late Colonial Secretary clung to the last moment to the belief that the Boers did not mean business, and did not mean to fight.
Let me go back now to the Prime Ministers' speech of 8th, January 1900. The first statement he made was that he did not think the Boers would fight, and his second assertion was, that if they did fight preparations had been made on a
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scale sufficient to meet any forces that were likely to be arrayed against us in the field, according to our military advisers. The Prime Minister said—
"Looking back impartially, I say that the steps we took were, in the state of our knowledge, sufficient steps."
That justified me in saying that the Prime Minister's view was that if the Boers were to fight the preparations were on a scale consistent with the description of the forces given by the military advisers. At the Hotel Cecil last November the Prime Minister said—
"It was in the fact that the task before us was proved to be far greater than any critic, military or civilian, had ever suggested that what are now called the deplorable War Office blunders really have their origin. I am not going to make the smallest apology, or attempt the smallest excuse, for anything that went wrong in the war."
That was the second defence. At the outbreak of the war everybody war astonished at the nature of the was preparations, and particularly at the range and capacity of the Boer big guns. The late Lord Salisbury was asked in January, 1900, in the House of Lords, how it was he did not know that the Boers had these quick-firing and big guns, and he replied—
"The guns were generally introduced in boilers and locomotives, and the munitions of war were introduced in piano cases and tubs. We had no power of search, we had no power of knowing what munitions of war were sent in. We know it now; we have the best reasons for knowing it. But that we knew it to the extent to which it existed in June last I entirely deny."
Lord Salisbury's "June last" is the month of June, 1899; and this is the date of the compilation of that marvellous handbook by Sir John Ardagh, which has already been referred to and which tabulated in the most specific and detailed way, and with extraordinary exactitude, the whole of the Boer armaments and the number of men they would be likely to put in the field. Take the big guns. With the accuracy of a trade prospectus there is a description given of the Long Toms, the Krupps, the Howitzers, the Nordenfeldts and the Hotchkisses. That hand-book states that the Boers had 107 big guns, and all of then are described most accurately. It appears from the papers captured from the Boers after the war, that in September, 1899, they really; had 99 big guns, and the hand-book

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described them as having 107. The same work placed the Boers' machine guns at 34, and their papers showthat they possessed 27. It placed small arms at 87,264, and the papers at the close of the war showed the total to be 96,661, and 12,000 of these were obsolete. Small arms ammunition was estimated in this hand-book at 33,000,000 rounds, while the papers captured showed that in September, 1899, the total was 33,050,000 rounds. I have never read of any case where the description has been so minutely accurate, and this hand-book was placed in the hands of the Government four months before war broke out. This hand-book said that the Boers could place in the field 47,600 men, and The Times "History of the War" estimates the highest number of Boers ever in the field at one time at 45,000 men. The Report says nothing more than it should say when it states—
"It will he seen from the above epitome of the "Military Notes" that the information given therein has been proved by after events to have been generally accurate, and that it sufficed to give a correct impression of the numerical strength, armament, and plans of the Boers."
I ask why did not the Ministers of the Cabinet make themselves more acquainted with the facts? Lord Lans-downe does not appear to have been very well acquainted with them. I see from Sir Ralph Knox's evidence that it was not mentioned at the debates of the War Office Council. The Prime Minister said—
"We took such steps as in the state of our knowledge were sufficient."
I think that the state of the Government's knowledge might have been very much more complete. Again, in a speech on 8th January, 1900, the right hon. Gentleman said—
"I do not believe it will ever be maintained that the army we have sent into the field is inadequately equipped with any of the modern requirements or any requirement which the progress of invention has shown to be necessary in the case of a modern army."
Now there are literally hundreds of expert contradictions of that statement. I take Lord Roberts. He says—
"In the way of artillery we were considerably behind other European nations at the commencement of the war. It was not until German guns were placed in the hands of our
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artillery officers that they recognised how far the Germans were in advance of ourselves as to quick-firing guns."
I take Sir Henry Brackenbury who says—
"We had no quick-firing guns in South Africa until we sent out some 4'7 guns, and the Navy sent up their 4'7 quick-firing guns also and 12-pounder quick-firing guns."
I take Sir Ralph Knox—
"I do not think we sometimes take the trouble to find what the improvements are, otherwise we would never have gone to South Africa with the guns we had."
I take General Plumer—
"The guns I had up to the relief of Mafeking were of various and mostly of old patterns, and were ineffective. We had seven guns and twelve machine guns; out of seven guns three only were efficient."
I take one point that has come up in the debate this afternoon. The Prime Minister said at the Hotel Cecil that the Government thought soldiers were the best advisers. Therefore, the argument was that if things went wrong, the military advisers of the Government should be blamed. Well, I quote only one of the Government's military advisers—Sir William Butler—a man who, I think, has been very badly treated. After the Bloemfontein Conference he said—
"The Boers will fight to the last man if you menace their independence."
That has turned out to be very true. In another part of his evidence he says that he warned the Government that the Boer women and children would help. That also turned out to be pretty true. How was he treated? He was recalled. He says he was ridiculed and vilified. That was treating the soldier as the best adviser in regard to these matters. I need not go in to Lord Wolseley's statement that reinforcements were necessary, and the Colonial Secretary's statement that no reinforcements were required at that time. That is another example, I suppose, of treating the soldiers as the better judges.
I ask the House now to remember the circumstances of 21st June, 1895. The Liberal Administration had on the specific advice of the military experts allowed the supply of cordite to run very low, and hon. Gentlemen opposite came down to the House in a state of

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high indignation that we should have been left short of cordite. I make no complaint of that. I state the fact. That was at a time of profound peace. There was happily no war cloud on the horizon. The present Secretary for Ireland was Under-Secretary for War in 1898–1900. He gave vent to an entirely unexceptionable statement on the shortage of cordite. He said—
"If we were overwhelmed by some national disaster, and it was due to any extent to neglect in the supply of ammunition, the Adjutant-General might not be shot, but the Minister of War would be held responsible for betraying the country."
That is a statement with which I associate myself. The Liberal Administration was put out on the shortage of cordite at a time of profound peace. A Conservative Government came in pledged to strengthen the national defences, and to perfect a great Department of State. I see from a statement made by the Prime Minister in 1895, after the Government was reconstituted that—
"No abler body of men were ever at the head of the Imperial Departments of the State than those who have recently been appointed."
I should think that he must have got rid of most of them recently. The Conservative Government came to power highly indignant that there should have been a shortage of cordite. Where do we find ourselves at the outbreak of the great Boer War, about the nature of which the Government had been warned for three years?
Sir Henry Brackenbury says—
"On taking up the appointment of Director-General of Ordnance in February last, I commenced an inquiry into the condition of our armaments and reserve of guns, ammunition, stores, and clothing; and I should have been able to report fully before this, had not the whole energies of my Department been absorbed by the war in South Africa. That war has now disclosed a situation as regards armaments, and reserves of guns, ammunition, stores and clothing, and as regards the power of output of material of war in emergency, which is, in my opinion, full of peril to the Empire. That is after seven years of the Government which came into power pledged to put these things straight."
Sir Henry Brackenbury in his evidence says—
"We had in reserve the material of only one horse-artillery battery…We had only material for eleven 15-pounder batteries."
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This is a statement of affairs in December, 1899, but at a later date we got into a worse condition. Sir Henry Brackenbury says—
"Then of gun ammunition we had only a reserve of 200 rounds per gun for each horse and field and mountain gun and howitzer, in addition to the 300 rounds which were with the batteries; and the whole of this reserve was absorbed by South Africa long before 15th December.…Naval orders for ammunition had to be held in abeyance from the beginning of October.…We borrowed ammunition from the Navy, and we borrowed ammunition from the Government of India, and yet I was unable to meet Sir Redvers Buller's demands for 5-inch howitzer ammunition and 7-pounder ammunition until a fortnight after they should have been complied with."
I take one point from the evidence of Major Sir Henry Colville. He says—
"On the second day at Magersfontein, G Battery, R. H.A., had only six rounds per gun left, and the Field Battery about twelve. I believe that at that date there was not another round left in Cape Colony."
Sir Henry Brackenbury further says—
"It caused roe the deepest anxiety as to what would take place in the event of a war in which both Navy and Army were engaged, for if in this war, in which only the land forces were engaged, we had, in order to keep up supplies, to borrow ammunition from the Navy, what would happen if the Army and Navy were both to be engaged? It would be impossible to meet the demands for ammunition under the conditions then existing."
Then there is the pitiable story of the small arms ammunition, 66,000,000 rounds. When a shot was fired with that ammunition, the bullet stripped and a coating of nickel and lead was left in the grooving, so that, as Sir Henry Brackenbury says—
"If there was a second load, you were apt to get an accident—a blow back in the breech."
He advised the Secretary for War to withdraw the whole of the 66,000,000 rounds as being ineffective for the purposes of war. He says—
"We were driven to great straits at one time because we had actually got reduced in this country to two or three boxes of Mark II ammunition, so that if we had had to go to war with a European Power we should have had to fight them with expanding bullets."
Take it any way you like it is the same terrible story of breakdown.
I shall only mention one other point. Take the case of the 25,000 Lee-Enfields which were supplied to the reservists.

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the men of whom we were so proud. They were men who had left the colours and gone back into civil life. At the call of duty they left wives and families and sprang to arms to a man. Each man was armed with a new pattern Lee-Enfield. These Lee-Enfields were so sighted that the best and truest shot was bound at 1,000 yards to place his shot wide of the mark The whole matter is very well summed up by Viscount Esher—
"The condition in 1899, as disclosed in Sir H. Brackenbury's memorandum, of our armaments, of our fortresses, of the Clothing Department, of the transport, of the Army Medical Corps, of the system of remounts, shows that either the Secretary of State was culpable of neglect, or that he was in ignorance of the facts."
If the Secretary of State was ignorant of the facts, his ignorance was culpable. I confess that I feel very strongly about all this. It was my privilege to be born and brought up in the barracks of a British regiment. I am proud to be able to speak of myself as the son of a man who fought at Crimea as a private soldier. The earliest lessons I learned were the bitterest lessons I shall ever learn. They referred to the sufferings and hardships which were inflicted on the men who fought in the Crimean War, owing in too many cases to what Lord Esher calls culpable negligence. It was said that this sort of thing could never occur again after Russell's letters to The Times, and the inquiries ordered by the House of Commons. I do not claim that the soldiers suffered as severely in South Africa as in the Crimea. It could not be so. There have been fifty years of advance in the means of communication, and fifty years of newspaper progress and the Press is read in every cottage home. But I say that if there had been no such improvement in communications and in the Press, things would have been just as bad in South Africa as in the Crimea. I do not say things were so bad from the point of view of the soldier. Here is the final Report of the Select Committee of this House on the condition of the British Army in the Crimea, of which Mr. Roebuck was chairman—
"The Cabinet appear to have been confident of success."
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That is the first comment.
"At the date of the expedition to the East no reserve was provided at home adequate to the undertaking."
That is the second comment. The Secretary for War, the Duke of Newcastle, found himself—
"imperfectly acquainted with the best mode of exercising his authority over the subordinate Departments, and these Departments were not officially informed of their relative position, or of their new duties towards the Minister for War."
Take another extract—
"The Cabinet, according to the statement of Ministers, was in darkness."
Take another statement—
"Your Committee must express their dissatisfaction with the administration of the contract system under the Ordnance Department."
And take the final paragraph from the Report, which shows that the South African Report is a hideous plagiarism of the Crimean Report—
"The administration which ordered that expedition hoped and expected that it would be immediately successful, and as they did not foresee the probability of a protracted struggle they made no provision for a winter campaign; what was planned and undertaken without sufficient information was conducted without sufficient care or forethought. This conduct on the part of the Administration was the first and chief cause of the calamities which befel our Army."
Now, here we are again, fifty years after, in the same position. The Report of to-day is merely a hideous plagiarism on the Report of fifty years ago. When the Government came down to the House on 20th October, 1899, they asked that supplies should be voted for the South African War. The Chancellor of the Exchequer gave a promise that the Estimates had been prepared with the "utmost possible accuracy and care." First of all, the House was asked to make provision for 35,000 men, and the Under-Secretary for War. stated that that would be the—
"Superior limit to the margin for which we might be called upon to draw."
Then on 21st October the Chancellor of the Exchequer asked for £10,000,000 for the war which was to be over in four months. It was to be all over by 31st March, 1900. [Cries of "Oh, oh" from the GOVERNMENT Benches]. Oh, excuse me. The Chancellor of the

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Exchequer asked for a Vote up to 31st March, late in October, and he said they had every reason to expect that the war would be over within the limit of time that the money was asked for. I call that four months. There is a good deal of new arithmetic about nowadays. Now, the four months became thirty-three months and the £10,000,000 became £222,974,000, and the 35,000 men became 448,435. I cannot help feeling that a great deal of the cost, duration, and magnitude of the war was the result of negligence and mismanagement; and that many a gallant lad's bones lie whitening on the South African veldt, and many a gallant lass is committed to a life of penury and toil to keep her children out of the workhouse, because of that negligence and mismanagement. It is because feeling that as I do I am bound by my conscience to second this Motion.
Amendment proposed—
"At the end of the Question, to add the words, 'But humbly represent to Your Majesty that the facts now made known in regard to the preparations for and conduct of the recent war in South Africa, and particularly the evidence taken by your Majesty's Commissioners appointed to inquire into those matters and their Report thereon, disclose grave negligence and mismanagement on the part of Your Majesty's Ministers, whereby the duration, magnitude, and cost of the war were greatly increased.'"—(Mr. Robson.)
Question proposed, "That these words be there added."
THE CHIEF SECRETARY FOR IRELAND (Mr. WYNDHAM,): The hon. Gentleman who has just sat down, towards the conclusion of his remarks drew a parallel between the state of affairs in the Crimea and the state of affairs in the first months of the South African War. It is true he added some words of mitigation, but in substance he believes himself, and would have this House believe, that there was some parallel to be drawn. There was none. When I come to that part of my argument I shall be able to show from the Report of the Commission that, so far as the finding of the Army is concerned, those who were responsible for that expedition stand acquitted, or justified in asking for
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acquittal, at the hands of this House. But in order not to leave that without giving some immediate reply, I will take an authority who may be accepted, I think, even by the hon. Member, as justification—I mean, Lord Wolseley. Lord Wolseley served in the Crimea, and he was competent to advise on matters of that kind. Lord Lansdowne in his evidence cites Lord Wolseley, and says—
"I am inclined to believe that Lord Wolseley was not far off the mark when he said in that minute of January, 1900, that the army which we sent to South Africa was a better found and a better equipped army than had ever been sent from these shores before."
I take another particular instance which the hon. Member suggests. Perhaps I may lead up to his remarks on guns and armaments by reminding the House of a very sound constitutional dictum I laid down on 21st June, 1895—namely, that the Government are responsible in these matters. I say so. I would call to mind something else I once said in this House. The hon. Member has laboured at great length his point regarding the information supplied by the Intelligence Department, and more particularly in respect of the guns. I made that point myself exactly four years ago in this House. Speaking on 1st February, 1900, I paid a compliment and just tribute to the exactness of the information which had been supplied by the Intelligence Department. Very well, the hon. Member asks us how it comes that Cabinet Ministers used words which seemed to mean that the Boers had armaments far in excess of those described. Well, the country believed that at the time. We had newspaper reports that went to prove that our guns were actually inferior to the guns of the Boers, that our guns were bad, that the guns of the Boers were much better, and that they were relatively more numerous. The hon. Member quoted Lord Roberts; the Commission quoted Lord Roberts. [HON. MEMBERS: Read it.] I will read it if you like. Lord Roberts says—
"Our experiences in South Africa have shown us that in the way of military matériel we were considerably behind other European nations at the commencement of the late war. Our field-gun, though a good serviceable weapon, was wanting both in range and rapidity of fire, whilst the fact of the enemy employing heavy field artillery against us at

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the commencement of hostilities placed us in a difficulty which we could not have avoided without calling on the sister service for the assistance of naval guns."
What is the next line of that Report—
"Notwithstanding this opinion, it would, we think, he unjust to say that the field armament prepared by the Ordnance Department was inferior to that which was in use by other great nations, or that there was a deficiency in the number of guns, though there was undoubtedly a deficiency in the reserve."
SIR. CHARLES DILKE: Does the right hon. Gentleman himself agree with the first line of that sentence?
MR. WYNDHAM: Notwithstanding this statement? No. [Laughter from the OPPOSITION Benches.] I do not disagree, and I do not agree; and I can tell the hon. Members who laughed why. Because I do not intend to copy them and to constitute myself another Commission in place of the one which has sat, and to select everything which suits my case, just as they have selected out of those volumes of evidence everything which suits theirs. I say you appeal to Caesar and to Caesar you shall go. There is the Report. By that we are ready to stand or fall. I think the line which the speakers have taken, and the interruptions with which they marked my very modest quotation from the finding, and not from the evidence, accounts for the phrase which I admit caught my eye in the Amendment proposed by the hon. and learned Member—
"Humbly to represent to Your Majesty that the facts now made known in regard to the preparations for and conduct of the recent war in South Africa, and particularly the evidence taken."
It is particularly in the evidence that they revel during these proceedings—in a selection from the evidence. [Dr. MACNAMARA: What about the sighting of the rifles?] In order to conclude in the time allotted to me, I refer the hon. Member for a reply on the sighting of these rifles to a speech I made four years ago in this House. I approach the task of replying to the forcible and able speech of the hon. and learned Member with a feeling of distaste which almost amounts to repugnance. I share as fully as it can be shared in many quarters which support
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the Government, and which earnestly desire to see Army reform, a feeling of annoyance at any attempt of justification, even on my part, when I am dealing with errors, some of which were committed long, long ago, and I share the feelings of annoyance at anything which could be twisted into recrimination upon our part against the great and distinguished soldiers who have rendered such important services. I do not think the soldiers will thank the hon. Gentleman opposite for the line of defence he has taken to-night. Who has stated more frankly than Lord Wolseley that he and all of them had a great deal to learn from this war, and that every war has lessons to teach that could not be anticipated. But, supposing we wilfully neglected the advice of our advisers, what the House has been asked to do to-night is to pass a vote of want of confidence in this Government. The hon. Members opposite who moved and seconded the Amendment were quite frank on that point. They have painted the Government which was in office at the beginning of the war as black as they could. They painted it so black that they want the House now not to act on the maxim that "a devil you know is better than a devil you do not know." Now, if the House will bear with me, I think I can take up, point by point, this accusation and show that we have a pretty good case. I will be quite candid and I shall leave the decision to the impartial consideration of the House. I do not know why the hon. Members opposite did not go to the Report instead of to the evidence.
DR. MACNAMARA: We did. Paragraphs 56 and 57 were read.
MR. WYNDHAM: I think they were the more bound to go to the Report, because the Commissioners themselves take account of the evidence in two ways. For one thing they discount—I use the word in no offensive sense—the value of some of the evidence on the ground that it was conflicting, and they refer to the evidence given by great soldiers on strategic problems, and say that the questions could not be determined unless you had a number of eye-witnesses on the spot. They also treat the evidence

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in another way. They cite in extenso a considerable section of Lord Lansdowne's evidence. I have hardly heard the mover or the seconder quote Lord Lansdowne during the course of their speeches, and yet his evidence is very pertinent. The length of that evidence, over 500 answers to questions, is no bar to the study of its purport, because it was very accurately and fairly summarised in a précis which appeared in The Times newspaper. I have yet to learn that The Times has been a very indulgent critic of Lord Lansdowne, and if you will not have the Report of the Commission because you do not think it sufficiently vindictive, perhaps you will take the views expressed in The Times on the evidence as given by Lord Lansdowne. But I appeal to the Report. Now, in considering this Report, I think we ought in all fairness to take note of two things. In the first place, the Commissioners pronounce themselves, I will not say incompetent, but not called upon, to declare judgment upon the diplomacy which preceded the war. They leave that out of account. In the next place, I would ask the House to consider that the terms of reference confined the investigation to the period ending with the fall of Pretoria, and therefore, when they complain that no more had been done in this or that direction, they omit a great many things which have been done since the fall of Pretoria. What we have to deal with now are things which ought to have been done before the war and which were not done. Take the point of diplomacy. The hon. Member for South Shields stated as one of his most formidable facts that Lord Wolseley had asked for the mobilisation of an army corps on Salisbury Plain in the month of June. That would have been a political act and not an act of military preparation. Surely it would have been a political act and not an act of military preparation. The hon. Member endeavoured to avoid that difficulty by stating that the Government had authorised the strengthening of the garrisons in South Africa in order to strengthen their diplomacy. Is there no distinction to be made between sending the number of troops stated by your advisers to be necessary to protect your frontiers against invasion and
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taking steps which could only be taken as contemplating invasion on a colossal scale? The diplomatic argument turns on the minute written by Lord Lansdowne on 12th August, 1899. In that minute he stated all the steps which must be taken in order to place a force in a condition to march in South Africa, and the step which would take the longest time—namely, three months—was the collection in South Africa of land transport. Will anybody say now that such a step ought to have been taken between the Bloemfontein Conference at the end of May and the rupture or cessation of diplomatic efforts towards the beginning of September? Such an act would have made it plain to the Boers and the whole world that we intended to invade them.
The hon. Member made another point, by the way. He asked, "Did you tell your soldiers you meant to annex the Transvaal?" What is the meaning of that remark? That you should conclude the war on terms? On what terms? the only terms offered were that we should evacuate the country and acknowledge what we had always denied—namely, to treat the Transvaal as a Sovereign and independent State. When a great country such as Great Britain has been provoked to war by the invasion of her own territory, you cannot suspend the war by making terms of the only character which would have brought that war to a conclusion. If we go through the Report in that spirit—am I claiming too much of the House of Commons when I invite the august Assembly which appointed this tribunal to take some heed of its conclusions? I have made one point, which I will not make again—namely, that, though the Commissioners took notice of the advice given and the views held by many great soldiers on strategic problems, they found there was conflict of opinion among these distinguished officers, and they declined to pronounce any judgment on their views separately. There was a divergence of opinion as to the proper strategic route of advance. The great fundamental strategic problems of the war were decided in various ways by some of the greatest strategists of the day, and the Commissioners found that it was quite impossible to subject those opinions to any reliable test, and that the only course that was

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fair to all was to leave them on the same footing, to record them, and to leave them to the judgment of the reader. I am not here to prove that with a better organisation at the War Office you could not have had a plan of campaign which would have been a better plan. On the contrary, the Government are now suggesting that that course should be taken and have adopted it by their own executive act. What I do say is that, acting with the machinery of those days, and with the guidance given us—and I pass no reflection on that given by our distinguished soldiers—we do not stand condemned.
CAPTAIN NORTON: What were the Committee of Defence doing?
MR. WYNDHAM: What is the relevance of that remark?
CAPTAIN NORTON: The Committee of Defence were the existing body at that time for dealing with questions of this nature.
MR. WYNDHAM: The Prime Minister put the Committee of Defence upon a basis which, as far as it goes, has earned the encomium of Lord Esher's Committee; but it was not within the duty of the Committee of Defence to decide on the strategical advance to be followed in the war. That was discussed as between Lord Lansdowne, the Secretary for War, Lord Wolseley, and Sir Redvers Buller, and you will find a triple minute, one by; each, was written on 25th September, and yet the hon. and learned Member says that Sir Redvers Buller was complaining in October that proper attention was not paid to his views.
MR. ROBSON: Yes, on 25th September; but I pointed out that it was only on 23rd September Lord Lansdowne communicated to General Buller that he might put forward his views with regard to the route.
MR. WYNDHAM: I understood the hon. Member to say that Sir Redvers Buller took exception to the lateness of the date.
MR. ROBSON: So he did.
MR. WYNDHAM: My reply to that is that the principal adviser of Lord Lansdowne was Lord Wolseley, and if the hon. Member will turn to page 514, answer 21,234, in the evidence of Lord Lansdowne, he will find these words—
"You will see in Lord Wolseley's minute of 8th June that he says:—'The general plan of campaign to be adopted is one that must thoroughly meet with the views of the general officer selected for the supreme command. There are, practically, only two lines of advance for an army into the Transvaal'; and in his later minute of 7th July, again, after considering the two lines of advance, he says that, 'should the Free State help the Transvaal against us, he presumes Sir Redvers Buller would not shrink from using the Free State as the line of advance upon Pretoria.'"
There is no substance or foundation in the charge that the soldiers were hampered by not being free to adopt either of those lines of advance, and again I would ask the House to accept the Report of the Commission. They say that the line of advance through the Orange Free State was considered to be the best. Well, it may or may not have been an over-refinement of political diplomacy on the part of the Government not to shake their fist at the Orange Free State before that was necessary. The hon. and learned Member has spun a long tissue of ingenious arguments, but what does it amount to? We knew there was a defensive alliance between the Orange Free State and the Transvaal, although the hon. and learned Member put it in words not familiar to me—he talked about the quarrel being just. It might have been an offensive and not a defensive alliance, but we should have been acting unwisely and wrongly if we had presumed that the Orange Free State would have backed up an unprovoked invasion of our territory. We may have believed they would, but the question was ought we to have acted as if we thought they would; and that question becomes very pertinent when upon the larger political problem—namely, the time it would take to get an efficient force in South Africa—we knew that three months must elapse, and that the first step to be taken—namely, the collection of transports—would proclaim to the whole world that we intended the invasion of South Africa. They may have been wrong, the Cabinet of that

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day—I was not a member of it, but I am here to defend Lord Lansdowne—but I think they were perfectly right. I think they would have offended the feelings of the civilised world if in June and July, when despatches were going from ourselves to the Transvaal Republic and back again, they had taken steps which could have only meant one thing, the intention on our part to crush that Republic. If it is argued that we are to be found guilty for having delayed preparations, I reply that I do not call that a delay of preparations. I call it the avoidance of a political act which would have put our country in the wrong, and would not, as a matter of fact, have really put us in a better position at an earlier date in South Africa.
Now take another finding of the Commission. The Commission point out on preparations that—
"A distinction must be made between the preparedness of this country for any war in the year 1899 and the definite preparation made for the event of a war against one or both of the Dutch Republics in South Africa."
The hon. and learned Member said—
"You must have known that these people Were preparing for war, and obviously for war against no one but yourselves."
And he thinks that statement of fact disposes of the Prime Minister's speech in which he pointed out that we had in this country to be prepared for a varied number of emergencies. Suppose you had prepared for that war and had found yourselves on the eve of war, or of national disgrace—you can always avoid it by accepting that—with some other Power; not with a small Republic, but a great European Power. I do not wish to revive unhappy memories, but if anybody will cast his eye carefully back over some of the anxious months of 1898 he will see that the Government of the day would have been guilty of the greatest folly and crime if they had specialised their preparations for one contingency in South Africa instead of dealing with Imperial defence as a whole. I will tell hon. Gentlemen opposite that in the matter of general preparations we have a record of which we need not bo ashamed. We ought not to glory in it, to take pride in it; we have made mistakes; we have not had the best system for the Army, nor a
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close enough correlation between the Army and Navy in Imperial defence; and until the present Prime Minister, whom we are asked by this Amendment to turn out of office, took the reins of the Defence Committee it was not as good an instrument as it is now. But with the opportunities at our disposal we have a record which I am not ashamed of comparing with the record of hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite, and I do not think, after the two speeches we have heard from the mover and seconder of the vote of non-confidence in the Government, that I shall be accused of adopting an unduly partisan tone when I say that on general preparations our record will stand examination and that theirs will not. When Mr. Stanhope was in power there was general preparation. During the Government of 1886 £21,500,000 was spent on the Navy—not wasted, but spent. I am not going to take up the small point about cordite; it is not a very important accusation, and there is a larger one; I say that during the years 1892–5, in the first place, the construction programme of the Navy was delayed, and, in the second place, nothing was added to the artillery of the Army.
SIR CHARLES DILKE: You mentioned Mr. Stanhope; Mr. Stanhope reduced the artillery.
Mr. WYNDHAM: It is not denied that when we came into office in 1895 240 guns had been added to the field artillery arm; that was general preparation; but 364 guns were sent out during the first few months of the war, and if the war had occurred in 1895 instead of 1899 you would have had that inferiority in the numbers of your artillery which is unjustly charged now. But I may be asked, Why had not further progress been made? Because, when the Government came into office it put the Navy first, rightly, as we think, in the scheme of general preparation; and, apart from keeping up the Navy to the two-Power standard then adopted, it appointed a Commission to report on the armament of all the naval stations, and the first work of the Government was to re-arm all our naval stations in the world with

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breechloaders instead of muzzleloaders. Observe, these armaments are not pertinent, are not relative. You ought to have been preparing particularly for the war in South Africa. Would hon. Members opposite have supported the Government if we had said we must re-arm all the naval stations of the world at a cost of £7,000,000, and we must also prepare for war which may or may not happen in South Africa in four, five or six, years time, at an annual cost of an additional £2,000,000 a year? It is absurd to put forward that proposition. General preparation had been pushed, not as far as it could be and not under the best system for obtaining the best advice, but honestly and truly pushed to a standard which enabled us to conduct the war to a successful conclusion in spite of the miscalculation, for which we accept, responsibility—namely, that 75,000 men were enough. That was the miscalculation. I ask any one to read this Report impartially and to judge whether that is a miscalculation which would justify this Government in being turned out of office. I do not wish to indulge in recrimination, but I say they acted on the advice that was given them.
I take the other point, of which much may be made—namely, that the garrisons in South Africa prior to the landing of the field forces were insufficient for the defence of our Colonies against invasion. What is the finding of the Commission on that point? They quote the statement of Lord Lansdowne, which is as follows—
"That the Government had received the assurance of their military advisers that the reinforcements sent to South Africa, together with those which could be added before a field force was despatched, would ensure the defence of the Colonies from serious invasion by the Boers."
They then quote more than a page and a half of Lord Lansdowne's evidence, and refer to Lord Wolseley's evidence also, and state that—
"Taken, as a whole, the evidence appears to support the position of the Government on this point—namely, that the steps taken to reinforce the troops in South Africa for defensive purposes, pending the arrival of the field force, were in accordance with the advice and requirements of their military advisers."
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We stand or fall on this—namely, that politically we were right not to take a step three months before the first act of war in order, if possible, to win a diplomatic victory—in order, if possible, to avoid war. And we confess that we were responsible for believing that 75,000 men was the total necessary, and that the forces in South Africa: prior to the advent of the field force could hold the passes until the field force arrived. If that shows such a lack of foresight and judgment, such a reckless want of consideration for the advice which reached us, then in heaven's name turn out the Government, and put in a Government which will do better. If not, let the acquittal, for it amounts to that, of the Commission stand. But when the Government is charged with not having made preparations for war, words are used which lead the people of this country to suppose that the supplies were inadequate in quantity and bad in quality. I believe that a noble Lord in another place, or elsewhere, made himself responsible for talking about paper boots or boots with paper soles. I will quote Lord Wolseley's dictum again, that no army was ever better equipped or better found, and I think there is a confusion in the minds of many as to the meaning of the words equipment and reserves. When we are told that there was a deficiency of reserves, that is perfectly true—there had been no policy in this country of accumulating large reserves; it was the settled policy of Government and Government, acting on the advice of those who were competent to advise them, that it was unwise to lock up a great deal of money in accumulated reserves, and it was believed that the manufacturers of this country could respond to any sudden stress. Well, as it turns out, that was an unfounded and bad policy, and when the first grave operation of the Government—namely, the re-armament of the coaling stations—was over, General Brackenbury was appointed by Lord Lansdowne for the specific purpose of going into this question of reserves. A Departmental Committee sat upon it, and the Treasury and the Government of the day allotted £10,500,000, in addition to the £7,000,000 for naval stations' armaments. So much for the reserves, and I say the first force.

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which was to be a force of 75,000 men, was properly equipped. So I run through the findings of the Commission. There is the finding on guns. Take rifles—
"The supply of rifles during the war appears to have been adequate and satisfactory."
Take clothing—
"The supply of clothing and boots in South Africa appears to have been satisfactory."
Saddlery and harness
"Was of good material and workmanship,"
better than the colonial. The Commission refer to the scandals about the remounts, and say they were very much exaggerated. I said I should be perfectly candid, and I will give the words of the Commissioners. They say—
"The Commission, having considered the mass of evidence taken by the Court of Inquiry and in other investigations with regard to the proceedings of the Remounts Department and the Yeomanry Committee in the purchase of horses, were convinced that it would be a waste of time to investigate afresh the individual transactions and questions of personal conduct to which most of the attack is directed. The former inquiries have shown that there was much exaggeration in the allegations of scandal, and more especially so far as the Government Remount Department was concerned, and the Commission sees no reason to dissent from the judgment delivered by the Court of Inquiry acquitting General Truman from personal blame."
MR. PIRIErose, but Mr. WYNDHAM declined to give way.
MR. WYNDHAM: And yet it was made the occasion of an attack upon this gentleman that there had been corruption leading to improper horses being purchased in large numbers.
MR. PIRIEagain rose, but Mr. WYNDHAM again declined to give way.
MR. SPEAKER: The hon. Member must not persist in interrupting unless the right hon. Gentleman gives way.
MR. WYNDHAM: I have very little time. I do not deny for one moment that our arrangements for the Remount Department were totally inadequate, and my right hon. friend the late Secretary for War took steps during his period of office to carry out some much-needed
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and, I believe, effective reforms. So it is also with regard to the supply of food and forage—
"The evidence shows (the Commissioners say), that both in method of distribution and in quality the supply of food was one of the successful features of the South African War."
So it is of sea transport, and so it is on almost every head. Now, you may say these are all small points, but it is an acquittal against the charge which has been preferred. It is an acquittal against the charges that used to be made against the Government during the early months of the war, charges preferred even by the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition. Certain salient features emerge from this Report. In the first place, the Government made themselves responsible for the belief that 75,000 men was an adequate force. There is on that a finding against the Government, and we accept responsibility. But we ask impartial critics to read the Report and find in that acceptance of responsibility any justification for such an Amendment as has been moved. We say, in the second place, that for political considerations, which may have been valid or invalid—we all believe them still to be valid—we declined to take steps which would have advertised three months beforehand our intentions of going to war. We declined to take those steps when diplomatic negotiations were still in process, and when we trusted and believed that the Republics would not be guilty of an invasion of our territories. The third salient fact is that the interim defence provided for our own colonies was, in the opinion of our military advisers, adequate until the arrival of the field force. And the fourth salient feature is that, in the choice of a strategic line of advance, although there was no elaborate plan of campaign as there might be now when we have reorganised the War Office, we acted on the advice of the most distinguished military authorities. They all agreed in that advice, and there is not the slightest reason to believe that if they had been sitting together on the remodelled Army Council they would have given any other advice than that which, as a. matter of fact, Lord Lansdowne followed. Then there is the quantity and quality of

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the provision of munitions of war. I feel that we need plead guilty only to having believed that 75,000 men were enough. We plead not guilty to the charge that these 75,000 men were not available or that they were not properly and adequately equipped.
We are arraigned by critics who think that they can impale us on the horns of a dilemma when they say that you ought either to prepare for war or to avoid war. Are you to prepare at all costs for every conceivable expedition? That is the view of one set of extremists. Are you to avoid war at all costs? That is the view-of extremists at the opposite pole. We say that it is the duty of a reponsible Government to seek for some mean between those opposite views. We declare that, according to such guidance and with such facilities as were then available, that purpose was sought by the Government of the day and by their predecessors when Mr. Stanhope was Secretary for War. We say we have always sought to find the exact mean between the two—between war and diplomacy. But who are those who bring this charge against us? What was their diplomacy in South Africa, and what were their particular preparations in South Africa? Having receded from the Transvaal in 1881 and given a large measure of independence, what did they do in the year 1882? They contracted a treaty with Portugal to admit of the free transit of arms and munitions of war into the Transvaal Republic. And then, when you come to 1895, you get a beautiful balance of diplomacy and preparation for war. A despatch was written in the Colonial Office urging upon President Kruger for his acceptance a five years franchise, the very terms which were offered by Sir Alfred Milner, as he then was, at the Bloemfontein Conference in May, 1899, and what was the preparation for war? The garrison of South Africa consisted of two battalions! I know the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition thinks that that was an adequate garrison at the time. [OPPOSITION cries of "So it was" and "That was before the Jameson Raid."] Then why did you keep the despatch back? The right hon. Gentleman has made himself responsible for saying that they had an overwhelming superior-
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ity with these two battalions at Cape Town, but the despatch did not go. He has made it a charge against us that, without sufficient preparation, we allowed the quarrel to develop. They did not allow the quarrel to develop. They kept the despatch back, and it is very easy to adjust the balance between your diplomacy and your preparation for war if you put nothing, or next to nothing, in either scale. It is not easy to keep an exact balance. It is very difficult to adjust that balance if you have, as you ought to have, a regard for your worldwide responsibilities, and, in particular, a regard for your responsibilities to your colonial brethren, and if at the same time you have, as you ought to have, a regard for the taxpayers and the credit of this country. To say that with all our efforts towards general preparation, and with all these diplomatic reasons for not pushing on special preparations too far, we are to be condemned upon such an issue, is to prefer a charge which this House will cast to the winds. What is the question? Is the Prime Minister, who received a special encomium from Lord Esher's Committee, to continue his work of Army reform, or is he to be succeeded by the distinguished statesman whom hon. and right hon. Members opposite have unanimously agreed upon as more fitting to direct the organisation of the War Office?
SIR A. HAYTERsaid the right hon. Gentleman had appealed to the evidence of Lord Lansdowne. That being so, might he refer him to page 518 of the Blue-book, where the following passage would be found—
"It is abundantly clear from Sir H. Bracken-bury's report that we were not sufficiently prepared even for the equipment of the comparatively small force which we had always contemplated might be employed beyond the limits of this country. For the much larger force which we have found it necessary to employ our resources were absolutely and miserably inadequate. We had at the outset of the campaign to send troops abroad insufficiently supplied with clothes and equipments. If other complications supervened a catastrophe would have been inevitable."
The right hon. Gentlemen had appealed to Caesar; to Caesar, then, he should go. By that evidence Lord Lansdowne gave a complete contradiction to a great deal that the Chief

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Secretary had been urging. Surely the right hon. Gentleman would also remember that according to the advice of the military authorities it then required an expenditure of £640,000 to complete the equipment of the First Army Corps. And were they to be told that soldiers, into whose hands were placed rifles which carried six inches to the right at 500 yards, were properly armed? or that cavalry with a reserve of eighty swords, and those of a kind perfectly useless for cavalry purposes, were efficiently equipped? It was impossible for Lord Wolseley to have taken these facts into consideration; the evidence of Lord Lansdowne was much more to be relied upon. The House owed a deep debt of gratitude to the hon. and learned Member for South Shields for the able and lucid speech in which he had brought this complicated question before them. He had been inclined to fear that the question had receded somewhat in public interest owing to the length of time which had elapsed since the events took place. to the time it had taken to compile the evidence, and to the appearance on the political horizon of a very large question which, like Aaron's rod, appeared to have swallowed up all others. Moreover, there had been the I promise of reform in the War Office, and they had in that Department a Secretary of State enlisted on the side of Army reform. His hon. and learned friend had wisely made it his first object to place the saddle on the right horse, being not only anxious to exonerate the soldiers, but to allot the I blame in the proper quarters. One quotation would show the opinion of the Royal Commission on this point—
"It appears now that with a greater amount of forethought in arrangements generally, in the, provision of stores and equipment, and with the addition perhaps of one brigade, the situation in Natal might have been so strengthened that the whole course of the war must have been altered."(Page 30.)
And again on page 28—
"There can be no doubt now that the position in South Africa was dangerously weak."
In the judgment of Sir J. French, the addition to the force in Natal of a brigade of 5,000 men,' would have turned the scale in the operations after Elands-
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laagte. It was difficult to form any conception of the difference in the whole course of the war which might have been the result. What was the situation in June, 1899? According to page 25 of the Report—
"In June, 1899, it has been shown that an Army Corps and a Cavalry Division was designated as the force which would be required in the event of hostilities. The equipment of that force required, in the opinion of the Army Board, an outlay of £640,000. The minutes of the Army Board up to 22nd, September 1899, make it clear that in their opinion the main difficulty was the refusal of sanction for the expenditure of the money involved. It is, however, equally manifest from his minute of the 12th of August, that Lord Lansdowne, as Secretary of State, fully appreciated the extent of the deficiency, and the consequence of any delay in the grant of money, and that he brought the whole circumstances before his colleagues. The decision not to sanction expenditure was, therefore, taken by the Cabinet, though Lord Lansdowne, of course, does not dissociate himself from it."
Therefore the very thing which prevented the Army Corps going out was the refusal of the Cabinet to sanction the necessary expenditure. Nothing could be more clear than that it was not the fault of the soldiers. Sir H. Brackenbury had shown that nothing was done by the Secretary of State to remedy the state of affairs. From his evidence it appeared that—
"The proceedings of the Army Board were full of instances of our asking at that time to be allowed to spend money in making preparations and of our being told we could not do it. It was perfectly clear that it was the decision of the Government that they would not spend money at that time in preparation for the despatch of an army corps."
And again—
"We, were equally refused money by the Secretary of State in the early stage to make any preparation for providing clothing for the First Army Corps, and nothing was done until the 22nd of September."
He could not conceive how that decision had been arrived at. The Cabinet must have known of the immense importations of arms and ammunition into the Transvaal; they must have known at the time of the Raid that we were very weak; they had the excellent reports of the Intelligence Division; and they knew that war was impending, because they sent to Sir Redvers Buller with the First Army Corps, and told him that when hostilities broke out he would be

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appointed to the command. It was, indeed, most melancholy to read of the want of preparation that obtained at that time. The question of the reserves in this country should not be lost sight of. The authorised reserve of cavalry swords was 6,000; the actual reserve, however, was 80, and they were described by Sir J. French as the worst that could possibly be used by any mounted troops, and by General Baden-Powell as a perfectly useless weapon. As to the rifles, the back-sight had been altered, and that was the cause of the divergence of the bullets, and it was a terrible blow at the commencement of the war that 200,000 rifles were useless. But who found that out? Not the War Office, but the unfortunate Yeomanry to whom they were served on the eve of going into the field. That, he contended, was a scandalous thing. Great use was made of machine guns, which were especially useful when acting with cavalry, but Sir H. Brackenbury stated that while the authorised number was 1,224, they had only 898, a deficiency of 326. And further—
"We were driven to great straits for ammunition, because we had actually got reduced in this country to two or three boxes of Mark II. ammunition, so that if we bad had to go to war with a European Power we should have had to fight them with expanding bullets."
He further stated—
"Almost the whole of the supplies tell a similar tale. We had 500 sets of cavalry saddlery in reserve to meet the wear and tear of 16,000 sets with the troops, we had 10,000 sets of infantry accoutrements in reserve to meet the wear and tear of 364,000 sets, we had 1,700 sets of mule harness and we had to buy an equipment of 25,000 sets from the trade before l5th December."
Then Lord Lansdowne stated in evidence—
"We had a quite insufficient reserve of horse and held artillery material, only one battery of horse artillery, and that converted to an experimental quick-firing system. The whole stock of field-gun ammunition was absorbed by demands from South Africa at an early stage. We borrowed from India and the Navy. We had only 500 sets of harness and 500 of Cavalry saddler in reserve, we at once exhausted the reserve of infantry accoutrements, we had to borrow large guns from the Navy, machine guns from fortresses, boots and helmets from India, to buy 25,000 sets of mule harness, 17,000 tents and 900 marquees, we had no reserve of hospital equipment, the fiftieth of the picketing gear required, and a reserve of 80 swords."
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That was from the evidence of Lord Lansdowne, a conclusive authority who cannot be mistaken.
With regard to the provision of men—
"Colonel Lucas, who acted as Deputy-Adjutant General of the Imperial Yeomanry, stated that on several occasions, he urged upon the War Office, after the despatch of the first contingent-that recruiting for the Imperial Yeomanry should not be stopped but the committee should be allowed to raise drafts to maintain the strength of the force. It was a mistake on the part of the War Office authorities to have declined to santion this. If the force first sent out had not been allowed to melt away the subsequent hurried and unsatisfactory raising of further contingents would not have been necessary."
The second contingent was raised by order in February, 1901. The privates were given 5s. a day, to the great disgust of their comrades in the first contingent who were paid at cavalry rates, and had also to be raised to 5s. a day, like the Colonials. These men when they arrived in South Africa, were absolutely untrained, and could neither shoot nor ride.
That was about the most extravagant expenditure in the war. Lord Methuen said of them—
"It was not their fault, it was sending them out unprepared and not giving them a chance when they got to the country of getting into order, before they were in front of the enemy."
Sir B. Hamilton says of them—
"The second lot of Yeomanry knew nothing at all, they did not know how to handle a rifle."
Sir C. Knox said of the same contingent—
"They were very bad; I do not know where they were got, but they had no idea of riding, shooting, or anything else."
Colonel Crabbe said that—
"They were absolutely ignorant of the rudiments of soldiering, and knew nothing about horses. Some of the officers were unfit and had to be sent home."
With regard to the officers he limited himself to the Militia. Lords Wolseley and Roberts and the Adjutant-General agreed that the Militia failed in the matter of an adequate number of well-trained officers. In the sixty-eight battalions warned for embarkation, there was a deficiency of 303 officers. One battalion was seventeen, another sixteen, and another fourteen officers short. The whole Militia

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force in 1899 was 624 officers short. The Inspector-General of the Auxiliary Forces between October, 1899, and April, 1900, gave away 407 Militia Commissions. He sent out young gentlemen with no training whatever, and knowing nothing. He took them straight from their families or from school and sent them out without even gazetting them. Naturally Lord Roberts found the greatest difference between Line and Militia on service, and could only employ the latter on lines of communication, and he referred to the great anxiety he felt in his communications being held by partially trained troops such as Militia and hastily raised Yeomanry. No doubt one of the great difficulties was the supply of trained officers. They could not pay a man for longer time than he served. Might they not utilise the Militia, increase largely the establishment, train an officer for three months and then one month yearly. They then would not need largely to increase the cadres of regiments, or pay men for twelve months while doing one month's duty, and yet they would get the Militia properly officered.
As to horses, there was less reason to speak of the terrible deficiencies of the remounts, as there had been more than one debate and more than one Committee upon it. But no one could pretend that an establishment to purchase only 2,500 horses a year was sufficient; nor could any excuse be found for not increasing the staff when they suddenly had to deal with an expenditure of £7,000,000 in a single year. All would agree with the finding of the Commission—
"That the real complaint against the Remount Department does not so much relate to its purchase of horses during the war as to the fact that from first to last there was not the symptom of an idea in anyone who was responsible for its organisation that in time of war there would be necessity for its expansion."
In conclusion, he thought they were all indebted to his hon. and learned friend for the admirable manner in which he had brought the subject before the House.
And, it being half-past Seven of the clock, the debate stood adjourned till this Evening's Sitting.

EVENING SITTING.

  KING'S SPEECH (MOTION FOR AN ADDRESS).
  Order read, for resuming adjourned debate on Amendment [4th February] to Main Question [2nd February].
  "That an humble Address be presented to His Majesty, as followeth:—
  "Most Gracious Sovereign,
  "We, Your Majesty's most dutiful and loyal subjects, the Commons of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, in Parliament assembled, beg leave to offer our humble thanks to Your Majesty for the Gracious Speech which Your Majesty has addressed to both Houses of Parliament."—(Mr. Hardy.)
  Which Amendment was—
  "At the end of the Question, to add the words, 'But humbly represent to Your Majesty that the facts now made known in regard to the preparations for and conduct of the recent war in South Africa, and particularly the evidence taken by Your Majesty's Commissioners appointed to inquire into those matters and their Report thereon, disclose grave negligence and mismanagement on the part of Your Majesty's Ministers, whereby the duration, magnitude and cost of the war were greatly increased.'"—(Mr. Robson.)
  Question again proposed, "That those words be there added."
  MR. DUKEsaid if it were possible for the Amendment to be a declaration of public necessity for the removal of the Government in order to promote the efficiency of the defensive forces of the Crown, there would be majority sufficiently public spirited to prefer the efficiency of the forces to the continued existence of His Majesty's Government. But the powerful speech of Mr. Wyndham must have satisfied Members on both sides of the House that the efficiency of the Imperial forces did not require the removal of the Government. The objects of the Commission were to discover any inefficiency or defects in the administration of the Army, as disclosed by the war in South Africa, and to indicate their causes where possible. The Commissioners faithfully carried out those objects, and devoted their ability and industry to discovering inefficiency and defects, which they disclosed in an impartial Report. Their

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  work would redound to the benefit of the public service if it was not defeated by partisan interference. They faithfully traced to their origin those mistakes which indicated inefficiency, and by which so much public humiliation was caused in the early stages of the war, but they had also, and to an extent which close study of the Report made quite clear, exonerated the advisers of the Crown and the members of the Government from culpability. In view of the finding of the Commission the speech of the hon. Member opposite was like a reiteration of the case for the prosecution after the verdict of acquittal had been given. It was founded upon isolated passages in the evidence—scraps had been selected, instances of inefficiency had been pieced together, and with an admirable adroitness, of which the House had had one or two instances that day, the blame of the whole matter had been laid at the doors of His Majesty's Administrators. He maintained that no Government in this country within the past century had contributed so much to the strengthening of the forces of the Crown—to the making of them efficient, to the provision of armaments and to the establishment of an intelligent system at headquarters—as this Government had. The business of the Administration in regard to the matters which came into question that day was the business of policy, and he protested against the notion that it was the duty of a Prime Minister or Secretary for War to go round sighting rifles, examining saddles, counting tents, or even to undertake the preparation of plans of campaign, or lines of strategic advance. A Government was to be judged by its conduct of public policy; a War Minister was bound to see that the Government had a force available to support the honour and determination of the country in such emergencies as arose. Upon those broad grounds it was impossible to support the Amendment. If hon. Members brought home to the Government every mistake and folly that was committed they might succeed upon the Amendment, but if the question was one of policy he ventured to say that the policy of the Government with regard to every material
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  stage in the progress of the acts under discussion, was a policy approved by the country and one which not infrequently had been approved by right hon. Gentlemen and hon. Gentlemen opposite.
  A great deal had been said with regard to the conduct of the Government in not providing sufficient forces in South Africa when war was thought to be possible. He challenged any critic to show that the Government did not more than satisfy the demands that were made upon them. The advice given by Sir William Butler was that the war would be a costly and serious matter. The general thought, but apparently did not advise, that it would certainly require 50,000 or 60,000 men, and might require 80,000 or 100,000. And he predicted also that such a war would not be begun by the Boers. How completely that prediction had been falsified ! Yet the Government was blamed because it was satisfied with the advice it had from the general at the Cape, the general in Natal, and its advisers in this country. His Majesty's Government may not have possessed a prophetic foresight. If they failed to send great forces to Africa in the summer of 1899 it was with a very excellent justification, for they were resolved that no act should be done on our part which should render war inevitable. Half the blame cast upon the Government was blame because in the summer of 1899 it did not mobilise an army corps. The justification for the position of this country at the outbreak of the war was that we had done nothing to provoke war. What would have been the attitude of hon. Gentlemen opposite if His Majesty's Government had in the summer of 1899 proposed to mobilise an army corps, or call out the Militia? On 28th July, 1899, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman said, in regard to preparations for the war, he saw nothing which established a case for armed intervention. What was censured at the time was not any slightness of preparation on the part of the Government, but their ostentation and excess. Before the Government was finally met by the hostility of the two Republics, the Government had been advised with regard to the force required. Various numbers were given; an expert said 40,000 men would be required, another 60,000. Now

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  they were told in this House that the number of men the Government ought to have expected to send off was upwards of 400,000. They knew now, when the war was successfully ended, that the number of troops required for the task to be performed was about 250,000, but there was not a scintilla of evidence placed before the Commission to show that any responsible person before the commencement of the war suggested that anything approaching even 100,000 would be required. I he force decided upon was larger than was advised by the experts. The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition, when the subject was discussed, was able to express a confident opinion as to the sufficiency of the forces sent to South Africa, and it was an idle thing at this time to say that he spoke without the knowledge of the facts he had now. He had such knowledge of the facts that he could speak with confidence and applaud the decision at which His Majesty's Government had arrived. The House did not know and did not need to know the exact quantity of facts which was required to give the right hon. Gentleman confidence in his opinion. What the right hon. Gentleman said with regard to the matter was contained in volume 75 of "Hansard of 1899."On 17th October, 1899, the right hon. Gentleman said—
  "I am glad that the Government are at least not falling into the error which has not infrequently been made by our countrymen in past times, and they are sending out, after some delay it is true, an ample force for the purpose of effectually prosecuting and concluding this enterprise."
  That responsible utterance at a time of the most serious crisis should outweigh some of the criticisms now offered in defiance of the findings of the Royal Commission. Not only was that the view of the Opposition, that view was endorsed by Lord Roberts, who said that what the Army was suffering from when he got out to South Africa was not a deficiency in the number of men, but defective strategy. In these days also it was not the opinion of the Leader of the Opposition that the Government had failed in their duty as regarded equipment, for on 20th October, 1899, he said that for us in our particular position to be paying a great deal of money in
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  continually keeping up a great establishment of transports solely for European or home purposes would be preposterous. and that it was shown by the fact that in this particular case we had already had to alter our wagons in order to suit the nature of the country in South Africa where they were to be used. Was it fair or beneficial to the country that what was regarded as reasonable and prudent in the time of crisis should now be condemned?
  As to the wrong sighting of certain rifles, Lord Roberts in his evidence said it was discovered at a time when it made no practical difference. Being asked (Question 10,575) whether it practically made any difference, Lord Roberts replied, "No, I do not think it did." The Government record with regard to Army administration was one showing that they had done something and risked something, and he commended it to the consideration of hon. Gentlemen opposite who were now such severe critics after, in office, setting a bad example. The Government had taken account of the main recommendations of the Commission, and had dealt even with the internal economy of the War Office in the manner called for by its Report. The Government provoked this Report. They appointed a Commission to investigate the errors which had been made, and he was heartily thankful that they had investigated them. He therefore ventured to suggest that the Government deserved encouragement in the prosecution of the task of military reform to which they had committed themselves, and to which he hoped they would be enabled to devote their energies for years to come.
  SIR CHARLES DILKEsaid the hon. and learned Gentleman concluded his speech by declaring that the Government had condemned the War Office. If that was true it was some justification for the Motion now before the House. If it was true that the War Office had not yet been replaced, it was a curious commentary on the Prime Minister's speeches in which he stated that he had made the War Office perfect, while according to the hon. and learned Gentleman we were at present provided with no War Office at all. The hon. and learned Gentleman stated that

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  previous speakers did not stick to the Report of the Commission, and complained that they had gone outside of it and referred to the evidence. The doctrine that the evidence should not be referred to was one which they could not recognise on this side of the House. The hon. and learned Gentleman asked if judgment was going to be passed on the Government by the House, with regard to events which occurred years ago. Judgment had been passed on the Government by a Commission of which they themselves chose every member, and of which they prepared the reference, which was a matter of importance in the case of a Commission. It was a Commission so composed which had passed on the Government a verdict the hon. and learned Gentleman and the Chief Secretary for Ireland called a verdict of acquittal. He would endeavour to put before the House the reasons which made him think that the Report was such that it would be impossible for the House of Commons to pass it over in silence, and not to point the moral which the Report contained, for the sake of the Empire as a whole. He could not help feeling that the fact that there had been three Secretaries for War in so short a time in what the Prime Minister called the same Government was an eloquent comment on the disclosures which had been made. With regard to the claim that the Report of the Commission was an acquittal of the Government he did not think that was the opinion of the Prime Minister. Immediately after the Report was issued the right hon. Gentleman, addressing his constituents, said it had left a painful impression upon the public mind, and that in the opinion of what he called "my friend the man in the street," the Government had been tried and found utterly inefficient. Surely that was hardly a way to meet a verdict of acquittal. The Chief Secretary had waved the Party flag, and attempted to substitute for the real question before the country a purely Party issue. Upon this military question some of them had really tried to keep free from Party spirit and some of them had shown that. He felt from a perusal of the Report and of the evidence, from his knowledge of the circumstances which led up to it,
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  from his recollection of the debates which took place after the unfortunate speeches of the Prime Minister, that it was incumbent upon all of them, for the sake of the nation, to support the judgment of the Royal Commission. If they passed over lightly such a Report as that dealing with facts, they should only deserve their fate if similar facts were to recur. It was a little ominous that some hon. Gentlemen were inclined to give a Party turn to the discussion. Perhaps that was natural and inevitable though unfortunate, and it seemed to him singularly unfair. It was a subject on which they had a collection of evidence by competent men admirably put before them, and it contained an enormous number of facts which it was essential to bear in mind for the future welfare of the country.
  The Chief Secretary for Ireland began the Party portion of his speech by an allusion to the most considerable and most grave of all the findings of the Commission. It was on the subject of what he called the preparation for the war; and he asked—the question had already been asked in Party newspapers, and in the unfortunate speech of the Prime Minister in which he tried to defend the Cabinet on Party lines—would hon. Members opposite have supported war preparations? If the question meant would hon. Members who had consistently opposed the policy of Lord Milner have supported war measures to back up that policy of Lord Milner, of course they would not. That went without saying. But, was that Party taunt any answer whatever to the charges that had been made on the findings of the Royal Commission? Did it clear the Cabinet in any way? In protesting against the view that the Government ought to have sent larger reinforcements to South Africa, the right hon. Gentleman said that the civilised world would have condemned such a provocation. He doubted that. He thought the civilised world would have been more likely to condemn the making of inflammatory speeches which had been delivered when reinforcements were not sent. The provocation sending reinforcements and adequate transport would have been small indeed beside the provocation offered by the speeches to

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  which he had referred. Another Party taunt which the Chief Secretary used was that in 1895 the right hon. Gentlemen who sat on these Benches had prepared a despatch on the franchise question which they had not sent to the Boer Government, and that at that time they had made no preparations for war, and that the garrison in South Africa was small. But he might point out that the Boer armaments had not been gathered at that time, and that their preparation for war, which had been so accurately described by the Intelligence Department, was caused by the Jameson Raid.
  The Chief Secretary said that the Report of the Commission was a. verdict of acquittal, and he should like therefore to ask the House to consider what exactly it was that the Commission had reported in regard, in the first place, to the main question of preparation and reinforcements. He was glad to see the right hon. Member for West Birmingham in his place, because it enabled him to quote a letter written by the then Secretary of State for War, Lord Lansdowne, in which he referred to a communication from the right hon. Gentleman which had not been published. On 20th August, Lord Lansdowne wrote from Ireland that the Colonial Secretary had written to him on 18th August, stating that "he saw no occasion for reinforcements." Now, it was on 22nd August that the Transvaal presented their five years franchise proposal, and the Secretary of State for War continued to sec no necessity for reinforcements, because to that proposal the Government had "sent a reasoned reply" and "the negotiation was going on." But it was on the 26th August that the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Birmingham was made about "the sands running down" and that "we shall have to find other ways;" and, according to the evidence of the Secretary of State for War on the very same day, the Cabinet—or at least the majority of the Cabinet—had come to a decision that they "ought not to send further reinforcements." On 5th September the Secretary of State for War, Lord Lansdowne, came to the view that war was certain, and the Commander-in-Chief, knowing the state
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  of our unpreparedness, wrote that he wished the Government to stave off war by diplomatic measures as the enemy was "in a position to take the offensive, and by striking the first blow to ensure the great advantage of winning the first round." That prophecy came exactly true, and it was the ground on which the Commission reported that the earlier sending of reinforcements would have changed the whole future course of the war, would have prevented the prolongation of the war, and would have saved an enormous sacrifice of life and treasure. The Commander-in-Chief in that prophecy did not stand by any means alone. The Intelligence Department's advice was exactly the same, and so was that of Sir William Butler about "temporising," in which he used, without previous communication, almost exactly the same words as the Commander-in-Chief. Let the House consider for a moment what would have been the effect of earlier action at that time. During the fatal week of December the troops were arriving largely too late to take any part in the operations, and the delay was caused by the Government holding their hand from 5th September. when even the peace members of the Cabinet came to the conclusion that war was certain, up to the 22nd and even 27th, 28th, and 29th September. Now, what were the words of the Report on that subject? What was this verdict of acquittal of which they had heard that night? The Commission found in those words—
  "With a greater amount of forethought…and with the addition of perhaps another brigade, the situation might have been so strengthened that the whole course of the war must have been altered."
  That statement seemed to him not to be a verdict of acquittal, but a. verdict of guilty on the main point.
  The second most important point referred to by the Commission concerned the deficiency of stores. The Chief Secretary for Ireland did not make, at the same length as the Prime Minister, but he did make that night the old pot-and-kettle charge, a Party charge on this question of stores and equipment. In the unfortunate speech which the Prime Minister made to his constituents in Manchester in defending

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  the Government after the Report came out, he attacked the Party on this side for deliberately starving the Army. He used these words—
  "When they (the Liberal Government) went out in 1895 and this Government came in, we set to work at once to bring up the Army to the standard which had been laid down by our Conservatives predecessors. and which had been abandoned…and which we were resolved to restore."
  And then he quoted Mr. Stanhope. The Chief Secretary again quoted Mr. Stanhope. Well, he (Sir Charles Dilke) had already deprecated Party recrimination on this question. He had claimed for himself detachment from Party, but he confessed that he was sickened by these Party charges in regard to this question which was specially referred to in the Commission, and on which they had plain evidence in the Report itself, and the verdict given was as complete a verdict of guilty as was the verdict on the other point. The Prime Minister said that—
  "The professors of efficiency left the Army in the deplorable position in which it was in 1895."
  But they knew that when Mr. Gladstone was in office in 1893, Mr. Stanhope said that the Army was in a very fine condition of efficiency; there was no falling off at all, and that—
  "The Army had never been more efficient or more thoroughly sui able for war than it then was. Our Army was better equipped than at any previous period."
  In 1895 a similar statement was made by the Prime Minister, though the right hon. Gentleman now explained that his remarks applied to the Navy, which was not at that time mentioned at all; and the Chief Secretary did not refer to the Navy in that connection. At all events, the Prime Minister was in the same condition of delusion on this subject, and in regard to the evidence and Report of the Commission, as he was in regard to the Orange Free State. The Prime Minister at Manchester put first in his list of "Unionist Army reforms" these stores which had returned to the standard set up by Mr. Stanhope, and which had been destroyed by the harm done by the wretched Liberal Party from
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  1892 to 1895; and then the right hon. Gentleman said—
  "We brought up the whole reserves of ammunition and equipment."
  And the Chief Secretary brought cheers from the other side when he spoke of "our record" on this subject. What were the words of the Report of the Royal Commission? The Commission reported—
  "A serious deficiency of stores and material required on the mobilisation of an army corps."
  And yet they had been told that the equipment of two, and later of three, army corps was complete in every respect. Now the Chief Secretary for Ireland asked the House to very carefully read on that subject the most valuable evidence of Lord Lansdowne. They had read it. Lord Lansdowne admitted the charge to the full. He spoke of the "melancholy extent of our deficiencies," which he said was "full of peril to the Empire." And that was after they had returned to the Conservative standard, and made up all the deficiencies and raised the Army to a state in which it had never been before ! Lord Lansdowne was specifically asked—
  "And do yon think that deficiency of stores has been of long standing?"
  And he said—
  "Yes, I think so."
  Well, the Commission were not content with the complete judgment which they passed on this point in the words I have read. The Chief Secretary wanted hon. Members to stick to the Report of the Commission. Well, the Commission went on to mention specially Mr. Stanhope, and they printed for the first time Mr. Stanhope's Memorandum. And they say—
  "The state of things in no way corresponded to…Mr. Stanhope's Memorandum."
  They found that there had not been that completeness of preparation under Mr. Stanhope for which the Chief Secretary vouched, and that instead of there being an improvement, there must have been very serious deterioration. The Commission went on to say that—
  "Some branches were barely strong enough for the equipment of two army corps."

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  And they specifically mentioned several points as to which the Government complained most unjustly that the House of Commons were responsible, the House of Commons had never done anything but good on these points. The Commission specifically pointed out many matters which his hon. friend the Member for West Aberdeenshire had brought before the House. The medical equipment was, they said, never anything like the equipment even for a single army corps. Well, that was complete proof, surely, without going into any evidence at all, and without raising any of those questions which the Chief Secretary said ought not to be raised—that the Report showed that the verdict of the Commission on the Government was not one of acquittal upon the main points, but was a condemnation on the two chief points which it was the bounden duty of the House to take notice of on this occasion in order to prevent a similar misfortune happening in the future.
  There were other matters of deep interest, but not of first-class importance, on which their opinion was as unfavourable and as clear. For years past the Army reformers in the House, on both sides, had perpetually urged upon the Government, in season and out of season, down to the conclusion of the war itself, the defective state of the Intelligence Department. On that point, too, the finding of the Commission was dead against the Government. They found that the Intelligence Department was undermanned, and was not sufficient to grapple with a great war. The present Secretary for India made a speech to his constituents in October last, defending the War Office, when he said that their attacks on the Government were most unfair, because, he contended, everyone "ignored that large additions have been made" to the Department, and he said how wrong it was to make these attacks when Sir William Nicholson "was satisfied." What were the facts? Sir William was rewarded by being driven from the War Office. At all events Lord Lansdowne was not satisfied; he was apparently impressed by the war having shown the importance of the Intelligence
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  Department; and he used these singular words—
  "One of the good results of the war will be that the importance of the Intelligence branch will receive greater recognition."
  It certainly was the result of the war that the Commission had condemned the undermanning of the Department, and that that which they had been urging for years had been complied with. The hon. Member for Plymouth complained that they had waited till after these events to make their criticism: but they had brought the question before the House as soon as it was reported upon by the Commission. The Secretary of State for India, defending the War Office, said that the Government ought not to be blamed, because they had given Sir William Nicholson all he wanted. They had the evidence of Sir William Nicholson quoted in the Report, and it was the basis of a judgment against the Government in which it was stated that the Department was "undermanned." Sir William Nicholson said that his moderate proposal of 1901 was negatived by the Government on the ground of expense; and when he was asked what the expense was he said £3,000 a year. So that this country, which spent infinitely more on its Army than any other country, had refused the moderate proposal of Sir William Nicholson while waste was going on in other Departments. Up to March, 1903, Sir William Nicholson had totally failed to obtain the augmentations for which he had asked for his Department, and he succeeded only by the evldence he gave before the Commission. The Secretary of State for India said that it was most unfair to blame the Government on this point—most unfair, he supposed, of the Royal Commission—Sir William Nicholson won only on his evidence; and now he was probably to be sent away from the War Office.
  There occurred during the debate a little passage of arms between the Chief Secretary and the seconder of this Motion. The Chief Secretary quoted the evidence of Lord Roberts about quick-firing guns and some words from the Report, and seemed to suggest to the House that the Commissioners understood the question better than Lord Roberts. He ventured to interrupt the Chief Secretary and asked him if he agreed with Lord

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  Roberts' statement that in quick-firing guns this country was altogether inferior to other Powers. The Chief Secretary did not answer; but he should like to press the question, because it was one of the points on which the Prime Minister had been as consistently misinformed as he was with regard to the attitude of the Orange State. The Prime Minister, defending the Government in January, 1900, went out of his way to deny that our Artillery had a worse gun than the French, for example. That matter was put to the test, because the French took their quick-firing gun to China at that very time, and some demonstrations of its value were given. The Prime Minister spoke at the Manchester Conservative Club on the 10th of January. On that occasion he was advised by someone to say that our guns compared favourably with any guns then used by any great State, and he went on to attack the critics and said no one had ever stated before that our guns were bad. The Chief Secretary knew at that time all the latest information on the subject, he knew very well that the statement of the Prime Minister was not the case, and he knew very well that Lord Roberts' statement was true, and that our guns failed deplorably in South Africa in quickness of fire. The Prussian "Military Considerations of the War in South Africa," a most valuable view of the war and a most important Supplement to the Report of the Royal Commission, described these guns "as old and old-fashioned. The |English had only one battery which was quick-firing and the Boer artillery had 126 quick-firing guns." One gun which the Army still possessed was the Liberal gun of 1885. It was converted in 1892 merely from an action on one side to an action on the other, and the spade attachment was added in 1899. The Member for South Birmingham defended that gun in debate, but it was admitted by the Government in 1899 that it was hopelessly out of date. He was able to state without doubt that the German gun of commerce—the Krupp gun of 1901—which anyone could buy, was seven times as good as our gun, as it could fire seven rounds for every one fired by the British gun, yet he had quoted the amazing statement of the Prime Minister which
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  was supplied to him, he did not know by whom. It was not a fact that when the present Secretary of State for War came to this House next month for money he would propose the very first Vote that had ever been proposed for quick-firing guns? Such statements of the Prime Minister were surely worthy of the attention of the House. It was universally admitted that the position of the Prime Minister in co-ordinating and deciding what share of increased taxation was to be allotted to each Department gave him a great say in such matters, but surely the House of Commons, which had to trust the Prime Minister, had a right to expect from him that he should keep himself aware of what his own military advisers were thinking on these questions, and that he should at least read the documents sent to him. His hon. and learned friend had made a weighty attack on the Prime Minister, but it was a very deserved and necessary attack, one painful, he knew, for his friend to make in the Prime Minister's absence. His hon. and learned friend devoted a considerable portion of his speech to the case of the Orange Free State, and it was necessary to bring it forward because soldier after soldier had pointed out what would happen. His hon. friend quoted one passage, but it was the whole burthen of the speech of the Prime Minister, who also used the following passage, which was perhaps more appropriate to this occasion because it contained one of those needless reflections on the military advisers of the Crown which had produced such a painful impression on the country. He spoke of—
  "What we did not know at the time, that the Orange Free State would throw all their forces into line with the Transvaal Republic"
  Now the Chief Secretary said that everyone the Prime Minister did not know it, and finally, when the matter was brought before knew that. Why did not the Prime Minister know it? The Intelligence Department reported it month after month in the critical period before the war, before the House, he made the lamest of lame explanations. It was suggested that the Government only thought that young men of the Orange Free State would leave the State and take part in the war, and that the Orange State would not throw in its lot with

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  the Transvaal. But it had been proved conclusively that the War Office was aware that the Orange State was being armed at the cost of the Transvaal, and that they were actually interchanging small bodies of regular troops. Those facts were brought to the attention of the Government in June and July, and was it not amazing that the Prime Minister should go out of his way to make these statements with regard to the action of the Orange Free State?
  There was a secondary matter which was reported on by the Committee, and that was the question of mounted men. The Committee reported on this subject on three points, in two of which the Government were condemned. The Prime Minister at Manchester stated as one of the reasons why the Government could not have been adequately prepared for war, and why they were bound to make the failures they did in the early stages of the war, that for the first time in military warfare, they had an enemy wholly mounted and that that fact had not been adequately realised. The Prime Minister went on again to attack the military authorities, and he said that they "might ask much of their officers and Ministers, but they could not ask omniscience." But the officers had reported this very fact, the Intelligence Department had reported that the Boers would put 54,000 mounted infantry into the field, and the Prime Minister must have been ignorant of the facts which were brought before the House during the war when the accuracy of the statement was already suspected, a suspicion which was now confirmed by the Report. The Committee reported that it was necessary to increase the number of mounted men, and he could not help remembering in this connection that it was Mr. Stanhope who reduced the number of horses at the time he reduced the artillery and that that reduction was not made up for an immense period. The Committee specifically censured the Government upon the subject of the Remount Department, although that could not have been gathered by what the Chief Secretary said that evening. The Commission whitewashed the Remount, Department and General Truman, but reported regarding the
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  Government that no one had ever foreseen the simple necessity for the expansion of the Department in time of war. On the question of mounted men the Commission also censured the Government. Some of the Yeomanry officers opposite would remember the report of Colonel Lucas in which he said that drafts ought to have been sent out, but it was established by the Royal Commission that the Government failed to keep up the Yeomanry to its full strength, and that the war was prolonged because the report of Colonel Lucas was not acted on and drafts were not sent out. The Chief Secretary asked them to stick to the Report of the Commission, and. with one divergence, in order to support the seconder of the Amendment. he had stuck closely to the actual findings of the Report. The Government thought that they had been acquitted by the Royal Commission, but the Prime Minister himself admitted the miscalculations of the Government, and threw the whole blame on their military advisers. The Commission condemned the Government not the military advisers. The attack on the soldiers was a mean attack. Certainly the soldiers were not responsible for the condition of the stores which they had frequently reported to the Government; they were not responsible for the state of the Intelligence Department, or for the miscalculation of the Prime Minister as to the Orange Free State. So far as he knew the sole justification which the Government had for trying to throw the blame off their own shoulders and on the shoulders of the soldiers related to the question of numbers and to that alone. and on that point what the soldiers said was that they did not understand that they were entering on a war of conquest, which was a very different thing from an ordinar war. When the Government proclaimed a policy of destroying a nationality they provoked an amount of resistance of a character and continuity which needed different forces to cope with it. The soldiers with one accord declared that they were never told a war of conquest was intended. That was an important answer, and one of which notice ought to be taken by the House. The soldier who made the clearest statement to the Commission was Sir T. Kelly

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  Kenny, who in 16,923 put that view forward, and the Commission appeared to have accepted it as there was no attempt to rebut it. And yet Sir T. Kelly Kenny was taken by the Government themselves as the best man they could find for a "thinking department" of the War Office. In the face of that they could hardly deny the authority of such a witness on such a subject. The country and the House might congratulate themselves that, in all the circumstances disclosed by the Report, we got through the war as well as we did. The evidence which had been placed before the Commission by men of the greatest weight as to what occurred at the time of the investment of Ladysmith, and as to what would have happened if the Boers had then reached that measure of efficiency which they undoubtedly did attain in the later stages of the war, showed what a danger we had escaped in spite of the admitted miscalculation and neglected preparation of the Government. The Government had appealed from the evidence to the Report; he had endeavoured to keep to the Report and to show from it that the Commission appointed by the Government themselves had confirmed the charge which had been made.
  MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN: Mr. Speaker, I was going to apologise to the House for intervening at all in this debate, but I gather that the House considers, as I do, that the course which it has taken necessitates, at all events, a few words from me. I came down to the House under the impression that I was not personally—not exceptionally—concerned in the subject under discussion. But, nevertheless, I was induced to come down by certain prefatory, preliminary announcements which I had seen in the newspapers, rumours which I had heard, that the hon. Member for South Shields was intending a great deliverance, was going to bring to bear all his forensic eloquence, and, in a Motion to condemn the Government for military inefficiency, was going to demolish for ever the reputation of the ex-Colonial Secretary. And really I think there was some foundation for that, because although I do not think the observations of the hon. and learned Member were
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  always relevant, yet I noticed throughout his lengthened speech a perpetual endeavour, an earnest desire, in all circumstances, at all times to lug in, somehow or other, King Charles's head, or the ex-Secretary of State's head, and to present it on a charger for the repudiation | and derision of the House. That is a I very bad precedent, and I ask the hon. and learned Gentleman to reconsider his action. Here for eight years the whole object of him and a great number of his colleagues has been to get rid of the Secretary of State for the Colonies. Now I they have got rid of him. Really, is it not rather hard that when, not forced by them. but voluntarily, I have yielded the office I once held with such pride and satisfaction, I should now be deprived of the immunities of a private Member? The whole object of the speech delivered by the hon. and learned Gentleman appeared to me, from first to last, in the most unnecessary, most unreasonable and illogical way, to lug me into matters in which, at all events, I was not principally concerned. [OPPOSITION cries of "Oh!"] Oh, that was not the object. Well, what was it? I ask those who listened to the lengthened speech of an hour and a half which the hon. and learned Gentleman delivered, and in which he dealt with facts in an imaginative manner,; from which he omitted, as it appeared to me, almost everything of importance—I ask hon. Gentlemen who listened to him, What was his object? Can it have been that the hon. and learned Gentle- man was moved by strong patriotic feelings, and, recognising that a great war had come to an end and that it ought to convey lessons, had resolved to devote himself to the study of all the incidents of the campaign, and to try to point out for the benefit of his descendants, of his country, and of the Empire, what mistakes had been made and in what way we might on future occasions improve on past experience? Was that his patriotic intention? Will anybody believe for a a moment who listened to him that he had that object in view? Does anybody believe that he cares one braes button [OPPOSITION cries of "Oh!"] about the lessons derived from (he war? Not a bit of it!
  Well, there was another object I though he might have had. I can hardly

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  believe it should have come from those Benche but the whole course of his speech went to show that this war, which during the whole of the last five years the whole of the opposition have been declaring was unnecessary, and might have been avoided, was an absolutely inevitable conflict. For my part I recognise most gratefully the result of his speech, but I do not believe that was his object. As I have said, the object appears to me to be to trump up a ridiculous indictment against my right hon. friend the Prime Minister, who is absent, fortunately for the hon. and learned Gentleman who attacked him, and against myself, who fortunately for myself am present. It is difficult to defend an absent man when he is attacked on the score of petty quotations picked out of I do not know how many speeches without their context—it is very difficult even for his nearest friend to defend him. Although I do not claim for myself that proud position, I claim that he has no truer friend. But in the course of the remark of the hon. and learned Gen leman what was important was not what my right hon. friend has said, but the into pretation the hon. and learned Gentlemen choose; to put on it; and it is only my right hon. friend who could himself give the true and correct interpretation, although perhaps I might suggest something different from that which commended itself to his assailants.
  For myself, so far as I was attacked in the matter, I do not shrink in the least from that corporate responsibility which belongs to every member of a Government; but I absolutely refuse to accept any special or exceptional responsibility beyond that general position. I was a member of the Government which prepared, or failed to prepare, for this war and the conduct of the war. [An HON. MEMBER: Misconduct.] Well, at all events, we won the war, and no thanks to the hon. Gentlemen opposite. But, as I say, all those who were members of that Government accept that corporate responsibility, and some of us undoubtedly had a more special responsibility. Now what was my special responsibility other than that of any of my colleagues? In a sense, I was, on behalf of the Government, conducting negotiations, and it was my duty to keep my colleagues in full know-
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  ledge of all the negotiations that went on. I did so. The hon. and learned Gentleman invented Cabinet meetings, communications between colleagues, and declarations of colleagues, which did the greatest credit to his humorous imagination, but which had not the slightest foundation in fact. The communications between the members of the Government were complete, and the Government knew all that I knew in regard to these negotiations, and I will go a great deal further and say that there was nothing of substantial importance in connection with those negotiations which was not known also to the whole of this House and to the whole of the public. There were no secrets, the necessity did not arise, and, from day to day almost, in this House I was questioned and I was glad enough to answer the questions addressed to me, as to the progress of the negotiations.
  Now the Cabinet was aware of the progress of the negotiations, and it was the duty of the Cabinet to prepare for possibilities. There were two questions: What was the preparation to be and when was the preparation to be made, the amount of preparation and the time of preparation. Those are two very important things, and I am prepared to justify, to take the fullest responsibility both for the time and for the amount. What is the charge of the hon. and learned Gentleman '? It is that we failed, that was how he began his speech, to provide for the defence of those of our colonies and possessions which we knew to be threatened. I could not help smiling when he came at last to his peroration. What was the conclusion, the moral, the thing he wished to impress on this House as the result of the crimes and iniquities he described as having been committed by the Government? I forget the exact words, the eloquent words, but the effect was that the Government which could have failed to provide for the defence of Natal and the Cape was unfitted to consider commercial questions. King Charles's head, Mr. Speaker! What a bathos! There was the object; it was to that conclusion that the whole of this great and eloquent oration tended. The Government were to be abused, and every possible fault was to be implied to them, in order that it might be proved to the satisfaction of the hon. and learned

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  Gentleman, and the other hon. Gentlemen who cheered him, that we were unfit to deal with commercial questions!
  The question; were—Did we make preparation in time, did we make preparation sufficient, in all human calculation, in amount? Perhaps it will surprise the hon. and learned Gentleman, though it cannot surprise any of those who were present at the debates at the time of the Bloemfontein Conference, both before and subsequently", that we earnestly strove, and that we actually believed almost to the end in the possibility of a peaceful solution. By that you must judge our policy. If the hon. and learned Gentleman is going to tell us that he saw better than we did, that he knew the Boer was not to be trusted, that there was no possibility of coming to terms with him. that the issue was inevitable, and that we ought from the first to have taken up an active, violent, and hostile position—very we I will say perhaps he was right. But that was not our view; honestly we believed that peace was possible, honestly we strove for it, and to a certain extent, undoubtedly, I admit it, that hampered our action, that hampered our preparations—hampered them both in regard to time and to amount. We had to keep two things in view. We had to keep in view in the first place the desirability and the importance of maintaining peace if peace were possible; we had at the same time to consider that we might fail, and that we ought to be prepared against the worst suits of such a failure—that if war did come, against our wish, against our hope, almost against our belief, at any rate we should have as considerable a preparation as was consistent with our desire for peace.
  I should have been glad to treat this matter absolutely in connection with the facts, or, at all events, with our separate view of the facts, and without any recrimination; but I cannot do that in the presence of a bitter, I might say almost malignant, speech such as that we have listened to. [OPPOSITION cries of "Oh !"] Oh, yes; I am perfectly in the recollection of the House; that speech was not a mere ordinary political speech, it was a bitter speech, and an unnecessarily bitter speech [OPPOSITION cries of "Oh!"]
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  and in face of a speech of that kind I cannot refrain from the natural and necessary recrimination.
  I say we strove for peace. I believed, I repeat, that peace was possible, and I believe peace was rendered impossible by two things. In the first place, I believed—and let me say that this belief of mine was confirmed by all I heard when I visited those countries and had conversations with Boer and Briton alike—I believed that President Kruger was influenced by his hope and belief that he would receive assistance from foreign countries. I do not think he ever had any real reason for that belief, although I do know as a fact that persons whom he thought to be influential gave him encouragement in that belief. And, in the second place, he believed that, as he said himself in public, he could rely on the Opposition. From first to last in our negotiations we were hampered by the fact that President Kruger did not believe that this country was in earnest, and he believed that this Government, which represented the country, was bluffing, that when it came to the point it would retire, and that the people would not support it. How could he believe otherwise? How could he believe we were in earnest, when even in June, 1899—a favourite date with the hon. and learned Member—and in July, 1899—another favourite and critical date, when the hon. and learned Member says we ought to have known that war was inevitable—when, even at that time, the Leader of the Opposition was saying——
  SIR H. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN: Hear, hear!
  MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN: Wait a minute—was saying that there was nothing to justify "either warlike action or even military preparation."
  SIR H. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN: In what was there nothing to justify either war, or the prospect of war, or even military preparation? Let the right hon. Gentleman read the words. If his memory has failed him and he has not got the words, which probably he has not, because they would not suit his purpose [MINISTERIAL cries of "Oh!"], I will remind him that I said that in the

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  whole story of the Government, in the whole of the case which they put before the country, so far as we knew it, there was nothing to justify war or even military preparation.
  MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN: Yes, Sir, the right hon. Gentleman said all he now says. He has had a good deal to say with regard to this unfortunate expression of his. But he did not say what he says now in his first statement. His first statement was made at Ilford in June, 1899. He did not then say what he has now told us. He said it afterwards in explanation. I do not think the explanation made much difference; but in any case it came too late. I do not care, I do not know, what the right hon. Gentleman meant when he said that. It is not my business to interpret his mind. But I know what the effect of that was upon everybody who heard it, upon everybody who read it; what its effect was upon us, and what its effect was upon the Boers. When you say, two or three months before war is declared by the Boers, that there is no reason for military preparation—I do not care how you may explain it—the effect upon the Boers is that they think they may safely continue. I would like to hear the right hon. Gentleman say that he regretted that his words should have been misinterpreted by the Boers [OPPOSITION cries of "Oh!"], but, whether he says it or not, the fact remains the same, and I here say it to his face, as I have said it over and over again in the country. How, I say, do you expect that at this time, when we are told by the hon. and learned Member that war was inevitable, the Boers would meet our desire for a reasonable arrangement—and it was a reasonable arrangement, as the Opposition admitted at the time—how do you expect that, when they thought that, if they refused it, we should not make military preparations, or, if we did, we should be condemned by the Opposition, to the power and influence and importance of which they attached a great deal more importance than was necessary?
  MR. ROBSON: I am sorry to interrupt the right hon. Gentleman, but I did not say that war was inevitable. What I
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  said was that it was inevitable that, if you fought the Transvaal, you would also have to fight the Orange Free State. It was the inevitability of war with the Orange Free State that I referred to.
  MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN: As a matter of courtesy I will answer the hon. and learned Gentleman, though I see no relevancy whatever in the interruption. [OPPOSITION cries of "Oh !"] The hon. and learned Gentleman says that war-was inevitable if you fought the Orange River Colony as well as the Transvaal. [OPPOSITION cries of "No."] What has that to do with it? [OPPOSITION cries of "Oh!"] Have I not rightly understood the hon. Gentleman?
  MR. ROBSON: What I said was that it was inevitable that if you fought the Transvaal you would also have to fight the Orange Free State. When I was reproaching the Government for want of preparation I was reproaching them for want of preparation in reference to that contingency.
  MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN: I will only say in answer to that explanation that I will deal with the question of the two States directly. It does not come in at this moment.
  Now, Sir, what I last said was that the views expressed by the Opposition seriously interfered, in my opinion, with the success of our diplomatic efforts. We never had any success, and I will ask you to find a single South African who will deny this statement—we never had or could have any success with the Boers so long as they did not believe that we were in earnest. Now I appeal to the fairness of hon. Gentlemen opposite to admit that during the whole course of the Bloemfontein discussion, and even for some time afterwards, the despatches that I addressed to President Kruger met with their entire approbation. There was not, so far as I know, an adverse criticism of those despatches either in the House—certainly not by any person of representative authority—or in any of the organs of the Press. They were admitted to be moderate despatches; no complaint whatever was made of them. Then came the speech

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  —it is very ancient history—to which the hon. and learned Gentleman has referred again to-night—the speech which he described as a minatory speech, a provocative speech, and adjectives of that kind. Well, I never dispute adjectives. That is a matter of taste. What I wish to say is that I take the fullest responsibility for that speech; I made it deliberately, and, knowing all that I know now, if I had to go through exactly the same situation I should make a similar speech again. And I will say why. Owing to the circumstances to which I have referred, it became evident to me—I had sufficient evidence—that President Kruger did not believe we were in earnest, and I desired in the fewest words, with the least offence but at the same time with the utmost firmness, to point out to President Kruger that, as I believed, the British Government and the British nation were in earnest. Sir, I said the sands were running out. That was the expression which I used. Really if one's literature is to be examined with such careful criticism as has been applied to some of mine, who is there who can escape? But I took, I admit on the spur of the moment, an illustration which I did not mean to be offensive. What I did mean to say was that President Kruger was letting out drop by drop—that is to say, insignificant portions—reforms which were quite insufficient to meet the demands that were made upon him. I will not go back on, nor do I think it worth while to defend, that term. But the point that was of importance, that may be considered to have constituted a threat, was contained in the words "the sands are running out." Sir, they were running out. I do not care—it is not my expression—I am perfectly willing to accept the statement that I am the author of the new diplomacy. If so, the new diplomacy consists only in this, in endeavouring to make your opponents know and to make your friends know what you mean. I have never believed in the low cunning, as I think it to be, which characterised the diplomacy of centuries ago, in which the object was to deceive your opponent as to what it was you intended; and, above all, in our democratic times I for one will never be a party to deceiving our own people. When you come into power go back to the old diplomacy, the
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  real Conservative diplomacy, if you please. But, whether you blame me for it or not, my idea of diplomacy is, as it is of every bargain of every kind in every sort of condition, that you should make perfectly clear what it is that you want, and try to get the clearest idea of what it is that your opponent wants, and then endeavour to come to an arrangement.
  Now, Sir, it is only these few words—I attach some importance to them myself, I did at the time, and I do now—it is only these few words as to which you can possibly assert that the diplomacy of this country at that time was in the slightest degree minatory or calculated to interfere with the cause of peace. Our object was that President Kruger should not enter upon the course which he ultimately adopted without full knowledge of what our object was. Well, all during this time we hoped for peace. Under these circumstances we are told that we ought to have moved the forces of the Crown, and that is what we are told by hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite. They seem to think that we could deal with this question in an autocratic and dictatorial way. No, Sir. We cannot do anything in secret. Everything, even the smallest movement, under such circumstances is known to all the world. Of course, we had to consider when the time came what was to be done when we would no longer have any choice. Of course, Lord Wolseley, who is not a politician, suggested—I forget what he called them—"discreet movements" or something of that kind. The thing is impossible. We who are politicians know that it is absolutely impossible. Hardly a regiment could be moved without everybody knowing it; therefore we could not take any really substantial or important step without thereby giving a warning to the Transvaal, which it might have been wise to give, but which might have been followed by a declaration of war which would have been supposed to be due to our action. It was a very difficult and delicate case. I do not, let me say, defend myself against those who think we acted wrongly. Undoubtedly there were preparations which otherwise we might have made, but which if made, would have become known, and perhaps hindered the object we had in view.

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  Now. Sir, what are we told now? The hon. and learned Gentleman for half-an-hour, at any rate, repeated to the House the reports, or the substance of the reports, of the Intelligence Department. We knew everything that is contained in those reports. It is quite true that the hon. and learned Member says we ought to have known. I repeat, in order to give him satisfaction, that we knew all about those reports [Cries of "Balfour did not know"]; but the hon. and learned Member does not make a distinction, which he ought to make, between those things stated by the Intelligence Department as facts and those things stated as opinions; and that is a very important distinction. In the case of facts we can accept them without the slightest doubt; but in the case of opinions they are submitted for criticism and comment. But what became of those reports? They went to the War office. That was the first place. They were intended for the War Office. Does the hon. and learned Member suppose that the Intelligence Department is for the private information of the Colonial Secretary? If he or any of his friends think that they are mistaken. It is primarily for the information of the War Office, and the War Office, perceiving the reports concerned matters in which the Colonial Office was much interested, sent copies to the Colonial Office which is entitled to them, and did comment upon them from time to time. I ought to have; said what I say now, that I do not yield to the hon. and learned Gentleman in my admiration of the work of the Intelligence Department. It was said that at the outbreak of war we knew nothing, and that the Intelligence Department must have been very inefficient. On the contrary we knew everything that I think we could fairly have expected to know. We did know the number of men likely to be opposed to us. We did know—I believe almost exactly—the number of the great guns opposed to us and their calibre, and we knew practically the number of rifles possessed by the Boers and the amount of the ammunition which they had. The whole Cabinet knew. [Cries of dissent from the OPPOSITION.] No one has ever denied it. [Cries of "Yes."] Who? [Several HON. MEMBERS: "Balfour."] Certainly he knew, and in his absence I deny that for him. He
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  knew it; we all did, and we discussed it. ["Oh!"] We knew all that, I am not dealing for the moment with the political situation in the two States, but we knew all this about the military preparations of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. Well, all that went to the War Office.
  It is all very fine to say now that the Government have tried to throw the blame off their own shoulders on to those of anybody else. So far as I know they have not blamed anyone. It is a perfect imposture for hon. Gentlemen to pretend that laymen can have the same valuable opinion or assert the same opinion as military men are entitled to have and assert. When the next war comes, and when the hon. and learned Gentleman attains to that high position to which I hope, in justice to his talents, he will attain, I suppose it will be the office of the Attorney-General which will have to deal with that war. That was not our view. We do not think it is the business of any office but the Military Office or the Naval Office, as the case may be. But as to policy and principles—that is the business of the Cabinet, But far the details of war, it is perfect nonsense to pretend to be in any sense personally responsible. I may have all kinds of opinions about strategy, but I am not conceited enough to put them forward as worth attention for a moment against those of the most subordinate officer in the Army. No, Sir, these facts relating to the military situation came to the War Office in the first instance, and afterwards they were at the disposal of the Government, What, then, was the duty of the Government? They went to their military advisers, they asked their advice, and they had their advice, and I have no reason to believe the advice they received was wrong; therefore I am not blaming the military authorities. What would the hon. and learned Gentleman have had us do? When I came to the Colonial Office how many men were in South Africa? Three thousand men, left there by my predecessor. [Cries of "Hear, hear," "Before the Raid," and "Order."] Was that because there was no danger of war? ["Yes."] Nonsense, there was danger of war, there was real danger of war during the time the right hon. Gentleman was in office. Why, we were very

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  near serious trouble at the time Lord Loch was at Johannesburg. It is very convenient to forget that now, but the situation was one of danger, and was so recognised at the time. Is it pretended that 3,000 men was a sufficient protection against possibilities long before the Raid was ever thought of? It is perfectly absurd. Well, what did we do? We did not want to do anything unnecessary, we did not wish to draw too much attention to it, but in four years we increased that 3,000 to 12,000. But these 12,000 men were not even then properly co-ordinated; there was not enough artillery, not enough cavalry. The right hon. Gentleman knew that perfectly well: he knew—he must have known, having had experience of military administration—that the military arrangements of the 12,000 troops in South Africa were not sufficient, that they were not a complete body, that the arrangements required additions, alterations, changes, and modifications, in order to make them complete even for that force.
  SIR H. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN: What year is the right hon. Gentleman referring to?
  MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN: 1899.
  SIR H. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN: I was not in office then.
  MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN: Certainly not; but surely the right hon. Gentleman does not mean to say that, although he was not in office, he, having the experience he has had, and knowing all about the organisation of the Army, he did not know, not merely from his own knowledge and experience, but from other information, that the condition of the force was unsatisfactory in the sense that it was incomplete? That is all I say.
  SIR H. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN: Does the right hon. Gentleman refer to a conversation I had with him at that
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  period, and the correspondence that followed it?
  MR. J. CHAMBERLAINassented.
  SIR H. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN: Will he absolve me from any condition of confidence in regard to it?
  MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN: Yes, I am delighted to do so. The right hon. Gentleman knows that I am leaving this country very quickly; he knows that probably or, if not, I may tell him, that I am leaving very shortly for a holiday I have not taken for a great many years; therefore it is not possible for me to supply the whole correspondence, but I shall be perfectly content if he will undertake to do so. I shall be glad if he will do so.
  SIR H. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN: In answer to that particular point I must explain that part of the correspondence is locked up in my house in Scotland. It is one of the inconveniences of having two houses that the particular thing you want is in the other house.
  MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN: I most thoroughly sympathise with the right hon. Gentleman, for I am in exactly the same position. I am afraid I really could not get at the correspondence in the time that remains to me. But I have absolute confidence in the right hon. Gentleman, and I shall be perfectly satisfied if he will produce the whole of the correspondence at such a time as may be convenient to him. For the moment I dismiss the correspondence, and I will rely on this—that it is obvious, with the experience the right hon. Gentleman has had of War Office matters, that he must have known that the 12,000 men in South Africa at the time were not satisfactorily provided for, that they were not properly co-ordinated, and that certain alterations were required. My point is this, although he knew that—and I think he must have

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  known it—he nevertheless declared there was—to use his words—no need for military preparations. That was the state of the case in 1899. About that time—I do not give the exact time, for they were very close together—it became almost certain that war would ensue. There must be some personal difference of opinion in matters of that kind. From Lord Lansdowne's evidence it would seem that I was more sanguine than he was. About the 5th September he thought war was inevitable. I certainly did not. I had hopes for some time after that date—but at all events the matter had got to the point that it was dangerous; and, as we considered that the time had come when we must deal with the necessary reinforcements, we did deal with the necessary reinforcements. We asked the military authorities, "What is the amount of troops you require in South Africa in order that we may substantially defend our colonies?" The answer was 20,000 men. We had within a day or two of the breaking out of war 22,000 men. You may say we ran it very close. So we did. We put it off to the last moment for the reason that I have frankly stated; but we were in time. We did even more than we were required. We had in fact rather more men on the spot before any substantial operation had taken place. They were sufficient to prevent the substantial invasion of Natal. The hon. and learned Gentleman talked of days and weeks wasted in moving the Indian troops to Ladysmith. They were taken from the ship, put on the train, and were at Ladysmith almost as soon as they landed. To those men who fought there during that glorious siege we owe it that Ladysmith remained a virgin
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  city, and that anything like a really dangerous, substantial overthrow of Natal was entirely prevented. That is the preparation we made, and who is going to blame us? You may say we might have sent these reinforcements before. All I can say is you would have had war so much earlier and you would have been the first to blame us and to declare that it was entirely our fault. We asked more. We asked of the military authorities again, "What do you want to carry on the war?" Now what is this ridiculous quibbling about whether the war was to end in annexation or not? No question of the kind was ever raised. The object was to beat the enemy. When we had beaten the enemy we could do what we liked with them; and whether we annexed, or did not annex, had nothing to do with the military authorities. We asked what do you want, and the answer was 50,000 men roughly and generally. The hon. and learned Member produced a statement which amazed me, that Sir William Butler had said that 80,000 to 100,000 men would be required. When did Sir William Butler say that?
  MR. ROBSON: Sir William Butler, in his evidence, described a conversation he had with his staff as to that number. He was never asked to advise the Government. He was only asked, so far as the Government was concerned, to prepare a defence scheme on the basis of the existing forces, but he described in his evidence what was the view he had given to the men about him.
  MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN: Really, the hon. and learned Gentleman would be wiser to wait before he makes interruptions of that kind. I do not know quite

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  how to describe them, but I entirely differ from their tone. The hon. and learned Gentleman, amid the loud cheers of that side of the House, cited Sir William Butler as saying that 80,000 to 100,000 men were required for this work. If he had done so it was his first duty, whether he was asked or not, to say so to us. The Government were employing him. He was one of the representatives of the country. I would not do General Butler, whom I believe to be a soldier of the highest reputation, the dishonour that was done to him by the hon. and learned Gentleman. He did not say anything of the kind. He said something quite different. He said the reverse. In the evidence before the Commission it was stated that all General Butler's letters had been read and the only one that referred to the number of troops required in the event of war in South Africa was in a letter of 10th May, 1899. His words were—
  "All things considered, I put the total of troops required in the event of war between the English and Dutch races"
  (He does not say between us and these two colonies.)
  "For that is the real meaning of a war in the Transvaal."
  At what did he put it? At 100,000 men? 80,000 men? No. "40,000 men." And yet the hon. and learned Gentleman, who has evidently given hours of time to the study of the Blue-books, and read every word of them, and picked out every syllable which could possibly tell against the Government, comes down here and delivers a philippic, and produces an impression so erroneous! I do not refer more to General Butler. It was thought, not
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  that 40,000 men on the whole, but 50,000 in addition to the 20,000 that were required for the purpose of defending the colony should be sent. We adopted that advice to the letter—No! not to the letter, because we sent more than 20,000 to hold the forts and more than 50,000 men to carry out the operations. The hon. and learned Member, who knows all about military affairs, asks why it was we did not succeed at first. I am not going to say whose fault it was that we did not succeed at first. But I thoroughly agree with him that, if we had succeeded at first, our military advisers would have been found to be correct in the opinion that 70,000 men would have been sufficient to complete the work. But who said at the time that we had not sent a sufficient force? I say that no one of the slightest importance or authority at horn:; or abroad—for, of course, we paid attention to military critics abroad—suggested that we required to send out more than 50,000 in the first instance to carry on the war.
  I now come to a smaller issue to which I must refer. The hon. and learned Gentleman said we were advised by the Intelligence Department that the Orange River Colony would go to war with us. Yes, we were. It is said that my right hon. friend the Prime Minister declared that we were not. My right hon. friend can defend himself, and I do not know how far the extract read from his speech may have been qualified. But if it was not qualified, I can only say that my right hon. friend went a little too far. We both knew, and did not know. We knew in the sense that there was a treaty between the Orange River Colony and the Transvaal. But who could say in the light of the past history of South

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  Africa, or of any part of the world, that at the exact moment that treaty would he fulfilled? Mr. Sehreiner—a gentleman who is quoted by hon. Members on the other side if by any chance he says anything that lends itself to their view, but whom I am content to take as a very honourable man, and a man of keen judgment, thoroughly conversant with the local situation—had assurances from the President of the Orange River Colony, Mr. Steyn himself, that the country would not take sides against us. Mr. Schreiner subsequently stated how disappointed he was that these assurances which had been given to him had not been fulfilled. At all events, there was a possibility that Mr. Schreiner was right.
  The hon. and learned Member says that we ought to have given the route to General Buller. That is perfectly ridiculous. General Buller had to prepare the plan of campaign, he had to prepare it on two hypotheses. There were two and we gave them. The probable hypothesis was that they would stand by the Transvaal and the other was that it was possible at the last moment that they would fall off. He himself said that we ought to go through the Orange River Colony to attack the Transvaal, but that in case the Orange River Colony remained neutral we could not, of course, attack a friendly State, and would have to go round the other way. What is there in all that on which to base a serious charge against the Government I say we all knew. The words quoted from the Prime Minister went only to this, that he himself believed it was inconceivable that a friendly State like the Orange River Colony—with whom we had no quarrel, and which
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  was absolutely certain to retain its independence if it did not go to war—would join the Transvaal. But it was quite possible for us to have differences of opinion on a matter of that kind-At all events we asked our military advisers to be prepared for both alternatives; and then when it was decided to go through the Orange River Colony to the Transvaal—which I humbly think would have been the better strategy—a change was made by the Commander-in-Chief in the field, and he went to Ladysmith instead. But where is the blame for the Government? What ground is there for the action of the Opposition except the trumpery excuse that any stick is good enough to beat a dog with, or any Amendment fair where, by hook or by crook, you can lug in the ox-Colonial Secretary and say disagreeable things about his late colleagues. The hon. Gentlemen the seconder of the Amendment wound up in a peroration expressing sympathy with those who died in the war and those who suffered by reason of it. Yes, Sir, so far as that sentiment is sincere ["Oh!"]—Do you want me to dispute it?—so far as that sentiment is sincere, and I do not dispute it in the case of hon. Gentlemen, it finds an echo in every heart. Sir, I should value the sympathy more, and think it of greater value, if it were not accompanied by a partisan Amendment and partisan bitterness of speech.
  Motion made, and Question, "That the debate be now adjourned"—(Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman)—put, and agreed to.
  Debate to be resumed To-morrow.
  Adjourned at five minutes before Twelve o'clock.