Commons Sitting of 24 June 1881

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS—Report—Commons Regulation (Shenfield) Provisional Order* [183]; Tramways Orders Confirmation (No. 3) * [169].
Third Reading—Burial Grounds (Scotland) Act (1855) Amendment* [184]; and passed.
The House met at Two of the clock.

QUESTIONS.

  ARMY (AUXILIARY FORCES)—MILITIA SURGEONS.
  DR. FARQUHARSONasked the Secretary of State for War, Whether it is
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  his intention to grant compensation for loss of expectation of pension to those Militia Surgeons who joined previous to Lord Panmure's Circular of 1854; and, whether it is his intention to compensate Militia Surgeons generally for the serious loss of income inflicted on them by recent changes, and in particular by the withdrawal of fees for the examination of recruits?
  MR. CHILDERS: No, Sir; I can only say that this question was fully considered and finally dealt with by my Predecessor (Viscount Cranbrook) some years ago, and I cannot undertake to re-open it.

  FRANCE AND CANADA—COMMERCIAL TREATY.
  MR. ECROYDgave Notice that on Thursday he would ask the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, Whether the statement is correct which recently appeared in the newspapers, that the French Consul at Quebec had received and communicated to the Governor General in Council official information that the French Minister for Foreign Affairs decided to conclude a Commercial Treaty direct with Canada?
  SIR CHARLES W. DILKE: Sir, if the House will permit me, I will deal with this matter at once by replying to the Notice as if it were a Question. I have been informed by the Canadian Prime Minister and by the Representative of Canada in this country that they have no knowledge of any such communication having been made, and, certainly, that Canada has not taken any steps to cause such a communication to be made.

  SHERIFFS' SALES (IRELAND);
  MR. HEALYasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether sheriffs' sales in Ireland held by auction have not been hitherto open to the public in the freest manner; whether it is not essential to the legal character of a sale by public auction that it should be so open; if the Government have considered whether the action of the Executive in Ireland in issuing proclamations prohibiting public assemblages at sales by auction, under execution by landlords against tenants, is not likely to have a ruinous effect on the tenants by deter-

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  ring probable purchasers from attending thereat, and thus letting the tenants' property fall into the hands of their landlords at nominal prices; whether the Government will take into consideration the advisability of ceasing to issue such proclamations as those referred to; whether the attention of the Government has been called to the several recent cases in which the police attending sheriffs' sales have, even where no such proclamation was issued, excluded large sections of the public there from, as reported in the public press, on the ground that the people excluded were not "probable bidders;" whether such action on the part of the constabulary is legal; whether, if so, it is part of the functions of the police to discriminate between probable bidders and non-bidders; whether they are possessed of any special information which would enable them to do so; whether he will state to the House the principles on which they exercise such discrimination; whether, if not legal, such proceedings on the part of the police are not actionable, both as against them and as against the sheriff concurring therein; and, whether the Government will issue instructions to the police that such conduct must not be repeated?
  MR. W. E. FORSTER: Sir, the hon. Member asks me six Questions. In answer to the first two, I have to say that sheriffs' sales have been open to the public hitherto in the freest manner; and it is essential that they should be so. With regard to the third Question, I think the hon. Member has misinterpreted the facts. No proclamation has been issued by the Government prohibiting public assemblages at sales by auction. The proclamation issued was this—It alluded to assemblages and meetings held for the purpose of obstructing by intimidation and threats of violence the execution of certain writs. The Government were determined to prevent any such obstruction, and they gave notice prohibiting any such assemblage for the purpose of so obstructing any sheriffs' sale. The object of the proclamation was to prevent obstructing the sheriff, and we considered that we were carrying out the object of having the sheriffs' sales held in the freest manner by preventing persons obstructing them. [Laughter.] That was the object, and I have not the slightest doubt it has had that effect. If we had
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  not done so, the sales would have been obstructed; and I believe that what we did has been the means, not of deterring probable purchasers from attending them, but of enabling people to attend who might otherwise be afraid to do so. With regard to the fourth Question, as to whether the Government would consider the advisability of ceasing to issue such proclamations, we shall certainly consider it our. duty to issue them in future, whenever there is the same reason for it. As to the fifth Question, it has not been the practice of the police to exclude large sections of the public from the sheriffs' sales; but, in a few isolated cases, the people have been excluded by order of the sheriff. This was where a proclamation was not in force, and it was done on the ground that the persons had no business at the sale, and might create a disturbance. In these cases the police, from their local knowledge, had no difficulty in discriminating between probable bidders and mere idlers. Persons who represented themselves as intending bidders, or as friends of the persons whose goods were under seizure, were freely admitted. As to the sixth Question, I am informed that whatever has been done on the part of the Constabulary is legal.
  MR. BIGGARasked, whether it would not be fairer to the House for the right hon. Gentleman to read the proclamation in full instead of giving garbled extracts from it?
  MR. HEALYasked the right hon. Gentleman, whether he would state to the House the principles upon which the police exercised their discrimination in deciding who were probable bidders and who were not?
  MR. W. E. FOBSTER: Sir, the principle is to use the best possible discretion in assisting the sheriff to obtain as fair an assemblage and as unobstructive a sale as is in their power. If a disturbance appeared probable it would be their duty to take measures to prevent it.
  MR. HEALYwished to know, whether, if the police excluded persons who were willing to become bidders, the right hon. Gentleman would reprimand them?
  MR. W. E. FORSTERconsidered the police deserved no reprimand for the course they pursued.
  MR. REDMONDasked the right hon. Gentleman to read the proclamation in full.
  MR. W. E. FORSTER, in reply, said, he would do so, and the House would then see that the extracts he had already quoted were not "garbled." [The right hon. Gentleman accordingly read the document in full.]

  PROTECTION OF PERSON AND PROPERTY (IRELAND) ACT, 1881—MR. HANNIGAN.
  MR. O'SULLIVANasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, If he is aware that Mr. Denis Hannigan, of Dromcolloher, county Limerick, at present confined in Kilmain-ham Prison under the Protection of Person and Property (Ireland) Bill, is losing his sight owing to his long confinement; and, if so, whether he will be further detained in prison?
  MR. W. E. FORSTER, in reply, said, from the Report of the General Prisons Board, it appeared that during the past two months Denis Hannigan was examined by an eminent oculist, who stated that the man's sight since his imprisonment had, if anything, improved. He was also informed by the Prisons Board that Mr. Hannigan had expressed a desire to contradict the rumour which had appeared relative to his failing sight. The examination of his eyes was made by Dr. Fitzgerald on the 9th of May; but if Mr. Hannigan would like a second examination to be made it should take place.

  ARMY—POLITICAL MEETINGS—COLONEL THE HON; T. G. CHOLMONDELEY.
  MR. LABOUCHEREasked the Secretary of State for War, Whether his attention has been called to a Letter in the "Daily News" of the 13th instant, signed "Philip H. B. Salusbury, Captain late First Royal Cheshire Light Infantry," in which that gentleman states that his father, being Chairman of the Committees of the Liberal Candidates at the late General Election, both in the borough and county (Chester and West Cheshire), and it being well known that he, his son, was an ardent Liberal, he received an order from his commanding officer, Colonel the Honourable T. G. Cholmondeley, forbidding him to attend political meetings, although this Colonel was then himself actively engaged on the Committee of the Conservative Candidates, and permitted his Adjutant and
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  other Conservative officers to attend Conservative meetings, and although at the late bye-election for West Cheshire he was prominent in the cause of the Conservative Candidate; and, whether, if upon investigation these statements are proved to be correct, he will take steps to call upon Colonel Cholmondeley to retire from the service, if he be, as is reported, past the age when, according to the Regulations, he has to do so, unless an exceptional favour be accorded to him?
  MR. CHILDERS: Sir, the letter to The Daily News to which my hon. Friend refers purports to criticize an article in that paper on the "German Soldier," and to quote the writer's own case as a proof that Militia officers do not live in "serene freedom." The writer then narrates the circumstances under which he, being a Liberal, attended a Conservative meeting at Chester in February, 1880; and complains that for his conduct there he was blamed by his superior officer, Colonel Cholmondeley, who himself attended Conservative meetings. I have read another letter, in The Daily News, dated the 16th of June, from Colonel Cholmondeley, in which he explains under what circumstances he wrote to Mr. Salusbury, in consequence of evidence at the police court relative to the language used by Mr. Salusbury at the Conservative meeting. It would be, in my opinion, of no public advantage in June, 1881, to inquire what Mr. Salusbury said, or what inquiries Colonel Cholmondeley made in February, 1880; but I may say that the result was that the papers were sent by Colonel Cholmondeley to the officer commanding the Brigade Dep ô t, who desired Mr. Salusbury to be cautioned as to his future conduct at political meetings. I do not think that this correspondence discloses any reason for removing Colonel Cholmondeley from his command. He will not be exceptionally dealt with.

  NAVY (CONSTRUCTION)—FIGHTING SHIPS.
  MR. W. H. JAMESasked the Secretary to the Admiralty, Whether it is true, as reported in the Naval and Military Intelligence of the "Times" newspaper of the 21st instant, that drawings are being prepared at the Admiralty for laying down a turret ship which will throw the "Inflexible" into the shade,

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  and approach, in bulk and armament the colossal fighting machines now in course I of building by the Italian Government; and that the new ship is to have a displacement of 13,000 tons, engines working up to 10,000 horses, and an estimated speed of 18 knots?
  MR. TREVELYAN: Sir, the class of fighting ship which should next be laid down is creating great interest and anxiety in every European country which has occasion to maintain a Meet; and it is, therefore, only natural that it should excite great interest in our own, for this country can least of all afford to treat so grave a question lightly. The consideration of that question has been the subject of long and repeated conferences and controversies on the part of the Lords of the Admiralty, and of varied and searching study on the part of their scientific advisers. As in duty bound, these gentlemen have made careful drawings of several classes of vessels, of different designs and sizes, having in mind what is doing in the Italian as well as in the French Dockyards. When the time comes I hope to be able to make an explanation, which may communicate to the House something of the great interest which the Board of Admiralty feels in the question—an interest which has led them carefully to pass in review, in print and in drawings, the different theories of naval construction which are now held in various quarters. They have pretty well made up their own mind on the subject, and I shall be very glad when the time comes to state it.
  SIR WILFRID LAWSON: Can the hon. Member give an estimate of the cost?
  MR. TREVELYAN: Yes, Sir; a careful estimate of the cost of the different designs has been made; and we know very well, within what is comparatively a small percentage, what the cost will be.
  SIR WILFRID LAWSON: What will it be?
  MR. TREVELYAN: I will explain that when the time comes.
  MR. GORSTasked, whether the hon. Gentleman would be able to inform the House of the type of ship intended to be built before the 1st Vote of the Naval Estimates was taken?
  MR. TREVELYANreplied in the affirmative.

  TRADE AND COMMERCE—THE FRENCH PATENT LAWS.
  SIR HENRY HOLLAND (for Mr. E. STANHOPE)asked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether it is the fact that patented articles cannot be imported into France under the protection of patent in France unless they have been solely and completely manufactured in that country?
  SIR CHARLES W. DILKE: Sir, my hon. Friend is right in his statement of the French law regarding patents; and representations on the subject were made in 1877 to Her Majesty's late Government. The attention of the French High. Commissioners will be called to the matter in the course of the present Treaty negotiations.

  PROTECTION OF PERSON AND PROPERTY (IRELAND) ACT, 1881—THE REV. FATHER SHEEHY.
  MR. GIVANasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether it is true that on the arrival of the military escort at Naas Prison to remove Father Sheehy to Kilmainham, he was found in the infirmary; and, whether, owing to the state of his health, and in view of the acute feelings of sorrow and regret which his arrest has caused amongst the Catholic people of Ireland, and especially amongst the Catholic clergy, the Irish Executive will prolong his imprisonment?
  MR. W. E. FORSTER, in reply, said, that when the military escort arrived at Naas Prison, Father Sheehy was in the infirmary; but Dr. Kenny, his own medical adviser, said he was fit for removal to Kilmainham Prison, and he was accordingly removed. As to his present health, Captain Barlow reported that he saw him at exercise on the 21st instant, when he informed him he was well. Dr. Kenny visited him on the 22nd, but made no entry in the journal as to his case, from which it was fair to infer there was nothing to mention. Father Sheehy joined the other prisoners under the Protection Act at exercise, and, so far as Captain Barlow could form an opinion, he was in good health.

  PARLIAMENT—BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE—PARLIAMENTARY OATHS BILL.
  SIR EARDLEY WILMOTasked the First Lord of the Treasury, seeing

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  that the Parliamentary Oaths Bill is I down on the Paper for Monday next, Whether it is his intention to proceed with it on that evening?
  MR. CHILDERS: Sir, in the absence of the Prime Minister I will answer the Question. That Order of the Day will be postponed on Monday to that day three weeks.
  SIR H. DEUMMOND WOLFFasked, whether it would positively be brought on then?
  MR. CHILDERSsaid; the hon. Member had better put the Question later on.
  SIR H. DEUMMOND WOLFF: I ask it now, because the right hon. Gentleman promised that due Notice should be given.

  EVICTIONS (IRELAND)—AUGHRAN, CARRIGALLEN, CO. LEITRIM.
  MR. BIGGAE (for Mr. PABNELL)asked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether his attention has been called to the eviction of John Blessing, Aughran, Carrigallen, county Leitrim, who was evicted, with five in family, on May 20th, 1879, and who, after being evicted, re-took possession, for which he was summoned to Carrigalleu Court three times, and was twice lined, but the third time no fine would be taken, and Mrs. Blessing was sent to gaol for a month; whether Mrs. Blessing, on being released from prison, again re-took possession, which she was only permitted to retain three days, when the sheriff and bailiff came and knocked the house down; and, whether she and her husband, who is in bad health and unable to work, are living in a house that was built for them near the old one, with scarcely any food or fire?
  MR. W. E. FORSTER: Sir, my attention has not been called to this case. It was an eviction which took place about a year before I came into Office. If, however, the hon. Member wishes me to make inquiry into the matter, and will give Notice of the Question, I will get what information I can.
  MR. BIGGAEsaid, he would repeat the Question on Thursday next.

  PIERS AND HARBOURS (IRELAND).
  MR. ARTHUR O'CONNORasked the Secretary to the Treasury, Whether he would have any objection to lay upon
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  the Table of the House a Return showing the actual amount of money paid by the Board of Public Works in Ireland for each of the several Piers and Harbour works enumerated in the Return, So. 244, of the present Session, up to the date of that Return?
  LORD FREDERICK CAVENDISH: Sir, the Question of the hon. Member only appeared on the Notice Paper this morning; as I must communicate with Dublin before answering it, I must ask the hon. Member to be good enough to repeat it on some subsequent day.

  ARMY ORGANIZATION—THE REVISED MEMORANDUM-PARAGRAPHS 11, 12, AND 14.
  MR. GREERasked the Secretary of State for War, Whether, under paragraphs 11 and 12, in Revised Memorandum of the proposed changes in Army Organisation, Corporals and Sergeants now serving, and who have not re-engaged, can do so; and, whether the term Corporal includes Corporals of all grades?
  MR. CHILDERS: Yes, Sir; speaking generally, present non-commissioned officers will have the privileges proposed to be given to future ones. The term corporal does not include lance or acting corporal. The privilege is given to a corporal when confirmed in that rank.
  MR. GREERasked the Secretary of State for War, Whether, under Paragraph 14 in the Revised Memorandum of the Proposed Changes in Army Organisation, a soldier who enlisted as a boy under the Army Enlistment Acts of 1867 and 1870, and having been allowed to continue in the Service under section 82, "Army Discipline Act, 1879," and having completed twenty-one years' service from seventeen years of age, would be entitled to receive the full pension awarded after the same service to soldiers who enlisted when over seventeen years of age?
  MR. CHILDERS: No, Sir; a deduction of ½ d. a-day will be made for each year of service given by such a soldier before attaining the age of 18.

  ARMY ORGANIZATION—ADJUTANTS OF THE AUXILIARY FORCES.
  COLONEL STANLEY (for Lord HENEY THYNNE)asked the Secretary of State

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  for War, Whether, as Adjutants of the Auxiliary Force who entered that Service previous to the five year rule serve with, the rank of Captains in the Army and are Honorary Majors, it is the intention of the Government to allow these gentlemen, on retirement after twenty years' service, to receive the pension proposed for all Captains in the Army of the same length of service, and also to Quartermasters in the Army of twenty years' service, viz.: £200 yearly?
  MR. CHILDERS: Sir, in reply to the right hon. and gallant Gentleman, I have to say that the rate of allowances to these adjutants, if compulsorily retired, is now under consideration; but I cannot admit that, whatever their rank may be, they necessarily must have the same rate of retirement as regimental captains.

  PROTECTION OF PERSON AND PROPERTY (IRELAND) ACT, 1881—PRESCRIBING THE CITY OF WATERFORD.
  MR. R. POWERasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, If he can state the reasons why the City of Waterford has been declared a proclaimed district?
  MR. W. E. FORSTER: Sir, the City of Waterford has not been proclaimed. It has been prescribed, with the county of Waterford, under the Act for the Protection of Person and Property. It was thought necessary to do so.
  MR. R. POWERasked what the difference was between proclaiming a district and prescribing it?
  MR. W. E. FORSTER: Sir, if the hon. Member will look at the Acts which have been passed, he will find that the word "proclaim" is used in the Arms Act, and the word "proscribe" in the Act for the Protection of Persons and Property.
  MR. R. POWERasked whether any agrarian outrages had been committed in the City of Waterford?
  MR. W. E. FORSTER: I shall be glad, Sir, if the hon. Member will give Notice of the Question, for I would rather give him an accurate answer. I am quite sure, however, that if we had a right to put the Act into operation at all there was good reason for putting it in operation in Waterford.
  MR. R. POWERsaid, he would give Notice of the Question.
  In reply to Mr. LEAMY,
  MR. W. E. FORSTERsaid, he could not state the terms of the proclamation.

ORDER OF TEE DAY.
  SUPPLY—ARMY ESTIMATES.
    Order for Committee read.

  ARMY ORGANIZATION—RETIREMENT OF OFFICERS.
  MR. CHILDERS: In accordance with the understanding arrived at a few days ago, I rise to move, Sir, that you do now leave the Chair. The Notice on the Paper states that I am to propose Votes 5, 8, 18, and 19, in the Army Estimates in Committee of Supply. I put those Votes on the Paper more as a description of the subjects on which the House would desire to discuss the Army question to-day than with any distinct intention of putting them in Committee of Supply, for even if we should reach the point of going into Supply before 7 o'clock, I should not think of putting them in the event of any objection being raised, although, of course, if there were no objection, I should be glad to take one or two Votes. My object in rising now to move that Mr. Speaker do leave the Chair is to afford hon. Members some additional information with respect to the plans of Army Organization which I unfolded to the House nearly four months ago, as to which I laid on the Table a Memorandum on the following day, and another within the last few days. I may say that since the original Memorandum was on the Table, referring as it does to an extremely difficult and intricate subject, a great many suggestions have been made to us, many of them by way of Questions asked by hon. Members in the House, and others in accordance with my particular request, in the shape of notes addressed to me; and I desire to thank hon. Members for the great assistance they have given us in this manner as regards the elaboration of these details. When hon. Members peruse the Revised Memorandum they will see that we have taken advantage of a good deal of the information contained in those suggestions, whether addressed to me in this House or outside, and that, with the assistance of the very competent officers of the War

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  Office, from the Commander-in-chief down to the junior clerks, we have been able to reach most of the difficulties that stood in our way. I find that a mass of suggested reforms from one end of the Army to the other has been before my Predecessors in Office as well as myself, and no Secretary of State could have deferred dealing with these accumulated questions beyond the present Session. As I explained before, we stand in the position of having unfolded to the House certain great principles, and certain great changes based upon those principles, with regard to the whole question of Army Organization. What I now propose to do, and I shall do it as shortly as I can, is to explain to the House in what respects the Revised Memorandum, and action we propose to take in accordance with it varies, as it does slightly, from the details of the original Memorandum. Now, Sir, I will take first the most important question with which I stated in March last we proposed to deal. I mean the future length of the men's service; and I will explain the changes we contemplate in the plan as originally stated. In the first instance, we propose that the additional year of service which may be required of a soldier should not be, as it is under the present law, obligatory on him either in the event of war or in the event of the regiment being abroad, but that in the contract with the man he should agree to serve for his additional year if the regiment is abroad, and, if the country should be in a state of war, a further year should be obligatory on him by statute. Thus, if a man be serving abroad, and a state of war ensues, he would be liable to serve nine years with the Colours—that is to say, seven normally, one as being abroad, and one on account of war. We also propose that there should be a longer term of Colour service in the case of certain men in the Artillery. Under the original Memorandum there was to be an uniform term of seven or eight years' service; but we now propose, not as a matter of contract, but of voluntary arrangement, that the term should be in the case of a certain portion of the Artillery, especially the Coast Brigade, for an additional five years after the first five years, so that these men may serve with the Colours for 10 years; and that, if a man is asked to
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  serve for two years more he should be entitled for four years to go into the second-class Army Reserve, with £6 a-year Reserve pay. With respect to the Household Cavalry, we propose to retain the present system. I may-say we have carefully considered, and have had the advantage of the opinion of a large number of military officers on the question, which has excited much interest in certain quarters, whether a private, after 12 years, should, be allowed to re-engage; but after careful consideration and the taking of the advice of many experienced officers, I have arrived at the conclusion that if a private soldier has not, after 12 years' service, become a corporal, it is not worth the while of the State to re-engage him as a private. On the other hand, if he has become a non-commissioned officer in that period we give him the privilege of being re-engaged. In the case of a corporal, the privilege would be subject to the sanction of the commanding officer; but any sergeant will be so entitled, whether his commanding officer wishes it or not, unless his re-engagement is vetoed at the War Office. That is to say, we give to the sergeant what has been so much desired, and, in a less degree, to the corporal also—an assured service of 21 years, with a right to a pension. We have come to this conclusion, having, among other things, regard to the fact that in consequence of his right to pension at the end of his service, a re-engaged soldier costs the State £300 more than one not entitled to pension, and we do not think that a man who has never been thought worthy to be a corporal is worth this difference. The next division of the subject I propose to take is the pecuniary prospect of the soldier. I explained to the House, in originally moving the Estimates, that what we thought the best method of improving the character of the men and making the Army more popular was not so much to increase the pay or emoluments of the private soldier, although, in more than one respect, that is to be done, but to improve the position of the offices they may aspire to—that is to say, to put the non-commissioned officers on a much better footing, whether corporal or sergeant; to raise the character of the status of the leading non-commissioned officer of a regiment, so that he should be elevated above the

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  other non-commissioned officers and become a warrant officer; to improve his pay, and also to ameliorate the condition of those who have from the noncommissioned or warrant ranks received a commission. We did a good deal in that direction in the original Memorandum; but, if hon. Members will refer to it, they will see we have done still more in the Revised Memorandum. The hon. and gallant Gentleman opposite (Colonel Alexander), who takes great interest in the status of the quartermasters, will see that we have given them very considerable additional boons by this second Memorandum. We have increased their maximum pay by Is. 6d. per day; we have reduced, the length of time necessary for them to attain to higher rates; and in other respects, including rank on retirement, we have benefited him. In the same way, as to men promoted to lieutenancies from the ranks, we have greatly improved their position and also their prospects when they retire. In answer to a question some time ago, I said that the number of men who could get commissions would be greater than before. Accordingly, we have doubled the number of men who may in a year receive commissions from the ranks; and, if the additional boons granted to men so promoted result in a still better class of men obtaining commissions in this way, I shall be quite prepared still further to increase the annual number. I pass now to the prospects of the officers, and it will be seen that we have done much by the Revised Memorandum, partly by way of explanation, and partly by way of actual improvement. For instance, at the bottom of the scale, the time in which a lieutenant may reach from the lowest the next rate of pay has for the present been reduced from three to two years. Proceeding to the next rank, we have made the prospects of Purchase captains perfectly plain; and I think those who asked me questions on the subject in the House will see that every captain's rights under the Purchase system have been most carefully and completely dealt with. We have added, in many cases, to the pension on compulsory retirement £50 a-year. With respect to captains of Artillery, as to whom the question was very difficult to deal with, we have temporarily raised the age at which they must be compulsorily retired,
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  so that they will be retired at 42 instead of at 40. With regard to compulsory retirement generally, let me remind the House that the mitigation of its severity was one of the main objects of our arrangements. I showed before to the House that if the state of things which I found in force was permanently continued, we should some day have as many as 4,500 captains retired from that rank at the age of 40, at a cost of something like £900,000 a-year, their services at that early age being entirely lost to the country. Now, there must be a certain amount of compulsory retirement under any conceivable system of efficient Army or Navy; but, instead of this retirement mainly taking effect among captains at the age of 40, we have endeavoured to retain the services of as many officers as possible up to the age of 50, 55, or even more, in the higher ranks. Instead of a large number retiring from, the exigencies of the Services at the early age of 40, a smaller number will now retire at later ages upon terms far more satisfactory to them and to the Public Service. I have shown that another result of this will be that, instead of sending out of the Army at an early age a large number of officers whose places would have to be at once filled up again by cadets, the number of appointments to the Army will be reduced by the retirement taking place so much later. Therefore, there will be two good results—officers, on the average, will remain in the Army a longer time, making their engagements more valuable to them; and we should not require to enter so large a number of young men. As I have stated to the House before, the number of entrants into the Army from this result and from the new regimental organization would be about 50 a-year less than now, resulting ultimately in a total reduction of 500 in the active list of officers; and this, taking the active and retired lists together, would give a reduction to the extent of something like 2,500 officers. I conceive that the economical result is not the most important, considerable as the saving will be; but that where most good will be gained will be in the minimizing the heartburning, if not discontent, which every officer when he gets his company must feel, when he reflects that under the present system the chances are more than equal that he will be

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  forced out of the Army at the age of 40. But in removing this grievance we have to. systematize retirement at higher ages; and we have mainly to deal with two classes—the senior colonels and the general officers. I will take the general officers first. A great deal has been said in mitigation of the necessity of reducing the number of general officers, to the extent to which we propose to reduce it, and as to the terms upon which retirement from the list is accomplished. About that, what I have to say is this—We have fixed the number of general officers at about double the average number who will be employed in ordinary times, leaving, therefore, ample margin for times of great wars. I do not speak of small wars, which add but slightly to the general's employment. We have brought that number down to what is considered by those who advise me on this subject an efficient number with respect to the requirements of the Service. Then, in deciding what should be the rule and method of retirement, we have applied such a system as acting upon that number we consider will produce a good average flow of promotion. If you make the rules of retirement less easy, you check promotion; and if you make the number of officers larger, you, by increasing the period of non-employment, check efficiency; but by settling, in the first instance, what ought to be the number in the upper ranks, and then deciding what system of retirement will give a good flow of promotion, we solve the double problem. With respect to retirement from these ranks, every general officer will have a right, if he chooses, to remain under the present system for unattached pay or colonelcy of a regiment, or take the new one for half pay and retired pay; but it has been strongly urged that as a great many officers in the rank of colonel have elected to remain in the Army because of the prospect of reaching the list of generals, with these pecuniary advantages we ought to be extremely careful not to compel them to retire on a scale of pensions less than the value of these prospects. This we have scrupulously observed, and every colonel who was lieutenant-colonel in 1877, and who, under the operation of the new system, has to retire at an earlier age than he is compelled to retire at now—will be entitled to receive the pension
  1234
  actuarially calculated as precisely equivalent to the present prospect of unattached pay, and of succeeding in due time to £1,000 a-year. That calculation he will be entitled to have actuarially made when his pension is settled. On one point I can give the House an interesting figure. I have had a careful calculation made of the present value of his unattached pay and prospective colonelcy of a regiment when an officer becomes a major general, and I find that it is £7,761, whereas under the new system of half pay and retired pay the present value is £7,807. We have, therefore, fully kept up the prospects of these officers. I come now to the fourth branch of the subject—that is, regimental organization. I have, in answer to Questions during the last three months, explained, I think, almost all our further changes. The chief ones are that there will be in the Cavalry as in the Infantry a second lieutenant colonel, and three instead of four majors. We also do not intend to require the adjutant to be a captain, a lieutenant being, in future, equally eligible. I pass now to the new system of territorial regiments. That system is the necessary sequence, in my opinion, of the linked battalions introduced by Lord Cardwell, and was advised by the right hon. and gallant Gentleman opposite (Colonel Stanley) and his powerful Committee. On this subject I think the few changes that have been made in details since March, when I unfolded the original Scheme, will have been found to be satisfactory. We have received from different quarters suggestions as to better combinations of battalions, and in many cases we have been able to carry them out. Even within the last few days I have been able to make arrangements with respect to the battalions connected with Nottinghamshire, Yorkshire, and Herefordshire, which I trust will be satisfactory. These are the five principal heads of the change in Army Organization, which I explained in March last. Let me sum up to the House in two or three words what these changes will, I hope, produce. In the first place, I hope that by the combination of two regiments, and by the new system of reliefs, and of facilitating the transfer of men and officers from one battalion to another, as is now the case in the Rifle Brigade or the 60th Rifles, or

  1235
  the double-battalion regiments, we shall arrive at a more satisfactory understanding with respect to the equal employment of men and officers at home and abroad, with greater facilities for exchanges between home and foreign service. The second advantage is the great reduction of compulsory retirement, which instead of being almost limited to captains at 40, and generals at 70, will be spread over all ranks, but altogether to a much less extent than now. The third, and not the least, is, in my belief, the great improvement in the prospects of the men, due to the higher pay of the non-commissioned ranks, the establishment of regimental warrant officers, and the better prospects of commissioned officers raised from the ranks. I believe much will thus be done to improve the tone of the Army, which will enable us to recruit from sources which we hardly reach now; and mainly, by that means, to reduce the waste of the Army, to reduce desertion, which has already been greatly reduced in comparison with the numbers recruited during the last few years—and to introduce a more satisfactory state of feeling in respect to the general popularity of the Army. I shall myself spare no effort in this direction, and I believe that this is the most important branch of Army Reform to which public attention can be called. We may thus be able to avoid what foreigners tell us is the only method of raising an efficient Army—conscription. Conscription is unpopular in this country, and I believe would altogether break down; but I hope, by improving the prospects of the soldier, to arrive at the same result as is obtained in other countries by conscription. One word, in conclusion, as to the financial result of these changes. I have given the figures before; but I may, perhaps, be allowed to repeat them. We are at this moment burdened, and shall be for some time hence, with the very heavy dead weight which is due to the terms of service previous to 1872, and which we have to bear as well as the charges due to short service itself. It will not be till 21 years have elapsed since that time—that is to say, before 1893—that the dead weight of the Army will begin to diminish; and meanwhile, as I have stated previously, it must considerably increase. I do not mean to say that the aggregate Army
  1236
  Estimates will increase for 10 years, but only that the automatic increase of the pension list will continue, whatever economies may be made elsewhere. But the effect of the changes we are now making, as compared with what would result from the present rules for pay, pension, and retirement, and regimental organization, will produce, when matters reach their normal condition, a saving in the expense of the personnel of the Army of £780,000 a-year. That saving will be due to the reduced number of officers, the reduced amount of compulsory retirement, and to the short service of privates without pension. The saving in connection with officers will be £250,000 to this country, and £11,000 to India. In connection with the men it will be £445,000 to us and £160,000 to India. On the other hand, the improved pay of the non-commissioned officers, of warrant officers, and of officers promoted from the ranks, will cost us about £60,000, and India about £30,000. The increased charge in connection with the Reserve will be about £20,000 a-year. Including the charge for the Cavalry, and the great saving in reliefs, the aggregate figures show an economy of £680,000 to us and £220,000 to India—amounting, on the whole, to £900,000. I am sorry to say this is a saving which will not be effected until a far distant day; but the slowness of the gain in this respect ought not to dishearten us in carrying out a plan which will tend, as I think my right hon. and gallant Predecessor will admit, greatly to improve the efficiency of the Army both as to officers and men. With these remarks, I beg to move that you, Sir, do now leave the Chair.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."—(Mr. Childers.)
  SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOTsaid, he had listened to the statement of the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Childers) with great interest, and he begged to thank him, not only for the great courtesy with which he uniformly treated all who had occasion to approach him, but also for the care with which he had carried out many of the suggestions which had been made to him. The statement of the right hon. Gentleman was one of those pleasant statements which, if it could be believed it was a correct esti-

  1237
  mate of what would happen, would show that in the future the Army would be everything that could be desired; but in the present circumstances under which they were now labouring, much, he thought, would remain to be done before the Army was in the same state of efficiency in which it once was. He held that on the question of the length of service depended the whole future of the English Army; and he said that in face of the fact that many right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite, and several organs in the Press, were loud and eloquent in their advocacy of the short-service system, especially one leading journal, and it was not difficult to read between the lines who was author of the article. He held that the matter was of so much importance that the House ought to lose no time in considering it, and that they ought to consider it fairly and dispassionately. The right hon. Gentleman admitted by the alterations he had proposed that the short-service system was not satisfactory, and that it ought to be modified; but what he had done in that direction had been done with a hesitating hand, and without, apparently, a full appreciation of the fact that it must necessarily tend to the disadvantage of the Service of the country to shorten the term of service of men in, for instance, the Artillery and Engineers, who had to deal with weapons of precision and with scientific appliances, and he must omit the Cavalry of the Line. The longer they could engage a man for, the better; for it was impossible to make a soldier in a day, and it was absurd to suppose that, having made him a soldier, he could be made available for service if, after being only a short time in the Army, he was drafted into the Reserve, and kept there for an indefinite period without being duly exercised in the use of the arms they would or might have to use. Then, again, with regard to the varied periods of enlistment and service in the Reserve, he thought they were objectionable. The real question was that there were to be two enlistments—one was to be for three years with the Colours and nine years in the Reserve, and the other was to be for seven years with the Colours and five years in the Reserve. [Mr. CHILDERS dissented.] The right hon. Gentleman shook his head; but that was be nearly correct that the War Office
  1238
  were to have the opportunity, if they wished, of passing as many men as they wanted into the Reserve.
  MR. CHILDERSsaid, there would be only one enlistment. It would be for seven years at home, or eight if the man was abroad. He took no powers to compel anybody to go into the Reserve, though men would be allowed to go into the Reserve, under certain circumstances, after three or four years.
  SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOTreplied, that the Scheme, nevertheless, was brought forward with the full intention that as many as possible should go into the Reserve, and even were they to go to India and the Colonies they were to be engaged for seven years.
  MR. CHILDERS: For eight.
  SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOT: Was that absolutely so?
  MR. CHILDERS: I stated originally that recruiting for service in India would be absolutely for eight years, and that the additional year would probably be insisted on for service abroad.
  SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOTsaid, the recruit joining would not know for how long he would have to serve, and that was a mischievous thing in itself. If there was anything which men in this country disliked, it was the uncertainty of the time they had to serve; and he felt sure that, if persisted in, these proposals would prevent recruiting to a large degree.
  MR. CHILDERSstated that, under the present law, a man serving abroad might be kept for an additional year, and this liability also existed as to men serving at home in war time. Under the new law the additional year abroad would be a matter of contract, and the liability for the additional year in war time would be in the statute.
  SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOTsaid, that that was to a certain extent an improvement; but it should be clearly stated in the attestation paper, so that a man might know how long he had to serve. Another and, as he thought, very strong objection to the proposal of the right hon. Gentleman, was the constant transference of men from depôt centres and from regiment to regiment. In the old days a soldier's regiment was his home, and the result was the esprit de corps which was considered the most glorifying and essential feature in the formation of the

  1239
  British Army. Now, they were to have three changes in course of the Service. First, a man was to be sent to the depot centre, next to the home battalion, and then transferred to the other battalion in the Colonies or in India. Under this system that which was regarded as essential in our Army, its esprit de corps, and soldierly pride in a regiment, would be done away with. A more mischievous system to the interests of the Army could not be propounded in the House of Commons; and. one of the gravest and greatest objections he had to the scheme was that the commanding officers would only have their regiments for four years, and some only for two years. Commanding officers and men would hardly know each other. He thought the question ought to be boldly faced, because it was not only his opinion, but that of many other men who had looked into the question, that, unless some system other than that of short service were adopted, the personnel of the Army would deteriorate, and an Army such as that which marched under the command of Sir Frederick Roberts from Cabul to Candahar would become an impossibility. Of the three regiments which Sir Frederick Roberts marched from Cabul to Candahar, the average service in two of the regiments—the 60th and 72nd—was seven years per man; and in the third—the 92nd—it was nine years per man, a longer service than would ever be again seen in the British Army. And what did General Roberts say? He said—and his opinion was endorsed by Sir Garnet Wolseley—that no man ought to go into a campaign of that kind unless he had seen three years' service. The old soldiers of the British Army were going, and would soon be all gone. Then the practice of sending small detachments from various regiments, and mixing them all up, destroyed any real regimental feeling, and weakened the power of the troops. This question of short service was a very serious one. Men enlisted for service abroad ought to join the Army for not less than 10 years, and he believed more recruits would be obtained if this were the system adopted, as nothing could be more pitiful than, after a very short period of service, to send a man into the Reserve, with an almost certainty that he could not secure employment, because those who might otherwise employ him had
  1240
  no sort of certainty as to when he would be recalled to the Army, and they would, therefore, lose his services. Much had already been done to lessen the esprit de corps, and the affection for the country's military service, without which no man was worth being kept in our Army, by the declaration of peace after our re-verso at Laing's Nek. There was also another recent circumstance which would be likely to affect the discipline and the recruiting of the Army. When the highest honour that could be granted to our gallant men—namely, the Thanks of both Houses of Parliament, and when that honour was about to be paid to our Forces in Afghanistan by the House of Commons, they had seen Cabinet Ministers, and other Members of the present Government, walk out of the House, in order to avoid giving their votes in favour of men who had dared everything in the interests of their country. Great dissatisfaction,. he maintained, must be caused among soldiers, and those who looked forward to becoming soldiers, by the knowledge that whatever our troops might do and suffer, there existed a certain class of politicians who would willingly withhold from them the honours which the country wished them to receive. Turning to the subject of the new Territorial Scheme, he argued that, though the Scheme had now been modified to a certain extent, there were still defects in its provisions. It was felt by certain regiments that their interest had not been consulted. He must always urge upon the right hon. Gentleman the necessity of allowing the fighting regiments, which had won well-known and glorious titles, to retain the names under which they had for so many years fought. The Royal Fusiliers, for instance, enjoyed a title which nothing but positive coercion would make them lay aside. He was glad that the right hon. Gentleman had recognized the fact that Purchase captains deserved more consideration than that which it was originally intended should be shown to them. But were Purchase captains to receive any portion of their purchase money back, or was the State going to put that money into its own pocket? The Government, he held, ought to have the courage to deal with this question manfully, and to return the regulation price paid by these officers for their commissions. In some crack

  1241
  regiments, in which officers remained for longer periods than were usually spent in less fashionable regiments, there were Purchase officers who would be passed over altogether under the Scheme of the right hon. Gentleman. He knew of one regiment in which there were officers who obtained their companies in 1868, but who would be passed over by Non-purchase officers, who did not get their companies till 1874 or 1875. Another class of officers who had grievances which ought to be redressed consisted of those who, contrary to their own wishes, were placed upon half-pay when their regiments were disbanded. With regard to the rule requiring generals to retire if unemployed for five years, he expressed the opinion that the change would operate unfairly. The House had been solemnly assured by Lord Cardwell that the interest of purchase officers would not be allowed to suffer in consequence of the abolition of the Purchase system. Yet the Government now proposed by this five years' rule to place colonels as well as generals who had purchased their commissions in a far worse position than that which they would have occupied if the system had not been done away with. It was true, as he understood it from the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War, that colonels would be allowed to retain their distinguished service pensions. But with what justice could it be said that because a general had been fortunate enough to get his promotion early, he was to be mulct of £10 a-year for every year he was under 62, when retired, so that the whole amount did not exceed £100. Then, was he to be allowed nothing for his prospective chance of getting a regiment? Those were matters fairly deserving further consideration. The Government, in fact, were about to take from these officers all opportunity of advancement in the Service, when, according to the terms under which they had entered the Army, they were entitled to expect advancement. The only reasonable course to follow would be to return to these officers the regulation price of their commissions, and he was also of opinion that it would be fair to extend the proposed term of five years to seven years at least. A solemn responsibility rested upon the right hon. Gentleman, and he (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) hoped that every consideration
  1242
  would be given to the defects which had been pointed out, so that the mischievous discontent which prevailed in the Army might be removed, and that the right hon. Gentleman would so use his power as to give justice and fair play to all ranks composing it.
  SIR ALEXANDER GORDON, in rising, according to Notice, to draw the attention of the House to the injustice to individuals, and the injury to the public service, which the compulsory retirement of efficient officers, in consequence of five years' non-employment, or on account of reaching a limit of age while still in the vigour of life, will cause in1 all cases, but specially in the cases of those officers who, relying on the assurances made by the Government, have paid for their promotion the sums required by the State for that purpose; and to move—
  "That, in the opinion of this House, it is not desirable to carry into effect that part of the new Army scheme, recently laid upon the Table, which authorises the compulsory retirement of efficient officers under 70 years of age, but that increased inducements to voluntary retirement should be substituted therefor, according to the original plan laid down by Lord Cardwell, and sanctioned by Parliament in 1871,"
  said, he thought the speech of the right hon. Gentleman who had brought forward this subject (Mr. CHILDERS) was calculated to create misapprehension with regard to the compulsory retirement of commissioned officers of all ranks. The right hon. Gentleman told the House that every general officer would have the right to remain as he was, and that his rights and privileges would be scrupulously retained to him. The House was left to believe by that, that the present rights and privileges of general officers would be retained to them; but that was precisely what the general officers wished. He had letters every day, not only from general officers, but from colonels, captains, and subalterns, complaining of the Scheme of compulsory retirement, which they would be forced to accept without any alternative or choice whatever. The right hon. Gentleman was a great financier, and he (Sir Alexander Gordon) expected that the right hon. Gentleman had been discussing the question solely upon the financial considerations arising out of it. The right hon. Gentleman seemed to ignore the fact that there was something

  1243
  dearer to the officer than the money consideration, and that was the honour of serving his country in the Service to which he had devoted, and in which he had risked, his life. All that the officers, both old officers and young officers, asked was to be placed on the footing in which the right hon. Gentleman said they were placed by the new Scheme. He would just show, in a few words, how erroneous was the belief that the officers would be placed on that footing. That very morning he had a letter from a lieutenant-general, of which he had the gallant gentleman's permission to make use. And here he might just say that in regard to the mass of communications he had received on this subject, he had permission to use the whole of it; but he did not think it desirable to mention the names of any officers, because, if he did so, the officers in question would never hear the last of it at the Horse Guards and the War Office. In the particular case to which he wished at present to refer, the officer attended the levee of His Royal Highness the Commander-in-chief to ask for relief from the system of which he complained; and he mentioned to His Royal Highness that he was the youngest lieutenant-general but seven in the whole Army. The answer he received from His Royal Highness was—" You are suffering from the rapidity of your promotion." This officer was promoted for distinguished services in the field, and now, though quite a young man, he was forced to retire under this new Scheme. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War had stated that special cases would be inquired into and provided for; and the officer in question, acting on this statement, wrote to ask that his case might be inquired into. The following was the reply he received from the Horse Guards:—
  "His Royal Highness is unable to alter the decision which has been arrived at by the Secretary of State in regard to the compulsory retirement of general officers in consequence of the period of non-employment."
  The gallant officer then wrote to the Secretary of State for War, and the answer he received was—
  "I am directed by the Field Marshal Commanding- in-Chief to acquaint you that the proposed new Warrant is now under consideration; but in carrying out the rules therein laid down it will not be possible to make an exception in favour of any particular officer."
  1244
  That was how the matter stood with regard to this gallant officer. Now, with reference generally to this compulsory retirement of efficient officers of all ranks, he wished to remind the House that the system was begun in 1877 by Mr. Gathorne Hardy, who was then Secretary of State for War, and that right hon. Gentleman proposed that a captain should be retired at the age of 40. Hon. Members would recollect that that proposal was strongly opposed by the hon. Member for the Border Burghs (Mr.Trevelyan), who, on August 6, 1877, said—
  "It was too evident that, with our present organization, the only means of making promotion rapid was by retiring officers from the lower ranks, and that was the method adopted in the scheme of the Government. That meant taking a man in the prime of life, and offering him a bribe to deprive the country of his services exactly when he became most valuable Our battalions ought to be organized on another system by which the plan of early retirement would be unnecessary, and which would do away in a great measure with the enormous burden, which this scheme proposed to entail on the country."—[3 Hansard, ccxxxvi. 475–6.]
  And who, afterwards, speaking at Galashiels, in November last, at a meeting of his constituents, further said that—
  "Because the Horse Guards would not undertake the responsibility of promoting regimental officers by selection, we should, on the 1st January next, be reduced to the miserable expedient of ejecting from the Army, against their will, a number of excellent officers at an age which a man past 40 might be permitted to call the prime of life—breaking their hearts and the back of the English Exchequer."
  The question at that time, in 1877, went to a division; and he hoped the right hon. and hon. Members who then occupied the Front Opposition Bench would, today, vote in the same way as they did on that occasion in support of the Motion of the hon. Member for the Border Burghs. The right hon. Gentleman said that the Scheme of 1877, as it was worked out, was quite intolerable.
  MR. CHILDERS: The Scheme for the compulsory retirement at the age of 40.
  SIR ALEXANDER GORDONsaid, that the right hon. Gentleman stated that the Scheme, as it was worked out, was quite intolerable. They all knew that the right hon. Gentleman introduced compulsory retirement on account of non-employment into the Navy; and now he was introducing it into the Army. There was, however, a differ-

  1245
  ence between the two cases. In the case of the Navy 10 years' non-employment were given to admirals and commanders before they were retired, whereas in the Army the period allowed to all ranks was to be only five years. In the Navy there was this further difference, that the officers paid nothing for their advancement in the Service; but in the Army the most of these officers paid £4,500 for their commissions, and they had done so under rules, not made by themselves, but by the State. Yet now it was proposed to take that money away from them without giving any equivalent in return. The fact was, that this Scheme of compulsory retirement was one which threw the whole advantages of the upper ranks in the Army into the hands of a small clique—those who were in the upper classes of society, and who could, by their social and political friends, bring influence to bear at the Horse Guards and the War Office. These were the people who derived benefit from this Scheme, because they were the people who would get employment. The poor officer, on the other hand, who was unable to make his case heard, was driven out of the Army. No doubt, the right hon. Gentleman, surrounded at the War Office by officers who benefited by these rules, found that the system was highly approved of; and, no doubt, the Ministers of the day, surrounded, as they were, by those who would benefit, heard in the same way that the Scheme was an admirable one. During the late Government's term of Office, he once amused himself drawing up a list of the Lennoxes who found employment; and in the same way, if any hon. Member took The Army List and went over it, he would find how advance in the Army was made by men who had friends in Office. Lord Cardwell, in dealing with the subject of Army Reform, opened the door to every man who had ability to get in; but the Scheme now proposed closed that door except to the upper classes and a favoured few. All the changes we had recently made were changes in favour of the monied classes; and it would be interesting to have a Return of the number of poor men who had refused commands, solely because of their inability to bear the expenses that were entailed upon them. The monied men, and those bulked largely in view, were those who
  1246
  were in these positions. Let them look, as an instance of what he meant, at the I annual Review at Brighton, The men who commanded there were Princes, Dukes, and Lords. They came largely before the public, were naturally largely under the eyes of the Horse Guards, and they obtained the good positions. In the same way, it was mostly monied men who attended the Autumn Manœuvres, and most of the distinctions recently given to the Volunteers went to the monied men. With regard to the exemptions that were given from the non-employment rule, there were also very serious objections to the way that was carried out. He noticed, for example, that Queen's aides-de-camp were not to be exempted from compulsory retirement. These appointments could only be obtained by men who had performed the most distinguished services in the field; and it was hard that an officer who had been selected for that great honour should not have any advantage, but should be relegated as a useless piece of lumber to the retired list. On the other hand, Equerries to the Sovereign and the Prince of Wales were exempted from compulsory retirement, and of this he did not complain; but he did not see why the more civil duty should carry exemption from compulsory retirement with it, while the officer who discharged the more soldierly duty of aide-de-camp to Her Majesty should not be exempted from compulsory retirement. Now, he should like to read what Lord Cardwell said of promotion in the Army. In 1871, Lord Cardwell said—
  "Of this, at least, officers may be certain, that a reasonable rapidity of promotion, such as is necessary for the benefit of the Service, is a vital consideration, and must be always provided by the the Crown and by Parliament. And when I say reasonable rapidity, I mean some such, rapidity as exists under the present system."—[3 Hansard, ccv. 144.]
  Mr. Gathorne Hardy, in 1877, referred to this passage, and said—
  "That must be taken as the solemn promise of the Government by which, and through which, they carried the abolition of purchase."—[Ibid, ccxxxvi. 507.]
  All that the Army asked the Government to do was to fulfil the promise which was made by Lord Cardwell, in 1871, and which Mr. Gathorne Hardy, in 1877, said was a solemn promise by

  1247
  which and through which the Government carried the abolition of Purchase. What did the Secretary of State for War now propose? Instead of the promotion promised, the right hon. Gentleman gave compulsory retirement. Instead of a fish, he gave a stone. Did the right hon. Gentleman think that officers looking for promotion would thank him for compulsory retirement? It was not fulfilling the condition under which these officers remained in the Service. With regard to reducing the number of subalterns, recently, 816 officers had been added to the Army, to take the places of officers who had been "seconded," because it was held that the Army must be kept up to its full establishment of officers which were necessary for the Service; and now, having put the country to the expense of these additional officers, it was proposed by the new Scheme to reduce them by 480. The fact was that the Army, instead of being a real Profession in which a man could enter and hope to obtain promotion, was a gambling transaction, in which a man might rise, or in which he might not. If a man served in a regiment where the officers were happy and contented, and remained in the regiment, the chances were that he would not get promotion; but if the man got into a brandy-drinking regiment, with a detestable officer at the head of it, he would get speedy promotion. He had a letter from an officer in one of the best regiments in the Service, an old Peninsular regiment. This officer drew his attention to the fact that in the 94th there was a captain of 1879 who would be promoted to be major on the 1st of July, but that in this old Peninsular regiment there was a captain of 1868 who would not be promoted. This was a difference of 11 years. A junior was promoted and a senior left; and there were no fewer than 32 captains in the same position. They had heard of the Prussian Army, but the Prussians had not got compulsory retirement. On the contrary, they took very great care of their old officers. There was not an Army in Europe that he knew of that had a system of compulsory retirement. The Prussians adopted another system. They rejected an inefficient officer. Why did not we do the same? He knew the theory was that it was done, It was stated that inefficient officers
  1248
  were not promoted; but they were, somehow, promoted. The merits and demerits of officers were only known by the Reports of the general officers; and in order to show how officers were rejected or not rejected, he would read a few lines from two Reports which he himself had made many years ago. In one of these Reports he said—
  "There have been 58 desertions in 12 months. Major is not, in my opinion, fit for command. There have been 108 courts martial in six months. The amount of drunkenness exceeds anything I have ever noticed."
  That was his Report upon the regiment, and this was the reply he received by way of encouragement—
  "His Royal Highness has derived the greatest satisfaction from the perusal of documents so very creditable to the several corps concerned, all of which appear to be in a high state of discipline."
  In the margin two corps were named—one the regiment he (Sir Alexander Gordon) had reported upon; and the other a portion of the Commissariat Staff. He mentioned that, because he knew the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War was a real reformer, and he wished him to take up the question of proper rejection and deal with it. If the right hon. Gentleman did so, there would be happiness and contentment in the Army, and there would be no need for the compulsory retirement of efficient officers. In another Report, he (Sir Alexander Gordon) said—
  "I found the quartermaster's department in the most deplorable confusion. The accounts and books are nearly all wrong, and there is a considerable deficiency of stores. The quarter master admitted that on receiving notice that the regiment was to be inspected by the general officer, he counted over the clothing in store, and then desired the clerk to insert as issues such figures as would leave a balance corresponding with the articles in store. The quarterly account for the repair of accoutrements was all wrong, fictitious and fraudulent. It seems to be entirely in the hands of the quartermaster sergeant. Of all the commanding officers under my orders, Colonel is certainly the worst, both in the field and in office."
  This Report had reference to a corps which was in Ireland when Sir George Browne held the Command in Chief, and the following was the note he (Sir Alexander Gordon) made on the back of the Report:—
  "After this Report was received by Sir George Browne, he told Colonel -—that it

  1249
  was impossible for him to remain in command, and that he had better make his arrangements for retiring quietly. The result was that Colonel—was made Inspecting Field Officer of one of the best recruiting districts in England; Quartermaster—obtained the honorary rank of Captain, and was allowed to retire on that rank; and the Quartermaster Sergeant was pensioned, and made a clerk at the War Office."
  This, as lie had said, occurred long ago; if it had been a recent case, he would not have mentioned it. But it showed, he thought, that undue leniency was exercised when severity ought to have been used. On the other hand, he had often found that undue severity had been used when leniency ought to have been shown, and that officers wore removed for unnecessary causes. His experience extended to two such cases. He had had occasion to obtain the reinstatement of two officers who had been improperly removed from the Army in consequence of improper Reports which had not been investigated in a proper manner. The system of compulsory retirement caused great hardship in many cases; and he would mention one such case. General Shute, when a Member of the House of Commons, was offered the post of Inspector General of Cavalry—a post to which all Cavalry officers aspired. General Shute would have accepted it, but the Minister of War of the day begged him not to take the appointment, and to remain in the House of Commons, where his presence was desired by the Secretary of State for War. General Shute accordingly declined the post, hoping to have his turn some other time. What happened? He had been promoted more rapidly than had been expected; and now General Shute was to be turned out as rubbish and refuse that was of no use in the Army. Dealing with the regimental system, he would point out that Mr. Gathorne Hardy declined to adopt it; and he thought that right hon. Gentleman acted on very good reason in doing so. He (Sir Alexander Gordon) thought the scheme was objectionable in different ways; and, while he said so, he hoped the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War did not think he was one of those who was opposed to all change. [To show this, the hon. and gallant Gentleman read an extract from a paper he had given to Mr. Cardwell in 1873, pointing out where his scheme of linked batal-
  1250
  lions would fail.] And it had failed precisely as he had indicated. He printed the paper in the following year.
  "The principle of the amalgamation which the Government seek to obtain by the recent changes would appear to be to destroy the individual interest and traditions of regiments, and henceforth to regard only those of the United Brigade; but the steps taken to carry this principle into effect are not complete. To be effectual, the county names and traditions of individual regiments must in future be merged in the county name and the traditions of the brigade in which they are linked together. The traditions of a regiment are very interesting to the officers in it; but they are of less importance to the country than a good organization, and must yield before the superior advantage of a perfect fusion of two regiments into one brigade, which the Government desire, but which cannot be complete as long as old traditions are fostered, and precedence, &c, retained."
  He was, perhaps, too much a reformer for his own benefit. The part of the system to which he chiefly objected was the increase that was made to the number of mounted officers. The right hon. Gentleman proposed to double the number of mounted officers—that was to say, instead of three mounted officers there would be six in future; and that was being done while the total number of officers had been reduced 480. Again, why had the second lieutenant-colonels been appointed, seeing they had nothing to do? In his own time second lieutenant-colonels had been reduced, because they had been found to be useless and sometimes mischievous. And why were they going to reduce the number of the very men that were wanted—namely, the subalterns? He only wished further to say that he had hoped when the right hon. Gentleman came into Office, he would have tackled the great reform so much, wanted by persons both in and out of the Army—the placing of the administration of the Army on the same footing as the administration of the Navy, and giving more public access to the different positions in the administration of the Army. No Government had hitherto had the courage to press it; but it was a reform that was much wanted, and he would have been glad if the right hon. Gentleman had seen his way to undertake it. He begged to move the Amendment of which he had given Notice.
  Amendment proposed,
  To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words

  1251
  " in the opinion of this House, it is not desirable to carry into effect that part of the new Army scheme, recently laid upon the Table, which authorises the compulsory retirement of efficient officers under 70 years of age, but that increased inducements to voluntary retirement should he substituted therefor, according to the original plan laid down by Lord Cardwell, and sanctioned by Parliament in 1871,"—(Sir Alexander Gordon,)
  —instead thereof.
  Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."
  SIR ROBERT LOYD-LINDSAYsaid, he wished to remind hon. Members that the hon. and gallant Baronet (Sir Alexander Gordon) had condemned the late quite as strongly as he had the present Government in connection with this subject; and from that circumstance he felt that he could safely congratulate the House and the country on the fact that the reform of the Army was not made a Party question. He (Sir Robert Loyd-Lindsay) thought that the right hon. Gentleman had gone as far as he could properly go in the scheme he had submitted, and quite as far as he could go in his concessions to those who had advocated the claims of the Colours in preference to the claims of the Reserve. He had no difficulty whatever in understanding the views and the feelings which officers of the Army held with regard to the maintaining the efficiency of the Colours. It was quite natural that an officer who had taken very great pains with the men under his command, and brought them to a high state of discipline, should view with great reluctance the prospect of seeing them moved off to the unknown limbo of the Reserves; but the Secretary of State had to consider in what way he could supply the place of those whom a war would place hors de combat. His hon. and gallant Friend the Member for West Sussex (Sir "Walter B. Barttelot) was therefore tinged with the unfairness of those who argued in favour of long service, and carefully ignored its disadvantages, and he could not agree with his hon. and gallant Friend in the criticisms he had made upon the short-service system. Long service, of course, produced a limited number of fine troops; but the losses incident to a long campaign, such as that in the Crimea, made all its weak points only too evident. When the
  1252
  Crimean War broke out magnificent regiments of the finest soldiers started for the seat of war. Three months afterwards, when the "shine" had been taken out of them, and many of them were hors de combat, there was no Reserve to fall back upon to fill up their ranks. The consequence was that the highways and hedges had to be searched for recruits—and it would have been well had that been all; but as they had also to go into the back slums of all our great cities for them, boys were sent out who were perfectly unfit for duty, so that Lord Raglan had to beg the authorities at home for Heaven's sake to send out no more of such recruits, because they were clogging the hospitals long before they came in face of the enemy. The long-service system had broken down, and in favour of a short service there appeared to him to be three convincing reasons. With the long-service system they could have no Reserve; there was an enormous non-effective charge upon the Army; and they were embarrassed with a very large number of married soldiers, who needed expensive barracks, and who, though very steady in time of peace, were home-sick in war time. No doubt, commanding officers were very well pleased when they were not on active service to have married soldiers in the ranks, because they were steady and well-behaved; but on active service nothing could be worse. The Warrant said that in India the service would be for eight years, and that for men abroad it might be extended to eight; and then it went on to say that the Secretary of State would not be precluded from extending the term to 12 years. That would be a blow at the Reserve, which had never been very brilliant, but had come out very well when called for. Many officers prophesied that the Reserve which was on paper would never be heard of; but, unluckily for the prophets, at least 95 per cent of the men appeared, and were excellent soldiers. But the prophets were on their legs again. He therefore hoped the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Childers) would do his best to make the Reserve highly efficient. His hon. and gallant Friend said that the employers of labour ought to be looked after. Certainly they ought. He hoped that Railway Companies and others who refused to employ Reserve men would have their names mentioned in the House, and their

  1253
  unpatriotic conduct denounced. There was one class of Militia colonels during the Crimean War who would not let their men pass into the Line. Other colonels took a more patriotic course, and did better service to the country. He should like to see included under the 13th paragraph, the men of the Army Hospital Corps. His right hon. Friend had permitted a certain portion of artificers, drummers, and buglers to extend their period of service for 21 years, so as to earn pensions. He would appeal to his right hon. Friend to allow the Army Hospital Corps men to go in for pensions. They had to attend to the sick and wounded, and men of 35 and more were better fitted for that duty than younger men. He would make another appeal to his right hon. Friend on behalf of corporals. He knew that, with the leave of their commanding officers, they might serve for pensions; but the soldier on taking the stripes ought to know whether he would be allowed to make the Army his career. He gave his cordial support to the principle of territorial regiments. It was the principle of his right hon. and gallant Friend (Colonel Stanley), and was proposed in his Committee. In the germs of that proposal there was the probability of a great success. But he regretted that the right hon. Gentleman had not included in those territorial regiments the Volunteers where that could be done. With regard to the depot centres, the right hon. Gentleman ought to consider how the scheme, which was a thoroughly good one, might be made to work. Although £3,000,000 had been spent upon it, the plan wanted more money to make it thoroughly efficient. They had the buildings for the depot centres scattered over the country; but hardly one of them was fit to receive a regiment of the Line or of the Militia. Until the counties should, from time to time, see their regiments among them, and hear their bands play in the streets, the territorial system would languish. If the right hon. Gentleman would call to his aid his Financial Secretary (Mr. Campbell-Bannerman), who had for six years spoken on military affairs with such authority from the Opposition Benches, perhaps the money might be found.
  COLONEL ALEXANDERsaid, he had to thank the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Childers) for the kind way in which he had taken into consideration the Memo-
  1254
  randum he (Colonel Alexander) had submitted on the case of the quartermasters, and for the concessions the right hon. Gentleman had made to them; but he must guard himself against being supposed entirely to approve of everything that had been done in that direction. There were two or three points to which he wished to direct attention, and he would ask the right hon. Gentleman to consider, even at the 11th hour, whether he could not make some slight modifications in the Memorandum. 1s. 6d. a-day increase was to be given to the quartermasters for 20 years' service upwards, and that seemed a very substantial improvement; but it was only a very slight improvement, and not in any way a substantial one. Of all the quartermasters in the active and Regular Army only five would come under the operation of the concession, and one of those five would be placed on half-pay in three months, and so would immediately forfeit the benefit. Then the rule obliging quartermasters to retire on completing 55 years of age would debar them from hoping to obtain this increase, so that the real increase which remained would be the magnificent sum of 4d. a-day. The right hon. Gentleman would earn the gratitude of the quartermasters if he would consider the advisability of granting this additional 1s. 6d. after 16 years, instead of after 20 years. Of the quartermasters six or eight would be obliged to retire on the 1st of July, and two within three months of that date, and he hoped the right hon. Gentleman would give those unfortunate men a little breathing time, in order that they might obtain new employment. The hardest case would be this—A and B were two quartermasters, aged 55 years. A would complete 10 years' service on June 30th as a quartermaster, and would be allowed to remain three years longer; but B, completing his 10 years on the following day, would be obliged to retire immediately. That was not an equitable arrangement. What special virtue was there in 55 years? If that rule were applied to the Cabinet, he feared the country would lose some of its brightest and most illustrious ornaments immediately, and he was afraid even. the right hon. Gentleman himself (Mr. Childers) would not long survive the application of the rule. Then the maximum retiring allowance for quarter-

  1255
  masters was fixed at £200 a-year, with a deduction of £10 a-year for every year less than 20 years' service. If that deduction were made, surely there ought to be a corresponding increase of £10 for every year over 20; or if that were impossible, there should be a bonus of at least £50 on retirement. He must confess also that he did not like the rule by which quartermasters might be compulsorily retired after 10 or 15 or 20 years respectively, unless they were recommended for continuance on the ground of efficiency. That would place too much power in the hands of commanding officers; and if a quartermaster was inefficient, he ought immediately to be retired without reference to the period of service. He must also point out that the quartermaster-sergeants were disappointed that the right hon. Gentleman had not seen his way to carry out the recommendations of Lord Airey's Committee and given them, as well as the serjeant-majors, the rank of warrant officers. With regard to the scheme of the right hon. Gentleman generally, he did not believe the rule as to the 19 years' limit for recruits could be practically carried out, for, as a Committee of medical officers had stated, the signs by which age could be fixed were so uncertain that a youth of 18 might appear to be any age between that and 23. In a short-service system it would be better to fix the limit at 20. He deeply regretted that the right hon. Gentleman did not see his way to allow at least a percentage of the men, other than non-commissioned officers, to extend their service for pension, for he was sure every practical soldier would bear him out in the assertion that very beneficial results would accrue from the presence of a certain number of old soldiers of good character in a regiment, and their influence upon the younger men. These old soldiers were the salt of the regiment. In the barrack-room, and in the absence of the married sergeant, they assumed the position of noncommissioned officers. They repressed, to a certain extent, the use of bad language, which had such a baneful effect on men of respectability in deterring them from entering the Service. He attached great importance to the residence of a certain number of pensioners in recruiting districts. He also hoped those men who had completed six years
  1256
  with the Colours would be allowed to reengage for pensions. It would be a distinct breach of faith, which would be bitterly felt in the various recruiting districts, if they were forced into the Reserve. As to the objection that it would involve considerable expense, he believed the cost would be trivial. He was very glad the non-commissioned officers were to be allowed to re-engage; but he objected to their re-engagement being subject to the veto of the War Secretary. The matter was too small a detail for the Secretary of State to deal with, and he would advise that the re-engagement of a sergeant or a corporal should depend on the commanding officer. Then, with regard to the drummers and buglers, he wanted to know from the right hon. Gentleman why a certain proportion of the drummers and buglers only were to be allowed to extend their service for pensions? That would be an injustice to those who were not granted the privilege; and ho would point out that as they usually entered at 14 years of age, they had not had time to learn a trade, and if they were turned adrift at 25 they would have no means of livelihood. He further deeply regretted that, in time of peace, men who had served three years with the Colours were to be allowed, and even encouraged, to pass into the Reserve. By encouraging these young soldiers to convert their Army into a Reserve Service, they virtually sacrificed the active and Regular Army to the necessities of the so-called Reserve Force, which, perhaps, once or twice in a century might be called out for active service. In addition to that, it must not be forgotten that the calling out of the Reserves had the effect of depriving soldiers of civil employment which they had either gained or resumed on leaving the Army and entering the Reserve. His own view was that, instead of the Government trying by artificial means to increase the strength of the First Class Army Reserve, that magnificent Force, the Militia Reserve, should be utilized, as was recommended some time ago by Sir Henry Havelock-Allen, who was at that time a Member of the House. He agreed with the hon. and gallant Member for East Aberdeenshire (Sir Alexander Gordon) in condemning altogether that rule by which officers were compelled to retire after five years' non-

  1257
  employment, and lie believed the enforcement of that rule would be a frightful source of jobbery and favouritism.
  MAJOR NOLAN, who had the following Notice on the Paper:—
  "To move, That the Army Retirement scheme, as embodied in the June Memorandum, entails considerable and unnecessary expense, and that this unnecessary expense is largely owing to the most prominent feature of the scheme, namely, the compulsory retirement of officers whilst they are physically fit for service; "
  said, that while agreeing that the Memorandum of the right hon. Gentleman was good, as far as it went, in reference to the cases of non-commissioned officers, lie thought it did not throw open a sufficient number of commissions to such officers. He also thought that the position of the private soldier was in no way improved. As regarded them, he thought the Secretary of State for War was making two mistakes in totally opposite directions; the fact being that the proposals of the right hon. Gentleman would have the effect of keeping on the bad characters in the Army, and of discharging the good men after shorter service. What should be done was just the contrary of this—the bad men should be got into the Reserve as quickly as possible, and the good men kept on active service as an example to others. As far as the commissioned officers were concerned, he could not help thinking that the present proposal was one which, could only result in giving a new lease of life to the bad system of compulsory retirement of captains at 40 years of age, just when they had become most competent for the discharge of their duties. That system, which was a very bad one, was introduced by the Conservative Government in 1877. He (Major Nolan) objected to it, believing that it would not only inflict hardship on the officers affected, but involve a cost of at least £1,200,000. There was, he would point out, no other Military Service in Europe by which men were retired at the early age of 40, and so strong was his objection to this practice that, although he did not altogether approve of the Motion of the hon. and gallant Member for East Aberdeenshire (Sir Alexander Gordon), thinking his own Motion rather preferable to it, he would gladly vote for it, as it contained a strong protest against the system of
  1258
  retiring officers when they were fit for service.
  LORD EUSTACE CECILsaid, that he hoped no one would speak for more than a quarter of an hour, or that if he did some one would pull him down by the coat tail. He should confine his observations to one or two subjects connected with that large question. And, first, he would touch on the point of expense, to which he more particularly wished to address himself. As regarded that point, it might have been expected that some hon. Gentleman below the Gangway opposite would have got up and talked about the great extravagance of the Army Estimates; but he (Lord Eustace Cecil) never observed that on a military night, whatever might have been said in election speeches, anyone got up, except the hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson), to suggest that the Army Estimates were extravagant, although hon. Gentlemen did get up and call for additional expenditure. Since he (Lord Eustace Cecil) had been in Parliament, the Army Estimates had risen from £12,000,000 to £13,000,000, to £15,000,000 or £16,000,000. That was a very portentous fact; but, as regarded it, he did not want to find fault with any particular Administration, and certainly not with the present Secretary of State for War. He knew that his right hon. Friend had a great many difficult questions to settle, and he was bound to say that everything he had done had been marked by courtesy, painstaking, and care, very creditable to a Secretary of State for War. Of course, he could not find fault with his immediate Predecessor (Colonel Stanley), nor with Lord Cranbrook, both of whom succeeded to legacies of embarrassment. But he must say that a great responsibility rested on Lord Cardwells Administration. Almost all the questions that were now causing difficulty arose out of what was done by that noble Lord. He (Lord Eustace Cecil) had opposed Lord Cardwell's scheme at the time, and pointed out what the country was committed to by it. The fact was, that in 10 years it had cost the country £25,500,000, or £3,000,000 a-year. That total sum included purchase of commissions, £8,000,000; brigade depôts, £3,500,000; waste on short service, £3,500,000; and officers' retirement scheme, £10,500,000;

  1259
  making together £25,500,000 in 10 years. More than 20 years ago the cost of a British soldier was calculated to be £100 a-year; now, as he (Lord Eustace Cecil) had pointed out in a recent speech, the cost per man was £135 a-year. That was a very serious matter; but he knew it was of no use crying over spilt milk. That money had been spent; and all he wanted to do was to ask the right hon. Gentleman opposite and the Financial Secretary of the War Office to take care that good-money should not be sent after bad. He was afraid that in what they were going to do in future—for the whole of the present scheme was a matter of speculation—a great deal of good money would go after the bad. He did not say that he or anybody in the House could prevent that scheme being carried out. All that they were doing or could do was in the nature of a protest. But it was right that they should record their protest. They, on that side of the House, did not agree in the policy adopted 10 years ago; and although when they were in Office they were bound to give it a fair trial, yet he must say that, in his opinion and that of his Friends, that policy had signally failed in the Zulu War and in the other wars that had since occurred His right hon. Friend the present Secretary for War, in his desire to do that which was most agreeable to the Service and the country, had brought in a scheme which had some good qualities; but, at the same time, many of which he could not speak so well. He would take One point especially—the age of recruits. His hon. and gallant Friend (Colonel Alexander) had spoken of the age of recuits, and had said that, in a military sense, it was most important that men of 20 should be enlisted. He (Lord Eustace Cecil) said the same thing in an economical sense. Lord Airey's Commission showed that every man who was enlisted at 19 cost the country £100 for the Cavalry and £96 for the Infantry; whereas, if enlisted at 20, the cost would be only £58 for the Cavalry and £57 for the Infantry. And, as he (Lord Eustace Cecil) had said the other day, if his right hon. Friend would enlist men at 20—and he did not think it would be at all difficult to do so—they would get not only a much cheaper, but also a much better article. Whatever might be the relative
  1260
  merits of each, he did not think they could do now without some combination of long and short service, because the ordinary British peasant had grown so accustomed to the system of enlisting for short service, that he did not believe they would easily get men to enlist for long service; so that that really settled the question. But in regard to short service, there was no doubt, as he had said, that there had been a very great waste. Lord Airey's Committee estimated its cost at £3,500,000 in 10 years. There was a danger that, in future, they might lose a certain number of men unless they were enlisted at 20 years of age; and he hoped that the right hon. Gentleman would consider whether it would not be possible to limit the recruits to that age. He wished to say a few words on the Non-Effective Vote. That Vote had certainly increased in the last 10 years, owing to the increase in the Out-Pension Vote. All that time the system of short service had been going on, and although Lord Cardwell did not immediately promise a reduction of expenditure in connection with this system, he held out the hope that such would be the case. What was the fact with regard to the Out-Pension Vote? Contrary to Lord Cardwell's anticipations, the Out-Pension Vote had, during the last few years, increased at the rate of £75,000 per annum, giving a total increase of £380,000. He should like if the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Childers) could explain how it was, for it was a pregnant fact that the Pension Vote had gone on increasing while we had had short service. As to compulsory retirement, he did not believe promotion would work properly without compulsory retirement. He thought there was nothing whatever to complain of as to the conditions of compulsory retirement in the scheme of the right hon. Gentleman.
  MAJOR O'BEIRNE, in criticizing the details of the scheme, said, that the short-service system had been tried and found wanting. It was a sham. The reason why the Reserves of foreign Armies answered was because they were efficient, in consequence of being called out annually for training, and our Reserves were never called out; whereas, in our case, two months' training was necessary before they were fit to take the field; and, further than that, foreign service was not allowed till after the age of 23.

  1261
  Besides, they had conscription, and were able thereby to collect the best of the male population all over the country. Ho agreed with the hon. and gallant Member for East Aberdeenshire (Sir Alexander Gordon) in what he had said in regard to the position of officers under the new scheme. As to the territorial system, however, he did not think it. would have the effect of destroying esprit de corps; but, at the same time, he held the best plan was that of the Duke of Wellington, who desired always to have the three Nationalities blended in one regiment. He wished to point out that the Reserve at present was useless; because, if we wanted the men, we should have to give them three months' training before they would be fit for active service. He also thought that under the present retirement rules the War Office would become a focus of backstairs influences.
  SIR HENRY FLETCHERsaid, he deeply regretted that the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War had not seen his way to allow the re-enlistment of men who had served their time, and who were willing to remain with the Colours. Lord Airey's Report recommended that 25 per cent of the old soldiers, who had completed 12 years' service, should be allowed to reengage, and he thought it would have been very much better for the discipline of the Army if that recommendation had been acceded to. He believed that by retaining a certain number of old soldiers discipline would be maintained in the Army. In a very short time, when the old soldiers had disappeared, the barrack-room would be filled with recruits and with non-commissioned officers about the same age as the recruits. The non-commissioned officers would probably act with too much harshness, or with indiscretion, in the management of the recruits. He thought, also, that it would be better for service in the field if some old soldiers were mixed up with the young ones. Certainly, the old system of long service was more popular with old soldiers than that which had been recently established. Two hundred and nine men, formerly in the Army, but now occupied in various Public Departments—the Police, the Home Office, the Convict Department, and in other responsible positions—were asked their opinions; and 129 expressed their
  1262
  opinion that they would much prefer the old system, and 61 only were in favour of the new. He also thought it was a most unwise proceeding to retire captains at 40. He was afraid the result of the system would be that they would find a number of those officers become loiterers at clubs and about watering-places, with just means enough to maintain themselves; and, that being so, he did not imagine that parents in the future would be disposed to spend heavy sums in the education of their sons for the Army with such a prospect before them. Nor could he express approval. of the territorial system; the abandonment of the well-known names and titles of regiments being, in his opinion, most dangerous, especially at this critical time, when every other Army in Europe was armed to the teeth. The change would be distasteful to the officers and not liked by the men, and young men would not be induced to join the territorial regiment of their district. He thought it was dangerous to interfere with the traditions of the Army; and though there was no doubt that the old system of linked battalions required amendment, he did not think that there should have been such a clean sweep of the old state of things. He thought men should have the opportunity of choosing their own regiments, and that in many cases they would prefer to be away from home. He would venture, in conclusion, to suggest to the Secretary of State for War whether he could not advise the Queen, before the final abolition of the existing arrangements, to hold a review of her troops under the old system, so that she might see them once more as they had existed hitherto, and that they might have the opportunity of exclaiming—
  "Ave CŖsar, Imperator! morituri te salutant."
  GENERAL SIR GRORGE BALFOURsaid, that when Lord Cardwell began those changes in their military system, which had ended in so wide a scope, the military expenditure had been brought down to between £12,000,000 and £13,000,000, or less than they had been since the time of the Crimean War. The expenditure, including interest on money spent in buying back the Army, and on outlay for dep ô t centres and other purposes, was now fully £17,000,000; and, as he thought that

  1263
  one of the most useful inquiries that could be instituted would be as to how this large increase had been applied, and whether the increase of £5,000,000 had been laid out with judgment and success, there would be no cause for regret. The right hon. Gentleman the present Secretary of State for War had made further important changes, and he was of opinion that some of them would be useful, although suggestions had been made in the course of the debate which well deserved his attention, as likely to make these changes work well. He must express his pleasure at finding changes proposed with the view to bringing about increased efficiency; but he deplored the fact that while the Army expenditure was steadily increasing, there had as yet been no corresponding increase in efficiency. The mere formation of a Reserve could not be said to be worth the actual change. Whether the great economies which the right hon. Gentleman stated were to result would be realized, they must wait several years to judge. He was of opinion that, for the sake of the efficiency of the Army, the country was prepared to spend whatever was necessary; and whilst anxious to have all branches of the Service kept up in the highest stage of efficiency, yet he was particularly anxious that something more should be done for the Infantry of the Line. They ought to try to raise that Force up to the most efficient state, so that no soldiers in the world could surpass them. They had only 97,000 privates in the Infantry of the Line, of whom 39,000 were in India, 39,000 at home, and 15,000 in the Colonies. But in those numbers were included lance corporals, bandsmen, clerks, acting drummers, and others so universally borne on the rolls as privates, instead of being shown separately from the soldiers available for guard duties. At least 80 privates in each battalion were inefficient as privates, leaving only 80,000 privates fit for duty out of the 97,000. No one having any knowledge of the calls upon our Army, in every part of the world, would say that such a small Force was sufficient for the widely extended purposes of the nation. Of the total number besides those in India and the Colonies, and with battalions at home, there were only 4,400 maintained in the depôts, 93,000 being actively employed with the Colours.
  1264
  The strength kept in the depôts had been greatly reduced since last year, and no one acquainted with the wants of the Infantry could for an instant accept the present depot strength as sufficient for the purpose of maintaining the nominal strength of the service battalions. There ought to be in the depôts a strength in privates equal to the numbers annually recruited, say 18,000; also a number of recruits sufficient to cover the strength of lads under 20 years of age, numbering about 7,000; and to cover other differences, at least 5,000 more privates. Say, in all the depôts, at least 30,000 recruits should be kept in excess of the 93,000 men present with battalions, all of whom ought to be efficient in the ranks of privates fit and able to take guard duties. He earnestly impressed upon the Secretary of State for War the importance and urgency of considering the suggestions that had been thrown out, with a view to increase the efficiency of the Infantry, which formed the main body of the Army. That Force should be relieved from all the many guards and other employments, in order that their time should be wholly given up to drills and instruction to fit them for war purposes, so that their small Army might be equal to a larger but less disciplined Force. He thought that as a considerable time must elapse before the effect of the recent changes would be realized, economy at the expense of efficiency would be a great mistake. In particular, the Infantry of the Line ought to be thoroughly efficient. Instead of making the country depend on a Reserve by passing youths through the Army, as in Germany, and making men cease to be soldiers at the very time they had attained to some degree of training, ho thought that some other mode should be followed for procuring a Reserve Force for the country. In 1870, he had suggested that the old local Militia, which was formed under Lord Castlereagh in 1809, should again be called into being. There were then 450,000 of the local Militia, and if the system had been carried on we might now have 1,000,000 men to defend the country, and so leave the Regular Army free for foreign service. With this local Militia, or with the universal training of the population, such as Mr. Wyndham proposed in 1807, there would be a magnificent Reserve kept available,

  1265
  thus leaving the Line Infantry to be formed and trained in the way best calculated to secure the greatest efficiency. Happily, the right lion, and gallant Gentleman (Colonel Stanley) the late Secretary of State for War had left the Acts of Parliament relating to the local Militia intact when he re-cast the laws relating to the Regular Militia, so that the calling out of the local Militia could be made whenever the nation desired. He thought a reasonable economy might be effected in reducing the number of companies, and consequently of captaincies. It frequently happened that, under the present formation, a captain had not really more than 40 men under his command. Instead of forming the battalions of eight companies, the formation ought to be either a four-company battalion, as in Germany and France, or, as a mean, into six companies, thereby making each company so strong as to need the presence of a captain and at least two subalterns. In this six-company formation, 846 companies would more than suffice for 141 battalions. In the whole of the Infantry, instead of the 1,410 companies now maintained in battalions and in depôts, of whom 1,128 were with battalions, 846, or even 600, companies ought to be kept up. Then the depôts could be supplied with officers and non-commissioned officers specially selected as the fittest for training recruits. But at present, with the short time allowed for this debate, it was not right to press one's views at greater length, seeing that the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the late Secretary of State was waiting to speak on affairs in which he had had so prominent a share.
  COLONEL STANLEY: Sir, there are three points in the statement of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War on which I desire to offer a few remarks. Within the limited time at my disposal there are various points on which it is almost impossible for me to touch; and I only wish it to be understood that if I abstain from offering criticisms upon them, it is not to be considered as implying anything in derogation of the proposals made, or any want of respect on my part. The main points on which the discussion has turned have been short or long service, organization, and compulsory retirement. On short or long service there have been expressed that variety of opinions not
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  unlikely to be found in the House. The right hon. Gentleman, who has listened to the debate with such patience, cannot but feel that there is among all sections of the House a very strong feeling that, as far as ho may find it practicable, it is desirable that there shall be left a leaven of old soldiers, whether in the form of non-commissioned officers or privates, and that these should be left in no inconsiderable proportions among those who are serving in the active ranks of the Army. I say nothing of some of the arguments which may be used as to the conditions under which the men are engaged. It is said that Englishmen do not like to engage so as to throw away the best part of their lifetime. There is a great deal of truth in that; and, on the other hand, there is a very great deal to be said in favour of short service. I am not at all sure, looking to the general conditions of labour in this country, that you could get a very large proportion of long-service men, even if you chose to take statutory powers to do so. That being the case, and having been the case for the past few years, by the enlistment provisions of the Army Regulation Act of 1879, we gave to the Secretary of State the widest possible statutory powers to enlist men for long or short service within the terms prescribed by the Act. We consider we have benefited by that provision, and if my right hon. Friend is prepared to go one step further in the Amendment Bill, which I understand will be in our hands in the course of a few days, he will find that any proposals in that direction will meet, at all events, with no hostile reception from these, or any other Benches. To show that I am not expressing only the ideas of the moment, I may quote the Reference I gave to Lord Airey, in which I said—
  "That recruits may be as a class equal to what they were formerly; but battalions composed mainly of young soldiers cannot be expected to exhibit the soldierly qualities of more experience."
  I do not say it is possible, even if it were desirable, to turn back the wheels of the clock and go back to long service altogether; but I think if my right hon. Friend were able, in view of recent experience, to enlarge his proposals a little, the Service would distinctly be the gainer. I should be glad if non-commisioned officers could have the power to

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  re-engage without the veto. There may be very good reasons why this veto has been introduced; but I confess I share the apprehensions of many hon. and gallant Friends about me, that it would be felt by the soldier that there is an element of doubt brought in, for he knows that if there is a reference to the "War Office or to the Secretary of State, the question will rarely go to the Secretary of State himself, but will be dealt with in the Office by those who may have preconceived opinions against re-enlistment. Whether the power should not be given to non-commissioned officers is a matter which deserves the careful consideration of my right hon. Friend. On the next point I would refer to, I know there are great differences of opinion among military men; but I think Lord Airey's Committee were guided by very good considerations in recommending that the quartermaster-sergeants, as well as the sergeant-majors, should be made warrant officers. I can well understand the reasons which have led to the conclusion which has been come to, and that it is desirable that the sergeant-major being at the head of the noncommissioned officers, that there should be a broad line of demarcation between him and other non-commissioned officers, and it is possible it may have been thought it would weaken that position if. the quartermaster-sergeant were made a warrant officer; but, on the other hand, I would desire to bring into notice the very great responsibility, financial and general, of the quartermaster-sergeants, and the temptations to which they may be exposed; and I cannot help thinking it would have been well to have improved the position of the quartermaster-sergeant, by making him a warrant officer, and so placing him on a higher level, in which he would be looked up to. As to the sergeant-majors, there can be no difference of opinion, and I am glad my right hon. Friend has done it. With regard to short service, without expressing any strong opinion for oragainst it, I may say there appeared to be great weight in the reasons which were given by the hon. and gallant Member for Berkshire (Sir Robert Loyd-Lindsay), who spoke when the House had been rather led away from the reasons which led to the formation of the Reserve. My hon. and gallant Friend reminded the House that the Reserve system had been
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  introduced because the long-service system and single enlistment had broken down. There is no doubt whatever about the fact. There was a general feeling that there must be a change of some kind, and short service appeared to be the only method by which an effectual Reserve could be established. With regard to the difficulties which lie in the way of the Reserve, I wish every success to my right hon. Friend in any attempt he may make to induce private employers of labour to co-operate with him as respects his Reserve men. I am very sorry to say that in 1878, when the Reserve men were called out, it was not without difficulty that, believing, as we rightly believed, they would only be out for a short time, when we asked employers of labour to keep their places open for them, that employers acceded to that request. Although the police authorities, Railway Companies, and others, did at last yield to our solicitations, there was not that cordial spirit displayed for the system established, though it is for a national benefit, and a national benefit alone. Much has been said with truth about the hardship of the short service, in respect of its necessitating the constant transference of men from one battalion to the other, and not a little of the blame was thrown on the shoulders of those who favoured the system of linked or double battalions. But I must remind hon. Members that there is no necessary connection whatever between the two. You may have long service, and at the same time you may have a system of linked battalions; you may have short service and single battalions; but the evils which are complained of do not necessarily attach to the combination of these two principles, and they may vary according to the state of the Service. If you wish to avoid frequent transferences, with all their disadvantages, there is only one way, and it is to keep up your battalions at comparatively equal strength. It stands to reason that if a battalion abroad is to be 800 strong, and the corresponding battalion at home is to be 40O, transferences must be more frequent than if each were 600 strong. There is no necessary connection between constant transfer and the system of linked battalions. At the same time, I do not agree that it is possible, under the circumstances in which we are placed, at

  1269
  all times to keep the battalions at home and abroad precisely equal. That, if anything, was the weak point, and will always remain the weak point, of the system inaugurated by Lord Cardwell in 1871. Nine-tenths of the complaints which are made against the modern system, are made because people do not recollect how much the battalions at home have to perform. They have not only to maintain their efficiency as battalions, but also to discharge the functions of depôts. Everyone knows how unpleasant it is to allow good men to leave one battalion for others; but I hope there is public spirit enough in the Service to make people put aside private feeling and work cordially for the most satisfactory result, although it may not be always visible to them. I am anxious to show that there is no necessary connection between some of the evils of the transfer so much complained of and the system of double battalions. It has never been attempted to be proved that in the case of the Guards, or the Rifle Brigade, or the Artillery, for example, there was ever any difficulty found in recruiting on the ground that the men might be shifted from one battalion to another. At the same time, every effort should be made to save the men being shifted from battalion to battalion; in fact, the system ought to be used, but not abused. At this advanced hour, I must put aside the question as to regimental organization save so far as this—that I would ask my right hon. Friend whether he intends to fill up the additional majors to anything like the double or large company system? What I understand is this—that the appointment of majors now to take place is really more for the purposes of promotion than for any other reason. Practically, they will be so many brevet majorities. The majors will do garrison duty; but elsewhere, except on the inarch, will perform the ordinary duties of captains. But what I venture to ask my right hon. Friend to do, before he goes in the direction of creating larger companies, is to look at the evidence and opinions of officers of great distinction in our Service, who, with singular unanimity, recommended that for our Army the single company of 100 men should be maintained as a formation rather than the larger companies which are to be found in the Armies of foreign Powers.
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  There is one other point on which I will touch very briefly. There has been, I believe, a complaint made in connection with the formation of territorial regiments that officers of Militia have been put to considerable and unnecessary expense. I did not gather from my right hon. Friend that he was prepared to allow those officers who had to change from silver to gold any allowance in respect to that change. If he does not, I hope my right hon. Friend will emphasize the fact that such officers may continue in their former dress as long as possible; because I know that, in such cases, pressure is brought to bear upon officers to change at once, which they find it very hard to resist. But I hope, under the circumstances, that my right hon. Friend will give a hint in the proper quarter in favour of an allowance being made. The recommendations of my Committee with respect to change of officers referred to the men rather than to the officers, and that in consequence of the difficulty which was being experienced when under the mobilization system the Militia were drafted off to the Line regiments. With respect to compulsory retirement, I would remind the House that when that system was adopted promotion absolutely ceased. To say that there shall be no compulsory retirement at all is no argument at all, but simply a begging of the whole question; for, from the moment when purchase was decided, compulsory retirement was only a matter of time. The officers of the Army laid their grievance before the Secretary of State, and two Commissions were appointed to inquire into the subject, and their Reports led to the step taken by the War Office in 1877. No one could, without regret, witness the necessity for the retirement of officers who desire to remain with their regiments; but it was seen that such retirement was necessary, and that the few should suffer for the many, however worthy the few might be. I must say that the parts of the scheme of my right hon. Friend which I approve least are those which refer to general officers; but I am content just now to ask the old question—"Why can you not let it alone?" There are other points as to which I would wish to say a few words, but time will not allow of of my doing so. I hope my right hon. Friend will continue to give that cordial consideration to the suggestions which.

  1271
  Lave been thrown out which he has hitherto done, and which, with the great attention he has devoted to the entire subject, has pained for him that meed of approval which has greeted him from all sides.
  MR. CHILDERSsaid, he was very much obliged to his right lion, and gallant Friend (Colonel Stanley) for the expressions lie had just used, in concluding his remarks, and also to the House for the manner in which the statement he (Mr. Childers) had had to make had been received. He could assure lion. Members that he was much obliged for the suggestions which had been made in the course of the debate. This was a question on which he might hope there were no political differences to affect their deliberations. He trusted the hon. and gallant Member who had moved the Amendment (Sir Alexander Gordon) would withdraw it before 7 o'clock, in order that at that Sitting the debate might be closed, so that the Government might fulfil their engagement with regard to the Evening Sitting. He could not accept the Amendment, because it would pledge the Government to the broad principle that no officer not absolutely inefficient could, under any circumstances, be compulsorily retired under 70 years of age. Such a rule would be fatal to any system of satisfactory promotion. They were bound to go on the lines of the system which, had been adopted after much consideration in the case of the Navy. With respect to the suggestion of his noble Friend opposite (Lord Eustace Cecil), he assured him that ho had not lost sight of the necessity with a shorter list of having additional safeguards in respect of selection, and he could say that in no case could any officer receive a second Staff appointment without the case previously coming under his own personal observation. His hon. and gallant Friend the Member for West Sussex (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) had stated that the men of the Reserve were starving all over the country; but his lion, and gallant Friend forgot that that was tested only a few weeks ago, when the Reserve men were called upon to join their regiments if they desired to do so. In answer to that call only 1,000 out of 20,000 men came forward to express their willingness to rejoin. Certainly, the number of men in the condition described could not
  1272
  have been large. His right hon. and gallant Friend who had just sat down (Colonel Stanley) had asked him whether non-commissioned officers could not be allowed to re-engage without veto or condition? He did not think it would be desirable to do away with the veto. Men, when originally made non-commissioned officers, might have had an excellent character in the Service, and yet be unsuitable ten years afterwards for nine years' further service as non-commissioned officers. Then the right hon. and gallant Gentleman had asked that the claims of quartermaster-sergeants might be considered. The Government had recently been dealing with the case of sergeant-majors, and he could only say that it was wise to take one thing at a time. When the promotion of sergeant-majors to warrant rank had been well tested, he would give the matter his future consideration. He had also been asked whether it was desirable to take advantage of the appointment of four majors per battalion, to introduce the double-company organization, so as to have four in a service battalion? There was a division of opinion on the subject, and he did not think it would be wise at present to meddle with existing arrangements. The time might come for it; but, at present, it was one of the questions on which they were not agreed. Had time allowed, he would gladly have answered other questions. He would, therefore, ask his lion, and gallant Friend at once to withdraw his Amendment.
  SIR ALEXANDER GORDONsaid, that in consequence of the request of his right hon. Friend, but not in consequence of his arguments, he would consent to the withdrawal of his Amendment.
  LIEUT. - COLONEL MILNE-HOMEasked, whether Purchase officers after the 1st of July would be entitled at any time to sell the commissions they held on the 1st November, 1871, on the payment of the Government valuation?
  MR. CHILDERS: Their lights are not affected at all.
  GENERAL BURNABYasked, whether there would be any further opportunity of discussing the question?
  MR. CHILDERS: Certainly. Once, if not twice, during the present Session there will be an opportunity on the Estimates.
  Amendment and Motion, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair," by leave, withdrawn.
  Committee to sit again this day.
  And it being ten minutes to Seven of the clock, House suspended its Sitting.
  House resumed its Sitting at Nine of the clock.

ORDER OF THE DAY.

  SUPPLY.—COMMITTEE.
  Order for Committee read.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."

  THE ANGLO-TURKISH CONVENTION.

    MOTION FOR AN ADDRESS.
    MR. RYLANDS, in rising to call attention to the Anglo-Turkish Convention; and to move—
    "That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, that She will be graciously pleased to give directions that there shall be laid before this House Copies of all Despatches and Papers on the subject of the Anglo-Turkish Convention which have passed between Her Majesty's Government, or Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, and the Turkish Government, and which have not already been laid before Parliament,"
    said, that the Anglo-Turkish Convention was a remarkable instance of the exercise of the Treaty-making Prerogative of the Crown. In former Sessions he had called the attention of the House to the exercise of that Prerogative, and had urged upon the House the grounds which rendered it highly important and necessary that all Treaties should be submitted to Parliament before ratification. The Prime Minister had stated that, in practice, there was generally an interval between the conclusion of a Treaty and its ratification during which Parliament might interfere. The declaration of the right hon. Gentleman on this subject was highly important, and was contained in the speech which he made upon the Berlin Treaty on July 30th, 1878, when ho said—
    "This House of Parliament may declare itself in decisive terms against any Treaty before ratification. The intervention of a Parliamentary Chamber, by well understood precedents, can stop the ratification of a Treaty. That is to
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    say, the Government which chooses to stop the ratification of a Treaty, in consequence of such an intervention, is not liable to the charge of bad faith."—[3 Hansard, ccxlii. 713.]
    The right hon. Gentleman, in justification of that statement, referred to the well-known precedent of the Eight of Search Treaty which was entered into between England and Prance in 1841, but which met with so much opposition in the French Chambers that the ratification was not proceeded with. The Anglo-Turkish Convention, however, was not only negotiated in secret and completed in a clandestine manner, but it was ratified before Parliament had any knowledge of its existence, and it was, therefore, absolutely impossible for this House to interfere. The right hon. Gentleman had urged another justification for the existence of the Treaty-making Prerogative. He said that the power could only be exercised by the Crown under the advice of Ministers, and under the important limitation that Treaties so entered upon should be in accordance with public opinion and the known views of Parliament. But the Convention absolutely violated these recognized conditions. It had been denounced by the right hon. Gentleman himself as an "abuse" of the Treaty-making Prerogative. It was sprung upon Parliament, and, to the amazement of the public, it was found that, without any note of warning, the country had been involved in enormous responsibilities. It was a mockery and a delusion to say that Parliament held the purse-strings of the nation, if it could be committed by secret Treaties of that kind, ratified without its knowledge or sanction, to obligations which might entail the expenditure of vast sums of money. That Convention, which in its conception and birth bore all the marks of illegitimacy, still existed, and the position in which they were placed by it demanded the serious attention of the Government and of Parliament. It was at least satisfactory that the Liberal Party were perfectly free to re-consider the question. It was said, in reference to the annexation of the Transvaal, that the Liberal Party were committed to its approval by the declarations of Lord Kimberley in the House of Lords and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. FORSTER) in this House. But no such allegation could

    1275
    be made in respect of the Anglo-Turkish Convention. The moment it was brought to the knowledge of the Liberal Party they denounced it. It was denounced by the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister in his Mid Lothian speeches. He said it was "an insane Convention." [Mr. GLADSTONE: I said it in this House.] The right hon. Gentleman had said it in that House. The noble Marquess who led the Liberal Party in that House in the last Parliament (the Marquess of Hartington)moved a Resolution condemning the heavy responsibilities and undefined engagements which this country had incurred under that Convention; and, in favour of that Resolution, the great body of the Liberal Members in the last House of Commons voted. Those "undefined engagements" and "heavy responsibilities" against which that protest was made still existed. The noble Marquess, in the powerful speech which he delivered on moving his Resolution, anticipated that the
    "Time for reflection would inevitably come when the country would retreat with honour while there was time from this false and ill-advised course."
    The time for reflection had now come. The false glamour which surrounded Lord Beaconsfield's meretricious Eastern policy had passed away; and now, so far as the people of that country were concerned, they might appeal from "Philip drunk to Philip sober." Some hon. Gentlemen had said in reference to his Motion—"Why not let sleeping dogs lie?" But sleeping dogs had not unfrequently the habit of awakening at an inconvenient time. He did not believe in a drifting policy. The Government had allowed things to drift in the Transvaal; and, although he highly honoured the wise determination they had ultimately arrived at, still it could not be denied that the delay in making their decision had occasioned most deplorable results. At any moment serious events might arise in the East which might place us in circumstances of great difficulty under the Convention. Let him remind the House of their obligations and pledges. That country had undertaken the responsibility of the good government of Asia Minor, a country containing 660,000 square miles—a territory larger than 'France, Spain, Italy, and the British Islands put together—with a population
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    of 16,000,000 or 17,000,000, under the worst possible government, overrun with, predatory tribes, and inhabited by distinct races, divided by religious animosities. The scheme was so wild, so extravagant, so impossible, that people escaped from the Convention by saying it was so monstrous it must be treated as waste paper. But that was not a creditable position for a great Power like England. If they did not mean to keep their pledges, they ought to withdraw from them. But the Convention, went still further. This country had assumed the Protectorate of Asia Minor. They had undertaken to defend the frontiers of Armenia from Russia. The late Government, under the Treaty of Berlin, recognized the possession by Russia of Kars, Batoum, and Ardahan, and thus having enormously increased the power of Russia on the Asiatic Frontier, and having given her a strong basis of operations for attacking Turkey, they had undertaken the impossible task of preventing her advance. Surely, that was the very insanity of statesmanship. There was no mistake as to the obligations entered into. The 1st Article of the Anglo-Turkish Convention was most explicit. It ran as follows:—
    "If Batoum, Ardahan, Kars, or any of them shall be retained by Russia, and if any attempt shall be made at any future time by Russia to take possession of any further territories of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, in Asia, as fixed by the definitive Treaty of Peace, England engages to join his Imperial Majesty the Sultan, in defending them by force of arms."
    It has been said that this was merely a "sham" Convention; but that was not the opinion of the late Government, and he supposed was not now the opinion of the Conservative Party. On the 6th August, 1878, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for North Devon (Sir Stafford Northcote) said—
    "The Convention is a very real Convention, and it was adopted with the substantial intention of Her Majesty's Government to give, in a serious and solemn manner, effect, as far as they can do so, to the proposals of that Convention. No doubt we have taken a very serious liability by undertaking that we shall defend Turkey against the invasion of Russia."—[3 Hansard, ccxlii. 1368.]
    The declarations of Lord Beaconsfield and Lord Salisbury left no doubt as to I the moaning and intention of the Anglo-' Turkish Convention. Lord Beaconsfield,
    in the House of Lords, on July 18, 1878, said—

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    "Yielding to Russia what she has obtained, we say to her, 'Thus far, and no further.' "—[3 Hansard, ccxli. 1772.]
    Lord Salisbury justified the Convention by condemning the Tripartite Treaty and similar guarantees given by the Powers of Europe conjointly as being
    "Misty and shadowy guarantees which bound you to everything in theory and which turned out in practice to bind you to nothing; "
    and he claimed that the Government had
    "Made a pledge which will be easily understood by those whom it concerns."
    Lord Salisbury added that, while former pledges derived from the "concert of Europe"had misled" Turkey, and had been despised by Russia," they had adopted the
    "Better and simpler form of engagement, in which, only two Powers being mixed up, there can be no doubt of the pledges being fulfilled."
    It was argued that the Convention fell to the ground in consequence of Turkey not fulfilling her promises to adopt reforms; but, unless we explicitly withdrew from the Convention, he could not see that the plea for its nullification that Turkey had not redeemed those pledges could be maintained. No time was fixed for the carrying out of those reforms in Turkey. The Convention stated that—
    "In return, His Imperial Majesty promises to England to introduce necessary reforms, to be agreed upon later between the two Powers, into the government, and for the protection of the Christian and other subjects of the Porte in these territories."
    In Lord Salisbury's covering despatch, all that the British Government insisted upon was—
    "That they should be formally assured of the intention of the Porte to introduce the necessary reforms."
    And he significantly added that—
    "It is not desirable to require more than an engagement in general terms."
    Again, at a great meeting at Manchester, on October 17, 1879, Lord Salisbury said—
    "What I think ought to be carefully considered by the English people is this—that however important it is that Turkey should be reformed, and although they will rightly require of their Government that every exertion should be made in order to carry these reforms into effect, the question of reformed or unreformed Turkey does not affect the necessity of keeping Russia from Constantinople and from the Ægean."
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    Lord Salisbury was now the recognized Leader of the Party opposite, and it was to be presumed that, on a change of Government, he might become Prime Minister. The House and the country, therefore, ought clearly to understand what his views were. The fact was, that the promises of Turkey were a mere secondary consideration. The late Government knew perfectly well what the promises of Turkey were worth. The undertaking to make reform was a mere shadowy engagement and a sham. But there was a real price insisted upon in return for their engagement to protect Turkey from Russia. They took Cyprus. In the Convention it was stipulated that—
    "In order to enable England to make necessary provision for executing her engagement, His Imperial Majesty further consents to assign the Island of Cyprus to be occupied and administered by England."
    The fact that Cyprus was now found to be a worthless possession did not alter the matter. It was the bribe we asked for, and it was now in our possession. No doubt, the return of Lord Salisbury from Berlin with the Cyprus Convention in his pocket, which he had purchased by involving England in great responsibilities, was very much like Moses Primrose returning home with a gross of green spectacles in exchange for his horse; but the bargain, however foolish, was actually made, and the House should realize the fact that the Convention actually existed and they might be called upon at any moment to fulfil the obligations they had incurred. If hon. Members had read the Blue Books on Armenia, they must have been horrified at the state of that country. The despatches were full of accounts of murders, robberies, and oppressions without redress. Criminals were protected by the ruling classes—the honour of Christian females was at the mercy of Mahommedan libertines, and taxation was only another name for plunder. All these horrors presented a great contrast to the state of things in Russian Armenia. There the population had exhibited during the past generation wonderful moral and intellectual progress, and had increased in numbers from 350,000 in 1830, to 800,000 at the present time. It could not be doubted that, unless reforms speedily took place in Turkish Armenia, the people would rise against

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    their oppressors. The embers of conflagration were smouldering in that country and might burst forth into flame at any moment. They might talk about "Russian intrigues;" but it required no foreign influence to rouse into insurrection a people who were crushed by the intolerable cruelties of Turkish despotism. An insurrection in Armenia would be followed by Turkish atrocities. Armenia would become a second Bulgaria, and Russia would certainly advance into Turkey to protect the Armenian Christians. Turkey would then call upon England under the terms of the Convention to defend the territories of the Porte by force of arms. What should they do then? He did not for a moment suppose that the present Government would attempt to resist the advance of Russia by force of arms in order to fasten on the necks of the Armenians the cruel yoke of Turkey. It would be a folly' and a crime. the Government would ignore this insane Convention; but they would again call down upon themselves a storm of obliquy. They would be charged with forfeiting the honour of England and the pledged word of the Queen. Probably, some hon. Member would say that they were again making the British Lion run away with his tail between his legs. [Mr. WARTON: Hear, hear!] Ho was bound to admit that such a position would not be exactly creditable in the eyes of Europe. It would be a far more prudent and honourable course to withdraw from the Convention explicitly, and to give Turkey full notice that their obligations under it had ceased. Government might already have taken that course. He asked for further Papers in the hopes that that might be so; but, at all events, the Papers already presented showed that the Government had acted exclusively under the 61st Article of the Treaty of Berlin and had apparently ignored the Anglo-Turkish Convention. He considered that that was a wise policy, and that the only safe course of dealing with Turkey was by maintaining the concert of Europe. But if they with-drew from the Anglo-Turkish Convention, what were they to do with Cyprus—that damnosa hœreditas from the Tory Government? Their title to Cyprus was bad—it was an infraction of the Public Law of Europe, which declared that no alteration in existing Treaties
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    should be made by any Power except with the consent of the other contracting Powers. The late Government had violated these stipulations by the possession of Cyprus, which was an evil example to other Powers. How was it justified? Lord Salisbury, at Manchester, in October, 1879, gave the grounds of the policy of the late Government in taking Cyprus. He said—
    "The occupation of Cyprus was merely carrying out the traditionary policy of the English Government for a long time past. When the interest of Europe was centred in the conflicts that were waged in Spain, England occupied Gibraltar. When the interest was centred in the conflicts that wore waged in Italy, England occupied Malta—and now that there is a chance that the interest of Europe may he centred in Asia Minor, or in Egypt, England has occupied Cyprus."
    That had been truly called a "Bandit policy." That evil example was now being followed by France; because it could not be doubted that the present Tunisian question took its root in the action of the British Government in 1878. When the terms of the Anglo-Convention became known, they excited dissatisfaction and distrust in Europe. In Franco, especially, there was naturally much irritation, and on July 21, 1378, M. Waddington wrote a despatch, in which he spoke of the "outburst of surprise and uneasiness" which had been called forth in France. That despatch, was concealed from Parliament for some months, and on August 1, 1878, the noble Lord the late Postmaster General (Lord John Manners) denied that there was any irritation in Franco, and declared that—
    "Not a cloud has arisen We have proceeded throughout these difficult and entangled negotiations in complete harmony with the French and Italian Governments."—[3 Hansard, ccxlii. 904.]
    But it was well known that the French Press was loud in its denunciations of the Anglo-Turkish Convention. Suddenly the excitement was closed, and the diplomatic rupture avoided. They now knew how Franco was pacified. There was another clandestine engagement involving the honour of England. There was a secret conference between Lord Salisbury and M. Waddington, which suggested the idea of bandits meeting together dividing their spoil. M. Waddington naturally complained of the bad faith of England in taking Cyprus

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    from Turkey. "Oh," Lord Salisbury, would reply—"that is easily arranged. Why not filch another slice of Turkish territory? Take Tunis." [Laughter.] That nefarious bargain was struck, and, when it oozed out, of course it was denied, in his usual manner, by Lord Salisbury. There was a despatch on August 7, 1878, to Sir Richard Wood, the Consul at Tunis, in which Lord Salisbury distinctly asserted that—
    "No offer of the annexation of Tunis to France has ever been made by Her Majesty's Government to the French Government."
    There was a similar denial in that House by the right hon. Gentleman the late Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Bourke), who proved himself quite capable of supporting the line taken by his Chief. His (Mr. Rylands') hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Kincardine (Sir George Balfour) asked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, on July 16, 1878—
    "To explain whether there are any grounds for the rumours about changes in the Mahommedan territories of Tunis and Tripoli as respects their transfer to Italy or France? "
    The right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Bourke) replied—"No, Sir; we have not heard anything on the subject." Well, the matter had now been cleared up, and the House was in possession of evidence distinctly proving that the bargain was entered into. Hon. Gentlemen opposite laughed just now when he described the conversation which had probably taken place between M. Waddington and Lord Salisbury; but his description was fully justified by M. Waddington's account of the transaction. Immediately on returning to Paris from Berlin, M. Waddington placed on record an exact record of the conversation he had had with Lord Salisbury. It was contained in a despatch to the Marquess d'Harcourt, dated the 26th of July, 1878, and in it he said that Lord Salisbury,—
    "Anticipating of his own accord the feelings he supposed us to entertain, gave me to understand in the most friendly, and at the same time explicit language, that England had made up her mind to raise no obstacle against us in that quarter; that in his view it would be solely for ourselves to settle, as suited our convenience, the nature and extent of our relations with the Bey; and that the Queen's Government accepted beforehand all the consequences which the natural development of our policy might entail on the ultimate destiny of the Tunisian Territory. 'Do at Tunis what you think proper,' his Lord.
    1282
    ship said—'England will offer no opposition, and will respect your decisions.' "
    [Sir. H. DRUMMOND WOLFF: Read the answer.] He would do so. It practically confirmed the accuracy of M. Waddington's statement, and was contained in a despatch from Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons, dated the 7th of August, 1878, in which he said that he had made no note of what he described as the
    "Very satisfactory conversations which he had with M. Waddington at Berlin on the subject of Tunis; "
    but that—
    "Without being able to confirm the exact phrases attributed to me, I have great pleasure in bearing witness to the general justice of his recollections."
    The Conservative Government, at that time, evidently thought that they were in possession of a long lease of power, and might act as they thought proper on the subject of foreign affairs without fear of being called to account. He believed that there were other despatches in existence on the subject, and he challenged the Government to produce them. Why were they not produced? He supposed that it was because Lord Salisbury objected to their being laid on the Table. [Mr. A. J. BALFOUR: Oh, oh !] The hon. Member for Hertford disputed that statement. Let him stand up in his place, and say that his noble Relative was willing to have any further Papers produced. It was impossible to deny that the responsibility of the present state of things in Tunis belonged to the late Government. The bargain between Lord Salisbury and M. Waddington was now being carried out. There was no difficulty in France finding pretexts for a policy of aggression. He (Mr. Rylands) regretted the course which had. been taken by France; but he could not understand the outcry made by Conservative Members at each stage of the development of the French policy of annexation of Tunis, when they knew that their Leaders had positively committed the British Government to acquiescence in the designs of France. But how, he asked, while we retained possession of Cyprus, could the British Government protest with any degree of consistency against the action of the French Government with regard to Tunis? While we held Cyprus our hands were not clean. That view was put forward by M. Barth é lemy St.

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    Hilaire in a despatch to Lord Lyons dated the 16th of May, 1881, in which he said—
    "It is quite evident that, just as the English Government, when it has assumed the responsibility of the administration of foreign countries, has considered that it was bound to alter the existing state of things, and to procure for the population of which it assumed the guardianship the advantage of a civilized and regular Government, so also France, in whose hands the superintendence of affairs in Tunis is now placed, cannot shirk the duty of inviting that country to share the benefits which our administration has already conferred upon Algeria."
    The possession of Cyprus under the present title was altogether unjustifiable. It weakened the moral power of England in the Councils of Europe, and gave the sanction of their example to a policy of aggression. Its possession was further objectionable, because it was weighted with such heavy obligations, and because, under the present tenure, it was quite impossible to administer the Island satisfactorily. It was still Turkish territory under the suzerainty of the Porte. They were the tax-gatherers of the Sultan; and the uncertainty of the tenure of the Island necessarily interfered with the investment of capital upon it. The Under Secretary of State for the Colonies had laid Papers on the Table which would, no doubt, throw much light on the condition of the Island; but they were not yet in the hands of hon. Members. The local newspapers published in Cyprus were full of complaints of its administration. The people complained of the heavy taxation now levied in a manner injurious to industry. There was an enormous expenditure in salaries of local officials, &c, amounting to £75,000 a-year, in addition to the £100,000 paid to the Sultan. Complaints were also made of the constitution of the Courts of Justice, and of the Legislative Council, and of the denial of municipal privileges; and generally it was said that—
    "The people could not see any great difference between the present joint-stock proprietorship with Turkey and the original Turkish misrule."
    The present Government had wisely and boldly reversed the dangerous and criminal policy of their Predecessors in Afghanistan and South Africa, and it now remained for them to carry out the principles avowed by the Prime Minister by withdrawing from the Anglo-Turkish Convention, which was a danger to Bri-
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    tish interests, and an evil example to the European Powers. He begged, in conclusion, to make the Motion of which he had given Notice.
    MR. BAXTER, in seconding the Motion, said: The last time, Sir, I ventured to address the House of Commons on foreign affairs—and I have too much respect for the time of this House to address it often on any question—was in June, 1875, when, returning from a protracted tour in the East, I thought it my duty to tell my fellow-countrymen that the Party that used formerly to believe in the possible regeneration of Turkey had entirely disappeared, and that men of all nationalities, of all religious creeds, and of all political principles universally believed that the last hour of Turkey was very nearly come, and that nothing could save her. On that occasion I warned the House, and told it to be prepared for three things—first, the revolt and the separation from Turkey of some of her finest Provinces; secondly, the massacres that astonished Europe; and, lastly, the total collapse of Turkish finance. Well, many Turkish bondholders were very angry at what they were pleased to call my wild statement—namely, that no Turkish bondholder would receive a shilling, either of principal or interest; and 1 am sorry to say that the speech I made then in this House was received with so much discouragement and incredulity both here and elsewhere that I felt rather chap-fallen, although some months afterwards I had the satisfaction of receiving several letters from gentlemen who acted upon my humble warning, and who saved themselves from ruin by selling all their Turkish investments. A great deal has happened since. A great warning has been given to the public of this country in regard to the true condition of the Ottoman Empire, and we hear very little from our Friends on the other side of the House of the "independence and integrity" of our ancient Ally. But, Sir, it is because I believe that no one, or very few, at all events, actually realize at present the rotten condition of the Turkish Empire; because I believe, if they have made themselves acquainted with its present condition, they must allow that it is a great deal worse than it was six years ago, rendering any alliance, political,

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    financial, or otherwise between us and the Porte to be eminently foolish and dangerous—that I desire, in seconding the Motion of my hon. Friend, to say a few words more on the subject. I do not think any hon. Gentleman who has read the recent Blue Books on the question, and that very remarkable despatch written by Sir Henry Layard just before he left Constantinople, in which he conclusively showed the utter impossibility of doing anything to regenerate Turkey, will be surprised to hear my statement that, without exception, every recent traveller to the East has bore this testimony—that the Empire throughout is thoroughly rotten. Mahomedans and Christians alike in every part of the Empire are every day becoming more dissatisfied and exasperated against the Central Government. We are told—and I believe it is true—that of the vast armies that were raised in Asia Minor for the late war, not one man in 10 returned to his home. In consequence of that, large tracts of land are going out of cultivation, mosques are falling out of repair, whole districts are relapsing into a state of absolute lawlessness; and all travellers bear witness to this, that all portions of the population, from the mountains of Armenia to the shores of the Persian Gulf, are prepared to welcome any Power that will deliver them from the yoke of their hated Rulers. I have no doubt that many hon. Gentlemen present have read the two delightful books recently published by Lady Anne Blunt, who tells us passim of what she calls "the abominable conduct of the Turks." Let me read two sentences from The Bedouin Tribes of the Euphrates—
    "The Turkish Government has never sanctioned any other system of administration in Arabia than one of oppression towards the weak, and deceit towards the strong. But for my part I do not believe in the regeneration of Turkey, or even in the maintenance of its military power for any length of time."
    To this I would add the testimony of Mr. Oliphant, in The Land of Gilead—
    "Both Moslems and Christians, not unnaturally, entertain a most profound dislike of their Turkish masters, considering how they squeeze for taxes; and while the former are loyal to the Sultan, as head of their religion, they are utterly devoid of any patriotic instinct, and would gladly welcome a change of rule which would bring with it greater security for life and property. The late war, and wholesale con-
    1286
    scription incidental to it, has increased this feeling, while it has largely contributed to the poverty and distress of the people."
    And this year there has been published a most interesting book of travels in Asia Minor by the Rev. Henry Tozer, in which he bears this testimony—
    "The whole population was now thoroughly disgusted with the Government, so much so that all of them, the Turks included, would gladly welcome any European Power that would step in. Towards Russia, in particular, there was an excellent feeling, mainly owing to the favourable treatment of the Turkish prisoners during their detention in that country. Those who returned said—' The Russians fed us well, and gave us good clothes and hoots. They are the very people to suit us as Governors.' Were it not for a long-standing feeling of goodwill towards England, they would all go over to the side of Russia. The opinion prevailed that the present r é gime was intolerable. On this subject there was no difference—Mahomedans and Christians, natives and foreign residents, all thought alike. The one thing that every person was inquiring for was some Power that might replace it. From all that we could learn the normal condition of the Christians in this neighbourhood (in Armenia) was very had—nor did there seem to be much loyalty among the Turks, though there is no openly-declared disaffection as there is in Asia Minor. The troops in Erzeroum had received no pay for four years, and nothing but loyalty to the Sultan and devotion to their religion kept them from mutinying; even so, it was a question how long their allegiance would continue."
    Well, Sir, this is the state of the nation with which we have entered into a defensive alliance; and this is the condition of those territories in Asia of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, which it is the object of the Anglo-Turkish Convention to secure to him for the future. Now, I put it to a British House of Commons that this is a situation full of peril to this country. I know very well that Lord Salisbury, when the Convention was made, said he believed the very idea—the very fact—of Great Britain having come under such an obligation would prevent any attempt at territorial aggrandizement on the part of Russia, and that we never should be called upon to resort to arms. There are others of a different—I might say, an opposite—school, who urge that we need not attach importance to this Convention, which had no real meaning, but was merely intended as a cloak and a cover for the Schouvaloff Capitulation, and might be considered quite in the light of a dropped order. To my mind, this is not a safe line to take. It is no purpose of mine to re-open a former

    1287
    controversy by denouncing the mode and manner in which, this Convention was secretly negotiated; but I do think, in the words of the Resolution moved in 1878 by the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for India, "that the liabilities of this country have, by the Convention, been unnecessarily extended." We have incurred an enormous liability and an immense military responsibility. We have put ourselves in a position to be forced at any moment, either by Russia or by Turkey, at a time it may be most inconvenient to us, but whenever they please, to defend an Empire, not only in Asia Minor, but in Syria, Mesopotamia, and Turkish Arabia, the state of which its Rulers are deliberately allowing to get worse, relying upon our guarantee. Why, Sir, I put it strongly—that, in this matter, we have practised a deceit and a delusion upon the people of this country and upon the other Powers of Europe. Is there any man present who will tell me that we have an Army sufficient to do anything of the kind? There are no roads or means of communication in the Asiatic Dominions of Turkey to enable our Armies to march; and you may depend upon it that, considering the extent of our Empire at the present moment, the people of this country would never tolerate any Ministry, whether on this or the other side of the House, engaging in such a mad and Quixotic crusade. Now, I venture to ask Her Majesty's Government, who have been, in my opinion, very wise and very courageous in regard to Candahar and the Transvaal, to pluck up a little more courage and take advantage of the earliest possible opportunity of that clause in the Treaty which pledges the Turks to execute certain necessary reforms, in order to give notice to put an end to this wild and insane Convention. Very eloquent speeches were made by occupants of the present Treasury Bench in 1878. I thought they were unanswerable. But there is a great difficulty in the way. In Cyprus we have got a sort of white elephant; but there are surely brains and ingenuity enough on the Treasury Bench to get out of that difficulty. When it is a question of money, Turkey is very easily dealt with; and I do not think it would be very difficult to buy out Turkish rights. We might communicate with
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    Greece; and the feeling in Larnaca is unanimously in favour of annexation to Greece. It is not for me to tell how it can be done. All I have got to say is, "Where there's a will there's a way." I am quite sure that the great majority that placed the Prime Minister in power expects him, at the earliest opportunity, to get this country out of the engagement which necessitates our defending, at all hazards, one of the most corrupt Governments on the face of the earth. I want to say a word or two on another branch of the question. The Liberal Party, I think, are entirely satisfied with, the energetic and wise action which the Government have taken in regard to the Frontiers of Greece and Montenegro. We are glad the Government we placed in power should have acted in such an energetic and wise manner in regard to these matters, and I only hope they will be equally as persevering and resolute in their endeavours to do something with regard to the claims of Armenia. The Treaty of Berlin, which I have always held strongly to be a step in the right direction, and therefore worthy of energetic support, did not forget that interesting people, who, I have no doubt, will exercise a great influence in determining the future of the East. The American missionaries, who are better acquainted with the state of matters in these countries than any other body of men, and who, I may say in passing, are doing more for the enlightenment of the East than all other agencies combined, have a firm belief in the intelligence and destiny of that people who at present have fixed their hopes on England seeing justice done to them in accordance with the 61st Article of the Treaty of Berlin. At present their condition and sufferings are worse than before the war; and what they earnestly desire is that they should be placed very much in the same position as the inhabitants of the Lebanon, with a Christian Governor, a local military force, exemption from the hateful presence of Zaptiehs and Bashi-Bazouks, and the right of spending the taxes which they pay in the improvement, for the most part, of their own Province. Nothing could have been more successful than the trial of local autonomy, under the auspices of England and France, in Syria; and I never was so much struck with a contrast in my life as that be-

    1289
    tween the miserable cultivation, wretched poverty, depopulation, and apparent sterility of the Turkish pashaliks adjoining the Lebanon, and the evident and cheering prosperity, the well-tilled fields, the comfortable look of the inhabitants of that comparatively fortunate region. Now, if Her Majesty's Government, with the conjunction of the other European Powers, can manage to obtain for Armenia what has been given to the inhabitants of Lebanon, they will, I believe, do a great deal in favour of the freedom of the Eastern population. Before I sit down, I wish to express my satisfaction that the ridiculous Russian bugbear has come to be regarded in its true light. When one considers what has recently taken place there—the prospect of anarchy in that great Empire—the absurdity of any danger to this great, free, and independent people, either in India or in the Mediterranean, from an Empire with a Frontier far too extended, with a crippled finance, discontented population, and an Army which I do not believe to be in a condition capable of fighting an Army like our own, and a Navy, the state of which is not to be talked of by any intelligent person—I hope, considering these things, we have really heard the last of that which has always appeared to me to be unworthy of a great maritime Power like England, and of all sensible and enlightened men. One of the most profound observers and shrewd thinkers in America thus writes—
    "The same suspicion has involved England in this wasteful and deplorable antagonism to Russia on the Eastern Question. This antagonism arrays her against the progress of Christian civilization, and allies her to the most paralyzing despotism in the world. It belies and degrades the great position she claims as the van leader of free nations and the institutions of freedom."
    I rejoice to think that the day for cherishing that phantasy is nearly, if not quite, gone by; and that in the consideration of the Eastern Question we shall be able in the future to deal with it without reference to apprehensions which are utterly unworthy of a great and free nation.
    Amendment proposed,
    To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, that She will be graciously pleased to give directions that there shall be laid before this House, Copies of all Despatches and Paper
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    on the subject of the Anglo-Turkish Convention which have passed between Her Majesty's Government, or Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, and the Turkish Government, and which have not already been laid before Parliament,"—(Mr. Rylands,)
    —instead thereof.
    Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."
    SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFFsaid, that however much hon. Gentlemen opposite might condemn the Ango-Turkish Convention, he wished to point out that it had been approved by the country—["No!" from the Radical Members]—well, by the late Parliament. He would even say by the late Government; but they had approved it honestly, and he was glad to find that there was no intention on the part of hon. Members opposite to interfere with the authority of the Crown to make Treaties. It was only right that there should be a solidarity between one Parliament and another, and that an incoming Government should not proceed immediately to reverse the foreign policy of its Predecessor. He wished to point out that under the terms of the Convention this country was not responsible for the government of Asia Minor, the Articles of that Convention merely insisting upon the introduction of certain reforms in the government of that portion of the Turkish Empire. An Armenian gentleman had told him at the time that this Convention was made that Cyprus would be of great advantage to England, because we should be able to get recruits from Asia Minor in the event of an attack being made upon India. The Convention was only part of a series of arrangements which were come to; and, rightly or wrongly, it was the opinion of the country at the time—[Cries of "No, no! "]—he did not wish to quibble about terms—at any rate, it was the opinion of Parliament and the late Government that it was necessary for us to enter into strict relations with Turkey, in order to preserve our prestige in the East, our influence with the Mahomedans in India, and even the preservation of our Indian Empire. The right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Baxter) was perfectly consistent in proposing that we should give up Cyprus; but he (Sir H. Drummond Wolff) thought that would not be judicious, for it would be departing from a Treaty

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    which had not yet been fully tried; and he did not think it was seriously intended that we should give back that Island to the bad government from which we had rescued it, and which the right hon. Gentleman so much deplored. It had been suggested that we should give it to Greece; but nothing could be worse for Greece at the present moment than that she should have an addition made to her territory in the shape of islands, which would inevitably vote solid in their own interests in her Assembly. It would be found to be impossible to pit the comparatively weak Greek nation against the Slavs in the East; and if a Byzantine Empire were attempted to be set up, it would only be maintained by intrigue. He could see no analogy between our occupation of Cyprus and the recent proceedings of the French in Tunis. It was said that France had shown great susceptibility in consequence of the Anglo-Turkish Convention; but what had France done herself in the matter of Algeria? Again, did not France annex Savoy and Nice? What was the feeling of this country on that occasion? But for the Commercial Treaty at that moment the two countries would have drifted into war. The annexation of Tunis by France, to which the hon. Member for Burnley (Mr. Rylands) had referred, was totally distinct from the taking of the possession of Cyprus by this country. England did not take possession of Cyprus by anything like violence, but by a peaceable Treaty with the Sultan, who was the Sovereign of his country—who had a perfect right to dispose of his own territory, and to give us the administration of the Island. But the case of Tunis was not like Cyprus. There was a large colony of British and other subjects there; the Natives were subjects of the Porte, and, as long as they were on Turkish territory, were bound by the Turkish law; and he considered it a very strong measure on the part of France that the Mussulman population was to be transferred from its allegiance to the Sultan to that of the French Consul who might happen to reside in the country. But France undertook not to annex it. He should like to ask the Under Secretary of State this question—What was the position of M. Roustan in Tunis? Was he Consul or Minister of France, or the Minister of Tunis? And if he filled both
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    capacities, how could he perform the inconsistent duties? He had heard of some chess-players who could play the left hand against the right, and. M. Roustan, he supposed, was supposed to perform a similar task. They had read an account of the conflicts between the French and the Italians in Tunis—who was to decide these questions? As was said to Count Andrassy with reference to the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it was annexation very badly disguised; so it might be said to France with reference to Tunis—it was annexation badly disguised. He perfectly agreed with the- Government and Lord Salisbury, that we ought not to oppose ourselves to the fair extension of the influences of France in Tunis; but it must be on a fair basis. We must know how we stood with regard to France—whether we were dealing with the Minister of France, or whether we must go to the French Government to ratify or repudiate the acts of their Agent in Tunis. The right hon. Member who had just sat down had referred to the Anglo-Turkish Convention; but he said the Government had acted wisely in not in any way endeavouring to obtain reforms in Asia Minor, except with the concert of Europe. They had often heard of the concert of Europe. It formed the staple of the speeches which the Prime Minister had made in the country. The Naval Demonstration, it was said, was intended to carry out the Treaty of Berlin; but the instructions given to Admiral Seymour were model instructions, and the concert of the Powers might be measured by the resolution of France not to let her guns be charged, and by Germany sending only one ship to the political picnic, to be followed by a little filibustering, just as a physician might send his carriage to the funeral of a disagreeable patient. He asked Ministers what single provision of the Treaty of Berlin had been carried out except that which had been effected, not by the occupants of the Treasury Bench, but by the skill of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen)? [" Hear, hear ! "] He was glad he had said something to please the Government. It was always his object to do so, though he did not always succeed. He repeated that nothing had been done to carry out the Treaty of Berlin but what had been effected by the skill of the

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    right hon. Member for Ripon. That was the increase of the territory of Greece; and that was really what the Turks would have done without any Conference of Berlin. The cession of Dulcigno was no carrying out of the Treaty. Dulcigno was given up to Montenegro; but it was not included in that instrument. Turkey had determined not to give up certain strategical points, and they had not been given up. What had the Powers done to carry out the Treaty of Berlin? Bulgaria and Macedonia were at that moment in a state of anarchy; and the same might almost be said of nearly all European Turkey. The Powers had done nothing to adjust the debts of Turkey, or to apportion the burdens to be borne by the tributary States, or to assist Turkey in the introduction of reforms in Armenia or elsewhere; and Macedonia and nearly all European Turkey was at present without any settled government at all. Everywhere, indeed, Her Majesty's Government had so mismanaged matters as, more or less, to receive rebuffs from those who ought to have been their Allies. They had alienated Turkey, deceived Greece, and betrayed Italy. Germany and Austria refused to co-operate with them in carrying out the Treaty of Berlin, and the latter Power had entered into an understanding with Servia which would place our iron trade in the Balkan Peninsula under great disadvantages. In short, the whole policy of Her Majesty's Government had tended to encourage Protection in other countries, and had been a panorama of failure.
    MR. ARTRUR ARNOLD, who had given Notice of his desire to amend the Motion by moving for Correspondence and Papers relative to the navigation of the Euphrates, the Tigris, and the Karun rivers, said, that his hon. Friends had scarcely done justice to the fact that the Anglo-Turkish Convention was at present practically inoperative owing to the neglect by Turkey of the condition upon which it was made. That Convention was founded in duplicity and in geographical error. It was strangely entangled at the Berlin Congress with the question of Tunis and Tripoli; and as for the geographical question, it would be remembered that, according to Lord Beaconsfield's statement at the Guildhall, the Convention was to secure the Passes of Asia Minor against Russia.
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    The noble Lord added, as a matter of certainty, that Erzeroum would be the scene of the strongest fortification in Western Asia. No one in authority had ever followed the noble Lord in the error of supposing that Russia would abandon her base upon the Caspian, which was 800 miles nearer to India. That error was appreciated by those who knew anything of the country as soon as it was uttered, and nothing had been done at Erzeroum. The speech just made was the most discursive he had ever heard, and he was puzzled to know how it could be connected with the Anglo-Turkish Convention. Although he felt a deep interest in the affairs of Greece, he could not understand how he could drag them into a debate concerning the Convention; but if he had been a Member to whom the reputation of the British Plenipotentiaries at the Berlin Congress was especially dear, if he had mentioned Greece he would, have set himself to explain how it was that the Congress of Berlin adjourned the claims of Greece on July 4th, the very day of the ratification of the annexe to the Convention, which had always seemed like a deliberate bartering of the claims of Greece for the possession of Cyprus. He would also have attempted to excuse—it did not admit of explanation—the plain connection between the highhanded policy of France in Tunis and the intimation which it was well understood had been given to Italy to occupy Tripoli in reference to the entry of France into Tunis. The very compromising reply given by the hon. Baronet the Under Secretary of State to a Question he (Mr. Arnold) had himself put on the subject led the Press of this country to infer that a record was extant at the Foreign Office of a conversation of Lord Salisbury with reference to the entry of Italy into Tripoli; and when the compromising reply of the Under Secretary of State was not followed by an explanation in "another place," he felt it his duty to put a Motion on the Paper for the production of the record. With regard, however, to the Convention, the present Prime Minister, on May 28th of last year, described it as an instrument under which, whatever ho might think of the policy which led to its conclusion or of its character in other respects, they were not free. That admission involved a very onerous and

    1295
    important responsibility, which, however, was conditional upon Turkish reforms. Well, what was the fact? The misgovernment of the territory in question had increased since the passing of that Convention. Reporting on the administrations of justice in Anatolia at the end of last June, Consul General Wilson informed Mr. Goschen that "crime went unpunished, and all manner of oppression and injustice was committed with impunity." Such was the administration of justice in a territory concerning which they were not free, and in regard to which the Sultan had promised the establishment of the most beneficial reforms. By the Treaty of Berlin, the Sultan was pledged to the Powers to improve the condition of the Armenians. But of the Christians of Western Asia, Consul General Wilson, in the same Report, stated that, "though Christian evidence may be received, no weight is attached to it." The scale of Turkish justice had fallen so low that one Turkish Cadi, Colonel Wilson said, had been bribed with 2½d. in cairné. He desired to make a few practical observations regarding the great Valley of the Tigris and the Euphrates, with a view to the benefit of the people of that country and the commerce of England. Major Trotter reported from Diarbekir to the Foreign Office that, in three weeks of last year, the Kurds from, certain villages near the Tigris had seized and plundered about 30 rafts, and that of 200 rafts which left Diarbekir in three weeks, not more than five or six had succeeded in reaching Djezirah. In such circumstances there was, of course, practically an end to trade and enterprize. From Armenia, from Bagdad, and even from Bussorah, the accounts were the same. The condition of the people was pitiable; the government never was, and could hardly be, worse; and the people, suffering constantly from violence and famine, were naturally now menaced with pestilence. The country to which he was referring was large, healthy, and fertile; it extended partly into Persia, and was inhabited by Tribes owing such slender allegiance to the Sultan, that Sir Lewis Pelly, when Governor at the Persian Gulf, reported to the Bombay Government that their allegiance was like the regard which Englishmen paid to the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church, which, he said, all accepted, but none
    1296
    remembered. Now, he wished to obtain the support of the House in pressing upon the Government certain considerations which he felt sure must tend to the better government and to the material welfare of this important territory. He wished to secure through Her Majesty's Government free navigation of the rivers in question, and for that purpose the Anglo-Turkish Convention was by no means necessary. He asked the House to consider what was the nature and extent of the vast area of country to which the widest designation of the Valley of the Euphrates and the Tigris had reference. It included the best part of Asiatic Turkey, together with a large portion of Persia. It was a region abounding with natural wealth, capable of maintaining a population 10 or 20 times the number of those who now, with unnecessary wretchedness, were its inhabitants, lacking especially the means of intercommunication for the distribution of seed and food, for the export of commodities, and for the import of English and other foreign manufactures. In one part of this vast area, Major Napier, a distinguished Indian officer, found good wheat selling at a price equal to 5s. a-quarter. The country yielded corn, cotton, wool, and other produce in abundance where any effort was made; and the whole of this vast area tended naturally to one point, and that was a point at which the power of this country was and must remain indisputable—he meant the mouth of the Tigris and the Euphrates in the Persian Gulf. Sir Henry Layard advised the late Government to occupy the junction of the two rivers instead of Cyprus. When the Anglo-Turkish Convention was concluded, a great deal of nonsense was current concerning Russian armies which were to advance to attack India by the Valley of the Euphrates. The idea was absurd, because the Persian Gulf was as completely dominated by British authority as the Caspian Sea was by Russian authority. Between the head of the Persian Gulf and the first port of India, which was Kurrachee, there were more than 1,200 miles of salt water; and while England was the greatest of naval Powers in the waters of India, the Valley of the Euphrates could be of no use whatever to a Russian force contemplating the invasion of India. There had been proposals

    1297
    before the House for constructing a railway along' the Valley of the Euphrates, or the Tigris, to India. But it would require a large amount of capital, and, for his own part, he was not surprised that these schemes had not passed beyond what he might call the paper-and-promoter stage. But even if it were constructed, many years must elapse before it could possibly repay the expenses of the permanent way. His proposals were much less ambitious; they made no impossible, not even any difficult, demand, and they had this merit, that failure was in their case impossible. He wished to promote the reform of Western Asia, not by any exclusive Conventions, by no military or costly machinery, but by the agency of commerce. His object was to obtain, not for England only, but for the trade of all countries, the free navigation of the great rivers of Western Asia. He was sure that some hon. Members who had not considered the subject would be surprised to learn that the Tigris was navigable for 600 miles from the Persian Gulf by steamers such as would carry 60 tons of cargo with a draft of less than 3 feet. The point of navigation in the Tigris at this limit would be the town of Mosul, and he had little doubt that steamboats of lighter draft could ascend at any time of the year 250 miles further, to Diarbekir. On the Euphrates it was certain that a steamboat of that draft and construction could pass up the stream 800 miles from the Persian Gulf to the town of Balis, from which the distance to the Mediterranean was not more than 150 miles. Now, his request to Her Majesty's Government was that they would obtain from the Turkish Government the free navigation of those rivers; that the Euphrates and the Tigris should be as free to English vessels as the Thames was to Turkish vessels; and that they would induce the Turkish Government to maintain and protect that navigation as we maintained and protected the navigation of the Thames. The proposition seemed so simple, the benefits which must result were so self-evident, that the House would, he thought, hear with some astonishment that the Turkish Government had been and was tiresome in the hindrances by which it impeded even the partial navigation of the Tigris as high as Bagdad. There were now two steamboats on the Tigris belonging to
    1298
    an English Company, which received a postal subsidy of about £3,000 a-year from the Indian Government. The Turkish Government would not permit the Company to increase the number of boats, nor to carry on commerce North of Bagdad. In 1879 the Company sent out two steel lighters, capable of carrying 200 tons of cargo with less than 2 feet draft of water, which could be towed up the stream when occasion should require in the lowest seasons. When there was lately a terrible scarcity of grain in that part of Asia, and in every direction people were dying of famine, the Turkish Government, which had forbidden the movement of these barges, allowed them to ascend the river loaded with grain; and on the day they commenced to run, he was informed that the price of corn in Bagdad fell by nearly as much as 150 per cent. If the navigation of the Tigris had been free, and organized as it would soon be if it were free, the best possible means to avert famine would have been taken. He begged the consideration of the House to the fact, and he was sure the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen) would confirm it, that the danger of famine would be to a great extent removed from that country if the Turkish Government would cease to oppose the free navigation of these rivers. When the first pressure of the famine ceased, the Turks stopped those steel barges; and he believed they were now lying idle, because of the perverse stupidity of the Turkish Government, which thus cruelly withheld from the people of Western Asia the most ready and the greatest advantage which was within their reach. The engineer to the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company passed up the Euphrates to Balis, 800 miles from the Persian Gulf, in a steamboat 120 feet in length, 20 feet beam, and drawing 33 inches of water. The city of Bagdad, on the Tigris, was joined with the Euphrates at Feluja by a navigable canal, and from Feluja this engineer passed up to Balis at a time when the river was 12 feet below the usual level; and that gentleman reported that, with a small expenditure for removing obstructions—
    "The navigation of the Euphrates at all times of the year by suitable steamers of light draft and good power is a matter of absolute certainty."

    1299
    At Balis, 800 miles from the outfall, the bed of the Euphrates was 628 feet above the Mediterranean, and was 300 yards wide, and had a fall, which for navigation was perfection, of about 6 inches per mile. The navigation of the Tigris also up to Mosul presented absolutely no difficulties whatever. There was absolutely nothing but the prejudice of the Turkish Government to overcome; and that ought not to be difficult, when Englishmen asked for no exclusive rights, and when the free navigation would prevent famine, would create wealth, and would smooth the path of suitable reforms. But there was a third river connected with those, and emptying itself by the same mouth, upon which it was his earnest desire, for the welfare of the Native people, of whom he had seen a good deal, and for the commerce of this country, to obtain free navigation, and that was the Karun, the only navigable river in the Persian Empire which flowed into the channel of the Tigris and Euphrates, near Bussorah. There was not a more important, a more beneficial work lying to the hand of the British Government in Asia than this. He asked for Papers relative also to the navigation of this river; and while he should be grateful for any Papers which his hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State might feel at liberty to produce, he wished the House distinctly to understand that the State Paper of which he most desired the production was that important document which was referred to in the Minute of the Government of India, dated January 7, 1880. He was informed, upon unquestionable authority, that that State Paper, which was, in fact, a draft Convention, provided for the free navigation of the Karun river. He wished only to add one or two facts, which would show how largo and how direct were the interests of this country in the free navigation of these three rivers. He was confident upon two points—first, that the Persian Gulf afforded the most secure, the most economic, and the most advantageous basis for our trade with Western and Central Asia; and, secondly, that the import of British goods, which in that part of the world chiefly consist of Manchester goods, would soon be trebled if we could obtain the free navigation of these rivers. From that, hon. Members would see its great advantages to the languish-
    1300
    ing trade of this country. The economy of this route was shown by the fact that tobacco from Ispahan, which used to pass through Bagdad to Damascus, now passed by the Persian Gulf and the Suez Canal. He knew of no part of the world in which commerce had shown such capacity for increase. In 1860, before the opening of the navigation of the Tigris, even so far as Bagdad, the tonnage arriving in the Persian Gulf from all places did not amount to more than 10,000 tons. Now a steamer tonnage of not less than 150,000 tons annually visited the single port of Bussorah. Then, the British duty on fruit was prohibitive of the import of dates, of which the best the world afforded were grown in great profusion in that region. The further development of trade was checked by the inadequate means of transit upon these great and natural highways of Western Asia, and he trusted that Her Majesty's Government would make strenuous and incessant efforts to obtain the free navigation of these rivers; and, if he were able to do so, he should move for correspondence relative to the Euphrates, the Tigris, and the Karun rivers.
    SIR CHARLES W. DILKEsaid, he wished, in the first place, to say what the course of Her Majesty's Government would be with regard to the Amendment before the House. In the Amendment his hon. Friend the Member for Burnley (Mr. Rylands) asked for the Papers on the subject of the Anglo-Turkish Convention which had passed between Her Majesty's Government, or Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople and the Turkish Government, and which had not been already laid before Parliament. The Government would have to meet that Motion by voting for Supply, for this reason, if for no other, that no such Papers were in existence. No Papers had passed between ourselves and the Turkish Government on the subject of the Convention. At any rate, there were no such Papers as were implied by the terms of the Motion. With regard to the proposed Amendment of his hon. Friend who had just sat down (Mr. Arnold), and who asked for Copies of Correspondence and Papers relating to the navigation of the Euphrates, Tigris, and Karun rivers, he had to say that there were Papers of considerable interest as to the Eu-

    1301
    phrates and Tigris; but they were not such as could be laid before the House at present, although he hoped they might be laid before it ultimately. There were also Papers as to the Karun, from which it appeared very plainly that the Persian Government would not be willing to grant the free navigation of that river; but those documents were so confidential, that he thought it would not be desirable to lay them before the House. He would now address himself to the speeches that had been made, and in doing so he would have to apologize for being discursive, though the debate itself had been as discursive as any he had ever known, for it had. wandered over the whole field of the Eastern Question. References had been made not only to Cyprus and the Convention, but also to the navigation of rivers in Persia, the affairs of Bulgaria, the Dulcigno settlement, and other matters into which it would be his duty, though to a certain extent under protest, to follow hon. Members. He was himself disposed to agree with a large portion of the remarks of the hon. Member for Burnley, who had said that the Convention was one of a peculiarly onerous kind, because it bound us to defend the possessions of Turkey, not only in Asia Minor, but also in Arabia. Hon. Members who had spoken of the present condition of the territories that were the subject of that arrangement had concurred in stating that no progress had been made by the Turkish Government in the introduction of reforms, and his right hon. Friend opposite (Mr. Bourke) had cheered the statement of the right hon. Member for Montrose (Mr. Baxter) that in Armenia the people longed for the coming of some foreign Power; but he (Sir Charles W. Dilke) did not suppose that that cheer meant that his right hon. Friend would wish to see Russia in Armenia. Presumably, therefore, his right hon. Friend cheered that remark because he thought the Armenians would like to see England there. However, the interpretation of the reforms stipulated for by the Convention was of a much more limited nature, and meant, according to Lord Salisbury's view, little more than the appointment of a few gendarmes. The hon. Member for Portsmouth (Sir H. Drummond Wolff) said that the late Government, before they left Office, had begun to try to carry out the obligations
    1302
    of the Convention. Ho presumed the hon. Member meant that the late Government had endeavoured to induce the Turkish Government to carry out those obligations—namely, to introduce reforms in the administration of Asia Minor. The hon. Member, however, had loft out the first words of the clause relating to the intended reforms, in which Turkey engaged to introduce them in return for our undertaking to defend her territory. He quoted those words because, as he read them, they constituted a condition of the Convention. He thought that those who read that Convention would agree with him that it was so hurriedly drawn up that not only was it one the entering into which was of more than doubtful policy, but it was one which was so hurriedly drawn up that there was reason to doubt what were the actual obligations which this country had incurred. Indeed, the language of certain portions of the Convention was of an unusually difficult kind. For his own part, he had never concealed his opinion as to the impolicy of this Convention; but to dissent from the expediency of an international engagement was a very different thing from reversing it after it had been entered into. Every-one would, at least, admit that it was open to grave objections. The conclusion of the Treaty had dispelled all idea that England was without any desire to obtain territorial aggrandizement at the expense of Turkey, and that view was taken throughout Europe at the time. To a certain extent he agreed with the Mover of the Amendment, that the example then set by England had proved an evil example in other portions of the world. The Anglo-Turkish Convention was an isolated arrangement between Great Britain and Turkey alone, concluded without the sanction, and even without the knowledge, of the other Powers of Europe, and it remained without any explicit sanction on the part of the other Powers, who accepted it as a fact, but did not regard it as affecting their Treaty rights. Thus there was a doubt whether the provisions of the Convention did not involve an infraction of the Treaty of Paris and the Convention of London of 1 871; and clearly the Convention at the time it was contracted was manifestly a departure in spirit from the principle of the concerted action which had been the object of the Treaty

    1303
    of Paris, and the leading feature in our treatment of Turkey up to that time. The Convention created difficulties which, but for the willingness of the other Powers to be silent about them, would have been insoluble. These were grave objections to the Convention, and wore snared, ho was certain, by a majority of that House. But, on the other hand, to violently escape from this Convention, and to put an end to it by isolated action, would be a step which would have serious results on the peace of the East; and, without expressing any opinion as to what might be the future of the Convention, he appealed to the House not to ask the Government violently and suddenly to set this Convention aside. The hon. Member for Burnley said that Cyprus was a bad bargain, and quoted the story of the gross of green spectacles; but Cyprus was a worse bargain, because the green spectacles cost nothing to keep, whereas Cyprus did involve us in very considerable expense. But his hon. Friend did not face the question what they were to do with Cyprus. He (Sir Charles W. Dilke) agreed with the ton. Member for Portsmouth that, having once undertaken its administration, they could not hand it back to Turkish rule. His hon. Friend said that it would be unjust to continue the occupation of Cyprus, with the obligations attaching to it. He supposed his lion. Friend meant that we ought to purchase Cyprus out and out. It was not for him (Sir Charles W. Dilke), in the position he held, to offer an opinion on that subject. That was a matter for those who wore Members of the Cabinet, and directly responsible for the administration of the country. It must be borne in mind, however, that there might be a considerable difference of opinion in that House with regard to the policy of paying a very large sum of money for the purchase of the Island, and that was a proceeding against which his hon. Friend, as an economist, might feel bound to protest. The hon. Member for Portsmouth, with that ability for which he was distinguished, drew a certain analogy between the case of Tunis and that of Cyprus. He could not agree with the hon. Member that the cases were the same. There were not only the differences which the hon. Member himself pointed out, and with which he (Sir Charles W. Dilke)
    1304
    agreed, but there was also one clearly recognized by Lord Salisbury—namely, that France, as the immediate neighbour of Tunis, was more interested in what happened in that country than we were in Cyprus. He agreed with the hon. Member for Burnley that the isolated mode of action adopted by this country as regarded our dealings with Cyprus did set an example which had been somewhat followed by France. Ho understood his hon. Friend to argue that by that action we had raised up international difficulties such as France had excited for herself. That such was the case was shown by the fact that the Questions put to his (Sir Charles W. Dilke's) Predecessor in his present Office with regard to Cyprus were of a very similar nature to those which were daily put to himself with respect to our international position towards Tunis. In fact, the isolated action of any Power in such a matter, without the general consent of Europe, was certain to lead to international difficulties, if foreign Powers chose to insist upon the very letter of former engagements. The hon. Member for Portsmouth asked him a distinct question with regard to the double character of the position of the Representative of France (M. Roustan) in Tunis. He (Sir Charles W. Dilke) would be out of Order in following the hon. Member in detail into that question to-night, inasmuch as Notice had been given on the subject for that day four weeks. But if he referred to the subject, it would be only to repeat what he had said more than once already—that the questions arising out of the double functions of M. Roustan were engaging the immediate attention of Her Majesty's Government. The hon. Member for Portsmouth complained, somewhat bitterly, of the representation of Tunisian interests in other parts of the world by French Agents. But the Treaty between the French Government and the Bey provided that the French Representatives in foreign countries would be charged with Tunisian interests, and Lord Salisbury stated after the Treaty that he saw no reason for remonstrance with respect to the action of France in Tunis. But in discussing this question, he (Sir Charles W. Dilke) was placed in a somewhat embarrassing position, by not knowing how far hon. Gentlemen opposite accepted the Leader-

    1305
    ship of their Chief. Lord Salisbury spoke, not in his own name, but in the name of the late Government, and distinctly stated that he was speaking the opinions of the late Government—the opinions of his Colleagues as well as his own. Lord Salisbury, after having had the Treaty in his possession for some days, and knowing that the French Representatives were to protect Tunisian interests in other portions of the world, speaking for his Colleagues as well as himself, said that he saw no ground for remonstrance in the action of France. He would not have raised the point at all, were it not for the attack which the hon. Member for Portsmouth had made upon Her Majesty's Government on the subject. The hon. Member went on to question the statement of the hon. Member for Burnley with regard to the dissatisfaction felt in France at the conclusion of the Anglo-Turkish Convention. The hon. Member for Portsmouth complained of an inference which the hon. Member for Burnley had drawn from the speech of the noble Lord the late Postmaster General (Lord John Manners). He (Sir Charles W. Dilke) could not but think that the statements made by those who now sat on his side of the House at the time to which the speech of the late Postmaster General referred were perfectly well-founded, and that the Papers since published showed that they were accurate. He now came to the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Montrose (Mr. Baxter), who had implored the House not to forget the miserable condition of Armenia, and had advocated the appointment of a Christian Governor of that Province, as was done in the case of the Lebanon. There was, however, no danger that this subject would be forgotten by the Representatives of the Powers at Constantinople. The question was placed third by the present Government among the most pressing questions requiring settlement in the East. The Greek and Montenegrin difficulties had now been solved, and the Armenian question was before the Representatives of the Powers at Constantinople at the present time. His right hon. Friend the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen)—at whose presence in the House they all felt great pleasure—who had represented this country in trying circumstances at Con-
    1306
    stantinople, and who had achieved a triumphant success, had always borne in mind the Armenian question, and the noble Lord who had now taken his place at Constantinople (Lord Dufferin) would keep that question well in view. He (Sir Charles W. Dilke) did not know what the opinion of the right hon. Member for Ripon was; but he did not himself attach so much importance to the question of the religion of the Governor of Armenia as he did to the faculty of administration which that official should possess. If he should prove to be a trusty administrator, his rule must be productive of good, whatever his religion. The hon. Member for Portsmouth had thrown some ridicule upon the concerted action of Europe in connection with the Armenian question; but the Powers, nevertheless, had been acting steadily together, doubtful as the fact might seem to the hon. Member for Eye (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett). The hon. Member for Portsmouth, towards the close of his speech, had departed from his customary tone of moderation, and, in fact, had adopted language which suggested to him (Sir Charles W. Dilke) that the hon. Member had found and availed himself of a speech belonging to the hon. Member for Eye. The hon. Member said that Greece had received an accession of territory, but that none of the other questions pending in the East at the time when the present Government took Office, and arising out of the Treaty of Berlin, had been settled. [Sir H. DRUMMOND WOLFF dissented.] Well, the hon. Member first made that statement, and afterwards he made the necessary exceptions. The hon. Member had apparently forgotten the settlement of the Asiatic boundary and the settlement of the Montenegrin question, which at one time seemed likely to cause an European war. The hon. Member for Portsmouth laughed at the settlement procured at Dulcigno, and said that the Dulcigno district was inhabited by an Albanian population, who peculiarly objected to Montenegrin rule. Colonel Freemantle, an impartial observer, had placed it on record that he saw in the town of Dulcigno but one Montenegrin soldier, and that on inquiry he found that there was only one small Montenegrin company garrisoning the whole of the Dulcignote country. That disposed of the statement as to the thousands of

    1307
    Mahomedan Dulcignotes who so strenuously objected to being handed over to Montenegrin rule. The hon. Member for Portsmouth also ridiculed the Naval Demonstration; but, at any rate, the Government had secured a settlement which had led to a perfect state of peace. The hon. Member for Portsmouth tad told them, also, that since the present Government had been in Office they had met with rebuffs from all parts of the world, and he had actually quoted—and one could hardly refer to it without smiling—the treatment they had received from Russia as to the passport of Mr. Lewisohn as an example of those rebuffs. He could hardly have been serious in doing that. There could only be one opinion in that House as to the wisdom, as a matter of policy, of what had been done in that case; but right or wrong, even as a matter of strict law, did not the hon. Gentleman know that the Russian Government had been only acting in that case as they had acted in the time of the late and of previous Governments for years and years past? Did he not know that the Austrian Emperor had received rebuffs of precisely the same kind; that three similar rebuffs had been given to the Government of the United States, of a worse character than that in regard to Mr. Lewisohn? Looking at the terms on which the United States were with Russia, he could hardly suppose that the hon. Member for Portsmouth would seriously maintain that Her Majesty's Government had received in the case of Mr. Lewisohn a rebuff from Russia which was caused by any particular weakness on their part. If it was a rebuff, it had been extended to all the nations of the world, and it was scarcely worthy of the hon. Member to bring it forward in the way he had done. Then the hon. Member said they had received a rebuff from Austria in regard to the Commercial Treaty with Servia. The hon. Member spoke without sufficient knowledge of the true state of things. He (Sir Charles W. Dilke) hoped to place in the hands of the House shortly a document which would show that the commercial interests of this country and Servia would not be in a worse, but perhaps in a better, position than they had hitherto been. The hon. Gentleman also charged them with having deceived Greece and betrayed Italy. Their information
    1308
    from Greece certainly was not such as to lead them to believe that Greece considered that Her Majesty's present Government had deceived or betrayed her. As to Italy, their relations with that Power were so entirely cordial, that he was horrified by the statement that they had suddenly betrayed it. The hon. Gentleman then told them that Germany had refused to act with England in representations to Turkey as to reforms.
    SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF: I was alluding to what you said the other day with reference to the European Commission.
    SIR CHARLES W. DILKEsaid, he did not know the hon. Member was referring to the European Commission. He (Sir Charles W. Dilke) was speaking under the correction of the right hon. Member for Ripon; but the non-action by Germany in the case of those reforms had been dictated simply by a hesitation as to pressing that question before the Greek and Montenegrin questions had been completely settled. Germany thought it would be unwise, in dealing with people like the Turks, to press too many questions on them at a time. The manner in which the right hon. Member for Ripon and the German Ambassador had worked together sufficiently refuted the idea that Germany refused to take part with this country. More had been done by Germany and England working together during the last few months than by any other two Powers that could be named. In conclusion, he had only to assure the hon. Member for Salford (Mr. Arnold) that in dealing with the subject of the Turkish Dominions in Asia, and the reforms to be introduced into them, and as to British influence in that portion of the globe, the Foreign Office and Her Majesty's Government were thoroughly aware of the great importance which must be attached to the free navigation of those rivers. There could be no extension of British influence and commerce which might be easily foreseen greater than that which would result from the free navigation of the Euphrates and the Tigris; and certainly the policy of procuring and fostering such facilities for navigation and trade would be more worthy of this country than the military policy contemplated by that Convention. He believed that ! the steps that had been taken by the

    1309
    right hon. Member for Ripon, and which would be followed up by Lord Dufferin at Constantinople, were calculated to press that point on the consideration of the Turkish Government. As to the Karun River, it was outside the subject of their discussion. The objections of the Persian Government to the throwing open of that river appeared at present almost insuperable; but still the matter would not be lost sight of by Her Majesty's Government.
    MR. BOURKE: I agree with the hon. Baronet (Sir Charles W. Dilke) that this discussion has been very discursive; but I do not think that his speech has been more discursive than the subject required. I will promise the House to detain them for a very short time, because, owing to the remarks which have been made by the hon. Baronet upon the Anglo-Turkish Convention, it will not be necessary to enter at length into that question. I will only allude to one topic which is not covered by the speech of the hon. Baronet. The hon. Member for Burnley (Mr. Rylands) has made an attack upon me of a somewhat disagreeable character. He has accused me of being uncandid towards him at the time I held Office. Now, that subject is one upon which—and I hope the House will excuse me—I am strictly jealous, because I do not believe that, during the whole six years I was in Office, I ever gave an answer which could not be defended, and which was not strictly, candid and correct. The answer which the hon. Member for Burnley alluded to was one which I gave in regard to Tunis. I was asked if there was any ground for the rumours about changes in the Mahomedan territories of Tunis and Tripoli as respected their transfer to Italy and France. Now, I answered on the 16th July—" No, Sir; I have never heard anything on the subject." That was on the 16th July. The despatch of M. Waddington was not written until the 26th July, and that was the first time that anybody at the Foreign Office heard anything upon the matter. When I saw that special despatch was the first time I heard of those rumours. The ton. Baronet (Sir Charles W. Dilke) has said that there were grave objections to the Anglo-Turkish Convention. Those objections we have heard before; but he went on to say that there was no intention on the part of Her Majesty's Go-
    1310
    vernment to ask the House to set aside that Convention, and that it is impossible to give Cyprus back to Turkey. Under these circumstances, I am perfectly satisfied, so far as that particular question is concerned. But I should like to say what I consider to be our position with regard to Asia Minor under the provisions of the Anglo-Turkish Convention. Some hon. Gentlemen have said that no responsibility attaches to England, because Turkey has not carried out the reforms she promised. That is perfectly true as between Turkey and England. Turkey, there is no doubt whatever at the present time, and as far as we see at any future time, or, at any rate, in the immediate future, is not entitled to call upon this country to protect that portion of the Turkish Empire if attacked, seeing that she herself has neglected to fulfil her stipulations with regard to reforms in the government of Asia Minor which were contained in the Treaty. But that is a mere question between England and Turkey; I think the question between England and the rest of the world is quite another thing. As regards the rest of the world, we are unquestionably bound to resist any aggression on the part of Russia upon Asia Minor, and to support Turkey and defend her territory against Russia. The more we look at that question the more we must think that our policy was a right policy. No person can have watched the progress of Russia, and the way in which she has made her commercial laws answer her political views, without coming to the conclusion that it would be most injurious to the interests of England, and even to our very existence in the East, if Russia were to take possession of Asia Minor. From a commercial point of view, there can be no doubt upon that question. Formerly, before Russia acquired her territories in the Black Sea, the commerce of England was carried into Central Asia, Circassia, and other parts of the East in very great quantities. But since the acquisition by Russia of her Black Sea territories and Circassia, she has applied her commercial policy to those territories, and the commerce of England has been absolutely prevented from entering them. In regard to Tabrez itself, that great emporium of trade, £1,000,000 of Manchester goods reached Tabrez every year; but since the acquisition

    1311
    of Kars by Russia, under the Treaty of Berlin, the effect of the Russian protective policy has been recognized in the fullest way by the Russian people and the Russian Government. Perhaps I may be allowed to read an extract from The Golos newspaper, showing the importance which Russia attached to the acquisitions she had obtained—
    "Having taken possession of Batoum with its port, which is the best in the Black Sea, and having annexed Ardahan, Kars, and Bayazid, Russia will retain control over the Anglo.Asiatic trade. In a word, she will be able to direct the Central Asian trade at her own pleasure, which she has not hitherto been able to do. A Russian Custom House will also be established at Bayazid, where English merchandise will be charged with duty."
    And then it goes on to point out that that acquisition was made because Russia feared the influence of England; and it further points out that by the acquisition of Batoum, English goods are for ever shut out from that portion of Asia Minor. As sure as Russia gets possession of other parts of Asia Minor, and obtains command of the Tigris and Euphrates Valleys—and it was to that subject that the speeches of the hon. Member for Salford (Mr. Arnold) and another hon. Member were directed—as sure as Russia does get possession of that portion of Asia Minor, both of these Valleys must fall into the possession of that Power, and she will obtain command of Bagdad and Bushire, and the whole of the commerce of the Persian Gulf will be lost to England. The protective policy of Russia will be pursued in those countries, and she -will be able to do exactly as she pleases. Indeed, her policy will be precisely that which she has pursued with regard to Circassia, and English goods will be shut out out from those countries for ever. These are my views with regard to the commercial question, and then with regard to the political question, which naturally follows, our position in the East will be absolutely untenable. Under these circumstances, I believe that the Anglo-Turkish Convention was right in principle—that it was based upon sound policy, and that it was the best policy that could be pursued at that time, because it was the only way in which England could assort her rights after the Treaty of Berlin was concluded. Everybody knew after the Conference at Berlin that the Treaty of
    1312
    San Stefano would have to be modified, and it was. The rest of Europe cared not a straw about anything else, and they, therefore, left us to make the best bargain we could. The hon. Baronet opposite the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Sir Charles W. Dilke) seems to think that the late Government have been guilty of a great crime in connection with that Convention, inasmuch as their negotiations in respect to it were conducted in secret. Now, the reason why the Anglo-Turkish Convention was kept a secret was that everybody knew that if it was thrown down at Constantinople for all the Powers to discuss, no Anglo-Turkish Convention—or any other Convention—would have been made. No doubt, any Government then in Office would have cared little for the concert of Europe, so long as the interests of their own country demanded that they should not be the subject of European concert. I believe that the concert of Europe is a most desirable instrument for certain purposes; but, at the same time, I believe there are cases in which it is the duty of England to act without that concert, and without relying upon the projects and different views of other Governments to give effect to it. If you rely in all matters upon the views of other Governments you will have no concert at all. Certainly, that was the view Her Majesty's late Government took of their duties with regard to the Anglo-Turkish Convention; and nothing I have heard to-night makes me think that they were wrong in the action which they took in the matter. At the same time, I think it is very right that this House should have availed itself of this opportunity of discussing the Motion of the hon. Member for Burnley, because I think it is highly desirable that the impressions which have existed abroad in consequence of the declarations of many people in regard to the Anglo-Turkish Convention should be removed, and that it should be understood that it is not the intention of Her Majesty's Government to withdraw from the Anglo-Turkish Convention—that Cyprus is not to be given up, and that with regard to the policy which the late Government initiated as to the Anglo-Turkish Convention, it is not to be reversed. Until we hear that it is to be reversed, we shall certainly understand that that

    1313
    policy remains in full force for the benefit of England, of Turkey, and of Asia Minor.
    MR. BRYCEsaid, he would confine himself to one important point, which had been raised by the hon. Member for Burnley (Mr. Rylands), and that was the alternative course which might be taken by this country instead of acting under the Anglo-Turkish Convention. That alternative course was the duty of acting under the 61st Article of the Treaty of Berlin, and of thereby preventing the dangers which threatened the peace of the East. He thought Her Majesty's Government had exercised a wise discretion in not answering the hypothetical case which the hon. Member for Burnley had put. But that hypothetical case was one which might probably arise. England might be called on to defend the Frontiers of Asiatic Turkey against Russian encroachments. It was from the disorders of the Armenian Provinces that the danger was to be apprehended. The House would remember that the sufferings of the Armenian people had been so great before the late war that steps had been taken to provide for the introduction of reforms into the country. The 16th Article of the Treaty of San Stefano expressly bound Turkey to Russia to execute reforms in the Armenian Provinces, and placed the Armenian population under the protection of Russia. When the Treaty of Berlin was substituted for the Treaty of San Stefano, mainly by the action of this country, that provision was taken over; and the Sublime Porte promised to carry out, without further delay, the reforms that were required by the local needs of the Armenian Provinces. The terms of Article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin were as follows:—
    "The Porte promises to carry out, without more delay, the reforms and improvements required by local needs in the Provinces inhabited by the Armenians, and to guarantee their security against Circassians and Kurds. It will periodically make known the means taken for this purpose to the Powers, who will supervise their execution."
    Now, no measures had yet been taken for the redemption of that promise. Three years had elapsed since the Treaty was signed, and nothing had been done to carry out the provisions of this 61st Article. On the contrary, the condition
    1314
    of the Armenian people was becoming worse and worse. All the evils that existed before existed now, even in a more aggravated form. The Courts were wholly corrupt. The Turkish Judges were constantly bribed; they refused to receive Christian evidence, and denied justice to Christian suitors. The Turkish officials and tax-gatherers continued their inhuman exactions upon the subjects. The robberies and outrages perpetrated by the savage Kurdish Tribes went on unchecked. All these things were worse than before the war. Nor did the matter stop there. There was too much reason to fear that the Turkish Government at Constantinople actually welcomed the ravages of famine and the sword of the Kurds, so that they might be able to carry out the faster the work of impoverishing and exterminating the Armenian people. He would not make such a charge if it were not fully borne out by the evidence contained in the Blue Books. If any hon. Gentleman would read dispassionately the Reports received from Her Majesty's Consuls by the late Government, he would see that the Turkish officials had repeatedly placed obstacles in the way of conveying grain to the impoverished districts of Armenia; that their officials had frequently sought to prevent the liberality which had been provided by this country from finding its way into that unfortunate land; and that they connived at the excesses of the Kurds because they helped to destroy the peaceable Christians. Sir Henry Layard, speaking on the 11th May with regard to the behaviour of the Porte itself, said—
    "The conduct of the Porte in this and other cases can only be viewed as a deliberate attempt to encourage the cruelty which has been practised towards the Sultan's Christian subjects in Armenia."
    The Armenian people had borne their sufferings with exemplary patience. It was true that they were an unarmed population; but, in spite of their weakness, they would probably have risen in revolt but for the presence among them of English Consuls. Although, as yet, no reforms had been introduced by the Porte, the people could not help hoping that some time or other the English Government would try to help them. In the Blue Books would, be found an account of the negotiations

    1315
    which had passed between Her Majesty's Government and the Porte on the subject of the Reports of the Consuls, and it would be found that the conduct of the Porte was most unfavourably criticized by our Reprosentative at Constantinople, as being entirely inconsistent with their promises and engagements, and as proving that there was no real desire to carry out the reforms they had undertaken. Nothing had been done to improve the condition of the people, nor was it possible to do anything until the administration was taken out of the present hands and given to people who would exercise it with justice and propriety. He did not complain of Her Majesty's Government for not having done more up to the present time, for they had been occupied with the Montenegrin and Greek Questions. He received with thankfulness the declaration which had been made by the hon. Baronet the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that the Armenian Question stood next on the programme for fulfilling the Treaty of Berlin. Still less did he complain of the conduct of Her Majesty's Representative at Constantinople. Nobody could have watched the progress of events there without feeling the highest admiration for the vigour, and tact, and skill which Her Majesty's Representative had displayed. But he urged upon Her Majesty's Government the importance of acting with energy, now that the Greek Frontier Question had been practically disposed of, in order to bring about an early settlement of the question. It was a question, in its ultimate results, not less important even than the Greek Question; and he hoped that the same earnestness which had been shown in that matter would be applied here. The danger of Russian intervention was no idle fear. Russia had a large population living immediately across the Armenian Frontier, who deeply sympathized with the oppressed people of the Provinces which were subjected to Turkish rule. Nothing was more likely than that, if the present state of things continued, they might induce, or indeed compel, the Armenian people to rise in arms. Such an insurrection would be followed up by a massacre, and would inevitably bring about Russian intervention. In fact, the story of Bulgaria would repeat itself over again. He ap-
    1316
    pealed to the First Lord of the Treasury, who had pointed out, with such incomparable force, that the best and only way of preventing Russian intervention was not to allow the misrule of Turkey to continue, that to tolerate Turkish misrule was to invite Russian aggression. He appealed to him to urge the other Powers of Europe to prompt action in this matter, and remove the excuse and justification for Russian aggression,-which the miseries of the Armenians now afforded. He did not put the case on the basis of British interests—though he knew that many hon. Members of that House conceived our political position in the East, and the safety of our route to India, to be affected—nor did he put it on the ground of humanity; he put it on the firmer and more solid ground of Treaty obligations. This country, in. 1878, took away the protection which. Russia had, by the Treaty of San Stefano, undertaken to give to the Christian inhabitants of Armenia. We annulled that Treaty, and took the Christian subjects under our own protection, by the Anglo-Turkish Convention, under that of the six Powers by the Treaty of Berlin. Should we continue to watch their sufferings unmoved, and without doing something to relieve them, we might find ourselves in the painful dilemma of seeing Russia advancing to occupy the Armenian Provinces, and being forced to choose between a humiliating retreat from Treaty engagements, or engaging in a contest with Russia which might end in war. He believed that hon. Members on both sides of the House were equally concerned in seeing the credit and honour of England maintained, and he thought that if they read the accounts contained in the Blue Books there would be no difference of opinion as to the duty of this country. No one could fail to be profoundly moved by the details which were given there of the sufferings of that unfortunate people. No one who realized the urgency of the case, and the dangers that loomed in the future, but must desire that the influence of Europe should be exerted to deliver a population which lay exposed, unarmed, and helpless, to the attacks of ferocious robbers and the extortions of rapacious officials. And while they strove to alleviate the miseries of the Christian population of Armenia, they would relieve themselves of what

    1317
    might prove a source of embarrassment and danger to this country itself.
    MR. A. J. BALFOURsaid, he did not propose to follow the hon. Gentleman who had just sat down (Mr. Bryce)into a discussion upon the Armenian Question. Everyone agreed with the hon. Member that the condition of affairs in Armenia was deplorable, and entertained an earnest desire that it would be speedily ameliorated. Nor did he intend to follow the discursive remarks of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Montrose (Mr. Baxter), nor to comment upon the experience of the hon. Member for Salford (Mr. Arnold) in regard to travels in the Valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates. He wished rather to bring back the debate to the question which he supposed the hon. Gentleman the Mover of the Amendment wished to raise. The Motion of the hon. Member for Burnley (Mr. Rylands), as it stood on the Paper, was for Papers which never had any existence; but he (Mr. Balfour) imagined the question the hon. Member wished to raise was the expediency of now withdrawing from the Anglo-Turkish Convention. In the speech which the hon. Member had made in support of his Motion, he had shown signs that he was affected by that morbid imagination which influenced so many of his Friends with regard to the proceedings of the Foreign Office. They suspected that there was a secret Treaty in every drawer of that Office, and some dark Convention in every pigeon-hole, and they were perpetually asking for information which could not be given, for the simple reason that such information did not exist. With respect to the Convention itself, the first criticism made by the hon. Baronet the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Sir Charles W. Dilke) was that it was made in conflict with the Treaty of London. But this appeal to the Treaty of London, which Treaty guaranteed the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, was really an appeal to a document which had been torn to shreds long before the Anglo-Turkish Convention was made. The war between Russia and Turkey entirely destroyed that document, practically, whatever it might have done formally. With regard to the accusation that the Convention had been entered into without a European Concert, Her Majesty's Government ap-
    1318
    peared to think that a European Concert would give guarantees against the individual action of separate Powers with regard to the acquisition of territory. Last Session they were told that whether or not a European Concert was a good instrument for carrying out reforms, at all events it did prevent selfish and separate action. For the last few-weeks that statement had not been repeated. The French aggressions in Tunis had showed the precise value of the European Concert as a means of stopping proceedings which, whether injurious or not to England, were undoubtedly separate and undoubtedly selfish. We had long known that the European Concert was not powerful to do good; we now know that it was not powerful to prevent harm. That class of politicians who were constantly attacking the Anglo-Turkish Convention could not be consistent in their attacks. They told us, like the right hon. Member for Montrose (Mr. Baxter) that the Eastern population had been better off under Russian government; but, in the very same speech in which that statement was made, we were told that Russian government was so bad that Russian aggression need not be feared. We were told that any dismemberment of the Turkish Empire was a thing to be desired, and that they were to shrink from nothing that would abstract a population from that pernicious rule; and, at the same time, we were attacked for putting under our own rule the population of Cyprus. We were told, also, that we had engaged ourselves to undertake military operations far above our strength, and not 10 sentences afterwards we were told that the Army of Russia was so rotten that it was perfectly incapable of contending with the Army of any well-governed European country. Now, as the Convention itself, it was really the strongest and most tangible inducement ever held out to the Turkish Empire to reform itself. He perfectly admitted that, so far, it had not attained this object, and he perfectly admitted that reforms had not followed upon it; but, he asked, had any other instrument in the possession of any other Government worked more successfully? True, the Anglo-Turkish Convention had in this respect failed; but had the European Concert succeeded? Was there the least sign

    1319
    that it was likely to succeed? Had the hon. Gentleman who spoke last (Mr. Bryce), who had dwelt in such touching terms on the; condition of Armenia, any hope of the success of the European Concert? Did he believe that Armenia was to be reformed by the European Concert? No; he (Mr. Balfour) felt certain that the hon. Member was not so Quixotic as to suppose any such thing. He would point out, also, as to these reforms, that, though it was unquestionably true that, so far, the Turkish Government had not been influenced by the Convention to carry out reforms, on the first menace of Russia the disposition to carry them out would be great, since, until they were carried out, we were not bound to defend Asia Minor. On the first threat from Russia, any English. Government in power at the time would be able to put the strongest pressure on the Turkish officials to do something tangible and permanent in the way of improvement. With regard to the responsibilities thrown on us, he was not one of those who thought we had incurred no risk by the Convention. Nothing whatever that was worth doing was to be done without some risk; but in this case it was entirely conditional on reforms in Turkey in Asia being carried out, and, from that point of view, he was afraid it was very remote. He could wish it were less remote; but if Asia Minor were reformed, and the Turkish Government did their duty in that part of their dominions, no English Government whatever, with or without the Anglo-Turkish Convention, could refuse to assist them in repelling Russian aggression. It would be the duty of any English Government, from whatever Party it was drawn, supposing that Asiatic Turkey were well governed, to prevent the extension of Russian influence through. Asia Minor and the Valley of the Euphrates. Asia Minor, it was said by the right hon. Member for Montrose, was a country without roads, through which it was difficult to transport an army; but they were not obliged to send an army there. All they were obliged to do was to assist Turkey in resisting Russia, and whether or not they should have to march an army to the North of Asia Minor and meet Russia there was a question that would have to be left to the Military Advisers
    1320
    of the Government then in power. It would be for us to assist Turkey not in this way or that way, but in the manner which would be most effective. He had gone over most of the points which related to the Convention, which was the matter to which he wished to confine himself. He would only say that he had heard with no little satisfaction from the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that the Government had, so far, no thoughts of abandoning the Convention. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Montrose (Mr. Baxter) had told them that the Government had had the courage to abandon Candahar, and had had the courage to abandon the Transvaal; and, he added, he hoped they would have the further courage to abandon that Convention. He admitted that the Government had shown themselves possessed, to an eminent degree, of that peculiar kind of courage which consisted in retreat of all kinds. But he was glad there was a limit to that courage, and that the Government were not going to follow the advice of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Montrose and carry out those principles not only in Afghanistan and South Africa, but also in the Eastern part of Europe.
    MR. GLADSTONE: I should have been very well content to leave this question in the position in which it was left by the most able speech of my hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; but there are one or two points on which, having regard to the position I hold, it is almost my duty to say a word; and, first and foremost, I avail myself of this—the very first—opportunity of acknowledging, in the face of this House,' the able services which have been rendered by my right hon. Friend the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen) to the country of which he is a most distinguished citizen, and I will go a little farther and say to the cause of justice, liberty, and humanity abroad. Those services drew a merited compliment from the hon. Member for Portsmouth (Sir H. Drummond Wolff), though that hon. Member was obliged, to pay that compliment at the cost of a grievous inconsistency, because, in almost two consecutive sentences, he stated that the services of the right hon. Gentleman had been "most able and most successful," and then that the whole policy of

    1321
    the Government had been "a panorama of failure." ["Hear, hear!"] Oh, yes; I quite understand that that suits the intellectual views of the hon. Member opposite; but I am not commenting upon his intellectuality, or upon his views—. I am commenting upon the cogency of the considerations which the hon.Member for Portsmouth must have felt to have been connected with the services of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon, when he felt it his duty—and it was honourably performed—to render tribute to those services, even in absolute contradiction to the sentiments which formed the climax and peroration of his speech. In reply to the hon. Member for the Tower Hamlets (Mr. Bryce) I wish to assure him that the principle on which we have endeavoured to proceed in dealing with the numerous and perilous questions which we found unsettled under the Treaty of Berlin has been that of orderly succession. We were well aware that it was perfectly impossible in any other mode to make progress in these difficult and complicated matters. The most dangerous and urgent, menacing the peace of Europe, under the Berlin Treaty, were the matters connected with the Montenegrin Frontier and the extension of Greek territory. It was to these, therefore, that we, through the able assistance of my right hon. Friend, first addressed ourselves; but that was never with the idea that the question relating to the condition of Armenia was other than one of the first rank in principle. I am sorry that my right hon. Friend could not prolong his stay in Constantinople, to render to that question also the efficient aid which he rendered to the questions of Montenegro and Greece. His departure may, perhaps, suggest to some the idea that Her Majesty's Government attached a less importance to reforms in Armenia than to the other questions. Now, I hope—though I like to assume nothing until it is actually accomplished—this matter has been settled; and that idea would be an entirely false one. My right hon. Friend knows well how happy we should have been had we been able to induce him, or had not other duties and engagements prevented him from prolonging his stay at Constantinople. But the able and distinguished person who has been chosen, to succeed him has carried
    1322
    out with him as the first article, I may say, of his instructions, the direction to apply his influence and energies in the greatest degree to the settlement of this most important Armenian question. Now, Sir, we have heard from two speakers since my hon. Friend (Mr. Bryce) sat down elaborate defences of the Anglo-Turkish Convention. The right hon. Gentleman the late Under Secretary of State (Mr. Bourke) began by making a defence of himself with regard to an answer given in this House, and he appealed to the House to support him in his assertion that he had never during the six years—the six difficult years—during which he represented the Foreign Office, been guilty of a want of candour in any replies made by him. Sir, I have very great pleasure in rendering my tribute to the right hon. Gentleman in that respect. I am sure he was quite incapable of dealing otherwise than most fairly and honourably with the House. At the same time, without in the slightest degree qualifying that admission, I must call the attention of the House to the position in which he left this matter. A Question was asked of him on the 16th July, 1878, whether there was any ground for disquieting rumours that had gone abroad with respect to the action of France in connection with Tunis and Tripoli. The right hon. Gentleman said there was no ground whatever; he has shown us that the despatches in our hands are of a later date, and that he was entirely ignorant of the matter disclosed in those despatches. I have not the least doubt that what has been said by him can be said with equal accuracy by the right hon. Baronet opposite (Sir Stafford Northcote), and by the other Members of the late Cabinet in this House. But this I must observe, that the organ of the Government in this House was upon that important subject permitted, innocently, to misinform and mislead the House, and that he was never corrected by those who possessed the knowledge to remove his error. The conversations between M. Waddington and Lord Salisbury were anterior to that date. Inquiry in this House proceeded in complete ignorance of these conversations and the important matters which had taken place. They were unknown to him at the time; they were kept back

    1323
    from him, they were kept back from Parliament, they were kept back from the world; and we were allowed and taught to discuss the whole of the question of the Anglo-Turkish Convention and of the Treaty of Berlin in entire ignorance of what had taken place between England and France; and, in fact, under the pressure of the strongest assurances, even for Members of the Cabinet, that no circumstances of uneasiness had arisen between those two great Powers in connection with that Convention. That is a state of facts unexampled, I believe, in the history of foreign discussion in this House—a state of facts which, I trust, having had one instance of the kind, will never recur in the annuals of the English Foreign Office or of Parliament. With regard to what has been truly said to be the main question of discussion to-night, the Anglo-Turkish Convention, I wish to observe upon the total contradiction between the argument of my hon. Friend who has just sat down (Mr. A. J. Balfour) and the argument of the right hon. Gentleman the late Under Secretary of State. My hon. Friend, while he fully acknowledges that no reforms have been effected in Turkey under the Anglo-Turkish Convention, says—" Yes; but wait—wait till Russia is on her way to Asia Minor, and then you will have an irresistible leverage to force Turkey to adopt reforms." But he evidently had not heard, or he is diametrically at variance with, the statement of the right hon. Gentleman the late Under Secretary of State, because the right hon. Gentleman, so far from founding the policy and duty of England to support Turkey against Russia in her Asiatic Dominions on the prior execution of those reforms, founded it upon a splendid and imposing commercial theory. He said it was the duty and policy of England to go and wage war, 3,000 miles from her base of operations, single-handed, against Russia, upon her continuous territory, for what? Why, for the purpose of preventing the tremendous and ruinous consequences to the commerce of this country that would follow if Russia obtaining territory in Asia Minor were to establish protective duties. If that is so, if it is our duty to go there to prevent Russia from enforcing protective duties, what becomes of your leverage upon Turkey to induce her to effect re-
    1324
    forms? You tell her it is your interest to do it. The right hon. Gentleman says the whole of our Empire in the East is at stake in keeping Russia out of Asia Minor. But if so, what leverage have you upon Turkey? Will not the Turks read the speech of the right hon. Gentleman, and learn from it that your own interest in your view will compel and constrain you to defend her upon her Frontier, whether she effects reforms or not? I confess I was surprised at my right hon. Friend, who is a man of great ability, and may look to obtain further distinction in the councils of the Empire, that his experience of the world has not taught him how much wickedness there is in it and the craft with which this wickedness is conducted. Depend upon it, there is quite intellect enough in the stupidest Pasha that ever held office in Constantinople to put together the two ideas, that if we are told by the organs of the late Government that the Anglo-Turkish Convention was founded upon the supreme policy of British interests it is perfectly clear it is not founded upon the prior necessity of introducing reforms. Now, Sir, with regard to the Convention, the right hon. Gentleman laid down another proposition of great importance. He boasts, on the part of the late Government, that they were glad to depart from the concert of Europe when, in their view, the interests of England required that course to be adopted. Well, I want to know whether that doctrine, if it be good for us, is not good for others also? My hon. Friend seemed to be surprised that France had been departing from that doctrine, and has, in Tunis, been taking measures which certainly, to state it mildly, Europe is not unanimous in approving. But, Sir, if France is blessed with Under Secretaries of State who are imbued with the doctrines of the right hon. Gentleman, she has no difficulty in finding an apology, for she has only to boast in the face of the world that she is ready, and desirous, and forward to act with the concert, and with the approval of Europe, until French interests are at stake. I am not here to pronounce an opinion—it is not my business to pronounce an opinion upon the measures recently taken by France in Tunis; but I am here to say this—that if those measures had been in their nature dangerous to

    1325
    the public tranquillity—nay, even if they had involved a breach of public law, the power which England gained 20, SO, 40, or 50 years ago would have manfully protested against any such proceeding. But it has been said that power has been crippled and impaired, by what was well called by my hon. Friend the Member for Burnley the evil example set by the Anglo-Turkish Convention. That Convention, to begin with, was a departure from the European Concert. Well, Sir, we have always said that the European Concert was to be maintained partly because it gave the highest authority to its own conclusions, which were capable of being brought to bear in the present condition of International Law on the settlement of great affairs. But we have also said that it had a great virtue in suppressing the selfishness of an individual Power. And then my hon. Friend astonished me by reproaching the advocates of the European Concert with the proceedings of France in Tunis. It was not in our power to get rid of that which had been done before we came into Office. These proceedings followed very closely upon the date of the Treaty of Berlin, and the abandonment of the principle of concert by the late Administration, particularly in the case of the Anglo-Turkish Convention. I ask you to go back a quarter of a century—to the time of the Crimean War and the Treaty of Paris. The Crimean War was entered into under the shield of a self-denying ordinance—under an engagement of the Powers concerned in it that they would take no benefit to themselves from the measures they were adopting on behalf of Turkey. What followed V The Treaty of Paris was concluded, and 20 years of peace was secured to Turkey. There was no Anglo-Turkish Convention then, there was no movement of the French against Tunis. There was no proceeding of this class, or approaching to it. The only point on which there was an apparent departure from the Treaty of Paris was the union of the Danubian Principalities which constituted the State of Roumania, and which was not a movement dictated by the selfish interest of anyone of the Powers concerned. It was a movement in favour of liberty, justice, the peace of Europe, and the stability and settlement of the East. That followed the Treaty of Paris.
    1326
    Compare with it what has followed the Treaty of Berlin. Sir, we adhered to the doctrine of the European Concert; but what we had to do was to build up a ruin which had been overthrown, which had become almost a bye-word in the mouths of those whom we succeeded. We have endeavoured to repair it; but repairing is a very different thing from, upholding. It is quite clear that the principle of concert, which the late Under Secretary of State boasts of, the readiness of the late Government to disregard where there were any British interests concerned—the principle of concert was the principle on which the whole of the policy of this country in the East has been founded for 50 at least—since Canning endeavoured to combine the Powers of Europe and succeeded in binding three of them, and the three greatest of them, for the purpose of constituting the Kingdom of Greece. From that time onwards it was the established rule of Europe. My hon. Friend says that concert has always failed; but is not the existence of the Kingdom of Greece at once a contradiction of the doctrine he has laid down? Concert may fail, but if concert fails, rely upon it that what is weaker than Concert is absolutely sure to fail. Do you want a more recent instance? Did concert fail in the Lebanon? Are you not there in the heart of Asia? And there you established 20 years ago, through the able services of Lord Dufferin, that political system in the Lebanon which has made the Lebanon comparatively almost a model for Asiatic Turkey, and which has subsisted there through all chances and changes to the present time. Well, concert was the principle upon which Europe founded its policy in the East for 50 years. England had won proud distinction even among European Powers. Whatever might be said of its ambition elsewhere, it was freely confessed that within those limits, at least, she had no selfish interests to pursue, and the consequence of that has been to give her enormous weight in guiding the councils of united Christendom. That was the position which England had attained up to 1878, and I hope she will recover it. Men warmly attached to British fame and British power have not scrupled to act upon the principle of concert. Lord Palmerston and Lord Russell, two states-

    1327
    men whose names are almost proverbial for their regard for the fame and splendour of their country, did not scruple to give over to Greece the Ionian Islands; and that act, which I believe, from their point of view, to have been a wise act, did much to corroborate the idea which rested on the precedents of a very long period of time—the idea of the justice, sincerity, and impartiality of this country, at least, on European questions. That position it will be the labour of the future to regain. Possibly it will be a slow progress; it may not be for the present Government—for me it cannot be a task to be much prolonged—but while I hold the Office I have the honour to hold I will labour steadily for that purpose, and will again endeavour to found the influence and fame of England, as far as we can, upon a strict regard for international right, and upon the cordial recognition of the title of others to be treated upon a footing of equality with ourselves. The hon. Gentleman the Member for Portsmouth (Sir H. Drummond Wolff), with great ingenuity, and no unfairness, contrasted in various points the case of England in regard to the Anglo-Turkish Convention with the case of France and Tunis. In regard to accidental particulars, I think he was quite accurate, so far as his point of attack was concerned; but there are other points which would vary considerably the effect of the contrast. There is one point to which the hon. Member did not refer, and which is an important point of view. It is the juridical point of view. "We may lament the conduct of France in Tunis; but it is difficult to assert that France by her conduct in Tunis has been guilty of a breach of International Law. France has never for a very long time—for 50 or 60 years, in fact, ever since the integrity of the Turkish Empire became a question of European interests—admitted that Tunis belonged to the Turkish Empire, and, only a few years ago, France was joined by Italy in holding that view. We hold the contrary; but it has only been a matter of opinion on one side and the other. It is impossible to assert as a proposition of European Law that Tunis belongs to the Turkish Empire; but when we look to the case of this Convention what do we find? A single power took from the Sultan by what is called a voluntary act on his part—
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    though, I must say, in describing it as a voluntary act you are straining the force of language. [An hon. MEMBER: No, no!] I beg to assure the hon. Member who cries "No, no !" that I think I have had better means, perhaps, than he has had of ascertaining what is the view taken by the authorities in Turkey of the Anglo-Turkish Convention, and in the words I have used I have kept myself within bounds. I do not scruple to assert—I am sorry this question has been raised again—that at the time that Convention was formed it was a breach of the law of Europe. The hon. Member for Hertford (Mr. A. J. Balfour) gives us now his reply to that allegation, and his reply to that allegation is that the Treaties under which he seems to admit that it would have been a breach of law had been destroyed by the logic of facts. If I wished to possess myself of a plea that, under all circumstances, would avail for any act of aggression, I can hardly conceive one more elastic, more available, more all comprehensible, than the contention that an obligation had been disposed of by the logic of facts; but I am not prepared to admit the logic of facts, as matter of fact. The Treaties of Paris and London had been reset up by the Treaty of Berlin. They were in force before the Treaty of Berlin, and after the Treaty of Berlin, except so far as the Treaty of Berlin altered them, and those Treaties said that every question relating to the independence of the Turkish Empire was a question of common interest to the whole of Europe, in which no single Power could take upon itself to act. Was not that what you did? Did our occupation and administration of Cyprus have any influence on the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire? If Russia had done the same thing in regard to Mitylene or Chios, would you have admitted for one moment that that was not an act affecting the integrity of the Turkish Empire? I make this admission to my hon. Friend. That act may be said to have been unknown by the absence of proof. I am not aware that the Powers had reserved their own rights, but they have nowhere protested against our action; and I therefore agree that the position of the question, years after the facts have been changed, is now altered in its character, and that we are not called upon to give up possession of Cyprus. I believe, and

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    frankly admit, that this Convention was made with the best intentions towards the subjects of Turkey. I have not the least doubt that a warm sympathy with their condition had a great effect on the minds of those who devised the Treaty; but permit me to say that, even from that point of view, it was an entire error. It is admitted that it was an error so far as practical results are concerned—at least that it has not yet been justified. But it had another effect. While it was futile for the purpose of relieving the subjects of Turkey from oppression, this substitution of our sole will for the united action of the Powers was perfectly well known in Turkey to constitute an absolute reversal of the principle upon which, the Crimean War was made. The grand object of the Crimean War was to get rid of the sole action of Russia in Turkey. The right of interference by Russia between the Sultan and his subjects was declared to be a cause of danger to the world, and when we come to reestablish—we who had taken a leading part in destroying that title to intervention on the part of Russia—when we come to re-establish for a right of the same kind by Treaty, the suspicion created in the mind of the Turkish Government, and I must say it was a natural suspicion, was that we had selfish and ulterior objects in view—namely, our own political strength in connection with our Asiatic Empire, and not the mere welfare of Turkish subjects; and I must say I think that suspicion would have been confirmed to-night could the Representatives of Turkey have listened to the right hon. Gentleman the late Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, when he emphatically declared how closely the policy of this Convention was connected with the maintenance of the Indian Empire of Great Britain. Well, Sir, I will not detain the House any longer; I should not have said so much, but for the defences which were offered by my hon. Friend who has just sat down (Mr. Balfour), and by the late Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. I have only to say one word before I close. The hon. Member for Portsmouth sees in the foreign policy of the present Government nothing but a panorama of failure. I do not wish to waste the time of the House, especially at this late time of the night; but the hon. Member admitted, in candour, one exception to that view- He certainly admitted that
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    considerable acquisition of territory had been in principle gained—and I hope practical measures have given effect to that—to the Kingdom of Greece. I am not sure whether the hon. Member will allow that the settlement of the Montenegrin Frontier Question, and the closing thereby of the controversy between Turkey and Greece, was of some importance. I noticed his criticisms of the particular method of settlement; but this has been amply dealt with; but it is a panorama of failure in which these two acts occurred. The first year of our Administration has produced these acts, together with others, to one of which my hon. Friend referred, and of which, perhaps, the hon. Member for Portsmouth was not aware—namely, the settlement of the Asiatic Frontier. But if these two acts—the settlement of the Montenegrin and Greek Questions—are so slight and insignificant that they are even invisible points in the great panorama of failure, how was it they had not been settled during the two years our Predecessors were in power with, as hon. Gentlemen opposite always assure us, unequalled influence all over the world—Predecessors who, we are told, enjoyed recognition all over the world of their transcendent merits; who were the finest and ablest' Ministers that ever swayed the destinies of a country? How was it that these two insignificant questions of the Montenegrin Frontier and the addition of the territory of Greece were not settled? No, Sir, these great men, when they went out of Office, handed over this question to the little men who came after them; but so far as those two questions are concerned, and mainly owing to the powerful exertions of my right hon. Friend behind me (Mr. Goschen), something has been done in these quarters in the interests of justice and liberty, and for the future peace of the world.
    SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTE: I regret that it should be necessary for me to take any part in the present discussion; but there have been some observations to which we have listened from the Prime Minister which appear to me to call for an immediate reply. Before I address myself to them, I wish to take the more grateful part of adding to his my own congratulations to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen) for the manner in which he discharged his duties at Constantinople.
    MR. GLADSTONE: Will you allow me for amoment? I forgot, very wrongly, to acknowledge the tribute paid by the hon. Member for Portsmouth (Sir H. Drummond Wolff) by making reciprocal admission joyfully, and a willing acknowledgment, of the way in which he served the interests of his own country end the people of European Roumelia in the Office he held.
    SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTE: It has been with great pleasure that I have heard these observations from the Prime Minister. Not only are they well deserved by my hon. Friend, the Member for Portsmouth, but they point to the fact that the work in which the right hon. Member for Ripon has been successfully engaged has been work which has been in no small degree prepared for him by those who have gone before him. The objection I take to the speech of the Prime Minister is not so much to the detail, but to the whole scope of the argument. The right hon. Gentleman appears to me to have entirely left out of sight himself, and to have desired that the House should have left out of sight, the whole course of that great Turkish-Russian Question out of which, amongst other. incidents, the incident of the Anglo-Turkish Convention grew; and I venture to say, when he speaks in the manner in which he has done in his closing observations of the position in which we left affairs, and the task left to be accomplished by the present Government, he leaves out of sight altogether that if we had not taken, on the whole, the course we took on that question, there would probably have been no Turkish Convention. The questions of the Greek Frontier or Roumelian Administration, if England had not come forward at a critical moment, you would have seen such an alteration in the relations between the different Powers of Europe as would have put your concert into a very peculiar position. If you were to judge from the speech of the right lion. Gentleman, you would think that the Anglo-Turkish Convention was a Convention entered into by England for the sake of acquiring some territory for itself, and that that was an isolated transaction, altogether apart from the great transactions of the Russian War, and of the negotiations that followed. What was the real state of things? The right hon. t Gentleman talks about the concert of
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    Europe. He says that ever since the Peace of Paris there had been a recognition by the European Powers that the affairs of Turkey were matters of public interest to be decided by the concert of Europe. I will not say whether there may be more or less truth in the statement—I mean whether it is a more or less complete and accurate description of the situation. I will not raise the question of how far that statement takes into account the Tripartite Treaty. I do not know how far that statement takes into account the Tripartite Treaty between England, France, and Austria, which was a special Treaty in regard to the maintenance of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Was that a part of a European Concert or not? I want to know. I do not understand what the argument of the Prime Minister is, so far as it would apply to such a Treaty as that. Had those three Powers any right, according to him, to enter into any such Treaty as that? Was that within the principles of European concert or not? If it was right, and I presume from his silence—and he was the Minister for many years giving effect to it—that he thinks it right, why, if the special interests of three Powers were to entitle them to enter into special arrangements for the security of Turkey, should it be wrong in the case of one of them? What was the case? War grew up between Turkey and Russia; we in this country, in concert with the other European Powers, did all in our power to prevent that war breaking out; the Conference at Constantinople was the last act of that European Concert, and I venture to say in that Conference we did everything that was possible for us to do, and France did the same, to prevent that attack by Russia upon Turkey. That failed, and the concert was broken up, not by us, but by Russia. The war began; we did all that was in our power to induce other Powers to come forward and stop that war. We were unable to do so, and were obliged to stand still with folded arms, as it were, while a war took place which was decidedly against European arrangements, and which was also in opposition to the interests of this country. I know it is a shocking thing to allude to the interests of this country, but we must expect to differ. The war went on; Russia was successful, and everything we could do

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    failed to stop her progress, and we found ourselves in the position that it was likely enough that the integrity of Turkey would be broken up and Russia be in possession of Constantinople. That was a state of things in which it was impossible for us to acquiesce, arid we took steps of which I am not at all ashamed, but even proud, to come forward and say that we, at all events, would take our part in preventing such a calamity. What was the result? The result was that we were successful; we arrested Russia on the threshold of Constantinople, and we succeeded in bringing about the Berlin Conference to settle the questions in which the Powers of Europe were interested; but there were questions in which the Powers were not interested, but in which we were interested. There were questions which affected vitally the interests of the Porte and of England with regard to our Eastern Empire in India. And I admit, although it may be a shocking thing to admit it, that we thought it our special duty to take steps ourselves to protect those particular interests which we had reason to know the other Powers would have considered outside the scope of their deliberations. That is the history of the Anglo-Turkish Convention. The right hon. Gentleman says you admit the fact that it was a Convention entered into for your own interests, for your commerce, for your Indian Empire, and, therefore, how can you expect Turkey to think it was entered into for the interests and improvement of Armenia? That was not the point. The point upon which we rested was that we considered some steps necessary to secure the Asiatic Dominions of the Porte from invasion by a foreign Power. We made an engagement binding ourselves to give assistance, and that was a stipulation which we made in lieu of the Tripartite Treaty, which had altogether broken down, and for which we substituted a Convention much more favourable to ourselves; and, at the same time, gave to Turkey a pledge which was of the greatest value to her. But then we felt that if we were giving a pledge to assist Turkey in the event of attack by Russia, it was necessary that we should take some precaxitions against those incidents which had occurred before, and might occur again, and which would naturally stir up public feeling against us—I mean the misgovernment
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    by Turkey of her Asiatic Dominions. And on that account the stipulations in regard to Armenia were put into the Treaty. That is the explanation of the whole matter. We asked, no doubt, for the right of the administration of Cyprus, not for the sake of obtaining territory, but for the sake of obtaining the means of carrying into effect the obligations we were incurring. That was perfectly intelligible; and if it were not for the fatal blot that it was an arrangement made by the late Government, there would be very little fear that it would be presented to the House as one that might fairly be condemned. It may be said that the arrangement was good or bad; if bad, I suppose you are going to give it up; but it was perfectly intelligible, and I hold that it was successful. We have heard a great deal about Tunis, and about the reticence that was observed in keeping back things that ought to have been communicated, and so forth. I was not in the House at the moment my right hon. Friend the late Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Bourke) spoke, but he referred to the answer he gave on the 16th July, and it will be seen from the Papers that the first question raised as to the precise language used by Lord Salisbury was not until 10 days later, on the 26th July, when the explanation of M. Waddington came. My right hon. Friend was perfectly justified in saying that there was no legimate foundation for the rumours to which reference had been made. But with regard to the whole of that business, what can anybody who is not prejudiced see in the matter? Why, simply that when reference to Cyprus and the Anglo-Turkish Convention was made and came under the consideration of the French Minister at Berlin, it was not unnatural that he should ask—"What is the meaning of all this, and what is its bearing on French interests in Africa? "The answer given was—" None at all. It has nothing to do with any desire to interfere with any French interests in Africa. We respect French interests in Africa. The arrangements have been made for reasons set forth in the Treaty, and for no other, and we do not interfere with French interests in Africa." Well, we hear that it is a wrong thing for England to act separately, and that it is not a wrong thing for France to act separately. All these questions are

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    matters which require very careful consideration, and you are putting cases to us which we are not in a position to discuss. It is one question whether France is or is not acting at the present moment in entire accordance with her relations with the other nations of Europe. But it is another question as to the action of England; and I say that the action of England in the Anglo-Turkish Convention was entirely justifiable, and justifiable not only in reference to this country and to Europe generally, but also with reference to her attitude towards France and the other European alliances. I do not think I need go further at present. I understand that the general effect of this debate is this—that Her Majesty's Government do not see their way to reversing or changing the policy which we adopted, and which we adopted on very strong grounds, in reference to the Anglo-Turkish Convention. You may reprobate our conduct, and say that it was selfish and wrong, and in every way to be condemned; but the Government do not see their way towards repudiating it. I am very glad of that. I think we have in the Convention taken a position which, on the whole, is creditable to this country. It is a strengthening position. I deny altogether that the occupation of Cyprus, in the sense, and to the extent in which we occupy it, is to be called anything in the nature of greed of territory. If it is necessary or justifiable to take measures for the protection of our ally the Sultan, and our Indian Empire, as well as the Empire of the Porte, then I contend that in taking that measure we have done that which was thoroughly justifiable, and although it is made the subject of comment by those who are disposed to cry down our policy, I confess that I have never been able to see the force of the arguments oused against it; and I am in no degree disposed to shrink from the responsibility of the consequences of it.
    SIR CHARLES W. DILKE: By the leave of the House, in reference to some of the remarks which have fallen from the right hon. Gentleman the late Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Bourke), I desire to say that I wish to be bound by the actual words which I have used in regard to the Anglo-Turkish Convention, and not by any comments that may have been made upon those words.
    MR. O'DONNELLsaid, he did not suppose that the Government designed to exclude the Irish Party from the discussion of that question. He did not intend to discuss the matter at any length; but he wished to assure the Government that the Irish Members did take an interest in the foreign policy of the country, and that that interest was likely to be increased in the futute. He thought there was an omission in the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister, upon which, as an Irish Member, he wished to make a remark. In referring to the vacillation or failure which might have marked the policy of the Conservative Party, the right hon. Gentleman seemed to have forgotten to take notice of the very weakening or damaging effect upon the public policy of the country caused by the persistent opposition of the Party of the right hon. Gentleman. The Irish Members were accused of fractiousness in not always falling is with the designs of the Liberal Party when in Opposition; but they had never been able to reach that pitch of inveterate animosity to the policy of the Government of the day which could at all equal the system of wholesale denunciation which was adopted by the present Premier when he left the out-of office Party of this country. Her Majesty's Government had told the House that the Armenian Question was the next to be taken up. He (Mr. O'Donnell) sincerely trusted that they were not on the verge of another diplomatic agitation upon foreign affairs to take off the attention of the Government from pressing internal reforms which still remained to be effected. Many of those reforms had been put aside by the present Administration. They were now going to settle the affairs of Armenia. By what means were they going to do it? Where was their Army? In consequence of having adopted a vicious policy, the attention of their troops was monopolized by the serving of processes in Ireland. He hoped that the statement of the Under Secretary of State had only been brought in by way of flourish to cover, with a decent veil, the unwise policy of Her Majesty's Government in regard to Home affairs.
    MR. LAINGsaid, he was of opinion that the most important feature in the debate was the declaration made by the late Under Secretary of State for Foreign

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    Affairs (Mr. Bourke) that in reference to reciprocal obligations between India and Turkey, Turkey ought to be required to fulfil her obligations before England was called upon to fulfil hers. Turkey had failed to fulfil her obligations, and England was no longer bound, in the sense of being under any obligation, to come forward and take any part in a war in that portion of Asia Minor unless it suited her interest to do it. In point of fact, the Anglo-Turkish Convention amounted to nothing more than that, in the event of certain contingencies, England might feel called upon to go to war for the preservation of the integrity of Asia Minor; but that there was no obligation upon her to undertake such a war. Such a declaration on the part of the Representative of the foreign policy of the late Government was satisfactory, and he did not care to scrutinize it too closely.
    Notice taken, that 40 Members were not present; House counted, and 40 Members not being present,
    House adjourned at half after One o'clock till Monday next.