Commons Sitting of 25 July 1882

Preamble
The House met at Two of the clock.

MINUTES.
—SELECT COMMITTEE—Report—Ecclesiastical and Mortuary Fees [No. 309].
SUPPLY—considered in Committee —£2,300,000, FORCES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN (Vote of Credit)—R.P.
Resolutions [July 24] reported.)
WAYS AND MEANS—considered in Committee—INCOME TAX.
PRIVATE BILL (by Order) —Second Reading—Ionian Bank *.
PUBLIC BILLS—Ordered—First Reading—Artlzans' Dwellings * [255].
Second Reading— Government Annuities and Assurance [190].
Considered as amended—Third Reading— Labourers' Cottages and Allotments (Ireland) * [212], and passed.
Withdrawn—Imprisonment for Debt *[102]; Banking Laws (Scotland) * [71]; Patents for Inventions * [72]; Distress Amendment * [73].

ARMY RESERVE FORCE.

  MESSAGE FROM HER MAJESTY.
  Message from Her Majesty brought up, and read by Mr. Speaker (all the Members being uncovered), as follows:—
  VICTORIA R.,
  Army Reserve Force.
  The present state of Public Affairs in Egypt, and the necessity in connection therewith of taking steps for the restoration of order and tranquillity in that Country, and for the protection of the interests of the Empire, having constituted in the opinion of Her Majesty a case of great emergency within the meaning of the Acts of Parliament in that behalf, Her Majesty deems it proper to provide additional means for the Military Service; and therefore, in pursuance of these Acts, Her Majesty has thought it right to communicate to the House of Commons that Her Majesty is about to cause Her Reserve Force, or such part thereof as Her Majesty shall think necessary, to be forthwith called out for permanent service.
  V. R.
  Ordered, That Her Majesty's Most Gracious Message be taken into consideration To-morrow.—(Mr. Gladstone.)

QUESTIONS.

  EGYPT—ALLEGED FURTHER MASSACRES OF EUROPEANS.
  SIR E. ASSHETON CROSS: I wish to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether Her Majesty's Government have received any telegraphic information which would either confirm or, as I hope, qualify the statements as to massacres in the interior of Egypt which have appeared in the newspapers?
  SIR CHARLES W. DILKE: We have received no information since yesterday on the subject. Yesterday I stated that we had heard of massacres in the inte-

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  rior of Egypt; but we really did not know how much credit to attach to accounts of Native travellers who came down to Alexandria. I hesitated, therefore, to say anything on the subject, because frequently before statements have been made and repeated hero which afterwards have been proved to be inaccurate. I stated a few days ago that we had received information of two Englishmen having been murdered in the interior, and names were given; but one of these Englishmen is now stated not to have been murdered, but to have escaped.

  THE ROYAL IRISH CONSTABULARY—FALSE CHARGE OF ATTACK UPON SUB-CONSTABLE FINNEY.
  MR. O'KELLYasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether it is true that Sub-Constable Finney, stationed in the iron hut at Derreenavoggy, near Keadne, reported on the night of the 18th of April that he had been fired at by five men on the public road, and that he had returned the fire; whether it did not afterwards appear that this statement was unfounded, and that instead of being attacked, the sub-constable had waylaid and threatened to shoot five persons; whether on the night in question Sub-Constable Finney had not asked a man named Muldoon to take his (Finney's) revolver, and fire a shot at him; whether, subsequently, he did not stop two men, named Patrick Walsh and John Regan, and, without provocation, present his revolver and threaten to shoot them; whether Messrs. Muldoon, Walsh, and Regan, summoned Sub-Constable Finney before the Keadne Petty Sessions; and, whether, a few-days before the trial day, the Crown entered charges against Finney; whether it was suddenly discovered, on the day preceding the trial, that Finney was insane; and, why the opinion of the local dispensary doctor was not taken as to alleged insanity of Sub-Constable Finney?
  MR. TREVELYAN: I find that Sub-Constable Finney did make the statement attributed to him in the Question of the hon. Member, and that subsequent inquiry led to the impression that there was no foundation for his statement. The other facts also appear to be correctly stated in the Question; but
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  before the sub-constable's conduct could be inquired into it was found necessary to place him in an asylum as a dangerous lunatic. The question why the opinion of the local dispensary doctor was not taken on the case has been referred to the district for report.

  PROTECTION OF PERSON AND PROPERTY (IRELAND) ACT, 1881—MR. HENRY O'MAHONY.
  MR. BIGGARasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether it is the fact that Mr. Henry O'Mahony, who is confined in Kilmainham, was, on the 15th instant, offered his liberty on condition that he would proceed to America; whether an intimation was given him that the Alien Clause of the Prevention of Crime (Ireland) Act would be put in force against him in case of his refusal to quit the Country; whether Mr. O'Mahony has lived in Ireland during the last seven years; and, if so, whether the Government have the power to expel him; and, whether it is the intention of the Government to grant Mr. O'Mahony a hearing before the Privy Council, in order to give him an opportunity of defending himself against the charge on which he is detained in prison before taking further action?
  MR. TREVELYAN: It is the case that Mr. Henry O'Mahony was, on the 10th instant, offered his liberty on condition of his leaving the country and going to America. It was intimated to him, at the same time, that if he still refused to leave the country His Excellency might feel it his duty to take advice as to whether any action should be taken under the "alien" provisions of the Prevention of Crime Act. Mr. O'Mahony returned to Ireland from America in the beginning of 1881. It is not the intention of the Government to take any further stops in the matter at present.

  PROTECTION OF PERSON AND PROPERTY (IRELAND) ACT, 1881—MR. DENIS HEALY.
  MR. BIGGARasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether it is the fact that Mr. Denis Healy, of county Clare, who was arrested on a charge of murder on February 5th, and discharged as there was no evidence

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  against him, was re-arrested on the 25th February, under the Protection of Person and Property (Ireland) Act, for intimidation, and is still in Enniskillen Gaol; and, whether, as he has an aged father and a sister only to manage his farm, the Lord Lieutenant will reconsider his case?
  MR. TREVELYAN,in reply, said, that Mr. Denis Healy was released on the 21st instant.

  BRAZIL—PROVINCE OF MINAS GERAES —SLAVE-HOLDING BY BRITISH SUBJECTS.
  MR. M'COANasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, If his attention has been called to a Memorandum recently issued by the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, showing that some two hundred negroes are now held in slavery in Brazil by the St. John del Roy Mining Company, an English Company working under English Law, and the head office of which is in London; and, whether, if the facts be as stated by the Society, the directors of the Company in question being British subjects, are not liable to criminal prosecution under the Slave Trade Act of 1873?
  SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT,in reply, said, that in Questions of this kind a reasonable interval should be allowed in order that the facts might be learned. He would give an answer in a week or a fortnight.
  MR. O'KELLYasked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether his attention has been called to the following statement in the "Bio News" of June 24th:—
  "There are yet a large number of slaves in the province of Minas Geraes belonging to the extinct 'National Brazilian Land and Mining Association,' commonly known as the 'C'ocaes Company,' which are illegally held because the English law forbids slave-holding to British subjects. These slaves, however, are hired out, and their wages are regularly received and administered by the British Court of Chancery. It is altogether likely that a brief note to the British Government on this matter will secure the liberation of these unfortunate captives;"
  and, whether the Government will take such action as will put an end to the administration of funds derived from slave labour by the Court of Chancery, and secure the liberation of the slaves illegally held as property by British subjects?
  SIR CHARLES W. DILKE: I must refer the hon. Member to the reply recently given by the Attorney General on this subject. Her Majesty's Government have been informed that the St. John del Rey Company have granted freedom to their only remaining slaves. The question of the liability of British subjects in these matters comes within the province of the Treasury.
  MR. O'KELLYsaid, the hon. Baronet had not answered the last part of the Question.
  SIR CHARLES W. DILKE: I believe that is a matter which comes within the functions of the Treasury.

  PALACE OF WESTMINSTER—VENTILATION OF THIS HOUSE.
  MR. O'SHEAasked the First Commissioner of Works, Whether complaints have reached him of defective ventilation and noxious exhalations in and about the House; and, if so, whether he will have the nuisance abated?
  MR. SHAW LEFEVREread the following Report from Dr. Percy, who has charge of the ventilation of the House:—
  "During the 17 years I have had charge of the ventilation of the Houses of Parliament complaint has occasionally been made by Members of the House of Commons of unpleasant smells within the House, and in every case it has been found that they were caused by contamination of the air outside, and sometimes at a considerable distance from the House. As the House is supplied with air from the Common Court, the Star Court, and the River front, it is not possible to prevent such smells when the air is impregnated with odorous matter. A short time ago an unpleasant smell in the House was temporarily caused by an exceptionally high wind blowing down smoke into one of the Courts above mentioned from a smoke shaft. The smell of tarry matter, which has occasionally been perceived in the House, was caused by the wood pavement in the Star Court, which, in order to preserve the wood, has been set with asphalte. No sewer gas can by any possibility escape from the drains connected with the House, as the gas is effectually exhausted from that drain by a furnace at the bottom of the Clock Tower, and ascends to the top of the Tower, where it passes into the atmosphere."
  The Chairman of Committees (Mr. Lyon Playfair), who had had a long experience of late hours in the House, who was a scientific man, and who said he was peculiarly sensitive to smells, had given it as his opinion that, on the whole, the ventilation of the House during the last few months had been maintained exceptionally well.

ORDER OF THE DAY.

  SUPPLY.—COMMITTEE.
  Order for Committee read.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."—(Mr. Gladstone.)

  WAR IN EGYPT.—RESOLUTION.
  LORD ELCHOsaid, he had taken upon himself the duty, possibly very rash, of placing on the Notice Paper, no other Notice being there, the following Resolution:—
  "That this House, while ready to vote whatever Supplies may he necessary for the protection of the Khedive and the security of the Suez Canal, is not prepared, having regard to the position of England as a great Mussulman Power, to enter upon a War for the restoration of the authority of the Khedive in Egypt, unless in conjunction with the Forces of the Sultan."
  He had had no intention on the previous night of taking part in that debate. He had listened with rapt attention to the Prime Minister as he unfolded the policy of the Government; and it had only occurred to him that morning, in reflecting upon the extreme gravity of the situation, to make the Motion which he was about to make. He was aware of the responsibility incurred by any private Member who ventured in any way to obstruct, or to put himself in opposition to, the policy of Her Majesty's Government. In all great national crises true patriotism required that everybody should support the Government; and he had not the slightest desire, in the few words which he should feel it necessary to say in support of his Resolution, to cast back at the Government any of their previous sayings and acts when in Opposition. It would be easy to make some severe remarks in that way; but he did not think it would be patriotic or a course that ought to be indulged in. It was only because he was deeply impressed with the gravity of the situation that he ventured to put himself forward at all. The situation was, indeed, a grave one; first, with regard to our position in reference to Europe; and, secondly, our position in connection with the general question of Egypt itself. What had they hoard from the Prime Minister'? They had heard, what they knew well enough before, that his sole object had
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  been to bring about a Concert of Europe, and that, if possible, England should act conjointly in its effort to put a stop to the state of anarchy in Egypt; or that, if England should act alone, she should, at any rate, be acting as the mandatory of the other Powers. They had heard from the Prime Minister that not only had they failed to bring about the Concert of Europe, but that the mandate had not been given to England by Europe conjointly, although he said the Government was satisfied with having what they believed would be the "moral support" of Europe, and they had nothing more than that. Failing to obtain this concerted action, failing to obtain the mandate, and having only the "moral support" of Europe, the House felt justified in questioning the foreign policy of Her Majesty's Government. Then, had the Government been more successful with regard to France? Certainly not, so far as the internal affairs of Egypt were concerned; for although, to a certain extent, Franco had gone along with England in all these transactions, at last she had broken away altogether, and absolutely refused to send a single soldier to intervene for the restoration of order in the East. All Franco did was to put herself on an equality with—or, rather, on a superiority to— England in the matter of the protection of the Suez Canal. Thus the result of our European Concert appeared to be that the British cat should take the chestnuts out of the fire, the other Powers subsequently determining what ultimate arrangements should be come to. Whether this question was regarded from its present point of view, or with a consideration of possible complications in the future, the House should beware of taking any step in the dark. The Prime Minister had said that the object of the intervention was to save this country of Egypt from military anarchy and from military crime. Were they quite sure that the sympathies of Egyptians as a nation, as a people, and as a religion were not upon the side of Arabi and his Party rather than on the side of the Khedive, whatever he might represent? It was stated in the newspapers that Ragheb Pasha, the Prime Minister of the Khedive, was playing a double game; that he was devoted to Arabi and his Party, and that he had clandestinely issued a Proclamation stating

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  that England had, without the sanction or the knowledge of the Khedive, declared war against the Egyptian people. It was also stated that a Holy War had been proclaimed in every village and in every mosque in Egypt. This was a serious circumstance, especially when coupled with the information received to the effect that prayers were offered up for Arabi in the mosques of Calcutta, and that the Chief of the Mahomedan religion in Mecca had offered an asylum to Arabi if he should be obliged to quit Egypt. There was a prospect, therefore, of a war between the Crescent and the Cross. He quite admitted the obligation cast on the country for the protection of the Khedive and this security of the Suez Canal, and for these objects he was individually prepared to vote any amount of money and to send any number of men that might be required; but he believed that British responsibility ended there. But as regarded the restoration of order in Egypt and the rule of the Khedive, if the Sovereign of that country (the Sultan) did not think it necessary to do so, he could not see why England should go and do what he should properly do himself. If we had a Turkish force by our side, the Sultan being the legitimate Head of the Mahomedan religion, he should be prepared to go on, because the Sultan would then, as it were, be endorsing our action; but without that he was not prepared to enter into this war, and therefore he made this Motion. He fully felt the responsibility he incurred in doing so; but he was not prepared to undertake, either with a light heart or a grave heart, such a war as the country was now invited to enter upon.
  MR. SPEAKER: Does any hon. Member second the Motion?
  MR. JOSEPH COWENsaid, he desired to do so.
  Amendment proposed,
  To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "this House, while ready to vote whatever Supplies may be necessary for the protection of the Khedive and the security of the Suez Canal, is not prepared, having regard to the position of England as a great Mussulman Power, to enter upon a War for the restoration of the authority of the Khedive in Egypt, unless in conjunction with the Forces of the Sultan,"— (Lord Elcho,)
  —instead thereof.
  Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."
  MR. GLADSTONE: The proceeding taken by my noble Friend places the House in a peculiar position. The situation, as he says, is one of very great gravity; and, under these circumstances, he invites the House to bind our hands by a Motion of which even the terms are not before us. They are before us as moved; but they are not before us for the purpose of full comprehension and reflection.
  LORD ELCHO: I am quite ready to withdraw the Motion now, and bring it on at any time.
  MR. GLADSTONE: Well, with regard to that, I must leave it to the judgment of my noble Friend himself. I only point out the difficulty in which we are placed by the fact that such a proposal has been made. My difficulty in acceding to his courteous suggestion, that it should be brought on at another time, lies in this—that it would seem to imply on my part that I thought that at some other time it would be a proper subject for the House to entertain. Now, Sir, I wish to state briefly that I cannot conceive any early phase of this question in which it would be admissible for the House to entertain a proposal of that nature. The proposal is not to abstain from intervention in Egyptian matters. By no means. We are to undertake the defence of the Suez Canal—that is to say, we are to deal with what is symptomatic, while we leave the source and seat of the mischief untouched; that we are also to maintain the personal security of the Khedive, which abolishes all distinctions of principle in this matter, because that implies the carrying forward of warlike measures in Egypt, and leave behind nothing but the question of degree. Then, thirdly, we are to announce that we are ready to make war in Egypt, provided the Sultan, as the Sovereign of the country, will join us. Well, Sir, it would be most unwise, in my opinion, to make a declaration of that kind. Be it remembered that what we are now doing is, excepting as regards the City of Alexandria, making preparations for warlike measures, which it may, and probably will be, necessary to take. But it is impossible for anyone to say at the present moment

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  what may be the exact position we shall occupy before these warlike measures, which the Vote of Credit is to support, can become practical measures. But reference has been made to the Conference at Constantinople. It may yet result, for all that we know, in more substantive support than perhaps the noble Lord supposes. We are not entitled in any manner to say that the Sovereign of the country—namely, the Sultan, has refused to send his troops to Egypt. I shall be nearer the mark if I were to say that he has asserted, in principle, his readiness to send troops to Egypt. I am not in a position to say that no European Power, other than England, will take part in military measures in Egypt. We are in a condition to say that France will take part up to a certain point. Now, Sir, under those circumstances, I think my noble Friend will see that it is impossible that the House could discuss the question at large upon a proposal of this kind, which ties and shuts us up in the midst of a number of contingencies which may take shape in a short time, but which have not yet taken shape—a Motion which shuts us up to a certain limited proposition, having, as far as I can see, no clear basis of principle to dwell upon, and having no other practical effect than that of greatly hampering and narrowing our liberty of choice, and which will prejudice our means of action. Under these circumstances, I need not say that it is impossible for me to accede to the proposition. We had better be permitted, after negativing that Motion, to go into Committee of Supply.
  Question put, and agreed to.
  Main Question, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair," put, and agreed to.

SUPPLY—FORCES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN (VOTE OF CREDIT).
[FIRST NIGHT.]
SUPPLY—considered in Committee.
(In the Committee.)
Motion made, and Question proposed,
"That a sum, not exceeding £2,300,000, be granted to Her Majesty, beyond the ordinary Grants of Parliament, towards defraying the Expenses which may be incurred during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1883, in strengthening Her Majesty's Forces in the Mediterranean."—(Mr. Gladstone.)
COLONEL STANLEY: I do not often venture to place myself before the House, and I trust that on this occasion I shall be allowed to say a few words upon the question now under discussion. In the first place, I may say that I join with those who, both in this House and in "another place," deprecate opposition on the part of persons who are in the slightest degree responsible to the country for their position in this House to warlike measures which may be necessary for the Government to undertake; and I would rather propose, at the present time, to address myself to certain practical points. I think, therefore, I shall be excused if for a moment I turn aside, in order to make reference to one or two statements which the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister made last night, and which I do not think it possible for us altogether to pass by without remark. But though I join in deprecating opposition to the proposals of the Government as far as they have led to Executive measures, I hope that, taking into consideration the circumstances of the case, the time of the year, the difficulty, almost forced on us, of having at a short notice to wade through a vast mass of Papers of great importance recently presented to us, we may be allowed, at least, to reserve to ourselves a certain liberty of appreciation as to whether the previous conduct of the Government has been exactly such as we, on the other side, could have approved. Sir, the right hon. Gentleman last night pointed out the gravity of the present state of affairs. Now, the gravity of the present state of affairs is, I venture to say, at least equalled by the gravity of the statement of the right hon. Gentleman. What is the position at which we have arrived? The peace of the East, which it has been the object, not only of English, but of all European diplomacy, to preserve intact during a long series of years, has at last been disturbed. War has begun; the lives and the property of British subjects, and of other Europeans, have been sacrificed, and this is a position which we have to confront hardly with an ally, although we are told that we have an ally up to a certain point. I do not want to follow the right hon. Gentleman into the question as to whether the Government were committed to the existing state of affairs by

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the policy of their Predecessors. I think the Committee will understand the argument of the right hon. Gentleman to be that, by the establishment of the Control in Egypt, this country was necessarily committed to such interference in the ordinary affairs of that country as inevitably led to the results which have now come to pass. It is only right to point out, on the part of the late Government, that at least for four years after 1876 that policy of Control, according to the admission of the right hon. Gentleman himself, has greatly benefited Egypt, and her condition was yet such as neither to endanger the peace of that country nor the peace of Europe itself. Whether the Controllers at a later period acted politically, rather than with reference to their specific duty, is a question which, for my own part, I will pass by, and will leave it to be dealt with by others better qualified than myself to speak upon the subject. But this I would reiterate, without fear of contradiction—that up to the time the late Government left Office, there was nothing in the slightest degree approaching to the present position, and there was nothing to show that the system of Control would in any way have led to these results. I do not wish to enter more fully into that subject; but I would rather address myself to a question of practical utility. I would venture to ask the Committee, as regards the contention of the Government, to examine their preparations, and, as far as possible, to inquire to what point those preparations are directed. Now, Sir, with regard to the preparations of the Government, I do not think it right to enter into that system of cross-examination which has been for some time frequent in this House as to the particular object for which troops have been sent out, nor the objects with which they were placed there; but, after what was said last night, I should be neglecting my duty if I did not put one or two interrogatories to the Government. It has undoubtedly been difficult to obtain information; and there can be no doubt that, in some respects, information has been withheld. There was a statement which I confess, casually made as it was, filled me and some others with considerable alarm. I mean when the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War was asked for certain details of
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the Vote of Credit, and when he pointed out that the amount taken for the pay of the Forces was comparatively small. When the right hon. Gentleman was asked on what basis he had arrived at his calculation his answer was most unsatisfactory. We all know that a Vote of Credit is inevitably, from its very nature, obliged to be vague in its terms; but I have always understood that there is to be an approximation to the service demanded in the allotment of the Vote within the limits for which it is asked. Well, the Secretary of State for War was asked why he had taken a sum so low as £100,000—the Vote for Men— because it must be remembered he proposed to add 10,000 men to the Army; and naturally there are those who, placing these two separate figures together, have arrived at the conclusion, cither that the number of men was not such as Her Majesty's Government think they are required to take, or else that the time for which they are required must be extremely limited in its duration. In reply to these objections the right hon. Gentleman said that the calculations had been made on the basis of the employment of the Force for three months. Now, that seems to me, if I may venture to say so, a repetition of the course which was taken before the Crimean War; and there is another point which confirms my impression, in regard to which I may, perhaps, have to say a word presently in connection with the temporary appointment of the Staff. It seems to us that the Government have in their own minds estimated that this is an expedition that is merely to go out; that it would probably not be there more than a fortnight, or perhaps it might remain a month or two in the country, and, therefore, that a three months' Vote would be amply sufficient. But when warlike stores, provisions, forage, and so forth, are taken into account, the sum appears to us to be of such a nature that the amount of the Vote must almost have been already spent in the preparations of Her Majesty's Government, and hence we are driven to the conclusion that the Government must either have under-estimated the cost of the preparations, or this is not a Vote of Credit intended to meet the whole of the emergency, but simply to carry the Government on, and to last for a sufficient time until affairs de-

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velop themselves and a further appeal to Parliament can be made for an additional Vote. If this is to be the first of a series of Votes, if Parliament, on reassembling in the month of October, is to be again confronted with this, or even a larger Vote, then I can understand why Her Majesty's Government take this small Vote of Credit only. But we must bear in mind that the financial question is not the only question that has to be considered in this matter. There are other eyes upon the Government besides those of their own countrymen; and there are those who recollect that the Vote at the time of the Crimean War was only taken, in the first instance, for the despatch of troops to Malta and back again. [Mr. GLADSTONE: There was no such Vote.] I understand the correction of the right hon. Gentleman that no such Vote in point of form was taken; but it will be in the recollection of the Committee that it was argued that beyond preliminary preparations no actual necessity existed for taking a Vote. I am quite content to be in the recollection of the Committee in regard to the matter. I venture to say that those who are fully competent to judge, and who know our preparations, and know how far those preparations must necessitate cost, will probably have great doubts in their minds whether, after all, this Vote is more than a tentative Vote, meant to meet a temporary emergency. I am not for a moment desiring to impute to the Government that they are asking the country for one thing and meaning another all the time; but, on the contrary, I urge that if this country and the House mean to support the Government in Executive measures, then they should insist upon the preparations being declared. I will not comment on the nature or the constitution of the force that the Government intends to prepare; but perhaps I should be something more than human if I resisted the temptation to congratulate the Secretary of State for War on the fact that his persuasive art has enabled the Home Secretary to forego his frequently-expressed objections to the use of the Island of Cyprus. For my own part, I have never varied in the slightest degree my opinion as to the value of that Island, and I am glad to find that the Home Secretary is about to discover the difference between an armed place and
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a place d'armes. If he has not, I would leave the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War to enlighten him still further. I do not wish to use language which may seem to taunt the Government with having reconsidered their position. I would rather congratulate them on the patriotism which has led them to surrender their private opinions, and to prefer, at last, the doctrine of common sense to consistency. I trust it may now be shown that we were not so short-sighted, or so utterly blind, or so foolish as some right hon. Gentlemen tried to persuade themselves we were in 1878. I do not mean to say that these particular complications could then have been foreseen; but this is perfectly certain—that the possession of the Island of Cyprus was intended then, and I trust still will be intended, to safeguard our road to the East. Now, Sir, I come to perhaps the most serious question of all. What are we to understand is the object to which these military preparations are to be addressed? The right hon. Gentleman last night seemed to me to point out an exceedingly grave and difficult prospect for the Government, for the country, and even for Europe at large. What did the right hon. Gentleman say? He told us, I am bound to say, little enough. Perhaps that was natural, and I do not press for information if Her Majesty's Government think it is desirable to withhold it. He gave us very little information indeed as to the precise points at which the expedition was to be addressed, and the steps it may be necessary to take. I am not in the least degree quarrelling with the course the right hon. Gentleman has taken in the matter; but, unfortunately, the right hon. Gentleman used one sentence which the Committee could not have listened to without the greatest alarm. The right hon. Gentleman said—
"We do not feel able to be satisfied that we should have fully discharged our duty without endeavouring to bring to bear adequate means of converting the present interior state of Egypt from anarchy and conflict to a state of peace and order."
The right hon. Gentleman used other words which I cannot at this moment trace; but his meaning was that the interior anarchy was the disease itself, of which all the other matters were only the symptoms.
MR. GLADSTONE: What I said was, that the Suez Canal was only a symptom of the disease. The disease itself was to be found in the interior of Egypt.
COLONEL STANLEY: Quite so. The right hon. Gentleman does not dispute my point, that the interior anarchy was the cause both of the bombardment of Alexandria and the present preparations, if they be only intended for safeguarding the Canal. It is the interior anarchy which is the disease itself, and all other matters are only the symptoms. The right hon. Gentleman, as the Committee knows, has tried to grapple successfully with many great tasks; but I should think it is, perhaps, one of the largest and one of the widest assumptions ever made by any Minister that, as regards the internal anarchy of Egypt, the preparations made by the right hon. Gentleman and his Colleagues at the War Office, based only on three months' calculations, are sufficient to remove this internal anarchy. I am not an alarmist. I would not willingly use one word in this House which could be interpreted as one of alarm, or as more than the most necessary caution; but it does seem to me, and to others also, that it is an exceedingly serious state of affairs. I care not whether it be owing to the misrepresentations of Arabi, or to the preaching of religious fanaticism, or any other cause; but it appears to me that precisely as we move further on, the legitimate system of the country seems to increase its resistance against us. Now, as regards the physical difficulties which will have to be encountered, I do not suppose anyone in this House, certainly no one of culture, would admit that an English force could be baffled by them. But there is a more serious question of the highest importance behind. At what cost—not merely of money and men, both valuable enough in their places— but at what cost are these forces to be crushed? Are they to be crushed by that which even in its appearance is taking the form of a religious war? Are the Government careful that, while repressing disorder, while endeavouring to repress a state of anarchy, they are taking all possible steps in their power to show that this is not in the slightest degree a crusade, and to prove that England, as a great Mahomedan Power, recognizes the rights of a Mahomedan
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as fully as of a Christian subject, and she is careful to separate the forces of anarchy from those of religious zeal and fanaticism. [Mr. GLADSTONE: Hear, hear!] The right hon. Gentleman cheers that sentiment. It almost follows, then, that that consideration must have been present in the minds of Her Majesty's Government. But something more definite than the statement of the right hon. Gentleman last night is required. I trust it is not only on the assurance given by the right hon. Gentleman last night, but on the strength of something much stronger, that Turkey is to be told to regard the right hon. Gentleman as, after all, her best friend. Well, Sir, I said that the previous Government had not experienced, or, at any rate, had not found the same necessity, for a state of war as that to which it would appear the present Government have arrived; but it must be remembered that the Government of the year 1879, when there was a personal dislike entertained to the then Ruler of Egypt, and difficulties arose, confronted those difficulties, which involved nothing else than a change in the Rulership. But it must be borne in mind that the late Government were not insensible to the Suzerainty of the country; and it was not by their own unassisted efforts, nor by calling the other European Powers into Council, nor by ignoring the Sultan, that the deposition of Is mail Pasha was accomplished, and the appointment of his successor achieved. Though Turkey may have signified so far her assent, in a qualified form, to the right hon. Gentleman's proposals, it must be remembered that conflicting advice has been constantly given, and that at an early period the Sultan, when anxious to send troops to Egypt for the restoration of order, was told, according to one of the Papers presented to us, that Her Majesty's Government did not at all wish to commit themselves to the approval of such a precipitate step, and that the language of Lord Dufferin to that effect was fully approved by Her Majesty's Government at home. At another moment the Sultan was sounded as to his willingness to interfere. One can easily make an allowance for a Sovereign who, I may say— without any wish to offend—has not in the past had any great reason to reckon the right hon. Gentleman among his cordial friends. No doubt, he would

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look upon such advice with some amount of reasonable suspicion, and hence he would urge on the Government to do all in its power to prevent a Jehad, or a Holy War of any sort, by endeavouring to show that, holding apart from anything which, rightly or wrongly, could be taken for a Crusade, England would treat both Christians and Mahomedans with an equal justice. England, as a great Mahomedan as well as a Christian Power, would, no doubt, endeavour to separate the force of anarchy from the force which might be collected for the purpose of carrying out misplaced religious zeal. There are one or two points of detail which, as the Secretary of State for War is not present, may be postponed. They are minor matters, and other opportunities will arise for asking questions about them. I merely want to say one word in regard to a question which I know has vexed the minds of hon. and right hon. Gentlemen who have spoken to mo on the subject. It may seem to be a small point; but it is larger than its immediate dimensions seem to show. It is this—that on the appointment made to the chief command, than whom, I venture to say, no better person could have been selected than my friend Lieutenant General Sir Garnet Wolseley, the Government have left the Home appointments vacant, and have not taken steps, as far as I can learn, to fill up those appointments except by devolution upon others. That, above all things, has produced the impression that the whole character of the expedition is such as to indicate that it has only to go out to strike a blow and to return in time, perhaps, for the Autumn Session. I am quite aware that the German system, which we are so apt to quote, recognizes the same principle, to a certain extent, which the right hon. Gentleman has adopted. It recognizes that a permanently-appointed commander should go to the field, and that there should be others at home employed at the desk, but not in the field, That is precisely the case here, because the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War and the Commander-in-Chief, between them, as the two great officers, will have to divide between them the duties of the two great offices which are left unfilled. It is a small point, but it is one which is of importance, not only in regard to itself, but in regard to what
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appears to be the hand-to-mouth policy pursued in this matter. It all comes to the same thing. Are the Government at this moment fully conscious of the gravity of the task they have before them? It may be that what we heard last night was only a rhetorical phrase, that we should be content with restoring order in Alexandria, and that we did not intend in the slightest degree to meddle with the question of order or disorder in the interior of the country. We may find ourselves committed only to safeguarding the ruins of Alexandria, and assisting France in protecting the Suez Canal. I do not quarrel with that decision if it be the decision of the Government. They are the only persons who can know. It is no secret that all the negotiations which have been going on have not yet been presented to Parliament, and the Government are the only persons who can possibly tell us what is going on at this moment. But if the words of the Prime Minister are good for anything at all—and the words of the right hon. Gentleman, on so grave an occasion, cannot be passed by as if they had no special weight— then I venture to say that the preparations made by the Government are wholly inadequate to their task, and I hope before this debate is concluded we may have full explanations from Her Majesty's Ministers on that point. I ask the pardon of the Committee for having intervened on this question. It is a grave matter, not, of course, only in a military point of view, but grave, possibly, beyond all recognition in the consequences that may ensue. If the Government is determined to go straight forward with single-heartedness to preserve British interests, and to keep British interests well before them, while by no means oblivious to those of other Powers, then they would find this country united almost to a man behind them, and they would be able to go forward with a confidence and strength to which they scarcely themselves lay claim. But if, on the other hand, a sudden move forward is to be followed by a course of hesitancy; if, the moment they had taken a forward step, Her Majesty's Government were to look around them to see which of their Allies, if they had any, were prepared to follow them, then I venture to say that the country, as well as your political opponents, and Europe

1701
itself, would not be slow in perceiving your weakness and the gravity of the situation, and your difficulties would be, by your own hands, increased tenfold. For this reason, feeling strongly upon the matter, I have asked the Committee to listen to me for a few moments. I earnestly entreat the Government to bear in mind that this is a question on which not only the Committee, but the country, feels strongly. Those who read the papers cannot but see what a strong feeling of relief there is whenever the Government take decided action. If Her Majesty's Government will take strong and decided action, the whole country, whether friends or opponents of the Government, will be ready to sustain them. I only hope that the Government, in the steps they are about to take, have fully calculated the cost—I do not mean the material cost—but that they have fully looked in the face the objects to which they intend to address themselves, and that both their preparations and the objects they have in view will commend themselves to the universal approval and support of the country.
SIR WILFRID LAWSONsaid, he thought the right hon. and gallant Gentleman who had just sat down was a very great authority upon War Estimates, and he did not wonder that the right hon. and gallant Gentleman was rather afraid that the Government had asked for less money than would be required for the purposes they had in hand, because they would all remember that when right hon. Gentlemen opposite took in hand the invasion of Afghanistan, they told the House that about £3,000,000 was wanted for that purpose, and in the end, he believed, the expedition cost them nearly £20,000,000. He (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) was glad to have an opportunity of making a few remarks upon this Vote. He did not wish to appear there as member of what was called "the Peace-at-any-price Party." He did not know that there was any such Party in the country. They might just as well say that hon. Members who supported any particular war were "War-at-any-price people;" but they did not say anything of the kind. What they said was that there might be those who advocated certain wars because they were for the benefit of the country, and they added that they were opposed to certain wars which were pro-
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posed because they thought they were injurious to the country. If anybody could tell thorn that any particular war was right, and convinced their reason that such a war was right, then all of them would be quite willing to support such a war. There was a great deal of talk about British interests. He supposed they were all for British interests; but it had been said by one of our statesmen that, after all, the greatest British interest was peace. He and his Friends did not go upon abstract grounds; they took their stand upon the Blue Books and the evidence before them, and on that evidence they said they did not see any reason for what was now going on. That was the way in which the question of the Crimean War was argued, a quarter of a century ago, by Mr. Cobden and by the late Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (Mr. John Bright). They were called the "Peace-at-any-price men;" but if the Committee would look back to the speeches those Gentlemen then made, they would find that, over and over again, they denied that they opposed war on those grounds. On the contrary, they said they took their stand on the Blue Books, and because they knew from the evidence before them that the war going on was an unjust and an unrighteous war. He was glad that his right hon. Friend the late Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, who was not present in his place at that moment, had not abjured the principle which, with all his eloquence, he had advanced in those days, but had shown that he regarded the present war as an unjust and immoral war. It was necessary for them to look back in order to see how they had got into this trouble, and it seemed to him that it was necessary to go back for about 20 years. About 20 years ago Egypt began the very bad plan of borrowing money, and so proficient in the course of 20 years did the country become in the art of borrowing that it incurred a National Debt of £115,000,000. He thought a more rapid growth of National Debt was never known in any country. And now let them see what was the state of things in 1876, when Sir Stephen Cave went out to inquire into this Debt. What was it that Sir Stephen Cave said? He told the people of this county that for the present amount of indebtedness

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there was absolutely nothing to show but the Suez Canal, which had cost about £14,000,000 or £16,000,000 out of the whole sum. The rest had been absorbed in the payment of interest and in a Sinking Fund. About that time we lent officials to re-organize the financial administration of the country, but the re-organization did not seem to have been very beneficial to Egypt; because the next thing, as appeared from the Parliamentary Papers, was a Report from the Consul General, dated July 30th, 1877, that the Revenues of Egypt might be greatly increased, without imposing further sacrifices upon the already overtaxed Natives of the country, by putting an end to the abuse which existed, and compelling the Europeans to contribute fairly to the taxation of the country. Not only did they not contribute, but there was a great deal of smuggling carried on by Europeans in Egypt. The country was full of contraband goods, openly smuggled under the very eyes of the authorities. So much for the great benefits we had bestowed upon the country. In the year 1879 it was reported to our own officers that out of a Revenue of £9,600,000 £4,473,000 was taken by the bondholders, leaving, after payment of the interest on the Suez Canal and other matters, only £1,700,000 for the necessary expenses of the country. The Prime Minister spoke of the blessings of civilization to be brought to these people; but the fact was that the Egyptians under this grand Control paid ten times as much taxation as our Indian subjects did, and the Consul General, on the 12th of July, 1877, said—
"The money required was fully paid up yesterday; but I fear that those results may have been achieved at the expense of ruinous sacrifices of the peasantry by forced sales of growing crops and by collecting the taxes in advance. All this must be ruin in some shape or other for a country already crushed by taxation. Meanwhile, I fear the European Administration may be unconsciously sanctioning the utter ruin of the peasant creators of the wealth of the country, for which I hold that Europeans are incurring a serious responsibility."
In February, 1879, a Decree was promulgated by the Cabinet, headed by the European Ministers, whereby—
"Large numbers of fellahs hitherto exempt from enforced labour became liable to do work, but might purchase exemption by payment of a sum of money."
He thought all those things went to
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show that the people of Egypt had serious grounds of complaint against the way in which we controlled them. Now, he would quote another authority— namely, Gordon Pasha, who, in January, 1882, said—
"It is reiterated over and over again that Egypt is prosperous and contented. I do not think it is altered at all, except in improving its finances for the benefit of the bondholders. The prisons are as full of unfortunates as ever they were; the local tribunals are as corrupt."
Then, again, in April, 1879, our Consul General wrote of an interview between the Khedive and Cherif Pasha—
"The Khedive took me aside and spoke very seriously about the very great discontent which existed in the country, and the serious consequences which might be likely to ensue. Cherif Pasha, when appealed to, stated that there was no doubt whatever as to the evidence of great discontent among all classes of the population."
Those statements, he thought, were very important when they were told about the Control being so beneficial. Then, on the 7th of April, 1879, Cherif Pasha said—
"It would have been impossible for the Khedive to have put himself in opposition to the will of the nation, which had been so positively expressed. His Highness had, in fact, no choice but to follow the course of action he has adopted in order to allay the discontent, which would have led to disastrous consequences."
Then, to show how the Natives regarded our control, on April 12th, 1879, 150 Ulemas and Sheiks of villages subscribed an oath which closed by declaring—
"I rejoice at the Europeans having been dismissed from the Administration."
He next came to the great question of to-day. Arabi Pasha set himself against all this sort of thing, and raised up a party who followed him. Whether it was a large or a small party he would not say; but Arabi had raised up a certain party who were opposed to the Europeans, and he had the Notables with him. At all events, they looked upon his action with approval, and there was no doubt he had the Army with him. That was the head and front of his offending. Anybody who heard the Prime Minister last night would have noticed the great stress he laid on the fact of the Army being with Arabi Pasha. He (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) was not very fond of Armies, but they were not always wrong. At times they had been the friends of freedom, and he believed

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Arabi had the Army with him. Even if Arabi was wrong in having the Army with him, still it was admitted on all hands that there was a National Army. People were apt to say—"Oh! yes; there is a National Army, but Arabi is not the head of it."There must always be a scapegoat, and the proper thing was to run down Arabi, and make him out one of the greatest scoundrels that ever appeared. That was just like what occurred during the China War. The hon. Member for Longford (Mr. Justin M'Carthy), in his history, described how the Chinese Question arose, and showed that it was clearly proved that we were in the wrong, and how, on a division in this House, by a considerable majority, Lord Palmerston was turned out. Lord Palmerston issued a Manifesto to the country, and the country, being ignorant of the facts and arguments produced in the House, said the British flag had been insulted. That was a capital election cry, and so it was a capital tiling now to run down Arabi Pasha and make him out a villain. Whether he was or was not a villain, he had the Army with him, and what were we fighting for? The Prime Minister, a fortnight ago, said we were not at war, and he (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) now did not know if there had been any declaration of war; but he understood we were at war in order to restore the status quo ante. The status quo ante was the grinding down of the people of Egypt to obtain money for the bondholders of this country—nothing more nor less than an effort to pay the interest on the bondholders' money. The status quo ante was a control over the finances of the country, which he maintained belonged to the people themselves; and for the Liberals, of all people, to engage in war to prevent people managing their own affairs was simply disgusting. What spirit, he wondered, would submit to such a proceeding. Could we be surprised at the Egyptians rising against us, and the National feeling being excited against us? What did Lord Granville say about setting up one Government against another? In a despatch, dated the 21st of November, 1881, he said—
"It cannot be too clearly understood that England desires no partizan Ministry in Egypt. In the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, a partizan Government founded on the support of a Foreign Power, or upon the personal influence
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of a Foreign Diplomatic Agent, is neither calculated to be of service to the country which it administers, nor of that in whose interest it is supposed to be maintained. It can only tend to alienate the population from their true allegiance to their Sovereign, and to give rise to counter intrigues which are detrimental to the influence of the State."
He did not think that there was ever a more conclusive sentence written than that, and he was astonished that the Government should now be sending troops to keep up a partizan Ministry. Now, he would assume that all these representations about oppression of the people were false. He would assume that the Government and their Controller were Heaven-born Administrators, and could govern the people of Egypt better than anybody else. Still, that would not justify their action. There was such a thing as independence, and liberty, and patriotism. He remembered when the Boers revolted against a power we sought to impose on them, the Government wrote beautiful despatches as to giving them good government, and in one of those despatches it was said—
"No doubt these are priceless privileges, but they are not liberty."
It was liberty the Egyptian people wanted; they believed it was better to manage their own affairs ill than to have foreigners managing them well. That was what was generally called patriotism, and he could not understand why it was not to be regarded as a virtue in the case of these poor Egyptians. We had now begun to promote what we called law and order in Egypt, and how had we begun it? By a bombardment which the Prime Minister described as the application of moral law. He did not think that was a good description of it; he should much rather have called it what the Prime Minister called lawless military violence in Egypt. The Prime Minister said the bombardment was an act of self-defence. What business had we there? Could anybody prove what right we had to send our Fleet into Egyptian waters to overawe the people and setup one party against another? Until that was proved he could see no force in the argument of self-defence. He would allude to one thing which took place in the debate, because the Prime Minister would remember that after he had said it was an act of self-defence, he said—

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"I have, however, given a justification of the act (self-defence); hut there is an important consequence…Does my hon. Friend hear in mind the massacre which occurred in Alexandria a few weeks ago? Does he hear in mind that that massacre remains, down to the present moment, wholly unexamined and unavenged? Does he estimate the effect which a massacre of that kind—unavenged and unexamined—subjected to a pretended examination only, which was a mockery and a delusion and a snare— would have had upon the security, not only of all Englishmen and all British subjects, hut of all European people throughout the whole East?"
Why did be quote that? Because the other day (July 11th, 1882), before the Prime Minister made that remark, Lord Granville wrote to Lord Dufferin as to the Alexandria riots—
"Her Majesty's Government have abstained for the present from making any formal demands; but they have announced their intention to demand full reparation and satisfaction for the outrages committed on the Queen's officers, and upon British subjects."
As far as he could see, about 10 men supported the Ministry in their conduct, and their argument seemed to be that the Tories had begun this matter, and they must go on with it. He always thought that the present Government had been put into power to alter the Tory policy, and now the argument was that they must go on in the same way as the Tories began. But there was a noble instance of the Government taking a very different tone. He alluded to Afghanistan. In that case the Government found a complication of evils; but instead of going on and making things worse they withdrew from Afghanistan, and this House and the country supported them. He remembered that when a deputation of gentlemen went to the noble Lord the Secretary of State for India and told him a great deal about the policy of cowardice, and so forth, and of leaving Candahar, he asked them what right we had to be there? Many a good speech had the noble Lord made, but he never made a better speech than that. What right had we in Afghanistan; what right, human or Divine, had we to take the management of affairs in a country that did not want us? Then there was the case of the Transvaal. The Ministry, under the guidance of the Prime Minister, took the noble and honourable course of admitting that they were wrong, and withdrew from the evil policy. He could not see why a prin-
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ciple that applied to Afghanistan should not apply to Egypt. But now what were the Government doing? They were raising up a tremendous conflagration all over the Eastern world. In the newspapers of to-day he saw how from all parts of Egypt people were flocking to Arabi's camp, and there was to be a great religious war. Even now we might withdraw from the evil course we were entering upon. There was no such cowardice as being afraid to say we were wrong. If we were wrong, let us admit it, and leave the Egyptian people to manage their own affairs. That would be a nobler and a braver act than the battering down of forts with our guns. There was, however, another argument that was very much used by hon. Members. They said they must trust the Government because it was such an excellent Government. He would not say anything against the Government; but many of the greatest crimes in history had been committed by the best men. A curious view was taken in the country of the Government. He would read a short account of what took place at a General Committee of the Birmingham Liberal Association, presided over by Mr. G. Dixon. On the motion of Mr. Kendrick, seconded by Mr. Holliday, the following resolutions were unanimously adopted:—
"That this meeting regrets the National loss occasioned by the retirement of Mr. Bright from the Cabinet; hut, knowing that his resignation has been caused by the same conscientious devotion to the cause of peace which has marked the whole or his career, assures him of the unabated confidence and affection of the constituency which he has served so long and so faithfully."
On the motion of Mr. E. W. Dale, another resolution was passed expressing—
"Deep sympathy with Her Majesty's Government in the difficulties and complications, which are largely the result of the engagements entered into by their Predecessors in Office;"
and declaring that the meeting—
"Entirely approved of the earnest efforts of the Government to secure a solution of the questions by means of the European Concert, and had the strongest confidence in its determination to protect the interests of England, while at the same time pursuing a policy directed to secure the peace of Europe, and the permanent welfare and self-government of Egypt."
That was one of the most delightful resolutions he ever heard. It reminded

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him of a good book he once read, called Making the Best of Both Worlds. It was holding with the non - interventionists and hunting with the "Jingoes;" shouting peace with the Ex-Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, and glory and gunpowder with the President of the Board of Trade. Although he would not say a word against the Government, yet in what they were doing they were exactly following in the footsteps of the Government they turned out, only, perhaps, in a worse way, because the late Govern-anent never bombarded a town as this Government had done. He was told that was taking a dangerous line—a very dangerous line. Well, he would read the following letter written on July 17, 1882, by a Liberal Member— who was a very excellent fellow, one of the best fellows in the world: —
"No man is loss aggressive than I am—no man more of a non-interventionist in the Egyptian policy. I have given my warm support to the Government. I have from the first said to my friends that the defence of our fellow - subjects in Egypt, their wives and children and property, was an act of painful necessity. I deeply deplore Mr. Bright's resignation; but I honour his motives, and warmly respect his most earnest wish to avoid blood-shedding. Even if our Government have made a mistake—and I, for one, think they have not—I am not going to withdraw my humble confidence from the best Government this country has seen. I have worked too hard to make, in my humble way, such a Government possible, that I am not going to bring back into power the Salisburys, the Lowthers, and such like."
That letter was a type and illustration of the feeling of the country at the present moment. The country did think sometimes, and when it did it was horrified at what was going on; but it said if it voted against the present Ministry back would come "the Salisburys and Lowthers"—and that was the real safeguard of the Liberal Administration. No doubt; but what was his answer to that? If these crimes against humanity were to be committed; if this unjust policy, this dangerous policy, was to be pursued, he would ten times rather it was carried out by his political opponents than by his political friends. Let those who had always avowed this policy have credit for it, but do not let the Liberal Party be disgraced by such a course. He had such an opinion of the Government that he hoped they would yet consider their
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action and look into this matter. It would be a very sad incident in the noble career of the Prime Minister if he now consented to carry out the policy of carrying fire and sword into Egypt for the sake of usurers who had lent money to that country. That was the real reason of the war. People might say it was not, but they could not bring evidence against that view. The evidence of the Blue Books said it was so. He knew the Prime Minister could carry out that policy; he justly had great influence, and would be supported; and it might be his desire to prove himself as great a Minister of War as he had been a Minister of Peace. He would have no insuperable difficulty, for we had plenty of troops; and he had a majority in the House which, no doubt, would support him, and in any case he was assured of the support of the right hon. Gentleman opposite. The Press was with him, and would shriek with exultation at every case of butchery; but he would say to the right hon. Gentleman that the end was not yet—
"There's a still small voice that speaks within Above earth's clamour and glory's din."
That small voice would speak both to the Government and to the nation upon undertaking so unwise, so impolitic, so ignoble, and unjust a policy as that which the Prime Minister had brought forward.
SIR CHARLES W. DILKE: My hon. and generally facetious Friend the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson)—if I may so call him—in the remarks which he has just addressed to the Committee, made use of some expressions which I cannot but deeply regret and deplore. He hopes the Government "will at last look into this matter," and he speaks as though the matter were not one which had been occupying the most anxious and most painful attention and the undivided energies of the whole Government for a considerable period. I can assure my hon. Friend that the responsibility of the Government, weighty as it must be in such times as these in which we live, has been considerably increased by the present complication, to which no Member of the Government concerned could refrain from giving his utmost care. My hon. Friend said, towards the end of his speech, that the effect of the present policy was "to carry

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fire and sword into the country of Egypt for the sake of usurers. "Those are terrible words, and I cannot but think that my hon. Friend, in using them, meets with the sympathy of but a very small portion indeed of the Members of this House. I do not doubt that my hon. Friend is persuaded in his own mind that although he has, as he must know himself, the sympathy of but a few Members of this House in the use of those words, he has the confidence outside this House of larger numbers. But I, on the other hand, however, cannot but persuade myself that there must be in this country a very general belief that not only the present Government, but that any Government of this country, would by far rather abandon the position which they hold and retire into private life, than for one moment be parties to a war of the kind which the hon. Baronet describes. Before I come to the remainder of my hon. Friend's remarks I should like to make some allusion to the very careful and measured and well-reasoned speech of the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for North Lancashire (Colonel Stanley). In that speech, and towards its close, the right hon. and gallant Gentleman told the Committee that he was alarmed at the news that the Government were making preparations to cope with general anarchy in Egypt. It is the opinion of Her Majesty's Advisers that the present anarchy in Egypt is caused by the pressure of military tyranny, and is not what may be called national anarchy, and that there is good reason to believe that calm in Egypt would follow the liberation of the country from military tyranny. Egypt is an easily governed country, and we are confirmed in that belief, a belief which is founded upon history, by the fact that the body of Notables is as fairly representative of the general feeling of the country as any body that is likely to be got together in a Mahomedan country could well be, and has shown itself to be composed of reasonable men. The right hon. and gallant Gentleman also asked whether we were quite sure that we were not entering upon a religious war. I can assure the right hon. and gallant Gentleman and the House that the Government are fully persuaded that the Khedive, at the present time, has the support of the most reasonable and sensible part of the Mahomedan popula-
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tion, and of the majority of the leading Mahomedan authorities whose names have been known in the past. The right hon. and gallant Gentleman made a most valuable suggestion, and one which I think ought to be well weighed by all who are concerned in this matter upon the spot—and that is, that the most careful means should be taken to inform those who guide Mahomedan opinion that we are not engaging in any general attack upon Mahomedans, that we have no quarrel with the Mahomedan world, which is represented by so enormous a population in Her Majesty's Dominions. My hon. Friend the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) asked whether we were going to manage the affairs of a country which does not want us? He said that we ought to leave the Egyptian people to manage their own affairs. I think I could not better conclude the remarks I have made in answer to the speech of the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for North Lancashire, than by assuring both sides of the House that it is the desire of Her Majesty's Government, after relieving Egypt from military tyranny, to leave the people to manage their own affairs. The right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for North Lancashire dealt also with the military side of the case, and that, of course, is a matter upon which I am not competent to speak; but, so far as it touches the political aspect of the question, I may make one reference to his remarks on the point. He said it would be a great mistake for us to suppose that a three months' Vote would be sufficient, and he feared repeated applications of this sort would have to be made to the House. But what the Committee have to consider is whether we should be justified in taking more or less than that for which we ask at this time. We have to deal with facts as they are before us, and we have reason to suppose that a three months' Vote is a sufficient Vote for the necessities of the case as they appear to us at the present moment, and nothing more than that can be asked of any Administration. We should be culpable if we were to ask for a three months' Vote, having distinctly in view the probability of further operations being required; but it is the opinion of the highest military authorities that a three months' Vote is sufficient to deal with the case as it stands. An hon. Member

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said that we were going into Egypt alone, and the Leader of the Opposition used the same phrase last night. "You are about to go alone," said the right hon. Gentleman. Now, it is not yet certain that we shall go into Egypt alone; and although I can say no more upon the subject, it must be remembered that this is one which cannot be regarded as concluded. Her Majesty's Government were bound to submit a Vote of Credit to the House as soon as they saw the absolute necessity for such expenditure, whether they went to Egypt alone or not. The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition yesterday, after making use of that phrase, spoke of the attitude of the other Powers towards our action in Egyptian affairs; and he asked what evidence we could give of the moral support of the other Powers which had been named by the Prime Minister? The right hon. Gentleman asked that question in such a way as to seem to imply some doubt on the point. I can only assure the right hon. Gentleman that words which have been used by the Secretary of State (Lord Granville) have been used by him after carefully weighing the words, and having the fullest grounds for his statement. The words used by the Secretary of State on this subject were these—
"We have the good-will, the good wishes, and, I may almost add, the moral support of the other Powers;"
and the phrase "moral support" was a phrase which had been used to him on behalf of a great Power. The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition asked, immediately after that portion of his speech, whether, in going on with this war, with the doubtful support, as he thought, of the other Powers, we were not endangering the European Concert? We should have been in a very different position at the present time—in an adverse sense—from that which we now occupy, had we not consulted the European Concert on this subject. We are in a very different position, even should we be obliged to act alone —we are in a very different position, and in a far more favourable position, than we should have been had we not consulted the other Powers, had we not exhausted every other means of action, and so proceeded, as we are justified in assuming, with the moral support of Europe.
1714
The right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for North Lancashire (Colonel Stanley) repeated an argument which was used yesterday by the Leader of the Opposition, an argument in answer to the Prime Minister's remarks in his speech of yesterday with regard to the Anglo-French Control. My hon. Friend the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) followed the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for North Lancashire to-day, and on this point read some resolutions which have been passed at Birmingham, laying particular stress upon the passage—"Difficulties which are largely the result of engagements entered into by their Predecessors." The contention of the Leader of the Opposition yesterday was that the intervention of the late Government in Egypt had been only financial and not political. I shall have to tax the patience of the Committee for a few minutes while I go step by step through the action of the late Government in the establishment of the Control. The Control was first established by what was known as the Goschen-Joubert Decree. I am glad I speak in the hearing of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen), who will correct me if I am wrong. There were originally to be two Controllers, one for receipts, the other for accounts and public debts. The Controller General of Accounts was, as his title implied, to supervise, check, and audit the accounts and payments of the Treasury; but the duty of the Controller General of Receipts was to watch over the receipt of all kinds of State Revenue in Egypt. His was the more important post, and I think it was the intention of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon at the time that the one post should be more important than the other. The yearly Budget was to be prepared in consultation with the Controllers, and they, in concert with the Minister of Finance, were to watch over the due execution of its provisions. In the first instance they had only a consulting voice. Of the two Controllers, one was an Englishman and the other a Frenchman. Mr. Romaine, the English Controller, was appointed by the Khedive. The French Controller General was designated by his own Government. There was this difference in the functions of the two Controllers, that the functions of the English Controller were much more considerable than those of his

1715
colleague. As I have said, the English Controller was appointed by the Khedive, and the French Controller, with less important functions, was designated by the Government of France. In 1879, a very considerable change took place, be-cause while Lord Derby had always refused to appoint a Controller, in 1879, Her Majesty's then Government themselves nominated a Controller General, and Mr. Baring was appointed Controller General of Receipts and Expenditure under the Decree of 1876—that is to say, that the Control remained what it had been hitherto; but the English Controller was appointed by Her Majesty's then Government for the first time. The English Controller still continued to have the superior functions of the two. The Decree of November, 1879, was the one to which the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition has alluded, and that was the result of an understanding between England and France, under which the functions of the Controllers were materially modified. The distinction between the two Controllers was then abrogated, and the Controllers became equal, the English Controller losing the superiority of functions. The two Controllers then divided between themselves the Public Services over which they exercised supervision; they received in financial matters the widest power of investigation over all branches of the Public Service. Ministers and public officials were to give them all information or documents that they, or their Agents, might require; they had rank and a seat in the Council of Ministers, and took part in the deliberations of the Council; they were not to be dismissed without the consent of their Governments; they appointed and dismissed the officers of their own Departments. The Decree of 1879 displaced the Decree of 1876; and our contention, which, in my mind, is absolutely justified by the facts, is, that the difference between the two systems of Control is that the Control of 1876 had a merely administrative character, and that the Control of 1879 brought the Controller General in relation with all the political Departments of State. The hon. Member for Carlisle spoke of the Control in another portion of his speech. He described the terrible financial situation of Egypt in 1876 and in 1877, and he led the House to suppose that that terrible financial situation
1716
existed immediately before the military outbreak. It is our belief, confirmed, I think, by the whole of the Papers before the House, that this situation had been changed; that that terrible situation had been changed as though by the wave of an enchanter's wand, and all the evil side of it had disappeared, or was disappearing fast, at the time when military violence first appeared. My hon. Friend said the exactions on the people had been made more stringent in 1879. That is simply not the case. He also stated that under the English and French Ministers those who followed the first institution of the Control, and who went before the Control in its later form, a very large number of Natives were made liable to forced labour. The Report to the Government on that subject at the time was that the Decree did not in the least extend the institution of forced labour, but was for the purpose of checking the abuses which had crept into the system. We believe the documents prove to the House that one of the effects of the Control has been to enormously limit, and will be to extinguish forced labour. If I may resume what I have said on the subject of the Control, it is the contention of the Government that the Control, instead of being financial under the late Government, became political. It gradually became political in the highest degree, and it is impossible to leave out of the consideration of this subject the fact that the late Government were the most active parties in the deposition of the late Khedive, and that by interfering, through the Porte it is true, but still interfering themselves to change the occupant of the Throne of Egypt, they did most absolutely and distinctly interfere in the external and political affairs of Egypt. The then English Government were looked upon as being the active parties in those transactions, for they were the persons applied to by other Powers to obtain a share in the Control. Italy, Austria, and Germany applied in 1879 to obtain a share in the Control. It seems to me that the interference by England and France under the late Government in 1879 in the affairs of Egypt was complete. In a speech which I made to my constituents at the time, I said that they had virtually taken the Government of Egypt into their own hands. But whatever might have been the political danger of the Control, it brought about

1717
an enormous improvement in the material development of Egypt; it brought about the abolition of vexatious taxation, the establishment of a just basis for the land tax, and an extraordinary increase of material prosperity.
We have now to look to what was the situation when Her Majesty's present Advisors first had to deal with the affairs of Egypt. In 1881 they pointed out that the policy of the Government towards Egypt had no other aim than the prosperity of the country, and the full enjoyment of that liberty which it had obtained under successive Firmans of the Sultan. The hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle quoted from a despatch words in which Lord Granville stated that it could not be too well understood that England desired no partizan Ministry in Egypt. Those are the opinions of Her Majesty's Government now. I wish to make that statement in the clearest terms. The hon. Baronet has asked whether we are sending troops-to Egypt—in fact, he has asserted that we are doing it to support a partizan Ministry. We are doing nothing of the kind. So completely is the reverse of that statement true, that we have actually recognized within the last few days the Ministry in which Arabi Pasha was formerly the Minister of War, they having recommended the Khedive to issue a Proclamation by which Arabi Pasha is declared a rebel. We are now in actual relation with that Ministry, which certainly cannot be called a partizan Ministry of our creation. Having made that statement with regard to the position of things in the year 1881, I may point out that the Government have repeatedly within the last few days, and in a despatch dated the 11th of July—laid before Parliament on Saturday last—repeated the very arguments in almost the very words which were used in our former despatches on this subject. There has been no change of policy on the part of the Government on that point. In 1881 there arose a considerable ferment or political movement in Egypt. The movement was political at first, but afterwards became connected with, and damaged by, its connection with a movement which was purely military. Her Majesty's Government had no objection whatever to the birth and growth of the National movement until it became military. On the contrary, we distinctly, on several
1718
occasions, expressed our preference for such a state of things in Egypt. We believe that this country had not only nothing to fear, but all to gain from such a movement. We believe that it is better for the interests of this country, as well as for the interests of Egypt, that Egypt should be governed by liberal institutions rather than by a despotic rule. The growth of free institutions in Egypt has a tendency to prevent a future return of arbitrary rule, and it is for the interests of this country that Egypt should not at any time be ruled by a purely despotic Ruler. When we have despotic rule in a country in which we have an enormous stake, we are placed at the mercy of a single man, who may be our friend, but who may be our enemy. We believe that this country would gain by the introduction into Egypt of something like Representative Institutions, which form a guarantee against anarchy on the one hand, and against a return to arbitrary rule on the other. In January of the present year, Her Majesty's Government repeated their declaration as regards the past; but this military ferment in Egypt, of which I speak, having considerably grown, we then stated that it was impossible for the Government to be indifferent to events which might plunge Egypt into anarchy, and destroy the results of the efforts made to improve the condition of that country. The power of the Military Party considerably and rapidly increased, and it then became the opinion of Her Majesty's Government that it was possible that force would have to be used to suppress the Military Party, and relieve Egypt from its tyranny, and Her Majesty's Government then expressed that opinion to the other Powders that if recourse to force was necessary to avoid anarchy in Egypt, the safest force to employ would be a Turkish Force, subject to proper conditions, as to the length of time it should be employed, and the like. When, a little later, the French Government came round to this view, which at first they had opposed, the French Government proposed to send an Anglo-French Squadron to Alexandria. The English Government expressed a wish that all the Powers should be invited to have their flags represented there, and that fact alone showed that we tried to secure the concert of the Powers. The Government have, as I have just said, over and over again an-

1719
nounced, and they Lave received the support of the whole of the European Powers in announcing, that it is impossible to tolerate the continuance of anarchy in Egypt. The dominance of a purely military faction at Cairo must place our communications with India and the East in permanent jeopardy— that is, we cannot permanently, although we might temporarily, protect the Suez Canal by a force employed on the Suez Canal alone. With regard to the suggestion which has been made that it might have been possible to patch up a peace with the Military Party in Egypt, I must state that, as regards the leader of that party—Arabi Pasha—even the hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle did not attempt to defend him. There is no doubt, I fear, that that leader was guilty of complicity in the preparations for the attack on the Europeans in Alexandria on the 11th of June. The hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle thinks it doubtful whether Arabi Pasha had the people of Egypt with him. The hon. Baronet says it is certain he has the Army with him, and tells us that armies are often the friends of freedom. [Sir WILFRID LAWSON: I said sometimes.] I took the words down, but I accept my hon. Friend's correction, and will give him the benefit of the doubt. My hon. Friend said, therefore, that armies sometimes are the friends of freedom. That is a curious sentiment for my hon. Friend, who does not much like armies, to express. I will not discuss the matter as one of history, or go through all the instances in which armies have proved themselves either the friends or the enemies of freedom. I will, however, say that this particular Army is not a friend of freedom. It is, undoubtedly, the fact that the Egyptian Army during its reign, this military tyranny which it has established in Egypt, has been steadily opposed by those representatives of Egyptian national sentiment, whose opinion my hon. Friend very properly desires we should conciliate.
I have spoken of the position of the Suez Canal, and of the bearing upon it of the Military Government in Cairo, as one reason which leads us to turn our attention to the form of government existing in Cairo, and to object to military tyranny there. Our position seems to arise from necessity, from Treaty right, and from duty—from necessity,
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because Egypt forms our highway to India and to the East generally; from Treaty-right, because under the Treaty of 1840 for the pacification of the Levant, and the subsequent Firmans and Treaties, we have peculiar rights with regard to Egypt, rights which have always been respected by the Powers; from duty, because it is incumbent upon us to see that the influence in Egypt which our necessities and Treaties give us is used for the benefit of the Egyptian people, and that the reforms introduced for the benefit of the oppressed population are not overturned, and the old state of corruption revived. As regards the Suez Canal, England has a double interest; it has a predominant commercial interest, because 82 per cent of the trade passing through the Canal is British trade, and it has a predominant political interest caused by the fact that the Canal is the principal highway to India, Ceylon, the Straits, and British Burmah, where 250,000,000 people live under our rule; and also to China, where we have vast interests and 84 per cent of the external trade of that still more enormous Empire. It is also one of the roads to our Colonial Empire in Australia and New Zealand. The hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle, in a speech which he made outside the walls of this House, attacked mo personally for "having asked the working men of England to abandon their principles for the sake of a little better trade." It was in this House that I made the speech to which the hon. Baronet alludes, and I never put forward trade as a ground for intervention; but, having been told publicly that the working men of England were indifferent to the position of their fellow-countrymen in the East, I said I could not desire to see British trade driven away from all parts of the world; and, speaking as the Under Secretary of State, superintending the Commercial Department of the Foreign Office, and speaking as a man whose duty it was to know more than most people about the ramifications of British external trade, I went on to speak of the importance which I must attach in that respect to our position in Egypt. It has been pointed out by one of the Members for Manchester (Mr. Slagg), in a letter which he has written to the newspapers, that the English have not forced themselves upon Egypt; that they have not forced them-

1721
solves or their trade upon Egypt, as might be said in the case of China and Japan. The influx of foreigners was fostered by the Egyptian Government, and the result of English immigration to Egypt, and the introduction of English capital into Egypt, has been an enormous advance in the wealth and civilization of the Egyptian people. It is not of material prosperity alone that I speak, though that has enormously increased. Egypt sells us of cotton alone to the value of £6,000,000 every year. Very little of that cotton was grown a few years ago, and all that may be said to be a pure increase in the wealth of Egypt. Intervention, however, is not to be defended '"on trade grounds, but on the grounds of necessity, Treaty right, and duty, which I put forward just now. We have not taken any isolated step in the direction of intervention in Egypt up to the present time. We have acted steadily with the other European Powers; but, if we should be forced to go forward alone, we shall not do so until we have exhausted every means of inducing other Powers to accompany us. From the point of view of necessity, besides our interest in the Canal, it is impossible to permanently acquiesce in any arrangement in Egypt, especially after the massacre at Alexandria on the 11th of June, which would destroy, not only the influence and credit of this country, but of all Europe in the East. Every English Minister must, of course, maintain that England is bound to guard her connection with India from interruption; but it is our desire to be most careful in the steps we take to avoid crushing anything like Egyptian national feeling in favour of Egyptian nationality. There is, undoubtedly, in Egypt a natural desire to see as many Egyptians as possible holding office, and there is a certain amount of real national feeling. That sentiment we might and should conciliate. To suppose, as my hon. Friend (Sir Wilfrid Lawson), in a speech he delivered ten days ago, seemed to suppose, that Arabi Pasha is the Representative of that national feeling, is a very different thing. Arabi Pasha, over and over again, has been repudiated by the authorized exponents of Egyptian national feeling. On the 20th of May, for instance, the Chamber of Notables expressly refused, at the peril of their lives, to support a declaration of confidence in the military leader. The so-
1722
called Ultimatum of the English and French Agents, which very much exercised the mind of the hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle at the time, was, as is stated on the face of it, drawn up by Sultan Pasha himself, the President of the Chamber of Notables, and it will be remembered that the document insisted upon the withdrawal from Egypt of Arabi Pasha. Arabi Pasha appears to be the ordinary military adventurer of the East, supported not by a nation, but by an army, and an army which he has to bribe by unjustifiable promotion and increased pay, an army whose actions compromise both the liberty and the welfare of the Egyptian people. On the other hand, the Notables have displayed both patriotism and independence, and it is one of our objects to liberate those Notables from military tyranny. Those Notables, I believe, are by so large a majority on the side of the Khedive against Arabi, that the numbers in their Body are represented by the figures of 65 to 9; the determination which they took to oppose Arabi, by all the means in their power, was a determination in which only 9 out of 74 Members refused to concur. We do not wish to impose on Egypt institutions of our own choice; but, as my hon. Friend suggests, rather to leave the choice of Egypt free. We believe that this military pronunciamen to has not the support of the agricultural population, which forms the mass of the Egyptian people; and it is our desire that not only should existing institutions in Egypt be respected, but that no obstacles should be placed by us in the way of a prudent development of those institutions. Guarantees ought, of course, to exist for the security of Europeans living in Egypt, and for the due observance of international engagements; but we do not desire to interfere beyond the strict necessities of the case in the internal administration of the country, or to prevent the government of Egypt by Egyptians. The awakening of national life in Egypt last winter was met with sympathy on the part of this country, and it is the honourable duty of this country to be true to the principles of free institutions which are our glory. It is a very different thing to sympathize with the desperate adventurer who, during his possession of power, used that power to promote officers in ridiculously undue proportion; to enormously raise their pay at the expense of

1723
their fellow-countrymen; to allow of the robbery of the public purse by his personal military supporters, and to arbitrarily imprison, exile, or degrade all those who showed the slightest independence of character. Was it possible for Europe to look on quietly while Arabi should depose and assassinate the Khedive, and set up a despotic military Government, regardless of the interests of the Egyptian people, and bent only upon securing for the military leaders the largest possible amount of plunder in the shortest possible time, and that in a country which is the greatest highway of the civilized world? The responsibility of the Powers who, by the Treaty of 1840, set up the present Government in Egypt, and the still higher and more peculiar responsibility of this country under the later Firmans, make it impossible that we should not see that if it is ever legitimate to use what may be called international police power it is necessary in this case.
In his speech outside this House on Tuesday last the hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle spoke as if non-intervention was a necessary part of the Liberal creed. The absolute doctrine of non-intervention, under all circumstances and at all times, has never been a portion of the Liberal creed, and has never been a portion of the Radical creed. There are Radicals as extreme as any Radicals in this country, and even as extreme as my hon. Friend the Member for Carlisle, who are sound, even in his view, on all English questions, but who have never supported the doctrine of non-intervention under all circumstances. However that may be, it is undoubtedly the case that many of those men hold that intervention under the present circumstances was absolutely justifiable. The hon. Member for Carlisle may contend that it was not; but, at all events, he must admit it is a matter to be debated, and not one to be decided upon abstract general principles.
The only other statement which I wish to make to the Committee as regards my hon. Friend the Member for Carlisle is, that after the bombardment of Alexandria my hon. Friend spoke of that bombardment as having been unjustifiable in the highest degree. I am not sure whether he used the word "crime" in regard to it. That is a statement which demands some answer at my
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hands. On a former occasion I stated to the House, step by step, the whole progress of events upon the question of the armament of Alexandria. I gave the House a full account of all that had occurred, in order to show how long suffering we had been with regard to the conduct of the Egyptian Military Party towards our Fleet, how earthworks and guns had been mounted directly bearing on that Fleet, and how that had been done against the express orders both of the Sultan and the Khedive. It must be remembered that our Fleet was not there as an isolated act of ours; but it was sent there with the approval of the whole of Europe, and sent there in con-junction with the Fleet of France. England and France had been acknowledged by the whole of the other Powers to have a predominant position with regard to Egypt, and our Fleet was sent to Alexandria for the security of our subjects; and also that it should have a moral effect in support of the Government of the Khedive. That Fleet being there for legitimate purposes, surely it was necessary we should protect it, and not allow it to be driven with ignominy from that place. We had no right to expose our men to daily increasing danger, and I cannot see that there is anything of the nature of a crime, or, indeed, anything contrary to the Radical principles as held by my hon. Friend himself, in striking hard in order to save English ships and men. There are some who believe power should never be used anywhere in a cause however right; but, at all events, in this case the steps taken were absolutely in the nature of self-defence. The Porte, as well as the Egyptian authorities, was thoroughly warned of what would happen, yet after those warnings—after the most distinct statement of the Khedive to the Military Chiefs and the Governor of Alexandria—guns were mounted outside the range of our guns, mounted upon the sea-front and batteries which did not command the harbour or its approaches. We told the Admiral to take no notice of this, and immediately fresh guns were mounted directly bearing on the Fleet itself. It is clear what was intended. My hon. Friend talks about half-armed batteries. It must be remembered that the guns were very heavy and extremely numerous, and were worked by efficient gunners. The armaments of the forts

1725
wore of a very formidable kind. Many of the guns were capable of piercing the plates of all the ships with two exceptions; and all could pierce the plates of Her Majesty's ship Invincible. It cannot be said, then, that those guns, worked by a large garrison of men who, undoubtedly, showed personal bravery, could be considered mere toy armaments, as my hon. Friend appears to think they were. Hon. Members opposite have told us that after the bombardment we ought to have cut off Arabi's retreat; we are told we ought to have been prepared to have landed a force. It is our belief that we could not, under the then political circumstances, have landed a force, and that we could not have had on board our ships at sea a sufficient force to land with any military safety. Diplomatically and politically speaking, it is one thing to perform naval operations in self-defence, and it is another thing to undertake isolated action in the face of promises given to Europe. We are asked why we are prepared to take isolated action now. It must be remembered we are looking forward to what will be done in the next week or two. We are bound, at the moment it becomes clear to the Government that they may or will probably have to take isolated action, or action in which they will have to play a leading part, to come before the House of Commons and ask for a Vote of Credit, which will enable them to meet the situation. I am sorry to detain the Committee; but I have had to deal with objections of two classes, and objections coming from both sides of the House on very different grounds. If I have, perhaps, laid most stress on the speech addressed to the House by the hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle, and upon the sentiments he has expressed outside these walls, it is because I deeply sympathize with him in his general views, and I am, therefore, personally more bound, when I entirely differ with him, to state my grounds for the disagreement.
SIR JOHN HAYsaid, the Committee would, perhaps, grant him their indulgence when he said that he had had a professional acquaintance with the affairs of the Levant for the last 40 years. He was employed in the Levant during the Syrian operations, and as Flag Captain in the Mediterranean during the matters connected with Egypt after the Crimean
1726
War; and, having the confidence of the officer commanding-in-chief, he had access to all the information on the subject then under consideration—in fact, he had had his attention directed to this matter more than many other Members who were at present Members of the Committee. He desired to say that while he concurred entirely with the late Government with regard to their action in sending the Fleet to Constantinople with the view of staying the proceedings at San Stefano, and in believing that the early and decided action taken by them prevented a collision which now had, unfortunately, occurred through delay, he was entirely of opinion that the Vote which was now about to be given was a Vote which it was necessary to give, in order for the better protection of British life and property in Egypt, and for the protection of the Suez Canal. He was also of opinion that any desire to interfere with the National arrangements in Egypt itself was beyond the scope of the military operations, which appeared at present to be in the contemplation of Her Majesty's Government. Having said these few words in reference to the political aspect of the question, he wished, first of all, to say that he looked upon the bombardment of Alexandria as perfectly justifiable. He believed that the course taken by the British Fleet at Algiers was identical in character, so far as the operations of Admiral Seymour were concerned; but he did not recognize any parallel case in the operations at Navarino. The operations which occurred at Alexandria appeared to them to be right so far as the Naval attack of the forts was concerned; but he was bound to say that, looking to the massacre of the inhabitants which occurred thereafter, it was not creditable to the Government of this country to engage in such operations without having provided the means of preventing the massacre which was the result of the bombardment. In operations of a similar character on the Coast of Syria in 1848, a large force was embarked in the Fleet which bombarded and captured St. Jean d'Acre. It was not to be supposed for a minute that that unfortunate catastrophe had not been duly announced to the Government beforehand by their officials on the spot. In the despatches which were now in the hands of Members the matter was clearly and distinctly set forth. In the

1727
first place, he would ask the Committee to allow him to address himself to the arrangements for the Naval attack on Alexandria, as made and prepared by Her Majesty's Government. The first step in that direction was taken in the month of May—on the 12th of May— and then it was arranged that France and England were each to send ships of war of sufficiently light draught of water to be enabled to enter the Harbour of Alexandria. That was set forth in the despatch of Lord Lyons to Lord Granville, received on May 13. He ventured to call the attention of the House at the time to the fact that of all the ships that were being despatched to Alexandria, only two were of the character which was there laid down; and of the additional ships afterwards sent, none were able to enter the Harbour of Alexandria. The whole of them were ships of such considerable draught of water as to be obliged to engage the batteries of Alexandria in motion, which made their fire most uncertain. He had seen a letter from an officer on board the Sultan, describing the events which occurred on the 11th of June. The Sultan was one of the vessels of large draught which were employed in attacking the batteries of Alexandria from outside. The Sultan, Alexandra, and the Superb were kept in motion; but they would have been much better employed inside, had they been of lighter draught. So unsteady was the Sultan that she was struck SO times, and had two men killed and nine wounded, before she was able, after firing for about two hours, to hit one of the batteries. This showed the risk which those ships incurred. When she had got in a position to hit the battery she was required to fire 11 shots before the gun, which was directed on the Sultan, and did her so much injury, and the management of which displayed so much credit upon the Egyptian gunners, was silenced. It was quite evident that, in operations of that kind, where it was necessary that the shell should be directed against batteries and batteries alone, great risk was run of the shells falling where they were not intended to, and that if the operation had been conducted from the smooth water inside the harbour instead of from outside, as was necessary with the means the Admiral had at his disposal, the result would have been more satisfactory
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to our arms, and, perhaps, less injury would have been inflicted on the city. He therefore wished, as a considerable portion of that Vote was for the Navy, to point out to the Committee that, however successful had been the Admiral, and however gallant had been the officers and men engaged under him in carrying out the operations with the means at their disposal, if the Government had been better advised as to the class of vessels which should be employed in that operation, the action at Alexandria would have been certainly more rapid, and even still more successful. He wished to point out that very clearly, because the despatches originally intended that the French and English Governments should each send ships of war of sufficiently light draught to enable them to go into the Harbour of Alexandria, and that condition was not fulfilled. In May he called the attention of the Secretary to the Admiralty to the matter. There were in this country the Neptune, the Orion, and the Belleisle, and at Gibraltar the Penelope. The three first-named wore purchased by his right hon. Friend the Member for Westminster (Mr. W. H. Smith); but it was not thought desirable by the Government to use them. The Penelope was under the command of His Royal Highness the Duke of Edinburgh, and she was despatched to Alexandria; but, as far as the operations of the Admiral were concerned, he was relying upon the assistance of the three French iron-clads. On the 29th of May Sir Beauchamp Seymour telegraphed to the Admiralty—
"Alexandria is apparently controlled this morning by the Military Party. Earthworks are being built rapidly abreast of Her Majesty's ship Invincible. I think an increase of force desirable. There is much panic at Cairo, and some here. I would suggest despatch of Her Majesty's ships Alexandra, Monarch, and gunboat."
The arrangements with France were stated in a speech of M. de Freycinet, which was given in No. 15 of the Blue Book. M. de Freycinet stated that the French Government were about to proceed to Alexandria conjointly with England, not for armed occupation, but to protect national interests; to testify to the revolutionary movement which had established itself in that country; and to show to the world that France and England were united; but he declined to give any indication of the means of action which

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might be resorted to, and declared emphatically that French military intervention was not one of them. Soon afterwards, when a collision was likely to take place, on the 3rd of June, Lord Granville telegraphed to Lord Dufferin, stating "batteries being raised on Alexandria. If not stopped may produce collision." Thus, on the 3rd of June, it was contemplated that a collision might occur between the batteries at Alexandria and the English and French ships in proximity and at anchor there. It seemed to him that there should then have been a definite understanding as to how far the British Admiral could rely upon the French ships for support, because at that moment they were in active alliance with him; but in the end he received no assistance from them whatever. In Paper No. 189, Sir Beau-champ Seymour reported the state of affairs at that time at the Port of Alexandria and Cairo, and the steps taken by himself, and by Pear Admiral Conrad, commanding the French Squadron, to check the construction of earthworks by the Egyptian troops. On the 30th of May, Sir Beauchamp Seymour and Pear Admiral Conrad—
"Requested their respective Consuls to point out to the Governor of Alexandria that the building of batteries hearing on the European quarter of the city, and on the merchant shipping in the harbour, was calculated to produce or prolong an impression on the minds of the European population that they are in danger."
Now, it seemed to him that when Admiral Conrad informed Sir Beauchamp Seymour that French ironclads might be looked for at the same time as further 'English ships, Sir Beauchamp Seymour was misled into believing that in the event of any collision occurring he would be able to rely upon the aid of the three French ironclads. The English Admiral had then three British ironclads inside the harbour—namely, the Invincible, the Monarch, and the Penelope, the ship last despatched; and there were also three French ironclads—the Alma, the Lagalliponiere, and the Thetis. Unfortunately, the information in the Blue Book was only brought down to a period considerably antecedent to the bombardment; and he (Sir John Hay) had no means of knowing how it was that when the supreme moment arrived, the Allied Force on which Sir Beauchamp Seymour ought to have relied, in consequence of
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the despatches and telegrams from his own Government, as well as the assurances of his brother Admiral, were not available, and he was left to undertake unaided the duty that had been imposed upon him. It appeared that the day before the collision occurred, and in consequence of the probability of a collision taking place, the French Squadron withdrew from the Harbour of Alexandria, and, in so withdrawing, left Sir Beauchamp Seymour with three ironclads too few to undertake the duty he had been called upon to perform. If Sir Beauchamp Seymour had had at his command iron-clad ships which could have entered the Harbour of Alexandria, the withdrawal of the French Squadron would not have been of so much consequence. The result of the withdrawal, and the fact that Her Majesty's Government had not sent out ships of light draught which could take the place of the French ships that were necessary for the completeness of the attack, but which had been withdrawn, laid the Naval administration and the management of affairs diplomatically of Her Majesty's Government, open to considerable challenge. It was right to point out that whatever accident might have occurred in the City of Alexandria, owing to the misdirection of the shells fired from the ships when engaging the forts, which was very possible owing to the motion of the sea, and the distance they were from the batteries, might have been averted if the ships of Her Majesty had been of a class necessary for the purpose, and if the three French iron-clad ships could have been replaced by ships of a class and character which ought to have been sent there. In that case this accident would not have occurred. With regard to another point upon which the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister was good enough to address the Committee last night, the right hon. Gentleman personally alluded to him (Sir John Hay). The right hon. Gentleman said—
"The question is now raised what ought to have been our conduct, and the answer given by some is that we ought to have sent with the Fleet a sufficient force for the purpose of preventing the conflagration and pillage which occurred. Well, I shall be curious to hear that matter argued out."
Now, in his (Sir John Hay's) opinion, a sufficient force ought to have been sent,

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and he confidently believed that that was the opinion of the House. Of course, the Rules of debate were such that he could not allude to speeches previously spoken; but Her Majesty's Government had been incessantly directing the Admiral to land a force if necessary, and the Admiral as constantly replied that he had no force to land. With the permission of the Committee, and in support of what he had stated, he would point out those despatches which seemed to him to bear on that point. In the Foreign Office Despatch of the 15th of May, No. 206, Lord Granville stated—
"I have to state to your Excellency that the following' are the instructions which have been sent to the British Admiral in regard to a joint co-operation of the naval forces of the two countries in the present crisis of Egypt:—'Communicate with the British Consul-General on arrival at Alexandria, and in concert with him propose to co-operate with naval forces of France to support Khedive and protect British subjects and Europeans, landing force, if required, for latter object, such force not to leave protection of ship's guns without instructions from home.'"
It must be remembered that the City of Alexandria at that moment contained, as they were informed, something like 12,000 men; while the force at the disposal of Admiral Seymour—and he presumed the French Admiral would have about the same force—was not more than 300 men. On the 16th of June, Lord Lyons, telegraphing to Earl Granville (Despatch No. 202), said—
"In spite of the information sent home by Sir Beauchamp Seymour,"—
to which he (Sir John Hay) would immediately allude—
"in execution of the instruction conveyed to me by your Lordship's telegram of last evening, I wrote this morning to M. de Freycinet to inform him that the measures which Admiral Sir Beauchamp Seymour has authority to take include the landing of men for the protection of British subjects in case of imminent danger to their lives; and I added that Her Majesty's Government feel sure that the French Admiral would concert measures with his English colleague for such an emergency. M. de Freycinet writes, in reply, that he has hastened to communicate my letter to the Minister of Marine, with a request to him to send orders in conformity with it by telegraph to the French Admiral."
Now, he would venture to say that the gallant Admiral, the present Minister of Marine in France, would never do anything so foolish. He mentioned these facts to show that Her Majesty's Government were so ill-informed as to the
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force at their Admiral's disposal that they were constantly enjoining him to land men, and in doing so they were enjoining him to do that which it would be unwise to do, and that which he had not the power of attempting to do. Turning to the despatch of Consul Cookson (No. 133), dated May 30, Mr. Cookson said—
"The small squadron actually in port could only silence the fire of the Egyptian forts, and when these forts are disabled then would commence a period of great danger for Europeans, who would be at the mercy of soldiers exasperated by defeat, while the English Admiral could not risk his men ashore, as his whole available force for shore operations does not exceed 300 men, although the squadron was sent here to safeguard European life and property. Every day's delay increases the dangerous temper of the soldiery and their growing defiance of discipline."
That telegram was sent in answer to a communication from Sir Beauchamp Seymour to Consul Cookson.
MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN: Are those Consul Cookson's own words?
SIR JOHN HAYsaid, it was hard to say, after what they had heard yesterday, whether what was published in the Blue Books were Consul Cookson's own words or not. These words appeared in the Blue Book under the heading of a despatch from Mr. Cookson to Lord Granville. He had only read an extract, but he would now give the whole letter—
"Alexandria, May 30.—I have been requested to telegraph to your Lordship the following, signed by all the principle British merchants:— British residents in Alexandria call upon Her Majesty's Government to provide efficient means for the protection of their lives. During 24 hours, from the 26th to the 27th instant, the town was in continual danger of being stormed by the soldiery, who, as we believe, actually had cartridges served out, in response to their demand, to be used against Europeans. The crisis is only suspended, but all elements of danger which existed yesterday remain to-day. There is every reason to fear the recurrence of perils which will come, as before, without warning, and against which Europeans are absolutely defenceless. They have not even the means of flight, as, in order to reach the ships in the harbour, they would have to run the gauntlet through the streets. The small squadron actually in port could only silence the fire of the Egyptians forts, and when these forts are disabled then would commence a period of great danger for Europeans, who would he at the mercy of soldiers exasperated by defeat, while the English Admiral could not risk his men ashore, as his whole available force for shore operations does not exceed 300 men, although the squadron was sent here to safeguard

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European life and property. Every day's delay increases the dangerous temper of the soldiery and their growing defiance of discipline."
In Inclosure 2, in No. 64, dated May 30th, there was a letter from Consul Cookson to Sir Edward Malet, in which Mr. Cookson stated—
"In continuation of my despatch of the 28th instant, I have the honour to report that on that morning I called upon Admiral Sir Beau-champ Seymour and conferred with him as to the best means of protecting British subjects in case of an attack on Europeans. He repeated that he had already told me that he was not prepared to land any force, hut that he would protect the embarkation of women and children and others who might seek refuge on board ships in the harbour."
This was only an extract; but he would read the whole of the letter if the Secretary to the Admiralty wished it. Further on Mr. Cookson said—
"This morning I received a note from Sir Beauchamp Seymour, requesting me in the most friendly way to call the attention of the Governor to the erection which had been going on since yesterday of an earthwork battery near Ras-el-Tin, bearing directly upon the European quarter of the town and the merchant ships in the harbour. I immediately saw His Excellency the Governor, who told me that he had already spoken on this subject to the Colonels, and had told them that if the work was not discontinued he would make a representation to the Minister of War that he thought it was likely to create an impression that Europeans were in danger. This afternoon His Excellency told Mr. Huri, whom I sent to inquire what had been done on the subject, that the Colonels had replied to him that they were only repairing the works, but that he was not satisfied, and had written to Arabi Pasha on the subject. The work is still going on."
Further on, on the 12th of June, in a despatch signed by Sir Beauchamp Seymour, contained in Inclosure 280, page 109, there was this passage—
"Neither the French Admiral nor myself have any idea of landing men, nor do we intend making any hostile movement."
That was after the Admiralty had desired Sir Beauchamp Seymour to do all in his power to protect the embarkation at all risks. Of course, as far as the boats of the Squadron were concerned, that would be done; but the Committee must remember that whereas, in olden times, a line-of-battle ship of the first class had some 1,200 men on board, and could land 500 or 600, the number of men on board an iron-clad was so much reduced that it was impossible to do this, and it was right to say that the Admiral would not have been able to
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have landed more than about 100 men from each ship. He thought he had now completed his case that Her Majesty's Government had been mislead into the belief that Sir Beauchamp Seymour had sufficient men at his disposal for landing an adequate force to protect life and property at Alexandria. The Admiral himself repeatedly, in direct communication with the Admiralty and others, repudiated any such power or ability. It, therefore, seemed unfair to allow it to go forth to the country, as it had gone forth, that a great part of the destruction of life and property resulting from the bombardment was due to the British Admiral not having made preparations for landing men for the purpose of protecting life and property, when he had no power whatever of doing so. Her Majesty's Government seemed to think that the Admiral had that power; but if they had put the question to any person who possessed naval experience, they would have been assured that he had no such naval power at all. The Naval authorities had denied it, and it was only in that House and "elsewhere" that any information was given to the contrary. He felt it his duty, as a naval officer, to say that he had satisfied himself it was entirely beyond the power of the Admiral to land men for that purpose, and that the Admiral had done his duty as an officer of Her Majesty, with a full desire to carry out the arduous operations intrusted to him to a successful conclusion. But he ventured to say that, looking through the various despatches which had been placed upon the Table, the preparation of a force to be landed on the occasion of the bombardment was a measure which was absolutely necessary at the hands of Her Majesty's Government. How was it that this terrible disaster to civilization had occurred? How was it that this great city had been pillaged and plundered on account of an attack upon its external fortifications? The Prime Minister, referring to the unhappy scenes in Alexandria, said that the burning of a city by persons deserting it was an operation which had never before been contemplated in civilized history. But surely, if the right hon. Gentleman would go back to the burning of Moscow, he would see that that was a very similar case. In that instance, the Russians thought it right to destroy the

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city in order to prevent those who were about to occupy it from obtaining the benefit that was to be derived from its occupation. In this case, the warnings of Her Majesty's diplomatic agents— Sir Edward Malet, Consul Cookson, Major Tulloch, and others—were entirely in unison and were disregarded, although they all said—"If you bombard the forts the city will be given up to pillage and rapine." The forts were bombarded, and the city was given up to pillage and rapine; and now the Government said they were not to blame for the catastrophe. The Prime Minister said that 10,000 troops could have prevented it. Then, why were not those 10,000 troops there? The Prime Minister said that it would not have been wise diplomatically for us to have sent ships of war to Alexandria ready to undertake the operation of landing 10,000 men when it was not certain that the forts would fire on us, and when it was not certain that we should have to fire on the forts and disarm them. But a second question arose. If the arming of the forts was continued, then in a certain eventuality the Admiral was to prevent Arabi Pasha from going on with the armament, and from the time the Egyptians commenced to arm the forts down to the massacre of the 11th of June, Her Majesty's Government had plenty of time to send 10,000 men, or any other number of men, in order to protect life and property in Alexandria. He was aware that he was going to touch upon tender ground, and, perhaps, some of the Committee might be of opinion that what he was about to say might savour of Party feeling. He knew that his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Derbyshire (Admiral Egerton) did not agree with him as to the advantage of Cyprus, although, as far as he had already gone, his hon. and gallant Friend, as a distinguished naval officer, did agree with him as to the nature of the operations. But what he now wished to say was this. If these 10,000 men had been at Cyprus, where Her Majesty's Government had a perfect right to place them, they would have been upon an island close to Alexandria and within reach of telegraph operations. If they had been ready with transports at Limasol on the day of the bombardment, they could have been at Alexandria at night ready
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to protect British life and property in the city. It was asked how they could land them when they were about to attack the forts? His reply was that they could have landed them very readily. They were about to attack the forts of the city, and the garrison, however strong it might be, would have to be withdrawn from the city in order to man the batteries. There were four miles of batteries up to the inner harbour, and three miles of batteries further on. In point of fact, the line of batteries extended from 8 to 12 miles, and that great line of fortifications would require that the whole of the garrison should be taken out of the City of Alexandria and employed upon the forts. The city might have been occupied by 10,000 Englishmen when the Egyptian garrison was withdrawn from the town, and while the ships were engaged in attacking the batteries, steps could have been taken to insure the preservation of life and property when the batteries were destroyed. He was satisfied that no naval or military man in the House would deny what he now asserted. On the very clay after the engagement, and in order that the crews of our ships might be enabled without difficulty to land and spike the guns of one of the forts, the Admiral made a feint by sending three ships down beyond the new harbour. Within sight of the Fleet the garrison were withdrawn from Fort Pharos to the new pier, and marched laboriously round the new harbour. The Squadron then steamed leisurely back, and the forts being empty, our seamen and marines were able to land and spike the guns. That being so, it was quite certain that an English force of 10,000 men could have occupied the City of Alexandria during the bombardment, without any fear of a collision with the Egyptian troops, who had been withdrawn from the town for the purpose of manning the batteries. If an operation of that kind had been undertaken by Her Majesty's Government, the naval operations, which had deservedly obtained great credit, would been further supported, and the disgraceful scenes of pillage and murder, which resulted from a want of prévoyance on the part of the Government, would have been prevented. He thanked the Committee for having permitted him to allude to these points. It did seem to him that when they had

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a Vote of Credit for £1,300,000 demanded for the Navy, some portion of the discussion might usefully be devoted to Naval matters. He gave the greatest credit to the gallant Admiral, Sir Beau-champ Seymour, for the operations he had carried out with the means at his disposal; but he ventured to repeat that if a force of 10,000 men had been ready at Cyprus, or in transports ready to land and occupy the city, that even after the withdrawal—which on all hands was to be regretted—of the three French ironclads from the place it was understood they were to take on that day—in spite of what had fallen from the Prime Minister, many hundreds of lives would have been saved in Alexandria, and many thousands of pounds' worth of property.
SIR JOSEPH PEASEsaid, he would not attempt to follow his right hon. and gallant Friend through the questions he had touched upon, because it seemed to him that the debate would turn, not so much upon questions of detail in regard to the landing of troops or the manner in which the ships were handled, as upon great principles of National policy. They were asked to spend a very large amount of money in carrying out the views of Her Majesty's Government in effecting their policy. The objects to which his right hon. and gallant Friend had alluded were matters of detail well worth inquiring into by his right hon. and gallant Friend as a highly efficient and gallant officer. For his part, he (Sir Joseph Pease) had never heard a doubt raised as to the ability of England to cope with the physical difficulties of landing such a force as might be wanted; but what he doubted from beginning to end was, whether we were pursuing a policy in regard to Egypt—he would not say this Government or the last Government, but both Governments combined— which commended itself to our moral sense. There was an interesting passage of arms the other day between his right hon. Friend the late Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (Mr. John Bright) and the Prime Minister, as to the propriety of our action in this particular circumstance. He had been brought up in the same school of morals and religious thought as his right hon. Friend the late Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, and his views of morals were very much in accordance with those of his
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right hon. Friend, although, perhaps, they did not always entirely coincide. It seemed to him that the real matter before them was not the mere question of date3 of landing troops, but whether they were right in pursuing this particular line of policy towards Egypt. In spite of the admirable speech which had been made by the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, he thought there was a very grave line to be drawn between the policy of intervention and of non-intervention. They had a terrible picture before them—a picture which they must view gravely on whatever side of the House they sat. Our Squadron had bombarded the forts of Alexandria, and within a few hours afterwards—with a scoundrelism hardly ever known previously in the history of the civilized world —the Egyptian soldiers under Arabi destroyed the city they ought to have protected, and gave it over to pillage and rapine. In all human probability the slaughter had been much larger than we had any idea of. The rough troops who had followed Arabi were troops of such a character that, when once let loose, they would be reckless with regard to human life. He wanted to know where all this was to end? He quite believed we should take Egypt: but it seemed to him that the late Government, in commencing these difficulties, and Her Majesty's Government in carrying on the same policy, had hardly considered the question where it was to land them. He doubted whether in the lifetime of any one of them they would see the end of it. In all human probability, before many months elapsed England would be found protecting Egypt, and he doubted whether, in their lifetime, the obligation would ever be got rid of in its entirety. Such a position was one of extreme difficulty and delicacy, and one which was likely to bring this country into conflict with some of the other Powers of Europe. Our troops were now upon the point of leaving this country, and they had, in all probability, as far as any of them could foresee, a long occupation of Egypt before them. A heavy burden would be imposed on the taxpayer at home, and new obligations incurred in Egypt. In 1879—and he would not go any further back than that—there were supposed to be three objects which we had in Egypt. One was the security and maintenance

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of the Suez Canal; the second, our material interest in Egypt itself, in common with the rest of Europe; and, thirdly, the interests of the Egyptian bondholders in this country. He thought that the importance of the Suez Canal to England tad been much overrated. It was well known that four-fifths of the traffic was carried by the ships of this country, and, therefore, the revenue was assured; but he had always been opposed to the investment of the money of the country in the Suez Canal. Egypt was certainly not the country he should select for the investment of our money. Although the Anglo-French Control had been of essential use to Egypt, yet, by leading to the employment of large numbers of foreigners, and to reductions in the Army, great discontent and dissatisfaction had been caused by it among the Native population by the employment of a large staff of Europeans. The right hon. Gentleman opposite (Sir Stafford North-cote), when speaking on the subject originally, had been careful in his comments upon the Mission of the two Commissioners, in stating that they were not acknowledged as Ambassadors, although they held a quasi-official position. They were simply recommended by England and France to assist the Egyptian Government in their financial arrangements. He believed that the appointment of the Board of Control had been of essential use to Egypt—not merely to the Government of Egypt, but to the people of that country; but, as he had pointed out, it filled the Government of Egypt with European appointments. A formidable Return was laid upon the Table a few months ago, showing that salaries of no less an amount than £373,000 were drawn annually by European officials connected with that Government. He believed that the jealousy produced among the Native population by the appointment of these European officers was still further increased by the fact that they were exempted from the ordinary taxation of the country. They were not taxed to the same degree or extent as the Natives were. In addition, this Financial Control gradually produced great uneasiness and dissatisfaction in the Army. The expenditure in the Army was about the first thing the Government of the day, under the Board of Control, ventured to deal with. As the discontent in the Army increased
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Arabi Bey came to the front, being an officer with considerable force of character, and he at once opposed the arrangements of the Board of Control. His demand for additional payment for his men was resisted by the Board of Control, and he at once attacked the Board, and then it was, in order to keep the Board to the fore, that the English and French Governments began their policy of further intervention. England and France, on the 21st of May, demanded that Arabi Bey and some other officers should be sent away. The Government saw the danger, and asked for ships. Towards the end of May English and French ships began to arrive for carrying out the Convention which had been made between England and France. The object of sending out ships of war belonging to this country and France to Alexandria was to support the demand of the Controllers of Finance that Arabi and his principal officers should be sent away from the country. The English ships were sent down. On the 21st of May they began to arrive; on the 29th it was said they were in danger from the fortifications; and, after that date, our policy had been described as one of self-defence. On the 4th of June Arabi Bey declined practically to alter the position of affairs, and on the 11th of July we bombarded the forts. There was one point which had never been explained— namely, the statement contained in The Times and Standard that, on the morning of the bombardment, an offer was made to disarm the forts. He believed that that had not been corroborated at present by any Government despatch; but he thought it was one of the statements made by the journals he had mentioned which required contradiction. There were only three points in which this country was interested—namely, the safety of the Suez Canal, the safety of our money, and the protection of our bondholders. The Suez Canal had never been more in danger than at this moment, the protection of the bondholders had never been more jeopardized, and the financial condition of Egypt within the last 15 or 20 years had never been worse than it had been within the last three months. In regard to the investment of our money in the Suez Canal, it seemed as if the time would arrive when the future prosperity of England would be secured without the

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employment of a channel which entailed a heavy penalty upon us for the attempts we made to establish peace and order in Egypt. It was very likely that from 1876 to 1879 Egypt might have drifted into a state of bankruptcy; but he did not know that that fact would have altered or seriously affected the interests of this country in any way. It could not have affected the country in regard to the navigation of the Suez Canal. In all probability that navigation would have been better protected if Egypt had been in a state of bankruptcy; and the interests we had in that undertaking, and our investment in it, would not have been affected. So long as the Suez Canal remained open four-fifths of the revenue came from our own commerce, and the revenue collected from the Canal had been sufficient to pay the interest upon the debt. All that our policy had done had been to occasion further bloodshed in Egypt, and to compel the Government to call upon the taxpayers for a large sum of money, with the probability of a much larger sum being required hereafter. He thought the policy of intervention, as compared with the policy of non-intervention, was entirely fallacious, and both this country and Egypt would have been better and happier if we had left the Financial Control of Egypt alone. It was said that we were obliged now to face the circumstances which had occurred. He contended that they were altogether appalling. The question was one which it was very difficult and very sad to contemplate. We found Egypt in a state of commercial beggary, and we should leave it little better. All our exertions during the last 10 or 15 years would not have improved its financial condition; and so far as the bankruptcy of Egypt was concerned, it could not have been worse at the time his right hon. Friend the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen) first began to take an interest in those financial affairs than it would be at the end of a war. Upon the whole, he had arrived at this view of the case. He felt that he was surrounded probably by the men who, either on that or the other side of the House, would have the guidance of the affairs of this great country in future days. If one thing struck him more prominently than another, it was that those who undertook to meddle with the financial affairs, and
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to exercise control over the financial affairs of other countries, ought to consider what was likely to be the result of their interference. The result of our interference in the financial difficulties of Egypt ought to have been foreseen from the beginning. For his own part, at this moment, he so entirely abhorred the policy of intervention in foreign affairs, that he was unable to give his vote for the money now asked for from the Committee. At the same time he did not see how, after the statement which had been made by the Government, he could oppose the Vote.
MR. H. S. NORTHCOTEsaid, he had one question to ask, and that was, whether the policy which established the Control was seriously impeached by the Government? The Prime Minister had entered something in the nature of a caveat against the Control established in 1879, and the language of the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that day, although guarded, was somewhat to the same effect as the language of the Prime Minister. But it was a caveat which made the position of the Government very much worse, because it tended to show that when they took Office they had the question of the Board of Control under their consideration, and that they decided to continue it. If it were otherwise, they had had more than two years to reverse the policy of the late Government, as they had done in the case of Afghanistan and the Transvaal; and if they disapproved the action of the late Government, they were bound to take the same course of reversing it. They preferred, however, to abide by the language they held on the 4th of November, 1881. They then said—
"The spread of education, the abolition of vexatious taxation, the establishment of the land tax on a regular and equitable basis, the diminution of forced labour, have all received our advocacy and support, and have been accomplished through the action of the English and French Controllers General;"
and on several occasions—notably on July 11—Lord Granville thus spoke of the Control at the time the Government took Office—
"It was undoubtedly working well for the material prosperity of the country, and promised to do so for the future."
In his humble judgment the Committee had to consider, not if the Control was a

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good concern, but whether the policy of Her Majesty's Government, since 1881, when they wrote that despatch—which was supposed to be considered the Charter of their Egyptian policy—had been one that was consistent with the policy enunciated in that despatch. It was something more than a mere bondholders' arrangement, and was ben tro-vato, at least as a policy. The objects were stated to be the prosperity of the country, and its full enjoyment of that liberty which it had obtained under successive Firmans of the Sultan, concluding with the Firman of 1879. What means did Her Majesty's Government take to carry out that policy? Outside Egypt itself there were two Powers specially interested in the affairs of Egypt—namely, France and Turkey— besides England, and he would examine briefly what were the specific lines of policy pursued by France and Turkey in the series of events which led to the bombardment. His complaint was that we handed ourselves over, bound hand and foot, to France, and snubbed and mistrusted the Porte. We paid too much deference to France, and did not sufficiently consult the interests of Turkey, or our own interests, beyond continuing our relations with France on good terms. He found, on going through the Correspondence, that throughout France had seemed to hang upon our hands like a dead weight, and whenever Her Majesty's Government entertained an idea which was a reasonable one the French Government persuaded and checked them from carrying it into execution. What return did we meet with from France? On the 12th of September, 1881, the British Government suggested that a Turkish General might be sent from Constantinople to Egypt in order to support and advise the Khedive; but in deference to France we did not insist upon this suggestion being carried out. On the 30th of January, Her Majesty's Government expressed a hope that France would agree with us that under certain conditions armed intervention in Egypt would be the best solution of the difficulty. France, however, declined to join with us. On the 22nd of March we proposed to send financial experts to Egypt to assist the English and French Consuls General; but this proposal was likewise refused by the French Government. He might
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say, en passant, that the Financial Control in Egypt could not have been considered objectionable, because, so late as March 22, Her Majesty's Government made this proposal for still further intervention in the financial affairs of that country. Again, on the 24th of April, Her Majesty's Government suggested the sending of a Turkish General to Egypt to assist in the financial arrangements, with the concurrence of an English and a French General, the concurrence of both of whom was to be necessary in restoring and maintaining order. But there, again, France declined to act with us. On the 13th of May we suggested that other Powers should be invited to co-operate in a Naval demon-station at Alexandria proposed by the French Government themselves; but again the French Government rejected and refused to accept the suggestion. On the 18th of May we made a singular request to the French Government, because we asked if they saw any objection to our "speaking openly" to the Porte on the subject of possible Turkish intervention in Egypt? The French Government replied that they saw the greatest possible objection to "speaking openly." On the 24th of May we proposed to address a request to other Powers to join in an appeal to the Sultan to hold troops in readiness for despatch to Egypt; but France again rejected our proposal. Finally, the French Government, after suggesting a Naval demonstration before Alexandria, declined as a matter of history to allow the French ships to join us in the bombardment. It would thus be seen that we had been in close conjunction and almost in absolute dependence upon France since September, 1881, and he could not find that the French Government had any sufficient justification for refusing our applications. We had never refused a request that was made to us by that Government except their proposal in September to establish a joint Anglo-French Military Control in Egypt, and their suggestion that we should formally declare that under no circumstances whatever would we tolerate Turkish military intervention in Egypt. In every matter we gave way, with the unfortunate result which had come to pass. He wished to say a few words now as to our dealings with Turkey. He would say, at once, that he could not have supported the Motion

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which was proposed at the beginning of the Sitting by the noble Lord the Member for Haddingtonshire (Lord Elcho), because he was very far from being willing to pledge himself unconditionally, or even with the conditions which had been suggested, to absolute co-operation with the Porte. He thought we ought to depend as little as possible upon one Power or another. But what did the Prime Minister say yesterday in speaking of our conduct towards Turkey? Having declared that the intervention of the Porte would be absolutely necessary, Her Majesty's Government proposed afterwards to provide that the Porte should have no voice or control as to the mode in which the military intervention was to be exercised. In this they afforded a great contrast to the deference they had always displayed towards Prance. On the 14th of September, 1881, when the disturbances first arose, we cautioned the Porte to use calm and dispassionate language, and not to think of sending troops to Egypt without our assent. The Porte took our advice. Then, in October, we sent iron-clads to Alexandria, against the strongest remonstrance of the Porte. We addressed a Dual Note to the Khedive, in defiance of the protest of the Porte, and without consulting the Sultan. In December Lord Dufferin reported that the Sultan was much irritated at the course taken by England and Prance in sending the Dual Note, and yet, at our advice, he abandoned the intention of sending troops to Egypt. On the 15th of May we made a Naval demonstration at Alexandria, in defiance of the protest of the Porte; and, at the same time, we cautioned the Porte not to take independent action. The Porte thereupon abandoned its design of ordering its Mediterranean Fleet to Alexandria. On the 28th of May the Sultan used language described by the French Ambassador at Constantinople to be most satisfactory with respect to the Khedive's Constitutional position. On June 2 the Porte acceded to the Khedive's request to send Turkish Commissioners to Egypt, and Her Majesty's Government expressed great satisfaction thereat. On the 3rd of June the Porte were told that the Conference would be held at Constantinople, and their protest that the announcement thereof would weaken the hands of Dervish
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Pasha was disregarded, notwithstanding the fact that most of the Powers supported this view. On the 5th of June the Porte, continuing to act with good faith, telegraphed peremptory orders to Alexandria to stop the construction of forts, and, at all events, temporarily those orders were obeyed. On the 11th of June the Sultan told Lord Dufferin that, strongly as he objected to the Conference, if it became necessary, he would not unconditionally refuse to join it; and, on the 14th of June, Lord Dufferin reported the Sultan as saying that, in the last resort, he would send troops to Egypt. It was true that, on the 19th of June, the Porte said that the time for conciliatory measures was not exhausted, and they would not then agree to send troops. At that time the German and Austrian agents at Cairo shared the opinion that the time for pacific measures had not passed. They deprecated the use of force, and, therefore, it was a little hard that we should strongly object to the Porte taking a different view to ourselves, supported, as they were, by other Powers of Europe. On the 23rd of June the Khedive told Sir Auckland Colvin that, in his opinion, Arabi was losing strength; and this he (Mr. Northcote) thought somewhat justified the Porte's belief that military measures might be dispensed with. If the Committee would allow him, he would attempt to sum up impartially the Porte's position in the matter. It must be remembered that on the commencement of affairs—on the 13th of December, 1881—Sir Edward Malet told the Sultan that he was consulted a good deal by Her Majesty's Government, and he was of opinion that, if intervention was necessary, it would naturally fall to the Sultan to intervene. If the Sultan ever entertained that idea it was speedily dispelled, because the French Government said they would not allow the question of Turkish military intervention to be raised. France induced us to deprecate a Turkish military intervention, and it must be remembered that the language of France had been consistently anti-Turkish throughout. We had, in pursuance of our policy of acting with the most perfect co-operation with France, entirely refused the various propositions which the Porte had made from time to time to negotiate separately with us on Egyptian questions. The

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Porte showed no such hostility to England as to justify the severe language which was only too often applied to it by public men in this country. He would like to remind the Committee that, when the first Commissioners were sent by the Porte to Alexandria, we protested at the instance of France, and we not only protested, but actually sent ironclads as a menace against those Commissioners, and we forced the Porto, under the pressure of those ironclads, to withdraw the Commissioners from Alexandria. What was our own Agent's opinion of the work the Commissioners were doing? Sir Edward Malet said they were, in his judgment, doing good work, and their presence was desirable; but our reply was, "Send them away." The Government had consistently—it might be justifiably—refused to allow them independent action—in fact, the position of the Porte was summed up, not unfairly, in the protest of the Pashas when they said—
"That the Sultan's rights of Sovereignty should not be attacked; "but" all intervention, all interference, in the affairs of an Ottoman Province were forbidden."
It must be remembered that as matters progressed in Egypt, the Porte had every fair reason to believe they were gradually losing ground in the estimation of the Mussulmen in Egypt. But there were other diplomatic sweetmeats, because, on the 19th of May, they found Lord Dufferin indicated to the Sultan, in a confidential conversation, that if he did not mind what he was about he might very probably lose Egypt. That was an alarming statement to make, and he (Mr. Northcote) did not wonder that the Sultan was not very much disposed to pick the chestnuts out of the fire in favour of the Power whose Representative used such language. On the 17th of June, when we had stopped the intervention of the Porte, Lord Granville told the Turkish Ambassador that we intended to hold the Turks responsible for the outrages at Alexandria. He must point out that the other Powers of Europe had all through been much less hard on the Porte than ourselves. On the 24th of May, for instance, they found Prince Bismarck admitting that the Porte should be allowed a voice in the settlement of Egyptian affairs. Austria objected most
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strongly to go into the Conference unless Turkey consented to join it; and both Austria and Germany and other Powers refused, in the first instance, to allow the Conference to be summoned elsewhere than at Constantinople, because they said the consent of the Porte was necessary. He did not advocate a complete reversal of the policy of Her Majesty's Government; but he thought a little more consideration should be shown for Ottoman feeling. The action of France in abandoning us at Alexandria, after hindering and hampering us throughout the negotiations, set our hands entirely free to deal with the Egyptian Question simply and solely in our own interest. We ought to settle matters without any special reference or consideration for French interests; let us secure our own, and let France look out for herself. They were told by the hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson), and by others, that the whole of these troubles were due to the establishment, by the Conservatives, of the Control. He protested against such an assertion. If Her Majesty's Government could not foresee on the 30th of May, when they were warned by their own Agent at Cairo that there would be a massacre on the 11th of June, it was wholly impossible that the late Government could in 1879 foresee that in 1882 a Liberal Government would be bombarding Alexandria. He failed to see why the Conservative Party should accept responsibility for what had happened.
MR. ARTHUR ARNOLDsaid, since the admirable speech of the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Committee had listened to a speech from the hon. Member for South Durham (Sir Joseph Pease) until, towards the termination of the speech, he had great difficulty in ascertaining what the opinion of the hon. Baronet was. The hon. Baronet, however, had left the Committee in no doubt upon one point, and that a point of enormous importance, for he had said he did not think the Suez Canal was of quite so much value to England as had been made out. It must be remembered that the late Foreign Secretary of France, M. St. Hilaire, took upon himself on one occasion to contrast the position of France and England in Egypt, and, dealing with the position of France in

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Egypt, he was obliged, in the first place, to have recourse to the historical events of the last century; and the only matter of importance to the French Foreign Secretary was that there was a large French population in Egypt requiring protection. When he spoke of England, M. St. Hilaire said—
"She it is who furnishes nearly all the custom of the Suez Canal, since her vessels of all sorts which pass through it compose nearly four-fifths of the total traffic. Moreover, the Canal, which joins the Mediterranean to the Red Sea, is henceforth for Great Britain the indispensable route which places her in communication with that incomparable Colony of 250,000,000 subjects which she possesses in India."
The hon. Member for South Durham (Sir Joseph Pease) followed in the foot-stops of others, and depreciated the importance of the Suez Canal; but he (Mr. Arnold) held that the Canal, which abbreviated the journey from England to Bombay by 4,000 miles, would never cease to be of importance to the trade of this country. He did not see any reason why the Canal should not be so deepened and widened as to admit of the transit of even larger vessels than were now able to pass through it. Of the import trade of Egypt with the world, amounting to £7,000,000, one-half was received from Great Britain; while of the export trade, amounting to £13,500,000, no less than three-fourths were received in this country. Practically, for us, Egypt was part of the sea; and therefore our interests in Egypt must be regarded in that light. He did not mean to make much of the interest of this country in Egypt against the proposition of his hon. Friend the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson). He wanted rather to consider what was the duty of this country in reference to interference; and upon that point he would ask the permission of the Committee to dwell for a moment or two, because he had the honour to represent a part of that vast population which accepted and endorsed, as he did, the principles and the policy of Mr. Cobden in their entirety, and which believed, as he (Mr. Arnold) did, that the greatest interest of this country was the interest of peace, and which also believed that non-intervention in the affairs of a foreign State ought to be the paramount policy of this country. He had been, as long as he could remember, a respectful student of the speeches of his right hon. Friend the Member for Bir-
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mingham (Mr. John Bright), and the pride of himself (Mr. Arnold) and the hon. Gentlemen who sat near him, at seeing the right hon. Gentleman sitting in their part of the House, was so great that they were sometimes tempted to forget the pain which they naturally experienced when they thought of the cause that had brought him amongst them. He had been also as attentive to the writings of Mr. Cobden, and he found an important and essential difference between the opinions of these two great men upon the very important subject of intervention. Many years ago a greatly respected Member of that House —a member of the Society of Friends— gave him a volume which had great weight in the Society of Friends—Dymond's Essays —and which was always recommended by the Birmingham School as one expounding the true policy with regard to war. He did not say Mr. Cobden was imbued with the high morality which inspired Dymond's Essays, because he accepted a view of national defence in a far wider sense than it was accepted by that Society—that Society of Friends which, illustrious as it was by the high ideal of morality that it upheld before mankind, had become still more illustrious by the fact that it had given the world such benefactors of humanity as William Penn, Edmund Sturge, and, the greatest of all, John Bright. What was the line of our policy in Egypt with regard to nonintervention? Even among civilized people, he respectfully submitted to the Committee, there was a limit to nonintervention which, to be a legitimate principle, must be a principle accepted by all Governments, or forced upon all Governments. For that purpose, that was to say, to force non-intervention upon Governments, the ships of this country were sent to Dulcigno; and when Prince Bismarck, with regard to the liberation of Thessaly and Epirus, suggested to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen) the forcible repression of Turkey by a blockade of the Dardanelles, even that strong proposition was not rejected in principle by Her Majesty's Government. It had been laid down by high authority that intervention to enforce non-intervention was always rightful and moral, though it might not be always prudent. Though it might be a mistake to force freedom

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upon a people who did not desire to have it, and who did not value it, it could not be right to insist that freedom should be withheld from the people, and that they should be subject to foreign coercion. That was the principle which directed the sending of our ships into Egyptian waters a few weeks ago. But there was this wide distinction to be borne in mind in regard to the principle of non-intervention, that there could not be an observance of that principle between civilized and semi-barbaric States. The rules of international morality implied, so it seemed to him, that they should be accorded on both sides. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Birmingham (Mr. John Bright) had said there had been in Egypt a violation of International Law. He (Mr. Arnold) asserted there could be no violation of International Law where one of the parties were a semi-barbaric people, who did not accept the rules which composed International Law. He was not specially concerned against Arabi Pasha because he was a rebel; he would never fire a shot, or send a ship, to subdue the revolted subjects of any Power, and to retain on the Throne of any country any particular Monarch. The state of Egypt appeared to him to be simply one of piracy, and the Law of Nations could not be violated in dealing with people who did not comprehend and accept the Law of Nations. But then came the question, what was the position of such people under the moral law? He submitted that, inasmuch as the rule of International Law did not apply between civilized and barbaric peoples, it must be well known that our relations with such people were these— that the rules of the moral law applied to such people just as the law of morality applied between man and man. That was the guide for our conduct in Egypt. He deprecated most strongly any action on the part of Her Majesty's Government which did not tend to the progress of Egypt towards that time when she would have a greater measure of independence and self-government over her people. But that seemed to him to be not only the signal merit of the speech of the hon. Baronet the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and of the speech of the Prime Minister yesterday but it seemed the merit which ran throughout the Government policy.
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After many years' reading of State Papers, he declared he never read anything which appeared more absolutely virtuous than the last four paragraphs of Lord Granville's despatch to Lord Dufferin, dated the 11th of this month, and he thought the Government were entitled to say, as they did in Lord Granville's despatch, that this country had—
"No interests or objects in regard to Egypt which are inconsistent with those of Europe in general, nor any interest which are inconsistent with those of the Egyptian people."
That was true. The matter was so important that it, at all events, deserved a moment's investigation. Upon the evidence, it was true, for there was not a trace or a suspicion in the policy of the Government of any aggressive action, or of any desire to intervene in Egypt for purposes of selfish aggrandisement or revenge. Throughout the policy of the Government they appeared to him to have displayed a most loyal deference to the Powers of Europe, and they had prevented the single and uncontrolled action of the Porte. The hen. Baronet the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) asked again and again, in a thunderous tone, why we did not allow the Egyptians to be independent? He would tell the hon. Baronet what would have happened. The Egyptian people were not comparable in physical force and endurance to the levies of the Porto, and but for the action of England, in conjunction with other Powers, Egypt would by this time have been prostrate under the foot of an Army of the Sultan, and the position of the Egyptian people would have been as wretched as that of the people of the Valleys of the Tigris and the Euphrates. The Sultan could not unsheath his sword against Arabi Pasha in company with Christians. But had England not been there His Majesty would have fought against Arabi just as his ancestor fought against Mehemet Ali, and Halim Pasha, the willing tool of the Porte, would have reigned in Egypt, Tewfik Pasha would have been dethroned, and the tool of the Sultan would have been elevated in his place. Notwithstanding action of a more than dubious character on his par!, the Powers had urged the Sultan to relieve the world of the dangers of anarchy in Egypt, taking, at the same time, due security against any prolonged

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occupation in Egypt. When the Porte failed, as it had failed, to take any steps for the better order and government of the country, it would in time become the duty of Her Majesty's Government to consider gravely whether some, at all events, if not the whole, of the expenses of this campaign should not be charged upon that large tribute of £681,000 which the Sultan drew from Egypt every year upon the condition of maintaining order and good government in that country? The Prime Minister did not make sufficient admission that the Sultan had never been an independent Sovereign in Egypt. The strongest of all acts against the Sovereignty of the Sultan was, in his (Mr. Arnold's) judgment, taken by Lord Salisbury in 1879. At that time the present Khedive had just acceded to the Throne, and he was ordered to attend at Constantinople to do homage and to receive the Firman of Investiture. Lord Salisbury did not hesitate to advise a refusal, and he telegraphed to Cairo in these terms—
"His Highness had better await a more tranquil moment for fulfilling this duty towards," not his Sovereign, but "his Suzerain."
Explanation was given to the Sultan that this supreme disregard was made in deference to the will of England and France. The next important act against the Sultan's Sovereignty was performed by the present Government last October, when the Sultan's Commissioners were hustled out of Egypt; and, lastly, when the Sultan proposed to send a ship of war to join the Anglo-French Squadron, he was graciously assured that the flag of his Sovereignty would meet with a "favourable reception." It was ridiculous to talk in high terms of the Sovereignty of the Sultan in Egypt, and he had made these observations in order that in future they might be under no delusion on that head. The fact was, the Sovereignty of Egypt had been for many years in commission, and that, Egypt being essentially a Maritime country, the strongest of the Commissioners had been, and should be, the Power which was the first Maritime Power in the world—that Power which held all its Possessions, including India, by this great title. England and France had, with the absolute approval of the Powers, prevented the establishment of the absolute Sovereignty of the Sultan
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upon the Nile. Now, in regard to the bombardment of the forts of Alexandria by the Fleet, it must be borne in mind what was the meaning of the naval supremacy of this country, concerning which, he begged the Committee to remember, Mr. Cobden wrote to Lord John Russell in 1860 the following words: —
"I would, if necessary, spend £100,000,000 sterling to maintain an irresistible superiority over France at sea."
That was the patriotic observation of Mr. Cobden. The sending of our Fleet to Alexandria was simply an act of duty. When our subjects had been killed and outraged, when the civilized people of every sort and clime had been ruthlessly turned out of Egypt, and when the question came to be whether our vessels should withdraw from the Harbour of Alexandria, he should have been one of the first in that House to condemn the Government had they ordered the withdrawal of the Fleet. He did not know that he had seen all the despatches from the British Admiral; but those he had seen he admired greatly, because they were straightforward and free from the truculent language of conquest which the British Admirals had used in past times. But he had this remark to make about the bombardment, that from the despatches it appeared the British Admiral committed a serious error if he did not inform Her Majesty's Government that he could not destroy the forts which were threatening his ships without throwing shells into and over the town, as had been alleged. If the allegation was true that the shells of the British Fleet fell into and over the town in great number, he could not quite excuse Admiral Seymour for not informing the Government in his despatches that he could not undertake the destruction of the forts without bringing on the town all the horrors of bombardment. Such information should have been clear in the despatches. Lastly, he came to the relations of the Government in regard to Egypt with the other Powers of Europe, and he confessed that during the last 12 months he had often felt some irritation at what appeared to him to be the extreme deference which the Foreign Office of this country was disposed to pay to the Government of France. Reviewing the Papers as a whole, it was impossible to deny that

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while maintaining that preponderance of England and France which had always been acknowledged by the Powers, the Government of this country had displayed, in circumstances to which the assent of Europe was scarcely applicable, a strong regard for international engagements, and a deference to the Concert of Europe which could not be without a beneficial influence upon the future of this undertaking, whatever that might be. He valued most deeply a full and friendly alliance with the great people of France; but he confessed he should have regarded, and he should regard, a joint expedition to Egypt with some anxiety and alarm. He should regard a joint expedition with anxiety and alarm, because the history of joint expeditions had not been the history of success; it had always been a history of divided purposes and counsels, and they wore always likely to lead to very unsatisfactory results. To France and the world the Prime Minister gave yesterday, in the name of this great country, the most solemn assurance that the people of this country in going to Egypt had no selfish design, that England sought no aggression or aggrandisement. That solemn assurance, he felt confident, would be maintained. We were not making war for an idea, and he should give his heartiest support to all the efforts of Her Majesty's Government to bring about a speedy termination of the present state of things in Egypt.
COLONEL ALEXANDERassumed that the great majority of the Committee would cheerfully give Her Majesty's Government the sum which they asked for to carry on the war in Egypt. The wonder was not that the sum asked for was so large, but that it was so small. The Government ought not, so to speak, to make three bites at one cherry, because they would have to come again, and that very soon, for an additional sum of money to enable them to carry on this war to a successful conclusion. They ought now to have asked for £6,000,000 instead of £2,300,000. Perhaps they did not ask for £6,000,000 because they were afraid of being called "Jingoes" by the hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Law-son). He (Colonel Alexander) would rather be called "a real Jingo" than "a Brummagem Jingo." The difference between a real Jingo and a Brummagem
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Jingo was this—that whereas a real Jingo, by asking for £6,000,000 and by bringing Indian troops to Malta, succeeded in averting war, a Brummagem Jingo closed the stable door after the horse was stolen, and then asked for a little more than a third of that sum. Yesterday evening the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Mintster spoke of the cruel and wanton crimes, of the barbarous and brutal conduct pursued by Arabi Pasha and his troops. The Government had never been alive to the magnitude of the crisis, had never appreciated the dangers to which the unfortunate European population had been exposed. The deplorable vacillation of the Government reminded him of nothing so much as of the conduct of Pharoah, who, not even under the plagues inflicted on his land, could be aroused from his apathy by his servants, who said despairingly, "Knowest thou not yet that Egypt is destroyed?" He (Colonel Alexander) believed that none of the 10 plagues of old inflicted greater suffering upon the unfortunate population of Alexandria than had the disastrous policy of Her Majesty's present Advisers. If Egypt was not yet destroyed, it was, indeed, on the high road to destruction. Its commerce was paralyzed, its cities had been bombarded and burned, its population murdered and mutilated. If anyone wished to realize the horror of the situation, let them read the correspondence in The Times of to-day. The Prime Minister excused himself for not landing troops on three grounds. The first ground was that he had no force adequate for the occasion; the second was that the landing of a force would have been an act of disloyalty to what the right hon. Gentleman called the European Concert; and the third was that it was not possible for Her Majesty's Government to have foreseen the brutal way in which Arabi Pasha and his Army would act. The Blue Book just presented to the House afforded ample proof of the warning given to the Government as to the probability of a massacre. They had it in evidence that some considerable time before the massacre the Swedish Consul proposed apian of defence which, unfortunately, was not acted upon. The Committee remembered that a Memorial was presented from merchants at Alexandria to Lord Granville, asking that the Government would take steps for a

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more efficient protection of their lives. After the massacre there appeared a letter in The Times, stating that the father of one of the victims had for some time seen the insecurity of the position of the Europeans in Alexandria, and had directed his son to come home. It was all very well, as the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister said, to be loyal to the European Concert; but it was more important that we should be loyal to our own flesh and blood. If England was not loyal to the Native population of Alexandria, how could they expect the loyalty of the Natives in return? The Prime Minister pointed out yesterday that the European Concert existed in the Conference which was now sitting at Constantinople; but the Blue Book to which he (Colonel Alexander) had just referred showed clearly that it was with considerable reluctance that some of the Powers entered the Conference—they thought very lightly of the Conference. They found the Austrian Chancellor expressing anxiety on the 2nd of June as to the events which might occur before the Conference assembled; and the Italian Government expressed great reluctance to enter the Conference—they thought a Conference would be a dilatory mode of proceeding. Although the Conference was considered by the Italian and Austrian Governments to be too dilatory a mode of proceeding, Lord Granville thought there was yet time to put off the Conference for a few days, in order that it might be seen what would come of the Turkish Mission sent to Alexandria. The action of Lord Granville in that respect was a complete and absolute waste of time; for what was the result of the Turkish Mission? It was that the Khedive was absolutely insulted, and Dervish Pasha acknowledged he was totally unable to protect the European residents in Alexandria. The hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) asked the other day what had become of the European Concert? He thought he could tell the hon. Baronet. It had gone where the Bulgarian atrocities, and all the other rubbish and "shoddy" manufactures of the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister had gone. The last time they heard of the European Concert was, as the hon. Baronet, the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs reminded them, two years ago,
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at Dulcigno, when a few ships sailed up and down like "painted ships on a painted ocean." Even the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister himself must now confess we had entered upon a very serious war, and that if we were to bring this war to a successful conclusion, we must rely upon our own resources, and not upon any European Concert which, in his (Colonel Alexander's) opinion, was an absolute and complete myth.
MR. M'COANsaid, he hoped he was not lacking in respect to the hon. Gentlemen who had already addressed the Committee, when he ventured to say that, with two exceptions, most of the speeches delivered had been rather of an academical than practical interest. The speech of the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was an admirable and exhaustive review of the diplomatic aspect of the question, and, to his mind, if he had any sympathy with the hon. Baronet's view, it would have been a very powerful and very convincing statement of fact. The hon. Member for Salford (Mr. Arnold) had made a practical contribution to the debate. The issue before the Committee was something like this. Had we interests in Egypt which justified our military intervention in the affairs of that country, and was the Government justified in asking for this Vote of Credit? As regarded our interest in Egypt, he did not think there would be much difference of opinion, and in venturing to maintain this statement, he must go over well-trodden ground. The Suez Canal was of paramount and national importance to England; indeed, it was a common thing to say that it formed the gate and the key to India. So long, therefore, as we held the Empire of India, we must, of necessity, dominate the Suez Canal. As the Committee had been told by the hon. Baronet the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 82 per cent, or four-fifths, of the trade of the Suez Canal was carried in British vessels; and, besides that, we had a proprietary interest in the Canal, the market value of which was something like £9,000,000 sterling—an investment, the justice and policy and wisdom of which had been abundantly proved by events. We had a political interest, we had a great and paramount commercial interest, and we

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had a share interest in the Canal. Next in importance, we had more than three-fourths of the whole foreign trade of Egypt in our hands. The Committee had heard that the foreign trade of Egypt exceeded £13,000,000 sterling a-year.
It being ten minutes before Seven of the clock, the Chairman left the Chair to report Progress; Committee to sit again this day.

QUESTION.

  EGYPT—THE CONFERENCE—ACTION OF THE PORTE.
  SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTE: Before the Sitting is suspended, I wish to put a Question to the Under Secretary of State—namely, Whether there is any truth in a report which has come by telegraph this evening, to the effect that Turkey has consented to send troops to Egypt?
  SIR CHARLES W. DILKE: The Turkish Government have not accepted the Identic Note of the Conference, but have stated that they consider the essence of that Note to be a proposal to send troops, and that they accept that proposal. It is entirely open to the Porte in to-morrow's Conference to discuss the conditions.
  The House suspended its Sitting at Seven of the clock.
  The House resumed its Sitting at Nine of the clock.

ORDERS OF THE DAY.

  SUPPLY—FORCES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN (VOTE OF CREDIT).
  SUPPLY—conisdered in Committee.
  (In the Committee.)
  Question again proposed,
  "That a sum, not exceeding £2,300,000, be granted to Her Majesty, beyond the ordinary Grants of Parliament, towards defraying the Expenses which may be incurred during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1883, in strengthening Her Majesty's Forces in the Mediterranean."—(Mr. Gladstone.)
  MR. M'COANsaid, when the discussion was adjourned he was endeavouring to recall the attention of hon. Members from Blue Books and marine gunnery to the subject before the Committee. He had asked the question whether our interests in, and our obligations with regard to, Egypt warranted and justified the proposed military action of the Government? And he ventured then to say that an impartial and honest review of the actual facts and circumstances of the situation would compel an answer to that query in the affirmative. He again asked the Committee what were our interests in connection with Egypt? Though these, of course, had been more or less stated in detail by every speaker who had addressed the Committee, he still felt it necessary to re-state them. They were—first, the Suez Canal; secondly, our trade with Egypt; and, thirdly, the subordinate, but still important, interest of the bondholders to whom Egypt was indebted. Now, as regarded the Canal, he could, of course, say nothing new on that subject. Its vital importance to England had been recognized by every hon. Member who had taken part in the discussion; and, indeed, so vital was it, and so inseparably was it bound up with our interests in our Indian Empire, that if we had in Egypt no other interest, that alone would justify the Government for having taken military action. As he had observed, our interest in the Canal was not merely one of enormous political weight, but there was also the minor, but still considerable interest, of the proprietary shares in that Canal. That interest was now of the market value of about £9,000,000; and upon that point he ventured to express his approval of the original purchase of the shares, which only cost the country £4,000,000 four years ago. He thought that the increased value of our stake in the Canal was one which called for the acknowledgment of every thorough-going Liberal in the House; and he, for one, felt grateful to the late Conservative Chief for the action taken by him in this matter. But, besides our ownership of these shares, there was the additional fact that four-fifths of the whole traffic passing through the Canal was British.—a fact which, in itself, constituted an

  1761
  interest of the very highest importance. There was also our trade with Egypt, which represented £13,000,000 sterling a-year; and he was quite sure that if it were possible to conceive that trade to be annihilated, there would be a loud cry raised from Manchester and other places interested in the Egyptian trade. He thought the importance of that question alone would entitle the Government to the vote of every commercial Radical below the Gangway on the other side of the House. Then there was the interest of the bondholders. Now, it seemed to be the fashion with many hon. Members in that House, and with many persons out of it, to speak of that interest with much less respect than he thought fairly belonged to it. The bondholders were far too commonly regarded as being no better than Irish "gombeen men"—as usurers who exacted exorbitant interest from the Government of Egypt from year to year. But there was absolutely no justification—so far as nine-tenths of the present holders of these bonds were concerned—for such an opinion. He had himself owned Egyptian Stock, and during the greater part of the past 20 years had been much interested in Egyptian finance. In the fewest possible words, he would, therefore, tell the Committee what was the foundation of the claim which the bondholders might fairly prefer, and for which they might justly ask Government support. Exclusive of the Daira Debts, the Egyptian National Debt proper consisted of five loans. The first of these was negotiated in 1862, towards the end of the Reign of Said Pasha, and amounted to £3,292,800, of which sum the Egyptian Government received only £2,500,000. The next, which took place in 1864, early in the Reign of Ismail Pasha, was for £5,704,000, of which the Government received only £4,864,063. The third loan, that of 1868, was for £3,000,000 nominal. This was secured upon the railways, which even then constituted a perfect guarantee; and it was actually repaid in cash in six yearly instalments of £500,000 each. But, although this loan was so amply secured and so speedily repaid, only £2,640,000 was paid into the Cairo Treasury, so that in six years the Egyptian Government by this transaction lost £360,000 over and above the interest. Now, as the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon (Mr.
  1762
  Goschen) would probably address the Committee with the great authority that attached to anything which he might say on the subject, it would be right for him (Mr. M'Coan) to mention that the firm of which the right hon. Gentleman was then a member were the contractors for all three of these loans. The right hon. Gentleman would, no doubt, be able to explain to the Committee how the large margins shown by the figures he had just stated were disposed of—how much of the loans went to Cairo, and how much remained in London. The right hon. Gentleman might or might not find it convenient to state this; but, at all events, he would have a personal knowledge with regard to some £2,000,000 or £3,000,000 of the Debt incurred up to the time indicated. Then there was the large loan of 1868, amounting to £11,890,000, of which amount the Egyptian Treasury received only £7,193,334. In other words, nearly £2,750,000 sterling remained in the hands of somebody. He now came to the loan of 1873, which was of the nominal amount of £32,000,000; but of, this the Egyptian Treasury received £20,740,077 only, and of that sum £9,000,000 consisted of bonds of the Floating Debt of the Government at that time, which were bought up by the contractors at rates as low as 63 per cent, and paid into the Egyptian Treasury as cash at 93 per cent, a circumstance which, Mr. Cave subsequently remarked, "materially enhanced the profit accruing to the negotiators of the loan." For these reasons, he said that whenever Egyptian finance was spoken of, it was only just that the whole blame should not be thrown upon the late Khedive. A full share of it belonged to those who had helped him to incur these huge debts. The figures he had quoted showed that out of a total of £55,870,000, the Egyptian Government received only £35,000,000 in cash. Of these £35,000,000, it had, so long ago as the year 1875, repaid, in interest and sinking fund, £29,570,994; but, notwithstanding, in that year it still remained indebted in the sum of £46,734,000. If the present bondholders stood in the shoes of the original contractors for these loans, the moral strength of their claim to consideration would be much less than it was. But there were pro-

  1763
  bably now no original holders of the bonds. These had passed into the hands of persons who had, from time to time, bought them long ago at their full market price; and persons who had so bought, and who received but a moderate rate of interest on their purchases, stood in a very different position from that of the "gombeen man" to whom they were far too commonly likened. They had a substantial claim, which the Government were, in fairness, bound to recognize and support. From the condition of things which he had described, the state of Egyptian finance became rapidly more and more embarrassed, and in 1875 the Cairo Government still owed to its foreign creditors nearly £47,000,000, and as it could not pay the high interest accruing thereon a state of bankruptcy was imminent. In the following year Mr. Cave was sent out to investigate the state of affairs, and afterwards made the valuable Report with which hon. Members were familiar. Later on the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen) went out as Delegate of the English, and M. Joubert as Delegate of the French, bondholders. The materials for a careful and exact judgment on the situation had already been provided by Mr. Cave's investigation; and Messrs. Goschen and Joubert proceeded to devise some scheme which should relieve, not the Egyptian Government, but its creditors. He happened to be at Cairo at the time, and could speak from personal recollection of what occurred. He was bound to say that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon had lent himself very readily indeed to the suggestions of M. Joubert; and the result was a settlement much in favour of the French as against the English bondholders, which imposed conditions on the Egyptian Treasury that he ventured to say at the time would, in the result, prove to be perfectly unworkable. However, owing to the joint pressure put by those Gentlemen upon the Khedive, the scheme was adopted and put into execution. The best feature in it was the creation of what was known as the Control. This consisted of two English and French gentlemen named by their respective Governments, and who, with the consent of the Khedive, exercised a most extensive ad-
  1764
  ministrative control over the affairs of Egypt. They were, in fact, appointed over the head of the Khedive, who was himself a most able administrator. But, although he submitted to this supersession, he did not like it, as also did not the large body of dismissed Native employés, whose posts were given to Europeans. The scheme was borne with till 1879, when, its working having become intolerable, it was put an end to, under circumstances which resulted in the deposition of the Khedive himself. It was, however, soon after revived on a different basis by his successor. The new Controllers were not invested with any actual administrative power; but they had the right of supervising the whole fiscal system of the country, and of reporting thereon to the Khedive and their own Governments. With the deposition of the previous Control the European employés, who had been imported into the Egyptian Service, had been dismissed; but one of the first steps of the revived Duumvirate was to re-import these gentlemen, and to add largely to their number. In fact, a very army of European employés was re-organized at a cost of £300,000 a-year to the Egyptian Government. Against this, Native feeling again gradually revolted. The dismissed officials found voice, and complaint became general amongst all classes. In this way, and to this extent, grew up what had been miscalled a National Party. The Turkish and Circassian officials found voice, and they extended their influence amongst their fellows until the little wave of discontent that he had spoken of widened out over the whole country. Still, it must in justice be admitted that, notwithstanding the angry feeling thus provoked, the Control reformed many abuses, and conferred great benefits on the country. The further history of what was falsely called, the "National movement" in Egypt had been told by several speakers, especially by the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; but he ventured to add, with whatever might be the weight attached to the opinion of one who had known the country for many years, that the movement of Arabi Bey had not behind it a shred of National feeling in any sense in which that term could be rightly employed. It was simply and purely a military revolt—a

  1765
  revolt began and promoted in the interests of the class to which it brought promotion and higher pay; and Arabi Pasha had, therefore, no sort of claim on our sympathy as the exponent of National feeling in Egypt. But, besides our interests, which were in themselves quite sufficient to justify the action of Her Majesty's Government, there was another consideration which went to the same conclusion, and that was our Treaty obligations. ["Oh, oh!"] Hon. Gentlemen behind him cried "Oh, oh !"at the idea of reviving our obligations; but they seemed to have forgotten that under the Treaty of 1841 we entered into a positive engagement to maintain and uphold through all time the settlement of Egyptian affairs that was then arranged. That Treaty was still in force, and the five Powers who were parties to it then were bound by it now. Unless we were to abrogate Treaties and all the moral and political obligations which they entailed, he maintained that those arising under that particular Treaty were substantial, real, and strong at the present moment. Then, not only were we direct parties to that Treaty, but we had also been parties quite as directly to every one of the Organic Firmans since issued by the Porte to the Governors of Egypt. By the settlement of 1841 the Porte virtually acknowledged the semi-independence of Egypt. The successive Firmans, to which he had referred, slightly modified some of the details of that settlement; but, whatever modifications took place, we and the four other Powers were parties to the whole. Therefore, he said, by that Treaty and by those successive Firmans there was imposed upon this country an obligation from which in honour we could not recede. If that were so—and he ventured to challenge contradiction upon any of the facts to which he had alluded—he thought they had a mass of justification which amply warranted the action of the Government; and he, for one, was "Jingo" enough to regret that the Government had not recognized the force of those obligations upon itself without any reference whatever to the Concert of Europe. He believed that the Government had made out a strong case for action, and he ventured to hope that it would be carried to its only logical, consistent, and safe con-
  1766
  clusion in the establishment not of a self-aggrandizing control over Egypt, but of an efficient Protectorate, under the cover of which the best interests of the country itself might be further promoted, and the liberties and welfare of its people be permanently secured.
  MR. RICHARD: I am quite aware that there are Gentlemen in this House who listen with some degree of prejudice to whatever I may say on any subject involving questions of peace and war. They are pleased to assume that I belong to what is called the "Peace-at-any-price Party." I do not know exactly what that phrase means. If, in its application to myself, it means that I love peace and hate war too much, I own that the charge lies very lightly on my conscience. But, in truth, it is only an opprobrious nick-name, invented by political partizans wherewith to smite their adversaries when no more convenient or effective weapon is at hand. I do not know whether the House is aware of the origin of this foolish phrase. My hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has traced its genesis. He says that, so far as he knows, it was first used by Friedrich von Gentz, the celebrated German political writer, and one of the Secretaries of the Congress of Vienna, who, in 1815, applied it contemptuously to Lord Castlereagh and the Duke of Wellington a few months before the Battle of Waterloo. It has been applied with the same want of discrimination ever since, by a certain class of persons, to all who are not prepared to run to the same excess of riot with themselves in enterprizes of violence and blood. No doubt there is a body of persons, not very numerous in this country, who, from profound religious convictions, hold views about war that are not generally accepted. I am not ashamed to acknowledge that I am one of them. But I have never obtruded those views on this House, because I feel that this is not an Assembly before which it is safe to hazard an appeal to any high or ideal Christian principle. We can be very zealous, even almost ferocious, Christians in this House on occasion, especially when it concerns the outward and ceremonious acknowledgment of Christianity. But no one would be safe from ridicule here who would attempt to bring our national policy, and espe-

  1767
  cially our foreign policy, to the test of a severe Christian morality. There is another class which may be regarded as the antipodes of the "Peace-at-any-price Party"—namely, the "War-at-any-cost Party," who are always ready to inflame public opinion to the fighting point, but who are careful to keep far away from the privations, the hardships, and the horrors which war entails. They indulge in what the Americans call "high-falutin" declamation about national dignity and glory and the honour of the British Flag. But when these are brought into peril by their own counsels, they preferred sending forth poor follows, whom they hired at 1s. 4d. a-day, to bear the brunt of the conflict while they stayed at home wrapped in luxury and ease. And yet these are the men who crow over us, who vaunt themselves as the only true patriots, and as the advocates of a spirited and heroic policy. Spirited and heroic! I call it cowardly and contemptible. I am fortified in this view by the authority of a great and distinguished politician. A Minister was defending the Government to which he belonged against the charge of not being sufficiently prompt to enter into war, and in doing so said—
  "There is nothing easier than to he brave with other people's blood, and to he generous with other people's money. If Her Majesty's Government had, in the course of a war, to sacrifice all their own fortunes and then to go into the field and be shot, he would say it was a brave and generous action for them to undertake such a war. But as long as the two duties fell, the one exclusively and the other mainly upon other people, he disputed the application of these two adjectives, brave and generous, to the act of a Government which plunged a nation into war."
  These were the words of the Marquess of Salisbury. These words, which were applied to a Government, would apply also to Parliament. Sometimes I have thought that I would move in this House a Resolution to the effect that when a majority voted in favour of war, those who had so voted should be at once incorporated into a regiment, and sent to the front to receive the first fire of the enemy. If that were the law I would answer for it that there would be fewer wars. I have given Notice of a Motion, which I am afraid I shall not have the opportunity to move, to the effect that the recent deplorable events in Egypt are the natural result of the policy of
  1768
  intervention in the internal affairs of that country initiated by the late Government, and unhappily adopted and perpetuated by the present Government. It may be said that I am going back to the region of ancient history. But so far is this from being the case that it is little more than three years since we wore officially and irrevocably committed to what is called the system of the Control. Yesterday there was a passage at arms between the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition on this subject. The right hon. Gentleman charged the Prime Minister with having attacked his Predecessors as regards their Egyptian policy. But the charge seemed to me entirely unfounded. I thought the Prime Minister treated them with remarkable leniency, probably because he felt he had practically condoned their policy by adopting it. In tracing the history of this intervention in Egypt, I have been struck with the manner in which our statesmen seem to have been dragged into it, as by some mysterious influence against their own better judgment. Everybody knows how it originated. In 1875 the late Khedive, Ismail Pasha, applied to the British Government for two persons acquainted with accounts and book-keeping to help him in the administration of his finances, which had fallen into a confused and tangled condition. How this confusion and entanglement arose is a long story upon which I cannot now enter. It is a dreary and discreditable story— discreditable to all concerned. But I may say, in a sentence, that the unfortunate Khedive, having learnt the fatal secret of raising loans in the Money Markets of Europe, fell into the hands of speculators and usurers, who fooled him to the top of his bent, and plundered him and his country in the most merciless fashion. Mr. Stephen Cave, to whose Mission I shall presently refer, in the able Report he presented on Egyptian Finance, shows that the entire proceeds of loans nominally aggregated to upwards of £68,000,000 only amounted to £45,500,000. The minimum rate of interest charged on the revenues of the country in respect to these loans was from 12 to 13½ per cent. and the maximum 26½ per cent. No wonder that the finances had got into a confused condition. But when the Khedive made the

  1769
  application to which I have referred, I believe nothing was further from his mind than any idea of a foreign official to control his finances. All he wanted evidently was a couple of clever clerks to act, as he said, "under the direction and orders of his own Minister of Finance." But the Government, instead of acceding to or refusing his request, did something quite other than what he had asked. They sent Mr. Stephen Cave out to make a thorough inquisition into the finances of Egypt. I believe no more competent person could have been found for such a task, if it had to be undertaken, and he did his work in an able and honourable manner. But, in sending him, Lord Derby evidently had some foreboding that they might be entering on a perilous path; therefore, in the instructions he gave to Mr. Cave, he earnestly impressed upon that Gentleman—
  "To be careful not to commit the Government to any course of proceeding, by advice or otherwise, which might be taken to imply a desire to exercise any undue influence on the internal affairs of Egypt."
  That was surely a wise precaution. But, unhappily, it was departed from afterwards. Then followed the Mission of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen) and M. Joubert, and they, for the first time, recommended the appointment of Controllers. The very name showed that the suggestion was a Trench one; but I believe that Lord Derby still refused to appoint a Controller in the name, and with the authority of the British Government. But in November of that year an Anglo-Trench Control was decreed by the Khedive, and in December Lord Derby again refused to appoint, but allowed an Englishman to accept the appointment of Controller. Lord Salisbury, who meanwhile had succeeded Lord Derby at the Foreign Office, went further and agreed to the appointment of an Englishman, Mr. Rivers Wilson, as a Member of the Cabinet of Egypt. But the Government were still careful to declare in very emphatic language that they disclaimed all responsibility for his appointment. This came out very clearly in a debate which took place in this House in March, 1879, on a Motion of my hon. Friend the Member for Kirkcaldy (Sir George Campbell), who is en-
  1770
  titled to the credit of having early foreseen and persistently proclaimed the danger of this meddling in Egyptian finance. On that occasion the right hon. Gentleman the Member for North Devon, who was then Chancellor of the Exchequer, made a speech marked by the sound judgment and sober sense which usually characterize his speeches, in which he laid down the principle on which the Government acted when Oriental nations applied to them for help as respects their finances. He said—
  "In cases in which any Government with which they were on friendly terms had applied to them to recommend the persons who were trustworthy, they had felt that those Governments were making an application which was perfectly natural and which might be complied with, but they had always been particularly cautious and reserved. They had, as a rule, said—'We will not undertake any such responsibility; but what we will do is to give you a list of gentlemen whose names occur to us.…We will place this list in your hands, and offer any facilities for you to make inquiries, and if you like to make any bargain with those gentlemen, do so by all means.' But they had abstained from entering upon any direct responsibility.…The single instance of an exception to the rule being made was that of Mr.Rivers Wilson. With respect to him they had done what they had not done in any other case. They had given him leave for two years to undertake his office. It was not correct, however, to say that they recommended him. His services were sought for by the Egyptian Government, and they were granted by us, but not tendered by us. He made that distinction because he thought it was important.…When Mr. Wilson went out, he went as the Minister to the Khedive, who had the right to dismiss him from his post whenever he thought fit."—[3 Hansard, ccxliv. 850–831.]
  Well, Mr. Rivers Wilson thus went out on his own account and on his own responsibility, and he was made Finance Minister in the Khedive's Cabinet. But no sooner was this done than the French Government became jealous, and demanded to have a French Minister in the Egyptian Cabinet. This was con-coded, and M. de Blignières was appointed, so that we had the extraordinary spectacle of two foreigners sitting as Cabinet Ministers in the Government of Egypt. This did not last long, as it was not likely it should. I will not inquire how these gentlemen fulfilled their duties; but one thing is certain—that their administration led to universal discontent among the people, so that the Khedive was obliged to dismiss his foreign Ministers. Mark what happened

  1771
  then. Although Mr. Rivers Wilson was not appointed, was not even recommended by the British Government, although the right hon. Gentleman had declared that the Khedive had absolute right to dismiss him from his post whenever he thought fit, yet his dismissal was made the occasion of a violent quarrel with him on the part of our Foreign Office. He was told by Lord Salisbury that—
  "The precipitate and causeless dismissal of the two Ministers constituted a grave and apparently intentional discourtesy to friendly Powers,"
  and that if he did not reinstate them—
  "He deliberately renounced all pretensions to the friendship of England and France."
  Now, here was a complete change of front. Hitherto, Mr. Rivers Wilson was regarded as merely a private British citizen, who made a bargain with the Khedive to serve him as his Minister for certain considerations, the Government disclaiming loudly all responsibility for his appointment. Yet, when the Khedive, driven by the force of a hostile public opinion, and in the exercise of his rights as a Sovereign, dispensed with his services, that is treated, as a violent affront to the British Government; and Lord Salisbury not only lectured him in the style I have cited, but threatened him with deposition unless he obeyed his orders to reinstate the dismissed Ministers. The Khedive refused to obey, and he was deposed. Then the present Khedive was placed on the Throne. I do not wish to say anything disrespectful of that Potentate; but it is impossible not to feel that when he succeeded to power he was the mere creature of England and France. He had, therefore, to do whatever these Powers wished. Then began the new form of the Control, no longer as a private arrangement, but as a matter of elaborate Treaty engagements, which, for the first time, committed the English nation to the obligations and responsibilities it involved. I have here before me, but I will not inflict it upon the Committee, the text of the Decree by which the Khedive constituted the Control. The very title of this instrument is most significant—The Articles of the Decree of the Khedive, under which the Administration of Egypt is now carried on. This recognizes the fact that the whole Administration of Egypt
  1772
  was to be carried on by the Control, and so it virtually was. I should have thought that no man of ordinary sagacity could have read these articles without feeling that they contained the germ of certain difficulty and discord. And what infinitely aggravated the mischief was the fact that it was a Joint Control. We had entered into partnership with another nation who had different aims and divergent interests. No one attaches more value than I do to a cordial good understanding between England and France. But I am very much of the opinion of my lamented Friend, Mr. Cobden, as to relations with other States, which was "Friendship with all, alliance with none." This was the state of things when the present Government came into Office. I heartily wish that they had refused to accept this part of the sinister inheritance bequeathed to them by their Predecessors. It is scarcely possible to believe, looking at the composition of the present Cabinet, that they could have approved of it. Indeed, the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister read yesterday an ex-tract from a speech, in which he had expressed strong disapproval of a scheme mooted in 1876 for meddling with Egyptian finance, far slighter than that which was afterwards embodied in the Control. Indeed, the right hon. Gentleman hardly did sufficient credit to his own vigilance and prophetic sagacity by the extracts which he read from that speech. I venture to quote two or three other sentences from the same speech—
  "I hope it will not he thought that I am premature in calling attention to the very slight and at the same time appalling outline of the scheme which it is proposed to substitute for the scheme of the Khedive. I shall he glad if any explanation is given which will remove the difficulties and apprehensions which we may feel in connection with it. Let me say that while I can understand the motives connected with recent transactions which have led Her Majesty's Government to feel that it may be a matter of importance, for reasons connected with their own conduct and proceedings, to bolster up Egypt, I think that in the whole of that matter they are treading upon tender ground. This is a question on which the public mind is extremely sensitive, and unless they are very cautious in the proceedings they adopt they may bring serious consequences upon Parliament and on themselves."—[3 Hansard, ccxxvii. 1424.]
  And they have brought serious consequences on Parliament and on them-

  1773
  selves. And my hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs never concealed his dislike of the Control. Speaking to his constituents, in 1879, he said that—
  "Lord Salisbury had virtually taken the Government of Egypt into our hands and those of the French Republic, and had reversed the cardinal principles of our Egyptian policy."
  What was the condition of things in Egypt under the Control? It has been said, and I dare say truly, that there was a great increase of material prosperity. That is one side of the question; but there is another side which verifies the language of my hon. Friend, that we had virtually taken the Government of Egypt into the hands of England and France. The Revenue of Egypt is £9,000,000 or £10,000,000. About one-half of this is sent out of the country to pay the foreign bondholders, which is as if £40,000,000 of our Revenues were sent out of the country, while nearly all places of trust and power and emolument in Egyptian administration are monopolized by Europeans. Let me show how rapid has been the growth of this under the Control. At the beginning of the year 1879 only 744 Europeans were in the pay of the Government of Egypt; and these, it must be remembered, already filled all the offices both in the Courts, Railways, Telegraphs, Port Trusts, &c, where foreigners were naturally required, or had been employed under the Consular Convention of 1870. But at the close of 1879, 208 had been added to that number, with salaries aggregating £60,000 a-year. In 1880, 250 more were appointed, with emoluments of £02,000 a-year; and again, in 1881, a further batch of 122 Europeans was introduced drawing £26,016 a-year. The total number actually receiving pay in March, 1882, was 1,325; and the total pay was £373,000 a-year, which is about one-twelfth part of the entire available Revenue of the country, to which must be added that there are between 60,000 and 100,000 Europeans in Egypt who live nearly tax free. Then there arose the National Party. And is it any wonder that a National Party should rise? It was time it should rise, and the Egyptians would have showed themselves utterly devoid of dignity and self-respect if they had not revolted
  1774
  against such a state of things. I believe there is a real National Party in Egypt. Of course, all the European office-holders do all in their power to deny or discredit that Party. It is most unfortunate that, in circumstances where accurate and impartial information is most necessary for the formation of an intelligent judgment, the Government at home has so often to receive its impressions from agents who, consciously or unconsciously, are swayed by their own interests and passions, or who blunder from sheer ignorance. There was a flagrant illustration of it in the case of the Transvaal. To the last moment our Representatives there declared with the utmost confidence that the discontented Boers were only a small body of ambitious and disorderly men, while the great bulk of the people were delighted with the annexation of their country. And so, I believe, it has been to a large extent with regard to Egypt. It may be said that the present Government, having come in after the country had been committed to the policy of intervention, could not have done otherwise than they have done. I am very sorry to be obliged to say in regard to a Government, which I have, to the best of my ability, hitherto supported, that I cannot acquit them of having committed very grave errors in the management of this business since it has come into their hands. There were especially three grave errors into which they seem to have fallen. The first was when Lord Granville, in an evil moment, permitted himself to be seduced into signing the Dual Note prepared for him by M. Gambetta, which committed the country to vast and vague obligations in Egypt, both moral and material. The second was the adoption of what is called the Ultimatum; and the last and most fatal of all was the sending of the Fleet to Alexandria. I ask, again, what was the Fleet sent to Alexandria for? Up to that time, so far as I can see from the Papers, there had been a series of intrigues and counter intrigues in the country, but no serious outbreak of violence. Why was the Fleet sent? Various reasons have been assigned—indeed, reasons so various and contradictory as to indicate some embarrassment in finding a consistent answer. But it seems to me to stand forth clearly from the documents in our hands, that it was sent, in

  1775
  fact, to depose one Government, and to install another in Office; in other words, to uphold the Ultimatum, which was presented, let it be remembered, not by the Governments of England and France, but by their subordinates in Egypt on their own authority, for Lord Granville expressly declares that—
  "The terms of this Note had not been previously submitted to Her Majesty's Government."
  And what did this Ultimatum demand? It demanded not only the resignation of the whole Egyptian Ministry, but the deportation of Arabi Pasha from the country, and the banishment of two other Members of the Cabinet into the Interior. Was there ever so monstrous a demand made on the Government of an independent country? But another reason assigned by Lord Granville in his despatch of May 15 is that the Fleet was sent" to protect British subjects and Europeans. "Well, how have you done that? Up to that time British subjects and Europeans had been apparently quite safe in Egypt. There were rumours of disturbances in the Provinces, as there always are in those countries. But since the arrival of your Fleet all British subjects and Europeans have had to floe precipitately from Alexandria, leaving their property to the mercy of the fanatical Natives. The Government could not fail to have been aware that the appearance of a British Squadron in Egyptian waters would produce danger to European residents. They had been warned of this even by Sir Edward Malet, in a passage which Lord Granville has reproduced, but the warning coupled with a strange assurance that—
  "The political advantage of the arrival of vessels at Alexandria would he so great as to outweigh in consideration the danger which might possibly accrue to Europeans in Cairo."
  What the political advantage is is not revealed. But we have more evidence on this point. On May 15, Sir Edward Malet writes that he and his French Colleague had called on Arabi Pasha, and warned him that if order were disturbed he would be held personally responsible. His answer was very significant—
  "He would guarantee public order and the safety of the Khedive so long as he remained Minister; but that, in the event of an Anglo-
  1776
  French Squadron arriving, he could not guarantee public safety."
  But, taking the objects defined by the Prime Minister a little while ago in justification of this armed intervention, it seems to me that every one of those objects has been injured or imperilled instead of being promoted by intervention. What did he say those objects were? To maintain the rights of the Sultan, the rights of the Khedive, the rights of the people of Egypt, and the rights of the foreign bondholders. The rights of the Sultan ! I should have thought the right hon. Gentleman was the last man in the world to care for the rights of the Sultan. I am quite certain of this—that if the people of England could be polled, they would protest, by an overwhelming majority, against one penny of British money, or one drop of British blood, being expended to maintain the authority of the Sultan in Egypt, or anywhere else. It was not without a great sense of relief that many of us learnt that the project of sending Turkish troops to restore order in Egypt had fallen through, for we know from their operations in Bulgaria and elsewhere in what fashion Turkish troops restore order. But have you maintained "the rights of the Sultan?" He does not think so; seeing that he has protested firmly and persistently, and in every form of language he could employ, against your Naval intervention, as derogating from his Sovereign rights and undermining his authority, and undoubtedly your plan placed him in a position of the greatest embarrassment and humiliation. But "the rights of the Khedive, "how have you maintained them? Why, he owes his life not to your protection, but to the forbearance, or the corruptibility, of Arabi's soldiers. He had the courage not to accept your offer to run away on board your ships; and he was left to his fate, and it was not owing to anything you have done that he did not perish in the confusion and turbulence you had provoked. But when that turbulence is over, as I suppose you hope it will be some day, when you have desolated Egypt with war and restored some kind of order, and the Khedive is re-installed in authority, do you think that he will be more acceptable to the people of Egypt for having been imposed upon

  1777
  them by foreign swords? Well, then, we come to "the rights of the people of Egypt." How have you protected them? You have bombarded a city of 200,000 inhabitants. ["No, no!"] Well, you have bombarded their earthworks and fortifications. But I maintain that a great deal of the mischief done to the city was done by the bombardment. You have, for a time at least, destroyed a great part of the industry and commerce of Egypt; you have plunged tens of thousands of the people into privation and misery, and made them responsible for enormous burdens hereafter. Lord Granville says that we have not yet demanded compensation for the disorder and massacre of the 11th of Juno. But he intimates we intend to do so. And there are ominous intimations in the Italian papers that millions upon millions' worth of property belonging to that nation have been destroyed by the bombardment and the conflagration which ensued, for which indemnity will have to be demanded of somebody. Who will have to pay? Will you impose that upon the Egyptian people, whose "rights" you have undertaken to maintain? I care not about the rights of the bondholders. I say in the language of a very sober journal, The Economist—
  "To link our national interests to the claims of the bondholders is the sure way to imperil them."
  It seems to me monstrous that the blood and money of the working people of this country should have to be expended to protect the investments and to collect the coupons of speculators in Egyptian Stock. But I confess I cannot see how, by plunging the country into what may be a prolonged anarchy, you have bettered the condition or prospects of even the bondholders. But, perhaps, the hardiest—I may almost say the most audacious—plea put forward is that the bombardment of Alexandria was a strict act of self-defence. Now, look at that plea for a moment. You send your Fleet to the waters of a foreign nation, which nobody pretends had up to that time attacked or molested us in any way. You send it avowedly in a menacing attitude, and with hostile purpose; and when the Government and people of that country take some precautions to fortify their coasts against this invading
  1778
  force, that is treated as an affront, and you pour your infernal fire upon them "in strict self-defence." I find a man prowling about my house with obviously felonious purposes. I hasten to get locks and bars, and to barricade my windows. He says that is an insult and threat to him, and he batters down my doors, and declares that he does so only as an act of strict self-defence. I own that I thought non-intervention in the internal affairs of other nations was one of the principles of the Liberal Party. In the very first speech ever delivered by Earl Grey in the House of Lords as Prime Minister, when he was expounding the policy of the Liberal Administration of which he was the head, these were the words he used—
  "Our true policy is to maintain universal peace; and, therefore, non-interference is the principle—the great principle—which ought to be, and will be, heartily adopted by the present Administration."
  My hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State seems to say that he also holds the principle of non-intervention, but with an exception. A witty French writer says that those who hold a principle with an exception are like a man who should take some precious essence and put it into a bottle, which he corks and hermetically seals, but leaves some small unseen crack at the bottom of the bottle through which all the precious contents gradually ooze out. Such are those who hold a principle with an exception. No language can adequately express the disappointment, surprise, and pain with which I see the nation led into this miserable embroglio in Egypt by statesmen whom I have so deeply honoured and so implicitly trusted as I have the Prime Minister and Lord Granville. I have not been accustomed to use flattering words towards the right hon. Gentleman at the head of the Government, because I should not regard myself as of sufficient importance to make any tribute from me of much value to him. But now that I am obliged to dissent from his policy, I may be permitted to say that I have yielded to no man living in intense admiration of his transcendent abilities, and profound veneration for his character. The name and fame of men like him form a part of the common inheritance of the Liberal Party, and, indeed, of the nation at large; and not

  1779
  the least painful misgiving I feel at the present moment is lest these unhappy events should cast a shadow on the close of a great and illustrious career. At any rate, I am glad that I have had an opportunity of delivering my own soul. I cannot vote for this money, which to me is nothing else than blood-money; and as it is only by refusing to support the Vote that I can put on record my practical protest against proceedings which in my conscience I believe to be as impolitic as they are immoral, and which open before us a future full of ominous and perilous possibilities, I am determined to record my vote against this proposal, even if I have to walk into the Lobby alone.
  MR. GORSTsaid, he had hoard with pleasure the speech of the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; but the hon. Baronet would, perhaps, forgive him for saying that there was an important defect in his speech. The hon. Baronet told the Committee everything upon which the great majority of the House was agreed. He said we were in conflict with a military movement in Egypt; he described the great interests and duties this country had in Egypt, and drew the conclusion that we were bound to maintain law and order in Egypt. So far, he thought, the great majority of the House, with the exception, perhaps, of the hon. Member who just spoken, and one or two other hon. Members, was agreed; but the hon. Gentleman did not state and discuss those points of the case upon which the Committee would very much like to be informed. He did not describe what the events were which led to the conflict, or how far those events were preventible or not. He thought the Committee were entitled, in voting this money, at all events, in their speeches, to ask the Government how they had brought the country into this unfortunate position? The Committee had no opportunity on this occasion of expressing their opinion on the policy of the Government by voting, because they could not put any Resolution on the Paper, and could not take any vote in the House or in Committee without standing between the Government and that Supply which they were only too ready to give to the Executive in its need. Therefore, there was no opportunity of taking the sense
  1780
  of the House or the Committee; but they had a right in debate to point out the errors and faults by which the Government had brought the country into this unhappy conflict with military despotism in Egypt, and to ask for an explanation. It seemed to him that there were two forces which the Government might have invoked to control the military movement in Egypt. These two forces were, in the first place, the Suzerain Power of the Sultan; and, in the second place, the National movement as represented by the Chamber of Notables. Unhappily, the Government had by their policy brought themselves into conflict with both forces, and that not in pursuance of any distinct policy, but because they had allowed themselves from the very outset to be led by their Ally, the Republic of France, or rather by M. Gambetta, the greatest of the Republicans, into a course to which the Government had, when they took Office, expressed their disapprobation. The Under Secretary of State in his speech had said that the Government had treated the National Party with sympathy, and had also said that they had raised no objection to the National movement until it had become military. It would have been very much more consonant with facts if the hon. Gentleman had said that Her Majesty's Government had discouraged and repressed the National movement Egypt until they had thrown it into the arms of Arabi, and had, through their own misconduct, identified it with the military movement. He would try to make that good. The Government had had every reason to regard with favour the Chamber of Notables, because at the time of the military revolt, in September, 1881, the Chamber had come in a most unexpected manner to their rescue. When, on the 30th of September, events took an unexpected turn for the better, relief had come from an equally unexpected quarter. Arabi had summoned to Cairo in support of his demand for a Constitution the Members of the Old Chamber of Notables; and those gentlemen on their arrival had gone in a body to Cherif Pasha, and had entreated him to form a Ministry, offering him their personal guarantee that if they consented the Army would submit, and it was by that means that the military movement had

  1781
  been put down. The Government had had, therefore, every reason to look with hope and favour upon the meeting of the Chamber of Notables. That had taken place soon after the despatch of Her Majesty's Government on November the 4th; but the Ally of Her Majesty's Government had been of a different opinion. They had been told in the month of December by M. Gambetta that the approaching meeting of the Chamber of Notables made him uneasy—
  "They might support the Khedive's authority, or they might make common cause with the colonels."
  And the Government had been induced by M. Gambetta to meet the Chamber of Notables before they had assembled with that identical communication which had been regarded by the Porte as an infringement of its Sovereignty, and it had not been calculated to inspire confidence in the Chamber of Notables. It had not been a great length of time before the Chamber of Notables had put to the test the words which had been used in the despatch of November 4, about having "no desire to diminish national institutions," because, not long after they had assembled, they had made a reasonable proposition with reference to the Egyptian Budget, which he (Mr. Gorst) thought was the key-stone of the present trouble, which he would contend had arisen from the conduct of the English and French Governments, with regard to the Budget. In the Egyptian Budget there were two distinct sections, one which related to the revenues assigned to the payment of the Public Debt; and, with reference to that part of the Budget, no claim whatever had been made at any time by the Chamber of Notables to interfere with it; but there was a second part of the Budget which related to revenues not so assigned, and which had no connection with the Public Debt, and with which the Controllers had no direct right to interfere. The Chamber had claimed the right to discuss and vote that second part of the Budget, which was free from all international obligations, with the understanding that they should not interfere with the part of the Budget subject to international obligations. How had that proposal been received by the English Government? Recollecting, he (Mr. Gorst) supposed, their de-
  1782
  spatch of the 4th of November, they had said—
  "That they did not wish to commit themselves to a total or permanent exclusion of the Chamber of Notables from handling the Budget."
  Therefore, it had been accepted without positive opposition by Her Majesty's Government; but that again had been only for a day, because the next day they had been informed by M. Gambetta that he had a—
  "Very strong objection to any interference by the Egyptian Chamber with the Budget."
  He had said that—
  "It behoved France and England to be very firm, lest any appearance of vacillation on their part should encourage the pretensions of the Notables to lay their hands on the Budget."
  And in obedience again to their French Ally, within a few days Her Majesty's Government had come to the conclusion—
  "That the proposal of the Notables could not be agreed to."
  Had that been to diminish liberty, or to tamper with the institution to which liberty had given birth? And were the Government of England at that moment, in obedience to their French Ally for the time being, running counter to the most cherished traditions of our national history? Well, M. Gambetta had not been content with sending a mere intimation to the English and French Agents in Egypt that the proposal of the Notables could not be agreed to. He had sent a very strong instruction directing M. Sienkiewicz—
  "To concert measures with Malet, and to insist upon Cherif Pasha absolutely rejecting the demands of the Notables, and not to listen for a moment to the proposed compromise or anything of the kind."
  The Government were warned by Sir Edward Malet that the breach with Cherif might throw the Notables into the arms of Arabi, and their own officer had written—
  "I should prefer to give the Chamber the right, and to wait until this right is abused before interfering. It must be borne in mind that the Egyptians have distinctly, for good or for evil, entered upon a Constitutional path— that the Organic Law of the Chamber is their charter of liberties."
  A few days later, on the 20th of January, he (Sir Edward Malet) had written

  1783
  a remarkable passage, which he (Mr. Gorst) thought justified him in saying that it was the dispute with the Chamber of Notables about the Budget which gave the key to the whole position. On the 20th of January, Sir Edward Malet had written—
  "Armed intervention will become necessary if we adhere to the refusal to allow the Budget to be voted by the Chamber."
  Well, notwithstanding the advice, and the warning, and the hypocritical provisions which had been made by the Government in their despatch, they had permitted M. Gambetta to adhere to his determination to trample upon the national liberties of the Egyptian people, and they had compelled Cherif Pasha to refuse the Organic Law of the Chamber, that had been the cause of the destruction of his (Cherif Pasha's) Ministry. In the despatch in which Lord Granville summed up the whole action of the Government he used the words—
  "It appears as if the opposition to the law had come from Cherif Pasha himself, and that the English and French Governments had supported him in his opposition."
  MR. ARTHUR COHEN: Will my hon. and learned Friend read to the end of the sentence?
  MR. GORSTsaid, he was about to read it. Cherif Pasha, had stated on the 10th, to the Chamber, that he could not accept the Amendments; and the Controllers General objected that by such an arrangement they would lose their hold on the finances. There had been, at all events, an instruction to the British and French Agents to support Cherif Pasha, and they had supported him so effectually that he had been turned out of Office. The language used on that occasion by the Chamber of Notables to the Khedive would mark the sympathy and respect of a liberty-loving Assembly like the present. They had said that the discussion of the Budget was not one which affected Foreign Powers. The Controllers had then very soon reported to the Governments that the power in Egypt belonged to-day to the Chamber of Delegates, and to certain Military Chiefs, "to whose influence the Chamber submits." But whose fault had it been, he would ask, that the Chamber had submitted, but that Government which had rejected the
  1784
  reasonable demands of the Chamber? They were then told again by the same Controllers that—
  "Cherif's Ministry fell only because it would not disregard the opposition of the English and French Governments to the pretensions put forward by the Chamber to vote the Budget."
  At the influence of the Controllers it had been destroyed. As a further illustration, he would point out that on the 14th of May, when Arabi convoked the Chamber of Notables for the purpose of deposing the Khedive, but ostensibly to take his part, one of the first suggestions made by Sir Edward Malet, after the massacre at Alexandria, had been to suggest to the Khedive again to summon the Chamber of Notables. They had learned from the public journals that the Chamber of Notables was now assembling in Cairo, and that some of them had actually forced their way through the camp of Arabi to Alexandria for the purpose of learning the actual state of the country. Therefore, he would say that the Chamber of Notables was a body to which the Government should have trusted; but, owing to the dislike of M. Gambetta to the free institutions of that country, they had been persuaded to place themselves in hostility to that body; and, because of that difference, they had driven the National Party into the hands of the Military Party. They compelled them to throw themselves into the arms of Arabi, and they had now allowed Arabi to pretend to be the head of a National Party, instead of being the head of a military organization. He would ask the Government to point out to the House that in the commencement of the unhappy war in Egypt they had not, by their neglect, been guilty of the pillage and destruction of Alexandria. There was an amusing and remarkable incident in connection with the matter which had occurred at the beginning of the trouble. The Government had written a despatch to their Minister at Paris on the 10th of December, in which they had described the actual position they wished to assume in the Egyptian crisis as an "attitude of a pacifying and calming character." That had been their policy, and the Ambassador, or Mr. Adams, who had been acting for the Ambassador, road that "elegant" description of the policy of the Government to M. de St. Hilaire.

  1785
  M. St. Hilaire had been so struck by that singular and charming phrase of the British Government that he had begged for a copy of it; and, said Mr. Adams, "I ventured to give it." And so those two diplomatists had rejoiced together over those words like the two old women over "that blessed word Mesopotamia." He wondered whether the British Government had recollected their "attitude of a pacifying and calming character" when they had stationed their iron-clads before the forts of Alexandria? He should have thought that it would have had as little of a pacifying character as it was easy to perceive. This matter had been already touched on by several speakers, so that he Mr. Gorst) would deal with it very shortly; but as he saw the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen) in his place, perhaps he might beg him, when he addressed the Committee, not to approach to within a measurable distance of calumny by insinuating that he (Mr. Gorst) meant, in what he was saying, to find fault with the sailors of the Fleet, and not with Her Majesty's Government. The object the right hon. Gentleman would have in making such a representation would be apparent; but he (Mr. Gorst) would defy the right hon. Gentleman to sow dissension between him and his constituents. His constituents were independent, and thought for themselves, like the constituency the right hon. Gentleman himself once represented. They did not, like the constituency the right hon. Gentleman now so fitly represented, take their political principles on trust from a Radical grandee. Well, the proposal to send the iron-clads to Alexandria was first made by the French Government, and it was only assented to by Lord Granville on the understanding that there should be three Commissioners sent at the same time to Egypt from England, France, and Turkey. Lord Granville said—
  "Such a demonstration could hardly in itself be a sufficient remedy or safeguard for the present condition of affairs: but it might be useful as a moral support to the three Commissioners if it were decided to send them."
  Before the three Commissioners were sent, a telegraphic communication was despatched to Sir Edward Malet, asking what effect such a course would have on the life and property of European sub-
  1786
  jects at Cairo. On May 14th Sir Edward Malet, in accord with his French Colleague, spoke of the danger which the arrival of the Fleet might cause to Europeans at Cairo; but it was said—
  "Its arrival in support of the Khedive, who now seems to have with him all hut the Military Party, diminishes the danger."
  In consequence of the unfavourable Report received from Sir Edward Malet, giving his and the French Agent's opinion that the appearance of the ships would be likely to place British and French subjects in danger, the ships were sent to Suda Bay. There, again, the intention to send ships to Suda Bay was persevered in for one day only, because, as in every other case, the view of the French Government was adopted. The French desired that the ships should go to Alexandria, and on the following day orders were sent that instead of going on to Suda Bay they should go on to Alexandria. There was a remarkable instance of the manner in which Her Majesty's Government allowed themselves to be influenced by the French Government to do what they thought was wrong. The other Powers were not, in this case, invited to co-operate, and it was to be found in the official documents that the Prime Minister regretted it, and that the Government thought it a mistake. So that they had here Her Majesty's Government doing an act which the Prime Minister regretted, and which the Government thought was wrong. However—
  "As the French Government held absolutely to it, and as they have gone so far to meet the views of Her Majesty's Government, they have concurred in the course taken."
  He (Mr. Gorst) should like to ask any Member, who hereafter might address the Committee, to produce a single instance in which the French Government had altered their views in deference to the wishes of this country. It appeared to him to be a ridiculous mockery, when, on every single occasion, Her Majesty's Government yielded their own opinion to the opinion of the French Government, and when they even did acts which they themselves thought wrong to please the French Government, that in not one single particular had the French Government ever altered its

  1787
  plans to meet the views of Her Majesty's Government. After a very careful study of the Papers, he had failed to discover a single instance of the kind. Then the Squadron went to Alexandria. And let him point out to the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister that if if the other Powers had been invited, and they had joined in the expedition to Alexandria, the objection which he had pointed out against having troops ready to land and to assist in the operations of the Fleet would never have been raised, and there would have been no fear of offending the European Concert, which, according to the right hon. Gentleman, had been done. When the hon. Member for Greenwich (Baron Henry de Worms) questioned Her Majesty's Government as to the reasons why they had not had troops to prevent the destruction of Alexandria after the bombardment, the right hon. Gentleman put forward two. In the first place, he had said that the sacking of the city was not a natural consequence of the bombardment by the Fleet, and that first reason he gave on the 17th instant. Well, many hon. Members had pointed out the numberless warnings that Her Majesty's Government had received on that head. When he (Mr. Gorst) addressed the House on that subject some little time ago, he was only able to point to the opinion of the Correspondent of The Standard in support of his contention. But as soon as he had access to the Official Papers he was able to discover the quarters from which they had serious warning. They had first a warning from Sir Edward Malet, who told them that Arabi Bey had informed himself and M. Sienkiewicz that, in the event of an Anglo - French Squadron arriving he could not guarantee public safety. The British residents in Alexandria made a communication to Mr. Cookson, which Mr. Cookson thought so important that he asked the leave of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to telegraph straight to London, and which Lord Granville in turn thought so important that he gave the necessary instructions for it to be so telegraphed; and this was the opinion of the British residents in Alexandria, telegraphed by Mr. Cookson on the 30th of May. One would almost think, so accurately did it describe what occurred, that those who
  1788
  prepared the message had the gift of prophecy.
  "The small Squadron, actually in port could only silence the fire of the Egyptian forts, and when those forts were disabled then would commence a great danger for Europeans, who would he at the mercy of soldiers exasperated by defeat, while the English Admiral could not risk his men ashore, as his whole available force for shore operations does not exceed 300 men, although the Squadron was sent here to safeguard European life and property."
  What an unfortunate enterprise "To safeguard European life and property !"Most of the Englishmen left Alexandria, and the few who remained, with all the rest of the Europeans on shore, were massacred, and the whole of the property on shore was destroyed. The Khedive told the Government on the 12th of June—
  "If the Egyptian garrison apprehends any hostile action on the part of Europeans, there is danger of a general conflagration throughout the country;"
  and Sir Edward Malet thought this so important that he not only telegraphed it to London, as he was bound to do, but communicated it by telegraph to Sir Beauchamp Seymour. Dervish Pasha warned them, on the same day, that danger might ensue if they assumed the aggressive—that immediate calamities might be produced by aggressive action —and on June 14 Sir Edward Malet told them that the Agents of Austria and Germany had telegraphed to their Governments that any armed intervention, not excepting Turkish, would place the lives of their countrymen in danger, and that the only means of avoiding the most serious calamities was his (Sir Edward Malet's) departure and that of the Fleet. That communication was considered so important that it was not only sent direct to the Government by their Egyptian Agent, but Count Karolyi thought it his duty to communicate it to Sir Henry Elliot, by whom it was communicated to the Foreign Office. On June 15, again, the Italian agent, Martino, telegraphed to Marsini—
  "Make no mistake. At the first news of an armed intervention, even exclusively Turkish, all the Colonists will fall victims to a fanaticism which has no longer any limits."
  That, again, was thought of such importance that it was communicated officially by the Italian Ambassador in London to Lord Granville. So that

  1789
  Her Majesty's Government had warnings from every quarter, and from every kind of person, through every sort of channel—they had notice that this would be the probable effect of the action of the Fleet. And how, after that, could the Prime Minister state on the 17th of July—
  "It is not arguable, in our opinion, that it was a natural or a probable consequence of the bombardment of the Fleet that an army estimated to number from 10,000 to 15,000 men should evacuate and burn and pillage the town."
  The other reason the right hon. Gentleman gave was even more extraordinary than the first, and in mentioning it he would not occupy the time of the Committee more than a minute. The right hon. Gentleman's second reason was that preparations adequate to cope with the Egyptian Army would, most certainly not have been allowable under the Instrument which was called the "Self-Denying" Protocol. He (Mr. Gorst) had not seen that "Self-Denying" Protocol, and he did not think any other hon. Members had.
  MR. GLADSTONE: I say I did not call it the "Self-Denying" Protocol. That is what it has been called; but it was not my phrase. It was an engagement entered into by the members of the Conference.
  MR. GORST: I take the words of The Times report, according to which the right hon. Gentleman stated—
  "Our judgment is that preparations adequate to cope with that army would most certainly not have been allowable under the instrument which is called the 'Self-Denying' Protocol."
  MR. GLADSTONE: I did not call it so. I do not deny that it has been called so.
  SIR CHARLES W. DILKEsaid, that, to prevent misapprehension, he would state that he had read the document in question yesterday to the House in answer to an hon. Member opposite.
  MR. GORSTsaid, he was anxious not to misrepresent the Prime Minister. The Instrument he referred to stated that—
  "The Government, represented by the undersigned, undertake, in any arrangement which may be made in consequence of their concerted action for the settlement of the affairs of Egypt, not to seek any territorial advantage, nor the concession of any commercial advantage for
  1790
  their subjects which those of any other nation shall not be equally able to obtain."
  MR. GLADSTONEsaid, that was not the "Self-Denying" Protocol. There had been another Paper read.
  SIR CHARLES W. DILKE: The "Self-Denying" Protocol was the one I read yesterday.
  MR. GORSTsaid, there seemed to be a difficulty in this matter; and he should very much like to know why these documents were concealed?
  SIR CHARLES W. DILKEsaid, he had read to the House yesterday the Instrument in reply to a Question. Either on Thursday or Friday last the right hon. Gentleman the Member for King's Lynn (Mr. Bourke) had asked him when the Instrument would be produced, and he had then said that the proceedings of the Conference being secret he could not answer the Question at once. A telegram was sent to Lord Dufferin asking if he knew any reason why the Instrument should not be placed before the House, and a reply was received yesterday from Lord Dufferin stating that his Colleagues would allow it to be communicated. That being so, he (Sir Charles W. Dilke) had at once read it.
  MR. GORSTsaid, that was not the "Self-Denying" Protocol, or the Instrument which had been called the "Self-Denying" Protocol. The hon. Member for Greenwich (Baron Henry De Worms) had referred to it, and had been told by the Prime Minister—
  MR. GLADSTONEsaid, that a verbal ambiguity had arisen in regard to his answer to the hon. Member for Greenwich. Two or three days after giving that answer he had explained that the document the hon. Member was referring to was not the "Self-Denying" Protocol, and that an arrangement had been made between the Members of the Conference in regard to their action.
  MR. GORSTsaid, the statements of the Government were so contradictory that the Committee was getting mixed up. What he had himself read was a document signed by the different Governments on entering the Conference. He now remembered the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs reading a Protocol or an extract from the proceedings of the Conference; but he challenged the Government to show, either by the one document or the other,

  1791
  that they were prevented from having in Alexandria Harbour a force sufficient to land and prevent the pillage and sack of the place. Her Majesty's Government might escape, and, no doubt, would escape, a Vote of Censure in this House—no Vote of Censure could be brought forward with a chance of success; but they would not escape the con-sure of the whole civilized world. They talked of the moral law and of blood-guiltiness; but they might depend upon it that, whether or not they escaped any censure from the Imperial Parliament for the pillage and destruction of Alexandria, they would merit and would receive the condemnation of history.
  MR. CHAMBERLAIN: At the commencement of the speech to which we have just listened, the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Chatham stated that he was unable to move an Amendment to the Vote before the Committee, not, of course, because that would be inconsistent with the Orders of the House, because we have already had an Amendment moved by the noble Lord the Member for Haddingtonshire (Lord Elcho), and the hon. and learned Member could have moved an Amendment in a similar way if he thought fit to do so; but he considered it improper to move an Amendment which might embarrass the Government at a time of national emergency. While, however, the hon. and learned Member hesitated to embarrass the Executive in a time of great need, he did not consider himself do-barred from making a speech in which, at great length, he brought charges against the Government which he might have condensed into an Amendment; but, with a modesty for which I am bound to give him the greatest credit, he assumed that no speech he could make could possibly embarrass the Executive. Well, the hon. and learned Member went on to say that he admitted the existence of a military despotism in Egypt; and he added that the Government might have invoked, in order to deal with this military despotism, two forces—they might either have called in the authority of the Sultan, or have appealed to the influence of the National Party, as represented by the Chamber of Notables. Well, I confess I should have thought the Papers would have shown conclusively that, from first to last, Her Ma-
  1792
  jesty's Government had invited and suggested the interference of the Sovereign of Egypt. We appealed to the Sultan of Turkey to exercise the duty of Sovereignty in restoring order in that country, and the real charge is not that we did not make this appeal, but that we did not enforce it in season and out of season, and independently of our Ally, the Republican Government of France. He taunts us, in fact, because throughout these proceedings we have not on every occasion acted independently of our Allies. Apparently he sets very small store upon the French alliance. ["Hear, hear!"] Well, that cheer may represent the opinion of hon. or of some right hon. Members opposite; but it is not the opinion of Her Majesty's Government. It has been throughout a cardinal point in our policy that, as far as possible, we would maintain that alliance which has existed for so long, and with such great advantage to the two countries. The Committee is aware that, in an eloquent speech which he made a few days ago in the French Chamber, M. Gambetta declared that the alliance was fraught with many benefits to France; and it has been rather unfairly urged, I think, that, therefore, it is of no advantage to England. But, on the contrary, I am persuaded that every word M. Gambetta used with regard to the interests of Franco may be used with equal force with regard to the interests of England. Everywhere throughout the world we meet the French nation, and we must meet them either as friends or foes; and I, for one, say better lot us meet them as friends than as foes. Our relations with France extend over so many and such vast interests that it is of the utmost importance that our negotiations with them should be, as far as possible, of a friendly and confidential character; and, that being the case, in this matter of Egypt it has been from the first the desire of the Government to make to their Ally any concession which did not involve any sacrifice of principle. The hon. and learned Member went on to charge us with deceiving the Sultan with reference to the despatch of the iron-clad Invincible, which took place in the month of October last year. The charge of the hon. and learned Member is that, whereas the Invincible was sent

  1793
  to Alexandria on the demand of the Consuls as a refuge for British subjects, we told the Sultan that it would be withdrawn as soon as the Turkish Commission was withdrawn.
  MR. GORST: What I said was that, after having sent out the Invincible to protect life and property, we pretended to the Sultan that it had been sent out because his Commissioners had not been withdrawn.
  MR. CHAMBERLAIN: No doubt it is true that, while, on the one hand, we said we sent the Invincible to protect British life and property, on the other hand, we said it would be withdrawn as soon as the Turkish Commission was withdrawn; and what I have now to say to the hon. and learned Member is that there is absolutely no inconsistency between the two statements. What was the statement of the Sultan to us? It was that the incident had terminated, that order had been restored, and that the presence of our ships was no longer necessary. We said, in reply—"If you are convinced that order is restored, and that the incident is terminated, you will show your conviction that that is the case by withdrawing the Commission; and, when you have given that proof, we shall be ready in turn to withdraw our ships." The hon. and learned Gentleman then went on to speak in terms of great severity of the despatch of Lord Granville, dated November 4. He said it was distinguished by its intense hypocrisy, as it laid down, in one of its paragraphs, as a cardinal principle, that we were concerned for the prosperity of Egypt and the good government of that country, whilst it was elsewhere stated that our interest was in the safety of the Suez Canal. I fail altogether to conceive the precise inconsistency between these two statements. It appears to me that the well-being and prosperity of Egypt was intimately bound up, on the one hand, with the safety of the Suez Canal, and, on the other hand, with the reasonably good government of the Egyptian people. The hon. and learned Member went on to complain that the Government allowed themselves to be placed in opposition to the National movement, and drove the Chamber of Notables into the arms of Arabi Pasha. It seems to me that that is absolutely the reverse of the facts as they happened. So far from the Chamber having
  1794
  been driven by the action of England into the arms of Arabi Pasha, on the contrary, as time went on the Members of the Chamber separated themselves from Arabi. In the first instance, the Chamber was convoked on the initiative of Arabi Pasha; but subsequently they separated themselves from him, and refused to sit when they were convoked without the consent of the Sultan; and it was the President of the Chamber of Notables, one of its ablest Members, who demanded the retirement of the military leaders and the banishment of Arabi Pasha, and in that way laid the foundation for the despatch which the hon. and learned Member refers to as the Ultimatum of the Consuls General. Then the hon. and learned Gentleman says he will make his charge good; and he does so, in the first instance, by proving that M. Gambetta was hostile to the Chamber of Notables. There is no doubt that at one time M. Gambetta was hostile to the Chamber, and that hostility was based upon the fact that that Chamber of Notables was convoked at the instigation of Arabi Pasha, and would prove to be creatures of his.
  SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF: What is the date of the Paper in which that is stated?
  MR. CHAMBERLAIN: I do not state it as appearing in the Papers; but as an inference drawn from the facts which appears to me extremely reasonable. I should think that, considering the circumstances in which Arabi Pasha rose to power, and considering that one of his first acts was to summon the Chamber of Notables, it was a reasonable inference to suppose that he had assured himself beforehand that their view was likely to be favourable to his schemes. The hon. and learned Gentleman did not prove his case by proving that M. Gambetta was hostile to the Chamber of Notables. Her Majesty's Government were never hostile to it; but the hon. and learned Member says they showed their hostility by objecting to the proposal of the Chamber to control the Budget. As to that, I would say that the Chamber made a claim which, in the opinion of the Government and in the opinion of the Controllers, was in contravention of the existing international agreement; and it is not competent for the Chamber of Notables or the British Government to permit an infraction of international

  1795
  agreement without, at all events, consulting the Powers concerned. All the Controllers and the British Government did was to point out that the arrangements were the subject of international agreement, and could not be altered without a fresh agreement. But the English Government did not express itself as at all unfriendly to a modification of the Control—on the contrary, negotiations were going on for a compromise, and were proceeding very favourably, when matters assumed a critical appearance, owing to the action of Arabi Bey and the Military Party. The whole matter, I will venture to say, is still in suspense. The question of the Control, no doubt, is an extremely difficult one. In the first place, it is perfectly certain that, whatever objection may be taken to the Control, it has been of immense advantage to Egypt. There is no doubt that it has legalized the collection of taxes, that it has prevented extortion, that it has secured the honest collection of the Revenue and lessened the burdens on the people, and that in that manner it has given an extraordinary impetus to the material prosperity of the country. Of course, if the sentiment of Egypt was opposed to the Control, and if they preferred a corrupt system of administration to the stern integrity and inflexible honesty of European administration, then I say that it may well be a question for consideration whether we are entitled to force the better system upon the people against their will. All I urge is that that, at all events, is a matter for the subsequent consideration of all the Great Powers, and not for the isolated decision of the British Government. I observe that in the French Chamber the other day, M. de Freycinet acknowledged the undoubted existence of a National sentiment in Egypt, and said that the time, perhaps, would come when due consideration must be given to it; and I say that when that time comes, the influence of the British Government will be used in order, as far as possible, to give due effect to all reasonable National aspirations on the part of the Egyptian people. Then the hon. and learned Member added to his indictment the charge that, in deference to this French alliance, we ordered our ships first to Suda Bay, and then sent them on to Alexandria. That matter is explained
  1796
  in the Papers, and the explanation is a simple one. The British Government were naturally anxious that the sending of the ships should not provoke an outbreak—a massacre or disaster—at Alexandria, and they wanted to be assured that their presence would not provoke such an outbreak before they finally gave an order that the ships should go to Alexandria. It will be found, on reference to the Papers, that Sir Edward Malet, while he asked at one time that the ships should be delayed, subsequently informed Her Majesty's Government that it was then most desirable that their arrival should be hastened. Our action as to the sending of the ships was guided by the information we received from our Agents. The hon. and learned Member went on to say that while we had recommended and desired that the other Powers should be invited to co-operate in the Naval Demonstration, we had again yielded to the desire of France, and refrained from giving that invitation; and he says that whilst the Prime Minister stated that we had done this in consequence of the French compliance with our wishes in other respects, the most careful examination he had been able to make of the Papers had failed to show him any single proof of such compliance on the part of the French. I must say I cannot understand how the hon. and learned Gentleman can have given any careful attention to the Papers without finding in those very documents, from which he quoted, proof of the statement of the Prime Minister. What is the fact? Why, in the very Paper in which the French Government propose that English and French ships alone should be sent to Alexandria, the French Government conceded to the English Government that the Sultan should be invited to send a military force to Egypt. Up to that time the French Government had persistently opposed the introduction of Turkish military intervention, and at that date, for the first time, they yielded to the representations of the English Government. This point seemed to us to be at the time of the very highest importance. Then the hon. and learned Gentleman, in the concluding part of his speech, called the Government once more to task for not having a sufficient force at hand at the time of the bombardment, and he says we received innumerable warnings as to

  1797
  the certain consequence of the bombardment. In the first place, he refers to the despatch of Sir Edward Malet, which was one of those earlier despatches to which I have already referred, and in which we were warned that the mere presence of the Fleet in Alexandrian waters would be productive of danger to the population—an opinion justified, no doubt, by the state of things that existed. He stated that Arabi Pasha made the threat that if the Fleet did not withdraw he would not be responsible for order. That was a threat which Arabi Pasha made directly on that occasion, and subsequently through other channels; but the hon. and learned Member seems to have failed to observe that a short time afterwards Arabi Pasha, himself and the Prime Minister of Egypt both joined in assuring Sir Edward Malet that when the Fleet arrived there would be and should be no disturbance. The hon. and learned Member adds that the residents in Alexandria also warned the Government; but here, again, he has failed to study the Papers with sufficient care and accuracy. What the inhabitants represented to the Government was that the Squadron then in Alexandrian waters was insufficient for its purpose. As a matter of fact, there was only one iron-clad—the Invincible —and two small despatch boats at Alexandria; and the residents represented that that was not enough, and that from such a Squadron only 300 men could be landed. In consequence of these representations the Government sent another iron-clad directly, and two or three days afterwards three more; and the result was that when the bombardment took place there were three or four times the number of men at the disposal of the Admiral. The hon. and learned Member went on to say that we were warned also by the Khedive and Dervish Pasha. At the time we received these warnings the Khedive and Dervish Pasha were mainly the channels through which Arabi Pasha wished to convey to the British Government a menace to prevent the bombardment, and to induce the Fleet to withdraw; and this, the hon. and learned Member suggests, was the course we ought to have taken. It was a menace from the very man who at that time was preparing and organizing the outbreak that subsequently took
  1798
  place. The hon. and learned Member concluded by saying that we should be condemned by the whole civilized world for not having taken precautions to prevent a massacre. I would answer him by saying that in the sense in which such words are ordinarily used, there never has been a massacre since the bombardment and in consequence of it. It is true an hon. Member asked a Question in the House the other day as to the thousands of persons who were killed in consequence of the bombardment. I will answer him by referring to a telegram which appeared in The Times newspaper, I think, on Friday last. The Correspondent of The Times in that telegram declared that up to that date he had only been able to ascertain that five persons, in all, had been killed since the bombardment, and that he did not believe there had been any more. Of course, there has been deplorable destruction of property, which I think we may say could hardly have been foreseen. It was not possible to suppose that a strong army that was in no possible danger of offensive operations would let loose the convicts, the scum of the place, in order to destroy the property of innocent people, and retire from the town. That disaster, much as we regret it, could not have been foreseen, and if it had been foreseen, I do not think it could have been prevented. The mischief was done before it would have been possible to have landed troops from the ships, and no force that could have been landed could have prevented the incendiary fires that took place. I should like to turn now for a few moments to the speech delivered from a very different point of view, at an earlier period of the evening—the speech of the hon. Member for Merthyr (Mr. Richard). The hon. Member had said he was sometimes described as a member of the "Peace-at-any-price Party." I understand him to admit that he is a Member of the Party that would never concede, under any circumstances, the right of military intervention in the affairs of another country, unless we ourselves were directly attacked. But I am prepared to allow that there is a difference between a view of that kind, extreme as I hold it to be, and what might be represented as "Peace-at-any-price principles." Certainly, I shall not approach the argu-

  1799
  ment of the hon. Gentleman with any prejudice, or scorn, or contempt, for I honour him for the consistency with which, on this and on all occasions, he has courageously advocated the views he holds. But my hon. Friend went on, in a tone and spirit which he will allow me to say was hardly worthy of him, to say that those who differed from him, and held views not so strong as to nonintervention as his own, might properly he described as the"War-at-any-cost-Party"—the Party that inflames others to bloody deeds, and remains at home wrapped in luxurious ease. I do not think it is necessary to impute cowardice and selfish motives to those who like myself believe that the honour and the interest of this country imperatively demand a military intervention. I, for one, at all events, have never accepted the doctrine of absolute non-intervention: and I cannot, for the life of me, understand how that policy of international arbitration, which has one of its most distinguished advocates in the person of my hon. Friend, can ever become a practical policy, unless it is coupled with the idea of an international police. The present appears to me to be a case for the intervention of an international police, and it seems to me that the special circumstances have thrown the duty and burden upon this country. Well, my hon. Friend went on to say that our action was, in his opinion, the irrevocable consequence of the policy of the late Government, unfortunately adopted by the present Government. Sir, it is not my business to defend the policy of the late Government, and, certainly, I am not prepared to say that we are adopting it; but that statement of my hon. Friend, in any case, does not convey the whole truth in this matter, because I venture to say that whatever may be our opinion as to the wisdom of the arrangement which constituted the Dual Control, and which involved this country in a constant interference in and supervision of the internal affairs of Egypt, if no such arrangement had been made, and no Control had existed, there is every reason to suppose that a state of things would have been brought about which would have threatened anarchy and disorder in Egypt; and, under these circumstances, the same duty as that we are now discharging would have fallen
  1800
  upon us. Sir, the cause of our intervention is the danger of anarchy in Egypt. Anarchy in Egypt would affect British interests of paramount importance, and I would say the interests of civilization generally. Now, what are these British interests? They are not— certainly not exclusively, certainly not primarily, or chiefly—the interests of the bondholders. I believe the total amount of the Egyptian Debt is something like £60,000,000 sterling, and I suppose it is probable that £30,000,000 of this amount is held in this country. I am not going to abuse the bondholders as being necessarily the enemies of the human race. I do not think it follows that because a man lends his capital to promote, in many cases, the material prosperity of other countries, that, therefore, he is to be represented as a usurer unworthy of any sympathy. But, on the other hand, any person who engages in a speculation of that kind must take the risks of it, and he is not entitled to call on his Government for military intervention in order to protect his investment. That is a position, however, which has been recognized in the past by the holders of Egyptian Bonds. They have already had to submit to a considerable reduction of the original terms on which they entered into these loans; and in the future, as in the past, they must make their own arrangements, and must not call on Her Majesty's Government to support them. But there are other interests, less questionable, more direct, and more important. There is, in the first place, our interest in the Suez Canal, the great highway of all nations, and, above all, the road between this country and our Eastern Possessions. I had the curiosity to have some figures prepared for me as to the British traffic on this Canal; and I find, on the best estimate that could be made, that £50,000,000 sterling in goods of different kinds pass through the Canal both ways and annually. In other words, one-seventh of the whole foreign trade of this country passes through the Canal at the present time. The fleet engaged in carrying this enormous trade is worth about £15,000,000 sterling, and four-fifths of the entire shipping passing through the Canal is British. As showing also our direct interest in Egypt, I may mention that of the total Egyptian exports, amounting to £7,000,000, £5,500,000 are

  1801
  British, while the French portion-is only £410,000. I hold that the security of that great highway is of paramount importance to this country, and we are bound to protect it against risk. Then, again, there are the private interests—the private commercial interests—which we have in Egypt. Probably there is between £20,000,000 and £30,000,000 of English capital engaged in private, peaceful, and legitimate undertakings in Egypt. Men so engaged in trade, whether in Egypt or any other country, have a right to look to their Government for reasonable protection. I have seen it assorted outside this House that we should give notice to British traders everywhere that they trade at their own risk, and that the British Government will give thorn no assistance and no support. Sir, I am not prepared to agree to such a doctrine as that. I only wish to point out to hon. Members what its immediate consequence would be. If you withdraw from those persons engaged in legitimate occupations the protection which hitherto they have been entitled to claim, you will withdraw also, I expect, a very large proportion of that enormous foreign trade which gives employment to so many of our people and contributes, not only to the prosperity of this country, but to the prosperity of other countries where these great commercial enterprizes are undertaken. I say it is a monstrous notion that all these great interests are to be sacrificed by this country to the ambition of a military adventurer—not to promote the National interests of the country, not to secure freedom in Egypt, not to secure the introduction of liberal reforms, but purely and solely in order that a military adventurer may continue his career unchecked and without opposition, I would ask also—though I do not intend to dwell at any length upon it—what effect would the holding of such a doctrine as this have upon our position, not merely in Europe or Egypt, but throughout the East? It has been said, and said truly, that we are a great Mussulman Power—that is to say, that millions of Mahomedans own our rule, and I cannot conceive anything more dangerous to the security of our people and to the security of our Possessions than that an idea should get abroad that we could be set at defiance with impunity under such circumstances as these. Well,
  1802
  Sir, my hon. Friend attributes the whole of the difficulties which have arisen in Egypt to the existence of the Control. He speaks of the number of Europeans who have been imposed upon the Egyptian people, and who draw largo salaries, and whom the Egyptians look upon with jealousy. But I would point out to him, in the first place, that the great majority of Europeans in the service of Egypt are not appointed by the Control at all, but are in the direct appointment of the Egyptian Government, which may also dismiss them at any time. I quite admit it is natural that there should be some indignation amongst the most intelligent of the Egyptians, who see places that they fairly might desire to occupy themselves filled by foreigners; and certainly' it will not be the duty of this country, when order is restored in Egypt, to use any influence it may possess in order to replace these Europeans in office. But, in my opinion, it would be entirely a mistake to assume that there is the slightest connection between what I would call this National sentiment, which I am inclined to think exists, and which is hostile probably to the control of the Egyptian administration by foreigners and the military movement that has for its leader Arabi Pasha. From first to last Arabi has never said a word against the Control. On the contrary, in a Manifesto he issued early in these proceedings, he admitted that the Control had been of immense material advantage to Egypt; and from first to last, throughout these proceedings, it will be found that his object, as tested by the result of his proceedings, has been to secure personal advantage for himself and his abettors. Let me follow that out for a moment. In February, 1881, the first military riots took place. What was their object? What view was put forward as justifying them? They had nothing to do with the increase of liberty in Egypt, with Constitutional reforms, or the Dual Control. But in connection with them a claim was made for the dismissal of an unpopular Minister of War, and a protest was made against the promotion of certain Circassians to the detriment of Egyptians. That riot, being successful, was followed almost immediately by an increase in the Army charge to the extent of something like £50,000 a-year. Again, in

  1803
  September, when the second military riot took place, the chief object insisted upon by Arabi Bey and the mutinous I colonels was an increase in the Army from 12,000 to 15,000 men, and that riot was almost immediately followed by an increase in the Army charges. The demand was for an increase of £280,000 in the Estimates; but that was finally compromised, and an actual increase made of £120,000 per annum. Then, in March, when another demonstration was threatened, the personal character of this conspiracy was still more clearly shown, for its object was to secure the promotion of a number of lieutenant colonels without the examination demanded bylaw— the object was to secure the promotion of men who could not pass the examination; and no words were uttered at that time, or at any other time, as to any Constitutional reform being required. And so the result of the movement up to the time of the bombardment was this— that 560 officers had been promoted, the numbers of the Army had been increased, and the Military Estimates had been enlarged by something like £200,000 per annum, while all the military opponents or rivals of Arabi had been proscribed, and some of them banished. These were the only "reforms promoted by Arabi Bey, whose action is now represented as a great National movement. If there is any doubt whatever remaining as to the position of this man, I think the Papers will show what is the opinion of the most intelligent Natives about him. There is, for instance, on record the opinion of Cherif Pasha, the most able, the most intelligent, and the most courageous of Egyptian statesmen. He accepted Office at the request, in the first instance, of the Army and Arabi Pasha; but with the greatest reluctance, well knowing that with a mutinous soldiery the situation would necessarily become intolerable. Accordingly, a short time afterwards he found himself in opposition to the Army, and the same Army which had promised obedience to him demanded his subsequent withdrawal and retirement. Then, at that period, there was an interesting conversation reported of Sir Edward Malet with the then Minister of Egyptian Foreign Affairs, Mustapha Pasha, who was supposed to be a creature of Arabi, and who declared in March that the condition of things had become intolerable, that the
  1804
  promotions made in the Army would only lead to further discontent and further promotions, and that settled government, under the circumstances, was hardly to be hoped for. Lastly, in May, Sultan Pasha, the President of the Notables, is reported as having demanded the retirement of the military leaders, and the withdrawal of Arabi from power. Subsequently, Arabi returned to power, not as leader of the National movement, hut in opposition to the Chamber of Notables, the most representative body in Egypt, and in opposition also to the Khedive and the Sultan. My hon. Friend went on to say that the Government made three cardinal errors in the course of their policy, and that the first of these was the Dual Note; the second, what my hon. Friend called the Ultimatum of the Consuls General; and the third, the sending of the Fleet. But I say that all these things hang together. The judgment of the Committee upon them will, of course, be influenced by the view they take of the situation. If my hon. Friend is right that it would be just and expedient to withdraw altogether from Egyptian affairs, to leave Egypt to anarchy, and to run the grave and serious risk of the interruption of the Suez Canal, and of danger to the lives and property of European and other subjects, then, of course, these three steps in the Government policy must be condemned. On the contrary, if it is evident to the Committee now, as it was evident to the Government after the military riots which had taken place, that some kind of interference was necessary if British interests were to be protected, then these were three steps which are easily to be justified. The Dual Note did not go further in principle than Lord Granville's despatch of the 4th of November, to which reference has already been made. That despatch was received with universal approval, not only by the Great Powers, but also in Egypt; and the Dual Note only put in another form the views which it expressed, and promised what at that time the Government were determined to afford—namely, the influence of this country in support of the Khedive against a military adventurer who was threatening his authority. Then the Ultimatum was described by my hon. Friend as the most monstrous demand ever made upon an independent Government. I have

  1805
  already pointed out that this so-called monstrous demand was originally the demand, not of the English Government, but of the Representative Chamber of Egyptian Notables; and as to the sending of the Fleet at the time it was sent, in view of the dangers which were threatening British and other European people in Egypt, I say that the Government would have been open to the severest condemnation unless that step had been taken by them. When my hon. Friend declares that the sending of the Fleet was the sole cause of the disaster which has since happened, I think he has not studied the Papers with sufficient care. Those Papers would have shown him that long before the Fleet was sent information was in the hands of the British Government that anarchy was rife in the Province. This information came to us, in the first instance, from our Agents in Egypt. My hon. Friend is disposed to distrust everything that comes from British Agents; but the Government do not share this distrust, and they relied on the information which they received as to the attempts made to rouse the fanaticism of the people, and as to the probability of general anarchy in Egypt if effectual measures were not taken to prevent it. And I do not doubt, if the Fleet had not been sent, that the loss of life, great as it undoubtedly is, would have been very much more serious. I hope my hon. Friend will receive what I say as being said with perfect sincerity. The Government have not entered upon this business without a full sense of its gravity, without a sense of the deep responsibility which their action casts upon them, and without the greatest possible reluctance. But there was a duty thrown upon Europe and upon Turkey, but primarily upon this country, to see that all the interests which had been created and which existed in Egypt should not be put in danger by a military revolt which it was in our power to put down. We have thought it our duty to interfere, and we have interfered with the sole purpose of putting down this military revolt, and of liberating in this way the National sentiment, to whose free expression we shall be prepared to give the most serious consideration. When those duties are accomplished we shall retire, having sought and having claimed no selfish advantage for ourselves.
  SIR R. ASSHETON CROSS: I do not think that any Member of this Committee can possibly conceal from himself the occasion on which we are at the present moment assembled. We have before us the consideration of the military action of Her Majesty's Government, taken upon what the right hon. Gentleman who has just sat down has chosen to call the determination to put down military tyranny in Egypt. I do not in the least quarrel with the way in which he has described that action; but, at the same time, we cannot conceal from ourselves that we have entered upon a very grave undertaking. It is impossible for us to enter upon that task with a light heart, because, when once the sword has been drawn, we know not, considering what has occurred in Europe and what may occur hereafter, when that sword can be again sheathed. Now, there are two sentiments expressed in the speech of the hon. Member for Merthyr Tydvil (Mr. Richard) with which, although we have probably arrived at our conclusions, for different reasons I entirely agree. I agree with him in feeling the greatest surprise and pain at the action which Her Majesty's Government have taken. The other conclusion I agree with is one which relates to a fact which Her Majesty's Government have not con sidered, and which I think they ought to have considered, in the course of these transactions; and that is that we (the English) were, before these transactions took place, on good terms with all the people of Egypt, and that the people of Egypt looked up to us more than to any other European Power. I am afraid it will be a long time before we can restore those good relations with the Egyptian people, which, up to the period I speak of, so happily existed. But I am very glad to hear from Her Majesty's Government that, at all events, they recognize the vast interests which we have in Egypt. Those interests seem to me to be almost paramount, and the despatch of Lord Granville contains the statement, with which I agree, that—
  "The situation of Egypt on the most direct maritime route between England and her Indian Possessions and Australian Colonies gives to this country a special interest in Egyptian affairs. In addition to this British capital and industry have been largely employed in the introduction into Egypt of the great works of modern improvement, and a largo British com-

  1807
  munity is resident in the country. Its prosperity cannot be affected without involving the material welfare of many British subjects."
  This sentence of the despatch has been substantiated by the right hon. Gentleman who has just sat down, and I think we cannot attach too much force to it. If the Committee will allow mo, I should like to recall one sentence of what is now a famous despatch written by the late Government on the 6th of May, 187 7, in which they showed, at all events, that they were perfectly well aware of the enormous interest that this country had in Egypt in connection with the Suez Canal. The words of the despatch, which has now become an historical document, are these—
  "Foremost amongst British interests is the necessity of keeping open uninjured and uninterrupted the communication between Europe and the East by the Suez Canal; and to blockade or otherwise interfere with the Canal and its approaches could not be regarded by the Government in any other light than that of a menace to India and a grave injury to the commerce of the world;"
  and it was added that—
  "Such a course could not be consistent with the maintenance by them of a passive neutrality. Moreover, the maritime interests of the world were so largely involved in Egypt that an attack on the Canal could scarcely be regarded without concern by the neutral Powers, and certainly not by England."
  These are not English interests, they are world-wide interests, and we are so intimately connected with them that it is our duty to see that the interests of the civilized world are kept safe from the anarchy and the state of terrorism described by the right hon. Gentleman who has just sat down. I very much regret that the question, upon which I should not have said one word, as to whether the original blame in this matter rested with one Government or another, has been introduced into this discussion. In this respect I shall not follow the example of the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister. But I cannot help saying that the question he raised in 1876 was one of small importance comparatively, and that his speech which has been referred to was made in 1876, and not in 1879, as he seemed to wish to represent to my hon. Friend behind me. If anyone will read it I think he will say it is simply a haphazard speech of the moment, and that it is not to be considered as a
  1808
  prophecy. But coming to the year 1879, when—although the right hon. Gentleman says that 1876 saw the groundwork of our policy laid—the famous step was taken, you will not find that the Prime Minister can quote any speech of his in that year in which he is able to say that he foretold anything which is supposed to have come from the action taken at that time. Yet, if the right hon. Gentleman had given warnings in 1870, when a small matter was before the House, and if he really thought that the groundwork of British policy, and of the threatened complications, was then laid, it would surely have been his duty in 1879 to have repeated those warnings in every possible form and shape. But he allowed everything to pass without a word. I will now pass from that matter, being quite content to allow the case to rest on the acceptance by the whole of Europe of what took place in 1879, as described in the despatch of Lord Granville to Lord Dufferin of the 11th of this month. His words were—
  "A declaration was at the same time signed by the Representatives of England, Austria, Germany, Italy, and France, engaging to accept the decisions of the Commission, and agreeing that the law to be framed on its recommendations should be recognized as obligatory in the International Tribunals."
  And if we go a step further in the despatch we shall find Lord Granville saying—
  "It was undoubtedly working well for the material prosperity of the country, and promised to do so for the future. Her Majesty's Government accepted it as a fact, and gave it their unreserved support."
  Hon. Members may be quite sure the Government would not have done that if they had not thought the system introduced by the action of their Predecessors was working well. I hope, before the debate closes, we may hear the Prime Minister backing up the doctrines which fell from the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade, not only on this point, but on a great many others also. The right hon. Gentleman said that this arrangement had undoubtedly had a beneficial result in Egypt—that there had been no extortion since it was in operation, and that it had worked an enormous amount of good to the inhabitants of the country; and with the acceptance of the arrangement by

  1809
  the Powers of Europe, by Her Majesty's Government, and by the President of the Board of Trade, I am content to leave all the frivolous arguments as to what occurred in 1876 and 1879, and to pass on to much graver matter. The question we have to discuss at the present moment is as to whether the action of Her Majesty's Government has really been conducive to the prosperity of Egypt, to the peace of the world, and to the interests of the Empire? The burden of proof in this matter lies upon Her Majesty's Government. The situation of Egypt when they came into Office, by their own confession, was perfectly healthy; they had no fault whatever to find with it, they uttered no -word of condemnation of what their Predecessors had done, and they descried no cloud in the future. But what is the state of Egypt at the present moment? Our interests there are, practically, in the greatest possible danger; lives have been sacrificed, and property lost to an extent to which I need not now allude, and a state of anarchy has arisen which will with great difficulty be put an end to, and I charge this upon Her Majesty's Government as the result of the action they have chosen to take. It is through their want of foresight that they have allowed affairs in Egypt to drift into their present position, and I believe they have done this because there has been in their Councils disunion, and, consequently, in their action weakness and vacillation. They have never been able, it seems to me, to make up their minds whether they would maintain strict union with France throughout, or whether they would leave France and apply to Turkey. France, as everyone knows, is completely opposed to Turkish intervention, and there was a broad line of distinction between the policy of the English Government and that of the Government of France on this one point—that is to say, the English Government were throughout the negotiations wishing, if it could possibly be managed, that the Turks should come in as the Sovereign Power in order to set matters in Egypt right. On the other-hand, the French Government said they were always opposed to intervention; but that of all interventions the intervention of Turkey was the worst. The Prime Minister told us last night that the great anxiety of the Government was that we
  1810
  should not be isolated, and that any action they might take should be taken in concert with the Powers of Europe, or, at all events, with France. What has been the result? They have got a Conference, and the result of that Conference is what the Prime Minister calls a "negative advantage," which means that the Powers themselves are not willing to be parties to military action in Egypt, and that we are, therefore, isolated from them. But the Government had another policy. They said if the Great Powers will not interfere they may give a mandate to some Power to act for them. But, unfortunately, they have not been able to arrive at that conclusion. We have it from the right hon. Gentleman that the Powers refused to issue a mandate to any Power to exercise military action. And then he goes on to say that, at all events, he has this entire satisfaction—that they have the moral support and concurrence of Europe in the policy they are pursuing. If that is all the result obtained from this great Conference, it is a very small one. It may be very satisfactory to know that the Great Powers are not going to quarrel with us over what we are fighting about; but if that is all we are to have for our delay and trouble, it is not very much. The Prime Minister goes on to say—"We have great hopes of getting France to join us;" but the result is that we are as badly off with her as with anybody else. We have the declaration made only yesterday that France, so far as she is concerned, holds herself prepared—for what? Why, to guarantee with us the free use and safety of the Suez Canal. But that is altogether beside the question; indeed, it was expressly excluded by the Prime Minister himself, so far as the Conference was concerned. We are not, then, entitled to look to France now for any individual or material concurrence in Egypt beyond this matter of the safety of the Suez Canal, so that the result of all the negotiations which have been carried on for so long a time is this—that, so far as we know, we are left absolutely isolated to take our own action alone. We have, then, suffered all the consequences of the delay which has taken place; but, by independent action long ago, we might have put a stop to the whole proceedings, without the loss of a single life or of

  1811
  any treasure. If we Lad simply put our foot down months ago, we might, I say, have stopped all this. The result of the want of firmness of the Government, of their want of decision, of their vacillation, of their weakness, is that we are now left in a perfect state of isolation to carry on this war in Egypt— to put down this military anarchy; and we know not how many complications may arise when once the sword is drawn. I do not wish to detain the Committee; but there are one or two points which I must touch upon, because they are broad points, which ought to be remembered. If this has been the view of the Government hitherto, I want to know why it was that they consented, so early as the month of January, to present this Dual Note with Prance? There is no doubt that an assurance has been given of what is called "sympathy and support" to the Khedive. That has been given in all kinds of despatches. But the Government tell us that this Dual Note, given in January, is of an extraordinary character; and they say themselves that the considerations which induced Her Majesty's Government to join in the Note are indicated in the document itself; and they believed that the announcement on the part of the two Governments of" a firm determination"—(I hope the Committee will lay a considerable stress on that word "firm," for it is rather an extraordinary word)—of "a firm determination" to support the Khedive and the proper authority, might have had the effect of averting the danger with which that authority seemed to be threatened. If the status quo was menaced, those people who chose to menace it would find England and France arrayed against them. That is a strong assertion to make for England and France. Turkey had not been asked; it was a Dual Note, not a Treble Note. It was to be the duty of England and France, if the status quo was menaced in any way, to array themselves against anybody who menaced it. An extraordinary occurrence took place immediately afterwards. It was quite evident that after the Note had been presented there was some hesitation and misgivings within the Government as to what they had done. How it arose I cannot say; but a curious conversation occurred between Lord Lyons and M. Gambetta, which is well worthy of close
  1812
  consideration, for M. Gambetta pointed out, somehow or other, that Her Majesty's Government wanted to explain away the Note which they had given, and M. Gambetta felt—I suppose at that time his courage was screwed up—he felt very much annoyed at that, and said—
  "If you explain that away the whole value of the Note will be gone, and we shall have to write a new one."
  He begged Lord Lyons, in words which cannot be mistaken, that the Government should give no explanation of the Note whatever, and that they should lot it go out in its bare integrity as it was. But what happened? I suppose there were occasions on which the Cabinet had their differences. Later on, certainly, I do not know how it came to pass, but the whole of Europe understood the Note as any rational man who road it would have understood it, that if the status quo was menaced, material support would be given to the Khedive to hold him in his position. But was that the real interpretation? Nothing of the kind. No material support was for a moment suggested, but only moral support, which was supposed to be quite as effectual; and there was nothing more meant in that Dual Note of the month of January than was meant in that most innocent despatch of the 4th of May; Europe must have been extremely astonished at that. An explanation never was given to the Khedive at all—he was left alone with the understanding that that Note really meant what it said, and that the Government said what they meant when they wrote it. That led the Khedive to go on trusting implicitly in the assurances of Her Majesty's Government, and must have largely influenced his conduct, for the Khedive, as the Prime Minister has himself stated, has behaved most loyally and truly throughout to Her Majesty's Government. Matters now go on rapidly, and we find M. Gambetta saying what would be the direct consequence if any explanation of the Note was offered. He says, and the words are very remarkable—"You will swell the arrogance of those who are opposed to you"—swell the arrogance, that is, of Arabi Bey. And the arrogance of Arabi Bey certainly did swell, until it has now swollen to a very considerable extent indeed. Matters continued to go on, and the Government

  1813
  had warnings given to them by a great many people. Sir Edward Malet gave them a great many warnings, and he implored them to let it be known that they were going to do something—I now come to the month of May—and to let it be known, at all events to Turkey, that England would interfere. He writes again on the 23rd, and says—
  "The present situation, which is so grave, arises from the belief that the Powers will not interfere, and that France will not allow Turkey to interfere. For Heaven's sake, do something to dispel this illusion. If you are going to interfere let them know it."
  But the great mischief that has happened is that you have encouraged the belief among the disturbed population of Egypt that whatever they did you would not interfere. That is conduct which I deplore as utterly unworthy of Her Majesty's Government. The Government were aware of it, and they soon found the difficulty in which they were placed. They knew they had written that Note, and they implored France, in a letter of a most extraordinary character, to act with them. They said—
  "We have great practical reason to act together in this matter—whatever happens do not sacrifice the great advantage which we have got from our joining on this point."
  But you do not want the matter to be known—you insist on secrecy—a secrecy which you know must be exploded in a few months. They knew the whole difficulty they were in, and they implored France to relieve them from it; but they had not the moral courage to break from France, or, at all events, to tell her, and let it be known what they really meant to do. What happened then? That was in May, and you then have that most deplorable despatch that was ever addressed to a British Government from their Consul at Alexandria. I will not read it again, but it described the deplorable state of Alexandria, and begged and implored assistance. [Mr. GLADSTONE: We sent it.] The Prime Minister says they sent it; but I say they did not—not adequate assistance. What did you do? You sent a Joint Note, and the story of that Note is very curious. Some suspicion had gone abroad that at last the English people would do something more than was expected, and by the full authority of the Government a Dual Note again was
  1814
  presented. That Note, I am bound to say, in the most positive terms, demanded nothing short of the exile of Arabi from Egypt altogether with his rank and pay; and it went on to set forth that if he was not banished the English and French Governments would insist on their conditions being fulfilled. Now, can you conceive a stronger point than this—that this great English Government, having sent one Note, and not having acted upon it, should again insist in still stronger terms, and say—"If this condition is not fulfilled, we shall insist upon its fulfilment?" The only conclusion I can come to is that the Egyptian— Arabi himself—well remembering the fact that Her Majesty's Government had spoken out before, but had not acted, thought he knew exactly with whom he was dealing, and came to the conclusion that the second Note meant no more than the first. He believed, no doubt, that he and his friends had only to stay in their position, and to go on with their arrogance swelling, and that the English Government would stand by with their arms folded doing nothing. That is exactly what they did, and they are much to blame. They ought never to have written either of those Notes unless they meant them to be backed up, and I have never heard a word of explanation upon that point. Either they meant what they said, or they said what they did not mean; and if they said what they did not mean, I say distinctly that that is not the sort of action which any English Government ought to hold out to the country. Many of our troubles have started from that point, and what is the result of the whole story? Nothing was done; and then came that terrible massacre. The right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade has told us, for the first time, that it was not a massacre, because we are to believe some newspaper telegrams which appeared in The Times saying that only a few people had been killed. Only to-day I asked a Question of the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs about a newspaper story of another massacre elsewhere; and he said we were not to take newspaper paragraphs when they talked of massacres, because they were all wrong.
  MR. CHAMBERLAIN: I think there is some confusion here. I was not speaking of the undoubted massacre of

  1815
  June 11th, but of the events subsequent to the bombardment.
  SIR R. ASSHETON CROSS: Then that will do equally well for my argument at the present moment. It backs up my argument that there was a massacre on the 11th of June. I misunderstood the right hon. Gentleman when he referred to one massacre. The fact is there have been so many, and I thought he was referring to that of the 11th of June. There was, then, an undoubted massacre on the 11th of June. There can be no doubt about that—I see the Prime Minister smiling; but this is not a matter about which a single smile ought to come from an English Minister—it is not a question on which a single smile ought to pass across the face of an English Minister.
  MR. GLADSTONE: I smiled at the errors of the right hon. Gentleman.
  SIR R. ASSHETON GROSS: Even if I have made an error, which I deny, this is not a matter on which a smile ought to be produced by a British Minister. The question is far too grave—it is far graver than the massacres in Bulgaria. Does not the right hon. Gentleman believe in the massacre of the 11th of June—in the terrible horrors which passed through the whole City of Alexandria on that day, when life and property were both destroyed? That is a state of things into which we have been brought entirely by the action of Her Majesty's Government. The massacre of the 11th of June did take place—I observe that the right hon. Gentleman still smiles—and the British Consul was insulted and wounded; and though we are going to ask some day that reparation shall be made, none has been made as yet. That was the state of affairs on the 1lth of June; but what is the case now? The arrogance of Arabi has certainly swelled to vast dimensions; and not only has he ignored the Khedive, but the authority of the Sultan as well; and yet he is allowed to go free. We had warning from our Admiral that forts were being built in opposition to our ships. We requested that their erection might be stopped: it was stopped for a time; but soon it went on again, more forts were built, and our ships, which were sent there, as I understand, as a refuge for British subjects and Europeans who might be there in need of help, were no longer safe at their moorings in the
  1816
  Harbour of Alexandria. We were put to all this trouble entirely through the action of the Government, which made it necessary either that our ships must run away, or that there must be a bombardment of the town. [Mr. GLADSTONE:: Of the forts.] Of the forts I mean. Nobody accuses the Government of wishing to bombard the town. If the action of the Government had been much firmer, none of these efforts would have been necessary. I hope the right hon. Gentleman will not smile upon this point. If the Ministry had shown a firm determination that the forts should not be built, they had the power to prevent it; but it was not until those forts became real dangers that they took effective steps to prevent it, and we know the mischief that has happened since. The events of the 1lth of June had shadowed out to the Government that there were not troops enough, and that if the bombardment did take place it would be followed by massacre. In consequence of the despatch of the 30th of May we did take steps to prevent massacre, but we did it only by halves; and this, at all events, may be depended upon—that if we had only sent more troops the Admiral would have made use of them. He did not confine himself to the 300 he had before, but he used all the forces at his command; and I must hold the Government responsible, to a great extent, for the massacre which did take place. Now, I want to know—and it would be extremely interesting to have it cleared up—why it was that at that point, after the bombardment, and as soon as the massacre was heard of, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (Mr. John Bright) left the Government? It was such a curious point at which to leave. He approves the bombardment, lights the match, and after it is all over he changes his mind, and immediately runs away. That must mean one of two things. Either he repents the action he took, or there were great dissensions in the Cabinet before that action was taken. It is clear that when the orders for the bombardment were given, that meant war. Why did he stay and give those orders for war, or, having given them, why did he not stay and bear the brunt of the consequences? We have never heard any explanation from him on that point; but we are thoroughly entitled to have ample explanation before the debate is

  1817
  over, because it might show that throughout all the previous conduct of the Government there have been great dissensions in the Cabinet as to whether action should or should not be taken. However, at last, we are compelled to go to war, and the Prime Minister comes down and asks for a Vote of Credit. He knows quite well that when a Minister comes down and demands a Vote of Credit on such a matter, that Vote will be given to him, and that fact necessarily deprives the debate of some of the interest it ought to have. But there is one question I would like to ask. We are told that this Vote of Credit is sufficient only for three months, and we very much want to know whether the Government calculate that the war, or whatever it may be called, will only last three months, or whether at the end of that period we are likely to be asked for more money? We were told that on Saturday the Prime Minister would give us a full account of the amount of the Vote of Credit; but he did not appear in his place on that day. Of course, we all know what his engagements are, and after a good deal of questioning we did get from the Secretary of State for War the announcement that we were going to be asked for £1,300,000, of which sum £900,000 was to be for the Army, and £400,000 for the Navy. We went away thoroughly satisfied that that was all that would be required, even though we thought the sum so small that we were almost tempted to ask whether there were not any shillings or pence in the calculations. But in the middle of the day an error of £1,000,000 was discovered. It was not £1,300,000, but £2,300,000, that was required. We were tempted to ask how it was, if the Cabinet had decided on the 6um, that a Cabinet Minister should make such a difference between his announcement at 12 and his announcement at 2 or 3 o'clock, when the other £1,000,000 was added? We should have thought very little about, and might have imagined that there had been a mistake about, the amount for the Navy, had it not been that the Prime Minister told us yesterday that, of the £1,400,000 which is nominally for the Navy, no less than £1,200,000 is really for the Army—for the transport of troops. How, then, was it that the Secretary of State for War was not aware of the sum?
  1818
  That wants explanation. [Mr. GLADSTONE: It is taken for the Navy.] Yes; but for Army purposes. The Secretary of State for War must have known that, in addition to the £900,000 required for the Army proper, no less than £1,200,000 of the balance was required for transport or other Army purposes. We cannot help thinking that a great deal of money has been spent already, and that the Government have undertaken a greater task than they are aware of, and have not laid before the House anything like the expenses which they will be asked for before the war is over. I believe they have totally miscalculated what the war is to be, and what it is to cost, and that they have now only asked the House for a first instalment of that cost. We have unhappily been brought into this war by the incaution, the vacillation, and the want of concert of Her Majesty's Government. [Mr. MUNDELLA: Hear, hear!] The right hon. Gentleman says "Hear, hear!" but he is not a Member of the Cabinet, nor can he tell us why the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster has separated himself from the Prime Minister, especially at so peculiar a point. Although we shall readily vote the amount now asked for, we shall hold the Government responsible for this war, because we believe it is entirely owing to their action that there has been any occasion for the Vote of Credit at all.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Chairman do report Progress, and ask leave to sit again."—(Mr. Hugh Shield.)
  MR. GLADSTONEexpressed a hope that the debate would be allowed to finish to-morrow. Hon. Gentlemen should remember that every day added to the debate was a day added to the Session.
  Motion agreed to.
  Committee report Progress; to sit again To-morrow.

  GOVERNMENT ANNUITIES AND ASSURANCE BILL.— [BILL 190.]
  (Mr. Fawcett, Mr. Courtney.)

  SECOND READING.
  Order for Second Heading read.
  MR. FAWCETTsaid, it would not be necessary for him to keep the House

  1819
  more than a few minutes in moving the second reading of this Bill. The Bill simply embodied the unanimous proposals of a Select Committee appointed at the commencement of the Session. That Committee was a representative one, embracing Representatives not only of each Party, but of almost every section in the House. Although the Bill embodied the unanimous proposals of that Committee, he found that there was one portion of the Bill to which considerable objection was raised, and that was a proposal to increase the maximum of insurance to £200, and make the maximum of annuities £200 also. Although he was extremely reluctant to relinquish that portion of the Bill, which was unanimously approved of by the Committee, he felt that at that period of the Session it would be perfectly useless to persevere with the provision in face of the opposition with which he had to contend. Therefore, as he had already stated, if he was allowed to get into Committee on the Bill, he would himself propose to alter the maximum of insurance and annuities to £100; and, if the Bill was now read a second time, he had Amendments which could be at once placed on the Paper, He thought hon. Members interested in the subject would see that he had faithfully carried out his promise. There was another portion of the Bill which was objected to by the bankers—namely, Clause 7; and it had been suggested, by a Circular which the country bankers had issued, that the Government were proposing, by a side-wind, to raise the amount allowed to be annually deposited in the Post Office Savings Banks. Nothing was further from his intention than that. He felt strongly that if the limit of the Savings' Banks' deposits was to be increased, it ought to be increased in an open and intelligent way, and not by a side-wind. But, to remove all doubts on the point, he had prepared an Amendment to Clause 7, which, he believed, would completely remove the objection of the bankers to this provision. If it did not, he should be ready to adopt any suggestion with the object of carrying out more fully their wishes on the subjcet. He hoped that those remarks would show that he had been anxious, as far as possible, to meet the wishes of those who objected to the Bill.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Bill be now read a second time."—(Mr. Fawcett.)
  MR. WARTONsaid, as the hon. Member for Wolverhampton (Mr. H. Fowler) and himself had felt it their duty to oppose the Bill in its original state, he was exceedingly obliged to the Postmaster General for the consideration he bad given to their objections, because, in its original state, the Bill seemed to interfere with the Insurance Companies, and to put a considerable risk on the Exchequer, inasmuch as the amount by which it was proposed to alter the annuities was very considerable. He was also obliged to him with regard to the objections raised by the country bankers. But he had to make a practical suggestion, and that was that, if the opposition was withdrawn to the Bill, the right hon. Gentleman would give some time, three or four days say, for the consideration of the Amendments which he had now proposed in regard to bankers and Insurance Companies. He made this proposal in perfect good faith and with the best intentions, and wished to offer no opposition to the Bill.
  Motion agreed to.
  Bill read a second time, and committed for Friday.

  WAYS AND MEANS.
  Considered in Committee.
  (In the Committee.)
  Resolved, That, towards raising the Supply granted to Her Majesty, in addition to the Duties of Income Tax to be granted in conformity with the Resolution of the twenty-fourth day of April last, there shall be charged, collected, and paid for the year which commenced on the sixth day of April, one thousand eight hundred and eighty-two, in respect of all Property, Profits, and Gains mentioned or de-scribed as chargeable in the Act of the sixteenth and seventeenth years of Her Majesty's reign, chapter thirty-four, the following Duties of Income Tax (that is to say):
  For every Twenty Shillings of the annual value or amount of Property, Profits, and Gains chargeable under Schedules (A), (C), (D), or (E) of the said Act, the Duty of One Penny Halfpenny;
  And for every Twenty Shillings of the annual value of the occupation of Lands, Tenements, Hereditaments, and Heri-

  1821
  tages chargeable under Schedule (B) of the said Act,—
  In England, the Duty of Three Farthings;
  In Scotland and Ireland respectively, the Duty of Five-eighths of a Penny;
  Provided always, That whore any Dividends, Interest, or other annual Profits or Gains are duo or payable, half-yearly or quarterly, in the course of the said year, the first half-yearly payment, and the first two quarterly payments shall be deemed to have been or to be chargeable with the Duty of Five Pence, and the other half-yearly payment and the two other quarterly payments shall be deemed to be chargeable with the Duty of Eight Pence.
  Resolution to be reported To-morrow;
  Committee to sit again To-morrow.

MOTIONS.

  ARTIZANS' DWELLINGS BILL.
  On Motion of Mr. SHAW LEFEVRE, Bill to amend the Artizans' and Labourers' Dwelling's Acts, ordered to be brought in by Mr. SHAW LEFEVRE and Secretary Sir WILLIAM HAR-COURT.
  Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 255.]

  NAVY (H. M. S. "INFLEXIBLE").
  Return ordered," showing the estimated and actual cost of building and completing for Sea service H.M.S. 'Inflexible.' "—(Mr. Campbell-Bannerman.)
  Return, presented accordingly; to lie upon the Table, and to he printed. [No. 306.]

  NAVY (SHIPS' ACCOUNT), 1882–3.
  Copy ordered, of Account of the state of Ships in the Programme for 1882–3, showing where built; when launched; first cost; total cost of repairs up to taking ship in hand for present repair; dates when commissioned and paid off; stations on which employed; work done up to the present time; present condition and nature of repairs proposed now to be done (in continuation of Parliamentary Paper, No. 406, of Session 1881) and of Ships now awaiting repair, with the date of their last commission.—(Mr. Campbell-Bannerman.)
  Copy presented accordingly; to lie upon the Table, and to be printed. [No. 307.]

  COMMISSIONERS OF IRISH LIGHTS (COPELAND OR MEW ISLAND STATION).
  Return ordered, "of the further Correspondence, since the date of the last letter of the
  1822
  last Return (20th day of February 1882, No. 32), which has taken place between the Commissioners of Irish Lights, the proprietors of Mew Island, the Trinity House, Mr. John R. Wigham, the Board of Trade, and Professor Tyndal, respecting the improvements of the light on, and the establishment of a fog signal at, Copeland or Mew Island, and the adoption of gas instead of oil as a means of illuminating that station."—(Mr. Ewart.)
  House adjourned at half after One o'clock.