§ LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL, Member for South Paddington, rose in his place, and asked leave to move the Adjournment of the House, for the purpose 1025 of discussing a definite matter of urgent public importance, viz., the Despatch of a British Battalion to Suakin; and the pleasure of the House having been signified:—
LORD RANDOLPH CHUECHILLThe House may well imagine that nothing but the very gravest imaginable reasons would have induced me to take so serious a step as moving the Adjournment of the House and interrupting Business. Nothing, I say, but the gravest reasons would have induced me, who have, at any rate, for a short time been responsible for the conduct of the Business of the House, to make such a Motion. No one is better aware than I am how exceedingly precious the time of the House of Commons is, at all times, and especially at the present moment. I know that the loss of a night is a loss of the most material and important character, and I have well weighed the nature of that loss and of the interruption to Business for which I am responsible. But I have come to the conclusion that there are reasone which must be weighed against the loss of a night for the despatch of ordinary Business, and those reasons raise the great issue of human life—they raise the issue of the lives of British soldiers; and if by the action of the House to-night the danger to the lives of British soldiers be averted, I think that the loss of a night for the despatch of Business may turn out for the advantage and interest of the country. No hon. Member will, I think, deny that there is every probability, if the course adopted by the Government be carried out, that, within the next few days, a battle will be fought at Suakin between British troops and Egyptian troops on the one hand, and Arab tribes on the other, and that there is a probability, amounting almost to certainty, that the battle will be distinguished for heavy and possibly desperate fighting. The House of Commons has to decide whether they will allow that battle to take place or not. It is to be regretted, indeed, that the House of Commons in matters of this kind is usually prevented from taking what I may call anticipatory action. As a general rule, the Executive Government present the House of Commons with a fait accompli, and the House has no other function to perform than to act as a 1026 Court of Review in pronouncing whether the action taken by the Executive is right or wrong. Its powers are seriously hampered by the fact that such action has been taken and cannot be undone. The House on this occasion is placed on a different footing. Before it has generally happened that action has been taken by the Executive Government, which action would not have been taken had the full circumstances been laid before the House of Commons, and had the House of Commons full opportunity of considering the circumstances. I adduce in support of that statement the remarkable instance of the bombardment of Alexandria. From information now in our possession, in all human probability, if the facts connected with the bombardment of Alexandria had been laid before the House of Commons, that bombardment would never have taken place, and the innumerable evils which have followed would have been prevented. In this case the House of Commons is situated in a more fortunate position; but the very good fortune of that position is accompanied with a disadvantage, because it imposes a heavy responsibility which the House of Commons does not ordinarily incur. There can be no doubt that every Member of Parliament who votes against this Motion to-night must take upon his own shoulders a large and heavy share of the responsibility for the action which is about to take place at Suakin, and a large share of the responsibility for the results which must follow. The object of this Motion is to ask the House of Commons to prevent, at any rate for the present, that battle from being fought, to prevent, in fact, any serious hostilities in which British troops may be engaged until much more serious consideration has been given to the question by the Executive Government of the day and much more ample information is in the possession of the House of Commons. It will be doubtless said by the Members of the Government that this Motion can have no effect; that is an argument which is sure to be brought forward tonight, but it is utterly valueless. There is not the slightest doubt whatever of the matter, and no Member of the House need have the slightest fear that, if the House of Commons determines this evening that it does not approve, or 1027 that it disapproves, the policy of sending a British battalion to Suakin, any Government would dare to fly in the face of that expression of opinion. No Government can neglect an expression of opinion of that kind. If the Government say that the Motion is inconclusive and inconvenient, I say that it is the recognized method in the House of treating matters of urgent public importance. I daresay Her Majesty's Government will bring pressure to bear upon those who support them—an urgent pressure, a pressure in the nature of hints, and possibly more than hints, of the gravest consequences which may follow the adoption of the course I recommend. I do not blame the Government for adducing arguments of that kind to the House, but I can assure the House that there is not the slightest danger of the risk of a resignation of the Ministry or a Dissolution of Parliament. It will be obvious, not only to hon. Members opposite, but to those who sit on this side of the House, that there is not a possibility of the existence of a Government which should appeal to the country on the question whether a British expedition should go to Suakin; and if that be a conclusive answer in the one case it equally applies to the other alternative. Therefore not only is the House of Commons, as I have pointed out, in the fortunate position of being able to take anticipatory action which will be effective in preventing the event which I dread, but more than that, the House of Commons is singularly fortunate in being able to act with unusual freedom and without that undue pressure which the Government as a rule can apply. Now, what is the end of the action which the Government propose to take, and which I ask the House of Commons to use its great power to modify? The nature of the action is this—it was well expressed by the Secretary of State for War on Saturday—that a British battalion was sent to Suakin, that it was necessary to raise the siege of Suakin, and that the force intended for that purpose was composed of 4,000 Egyptian troops and one battalion of British Infantry. Now, I will not discuss to-night, and I hope the House of Commons will not discuss, the general question of the Soudan, or any other general question, or the advantages or disadvantages of our retaining 1028 our hold on the Soudan, or whether the advantages or disadvantages are mainly Egyptian or British, or whether our operations on the Red Sea are for good or not for good. I further venture to hope that the House will not to-night discuss the matter of the Slave Trade, all these matters not being pertinent to my Motion. I will not discuss, and I hope the House will refuse to discuss, any alternative action to that of the Government. I submit without fear of contradiction, confident of the approval of the highest Parliamentary authority, that it is not the business of the House of Commons, when it differs from the Government of the day, to suggest alternative action. I protest against such a proceeding as utterly destructive of the independence of the House of Commons. Circumstances arise with which the Government of the day propose to deal by certain specific methods, and all the House of Commons has to do is to pronounce whether those plans are good or bad, safe or unsafe, defensible or the reverse. The plan adopted by the Government of sending an expedition to Suakin composed of 4,000 Egyptian troops and one battalion of British Infantry is a plan which is not safe, is not sensible, and which in no sense of the word can, in the light of the experience of the past, be considered by the House of Commons as a good plan. The ground upon which I venture to press this Motion upon the House is that the British Contingent is wholly inadequate to the work which it is expected to perform. Sir, we have no business in employing British soldiers in any part of the world, but more especially in such parts as the Soudan, to run any unnecessary risks. Unnecessary risks are at all times to be deprecated and condemned; and that we are running an unnecessary risk there can be no doubt whatever in sending this small battalion of British Infantry overwhelmed among a mass of 4,000 utterly unreliable Egyptian troops. I should like to recall the recollection of the House to what have been the difficulties and disasters which have arisen from the employment of inadequate forces—of British forces too small for the work they had to do—in meeting savage and warlike tribes, and other enemies of a stubborn character. The Zulu War was a case in point. That war was commenced with inadequate British forces; defeat 1029 and disaster followed, and immense expenditure and immense efforts were required to make up for the primary and cardinal error of sending out inadequate forces. Nothing contributed so much to the fall of the Government of that day as the conduct of the Zulu War. The Boer War of 1881 was another instance of attempting to do work admitted to be difficult with inadequate British forces. Again immense expenditure and grave loss of life followed that cardinal error. Those two instances alone would give great point and force to the contention I lay before the House, that one battalion of British Infantry with a mass of Egyptian troops is an inadequate force for the task set before it. Not only do those and other examples which I might quote point to the danger of attempting considerable operations with inadequate forces, but if we should want an illustration of employing inadequate forces we find it in past events at Suakin itself. No doubt the Government of that day were singularly unfortunate in their treatment of the Soudan, but it is a matter that is now hardly denied that many blunders must be laid to their charge. One blunder, however, they did not make; they did not attempt to encounter the Soudanese warriors with inadequate forces. The first expedition of General Graham was essentially a strong force. Yet we know that very heavy fighting attended that expedition. The second expedition to Suakin, also, I think, under the command of General Graham, was nearly double in size and accompanied by Indian troops; and, moreover, the House must bear this in mind, because it brings out the fighting qualities of those Arab troops—that expedition was at one time in danger of total overthrow when under the command of Sir J. M'Neill, and, but for the desperate gallantry of an Indian regiment, inevitable and overwhelming disaster must have followed. That incident is of great importance in considering the sort of expedition we have to contemplate, and it has a force which the House of Commons will admit as an argument against sending any such expedition without a strong and adequate force of British troops. Why do I urge these points upon the House? Because I hold that in sending one battalion of British Infantry to Suakin you are flying in the face of all our experience. But I 1030 would not dare to interrupt the Business of the House on that plea alone; I would not dare to set up my opinion against that of the Executive Government, if it were not for this very, very grave fact—I state it as a positive fact, and I implore the House to give that fact the weight which I think it deserves—that in deciding to send one British battalion to Suakin, Her Majesty's Government have acted against the advice of responsible and high military authorities here. That would appear to be perfectly clear from the cautious answer—of which I do not in the least complain—which the Secretary for War gave to my Question this afternoon. But if it did not appear from that, I state it as a positive fact, and I defy contradiction, that high military authorities at home have disapproved of this sending of one battalion of British Infantry to Suakin. Can anything better illustrate the curiosity of our military organization—that a Military Expedition can take place against the advice and be composed in a manner disapproved of by high military authority in command of the Army? That is undoubtedly the fact. And, Sir, this is also the case, which the House of Commons will also bear in mind—that if by any chance these operations are not attended with success, no responsibility whatever can fall upon high military authorities at home. That is a very serious matter, but it does not stand alone. I should have thought that it must be to many hon. Gentlemen in this House a matter of notoriety that military opinion is universal in deprecating and condemning the fact of this single battalion of British Infantry being sent to Suakin. I do not know if the Secretary for War finds time to read the military papers. The Army and Navy Gazette, which I think may be taken as carrying some weight as the expression of military opinion, contained an article on Saturday last strongly condemning the policy adopted by Her Majesty's Government with regard to that matter. I am quite aware that the Secretary of State for War bases his decision upon the opinion of the Egyptian authorities. These Egyptian authorities I take to be mainly three—Sir Evelyn Baring, General Dormer, and General Grenfell. I put aside Sir Evelyn Baring, because he is not more 1031 qualified to give an opinion than anyone else upon an exclusively military matter. I say in the mildest manner possible that I do not think Sir Evelyn Baring has been altogether fortunate in the advice he has given to successive Governments. So I take General Dormer and General Grenfell. I have heard on all sides that they are two most excellent officers in every way, and advice given by them, if corroborated by the military authorities at home, would undoubtedly be of great weight; but when I find their advice not carrying weight with military authorities at home, not carrying the weight so high an authority ought to carry, I am obliged to consider that their opinion is influenced by considerations—considerations of a natural and praiseworthy character, but which do not tend to an impartial judgment of the case. General Dormer is in command of the British Forces in Egypt. He is a gallant officer, and naturally the officer in command of the British Forces at Cairo, surrounded by many gallant officers of a similar character to himself, would be desirous, and rightly desirous, that the forces under his command should not miss an opportunity of brilliantly maintaining British interests and gaining distinction and renown. That is a matter which must be borne in mind in estimating the weight to be attached to the advice given by General Dormer. General Grenfell is placed in a still more peculiar position, for he is in command of the Egyptian Army, and he and other officers under his command have, in a most indefatigable manner, devoted much time and skill in its organization and training, and I can understand that they would be by no means loath to show that the Egyptian Army had, under their training, become an efficient implement of war. Those are considerations which would not have been of any value but for the fact that the opinions of those officers were disapproved of by the military authorities at home. In addition to those considerations, it must be borne in mind that the opinion of the military authorities at home has been sought, has been given, and has been overruled. Why has that advice been overruled? The reason, I think, is obvious, and the House should lay it to heart. This expedition, if the Government determined 1032 upon it, was obliged to be an expedition that would not cost a large sum of money. It was an expedition which had to be done, if done at all, on the cheap. Neither this nor any other Government would now venture, under present circumstances, to ask the House of Commons to vote a large sum of money to defray the cost of a great expedition to the Soudan. Then, under those circumstances, if an expedition had been sent to Egypt, Egypt would have to pay, but the resources of the country are slender and limited, and if a large British force had been sent, such as might have been considered adequate by prudent men, the charge on the Egyptian Revenue would have been greater than the Egyptian Government could have afforded. It is for that reason, and I expect for that reason alone, the military authorities resolved to run the great risk of sending one British battalion. The fact of the matter is that this expedition to Suakin has not been sufficiently considered by the Government. Of course, information has been laid before the Cabinet, but for a matter so grave, involving such immense issues, I hold it has not been sufficiently considered. I am certain of that, because the First Lord of the Treasury, in response to the right hon. Member for Newcastle (Mr. John Morley), who made a demand for Papers, said that the communications which had passed between the British and Egyptian Governments were so very few that he did not think it would be easy to find records of them. That I think is a most significant announcement. The Government have decided to recommence operations in the Soudan, and have taken that decision upon communications with the Egyptian Government so scanty and so slight, that there are practically none to lay before the House. Now, I do submit that a decision such as that should not have been taken except on communications with the Egyptian Government most copious and frequent, and innumerable questions of every sort and kind as regards the operations contemplated should have been addressed to the authorities in Egypt, Native and English, and should have been fully and satisfactorily answered. It is obvious from the reply of the First Lord of the Treasury that that cannot have been done. Now, the two grounds on which I ask the 1033 House to interfere are—first, the inadequacy of the British force for the operations which have to be performed, an inadequacy borne witness to, practically, by the great military authorities; and, secondly, the obvious insufficiency of the consideration which Her Majesty's Government have been able to give, up to the present, to this most important matter. There is another point which I must simply mention. If the House of Commons does not interfere, a battle will be fought within a very few days, and we have no intimation that any serious or earnest attempt has been recently made at negotiations with the foe. Let hon. Members on this side recall the events of 1881 connected with General Graham's first expedition to the Soudan. Hon. Members at that time on the Opposition Benches pressed upon the Government of the right hon. Member for Mid Lothian (Mr. W. E. Gladstone), and forced on his Government that they should make an earnest and serious effort at negotiation with the Arab tribes before General Graham was allowed to advance. We pressed our demand unanimously, and we were successful, for the Government undertook to make efforts in that direction. That was what the Tory Party did in those days, and I merely recall that to show what view the Tories of those days took of such expeditions to the Soudan. I know it is stated now by competent authorities that negotiations with these tribes are not altogether impossible, nor altogether hopeless; that there are negotiations which might be considered and might be undertaken. Sir, I do think the House of Commons ought to be very careful, before authorizing what amounts to slaughter and bloodshed, to see that the Government of the day exhaust every means by which that slaughter and bloodshed may be averted. But for the purposes of my present argument, it does not matter whether the Government show that negotiations are hopeless or whether they admit that negotiations are possible. What I point out is this—that on military grounds, and on high military authority, the operations contemplated by the Government are unsound and unsafe operations. They are going to risk a battalion of British Infantry in another battle in the Soudan. It is one of the very finest battalions in 1034 the British Army, numbering some 600 or 700 men. Have we so many of those fine regiments that we ought to fritter them away unnecessarily in the desert round Suakin? It is recorded that Prince Bismarck once said that he would not risk the bones of a single Pomeranian Grenadier in connection with the Eastern Question. I wish that that idea of Prince Bismarck could permeate the minds of our Ministers from time to time, and that they would be a little more careful—I would almost say a little more avaricious—of the bones of British soldiers. I do not hesitate to say that I hate the Soudan. The idea to me of risking the life of a single British soldier in that part of the world is inexpressibly repugnant. I do not believe that any gain can accrue to this country, no matter how great may be the military success, and I am certain that great loss and danger may come if those military expeditions are not successful. The risk which we run is not only unnecessary, but, in the event of success, the result is altogether incommensurate with the risk. I cannot help pointing out to hon. Gentlemen on this side of the House, so vivid is the impression made on my mind by past events, that not only is the Government going to risk the lives of British soldiers in circumstances disapproved of by high military authorities, but Her Majesty's Government is risking more; it is risking its own life. It is risking the life of the Party which supports it, and the strength of all the interests which that Party represents, because hon. Members on this side can imagine, possibly with greater accuracy than Members on that, what would be the fate of any Government which had to ask the country to approve of large and expensive operations in the Soudan, for as prudent men you are bound to calculate on the possibility of those operations being of a large and expensive character. I do most earnestly ask the House—in view of the very great risk which is going to be run, in view of the military opinion to which the House must attach weight, in view of the utterly incommensurate result which can follow oven from success—I ask the House to take action to-night which at any rate may persuade the Government to reconsider this whole matter before entering upon a course which must involve great bloodshed and great slaughter. I have 1035 shown that the House of Commons, I think, has complete power to act, and that, having complete power to act, if it does not act, the whole responsibility for any battle which may happen within a few days, any loss of life and any other results that may follow the battle, rests on the House of Commons and every Member of it. I have shown the House that it is free to act, that it is free from all pressure, owing to the circumstances of the moment—Pressure usually brought to bear on a Party in a majority. I have also shown the House that its action must be effective—that if the House did decide to accede to this Motion, the battle which otherwise would be fought must be averted, and possibly indefinitely postponed. I have shown the House that in that battle there will be fighting a battalion of British Infantry among a mass of unreliable Native allies in circumstances which high and responsible Military Authorities disapprove and condemn. I do ask the House most earnestly to exert its authority. I ask it to stretch out its arms, reaching out as it were many thousands of miles away, right down on that African coast, interposing and arresting slaughter and bloodshed. I think I have adduced weighty ground for that request. But there is another point which occurs to me, which I also adduce with great hope, but, certainly, with some hesitation. There is a great Englishman, I can call him by no other name, a Member of this House, who is now lying on a bed of severe affliction, to the immense and profound grief of all of us. I cannot help recalling that on one great occasion that great man made an earnest and eloquent appeal to the House of Commons to avert and arrest the slaughter of British soldiers who had been sent to a distant shore, and in a passage of singular eloquence, so beautiful and so widely known that while it has ascended to the dignity of a classic it has almost descended to the level of a commonplace, he implored the House to exert its authority to save the lives of British soldiers who were, in his opinion, likely to be unnecessarily sacrificed. Who is there, I should like to know, in this House, who, looking back to those days, would not regret that the voice of that right hon. Gentleman had not greater influence and power with the Government of 1036 that day? Sir, we of the Unionist Party, and I believe the entire House, attach great value to the opinion of that great man. We cannot doubt what advice he would give us with regard to this new comtemplated sacrifice of British soldiers had he been among us this afternoon and his health and strength permitted. I do submit no better recognition could be offered by the House, no more brilliant tribute could be rendered to the regard in which his name is held in the hearts of the people, than if we were to reflect that he would tell us to pause before we entered rashly on a career of warlike operations in the Soudan. Sir, I feel I must apologize to the House for having spoken at some length, but I hope the House will feel that the lives of British soldiers are in their hands and under their direction—that the British soldiers at Suakin are going to be placed in a position in which no prudent military man would place them. I implore the House to exercise its authority, and to save, if possible, the lives of British soldiers threatened with useless sacrifice. I implore the House to act so as to prevent so great a catastrophe. The noble Lord then moved the Adjournment of the House.
§ SIR LEWIS PELLY (Hackney, N.)Sir, in rising to second the Motion, I cannot tell the House how deeply I regret that, on almost the first occasion on which I have broken silence during the three years that I have had the honour of sitting in this House, I may possibly interfere with the progress of Business. I would not do so if I were not deeply impressed with my duty on this occasion. I will limit my remarks to the simple question of a military advance, or otherwise, towards Suakin. One asks one's self what is the object of that movement, which, I understand, the highest Military Authorities of this country disapprove? Supposing you have got your 3,000 or 4,000 Egyptian troops at Suakin, with a handful of English, and with the enemy in front of you; of two things one will result. Either when you leave Suakin and proceed to their forts they will retire to the jungle, or they will oppose you. If they retire to the jungle you may destroy their forts and injure their wells, and then you will return to Suakin. I know the Arabs very well. I have punished them over a 1037 dozen times, and always with very small means. I know they are very unpleasant men to meet when they think they have right on their side. If they think you are exercising against them the brute force of civilization, without its justice, sometimes they are almost as good men as we are. The first thing you ought to do is to be sure of the justice of your cause, and the second is to make the tribes feel that your cause is just, and to carry their opinion with you. When you have done this you will have very little trouble. I know not whether negotiations have been carried on with these tribes or not, but I have always found that the best way to deal with them is to talk to them, to explain to them, to lead them in the right way, like children as they are, and then, if they persist in the wrong, to take measures that will be effectual and lasting. I do not see what good will result from going to Suakin. We have tried that sort of Wheel Tax policy over and over again. What is the use, from a statesmanlike point of view, of going up to a certain point, knocking a few men over, and then having to go over the work again? If you go to Suakin, go with a policy. Decide whether it is your intention to hold Egypt against all comers, or to take the alternative and clear out. I do not fear putting English troops before these Soudanese if they are alone; but I am not quite so sure what the result would be if you had 2,000 or 3,000 Egyptians hanging on the skirts of your Englishmen and ready to fly at any moment. I would certainly rather not put our men in that position, unless the Government are able to explain to us what is to be their policy when the battle has been fought and the troops have returned to Suakin. Ascertain your policy first, and stick to it, and feel that a great Empire cannot go back. If you intend to stay at Suakin and in Egypt, do it like statesmen, and on statesmanlike grounds. I fear that Party Government has done us much harm in regard to Egypt. If we had always stuck to the broad road of statesmanship, and had avoided the inextricable jungle of Party manoeuvres, we should never have got into the present difficulty. I beg to second the Motion.
§ Motion made, and Question proposed "That this House do now adjourn."—(Lord Randolph Churchill.)
1038§ THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (Mr. E. STANHOPE) (Lincolnshire, Horncastle)I do not desire to dispute the proposition which the noble Lord put forward, that in bringing this Motion forward he has been actuated solely by motives of humanity. He said that his great desire was to save the lives of British soldiers in a battle which may take place at Suakin at no distant day; and I have no doubt that since the debate which took place on Saturday last the noble Lord has had this matter in his mind, and that he has held consultation with other persons, but the one person to whom he has not given Notice is myself. Although the noble Lord is so anxious to avert the battle, and to save human life, at least he might have had the courtesy—the ordinary courtesy which is shown even by a political opponent—to privately communicate with me beforehand that he intended to move the Adjournment of the House. But, Sir, I am quite prepared, though I speak absolutely without Notice, to meet all the points brought forward by the noble Lord, and I must ask the House to bear with me a little time while I go over the wide ground which the noble Lord covered. As I understand the noble Lord, his view is that it is not safe to go to Suakin. It is not safe, he says, to send these troops there. How does he know anything about it? I listened in vain for any observation from the noble Lord tending to show us that he knew anything about the conditions now existing at Suakin—that he examined or asked anyone to tell him the force opposed to us. With the exception of the alleged opinion of Military Authorities, to which I shall refer later, the noble Lord has absolutely given nothing to the House—he has not produced a single fact to the House—to induce it to believe that this policy is not a safe one. Although the noble Lord is unable to give the House any information, I may say that the Government is in full possession of information on this point, and it is on that they have acted. The steps which have been taken, and the steps we propose to take, are based upon information which has been sent home as to the exact condition of affairs at Suakin at the present moment. The noble Lord urged, among other things, that negotiations should be carried on with the tribes instead of 1039 fighting them. Is he not aware that, according to all our information, negotiations are forbidden by the Mahdi, that the tribes which fight in his name are not allowed to enter into negotiations with us, and that he has declared his determination to drive the Egyptians into the sea? As to the local tribes, it is clear they are not taking part in these operations. They stand aloof, and from them, at least, we have no cause to fear. Let us examine the ground upon which the noble Lord says that this expedition is not safe. The noble Lord absolutely commits himself to this statement—that there is at Suakin an utterly unreliable Egyptian Army. I utterly deny that statement, and I do so on the authority of those most competent to speak—I mean the authority of the English officers in Egypt. The Egyptian Army—and I speak particularly of the black battalions—[Derisive Laughter]—are thoroughly loyal. These black battalions—[Interruption on the Opposition side]—
§ MR. SPEAKEROrder, order!
§ MR. E. STANHOPEThese black battalions have proved in previous contests that they are a force upon which you can rely, and I think that the account of the march that they executed, which is reported in the papers this morning, proves that they are men possessing much more than ordinary stamina, and I believe also much more than ordinary courage. This was the verdict of English officers. Then the noble Lord says the British Contingent is inadequate, which, he says, is amply proved by the fact that on previous expeditions we sent a very large force. Surely the noble Lord cannot venture to suggest that there is any parallel between these previous expeditions and this expedition. These expeditions were undertaken for an object of a wide and very extensive character. In one case the expedition was nothing less than a part of a scheme for the re-conquest of the Soudan, and, among other things, for making a railway from Suakin to Berber and protecting the railway in the land of a hostile people. Compare that with the present operation, which is undertaken for the sole purpose of raising the siege of Suakin, which is practically to be carried out under the cover of British guns. "Oh," says the noble Lord. "I understand the policy 1040 of the Government; they want to do this matter on the cheap." I do think the noble Lord might have given a little more credit to his political friends than that. The responsibility of the Government, my own responsibility, is far too great for any such consideration as that, and I am perfectly certain we should every one of us be determined, whatever consideration actuated us, that the fear of being turned out of Office ought not to weigh with us in comparison with this circumstance, that we are responsible to the country for the steps we are now taking, and that those steps must be adequate for the purpose for which they are undertaken. The noble Lord then turns to the high Military Authorities. He seems, according to his view, to be very well informed with regard to the communications which have passed between my Military Advisers and myself. But the noble Lord knows he takes me at a very great disadvantage, because if I would, it is utterly impossible for me to lay before the House confidential communications which have passed between my Military Advisers and myself; and he knows that if any Minister were to do anything of the kind the action of Governments at the most critical moments might be paralyzed and rendered inoperative. The House, therefore, cannot expect me to give information.
LORD RANDOLPH CHUROHILLI never asked for any confidential information. I merely stated it as a fact that the Military Authorities at home did not approve of the despatch of a single battalion. That is a fact which can be asserted or denied. It does not require any confidential information.
§ MR. E. STANHOPEThat is an evasion of the point I have just been stating to the House. It is all very well for the noble Lord to make certain definite statements, but he knows well that I cannot meet him on equal terms, because it is not in my power to give him definite and distinct information, and if I gave partial information it might mislead the House. I am, therefore, not prepared to take the responsibility of departing from the course which all my Predecessors have followed. I have received representations from my military advisers. As a matter of course, no one can doubt that I should in the most frank and confidential manner have 1041 entered into communication with those who advise me at the War Office. Those who advise me at the War Office are not, of course, so cognizant of the state of things actually existing at Suakin as certain other military authorities whom I have also had to consult. The noble Lord has mentioned those authorities. He has alluded in particular to General Dormer and General Grenfell, and he spoke in terms of high praise of those officers, who likewise enjoy the confidence of Her Majesty's Government. It is plainly our duty to press them to give us full information in order that we might exercise our responsibility with a full knowledge of the circumstances. What is the fact? This state of things, which I described on Saturday as a siege of Suakin, has been going on for some little time. It is not a very large matter altogether, because the number of troops engaged in the siege is exceedingly limited, but they have had the advantage of intrenching themselves in a position too close to the town to be pleasant, and there they are able effectually to shelter. The Egyptian authorities have made various attempts which have almost been successful, even with the limited forces at Suakin, to dislodge them; and the time came at last when, in the opinion of the Ministers of the Khedive, it was absolutely necessary to take further steps for the purpose of driving the enemy out of those positions of advantage. They proposed, in the first place, to send some extra black battalions in Egypt, and they were confident that with the addition of these battalions they could easily and without doubt accomplish the object intended. Accordingly steps were taken for sending those black battalions from Cairo to Suakin, and we were ready to assist in that object by allowing a certain number of English troops to go up the Nile to defend the frontier during the temporary absence of these black troops. But when they came face to face with the operations they thought that, on the whole, they had an insufficient force of Cavalry, and if their operations were to be completely successful, some additional Cavalry would be required for the purpose of getting round the main body of the enemy. The first thing we heard on the matter from those on the spot was when they suggested that a very small body—indeed, to show the House 1042 the magnitude of the operation as it appeared to the Egyptian Government, I may say, I believe, the number was about 70—of Cavalry from Aden should be sent to assist in the operations about to be commenced. Her Majesty's Government considered this application with very great care. When my noble Friend talks about insufficient consideration, I think he might have given us credit for acting after full consideration and with a desire to know all the circumstances. We decided to make an offer to the Egyptian Government of an additional white force, if they wanted it, to make the operations more successful. Accordingly careful consultations took place at Cairo, and the Egyptian Government eventually replied that they would like to be allowed to move a battalion of white troops from Cairo, and also to take a certain number of Mounted Infantry from there. Those operations have been sanctioned by the British Government, and there have been no other suggestions of any further force being required coming from the Military Authorities in Egypt to Her Majesty's Government. I have frankly told the House the whole state of the case. The force now proceeding to Suakin is, in the opinion of the Military Authorities in Egypt, perfectly adequate for the purpose, and no doubt is entertained as to its success. In common with the noble Lord, I felt, when a representation was addressed to me by my military advisers in this country, that some further steps might betaken, and accordingly I telegraphed to Egypt stating in the plainest possible words that the Military Authorities here had made certain communications to me upon the subject, and asking them to tell me whether General Grenfell is at the present time absolutely satisfied that he, as the officer who was going to command the expedition, had enough force successfully to accomplish his object. I may say, with the facts fully before us, and with the deliberate opinion of those on the spot who are best able to judge, we are prepared deliberately to accept the responsibility for what has been done, because we are sure that we have taken every reasonable step in the matter. What is the alternative? The noble Lord asks that the House will adjourn for the purpose of stopping this expedition altogether. Let the House 1043 consider what that means. Here is Suakin in a state of siege, that has in the last month or two become very much more serious than it was before. It is a state that the Egyptian authorities say cannot be allowed to continue. If we were to allow this expedition to stop while our various advisers in the House of Commons made up their minds to an alternative policy, such a step might be described as the noble Lord described it on Saturday—a slovenly policy, and one which the House ought not for a moment to sanction. We cannot allow the state of things at Suakin to continue; we are taking all reasonable steps to put an end to it; and we have no reason to doubt that the prognostications we have formed will fall short of realization. We believe it to be an operation of a most limited and comparatively easy character, and our duty seems to us to be perfectly plain and direct, and we should shrink in our duty to the country if we failed to recognize the facts before us. The noble Lord concluded his speech by a very eloquent reference to a statesman whose illness we all deplore. I have the greatest respect for the right hon. Member for Birmingham (Mr. John Bright). He, at any rate, has been what other politicians have not always been—perfectly consistent in his advocacy of peace. However much we may agree with the right hon. Gentleman on many matters, there is no doubt that in this matter of peace and war he has necessarily fallen into conflict on more than one occasion with the public opinion of this country; and, however much it may be deprecated, war is sometimes necessary. We should not be engaged in this operation had we not known it was necessary, and it is in that spirit we have undertaken it, and it is in that spirit we shall, as soon as honour allows us, bring it to a successful completion.
§ SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT (Derby)The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War (Mr. E. Stanhope) has made a very important statement on which I wish to ask the Government a question. The noble Lord the Member for South Paddington (Lord Randolph Churchill) put it very strongly that the opinion of the Military Advisers of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War was against the course of action which the Government are taking. Well, the right hon. Gentleman practically 1044 declined the challenge of the noble Lord, but everybody can see from his language that he did implicitly admit that the opinion of the Military Authorities was adverse to that course. But the statement to which I call attention is this. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for War said—
We have sent a telegram to the Military Authorities in Egypt in consequence of communications made to us by the Military Authorities here in England, to ask for the reconsideration of the question by the Military Authorities in Egypt.That telegram is obviously founded, one sees, upon remonstrance of the Military Authorities in England, and that, I imagine, is now the situation. Now, the question I ask is this—when was that telegram sent? If it were sent some days ago—at which time the Government must have been acquainted with the opinions of the Military Authorities here—why have we not an answer to the telegram? Or has it been sent to-day—sent, it may be, under pressure of the Motion of the noble Lord? If so, why did not the Government at once communicate to the Military Authorities in Egypt the opinion of the Military Authorities in London?
§ MR. E. STANHOPEA communication reached us only last night from the English Military Authorities which induced me to send a telegram to the Military Authorities in Egypt, and it was sent to-day.
§ SIR WILLIAM HARCOURTI hope the Secretary for War will not think I am unduly catechizing him, but this is a matter of great public importance. A communication reached him from the Military Authorities last night, but how long have the Military Authorities in London been aware of the course which Her Majesty's Government intended to take? When was the decision arrived at to send this force? This is a matter which the Government say has been fully and adequately considered. When was it first laid by the Secretary of State before his Military Advisers, and why did the communication from those advisers regarding it only reach him last night, when the Government having taken their decision had announced it, not only to the English public, but what is more important, to the public of Egypt and the Egyptian Government? We ask when did the Government decide 1045 to send the force to Suakin? They say they did it after full inquiry. When they came to that decision what were their relations with their Military Advisers? I am told that the Government have stated in this House that they came to this decision a week ago. We all know that the Cabinet sat upon the question some days ago. Then how comes it that a communication upon this subject only reached the Secretary of State last night? Is it possible more completely to justify the action of the noble Lord? Is not the Adjournment of the House which he demands justified up to the hilt? Is the House to express an opinion without knowing what is the answer to their telegram sent last night? Those are all matters upon which we ought to have full information, and what the noble Lord desires is not only that we should have time to consider, but that the Government should have to consider the answer to that telegram, and should not pass unnoticed the unsatisfactory condition of things which have been revealed.
§ SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOT (Sussex, N.W.)said, he had always considered the course pursued by this country in Egypt a most unfortunate one. The late Government had no policy whatever in regard to Egypt, and left that country in a most lamentable state. The present Government, without having at first, perhaps he might say, the courage to alter the then existing state of things, had at last determined that we should remain in Egypt. So he understood from the speech of his right hon. Friend, and he felt the gravity of the responsibility placed upon them of dealing in a practical manner with the grave questions now under discussion. He would like to ask how it had happened that, knowing what the requirements of Egypt had been and were likely to be, the forces in Egypt had been reduced so greatly? The number of British troops in Egypt had been reduced from 6,000 to 3,000. Was it possible, he would ask hon. Gentlemen in all parts of the House, to effect all that was required to be effected in Egypt with so small a force? We had half a battalion only in Cairo; we had half a battalion at Wady Haifa and one battalion at Alexandria, and we had now sent the other battalion to Suakin. He 1046 thought that proved, and proved most decidedly, that our forces in Egypt had been reduced to such a point that it was impossible properly to carry on the multifarious duties which might be imposed upon them. The Government—and he laid stress upon this circumstance, because it was an important point in the case—at one time wished to detain in Egypt a regiment that was coming home from India, but the pertinacity of the questions put by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for New-castle-upon-Tyne (Mr. John Morley) and others upon the other side had, he believed, stopped what would, in his humble judgment, have been a right and sound policy. With regard to the reduction of the troops at Cairo, those who had studied the question as he had ventured to study it would know that the danger to be apprehended was that if any reverse to the British arms took place at Suakin or elsewhere there might very probably also be a rising in Cairo, which might have a most dangerous effect. The Government, having followed the advice so unwisely given by those on the other side, had thought it absolutely necessary to reduce the force in Cairo to the small number, because if they were to help Suakin they were bound to send an efficient and effective battalion. No doubt it was a most admirable regiment, and he had no doubt that the battalion and the two black battalions would be able to accomplish the work they had to do with the troops at Suakin. But the whole of the circumstances conveyed a warning to the Government to be prepared in future. Let them not be urged to say one thing and mean another. We meant, as he understood the Government statement, to hold Egypt. We were not going to allow any other Power to occupy Egypt or Suakin. We had laid down, indeed, the principle that we were to remain in Egypt as long as there was a necessity for our remaining, and he thought he might recall the words of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Mid Lothian (Mr. W. E. Gladstone) who stated, from the beginning to the end, that we were not to leave Egypt till Egypt could take care of herself. That position the Government had taken up, but to carry it into effect there must be enough English troops to maintain the objects for which 1047 we first went to that country—the maintenance of peace and order, and the prevention of attempts by any other Power to invade her shores. That being so, he approved of the present action of the Government with regard to Suakin. If a rush were made by the Arabs upon Suakin and they happened to take it, how would the country feel? Should we not say that such an event ought never to have been allowed to take place, and that we must, at all hazards and at all costs, retake the place and guard against such a calamity in the future? He thought the Government had acted with doubtful discretion in not having a stronger force upon the spot, but he approved their action in sending as strong a force as was at their disposal to see that Suakin did not fall into any other hands than ours and those of the Egyptian Government.
§ SIR HENRY HAVELOCK-ALLAN (Durham, S.E.)said, that there was not the least necessity for this Motion of Adjournment. He was of opinion that to provide for any contingency which might arise at Suakin, Her Majesty's Government had done their best. If the proposal spoken of some time ago of detaining in Egypt a battalion on its way home from India in order to place it at the disposal of the Egyptian Government for raising the so-called siege of Suakin had been in danger of being carried out he would have protested against it, since, from a military point of view, nothing could have been more likely to lead to disaster than so to detain a battalion which must necessarily be incomplete in its organization. He deprecated doing anything in a weak and inefficient manner; but at the present moment there was a fully efficient English battalion being sent to the place, and there were besides two Egyptian or black battalions there. [Mr. E. STANHOPE: Three.] That should be enough; and if in any extremity General Grenfell should think it desirable to have reinforcements, there was another wing of a British regiment which could be added to the Suakin force at a few hours' notice. It was not for him to attribute any motive as to why the Motion had been made. He trusted the House would repose sufficient confidence in Her Majesty's present Government and the Secretary of State for War, and meet 1048 the Motion for Adjournment with a direct negative.
§ SIR EDWARD HAMLEY (Birkenhead)said, he concurred in wishing that the Government had a definite policy in Egypt; because in order to have a definite policy one must know what was meant to be done and how it was meant to be done. This condition would lead to success, just as the contrary would lead to failure. But if the Government had not a definite policy in Egypt just now, was that their fault? They had inherited their policy from the Government of the right hon. Gentleman opposite—a maze of perplexity. All the operations carried on by the late Government in the Soudan had been marked with futility and failure. It was not necessary to enter into the question of general policy in Egypt at this time, because there was a distinct and definite proposition before the House—namely, whether the Government should or should not reinforce the garrison of Suakin? The garrison had been established at the instance of an English Government; it had been maintained at the instance of an English Government; an English General had been in command there for a long time; and he should say, therefore, that the credit of England was bound up with the maintenance of that garrison, if it were necessary to maintain it. "What were the Government expected to do in such a matter? He should imagine that an assembly of Quakers would shrink from the responsibility of abandoning Suakin at the present time, held as it was by an English General, and threatened by a formidable enemy, who was doing his best to enter. What would be the condition of the credit of England if she were seen to be withdrawing from the place, our rearguard pressed by the pursuing Arabs, and the retreat resulting in one of those massacres which, in that quarter of the world, had horrified everyone, and for which this country had not been without its share of opprobrium? There were Generals on the spot in whom the Government had rightly the most complete confidence, and if these Generals demanded reinforcements what were the Government to do? Were they to allow the different stages of the war to be conducted from the House of Commons? He begged the House not to fall into 1049 that error. If there were men on the spot worthy of confidence, the House should give them its confidence; and if they asked for reinforcements they should have them. He had been going to say that no English Government would hesitate in such a matter; but he remembered that English Governments had sometimes failed to maintain the honour of England, That was all the more reason why the present Government should act promptly and decisively. He would beg the House not to listen to any proposal to withdraw. [Cheers.] And when they considered from what quarters of the House the cheers had come when such proposals were suggested, they must remember that from that quarter no sentiments were cheered except those which would affect injuriously the honour of England.
§ SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL (Kirkcaldy, &c.)said, that the hon. and gallant Member who had just sat down had spoken as though there were only two alternatives before the Government—that of withdrawing, and that of pursuing an aggressive policy. But there was a third choice—namely, to do nothing at all. That was a sensible and prudent policy, though the noble Lord the Member for South Paddington (Lord Randolph Churchill) said that it was a slovenly policy, for it had been officially stated that there was not the slightest chance of the so-called rebels taking Suakin. Why should not that sort of thing be allowed to go on? Accounts were seen in the papers from time to time of the shelling of Suakin by the Arabs. Anybody would think, from what some people said, that the world was coming to an end; but although shells fell in Suakin they did no harm, and people got accustomed to them, as they did at the sieges of Lucknow and Paris, where a lady said—"Oh, there's one of those nasty shells bursting again." The rebels, moreover, would only defeat themselves. They would hammer away at the place, without doing much harm, until they had fired all their shells.
§ MR. CHILDERS (Edinburgh, S.)said, he was afraid that he could not follow his hon. Eriend into a discussion as to the effect of the shells or the incidents of the siege, but to ask the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War to reply to the questions raised by his right hon. 1050 Friend the Member for Derby (Sir William Harcourt). His right hon. Friend asked for certain dates, when certain decisions were taken, and when the communication was made by the Military Advisers which the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War felt it his duty to forward to the Authorities in Egypt?
§ MR. E. STANHOPEThe House is well aware that I can only speak again with the indulgence of the House; but as I am speaking I hope I may be allowed to make some reference to other speeches besides that of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Derby (Sir William Harcourt). My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for North-West Sussex (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) took a totally different view from the noble Lord (Lord Randolph Churchill), but raised a question of very great importance. My hon. and gallant Friend alluded to the reduction of the British force in Egypt. No Government would be justified in keeping a larger force in that country and compelling the Egyptian Government to pay for a larger force than the circumstances of the case required. We have reduced the force in Egypt to a strength deemed necessary for the objects we have in view and sufficient for that purpose, and the best proof that it is sufficient is that, although we are called upon to send troops to Suakin, and also a certain amount of force to assist the Egyptian Government in defending the frontier at Assouan, in the opinion of the Military Authorities in Egypt the force left in that country is sufficient to maintain order, and with this we have been content. My hon. and gallant Friend says that there was an intention on the part of the Government to stop a regiment coming home from India, and that policy was abandoned in consequence of questions put by hon. Members opposite. Well, if it is any comfort to the hon. and gallant Gentleman, I may tell him that the stopping of the regiment was my own doing before any question was put by right hon. Gentlemen on the subject. I had a communication which led me to think that it was very much more desirable that a battalion should proceed from Egypt. My hon. and gallant Friend also said that he should like us to show that we have a definite policy with regard to Egypt. We have stated over and over again that we have such 1051 a policy. My right hon. Friend the First Lord of the Treasury (Mr. W. H. Smith) stated on Saturday in the plainest terms that our policy was, as soon as our obligations of honour were fulfilled, to leave Egypt; that that policy was clearly set out in the Turkish Convention, from it we have not receded, and it is not our policy; it is a solemn obligation which we have inherited. There was a Despatch sent by Lord Granville to Sir Evelyn Baring in 1883, and this is the distinct assurance which he gave with respect to the affairs in the Red Sea—
Her Majesty's Government would be prepared to assist in maintaining order in Egypt proper, and in defending it as well as the ports on the Red Sea.There was a further assurance given by Lord Granville on the 4th of January, 1884, which is contained in these words—Her Majesty's Government will, therefore, he prepared to assist in maintaining order in Egypt proper, and in defending, as well as continuing to protect, the ports on the Red Sea." Therefore, we are not initiating a new policy, but carrying out the policy we have inherited. There have been, undoubtedly, various private conversations and communications which passed between me and my Military Advisers on this subject, and among other things as to the question of the military value and importance to be attached to the British Force which might be sent to reinforce Suakin. Communications have passed for some time between us, and we arrived deliberately at the conclusion that the force we should send to reinforce Suakin should be the force asked for by the Egyptian Government and our own Military Advisers in Egypt, and that force has been sent.
§ SIR WILLIAM HARCOURTI asked the date of that decision.
§ MR. E. STANHOPEI cannot answer that question without Notice, but I believe the telegram which authorizes the sending of this battalion to Suakin from Cairo was sent last Tuesday. Since that time the last communication I have received from my Military Advisers was received last night. I entertain no doubt whatever of General Grenfell's ability to give the best advice in this matter.
§ MR. JOHN MORLEY (Newcastle-upon-Tyne)Do I understand that the right hon. Gentleman has just said that 1052 this resolve to send a British Force was arrived at in compliance with a request made by the Egyptian Government?
§ MR. E. STANHOPEI beg pardon. It is perfectly true that we offered a British Force, and on Tuesday a telegram was sent giving them the exact number of troops required.
§ MR. W. E. GLADSTONE (Edinburgh, Mid Lothian)I think that this is a question on which the debate has exhibited a tendency, not unnatural under the circumstances, to pass beyond the narrow and well-defined points assigned to it by the noble Lord the Member for South Paddington (Lord Randolph Churchill). We are not now discussing a Motion which expresses the views of the Mover in the terms in which it is conceived. The Motion for the Adjournment of the House is moved by the noble Lord upon certain definite and specific grounds which he states in his speech, and to his views on which he desires to give effect by his Motion. It is necessarily an informal proceeding, but it is one with which the House is intimate and one to which we have to accommodate ourselves as the only means under the circumstances of expressing our views of the matter raised, if its importance justifies the intervention of the House, by voting in its favour. It may be that there are many persons on that side of the House, and some on this, who will vote against this Motion in order to deliver Her Majesty's Government from embarrassment. It may be that there are others who, feeling a great aversion to the military operations in Egypt, feel a still greater aversion to any extension of those operations, and will take this opportunity, by voting in favour of the Motion, to express their aversion. Neither of these considerations I take to be within the purpose of the noble Lord. The noble Lord has not raised the question of our policy in Egypt. The hon. and gallant Member for Birkenhead (Sir Edward Hamley) and others have gone back upon the want of policy of the late Government with respect to Egypt, and if they choose to discuss that subject, far be it from me to say that it is an illegitimate discussion. But it has nothing whatever to do with the present issue. We are not now discussing the policy to be pursued for Egypt at large, nor the policy to be pursued, as I understand it, 1053 with respect to the defence of Suakin and the measures to be taken on the Red Sea. The noble Lord, if I understand him aright, has distinctly refused to enter upon that subject, and in my opinion it was necessary, to be consistent with the general purport of his speech, that he should so refuse. Whether anything is to be done at Suakin or not, whether we are bound in honour to support the Egyptian Government in all reasonable and proper methods of defence, is a matter upon which there may be large difference of opinion, but it is not the matter before us. The issue which I understand the noble Lord to have raised is the question of the sufficiency of the British Forces, for the sending of which we were directly concerned. That has been recognized by an hon. and gallant Member behind me, and he has given us his military opinion that the force is sufficient. That is all very well for the giving of the vote of the hon. and gallant Gentleman, but it is not quite sufficient advice to sustain the conclusion of this House. The question raised by the noble Lord is one of a most serious character, and, so far as I know, entirely new in the experience of this House. The noble Lord has stated as a fact that the Military Authorities, upon whom, as to military purposes, strictly so-called, the Secretary of State has to rely, are distinctly of opinion that the force ordered to be sent does not suffice for the purpose in view. I draw a distinction, so far as I am concerned, between questions of policy and the military means by which they are carried into execution. So far as policy is concerned, the Secretary of State cannot shelter himself by reference to the opinions of Military Authorities. In regard to this the jurisdiction of the Cabinet is exclusive, and the noble Lord does not interfere with that exclusive jurisdiction. What he has said is, if we send a force it ought to be sufficient; that this is a purely military question upon which the House has been accustomed to be sustained by the assurance of the Government that the Military Authorities affirm the sufficiency of the means to be employed. The noble Lord has stated, upon his own authority, but as a matter of fact known to him, that the Military Authorities in this case affirm the direct contrary. Now, that is a most grave state of affairs. British 1054 life, British honour, and not British life only, but the life of the British soldier, the life of Her Majesty's subjects in the form in which we are most specially concerned to protect it, and concerned to consider all that we do which may involve it, is placed before us. The noble Lord assures us that those Military Authorities have declared the insufficiency of those means, and, if those means be insufficient, I remember the responsibility that the House is incurring in giving its sanction to the adoption of a measure which is a matter for professional consideration, and in which those professional judges who must be the best, as well as the fully responsible, authorities declare that the instruments proposed to be employed are not adequate to the end which is in view. I must say that, after that declaration of the noble Lord, I was disappointed by the statement of the right hon. Gentleman, and I am compelled to take that statement as an admission, and, therefore, in the nature of an affirmation, of the statatement of the noble Lord. That raises a most grave state of things, and I am not prepared to take the responsibility under those circumstances of voting against the Motion of the noble Lord, and exposing the force which it is proposed to send to Suakin without the assurance that we have sufficient grounds for believing that that force is adequate. Another question is raised as to the position of Her Majesty's Government, and that is without example. Let me observe that the point at which the noble Lord leaves the question is this—that we cannot undertake in the present state of our information—it is not for us to determine what steps ought to be taken at Suakin. It is for the Government to determine that question, but it is also their duty to see that if they do take steps, their steps are adequate to the purpose, and that a reasonable assurance to that effect should be supplied to the House. Her Majesty's Government informs us that the decision to send a force to Suakin was taken on Tuesday last, and therefore at a time when a certain relative attitude subsisted between Her Majesty's Government and the Military Authorities. Upon that decision the orders were given for the despatch of this force, which I presume is now upon its way. But since that 1055 time a change has taken place in the attitude of Her Majesty's Government, and having taken that decision and allowed time to elapse during which the force may be on its way, they have sent a telegram of the purport of which we are not informed, but which appears to raise the whole question whether the force is to be sent or not, or whether it is a sufficient force. It is impossible, therefore, not to feel that we are in an extraordinary position. The force was sent on the advice of the Military Authorities. Have the Military Authorities changed their views or not? We are left to believe, and I am obliged to believe from facts as they are before me, that the attitude of the Military Authorities is precisely the same as it was at the time the Government came to the decision to send the force. Secondly, I am compelled to believe that since that decision the Government has changed its views, and has again been obliged to bring under consideration the question which they told us last week had been definitely considered and settled. I am not prepared on the state of facts which the noble Lord has laid before us, either to acquit or to condemn. I have no desire to condemn or to prematurely pronounce an opinion upon the subject, but I am not prepared to give a sanction by voting against the noble Lord to the proposition that the House will calmly look on and see a force sent for a definite purpose to Egypt with respect to which the whole evidence practically compels us to believe that competent authorities declare to be insufficient for the end in view. I am not satisfied with the action of Her Majesty's Government, who decided last week with the whole of the facts before them, and now, without any new facts whatever in the possession of the Military Authorities, turn their back upon their own position, and thus leave it in a state of absolute fluctuation and indecision. I cannot, therefore, do otherwise than give my vote for the Motion of the noble Lord.
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON (Lancashire, Rossendale)I did not, unfortunately, hear the speech of the noble Lord the Member for South Paddington, and I therefore take the account of the issue which he has placed before the House from the speech which has just been made by my right hon. Friend 1056 the Member for Mid Lothian. The House is asked to take an unusual, and, I believe, an unprecedented step, and a step which, in my opinion, would be a very grave mistake. As I understand the question of the policy of continuing or extending the military operations is not in any degree raised by this Motion. The issue is simply one of the sufficiency of the force that is about to embark upon certain operations. Now, it seems to me that it would be a most dangerous and inconvenient precedent if the House were to take upon itself the responsibility of interfering directly with the conduct of military operations. I have always understood that the Government, and especially the Secretary of State for War, was responsible to this House, and alone responsible, for the conduct of military operations. It is they who receive the advice of the professional and Military Advisers of the War Department; that advice is not given to the House of Commons, but to the Government, and it is for the Government to act upon that advice in accordance with the best judgment they can form, and upon their own responsibility alone. I understand the effect of this Vote, if it were agreed to by the House, would either be to stop the despatch of the troops or to suspend any active operations in Suakin until a much larger force is sent there. That, Sir, appears to me to be a direct interference with the conduct of military operations by the Government of the day, and to be a step which would entirely and absolutely relieve the Government from the responsibility that properly devolves upon them. I think nothing could be more prejudicial to the public interest, nothing would more tend to lessen the responsibility which I think the House has always been jealous to uphold, the responsibility, pure and entire, of the Government of the day for decisions which it takes upon all military matters, than such an interference as that which, according to my right hon. Friend (Mr. W. B. Gladstone), the House is now invited to enter upon between the Government and the decisions of its Military Advisers. That being the issue which is presented to the House, I can have no hesitation in the vote I shall give.
§ COLONEL NOLAN (Galway, N.)said, he admitted that the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War had 1057 made a very good defence out of very bad materials. He believed the whole state of the case was this—that the Egyptian Government, knowing they were not able to get a large force, had asked for a small force in order to commit her Majesty's Government. Possibly the force intended to be sent would be sufficiently strong to encounter the number of Arabs that were estimated to be round Suakin, but it might be that a much larger number than was expected would have to be met, for, as to the strength of the enemy, there was no reliable information.
§ GENERAL GOLDSWORTHY (Hammersmith)said, he could not support the Motion for Adjournment, for he did not think this was the time to attack the Government with reference to their action in Egypt, though the time might come when it would be. He desired to express the hope that Her Majesty's Government would err, if at all, rather by sending too many than by sending too few British troops.
§ LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILLI must say two or three words in reply. I should not have done so were it not for the speech of the noble Lord (the Marquess of Hartington). It seems to me that he has misapprehended the nature of the Motion I have made. What I have put before the House is the fact that a decision to send a certain number of British troops to Suakin was disapproved by the Military Authorities at home, and that in the event of any ill-success attending those operations, or in the event of these operations not securing the result which it is hoped they will attain, not a shred of responsibility can fall on the Military Authorities. That has practically been admitted by the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War (Mr. E. Stanhope) in the startling announcement that a formal communication was addressed to him on Monday by the Military Authorities in command of the Army at home, the nature of the communication being so remarkable that the right hon. Gentleman thought it his duty to forward it for the information of the Military Authorities in Egypt. I ask the noble Lord (the Marquess of Hartington), who has been Secretary of State for War, who has had great experience of the House of Commons, whether he recollects any occasion on which the Government have 1058 taken a decision upon a purely Military question which was at variance with the known and expressed views of their Military advisers? I should not have ventured to move the Adjournment of the House if it was not that I wish to bring before the House the extraordinary fact that no responsibility can rest on the Military Authorities in this matter. I must point out that, if in these purely military and technical questions, involving, however, grave interests, the Government are not to pay attention to the advice of high Military Authorities, if they are not to place responsibility for military action upon the Military Authorities, then I want to know, not only whether there can be any sense in our policy, but whether there can be any efficiency. The object of my Motion is to gain time, so that the difference of opinion between the Government and the Mititary Authorities may be set at rest. I consider that I should have failed in my duty as a Member of this House if, knowing there was this difference of opinion, I had not brought the matter before the House.
§ MR. CREMER (Shoreditch, Haggerston)said, he wished to make it clear that he and others on the Opposition side would vote for the noble Lords' Motion, not on the somewhat low ground that the force about to be despatched to Suakin was too small, but upon the higher ground of principle; for, in their opinion, no force ought to be sent there at all, because they were opposed to our interference in Egypt altogether.
§ Question put.
§ The House divided:—Ayes 189; Noes 231: Majority 42.
1061| AYES. | |
| Abraham, W. (Limerick, W.) | Buxton, S. C. |
| Acland, A. H. D. | Campbell, Sir G. |
| Acland, C. T. D. | Campbell, H. |
| Allison, R. A. | Campbell-Bannerman, right hon. H. |
| Anderson, C. H. | Carew, J. L. |
| Asquith, H. H. | Causton, R. K. |
| Balfour, Sir G. | Chance, P. A. |
| Barbour, W. B. | Channing, F. A. |
| Barran, J. | Childers, right hon. H. C. E. |
| Biggar, J. G. | Clancy, J. J. |
| Blane, A. | Clark, Dr. G. B. |
| Bolton, J. C. | Cobb, H. P. |
| Bright, Jacob | Conway, M. |
| Bright, W. L. | Conybeare, C. A. V. |
| Broadhurst, H. | Corbet, W. J. |
| Brown, A. L. | Cossham, H. |
| Buchanan, T. R. |
| Cox, J. R. | M'Kenna, Sir J. N. |
| Cozens-Hardy, H. H. | M'Laren, W. S. B. |
| Crawford, D. | Mahony, P. |
| Crawford, W. | Mappin, Sir F. T. |
| Cremer, W. R. | Marjoribanks, rt. hon. E. |
| Crilly, D. | Marum, E. M. |
| Curzon, Viscount | Menzies, R. S. |
| Deasy, J. | Molloy, B. C. |
| Dickson, T. A. | Montagu, S. |
| Dillon, J. | Morgan, rt. hon. G. O. |
| Dillwyn, L. L. | Morgan, W. P. |
| Ellis, J. E. | Morley, rt. hon. J. |
| Ellis, T. E. | Morley, A. |
| Esslemont, P. | Mundella, rt. hn. A. J. |
| Evershed, S. | Murphy, W. M. |
| Farquharson, Dr. R. | Neville, R. |
| Ferguson, R. C. Munro- | Nolan, Colonel J. P. |
| Finucane, J. | Nolan, J. |
| Firth, J. F. B. | O'Brien, J. F. X. |
| Fitzgerald, J. G. | O'Brien, P. |
| Flower, C. | O'Brien, P. J. |
| Flynn, J. C. | O'Brien, W. |
| Foley, P. J. | O'Connor, A. |
| Foljambe, C. G. S. | O'Connor, J. |
| Forster, Sir C. | O'Connor, T. P. |
| Fox, Dr. J. F. | O'Gorman Mahon, The |
| Fry, T. | Parker, C. S. |
| Fuller, G. P. | Parnell, C. S. |
| Gardner, H. | Paulton, J. M. |
| Gaskell, C. G. Milnes- | Pease, A. E. |
| Gladstone, right hon. W. E. | Pease, H. F. |
| Gladstone, H. J. | Philipps, J. W. |
| Gourley, E. T. | Pickard, B. |
| Grey, Sir E. | Pickersgill, E. H. |
| Haldane, R. B. | Picton, J. A. |
| Hanbury, R. W. | Pinkerton, J. |
| Harcourt, rt. hon. Sir W. G. V. V. | Playfair, right hon. Sir L. |
| Harrington, E. | Potter, T. B. |
| Harrington, T. C. | Power, P. J. |
| Harris, M. | Power, R. |
| Hayden, L. P. | Price, T. P. |
| Hayne, C. Seale- | Priestley, B. |
| Healy, M. | Redmond, J. E. |
| Healy, T. M. | Reed, Sir E. J. |
| Heathcote, Capt. J. H. | Reid, R. T. |
| Edwards- | Rendel, S. |
| Howell, G. | Reynolds, W. J. |
| Hunter, W. A. | Roberts, J. B. |
| Jacoby, J. A. | Robertson, E. |
| Jennings, L. J. | Roscoe, Sir H. E. |
| Joicey, J. | Rowlands, J. |
| Kay-Shuttleworth, rt. hon. Sir U. J. | Rowlands, W. B. |
| Kenny, J. E. | Rowntree, J. |
| Kilbride, D. | Russell, Sir C. |
| Labouchere, H. | Schwann, C. E. |
| Lalor, R. | Sexton, T. |
| Lane, W. J. | Sheehy, D. |
| Lawson, H. L. W. | Sheil, E. |
| Leahy, J. | Sinclair, J. |
| Leamy, E. | Smith, S. |
| Lefevre, right hon. G. J. S. | Spencer, hon. C. R. |
| Lockwood, F. | Stack, J. |
| Macdonald, W. A. | Stanhope, hon. P. J. |
| Mac Neill, J. G. S. | Stansfeld, right hon J. |
| M'Arthur, W. A. | Stevenson, F. S. |
| M'Cartan, M. | Stevenson, J. C. |
| M'Carthy, J. H. | Stewart, H. |
| M'Donald, Dr. R. | Sullivan, D. |
| M'Ewan, W. | Sullivan, T. D. |
| Summers, W. |
| Swinburne, Sir J. | Williams, A. J. |
| Tanner, C. K. | Williamson, J. |
| Trevelyan, right hon. Sir G. O. | Williamson, S. |
| Tuite, J. | Wilson, H. J. |
| Waddy, S. D. | Winterbotham, A. B. |
| Wallace, R. | Woodall, W. |
| Warmington, C. M. | Wright, C. |
| Watt, H. | |
| Wayman, T. | TELLERS Churchill, rt. hn. Lord R. H. S. |
| Whitbread, S. | Pelly, Sir L. |
| Will, J. S. |
| NOES. | |
| Ainslie, W. G. | Cubitt, right hon. G. |
| Aird, J. | Curzon, hon. G. N. |
| Amherst, W. A. T. | Dalrymple, Sir C. |
| Anstruther, Colonel R. H. L. | Darling, C. J. |
| Anstruther, H. T. | Darling, M. T. S. |
| Ashmead-Bartlett, E. | Davenport, W. B. |
| Atkinson, H. J. | De Lisle, E. J. L. M. P. |
| Baird, J. G. A. | De Worms, Baron H. |
| Balfour, rt. hon. A. J. | Dimsdale, Baron R. |
| Balfour, G. W. | Dixon-Hartland, F. D. |
| Barclay, J. W. | Dugdale, J. S. |
| Baring, T. C. | Duncombe, A. |
| Barry, A. H. S. | Dyke, right hon. Sir W. H. |
| Bartley, G. C. T. | Ebrington, Viscount |
| Barttelot, Sir W. B. | Egerton, hon. A. de T. |
| Bates, Sir E. | Elliot, hon. A. R. D. |
| Baumann, A. A. | Elliot, Sir G. |
| Bazley-White, J. | Ellis, Sir J. W. |
| Beach, right hon. Sir | Elton, C. I. |
| M. E. Hicks- | Ewart, Sir W. |
| Beach, W. W. B. | Eyre, Colonel H. |
| Beckett, W. | Feilden, Lt.-Gen. R. J. |
| Bentinck, rt. hn. G. C. | Fellowes, A. E |
| Bentinck, Lord H. C. | Fergusson, right hon. Sir J. |
| Bigwood, J. | Field, Admiral E. |
| Blundell, Colonel H. | Fielden, T. |
| B. H. | Finch, G. H. |
| Bond, G. H. | Fisher, W. H. |
| Boord, T. W. | Fitz-Wygram, General Sir F. W. |
| Borthwick, Sir A. | Fletcher, Sir H. |
| Bristowe, T. L. | Folkestone, right hon. |
| Brodrick, hon. W. St. J. F. | Viscount |
| Brookfield, A. M. | Forwood, A. B. |
| Bruce, Lord H. | Fowler, Sir R. N. |
| Bruce, G. | Fraser, General C. C. |
| Burdett-Coutts, W. L Ash.-B. | Fulton, J. F. |
| Burghley, Lord | Gathorne-Hardy, hon. J. S. |
| Caldwell, J. | Gedge, S. |
| Campbell, Sir A. | Gilliat, J. S. |
| Campbell, J. A. | Godson, A. F. |
| Carmarthen, Marq. of | Goldsmid, Sir J. |
| Chamberlain, R. | Goldsworthy, Major |
| Chaplin, right hon. H. | General W. T. |
| Clarke, Sir E. G. | Gorst, Sir J. E. |
| Cochrane-Baillie, hon. | Goschen, rt. hon. G. J. |
| C. W. A. N. | Gray, C. W. |
| Coddington, W. | Hall, A. W. |
| Coghill, D. H. | Hall, C. |
| Colomb, Sir J. C. R. | Halsey, T. F. |
| Cooke, C. W. R. | Hamilton, right hon. |
| Corbett, A. C. | Lord G. F. |
| Corry, Sir J. P. | Hamley, Gen. Sir E. B. |
| Cotton, Capt. E. T. D. | Hankey, F. A. |
| Courtney, L. H. | Hardcastle, E. |
| Cranborne, Viscount | Hartington, Marq. of |
| Cross, W. H. |
| Havelock-Allan, Sir H. M. | Noble, W. |
| Heath, A. R. | Norris, E. S. |
| Herbert, hon. S. | Northcote, hon. Sir H. S. |
| Hermon-Hodge, R. T. | O'Neill, hon. R. T. |
| Hill, right hon. Lore A.W. | Paget, Sir R. H. |
| Hoare, E. B. | Parker, hon. F. |
| Hoare, S. | Plunket, right hon. D. R. |
| Houldsworth, Sir W. H. | Plunkett, hon. J. W. |
| Howorth, H. H. | Powell, F. S. |
| Hozier, J. H. C. | Price, Captain G. E. |
| Hubbard, hon. E. | Puleston, Sir J. H. |
| Hughes, Colonel E. | Raikes, rt. hon. H. C. |
| Hulse, E. H. | Rankin, J. |
| Hunt, F. S. | Reed, H. B. |
| Isaacs, L. H. | Richardson, T. |
| Isaacson, F. W. | Ridley, Sir M. W. |
| Jackson, W. L. | Ritchie, rt. hn. C. T. |
| James, rt. hon. Sir H. | Robertson, rt. hon. J. |
| Jeffreys, A. F. | P. B. |
| Kelly, J. R. | Robertson, Sir AY T. |
| Kenyon, hon. G. T. | Robinson, B. |
| Kerans, F. H. | Rollit, Sir A. K. |
| Kimher, H. | Round, J. |
| King, H. S. | Russell, Sir G. |
| Knatehbull-Hugessen, H. T. | Russell, T. W. |
| Knightley, Sir R. | Selwyn, Capt. C. W. |
| Knowles, L. | Seton-Karr, H. |
| Lambert, C. | Shaw-Stewart, M. H. |
| Laurie, Colonel R. P. | Sidebottom, T. H. |
| Lawrance, J. C. | Sidebottom, W. |
| Lawrence, Sir J. J. T. | Sinclair, W. P. |
| Lawrence, W. F. | Smith, right hon. W. H. |
| Lechmere, Sir E. A. H. | Smith, A. |
| Legh, T. W. | Spencer, J. E. |
| Leighton, S. | Stanhope, rt. hon. E. |
| Lethbridge, Sir R. | Stanley, E. J. |
| Lewis, Sir C. E. | Stokes, G. G. |
| Lewisham, right hon. | Sykes, C. |
| Viscount | Talbot, J. G. |
| Llewellyn, E. H. | Taylor, F. |
| Long, W. H. | Temple, Sir R. |
| Lowther, right hon. J. | Theobald, J. |
| Macartney, W. G. E. | Thorburn, W. |
| Mackintosh, C. F. | Tomlinson, W. E. M. |
| Maclean, F. W. | Townsend, F. |
| Maclean, J. M. | Tyler, Sir H. W. |
| Maclure, J. W. | Vincent, C. E. H. |
| M'Calmont, Captain J. | Walsh, hon. A. H. J. |
| Madden, D. H. | Waring, Colonel T. |
| Makins, Colonel W. T. | Watson, J. |
| Malcolm, Col. J. W. | Webster, Sir R. E. |
| Mallock, R. | Webster, R. G. |
| Maple, J. B. | West, Colonel W. C. |
| Matthews, right hon. H. | Whitley, E. |
| Maxwell, Sir H. E. | Whitmore, C. A. |
| Mayne, Admiral R. C. | Williams, J. Powell- |
| Mills, hon. C. W. | Wilson, Sir S. |
| Milvain, T. | Wolmer, Viscount |
| More, R. J. | Wood, N. |
| Morrison, W. | Wortley, C. B. Stuart- |
| Moss, R. | Wright, H. S. |
| Mount, W. G. | Wroughton, P. |
| Mowbray, R. G. C. | |
| Mulholland, H. L. | TELLERS. Douglas, A. Akers-Walrond, Col. W. H. |
| Muncaster, Lord | |
| Murdoch, C. T. |
Bill read the third time, and passed.