Commons Sitting of 24 February 1885

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS—Ordered—First Reading—Labourers (Ireland) * [68]; Local Courts of Bankruptcy (Ireland) * [69]; Duration of Parliaments * [70].
QUESTIONS.

  TREATY OF BERLIN—ARTICLE XXIII. —MACEDONIA.
  MR. BRYCEasked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether he can give the House any further information regarding the condition of Macedonia, and the anarchy reputed to exist there; and when the Report of Major Trotter upon the state of that country is expected to be received and presented to the House?
  SIR GEORGE CAMPBELLasked, Whether Her Majesty's Government will take advantage of the presence of a Special Envoy from the Sultan, and the approaches for friendly relations made by that Potentate, to obtain the fulfilment of the Twenty-third Article of the Treaty of Berlin, by which the Sultan is bound to establish autonomous institutions in the Provinces of his Empire, and to impress on him that he can expect nothing from England till he fulfils his Treaty obligations?
  LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICE: I will answer both Questions. Her Majesty's Government think it advisable to defer making any statement until the receipt of Major Trotter's Report, which is on its way home. Any representations which it may be considered advisable to make to the Porte in regard to the condition of the European Provinces of Turkey will be made in the manner most likely to be effectual; but no pledge can be given as to the mode of communication.
  MR. BRYCE: When does the noble Lord think it is likely that the Report of Major Trotter will be presented to the House?
  LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICE: Very soon, indeed. It has been telegraphed for, and is now on its way home.
  SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL: May I ask for an answer to my Question? The answer of the noble Lord has no connection whatever with it.
  LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICE: Whatever steps Her Majesty's Government may take must depend to a considerable extent on the Report of Major Trotter. I do not anticipate that the Special Ambassador from the Sultan will be in England very much longer; and probably he will not be here when action is taken respecting one of the most important of the remaining Provinces of European Turkey.
  SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF: Cannot the Government, in concert with the other Powers of Europe, with which the Government seems to be on such good terms, make representations with a view of pressing on Turkey the obligations of the Treaty of Berlin?
  LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICE: That Question is a very fair one to ask, and really raises one of the principal points. The obligation is one which is incumbent not merely upon this country, but upon all the other Powers of Europe.

  INLAND REVENUE—BREWERS' LICENCES.
  MR. BIRKBECKasked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether, taking into consideration the small amount of revenue received on account of Brewers' Licences where the annual value of the house does not exceed £10, and the hardship of agricultural labourers having to pay an annual licence of six shillings for brewing homo browed beer for their own consumption, he will for the future relinquish or abate the tax?
  THE CHANCELLOR OFTIIE EXCHEQUER (Mr. GUILDERS): I promised last year that I would consider the question of the 6s. and 9s. brewing licences before this year's Budget, and at present I am not able to say more. But I must point out to the hon. Member, and to those who have appealed to me on this subject, that private brewers' licences are understood to be not so much taken out by agricultural labourers as by farmers whose dwelling-houses are not valued above £10; and in these cases they give beer to their labourers without payment of any duty but the licence, which is not nearly equal to the beer duty.

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  Were it not for the licence very serious inroads would be made on the beer duty, as well as injustice done to small country brewers for sale, who pay both licence and duty.

  ARMY—REMOVAL OF AN INSANE SOLDIER FROM ENGLAND TO IRELAND.
  COLONEL NOLANasked the Secretary of State for War, If a War Office route was signed by his Department about the 10th February ordering a lance sergeant of the Scotch Fusilier Guards and an escort to proceed from England to Tuam, and there to consign to the parish authorities a soldier of that regiment, who was an alleged lunatic; if this soldier had seen any war service; and, if so, where; if there was any proof that this soldier had ever been in Tuam beyond his statement on attestation; how long this soldier had been quartered in England, or had been on active service, and how long he had been out of Ireland previous to his enlistment; if the soldier referred to was entitled to £16 deferred pay; and, if he would take steps to guard against soldiers being handed over by an escort to a parish when no longer useful to the War Department, and until this change is effected to afford some intimation to the Poor Law authorities before they are requested or ordered to take charge of such cases?
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: Such a route was signed on the 2nd instant, in accordance with the provisions of Clause 91 of the Army Act of 1881. The soldier served in the Egyptian Campaign of 1882. There was not any proof that he had ever been in Tuam beyond his statement on attestation. With the exception of service in Egypt in 1882, the soldier had been quartered in England since January, 1879. He was enlisted at Glasgow, and was supposed to have found, his way there in search of work; but it is not known how long before enlistment he had been out of Ireland. He was entitled to deferred pay, amounting to £15 19 s. 4d I will take care that reasonable notice shall in such cases be afforded to the Local Authorities; but I am not prepared at present to recommend any change in the Act.

  BOARD OF PUBLIC WORKS (IRELAND) —ASSISTANT SURVEYOR OF BUILDINGS.
  MR. JUSTIN M'CAETHYasked the Secretary to the Treasury the following Questions with regard to the appointment to one of the two then vacant offices of Assistant Surveyor of Buildings in the Department of Public Works in Ireland which was made last November, and, according to the answer given in this House, was made "by promotion from persons of twenty years' service;"—What were the qualifications of the person promoted; what post he actually held previous to this appointment, and whether it was of a temporary nature; what is his age; and was he medically examined with a view to his post; and by whom, and when, the rule of twenty years' service entitling to promotion was instituted?
  MR. HIBBERT: The hon. Member seems to be misinformed as to the state of the case, as he will see by reference to Hansard's report of my Predecessor's reply to his former Question. The officer promoted on the occasion referred to had been for 20 years permanently employed in different branches of the Office as an architectural and engineering draftsman; he is 38 years of age, and holds the Civil Service certificate of his qualification, including health. There is no such rule as that suggested in the last paragraph of the Question; and I should have thought that no exception could be taken to promoting a man after 20 years of good service to a newly created post.

  LAW AND JUSTICE (IRELAND)—CASE OF JOHN EGAN.
  MR. SEXTONasked, Whether one John Egan, of Derryea, county Mayo, is now enduring a sentence of two years' imprisonment, upon a conviction obtained on a charge of having assaulted one John Walsh, in December 1883; whether, on the 23rd of December last, John M'Manus, of Derry, county Mayo, went before Mr. Joseph D'Arcy, a justice of the said county, and made a declaration on oath, admitting that he had committed the assault in respect of which John Egan had been convicted, and that he is ready and willing to abide the result of his confession; whether, the

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  sworn declaration of John M'Manus having been transmitted to the Lord Lieutenant, His Excellency, on the 2nd ult., caused the announcement to be made that "the Law must take its course;" whether this is to be taken as a final answer; and, whether a copy of the notes of the Judge who tried the case will be laid upon the Table?
  THE SOLICITOR GENERAL FOR IRELAND (Mr. WALKER),inreply, said: The man mentioned in the Question is undergoing a period of two years' imprisonment for a serious assault on one John Walsh, committed in December, 1883. The case was very clearly proved. It is true that John M'Manus, who is brother-in-law of Egan, has made the declaration referred to; but he was examined as a witness for the defence at the trial, where he swore equally positively that it was not he who struck the blow. No credence can be attached to his statement, and His Excellency has decided that the law must take its course, and this may be regarded as the final answer. I cannot undertake to lay the Judge's notes on the Table. It is not the practice to do so.

  FISHERIES (IRELAND)—THE RIVER NORE-ALLEGED ACTION OF THE POLICE.
  MR. MARUMasked, Whether it is the fact that the Constabulary force stationed at Bennettsbridge, in the county Kilkenny, are in the habit of acting as water bailiffs over the River Nore, instead of confining their duties to the enforcement of the fishery regulations thereof; whether they are in the habit of flinging stones and long ropes with iron crooks at the ends called "drags" from the summit of a bridge over the river at boatmen beneath, to the imminent danger of inflicting grievous bodily injury; whether some fishermen have been seriously injured thereby; and, whether he will cause inquiry to be made and steps to be taken to prevent such illegal practices?
  THE SOLICITOR GENERAL FOE IRELAND (Mr. WALKER): It is not the fact that the Constabulary at Bennetts-bridge are in the habit of acting as water bailiffs over the river, nor have they, or any of them, flung stones or "drags," as alleged in the Question. 'It is understood that stones have been thrown at men who were illegally fishing
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  in the river, and that on one occasion shots were fired over their heads. This was not done by the Constabulary, but it is believed by other fishermen, with the object of frightening the poachers, and driving them away.

  INLAND NAVIGATION AND DRAINAGE (IRELAND)—THE RIVER FERGUS.
  MR. BIGGARasked the Secretary to the Treasury, How much the Government has lent towards the River Fergus reclamation scheme, in county Clare; what is now the position of the land proposed to be reclaimed, when the tide is full; how much do the Government engineers estimate it would now take to finish the work; and, what is their idea of the value of the property when finished?
  MR. HIBBERT: About £92,000 has been expended on this work, and it is hoped that between £7,000 and £8,000 more will complete it. The estimated value of the land to be reclaimed exceeds £70,000. The land is still covered with water at high tide, as the sea cannot be excluded until the bank is finished.

  RAILWAYS (IRELAND)—THE DERRY CENTRAL RAILWAY.
  MR. BIGGARasked the Secretary to the Treasury, What is the extent of the mortgage of the Government against the Derry Central Railway; what is the rate of interest; and, whether the interest has been punctually paid up till the present; and, if not, how much arrears of interest is due?
  MR. HIBBERT: [The mortgage in this case is for £100,000, bearing interest at 4 per cent. I am sorry to say the interest has not been paid punctually, and the arrears have accumulated to the amount of about £10,000. The Company is, however, paying over the whole of its net revenue, and with improved traffic we may hope to see the arrears reduced.
  SIR HERVEY BRUCEasked whether there were other railways in the same position?
  MR. HIBBERTsaid, it was only too true that there were other railways in the same position.
  SIR HERVEY BRUCE: What are their names?
  MR. HIBBERTsaid, he could not tell the names at present.

  CRIMINAL LAW—THE BABBICOMBE MURDER—ATTEMPTED EXECUTION AT EXETER.
  SIR E. ASSHETON CROSSasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether the account which has appeared of the attempted execution at Exeter is true; and, what course he intends to take in the present case, and also in the future, in order to prevent the recurrence of such a scandal? I assume that the answer to the first part of my Question will be in the affirmative. With regard to the second, the Home Secretary had said he did not think public opinion would uphold him in carrying out the execution if this person were brought to be hung again, in which statement I am bound to say I agree. But I should like to ask the third Question—that is, as regards the future—whether the right hon. and learned Gentleman means to take any steps to prevent the recurrence of such a scandal? I ask this, because I think it is of importance to be known whether the responsibility of finding the scaffold rests on the Sheriff or the officers of the prison; and if, as I suppose the answer will be, it rests on the Sheriff, whether the right hon. and learned Gentleman proposes fresh legislation to make any alteration in this position?
  SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT: I am extremely glad to receive the support of the right hon. Gentleman in the decision at which I have arrived, because I am quite sure it will carry great weight in public opinion. As regards the first Question he has asked me as to the cause of this deplorable miscarriage in the execution, substantially, I believe, the account that has appeared in the newspapers is true. I have received this afternoon an account from men who were sent down to inquire into what happened in the gaol, and, of course, there will be a more formal Report and investigation in the case. With reference to the Question as regards the responsible authority in matters of this kind, there can be no doubt that the entire responsibility for the execution of capital sentences in all respects rests with the Sheriff. That is a fundamental part of the Constitution of this country, and when various changes have taken place in the gaols, both in the Act of 1865 and the Act of 1877, great care was taken that the
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  position of the Sheriff in that respect should remain entirely unaltered; and, therefore, whatever the officers of the prison do in respect of these executions, they do simply and directly under the orders of the Sheriff; and there was a letter from the right hon. Gentleman in December, 1878, to the Governors of prisons, ordering them, when the prisons came under the control of the Government, to obey and to carry out the orders of the Sheriff in this respect. I confess myself, on the best consideration I could give to the matter, I do not see that there would be any advantage—but, on the contrary, considerable disadvantage—in altering that state of things. Though the right hon. Gentleman has been good enough to express his concurrence in the decision I arrived at in reference to the respite, perhaps, as some doubt has been expressed on the subject, I may say a word upon that matter. Of course, the responsibility of a decision in that matter rests absolutely and entirely upon the Secretary of State. It is, of course, a very grave and very onerous responsibility; but I confess in this case I never entertained one moment's doubt upon it. At the same time, it is desirable that the truth should be understood—I do not mean in this House, but outside this House. The tact is that the exercise of the Prerogative^ mercy does not depend upon principles of strict law and justice; still less does it depend upon sentiment in any way. It is really a question of policy and of judgment in each individual case; and, in my opinion, a capital execution, which in its circumstances creates horror and compassion for the culprit rather than a sense of indignation at his crime, is a great evil, and when such events occur it becomes more and more difficult to maintain the punishment of death at all. This is a question that cannot be decided on precedents alone—it is not a question of precedents. But it is important to consider what we have done in cases of this kind in former times. When I had to decide this case, which I had to do at once, I had in my recollection a book I recently read—The Chronicles of New gate—which contains a quantity of incidents of this character which have happened in former times, when executions were more carelessly performed than they are now. In those cases there were frequent instances

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  of the rope breaking; and still oftener there were oases of persons being resuscitated after they were supposed to have been hanged. In many of these cases—indeed, in most of them—the practice was, when the execution had miscarried, not after an interval of time to revert to it, and carry it into effect. I do not know whether I should be taking up the time of the House too much; but I should like to mention a case which is very much like the present. There was a horrid scene at Jersey at the beginning of this century. The hangman added his weight to that of the suspended culprit, and having first pulled him sideways, he then got on his shoulders, so that the rope broke, and to the surprise of all, the criminal rose to his feet with the hangman on his shoulders, and with his fingers loosened the rope. After that the Sheriff sent for another rope; but the spectators interfered, and the man was carried back to gaol. The whole case was referred to the King, and the poor wretch, whose crime had been a military one, was pardoned. That shows what in former times was the view taken in these cases; and I do not think that anybody would desire that our manners should be more savage and barbarous than they were at the beginning of the century.

  FISHING VESSELS (REGULATIONS AS TO LIGHTS).
  MR. BIRKBECKasked the President of the Board of Trade, Whether a Memorial from a portion of the trawling smack-owners at Grimsby was presented to the Board of Trade, during the week ending 6th December last, in favour of a new proposal for trawlers' lights, viz. a duplex coloured lanthorn in addition to a white masthead light; whether such proposal was condemned at a Conference of delegates from Scarborough, Hull, Great Yarmouth, Lowestoft, Ramsgate, Brixham, and Plymouth, held in London on 16th December last; whether he is aware that the Memorial was only supported by a portion of the smack-owners of Grimsby and some Northern ports, principally interested in steam trawlers; whether it is a fact that the duplex lanthorn proposal was only submitted to individual members of a Departmental Committee (not assembled), and was recommended, without previous trial by the Board of Trade, for legalisa-
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  tion within twenty-three days of the presentation of the Grimsby Memorial, and without any opportunity being afforded by the Board of Trade to the smack-owners of England to express an opinion on the new regulation; whether the proposal was legalised by Order in Council on 30th December last; and, whether he is aware that at the conclusion of the debate on fishing vessels lights on 31st May 1881, he is reported by Hantard to have said—
  "As to the new regulations he would undertake that they should not come into force until a further Report was made;" and "that the House would have an opportunity of considering any new regulations that might be proposed, anything that differed from the present practice?"
  MR. CHAMBERLAIN: The history of the case as set forth in the hon. Member's Question is, in the main, correct. The proposal, however, for the adoption of a duplex lanthorn came from a large and influential section of the trawling interest. The hon. Member has quoted some observations which I made in the course of a debate with regard to fishing vessels lights, which took place in this House in May, 1881. If he will carefully refer to the context he will see that the pledge which I gave was that the present regulations should not be altered until the House had had an opportunity of considering the proposed alterations. The existing regulations have not been altered, and are not affected by the permissive use of the duplex lanthorn, which is all that has been sanctioned by the Order in Council.

  HOSPITALS AND INFIRMARIES (IRELAND)—GRANTS TO DUBLIN HOSPITALS.
  MR. SEXTONasked the Secretary to the Treasury, If it is true, as stated, that the Treasury claim to have the power to capitalise the various sums annually voted by this House in aid of certain hospitals in Dublin; and, whether he will undertake on the part of the Government that no step will be taken towards capitalising those annual grants, or any of them, until the Estimate in that regard for the current year has been dealt with, and until the House has had an opportunity of considering the principle upon which the grants are now distributed?
  MR. HIBBERT: The matter to which the hon. Member refers is still under

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  the careful consideration of the Government. As it would be impossible to capitalize the grants without the authority of Parliament, there will be necessarily afforded the opportunity of discussion which the hon. Member desires.

  NAVY—ARMOUR OF SHIPS OF WAR.
  SIR EDWARD J. REEDasked the Secretary to the Admiralty, Whether it is the intention of the Admiralty to apply any additional armour to Her Majesty's Ships Ajax, Agamemnon, Colossus, Edinburgh, Collingwood, Rodney, Howe, Anson, Benbow, Camperdown, Impérieuse, and Warspite, for the purpose of protecting them against the fire of machine guns?
  SIR THOMAS BRASSEY: The Board of Admiralty have not decided to apply additional armour to the ships enumerated by the hon. Member. Various suggestions connected with the armour and armaments of these ships have been submitted from time to time by the professional officers, and they are receiving most careful consideration.
  SIR EDWARD J. REED: In consequence of the unsatisfactory answer I have received I will repeat the Question shortly. The hon. Member then asked the Secretary to the Admiralty, Whether his attention has been called to that portion of the Report of the 1871 Committee on Designs, in which they refer to so-called citadel ships with un-armoured ends—
  "Constructed on a cellular system, or containing some buoyant substance such, as cork,"
  and say—
  "in the absence of any practical experience of the effect of large shells or torpedoes upon such a structure as that which we have in view, it is impossible to say with confidence that the object aimed at would be thus attained, but, if it were, consequences of so much importance and value would follow that we think it right to indicate this line of inquiry as worthy of experimental investigation;
  whether he is aware that the Director of Naval Construction in 1877 expressed his full agreement with that part of the Committee's Report; whether the experimental investigation thus recommended has ever been made; if not, whether it is true that, notwithstanding the strongly expressed opinion of the Committee on Designs and of our own Chief Professional Adviser that—
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  "It is impossible to say with confidence that the object aimed at would be thus attained,"
  the Board of Admiralty have proceeded with the construction of such ships, to the exclusion of all other armoured ships, until the total expenditure upon them which has been made or undertaken has exceeded the sum of seven millions sterling, exclusive of the cost of their armaments and stores; and, whether the Admiralty propose, before further ships of this kind are recommended to Parliament, to carry out the experimental investigation so strongly recommended by the Committee on Designs and by the Director of Naval Construction?
  SIR THOMAS BRASSEY: The question of the shipbuilding policy of the Admiralty during many years involves so much controversial matter, and would require so much explanatory statement in order to deal with it properly, that I venture to submit to the general sense of the House that the hon. Member would do better to place his views before Parliament in the form of a Motion, or to bring them forward upon the Navy Estimates.
  SIR EDWARD J. REED: As my Question relates purely to matters of historical fact I shall repeat it this day week.

  NAVY—ENGINEER OFFICERS OF THE NAVY.
  SIR EDWARD J. REEDasked the Secretary to the Admiralty, If he is able to state what improvements in the pay, rank, and uniform of the Engineer Officers of the Royal Navy have been recently made, or are in contemplation?
  SIR THOMAS BRASSEY: We regret that we have not been able to include in the Estimates any addition to the pay of the engineers; but the question of pay, rank, and uniform are under the consideration of the Board.
  MR. PULESTONasked when the Report on the subject was likely to be made?
  SIR THOMAS BRASSEY: The Report has already been made, and is under the consideration of the Naval Lords.
  MR. W. H. SMITHasked the Secretary to the Admiralty, If he will state what armament the Admiralty now intend to place in the Benbow, Rodney,

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  Howe, Camperdown, Edinburgh, Collingwood, Hero, Impérieuse, and Warspite, on what dates respectively the guns will be required, and the dates also on which it is now intended and expected that the ships will be ready for sea; and, whether the War Department has undertaken to supply the guns within the requisite time?
  SIR THOMAS BRASSEY: In reply to the Question of my right hon. Friend, I have to state that the main armament of the Benbow includes two 110-ton guns and 10 6-inch guns. The guns will be required in September, 1886. The main armament of the Rodney and Howe includes four 64-ton and six 6-inch guns. The guns will be required in June, 1886. The Camperdown carries a similar armament. The guns will be required in June, 1887. The Edinburgh and Collingwood will be armed with four 43-ton guns and five and six 6-inch guns respectively. The guns will be required in June and July of this year. The Hero will be armed with two 43-ton and four 6-inch guns. The guns will be required in September, 1886. The Impérieuse and Warspite will carry four 18-ton guns and six 6-inch guns. The guns are required for the Imyérieuse in April next, and for the Warspite in March. The War Office has undertaken to supply all the guns by the time they are required. The dates proposed for the completion of the ships are approximately six months after the delivery of the guns.
  MR. PULESTONasked the Secretary to the Admiralty, Whether his attention has been called to the letter in The Times last week from the honourable Member for Cardiff, formerly Chief Constructor of the Navy, and especially the following paragraph, viz.:—
  "I will here repeat in the most public and responsible manner that the Ajax, Agamemnon, Colossus, and Edinburgh, and the six ships of the Admiral class, are all utterly unfit to engage the corresponding French ships: unfit to enter the line of battle at all; unfit to be retained on the list of armoured ships; and I demand that they be at least afforded protection against that swift destruction from the fire of the smallest guns afloat which now awaits them; if this be not done, then upon the heads of the present Board of Admiralty must continue to rest, after this public warning, the responsibility of delivering 10 British ships of the largest class an easy and certain prey to destruction should war arise;"
  and, what course the Government intend to take with respect to those ships?
  SIR THOMAS BRASSEY: The Board of Admiralty do not concur with the opinion expressed by the hon. Member for Cardiff in a recent letter to The Times with reference to the fighting qualities of the ships built by successive Boards of Admiralty, which he enumerates. The course which the Government intend to take is to do all in their power to complete five ships rapidly, and to make them thoroughly effective vessels of war.

  FRANCE AND BURMAH—THE COMMERCIAL TREATY.
  CAPTAIN AYLMERasked the Under Secretary of State for India, Whether the Government have received particulars of the Treaty stated to have been made between France and Burmah; if so, whether it is a purely Commercial Treaty, or connected with the political situation; also, whether this country is represented at the Court of Mandalay?
  MR. J. K. CROSS: This country is not now represented at the Court of Mandalay. The Treaty between France and Burmah has not yet been ratified in the French Chamber; but M. Ferry has furnished Her Majesty's Government with a copy of the Convention, which appears to be a purely commercial one. It is supplementary to the Treaty, signed in Paris on January 29, 1873, but not put in force till June 1 last, which established between France and Burmah a mutual right to accredit Diplomatic and Consular Representatives.

  POST OFFICE—PARCEL POST TO EGYPT FOR SOLDIERS SERVING IN THAT COUNTRY.
  COLONEL MAKINSasked the Postmaster General, Whether, in consequence of the great cost to the wives and friends of our soldiers in Egypt of sending small parcels to them at ordinary postage rates, he can arrange for the Parcel Post tariff applying to Egypt as it does to India; or, at any rate, to parcels addressed to those serving with the Army in Egypt?
  MR. SHAW LEFEVRE: In reply to the Question of the hon. and gallant Member, I am glad to state that I have so far been able to anticipate the object he has in view that by the last mail I made a proposal to the Egyptian Post Office for a parcel post between this

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  country and Egypt. On learning that my proposal is accepted, and subject to the approval of the Treasury, I shall be able to carry out the arrangement at once.

  GENERAL GORDON'S LETTERS AND DIARIES.
  SIR HENRY TYLERasked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether he would have any objection to place in the Tea Room or Library, properly protected by glass, some of the actual letters received from General Gordon from Khartoum, including those on small pieces of paper saying "Khartoum all right," and "could hold out for years;" and, whether he considers the latter genuine?
  LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICE: The originals of the messages which the hon. Member specially mentions have not yet been received. Lord Wolseley has not sent home all General Gordon's original letters and messages; but he has been instructed by telegraph to do so. There will, probably, be no objection to treat some of them as the hon. Member proposes, in order to give to hon. Members the opportunity of judging whether they are genuine.

  THE MANCHESTER SHIP CANAL BILL.
  MR. JACOB BRIGHTasked the Chairman of Ways and Means, who has reported to the House that the Manchester Ship Canal Bill is to go first before a Committee of the Lords, Whether, since a Bill to connect Manchester with the sea was passed by a Committee of the Commons and thrown out by a Committee of the Lords in the Session of 1883, and a similar Bill was passed by a Committee of the Lords and thrown out by a Committee of the Commons in the Session of 1884, there is any reason to suppose that the present Session will afford time for two inquiries into so large a subject; whether it is a fact that in the two last Sessions the second inquiry took place in the greatest difficulty with regard to time; and, whether, under the special circumstances of this case, having regard both to time and cost, he would support a Motion to refer this Bill to a Joint Committee of the two Houses?
  SIR ABTHUR OTWAY: In accordance with the arrangements which exist
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  for the conduct of Private Business in both Houses of Parliament, the Bill to which the Question of my hon. Friend relates has been in due course referred to the House of Lords. Any proposition, therefore, for a Joint Committee of both Houses of Parliament on the Manchester Ship Canal Bill, would have to be originated in that House. I do not understand my hon. Friend to desire me to express any opinion as to the merits of the Bill, and I am anxious to avoid the supposition of doing so. But there can be no doubt that a project to connect Manchester with the sea and to make it a seaport is one of great importance and interest, not only to that great commercial city, but also to Liverpool and the whole of Lancashire. That project has already been considered by both Houses of Parliament on two occasions and with varying fortunes in each. In 1883 it was introduced in this House and examined by a Committee for 39 days, when it was passed. It went to the House of Lords on the 12th of July, and after 10 days' consideration in Committee in that House it was rejected. In 1884 the Bill was introduced in the House of Lords, and was for 41 days under the consideration of a Select Committee there, who passed the Bill. It then came before a Committee here on the 7th of July, and after being under consideration during 20 days it was rejected. Thus there has been a very great expenditure of money involved in these proceedings, amounting, I am told, to between £100,000 and £200,000, and the labours of four Committees have been rendered fruitless. Now, Sir, considering the very exceptional character of this Bill, I am persuaded that it might, with advantage, having regard to several precedents, be referred to a Joint Committee of both Houses. I shall be very glad to co-operate with any arrangement of that character when the proper time comes for so doing.
  LORD CLAUD HAMILTON: In reference to the remarks which have just fallen from the hon. Gentleman the Chairman of Ways and Means, may I ask if hon. Members will be allowed to offer an opinion, if there is a proposal to refer this Bill to a Joint Committee of both Houses? It is a matter upon which, Sir, Liverpool would certainly have something to say.
  SIR ARTHUR OTWAT: I do not know whether what I said caught the ear of my noble Friend, but I stated that any proposition for submitting the Bill to a Joint Committe must originate with the House of Lords. If such a proposal, after having been originated in the House of Lords, were brought down for the consideration of this House, there would be, unquestionably, an opportunity afforded to every hon. Member for expressing an opinion upon it.

  INLAND NAVIGATION AND DRAINAGE (IRELAND)—THE KILKENNY DEAINAGE DISTRICT SCHEME.
  MR. MARUMasked the Secretary to the Treasury, Whether he is aware of the proposed formation of an arterial drainage district in North Kilkenny, projected by certain tenant farmers, and extending over an area of some twenty miles in length; that the county surveyor of Kilkenny has executed all the necessary maps, plans, and specifications, on their behalf, which have been lodged with the Board of Works at the expense of those tenant farmers; that the engineer of the Board of Works has held an inquiry, after deposit of funds made by those tenant farmers, that he has reported favourably as to this proposed arterial drainage scheme, and that the sum of over £32,000 proposed to be expended would realise at the lowest estimate 6½ per cent. upon the outlay; that a deputation waited upon his predecessor, Mr. Trevelyan, in 1883, requesting exceptionable terms as to the interest upon the sum of £32,000 required for the project, and likewise encouragement and assistance in reference to the formation of the drainage district and the action of the Board of Works in relation thereto; that by a letter dated the 6th day of December 1883, Mr. Trevelyan intimated that some alteration in the law in regard to giving tenants a voice in the undertaking of arterial drainage works would be introduced into the Laud Improvement (Ireland) Consolidation Bill of the former Session in the event of its being re-introduced in the then next Session, and that Mr. Trevelyan recommended upon the whole matter—
  "That the promoters of the Kilkenny scheme should hold it over until those matters had been considered and decided by the Government;"
  1166
  that the Land Improvement and Arterial Drainage (Ireland) Bill of 1883 was withdrawn, and subsequently the Land Improvement and Arterial Drainage (Ireland) Bill of 1884 was likewise withdrawn; that the tenant farmers of this extensive drainage district, namely, of Urlingford, Johnstown, Cullohill, Rathdowney, and Durrow, who have expended a large sum in preliminary expenses, in reference to those projected drainage works, have been and are much disappointed, and likewise the labourers of the locality; and, whether the Government are prepared to introduce provisions into the Arterial Drainage Bill now brought in, that will carry out the undertaking of Mr. Trevelyan as to giving a voice to the tenants on the Drainage Board by constituting "Statutory termors" owners of land for the purposes of the Act, and otherwise?
  MR. HIBBERT: The circumstances stated by the hon. Member are known to me, and I am glad to recognize the intelligent zeal of the tenant farmers for the improvement of their land. In reply to the substantive part of this Question, I beg to refer him to the Land Improvement and Arterial Drainage Bill now before the House, Clause 45 of which would effect the object he desires, and which contains many other useful improvements in the existing law. Unfortunately, however, these improvements seem to be disapproved by the hon. Member for Cavan (Mr. Biggar).

  THE MAGISTRACY (GREAT BRITAIN)— PROHIBITION OF PUBLIC MEETINGS AND PROCESSIONS.
  MR. MARUMasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether there is any circular or instruction issued to the local magistracy of Great Britain, in reference to the prohibition of public meetings or processions, or their action in relation thereto; whether his attention has been directed to the Salvation Army case (Beatly and others, Appellants; Gillbanks, Respondent, Law Reports, Q.B. 308), wherein the following "Public Notice" was placarded through the streets of Weston-super-Mare:—
  "Whereas it hath been made appear to us the undersigned, two of Her Majesty's justices of the peace for the county of Somerset, acting in and for the division upon the outh of divers persons, that a riotous and tumultuous assembly

  1167
  did take place on the night of the 23rd of March in certain public streets in Weston-super-Mare, and further, that there are reasonable grounds for apprehending a repetition of such riotous and tumultuous assembly in the public streets of Weston-super-Mare. We do therefore hereby require, order, and direct all persons to abstain from assembling to the disturbance of the public peace, in the public streets, within the parish." (Signed by two magistrates.)
  That, thereupon one Beatly and others were arrested for holding an assembly and forming a procession in contravention of this magisterial notice or proclamation, and were subsequently convicted by the local magistrates and ordered to find sureties to keep the peace. That such conviction and order was set aside, with costs, in the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court of Justice (13th June, 1882); that the appellants assembled with others for a lawful purpose and with no intention of carrying it out unlawfully, but with the knowledge that their assembly would be opposed, and with good reason to suppose that a breach of the peace would be committed by those opposed to it; that it was held by Field and Cave, T.S. that they could not be rightly convicted of an unlawful assembly; that Mr. Justice Field, in the course of giving judgment, said—
  "What has happened here is that an unlawful organisation has assumed to itself the right to prevent the appellants and others from lawfully assembling together, and the finding of the justices (magistrates at petty sessions) amounts to this, that a man may be convicted for doing ft lawful act if he knows that his doing it may cause another to do an unlawful act. There is no authority for such a proposition;"
  whether he acquiesces in the principles of Law laid down by the learned judges in the above case, and that the prohibition of public meetings or public processions, under the circumstances therein occurring, and proclamations or public notices purporting to suppress such public meetings or public processions in local authorities are not warranted by Law in Great Britain; and, whether, in consequence of this decision, he has felt it to be his duty to withdraw or modify any former circular or instruction to local magistracy or issue any fresh one; and, if so, whether he will lay a copy of the same before the House?
  SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT,in reply, said, that he had not issued any such Circular. He had no power to
  1168
  send instructions to local magistrates as to their duty; he never attempted to do so. When applied to for advice, he had given the best information and advice he could. Before the decision in the Weston-super-Mare case the Home Office gave advice, founded upon opinions given by Law Officers of the Crown. Papers were laid upon the Table in 1882 in connection with what was called the Basingstoke case. Then, came the legal decision referred to, and after that, whenever magistrates appealed to the Home Office, they were referred to that decision. The whole matter was fully set out in a speech he made on the 15th of July last year on the Cleator Moor case.

  CENTRAL ASIA—THE RUSSO-AFGHAN FRONTIER.
  SIR HENRY TYLERasked the Under Secretary of State for India, Whether Punj Deh is garrisoned by Afghan troops, and at what distance from Punj Deh the Russian advanced force now is?
  MR. J. K. CROSS: Punj Deh is garrisoned by Afghan troops. It is about 24 miles south of Sariyazi, which is reported to have been lately occupied by the Russians.

  ARMY (INDIA)—BRITISH REINFORCEMENTS.
  SIR HENRY TYLERasked the Under Secretary of State for India, Whether, having regard to recent events, it is intended to strengthen the British Forces in India?
  MR. J. K. CROSS: In answering this Question I will also reply to the hon. Member for Athlone (Mr. Justin Huntly M'Carthy). The Earl of Dufferin has not asked for any increase of the number of British troops; and Her Majesty's Government have not thought it necessary to strengthen the British Forces in India.

  COMMITTEE ON ARMY AND NAVY EXPENDITURE—SHORT SERVICE.
  SIR BALDWYN LEIGHTONasked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether the question of Short Service, especially as regards Indian Reliefs and the depletion of Regiments, also the numbers of men constantly in hospital, will form parts of the subject for the Select

  1169
  Committee on Army and Navy Expenditure, or be within the province of such Committee?
  THE CHANCELLOE OF THE EXCHEQUER (Mr. CHILDERS): The whole question of Army and Navy Expenditure is proposed to be referred to the Committee, and it will be for the Committee itself to determine what branches of expenditure it will take up.

  EGYPT—THE WAR IN THE SOUDAN— STEAMERS ON THE NILE.
  MR. GOURLEYasked the Secretary of State for War, Whether the Government intend building portable shallow water steel-clad steamers suitable for the protection of the Lower and Upper Nile Valleys; if so, whether he can inform the House what number are to be ordered, also how they are to be armed, and when they are to be ready for shipment to Alexandria?
  THE MARQUESS OF HAETINGTON: We are making every preparation to afford Lord Wolseley all the assistance he may require in the matter of steamers for the Nile or otherwise; but, in the interests of the Expedition, I must ask hon. Members not to expect me to describe in detail the preparations, knowledge of which might become valuable to the enemy.

  FRANCE AND CHINA—THE HOSTILITIES—BLOCKING OF SHANGHAI RIVER.
  MR. SUTHERLANDasked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether information has been received by the Foreign Office to the effect that the Chinese authorities have, within the last forty-eight hours, publicly intimated that the entrance to the Shanghai River at Woosung will be blocked, so as to prevent the access of shipping to that port, and that vessels are now being stopped by their owners at Woosung in consequence of this notification; and, if so, whether he can hold out any hopes that the influence of Her Majesty's Government may be successfully employed to avert this extreme measure, which, if carried out, must be the cause of most serious loss and inconvenience to British trade?
  LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICE: Her Majesty's Government have not been informed that the Chinese authori-
  1170
  ties at Shanghai have given notice that the river is about to be blocked; but they are aware that preparations have been made for that purpose, and that it is the intention of the authorities to obstruct the access to the river if they think it necessary for purposes of defence. Her Majesty's Government have urged, and will continue to urge, upon the Chinese Government that there should be no unnecessary interference with trade; but they would not be justified in preventing the Chinese authorities from the adoption of defensive measures. From a telegram received to-day at Lloyd's it appears that the French Minister in China has re-affirmed an agreement made last year between the French and Chinese officials at Shanghai that Shanghai and Woosung should remain outside the range of hostilities.

  FRANCE AND CHINA—THE HOSTILITIES—INTERNATIONAL LAW.
  MR. CROPPERasked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, If he has seen the following report in The Times;—
  "Hong Kong, Feb. 2.
  "At Taiwan there are only three French vessels blockading the south-west of Formosa. The French are, however, destroying hundreds of fishing and trading craft along the coast, the crews being killed, or taken to Kelung and treated barbarously:
  "Much indignation is expressed at Hong Kong being allowed to be used as a base for such operations;"
  and, if he will inform the House if the Foreign Enlistment Act is yet fairly put in force at our Stations in China?
  LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICE: I beg to refer the hon. Member to Earl Granville's full and explicit statement in the House of Lords yesterday, in answer to Lord Denman's Question, and to state that the Foreign Enlistment Act is being enforced in Her Majesty's Colonies in the East.

  PUBLIC MEETINGS AT BIRMINGHAM— MR. CHAMBERLAIN.
  MR. DIXON-HARTLANDasked the First Lord of the Treasury, If his attention has been called to a speech delivered at Birmingham by the President of the Board of Trade on the 5th January, and in which he is reported in The Times of the 6th to have said—

  1171
  "But I ask what ransom will property pay for the security which it enjoys," and "what substitute will it make for the natural rights which hare ceased to he recognized;"
  and, whether these sentiments express the policy of the Cabinet as a body; and, if not, whether the principle that those who hold landed property may be compelled to ransom it, is an open question on which each Minister of the Crown is free to hold his own opinion?
  MR. GLADSTONE: The Question of the hon. Gentleman leads me to state that I had some communication—about 10 days, or I believe more than that—a fortnight ago with my right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade on the subject of the speech to which the hon. Member refers. My right hon. Friend was kind enough to give me an explanation of his general meaning. The House will forgive me if I read the passage of the letter, although it is longer than I should wish to introduce ordinarily in reply to a Question. My right hon. Friend says in a letter to me, which is dated February 7—
  "Starting with the proposition that the obligations as well as the rights of property must be strictly enforced, I argued that the community, as a whole, owed to its poorer members something more in the way of social legislation than it already had conceded in the Poor Law and the Education Act. I urged that the incidence of taxation still bore unequally on the working classes, and that the burden should be in proportion to the means. I also argued in favour of some practical attempt to multiply small owners and tenants."
  My right hon. Friend then further illustrates his meaning by reference to a speech of my right hon. Friend the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen). He says—
  "I find, for instance, Mr. Goschen, at Edinburgh, declaring the greatest happiness of the greatest number to be the peculiar object of Liberal policy, and advocating, in particular, as one of the applications of the general doctrine, the multiplication of small holders. He expresses disapproval of the methods suggested in my speeches; but I note a remarkable passage in which he says, in regard to the proposals of State socialism, he thinks it wiser to extend the functions of local authorities in order to entrust to them the work which cannot be safely performed by the State. This completely covers by main suggestion, that the local authorities should have power to purchase land, and expend money in connection with the creation of occupying ownerships and allotments."
  I therefore understand that my right hon. Friend considers that the incidence
  1172
  of taxation is still bearing unequally upon the working Classes, and that the burden ought to be in proportion to the means of the taxpayer. These are opinions which appear to me to be matters for discussion, and which it is totally impossible for me to discuss in making a reply to a Question; but, undoubtedly, if there is anyone in the House in whose case it is unnecessary that such exposition should be given, I am that person; because for the last 30 years it has been my incessant duty—or, at all events, my practice—to inflict upon the House of Commons the most detailed knowledge of all my opinions upon every question of money and finance. But the hon. Gentleman has added another Question, which I have some difficulty in construing. I have said those opinions of my right hon. Friend are matters for discussion; but, in my opinion, they do not express, nor do they purport to express, the policy of the Cabinet as a body. They are his own particular sentiments, and have nothing to do with any matter now under the consideration of the Cabinet. And then the hon. Gentleman asks whether the principle that those who hold landed property may be compelled to ransom it, is an open question on which each Minister of the Crown is free to hold his own opinion? I am not aware that any such principle is announced with regard to landed property. I am bound to say the only serious attack I have ever known made on landed property was an attack made, whether knowingly or not, by the Party opposite, strange as it may seem; for in the year 1852—the right hon. Gentleman who leads the Party opposite is not responsible for it, for he was not then in the House—but in that year it was proposed by the Party opposite, when in power under the Leadership of that distinguished man, Mr. Disraeli, to introduce into the Income Tax the principle of taxing Schedule A, together with Schedule C, at a higher rate than Schedule D and the other Schedules. Undoubtedly that was, in my opinion, a most formidable attack on landed property, which I have on every occasion, for 30 years, done my best to oppose; and if my right hon. Friend leans at all to an opinion of that kind, he certainly will find in me one of his antagonists. But I have communicated with my right hon. Friend, and I find he by no means follows

  1173
  the Party opposite in this matter. He assures me that what he has said is—not in his fixed conviction, but, as I understand him, he thinks it a fair subject for consideration—that all property should, whether anything in the nature of investments, whether personal or in land, be taxed at a higher rate than precarious incomes. This seems to me to be a matter for fair Parliamentary consideration; and undoubtedly it is impossible for me to quarrel with my right hon. Friend for holding that opinion, though I entirely dissent from it, when I recollect that he stops far short of a doctrine announced as a matter of practical legislation by Gentlemen who sit on the Benches opposite.
  MR. DIXON-HARTLAND: I am afraid the right hon. Gentleman has not looked at my Question. The Question I asked is, whether he has seen the extracts from the speech which contained the following words:—
  "But I ask what ransom will property pay for the security which it enjoys;"
  and—
  "what substitute will it make for the natural rights which have ceased to be recognised?"
  The right hon. Gentleman simply reads an explanation of other parts of the President of the Board of Trade's speech; but does not answer my Question.
  MR. GLADSTONE: I beg pardon; I began by saying that, having seen and had my attention called to these expressions, I asked my right hon. Friend what he intended to convey by them, and I have read to the House his explanation. There was nothing said, either in these expressions or anywhere else, about landed property, on which the stress of the hon. Gentleman's Question was meant to bear; and I really venture to doubt whether the hon. Gentleman has read his own Question.

  EGYPT—THE WAR IN THE SOUDAN— PUBLIC PRAYER FOR THE TROOPS.
  SIR JOHN HAYasked the First Lord of the Treasury, Whether, as the state of public affairs in the Soudan and elsewhere has constituted a case of great emergency, he will advise the Crown to issue its mandate for public Prayer to be offered to Almighty God for our seamen and soldiers engaged in warlike operations, and for the success of Her Majesty's arms by sea and land?
  MR. SEXTONasked whether the right hon. Gentleman did not consider prayers voluntarily offered to the Almighty of more efficacy than prayers consequent on the mandate of Her Majesty's Government?
  MR. GLADSTONE: In reply to the Question of the right hon. and gallant Gentleman, I have already informed him that I have had communications with the Primate of the Church of England, and I have found that provision had been made, by means not political, for the offering of prayers of this kind, and I believe they are universally used at the present time throughout the country. That being so, there is no intention on the part of the Government to attempt any interference.

  CENTRAL ASIA—HERAT.
  SIR HENRY TYLERasked the First Lord of the Treasury, Whether Her Majesty's Government have taken, are taking, or will take, any measures with a view to the security of Herat, and to prevent its being taken by a coup de main?
  MR. GLADSTONE: Sir, in reply to the hon. Gentleman, I have to state that Her Majesty's Government are engaged in taking the steps which they deem best for ascertaining and securing the entire frontier of Afghanistan, including Herat; and they cannot enter into any statement of particulars, because they conceive it would be disadvantageous to the public interest.

  GENERAL GORDON—TRIBUTE OF HONOUR.
  SIR FEEDERICK MILNER,who had given Notice to ask the First Lord of the Treasury, Whether it is his intention, or of any responsible Minister of the Crown in the House of Commons, to pay any verbal tribute of honour to the memory of General Gordon? said, that after the eloquent, but rather tardy, tribute paid by the Prime Minister the previous night to the memory of General Gordon, he would not put the Question.

  EGYPT (EVENTS IN THE SOUDAN)— THE EVACUATION OF THE SOUDAN.
  MR. ASHMEAD-BARTLETTasked the First Lord of the Treasury, Whether his attention has been called to the following statements, made by the Cor-

  1175
  respondent of The Standard at Suakin on the 23rd:—
  "The avowed determination of Government to abandon the Soudan after taking Khartoum must have the effect of driving every tribesman inclined to help us into the arms of the Mahdi, it will in no way disarm the fanatical hostility of the enemy; the news known here to-day will he carried to-morrow across the Desert. In ten days it will be known at Berber and Khartoum, and throughout the whole of the valley of the Upper Nile, and will be a direct incitement on the part of the English Government to every tribe in the Soudan to rise on the flanks and rear of our little army there, for it is a notice that all who take our part or show us friendship will be finally abandoned to the vengeance of the Mahdi. The most intense bitterness is felt and expressed by officers and men here. They feel that Government has thus once more, at a critical moment, increased the difficulties and dangers of their arduous undertaking, and has added one more to the series of blunders which will have to be retrieved by their life blood; the declaration last year that the Soudan was to be abandoned doomed General Gordon's mission to failure, and cost him his life. The consequences of the reiteration of that pledge today are likely to prove scarcely less disastrous;"
  and, whether he will now make a declaration that will avert these disastrous results?
  MR. GLADSTONE: The hon. Gentleman has been misled by the statements of a correspondent. I am not surprised that the correspondent should have been misled; but I am a little surprised that the hon. Gentleman should have been, as he heard the statement which I made in this House the other day. He calls my attention, and asks me to read a recantation in consequence of a statement of the Correspondent of The Standard that there has been an avowed determination on the part of the Government to abandon the Soudan after taking Khartoum. Who has expressed that determination? I have never said a word about it. ["Oh!"] I am speaking now of what has taken place since Parliament met after the Adjournment. What I spoke of, Sir, in the explanation which I addressed to Parliament in the House of Commons on Thursday last was, not the abandonment of the Soudan after the taking of Khartoum—it was the evacuation of the Soudan by Egypt. I have never said a word on the subject of the withdrawal or of the evacuation of the Soudan by Her Majesty's Forces. [Opposition laughter.] Sir, I explained myself, I think, with tolerable fulness on this subject last night; but I am endeavouring to correct
  1176
  what is evidently a gross misapprehension which seems to have consisted in this—that I have stated that Her Majesty's Forces were to evacuate the Soudan immediately after they had succeeded in taking Khartoum. I have never entered into the subject in the form of any particular statement. What I have said is, that the evacuation of the Soudan by Egypt and its restoration to freedom constituted the original policy of Her Majesty's Government, and that that policy had not been altered, but that events had occurred which prevented its immediate execution. And then, in dealing with the question of the taking of Khartoum, I pointed out that the effect of a negative decision on that question would have been the abandonment at one stroke of a variety of purposes—some of which I enumerated, and which consisted of matters with respect to which I believe I said more than once that, in our view, any reasonable effort ought to be made to deal with them. Consequently, there is no truth in the statement that Her Majesty's Forces were simply to execute a military operation and then retire. I now wish to say that I adhere to my full statement of last night as the explanation more at large of my sentiments; but the reason why I dwell more on the phrase "evacuation of the Soudan by Egypt" is this—that on Thursday I was speaking, not as I usually do, but from a note made, after careful consideration, with my Colleagues, and I find the phrase I used—"the evacuation of the Soudan by Egypt"—is carefully reported in the newspapers.
  MR. ASHMEAD-BARTLETTasked whether, in view of the very important statement of the Prime Minister, and the importance of the precise meaning of the Government being properly understood in the East, they were to understand from the reply just given that Her Majesty's Government would not give up their control, political or military, over the Soudan which they were endeavouring to obtain till a fixed and orderly Government had been established there?
  MR. GLADSTONE: I refer the hon. Member to the speech I made last night, and to the explanations I gave on Thursday. I abide by those explanations, and I refer the hon. Gentleman to them so far as I am concerned.

  EGYPT (EVENTS IN THE SOUDAN)— PRINCE HASSAN.
  MR. ARTHUR O'CONNORasked the Prime Minister, If he could now state whether Prince Hassan was a functionary of the British Government or of the Egyptian?
  MR. GLADSTONE: I apprehend that the case is, as it was stated by my noble Friend the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that Prince Hassan is to be considered as a person holding an appointment having relations with other persona who are under the authority of the Khedive of Egypt; but that that appointment was made with the approval and counsel of British functionaries in the Soudan.
  SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFFasked the Prime Minister, Whether, as it had been publicly stated that Prince Hassan was to be made Governor of Khartoum, Her Majesty's Government would therefore prevent his going as Civil Commissioner with Lord Wolseley?
  MR. GLADSTONE: No; Her Majesty's Government do not intend to prevent his going as Civil Commissioner.

  EGYPT—ARABI PASHA.
  MR. JUSTIN HUNTLYM CARTHYasked the First Lord of the Treasury, Whether, in consideration of the present condition of affairs in Egypt, Her Majesty's Government can see their way to cause the recall of Arabi Pasha from exile in Ceylon, and to further cause his restoration to authority in the administration of the government of the country?
  MR. GLADSTONE: No, Sir; Her Majesty's Government will not adopt the suggestion contained in the hon. Member's Question.

  NAVY—THE TROOPSHIP "POONAH."
  MR. W. H. SMITHasked the Secretary to the Admiralty, Whether he could give any information with regard to the transport Poonah, which was reported to be somewhere in the Irish Channel, having injured her shaft?
  SIR THOMAS BRASSEY: The transport Poonah, on her way from Malta to Queenstown, partially fractured her main shaft. The Canadian voyageurs who formed part of her passengers were landed at Queenstown. After a consultation with the representatives of the Peninsular
  1178
  and Oriental Company, and on the report of the Admiral and engineer officials at Queenstown, it was considered safe to let the ship proceed to Portsmouth accompanied by two tugs. Off the Longships the hawsers parted, and one of the tugs which had lost sight of the steamer in the night came into Falmouth on Monday morning and reported the circumstance. About 7.30 P.M. last night the Mount Etna, the other tug which had been engaged, parted with the Poonah off the coast of Cornwall. The Admiralty have despatched the powerful tug Stormcock from Pembroke, two tugs from Devonport, and a hired tug from Queenstown. They are expected to fall in with the Poonah this afternoon.

  THE SELECT COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC EXPENDITURE.
  MR. W. H. SMITHasked as to the time when the Chancellor of the Exchequer would move for the appointment of the Select Committees on Army and Navy Expenditure, and on the expenditure for Miscellaneous and other Services?
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER (Mr. CHILDERS): I do not see any prospect of the Motion for the two Committees being reached before half-past 12 to-night; but I shall move them on the first occasion permitted by the Rules of the House.
  LORD GEORGE HAMILTONinquired whether the right hon. Gentleman was really going to move a Vote of Censure on his two Colleagues at 12 o'clock at night?
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER (Mr. CHILDERS)said, that it was the wish of the House in ls83 and 1884—a wish pointedly expressed by the Leader of the Party to which the noble Lord belonged—that this Committee to which the noble Lord referred should be appointed, and he should certainly take the first opportunity of moving for its appointment.

  GENERAL GORDON—LETTER FROM LORD WOLSELEY.
  LORD JOHN MANNERS: I wish to ask the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War, Whether he has any objection to laying on the Table the letter from Lord Wolseley to General Gordon intrusted to Sir Charles Wilson?
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: I have made inquiry, and find that no copy of that letter has been sent home.

MOTION.
  ORDERS OF THE DAY— EGYPT AND THE SOUDAN—THE VOTE OF CENSURE—NOTICES OF MOTIONS.

    RESOLUTION.
    Motion made, and Question proposed,
    "That the Notices of Motions be postponed until after the Order of the Day for resuming the Adjourned Debate on Egypt and the Soudan."—(Mr. Gladstone.)
    MR. JOHN REDMOND,who had a Notice on the Paper to call attention to the case of District Inspector Murphy, said, that he rose for the purpose of opposing the Motion which had been made by the Prime Minister. He should not have taken this course if there had been the slightest probability of his being able, as a private Member, to have called, attention to the subject standing in his name upon any other occasion, as the Government had appropriated all the days of private Members for an indefinite period. He could quite understand the impatience with which English Members might regard the introduction of merely Irish questions at a time like that; but they should remember the position which the Irish Members occupied in that House. They had no other means of calling to account the men ruling their country, who were invested with absolutely arbitrary powers; and it should also be remembered that the Irish Members were not at all interested in the solemn sham fight going on between the rival English political Parties. There were two reasons why the Motion which stood in his name should not be pushed aside by the carrying of the Resolution before the matter had been adequately discussed and disposed of. The matter was one which could brook no delay, for although it might appear to some Members that the subject was an insignificant one, still it should be distinctly understood that this view would not be taken by those who represented the Irish Executive. It related to the dismissal from the Irish Constabulary of an officer who, after 18 years' meritorious service, had been removed from the Force without pension in the most arbitrary and unjust manner,
    1180
    and, as he (Mr. Redmond) believed he would be able to show, most illegally.
    MR. SPEAKER: Order, order! I must remind the hon. Member that the Rule of Relevancy strictly applies to this debate. The hon. Member would not be in order in going into the details of the case he has referred to upon the Motion now before the House.
    MR. JOHN REDMONDsaid, he was most anxious to observe the ruling of the Chair. He had no intention of going into the details of the case; but he believed he was entitled, as a matter of argument, to show that his Motion was one of such importance that it would not brook delay, and ought not to be overridden by the proposal which the Prime Minister had just made. If he were right in that view, he would continue his remarks, bearing in mind most strictly the ruling of the Chair. His Motion dealt not only with the unjust and illegal dismissal of an officer, but with the conduct of the Executive Government.
    MR. SPEAKER: Order, order! That would be entirely out of Order. The question of the dismissal of this officer is not the point now before the House, and cannot be discussed.
    MR. JOHN REDMONDcontinued. He was most anxious to observe the ruling of the Chair, and he was only proceeding to show the relevancy of the subject. But if the right hon. Gentleman decided against him, of course he would submit to his ruling. His argument was that the Motion which appeared on the Paper in his name was one which called to account the conduct of certain leading Irish officials, who had unjustly and illegally dismissed a man from the Royal Irish Constabulary simply on the ground of revenge.
    MR. SPEAKER: I must again call the hon. Member to Order. I have already twice pointed out to the hon. Member that the way in which he is discussing this subject is not in Order, and I beg that he will observe the ruling of the Chair.
    MR. JOHN REDMONDreminded the Speaker that he had said he was anxious to observe the ruling of the Chair. [Laughter.] That statement might afford some amusement to certain hon. Members, but, nevertheless, it was true. The relative importance of the debate upon the Vote of Censure, and the

    1181
    Motion which stood in his name on the Paper, was such that Irish Members were justified in opposing the proposal of the Prime Minister by every means in their power. He believed that he was entitled to ask the Government to afford him some facilities for the consideration of his Motion. He should be satisfied if the Prime Minister would undertake to give him an opportunity for bringing the matter forward within the next three or four weeks. The discussion need not be a long one. The Solicitor General for Ireland had blocked the Notice so that the Motion could not be discussed that evening after 12.30. This looked as if the hon. and learned Gentleman was deliberately trying to suppress the discussion in the interest of his Colleagues in Dublin Castle.
    MR. T. P. O'CONNORsaid, he was quite willing to give way should any Members of the Government be desirous of answering the appeal of his hon. Friend. He did not want to occupy the time of the House; but as nobody had risen he would make a few observations in support of the objection made by his hon. Friend. It must have struck every hon. Member that this was the second occasion during the present Session that the Prime Minister had stood up and asked the House to deprive Irish Members of their privileges, and of the advantages which they had obtained from the ballot. He would point out that the Government had already monopolized the whole of the time of the House, to the prejudice of the Irish Members, who were extremely anxious to discuss various questions which vitally affected the interests of their constituents. The debate on the Vote of Censure might without any disadvantage be postponed until after the discussion of the Motion of his hon. Friend, or even for three or four weeks. All the speeches on the Motion of the Leader of the Opposition, up to the present, had been extremely dull. He should have been glad, if possible, to make an exception in favour of the Prime Minister; but in justice he felt reluctantly compelled to include the right hon. Gentleman in the description. The debate excited no interest either in the House or out of it. As far as he could see, both sides of the House seemed to look upon the result of the
    1182
    debate as a foregone conclusion. The Government would not go out, and the Tories would not take their places if they did go out; and the discussion was, therefore, a most unwarrantable waste of time. His hon. Friend the Member for New Boss (Mr. John Redmond) had a distinct cause of complaint against the hon. and learned Solicitor General for Ireland (Mr. Walker) for the block he had placed against the Motion, because otherwise the Motion itself might have been discussed at a later hour. The action of the hon. and learned Gentleman showed him to be more Viceregal than the Viceroy himself.
    MR. GLADSTONEsaid, that if, as stated by the hon. Member who had just sat down, the debate on the Vote of Censure had to them been without spirit or animation, the hon. Member might still hope that thenceforth it would be both powerful and animated. Hon. Members could not suppose that the Government were so desperately enamoured of Votes of Censure upon themselves that they had an interested motive in proposing the Motion now before the House. It was in accordance with established rule and practice that a debate on a Motion of Censure should, if possible, be proceeded with without interruption to its close. He could assure the hon. Member that no one felt more than he (Mr. Gladstone) did the inconvenience to which he had been put. He was anxious to facilitate any arrangement which might be feasible to forward their views, although he could not agree with the hon. Member that in Ireland there was an absolute and arbitrary system of government. He fully agreed with him in the desire that Members from Ireland should have the fullest liberty of submitting anything which they thought partook of the nature of a grievance to the House. With regard to the Motion of the hon. Gentleman, it had been observed that his hon. Friend the Chief Secretary was not in his place; but the reason was that he was unable to be in his place that evening, and that warranted the Solicitor General in taking the step which he had. The hon. Gentleman had given an assurance that this discussion would not occupy any great length of time. That being so, what he had to say to him was this—no opposition would be made to his bringing

    1183
    on his Motion on a future evening after the adjournment of the debate had been proposed. He need not, however, point out the great difficulty which there would be in that case in securing a House for any great length of time. It was not absolutely in the power of the Government to secure a House for the hon. Member, but he could assure him that no obstacle would be placed in his way.
    MR. SEXTONsaid, that the right hon. Gentleman had quoted custom and usage in support of a Motion for proceeding with the discussion on the Vote of Censure; but he believed that he was entitled to say that custom and usage might be occasionally wisely departed from. The hon. Member for New Ross desired to bring forward a Motion relating to Ireland, and he believed that the Government would act wisely in allowing that debate to go on and be disposed of without further expenditure of time. He attached no importance to the absence of the Chief Secretary for Ireland. The Irish Members would be glad that evening to accept the Solicitor General for Ireland as a substitute for the right hon. Gentleman. The hon. and learned Gentleman had been so rigorous in his silence lately that they would all be glad to hear him. He objected to the manner in which the hon. Member for New Ross had been met by the Prime Minister. The proposal was by no means a fair one, and gave them no assurance of any certainty that they would be able to bring the case of District Inspector Murphy forward. The right hon. Gentleman had expressed a desire that Irish questions should be treated promptly and fully in that House. If he really felt such a desire, why, then, did he allow his legal subordinate, the Solicitor General, to block the Motion? In reference to the Soudan debate, he asked any impartial Member if the discussion had not run itself out? A duller, more pointless, more spiritless debate had not taken place in the course of the present Parliament. A stumbling attack on the Government had been followed by a bewildering defence; and if many more explanations should be made in the course of the debate similar to that which the Prime Minister had volunteered at the Table that evening, it would make confusion more confounded. The Leaders on both sides had spoken,
    1184
    and their followers were not likely to have anything new or wise to add. Everyone had made up his mind as to the division, and nothing hinged on the debate, for they all knew that the Government did not intend to go out, and that the Opposition did not want to go in. Nobody in the country was athirst for the matured wisdom of the right hon. Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen); and, under all the circumstances, he would suggest to the House that their respective forces should be drawn off in this sham battle, and that they should take the vote at once; or, if it was inconvenient to do so now, let the debate be adjourned until a future day, when a division could be taken.
    MR. O'BRIENsaid, that the offer of the Prime Minister was altogether illusory, as there could be little hope that they would have another opportunity of bringing this Motion forward. It would be wiser for the Government to cut short the debate on the Vote of Censure rather than incur the charge of having suppressed the Motion of his hon. Friend; for that was really what their proceeding amounted to. If the Irish Members were denied the opportunity of challenging the conduct of the Irish Government in regard to District Inspector Murphy, the matter would be practically shelved for the Session. The case of the grievance of an ordinary individual might well wait; but Mr. Murphy had no remedy at law, and his livelihood and character—he might say his very life—depended on an appeal to Parliament for an inquiry. He urged, therefore, that his hon. Friend should be permitted to bring forward his Motion. Everybody was really pretty tired of this debate on the Vote of Censure. The Opposition did not want the Government out, and he was sure the Radicals did not. No interest whatever was taken in the matter except by the Members who had their speeches in type. He was sure that in justice to Mr. Murphy the Government should afford Irish Members an opportunity of clearing his character from the imputations made by what they could could not help regarding as a conspiracy against him. If the Government persisted by the mere force of a majority of that House in depriving them of that opportunity, all he could say was that a majority of the Irish people would know very well how to view the action of the

    1185
    Government, and would believe them responsible for this conspiracy.
    MR. WILLIAM REDMONDthought that the Government were practically shelving the Motion of the hon. Member. Their action in this matter would be regarded by the Irish people as a sign that the Irish Executive were afraid to allow the case of Mr. Murphy to be investigated. The proposals of the right hon. Gentleman would not be received with any degree of satisfaction either by the Irish Members or the Irish people. The right hon. Gentleman and his followers must be aware that the Government of Dublin Castle was detested by the people of Ireland.

    THE NEW RULES OF PROCEDURE.
    Rule 5 (Irrelevance or Repetition).
    MR. SPEAKER: Order, order! The hon. Member is not now addressing himself to the subject before the House. His observations are quite irrelevant.
    MR. WILLIAM REDMOND: I bow to your ruling, Sir; but I am glad to hear that Dublin Castle is irrelevant.
    MR. SPEAKER: The hon. Member is altogether irrelevant, and I must call upon him to discontinue his speech.
    Mr. REDMOND resumed his seat.
    MR. ARTHUR O'CONNORsaid, he could not share in the opinion of soma of his hon. Friends that the debate on the Soudan was a sham fight, an empty form; for, no doubt, English Members on both sides, as well as the Government, were anxious that a direct answer should be given to the challenge thrown out by the Front Opposition Bench. At the same time, he felt bound to complain of the ruthless manner in which the Government dealt with the rights of private Members. Unfortunately, the Irish Members were now almost the only champions of those rights. He would remind the Prime Minister that the precedents quoted by him were drawn from a time when the constitution of Parliament was very much different from what it was now. The Irish Members would not be justified in allowing the Government to push aside the important Motion of his hon. Friend without remonstrance. He would, therefore, move, as an Amendment to the Motion of the Prime Minister, to insert, after the word "Motion," these words—"Except the Motion relating to the Royal
    1186
    Irish Constabulary (District Inspector Murphy)." They would, however, be satisfied if the Government promised to adjourn the debate on Thursday night at 11 o'clock, so that his hon. Friend's Motion could be brought forward.
    Amendment proposed,
    After the word "Motions," to insert the words "except the Motion relating to the Royal Irish Constabulary (District Inspector Murphy)."—[Mr. Arthur O'Connor.]
    Question proposed, "That those words be there inserted."
    MR. DEASYsupported the Amendment, and argued that the debate on the Vote of Censure was not of such importance as to take precedence of the other important Motions of private Members. He suggested that the Irish Members should be allowed by the Government to set down this Motion for Thursday night at 11 o'clock; and if they were not permitted to discuss the case of Inspector Murphy now, they would feel it their duty to enter into it more fully whenever they had an opportunity of doing so. Probably they would not be allowed to discuss any important matter until the Prince of Wales had been to Ireland. He might say that it would not add to the warmth of the reception the Prince would get there when it became known that, immediately after the Government had decided on this visit, they took the extreme course of preventing the Irish Members from ventilating their grievances in that House.
    Mr. JUSTIN M'CARTHY and Mr. WILLIAM EEDMONDrose together, but the latter gave way.

    THE NEW RULES OF PROCEDURE.
    Rule 1 (Putting the Question).
    MR. SPEAKER: Order, order! It is my duty to inform the House that I consider that this subject has been adequately discussed; and I think it is the evident sense of the House that the Question should be put.
    Mr. GLADSTONErose with a copy of the Standing Orders in his hand, but was prevented from making himself heard by loud ironical cheers from the Benches occupied by the Irish Members. The right hon. Gentleman remained standing at the Table.
    An Irish MEMBER: This is the Liberal policy.
    MR. O'BRIEN: We will remember this in Ireland.

    THE NEW RULES OF PROCEDURE.
    Rule 9 (Order in Debate).
    MR. SPEAKER: I Name Mr. O'Brien for disregarding the authority of the Chair.
    MR. KENNY (and other Irish MEMBERS): Name away.
    MR. GLADSTONE: I was on the point. Sir, of making another Motion in accordance with the intimation which fell from you at the moment when the hon. Member for Mallow (Mr. O'Brien) was Named from the Chair. My duty, however, in relation to the Naming of a Member takes precedence of the duty I was about to perform. I now beg to move—"That Mr. O'Brien be suspended from the service of the House."
    MR. O'BRIEN: It is the only honour I have any ambition for.
    MR. SEXTON: I rise to a point of Order.
    MR. SPEAKER: The Question I have to put is, "That Mr. O'Brien be suspended from the service of the House."
    Mr. SEXTONremained standing.
    An Irish MEMBER: The object is to destroy our votes.
    MR. SEXTON: I wish, Sir, to address you on a point of Order.
    MR. SPEAKER: No debate can be allowed upon this Question.
    MR. SEXTON: I have no desire to raise a debate; but I rise to a point of Order. [Cries of "Order!" and "Chair!"]
    MR. SPEAKER: As no debate is allowed on this Question it is my duty to put it from the Chair.
    MR. SEXTON: I repeat, Sir, that I do not rise for the purpose of raising a debate, but merely to speak upon a point of Order.
    MR. SPEAKER: If the hon. Member rises to a point of Order he can be heard.
    MR. SEXTON: I wish to submit to you, Sir, that on every occasion hitherto, when a Member has been suspended from the service of the House for disregarding the authority of the Chair, this formula has always been ob-
    1188
    served by the Speaker—"Mr. So-and-so, I Name you to the House for disregarding the authority of the Chair;" and then a Minister of the Crown has moved a Motion to suspend him from the service of the House. On this occasion, Sir, the only words which passed your lips were "Mr. O'Brien." You said nothing further.
    MR. SPEAKER: The course which I adopted was perfectly regular. The Question is, "That Mr. O'Brien be suspended from the service of the House."
    The House divided:—Ayes 244; Noes 20: Majority 224.—(Div. List, No. 28.)
    MR. SPEAKER,having read the numbers, said: I now call upon the hon. Member for Mallow to withdraw.
    MR. O'BRIEN,rising: Certainly, Mr. Speaker; and I shall leave the House with far more pleasure than I ever entered it.
    Mr. O'BRIENthen withdrew.
    MR. GLADSTONE: In consequence of the declaration made from the Chair immediately before the last Question was put, I beg now to move "That the Question be now put."
    MR. SPEAKER: The original Question was—
    "That the Notices of Motions be postponed until after the Order of the Day for resuming the Adjourned Debate on Egypt and the Soudan"—
    since which an Amendment has been moved, after the word "Motions," to insert the words "except the Motion relating to the Royal Irish Constabulary (District Inspector Murphy)." The Question I have now to put is, "That those words be there inserted."
    MR. PARNELL: I rise to a point of Order. I wish to submit to you, Sir, that the Question is not "That those words be there inserted," but that in accordance with the Standing Order you should first put the Question, "That the Question be now put."
    MR. SPEAKER: It is in accordance with the Standing Order that I have now put the Question—the Question being the insertion of these words.
    The House was cleared for a Division.
    MR. GORST(speaking seated, and covered): I beg to submit a point of Order. You, Sir, having, in accordance

    1189
    with the Standing Order, intimated that in your opinion the subject has been adequately discussed, and that the evident sense of the House is in favour of coming to a conclusion upon it, I submit that in accordance with the Standing Order the Question put from the Chair should be, "That the Question be now put." Upon the Question being so proposed and put from the Chair there may be a Division. If in that Division fewer than 200 Members vote for the Motion, then the debate ought to be continued, unless the minority is less than 40. I submit, therefore, that the mode in which the Question has been put is not regular, and is not in accordance with the Standing Order.
    MR. SPEAKER: The Question immediately before the House was the Amendment, and the Question put to the House was, "That the Question be now put." The right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister made that Motion.
    MR. SEXTON: You never put that Question.
    MR. SPEAKER: The right hon. Gentleman put the Question, "That the Question be now put."
    MR. SEXTON: With all due deference, the right hon. Gentleman only made that Motion; he could not put it.
    MR. ARTHUR O'CONNOR: You never put the Question, "That the Question be now put." It was for you, Sir, to put that Question to the House.
    MR. SPEAKER: I put the Question to the House from the Chair, "That the Question be now put."
    Several Irish MEMBERS: No, Sir; certainly not. Never.
    MR. SPEAKER: I am in the recollection of the House, and I said that the Motion was, "That the Question be now put." The Question then immediately before the House was the Amendment moved by the hon. Member for Queen's County; and I thought it was my duty to put the Question, "That the Question be now put," on the Amendment as well as on the Main Question.
    MR. ARTHUR O'CONNOR: I wish to represent to you, Sir, that the House has not had an opportunity of deciding the question whether the Question be now put.
    MR. PARNELL: I submit, with great respect, that one Question only can be put at a time, and that we should, in
    1190
    accordance with the Standing Order, be permitted to ascertain the sense of the House on the first Question—namely, "That the Question be now put."
    MR. SPEAKER: My view was that I did put to the House the Question "That the Question be now put" upon the Amendment, which was then before the House. I should again have to put the Question "That the Question be now put" upon the Main Question, when that came up for decision. That is the view which I took, and I believe that it is in compliance with the Standing Order.
    MR. GORST: Is the Question now before the House, and upon which the House is now about to vote, the Question "That the Question be now put?"
    MR. SPEAKER: Yes; the Question before the House is "That the Question be now put."
    The House divided:—Ayes 207; Noes 46: Majority 161.—(Div. List, No. 29.)
    MR. GLADSTONE: I believe, Sir, that under your ruling from the Chair it now devolves upon me to make a Motion—[Cries of "Question!" from the Irish Members.]
    Question put, "That the words 'except the Motion relating to the Royal Irish Constabulary (District Inspector Murphy)' be there inserted."
    The House divided:—Ayes 235; Noes 19: Majority 216.—(Div. List, No. 30.)
    Main Question again proposed.
    MR. PARNELL: I must say that I sympathize very greatly with the desire of my hon. Friends to secure from the Government an opportunity for discussing the question of the case of Mr. Inspector Murphy; but as that matter has been finally decided by the vote of the House, of course I shall not be permitted by the Rules of the House to refer to it any further. I will only, in speaking on the general question of the postponement of the Orders of the Day, pay that I am bound to think that my hon. Friends have made out their case, that there was no urgency whatever for the Motion of the Prime Minister; and I am bound to think that the House might very easily be allowed to pursue its ordinary course without diverging into the shoals and quicksands of the Soudan and Arabian politics. For my

    1191
    part, I look upon the debate which commenced and proceeded yesterday as, to a considerable extent, a sham debate, and one of a foregone conclusion; and although, undoubtedly, it is customary, when the Leader of the Front Opposition Bench makes a request that the Government of the day should place facilities at his disposal for the purpose of moving a Vote of Censure, that the Government should afford such facilities under such circumstances, yet still, if ever there was an occasion when that custom might have been departed from, it was now, when, after repeated assaults and Motions of no confidence in the Government, the Front Opposition Bench with their Party came forward once more with a Motion which is evidently some subterfuge, and not based on any real desire to upset Her Majesty's Government. Therefore I say that, from that point of view, the Government might reason ably have refused the request of the Leader of the Opposition to be furnished with Government time for the purpose of carrying on the debate on the Vote of Censure. But, Sir, the case is still stronger as regards private Members, and certainly as regards the private Members who sit in this part of the House. We were asked earlier in the Session, in the interests of the Redistribution Bill, to give up all opportunities of discussing Irish questions until that Bill had been passed. We are now asked to-night to give up all opportunities of discussing Irish questions until this Vote of Censure has been disposed of; and I submit that there is no ground whatever why either the Prime Minister or the Leader of the Opposition should make such a demand upon us. The opportunities which belong to private Members have been steadily infringed upon of recent years; but it has been reserved for this Session for the Government to turn over what is practically a new leaf, and to commence at the beginning of the Session to take a step which is usually taken after the Whitsuntide holidays. Therefore, Sir, we are obliged, in self-defence, with the small instinct of self-preservation that may be left to us, to contest such a Motion as this, and to incur the grave and weighty displeasure of both of the front Benches in our attempt to defend the privileges of private Members. I regret exceedingly that the great bulk
    1192
    of Members should yield so facilely to the orders and directions of the two front Benches. The time has nearly come when, if this sort of thing continues, the Government of the day will absorb all the time of the House, and when the facilities which private Members now enjoy for the ventilation of their grievances will have disappeared altogether. We shall then see the Leader of the Opposition humbly craving, not as a matter of right, but as a matter of favour, a day from the all-powerful Government of Her Majesty for the purpose of moving a Vote of Censure, and, perhaps, not getting it. Now, Sir, I am forbidden to touch—it would be out of Order to do so—on the question of the Motion of my hon. Friend; but if the debate had been allowed to continue, I should have suggested that the Government might have made some sort of promise that some time would be given, not necessarily during the course of this debate, but during the proceedings on the Redistribution Bill, for the purpose of considering that Motion—some time that might have been convenient to Her Majesty's Government, and which they might easily find upon some evening when the question of the Redistribution Bill might be adjourned at 11 or half-past 11, so that my hon. Friend might have an opportunity of proceeding with his Motion. However, as I have said, that question is disposed of. It only, therefore, remains for me to say that we will take a Division against the Motion of the Prime Minister, so that we may protest, in that way, as strongly as we can against what we must consider to be the most unreasonable and arbitrary conduct of the two front Benches and their followers on the present occasion.
    Main Question put.
    The House divided:—Ayes 222; Noes 19: Majority 203.—(Div. List, No. 31.)
    Ordered, That the Notices of Motions be postponed until after the Order of the Day for resuming' the Adjourned Debate on Egypt and the Soudan.
    The following is the entry in the Votes:—
    NOTICES OF MOTIONS,—Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Notices of Motions be postponed until after the Order of the

    1193
    Day for resuming the Adjourned Debate on Egypt and the Soudan:"—(Mr. Gladstone:)—
    Mr. Speaker, having called the attention of the House to continued irrelevance on the part of Mr. William Redmond, Member for Wexford, directed the honourable Member to discontinue his speech:—
    Amendment proposed, after the word "Motions," to insert the words "except the Motion relating to the Royal Irish Constabulary (District Inspector Murphy:"—(Mr. Arthur O'Connor:)—
    Question proposed, "That those words be there inserted:"—
    And it appearing to Mr. Speaker that the subject had been adequately discussed, and that it was the evident sense of the House that the Question should be put, he so informed the House.
    Mr. O'Brien, Member for Mallow, having been Named by Mr. Speaker for abusing the Rules of the House, by disorderly interruption:—
    Motion made, and Question put, "That Mr. O'Brien be suspended from the service of the House:"—(Mr. Gladstone:)—The House divided; Ayes 244, Noes 20.
    Mr. Speaker then directed Mr. O'Brien to withdraw, and he withdrew accordingly.
    Motion made, and Question put, "That the Question be now put:"—(Mr. Gladstone:)—The House divided;Ayes 207, Noes 46.
    Question put, "That the words 'except the Motion relating to the Royal Irish Constabulary (District Inspector Murphy)' be there inserted:"—The House divided; Ayes 19, Noes 235.
    Main Question put:—The House divided; Ayes 222, Noes 19.
    Ordered, That the Notices of Motions be postponed until after the Order of the Day for resuming the Adjourned Debate on Egypt and the Soudan.

ORDER OF THE DAY.
  EGYPT AND THE SOUDAN—VOTE OF CENSURE.—RESOLUTION.

    [ADJOURNED DEBATE.] [SECOND NIGHT.]
    Order read, for resuming Adjourned Debate on Amendment proposed to Question [23rd February],
    "That an humble Address be presented to the Queen, humbly representing to Her Majesty that the course pursued by Her Majesty's Government in respect to the affairs of Egypt and the Soudan, has involved a great sacrifice
    1194
    of valuable lives and a heavy expenditure without any beneficial result, and has rendered it imperatively necessary in the interests of the British Empire and of the Egyptian people that Her Majesty's Government should distinctly recognise, and take decided measures to fulfil, the special responsibility now incumbent on them to assure a good and stable Government to Egypt and to those portions of the Soudan which are necessary to its security."—(Sir Stafford Northcote.)
    And which Amendment was,
    To leave out from the first word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to insert the words "this House, while refraining from expressing an opinion on the policy pursued by Her Majesty's Government in respect to the affairs of Egypt and the Soudan, regrets the decision of Her Majesty's Government to employ the forces of the Crown for the overthrow of the power of the Mahdi,"—(Mr. John Morley,)
    —instead thereof.
    Question again proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."
    Debate resumed.
    SIR JOHN LUBBOCK: Sir, while fully recognizing the extreme difficulty and complexity of the problems which confronted Her Majesty's Government; that they have had sources of information, and must have been influenced by considerations, which even now they cannot completely bring before us, I am anxious to place before the Prime Minister certain considerations, which I am sure he will accept in the spirit in which they are made. My right hon. Friend very justly observed, that Khartoum stands in a separate position from the rest of the Soudan. It is a new city, the creation of commerce; it has not been under any Native Sultan; it stands in a peculiar position with reference to Egypt. For my own part, I cannot but feel that on many grounds Khartoum is of great importance to Egypt. That was the view of Thothmes III., whose proud boast it was that he placed the Frontier of Egypt where he pleased. It may be true that the Romans preferred the limit of Wady Haifa; but since then circumstances have changed; if they had had railways and telegraphs perhaps they would not have done so. If, then, Her Majesty's Government came before the House and said that while excluding the rest of the Soudan they considered that Khartoum and the country round should form part of Egypt, there might be

    1195
    much to be said for their resolve to retake it from the Mahdi. "What I cannot understand, the policy against which I would venture to protest, is their intention to retake Khartoum and then give it up again. The right hon. Gentleman states that he is anxious to establish a strong Government in the Soudan. But we must remember the dictum of General Gordon himself, that—
    "The sacrifices necessary towards securing a good government would be far too onerous to admit of such an attempt being made. Indeed, one may say that it is impracticable at any cost."[Egypt. No. 7 (1884), p. 3.]
    No language could be stronger or more decisive. Any Government there must either be English, Egyptian, or Native. The Prime Minister has already told us that it is not to be English. As to a re-establishment of Egyptian authority over the Soudan, I need only remind the House of the admirable Report drawn by the late lamented Colonel Stewart, who was specially deputed by Her Majesty's Government to inquire into the question. Colonel Stewart said—
    "I am firmly convinced that the Egyptians are quite unfit in every way to undertake such a task as the Government of so vast a country with a view to its welfare, and that, both for their own sake and that of the people they tried to rule, it would be advisable to abandon large portions of it. The fact of their general incompetence to rule is so generally acknowledged that it is unnecessary to discuss the question."
    Indeed, the Prime Minister implied on Thursday, if he did not say so in so many words, that no re-establishment of Egyptian authority was in contemplation, though, that being so, I confess I do not understand the nature or object of Prince Hassan's mission. A Native Government then alone remains. But a Native Government already exists. Are we to spend millions of money and sacrifice thousands of lives to replace one Native Ruler by another? The tribes of the Soudan are staunch adherents of the Mahdi. One strong proof of their devotion and their determination to support him has been the impossibility for months past of communicating with Khartoum. Suppose we go forward and occupy Khartoum? Our troops then will, as General Gordon was, be surrounded by a bitterly hostile population. Suppose we defeat the Mahdi and he retires? What
    1196
    then? Are we to follow him still further across the burning deserts of the heart of Africa? The right hon. Gentleman alluded to the desirability of putting down the Slave Trade. But this will not be effected merely by going to Khartoum. To do this you must not only go there, but stay there. I regretted to hear the Prime Minister state that, in his opinion, no negotiations could be opened with the Mahdi. Indeed, I have never been able to understand why that was not done long ago. This whole war has risen out of misunderstandings. But even if it is impossible or undesirable to negotiate with the Mahdi, surely a Proclamation might be issued stating our intentions. It is true that Lord Wolseley has issued one, but it does not bear on this point. He says his object is to restore peace, and that he will pay for all supplies. But that is no statement of policy. General Gordon proclaimed his object to be to smash the Mahdi; and the Prime Minister also has told us that the policy of the Government is to overthrow the power of the Mahdi. No doubt, in that ease, negotiations are impossible; but how is that consistent with Lord Wolseley's statement that his object is to restore peace? A great deal has been said about the moral effect of a retreat. But what was the object of our Expedition? The relief of General Gordon and his garrison. The fall of Khartoum and the massacre of the garrison has, unfortunately, rendered that object unattainable. To proceed under such circumstances would show that the relief of General Gordon could not have been our real or main object. But we are told that to retreat would have a bad moral effect. Well, but that will be as true next year as it is now. If you do not mean to hold Khartoum it would be far better not to go there at all. Our advance on Khartoum is dictated by political, not by military, considerations. This seems clear, because Lord Wolseley telegraphed to know the political intentions of the Government with reference to Khartoum, in order that he might act accordingly. He did not decide himself to advance on Khartoum, but telegraphed home, as the right hon. Gentleman told us, to know whether the Government desired to attack the Mahdi or not, so that he might frame his plans

    1197
    accordingly. This shows that the decision has been made, not on military, but on political grounds. The present views of the Liberal Party astonish me. I can see no justification for attacking any districts which we do not intend to hold permanently. In doing so we not only lavish many of our best lives, and millions which we can ill spare, but inflict suffering and misery on a people who have risen against a Government which we ourselves admit to have been both corrupt and oppressive. Khartoum is, indeed, in many respects, in a different position from the Southern and Western Soudan. Her Majesty's Government have not told us how much of the Soudan they propose to take from the Mahdi. If, as I infer, Khartoum is not to form part of the Egyptian Dominion, they have not told us what form of Government they propose to establish there, or whom they intend to set up as a Ruler. After the announcement made by the Prime Minister, I do not see how the Mahdi can be expected to open negotiations, nor any end to the struggle on which we are entering. Is it the interest of the Mahdi to negotiate? Our presence in the Soudan unites all the Native tribes in his support. The right hon. Gentleman told us yesterday that, in Lord Wolseley's opinion, the fall of Khartoum on the very day before our arrival was no accident—that the treachery was planned long before, and postponed purposely. Now, why did the Mahdi defer the seizure of Khartoum until the last moment? May he not have wished to lead us on, knowing that the presence of Infidel enemies in the Soudan would induce all the tribes to sink their differences and rally round him against the common foe? My right hon. Friend condemned the Resolution of the right hon. Baronet, because he said, with great force and truth, that it—
    "Means committing your gallant Army to a struggle from year to year in a tropical climate with people who are courageous by birth and courageous by fanaticism. It means a despotic Government to be established and upheld by British hands against those who hate it."
    But does not this description also apply to the policy of the Government? Are they not "committing our gallant Army to a struggle in a tropical country with a brave and fanatical people?" Are they not going "to put up a despotic Government to be upheld by British hands
    1198
    against those who hate it." This policy will involve us in a terrible loss of life and immense expenditure, without either any necessity or any possible advantage to this country; and I shall, therefore, take the earliest opportunity of moving—
    "That this House, while ready to support Her Majesty's Government in any steps which may be necessary to protect the dominions of Egypt from attack by the Mahdi, would regret the extension of offensive military operations beyond the limits which may be adopted as the permanent frontier of Egypt."
    MR. STUART-WORTLEY: Sir, the Government, as it appears from the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister, have nothing to reply to the grave charges contained in the Motion of the right hon. Baronet (Sir Stafford Northcote), except, first, that up to a certain time it was open to General Gordon to have escaped to the South by the Equatorial route; secondly, that the determination of the route by which he could best be rescued was a long and difficult process; thirdly, that the physical obstacles to the rescuers were great; fourthly, that the news of his being in danger took a long time to reach England; and, lastly, that the whole question was res judicata, having been practically disposed of by the House of Commons last May. All these excuses, except the last, were capable of being very summarily answered. When we are told that General Gordon could have escaped to the Equator we need only remember that from the first he declared that, in order to save himself, he would not desert the people who had trusted in him, and whom he had been sent to save. Let the House not forget his words of the 3rd of March—
    "How could I look the world in the face if I abandoned them and fled P As a gentleman, could you advise this course?"
    The Government stand convicted of having made their Envoy's life depend upon his doing that which they knew was repugnant to his noblest instincts. This part of the Government defence seems to come nearer than anything else to that "climax of meanness" with which General Gordon, in the same despatch, refused to be a party. It is not possible to listen with much more patience to the right hon. Gentleman when he pleads that the choice between the Nile route and that from Suakin to Berber was a decision that required a long and

    1199
    difficult inquiry. Why was that inquiry not sooner begun? Why, indeed, was it not begun before the mission of General Gordon was decided upon? I was never much in love myself with the idea of sending an Envoy unarmed and practically alone. That was a step for winch this House is in no way responsible. When Parliament first assembled in 1884 the despatch of General Gordon to Egypt was announced in Her Majesty's Speech as an accomplished fact. It may be that the Opposition did not expressly include that step in the Vote of Censure with which they were not last Session slow to attack the Government. The right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister must, however, be a sufficient master of Constitutional doctrine and principles to know that even if the whole House, Opposition and all, had joined in an unanimous chorus of approval, that would in no way have lessened the responsibility of the Government for sending out General Gordon alone into the enemy's camp. We are now told, moreover, that all these accusations were disposed of by Parliament last May. Does the right hon. Gentleman seriously mean to make this plea? Does the Prime Minister think this a happy occasion for such an argument? It may be true that the Motion of the right hon. Baronet (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach) was voted down last May; but would that adverse majority, small as it was, be taken to now represent the opinion of the House of Commons, or of the public, on the question then and now in dispute? There was a great deal that was special in the circumstances of the time when that Motion was made last May. The Franchise Bill was not then out of danger, and faithful Liberals could indulge in the insinuation that the Soudan question and the Vote of Censure were being made use of to avert Reform. Since then, however, not only has that terror to Liberal consciences been removed—not only has the Opposition given the most substantial proof of its sincerity about Reform, but events of far graver importance have occurred, and throw upon this inquiry into the conduct of the Government a livid and ghastly light that did not exist before. So much for the defence which the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister has not been ashamed to put forward in answer to the Vote of Censure. There is, indeed, it must be
    1200
    confessed, little else that could be put forward in excuse for errors so gross. With respect, however, to the future, I believe that no Government will be able to successfully grapple with these difficulties that is not willing to run the risk of incurring unpopularity in order to act vigorously or fearlessly in whatever direction their duty may seem to point. We have had enough of this angling for popularity. There are far nobler objects for English Ministers than the union of a distracted Party. At this moment we are in doubt whether we are to regard the policy of the Government as expounded by the Prime Minister's warlike words of Thursday, or by his Machiavellian silence of Monday. Let him not hope to solve Egyptian questions by the same means by which ho unites his Party in his support. He may win warlike Liberals on Thursday by breathing fire at the Mahdi, and he may secure hon. Gentlemen below the Gangway by hinting on Monday that his truculent words had no meaning. Sooner or later he will have to address his mind to the Egyptian Question itself, and to take his attention away from watching the motions of political sections here; otherwise he will once more, and for the ninety-ninth time, be making up his mind too late. I challenge the Government to say categorically, before the end of this debate, whether they adhere to their determination, failing accommodation with the Mahdi, to overthrow his power at Khartoum without remaining at Khartoum themselves—in other words, whether they seriously intend to give to the Soudan all the horrors of conquest without the palliatives of order and settled government; whether they mean the British Army to be remembered in the Soudan, not for any of the blessings by which British conquest is known to be tempered elsewhere, but only for blind and purposeless slaughter? I have said that, in such a crisis as this, the unpopular course may have to be faced. A British occupation of Khartoum would be rightly unpopular; but it may yet turn out to be necessary. Can any Government altogether reject the opinion that the master of Khartoum can make himself, if he chooses, also the master of Egypt? Is it so very sure that the holder of Berber has it not in his power, by the diversion of waters, to stop the fertilizing inundations of Egypt? Is it

    1201
    inconceivable that under a Government joining the Soudan to Egypt the warlike qualities of the Soudanese may be turned in some way to the advantage and defence of Egypt herself? Is there no solution of these questions save such as will leave Egypt in such daily fear of an Arab invasion from the south, that, as a consequence, she will require the indefinitely prolonged support of British troops? If an English occupation of Khartoum be, indeed, necessary, it can only be because it may tend to the solution of some of these questions? The hon. Member for Leicester (Mr. Picton) reminds us, in language with which I have much sympathy, that England is great enough to have no need to think of prestige. I have nothing but admiration for the love of the English people for peace; but, unfortunately, it is not as if we had to deal all over the world with the strong common sense of the British democracy. We have to consider in our actions the effect upon savage or fanatical races, who, all the world over, are living either as subjects or as neighbours of British Colonies. To these Colonies the question of prestige is one of very serious reality. The acceptance of the splendid offers by the Colonies of military assistance to the Mother Country has so far advanced the question of Colonial Confederation that soon the electors of these Islands will have lost the legal as well as the moral right to a sole voice in questions concerning the Empire as a whole. When that day comes, it will be no longer possible for the Imperial or Federal policy to disregard considerations of prestige. The Prime Minister appeals to the House not to present the spectacle in this crisis of a "disparaged Government." I believe that, so far from its being an evil, the best thing of all at the present crisis, with all the other tasks on our hands, of which the Mover of the Amendment speaks, would be the spectacle of a changed or reconstructed Ministry in England, following upon a vote of this House; for that would prove to the world that there are limits beyond which you cannot safely try the patience, even of the good-humoured and pacific democracy of England. The interest of England abroad will not be served by its appearing that England prefers a Minister like the Prime Minister, who is always at war without gaining
    1202
    his point, to such a Minister as his great Predecessor, who gained his point without making a war.
    MR. BORLASE: I am sorry that the hon. Member who was the last to address the House (Mr. Stuart-Wortley) has left it, because I was desirous of congratulating him on the extremely moderate tone of his speech—a speech with many points in which I find little matter for difference. I am sorry, also, that my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle (Mr. John Morley) is not in his place, as I wished to assure him how truly I sympathize with him in the spirit which has dictated the Amendment which we are now considering. That Amendment, and the straightforward speech in which he proposed it, gives expression to a feeling in the country far more widespread and deep-rooted than is supposed by those who think they gather the views of the marketplaces in the country from those of the Jingo agitators of the London Press. In my own part of England, where the teachings of Wesley have indelibly impressed on the hearts and on the character of the people the duty of advocating peace, the feeling, as far as I can gauge it, is one of sincere sorrow—I might even say, in many cases, of silent humiliation—that, owing to the fact that Her Majesty's Government have followed on the lines of the Egyptian policy laid down for them by their Predecessors, they have been once and again entrapped into war. The public anxiety is, of course, to be rid of this war in the Soudan, and to have some assurance that the Forces now being sent out are not to be employed in any permanent retention of these Provinces. Aye, but it is something more than this. If the truth be known, it is to be rid also of that country in which, as a nation, we never should have set foot at all—to be rid of the responsibilities in Egypt itself—in that country where history repeats herself with fatal accuracy; that selfsame Egypt which contributed not a little to the decline and fall of the most firmly-established Empire that the world has ever seen or known—and which seems to hold out a like fate to those who, allowing themselves to be allured up the waters of the Nile, find themselves at last in a spot where the inanimate powers of Nature on the one hand, and the bravery and the pa-

    1203
    triotism of the inhabitants on the other, are arrayed against them; and where, oppressed with responsibilities whose origin is obscure, and weighted down with engagements, whose end is purposeless, they have, in the long run, sooner or later, either to fall victims to that valour which, in the British soldier, is something far more than the mere concomitant of despair, or to retreat without the accomplishment of one single object which can accrue to the good of mankind. It is an old proverb, the truth of which has often occurred to me, that "Egypt is a broken reed, on the which, if a man lean, it will go into his hand. "I believe, then, that the expression of public feeling contained in the Amendment of my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle, in favour of a new departure at this juncture in the direction of peace, rests not merely on a desire to leave Khartoum alone, but to take now the first step towards clearing out of Egypt altogether. For that new departure there are, doubtless, many special as well as general reasons. I listened, with the greatest attention, to the speech of the right hon. Gentleman at the head of Her Majesty's Government yesterday; but—probably it was owing to my own stupidity—I failed to gather, in any one categorical statement, what is the precise object, intention, ultimate destination, and duty of the very large Expedition now leaving our shores. The old objects are gone. They have flown on before us, like the sand-storms in the Desert, until they have vanished from our view. The object of the Expedition of Lord Wolseley ceased with the death of him whom he was sent to rescue. The objects of General Gordon had well-high ceased before his death. With his death they all—save one of dubious utility, to which I will presently refer—ceased too. Instead of being a messenger of peace, as it was the primary object of the Government that he should be, circumstances over which he had no control transformed him into an instrument of war. And as to the particular objects. Where are the garrisons ho was sent to relieve? Where are the wives and children and employés? Where that mass of people which were the real millstone, which, because of his great humanity, he allowed to be hung round his neck by the Cairo authorities in February, 1884;—that weight of responsibility,
    1204
    which was the real cause of his declining to accept the alternative of what he considered would have been a base and cowardly flight. It was a task of Hercules which he undertook; and, as it was one which never should have been imposed on him, I cannot, in this respect, hold the Government perfectly free from blame. I said—" Where are the garrisons?"—Tokar, Sinkat, Berber, and the rest? It is truly horrible to contemplate the destruction which, once again in the history of Egypt, a race of utter barbarians, actuated by fanaticism, has inflicted on the half-civilized and effeminate people of the Lower Nile! All these objects, then, are gone; and, as to the Slave Trade, it is as flourishing as ever; and never can be repressed in the Soudan, except by the presence of garrisons and cruisers on the Red Sea. I said—"These objects are all gone, save one." That one is the establishment of some control at Khartoum. In a strange sense, that object has been gained by the death of General Gordon. Looking at the matter for a moment in this light, I wish, Sir, to call the attention of the House to a telegraphic despatch, dated February 18, 1884, in which Consul Power wires to Sir Evelyn Baring, from Khartoum—
    "To-day Proclamations up everywhere from Gordon, acknowledging Mohammed Ahmed (that is, the Mahdi) as Sultan of Kordofan, remitting half taxes, and saying buying and selling of slaves will not be interfered with. This," he adds, "has had the best possible effect among the Arabs."—[Egypt. No 12 (1884), p. 68.]
    It is true that this appointment of the Mahdi may have been nothing but a passing thought in General Gordon's mind; that it was soon found that another course was preferable; that the Mahdi cared to receive nothing from us; but it proves to us that the idea crossed General Gordon's mind, when he was canvassing the various methods by which a secure Government could be formed, that the Mahdi might be a man capable of bearing rule. Now, this is the same man who has now gained for himself the possession of supreme power at Khartoum. Is it, then, quite beyond belief that in him we may see some glimmering of a hope for a peaceful solution of the difficulty? It is one of the extraordinary circumstances of our position that we absolutely know nothing of him against whom we have

    1205
    turned our arms—nothing of his capacities; indeed, I am not even aware that we know anything authentic even about hi8 personal appearance at all. But this is by the way. The question is, what is the object of our present Expedition to Egypt? Is it to take Khartoum, with the object of remaining there, and bolstering up a Government in contradiction to the wishes of the people? If so, I, for one, am against it. Is it to retire? If so, we had better not go; for we shall only be upsetting an existing form of Government, which may right itself, in order to produce absolute anarchy. There is, on this point, a true saying of General Gordon's, which, in one sentence, hits off exactly what the situation was with regard to himself, and which would be equally applicable to us if we try to organize a temporary Government with the intention of retreating. On March 10 he says—"It is evident that no one will throw in his fortunes with a departing Government." In saying this he admits also what he distinctly states in another place, that "perhaps it was a mistake to send him." But, although I have said all this in favour of my hon. Friend's Amendment, there is an object which occurs to me for placing a large Force in Egypt just now. The function of power is to protect; and the protection of our Forces, already out there, is our first duty. We hear to-day, in the papers, that it is probable that the Force under General Braekenbury will spend the summer at Abou Hamed, and that that of Lord Wolseley will do so at Korti. They cannot descend the river. They are too late for that. Now, neither of these positions is enviable, especially the former. There are no hills to go to to escape the heat. The flat, boundless, burning Desert is around them. The climate is against them; the river is against them; the ammunition and guns captured in Khartoum are turned against them; even the friendly tribes must bend to the storm which is upon them. The Mahdi's position is that of Cœsar when he crossed the Rubicon. He has only to stamp his foot on the ground, and men for the Army will spring up from the earth. Now, Sir, if we place ourselves in force at Suakin, I contend that we shall be, at all events, within reach of our men by that route.
    1206
    Our very presence there—no matter what we may be able to effect—would have, at least, a good moral influence in checking any attack or blockade which might be attempted; and, a3 the summer goes on, the Mahdi will have time to consider whether he will elect to possess the Soudan, and govern, as best he can, on terms which secure the safety of Egypt, or to confront the British Forces, with the certainty of ultimate failure and annihilation. It is because, then, I believe that the sending of this Force—which, indeed, now we cannot stay—may rather operate in the direction of peace than in that of war, that I cannot—though I regret it, for in the abstract he has my grateful sympathy—go into the Lobby with my hon. Friend. I know that there is much force in the question which is perpetually asked—which he, indeed, asked in his speech—Is it safe to tie our right arm behind our back? Is it safe to lock away so large a Force of our best men in the Lybian Desert? Are things so smooth at home? Does not the bravado of the insurrectionist intrude itself on us even here in this House? Are our foreign relations so extremely pacific? Is it not an open secret that a very near neighbour of ours indeed, and one who should ever be our best friend, was prepared to take a very strong step indeed the other day, if the Egyptian financial question had not passed a particular turnstile in its course? Are there not those opposite us in this House, who, by their importunity, may succeed in disturbing our relations with Russia? Well, Sir, supposing all this is so, and suppose a large Force to be on the shore of the Red Sea. My contention is, that it would be so much nearer to those vital centres where disturbance might arise—so much nearer, for instance, to the Suez Canal—and therefore so much the more capable of preventing a hostile intention, should there be one on the part of any nation, from being carried out. Now, I wish to make a few remarks on a point or two in the speech of the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Launceston (Sir Hardinge Giffard). He twitted us, as we are so often twitted, with not carrying out General Gordon's wishes; and he especially referred to three things. That we did not send Zebehr; that we did not advance Graham's Force from Sua-

    1207
    kin to Berber; and that we did not send 200 Indian troops to Berber, and a like number of English ones to Wady Haifa. Now, with respect to Zebehr, I do not want to go over all the ground again. I merely wish to prove the wisdom of the Government in not sending him, by reminding the House of what has happened since. Who was it that betrayed Gordon? Who was Ferhat Pasha? The same man of whom we read in a despatch from Gordon, dated Berber, February 12, as follows:—
    "The number of applications for appointments, some 400, show that the people evidently contemplate nothing hut peace. Ferhat Bey, late Mudir here, kept up his nefarious doings even after Hicks's defeat. One can scarcely understand such madness."—[Egypt, No. 12 (1884), p. 89.]
    Well, Sir, Gordon forgave him, as he had forgiven Zebehr; but he betrayed him for all that. He and Zebehr stood, in this respect, in the same relation to Gordon. But there was this difference in the cases—Ferhat had no grudge against Gordon, except that he had been found out. Zebehr had a grudge against Gordon, the greatest a man can have, since Gordon had caused his son's death for an act of treachery. Here, then, was the result of forgiveness. Would the Government have been justified in placing Gordon in the hands of such a man? Now, the next ground of complaint is as to the Suakin-Berber advance. Lot me read to the House a despatch, which I have not yet seen quoted in the debate, from one whose advice, above all others, the War Office was bound to listen to, especially when, as we know, it was supported by Military Authorities at home—I mean that of General Stephenson. Writing to the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War (the Marquess of Hartington), from Cairo, on March 5, he says—
    "Graham telegraphs suggesting that Gordon Pasha ho asked if he would recommend force under Graham operating on line Suakin Berber; if so, how far he would he prepared to cooperate? …. Baring tells me that Gordon attaches importance to this route being opened. I am not prepared to recommend Graham's force marching to Berber, owing to scarcity of water on road."—[Ibid., p. 141.]
    Now, I appeal to right hon. Gentlemen opposite, who may have occupied, or might have been occupying at that date, the post which is now filled by my noble Friend. Would they, could they, have
    1208
    taken any other course, considering the source of the advice and that it was backed up by Sir Evelyn Baring, than that taken by the noble Marquess, when he telegraphed at once as follows to General Graham:—
    "Yours 5th forwarded by General Stephenson. Operations at considerable distance from Suakin not to be undertaken."—[Ibid.]
    Well, I know that I shall be told "Yes; but General Stephenson changed his opinion." Did he; and to what extent? I know the despatch. It is one from Sir Evelyn Baring to Earl Granville on March 24. He says—
    "An effort should be made to help General Gordon from Suakin, if it is at all a possible military operation. General Stephenson and Sir Evelyn Wood, whilst admitting the very great risk to the health of the troops, besides the extraordinary military risks, are of opinion that the undertaking is possible."—[Ibid., p. 186.]
    Possible! A blank possibility of getting through; with an overwhelming probability of disaster. Again, I say, if right hon. Gentlemen opposite had had to deal with this matter, I give them the credit of thinking that the wise course adopted by Earl Granville would have been that which would have commended itself to them. He writes—
    "Having regard to the dangers of the climate of the Soudan at this time of the year, as well as to the extraordinary risk from a military point of view, Her Majesty's Government do not think it justifiable to send a British expedition to Berber."—[Egypt. No. 13 (1884), p. 1.]
    Later on, when asked his opinion, Mr. Egerton, on the 23rd of April, telegraphs to Earl Granville—
    "It would be almost madness to run the risk of sending an English or Egyptian force now to Berber by the route suggested."—[Ibid., p. 15.]
    In the face of such evidence on the spot, what course was open but refusal? Now, the third complaint is that, when subsequently General Gordon asked that a Force of 200 Indian Cavalry should be sent to Berber, and a similar Force of British Cavalry to Wady Halfa—["Hear, hear!"]—this request was also refused. The hon. Member opposite me (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett) thinks they ought. What! Send away into the Desert two squadrons to form fresh centres of attack! Has it not been bad enough to lose the garrisons we have lost, without incurring the danger of setting up fresh ones? From a military point of view, it was impos-

    1209
    sible. On the 10th of April, Sir Evelyn Baring telegraphed to Gordon as follows:—
    "General Stephenson thinks the proposed step of sending English troops to Wady Halfa (as he—Gordon—suggests) is open to strong objections on account of the climate during the summer months; and he also considers it unwise to leave a detachment at so great a distance from its hase."—[Ibid., p. 10.]
    Here is the full justification of the Government. Enough, then, has been said on these points. The fact remains that Gordon's rescue was impossible. Once more in the history of the world one man has died for the people. He has laid down his life, not even for his friends, hut because of his sacred engagement to protect the wives and families of those who were strangers in race and religion to himself. If any man ever did so, he has died a Christian hero's death. It was unwise; it was an act, indeed, of inconceivable temerity ever to have allowed him to take over those Cairo instructions at all. But we must remember that the truth of the situation was not known at that time. His first duty was to report. Much less could the sequel have been foreseen. If it could have been, the action of Her Majesty's Government would indeed have been criminal. As it is, the Government, in my opinion, deserves our sympathy rather than our blame. They sowed the wind unwittingly. They have reaped the whirlwind, and on none has it fallen, you may depend, half so heavily as on themselves. It is useless for my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle, in his Amendment, to say in effect—"We will say nothing about the seed-sowing, but we object to the harvest coming up." It was in that seed-sowing that the origin and source of all our subsequent complications are to be found—complications from which it was impossible to extricate either Gordon or ourselves. The Government have not altered their policy; and for the attitude they are taking, now that the storm has fallen on them, they seem to me to deserve—rather than a Vote of Censure, no matter how mild may be its terms—thanks similar to those which, on a memorable occasion, were accorded by the people of Rome to one who, desperate though the situation was, would not and did not "despair of the Republic."
    MR. LONGsaid, that he entirely sympathized with the feelings to which the Resolution of the right hon. Baronet the Leader of the Opposition (Sir Stafford Northcote) gave expression. All on that side of the House would agree with hon. Members opposite that it was very desirable to get rid of the war in the Soudan; but few would he ready to do so, unless our troops could be withdrawn in a manner honourable to the nation, and upon the lines distinctly laid down by the distinguished man who had sacrificed his life in the service of his country; nothing could be more unsatisfactory than for this country now to desert people who had been favourable to us during this trying time. It was clear that there was one idea with General Gordon from the beginning to the end, and that was to do nothing that would appear, in the slightest manner, to be a desertion of those who were loyal to him during his difficulties. Hon. Members opposite declared that it would now be easy for us to withdraw from the Soudan; but he (Mr. Long) did not hear one word of sympathy for the people who had suffered for their friendship to us, and who, if we were to withdraw from the Soudan hastily, would suffer still more heavily. As regarded what we had done in the past, no one could more strongly condemn the Government than the hon. Member who had last spoken (Mr. Borlase). He said that if anyone could have foreseen the result of the policy of the Government, then the Government would indeed have been criminal. But Her Majesty's Government were warned from time to time in the strongest manner possible, by speakers in the House and out of the House, that unless they adopted a more vigorous and determined policy in the Soudan, the consequences would be such as had now happened. On that side of the House they told the Government this so often, that they brought down rebukes on the Leader of the Opposition. They lost no opportunity of impressing the Government with their conviction that the want of a more vigorous and determined policy in the Soudan would produce trouble there and disgrace to this country. The Members of the Opposition were justified now in claiming that the prediction they made had now been literally ful-

    1211
    filled. They now charged Her Majesty's Government with having been guilty of the worst possible offence that any Government could commit—with having taken no precautions and neglected every word of advice and warning given to them, and thus having deliberately brought upon the country the shame it now had to endure. Notwithstanding that hon. Members opposite said that they regarded everything that had been done in Egypt since our interference there, and since General Gordon was sent out, as wrong, yet these Liberal Members were prepared to go into the Lobby in support of the Government, because of their fear of others whom they liked less than they did the present Government—a Government which, notwithstanding the state of affairs, had not yet indicated what their future policy would be. The time, however, was one when hon. Members ought not to think of the welfare of a Party, but of the welfare of the country. The whole history of the Soudan business was melancholy in the extreme and greatly to be deplored; but there was no more unhappy portion of it than the speech they heard last night from the Prime Minister. They would have been glad if the policy of the Government had been consistent, and if they had heard who it was they wore fighting, and for what they were going to fight. Those who were called upon to part from their nearest and dearest, who were going out to the Soudan, might feel that they grudged the lives of our gallant soldiers when they were sent in this cause loss war, brought about by a Government which declined to say what they were fighting for. It might be that the Government had a clear policy, and knew what they were about; but, if that were so, they had not thought fit to make the House a party to it, and he thought that the Opposition, and the country, which was behind the Opposition, were justified in asking Her Majesty's Government to tell them rather more clearly what their policy was going to be. It seemed to him that, from beginning to end, the despatches of General Gordon pointed to one line of action. They had been told by the Prime Minister that Gordon could have escaped from Khartoum if he had liked, but that his patriotism and devotion to his country prevented
    1212
    him from exercising that power. But on March 3 he had asked—
    "As a gentleman, could you advise this course? It may have been a mistake to send me up; but having been done, I have no option but to see evacuation through; for even if I was mean enough to escape I have no power to do so."—[Egypt, No. 12 (1884), p. 156.]
    That was a plain answer to the statement of Her Majesty's Government. When the Government had found themselves in a position of difficulty, on account of their weakness and vacillation, they had turned to the one man who might save them from the consequences, and, having sent him out, as a scapegoat into the Desert, laden with all their sins upon his head, they had deserted him. That was a charge which could not be brought too often against Her Majesty's Government; and, with all the rhetoric that the Government could bring to bear on the matter, they could never acquit themselves of that charge. They might be told that on that side of the House they welcomed this as an opportunity for a Party triumph; but, for himself, he disclaimed any such feeling, and there was nobody on the Conservative Benches who would more gladly see a Conservative Government replace the present incompetent Administration than he would; but he, and he believed all other Conservatives, would gladly have foregone that triumph, if he could have foregone the present national disgrace and the national shame. Representing as he did an agricultural constituency, he would much have preferred the Government should have been strong enough to preserve the national honour, for there was nothing which men of all classes felt more deeply than the national and individual disgrace of this desertion of our gallant hero through the want of policy and vacillation of a Government which even now declined to realize the position.
    MR. ARTHUR ARNOLDsaid, that he was inclined to express a hope—which he trusted was not too late—that this debate would have a practical character; that they would remember that it was their duty not to mourn over the circumstances of the past, but rather to turn to the future, and endeavour, as far as they could in the light of the Papers before them, to give their best counsel and aid to the Government in the difficult position in which the affairs of Egypt

    1213
    were now placed. They all knew the historical part of the case. Even if it were true—
    "That the course pursued by Her Majesty's Government in respect to the affairs of Egypt and the Soudan, has involved a great sacrifice of valuable lives and a heavy expenditure without any beneficial result,"
    he could only say that he was not disposed to add to that sacrifice any waste of the time of Parliament. They were rather concerned, he thought, with the latter part of the Motion; but that was so queerly composed that its meaning could only be guessed at. Literally, the Motion bound those who supported it to undertake the security of the whole of the Soudan, which he was sure was contrary to the wish of the House. But that was not the meaning of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for North Devon (Sir Stafford Northcote). It was only the fault of his draftsman. The right hon. Gentleman meant, he (Mr. Arthur Arnold) took it, that they were to do, in the Soudan, what might be necessary for the security of Egypt. He did not gather, however, that the right hon. Gentleman, by his policy, would do more in that way than the Prime Minister proposed to accomplish; and, that being so, there was nothing left of the Resolution except the retrospective censure—a most vain and useless proceeding, even if it were just. It seemed to him (Mr. Arthur Arnold) that there had been a series of mistakes made in regard to Egypt; but they had not been those of the Government only. A year ago they had heard the Prime Minister speak of General Gordon as "the highest authority on the subject," yet everyone now knew that Gordon made a terrible mistake when he set out alone upon that dangerous and perilous journey to Khartoum. If they were to adopt the spirit of Gordon, ho could understand that one, who had his implicit faith in the great purposes of an all-governing and beneficent Power, might well believe that such a life and death were designed for our instruction; that they might be set up before our eyes as a model of courage and endurance, of piety and virtue, such as made the human race illustrious, and such as elevated mankind. He could not find it in his heart to do nothing but mourn over a death so enviable and glorious, nor could he consent to say that that death was attributable to the fault
    1214
    or neglect of those who had not earlier sent relief when he read the messages which had come from Gordon, and especially those of the latest date, and when he remembered that treachery was never at any time absent from his dwelling in Khartoum. It was evident that the Government had been slow to enter the Soudan, and eager to leave it. Remembering Gordon's words, that "the Soudan is a useless possession, ever was so, and ever will be so," who could wonder at their avoidance of what Gordon called "its fearful monotony and deadly climate?" It was said that General Gordon was neglected, because his requirements were not carried out; but, before the House agreed to that view of the subject, they must go through all the suggestions which came from General Gordon, and they must apply to those suggestions the test of experience. For example, General Gordon suggested that 400 or 500 English Cavalry should be taken to Berber; but, as a matter of fact, no more than 400 men could, under any circumstances, have crossed at any time from Suakin to Berber, and at each stage of the Wells they must have had two and a-half days' travelling without any water at all. Then General Gordon asked for 200 troops to be sent to Wady Haifa; but did anyone believe, from recent events, that the Cavalry would have been safe at Berber, or that such a demonstration would have stayed the progress of the Mahdi? He honoured the memory of General Gordon as a possession precious to all Englishmen; but he thought he saw now that Gordon's estimate of the Mahdi movement had been throughout erroneous. When the Mahdi was at El Obeid, in February, Gordon was for destroying or smashing him; and, for the work, asked for £100,000 and 200 English troops at Wady Haifa. Was there anyone who now believed that an advance to El Oboid, for the purpose of smashing the Mahdi a year ago, with such a force as General Gordon possessed or suggested would have been effective? It was said that whereas the Government then refused to send 200, they had now to send 20,000. It was taken for granted that the 200 would have smashed the Mahdi. He could only say that, after reading the Papers just issued, he was most thankful the Government of the country had not been in the hands of those who

    1215
    were so credulous. He had said in May last that he wished Gordon had never left Jerusalem, and the wish had only been strengthened in the anxious mouths that had since elapsed. When General Gordon entered Khartoum, ho entered into a trap from which it was almost impossible for him to escape alive. His presence in Khartoum seemed to have increased the power of the Mahdi's movement. His presence there seemed to have acted very much as a foreign body did in a wound, by increasing the inflammation. With reference to the Proclamations issued by General Gordon, and particularly that one in which he denounced the person styling himself the Mahdi, he (Mr. Arthur Arnold) had, he thought, visited most of the Mahommedan States of the world, and he had often heard the word "Mahdi" on the lips of the people. There wore millions of Mahommedans who, in their daily prayers, never forgot to pray for the coming of the Mahdi, and with whom it was their principal tenet to accept the advent of such a person. The title of Mahdi was one of wonderful power; but its power when associated with success became enormous and overwhelming. The civilization of Egypt was such as the followers of the Mahdi had no idea of, and was infinitely greater than anything they had ever known or seen. He thought it was as certain as sunrise that but for the presence of English troops such civilization—and it was not inconsiderable—as existed in that country would be at the mercy of those ignorant and fanatical hill tribes. If they saw but the Suez Canal, it was his belief, as well as his fear, that they would destroy it, because they would regard it as a means for the introduction into their country of the infidel whom it was their great desire to keep out. With regard to a people so helpless as the Egyptians, he considered the intervention of some Foreign Power useful, and, indeed, inevitable. The Amendment of his hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle (Mr. John Morley) he regarded as insufficient and inaccurate. He thought that not the Government only, but the independent Members of the House would deserve a Vote of Censure if, in the circumstances in which the country was placed, they refrained from expressing an opinion upon the policy of the Government, and did not conceive it to be
    1216
    their duty to form the best judgment the opportunity afforded. They need not be historical; but they were bound to express their opinion upon that policy, so far as it was concerned with the present position of affairs. For example, their troops were going to clear the way to Suakin from Berber. It was plain, ho thought, from the Papers lately distributed, that they had not before them all the communications from Lord Wolseley to the Government. They gathered from the Prime Minister that the movement from Suakin, in order to open up the road to Berber, was needed for the security of our troops. That was in accordance with general belief. He thought they were compelled to give some opinion upon it. If it was needed for the security of Lord Wolseley's Force, then, and then only, he thought it deserved the approval of the House of Commons. It seemed to be imprudent and unnecessary on the part of the Government to announce their determination to overthrow the power of the Mahdi at Khartoum. It might be needful for the protection of Egypt to overthrow the power of the Mahdi; but it might not be necessary to do it at Khartoum. On the contrary, the time might not be distant when it would be both expedient and desirable for the Government to make an accommodation with the Mahdi at Khartoum. The Amendment of his hon. Friend imputed to the Government that which they had never announced. The Amendment charged the Government with a general intention to overthrow the power of the Mahdi. The Government, as he understood, declared no such intention. They would, indeed, be a Government of imbeciles if they had made such a decision; and ho should not then hesitate to join in his hon. Friend (Mr. John Morley's) Vote of Censure. If the Mahdi were to return to Darfour or Kordofan, the Government would not, he was sure, propose to use the Forces of the Crown for the overthrow of his power. Therefore, if he were to vote for the Amendment of his hon. Friend, he should be regretting a decision of the Government which the Government had never formed. But the fault of his hon. Friend's Amendment was two-fold. It imputed to the Government that which the Government had never asserted—an intention to overthrow the Mahdi wher-

    1217
    ever he might be. He should certainly support an Amendment in the sense of that of his hon. Friend, if the Government had decided to follow the Mahdi anywhere, even to the Equator. But they had done nothing of the sort; indeed, if they had done so, they would not have received the support of any intelligent Member of the House; they had expressly limited their operations against the Mahdi. It was unfortunate that they had mentioned Khartoum, where they might hereafter be ready to recognize the Mahdi's power. If his hon. Friend had placed the words "at Khartoum" at the end of his Amendment, then they should have known what they were voting for. The Amendment had another fault, and this fault was equally grave. Suppose that in three months the Mahdi was at Dongola or at Wady Haifa, in what position should he (Mr. Arthur Arnold) be if he had supported the Amendment of his hon. Friend? He should have consented to the entry of the Mahdi and the tribes which followed him into Egypt. To that he was not prepared to consent. Suppose the power of the Mahdi had reached Cairo, as it most surely would were there no British troops in Egypt, the hand of the Government would be stayed were the Amendment of his hon. Friend adopted. He was convinced that the power of the Mahdi would be ruinous to Egypt; and he was quite willing to use the Forces of the Crown to protect the feeble yet industrious people of the Delta against invasion by these Desert hordes. Such civilization as existed in the Delta could not be saved by the Egyptian people themselves. All the evidence went to show the truth of Lord Northbrook's Report that—
    "The Natives of Egypt do not appear to possess the qualities which are required to form really reliable troops."
    Much as they admired General Gordon, they must not blindly accept his statements. Experience had proved this. He had told them that as soon as troops were sent, or even with the mere rumour of troops, the movement would end. The Mahdi's siege of Obeid in 1883 was as difficult as his siege of Khartoum. They saw that Gordon was mistaken. Our troops, unconquered and unconquerable, reached the Nile far above Berber, yet the Mahdi's movement was a long way from being ended. Neither the Motion
    1218
    nor the Amendment touched upon that most important decision of the Government—namely, the construction of a railway from Suakin to Berber. He regarded that as of equal, if not of greater, importance than any other decision. He agreed with Lord Dufferin—
    "That the completion of this enterprize would at once change all the elements of the problem."
    He supposed they were committed to the execution of this railway; he supposed the contract had been concluded, and that the nation was bound by its terms; he supposed that nothing would have induced the Government to give their consent to its construction otherwise than that it was essential for the safety of our Army, and that there was no escape from this costly work. The construction of this railway was one of the most important factors in the ease with which they had to deal; and, if constructed with English money, he would not willingly be a party to handing it over to possible destruction. Instead of the point of command being from Egypt or the Nile, the point of command of the Eastern Soudan would be entirely changed; the base—the power of command—would be changed to the Red Sea. If they tapped the Nile by this railway, the Government would certainly be wrong if they did not establish a Government in the Soudan which would endeavour to protect so enormous and costly a work; for possibly in the future it might be that this railway would bring such prosperity and civilization to the Soudan as to illustrate once more that war, which was mischief on the largest scale, sometimes carried advantages in its train.
    MR. ASHMEAD-BARTLETTsaid, that he had pleasure in congratulating the hon. Member for Salford (Mr. Arthur Arnold) upon his statesmanlike speech. It was, however, a pity the hon. Member did not deliver his speech six months ago, and then give his support to the Opposition. At that period the Conservative Party gave in good time the warnings which the hon. Member advanced now, though too late to be of effect. He regretted, however, that the hon. Member should have put words in the mouth of General Gordon which he had never uttered. General Gordon had never said he could overthrow the Mahdi with 500 men. What he had said last

    1219
    March was this—that if he had 500 determined men he could nip in the bud and destroy the incipient revolt around and North of Khartoum, which soon developed to such a terrible extent, owing to the neglect of General Gordon's warnings by Her Majesty's Ministers. The hon. Member for Sheffield (Mr. Stuart-Wortley) had said that we were face to face in Egypt with a greater crisis than ever before. About that he (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett) thought there could be no doubt. Never since the Forces of England overcame the French tyrant 70 years ago had England been confronted with so serious a state of affairs. While our Forces in the Soudan were struggling against the savage fanaticism which the neglect of the Government had allowed to reach its present dimensions, the traditional perfidy and aggression of our great rival in Asia was unmasking itself, and threatening the very existence of our Indian Empire. The French "Ally" of the Government was counter-working them in every quarter of the globe, sapping up to Hindostanon the East, paralyzing our valuable trade with China, and unscrupulously intriguing against British interests in Egypt. In vain did the Ministers of the Crown shovel loadfuls of sacrifices down the throat of the French Republic. The cry was ever "more!" At a moment when the friendship of the Head of the Mahommedan faith would be invaluable to England, as the largest Mahommedan Power in the world, the British Ministry were driving the Ottoman Government and its 300,000 valiant warriors into the arms of our foes by the absurd injustice and persecution which had its origin in the factious ravings of 1877. And, worst and most monstrous and fatal blunder of all, the Prime Minister and his Colleagues had deliberately alienated the splendid and invincible support of the German Powers, the natural Allies of England. Austria, Germany, and England could have stood against the world. All the machinations of those perpetual disturbers of European peace—the restless and anarchic Republic of Paris and the dark and treacherous despotism of St. Petersburg—would have been futile against such a peace union. Still he did not think the situation hopeless. It was very far from it; but in order that it should not be rendered hopeless it was absolutely
    1220
    necessary, if the country was to be rescued from despair, that the Government should display those qualities of vigour and statesmanship in which they had thus far been so singularly and absolutely lacking. They must show that they had the head to conceive, the heart to carry through, and the hand to strike, in place of the aimless, divided, and, disastrous counsels that had up to now paralyzed the arm of England. It was necessary to have statesmen who could govern, and Ministers who could rule. The retrospect of the past three years in Egypt was dreary enough; but it became appalling when it was remembered that all this frightful sacrifice of blood and treasure, all this accumulated slaughter, enslavement, outrage, misery, and black ruin, had been absolutely without fruit, devoid of all beneficial result. £10,000,000 of extra burdens had the blundering and shuffling of the British Cabinet laid upon those harmless and docile Fellaheen, whose claims they had trampled under foot. £10,000,000 more of our Imperial resources had they flung away into the abyss of their purposeless ineptitude. Heaven alone knew how many millions further would be sunk in the tardy and panic-stricken attempt to retrieve the disasters caused by their delay, feebleness, and shirking of bounden responsibilities. Most horrible of all was the tale of the needless butchery and wholesale massacre, the hecatombs of human victims that had been offered up to this Moloch of blindness and cowardice. Never since the days of Tamerlane had such a mass of human agony been known as that which the Mahdi of Kordofan and the Mahdis of the Treasury Bench had piled up throughout the Soudan. Yet once again the apostles of sham philanthropy and retreat were trying to make capital out of all that had happened, and once more urging their craven and sanguinary policy of surrender upon the nation. Those men who had done their best to bring about "red ruin and the breaking up of laws" in Asia, South Africa, Ireland, and Egypt were once more at their disintegrating work. Those so-called friends of peace, who had caused more bloody wars than all the Jingoes and Imperialists that ever lived, were again preaching their base and craven gospel of "scuttle" and anarchy. But the nation had had enough and too much of them. It was

    1221
    weary of that mock morality which meant devastation, slavery, and woe; it was weary of that sickly sentimentalism which carried ruin and disgrace in its wake. It was sick to death of that sham humanity, which meant wanton bloodshed and fruitless massacre. It would have no more of that fatal policy of war without honour and peace with shame. The Prime Minister had based his defence—if defence it could be called—upon two grounds, the first that General Gordon could have escaped when he pleased; the second, that the Government had no reason to believe that he was in danger in Khartoum. But if it were true that Gordon could have escaped, how could it be supposed for one moment that a British officer, much less a Christian hero, would have been guilty of such cowardice and baseness as to be willing, in order to save his own life, to abandon the mission upon which he had been sent, and to desert the people whom he had gone out to rescue? Gordon had not only stated that he would not be so mean as to leave those people, but that he could not if he would. General Gordon said—
    "I stay in Khartoum, because the Arabs have shut us in and will not let us out. The people, also, would not let me go unless I gave them some Government or took them with me, which I could not do."
    The Prime Minister had frequently told the House that Khartoum was in no danger; but he thought the country was already convinced of the extraordinary perversity of the Prime Minister's views on the subject. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster) had said that the Prime Minister could persuade most people of most things, and himself of anything; but he (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett) was perfectly sure that even the Prime Minister could not convince the people of England that Khartoum had not been long in imminent danger. The hon. Member opposite (Mr. Arthur Arnold) thought, with the Prime Minister, that there was no effusion of blood at Khartoum. But upon what evidence was such an opinion founded, for all the evidence had pointed to the contrary? Dismissing, for the sake of argument, the circumstantial accounts of barbarous slaughter, which correspondents at Gubat had gathered from the lips of the refugees that came back with Sir Charles Wilson, there was
    1222
    ample other evidence. There was the testimony of Gordon's trusted messenger, George, who stated that all the notables and inhabitants that had been so long faithful were, with their families, cruelly butchered, and their bodies thrown into the Nile. The families of the soldiers on Gordon's steamers were also killed; and piteous accounts of the intensity of the soldiers' grief had come home to us. He never could understand how, with the knowledge of what was going on in Khartoum, the Prime Minister could at any moment say that Gordon was not in deadly peril. Gordon informed them of the dangers of his position by implication in his despatches. They knew that he stood alone in a city surrounded by savage fanatics; that he had no reliable troops with him. The great city, that his courage and genius alone guarded, was poorly fortified. Gordon had no money, no officers, consolers, friends, save only the gallant Stewart. Within seven weeks of his arrival he was attacked and surrounded. His wretched troops were badly defeated in March, and Khartoum was at once closely beleaguered by savage foes. Yet Ministers had the head and the heart to say he was in no danger. Gordon in no danger! He was alone in that far-distant land, threatened by savage and triumphant fanatics, surrounded by an ignorant and largely hostile population. The story of General Gordon's long desertion is too well known, too indelibly branded on the mind of the English people to need repetition now. Every suggestion he made, every advice he offered, every help he asked for was neglected, contemned, and refused. Zebehr, the five officers, the 200 British soldiers at Wady Haifa, the Indian troops at Berber, the opening of the Berber road by Graham, the £200,000, and 2,000 Turkish volunteers, for which, in despair of British help, he prayed, were all deliberately and heartlessly refused to him. Insolent and idiotic messages about his pacific mission, and denying him military aid, were sent by the Cabinet to their devoted officer at Khartoum. He had exhausted every effort to bring about a peaceful settlement; he was in deadly peril, attacked and beleaguered by savage fanatics. Yet Ministers could say that he was in no danger and under no constraint to remain at Khartoum. Mr. Power's

    1223
    able and pathetic despatches were also treated with cold contempt. The Prime Minister spoke of the reference to them by the Leader of the Opposition as "a farce." Just so he derided the references to the gallant but ill-starred General Hicks in these words—"I thought we had had enough of General Hicks." Yet, in face of this knowledge, the Prime Minister had distinctly asserted that neither Khartoum nor Gordon was in any danger. The result was well known. The Government said that Gordon could escape; and yet Colonel Stewart, the only man who tried to escape, or rather who was forced by Gordon to make the attempt, came to an untimely death on his way down the Nile. Then the Prime Minister said that Gordon could escape by the Equator, as if that were an easy thing to do. Had the Prime Minister any idea of the dangers of that route? Had he thought of the difficulties of the hundreds of miles of desert, of the immense difficulties of the rivers, of the savage tribes that would have to be traversed? Gordon himself never spoke of the retreat to the Equator as an easy matter; but, on the contrary, he spoke of it as a last resource in that memorable telegram in which he declared that indelible disgrace would attach to the Government if they deserted the garrisons. He (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett) would not do more than refer to the interesting telegrams of Mr. Power. One extract he would make. Thus, on April 7, Mr. Power telegraphed—
    "Khartoum is at present the centre of an enormous rebel camp. Our store of Krupp ammunition is rather short. The situation is now very critical. We are trying to run a steamer through the rebel lines to Berber. Today arrived an unciphered telegram sent from Sir Evelyn Baring to Berber, saying that no English troops would be sent to that place—in a word, clearly indicating that General Gordon and the others who have been faithful to the Government are thrown over. To retreat on Berber is impossible. Sir Evelyn Baring's unciphered telegram to that place will quickly be spread abroad, and the Arabs will learn that the members of the English Government have turned down their thumbs while General Gordon is struggling here. A retreat on the Congo will entail great hardships."
    Mr. Power's messages were full of information as to the dangers at Khartoum; they told Gordon's mind more clearly than Gordon himself would have told it; and they showed how impossible it was, in
    1224
    the face of the abandonment by England, that the garrison, or the people, or any portion of them could escape. That was a point with regard to the action of the Government which was worth the attention of the House. The Prime Minister had dwelt on the fact that there was no delay on the part of the Ministry; but he (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett) would like to have the delay that took place between August 3 and August 23 explained a little better. He asked for a Vote of Credit on August 3; and yet, down to August 23, the Prime Minister prevented all action being taken in spite of the urgent remonstrances of his Colleagues. He had caused the Vote to be practically worthless until August 23; and, if that were so, then those three weeks were responsible for the death of General Gordon; for those three weeks would have saved him, and halved the cost of Lord Wolseley's Expedition. Lord Wolseley himself had repeatedly said that his Expedition was started from England a month too late. It was quite true that the Prime Minister tried to make out that the cause of Gordon's loss was treachery alone on the part of the Soudanese troops, and that treachery was inevitable under any circumstances; but that supposed that the Mahdi and his accomplices in the garrison were the greatest idiots that ever breathed. If Khartoum was in their hand, would they have deliberately put off its conveyance till the last and most dangerous moment? A more extraordinary and puerile argument was never addressed to the intelligence of the House of Commons. Did the Prime Minister mean to say that the Mahdi and the traitors were such absolute fools as to run the enormous risks they ran by delaying their treachery; that they would have deliberately incurred the enormous loss that took place in the assaults on Khartoum in December; and that they would have run the risk of the sudden advance of the British troops? The idea was preposterous and absurd. Lord Wolseley himself had stated repeatedly that the Expedition started a month too late, and the House knew whose fault it was that this precious month was lost. What was more astonishing than all was the Prime Minister's attempt to prove, in the face of the Blue Books he had issued, that Khartoum was not suffering privation,

    1225
    and was well-provisioned. Never was there so transparent a misrepresentation, for there was the clearest and most direct evidence to show that Khartoum was in dire distress. On December 14 came Gordon's important and mournful message, which was sent to Lord Wolseley—
    "Our troops in Khartoum are suffering from lack of provisions. Food we still have is little; some grain and biscuit. We want you to come quickly. … In Khartoum there are no butter nor dates, and little meat. All food is very dear."—[Egypt, No. 1 (1885), p. 132.]
    "All food is dear; come quickly." From the lips of a hero like Gordon that message meant that the garrison was starving; that the hearts of the troops were failing them at the long and inexplicable delay; that a state of suffering and despair was being engendered, in which treachery would find its fertile opportunity. As against that solemn and pathetic message of General Gordon himself, the Prime Minister quoted the verbal report of a messenger who left Khartoum on December 28, having been only one day there. He said Gordon was in perfect health, and the soldiers on the five steamers he saw were well and happy; that the steamers had seized cattle and grain and were taking them up the river to Khartoum. What on earth does this prove—thatKhartoumwas provisioned, that food was plenty? Nothing of the kind, but only that five steamers picked up a certain amount of provisions. How far would that go among 20,000 people? By this message of Dec. 28, Gordon repeated the starvation message of Dec. 14. Yet this all important fact the Prime Minister suppressed till an intimation compelled him to refer to it. "Oh, no;" said the Prime Minister, '' the idea that Khartoum was starving is utterly absurd." It was his own statement that was purely and utterly unserving of serious notice. Then came what he thought was the worst feature in the Prime Minister's speech—his use of Gordon's slip of December 29—"Khartoum all right. Can hold out for years." Why did he not tell the House, what was well known, that Gordon had informed Lord Wolseley that certain of these written messages of his, which the Mahdi almost always intercepted, were to be taken in the exact reverse sense to which they read? The moving cause of the betrayal of Khar-
    1226
    toum was the announcement by Her Majesty's Ministers that Khartoum and the Soudan were to be abandoned. Those who betrayed Gordon felt it to be their only chance to make terms with the Mahdi before the British troops appeared to take Gordon away. So the hero of Khartoum perished. There was "little effusion of blood at Khartoum," said the Prime Minister. All the evidence was against him. Those troops who were faithful to Gordon were slain. All the notables and their families were butchered. What right had Ministers to assume that the savage destroyer who massacred the defenders of El Obeid and Hicks's 10,000 men; that the butchers of Sinkat and Berber would spare the loyal people of Khartoum? He (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett) was astonished at the indifference which hon. Members opposite, who were such professed humanitarians, showed towards those horrible and unparalleled scenes of carnage and ruin which that human butcher the Mahdi, was producing throughout the Soudan. The country now realized the hollowness and hypocrisy of the crocodile tears which were shed over the Bulgarian atrocities. Last night the right hon. Gentleman had affected to display an interest in putting down the Slave Trade; but that interest came very ill indeed from the right hon. Gentleman, in view of the policy of abandonment which he had been endeavouring to carry out in the Soudan. The Government knew perfectly well that the policy of abandonment they had been forcing upon Egypt, and preaching throughout the country, was a direct encouragement to the Slave Trade. What did General Gordon write on February 21? He wrote to Sir Evelyn Baring—
    "I answered (questions regarding the liberation of slaves) that the Treaty of 1877 would not be enforced in 1889 by me, which, considering the determination of Her Majesty's Government respecting the Soudan, was a self-evident fact."
    And Sir Evelyn Baring himself wrote to Lord Granville—
    "It was obvious from the first that a revival of slavery in the Soudan would result from the policy of abandonment."
    So that, in addition to all the other human misery which the Government policy had caused, "a revival of slavery" was its clear and proclaimed result. Yet, with these words before them, the Go-

    1227
    vernment had persistently followed a policy which they knew was a revival of the Slave Trade. Now we were told that Egypt and the Soudan were not worth the trouble and expense they were costing us. The apostles of sham philanthropy and retreat were trying to make capital out of all that had happened. "Why all this cost and trouble?" they cried; "let us have done with the Soudan and Egypt. Let us scuttle and run, and leave these peoples to stew in their own juice." Apart from the utter baseness, the un-English cowardice of such a policy, it was impracticable and impossible. They might wish to leave the Mahdi alone; but that savage conqueror would not leave them, or Egypt alone. He would follow our retreat and harass our Armies in Egypt. The bloody sponge which Ministers had allowed him to pass over the Soudan would inflict like horrors upon Egypt, upon Arabia, and North Africa. A world-wide conflagration might easily be kindled. The echoes of Mahommedan revival were already reverberating throughout the East, and we should have to pay in India for abnegation of duty in Egypt. But it was not Egypt or the Soudan; it was not Arabi or the Mahdi that had cost England, no less than the suffering peoples of those distant countries, so bitter a penalty. It was the present Ministers of the Crown and their policy that were responsible for this waste of blood and treasure. It was their persistent inaction, their ingrained indecision, their rooted resolve to shirk responsibility, their shuffling, their absolute lack of courage that had brought all these calamities upon Egypt and England. Their policy and their action alone were responsible for all this misery and trouble; and until that policy was reversed the country could not hope for a discontinuance of it. Hon. Members might ask what policy would be advocated by the Opposition. Well, the policy which he advocated was that from which he had never varied. It was simply this—that Egypt should be taken in hand clearly and consistently, and administered by British officials for a certain number of years; but only on this condition—that it was done by arrangement with the Sultan of Turkey, the Sovereign of Egypt. Thus alone, too, could a permanent settlement of Egyptian finance be achieved. The Sultan was the legiti-
    1228
    mate and recognized Sovereign of Egypt. With his countenance and support our position in Egypt would be legally and materially unassailable. The Sultan and the Ottoman people were most anxious for the friendship of England. If only the British Cabinet would treat them in a just, honest, and cordial spirit, all could readily be arranged. Then, if Turkey broke up, England was in possession, and would become her natural legatee in Egypt. To secure our position there and throughout the world we must regain the alliance of the German Powers, which so recklessly we had thrown away. As to the Soudan, we were bound to establish a stable and honest Government over, at all events, that portion of the country lying between the White Nile and the Red Sea, under a capable European Governor. Of such men our Indian Service possessed scores. He protested against this cruel and shameful policy of "massacre and retreat" propounded by this Government. They owed it even to these gallant Arabs to show them that England had something to offer them besides the withering blast of her rifles and the fierce thrust of her bayonets. This fatal policy of abandonment had already cost us a bloody penalty. It paralyzed Baker last February at Suakin. It ruined Gordon at Khartoum; it deprived Lord Wolseley of all Native help. It would hurl every friendly and wavering tribe against our hard-pressed Army. Khartoum must be retaken; and, retaken, it must be held for civilization and for the safety of Egypt. They owed it to their national honour, to the cause of humanity; above all, to the memory of their martyr hero, who gave up his life for the cause, to secure to the suffering peoples of the Soudan the blessings of a civilized, free, and beneficent rule. If the policy he recommended were carried out, supported by the alliance of the German Powers, the difficulties in which Her Majesty's Government were now placed would disappear; we should find the Mahdi's movement, which now appeared so formidable, could easily be put down; and we should regain the strong position abroad which England held under the late Administration, and which the present Government had lost.
    MR. TREVELYAN: I certainly do not intend, in the few words I am about to address to the House, to turn my at-

    1229
    tention to Party topics, and the example of the hon. Member who has just sat down is not likely to attract me in that direction. This is the first occasion on which I have had an opportunity of addressing the House on the Egyptian Question; and I do not think it is necessary for me to inquire whether the words of the gallant and Christian hero who has died for the whole of his country can be so interpreted and twisted as to elicit cheers from this or from that side of the House. I have also very little inclination to enter seriously into an argument against the hon. Member's contention that the Government, who are in great difficulties—which is of far less importance than that the country should be in difficulties—in consequence of having sent a great Expedition into the centre of Africa, have deserted General Gordon. I may, however, be permitted to reply to the argumentative assertion of the hon. Member that desertion, or, in other words, abandonment, implies intention. I have further yet to discover the authority which supports the hon. Member's contention that the words of General Gordon to Lord Wolseley should be taken in an inverse sense from that in which they were written. There are graver cares upon us at this moment, and it is to those that I shall address myself during the short time that I shall occupy the attention of the House. But before I do so let me say one word upon Party politics in reference to the capital speech which was delivered from the back Benches opposite by the hon. Member for North Wilts (Mr. Long) who shows very considerable sympathy with the views of hon. Members who sit below the Gangway on our side of the House, and appears to understand those views very well. The hon. Member appeared to find some inconsistency in the fact that those hon. Members who profess to disapprove of every step which the Government have taken have expressed their intention of supporting us on the present occasion against the Motion which has been moved by the right hon. Baronet opposite (Sir Stafford Northcote). I must confess that I do not see any inconsistency in the conduct of hon. Members below the Gangway; because every step which the Government have taken in Egypt has been taken, I do not say under the pressure, but, at all events, with the encourage-
    1230
    ment of hon. Members opposite. The support of the Khedive, which was the natural outcome of the Dual Control set up by our Predecessors; the bombardment of Alexandria; the attempt to relieve the garrisons in the Soudan; the sending out of General Gordon—["No!"]—I am going to qualify my statement in a manner which I think will make hon. Members opposite agree with its drift—and the sending out of an Expedition to relieve General Gordon, were all approved in principle—I am not speaking of the steps by which that principle was attempted to be carried out—by hon. Members opposite. But those are exactly the steps which are disapproved of by hon. Members below the Gangway on our side of the House. I can, therefore, easily understand that those hon. Members below the Gangway are unwilling to place in Office those who have consistently advocated the taking of those steps, and those steps only, of which they disapprove in the action of the Government, to which on other points they are ready to give their support. There are some words which were used by the hon. Member for East Cornwall (Mr. Borlase), in the very eloquent and finished speech with which he delighted the House—which was too thin at the time to deserve it—to which I feel bound to refer. The hon. Member said that although he was not inclined altogether to approve of the past—while, at the same time, he was equally disinclined altogether to blame it—he was more inclined to look to the future; and in saying that the hon. Member was evidently in sympathy with the majority of those who have as yet taken an active part in this debate. At the present moment, there are before the House one Resolution and two Amendments—if I am in Order in saying so; because the hon. Member for the University of London (Sir John Lubbock) has referred to, and has advocated, a second Amendment, which must, therefore, be taken to be under the consideration of the House. In that Resolution, and in those Amendments, there is only one line and a-half which refers to the past; and it is that which states that the course pursued by Her Majesty's Government has involved great sacrifice of valuable lives and a heavy expenditure without any beneficial result. Every word of the Amendment of the hon. Member for Newcastle

    1231
    (Mr. John Morley) refers to the future, and so does the Motion of the right hon. Baronet opposite. In these circumstances, I shall confine myself to the future, and to one single point in the future, but that all important—it being one with regard to which, if I were a private Member, I should require to have the most complete elucidation and the most perfect satisfaction in order to guide my course in the vote I should have to give on Thursday or on Friday next; and that point is this—were the Government right or wrong in the decision to which they came when they received the news of the fall of Khartoum? That news reached the Government late on the night of the 4th or 5th of February, and the effect of that news was to determine the Cabinet to pursue the war. What were the grounds for that determination? Were they such as to commend themselves to the mind of the House, and to the mind of the country, and, what is much more serious, were they such as to justify the Government in being influenced by them? I can well understand that this is a question which greatly troubles the minds of hon. Gentlemen below the Gangway, and troubles the minds of the people of the country; because I never took part in any decision which more greatly troubled my own mind. That trouble did not arise from any doubt or hesitation as to the propriety of that decision, but because that decision involved a departure from those general views of policy which we believed to be of advantage to the country, and because it might lead those who hold those views with us to believe that we hold them no longer. Those views were most eloquently expressed by the hon. Member for Newcastle in the one ornate passage of his speech, in which he stated that it would be detrimental, in the highest degree, to the welfare of the nation if we were to extend our Possessions or our responsibilities beyond our fighting power. If that is adopted as a general principle of action, if we did increase our responsibilities beyond what increased our fighting power, if we looked for the appearance of strength and not for the reality of it, then the nation is going in a downward direction, and has embarked on a course which will imperil her. Is the decision to continue and push on the war in the Soudan
    1232
    a justifiable decision by persons who hold these views? In order to vindicate that decision it is necessary to ask the House to put itself in the position in which we were when we made it, with the facts which we had then before us, and candidly and frankly I will expose the grounds of that decision. When the news of the fall of Khartoum reached us, what were the facts before us? Six thousand fighting British soldiers were in the heart of Africa. The distance they had traversed, which, if they had done nothing else—and they had done a great deal else—would alone entitle them to the fame of having completed a great undertaking. They were 1,400 miles from the city whence they originally started. They were divided into three bodies, small in number, however heroically valiant, one at a distance of 160 miles from the central body, the other half that distance away. They were in the face of a powerful enemy, flushed with a recent success—an enemy of that nature whom success rendered much more powerful, not only by means of the material advantages in the way of ammunition, and weapons, and food, and military positions, but in the immense effect which success made on the question whether he was to be joined by great multitudes of people who were half soldiers already. In this strait, and with all these real enemies around them, and with 1,400 miles already behind them, there still was what I should call the certainty that such troops under such leaders should make head even against this situation, but only on one condition, and that was that they should know promptly and even instantly that their countrymen at home would spare nothing to make their position secure, and, if it were needed, doubly secure; that they should not be allowed to ride at single anchor, but should have another line of retreat if the existing line should possibly fail; and that, above all, their General should not be tied down to this species of retreat or retirement; but that he should be allowed full discretion to take what is the only means of extricating an army from a dangerous position, and especially a dangerous position in the face of an uncivilized foe—that is to say, to resort to vigorous offensive tactics. Now, I have a right to ask hon. Members to put themselves in our

    1233
    position then, and to look at this matter with our eyes; and I have especially a right to ask my hon. Friend the Member for Liskeard (Mr. Courtney) to do so, because he has taken a leading part in protesting against the action of the Government. The difficulty in which our Army was placed arose, to a great extent, from the march across the Bayuda Desert that was led so gallantly by my dear personal friend, Sir Herbert Stewart. This march, as long as General Gordon held Khartoum, was, if a civilian may be permitted to express an opinion on a military subject, a most bold, but a most judicious proceeding; and I am certain, from what Sir Herbert Stewart told me of Soudanese warfare, that it was the sort of proceeding in which he would be very glad to be engaged. But it was quite another thing when Khartoum fell. As soon as Khartoum fell the Army was in a position not adapted to its then circumstances. That position was the result of the undertaking which was set on foot by the Government to which my hon. Friend the Member for Liskeard belonged. There is no question so difficult as to settle what difference of judgment it is which constitutes an obligation on a Member of a Government to leave that Government. But on one question there is no doubt whatever, in my opinion—namely, that we must accept the necessary consequences of the action taken by a Government at the time that you were in it. Now, the hon. Member said that the particular things which were most obnoxious to himself, and to at least one of his Colleagues—and I believe when he said that he referred to the late lamented Mr. Fawcett, though I am bound to say I object altogether to any deduction being drawn as to what opinion Mr. Fawcett would have held at this crisis—were done, as he said, completely before they knew anything about them. But that cannot be said about the Expedition for the relief of General Gordon. That was a thing which was not done in a corner. The Government to which my hon. Friend, exactly as much as I, then belonged, placed these 6,000 men in the heart of Africa; and it seems to me that if the Government, with the facts before them, and with the best military advice they could get under their eyes, thought that, in order to place these men in a
    1234
    position of safety, measures stronger and more energetic than my hon. Friend quite approves ought to be taken, I must say, I think my hon. Friend ought to be slow and very chary indeed to blame the Government for taking those steps. Well, Sir, it was the bounden duty of the Government to take a decided course; and what was that course to be? I understand there is a widespread wish, which the hon. Member for the University of London (Sir John Lubbock) put into a very short and effective speech, that we should have instructed General Wolseley to withdraw down the Valley of the Nile to Wady Haifa, or Korosko, or Assouan, or to some other point which is imagined to be a point of military safety. Now, I do not hesitate to say that, from a military point of view, no Government would have been justified in giving such an order to a General of an army. A retreat, and especially a retreat before an uncivilized foe, who is so very easily moved, and in case of disaster becomes ubiquitous and covers the whole country, is the most hazardous of all operations; and it is safe only on one condition—namely, if you are retreating to a point so secure that when you get to it you are certain you are in safety. There was the retreat of Wellington to the lines of Torres Vedras, a point where he was in safety. Then there was the retreat of General Moore upon Corunna; but at Corunna he found the sea and ships, and consequently safety. But these places which people name down the Valley of the Nile are not places of safety at all. They are not at all stronger than the position our Army at present occupies. I do not like to speak in detail of the difficulties of transport; but this is a matter of immense importance. The position our troops occupy at this moment they can defend, and they have food; but if they retreated, how could they carry their food with them? The river is absolutely impassable, and there are 240 miles along which boats cannot pass at all. This constitutes a formidable obstacle indeed. Then there are all the Arab tribes which, if we left the country as fugitives, would very soon be upon us. These tribes be all along our line of retreat. My hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle (Mr. John Morley) talked about the retreat from Moscow, and asked what destroyed the Grand Army of Na-

    1235
    poleon. It is not the Mahdi and his forces that we have to fear; but the rainless deserts and illimitable distances. As long as our Army stay where they are—they cannot stay there always, and that is the strength of the position of the Government—holding their position towards the front, we are afraid neither of the rainless deserts nor of the illimitable distances; but the place to which it is said our Army should retreat is more than 500 miles from our front. If we were to give from Downing Street an absolute order to a General to commence such a retreat in that climate and under these circumstances, we should take a step which no Government has any right to take. But it is said that there is another course, and that the Government might have telegraphed to Lord Wolseley to take such measures as would enable him to retreat with security and with dignity—I think the words which my hon. Friend the Member for Liskeard (Mr. Courtney) used were "quietly and calmly"—and that we should assure him of our support, whatever those measures might be. Now, Sir, that is a proposal which reads very well as a peroration to an extremely effective speech; but it would read much less well if it were read by a General in an African desert. Just think what it means. It means that the Government, who with such military light as they can obtain at home are satisfied that the safety of our Army lies in a vigorous defensive, is to telegraph—"Our object is to get away. If you can only get away by hard forward fighting then you must do it on your own responsibility; but do not put it upon us. Let the suggestion come from you if you think it is necessary to open up the Suakin-Berber route and to break up the Mahdi's power. Take the whole responsibility and the unpopularity, and let us be able to say—'All we did was to order you to retreat.'" Hon. Members may read such a message otherwise; but that is the only interpretation I can put upon it. We took the right course. Without dictating military details, we laid down our main policy—namely, that the war shall be conducted as a war shall always be conducted—that is to say, with a broad, vigorous, and energetic offensive. That means keeping back the Mahdi on his line of advance, and opening up the Berber-Suakin route, with the military
    1236
    operations necessary for that purpose. As for the construction of the railway, it is a military operation of an absolutely necessary order. It is for military reasons that the railway is to be made a broad-gauge railway; and for the present I refuse to be bound to any future policy by the existence of that railway, just as much as I should refuse to be bound by the ^Resolution of the right hon. Baronet opposite (Sir Stafford Northcote). And here I come to what is almost my last point; but it is one which weighed very much with us in coming to a decision. Some hon. Members are desirous of entering into negotiations with the Mahdi. Now, that point of view was not out of our minds. We respect the Mahdi as an enemy; and we think it possible—we hope it may be possible—that it may lead to a pacification of the Soudan. [Ironical cheers.] I hear a right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Goschen), who is going to give us an extremely authentic discourse on the Soudan, laugh at that proposal. Sir, I am proud to say that I enjoyed the intimate acquaintance of the late Colonel Stewart, who accompanied General Gordon to the Soudan, and who was murdered on the Nile. He used to tell me that, in his opinion, the only means of pacifying the Soudan was to take the Mahdi into our counsels, and while placing Khartoum under a settled Government to give him great authority in other parts of the Soudan, for which his rule was better fitted. That was the policy, not only of Colonel Stewart—it was the policy also of General Gordon himself. Well, then, if you want to negotiate in time of war the only way to do so is to negotiate while you are fighting, to advance boldly in the direction in which you are advancing militarily, and then to accept overtures which will go on more quickly and effectually than if you checked your course. I would ask the House to consider the grave calamities which befell the British Army in another war. I do hope we are not going to repeat the story of Sir William Macnaghten and the calamity of Cabul, which, if we remain in military inaction during negotiation, will too likely fall upon us. That policy certainly the Government cannot adopt. I lay most stress upon the arguments which affect us most strongly. But I cannot forget likewise that in leaving

    1237
    the Soudan we shall leave those whom the Mahdi suspects of being our allies to a fate which I do not like to contemplate; and then if we do get safely away it is only a question of time—and no very long time—before we shall have another invasion. It is not four years since the Mahdi first announced his intention of gaining the whole of the Soudan to his cause, and then in the same Proclamation of conquering the whole of Egypt, overthrowing the unbelieving Turk, and converting the world, the unbelieving Turks being the Mahommedans who do not believe in his supremacy. During those four years he has upset the power of Egypt in the Soudan. He has caused a great deal of slaughter. He has pretty well destroyed the agriculture and entirely ruined the commerce of the Soudan. He has taken several great towns, including Khartoum and Berber. What do hon. Members think will stand in the way of his taking Dongola, Korosko, and Assouan when they have no defenders whatever? We know very well what in an Oriental mouth this talk means of converting the world. It means a good deal, even in a country like the Soudan; but in the fertile Valley of the Nile it means dreadful cruelty, the ruin of all prosperity, the destruction of all organized society. My hon. Friend the Member for Leicester (Mr. Picton) compares the fanaticism of the Mahdi with the fanaticism of Christianity, and says there is a good deal to say for both. But in truth there is no analogy between the mild and mitigating effects of Christian enthusiasm and the stern and grim effects of Mahommedan fanaticism. I am surprised that a well-known historian like the hon. Member for Newcastle (Mr. John Morley) should talk of such an Oriental Government as one under which the people could enjoy a great deal of quiet and prosperity. My hon. Friend cannot have so read history as to expect such results from an Oriental Government of warriors and shepherds, or think that Egypt could safely be entrusted to it. I know my hon. Friend has adopted such an argument from motives which I honour—motives of indignation at what he conceives to have been a national misdemeanour. My hon. Friend is actuated by feelings which I think I understand, and which, if I understand them, I heartily share; but I do not think he has gone the right
    1238
    way to carry them into effect. I believe if the course he recommends be adopted by the Government we shall in the long run have more bloodshed, and undertake more permanent and extensive responsibilities, than we shall if we take the course recommended by the Government. My hon. Friend stated that if the questions raised in this debate were questions merely of the military situation there would be no difference of opinion on either side of the House. I have endeavoured to answer his appeal. I have concealed nothing. I have magnified nothing. I may not have persuaded his judgment or those of my hon. Friends who sit round him; but I am sure I have convinced him that I have straightforwardly attempted to deal with the arguments which he has urged.
    MR. GIBSON: Mr. Speaker—Sir, there is a very wide contrast between the way in which the opposition to the Motion of my right hon. Friend has been presented by the Prime Minister, and by the right hon. Gentleman who has just sat down. The right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (Mr. Trevelyan), having been but a very short time a Member of the Cabinet, has thought it only necessary to deal with such portions of the action of the Government as were covered by his own connection with that august Body, and he limited himself to a rather narrow statement of the military decision arrived at in the crisis which presented itself after the fall of Khartoum. But I am not aware that from beginning to end of his interesting speech the right hon. Gentleman indicated by one syllable anything to show what, in his view, was not only the military exigency, but the policy which in future is to sway the Government. The only indication that I could see or gather in the speech we have just listened to was presented obscurely, that in the not remote future the Mahdi would become an element in the pacification of the Soudan. I do not press that topic. It is a curious topic, curiously presented, and it struck upon our ears with a strange sound. It possibly meant something that cannot be immediately grasped. The Prime Minister was not in the happy position of having been in the Cabinet for only a few months. The responsibility of the Prime Minister is covered by a duration that commands respect,

    1239
    and carries with it vast responsibility, and he was therefore unable to confine himself either to the future or the present. He had to deal with the past as well; and I venture to think there never was a performance of his which was more characterized by the remarkable versatility of his genius. He showed a bold courage which in others might possibly be called audacity. He occasionally showed also much gracious humility in the way in which he presented his topics. We have had the pleasure, on Thursday, of hearing his views from what we learn to-night was a written memorandum prepared in connection with his Colleagues—a strange fetter on the Prime Minister's power of speech. We then heard with fulness, but not with more amplitude of definition, an explanation of the meaning of "abandonment." We have heard to-night, in reply to my hon. Friend the Member for Eye (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett), what kind of abandonment was meant. [Mr. GLADSTONE: A re-statement.] Yes; a re-statement, which presented to some people in this House a meaning different from that of the earlier statement. Well, the position taken by the Prime Minister last night, in the course of the debate, was very clever, and, if it could succeed, would be very successful. The whole matter, he assumes, is decided; it was decided last May in the Division which took place in this House on the Vote of Want of Confidence; it is not possible to re-open the matter again; we are estopped by the then vote of the House, and we have no business to go behind it. Surely it is rather a strong assertion, even for a Prime Minister to make, that, notwithstanding all that has happened since, that vote of this House, carried by a small majority of 28 last May, is to bind us now. Last night he used words about a covenant being then entered into between the Government on the one side and the Parliament and the nation on the other. Our contention is that that covenant has been broken; and in the immense fact that Khartoum has fallen, and that Gordon has lost his life, we have, at all events, overwhelming proof that the covenant has not been fulfilled. The contention of the Prime Minister, which, as I have said, was marked by a bold courage, is that there was no danger to Gordon that the Government knew of.
    1240
    How is one to apply himself to argue against a proposition so plainly disproved that if put forward by anyone else it would not have obtained audience in this House? If the House was so satisfied of the gravity of the crisis and of the imminence of the danger last May that the Prime Minister, using all the weight of his personal influence and all the pressure which Party ties could give him, was only able to get a small majority of 28, to give the Government a further chance of showing that they were in earnest, it is impossible to follow the Prime Minister in this suggestion of the absence of danger. Take Gordon's own words on the 1st of March—"I feel certain I shall be caught at Khartoum." You are asked in one part of the Prime Minister's speech to remember that this was a hero of heroes, whoso word was to be accepted as that of a truthful, experienced, and able man; and in another you are asked to disregard this statement, and to take it as that of a man who, if he knew the gravity of his danger, did not know what he was saying. On the 19th of April, in the last telegram that was received from General Gordon before the interruption of communications with him—that which was sent, not to the Government, but to Sir Samuel Baker, and published in the newspapers, he said—"We are hemmed in." This is the language of an Engineer officer of whom the Prime Minister stated in an earlier speech that he knew better than anyone else how to indicate the way in which he could be helped. Gordon said—"We are hemmed in." Notwithstanding this the Prime Minister asks the House, after Gordon has fallen a victim to the danger which threatened him for so many months, to believe that he was in no danger at all, and that we had no business to know it. This extraordinary power of the Prime Minister not to see what everybody else sees is not confined to Khartoum. We have the case of Berber to illustrate his action about Khartoum On the 15th of April the Prime Minister's attention was called to Berber by General Gordon, and by a Memorial from all the inhabitants of Berber, which was of the strongest, the most pathetic, and the gravest character. On the 24th of April the Prime Minister said he had no reason to believe that there was any risk of Berber sustaining the fate of

    1241
    Sinkat. In two or three weeks it fell, and 5,000 then were massacred. Like case again—Khartoum and Berber. It did not suit the Prime Minister to recognize the looming danger in the case of Berber. He did not see it, and he would not see it. He disregarded the wail—the melancholy, despairing wail—which proceeded from the merchants and inhabitants of Berber. He said he knew Berber better than they, and on the 1st of June, according to Gordon's own subsequent statement, 5,000 were murdered on the capture of Berber.
    MR. GLADSTONE: Where do you find that statement?
    MR. GIBSON: The Prime Minister asks me for a statement about these 5,000. Well, I say it is to be found, and I pledge myself to give the Prime Minister the reference to-morrow, which shows that Gordon stated that on the 1st of June 5,000 lost their lives after the capture of Berber.
    An hon. MEMBER: He never was there.
    MR. GIBSON: Whoever interrupts me has not, at all events, the same knowledge of the matter as General Gordon had. Still, taking his stand on the assumed res judicata of the decision of May, the Prime Minister asks—What is your new fact since May to show that the Government has been remiss? There is the lapse of time. By that lapse of time you have been too late. The Government make the defence, through the Prime Minister, that there was no delay between May, which was the time they entered into the covenant with the House for the safety of Gordon, and the time they moved in August. How does the Prime Minister attempt to bridge over that interval of three months? If these excuses did not come from the Prime Minister they would not obtain audience from anyone else. It is said there was no delay because this period—not of weeks but of months—was taken up by an anxious examination of the comparative merits of different routes, that by the Nile, and that from Suakin to Berber. Remember, these are not my words, but those of the Prime Minister, and there was an examination so anxious and critical that it took months. Any Intelligence Department that took months to present a Paper containing a clear decision on the matter ought to be swept off the face of the earth. I venture to
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    say, however, that if any officer of our Intelligence Department, with a right of audience in this House, had liberty to dispose of this statement, he would have dealt with it in the most clear and concise manner. I notice that the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (Mr. Trevelyan), who spoke this evening, confined himself to the period of the last few months or weeks, and that he did not attempt—he was far too wise—to give a particle of explanation of that fatal lapse of time which made the subsequent Expedition of Lord Wolseley a death march against time. The Prime Minister says there was nothing to indicate that there was urgency in this matter. I point again to the lapse of time. The vote, on which he relies as stopping us almost from the right of debating the matter at all—that vote took place in the month of May. At that time General Gordon had been "hemmed in," to use his own words, for a considerable time. The Government had failed for over a month to get their despatches into Khartoum, and Gordon, during the same period, was unable to pass any despatches out to the Government. Does not this damning fact increase the urgency of the case against the Government? This cutting-off of communication between General Gordon and the outer world that in May had existed for a month lasted for months after that, and during those months the only explanation given by Her Majesty's Ministers for their deadly torpor and fatal apathy is this—that they were not able to make up their minds. [Mr. GLADSTONE: Not at all!] If I can demonstrate anything in the world to my own mind, I can demonstrate that. The Prime Minister said distinctly and plainly that the examination of the contending merits of the routes by Suakin and by the Nile occupied months. These months must have preceded the 5th of August, when the money Vote for £300,000 was taken; because, after Lord Wolseley's instructions were sent—on the 23rd of the same month—there was not time for months of examination; therefore, the examination must have preceded, and the sole explanation is that the Government had not made up their minds. ["Oh!"] Well, if you have not that excuse, you have none. The Prime Minister yesterday paid Gordon a tribute in very eloquent words; but the substance of

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    some of his statements was not so complimentary. He conveyed by innuendo that Gordon partly brought his own fate upon himself by his own rashness. It is plain to me, on reading the Papers that have been presented, and it must be plain to anyone else who reads them fairly, that Gordon would not have escaped and retained the character which the Prime Minister gave him at any time after the 13th of March. On the 9th of March General Gordon, according to the Papers with which we are now familiar, preferred a request that he might be allowed—he saw the difficulties increasing, and he was beginning to understand the Government—to send Stewart and part of the employés to Berber, to surrender his commission, and go to the Equator. That request was refused by Sir Evelyn Baring, who told him to stay at Khartoum, and not go to the Equator. Two days after the route was blocked, and then, for the first time, on the 13th of March, Earl Granville, in one of his interesting despatches, tells Gordon that he is at liberty to escape if he can. At no time, however, after the 13th of March, was it possible for Gordon to have effected his escape. Sir, these are painful things in this matter for anyone to have to realize. It is appalling for a Government who are directly and primarily responsible to reflect upon what has occurred in consequence of their action and non-action; and I know not of one single alleviation for their feelings. It is an alleviation when sorrow and trouble come if one can say that he has done all that human power can do in the way of what is right and proper. But in all these anxious 12 months, during which Gordon was at Khartoum, the Government are unable to point to one single thing that they have done to support him. Literally, until Gordon died, or until his fate had reached its most supreme point, they hardly appear to have stirred at all. I repeat, that the Government are unable to point, in all the 12 months that Gordon was alive in Khartoum, to one solitary request of his that they complied with. They are unable to point to one single expedient that General Gordon indicated that they did not oppose; and Gordon has died never obtaining at their hands while he lived, and while concessions might have kept him alive, the tribute of having, in any parti-
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    cular, acted upon his advice. Her Majesty's Government adopted the humble, but comtemptible, rôle of opposing everything and proposing nothing. They refused everything at a time when each refusal increased their responsibility, and unfulfilled responsibility involves criminal disgrace. And now as to the Prime Minister's "no danger"—the great fallacy he put forward yesterday—I will just make one quotation, the only one I shall make from any of these Blue Books. Sir Evelyn Baring, in a despatch of March 24, 1884, says—
    "There are only two possible solutions. The first is to trust Gordon's being able to maintain himself at Khartoum till the autumn…. This he might, perhaps, he able to do; but it, of course, involves running a great risk. The only other plan is to send a portion of General Graham's Army to Berber with instructions to open up communication with Khartoum."—[Egypt. No. 12(1884), p. 186.]
    Well, Sir, Her Majesty's Ministers deliberately elected to run what their own Agent pointed out to them was a great risk, and we are asked now to hold indemnified, blameless, and spotless, a Government which deliberately gambled with the life of "a hero of heroes." The Government acted in that way throughout, deliberately, notwithstanding the increased and fearful pressure of their obligations. They were warned in Parliament, they were warned in the Press, and every single thing that has occurred was a matter that must have been present to their minds, because they were told of it in this House, in the Press, and by Gordon himself. The Prime Minister has relied upon the treachery which apparently waited on the final scene of the unfortunate Gordon's life almost as matter for the exoneration and justification of the Government. Why, dealing with an Eastern people, treachery is one of the every-day risks against which any position is to be guarded. Gordon himself told you of it in March. You were told of it in this House by my right hon. Friend who moved the Motion on the 12th of May. It was obviously one of the risks which Sir Evelyn Baring told you you were deliberately running when you refused to adopt the Berber-Suakin route. The Prime Minister, in the course of his interesting speech yesterday, referred to a telegram—an opportune telegram—that came on Saturday last from Lord Wolseley, and which

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    referred to the extraordinary theory that, maybe, the Relief Expedition, after all, was the cause of Gordon's death. Really that is the argument. That is to say, that if there had been no Relief Expedition, there would have been no treachery. But Gordon was killed by treachery, and therefore the Relief Expedition killed Gordon. In the name of common sense, what did the telegram mean? General Lord Wolseley concluded that despatch by words on which I rely, in which he said that he bewailed the loss of Gordon, and bitterly regretted that he had not been in the Soudan a month before. On that I rely, because we know Lord Wolseley. We know he is a man who understands the exigencies of his position, and when he said that, he must have believed that if he had been given a month's start: in the death race to Khartoum he would have saved Gordon. But that is not what the Prime Minister relies on. He- relies on the statement of the anonymous Colonels of Gordon. Who are they? These men either must have left Khartoum before Gordon was murdered, and therefore it is from the richness of Oriental imagination that this theory of theirs, which is a peculiar one, must have proceeded, or else they must have known who were the traitors before they came away, and what they intended to do, and they must have come away leaving Gordon to his fate. The Government may take their choice in that dilemma. Either these men are the victims of an illusion—to put a mild construction upon it—or else they are guilty of something far worse. [Mr. GLADSTONE: Hear, hear !] The Prime Minister is good enough to cheer that statement, but I do not know whether he cheers the dilemma generally or only a particular part of it. The Prime Minister appears also to labour under an extraordinary delusion with reference to the food supply at Khartoum. I throw out this challenge. I say that whoever is going to reply for the Government later in the debate will be unable to adduce any trustworthy evidence, under Gordon's hand or otherwise, to show that he had food to last up to a month before the time he met his death. In one of his letters he alludes to five months' supply, in another to four months'—periods which would end weeks before the fall. [Mr. GLADSTONE: No.] I
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    may be contradicted, but again I say that I am giving my own statement of this matter. I again say that not one single piece of trustworthy evidence can be pointed out to show that Gordon had a food supply that would last up to within a month of the time at which he met his death. ["No!"] Hon. Members opposite can speak after me, and may deny it, but that is my proposition. There is a period at which he speaks of five months' supply, another at which he speaks of four months' supply, then of 40 days'; and then come the extraordinary communications of the 14th and 18th of December, which the Prime Minister dealt with in a peculiar way. What is the meaning of those despatches? One of them, which Lord Wolseley calls a "tiny despatch," contains the words, "Khartoum is all right." That was sent by a confidential agent, who carried with him confidential instructions to Lord Wolseley, and who knew what was confidential and secret, and what was not. He appears to have carried two sets of instructions—one of which was not covered by the seal of secrecy and confidence, while the other was covered both by the seal of secrecy and confidence. This trusted messenger conveyed a tiny written message saying "Khartoum is all right," and then the confidential messenger gave a secret oral message of the gravest purport. What was that message? It was—
    "Our troops are suffering from want of food.—Secret and confidential."
    These are Gordon's words in December last, and he proceeds to emphasize that by saying—"We want you to come quickly." The "hero of heroes" does not ask for aid until it is very necessary, and yet the Prime Minister asks us to forget this despatch—this grave and secret message from Gordon on the 14th of December—and asks us to believe that it was overridden by the message of the 18th. [Mr. GLADSTONE: The 28th.] Well, of the 28th; but nothing turns upon that. The governing date is the 14th, when there was certainly a message from Gordon, showing what his position actually was. Was there any message after the 14th to override the statement that General Gordon and the troops shut up in Khartoum were in perilous straits? Nothing of the kind, and the inference deduced by the Prime

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    Minister appears to have been arrived at from a casual statement of some anonymous messenger who brought the message of the 28th. When the Prime Minister says that the statement of the 28th should override the despatch of the 14th, he asks us to prefer the loose statement of an anonymous messenger, of whom nothing is known, to a despatch sent by an accredited agent. The conduct of the Government appears to be entirely without either justification, excuse, or palliation. Gordon did his best, and the Cabinet did their worst. If it were simply a question of the Government and its fate, it would be one of comparative smallness; but the loss which the country has sustained materially and in repute is grave and very serious. I know of no question that calls more for grave and anxious consideration at the hands of the Representatives of the people than the crisis in which we are involved, the way in which it has been forced upon us, and what may be the best mode of escaping from it. The Government ask once again to be trusted because they have broken covenants in the past. They ask us to believe that they will keep this new covenant better in the future, because they have broken every promise they made to Gordon and the House of Commons. They ask us now to believe that we can trust their lightest promises as covenants. It is not my word; it is the Prime Minister's. We might trust a fresh, untried Government; we might trust a Government that had not broken covenants and outraged promises; but a Government that is disparaged and discredited cannot be trusted. What is now your policy? We have listened, on more than one occasion, to discussions upon this subject, and still the question awaits something like a clear answer. The right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (Mr. Trevelyan) said that the question which presented itself was this—"Was the Government right in what it did on hearing of the fall of Khartoum?" That is not the question; but it is the narrow way in which a man who wants to minimize his own responsibility presents the question. The right hon. Gentleman speaks almost like a Field Marshal when ho takes credit for the military operations that have taken place and may- take place. But the policy
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    which the Government have let out is due somewhat to the action of Lord Wolseley, and not to the initiative of the Government. It is perfectly plain and manifest that the action which took place was this. The Government, for those high reasons of State which are sometimes so convenient, have not printed a most important message to Lord Wolseley, nor his reply. But enough has come out to show this—that the Government first heaped upon Lord Wolseley's devoted shoulders a discretion of an overwhelming character, wishing that he might find out not only what military exigency, but also what political exigency required. I am giving my own impression of documents which some day we shall all be able to road. It is plain that Lord Wolseley would not accept the discretion that you gave him, that ho asked what you meant, and what your policy was, and it was not until you were subjected to the pressure of the insistence of Lord Wolseley that, at last, you were compelled to arrive at something in the shape of a decision. Let me again refer to the fact that the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (Mr. Trevelyan) has not, from the beginning to the end of his speech, indicated, by suggestion or hint, what he believes or understands the policy of the Government to be. Again, I ask, what is the policy of the Government? The statement of the Prime Minister on Thursday becomes doubly important from the fact that it was in writing, and that it had been prepared in consultation with his Colleagues. Therefore, it must be assumed that every vagueness, every uncertainty, and every elasticity which have been put into the words in which their case is contained are studied and elaborate ambiguities. And now that we know that, are we not entitled to say that this statement, if it is to be called a statement, of policy is vague, disappointing, contradictory!' It is a policy framed to win, if possible, the support of contrary opinions. The Government, in fact, say—"We will go to Khartoum and overthrow the Mahdi to please the Whigs; we will run away from Khartoum to please the Radicals." I pity either one or the other of those two great classes, for one or the other is doomed to be disappointed. I do not care particularly for that; but I do care very much for this—that in this process of elaborate and studied vagueness it

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    may be that the nation will be compelled to lose thousands more of its best lives, and to spend millions more of its hard-earned money. At all events, we have this from the Prime Minister—that they have a basis of policy, and that that basis is the overthrow of the Mahdi at Khartoum. Now, that is a very grave and serious basis, that, if adopted, should be the foundation of a well-considered policy; but if it is the basis of nothing except of a platform on which to join the Whigs and Radicals together, it is something which I should not like to christen with the name of policy. I can understand and realize that, after what has occurred in the East, it is necessary to do something to re-establish our credit, which must be seriously impaired in the Eastern mind. The Prime Minister indicated on Thursday the methods by which he proposes to carry out the basis of his policy—namely, the making of a railway from Suakin to Berber, so as to open up the Suakin-Berber route. The basis of the policy of the Prime Minister was the overthrow of the power of the Mahdi at Khartoum; and it is a basis of policy laid down in conjunction with his Colleagues. Tonight the suggestion of the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster is that the governing principle of the military operations is the opening up of the Suakin-Berber route by the construction of a railway. Many objects, some of them very interesting and philanthropic, were stated by the Prime Minister as the result of the war. What we want to know is, how far the Government consider that they are pledged to carry out all or any of those objects? Is it competent for the Government, on the plan they have drawn up for themselves on paper, and guarded and fenced round with conditions to satisfy their basis, to spend millions of our money, to lose thousands of precious lives, and then to proclaim that they are unable to carry out the objects for which they went, and to announce that forthwith they must withdraw from the country? How long do they intend to pursue the Mahdi? Do they intend to seek him at Khartoum, or beyond it? Is Khartoum the governing principle of their policy or is the Mahdi? Is the going to Khartoum their object, or do they intend to seek the Mahdi wherever he may be found? I should like to know what is
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    the object the Government seriously intend to carry out? If the Government have no fixed or settled policy—if the Government have no fixed and steady purpose which they have adopted and are in a condition to proclaim to the House of Commons, then they have embarked on a career—I will not say of vengeance, but on that of a very rash and ill-considered spending of blood and treasure. Last night the Prime Minister did not unsay a single portion of his statement on Thursday; and, therefore, we must take it that that deliberate n written statement is still to be regarded as the basis of the policy of the Government. He applied to it a process of mild attenuation; but this is too grave a matter for us to permit it to be attenuated. They must stand upon their words, that the basis of their policy is the overthrow of the Mahdi, or they must withdraw them. We cannot allow these things to be left to doubt, uncertainty, or vagueness. Some words used on the subject by the Prime Minister appeared not inconsistent with, but somewhat to weaken, the previous statement. But I presume the basis I have mentioned must be taken to be the one adopted and intended. The obscurity is as to how far their objects are to be sought, and how far they are to be realized. The Prime Minister has been anxious to explain that he is consistent; but I do not care to go into that subject. I think he said that the Government had never varied in their policy of abandoning the Soudan, and that their policy had been entirely consistent. [Mr. GLADSTONE dissented.] I do not think the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister need take me up for suggesting that he was adhering to his consistency, because I am not aware that at any time in his long and honoured career he has ever admitted that he was inconsistent. Now, Sir, if there was no past for us to remember; if we had not the wretched experience of the last two or three years in Egypt, and the miserable experiences of the past year, I could understand the Government meeting this Motion by asking once more to be trusted. We might hope, if this were a question of a fresh occasion, that there would be in the future some resolution and purpose about the Government; but the past career of the Government indicates that the future under the control of the Go-

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    vernment must be absolutely hopeless. They have been unreliable in the past, and they will be unreliable in the future. They have been tried and found wanting, and there is no guarantee whatever upon which any rational man can rely that, no matter what pledges are now given, the Government policy will not be again one of useless expenditure and wanton bloodshed.
    MR. GOSCHEN: Mr. Speaker—Sir, I hope that in the course of this debate we may have reason to convince ourselves whether the taunt which has been levelled by the right hon. Gentleman who has just sat down at the Government is, or is not, without foundation—namely, that they intend to go to Khartoum to please the Whigs, and that they intend to retire from Khartoum to please the Radicals. I trust that the Government, by the most explicit declarations, will be able to show that for such a statement there is absolutely no foundation. I am sure that I express the almost unanimous view of this House when I say that if there is one thing for which we are all anxious, it is that we may thoroughly understand what the policy of Her Majesty's Government is. I will venture to implore Her Majesty's Government, even more than has hitherto been done, to take the House into their confidence, and to let us see what the ultimate objects are at which they are aiming. We have to remember this—that we have not only to decide these matters in this House, but that the country has to be called upon to make considerable sacrifices; that it will not be sufficient to place before our constituents vague statements and problematical contingencies; that it will not be enough to say there are some objects which under certain circumstances we must use reasonable efforts to secure; but we must be able to show that there is something vital to the interests of this country at which the Government are aiming by the sacrifices which the nation will be called upon to make. At this time of the evening I will certainly not dwell on the retrospective part of this case. I will not go over ground which the right hon. and learned Gentleman opposite (Mr. Gibson) has touched upon—whether there was danger to General Gordon or not. I will confine myself on that point to one single remark—that if it was incomprehensible to some persons in May
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    and August that the Government did not recognize that there was danger to General Gordon, it is not likely that subsequent events will have changed their minds in that respect. Nor do I think it fair that the danger should be calculated in this matter by the single test—whether heroism was able to avert the danger. A man may have been in tremendous danger for many months, and it is no proof of there having been no danger that by stupendous efforts—with almost impossible means—he succeeded in averting the danger which threatened him. None of us can be surprised that many hon. Members in this House, and the whole country out of it, should review the circumstances connected with the death of General Gordon with the greatest indignation. But it is still more important in the situation in which we find ourselves to know what are the responsibilities we are about to undertake, what will be the ultimate sacrifices we may be called upon to make, and what are the difficulties that will be encountered in this matter. The question cannot be confined, as in the eloquent speech of my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (Mr. Trevelyan) it was almost confined, to the military operations, but it touches some of the most important political considerations ever submitted to an Assembly such as this. Now, I am bound to say that I do not find, as regards my own mind—and I should like to know what is the case with hon. Members who sit both below and above the Gangway—I do not find that my own mind has become clearer as to the ultimate intentions of the Cabinet as this debate has proceeded. I think there was one surprise this evening for some hon. Members below the Gangway. They erroneously imagined that Her Majesty's Government had pledged itself to the evacuation of the Soudan; but if they had followed accurately the language of my right hon. Friend at the head of the Government, they would have plainly seen that he had certainly said no such thing. But why do these misapprehensions occur? Because the important point of evacuation or non-evacuation was simply treated by that one phrase, which was quoted to-night, and was never expounded or placed clearly before the House of Commons. We were unable to gather, except from

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    that one phrase, what the intentions of Her Majesty's Government were with regard to the Soudan, after they had made these forward offensive operations to which they are pledged. I should wish to be permitted, before I make some remarks upon the policy of the Government as regards the Soudan, to say a word or two on some other political points connected with our position in Egypt, to which scarcely any allusion has hitherto been made in the statements of Ministers. I wish to show how little we really know, even at present, of our situation in Egypt and the Soudan. I want to know what it is that Hassan Fehmy Pasha, the Turkish Envoy, is negotiating at present with the Government in London? Are there negotiations in progress which touch the Eastern portion of the Soudan? Are there operations contemplated with regard to the occupation of Suakin, or has it occurred to Her Majesty's Government that the Sultan is the Suzerain of the Soudan, and that, if we do not wish to stay there, or if we wash our hands entirely of that country, he may think it wise to take our place? I know nothing about this; but we see matters going on of which we know absolutely nothing. Take, again, that queer incident of Prince Hassan. These things puzzle hon. Members on both sides of the House. I am glad to see that my right hon. Friend acknowledges we have a right to be puzzled. But why does my right hon. Friend not give us somewhat clearer glimpses of his policy? It seems to amuse my right hon. Friend; but I was extremely puzzled the other day by a journal not unfriendly to Her Majesty's Government which suggested that Hassan was going into the camp of Lord Wolseley, because, possibly, Lord Wolseley would find something for Hassan to do ultimately at Khartoum. How are we to understand a hint of that kind? I have seen the Papers presented to the House; but whether this ultimate intention is in the breasts of any of Her Majesty's Advisers I am unable to ascertain. A third point to which I should like to call attention is this—what are the Italians doing at Massowah? What is our position with regard to those ports of the Red Sea which have been partly occupied by the Italians? Is there any understanding with that gallant and friendly nation that they will be of some
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    assistance to us? Do we look to them to garrison Massowah; or is it simply an extraordinary coincidence that the Italians should occupy that port at such a time? Let me suggest a fourth point, about which, for my part, I know very little, and of which I do not know whether hon. Members know more, and that is that, coincident in time with all these difficulties in which we find ourselves in the Soudan, we hear of Germany and Russia and other Powers claiming more power and greater locus stands in Egypt Proper than they have done for some time past. Therefore, when this country is to be called upon to make great sacrifices to protect Egypt Proper, I should like to ask what is to be the future of that Egypt which is to be protected by the money of the British taxpayer, and by the bayonet of the British soldier? Now, we know that the Government have pledged themselves to a distinct policy; but there are two alternatives. There is an international Egypt, and there is an autonomous Egypt. We may soon see, in these negotiations with the Powers with regard to finance, what the view of the Government is as to the autonomy of Egypt, the development of her institutions, and leaving her to stand alone, as far as she can possibly be allowed to stand alone. Is that principle to be sustained in its absolute integrity? It is suspicious that Foreign Powers have been so extremely eager to give an international guarantee. I should hope that we shall soon hear, and I trust and believe that Her Majesty's Government maybe able to give, a satisfactory answer on that point—at all events, an assurance, that in the coming years, while we are making these efforts, which will have to be as great as the Government have sketched out, we shall retain as free a hand in Egypt as we have now, and have even a clearer position in relation to the Egyptian Government. Some time ago it was a policy of neutrality for Egypt towards which the Government were tending. Is that still their policy? It would be wrong of me to elaborate these points now in any degree; but I wish to suggest them to Members of the House of Commons, to show how ignorant we still are of the whole situation, and how much we must learn still before we know what the real policy of Her Majesty's Government is, as a whole, in regard to

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    Egypt, because I think we shall be justified in assuming that the policy of Her Majesty's Government as regards Egypt will more or less influence them in their policy as regards the Soudan. According to our position in Egypt Proper, so will be the attitude we take in the Soudan. I wish now to call attention to the policy of the Government, so far as we know it, in the Soudan, in consequence of the disaster which has recently occurred. The first announcement of policy was made almost immediately after the great disaster at Khartoum, and it is on that we have definite information from the Government—namely, that they intend to break the power of the Mahdi at Khartoum. To that I understand they have pledged themselves. Other subsidiary objects they have suggested; but to that one point they have pledged themselves. Hon. Members will remember that soon after the news arrived there was no uncertain sound in any Governmental quarters. Lord Wolseley was instructed that the power of the Mahdi must be broken at Khartoum. The Earl of Rosebery made an eloquent speech at Epsom; he joined the Cabinet upon what was believed to be a declaration of a strong and vigorous policy in Egypt; the Colonies responded to the general note which had been struck; and my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (Mr. Trevelyan) also made an eloquent and somewhat martial speech. Then came the Thursday on which my right hon. Friend at the head of the Government made his statement of the intentions of the Government—a written statement, as it has been explained to us—and I am bound to say that most of us who listened to the statement of my right hon. Friend did not recognize in its tone the same ring that had characterized the previous utterances of some of his Colleagues, and the declarations that had been previously made. As has been said by the right hon. and learned Gentleman who has just sat down, several matters were stated in that declaration as lying within the intentions of Her Majesty's Government. There was the obligation to the persons for whose safety General Gordon had forborne to escape; there was the possibility of establishing an orderly Government at Khartoum; there was the subject of the Slave Trade; there was the
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    matter of the Egyptian garrisons in the Soudan; and, besides that, there were the important and serious general consequences to Egypt and the East. And we must attach considerable importance to this document, because, as we now learn, it was a written document, and it expressed the views of the Government.
    MR. GLADSTONE: I do not wish to be misunderstood. I did not go so far as to call it a written document; I stated that there were written notes affecting the material parts of it.
    MR. GOSCHEN: I would not wish for a moment to push my right hon. Friend further; but I take it that, in the main, the statement represented the carefully-expressed views of the Cabinet, and it is extremely important for us to note that point. As to the extent to which the Government intend to stand to these objects, that is a matter on which I confess that my own mind is at present a perfect blank. It was in the same speech that my right hon. Friend at the head of the Government said they were pledged to the evacuation of the Soudan by Egypt. [Mr. GLADSTONE assented.] I am glad to see that my right hon. Friend assents to that. That is one of the points on which there is no doubt. But the curious point is this—that when my right hon. Friend spoke, on the following Monday, nearly all those points which were introduced on the Thursday before vanished from the enumeration that he then made.
    MR. GLADSTONE,who rose amid cries of "Order!" said: I rise to Order. I must correct my right hon. Friend. I distinctly referred to those points. It was not necessary for me to go over all of them again.
    MR. GOSCHEN: That is a point upon which I distinctly join issue with my right hon. Friend. I think that it was necessary to refer to them again, because it was done before only in the way of allusion; it was a simple allusion to those points; and I want my right hon. Friend to remember that, as I have suggested before, hon. Members have to go to their constituents on these matters; and we wish him to give us the key-note in this House, and to expand these points, as he expanded some of the points in his reply to the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Sir Stafford Northcote). Take the one subject of the Slave Trade. The Slave Trade was

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    referred to in the first statement of my right hon. Friend, but not in the second. He did not refer to it again. [Mr. GLADSTONE: Yes; I did.] Of course, I accept the statement of my right hon. Friend at once; but I do not think we have had any other answer than this, nor did my right hon. Friend distinctly develop the point, although, on a previous occasion, the President of the Local Government Board (Sir Charles W. Dilke) had stated in debate that there was no good whatever in attempting to stop the Slave Trade at Khartoum, but that it must be stopped on the East Coast. I assure my right hon. Friend that I allude to these matters only that we may have a clear case, and know precisely where we are, and not for one moment in any controversial spirit. Now, I ask my right hon. Friend, since he has alluded to this subject of slavery, and since he says he alluded to it again in his second speech, whether we may take it for granted, and put it before the public, that a part of the object of Her Majesty's Government, and a serious part at a moment like this, is to assist in suppressing the Slave Trade? Is that going to last? Is that a motive which is to operate on our minds? In the speech which my right hon. Friend made in reply to my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle (Mr. John Morley), he did not allude to the difficulties which have been started in regard to the Slave Trade. I want to clear up this important matter. May I take it from the Government, and will some subsequent Cabinet Minister, when speaking, tell us, that we may fairly go to the country with this as one of the objects of the sacrifices they are called upon to make. But if they are not in earnest, and if it is not intended that this is to have any weight at all, let us withdraw at once frankly from the position, and say that the Slave Trade is not one of those matters for which we are going to Khartoum. I object to these philanthropic aims if they are only put forward for the time. Although my right hon. Friend told me I was wrong upon one point, and consequently lengthened my remarks, his correction has enabled me to put before the House this one point as one of the objects for which we are going to Khartoum. But to return to the declarations of my right hon. Friend.
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    In his first speech the question was as to whether there was a possibility of establishing a Government at Khartoum. I notice that my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (Mr. Trevelyan) has repeated that statement this evening, in connection with his somewhat extraordinary remarks with regard to negotiations with the Mahdi. It appears that we are to utilize the Mahdi in the Soudan after we have broken his power at Khartoum. "We are first to attack and smash him, and then we are to utilize a smashed Mahdi for those purposes for which we may, in that condition, still find him useful. But let the House note this—that the recommendation of General Gordon was that the Mahdi should not be utilized for Khartoum, but that he should be utilized for Kordofan.
    MR. TREVELYAN: That is what I said.
    MR. GOSCHEN: Yes; and my point is that if we are to establish a Government at Khartoum the very quotation in which the use of the Mahdi was recommended shows that for Khartoum he should not be utilized, and therefore there is to be some other form of Government at Khartoum. Let me put before the House the statement of the Prime Minister in his second speech with regard to establishing a Government at Khartoum. It is this—
    "We are not prepared to say that there is no obligation upon us to use, according to circumstances, reasonable efforts, if we go there, to leave behind us an orderly Government"—
    that is to say, this statement contains a double negative, and three hypotheses. There are three "ifs" and two "noes," and it is upon that statement that we are to go forward and break the power of the Mahdi at Khartoum. Now, it appears to me that this is far too shadowy a statement for us to be able to utilize it as an argument that there is a real object in going to Khartoum. Do we mean or do we not mean to establish an orderly Government at Khartoum? It appears to me that my right hon. Friend was infinitely more eloquent in denouncing the proposition of the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition, which much more resembled his own policy, than he was in denouncing the policy of my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle (Mr. John Morley), which struck at the key-note of the Go-

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    vernment policy. What is the key-note of the Government policy? We are to break the power of the Mahdi at Khartoum. To that my hon. Friend is thoroughly and decidedly opposed. The Prime Minister dealt very gently with my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle; but he was extremely strong in his answer to the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition, who proposed to
    "assure a good and stable Government to Egypt, and to those portions of the Soudan which are necessary to its security."
    Now, the proposal of the Government is that we should try and leave behind us an orderly Government at Khartoum, and the proposal of the right hon. Baronet opposite is that we should
    "assure a good and stable Government to Egypt, and to those portions of the Soudan which are necessary to its security."
    I must say that I thought my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister went too far when, he said, in reply to the right hon. Baronet, that that must mean the whole of the Eastern Soudan. Why should the whole of the Eastern Soudan be necessary to the security of Egypt? I do not think that was laid down by the right hon. Baronet, and surely my right hon. Friend himself cannot think the whole of the Eastern Soudan is necessary to the security of Egypt, because he has himself said that such measures as are necessary for the security of Egypt must be taken by Her Majesty's Government. I wish to call the attention of the House to that point. I do not think that the words
    "assure a good and stable Government to Egypt, and to those portions of the Soudan which are necessary to its security,"
    bear the very wide interpretation put upon them by my right hon. Friend. Now, in answering my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle (Mr. John Morley), what did the Prime Minister say? He joined issue with my hon. Friend mainly on the military operations. He did not join issue with him on the objections made to the breaking up of the power of the Mahdi at Khartoum. And I say this—being anxious to support a vigorous policy—that we have not had sufficient arguments presented to us in this House, so far, to justify that pledge of the Government, that we are necessarily to break up the
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    power of the Mahdi at Khartoum. I do not say that it is not necessary—I do not say that the Government have not exercised a sound judgment in coming to that conclusion. I doubt it; but all I say is that they have not placed before the House sufficient arguments to justify that course, especially if there is no other good to flow from it than a military retreat. I would ask any Members of the Cabinet who are going to speak in this debate to tell us, if they can tell us in no uncertain manner, this—Do they attach, or do they not attach, importance to the argument that we must break the power of the Mahdi at Khartoum in order to influence the East generally with regard to the omnipotence of our arms? Is that, or is it not, the argument of Her Majesty's Government? They cannot be silent upon points like that; they must tell us, if we are to make further sacrifices, whether there is in this more than the military question; whether their policy is to assert our influence generally; or whether it is simply to assist General Wolseley in retreating in the most creditable manner? These are issues which cannot be evaded, and with which it is the bounden duty of the Government to deal. Now, I will frankly state to the House my opinion that this programme of going forward to break the power of the Mahdi at Khartoum, without any more definite objects than those given in the shadowy declarations of the Prime Minister, is both too much and too little. I am not sure whether it is not too much. The Government have pledged themselves to a much more difficult task than some of the other objects referred to by them. But how long during the months of weary waiting will the country stand by them and insist on the breaking of the power of the Mahdi at Khartoum, relying only upon this shadowy argument, and without anything tangible before them? I say it with as profound a conviction as I have ever held on any subject in my life, that it would be disastrous if in the end we should fail in the performance of the task we have undertaken, and have to bear the ignominy of retiring from the position we have taken up. Let us, while there is still time to deal with this question, pause and see whether the House of commons will exact from the Govern-

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    ment that they should absolutely pledge themselves to this task. In my opinion, there are tasks less heavy and more useful which would equally assist the honourable retreat of our Army, and, at the same time, secure certain ends in which I am sure Her Majesty's Government will concur as being desirable, and which, I believe, are more possible than the course which they propose. Now, there are two objects which, to my mind, ought to be almost an irreducible minimum in what we are about to undertake. I gathered with great pleasure from the speech of my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (Mr. Trevelyan) that the Government recognized the responsibilities we have incurred to those tribes and to those men who have supported us in our operations in the Soudan. Now, that is a tangible point upon which the country would, I believe, be unanimous; it is a point on which you can appeal to every sentiment by which it ought to be inspired. We must stand by those who have stood by us, and therefore we must consider especially what is the position of such a Province as Dongola and the tribes in that neighbourhood who have assisted us; and I should consider that any scheme for the settlement of the Soudan which did not afford some security to those who have assisted us would be unsatisfactory in the highest degree. But there is another point which I would humbly submit to the consideration of my right hon. Friend and the House. We are to construct a railway from Suakin to Berber. Am I to understand that that railway is for military purposes alone? In that case, what is to be the fate of that railway? Is it to be broken up, or is it to be handed over to the wild hordes of Arabs? Again, I have no information as to what steps have been taken with regard to slavery, and whether any precautions will be taken to prevent it at Khartoum; but I want to know whether we are also going to leave Berber unprotected, and is the railway to be in such hands and in such a condition that fourth-class carriages will be attached for the conveyance of slaves from Khartoum to the coast? What is to be the fate of the railway? Now, I say there is a clear—I will not say an easy policy, because Heaven knows that I thoroughly recognize the great diffi-
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    culties which beset Her Majesty's Government—but we have to choose; and I say it strikes me it would be a better policy to put our grip on the Nile by holding Berber and the railway from that place to Suakin, than to march forward and break the power of the Mahdi at Khartoum. It appears to me that this is a simpler policy, and one which places us nearer to our true base—namely, the sea. If I am asked—"Do you propose to garrison Berber with English troops?" I reply by another question—"How do you intend to deal with Suakin; how do you intend to deal with the littoral of the Red Sea? What is your policy there?" You may hold Berber, not by British troops; but I do trust that, in any case, it will be held as the outpost of Western civilization on the Nile, and not in any selfish interest of England alone, but as signifying that civilization is not entirely to be driven out of the Soudan, and that arrangements may be made in that way to secure the route from Suakin to Berber. Of course, I can imagine that most of my hon. Friends below the Gangway may be opposed to that idea; but are they more opposed to it than to the idea of the Government that we must crush the power of the Mahdi at Khartoum? I submit that it is a simpler policy; that it is an easier policy; and, more than that, that it is a policy which does not leave us open to the fearful reproach that we are simply to move forward to conquer and fight battles, without being able to point in the Soudan to one single object which we have attained. For I do not believe in the establishment of a stable Government at Khartoum, unless the Government hold much stronger language upon the subject than they have held hitherto. I say, again, that it is not only necessary to convince us that they will do it, but that it is necessary to convince the country; and unless they can do that they will not have the country with them. Sir, I have endeavoured to place before the House the difficulties in our way, and the various issues which cannot be put aside. I am not prepared myself to support the policy of pledging ourselves absolutely to break up the power of the Mahdi at Khartoum, without any further pledges and without any stricter declarations of intention from Her Majesty's Government than we have

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    received up to this moment. If Her Majesty's Government will say how far they really intend to go; if they can say that they will at least hold Berber, even if they do not go to Khartoum; if they will say they will not leave the Soudan until they have ensured the safety of those who have stood beside us; if they will make these declarations in clear and unmistakable language, and not surrounded with too many contingencies; not putting it as that one declaration has been put, with a double negative and three "if's;" if they will put such an object clearly before us, then I shall be prepared to support Her Majesty's Government. But if they will not pledge themselves to anything more than to break the power of the Mahdi at Khartoum; if they will not say that there is anything more to which we shall be able to point before we retire, then I cannot see my way to support Her Majesty's Government, and shall be bound to vote for the Motion of the right hon. Baronet opposite.
    Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Debate be now adjourned."—(Mr. Chaplin.)
    Motion agreed to.
    Debate further adjourned till Thursday.

  MOTIONS.

    LABOURERS (IRELAND) BILL.
    On Motion of Mr. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN, Bill to amend "The Labourers (Ireland) Act, 1883," and for other purposes connected with Labourers' dwellings in Ireland, ordered to be brought in by Mr. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN and Mr. SOLICITOR GENERAL for IRELAND.
    Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 68.]

    LOCAL COURTS OF BANKRUPTCY (IRELAND) BILL.
    On Motion of Mr. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN, Bill to provide for the establishment of Local Courts of Bankruptcy in Ireland, ordered to be brought in by Mr. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN and Mr. SOLICITOR GENERAL for IRELAND.
    Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 69.i

    DURATION OF PARLIAMENTS BILL.
    On Motion of Mr. STANSFELD, Bill to shorten the duration of future Parliaments, ordered to be brought in by Mr. STANSFELD, Mr. JOHN MORLEY, and Professor STUART.
    Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 70.]

    COPYHOLD ENFRANCHISEMENT [STAMP DUTY].
    Considered in Committee.
    (In the Committee.)
    Resolved, That it is expedient to authorise the payment of a Stamp Duty on any Copy of Memorandum of Enfranchisement, of the same amount as if it were a deed of conveyance, which may become payable under the provisions of any Act of the present Session for amending the Copyhold Acts.
    Resolution to be reported To-morrow.
    House adjourned at twenty-five minutes before One o'clock.