SECOND READING.

HC Deb 27 June 1888 vol 327 cc1426-506

Order for Second Reading read.

SIR EDWARD WATKIN (Hythe)

, in moving the second reading, said, that the Bill was promoted by 600 or 700 gentlemen and a few ladies. Among the number were Members of that House and Members of the other House of Parliament, together with representatives of the great staple industries and commerce of the country. He wished they could have had upon the present occasion a more effective advocate. There had been a good deal of letter and pamphlet writing on the subject, and a considerable amount of misconception and misrepresentation in regard to it. Only that morning there was an article in The Times to which he wished to direct particular attention. It contained one of the most glaring misstatements he ever remembered to have read. The article said— We are promised a great increase of trade if we construct a Tunnel and avoid the breaking of bulk; but the fact is judiciously ignored that bulk will have to be broken all the same, because the Continental railway gauge is different from ours. In regard to that statement, he could only say that the carriage of His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales, built in England on the English gauge, had travelled all over Europe without break of gauge, except in regard to one part of it. Scientifically speaking, no doubt the English gauge of 4 feet 8½ inches was not the gauge of France, Germany, Italy, and Austria, where they used a decimal system of measurement, and there might be a hair's breadth of difference between the gauge of England and on the Continent. The only exception to that substantial continuity was to be found in Russia, where, undoubtedly, there was a different gauge, and goods sent to Russia had to be broken in bulk. He had now to return his thanks to the Leader of the House for having given that day for the discussion of what he ventured to think was one of the most important questions that could be discussed in the industrial and commercial interests of the country. The right hon. Gentleman, no doubt, would have given a better day, if it could in any way have been conceded; but he had been good enough to say that the question, so far as the action of the Government was concerned, would be treated as an open question, and not as one in regard to which every Supporter of the Government must of necessity vote the same way. He hoped, therefore, that those hon. Gentlemen who carried the rod for the benefit of hon. Members on the other side, would kindly bear that declaration in mind, and not attempt to put any pressure on the ordinary Supporters of the Government, but would in this matter respect the just wishes of the Leader of the House. He thought he might, in return for the kindness of the right hon. Gentleman, call on the Leader of the House to express his sentiments and views in regard to the construction of a Tunnel under the Channel. Undoubtedly, in past times, the right hon. Gentleman was very much in favour of such a means of communication; and, undoubtedly, also, when a Member of the Governments of Lord Derby and Lord Beaconsfield, he was the medium of communications with France, intended, as far as possible, to unite the two countries on the question. He did not think he would be contradicted by anybody when he said that the Government of the Liberal Party and of the Tory Party each coincided in conducting negotiations which led to a complete arrangement between the two countries in favour of the construction of the Tunnel, and led further to the drawing up of a Convention conducted on the part of England by the hon. Member for Great Yarmouth (Sir Henry Tyler) and others; and on the part of France by certain Commissioners, which Convention was laid on the Table of the House in 1876. The question before the House was hardly a question whether there ought to be a Tunnel under the Channel or not. The Bill before the House was to enable the experiments, which had so far been successful, to be continued, but it contained also, he admitted, provisions under which, if the experiments were successful throughout, the Government of the day, and the Government of the day only, should have power to decide whether the experimental works should be widened into permanent works, and the Tunnel be completed. If the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade thought it would be better to have those clauses struck out of the Bill, and to confine the measure simply to the continuance of the experiments, the promoters of the Bill would make no objection, although they would regret it. They would regret it because it had always been thought that a great work of this kind, even it were conducted in the first instance by private enterprize, ought to become a National work. It had never been believed by those for whom he spoke that a great structure of this kind should be possessed by private persons, and, there- fore, there had been an endeavour in drawing the Bill to facilitate future arrangements which might be considered the most salutary to the country. With regard to experiments, he would remind hon. Members that on two or three previous occasions the House had deliberately, by enactment, sanctioned the prosecution of experiments in order to show whether a Channel Tunnel could be made or not. Therefore, he was asking the House to sanction no new legislation, but merely to enable a number of private individuals, who had done the public service by devoting their time and money to an attempt to solve the question, to provide, as a joint stock company, further money, with a view of solving the question whether the Tunnel could be made or not. The article he had quoted from The Times of that morning spoke very doubtfully as to whether the continuity of the stratum through which the Tunnel would have to pass was an ascertained fact. Now, the measures were in the same position and of the same thickness on both sides of the Channel, and if any doubt existed as to the reasonable proof of continuity, he thought that would be an argument for allowing the experiments to proceed. At the same time, he was bound to say that the French Tunnel Company, who held a Charter under the French Government, had made about 11,000 soundings of the Channel, and if there had been any fault or any breach of continuity between the two sides of the Channel, the geological presumption was that that fault would have been discovered. The position of the matter at present was this—a Convention had been made with the French, but that Convention had either been suspended or, as the French asserted, broken on our side, although the French had laid out their money on the solemn assurance that this country would allow similar works to be constructed on the English side of the Channel. On the French side £80,000 had been expended on works on the faith of the experiment being allowed; but, of course, the works were at a standstill, and no interest could be paid on the capital invested. No doubt they felt aggrieved, and perhaps the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade, in replying to him, would kindly say what Her Majesty's Government intended to do in regard to the great sacrifices which had been made by the house of Rothschild and others in reference to the experiments.

MR. HOWARD VINCENT (Sheffield, Central)

On the French side?

SIR EDWARD WATKIN

Yes. On this side about £60,000 had been expended; but the expenditure had been useless, for they were interdicted from making one single turn of the boring machine without the permission of the Board of Trade. The work on the two sides had been carried altogether for about 2¼ miles; so that about one-tenth of the distance had been experimented upon. They did not propose to ask anyone to subscribe capital for a permanent Tunnel until it was proved to demonstration that the work could be done. Therefore, they desired to have a drift-way cut from one side of the Channel to the other. He did not think that even that "small hole," as it had been called, would be useless, because it might be utilized for the passage of telegraph wires, and the transmission of Her Majesty's mails, to the great advantage and profit of the country, even if the Government of the day did not think it desirable to construct a complete Tunnel through which passengers, baggage, and all kinds of material could pass. That being their object—namely, to complete the drift-way, and, therefore, render it certain, or absolutely uncertain, that the Tunnel could be made, the period of suspension inflicted upon them, unjustly and needlessly, as they believed, by the Board of Trade, had not been entirely lost. They had made experiments in regard to ventilation, as to the kind of carriages to be used, also in respect of the electric lighting of the Tunnel, and as to the mode in which the trains, whether containing goods or passengers, could be lifted up from the Tunnel to the level of the surface of the ground. They had invented a locomotive to work by compressed air, and it had been a great success. The present arrangements seemed to be more costly than steam; but, at the same time, it was found that it could be done at a moderate increase of cost compared with the cost of propulsion by steam. That locomotive would do exactly what the Tunnel machine did when it was worked. Compressed air was used at a pressure of about 20 lbs. to the square inch, and, as the machine turned or the engine moved, the compressed air came out again, thus disposing of all the nonsense which had been uttered about the ventilation of the Tunnel. In regard to lighting the Tunnel, they had taken the advice of the late Sir William Siemens, undoubtedly a very high authority, and improving on that advice, they prepared a scheme by which the Tunnel could be admirably lighted; in fact, made as light as day. The trains would be lifted to the surface by hydraulic power. He came now to the military objections to this Tunnel, and he had something to say about those objections. He proposed to answer one soldier by another soldier. The proposal, he repeated, was to lift the train bodily from the Tunnel level to the ground level, and there was no difficulty about that, as, with the hydraulic system, they might lift almost anything they pleased. That would shorten the length of the Tunnel and place the carriages on the upper level sooner than by any other means. Under those circumstances it seemed to him that the notion of pouring millions of men through the Tunnel from all parts of Europe rather fell to the ground. That was the general position and the general intention of the promoters. The real question that day was whether they were to have their most reasonable request granted, and be allowed to continue these experiments. He must say that he was astonished at any Member of a Department, or of an intelligent Government, interfering with scientific experiments of this kind, especially in connection with a country like this, where every ascertained fact was turned by merchants and traders into money. If the experimental works had not been stopped about five years ago by the Board of Trade, they would have been completed in time to have allowed the placing of a likeness of Her Majesty in the centre of the Tunnel and in time to take possession of that part which was under the sea for the British Empire in the year of Her Majesty's Jubilee. The responsibility of not doing so was not theirs, but that of the Board of Trade. Simple-minded people had an idea that the Board of Trade was intended to protect enter-prize, and not to obstruct it. He had already spoken of the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the House, but he could quote the names of a great many personages who had been, and many of whom still were, in favour of the construction of this Tunnel. At the head of the list was the late Prince Consort. He knew it had been denied, or doubted, that the Prince Consort ever expressed himself as in favour of the construction of the Tunnel, and therefore he had obtained a public document which had been published in English, French, German, Italian, and Spanish, and circulated in 1867, the year of the great French Exhibition, which gave a history by the French Tunnel Projectors of the initiation of the enterprize, in which approval of the scheme was expressed by the Prince Consort. The late Mr. Cobden was also in favour of it, and spoke of the construction of a submarine Tunnel as the best means of securing a true alliance between the two countries. He thought that England would become isolated, and more and more restricted in regard to that continuity of transit which existed almost throughout Europe. The book he quoted contained this passage— The first time that we had the opportunity of talking to Lord Palmerston on the subject of the Submarine Tunnel, we found him at first rather close. 'What! you pretend to ask us to contribute to a work the object of which is to shorten a distance which we find already too short!' We expressed to him our wish to talk of it to Prince Albert in his presence, and to that he very kindly consented. The Prince Consort had supported this project with truly enthusiastic sympathy. His reception, therefore, was most kind. He entered into conversation, in which the Prince unfolded all the advantages which his elevated mind foresaw for England in the creation of a road to the Continent. Lord Palmerston, without losing that perfectly courteous tone which was habitual with him, made, however, a remark to the Prince which was very rude at bottom—'You would think quite differently if you had been born in this island.' We were ourselves perfectly stupefied with this unexpected apostrophe. To make Prince Albert, whose love of the country of his adoption was well known, feel that he was a foreigner, was shocking to us, and we felt deeply hurt. Some days after we went to excuse ourselves with the Prince Consort for having been the cause of this disgraceful incident. The Prince appeared not to have been offended, and told us that he had received that innocent dart as one of the frequent sallies in which Pam dealt. Then he added, that he had said a few words about the Submarine Tunnel to the Queen. Her Majesty had been graciously pleased to answer him in these words—'You may tell the French engineer that if he can accomplish it, I will give him my blessing in my own name, and in the name of all the ladies of England.' Lord Palmerston knew this, and whether it worked a sudden change in his thoughts, considering it as public opinion, or whether he was really not so disposed to resistance as he had appeared to be, he said frankly one evening at a numerous party, at which the Tunnel was spoken about—'This project will be carried out, because it is respectable, and because it is favoured by all the ladies of England.' On his side Richard Cobden said at a public meeting—'I consider the Submarine Tunnel as the true arch of alliance between the two countries.' He imagined that the late Lord Derby was no mean authority with hon. Gentlemen opposite as to the interests of the country. Well, Lord Derby must have believed that this was an enterprize which ought not to be discourged, and could have had no belief in the scare in regard to it which distracted the minds of other persons. Therefore he sanctioned the convention with France. The notion of connecting England and France together by a Tunnel originated in this way—57 Members of Parliament, an Archbishop, and a great many merchants, traders, lawyers, and scientific men sent a memorial to the Emperor of the French, asking him to consent to such an undertaking. The Tunnel was thus initiated on this side of the water, and if ever it were made, as he believed it would be made to the great advantage both of England, France, and every civilized nation, the credit would be due to Lord Richard Grosvenor, as he was known in that House, or Lord Stalbridge, as he was known in the other House; and also, whatever their present opinions might be, to the house of Rothschild. There had been plenty of supporters of the Tunnel, and many opinions in favour of its construction expressed on the part of leading persons in this country with regard to it. The newspapers also were, at no distant date, strongly in favour of the construction of the Tunnel. He would read an extract from a letter written by a very remarkable man, the late Sir Moses Montefiore, who died in 1885, at the age of 101. In 1882, Sir Moses Montefiore wrote this letter to him— The receipt and perusal of your esteemed note has afforded me great pleasure. In thanking you, which I do most heartily, for your kind offer to accompany me on a visit to the works of the Channel Tunnel, I regret to say that the state of my health is such as to preclude the possibility of my availing myself at present of the honour you have most kindly proposed to confer on me; but I do not give up the hope of attending its christening, and of hearing his Grace the Archbishop of Canterbury name it. I am one of those who think that every great work—and such the Channel Tunnel undoubtedly is—should bear the name of its promoter, and that no undertaking can prosper without the blessing of God. In an article on September 11th, 1873, The Times said— On our side of the Channel everything that contributes to the development of French commerce, or that adds to the stake held by the French nation in the friendly rivalry in which there are no vanquished, will be regarded with feelings of unmixed satisfaction. An improvement which brings Paris 90 minutes nearer to us will probably induce many Englishmen to go twice where they go once under the existing conditions, and a submarine railway or a harbour in connection with a line of steamers warranted to prevent sea sickness, would take travellers across on pretexts as slight as those which now bring the residents in the Provinces to spend 24 hours in London. To make France as accessible as Scotland, and far more accessible than Ireland, would be to have the entente cordiale on such conditions of mutual satisfaction and advantage that it is difficult to conceive the circumstances under which they could be broken down. On December 8th, 1874, The Times again referred in approving words to the Tunnel, and spoke in high terms of the excellence of the project. On the 30th of January, 1875, The Times said— The project of a Channel Tunnel has now been finally sanctioned by the Governments of Great Britain and France. In France some difficulty arose from the Law of 1841, which required that the project should be declared 'of public utility' before an official concession in its favour could be definitive, and not merely contingent; but, as our Paris correspondent stated yesterday, the difficulty has been overcome, and this formality will have been completed before the passing of the Bill which the Minister of Public Works has laid before the Assembly. A despatch, dated January 26, intimated the consent of the English Government to the proposed arrangements, subject to certain conditions—among others, that the right to suspend traffic on war being imminent shall be an express article of the agreement, and that the exercise of this right shall be made no ground for claiming indemnity. The French Government has assented; but thinks it just that a term of extension equal to such suspension of traffic should be given to the 99 years' concession and the 30 years' monopoly. Seventy-three Chambers of Commerce have been consulted, and all approve, twenty-seven of these demanding, however, that there should be no indefinite monopoly, but that the State should have power to purchase, and that a tariff of maximum rates should be fixed. Whatever may be the practical result of this great enterprize—and we wish it all success—it will always remain an honourable example of persevering scientific effort and of international co-operation for the common good. He would not trouble the House with more than he could help, but he wanted to show the Government and the House that as far as the newspapers were con- cerned, they were at the time in favour of the enterprize. It may be said there had been a change of opinion, but he was afraid there had only been a change of editors. The Daily Telegraph on the 2nd December, 1868, said— No guarantee is asked, if, as these three Englishmen and also one very scientific French engineer firmly believe, the Tunnel is feasible. We have not forgotten that, alone among his Colleagues, Mr. Gladstone, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, was disposed to give a Government guarantee to the entrepreneurs of the Atlantic Cable.

MR. W. E. GLADSTONE (Edinburgh, Mid Lothian)

I am afraid that is a mistake.

SIR EDWARD WATKIN

said, the right hon. Gentleman informed him that it was a mistake about the guarantee. The Daily News of the 2nd January, 1875, spoke favourably of the project, and said— The opening of such a communication between this country and the Continent will be a pure gain to the commercial and social interests on both sides. It obliterates the Channel, as far as it hinders direct communication; yet keeps it intact for all those advantages of severance from the political complications of the Continent, which no generation has more thoroughly appreciated than our own. The commercial advantages of the communication must necessarily be beyond all calculation. A link between the two chief capitals of Western Europe which would annex our railway system to the whole of the railways of the Continent would practically widen the world to pleasure and travel, and every kind of enterprize. The 300,000 travellers who cross the Channel every year would probably become 3,000,000 if the sea were practically taken out of the way by a safe and quick communication under it. The journey to Paris would be very little more than that from London to Liverpool. It is, however, quite needless to enlarge on these advantages. The Channel Tunnel is the crowning enterprize of an age of vast engineering works. Its accomplishment is to be desired from every point of view; and, should it be successful, it will be as beneficent in its results as the other great triumphs of the science of our time. He now desired to say a word or two in regard to the military objections. The hon. and gallant Gentleman (Sir Edward Hamley), who was a Member of that House, wished to have spoken upon the question last year, and intended to follow the Secretary to the Board of Trade. It must be remembered that a Division was taken somewhat suddenly, at the request of the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the House. The request was a reasonable one, and was therefore complied with. The next day the hon. and gallant Gentleman, who had been unable to take part in the debate, wrote a letter to The Times, and he (Sir E. Watkin) took it for granted that the objections stated in that letter were the objections of that section of the military classes who opposed the construction of the Tunnel as being dangerous to the State. The objections of the hon. and gallant Gentleman were similar to those that were put forward on a previous occasion by the Under Secretary to the Colonies, then Secretary to the Board of Trade (Baron Henry de Worms), but his arguments were demolished in three words by the Chairman of Committees, who spoke of them as a "combination of bogeyism and fogeyism." The gallant general said— I will now take the other case. I will suppose that an invasion should take place after the making of the Tunnel—that is to say, when there is a great highway between France and England, the possession of both ends of which would render the invader independent of the sea. Of course, we hear it insisted on that we could always prevent the enemy from using the Tunnel, either by partially or completely destroying it. Now, that a work of this extensive character, involving such an amount of labour and such expenditure, should be absolutely and permanently destroyed, possibly on a false alarm, is what I refuse to believe. I do not believe that shareholders would be found to join in an undertaking that might be liable to such a catastrophe. I, therefore, dismiss the question of complete destruction, and assume that either our end of the Tunnel would be blocked, or some partial destruction would be resorted to. Now, there are many parts of our Southern Coasts where large forces can be thrown on shore, under cover of the fire of their warships, superior to what we could at the moment assemble; and, therefore, secure of possessing themselves of a certain area beyond the immediate landing place. If they were thus landed at or near Dover, they would assuredly seize the mine of the Tunnel and open it, whether by repair or otherwise. Thus it would be rendered available for the enemy, and what would we then see? Night and day a storm of troops and supplies would be pouring through the Tunnel, possibly under the heels of our victorious, but helpless, Channel Fleet. Now in this case—and I would impress this point—it would no longer be a contest between two armies, but between the entire military resources of France on the one side, and what we could oppose on the other—and who could doubt the result, it France could bring all her trained armies, all her vast military establishments, to bear upon us? And who can doubt that in the Treaty which would ensue, a main article would empower her to hold our issue of the Tunnel and to protect it by works on the heights of Dover? And this thorn in our side—in our vitals—we might never be rid of. An hon. MEMBER asked who the gallant Gentleman referred to was?

SIR EDWARD WATKIN

General Sir Edward Hamley.

MR. SPEAKER

Order, order!

SIR EDWARD WATKIN

said, he meant the hon. and gallant Member for Birkenhead (Sir Edward Hawley), whose name he had used in answering the question instead of the place he represented. The hon. and gallant General had had great experience, and had published a book which he hoped would assist in the manufacture of many excellent soldiers. They knew that in the Convention concluded and laid before the House in 1876, provision was made for closing the Tunnel in the event of war. That point had not been neglected. Sir Frederick Bramwell and Mr. Brady, their engineers, and no mean authorities, said that by a simple arrangement the Tunnel could be closed by drowning a portion of it in three minutes, while it would take three months to pump the water out again, even if there were machinery on the spot. Then, again, they had designed a machine by which a Minister of the State or any responsible military officer in any part of England, by touching a button, could explode a mine and blow up the entrance of the Tunnel. They had, in fact, 30 different modes for closing or destroying the Tunnel; therefore he wished it to be understood that they had anticipated all these objections, and he thought if the hon. and gallant Member for Birkenhead would devote his attention to what had been proposed before he wrote letters to newspapers, it might lead to a better result. He had said that he would answer one soldier by another soldier. He would answer the hon. and gallant Member for Birkenhead by quoting the opinion of a gallant officer who had been one of his own pupils—he meant Colonel Hozier. Everyone knew that Colonel Hozier was a gallant soldier, and that he had had an advantage which no other officer had of having been the correspondent for The Times in the war in Denmark, in the war between Prussia and Austria, and in the Franco-German War. On each occasion he had served on the Staff of the Crown Prince, the late Emperor, whom he described as the noblest man he ever met, and no one knew better than he did the opinions of German military men on this and many other questions. Colonel Hozier said— It has been argued that, if the Tunnel existed, we might be defeated somewhere else and be obliged to surrender it and allow our enemies to use it as they liked. If we were so heavily defeated as to have to make any terms our enemies chose, would not the first demand be, 'Give up your Navy?' We must never be defeated, but keep up the Army and Navy at such a strength that such a contingency could not be possible. Another objection is, that we shall get slack in the course of time, and allow our sentries to get negligent, and some one might arrive and take us; but if our sentries are so liable to be negligent, and our outposts to be so careless, we ought to be anxious at the present moment. Why should not Gibraltar be seized to-morrow by the Spaniards? The sentries there have not yet gone to sleep. If our soldiers are not to be trusted, what is the good of building fortifications? This argument against the Tunnel is the fantastic idea of some disordered imagination. He (Sir Edward Watkin) quite agreed with the opinion that we must never be defeated, and he would go very far with hon. Gentlemen on both sides of the House in increasing our Army and Navy in any way that was deemed necessary. He advocated the construction of the Tunnel, because he believed that it would be one of the best means of defence, and, at times, of offence, which could possibly be provided. It was Colonel Hozier's opinion that the arguments against the Tunnel were only the fantastic idea of a disordered imagination. One ground on which the advocates of the Tunnel relied was that it formed a second line of supply in case the sea was closed to us, and assuming that we were not at war with France. He would read a few words that were uttered by the noble and gallant Lord the Member for East Marylebone (Lord Charles Beresford), who took such deep interest in the Navy. The noble and gallant Lord remembered, no doubt, that we imported into this country 40 per cent of our food, and all of our raw material except flax from Ireland and the wool we got from our own sheep; and the noble and gallant Lord pointed out that if England were crippled at sea, we should be starved by a blockade. Then what we wanted was a second line of communication that would enable us to pour supplies into the country, and relieve us from the difficulty caused by the obstruction of our supply from America and other parts of the world. He maintained that it was necessary for the safety of the country that we should have a second line of supply, and not be altogether dependent upon the sea. The construction of the Channel Tunnel would strengthen instead of weakening our military position. Foreign Nations would know that, unless we happened to be at war with France, of which he thought there was no probability, except through our own fault, it would be impossible to defeat us by stopping our supplies. Therefore, the construction of a Channel Tunnel was a project which would give us exactly that which we required. One contention of the promoters of the Tunnel was that the Governments of both countries, having once sanctioned the undertaking, neither could honourably retire. They maintained that it would promote and secure peace with France. What was France? France, it should be remembered, was not only our nearest neighbour, but our best foreign customer save one. The trade between France and this country amounted to £51,000,000 sterling per annum. People talked of France as if we had no interest in it at all. In the time of Queen Anne an Act was passed, declaring that trade with France was a common nuisance, and ought to be abated. That seemed to be the sentiment of the right hon. Baronet the President of the Board of Trade (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach). Those, however, were not the propositions which he (Sir Edward Watkin) laid down, and he wanted to know from the Government if they were prepared to take the responsibility of saying that we should never have under any circumstances, or at any time, a second means of obtaining our supplies irrespective of the sea. We might increase our Navy to any conceivable extent; but with the cumbrous and untried ships we had, and their immense weight, could anyone tell us that, at any moment, a naval disaster might not cripple the capacity of our Navy? Then, would Her Majesty's Government take the responsibility, before the House and the country, of saying that, under no circumstances would they ever sanction the formation of a second line of supply in the interests of our commerce and our people? What was England? Industry and commerce. Take away her trade and commerce, and what support would there be for her Forces, either on land or sea? It might be said that there was no great outcry for the Tunnel, but that was because no great agitation had ever been got up in its favour, as they believed they would one day find a Government sensible enough to rise above all fear and panic and look to the future from a broad and prudent point of view. The best national insurance we could possibly have was to provide a second line of communication independent of the sea. As far as foreign opinion went, the great strategist, Count Von Moltke, and other German officers, had distinctly declared that the idea of invading England through the Tunnel was perfectly absurd. Count Von Moltke said, they might just as well try to invade England through his library door. The proposal was to construct two single lines of tunnel, as it was believed they would be in every way better than one, and each would be about the size of the door of that chamber. Yet they were told that all the Queen's horses and all the Queen's men would be insufficient to enable them to defend two small holes of that nature against the enemy. He thought the whole thing was absurd on the face of it. The late Secretary to the Board of Trade, Sir Thomas Farrer, was an enthusiastic supporter of the Channel Tunnel, and another official of the Board of Trade, Mr. Giffen, gave evidence before a Joint Commitee. Being asked, with reference to the statement of the Commander-in-Chief and Lord Wolseley that the Tunnel would make it necessary to expend £3,000,000 in turning Dover into a first-class fortress, he said— I have looked at the question from that point of view, assuming the statements that have been made by Lord Wolseley and the Duke of Cambridge, and others, in their military Reports on the matter; and what I should like to put before the Committee upon that subject is with regard to the expense of making a first-class fortress, which is one of the main points upon which Lord Wolseley and the Duke insist. The expenditure of £3,000,000 sterling would be equal to an annual charge of £90,000, and I think that would be quite an insignificant sum compared with the commercial advantages alone of the Tunnel, if it answers at all the expectations which the promoters put forward, and which I think to a large extent are well founded. That was Mr. Giffen's opinion. If they had to expend this money in the way proposed, Mr. Giffen said the commercial advantages that would be gained would be so great that they would save money by doing so. He thought that Mr. Giffen's opinion ought to have some weight with the Board of Trade. He would like now to ask another question—namely, why the Government took upon themselves the responsibility for refusing for all time to come, if they could, this second line of supply? What was the reason they resisted fulfilling the pledges which they, as a Conservative Government, gave through the right hon. Gentleman the present Leader of the House (Mr. W. H. Smith), by the instruction of Lord Beaconsfield—whom, he supposed, was still considered a sagacious man—and of Lord Derby? What was the reason why they had now changed their front, and refused to consent to this most reasonable proposition? He would put these points to the Government. Even with an increased Navy, as desired by the noble and gallant Lord the Member for East Marylebone (Lord Charles Beresford), England might be subjected to a naval reverse, even although the five men-of-war and the cruisers asked for by the noble and gallant Lord were provided. The noble and gallant Lord said, when interviewed by The Pall Mall Gazette— They are making a great fuss in the House of Commons about the defencelessness of London, &c., and so long as the Navy leaves something to be desired they are right in wishing to strengthen the Army; but I do, and I shall, insist that England must rule the seas, if she expects to rule anything. In the House of Commons four or five of us from the Navy stood against 20 times as many Army men, and so we had hard work to make ourselves felt; but is it not evident that were England beaten in the waters which form her only frontier, the enemy would have only to block her food supplies and let her starve? They would conquer us without striking a blow. England can never be saved by her Army. Therefore, as it is our sole hope, our Navy must be very strong, very much stronger. I maintain now, as I have always maintained, that we want five more men-of-war and 23 more cruisers. Then we will be safe, and not until then. No man could say, as an infallible certainty, that whatever the extent of our Fleet we might not be subjected to naval reverses. Then, why should not Her Majesty's Government sanction a second line of communication which would prevent our being starved if blockaded? He wished to know why the Convention of 1876 was to be repudiated? No doubt, if it was repudiated it would be from a fear of France. The late President of France, M. Grévy, declared to a deputation of English workmen, who waited upon him three or four years ago, that— He regarded the Tunnel as a magnificent enterprize, and one involving the happiest effects. It was not, therefore, on that side of the Channel that any objection would be raised. France did not anticipate or fear invasion. [An hon. MEMBER: Hear, hear!] "Hear, hear!" said the hon. and gallant Gentleman, and there they had the voice of prejudice at once. President Grévy made use of further expressions which were very important, and which he asked the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade to answer if he could. The words were— But it was not for him to judge the pre-occupations of eminent Englishmen. It was in England that the opposition existed. They had addressed themselves to the French workmen, who were certainly in harmony with them; but what influence could they exercise over public opinion in England? It was for England to reflect and decide. If England thought isolation and separation the best for her, she was the best judge. This was the only reply he could give so far as the Tunnel was concerned. No objection would be raised against it in France. It was purely an English question. On this question what did foreign nations and our own Colonies say about the construction of the Tunnel? Why, our Colonies were almost to a man in favour of it. Everybody in the United States laughed at our fears, and they knew very well that if England belonged to the United States, which, perhaps, might be the case some day for anything he knew, did they think that 24 hours would elapse before they began to connect themselves with France? He believed that we should increase our power and our commerce by putting aside our prejudices. The construction of the Tunnel was chiefly opposed by men who had narrow naval or military views, who discussed the question in cabins and drawing rooms, by half-informed editors, and by men who know nothing of the great work. Some of them could not pass a thoroughly good examination in geography, and knew nothing about the great commercial requirements of the day. In America, as he had said, they spoke with contempt of the fears with which we chose to indulge in in this country. In Australia, every man to whom he had spoken had expressed a strong opinion of the folly of pursuing the line of action which the Government proposed to take with reference to this important question, and denounced our cruelty in compelling them, after they had crossed the ocean to visit us, unnecessarily to undergo all the horrors of the middle passage between this country and France. Caricatures were the laughing voice of nations. He would produce only two, out of hundreds issued in different parts of the world. One published in the United States represented the British Lion running away with his tail between his legs from one end of the Tunnel, with Lord Wolseley on his back, frightened by the crowing of a Gallic cock. Another cartoon, published in Spain, represented a British soldier with a great number of shells, swords, and guns around him, saying—"I am so afraid of being invaded." One man might be seen in the distance, and a few rats running out of the Tunnel. He was ashamed that we should allow ourselves to be made the laughing-stock of all nations. By doing so we were weakening our moral power and our prestige. He would conclude the few observations which the House had listened to so patiently and so kindly by quoting a letter which he stumbled across the other day. It was a letter written by the then King of Hanover to Lord Strangford, at the time of the opening of the Great Exhibition of 1851, in which he said— The folly and absurdity of the Queen in allowing this trumpery show must strike every sensible and well-thinking mind, and I am astonished the Ministers themselves do not insist on her at least going to Osborne during the Exhibition, as no human being can possibly answer for what may occur on the occasion. The idea of permitting 3,000 National Guards to come over en corps, and parade London in their side-arms, must shock every honest and well-meaning Englishman. But it seems everything is combining to lower us in the eyes of Europe. He was afraid that the right hon. Baronet the President of the Board of Trade was animated by a similar spirit to that which had dictated the writing of that letter. He thanked the House for its indulgence, and he would only repeat his questions to the right hon. Baronet. He trusted that the right hon. Baronet would give him a plain, explicit, and unmistakable answer. Would the Government take the responsibility of preventing, if it could, for all time the construction of a second line of supply independent of the sea; would the Government explain to the House their reasons for their change of policy; and would they tell the House, if they objected to the construction of the Channel Tunnel as a means of national protection and national insurance, what they themselves would propose? He trusted that the House of Commons would not throw unnecessary obstacles in the way of one of the greatest works which had been conceived in modern times. The opinions of some of the best and most able men of the country were in favour of the project. He trusted, therefore, that the House of Commons would rise superior to the prejudices of the right hon. Baronet the President of the Board of Trade, and would do justice to the promoters of the Bill, by referring the Bill to a Select Committee, which was all the promoters asked. He begged to move that the Bill be read a second time, and be sent to a Select Committee to be inquired into in the ordinary way.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Bill be now read a second time."—(Sir Edward Watkin.)

THE PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD OF TRADE (Sir MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH) (Bristol, W.)

My duty in this case is to follow the example of those who have represented the Board of Trade in this House, and to move that this Bill be read a second time this day three months. The hon. Member has used a great many hard words with regard to the Board of Trade. I do not wish to go into the relations that have existed between the hon. Member and the Board of Trade; but if any complaint is to be made in respect to those relations, it should be made rather with regard to the conduct of the hon. Member towards the Board of Trade than that of the Department towards the hon. Member.

SIR EDWARD WATKIN

I rise to Order. Surely the right hon. Gentleman knows that I have had a letter from a former President of the Board of Trade thanking me for my conduct and for the very useful information which I had given to the Department.

SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH

We have been told that the information given by the hon. Gentleman was neither candid nor accurate when the right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Birmingham (Mr. J. Chamberlain) was President of the Board of Trade. But I do not wish to enter into that matter. It is not merely on Departmental grounds that I oppose this Bill; I speak on behalf of the whole of Her Majesty's Government. I saw the other day a most extraordinary statement that went the round of the Press to the effect that it was the intention of the Government to treat this matter as an open question. I did not contradict that statement; I treated it with contempt. But we have heard to day from the hon. Member that that statement was made upon the authority of no less a person than my right hon. Friend the First Lord of the Treasury.

SIR EDWARD WATKIN

Certainly.

SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH

On the authority of the First Lord of the Treasury?

SIR EDWARD WATKIN

Yes.

SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH

Then I can tell the hon. Member that that statement is absolutely without foundation.

SIR EDWARD WATKIN

Will the right hon. Gentleman say so himself? No; he will not do so.

SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH

Yes; he will. These are the words which my right hon. Friend has authorized me to state to the House— I told Sir Edward Watkin that the Government had considered his proposals, and had come to the conclusion that they would oppose the second reading; and, further, that the President of the Board of Trade would move its rejection, and, therefore, there must be Government Tellers.

SIR EDWARD WATKIN

That is quite true, but not all the truth.

SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH

Therefore it is that I say that in moving the rejection of this measure I am doing so as completely on behalf of the Government as any of my Predecessors in Office in former years. At the outset of my observations I would deprecate the attempt of the hon. Member to minimize the importance of the Bill he has introduced. The hon. Member, in moving the second reading, described it as a Bill merely to authorize the continuance of a scientific experiment which it would be in the power of the Government of the day at any time to put an immediate stop to. But I know what would be the consequence if this House should, unfortunately, sanction the second reading of the Bill. The hon. Member himself would be the first to attribute great importance to the action of the House, and to assert that the House, by sanctioning the second reading of the measure, had not merely sanctioned the continuance of a scientific experiment, but had approved the principle of the construction of the Channel Tunnel. I will prove that by what the hon. Member has himself stated to-day. The hon. Member has put it before the House as a great grievance that whereas at one time the Governments of England and France looked with favour upon the scheme of the Channel Tunnel, and encouraged an experiment in which preliminary expenses were incurred, there was subsequently a change of policy; and he has actually suggested that, on this account, compensation ought to be given by the Government to a French firm which made this experiment and expended money under a French Charter upon the other side of the Channel. No, Sir; the fact is that we have before us a proposal to institute experiments which, if successful, would, according to the hon. Gentleman, be subsequently carried on to the completion of the works which he advocates. Therefore, the question we are asked to decide to-day is not a question of mere scientific experiments, but the principle of the Channel Tunnel. Well, Sir, I may say at once that I am opposed to that principle. I do not wish to discuss whether the construction of the Channel Tunnel is feasible. It may or may not be so, although that is a point upon which the hon. Member has not given the House or the public sufficient information. I do not want to dwell upon the sufficiency of the very varying estimates which at one time or another have been put before a credulous public—["Oh, oh!"]—Yes; I repeat before a credulous public, by the hon. Member, as to the amount of capital that would be required for the completion of such a work, or upon the probability of it proving a commercial success, if ever it were to be completed. These are matters upon which Parliament would certainly require to be fully and amply satisfied before they authorized the construction of this Tunnel. But those are not matters with which we have to deal in the debate to-day. The hon. Member has adverted to the opinions which he says have been expressed on the idea of the construction of a Channel Tunnel by several persons. I leave the House to judge of the good taste of the hon. Member in introducing the name of Her Majesty the Queen into such a controversy as this, or of the value of the opinion of a man in his 99th year, like Sir Moses Montefiore. But I say that I disbelieve the assertion of the hon. Member that the late Lord Derby ever gave an opinion in favour of the Channel Tunnel. Moreover, I believe that the hon. Member has entirely misrepresented to the House the opinion of the late Lord Beaconsfield on the question, and I challenge him to produce the letter in which he avers that the noble Lord expressed himself in favour of this scheme. When that letter is produced I believe that it will be found to contain a statement to the effect that the shareholders who might be deluded into taking part in such a scheme would never receive any interest on their money. But, however that may be, this is by no means a Party question, and I trust the House will look at it as that which should be far above Party differences—namely, a question relating to the national security. Well, that is the way in which this question has been considered by authorities whom I think even the hon. Member himself must respect. Those authorities, Parliamentary, military, and scientific, have reported adversely to the construction of the Tunnel as injurious to this country, and the House of Commons, on three previous occasions, has ratified the decision at which those authorities arrived. Now, Sir, what were the reasons on which that decision was based. I will endeavour very shortly to state them to the House. I think it is quite impossible for any reasonable person to deny that the insular position of this country, and the absence of a military frontier, have been of enormous advantage to us in the past, and may prove of enormous advantage in the future. Now, so far as it goes, the construction of the Channel Tunnel would give us a military frontier. It would open a door for attack which does not now exist, and I think it is not a little due to the fact that no such door exists that we have been saved in this Kingdom from the curse of conscription, and that for so many generations we have been spared those horrors of invasion from which every other European country has heavily suffered. Now, the first thing for the House to ask itself is whether—as it cannot be denied that such a door would be opened by the construction of the Channel Tunnel—that door could be closed with absolute certainty in time of danger? [Sir EDWARD WATKIN: Yes.] The hon. Member thinks that it can, and many hon. Members who will support the second reading of the Bill no doubt are of the same opinion; but my own opinion is that there is no such thing as absolute certainty in the conduct of human affairs, and I will venture to quote, if the House will bear with me, some expressions of opinion from high authorities on these matters, who agree in the main with the hon. Member opposite, which I think will show that on this point they are not precisely in accord with his views. The House is aware that this subject was considered by a very able and strong Committee of both Houses of Parliament, and that a Report of unquestionable ability was presented by a minority of that Committee in favour of the scheme of the hon. Member.

MR. W. E. GLADSTONE

In 1883.

SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH

Yes; in 1883. Well, that minority, headed by Lord Lansdowne, admitted that the construction of the Tunnel would in some respect modify the conditions under which the defences of this country would have to be considered, and that special precautions would be necessary to prevent its falling into the hands of an enemy; they admitted, further, that its possession either during the progress of operations or an occupation of English soil would be highly advantageous to the invading force and injurious to the nation, and they conceived that if it could be shown that no means could be devised to prevent the Tunnel, when once made, from passing into the hands of the enemy, its formation would be in the highest degree objectionable. The question was, could such means be devised? That was referred to a scientific Committee of military and engineering authorities, who made recommendations for the se- curity of the Tunnel so complicated, so numerous, and so costly, that if they were carried out in any great degree at the expense of the shareholders, as the hon. Member once suggested—he does not, I see, now give any assent to that proposition—they would absolutely deprive the shareholders of any possibilities of making the Tunnel a commercial success. But this scientific Committee reported that while by the means they recommended the Tunnel might be made absolutely useless to an enemy it would be presumptuous to place absolute confidence in the most complete arrangements for preventing it from falling into the hands of an enemy, thus absolutely negativing the presumption on which the Minority Report of Lord Lansdowne was based. Now, the hon. Member treated almost with ridicule any idea that we could possibly ever be at war with France. I hope and pray that such a calamity to both nations may never occur, but it is simply folly and madness to shut our eyes to the fact that wars between those countries, of the most serious character, have occurred. It is possible that they may occur again, and we have no right in this House to look at this question of the Channel Tunnel without reference to the possibility of war between this country and France. Now, I do not imagine that it has ever been contended by those military experts to whom the hon. Member—who is not a soldier himself—has referred in terms of remarkable contempt, that if in a war between France and England the English end of the Tunnel were in our possession the French would attempt to invade this country by sending an army through the Tunnel; but what has been contended is this—that there might be the possibility of surprise. Such things have happened in past wars, and the House will remember that they have sometimes happened without a previous declaration of war. One notable case is that in which we seized the Danish Fleet in 1807. Surprise might be attempted and made successful through treachery, for who will guarantee the loyalty to this country of all of the employés of a cosmopolitan company, many of the shareholders in which might be Frenchmen themselves? It might be aided by delay on the part of the authorities, or by the failure of the action of the apparatus for flooding the Tunnel in a moment of danger, because, of course, you never could test such an apparatus to see whether it would work when required. We should have no guarantee for its continuous efficiency, and I should like to know what Government would not hesitate until the very last moment before it gave the order for causing such a great destruction of property as would result from the flooding or blocking of the Tunnel? But supposing this danger avoided, the order given, the Tunnel blocked or flooded, and the risk of surprise or treachery gone, would not the English end of the Tunnel still remain as a point of the gravest anxiety to this country during the progress of a war? It would be the first point of contemplated attack by our enemies throughout. I will not attempt to express an opinion as to the possibility, military or engineering, of such an operation; but we hear a great deal in these days about the likelihood of an invasion of England, Surely it would be a much easier and simpler operation to send over a force sufficient to seize and hold the English end of the Tunnel for such time as would be necessary to repair and pump it out? Then, how can the hon. Member ridicule the idea that if this were once done, troops might be poured from France through the Tunnel in such numbers as would render it very fortunate for us if we ever secured the possession of the key of England again? I dare say that hon. Members will say that these ideas are exaggerated; but I would submit this to their consideration. There is no doubt that these opinions are widely entertained in this country. They are held by great military authorities, and have been enforced by able writers in the Press; and they have taken, and will take, hold very largely of public opinion. Do you think that that public opinion, so influenced, would have no bearing upon our military and naval expenditure? Do hon. Members opposite who are anxious for economy, and who are endeavouring in every possible and impossible way to promote it in these matters, think that they are doing something likely to tend to economy in military and naval expenditure by adding a greater scare to the scares which already exist? I venture to say that with every rumour of war on the Continent there would be fresh demands for fortifications, armaments, and garrisons for the defence of the English end of the Tunnel. At all events, even the hon. Member for Hythe will admit, if he will not take the burden of erecting these fortifications upon the shareholders of his Company, that the nation would have to spend a considerable sum for the purpose of providing fortifications, armaments, and garrisons, and that thousands of men, whether added to the strength already existing of the Army or taken from their present duties, would be fixed in one spot in peace and in war, their services being required for the protection of the Tunnel. Therefore, on the ground of risk, possible rather than probable though that risk may be, but even more on the ground of the great addition to our expenditure which such risk would certainly cause, I am opposed to the construction of such a Tunnel as this. But I should like to know what are the advantages which are held out to us? The hon. Member tells us that the construction of the Tunnel would promote and secure peace with France; and he charges us by implication today, and in so many words in his former speeches, with a policy of isolation and separation, the logical end of which must be to strain the relations and possibly lead to war between the two countries. I maintain that our insular position is the best security for peace. I believe that it saves many opportunities of quarrel and much temptation to an invasion of this country. Our relations with France now are admitted even by the hon. Member to be friendly.

SIR EDWARD WATKIN

Yes.

SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH

They certainly are so. Then I ask the hon. Member, would he change them for the relations which obviously exist between France and her two powerful Continental neighbours, with whom she has an extended land frontier and such complete means of artificial intercourse by railways, roads, and other methods of communication? You cannot say—it would be ludicrous to pretend—that you can deprive nations of occasions of quarrel by increasing the means of communication between them. The hon. Gentleman made use of two arguments in support of the Bill which I must notice. He said that the Channel Tunnel would provide this country with an additional means of food supply. But if the other end of the Tunnel was in the hands of France, it certainly would not provide us with an additional means of food supply if we were at war with France, and France is the only country which could possibly deprive us for a day of the complete command of the sea. Therefore, what would be the advantage of the hon. Member's Channel Tunnel from that point of view? Then the hon. Gentleman dwelt on the great commercial advantages which would be derived from the proposed undertaking, I give him the benefit of the argument as to the greater ease and comfort of the passengers. He would mitigate the sufferings of many an old lady, and increase largely the passenger traffic. But the suffering might be lessened if the harbours on both sides were so improved as to make it possible to use steamers like the steamers between this country and Ireland, though a large proportion of passengers would prefer a cheaper mode of conveyance. So far as heavy goods traffic is concerned, I do not think the Channel Tunnel would do anything for it at all. I would invite hon. Members to look at the evidence which was given before the Parliamentary Committee. If they will do so, I think they will find conclusive proof upon the subject. For there is not only the difficulty of the break of gauge, which the hon. Member passed over so lightly—

SIR EDWARD WATKIN

There is no such thing as a break of gauge.

SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH

But the hon. Member admitted that there is a break of gauge.

SIR EDWARD WATKIN

Only in Russia.

SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH

There is not only that question, whatever it may amount to, but there is the fact that a tunnel 20 or 25 miles long could not by any possibility have the same relative capacity for carrying goods in 24 hours as an ordinary railway. If there is to be a great passenger and perishable goods traffic, there would not be room for heavy goods trains, and the cost of the line would be so great that the rates charged must necessarily be high if the shareholders are to get a return for their money, and goods would go by the cheapest route. Another argument is that we are losing the depôt trade of the Continent, and that by better communication between England and the Continent we might retain that trade. I will tell you of a better and cheaper mode of retaining that trade. It is so to improve our own harbours as to make them better and more accessible to large ships than the harbours of our Continental rivals, and in doing that we should have the additional advantage of benefiting our Mercantile Marine, which, as far as it goes, would be rather injured than benefited by the construction of a Tunnel. I quite grant that the construction of a railway between England and France would, to some extent, stimulate trade, as undoubtedly it would encourage travelling; and it might, therefore, if it were done, be of service to the wealth of this country, and improve the relations between this country and France. But I do not believe that anything would be gained in this way which would not be far outweighed by the injury to trade from the anxiety caused by the perpetually recurring panics, and the feeling of insecurity which would arise from the existence of a Tunnel, and the gain would also, to a great extent, be counterbalanced by the expenditure that would be required for fortifications and defence. I do not know that it is necessary for me to detain the House at any greater length. I would remind the House that on three previous occasions it has rejected this Bill on the second reading. The first occasion was in 1884; and in 1885 it was also rejected, when the right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Birmingham (Mr. J. Chamberlain), speaking on behalf of the Government of the day, moved the same Motion that I am about to make. I do not know what has happened since that time which would induce the House to alter its decision, unless it be that the right hon. Gentleman opposite the Member for Mid Lothian is in a position of greater freedom and less responsibility, and that the rumour is true that on this occasion he is going to give his powerful support to a Bill against which he voted in 1884 and 1885. If that be so, it is even a more remarkable change than the political gyrations of the hon. Member for Hythe himself, for I cannot conceive the faintest reason for it. It may be, for the moment, that the European sky is clearer than it was. [Mr. W.E. GLADSTONE dissented.] The right hon. Gentleman shakes his head. I am trying to give him the benefit of a doubt. It may be that rumours of impending wars are not quite so rife as they were at that time. I do not know that either of those propositions are true, but of one thing I am quite certain—that the causes of great Continental wars exist in as great force now as they did then, and that the excessive armaments of the great Continental Powers have been largely increased since that time. And what is the condition of France? It is, unfortunately, far more unstable now than it was in 1884, and there is an uncertainty about its political future far greater than existed then. What is our condition here? We have a strong feeling abroad, propagated with great diligence, of the insecurity of this country. Is this the time to add to that feeling of insecurity by opening another door to the attack of a possible enemy? Is this the time to give a chance, and a very good chance, for that feeling to be increased, and a scare created which would sweep away the hon. Member for West Bradford (Mr. Illingworth) and all the economists on that side of the House, and land us in a military and naval expenditure which was never contemplated in the wildest dreams of the right hon. Gentleman when he was Prime Minister? If the right hon. Gentleman opposite has less responsibility now than in 1884, we have greater; and in pursuance of that responsibility it is my duty, on behalf of Her Majesty's Government, to ask the House to-day, by refusing to sanction the second reading of this Bill, to maintain inviolate the silver streak which for so many ages past has been the natural and cheap defence of the liberty and the prosperity of our country. I beg to move that the Bill be read a second time this day three months.

Amendment proposed, to leave out the word "now," and at the end of the Question to add the words "upon this day three months."—(Sir Michael Hicks-Beach.)

Question proposed, "That the word 'now' stand part of the Question."

MR. W. E. GLADSTONE (Edinburgh, Mid Lothian)

The appeal which has been made to me by the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Local Government Board is a very fair appeal. He has a right to know, and I will endeavour to explain to him, why, having been at the bead of the Government in 1884, and having voted against proceeding with the Channel Tunnel Bill, I do not take the same course on the present occasion. The right hon. Gentleman has spoken for the Government to which he belongs, and, so far, he is in the same position as was my right hon. Friend the Member for West Birmingham (Mr. J. Chamberlain) when, in 1885, he asked the House to put a negative upon the Bill. But the right hon. Gentleman will at once perceive the broad and vital difference between the speech which he has now made in stating the grounds for his proceeding and the speech which was then made by my right hon. Friend. The right hon. Gentleman has opposed the Channel Tunnel Bill, I am sorry to say, upon its merits—upon grounds which will be as good in any future year as they are at the present moment. My right hon. Friend the Member for West Birmingham is not in the House, but I have had within the last week or 10 days an opportunity, through his kindness, of going over the whole ground and testing our several recollections, and I believe I am correct in saying that in the speech of my right hon. Friend there was not one word condemnatory of the Channel Tunnel upon its merits, and that his opposition was an opposition of time, and of time only. For my part, I could not have taken then any other position, and I will presently state why it was that I was a party to opposition on that ground. It is a matter of justice to the hon. Member for Hythe (Sir Edward Watkin) and to the promoters of the Channel Tunnel, after what happened in 1884 and 1885—I believe these were the years, though I am not certain that I am absolutely correct—that I should explain the view which I took of their case and the reasons which induced me at that period, without any doubt or hesitation, to join in the opposition to the progress of the Bill. I am very glad to think after the debate of last night that we are now engaged in a discussion of a very different kind. I do not think that any person who agrees with me will be induced to vote against the Government from any desire to displace it, or that any Gentleman who will vote with the Government will do so upon the ground that this is one of the sacrifices required from them to protect the country against the danger of a Liberal invasion of the Benches opposite. On the other hand, I am afraid that our arguments in this matter on the one side and on the other are looked upon as singularly unsatisfactory by our opponents. On political questions we often feel that, at any rate, there is something in what the other man says; but on this occasion we seem to get at the ultimate principles and modes of thinking which are fixed on one side and fixed on the other, and which would lead us, if we used the language that occurs to us, to describe the opposite arguments in very disrespectful terms. The right hon. Gentleman has stated his ease with force, clearness, and ability; and yet I frankly own—and frankness is, after all, a great virtue—the whole of the considerations he has advanced, and his arguments against this Tunnel, are neither better nor worse than mere and sheer bugbears. Having gone thus far in the exercise of frankness, I will for the rest of my speech endeavour to fall back on the virtue of courtesy; and I will not recur to the use of any language of that character, by which I only meant to illustrate the position in which we stand to one another, and which we unhappily aggravated in 1884. Now, Sir, this subject was first introduced to me by a Tory Chancellor of the Exchequer. It was first introduced to me in the year 1865 by a gentleman whose name will always be mentioned with respect in this House—I mean Mr. Ward Hunt. He was not Chancellor of the Exchequer at that exact time, for I was. He came to me as the leader of a deputation, and endeavoured to induce—or perhaps I should say seduce—me, the Chancellor of the Exchequer to Lord Palmerston, into giving my support to the promotion of this dangerous project. Mr. Ward Hunt was totally insensible of the dreadful nature of the petition he was making—notwithstanding his position in the Conservative Party, he was totally unaware of all the dangers that have been pointed out by the right hon. Gentleman opposite. And here, Sir, I am obliged to correct a statement of my hon. Friend the Member for Hythe, who, on the authority of somebody or another, alleged that I alone among the Ministers of that day, was disposed to give a guarantee in some shape or other to the promoters of the project. I was never disposed to give a guarantee to the extent of one single farthing to the promoters of this scheme, or any other scheme of a similar kind. I find it necessary, for my own credit perhaps, at any rate for the truth of history, to disclaim it. Sir, I was instructed on behalf of the Government, and with my own full concurrence, to refuse a guarantee; but we did so without giving the slightest indication of any opposition to the Tunnel scheme. A series of other Governments followed, and every one of those Governments officially committed itself on the merits of the Tunnel. Lord Granville on the part of the Government of 1868; Lord Derby on the part of the Government of 1874; and, I think, the senior Lord Derby, the distinguished Prime Minister of a former period, expressed precisely similar sentiments; and every one of those Governments, acting unanimously, was engaged so far in the promotion of this project that they gave it their unequivocal sanction. Nor did they stop there, but they entered upon international proceedings. Communications were established with France. A Commission was appointed on the part of the two countries, and I do wish to bring home to the minds of hon. and right hon. Gentlemen the degree to which our honour and our dignity in an international aspect are involved in the question before the House. I must say that that is one of the most serious considerations that operate on my mind with regard to the promotion of this Bill. The two Governments jointly instituted a Commission to consider the details—the important and difficult details—of the schemes by means of which this great project could be best advanced. The principle of the project was taken for granted, on the one side and on the other, when we entered into these general proceedings with the French Government. The Commission laid down conditions which were to be the basis of a Treaty between the two countries, and the actual signature of the Treaty was suspended, not upon the ground of any political apprehension whatever, but simply, I believe, upon the ground that financial considerations did not at that moment favour the progress of the scheme. What dwells upon my mind is this—that there was very much of the character of an engagement of honour in these proceedings between England and France, and that it is a matter of some difficulty to justify the recession of a Kingdom like this from a position of that kind, after you have voluntarily and deliberately, and after long thought and reflection, made it the subject of such international proceedings. The right hon. Gentleman says—and I have no doubt very truly—that there are serious objections raised by the military authorities against the scheme. Well, Sir, at the time I am speaking of, the opinion of the military authorities was in favour of the Tunnel. The two Governments did not act in respect of the Tunnel without consulting the military authorities, and those military authorities whom the Government had to consult were distinctly favourable to the Tunnel. But I think I may go a little further than that, and may venture to read, at least for the purpose of challenging contradiction if it can be challenged, a short extract from a very well-informed memorandum with which I have been supplied on the part of the promoters—and which is one which can easily be brought to issue. The extract to which I refer says— It was not until the autumn of 1881 that any military opinion adverse to the Tunnel was expressed. Now, Sir, that is a remarkable fact. The Tunnel was then a scheme 20 years old. It had been discussed in every possible form. It had been the subject of much official Correspondence, and it had received the assent of a number of Governments. Those Governments would not have assented, and did not assent, without the authority of the Military Department and the advice of their military advisers, and until the year 1881 these portentous discoveries which have taken possession of the mind and imagination of the right hon. Gentleman, and, I suppose, of those who sit near him, were never heard of. Surely that is rather a staggering circumstance. And now I will relate the facts upon which the Government of 1881 and the following years had to base itself in dealing with this subject. At that time we find that the military authorities had commenced their opposition, and a great ferment began to prevail. A combination of powers was brought into opera- tion. The literary authorities were brought to back up the military authorities. Great poets evoked the Muses, and strove, not as great poets in other times used to do, to embolden their countrymen to encounter serious dangers, but to intimidate their countrymen by conjuring up phantoms of danger that were not fit to be presented to anybody except that valuable class of the community that the right hon. Gentleman has described in his speech as suffering occasionally the pains of seasickness. Then, Sir, the Army—the military host and the literary host—were backed by the opinion of what is called "Society," and society is always ready for the enjoyment of the luxury of a good panic. There is nothing more enjoyable than a good panic when that panic is based on a latent conviction that the thing which it contemplates is not in the least degree likely to happen. These speculative panics—these panics in the air—have an attraction for certain classes of minds that is indescribable, and these classes of minds, I am bound to say, are very largely to be found among the educated portion of society. The subject of this panic never touched the mind of the nation. These things are not accessible to the mind of the nation. They are accessible to what is called the public opinion of the day—that is to say, public opinion manufactured in London by great editors and clubs, who are at all times formidable, and a great power for the purposes of the moment, but who are a greater power and become an overwhelming power, when they are backed by the threefold forces of the military and literary authorities and the social circles of London. Well, Sir, these powers among them created at that period such a panic that even those who were most favourable to the Tunnel, of whom I was one, thought it quite vain to offer a direct opposition. We, therefore, proposed the appointment of a Joint Committee, and the issue of that Joint Committee has been very fairly stated by the right hon. Gentleman. I am bound to make a fair admission—and I do it in the presence of my noble Friend the Member for the Rossendale Division of Lancashire (the Marquess of Hartington), whose opinion at the time I do not now remember—that, although in the Government of 1868, to which he and I belonged, there never was a question as to the propriety of the Tunnel, and Lord Granville wrote in that sense, and even instituted communications with France; yet when we come to the Government of 1880, and the circumstances of 1881, 1882, and 1883, a change of opinion did find its way even into the Cabinet. Some of us were what I should call not quite sound and others of us were, and we all agreed that the best thing we could do was to refer the matter to this impartial tribunal. And when that tribunal reported there was no improvement in the circumstances. If I am asked why, under these circumstances, I took part in throwing out the Channel Tunnel Bill, my answer is that we, the Government, were engaged in arduous affairs. Powers were put very freely into action against us at that time which are now happily in abeyance. We deemed that it was our duty to have some regard to the time of Parliament. We knew it was impossible to pass the Bill. It was a time of tempests, and as sensible men in time of tempest are not satisfied with the shelter of an umbrella and seek shelter under the roof of some substantial building, so we acted. Whether or not we ought to have shown more heroism I do not know. But we thought it idle to persevere in a hopeless struggle. We did not in the least condemn the Tunnel on its merits. We did not think there was the slightest chance of proceeding with the Bill to the end, and we, therefore, invited Parliament not to bestow its time on a discussion which we believed to be perfectly useless. That was the principle on which we proceeded at the time. I will say a little upon the arguments of the right hon. Gentleman, but I am not going to attempt to follow those arguments as if we were engaged in a debate like that of last night. I do not think it would be expedient or convenient to make this a debate between both sides of the House. There are some on this side of the House who are probably unsound besides those who are usually so; and I hope there are some on that side who are sound, and, therefore, the House is totally without prejudice. But there is one thing which fell from the right hon. Gentleman which I regret, and that was his comparison between the internal condition of France at the present time and the internal condition of France some six or seven years ago. I own I think it was an error to enter upon that chapter of the subject, even if the right hon. Gentleman entertains the opinion which he apparently does entertain. But as he has said that he thinks there is not the same prospect of stability in France now as then, I must give myself the satisfaction so far of expressing quite a different opinion. And I may remind the Government and the House of this—that the French Republic never, since 1870, has been called upon to pass through so severe a crisis as the crisis, not yet, I think, 12 months old, with respect to the appointment of President. That was the most trying experience which it has had to go through, and it made many of its friends and well-wishers tremble as to the issue. It made every sound and right-minded man in France apprehensive of what was to happen, and I rejoice to say that France and the institutions of France came through the struggle with as much calm temper and solidity as any country in the world could have done. That is one thing I feel it right to say inconsequence of what fell from the right hon. Gentleman. Following the right hon. Gentleman opposite, I do not touch on the engineering question. Neither will I touch upon the commercial question, except to say frankly that I differ from the right hon. Gentleman, and I believe the commercial advantages of this Tunnel would be enormous. I have nothing, however, to do with engineering or commercial questions. I am here simply as a Member of Parliament to see whether there is any reason why I should withhold my assent to the plan. Now, Sir, I have used the familiar illustration of the umbrella as shelter in a storm. After hearing the speech of the right hon. Gentleman, I am not quite sure whether the storm is still going on; but I was under the impression that the panic had passed away. My impression has been, and in the main my impression is, that the literary alarm, the social alarm, which backed up the military alarm are very greatly allayed, and that we have now, what we had not five or six years ago, a chance of a fair, temperate, and candid discussion. The right hon. Gentleman refers to a land frontier as if it were an unmixed evil. No doubt it is less secure, upon the whole, than a sea frontier; but he must not forget that a land frontier has enormous advantages with respect to intercourse between man and man, which are of great consequence in the view of those who believe that peace and not war is the natural and proper condition of mankind, and it is to be as we trust to a great extent for this country, at least, the ordinary normal and habitual condition in which we live with foreign countries. But on the question of procuring a land frontier, if it is a land frontier, which I do not think it is, the habitual and standing advantages of a land frontier are enormous compared with its occasional disadvantages and dangers. With regard to the political and military objections, I must say I feel pained, as an Englishman, in considering the extensive revolution of opinion that has taken place. For 20 years this project lived and flourished, difficult in an engineering sense, very difficult in a technical sense, and as a financial question. I do not presume to enter upon those questions, and leave them to those who better understand them—but with no doubt cast on it from the point of view of the security of this country. Now, Sir, a transition from darkness to light has taken place—and it ought to be hailed notwithstanding all the inconveniences which accompany such transitions—and it is rather a serious question for us to consider whether the English nation and Government from 1860 to 1880, or whether the influences which acted during the years 1883–4 and 1885, and which are to some extent acting now, lead us in the right or wrong direction. Speaking of the dangers of a land frontier the right hon. Gentleman, in a lugubrious manner, said that this end of the Tunnel must always be the subject of great anxiety. Well, if this end of the Tunnel is to be the subject of great anxiety, what will the other end be? But, strange to say, I find that the other end of the Tunnel is the subject of no anxiety at all. Many of us are in the habit of considering the French nation as light-minded, with great resources and great ingenuity, talents, and energy, but still light-minded, unlike ourselves, solid, and stable, perhaps rather heavy, but at any rate a very steady-going people, who make up our minds slowly and resolutely, and do not change them.[Laughter.] Oh, I am not speaking for myself—I am only speaking on behalf of my country; but I would ask hon. Gentlemen to apply this test to the case of the French people. I must say that they have treated this matter with the most dignified self-restraint and consistency throughout. I am bound to give my opinion, and I think the French, had they any other than the most friendly disposition with regard to ourselves, might have made serious complaints of the manner of their treatment in having been invited to embark in this enterprize to an extent only short of the signature of the Treaty when we receded from the ground and left the light-minded people standing in exactly their original attitude, while we—not the nation, but the Government and the circles of opinion known in London—have very considerably altered. Well, but, you will say, the question of our invading France is not a matter to be considered at all. Therefore, the other end of the Tunnel does not seriously enter into the question. The real question that we have before us is the likelihood of the coming of that unhappy day—I agree it is a perfectly possible thing, I think and hope it is nothing more than a possible event, still it must be taken into consideration—when England will be invaded by France. I am very much behind the age in a great many respects, and I am sorry to say very much behind those Representatives of the age who sit on the opposite side of the House, for I have the habit of being guided to a certain extent in anticipations of the future by considerations of the past. I know that it is a mode of looking at a subject entirely dismissed from consideration at present. For about 800 years, beginning from the Conquest, I want to know which country has oftenest invaded the other, and I will state this proposition—that the invasions of France by England have been tenfold more than the invasions of the British Islands by France. Do you believe in a total revolution in the means of action between the two countries? I do not believe it. There has, indeed, been a great change in one matter—that of population. Now, Sir, during the Revolutionary wars what happened? The great Napoleon—the most wonderful general and strategist of modern times, the man of whom Dr. Döllinger says that he raised war as the mode of its planning and execution, not as to its morality, almost to the dignity and atti- tude of a fine art—addressed the whole of his resources and thoughts to the invasion of England. Ireland was tried three times by the Directory, and three times there were miserable failures. Two other Fleets had set out, one from Holland and one from Spain, and they had been destroyed by the power of British arms at sea. But Napoleon made it a study nightly and daily to devise and arrange the means of invading England, and he was obliged to recede from it as an impossible task. Not that it is an impossible task. Do not suppose that I am going to say anything so extravagant. I am going to say this. It is worth while for those who have these portentous ideas of the power of France, and so small an idea of our means of defence, to consider the relative population of the two countries. At the time when Napoleon prosecuted his schemes the population of Great Britain was 10,000,000; the population of France 22,000,000. I will not count the population of Ireland, for at that period, unfortunately, as at others, it added nothing to the military resources of this country for repelling invasion. Well, 10,000,000 Englishmen constituted the sum of those whom Napoleon had to invade, and he could not manage it. At the present moment this Island contains far more than 30,000,000 men not less strong, not less determined, not less energetic than the 10,000,000 in Napoleon's time at the beginning of the century, and they are close in mere numbers upon the population of France. Here, then, are two countries, and the question is whether one will invade the other by means of the Channel Tunnel? This is a country that has incessantly invaded France, and I am not sorry to say that, though we did it with marvellous success 500 years ago, we have not always been equally successful in recent years, though there is the paramount case of 1815, with respect to which, if a parallel case could be quoted on the other side for the action of England and Wellington, I would admit that there would be something more in the argument of the right hon. Gentleman than I can allow that it contained as matters stand. I shall be told that Napoleon had no steam. That appears to be a strong argument, but it is capable of being used both ways. I believe that the inven- tion of steam, and the great revolution that we have seen in shipbuilding, have enormously increased our means of defence as compared with those of France. I believe that our defensive power in times of crisis would develop itself with a rapidity, to an extent, and with an efficiency that would surpass all previous examples, and would astonish the world. There is one question that I should like to ask—What is the ground taken up by those Gentlemen who point to our security as the main matter which we have to consider? Do they mean, on that ground, to limit our communications with France? Do they mean, as in the time of Queen Anne, to "abate" our trade with France, as being a source of danger and insecurity? "No," says the right hon. Gentleman opposite; "anything but it; extend your communications to the uttermost; give every facility by which men and material "—for the word "goods" is synonymous with material—"can pass from one country to the other, but do not sanction the construction of this Tunnel." That is the plan of the right hon. Gentleman. He proposes that the harbours of the country should be enlarged. He set no limit to the range of his philanthropy and enlightened views upon this matter. He has no apprehension upon this subject. Well, my apprehension of invasion is not great; but, if I am to conjure up any prospect of danger, I tell the right hon. Gentleman deliberately that his plan of harbours and great ships and of making the Channel a high road to be crossed with wonderful rapidity presents 10 times the danger that the prospects of the Tunnel could possibly present to the most excitable mind. Now, one word about the opinion of the military authorities. I am not going to speak of them with contempt; on the contrary, I must say that I have the deepest respect for the profession of the soldier, and especially for the function of a commander in the field, charged with the care of large bodies of men, with the duty of making the most of the resources of the country, and with the enormously difficult task of bringing all to bear on a particular point, under particular circumstances, and at a particular time, for the purpose of war. That I deem to be one of the highest and most extraordinary trials to which the human mind can be subjected, and I do not know any other position in which the demand for energy and the exercise of every great quality of human force is so tremendous and overwhelming. Therefore, for the opinion of Lord Wolseley, whom I believe to be a man extremely valuable to his country in the great and possible contingency of military danger and military effort, I have the profoundest respect, as I have for the opinion of other military authorities. But that respect is mainly due in relation to the operations of war, or measures directly connected with the operations of war. On other matters not so connected their, judgment carries weight, and always will carry weight; but in questions of this character the judgments of military authorities cannot be accepted as infallible, and we find that the prescriptions and recommendations of the military authorities of one day or one year are disowned and reversed by the military authorities of another time. We were told in 1860 that Lord Palmerston's fortifications would give us such a state of security that we need never be alarmed again; but have we not had within these latter years alarms more poignant, more startling, more costly than, perhaps, were ever reached before in times of peace, and these fortifications are regarded apparently by those who recommended them with the greatest indifference? If I am asked to rely on the opinion of military authorities as infallible, and required to surrender my own poor judgment and responsibility into their hands, I would quote the name of Alderney. If there is a single creation on earth that may be called the creation of military authority it is the work now represented by the remains, the ruins, the shreds and tatters of the fortifications at Alderney. Save that the funds were supplied from the Treasury, these works were a military creation. I know it is sometimes said that all faults and imperfections in such cases are due to the impertinent interference of civilians; but what civilian had anything to do with the works at Alderney? I had to do with them in the service of yielding to the imperative demands of the military authorities of that day, excellent, able, and highly distinguished men they were, Sir John Burgoyne, Sir Henry Hardinge, and others of whom the country may be proud. They told us that with an ex- penditure of £150,000 Cherbourg would be sealed up, and no hostile Fleet could ever issue from it. I was the man who proposed this expenditure, and the House agreed to it 35 years ago. But I need not say the matter did not stop there; the expenditure went up to £1,500,000—and I am not sure whether it stopped short of £2,000,000—and of that there now remain but the miserable fragments of that work, a monument of human folly, useless to us as regards any purpose for which we were urged by military authorities to adopt their plan, but perhaps not absolutely useless to a possible enemy, with whom we may at some period have to deal, and who may possibly be able to extract some profit in the way of shelter and accommodation from the ruins. Then take another and very different example from another branch of the subject—I wish to speak of nothing but of which I have some personal knowledge. Everybody knows that in the crisis of a great war the one real and appalling difficulty, if not danger, of this country is the fewness of men, and not the scantiness of any other resources whatever. We were, until the forethought and sagacity of Lord Palmerston and Lord John Russell relieved us of the task, in military occupation of the Ionian Islands. Our garrison there used to consist in times of peace of 6,000 or 7,000 men, and I believe it was admitted that, considered in reference to times of war and in reference to Reserves, such soldiers as we should require to have there would stand to our debit in time of war at not less than 12,000 men. I am not speaking of political considerations; but I do not think any man in this House will say it is desirable to be charged with the responsibility of maintaining 12,000 men in a time of a great war for the purpose of maintaining a hold, even if it were otherwise possible, upon Corfu, Cephalonia, Zante and the other Ionian Isles. But at that time military authorities were unanimous in their belief, and strongly urged upon the Government that the maintenance of our military hold upon the Ionian Islands was a great, if not an essential, element in the maintenance of our power in the Mediterranean. Something, we must admit, is to be allowed for the professional zeal of men who know no bounds to the service they render and the sacrifices they are prepared to make when the country has occasion to call for their services; but much also must be allowed for the fallibility of human judgment when applied to an object they consider it necessary to secure, and these are considerations which in some degree equalizes our position, though not absolutely, to the position of the military authorities. It seems ludicrous for a person like myself to give an opinion on the military danger of the Channel Tunnel in the face of the opinion of military authorities; but I cannot get rid of the feeling—and it is simply common sense—that when I endeavour to consider all the points, which I will not now enter upon in detail, I am bound to point out that it is not a safe thing for us to say, "We have military authorities who tell us this thing or that, and we ought to be satisfied," when of necessity we have before our eyes many exemplary cases where the predictions and injunctions of military authorities have been totally falsified; and when we know that what is preached by the military authorities of to-day is the direct reversal of what was thought and taught by military authorities 20 or 30 years ago. Under the circumstances, I trust we have arrived at a time of comparative calm, when the matter can be considered without prejudice, which was not possible in 1883. If I may presume to refer to an old and homely proverb, "Philip was then drunk;" but Philip is now, I trust, sober, and it is in the sobriety of Philip that I place all my confidence. I hope, Sir, I am not going beyond Parliamentary etiquette, if I express my hearty congratulations that you, Sir, in the midst of the storm and excitement, were one of the men who affixed a signature to the Minority Report on the subject. I believe even now we have arrived at a happier time when the gallant enterprize—for I must call it so, arduous and difficult it is—of my hon. Friend the Member for Hythe has some chance of fair judgment. The opinion of the nation was never against it. A factitious opinion, which is sometimes assumed to be national opinion, was too strong against it at one period, and it was too strong for me, and it even now exists, but weakened and brought within moderate bounds, and there is now some chance for common sense and the exercise of that spirit of enterprize that has been at all times among the noblest characteristics of our country.

SIR EDWARD HAMLEY (Birkenhead)

said, they must all admit that the hon. Baronet the Member for Hythe (Sir Edward Watkin) possessed the virtue of perseverance, and also the quality of not knowing when he was beaten. Year after year he went on bringing up afresh his rejected scheme for that imaginary work of an unknown future which he called the Channel Tunnel, and ho had succeeded in making the public so familiar with it, and with everything that was to be said for and against it, that it was, perhaps, almost unnecessary to recapitulate the conditions of the question. Those who objected to the scheme must be very careful not to attribute to the hon. Member any, not even the most distant, desire to make a profit out of this scheme. The hon. Gentleman alluded to a letter he (Sir Edward Hamley) wrote to The Times last year. The hon. Member for Hythe also replied through The Times, and in his letter took him (Sir Edward Hamley) severely to task for having presumed to allude to the Channel Tunnel as a commercial speculation. More in sorrow than in anger the hon. Gentleman remarked that he would pass by what he pleased to call his (Sir Edward Hamley's) rude allusions as unworthy of notice; and then he took very lofty ground indeed, and talked of the great services rendered gratuitously to the country by those who were engaged in what he styled the grand work of the century. Well, if the Channel Tunnel were the grand work of the century, it must, he (Sir Edward Hamley) supposed, be the work of a Company, and that Company would be got together in the usual manner, and capital would be raised by offering the shares for sale with the usual inducements to purchasers, and therefore the shareholders would be very different persons indeed to those philanthropists who invested their money for the benefit of the human race. But he perceived that this was a tender point with the hon. Member, and therefore he would humour him so far as he had to allude to his Company by calling it a benevolent association. Now, when the matter had been so long discussed, it was in vain to expect that much new matter could be imported into it, and therefore they found in the present debate, as he found in the records of a meeting which was held last month by the promoters of the scheme, that very little that was new had been said, and that nothing had been said which had not been quite as forcibly expressed a score of times before. They had had the usual promise of immense benefits which were to flow from the Tunnel; the usual amount of contempt had been showered on those who were so weak and foolish as to suppose there could be any danger to the country in so beneficent a project. A new feature, however, was introduced at the meeting of the promoters which he had already mentioned. A speaker repeated the arguments used by the hon. Member for Hythe in his letter to The Times, and said that if France could invade us through the Tunnel, we could also invade France through the Tunnel, and then went on in a burst of patriotic valour to suggest that we should not wait for the invasion, but should ourselves become the assailants. To his (Sir Edward Hamley's) very great surprise, this view had also been insisted upon by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Mid Lothian (Mr. W. E. Gladstone). He (Sir Edward Hamley) would only give one reason in reply, which he had no doubt hon. Members opposite would not accept, and that was that for every soldier we could land in France, we should find 10 French soldiers to meet him, and for every gun we should find 10 French guns. To those pusillanimous persons who had doubts about the policy of the Tunnel this might seem to be a sufficient reply. Colonel Hozier had been mentioned by the hon. Member for Hythe, and he had introduced a plausible argument which had some novelty about it, and which he (Sir Edward Hamley), therefore, desired to advert to. He wished to speak of Colonel Hozier with all the respect due to his qualifications for dealing with the military aspect of the question. Colonel Hozier said that if the Tunnel were made, and if we were at peace with France, we could still obtain all the supplies we wanted in this country through France in spite of the enemy's cruisers. To which he (Sir Edward Hamley) would reply, that if we were at peace with France we should be pretty sure to be able to protect ourselves against all other enemies at sea, and that at least we should always retain in such a case the command of the Channel, and so we should then, as now, be able to supply ourselves through France by shipments from that country. Though not much had been said which was new, yet all the old arguments had re-appeared in the present debate. They were once more promised a universal brotherhood as the result of the Tunnel; the Tunnel was to be the highway to the Millennium; and as soon as it was made the South-Eastern Railway Company and the Northern Railway Company of France were to lie down together in its peaceful shades, with, as they were now given to understand, Her Majesty's portrait overhead, and survey their work, and plan fresh schemes for the benefit of mankind. They were also told that great riches and prosperity would flow out of the Tunnel for everybody, especially for France and England. Then the cases were quoted in which tunnels had been made with great advantage under English rivers, as if there was any possible relation between establishing a communication between two English counties and establishing a connection between France and England. Then the old staple argument was trotted out, that the Tunnel would be a guarantee of peace, whereas many of them believed that by offering such a prize to an invader they would be establishing a perpetual inducement to invasion. But to all these promises of prospective advantage, they could still make the old response:—everybody agreed that the Tunnel itself might in certain circumstances constitute a possible danger to this country, a danger of a character which was nothing short of fatal. The friends of the Company maintained that by their precautions they would render this danger unworthy of consideration, and the hon. Member for Hythe had described to them how, by pressing a button somewhere, he could at once destroy the work, which he (Sir Edward Hamley) thought must be very agreeable intelligence for his shareholders. Well, he did not know how the hon. Member might succeed with his precautions, but this he maintained—that whatever precautions might be taken, and however effective they might be supposed to be, still no precau- tions could have the same value as having no need for precautions which was our case at present; and with such tremendous issues at stake we ought not to be called upon to accept the game, even with the chances which were alleged in our favour. He had formerly presented some arguments against the Tunnel which had never, so far as he knew, been disposed of, and he would only now reproduce one to the House. Putting aside the prospect of foreign troops obtaining possession of our end of the Tunnel, were there no enemies at home who might seize it; had we not those among us who made a boast of their hostility to England? He had heard of an hon. Member upon the opposite Benches on one occasion announcing, within the precincts of that House, that if we were at war he would place his sword at the disposal of the enemy. Considering the hon. Member's profession, he thought it was likely the hon. Gentleman did not mean his sword, but his lancet, which, in his hands, would probably be the more fatal weapon of the two. But, however that might be, the point of the matter was that the will existed there, and that men holding such opinions would acquire an immense importance if they could offer such an inducement to an invader, and we should be crazy indeed if we gave such opportunities to treason. Why, we knew there existed in this country a con spiracy which was maintained and fed by contributions from a vile faction in a foreign land, whose sole motive was malignity to England. He would only further observe that there were many who had considered this question from a military point of view, and who could have no possible reason for opposing the Tunnel as a commercial speculation, yet who had arrived at the very strong conviction that it would not be for the advantage of this country, but very much to the disadvantage, that this enterprize should be allowed to proceed. There was one other circumstance which it was impossible not to notice, because it was an entirely new feature in this question, and that was, that the hon. Member for Hythe had obtained a very remarkable recruit in the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Mid Lothian (Mr. W. E. Gladstone). No doubt, the hon. Gentleman was able to give the right hon. Gentleman very cogent reasons. They all of them remembered how an eminent statesman of a former time was described as— Straining his throat To persuade Tommy Townshend to lend him a vote. If they substituted another name for "Tommy Townshend," they might, perhaps, arrive at a faint and distant clue to the reasons which induced the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Mid Lothian, at this late stage of his career, to become a convert to the Channel Tunnel. They all felt that when the right hon. Gentleman's biography came to be written, it would largely consist of the history of his conversions. This conversion by the hon. Member for Hythe was the latest of them up to the present date; let them hope that all hon. Members of the House who might happen to have a dangerous or a mischievous project might not take the surest way of obtaining the support of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Mid Lothian. But he knew that this was tender and delicate ground; for they all felt, especially since last night, how the necessities of the right hon. Gentleman were great and pressing. He would not, therefore, deal with the political view the right hon. Gentleman had expressed; and as to the right hon. Gentleman's military opinions, he would refrain from following him either to Alderney or to the Ionian Isles. He would only venture to say that the right hon. Gentleman's conversion appeared to him to be too recent to allow the right hon. Gentleman to gain any knowledge that could possibly be of service to anybody in relation to the present question.

MR. SLAGG (Burnley)

said, he felt sure that the speeches which had been addressed to the House by the hon. and gallant Gentleman opposite must have been received with very great disappointment on the Opposition side of the House from two causes. The first was, that it appeared to be the determination of the Government to oppose a solid front of opposition to the Motion; and the second cause was, that it seemed that the old reputation for courage and self-reliance which hon. Members of the Party opposite used to pride themselves upon had disappeared, and had been replaced by a timid and unworthy state of mind an attitude which took alarm at any old wife's story. Now, the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach) referred at some length to the conclusions of the Joint Committee of the two Houses which sat in 1883, but he forgot to give due weight to one or two of those conclusions. It would be within the knowledge of hon. Members that the commercial part of the case in favour of the Channel Tunnel, which he (Mr. Slagg) admitted was a very important part of it, was proved up to the very hilt on the evidence of the most trustworthy commercial witnesses. What did those witnesses give evidence upon? They were almost unanimous in the opinion that means of communication of this description would very largely increase the commercial intercourse of the different countries; that the direct trade not only with France, but with the whole Continent of Europe, would be greatly stimulated; that for light articles of commerce especially, and for costly commodities, the proposed method of transit would be invaluable; and that we might hope, in the future, when this route was established, to see a most useful and profitable augmentation of our trade. The right hon. Baronet (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach) asked what now reasons there were of a commercial nature which should induce them to go forward with this project? He (Mr. Slagg) ventured to offer to the House one or two new reasons which had developed during the period which had intervened between now and the presentation of the Committee's Report. The method by which the commerce of the country was conducted had very largely altered. The manufactories of England had for a long time been regarded as specially adapted to the production of large quantities of cheap articles. That method of business was changing, and there was now seen on all hands, in regard to our staple industries, an effort, and a successful effort, to produce also smaller quantities of valuable and artistic articles. He could answer for the Cotton trade, of which he knew something, that a change was rapidly coming over its methods. Whereas the orders used to be mainly for huge bulks of a very limited class of commodities, manufacturers were now applying themselves to produce also smaller quantities of those articles in the production of which taste, skill, and artistic science entered very largely. The hon. Member for West Bradford (Mr. Illingworth) would confirm him in the opinion that the same change was prevalent in regard to the trade of Yorkshire; indeed, wherever they turned, they found development and increase in the power of producing artistic work. What did that necessitate? It necessitated, of all things in the world, extended rapid means of transit. We could not now afford the time which used to be expended in taking our goods to their respective markets; time was of the essence of all this business, and where weeks under the former condition were of little consequence, now days, and even hours, were of the greatest significance in making profitable arrangements. The day had gone by when the producers of this country might be confined to the production of these masses of ordinary goods; technical skill and scientific teaching were now doing a great work among us, and we were entering upon a phase of industry in which we were becoming not only rivals, but, to a very great extent, successful rivals with Continental producers to whom we used too readily to relegate the production of scientific and artistic work. This march and change in regard to our industries would make greater strides in the future, and, therefore, he claimed for this new and civilized method of communication a position of absolute necessity in regard to the future development of our trade and industries. There was one point which he thought had not been touched upon by previous speakers in this debate, and it was one to which he attached very great importance. He was sure that the time could not be far distant when direct communication would be established between the Continent and India; and he asserted that our politicians and diplomatists would do well to consider this matter, and instead of pursuing a policy in India which was to some extent calculated to inspire feelings of jealousy, alarm, and animosity, they should direct their attention to making those alliances with Russia and the Ruler of Afghanistan which would insure the completion of the railway route to India. That this route would be eventually finished he thought there could be no doubt whatever, and he asked were we alone of all the great Powers of Europe—the greatest commercial Power—to be deprived of direct access by railway to our important Indian Dependency? So much for the trade aspect of this case. There was one other aspect upon which he wished to say a few words, and it was the international aspect. Hon. Members who had spoken from the Benches opposite had addressed the House as if a condition of hatred and possible war with France were a chronic state of things. Pray let them for once imagine the possibility of being at peace with France, and let them allow themselves even to stretch their imagination to such limits as to suppose France might be our possible ally. Were we for ever, to the end of all time, to regard France, our natural ally and friend, as an enemy and as a Power to be held always in a state of antipathy? He considered those old-world prejudices, those worn-out notions of hostility against France, would rapidly disappear under the benign influence of a communication of this sort. The two peoples would get to know each other, to understand one another's views, to appreciate one another's ideas, and in a short time we should all look back with surprise to those feelings of hostility and antipathy which now appeared to animate so many. Now, he approached the consideration of the military aspect of the case with very natural diffidence; he did not, in fact, intend to offer an opinion on it; he thought it would be sufficient for him just briefly to state what it was, and to draw the attention of hon. Members to it. He thought he was right in saying that the whole of the military scare which had been raised in opposition to this scheme rested not upon probabilities, but on possibilities drawn from a very excited imagination. What were we asked to believe, and he took the list of possibilities from the evidence given by military witnesses before the Joint Committee of 1883? First, they were invited to suppose that there might be a grand European plot, hatched and contrived in a more or less secret manner, against the peace and liberty of this country. He thought that even the gallant Gentlemen, including the hon. and gallant Member who had just spoken (Sir Edward Hamley), who had given them so much warning of the sort, would hardly fear the assault of any single Power. They were to suppose that there would be secretly a combination of several Powers. As a matter of course, the force would assemble on the shores of France. This assembling was to take place without awakening the suspicion or the apprehension of anybody in this country. The combination having been effected, the united forces must agree upon a general course of operations, which he should think would be rather a difficult thing for them to do. Having so agreed, they must have a general who was foolish enough to trust his army in such a place as the Channel Tunnel. Remember also, that all this time our Military Authorities, our Naval Authorities, our Political Authorities were fast asleep, and that the garrison of Dover and the coast defences were sharing in this Rip Van Winkle slumber. He considered the arguments advanced that day against this civilizing step might be reasonably urged against the construction of any road between one State and another. If a railway made from one State to another was to produce all the terrible consequences which had been foreshadowed in the House that day, he was surprised that they should be continued on the large scale on which they were now projected. But they knew very well that, so far from producing hostility, they tended to peace and a better understanding among the nations. He was convinced that numerous commercial advantages would arise from the construction of this Tunnel; they in the House of Commons had nothing to do at that moment with the question whether the enterprize would pay or not. Hon. Members knew perfectly well that that was a matter which the shareholders would look after for themselves, and it was a matter which would be thoroughly sifted by a Committee of the House. They had only to consider whether it would be wise and prudent to adopt the course suggested; they had to consider whether it would increase or diminish the commerce and prosperity of the country; whether it would draw closer the bonds of friendship between two great countries and increase their good understanding. He was convinced that the establishment of the proposed com- munication would do all these things, and that by it we should be provided with a splendid insurance against any evil which could possibly arise.

SIR HUSSEY VIVIAN (Swansea District)

said, he was the only Member in the House except Mr. Speaker, and he feared that Mr. Speaker's voice could not be heard on that occasion, of the five Members who were appointed by the House of Commons to sit upon the Joint Committee of the Lords and Commons, in 1883, to investigate the question of the construction of the Channel Tunnel; therefore it would ill become him to be silent on this occasion. He did not think that in the speeches which had been delivered sufficient weight had been given to the exhaustive inquiry which took place before the Committee. Before, however, he entered upon the questions which came before the Committee, he thought it necessary to caution the House against being in any way misled by the manner in which this question was put before them by the hon. Member for Hythe (Sir Edward Watkin). The hon. Member said that he brought the Bill forward for the purpose of enabling his Company, or the Company which he proposed to form, to carry on experimental works. It was rightly pointed out by the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach) that they could not regard the Bill in that sense; that, if the House passed the Bill to-day, it would pass a Bill affirming the desirability of constructing the Channel Tunnel, and they must take the Bill upon that distinct issue. Upon that distinct issue every man must vote to-day. He knew pretty well the conditions, and from a long experience of underground work, his distinct opinion was that there would be no difficulty in constructing this Tunnel. His opinion was that an undertaking of such magnitude was scarcely ever conceived which would be more easy of accomplishment than the Channel Tunnel. He never saw easier ground or more favourable conditions than he saw when he went through the already existing works of the Channel Tunnel, which were amply sufficient for experimental purposes; and, therefore, he thought it was altogether misleading to put the question forward as one of experiment. It could not be regarded in that light. Then the hon. Member tried to persuade the House that this was to be regarded as a small drift-way. They all knew that small drivings were always made before large tunnels were broken down, and here again he thought that it was necessary he should caution the House against being misled by any such statement as that this Bill must be regarded as permitting a drift-way which was to be used for electric wires and for the conveyance of mails. He hoped the House would in no way regard it in that sense. This Bill was, in fact, a Bill sanctioning the Channel Tunnel. Now, when he was selected to serve on the Committee, he entered upon his duties with a perfectly open and judicial mind; he was not prejudiced in one way or the other. He was not brought up in what the hon. Member for Hythe stigmatized as the cramped atmosphere of the cabin of a man-of-war, nor was he brought up in the office of an editor of a newspaper. His whole life had been spent in great commercial and manufacturing undertakings; and, therefore, he thought he was about as unprejudiced a witness upon this question as could well be found. The Committee investigated the case with the greatest care; 40 witnesses were examined; of these 40 witnesses, 10 were military men, 3 were naval men, 12 were connected with the great railways of the country, and they were really representative men, the very best of the railway officials and chairmen; 10 were engaged in commerce and manufactures, and two were Government officials. It would be seen that the witnesses brought before the Committee were thoroughly capable of giving to the Committee the opinions of the great undertakings with which they were connected. One remarkable point impressed itself upon him at the very beginning. It was natural, in the first place, to consider what advantages were likely to accrue to the country from the construction of this Tunnel, and whether they conferred adequate compensation for the undoubted dangers which might arise from its construction. One would have supposed that at the very beginning the commercial advantages would have been put forward by the promoters in the strongest possible terms, but such was by no means the case. The Committee thought it was their duty with this object to invite the opinions of the Chambers of Commerce, and they accordingly addressed themselves to the Chairman of the Associated Chambers of Commerce. They rceived from him this reply— The Council of the Associated Chambers of Commerce of the United Kingdom are not prepared to offer evidence on the subject of the Channel Tunnel Bills referred to the Joint Committee of both Houses of Parliament. If this had been a very large and important commercial question, surely the Associated Chambers of Commerce would have taken a very different line. If they had not done so as a great commercial organization, surely a large number of Chambers of Commerce would have taken an active part in representing to the Committee the advantages which it was presumed were likely to flow from the construction of this Channel Tunnel. But, instead of that, the Chairman, on behalf of the Association, as the extract he had read showed, informed the Committee that the Chambers of Commerce had no desire to say a word in favour of the construction of the Tunnel. The hon. Member for Hythe himself gave evidence, and he (Sir Hussey Vivian) thought those who supported this Bill would do well to read the hon. Gentleman's evidence, because he did not think they would find in it any very strong statement as to the commercial advantages which were to flow from the construction of the Tunnel. In his evidence, the hon. Member for Hythe admitted that— There has been nothing that deserved the epithet of a wide and enthusiastic declaration or demand for the Tunnel, upon the part of the trading and manufacturing interests of the country.

SIR EDWARD WATKIN

Read the context.

SIR HUSSEY VIVIAN

said, he was not aware that he had misquoted the hon. Gentleman's evidence.

SIR EDWARD WATKIN

Read what precedes, and what follows the passage you have quoted.

SIR HUSSEY VIVIAN

said, he had the reference and the evidence, but he could not comply with the hon. Gentleman's wish without troubling the House at too great length; he had read the entire reply to a question put to the Hon. Gentleman. He listened to the hon. Gentleman's speech that day, and he thought he should have heard some strong statement setting forth the great advantages which would accrue to the commerce of this country from the construction of the Channel Tunnel. He was bound to say, however, that he was very much disappointed, for he heard no such statement; he heard prophetic words of a large and sonorous character, but there was an utter absence of detailed information as regarded the commercial effect of the construction of this Tunnel. Of course, prophecy was very easy; but they wanted material facts to establish the desirability of running the undoubted risk we should run in permitting this Tunnel to be constructed. The hon. Gentleman made four points in regard to the necessity for the construction of this Tunnel. He said that it was needed as a second line of supply for the food of the country. That had been perfectly well met by two speakers already, who had asserted that if we were at war with France we could not get our supplies of food through the Channel Tunnel—that it was only from France we could possibly fear we should lose the command of the sea, and that if we lost the command of the sea, we undoubtedly could not get our food supplies through the Tunnel, Therefore, he thought, the hon. Gentleman's first argument fell to the ground entirely. The hon. Gentleman's second argument was that we should strengthen our military power. He (Sir Hussey Vivian) hardly understood how that could be. Then came the question of the Government not being able honourably to retire from the engagements which were contracted beforehand. Upon that point, he could express no opinion, as he did not belong to either of the Governments concerned; but this was clear, that the question was never decided by Parliament, and that Parliament never came to any resolution whatever in the matter. His right hon. Friend the Member for Mid Lothian (Mr. W. E. Gladstone) referred a great deal to the flourishing condition of this question during the 20 years prior to 1883, yet during that period it never received the sanction of Parliament. He (Sir Hussey Vivian) believed that no one thought at that time that it was possible to construct the Channel Tunnel, and therefore the world at large disregarded the question and never thought seriously of it. At any rate, the question was never brought forward and sanctioned in the House, and they could not go back upon any correspondence which passed between the Government of this country and the Government of France; therefore he considered that this country was in no way honourably pledged or bound by such correspondence. It was only the Parliament of this country that could bind us to any particular action. Now, as regarded the general question. It came out before the Committee that it was perfectly certain that heavy goods would not pay to send through the Tunnel. Take the case of coal. Our transactions with France in coal were very large. Those who were best informed on the question of the coal traffic never ventured to say that the coal traffic with France would be taken through the Tunnel. Why, coal could be delivered in France from the Tyne or from Wales for 4s. a-ton and it could be laid down at the very place where it was wanted—at Rouen or Dunquerque, or some other port, close to the place where it was used, and he defied any Railway Company by means of a Tunnel to deliver coal from Newcastle to Dunquerque, or from Newcastle to Rouen, which is in the immediate vicinity of the great manufactories of France, for 4s. a-ton or for three times 4s. a-ton. The hon. Member (Sir Edward Watkin) knew perfectly well that no Railway Company could do it. There were many other heavy goods which no one had ventured to say were likely to be carried through the Tunnel. It was quite possible that some light and artistic goods might, as the hon. Member for Burnley (Mr. Slagg) had just said, derive some advantage from going through the Tunnel, but heavy goods would never go through it. Then there was the question of distribution, and that, he admitted, was a most important question. The entrepôt business of the ports of London and Liverpool was most important and valuable to this country. The evidence given to the Committee upon that point was, that the distribution could take place better from the port of London or the port of Liverpool to the port in a foreign country nearest to the place where the goods were consumed than by going through a Tunnel at one fixed point distant from the place of consumption. Instead of taking goods to Dover and thence through the Tunnel to Calais, and from there forwarding them to distant places in France, Germany, or Spain, it was much better to deliver them at Havre, or Rouen, or Bordeaux, or Dunquerque, or other French port, or at Hamburg, or whatever port was nearest to the place where the goods were consigned, by a steamer direct from London. Not only was it infinitely cheaper and infinitely better to do so, but they would avoid delay on the French lines. It was pressed upon the Committee very strongly that great delay occurs on the French lines, that when once goods got on the French lines they were not forwarded with the same rapidity that they would be forwarded in this country, and therefore he contended that as fast steamers were now used, it was in all respects better and cheaper to distribute goods from the port of London, or the port of Liverpool, or elsewhere, to the French and German ports, than to send them through a Tunnel and then along the French lines. Such was the evidence given to the Committee, and it produced a very strong impression on his mind. It must be borne in mind that goods so distributed had only one extra loading and not two. It was just as easy, and easier, to put goods from one ship into another at the docks, and then let them be conveyed to a foreign port as it was to put them into a railway truck, and send them through the Tunnel. It was, therefore, only unloading from the ship into a railway truck at the foreign port which was extra, and no more. Very remarkable evidence was given to the Committee with regard to the question of the cost of conveying goods. Mr. Ecroyd, who was then a Member of this House, gave the Committee some very valuable evidence. Mr. Ecroyd said that— The freight on wool from London to Bradford is 37s. 6d. per ton, and from London to Roubaix (in France) 26s. per ton. Therefore, the man who bought wool in London and got it conveyed by rail to Bradford was 10s. per ton worse off than the man who, having his manufactory at Roubaix, bought wool in London and got it taken to Roubaix by steamer from London. Mr. Ecroyd went on to say— But when the goods are manufactured, the freight between Bradford and London for home-trade goods is 43s. 6d. per ton, and the freight between Bradford and Paris for the same goods is 33s. 9d. per ton"— Again a difference of 10s. per ton, although in the latter case the goods had passed over the Channel; and he further remarked— So that even where the goods are sent to Bradford for sale and not to London, the French manufacturer has already a very great advantage in the matter of freights in both directions. Mr. Ecroyd afterwards told them— I find, again, that the freight of woollen yarns, such as we produce, from the Roubaix district is 40s. per ton to Burnley, my nearest town; but the freight from London to Burnley for the like yarns is 50s. per ton. He (Sir Hussey Vivian) thought these facts went to show that the French manufacturers had greater advantages by the present sea route than our home manufacturers had by the railway routes within their own country, and that no real commercial advantage was likely to accrue from the construction of a Tunnel. The Committee received a good deal of evidence with regard to wine and other things, but he would not trouble the House by noticing it in detail. What he was particularly anxious to do was to state distinctly, as a Member of the Joint Committee, that in his opinion no case was made out as to the commercial advantages which would flow from the construction of the Tunnel. He had no doubt that advantages would accrue to the passenger traffic; but, after all, what was the sea passage at present? It only occupied an hour and 10 minutes. How much time would be saved by the Tunnel? He doubted very much whether any time would be saved. As to sea sickness, the fact is, that the passage is now made in large boats, and thus fewer people suffered from sea sickness than formerly. Great exertions were now being made on the French side, and we also were expending large sums of money on our own side, to improve the Channel ports. Immense sums were being expended by the French Government at Boulogne and Calais, and he had no doubt that a very superior service of steamers would, before long, become perfectly practicable, and thus still further reduce sea sickness. This question was worked out with considerable ability by one of our foremost engineers, Mr. John Fowler. Mr. Fowler had produced a scheme for the construction of large steam ferry-boats to cross the Channel—ferry-boats which would take whole train-loads. The proposal was supported by 13 of our most eminent engineers. Mr. Fowler's scheme was twice sanctioned by Committees of the House of Commons, and once by a Committee of the House of Lords. He believed that Mr. Fowler's scheme was quite within the bounds of possibility. He believed that when the new harbours were constructed train-loads could be taken over in ferry-boats, and that people need never be compelled to leave their carriage in the journey from London to Paris. In a construction of that kind, there was no real danger to the country, because it was clear that, so long as we had the command of the Channel, we could prevent the passage of boats of that kind without the slightest difficulty. But if the House sanctioned a Tunnel passing 150 feet beneath the Channel, our fleets might sail uselessly over the Tunnel while thousands and tens of thousands of men were passing through to invade and occupy our country, and the vessels would be perfectly powerless to keep the enemy back. At present we had the grand barrier which Nature had interposed between us and France; but the case would be very different if we constructed such a communication as the Channel Tunnel would afford. In this debate the opinion of military men had been more or less referred to. The Committee examined 10 officers of foremost rank, distinction and experience, and out of that number only one was in favour of the construction of the Tunnel. That officer thought that the risk was infinitessimally small, not worthy of calculation, looking at the manner in which this country had been built up by "incurring risks;" and he went on to say that we ought to invade France; but, on cross-examination, he failed to show how, with our small Army, such an operation would be practicable. Why this country should voluntarily incur risks he altogether failed to see. Unless they could establish a very strong case, a far stronger case than had been established in the House to-day, or had ever been established before, for the construction of this Tunnel, he maintained that we had no business to entail these risks upon ourselves and our posterity. His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge was examined before the Joint Committee, and gave the strongest possible evidence against the scheme. He believed there was no more sensible Englishman in the country than His Royal Highness, and what had he said in his evidence? He said this— I think it would be destructive of the interests of this country, and, therefore, as you are now perfectly secure, I think anything you do to render it less secure than the country is now, is very dangerous, and, to my mind, not justifiable. His Royal Highness pointed out to the House that by allowing the construction of this Tunnel they would be creating a land frontier, and that they would be compelled, by force of circumstances, to adopt the same means of defending the country that other countries with a land frontier had been bound to adopt. Now, what did Lord Wolseley say? Lord Wolseley stated that— There is no commercial advantage possible to calculate or put into figures that could compensate for the risk that would be entailed upon the country by the construction of the Tunnel, assuming also, commercially, the great inconvenience and loss which the country would sustain in panics when the relations between this country were strained, and that panics would give rise not only to commercial losses and damage to industry, but also occasion great and sudden increases to our military establishment, perhaps without any good reason. And he further stated that— He could think of no national advantage which could justify the construction of the Tunnel. He went on to say, when asked whether it would be possible to drive an enemy out when it had once obtained possession of the Tunnel— I think it would be utterly impossible for this country ever to raise its head again, as a free and independent country, if the Tunnel were in the possession of a foreign nation. The other military authorities entirely agreed with Lord Wolseley. Sir J. Lintorn Simmons said— I am of opinion that if an enemy got possession of the Channel Tunnel, Great Britain, with its present military organization, could not possibly expel that enemy from Great Britain. And he went on to emphasize that in this way; in reply to Question 2,232— Then you think that our national dangers might be increased, and that our national in- terests might suffer?" He replied: "I think it might bring national ruin; that is my opinion. I cannot conceive any amount of commercial advantage that could in any way compensate the risk that would be run. He (Sir Hussey Vivian) could read to the House evidence of that character repeated over and over again. It must be remembered that these were statements made by our most experienced Generals. Were we altogether to ignore the opinion of our Generals—experts in military matters—who were the best qualified men amongst us, and bound to consider this question under the grave responsibilities of their position. They had considered it with the greatest possible anxiety, and had come to a distinct and, he might say, unanimous decision against the construction of the Tunnel. He need hardly say that naval men were of exactly the same opinion as the military authorities. Then what an enormous cost would the construction of this Tunnel entail upon the country. Supposing that Parliament allowed the Tunnel to be made, one of the results would be, that we should have to construct a first-class fortress at the mouth of the Tunnel. That would cost a very large sum; some estimated it at £1,500,000, others at £3,000,000. In the first place, this enormous expense would be entailed in order to construct a first-class fortress, and then we should have to keep in it 8,000 to 10,000 men, who would cost from £40 or £42 to £100 a-year each, the latter sum being about the average cost of a soldier of the Regular Army. That meant a permanent increase of our military establishment to the amount of £1,000,000 per annum. But it did not end there. If we once had a land frontier to this country we should be bound to increase our Army—we should be bound to increase it, he might say, to the same extent as foreign nations had increased their Armies. Why had we not been under the necessity of increasing our Army heretofore? Simply because by means of our Navy we had command of the Channel, and because we believed, and he thought rightly, that no enemy could invade us. If they did invade us, we believed that we could shut them up in this country, cut off their base of operations, and entirely destroy and annihilate them. But the very moment they got a land connection all that ceased, and we might depend upon it that the first step of anybody who might desire to invade this country—a Napoleon if he came to life again—would be to seize our end of the Channel Tunnel. Our only security would be in increasing our Army, so that we should be able to meet the Army of France man to man. If they were prepared to do that he, for one, would never oppose the Channel Tunnel. He opposed it entirely because he knew that the Army of this country was not sufficiently numerous and powerful to meet the Army of France, and that it would give rise to a vast increase of our Military expenditure. If they would to-morrow decide upon the adoption of the conscription, and raise an Army of 500,000 men even—he would not say 1,000,000—then he would go into the Lobby for the Channel Tunnel; but so long as he knew that we were not prepared to meet France so long would he oppose the scheme, as be believed that it would be an enormous national danger. His right hon. Friend the Member for Mid Lothian has contrasted the population of England with that of France now and at the time of the war, and had drawn the conclusion that we were now numerically nearly equal to France, while, at the time of the war, we were not much more than one half. He admitted that that would be a weighty argument if his right hon. Friend were prepared to pursue it to its logical sequence and to enact for this country conscription and the same military organization as that of France; otherwise the argument had no practical force. Well, hon. Gentlemen who were in favour of this Tunnel believed that we could be rendered safe against invasion by having the means of destroying the Tunnel at a moment's notice; but the evidence taken by the Joint Committee led him (Sir Hussey Vivian), at any rate, to a wholly different conclusion. So far as blowing up the Tunnel was concerned, he told the House distinctly, having had long experience in colliery matters, that they could not do it. They could not blow up a drift or tunnel 150 feet below the ground. If that were possible many of our collieries would have been blown up long ago. They had had plenty of explosions quite as severe as any which could be occasioned by dynamite or anything else which could be exploded in the Channel Tunnel—and though the under- ground workings were more or less shattered for a certain time, he had never yet known of a colliery blown up to the surface—it was impossible, in fact, to blow up 150 feet to the surface, and it was ridiculous nonsense to talk about it. Then it was suggested that the Tunnel might be mined—that mines of dynamite might be placed around it, and that by touching a button—he thought that was what the hon. Baronet (Sir Edward Watkin) himself had suggested—at the War Office, or in any part of England, they would be able to blow the sides of the Tunnel in. But what did Sir John Hawkshaw—who was rather interested in the making of this Tunnel—say to that? Why, he said that no one would trust himself in a Tunnel mined and charged with dynamite, and liable to be blown to pieces by the touch of some official on a button. He thought Sir John Hawkshaw showed his wisdom when he said that. He (Sir Hussey Vivian) wondered what the sea-sick old lady would say when she knew that she was travelling over dynamite, and that it rested with some one at the War Office whether or not a button was to be touched. Then it was said they might construct such sluices as would flood the Tunnel; but the right hon. Baronet the President of the Board of Trade (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach) had very properly pointed out that we should not know from time to time whether these sluices were in proper order. It would not be possible to exercise them every week or fortnight, and they might get rusted and refuse to act at the critical moment. They would be depending upon delicate mechanical construction which, after a given number of years, might not act as they were expected to do, and thus the safety of the country would depend upon the compliance or refusal of a valve to do the work required of it. Even if a system of this kind were adopted, the question would arise who was to turn the valve or press the button? It would be a very serious question to determine upon—namely, the destruction of this great work and the sacrifice of millions invested in it. If the Tunnel were made, who would take the responsibilty on himself? Suppose that relations were strained between this country and France, at what period of this straining of relations would it be proper to give the order to flood or destroy the Tunnel? His own impression was that no one would be inclined to take upon himself the responsibility of giving such orders, and that the Tunnel would never be destroyed or flooded. They were not altogether without knowledge of what had occurred in cases of this kind. The tunnels through the Vosges mountains between France and Germany were mined, the mines were charged, and there was an officer in charge of the mines instructed to blow them up when the order was given. Instructions were sent to that officer to blow up the tunnels during the Franco-Prussian War, but the officer did not do it; he was afraid of doing it, and the result was that the German Armies passed through. Very well, were we in this country going to create a danger of that kind; were we going to lay this country open to invasion in that way, and for what reason? Had any sufficient reason been given? He answered that it had not. He declared as one who, having listened to all the commercial evidence upon this point, and to all the speeches this day, could not but submit that no sufficient evidence had been given to warrant this House in undertaking the enormous responsibility of creating this danger to the country. Long immunity from war would abate the vigilance we might at first exercise. They must bear this in mind, that long negotiations and extensive correspondence did not generally precede the breaking out of hostilities. The House had had a Paper presented to it which was prepared by the Intelligence Departments—showing that between the years 1770 and 1871 there had been 107 cases in which hostilities had broken out without notice. We might be well assured that if this country was going to be invaded, we should have uncommon little notice of the fact. Now, his right hon. Friend the Member for Mid Lothian (Mr. W. E. Gladstone) had instanced the case of Napoleon, and had said that that great General, with all his military skill and ability, had never been able to invade this country. But then Napoleon had no Channel Tunnel, and he possessed no fast screw steamers which he could concentrate upon a given objective point with absolute certainty at a given hour of any day. The conditions with which Napoleon had to deal were wholly different, as he prepared to bring his troops across in open boats. Therefore, they could not draw a parallel between the state of things in the time of Napoleon and those which would prevail to-day if war broke out. They must anticipate that hostilities would commence without notice, and if the House should sanction the construction of a Channel Tunnel, it must be prepared at all times, and under all circumstances, to resist any attempt by coup de main to take possession of the English end of the Tunnel. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Mid Lothian had said that there had been no anxiety in France in regard to the French end of the Tunnel. Well, why should there be when France had 10 soldiers and 10 guns to our one? Why should they be afraid of any invasion from this country? That was really not in question. As he had said before, if they would raise the numbers of our Army so as to meet the French man to man, he was quite sure that we should not only be able to resist them, but to march from one end of France to the other and take possession of the country without the slightest difficulty. He had no hesitation in saying that. He was a great believer in the pluck and endurance of Englishmen, but that was not our position, and Parliament was not prepared to place the country in that position; and he believed that anyone who voted for the second reading of this Bill to day—though he might not believe it at the time—was assuredly taking a step towards rendering conscription inevitable in this country.

LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL (Paddington, S.)

If I may say so without presumption, I think the hon. Baronet (Sir Hussey Vivian) who has just concluded his speech has made a most valuable and effective contribution to the consideration of this subject this afternoon, and I deeply regret that the attendance in the House was not larger while that contribution was being delivered. Although one would not have thought, from the state of the House, that this question was one of great importance, still there can be no doubt whatever that the importance of the question cannot well be exaggerated, and the only deduction I draw from the somewhat scanty attendance on the Benches on both sides of the House is, not that the subject is not one of importance, but that no interest is taken either in the country or by Parliament in the project we are asked to sanction. The hon. Baronet has addressed to the hon. Member for Burnley (Mr. Slagg), and those who think with him, a convincing and unanswerable argument with regard to the commercial results which are expected to flow from this enterprize. It struck me particularly, when the hon. Members for Hythe and Burnley were addressing the House mainly on this question, that they carefully avoided all facts, figures, and statistics, and dealt solely in generalities. Now, I put it to the hon. Member for Burnley—who is a practical man, and who occupies a deservedly high position in the commercial world, and who has defended this scheme in general phrases—whether, as a man of business, he would invest his money in this project? Unless he is prepared to give not only an unmistakable but a ready reply to that question, then his argument as to the commercial advantages of the Tunnel comes to absolutely nothing.

MR. SLAGG

I have stated that the commercial aspect of the question is not before the House. When it is before the House, I shall be quite ready to give an opinion upon it. It is a matter which, in the nature of things, it would be most improper to comment upon until it is put before us formally and we know the exact conditions and circumstances of the case.

LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL

I know that that question is not before the House. I know the hon. Member and the hon. Baronet have declined to bring this question before the House. But generally, in trying a commercial point, we must know whether investment in an enterprize would be likely to produce a good dividend; and on this point I should say there were no better judges anywhere than the hon. Member and the hon. Baronet, and if the enterprize in question were likely to produce a good dividend, those hon. Gentlemen would not be likely to conceal their opinion from the House. I pass from the commercial question to the other considerations involved. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Mid Lothian (Mr. W. E. Gladstone), not in the least discourteously, but at the same time very forcibly, compared the arguments of the right hon. Baronet the President of the Board of Trade (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach) to bugbears. Now, the speech of the right hon. Baronet the President of the Board of Trade was especially useful in this, that he reminded the House of what seemed to have been forgotten, I admit, that the whole question has been carefully investigated by the highest investigating authority known to this House. We often have recourse to Royal Commissions and Select Committees, but we very rarely have recourse to a Joint Committee of both Houses of Parliament; and it was the Report of such a Joint Committee, which has been so well summarized and explained by the hon. Baronet who spoke last (Sir Hussey Vivian), that formed the weighty foundation for what the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Mid Lothian has called bugbears. Have we really come to this, that an important, weighty, and prolonged Inquiry, conducted by men of position, taking evidence on a question like this, extending over several weeks, and its deliberately and carefully considered Report, is to be stigmatized by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Mid Lothian as a mere collection of fancies and phantoms and bugbears? That is an assertion altogether too loose, and it is unworthy of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Mid Lothian. The chief feature of this debate has been the intervention of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Mid Lothian; and so high does Party feeling run at this moment, so exasperated even are certain subjects in politics, that I greatly fear that there will be a minute and microscopic inquiry to-morrow morning, mainly conducted through the Press, as to the motives which may have induced the right hon. Gentleman to lend his aid to the hon. Member for Hythe. I am not concerned myself to examine into that matter; but I fancy a calculation might be made of a very formidable character to the right hon. Gentleman, and the calculation which I think Party polemics may lead to is this. If the right hon. Gentleman is going to pay as the price of abstention from a vote against his Irish policy—if he is going to pay so much as a Channel Tunnel, what will he pay for a vote, and what will he pay for a group of votes? I do not go into that calculation myself, but that it will be made I have no doubt whatever. I am tempted to make the calculation on account of the extreme weakness and absolute inaccuracy of the reasons advanced by the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. W. E. Gladstone) in support of his change of mind on this question. The right hon. Gentleman said that, in 1881, in 1883, and, again, in 1885, opposition was made by his Government, as a Government, to this project; but that opposition had reference, he says, only to the time at which the proposal was made, and had no reference to the principles of the controversy. That is absolutely contradicted by the speech made in 1883 and by the speech made in 1885 by the then President of the Board of Trade (Mr. J. Chamberlain); and there is no one in this House who will be bold enough to assert that, at any rate in those palmy days, the then President of the Board of Trade did not possess the complete confidence of the right hon. Gentleman. What did the then President of the Board of Trade say in 1883? On the 24th July, 1883, he said that— A Committee of both Houses was appointed. That Committee had now concluded its labours; and although the Members of the Committee had been unable to agree upon any detailed Report, they had made a Report to the House to the effect that the majority of the Committee were of opinion that Parliamentary sanction should not be given to a submarine communication between England and France. Now, there is no limit of time to qualify this condemnation. Then he goes on— The Government having considered both the Report of the Committee, and also the state of circumstances which it disclosed, had decided to adopt their decision."—(3 Hansard, [282] 285.) Not a word in the nature of qualification, not a hope held out to the hon. Baronet the Member for Hythe; but, Sir, we find a remarkable persistency, which is worthy of note, considering the way in which people change in the present day—a remarkable persistence in this view on the part of the right hon. Gentleman the then President of the Board of Trade, because, two years later, when not a shade or a shadow of difference existed between himself and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Mid Lothian, he used these words— From the moment the question arose as to whether the making of this Tunnel might not constitute a great national danger"— A bugbear, as the right hon. Gentleman says— they laid it down that the fullest possible inquiry must be held into that question; and, as a final result, they determined that the whole matter should be considered by a Joint Committee of both Houses, and they agreed to accept the opinion of that Committee."—(3 Hansard, [298] 337.) Well, I think I have shown that the reasons which the right hon. Gentleman has given for lending the weight of his authority in support of a project which, as the Head of a Government, he had strongly and unreservedly condemned, are inconclusive reasons, and not based upon adequate Parliamentary considerations. I am, undoubtedly, impressed against this project; and perhaps I may as well here state to the House that it would be difficult for anyone to take part in a debate of this kind in a more impartial frame of mind than myself, for I am actually a shareholder in a Channel Tunnel, though not the Channel Tunnel of the hon. Baronet the Member for Hythe.

SIR EDWARD WATKIN

The noble Lord is a shareholder in the Tunnel which I have the honour to represent. I saw his name on the register only yesterday.

LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL

All I can say is I am extremely sorry to hear it. It is entirely against my will. The hon. Baronet seems to exercise that extraordinary power of absorption and of devouring every rival scheme which he has so often shown in connection with other projects. It was without my knowledge that he has absorbed into his capacious maw the little enterprize in which I had an exiguous amount of stock. I wish to look at this project from an impartial point of view and without prejudice. But we are told by the hon. Baronet that no possible danger can arise to this country from the construction of this Channel Tunnel. He has told us that it may be easily blocked. I hope the House observed that he carefully abstained from using the word "destroyed"—he said it might be easily blocked by certain machinery which he, or some friend of his, had invented, connected with a button which was to be touched by a Secretary of State for War in a Cabinet in Pall Mall. I ask whether such a ridiculous proposition was a worthy argument to be introduced into such a question as we have before us? Imagine a Cabinet Council sitting in the War Office, around the button; fancy the present Cabinet gathered together and having to decide who should touch the button, and the difficulty of coming to a conclusion whether it ought to be touched. I think that point of the button shows the absurdity of all the precautions we might take to close the Tunnel in the event of war. But we have to consider other possibilities besides the event of war. We have to consider the possible event of what are called strained relations, and that is a matter of much importance, which has only been glanced at, but which I think should be considered with a great amount of care. We must consider the possibility of strained relations between this country and France, because this is a project which is to make our communications with France more easy. I venture to notice, in passing, the rebuke which the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Mid Lothian addressed to my right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade for having asserted, as I think rightly, that the prospects of stability in the Government of France were, perhaps, at the present moment, not so bright as they were four or five years ago. The right hon. Gentleman said— How can you make that assertion, considering that the French Republic went the other day through the arduous and critical operation of electing a President? But that is a proceeding which has to be gone through from time to time, and the fact that the political conflict has taken place does not seem to me to be an indisputable proof of permanence and stability in the Constitution. I wonder that the right hon. Gentleman, who I believe follows French politics very closely, does not recollect that my right hon. Friend had in his mind the very great and, possibly, for all we know, most formidable movement which is now passing through France, and especially in the Provinces against the Government. I do not want to dwell on the fact, although I think my right hon. Friend was right in alluding to the stability, greater or less, of the French Republic. But I come to a much more important question. The right hon. Gentleman seems to think that a great change has come over the public mind with regard to our relations with France, and with regard to the construction of this Tunnel. But are there not ample reasons to ac- count for the change? Twenty-five years ago there were at least three elements of great force which united us with France. We had at that time the recollection of the then recent Crimean War, and of having shared with the French Government all the dangers, the hazards, and expense of that war. We had the effect of the French Treaty which the right hon. Gentleman himself negotiated—and I suppose he would be the last to impair the effect of that Treaty in producing cordial relations between England and France; and then there was a Ruler in France who, on many occasions, had shown himself to be determined on close and friendly alliance with this country. These were the elements which produced real friendship between the two countries. I do not say that that friendly feeling has by any means disappeared; but I point out that the great elements have absolutely disappeared which gave rise to it. The feeling exists; but we have a new element which might, at any moment, produce most dangerous discord between the two countries, and I allude to the element for which we are indebted entirely to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Mid Lothian, and that is the occupation of Egypt. As an independent Member I can state my opinion without entailing any responsibility on anyone else, and I say it is my deliberate opinion and conviction that, as long as the occupation of Egypt continues, there is what I may call a sub-acute casus belli. In support of that assertion, I remind the right hon. Gentleman of what occurred last year, when not only was there a state of dissatisfaction in France, but the French Ambassador informed the Sultan that if he agreed to a Convention with us for the occupation of Egypt, it would be the cause of probable hostility between France and England. We know that our occupation of Egypt produces in the French mind most intense feelings of dissatisfaction. Whether it is beneficial or not, our occupation arouses every feeling of pride and jealousy of which the French mind is capable, and when we know that nothing but the placing of the most complete control upon themselves on the part of the people of France prevents an outbreak of those feelings, I say it is absurd to go back 25 years, and charge those who are sceptical as to the permanence and durability of the French Government as being mere alarmists. I feel sure that the right hon. Gentleman will, on reflection, be of opinion that there are now matters at issue between us and France that might produce a set of circumstances, now happily unknown, when all in this House, without any difference whatever, would be extremely thankful that the Channel Tunnel has not been made. The right hon. Gentleman threw doubts upon the value of military opinions with regard to the matter, but he naturally treated them with more respect than did the hon. Baronet the Member for Hythe, who treated military opinions against his scheme with the same amount of contempt as he would those of a recalcitrant shareholder at a half-yearly meeting of the South-Eastern Railway Company. The right hon. Gentleman certainly adduced an argument which seemed to be satisfactory to his own mind to show why military opinion should not be held to be of great or conclusive weight in this matter. He said he had great respect for military opinion, so far as it related to the absolute operations of war; but he limited his respect to those operations. That strikes me as somewhat illogical. What should we say of a person who said to a physician—"I have great respect for you as long as you are treating a specific disease, but I have none whatever in you when you advise me as to what precautions should be taken to prevent that disease?" I am sure he would be regarded as a most unpractical person. If we are not to pay attention to the advice of our naval and military men in this matter, whose opinions are we to consider? Upon this subject, it is to be observed, that there has been a remarkable unanimity among military men as to the effect of the Tunnel from a military point of view. I am opposed to this Bill on the general grounds such as I have indicated, which go to show that no case has been made out for our running the risk that would here be involved, and no case showing any great and preponderating advantage by which we should be compensated for running that risk. And now I come to the great argument which I am sorry I could not address to the right hon. Gentleman before he spoke, for it is one which I think, with great confidence, will have some effect on hon. Gentlemen before me. Sir, I am invincibly opposed to this project on the ground of economy. I am sure that one certain effect of the Tunnel would be to lead the country into largely increased military expenditure. Now, the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition has a mind capable of rising to every subject which interests the mind of man, and he deals with every subject which he approaches with an ability which is surpassed by almost no other person; but there is one subject which I do not think has attracted the genius of the right hon. Gentleman, and that is expenditure and organization in military and naval affairs. Those are matters of which I think the right hon. Gentleman has not made himself master, and he is indeed somewhat ignorant of what is going on with regard to them, inasmuch as they do not attract his notice. At a time like the present, he is perhaps not aware of the tremendous opposition which exists among military authorities against this project of a Channel Tunnel. Is he aware that it has been proved month by month, and day by day, with increasing force, within the last two or three years, that our military and our naval organization, which is our bulwark without the Tunnel and would be ten times our bulwark with it, is in a state in which no sensible man would place any reliance? Is he aware that there are not 50 independent Members of the House of Commons who would vote confidence in our present military and naval arrangements? I do not think the right hon. Gentleman is aware of that fact. But does the right hon. Gentleman know that we are now going through what in this country produces panic, and that without any Tunnel in existence there are demands for millions of money to be spent in one direction and millions in an other, and for thousands of men to be added to the Army? Does he know that there is in this House a struggling Party for economy and a growing Party in favour of expenditure, who would use the Channel Tunnel as a lever in support of their demands for increased military expenditure? We know that if the Tunnel were constructed, between £2,000,000 and £3,000,000 must be immediately laid out in fortifications. That is not denied. The hon. Member for Hythe, in a burst of unusual generosity—a generosity in his own career absolutely without precedent—when the right hon. Gentleman was in power and the proposal was made to construct the Tunnel, held out some hopes that the shareholders, over whom he appears to exercise some great influence, would vote those millions themselves; but he never denied that a large expenditure would be necessary for the purpose of defending the mouth of the Tunnel. Are hon. Gentlemen opposite who are interested in economy prepared by their votes this day—for the sake of illusory commercial advantages, for the sake of closer friendship with France, which has been shown to be of an equally illusory character—to impose on the taxpayers of the country, either next year or the year after, several millions of taxation for the purpose of fortifying the approaches to the Tunnel? If they are, then I cannot see how they can claim to be practical economists. I feel certain that my right hon. Friend the Member for East Wolverhampton (Mr. Henry H. Fowler) will be affected by this argument, and that he feels great difficulty indeed in supporting a project which he knows, as well as I do, must lead inevitably to a great increase of military expenditure. These are the grounds on which I oppose the Motion, and I consider the arguments are unanswerable in view of the fact that no corresponding advantage has been proved to be likely to accrue from the construction of the Tunnel. I conclude by urging on the House of Commons the well-known trite and common-place maxim—essentially a Conservative maxim—"Let well alone." It is not denied that our position at the present moment, so far as defensive purposes go, is a good one. I may take refuge in the obscurity of a learned language and compare the position of Great Britain to that of virgo intacta. I say it is essentially a good position. Now the hon. Baronet, with his immense patriotism and ardent desire to improve the condition of the people and the wealth and power of the country, comes forward and offers to make that position a better one. And again, Sir, I have recourse to a common-place, and will remind the House and the hon. Baronet, in the hope that they will treat it with the consideration which it deserves, that "Better is the enemy of Good."

SIR HENRY TYLER (Great Yarmouth)

(who spoke amid cries of "Divide!") said, he rose to speak on the question because he found himself placed in a very peculiar position with regard to this subject, and he felt he ought to apologize to the House for not having previously spoken. He had the honour, in 1875, of being appointed by the Conservative Government of that day, together with Mr. Kennedy, the eminent Head of the Commercial Department of the Foreign Office, and the then Solicitor to the Post Office, as a Commissioner to negotiate with some French gentlemen of eminence on the subject of a Channel Tunnel. He would point out that the Conservative Government at that time were thoroughly committed to the principle of a Channel Tunnel equally with the en-Liberal Government. The right hon. Gentleman the present First Lord of the Treasury (Mr. W. H. Smith) was at that time the Officer, as Secretary to the Treasury, of the Conservative Government, under whom he (Sir Henry Tyler) had acted in negotiating for 12 months with the French Commissioners, at the conclusion of which a Convention was framed and signed by the Commissioners on behalf of the two Governments, and that Convention was agreed to with the full approval of his right hon. Friend and the Conservative Government of the day. The hon. Baronet opposite (Sir Hussey Vivian) had given the House a précis of the evidence taken later, before Lord Lansdowne's Commission, which had awakened in his mind many memories with regard to the reports he had made in the past in connection with our communication with India, the Channel communications, and other matters. He felt that he stood now somewhat in the position of a principal criminal before those Members of the House who were so strongly opposed to the project, as one who had on public grounds originally approved and promoted the idea of a Channel Tunnel. He still believed, however, that a Channel Tunnel would be of great commercial advantage to this country and to Europe, and he believes strongly, from ample experience, in the humanizing and civilizing effects of facility of intercourse. In his opinion, instead of the 300,000 who went to and from the Continent in 1875 by the existing shorter means of communication, and the 500,000 who now travelled by those routes, there would be many times that number passing through the Tunnel. He was also of opinion that there was a good deal of misapprehension on the part of hon. Gentlemen on that side of the House as to the danger which might possibly arise, from a military point of view, through this work being carried out. The questions of flooding, blocking, and defending the Tunnel were very simple. The length of the Tunnel would be 23 miles under the sea, and there would be three or four miles of approaches at each end making a total length of 30 miles. There would be a depth of about 200 feet of sea above the Tunnel and the tremendous pressure of water which that represented would always be available at any moment, under proper arrangements, for the purpose of flooding the Tunnel in case of need. Now, it was agreed by the Convention between the two Governments that it should be in the power of either Government not merely to flood or damage or destroy the works of the Tunnel when there was any apprehension of war, but, whenever it was thought fit, to stop the traffic, and that those powers should be exercised without compensation; the only stipulation being that the term of the concession should be lengthened by the addition of the time for which the traffic would be so stopped. He remembered that arguments similar to those now put forward were used against the construction of a railway to Southampton, and the construction of the Suez Canal had been warmly opposed as being likely to endanger British interests. He had at the time when that Canal was under construction ventured to suggest that it would be of more value to British commerce than that of any other nation; and, knowing as an old officer of Engineers how easily and cheaply and securely a Channel Tunnel might be defended, he was now of opinion that no case had been made out against the proposal.

Question put.

The House divided:—Ayes 165; Noes 307: Majority 142.

AYES.
Abraham, W. (Glam.)	Austin, J.
Allison, R. A.	Balfour, Sir G.
Allsopp, hon. P.	Bentinck, rt. hn. G. C
Anderson, C. H.	Biggar, J. G.
Asher, A,	Bradlaugh, C,

Bright, Jacob	Lefevre, right hon. G. J. S.
Brunner, J. T.
Bryce, J.	Lewis, T. P.
Buchanan, T. R.	Macdonald, W. A.
Byrne, G. M.	Maclure, J. W.
Caine, W. S.	Mac Neill, J. G. S.
Cameron, C.	M'Arthur, A.
Campbell, Sir G.	M'Cartan, M.
Campbell-Bannerman, right hon. H.	M'Donald, P.
	M'Donald, Dr. R.
Carew, J. L.	M'Kenna, Sir J. N.
Cavan, Earl of	M'Lagan, P.
Channing, F. A.	M'Laren, W. S. B.
Childers, right hon. H. C. E.	Mahony, P.
	Marum, E. M.
Clancy, J. J.	Mayne, T.
Clark, Dr. G. B.	Menzies, R. S.
Cobb, H. P.	Molloy, B. C.
Coddington, W.	Montagu, S.
Colman, J. J.	Morgan, O. V.
Commins, A.	Morley, rt. hon. J.
Condon, T. J.	Morley, A.
Conway, M.	Mundella, rt. hn. A. J.
Conybeare, C. A. V	Murphy, W. M.
Courtney, L. H.	Nolan, Colonel J. P.
Cox, J. R.	Nolan, J.
Craven, J.	O'Brien, J. F. X.
Crawford, W.	O'Brien, P. J.
Cremer, W. R.	O'Brien, W.
Crilly, D.	O'Connor, A.
Crossley, E.	O'Connor, T. P.
Deasy, J.	O'Doherty, J. E.
Dickson, T. A.	O'Gorman Mahon, The
Dixon, G.	O'Hea, P.
Ellis, J.	O'Keeffe, F. A.
Ellis, T. E.	O'Kelly, J.
Esmonde, Sir T. H. G.	Palmer, Sir C. M.
Esslemont, P.	Parnell, C. S.
Fenwick, C.	Pease, H. F.
Finucane, J.	Pickard, B.
Firth, J. F. B.	Picton, J. A.
Flower, C.	Playfair, right hon. Sir L.
Flynn, J. C.
Foley, P. J.	Potter, T. B.
Forster, Sir C.	Powell, W. R. H.
Fox, Dr. J. F.	Power, R.
Gilhooly, J.	Priestley, B.
Gill, T. P.	Pugh, D.
Gladstone, right hon. W. E.	Puleston, Sir J. H.
	Quinn, T.
Gourley, E. T.	Randell, D.
Graham, R. C.	Redmond, J. E.
Greenall, Sir G.	Redmond, W. H. K.
Hamilton, Col. C. E.	Reed, Sir E. J.
Harrington, E.	Reynolds, W. J.
Harrington, T. C.	Roberts, J.
Harris, M.	Roe, T.
Hayden, L. P.	Rollit, Sir A. K.
Healy, M.	Roscoe, Sir H. E.
Holden, I.	Rowlands, J.
Hooper, J.	Rowlands, W. B.
Illingworth, A.	Russell, Sir C.
James, hon. W. H.	Samuelson, Sir B.
Joicey, J.	Samuelson, G. B.
Kay-Shuttleworth, rt. hon. Sir U. J.	Schwann, C. E.
	Sexton, T.
Kenny, J. E.	Shaw, T.
Kenny, M. J.	Sheehan, J. D.
Kilbride, D.	Sheehy, D.
Lane, W. J.	Stack, J.
Lawson, Sir W.	Stansfeld, rt. hon. J.
Leahy, J.	Storey, S.
Leake, R.	Stuart, J.

Sullivan, D.	Williamson, S.
Sutherland, A.	Wilson, C. H.
Tanner, C. K.	Wilson, I.
Thomas, A.	Woodall, W.
Tuite, J.	Woodhead, J.
Tyler, Sir H. W.
Wallace, R.	TELLERS,
Watkin, Sir E. W.	Slagg, J.
Wayman, T.	Summers, W.
Williamson, J.

NOES.
Addison, J. E. W.	Chamberlain, R.
Agg-Gardner, J. T.	Chaplin, right hon. H.
Aird, J.	Charrington, S.
Allsopp, hon. G.	Churchill, rt. hn. Lord R. H. S.
Ambrose, W.
Amherst, W. A. T.	Clarke, Sir E. G.
Anstruther, Colonel R. H. L.	Coghill, D. H.
	Colomb, Sir J. C. R.
Anstruther, H. T.	Compton, F.
Ashmead-Bartlett, E.	Cooke, C. W. R.
Atherley-Jones, L.	Corbett, A. C.
Baden-Powell, Sir G.S.	Corry, Sir J. P.
Bailey, Sir J. R.	Cotton, Capt. E. T. D.
Ballantine, W. H. W.	Cozens-Hardy. H. H.
Banes, Major G. E.	Cranborne, Viscount
Baring, T. C.	Cross, H. S.
Barnes, A.	Crossley, Sir S. B.
Barran, J.	Cubitt, right hon. G.
Barry, A. H. S.	Curzon, Viscount
Bartley, G. C. T.	Dalrymple, Sir C.
Barttelot, Sir W. B.	Davenport, H. T.
Bates, Sir E.	De Cobain, E. S. W.
Baumann, A. A.	De Worms, Baron H.
Bazley-White, J.	Dillwyn, L. L.
Beach, right hon. Sir M. E. Hicks-	Dimsdale, Baron R.
	Dixon-Hartland, F. D.
Beach, W. W. B.	Donkin, R. S.
Beadel, W. J.	Doringtuns, Sir J. E.
Beaumont, H. F.	Duncan, Colonel F.
Beckett, E. W.	Duncombe, A.
Bective, Earl of	Dyke, right hon. Sir W. H.
Bentinck, Lord H. C.
Bentinek, W. G. C.	Edwards-Moss, T. C.
Beresford, Lord C. W. de la Poer	Egerton, hon. A. J. F.
	Egerton, hon. A. de T.
Bethell, Commander G. R.	Elcho, Lord
	Elliot, hon. A. R. D.
Biddulph, M.	Elliot, hon. H. F. H.
Bigwood, J.	Elliot, G. W.
Birkbeck, Sir E.	Elton, C. I.
Blundell, Col. H. B. H.	Evershed, S.
Bolitho, T. B.	Ewart, Sir W.
Bolton, J. C.	Ewing, Sir A. O.
Bonsor, H. C. O.	Eyre, Colonel H.
Boord, T. W.	Farquharson, H. R.
Borthwick, Sir A.	Feilden, Lt.-Gen. R. J.
Bridgeman, Col. hon. F. C.	Ferguson, R. C. Munro-
	Fergusson, right hon. Sir J.
Bristowe, T. L.
Brodrick, hon. W. St. J. F.	Field, Admiral E.
	Fielden, T.
Brookfield, A. M.	Finch, G. H.
Brooks, Sir W. C.	Finlay, R. B.
Brown, A. H.	Fisher, W. H.
Bruce, Lord H.	Fitzgerald, R. U. P.
Burghley, Lord	Fitzwilliam, hon. W. H. W.
Burt, T.
Buxton, S. C.	Fitzwilliam, hon. W. J. W.
Campbell, Sir A.
Campbell, J. A.	Fitz-Wygram, General Sir F. W.
Carmarthen, Marq. of

Fletcher, Sir H.	Kennaway, Sir J. H.
Foljambe, C. G. S.	Kenny, C. S.
Folkestone, right hon. Viscount	King, H. S.
	Knatchbull-Hugessen, H. T.
Forwood, A. B.
Fraser, General C. C.	Knightley, Sir R.
Fulton, J. F.	Knowles, L.
Gardner, R. Richardson-	Lafone, A.
Gaskell, C. G. Milnes-	Lambert, C.
Gathorne-Hardy, hon. J. S.	Lawrence, Sir J. J. T.
	Lea, T.
Gedge, S.	Lechmere, Sir E. A. H.
Gent-Davis, R.	Lees, E.
Giles A.	Leighton, S.
Gilliat, J. S.	Lennox, Lord W. C. Gordon-
Goldsmid, Sir J.
Goldsworthy, Major General W. T.	Lewis, Sir C. E.
	Lewisham, right hon. Viscount
Gorst, Sir J. E.
Goschen, rt. hon. G. J.	Llewellyn, E. H.
Gray, C. W.	Lockwood, F.
Green, Sir E.	Long, W. H.
Greene. E.	Lowther, hon. W.
Grey, Sir E.	Lubbock, Sir J.
Grotrian, F. B.	Lymington, Viscount
Grove, Sir T. F.	Macartney, W. G. E.
Gunter, Colonel R.	Macdonald, rt. hon. J. H. A.
Gurdon, R. T.
Hall, A. W.	Mackintosh, C. F.
Hall, C.	Maclean, F. W.
Halsey, T. F.	Maclean, J. M.
Hamilton, right hon. Lord G. F.	M'Arthur, W. A.
	M'Ewan, W.
Hamilton, Lord C. J.	Madden, D. H.
Hamley, Gen. Sir E. B.	Makins, Colonel W. T.
Hanbury, R. W.	Mallock, R.
Hankey, F. A.	Maple, J. B.
Hardcastle, E.	Mappin, Sir F. T.
Hardcastle, F.	Marriott, rt. hon. Sir W. T.
Hastings, G. W.
Hayne, C. Seale-	Matthews, rt. hon. H.
Heath, A. R.	Mattinson, M. W.
Heathcote, Capt. J. H. Edwards-	Maxwell, Sir H. E.
	Mildmay, F. B.
Heneage, right hon. E.	Milvain, T.
Herbert, hon. S.	More, R. J.
Hermon-Hodge, R. T.	Morgan, hon. F.
Hervey, Lord F.	Moss, R.
Hill, right hon. Lord A. W.	Mowbray, rt. hon. Sir J. R.
Hill, Colonel E. S.	Mowbray, R. G. C.
Hingley, B.	Mulholland, H. L.
Hoare, E. B.	Muncaster Lord
Hoare, S.	Muntz, P. A.
Hobhouse, H.	Neville, R.
Holloway, G.	Newark, Viscount
Hornby, W. H.	Noble, W.
Houldsworth, Sir W.H.	Norris, E. S.
Howard, J.	Norton, R.
Howell, G.	Paget, Sir R. H.
Hubbard, hon. E.	Parker, hon. F.
Hulse, E. H.	Pearce, Sir W.
Hunt, F. S.	Penton, Captain F. T.
Hunter, Sir W. G.	Plowden, Sir W. C.
Isaacson, F. W.	Plunket, rt. hon. D. R.
Jackson, W. L.	Pomfret, W. P.
Jacoby, J. A.	Portman, hon. E. B.
James, rt. hon. Sir H.	Powell, F. S.
Jardine, Sir R.	Price, Captain G. E.
Jeffreys, A. F.	Raikes, rt. hon. H. C.
Jennings, L. J.	Rankin, J.
Johnston, W.	Reed, H. B.
Kelly, J. R.	Richard, H.

Richardson, T.	Theobald, J.
Ridley, Sir M. W.	Thomas, D. A.
Ritchie, rt. hn. C. T.	Thorburn, W.
Robertson, Sir W. T.	Tollemache, H. J.
Robertson, E.	Tomlinson, W. E. M.
Robertson, J. P. B.	Townsend, F.
Robinson, B.	Vernon, hon. G. R.
Ross, A. H.	Villiers, rt. hon. C. P.
Rothschild, Baron F. J. de	Vincent, C. E. H.
	Vivian, Sir H. H.
Round, J.	Walsh, hon. A. H. J.
Russell, T. W.	Warmington, C. M.
Saunderson, Col. E. J.	Watson, J.
Sellar, A. C.	Webster, Sir R. E.
Seton-Karr, H.	Webster, R. G.
Shaw-Stewart, M. H.	Weymouth, Viscount
Sidebotham, J. W.	Wharton, J. L.
Sidebottom, W.	Whitley, E.
Sinclair, W. P.	Whitmore, C. A.
Smith, right hon. W. H.	Wiggin, H.
	Will, J. S.
Smith, A.	Wilson, Sir S.
Smith, S.	Winn, hon. R.
Spencer, J. E.	Wodehouse, E. R.
Stanhope, rt. hon. E.	Wood, N.
Stanley, E. J.	Wortley, C. B. Stuart-
Stevenson, J. C.	Wright, H. S.
Stewart, M. J.	Wroughton, P.
Stokes, G. G.	Yerburgh, R. A.
Sutherland, T.	Young, C. E. B.
Swetenham, E.
Sykes, C.	TELLERS.
Talbot, J. G.	Douglas, A. Akers-
Taylor, F.	Walrond, Col. W. H.
Temple, Sir R.

Bill read the third time, and passed.

Words added.

Main Question, as amended, put, and agreed to.

Second Reading put off for three months.