Commons Sitting of 4 September 1880

Preamble
The House met at a quarter before Two of the clock.

MINUTES.
EAST INDIA REVENUE ACCOUNTS—considered in Committee.
PUBLIC BILL—Third Heading—Consolidated Fund (Appropriation), and passed.

QUESTIONS.

  NAVY—ALLEGED INSTANCE OF "KEEL-HAULING."
  MR. P. A. TAYLORasked the Secretary to the Admiralty, Whether he is aware that a statement has appeared in certain Italian newspapers (Palermo and Messina) alleging that a Marine, of H.M.S. "Alexandra," was lately condemned to be keel-hauled and died under the punishment; and, whether he will institute inquiries upon the subject? The hon. Gentleman added that the newspapers had been ostensibly sent to him by an English officer.
  MR. SHAW LEFEVRE: Sir, it is wholly impossible that there can be any truth in the story reported in the Italian papers, that a Marine has been keelhauled on board the Alexandra, and died under the punishment. We have heard nothing about it, and I do not think it is necessary to insult the officers of the ship by asking whether it is true. The last reference to keel-hauling in the Navy is contained in a well-known story of the Emperor Paul of Russia, which shows that in his day there was a current belief on the Continent that this punishment was practised. When he came on board a man-of-war he asked to see the process, and when he was told that it would cause the death of the seaman, he offered one of his staff for the experiment. The editor of the Italian paper was about as well informed as the retailer of this anecdote. I do not think it necessary to make further inquiry.

  TREATY OF BERLIN—THE CONFERENCE AT BERLIN—"ARMED COERCION."
  SIR WILFRID LAWSONasked the Secretary of State for India, If he can give the House any assurance that the "armed coercion" in regard to Eastern affairs, for which he has expressed his earnest hope that no necessity may arise, will not be resorted to by Her Majesty's Government until they have given Parliament an opportunity of expressing its opinion on the matter?
  MR. GLADSTONE: Sir, I am aware that during my absence from this House a Question has been put to my noble
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  Friend near me with reference to the intended action of Her Majesty's Government, virtually based upon the same foundation, the same state of matters, as that to which the Question of my hon. Friend refers. I wish to say that I entirely concur in the discretion and justice of the answer made by my noble Friend; and, moreover, Sir, I hope my hon. Friend will not think it discourteous on my part if the first reply which it is my duty to make to the Question after my return to this House should appear to be of a somewhat stinted character. My hon. Friend is aware of the extreme delicacy of these matters. He is aware of the great, of the undue latitude and significance that are apt to be attached to declarations of the Government which are at all of an abstract character, or which refer to anything beyond the actual situation which has positively arisen. Under these circumstances, I think it my duty to state to my hon. Friend that, while I am sure he will not suspect us of any disposition to travel wide apart from the known views and intentions of Parliament or the convictions of the country, I do not think it right to make any addition to the declaration made on a former occasion by my noble Friend the Secretary of State for India.

  AFGHANISTAN—MILITARY OPERATIONS—THE LATEST TELEGRAM (GENERAL ROBERTS'S VICTORY.)
  MR. BRADLAUGHasked the Secretary of State for India, Whether it will be possible, at any early date, to publish a list of the names of the killed and missing of the rank and file in the engagements under General Burrows and in the sortie at Candahar?
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: I have sent a telegram to the Viceroy on this subject, but I have been informed in reply that he is only in possession of the names of the officers who were killed or wounded in the engagements under General Burrows, at Khuskh-i-Nakhund, and in the sortie from Candahar. He has telegraphed to General Primrose for information in regard to the men who were killed or wounded, but he has not yet received any particulars. I may, perhaps, take this opportunity of reading to the House a telegram which has been received from

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  General Roberts. It is dated 1st September, six in the evening, and was received to-day—
  "Ayoub Khan's army to-day defeated, and completely dispersed, with, I hope, comparative slight loss on our side. The two lost guns of E. B. Royal Horse Artillery were recovered, and several field guns of various calibre fell to the splendid infantry of this force. Cavalry still in pursuit."
  The telegram contains a list of casualties amongst the officers, but it is at present impossible to ascertain the casualties amongst the Native troops. I have no reason to believe they were excessive, but full details will be telegraphed to-morrow. Ayoub Khan is supposed to have fled towards Herat.
  MR. ONSLOWasked the Secretary of State for India if he can now state, without detriment to the public service, whether it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government permanently to occupy Candahar?
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: Sir, I stated generally a short time ago what the views of the Government were in regard to Candahar. The Government of India have not been able to come to any further decision than that which I then announced, but certain recent events have not diminished, but have, on the contrary, rather increased, the difficulty of coming to an immediate decision as to our future relations with Candahar.

  NAVY—TRAINING SKIPS.
  SIR EDWARD REEDasked the Secretary to the Admiralty, Whether the Admiralty propose to make any provision for the training of young seamen in substitution for the "Eurydice" and the "Atalanta"?
  MR. SHAW LEFEVRE: Sir, there are no other sailing vessels in the Reserves at our naval ports which could be made suitable for the training of seamen to replace the Eurydice and Atalanta, if it were thought desirable to do so. There are, however, large numbers of young seamen in our home ports whom it is most desirable to send to sea. The Admiralty, therefore, have considered that, without waiting further for the determination of the question whether it would be desirable to build sailing vessels for the special purpose of training seamen, it is, at all events, most ex-
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  pedient to send to sea as many of these men as they can. They have, therefore, decided to form a detached squadron with this object. It will consist of the Inconstant, the Bacchante, and two corvettes, the Tourmaline and Cleopatra. Of these vessels the Bacchante is already in commission, The Tourmaline is taken from the West Indian squadron, and will have fresh drafts of seamen put on board on her return home in a few days. As many young seamen will be drafted into the squadron as possible. The squadron will be under the command of Lord Clanwilliam, and will be absent from England about 15 months. The instructions to Lord Clanwilliam will be that the purpose in view is the training of the officers and seamen, and that with this object steam will only be used in emergency or for steam tactics.

  SOUTH AFRICA—BASUTOLAND.
  MR. RICHARDasked the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, Whether the Government has received any confirmation of the serious intelligence from Basutoland, contained in a telegram of the "Times" of Friday, September 3rd; and, assuming that intelligence to be correct, what steps the Government are taking to preserve peace?
  MR. GRANT DUFF: Sir, in reply to my hon. Friend's Question, I have to say that no confirmation of the statement to which he refers has been received, and that the Cape Government, with which the entire responsibility of maintaining peace rests, appears to be giving its full and most anxious attention to the matter, the Premier and the Governor being both actively engaged in endeavouring to effect a settlement.

  NAVY—DOCKYARD ACCOUNTS.
  GENERAL SIR GEORGE BALFOURasked the Secretary to the Admiralty, If he can give an explanation regarding the large increase in, and the varying amounts of, the incidental charges in the dockyards?
  MR. SHAW LEFEVRE: Sir, the attention of the Board of Admiralty has been directed to the very able Report of the Accountant General in the preface to the Expense Accounts of 1878–9. It shows that, during the last few years,

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  there has been a very serious increase in the incidental charges at the dockyards—namely, those items of dockyard expenditure which cannot be charged direct against ships and other services. Comparing the year 1878 with the year 1872, the increase amounts to nearly £400,000, or 54 per cent. This increase is more especially the case at some of the yards. At Portsmouth the increase has been 63 per cent, at Devonport 67 per cent; while at Sheerness it has been 32 per cent, and at Pembroke 41 per cent. The increase is so serious that the Admiralty has thought it right to appoint a Departmental Committee to inquire into its causes.

  CRIMINAL LAW—SENTENCES ON CHILDREN.
  In reply to a Question by an hon. MEMBER,
  SIR WILLIAM HARCOURTsaid, that the imprisonment of children of a tender age had lately been occupying very much of his attention. Only a few weeks ago he received a report from a prison in England, that "a child, eight years old, looking younger," was in gaol under sentence of several weeks' hard labour. This, he confessed, so shocked him that he immediately required a report from the Prisons' Commissioners showing the number of children under 15 years of age in gaol. These reports were coming in to him in immense numbers, and he found that children of 10 and 11 years were constantly committed to prison for several weeks of hard labour. Some were sent to gaol for playing at pitch and toss, some for obstruction in the streets, some for trampling down grass, and some for throwing stones and breaking panes of glass. In most of these cases he had directed inquiries to be made. He was perfectly aware of the difficulty of dealing with refractory children; but he could not think that committing children of that age to prison for several weeks' hard labour was the proper way to deal with them. He had given directions that no child under 15 years should be sent to prison without the case being brought under his personal knowledge; and he was preparing a circular to magistrates in England, requesting their consideration whether, by means of the Summary Jurisdiction Act,
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  or by industrial and reformatory schools, they could not escape from this course of proceeding, which tended to poison the fountains of life, and make a child a gaol bird before he reached the years of discretion.

  CRIMINAL LAW—UNJUST CONVICTIONS—COMPENSATION.
  MR. MONTAGUE GUESTasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, What course was to be taken in reference to the liberation of Charles Frost and another person, who it is proved have been unjustly imprisoned on a charge of burglary at Colchester?
  SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT,in reply, said, this was a most deplorable case, and one deserving of the deepest sympathy. He was engaged at the present moment in inquiring into the case, which only came under his notice a few days ago. Within 24 hours after he had had an opportunity of seeing the papers, he had directed a free pardon to be given to these men, and had ordered £3 to be given them. What was to be done hereafter in respect to these men was a matter of great difficulty and delicacy; and he hoped the hon. Gentleman would be satisfied with the assurance that the matter was engaging his anxious attention.

  HALL MARKING (GOLD AND SILVER)—FORGED HALL MARKS.
  MR. MONTAGUE GUESTasked the Financial Secretary to the Treasury, Whether he can lay upon the Table of the House a Return of the number of prosecutions instituted by the Goldsmiths' Company for the last ten years against persons infringing the Acts relating to the Hall Marking of plate, with particulars relating to such prosecutions; and, further, if he can state whether the reward of £500 offered by the Goldsmiths' Company for the discovery of the person or persons who manufactured certain plate with forged Hall marks has had the effects of producing any evidence as to the perpetrators of the offence?
  LORD FREDERICK CAVENDISH: Sir, as I stated to my hon. Friend in reply to a former Question the Goldsmiths' Company have by statute largo powers conferred upon thorn with regard

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  to these prosecutions, and act upon them quite independently of the Treasury. It would, therefore, be more convenient if he would address himself directly to the officers of the Company, who would be happy to furnish him with any information on the subject which he may require. I have, however, made inquiries, and am informed, on behalf of the Company, that there would probably be no difficulty in furnishing the Return in question; but, as it would require some research, perhaps my hon. Friend will communicate with the secretary of the Company on the subject. With regard to the reward offered for the discovery of the perpetrators of the recent forgery of Hall marks, I am informed that no evidence has as yet been produced.

  INLAND NAVIGATION (IRELAND)—WEIRS ON THE SHANNON.
  MR. TOTTENHAMasked the Financial Secretary to the Treasury, Whether his attention has been called to Petitions presented to the House from the Boards of Guardians of the Carrick on Shannon and Mohill Unions, in the counties Leitrim and Roscommon, and also one signed by the High Sheriff of the county Leitrim, on behalf of those who attended a meeting convened by him to consider the necessity for lowering the weir walls on the River Shannon; and, whether, in view of the strong expression of feeling that the temporary lowering of these weirs, pending the completion of the permanent works, is absolutely necessary to prevent further loss and disastrous consequences to the inhabitants of the district, he will give instructions to have this effected without delay?
  LORD FREDERICK CAVENDISH: Sir, I received the Petitions referred to by the hon. Member yesterday. I had previously consulted the Board of Works in Ireland on the subject, at the suggestion of the hon. Member; but they are very strongly of opinion that to open a gap in the weirs in question, or to take off the coping, would be attended with great danger to the works. Under these circumstances, therefore, I am afraid it is impossible to take the steps suggested for lowering the weirs; but the permanent works will be proceeded with as rapidly as possible.

ORDERS OF THE DAY.
  CONSOLIDATED FUND (APPROPRIATION) BILL.
  (Mr. Playfair, Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Lord Frederick Cavendish.)

  Order for Third Reading read.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Bill be now read the third time."

  AFGHANISTAN (MILITARY OPERA. TIONS)—GENERAL BURROWS'S DEFEAT.—RESOLUTION.
  LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL,in rising to move—
  "That the disaster sustained by General Burrows on the 26th July, far exceeding in magnitude any reverse which has befallen the British Arms for more than a quarter of a century, is mainly attributable to the want of foresight, military knowledge, and caution on the part of the Indian Executive,"
  said, he hoped he should not be considered as taking too great a liberty if he ventured, on behalf of himself and his hon. Friends, to offer to the Prime Minister their humble and unpretending, but, at the same time, no less sincere, congratulations on what he hoped was his complete restoration to health. He could assure the right hon. Gentleman that his progress towards recovery had been watched with as much interest on that side of the House as on the other; and he did not think there was any difference in the amount of satisfaction which had been felt on either side at the recovery of the right hon. Gentleman. He also thought it would be ungracious and ungenerous on the part of any Member of the Opposition intending to call into account the conduct of affairs in South Afghanistan if he omitted to allude to the great and brilliant victory just achieved by General Roberts. He would congratulate the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for India on the result of the famous march that had been made by General Roberts from Cabul to Candahar. He willingly recognized that the success of that march had proved the soundness of the calculations of the Indian Government, and had equally disproved the forebodings which had oppressed the minds of hon. Members on both sides of the House. It was intensely gratifying to reflect that

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  in these curious times, when it was the fashion to sneer at and deride military renown and so-called prestige—when persons in the position of the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (Mr. John Bright) lost no opportunity of informing the public that any amount of valour could be purchased at 1s. 6d. a-day—it was, he said, intensely gratifying to reflect that the country had still at its command skilful and intrepid generals, and could rely with confidence on its gallant soldiers; and the exploit of which the details had just been presented by the noble Marquess might well be a subject of legitimate pride. He could not help offering his warmest congratulations to the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster on the curious fact that he, the apostle of peace, should have formed one of a Cabinet under whose auspices the most brilliant military exploit of modern times had been achieved. He hoped that what might be called the irony of fate might, perhaps, induce the right hon. Gentleman to feel and express in the future a higher admiration of the qualities of the English and Indian Armies than he had hitherto done. Some persons might think that at this moment of general rejoicing and universal relief—as well as of grief at the loss of brave men—any Motion of Censure on the Government was somewhat ill-timed; but he hardly thought that that remark would be made by hon. Gentlemen opposite. It must not be forgotten that if the discussion on these matters were to be postponed to next Session there would be no opportunity, in the meantime, of drawing public attention to them; and they lived so quickly now-a-days that it would be impossible to revive any interest in the details. It must not be forgotten, also, that the victory, brilliant as it was, was preceded by serious disaster and enormous losses, and that there would have been no necessity for such efforts if it had not been for the reverses before sustained. He could conceive nothing more disastrous to the public welfare, nothing more likely to make generals careless and high officials over confident, than that it should become the practice to pass over reverses which had arisen, possibly from culpable neglect, simply because a brilliant victory had been subsequently achieved. He thought it well that soldiers, officers, generals,
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  and high officials should bear in mind that, on all occasions, their actions, in every part of the world, were watched with a critical eye, and that whatever their acts might be, whether successful or unsuccessful, they would be supported or condemned by the Representatives of the people. It was to be noted that the official Papers on the state of affairs in Afghanistan were not issued until just on the eve of the Prorogation, and very imperfect and incomplete they were; but he thought he should be able to show, from the facts he had gleaned therefrom, that every word of the Resolution was fully borne out. He would first call attention to the telegram from the Resident at Candahar, dated June 28, 1880, and addressed to the Foreign Secretary at Simla—
  "9th June is day on which Regular troops known to have camped outside Herat. Actual start probably some days later. Nevertheless, I recommend despatch of brigade to Maiwand as quickly as possible, in order to confirm fidelity of Wali's troops, to overawe Zemindawur Tribes, and establish confidence here."
  He would point out that Colonel St. John had not asked for the presence of a British brigade to arrest the march of Ayoub Khan, but to confirm the fidelity of the Wali's troops. On the 27th of June the Viceroy telegraphed to the Secretary of State for India; and this telegram fixed the whole responsibility on the Government—
  "Telegram from Thomson at Teheran says Ayoub Khan marching against Candahar with large force."
  He (Lord Randolph Churchill) would direct special attention to the adjective "large." The telegram went on—
  "I think we should leave Shere Ali to defend himself beyond the Helmund: but it seems to mo, after communicating with Stewart, that it would be inconsistent with the security of our military position at Candahar to allow hostile forces to cross that river. I propose, therefore, to instruct Primrose, if Ayoub reaches Furrah, to advance towards Girishk with sufficient force to prevent passage of Helmund. This would necessitate moving up reinforcement from Phayre's reserve. No troops would be moved until necessity actually arose."
  This telegram evidently, on the face of it, asked for the official approval of the Cabinet at home. It was a telegram of an interrogatory character, and the Secretary of State for India had not communicated the answer he gave to it. Well, Lord Ripon had laid down as a fact that the military position of Can-

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  dahar would be insecure if hostile troops should cross the Helmund; and in the telegram from the Foreign Secretary at Simla to Colonel St. John, at Candahar, it was stated—
  "Orders are issuing for brigade to Mai-wand. Your political instructions are that no hostile troops must cross Helmund; and Wali must he supported, if necessary, in maintaining order this side river. Beyond Helmund he must rely on his own resources."
  On the 2nd of July Colonel St. John told Lord Ripon the accurate strength of Ayoub's force—that he had 2,500 cavalry, 5,000 infantry, and six batteries of artillery. Orders for the brigade to march to the Helmund had been issued on the 1st of July; and yet the Viceroy made no modification in his previous order not to cross the river, and took no steps to strengthen the forces at Candahar. The Secretary of State for India had said that Lord Lytton's Government had more or less involved the country in the disaster that had occurred, because they had made no preparations for reinforcing Candahar in case of a strong attack; but a reference to the telegrams would show that that charge could not justly be made, for it appeared that there was a reserve division already at Kurrachee, and in the diary of military events from the 3rd to the 6th July it was stated that that had been ordered to Candahar. The Governor General at Quettah, in a telegram of July 1 to Foreign Secretary at Simla, informed that officer of Ayoub's advance on the Helmund, and added that "one of Wali Shere Ali's regiments is said to have deserted." Then, on the 13th of July, the Viceroy was told that certain officers had gone over with a considerable following to Ayoub Khan, and yet the state of things remained as before, the Viceroy having despatched 2,000 men under imperative orders not to allow hostile troops to cross the Helmund. On the 13th of July he was told that the river was fordable everywhere, and presented no obstacle to Ayoub's force, and he had been previously made aware of the mutinous feeling among the Wali's troops. In spite of this knowledge, however, no change was made in the orders given to General Burrows. On the 13th of July Colonel St. John telegraphed that Ayoub was at Washir, not far from Candahar, and on the 14th of July the
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  mutiny of the Wali's troops took place. The Wali had requested that the British troops might be sent over to his side of the river, as he felt by no means confident of the loyalty of his troops; and Colonel St. John, as his despatch showed, did not think it right to tell him that he was under strict orders not to cross the river, as he was in hopes that General Burrows on his arrival might bring other orders in which permission to cross might be given. What, he asked, did the House think of the state of things disclosed by the telegrams? What did they think of the fact that an officer who was 70 miles from Candahar, without any communications, and who was told to coerce the Wali's rebellious troops, and to oppose the large army of Ayoub Khan, had been imperatively commanded not to cross the Helmund? Had the force of General Burrows been allowed to cross that river on the 10th, 11th, 12th, or 13th of July a very slight effort would have sufficed to disarm the mutineers. Thus, through these fatal instructions that the British troops were not to cross the Helmund, the Wali's troops were able to mutiny, and to mutiny with impunity. On the 13th of July the situation was so desperate that General Burrows decided to break the Viceroy's orders, and he determined to cross the Helmund on the 14th, in order to disarm the rebellious troops; but it was then too late to do so—the troops had mutinied and escaped. But there was a still more serious matter behind. On the further side of the Helmund was the fort of Girishk, where the Wali had for a considerable time been accumulating stores for the support of the advance division of our troops. Now, fettered by the Viceroy's orders, neither Colonel St. John nor General Burrows were able to take any steps to protect this vast accumulation of stores, which were destroyed by the mutinous troops. Never, he maintained, was a more disastrous order given than the instruction from Lord Ripon to General Burrows not to cross the Helmund. To proceed. On the 15th or 16th of July the Viceroy knew that the Wali's troops had at last mutinied, that the stores collected for the British troops had been destroyed, that Ayoub Khan had 12,000 men, that the Helmund was an indefensible river, and that General Primrose had been obliged to retreat.

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  Knowing all this, the Viceroy gave no orders whatever. General Burrows was left to act under the same instructions. After the mutiny of the troops and the destruction of the stores, he was compelled to fall back some 20 miles to Kuskh-i-Nakud, which, from the despatches, appeared to be a very advantageous position commanding all the approaches to Candahar, and he manœuvred in that neighbourhood for three days. What was the position of this brigade of 2,000 men? They had absolutely no communication with Cabul, no military posts on which they could retire in case of need; and one day the post-bag was robbed and lost, and yet no steps were taken by the Viceroy to strengthen the force at Candahar. All this time, while Ayoub Khan's force was confronting General Burrows and holding him in check, a portion moved round and surrounded him to such an extent that positively within 24 hours of the defeat of General Burrows communication between Candahar and Quettah was cut off, and all the outlying posts placed in the most imminent danger. It appeared to him that General Burrows, having received these peremptory orders, on which his military character depended, not to allow any hostile force to cross the Helmund, and knowing that Ayoub Khan had crossed the Helmund, grew desperate, forsook his advantageous position, and advanced to meet the force of Ayoub Khan as a forlorn hope; and they all know the consequences of that extraordinary military manœuvre. He would point out to the noble Marquess that in the despatch of the 17th July, which gave an account of the mutiny of the Wali's troops, Colonel St. John telegraphed these words—"On the brief engagements that ensued it is not my province to enlarge." But whose province was it then? Why had there been no despatches from the general in command or the Commander-in-Chief? More than six weeks had elapsed since the action with the mutineers, and the despatch of General Burrows must be in the hands of the Indian Government. The details of these engagements were being kept back from Parliament; and it was the greatest chance in the world that the accidental prolongation of Parliament would put them in possession of facts they would not otherwise have
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  known. The Government believed that the details would arrive during the Recess, and would be forgotten by next Session, and the successes of General Roberts would have covered up the defeat. As for the defeat itself, he could find no parallel for it within the last quarter of a century. Twelve hundred and twenty effective soldiers were killed or missing; and among them one of the finest regiments in the British Army, composed of tried and picked soldiers, had been annihilated, as well as 19 officers, all of them men of great skill and reputation. Pour hundred Martini-Henry rifles, 700 Sniders, two guns, and every scrap of ammunition had been captured or destroyed. Then there were the camp followers—who were probably as numerous as the fighting force—of whom nothing was said, and nothing probably would ever be known as to how many of them were killed. That was the nature of the event on account of which he asked the House not to separate without extracting some explanation from the Government. Who was responsible for the defeat of General Burrows? In his opinion, not a single soul was responsible except Lord Ripon. Lord Ripon said, after consultation with General Stewart, that it would be inconsistent with the safety of our military position to allow a hostile force to cross the Helmund. He proposed, therefore, to General Primrose to defend the river. Lord Ripon knew the strength of the forces at Candahar and at Quettah. He knew that the force at Quettah was barely sufficient to keep up communications with Candahar; and, knowing all this, he deliberately diminished the garrison of Candahar by one-half, and sent off a force 60 or 70 miles from the base of British support. They were told to do an impossible duty—to defend a river which was indefensible—and they were given instructions which ultimately proved fatal to them. The noble Marquess told the House it would be intolerable that 4,000 British soldiers should remain inactive at Candahar; it was not necessary that they should do so; but the Viceroy ordered an operation which he must have known could not be carried out without a much larger force; and until General Burrows was defeated, in spite of all the information received from day to day, he absolutely took no step to

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  cause General Burrows to fall back or General Phayre to advance. The noble Marquess had said the other day that it was easy to be wise after the event; but he (Lord Randolph Churchill) ventured to think that with the information possessed by Lord Ripon it might have been possible to be wise even before the event, and though the garrison at Candahar might not have remained inactive, it might have corrected the Wali's troops and checked the advance of Ayoub Khan without offering an action under circumstances in which a defeat was certain. The Viceroy knew perfectly well how serious would be the consequences, direct and indirect, of a disaster, and yet he had all but courted a misfortune for which he was in no way prepared. Telegrams had been sent asking for reinforcements, five troopships had been despatched, and the hazardous march of General Roberts had been found necessary. It should be always remembered that if Ayoub Khan had had any energy—and, of course, his inaction was not foreseen—in all human probability he would have taken Candahar and destroyed all the outlying posts, and the British would have been obliged to fall back on Quettah, and probably now would be on the other side of the Bolan Pass. Providentially, time was given for the march of General Roberts and the advance of General Phayre, and the bloody sacrifice was no doubt retrieved; but no success, however great, should blind the public to the real point at issue—the Ministerial mistake. A heavy responsibility rested on Lord Ripon, whose first important act as Viceroy had ended so disastrously, and had resulted in such a frightful blow to the British Army, that it would make people at home apprehensive as to the results which might arise from his future policy. He regretted, on the last day of the Session, to have to add to the cares and anxieties of the noble Marquess. Within the last few weeks, in the absence of the Prime Minister, his time had been taken up by arduous labours in relation to the conduct of the Business of the House, and he should admit that these labours had been rewarded with singular success; but, at the same time, he thought he noble Marquess himself would not it all regret that public attention had been called to this matter, particularly
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  as the Secretary of State himself could now be absolved of responsibility for these events. The noble Marquess had been in daily communication with the Viceroy, and he was in as good position as the Viceroy for forming an opinion. One extremely remarkable feature in the Papers that had been laid before the House was that there was not in them, from beginning to end, a single despatch from the Secretary of State; and the noble Marquess was bound to take the earliest opportunity of giving the House his own views and the views of the Home Government on these disasters. The noble Lord concluded by moving the Resolution which stood in his name.
  Amendment proposed,
  To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "the disaster sustained by General Burrows on the 26th July, far exceeding in magnitude any reverse which has befallen the British Arms for more than a quarter of a century, is mainly attributable to the want of foresight, military knowledge, and caution on the part of the Indian Executive,"—(Lord Randolph Churchill,)
  —instead thereof.
  Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: Sir, although the noble Lord has spoken with considerable severity with respect to the Government of India, I do not at all regret that he has brought forward this Motion, because he has given me an opportunity of making one or two explanations which I think ought to be made, both in justice to the Government of India and the officers engaged in these operations. First of all, I must revert to the remarks of the noble Lord as to the lateness of the production of these Papers. It is true that a considerable time has elapsed since these events had occurred, and that the Papers have only just been placed in the hands of hon. Members. I am more inclined to regret that these Papers have been placed so soon before Parliament than that they had not been produced before, and I regret it because upon giving more careful consideration to the Papers than I have hitherto been able to give I find that, late as they have been published, they are still extremely imperfect, both as to the Papers in our possession, and still more as to those Papers which have not

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  yet reached this country. With regard to a Question asked by the hon. Member for Portsmouth (Sir H. Drummond Wolff) a few days ago, I said that no despatches whatever from Generals Burrows and Primrose had yet been received in this country in relation to these events. It is true that there are some extremely short and meagre diaries telegraphed from General Primrose in our possession; and it was my original intention to have included the whole of those telegrams in the Papers now be-fore the House. But, as I stated the other day, I have been so engaged that I have not been able personally to supervise the compilations of these Papers; and I regret very much to find that there are a considerable number of military telegrams left out, which, although they would not add to any considerable extent to the information of hon. Members, would show that the military authorities were not so completely superseded as the noble Lord seems to think. My first impression was to issue additional Papers; but I found on going over them that they wore extremely meagre, and that Lord Ripon himself had received scarcely any full despatches. I, therefore, thought it would be the fairest course to pursue, not only to the Viceroy, but to the generals concerned, that no Papers should be presented until we have a full account from the Viceroy, and the generals. If I owe an apology—and, perhaps, I do owe it—to the House, it is for presenting incomplete despatches that do not present the amount of responsibility which is duo to everyone concerned. Under the circumstances, I hope the House will be willing to postpone its final judgment as to the responsibility of the Indian Government, and of the generals commanding, until we are in possession of full details. I do not think the noble Lord need be under the slightest apprehension that the interest of Parliament or of the country in these events will flag. Without entirely endorsing the description given by the noble Lord of the disaster sustained by General Burrows, I am willing to admit it is a disaster—one of the most serious that has befallen our arms in recent years, and certainly reflects discredit on our military character. I do not think, however brilliant is the success by which that disaster has been retrieved, that the
  1292
  country will rest satisfied until they know, and know thoroughly, on whom the responsibility falls in regard to this matter. Under the circumstances, I do not propose to follow in detail the charges made by the noble Lord which he advances on these Papers, or which naturally occur to him on the face of these Papers, and which, in the absence of fuller information, it is not yet possible for me fully to rebut. But when the noble Lord refers to the first telegram in these Papers, and says that Lord Ripon has taken on himself the grave responsibility of issuing instructions in that telegram, I must ask the House what alternative was open to Lord Ripon. Lord Ripon had arrived at Simla about a fortnight, and he is informed that Ayoub's advance, which has been talked about for months, has actually occurred. "What is it possible for Lord Ripon to do, having recently arrived at Simla, but to summon his Council, and consult his military advisers; consult General Stewart, who had recently been in command at Candahar; take the best military advice at his disposal, and then act upon it? That Lord Ripon has done. I admit the responsibility rests upon the Home Government; and I regret that there is omitted from these Papers a telegram, in which, in reply to a telegram from the Viceroy, we gave him full authority to act as he proposed. There is no reply to this in the first Papers, and the delay of two or three days occurred from my not understanding that the telegram was of an interrogatory character. I considered it simply as information of what was intended under certain circumstances, and it did not appear to me to require an answer. But an answer was given a few days after. No doubt, the Government at home are responsible for the military conduct of the campaign; but I do not think I should be doing my duty in interfering by interposing my advice on military affairs. The Viceroy was amply provided with military advisers, and my authority was directed to the political aspect of the question, and not in the slightest degree to military details. Then the noble Lord goes on to say that there is nothing in these Papers to show that the reinforcements which were ordered were pushed forward. Now, I think there is a telegram—it is

  1293
  omitted from these Papers, but I have it in my possession—which would have shown that they were. But I do not wish to press the point; but I will state to the House with the utmost confidence that from the day the order was given no effort was spared by the Government at Simla, or the Governor of Bombay, or the Commander-in-Chief, to push forward those reinforcements, which were in excess of what General Primrose asked for. They were pushed forward to Candahar with all possible speed. Delay there was; but this was caused by the breaking of the railway communication, which did, for a considerable time retard the advance of the reinforcements; but no effort was spared, as the House will see when it gets full information, to push forward the reinforcements with all possible speed. But now to come to the chief charge of the noble Lord. He says everything was ruined by the order given to General Burrows not to cross the Helmund. That conclusion, I suppose, he draws from this diary of military events—
  LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL: And from the political instructions.
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: Well, he rests on the two grounds. We have the telegram which lays down the instruction that beyond the Helmund the Wali must rely on his own resources. Then, I presume, the authority he gets from the military diary of events is that instruction of July 3, in which an advance is said to be ordered to Girishk, but not across the Helmund.
  LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL: I am sorry to interrupt the noble Lord; but, if he will refer to page 14, he will see how Colonel St. John did not think it right to tell the Wali that the general in command had stringent orders not to cross the Helmund.
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: This diary of events contains the barest summary of the instructions issued; but this does not in the least mean that these are the complete instructions issued to General Primrose. No doubt, the intention was that General Primrose should oppose the advance of Ayoub, and act in support of the Wali on this side of the Helmund, and it was intended not to extend those operations on the other side of the river; but I do not think that the entry in the diary justifies the impression that orders of so stringent
  1294
  a character were given to General Primrose that he could not even cross the Helmund from a difficulty which might arise in reference to his actual position. No doubt, Colonel St. John said that General Burrows felt fettered with the stringent instructions; but we are not in possession of anything to prove by whom those orders were given. It does not follow that they came from the Government of India. It is impossible to say whether they were given by the Government of India, or General Primrose, under whom General Burrows was immediately acting. These orders, I find, are not of such a stringent character afterwards, because General Burrows did within the next few days, when it was thought necessary, cross the river to take active measures against the Wali's troops who had deserted. I was asked the other day whether General Primrose had been consulted in regard to these movements. I am not able to point to any telegram received which distinctly proves that; but this I may urge as another reason why the House should suspend its judgment until fuller information is before us. But I may say that I have received from the Viceroy a telegram which leads me confidently to believe that before these operations were commenced General Primrose was consulted, and they were undertaken with his advice. I am not making anything like a reply to the charge of the noble Lord, for I have nothing in my possession that distinctly proves that; but I am only urging that we are not in a position to come to a conclusion as to the responsibility of these transactions. Further, I have every reason to believe that far greater discretion was given to General Primrose and to General Burrows than was supposed by the noble Lord. I have reason also to believe, after intelligence had been received at Simla of the desertion of the Wali's troops, that General Primrose was informed distinctly that he was entirely at liberty, under altered circumstances, to act on his own discretion, and the movements that afterwards took place were taken by General Burrows under the authority of General Primrose. I do not think it is possible for me, without going into full details from the Papers which are not yet before Parliament, to go more fully into the history of these matters. Without some-

  1295
  thing more than the House have in their possession, it would not be possible to enter into full justification of the Government without appearing to cast responsibility on the officers in command, which I am most unwilling to do without full information before the House. I can only promise that as soon as complete information is in our possession it shall be published without favour or partiality to any person concerned, whether it reflects upon the Government or anybody else. I believe that when that full information is laid before the House it will be found such as to show that the Government acted in consultation with the best responsible military advice, leaving sufficient freedom of action to the officers concerned. At the last moment there was no doubt of the wisdom of the measures adopted, and arrangements were pressed forward with all the energy possible; and the responsibility, when full explanation is known, would have to be divided, and I hope it will be impartially divided, between the Government of India and the officers acting in command as their subordinates. Though I am glad to have had this opportunity of making this present explanation, I trust the debate will not be very much prolonged, for I do not think it will tend to a very fair and unprejudiced issue without that full information which I had hoped to make public.
  SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFFsaid, that while he did not consider a portion of the answer of the noble Marquess entirely satisfactory, at the same time he thought it fully justified his noble Friend in having brought forward his Motion. With respect to the Question he (Sir H. Drummond Wolff) had put on the previous day, he desired to explain that he had no wish whatever to be in the least degree discourteous to the noble Marquess, who invariably treated hon. Members on the Opposition side with courtesy and consideration. As to the imperfect state of the Papers, whether they were to be supplemented later on or not, as they stood at present they were not documents from which a case of argument in favour of the friends of the Government of India could be made out. In the first place, the House had fair reason to complain, because they had not got fuller information from the individual generals. He did not wish in any way to throw blame on Lord Ripon, especially after the answer of the
  The Marquess Hartington
  1296
  noble Lord; but he would point out to him that it was perfectly clear that the orders to General Primrose that there should be no crossing of the Helmund had been given, for they were referred to not only in the despatch of Colonel St. John, but also in his military diary. It was much to be regretted that so long a time would elapse before Parliament could judge of the supplementary despatches. Of course, as the noble Marquess had asked that judgment should be suspended they had no alternative but to do so. As far as the Papers were concerned they were not satisfactory. However, he thought the purpose of his noble Friend had been served by bringing these very remarkable Papers before the House. They had the admission of the noble Marquess that they were not satisfactory or complete; and, under the circumstances, he thought his noble Friend might withdraw his Motion.
  LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILLsaid, the reply of the noble Lord had precluded him from going further. The noble Lord's remarks rather tended to disarm further criticism at that moment. At the same time, he begged to say that he had taken these published Papers as the complete case for the Government, and had confined himself strictly to matters which were included in those Papers, and to facts which lay on the face of them. He had given public Notice of his Motion; but the noble Lord had not thought proper to request him not to bring the subject before the House on the ground that the Papers were not complete. He would, with the permission of the House, withdraw his Motion.
  SIR GEORGE CAMPBELLsaid, he thought the noble Lord the Member for Woodstock was, under the circumstances, wise in withdrawing the Motion. It was quite clear that it was the Government of Lord Lytton and not the Government of Lord Ripon that was responsible for the military position at Candahar. It was the former Government which maintained the force at Candahar and provided the reserves for that force, and did not provide carriage for that reserve. As to the political aspect of the matter, he saw throughout the most extraordinary ignorance or disregard of all our Afghan experience. The late Government seemed to have lived in a sort of fool's para-

  1297
  dise, considering every arrangement final, without taking into account the Afghan character. Experience ought to have shown that for England to support the claims of any aspirant to the authority of the Ameer was enough to set the country against our protégé Such had been the experience of 1840, and such had been the experience of 1880. The true cause of the difficulty and defeat was in setting up a puppet Prince at Candahar, supported by an insufficient British force, just as in the ease of Shah Shoojah in 1841.
  SIR WILLIAM PALLISERsaid, that he had not intended to speak, especially after the conciliatory speech of the noble Marquess, and after the friendly reception which the noble Marquess had given to a deputation of which he had formed a part. But when the hon. Gentleman the Member for Kirkcaldy (Sir George Campbell) attempted to transfer all blame from Lord Ripon to Lord Lytton he was bound to remind hon. Members that the present Government had been in power since April, and that, since that time, Lord Lytton had been a servant of that Government. Lord Lytton had resigned long since, and had only remained to carry out the instructions of the present Government until Lord Ripon had arrived out. This was not the first time that the hon. Gentleman had got up and spoken in a manner which was hardly calculated to promote the harmony of the Assembly; and the first time he (Sir William Palliser) had spoken on the subject now before the House the hon. Gentleman had accused him of unpatriotic motives—
  SIR GEORGE CAMPBELLwished to explain that he did not attribute unpatriotic motives in the ordinary sense to the hon. and gallant Member. He had only represented his statement that General Roberts's march would not likely be entirely successful as an unpatriotic fear.
  SIR WILLIAM PALLISERwished to deny emphatically that he had ever stated that General Roberts would not arrive at Candahar. On the contrary, in order to prevent any possible misunderstanding, he had, on the day following the debate on this subject, written a letter to The Times, in which he had stated his complete confidence that General Roberts would surmount all his difficulties and come out triumphantly in the end; but he had maintained, at
  1298
  the same time, that such confidence was no reason why any means of precaution should be neglected, or why they should spare any pains to promote that end. His motive in raising that debate had been not to embarrass the Government, but to do good, and it was with that object that he had called attention to the great danger of advancing an army without the means of insuring proper supplies, and an example of the necessity of transport and supplies had been afforded by the compulsory inactivity and uselessness of General Phayre's army for two months.
  Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

TREATY OF BERLIN—EASTERN AFFAIRS—THE PRINCIPLE OF "NATIONALISES."

  OBSERVATIONS.
  MR. J. COWENsaid, after the frank and candid statement of the Secretary of State for India, he hoped the discussion that had been raised by the noble Lord the Member for Woodstock (Lord Randolph Churchill) would be allowed to terminate. On a future occasion, with more ample details, the case could be discussed. He was desirous of drawing the attention of the House for a short time to another but cognate theme. He had the misfortune, along with some other hon. Gentlemen who sat on that side of the House, not to be in entire accord with the Government on their foreign policy. During the Session they had—he was speaking for others as well as for himself—abstained from provoking discussions that might be inconvenient. They were unwilling, even apparently, to embarrass the diplomatic and administrative action of the Ministry. Although they did not approve of some things that had been done, and others that had been spoken, they had been silent. They had been assured, however, on more than one occasion from the Treasury Bench that before the Session terminated a statement of the course the Government intended to pursue in the East would be submitted to Parliament. And that statement, they were led to understand, would clear up many difficulties and remove many doubts. The speech of the noble Lord the Secretary of State for India, on Thursday night, did not fulfil this expectation. The information then imparted was meagre and incom-

  1299
  plete. He wished to afford the Government an opportunity at that, the last Business Sitting of the House, to extend their statement; and, as they said they could not enter into general details, he would address to them special questions, to which, possibly, they could give explicit replies. He knew that the task he was undertaking would be distasteful to many present. The thoughts of hon. Members were running on other things. It was unreasonable to suppose that they could deeply interest themselves in an abstract dissertation on foreign policy, initiated by an irresponsible outsider like himself, at the close of a prolonged and exhausting Session, at an Afternoon Sitting, on a sunny Saturday in September. Still, the question was so important that he must use the only opportunity now afforded him to press it on the consideration of the House. Let them look at the facts. Parliament was about to rise. For six months the Cabinet would have uncontrolled authority. They would be enabled to use the vast military and naval power of the State, free from the criticism and comments of the Legislature. And on the eve of their separation Members were told that the Government had committed themselves to a perilous enterprize, which might end in a way they did not intend, and on which they did not calculate. It might produce, indeed, another Navarino. Political memories were never long. People usually forgot one week what had transpired the previous one. But there must be some Gentlemen in the House who had not entirely overlooked the proclamations, the professions, and the promises of the last six months. The charge made against the foreign policy of the late Government was that it was a policy of evasion and equivocation, of mystification and concealment. The Cabinet were accused of forging their designs in secret, and then launching them upon a startled world with theatrical suddenness. Their policy at home was summed up in the word "brag," and abroad in the word "swagger." These were, in substance, the accusations on foreign matters that were pressed with wearying iteration against the last Administration. The present Government came into Office to reverse that course of procedure. They were to usher in a reign of righteousness, of peace, and of non-intervention. As
  1300
  that man was healthiest who did not know he had a stomach, so they were assured that that nation was happiest which did not know it had a foreign policy. They wore to concern themselves mainly, if not exclusively, with domestic affairs, and leave entangling engagements abroad to more meddlesome States. How had these professions been fulfilled? The Government had been in Office over three months; and he would undertake to say that a less amount of information respecting the action of the Cabinet in foreign matters had been imparted to Parliament during that period than during any similar period in the last six years. A few Questions had been addressed to the Ministry from time to time, and the information in reply to them had been doled out in driblets. Now, when within a few hours of the Prorogation, they were informed that, at the instance of England, the representatives of the fleets of the Great Powers were to rendezvous at Ragusa. They did not gather such a quantity of gunpowder and such a number of guns in an obscure Adriatic port without a purpose. And what was that purpose? The Government were either unwilling or unable to state. The de-sign they had in view might end in a fiasco, and bring in its train humiliation. It might end in fighting. He would like to know what would have been said by peace-loving Members to such an enterprize, initiated at such a time, and under such circumstances, by the last Administration. He could easily conceive—if the Liberals had been sitting on the opposite seats, and the Conservatives had held the Treasury Benches—the indignant speeches that would have been delivered. They talked of opposition. That word would convey no description of the tactics that would have been adopted. The Appropriation Bill, and the other routine measures of terminating the Session, would have been obstructed violently and determinedly. The Privileges of Parliament and the rights of the people would have been appealed to, and it would have been declared, again and again, that hon. Members would not disperse in such a state of uncertainty. Attempts would have been made to drive the Ministry to break through their reticence, and no one would have been more active and energetic in this course of procedure than half-a-dozen hon. Members whom he

  1301
  could easily name. But now that the position of Parties was reversed those hon. Gentlemen were still and silent. What would have been not only wrong but dangerous, if not unconstitutional, when done by one Party, was condoned and approved of when done by the other. He owned that he did not see the fairness of such reasoning. It was to him a matter of no consequence what Party was in power. If they adopted a line of action calculated to endanger the best interests of the State, he would, to the best of his ability, oppose it. It was matterless whether it was done by political friends or foes. They were constantly being assured that Party government had conferred great benefits on the country. Within limits, that contention was correct. But the benefits conferred had been grossly and outrageously exaggerated. To him, one of the most painful aspects of strict Party action was the incentive to insincerity and immorality that it engendered. His hon. Friend the Member for Carlisle, at least, was consistent. He took the same line when his Party was in Opposition as when it was in power. Whatever side of the House he sat on, he was opposed to drinking and opposed to fighting. He supposed the object of the threatened gathering of destructive mechanism at Ragusa was to terrify the Turks. But suppose the Turks would not be terrified? What then? Was the naval power of free and Constitutional England to be used for the purpose of burning or beating down the huts of the Albanian huntsmen, fishermen, or herdsmen on the harbourless coasts of the Adriatic? Was that the ignoble purpose to which the might of Britain was to be applied? But if even this proposed pressure was not found sufficient, was Constantinople to be blockaded and bombarded? [Sir GEORGE CAMPBELL: Hear, hear!] He was surprised at the approving cheer from his hon. Friend the Member for Kirkcaldy. Had he fully realized what the bombardment of a peaceful and unoffending city meant? He did not know, he had no means of knowing, more than any ordinary person knew; but it had been said abroad, on what appeared to be fair authority, that such a project had at least been discussed. The forcing of the Dardanelles and the carrying of coercion to the Turkish capital was said to be at least a possibility. But the idea, he hoped, had got
  1302
  no further than a suggestion. And what was all this for? It was to secure additional territory to the little State of Montenegro. It was far from his intention to speak in terms of disparagement of any country, however small, or of any people, however powerless. But it was right for them to have before their minds the extent of the country and the character of the race on whose behalf they were asked by the Government to run such large risks. Montenegro was a State on the east coast of the Adriatic, about the size of a moderate English county. It had a few more inhabitants than the borough he had the honour to represent in that House. The gross annual Revenue was under£30,000 a-year, and half of this was supplied from abroad; £15,000 was given as subsidies by foreign Governments—£12,000 by Russia, and£3,000by Austria. The Prince received from the Montenegrin inhabitants £350 a-year; but that amount was made up by the Czar to £3,500. This Montenegrin Prince, therefore, was really in the pay of Russia, and the State was little more than an outpost of that Empire. Its surface was sterile and mountainous. There was a story common on the Dalmatian coast, that when the gods were busy sowing stones upon earth a bag of boulders burst over Montenegro, and that accounted for the unusual prevalence of rocks. The people had been described by one Prime Minister in that House—Lord Palmerston—as the worst savages in Europe. They had been described more recently by the present Prime Minister as a highland and heroic race. Highland truly they were; but their heroism was, he feared, somewhat damaged by their brutality. They were unquestionably courageous, and fought with commendable bravery for their independence. But their warfare had been in the past of a rather repulsive character. The Montenegrins were accustomed to cut off the heads of the men they slew in battle and sometimes of their prisoners, and the skulls of their slain enemies were hung about the walls of the Montenegrin houses alongside the implements of war and the chase. As the North American Indians preserved the scalps of their enemies, the Montenegrins preserved the skulls of theirs as trophies of their victories. They were regarded as proofs of their old men's valour, and used as incentives to their

  1303
  young warriors to follow the example of their fathers. No doubt, the country would be benefited if it could be brought into closer contact with the outer world by having free access to the sea. This would be a distinct gain, and one which every liberal and generous man would desire to see realized. It would have a softening influence upon the Montenegrin character. It would also be well if, in addition to their mountains, they had some lowlands where their cattle could be fed with greater ease and with less labour. A portion of the people were engaged either as brigands or as soldiers. Unable to raise sufficient food on their sterile soil, they were driven to levy black-mail, and to commit acts of pillage on their neighbours. It would be to the advantage equally of themselves as of their neighbours if their cultivateable land was increased. But while he admitted the force of this reasoning, and the wisdom of its being complied with, he altogether denied the right or the wisdom of this country giving to Montenegro territory that belonged to others. The Montenegrins were surrounded by another people who were equally as brave, and whose history stretched back into the very mists of time. The Albanians were the oldest people in the Levant. They were there before the ancient Greeks. They had legends, language, and characteristics of their own. They had some of the adverse features, unquestionably, of the Montenegrins; but they were quite as courageous, and their love of independence was as unquestioned and as unquestionable. What the Powers proposed to do was to take the land of the Albanians, and hand it over to the Montenegrins without the approval or consent of the Albanians. [An hon. MEMBER: They are not a nationality.] Not a nationality, his hon. Friend said. That was Prince Bismarck's remark at Berlin. He said he did not know of the existence of the Albanian nation. Such a statement was not at all surprising. Prince Bismarck did not know of the nationality of Denmark or of Holland either. And another Prince, quite as potent then as Prince Bismarck is now, contended at the Congress of Vienna that he did not know of the nationality of Italy. In that statesman's opinion, Italy was merely a geographical expression. And yet they all knew that
  1304
  Italy to-day was a great and united nation. What had come true of the people on one side of the Adriatic, in little more than 50 years, might also be-come true, in a modified sense, of those on the other side in a like period. There were bitter race feuds between the Montenegrins and the Albanians. They were members not only of a distinct nationality, but they were of a different religion. It was, in his judgment, as unjust to subject the Albanians to the domination of the Montenegrins as it would be to subject the Montenegrins to the domination of the Albanians. The proposition was to take the more fertile valleys, and the few harbours that were to be got on the Adriatic from the Albanians, and give them to their enemies. So that the Albanians, if the arrangement was carried out, would be in exactly the same position as that now complained of by the Montenegrins. They would be injuring one people to benefit another. The district of Dulcigno, which was at present in controversy, contained between 8,000 and 9,000 Mahommedans, 3,000 or 4,000 Roman Catholics, from 1,200 to 1,500 gipsies, and about 1,500 Slavs of the Greek Church. It was proposed to hand over the government of these 13,000 or 14,000 people of different religions and races to the 1,400 or 1,500 Slavs. And this was to be done in the name of the principle of nationalities. He owned he was unable to see the justice of such a course of procedure. No one in that House more warmly upheld the cause of nationality than he did. But he repudiated their right, or the right of Europe, to trample on a people merely because its faith was unorthodox, and its civilization Asiatic. They had recently had roused in this country quite a fervour in favour of nationalities. Its growth had been sudden and its extent suspiciously limited. These people had no end of sympathy for Slav nationality—for the Bulgar, or the Montenegrin, or the Serb; but they had very little care for the nationality of rival peoples. The Turk or the Mahomedan might die in the ditch there—polygamous and deistical heretic that he was—he might die without a groan, die without a sigh, so that his emancipators, his Christian emancipators and liberators, might live in peace and aggrandise their dominions at his expense. The advocates of this

  1305
  partial application of the principle of nationalities should remember that—
  "Tawny skins and dark complexions
  Could not forfeit Nature's claim."
  Creeds might differ, but affection and right of nationality dwelt with Turk and Slav the same. Our Government had specially espoused the cause of nationalities, and he rejoiced in it. But their course was inconsistent, if not erratic. It was rather a surprising circumstance to find a Government that ruled India talking of nationalities. They were fond enough of nationalities for the Bulgars; but they had small concern for the nationality across the Irish Channel. There they had a distinct nation with boundaries clearly enough marked certainly, and they not only refused it autonomy, but even any form of local self-government. Yet the Administration that did this set itself up as the special champion of nationalities abroad! He was told that the cession of the territory to Montenegro was in accordance with the decision of the Congress at Berlin. He quite admitted it. The Sultan had bound himself to give additional territory to the Montenegrins, and he ought to fulfil his engagements, however unpleasant or however difficult. But, as showing the ignorance that existed even in the highest quarters as to that part of Europe, the history of this Montenegrin extension might be recited. Gibbon said, at his time, that the interior of Albania was as little known as the interior of Africa, and it would almost appear that what was true in Gibbon's day was true now. By the Treaty of San Stefano a certain territory was awarded to Montenegro. It was found, at Berlin, that this territory was occupied exclusively by Mahommedans; and it would be difficult, if not impossible, to hand them over to the little State without much bloodshed. A new strip of land was then marked out for surrender to them. But the statesmen and military men merely took the Austrian military map, ran a line across certain hills and certain valleys, and said—"This much goes to Montenegro, and the other is to be retained by Turkey." But they took no account of the people who lived in these valleys. They found, upon examination, that as the people conceded by the Treaty of San Stefano were Mahommedans, so those conceded by the
  1306
  Treaty of Berlin were mainly Roman Catholics, So that arrangement also had to be set aside. Count Corti hit upon a compromise, and a not altogether unsatisfactory one; but there were difficulties even in the way of its fulfilment. And now our Government were insisting upon the surrender of the district of Dulcigno, which he had just referred to. The changes that had been made in surrendering the different strips of territory showed the difficulty of dealing with the question with a due regard to interests and rights of all parties concerned. The Turks were blamed for their dilatoriness in fulfilling the engagements. He had no wish whatever to stand there, in any sense, as an apologist of the Turkish Government. Their doings had put them beyond defence. Their corruption, their slothfulness, and their extravagance had rendered apologies for them impossible. There was little that the Prime Minister had said in condemnation of the orthodox government of the Pashas and the Palace that he was not prepared to indorse. What he contended for was that injustice should not be done to the people of Turkey because of the sins and crimes of the governing classes in the country. His contention was that, heretics though they were, they were as much entitled to consideration as their Christian, or professedly Christian, neighbours. He could not emphasize too strongly his declaration that it was sympathy with the common people of Turkey—who had suffered more than the outlying Christian populations—and not sympathy with the governing caste that he had. But while saying this, he was equally bound to say that the Sultan, on this Montenegrin question, had not acted unfairly. He strove to surrender the territory awarded by the Treaty of Berlin, and sent, for the purpose of the cession, one of his ablest statesmen and greatest generals—Mehemet Ali. But the distinguished soldier and his suite were murdered by the Albanians. Rather than comply with the orders from Constantinople they killed their own countrymen. It was not want of will so much as want of power on the part of Turkey to do what was asked of her. He had no doubt the Porte would be very glad to be quit of the difficulty; but, in getting quit of it, they did not wish to drive their own subjects into insurrection.

  1307
  On another occasion, when the Turks surrendered the forts along the Montenegrin border, the Montenegrins were unable to take possession of them. If there had been any serious desire on the part of the people in these districts to join this Montenegrin State the withdrawal of the Turkish soldiers would have enabled them to do this. The contention was that these people were kept in subjection by Turkey. The Turks, however, withdrew; and yet, notwithstanding, the people clung to their rule, and refused to be annexed to Montenegro. What Europe wished to do was to compel Turkey to fight against her own people, and hand them over against their will to a race and Government they disliked, if not detested. With respect to the Treaty of Berlin, he denied, too, that there was anything in that Treaty that required the Powers to take conjoint action to enforce its provisions. That Treaty was a compromise. It prescribed certain territory to be surrendered by Turkey, and certain advantages to be conceded to her. But when Prince Gortschakoff sought to induce the Congress to enter into an engagement for giving military effect to these provisions, all the Representatives of the Congress refused to agree to his proposal. None did this more emphatically than the Representatives of this country. Prince Bismarck said that all the Congress was called upon to do was to mark out certain arrangements which it deemed to be desirable for the East of Europe, and then leave the fulfilment to the steady operation of time and the influence of circumstances. He protested, and so did Count Andrassy, against any forcible application being made to apply these provisions, lest by that very application of force the whole arrangements of the Treaty might be endangered. But when the Government did seek to apply military and naval pressure for this purpose it was right that its application should be equal—that, while it obtained the fulfilment of the conditions that were against Turkey, it should be equally used to secure the conditions that were made in her favour. And that led him to ask the Government to state whether the conditions prescribed with respect to Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia, as well as those respecting Montenegro, were also to be enforced by the
  1308
  concerted action of the Powers. He would like to know from the Representative of the Foreign Office if the Government could give any information as to the unusual and extraordinary migration of Russian soldiers to the Balkan States. It was said that 80,000 stand of arms and 30,000 Russian soldiers had recently gone to Bulgaria. These soldiers, and these munitions of war, could only be sent there for one purpose, and that purpose would be aggressive and offensive. Were the Government in a position to state that the use to be made of this warlike material and these warlike men was not a like use to that made of a like migration into Servia a few years ago? Did they not point to further assaults upon the Mahomedan population? The Under Secretary had said some time ago, in answer to a question from the hon. Member for Rochester (Mr. Otway), that a proposal had been made to the Government by another Power to this effect. Supposing the Turkish Government fulfilled all the conditions of the Treaty of Berlin, was England prepared to join the other Powers in declaring that no further concessions should be asked for from her? He knew it was not an absolute guarantee that was suggested by Germany; but it was a general undertaking that, if the Treaty engagements were fulfilled, for a time, at least, the Ottoman Empire should not be further harassed. These were the three points on which he desired information from the Ministry. First, whether the naval power of England, if used for the service of Montenegrin nationality, might not be used to the disservice and detriment of the Albanian nationality? Second, whether any further arrangement had been made as to the proposed engagement with respect to protecting the remnants of the Turkish Empire? Third, whether the suspicious action of Russia in Bulgaria and Roumelia had received the attention of the Ministry? He thought it would be possible for the Government to give the country information on these points, without embarrassing them in any action with the other Powers. So far as the Treaty of Berlin was concerned, he joined with the Ministry in believing in the necessity for effect being given to it. There were two ways, however, of carrying out a bargain. Its fulfilment might be made to press with

  1309
  undue severity on one of the parties, and with great leniency on the other. They had ridiculed it, and declared, not once, but frequently, that the retention of any form of Mahomedan rule, even for the Mussulman population west of the Bosphorus, was not only impossible, but undesirable. They sought not only the overturning of the Porte—which was a point on which he, to a large extent, agreed with them—but also for the subjugation of the Turkish to the Slav race. In estimating the value of the Treaty of Berlin, they should calculate not only what was accomplished by it, but the obstacles there were in calling it into existence. The settlement of the oldest, the greatest, and the most complex international problem in Europe, one involving the destinies—material, political, and religious—of millions of people, was not an undertaking that could be adjusted off-hand, as they could do a Railway Bill in that House. In the classic lands dealt with in the Treaty of Berlin, there met the conflicting civilizations of the East and West—the one iconoclastic and progressive, the other traditional and conservative. There came there into collision all variety of races and religions—the Hebrew, the heathen, the Greek, the gipsy, and the Slav—men of all faiths, as well as men of no faith. At the junction of opposing streams, you had formed debateable deltas, erratic eddies, and cross-currents. So, in Turkey, there was run together territory that had been the battle-ground of the world for ages, the representative of an all but exhausted past and of an aggressive present. War and diplomacy, sentiment and interest, the principle of nationality, and the prejudices of sectarianism, had all been tried; but it had baffled the ingenuity of generations of statesmen to find a solution for the many complex problems that were bound up in the Eastern Question. The long existence of the loosely-organized Turkish Empire was itself a monument and symbol of that failure. The Porte, though not a system of government that could be defended, had been heretofore found a fairly working substitute for the object of that fruitless search. It was unreasonable to expect that any Congress, or Government, or series of Governments, could clear off all at once the legacy of sectarian hate, and of race jealousy, that centuries of injustice and
  1310
  misrule had bequeathed to the present generation. All that could be done by such an arrangement was to help forward the settlement; and this, he contended, the Treaty of Berlin had done. In sitting in judgment upon the finding of that document, they should recollect not only the intrinsic difficulties of the question dealt with, but the rival interests of the parties concerned. When they remembered these difficulties—the intricacies in the East, the jealousies of other nations, the divisions always active and sometimes exacting we had at home—he thought they might fairly regard the solution arrived at two years ago at Berlin as not unsatisfactory. It was not what many of them wanted; it was not what some of them expected. But, given the circumstances, and admitting the conditions, the award was, taking it all round, not unfair. He rejoiced, therefore, that the Government had resolved to give effect to that agreement. In their efforts to do this they would receive, if impartial, the encouraging support of all shades of politicians in this country. He recognized clearly the difficulties of their position, and was willing to make all allowance for them. It was the interest of all parties to lend the Government help in seeking the fulfilment of this Treaty. But, again, he wished to declare that to seek the fulfilment of one side of the Treaty, and not the fulfilment of the other, would be to prevent the realization of the advantages that it would otherwise confer. At the same time, it would be an injustice to unoffending and helpless people; and it might, if pushed too far, be a danger to Europe.
  SIR CHARLES W. DILKEthought that the speech which they had just heard would have been more appropriate to the debate of last Thursday night than to the present occasion. The policy of the late Government was an isolated policy. That of the present Government, on the contrary, was one upon which the Powers were in agreement. It was not, however, a new policy; it was the policy traced out by the Treaty of Berlin. On the general question, his hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle (Mr. J. Cowen) had used language which he could not but describe as of a very exaggerated kind. His hon. Friend spoke of forcing the Dardanelles and bombarding Constantinople.
  MR. J. COWENremarked, that he referred merely to rumours -which were in circulation to that effect.
  SIR CHARLES W. DILKEsaid, he was, of course, in the recollection of the House; but it appeared to him that the hon. Member did not merely refer to rumours, because he went on in a passage of impassioned oratory to protest against the bombardment of a peaceful town. But the truth was that no project of the kind was entertained. His hon. Friend did the Montenegrin people scant justice. They were, no doubt, miserably poor; but their love of independence was very great, and they might be said to be almost the only unconquered race in the East of Europe. There was nothing to show that they were animated by a spirit of brigandage and lawlessness. On the contrary, he believed they were, to a great extent, free from the vice of brigandage so prevalent in the East, and their respect for law and order was proved by the scrupulous care they showed in carrying out the provisions of the Treaty of Berlin—a matter in which they had put themselves in harmony with the most modern ideas of civilized Europe. Again, there was no information in the possession of the Government to confirm the statement of the hon. Member that there was a wish to hand over the Albanians to a Power whose rule they would detest. The Corti Compromise would, if carried out, have embraced a large Catholic population; but Her Majesty's Government were assured that the Dulcigno Arrangement was not subject to any objection of that sort. He did not sympathize entirely with the Slav populations, and he had taken pains to ascertain what were the feelings of the people in regard to the matter in question. He could not agree with the estimate of his hon. Friend to the effect that there were 9,000 Mohammedans in Dulcigno. The highest number at which he had heard them put was 5,000, and he had every reason to believe that there were not more than 3,000, and he thought that his hon. Friend would give him credit for a desire not to favour unduly any population in the East at the expense of another. That Turkey was willing to carry out the Treaty of Berlin in respect to the Montenegrin Frontier was not a view which the Government, acting upon the Reports of their responsible
  1312
  agents, could take. There might have been a moment when Turkey was willing to rectify the Montenegrin Fronter in the sense prescribed; but, certainly, since the present Government came into Office there had been no sign on her part of a disposition to do so. The information which the Government possessed led them to impute to Turkish officials all the delay which had taken place in the execution of the Treaty of Berlin in respect to the Montenegrin Frontier, and all the consequent danger to the peace of Europe which existed. There could be no doubt, in fact, that the present state of things in respect to the Montenegrin Frontier did constitute a menace and a danger to the peace of Europe. Their information was that early in June the North Albanian Chiefs had expressed themselves as not unfavourable to the proposed arrangement. The inhabitants of the Dulcigno district could hardly be said to belong to the Albanian race; they were an extremely mixed people, and it was doubtful how far they were Slav and how far Albanian; but, at any rate, they did not have frequent? communication with the Chiefs of North Albania, from whom they and their district were cut off by a river and a lake. During the late War the whole district had been occupied by a Montenegrin force, which remained for a year, and left in fulfilment of one of the stipulations of the Treaty of Berlin. There was reason to believe that that Montenegrin occupation was not resisted by the people of the district. According to the latest information sent by Mr. Kirby Green, the local feeling in the extreme north of Albania was favourable to the Dulcigno Arrangement, and the Chiefs who were in favour of resisting it were not inhabitants of the district. In a despatch that would shortly be published it was stated that—
  "The arrangement would be received by the Albanians with a sensation of relief from a state of things that is fast becoming intolerable."
  And they had heard over and over again that any resistance that might be made would not be bond fide, but would be instigated by officials from the Porte. He might also inform the House that the several Governments had agreed to make the fullest possible arrangements for the equitable treatment of the inhabitants of any districts that might be ceded to Montenegro. It might be urged, pos-

  1313
  sibly, that no such stipulation had any practical value; but they were bound to believe that any such arrangements would be carefully carried into effect. There was another matter to which his hon. Friend had alluded very briefly, and that was the statement that 80,000 stand of arms had been imported into Bulgaria. There was no doubt whatever that the Bulgarian Militia were being armed, and, as far as he knew, there was no reason why they should not be armed; but they had no information that would lead them to suppose that there had been so considerable an importation of arms. He would only add that no one concurred more sincerely than he did with his hon. Friend in desiring that all creeds should be treated on an equality. He firmly believed that their policy was designed to treat them all equally, and not to favour one nationality at the expense of another.
  SIR WILFRID LAWSON,as an irresponsible outsider, thought that it would be well to know what was going on with respect to foreign affairs. He did not wish for any further declaration, but only to know that the Government would not take any active steps in the direction of a policy of coercion without giving the House an opportunity of expressing an opinion on the subject. He confessed that he was puzzled to know what the Government meant by their projected Naval Demonstration in concert with the five Great European Powers. They had been told that the object of the Naval Demonstration was to strengthen and not to embarrass the Turkish Empire, and to secure European peace, and preserve the power of the Porte itself. That was only the old cry again, the balance of power in Europe, that ancient fetish which had cost millions of lives. What was known as the independence of the Turkish Empire was the most foolish policy which this country had ever maintained. It was impossible exactly to know from the statement of the Under Secretary what the real object of the Naval Demonstration was, for he was at a lost to understand how a country could be strengthened by pressure being exercised upon them by the combined Powers of Europe. His own firm conviction was that the course now being pursued was full of danger, because it was impossible, without great danger, to keep a fire in a powder magazine. As to
  1314
  acting in conjunction and by agreement with other Powers, if the Government once began such a policy they would cease to be their own masters, and would be in the greatest danger of becoming, before long, entangled in the toils of the military Empires. And what was it all for? The Prime Minister had preached the doctrine of nationalities. There was a conflict between the speeches of the hon. Member for Newcastle (Mr. J. Cowen) and the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, as to the number of Mahomedans and Catholics in certain places. That showed that we were not in a position to undertake the settlement of these disputes in different parts of the world. We ought to consult the wishes of the people as to the Government they wished to live under. We could not arrive at a satisfactory settlement by the Powers of Europe carving out territory as they thought fit. He supposed that what was aimed at in this case was not a scientific Frontier, but a philanthropic Frontier; but he was not prepared to send a single soldier or a single ship to fight for it. He had never read a speech with greater pleasure than he did the reply of the noble Lord the Secretary of State for India to the deputation of Jingoes who urged the occupation of Candahar. They urged all the usual arguments; the noble Lord heard them through, and with that straightforward, honest directness which would some day make him the most popular man in England, said—"It is all very well; but the question is, what right have we to go to Candahar?" That was a plain question, and it was such a question he wished the Government to consider thoroughly before undertaking to settle Frontiers in distant parts of the world. Let us find out what right we had to make those settlements. He protested against the doctrine that we were the police of the world. We had no commission, human or divine, to set right every wrong. We lived in an island far away from all these complications; and it would be a great deal better, in his opinion, not to throw themselves into these quarrels and troubles, but to remember the old maxim that we should do our duty in the station of life to which it had pleased God to call us. We had had a six years' cry of British interests. That was the most humiliating cry that any nation could have put forth

  1315
  —interests at the expense of honour; but he did not know that the cry of British interference all over the world was a great deal better; it was only Jingoism in a respectable dress. It seemed a ridiculous idea that we, of all people, were to set ourselves up as the great reformers of abuses, that we should go to war for nationalities, whether bullets or buckshot should be used to keep one down, that we should talk of peace while our hands were reeking with the blood of Afghans and Zulus, who simply defended their own country, and that we should insist on local government elsewhere, while we could not shoot a rabbit without the permission of an absolute oligarchy. We really seemed to exhibit ourselves as the Pharisees of Europe. He asked for no statement that might endanger our relations. He fully believed the Home Secretary, when he said that no projects were being hatched that would take the country by surprise. All be asked was that the Government would undertake, before committing the country to warlike measures, that Parliament should have the opportunity of considering whether the object was one for which the blood and treasure of this country ought to be expended.
  MR. A. J. BALFOURsaid, he failed to see the distinction in point of selfishness between the policy of British interests, which the hon. Baronet described as degrading, and the policy of ignoring foreign affairs altogether, and devoting ourselves entirely to our own interests. In fact, they only differed as to the manner in which British interests could best be promoted, and the hon. Baronet thought it was to be done by selfish isolation, and not by united action among the Powers of Europe. The Government said their object was to carry out the Treaty of Berlin; but the means by which they intended to carry it out seemed to be full of danger, and might have consequences more far-reaching than they contemplated, and might, in no distant future, produce evils throughout Europe. No doubt, it was strange that the Gentlemen who, two or three years ago, were complaining of the concealment practised in foreign affairs, should, within the first three months of their taking Office, practice concealment as dark as any practised by the late Government. He did not mean to complain
  1316
  of them on that account. If they said it was for the interests of this country that the conduct of foreign affairs should not at that moment be made public, he claimed for them, as he claimed for the last Government, that they must be the only judges of that public necessity. The late Government said, at a certain time, it was impossible for them to take the public into their confidence without injury to public interests; and he would be the last to say that such a plea should not be considered now. The real check upon the foreign policy of a Government was the discussion which must come at the close of particular stages. ["Hear, hear!"] The Prime Minister cheered that statement; but, in his Mid Lothian speeches, did he not express disapproval of that theory of government, and say that the public ought to be taken into confidence at every stage of foreign negotiation? The check on Government was the responsibility to Parliament for the consequences of a policy. But he must warn the Government against doing what they seemed inclined to do, which was to urge the fact that they were acting in concert with Europe as an excuse for the consequences of their policy. The Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said there was a great distinction between the present and the late Government in this respect—that whereas the late Government pursued a course of isolation the present were acting in concert with the Powers of Europe. He did not think this would exonerate the present Government from blame if they got into any difficulty. It must be remembered that for every end the Powers had in common they had half-a-dozen not in common; and though we were acting in concert with other Powers, they might be acting in the best possible way to obtain their own ends. Acting with them we might not be acting in the best possible way to obtain our own ends.
  MR. ASHMEAD-BARTLETTadmitted the anxiety of the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to prove that great impartiality and fairness were shown to the Mussulman population; but when they came to action it was always found that action was most favourable to the intolerant majority. In no action they had taken had the condition of the Mussulman population been fairly considered. Had they taken

  1317
  any serious steps to improve that condition of the Mussulman population? On the contrary, it was becoming more and more atrocious till it had now reached a state of oppression unequalled in ancient or modern times. The provisions of the Berlin Treaty had not been duly respected in this matter. At the present moment intrigues were going on all over the Balkan Peninsula, and Russian agents were traversing it with impunity from end to end. Turkey knew very well that we were pressing ruthlessly every point that told against her, as in the matter of Greece; but why should the Government claim credit for doing so with a view to strengthen Turkey? Let the Government be fair and equitable in this matter, and when depriving Turkey of their territory and population let them not pretend that they were doing so to strengthen Turkey. He agreed with much that had been so eloquently stated by the hon. Member for Newcastle (Mr. J. Cowen); the facts were as he had represented. The Treaty of Berlin had been assented to by the Turks, and was signed by the Sultan, however unfavourable it was in some of its provisions. In that Treaty the Powers were authorized to offer their mediation; but what had been done? The Government, instead of acting as mediators, had acted as arbitrators. England with the Russian Government or the Powers of Europe were going to compel an unwilling people to cede their territory to Montenegro and Greece. There was another point, and that was the contrast between the condition of affairs now and the condition of affairs when the late Government were in Office. All these questions were being quietly settled under the late Government. As soon as the present Government came into Office every one of these questions burst out afresh. Every one of these nationalities was encouraged by Russia to disturb every part of the Turkish Empire. Moreover, suddenly, since the accession of the present Government to Office, a new naval demonstration on the part of the European Powers had been arranged, which threatened general disturbance and war. He thought the Government of this country would show greater courage by giving up the policy of sanctioning, directly or indirectly, the plans of Russia. If they had any real desire to promote the welfare of Turkey
  1318
  its action towards it would be of a very different character; and instead of a British squadron being sent to make a demonstration in Turkish waters they would hear of one being despatched to the coast of Poland, and another to the Eastern shores of the Black Sea. The policy which the Government were pursuing in Grecee was evidently designed to promote the interests of that country at the expense of Turkey, and could not be expected to be received with favour by the latter country.
  MR. GLADSTONE: Sir, I believe it is right, out of consideration for one or two hon. Members who have spoken, that I should not allow this debate to close without saying a few words. But I think also that the prolongation of it would be attended with great inconvenience, not only to persons present, but to persons elsewhere. There are many matters to which I should have been otherwise glad to refer. After hearing the speech of the hon. Gentleman who has just sat down, I can only say that the strain of that speech is such that I do not think on the whole it requires an answer. Every idle rumour, every extravagant assertion, every doctrine favourable to domination of Turkey, even beyond what the Turks themselves advance, we are sure to hear from him when he rises. Even on a matter of geography the hon. Member is extravagant, for he recommends us to send a fleet to the coast of Poland or to a corner of the Baltic. Under these circumstances, I will only refer to one point which he has mentioned. He told the House, and I have not a doubt he himself believes it, I am sure he speaks with perfect sincerity, that we are acting under the dictation, or under the secret influence of Russia in endeavouring to extend the Greek Frontier at the expense of Turkey. So little has the hon. Gentleman watched the relative attitude of Russia to the Hellenic race in the Turkish Empire that he, actually running counter to the most palpable, notorious, and elementary facts of the Eastern Question, lands us in the supposition that Russia herself, watched by us mainly on account of her inclination to sacrifice Greek interests to those of the Slav, is the active, ardent champion of the Greek race, at whose instigation Europe has been acting in recommending the extension of the Greek Frontier. [Mr. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT dis-

  1319
  sented.] The House, I believe, put upon the speech of the hon. Gentleman the construction I have put upon it; and if it is not the true one, the hon. Gentleman will have an opportunity of explaining his speech when I sit down. As respects the Greek Question itself, I will only observe that for the assembled Powers of Europe to give a construction to the Treaty of Berlin has been characterized by the hon. Gentleman as an act of international brigandage; and he said there was no precedent for anything of the kind. He entirely forgets the manner in which the Greek Kingdom was setup. He forgets how it was and why it was the Free State of Belgium came into existence; and, in fact, he claims for himself a licence which I think he must find very greatly to increase any facilities he might otherwise enjoy for sustaining the case he wishes to recommend to Parliament, but which likewise, I think, dispenses us from the necessity of minute and detailed reply to his observations. Now, Sir, the case of Greece is not one which is most prominently before us; but the case of Greece cannot be justly or fairly considered except by bearing in mind that of which there is not a glimpse in the hon. Gentleman's speech, nor, apparently, in his mind—namely, the course taken with regard to Greece during the War between Russia and Turkey. At that time the alliance of the Greeks would have been invaluable to Russia. Russia sought the alliance of the Greeks. A union with Greece, acting upon the Christian population of Thessaly, which my hon. Friend never seemed to take at all into account, but treats Thessaly as if it were a country inhabited by Turks—a union of Greece with Russia at that time would have been of vital consequence to Russia; but Greece was prevented from giving that co-operation by the action of the Powers of Europe; and after Greece was prevented from giving that co-operation, the hon. Gentleman, and possibly others, say the Powers of Europe have no right to interfere between Greece and Turkey, or to take any steps whatever for the extension of the Greek Frontier. I see my hon. Friend the Member for Hertford (Mr. A. J. Balfour) has returned to his place. I think he is perfectly correct in stating that we cannot escape from any part of our responsibility by pleading the con-
  1320
  cert of Europe. If the measures which we recommend to the House, or if the measures which we ourselves adopt, are bad, it is no sufficient apology to offer to Parliament, or the people of England, that we adopted them in concert with others; and, therefore, I am most glad we should be taken to task if, at anytime, we are heard urging the doctrine of the concert of Europe, and the expediency of maintaining it as a means of escaping from, or reducing in any respect, our own responsibility. But, on the other hand, when we come to consider the question whether the concert of Europe, so far as it can be had, is a most valuable and important instrument for the settlement on broad principles of justice of international questions, then we are ready to maintain the doctrine of cherishing and promoting to the utmost this concert of Europe. It is difficult, no doubt, to maintain; but when you cannot maintain it what have you to substitute for it? As long as it can be maintained you have that inestimable advantage and security that it. is almost a moral impossibility that all the united Powers of Europe over can consciously act together for the pursuit of an object that is unjust. Mistakes may be committed, into errors they may fall, but injustice is hardly conceivable; while selfishness it is totally impossible that the Powers of Europe should pursue in common. Therefore, I am very sorry when I hear any speech in this House, whether it is the speech of the hon. Gentleman opposite, or the speech of the hon. Member for Newcastle (Mr. J. Cowen), which, so far as I am able to judge, goes to depreciate or to put out of repute that which the present Government have declared to be emphatically their policy—namely, to maintain to the utmost of their power the concert of Europe for the settlement of international questions. Now, I do not think the hon. Member for Newcastle will be in the slightest degree put out of conceit with the speech which he has delivered when I state with what regret, and even, as to some parts, with what surprise I have heard it. My hon. Friend is a great promoter of the doctrine of nationalities. No person can doubt the sincerity of his professions on this subject. He has, I believe, given practical demonstration of the sincerity of those professions in a manner to place

  1321
  them beyond all question; but I must say it is most unfortunate, so far as regards the East, that I never heard my hon. Friend, in these latest years, preach and enforce the doctrine of nationalities, except in conjunction with an argument and declaration which go directly to the promotion of the Turkish policy and the maintenance of the Turkish Power, irrespective of all the great interests we ought to consider in connection with the maintenance of nationalities. But he has yet to learn one lesson, the most vital of all, and it is this—that if you permit and cause it to be understood in Turkey that you believe the first necessity of the hour is the maintenance of the Turkish Empire, irrespective of the manner in which government is exercised—when that is once known, all your love of nationalities, all your desire for reforms, all your humanity and philanthropy—and far be it from me for a moment to question them—will become doctrines idle and utterly futile in the view of the Government of Turkey. That, Sir, was the basis on which the Powers proceeded at the period of the Treaty of Paris, when the language adopted was this—
  "We shall recommend and take every security in our power for the introduction of reforms into Turkey; but their introduction must be subservient to the maintenance of the integrity of the Turkish Empire."
  That was the doctrine adopted at the time in good faith, and I will not say it was not justified by the state of experience of that day. But what was the effect of that doctrine? The effect of it was that though 20 years of perfect rest after the severe chastisement Russia had received were granted to Turkey; though she had every facility which, in the nature of things, it was possible she could have for introducing reforms during the whole of that period, and though—as we are now told that want of money, forsooth, is the reason why reforms cannot be introduced—though she then had £200,000,000 put into her pocket for the purpose, not the slightest progress in any one portion of her Empire was made towards the attainment of those objects. And, Sir, it became perfectly clear that a change of tone must be adopted; that it was a sham and a farce to continue to recommend reforms, and, at the same time, to hold this language to the Turkish Govern-
  1322
  ment—"Mind, whatever we say about reforms, that is a secondary object in our view; to keep you where you are is our first object. "And the change, Sir, that I hope has been made has been this—that the Ottoman Government begins to understand that although we are bona fide desirous to avoid the difficulties and complications that might arise upon the breaking up of the Turkish Empire, yet the tolerable discharge of the duties of government towards the subjects of Turkey is no longer a secondary, but a primary object; and that unless Turkey is prepared to discharge them in that tolerable manner of which, I am sorry to say, we have not yet sufficient evidence, the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire must learn to shift for themselves. Notwithstanding it may appear strange to the hon. Member opposite, this is what we believe to be true friendship to Turkey. We believe the true interests of Turkey lie in the adoption of those reforms which good government demands. Other friends of Turkey have had her destinies in their hands at other times, and we see what has been the result. The present condition of the Turkish Empire and its present dangers are the proof of the fruits of another policy. Let Europe make it understood by Turkey that the discharge of the duties of a Government is the first condition of support and countenance to the maintenance of Ottoman rule, and then, no doubt, if ever, we shall have some hope of effecting real improvement in that condition. I listened with the greatest regret to the account given by the hon. Member for Newcastle (Mr. J. Cowen) of the people of Montenegro—the most heroic race in Europe. I am sorry he should have ridiculed their sterile country. Why is their country sterile? Because they alone of the European races preferred to surrender property, ease, and comfort, and, retiring into these mountains, hold their rocky fastnesses, while the desolalation of the Ottoman conquest spread all around them. And that is made a subject of reproach and ridicule by my hon. Friend, the friend of nationalities. It is quite a mistake, as far as my information goes—and if a mistake, a most injurious one—to describe the Montenegrins as in great part brigands, and given systematically to inhuman acts in war, such, for instance, as the destruc-

  1323
  tion of the lives of prisoners. I wish my hon. Friend would give some study to the interesting history of Montenegro. It is evident he has never done it, and that he has given us one or two little scraps of what he may possibly have picked up from some Turkish newspaper. They actually cut off the heads of their prisoners, it is said. Sir, that is totally untrue. Not only so, but it was untrue even in times when the people of Montenegro were, to a considerable extent, barbarized by the circumstances of their position. I remember an anecdote, which is a true anecdote. It was certainly many generations ago; I will not define the exact date, but it is not less than 200, perhaps 300, years ago. In a particular action the Montenegrins took 147 prisoners from the Turks, and they exchanged these 147 Turkish prisoners for 147 pigs, these being of great value to the Montenegrins, whose country produced hardly any animal food, while 147 Turkish prisoners were evidently of no value at all. I mention that incident, strange as it may seem, to show that in far more barbarous times than the present they had not the practice which the hon. Gentleman describes. I will admit that, having taken some pains to acquaint myself with Montenegrin territory, I find that 100 years ago the Montenegrins were largely given to brigandage, and no wonder, because they had been perpetually maintaining a military struggle for the possession of the lands of which they had been formerly proprietors, Dulcigno included. That being so, it was no very great wonder that these people, driven by such hard conditions of life and the extreme want of their inhospitable fastnesses, should make raids on their neighbours, whom they deemed to be in unjust possession of their lands. Still, what the hon. Member ought to know is this—that not only have great efforts, in the ordinary sense of the word, been made, but the most extreme severity has been exercised by the last rulers of Montenegro to put an end to that system of brigandage; and, unless I am mistaken, I am within the mark in saying that 500 Montenegrins were put to death by the last Prince or the present one, and that the effect of the severity has been that brigandage is at an end. If the hon. Gentleman wishes to characterize
  1324
  the Montenegrins as simply a savage and lawless people, let him take this fact and lay it to heart, about which there is not the smallest doubt, that any traveller who goes to Montenegro, and obtains a Montenegrin woman for his guide, although he may be a stranger and without any defence—and in worse times than at present and before brigandage was extinguished this was the case—he may walk in perfect safety from one end of the country to the other. I will not dwell upon that subject any further, but will come very briefly to what I think are the main allegations of the hon. Member. The hon. Member lays down a very just principle—that we ought not to hand over to any other State the unwilling populations. But he begs the question when he assumes that Dulcigno is unwilling. We do not admit that Dulcigno is unwilling. We know very well that Turkish organs tell us that Dulcigno is unwilling. If, Sir, we are to trust Turkish organs, we had better abandon altogether intervention in this matter, and we had better never have contracted any engagement in relation to these Eastern countries. From the information we have received we have every reason to believe that the people of Dulcigno are agreeable to the transfer. When it is said that Mr. Kirby Green is our solitary informant the statement is totally inaccurate. The Representatives of other Powers, and particularly a most competent gentleman, the Representative of Austria, are on this point in complete accordance with him. Therefore, the first condition set up by my hon. Friend, the assent of the people as a transfer from one Government to another, is satisfied in the case of Dulcigno. The Government has no wish to go all over the world rectifying the wrongs of mankind, and any action in which the present Government has been engaged has been absolutely limited to the settlement of the Treaty of Berlin. The hon. Gentleman says that the Turkish Government has been eager to give effect to the Treaty of Berlin. I will not now enter into that matter. Our means of judging have been tolerably large during the time that we have been in Office; and, instead of saying that during that time there has been eagerness on the part of the Turkish Government to give effect to the Treaty of Berlin, I am bound to say there has been precisely the oppo-

  1325
  site. The hon. Member did not in the course of his speech make many other statements which have not been ably answered by my hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. I must, however, before sitting down say a few words in reference to the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson). In the first place, I do not believe there is any body of gentlemen who more entirely concur in the general declaration of my hon. Friend than the present Government. We have no mission or commission to go all over the world rectifying the wrongs of mankind wherever they are to be found. That is, I believe, as far as possible from the view of Members of the present Government—at any rate, it is as far as possible from any action with which the present Government has been engaged. My hon. Friend spoke of British interference all over the world. Our interference has been absolutely limited to the fulfilment of Treaty obligations. My hon. Friend must admit, and I do not think he would be reluctant to admit, that the fulfilment of Treaty obligations is a matter entirely distinct from either chivalrous or Quixotic tendencies to wander all over the world in search of occasions for interference; or, what is still worse than chivalrous and Quixotic interference, a disposition to set up a plea and pretext of British interests for the purpose of disregarding the rights of other people. To neither of these things is there, in my opinion, any reason for me to refer on the present occasion. I will, therefore, confine myself to meeting the inquiry put by my hon. Friend, who says that he does not know what we are going to do. The hon. Member for Newcastle (Mr. J. Cowen) says that we are keeping back information from Parliament, and that there never has been an occasion when it has been so long withheld. It was not until well on in the Session of 1876 that the first information was given to us with respect to the events in the East, which had commenced in the summer of 1875; and it was not until the end of the Session of 1876—on the 31st of July, I believe—that the first adverse criticism was pronounced upon the policy of the then existing Government, which policy they had been prosecuting for more than 12 months. Therefore the charge of a hasty, intolerant, and precipitate attack upon the policy
  1326
  of the late Government falls to the ground. But my hon. Friend asks from us a positive declaration that if any measure is adopted by us which can, under any circumstances, lead to the use of coercion, concerted or isolated, great or small, for the most immediate purposes of humanity, or for general purposes of policy, no such measure shall on any account be taken without first summoning Parliament. [Sir WILFRID LAWSON: What I said was actual measure.] If it is to be done before any actual measure, it must be done before any step is taken that can lead to those actual measures. Otherwise, what is the value of the intervention of Parliament? It is a very heavy responsibility I admit. It is a responsibility that cannot be overstated. Parliament puts into the hands of the Executive Government the use of the military and naval power within certain limits; and though we should be the first to assert that such military and naval power ought never to be used except under the gravest necessity, and with the clearest proof of right, yet we are not prepared to say, and, indeed, we might sacrifice the honour of the country if we were prepared to say, that on no condition should it be exercised and no measure should be taken that could even so remotely result in its exercise until Parliament had been called together and consulted at the very outset as to the origin of the measure. The conditions which my hon. Friend seeks to impose are not compatible with the functions of an Executive and Legislative Assembly. My hon. Friend is quite satisfied, I hope, that there is no wild, impolitic, or selfish schemes entertained or fostered on the part of the Government. If it is so, I hope that he will rest satisfied with the limitation that we have placed upon ourselves. Of course, it is a great limitation to say that we are averse to any isolated action, for obviously concerted action is a very limitation on the liberty which might be assumed by any single Power. We have placed upon ourselves another and a different limitation, and it is this—that we are not now proposing to Parliament to give effect to objects of policy, however tenable they may be, or however good they may be, which are new or undefined; but we have placed before ourselves nothing else than this—the fulfilment to the letter, and in the spirit, of

  1327
  what has been brought about by our absolute and positive obligations. That, again, I need scarcely say, is a narrowing somewhat of the province of action, such as I hope will tend to re-assure my hon. Friend. If further assurance is necessary, and should be required, I have only to say that I trust my hon. Friend may find it in looking back on the career of those who in general form the present Government. I am not aware that any of them have been characterized by a precipitate desire to multiply our foreign engagements and relations all over the world, and which tend to increase the already heavy burdens imposed on the shoulders of the people of this country. In that spirit of reserve, and caution, and discretion, with that desire to maintain the united action of the civilized Powers, as well as with the strictest regard to what we conceive to be due justice, all our steps have been, and will be taken. Let me now give an assurance to the hon. Member for Newcastle (Mr. J. Cowen) that, not upon what we may think it to be vain and idle rumours, but upon proved facts, the moment just consideration of the rights of a nationality is established we have no title to inquire by what name that nationality is called. There is one point more in the remarks of my hon. Friend to which I must now allude. After the speech of my hon. Friend the Under Secretary, referring to the question he has put as to the existing state of things in Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia, I can assure him most unequivocally, as can be borne out by information that can be laid before the House, that all the influence we could fairly use has been exercised to preserve the peace of the Balkan Peninsula by the maintenance of the existing state of things. That is the path in which we still continue to go. I feel sure, from the generous character of the hon. Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson), that he will not believe we have any latent intention when we say that it is not possible for us to enter into any absolute engagement, and that every case that may arise in a complicated state of affairs abroad must be considered on its own particular merits, and will never be considered by us without a due sense of our responsibility to Parliament and to the people of this country.
  MR. J. COWENsaid, after the satisfactory assurances that the Prime Minister had made, he had no desire to trouble the House further. He trusted that his adverse anticipations as to the threatened demonstration would not be realized. He wished to make only this other remark. He had never dreamt of speaking adversely of a State because it was little, or of people because they were poor. Whatever fault he might find with Montenegro, certainly the sterility of its soil, or the fewness of its people, were not objections with him. Why he cited the facts was to show that the risks likely to be run by a naval demonstration were out of proportion to the proposed advantages that the demonstration could effect, even if successful. In a sentence, the risks were greater than the results could be beneficial.
  MR. ASHMEAD-BARTLETTwished to explain that he had in several particulars been misunderstood by the Prime Minister. He did not say that Russia was instigating the cession of territory to Greece, but that she was instigating the Naval Demonstration, with a view to precipitating disturbance and war throughout the Ottoman Empire; nor did he say there were no Greeks in Thessaly; but he objected to the enforced cession of the Albanian fortresses and territory of Janina and Metzovo to Greece. He did not object to pressure being put by the Powers upon Turkey to induce her to reform; but he objected to the use of the Fleets of Europe to plunder Turkey.

PARLIAMENT—ORDER—MR. CALLAN.
  PERSONAL EXPLANATION.
  MR. CALLANsaid, he wished to take the earliest opportunity afforded by the course of the debate, in reference to the occurrence of last evening, of tendering to the House, and especially to the Chairman of Committees, his free, full, frank, and unreserved expression of regret for what then took place. He did so in justice to the Chairman of Committees, to the House, and to himself. He did not think he need do more at the present stage of the Business of the House than simply offer this full and unsuggested apology.

  POOR LAW (ENGLAND)—ROMAN CATHOLIC CHAPLAINS IN WORKHOUSES.—OBSERVATIONS.
  MR. CALLANsaid, that at that late period of the Session, and late hour for a Saturday Sitting, he would only detain the House to point out very briefly the gross injustice under which the Catholics laboured in this country with respect to the provision made for religious ministrations to Catholics in workhouses, and which were in striking contrast to the provisions in Ireland for the religious requirements of the Protestant and Presbyterian paupers. From the Return which had been ordered on his Motion last Session, he found that in three Poor Law Unions of Dundalk, Ardee, and Drogheda, which embraced the county of Louth and large portions of Meath, Monaghan, and Armagh, there were three Protestant chaplains and one Presbyterian chaplain in receipt of £85 per annum for attending to the religious wants of 11 Protestant and Presbyterian paupers, and that all through Ireland the Protestant poor in the workhouses were treated in the same kind and considerate manner. After a careful analysis of the Return made by the Local Government Board in Ireland, he found that there were only seven Protestant paupers and 11 Presbyterian, a total of 18 non-Catholic paupers, scattered over 10 different Unions, for whom chaplains were not appointed and in receipt of salaries. The very imperfect Return furnished by the Local Government Board disclosed a very different state of things in England, which was neither satisfactory nor creditable. He (Mr. Callan) would not now go into any minute details, but would confine himself to the Metropolis and the Irish centres of Liverpool and Manchester; and, as the Prime Minister was present, he felt confident the striking injustice he complained of would be rectified. Taking the 28 Unions comprised in the Metropolitan district, he found that whilst upwards of £6,800 was paid in salaries to 42 Protestant chaplains, being an average of over £160 each, not one penny was paid either for religious services for, or "religious instruction" to, the 4,940 Catholic paupers in London workhouses. Was that just—was that fair play? Just glance at the contrast. In Ireland £3,500 was paid
  1330
  yearly to Protestant chaplains for their ministrations to less than 4,000 Protestant paupers. In London not one penny was paid towards providing any religious services or instructions for 4,900 Catholic paupers. The same state of things existed in Salford—Liberal, Radical Salford; £230 was paid to the Protestant chaplain for attendance on 750 Protestant paupers; but not one penny was paid for religious services for the 444 Catholic paupers. Manchester had three workhouses, containing 1,880 Protestant and 1,560 Catholic paupers. There were three Protestant chaplains provided, at an expense of £500; but there was no Catholic chaplain. He would only now refer to Liverpool. There in the workhouse there were 1,210 Protestants and 1,365 Catholics. Not one penny expended to secure religious ministration to the 1,300 Catholics, while a chaplain at a salary of £250 was provided for the 1,200 Protestants. But though no salary was provided, the poor Catholics were not forgotten nor neglected, for the Clerk of the Union stated in a note appended to his Return—"Voluntary attendance is given at the workhouse daily by the Roman Catholic clergy; "but was it fair that these devoted priests should receive no remuneration whatever for their services and labours? But matters were still worse in the industrial schools at Liverpool. There were 427 Protestant children, for whom a chaplain was provided and paid £250, and very properly paid. Nowhere was religious instruction more needed than in the bringing up of the young in industrial schools, and he had no doubt but that the Protestant chaplain there gave ample value for his salary; but how fared it with the Catholic poor children? Numbering over 550, upwards of 100 more than the Protestant children, for them there was no religious instruction paid for or provided, save, again, as the Clerk of the Union reported, by the voluntary attendance of the Roman Catholic clergy frequently at the industrial schools. The same marked injustice prevailed all through England and Scotland. He was aware the Local Government Board had not the same power in this country that was given to the Local Government Board in Ireland; but though their powers might not be as extensive, yet the Board naturally possessed great in-

  1331
  fluence and weight with the Boards of Guardians, and he would ask of them to exert that influence during the Recess to have these matters complained of remedied, and fair play dealt out to the poor unfortunate Catholics in workhouses in England; and in case Boards of Guardians throughout the country were not amenable to the suggestions of the Local Government Board, or that increased power with respect to chaplains was required, then he hoped that a Bill would be prepared and introduced early next Session dealing fully and fairly with a subject which had created great irritation and given cause for dissatisfaction to all those interested in the subject, who were aware of the gross injustice done, and the grave evils caused, by the present system.
  MR. DODSONsaid, the hon. Member called his attention to a Return which he had moved for, and which was laid on the Table of the House by his Predecessor. That Return, no doubt, showed that in the workhouses of Ireland chaplains of the various religions were provided, and that in England that was not the case. The explanation was, as the hon. Member seemed to be aware, that the laws of the two countries were different. In Ireland the Local Government Board had the power to require the Guardians to appoint chaplains of the different denominations. In England, not only had the Local Government Board no power to do so, but the Guardians had no power either. What the Guardians could do in England was this—they could appoint and pay a Roman Catholic priest to give religious instructions, and in those cases the Local Government Board had always been ready to signify its approval. He could only say at the present time, in reply to the observations of the hon. Member, that he would give further consideration to the Return in the Recess. It would, however, be necessary that an Act of Parliament should be passed if it were intended to enable the Local Government Board or the Guardians to appoint Roman Catholic chaplains.
  Main Question, "That the Bill be now read the third time," put, and agreed to.
  Bill read the third time, and passed.

INDIA (FINANCE, &c.)—EAST INDIA REVENUE ACCOUNTS.

  COMMITTEE. [ADJOURNED DEBATE.]
  Order read, for resuming Adjourned Debate on Amendment proposed to Question [17th August],"That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."
  And which Amendment was,
  To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "the public expenditure in India and the charges on the Indian Revenues defrayed in England are excessive; and that, in the interests of the people of India, it is desirable to effect a prompt and large diminution of such expenditure,"—(Mr. Otway,)
  —instead thereof.
  Question again proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."
  Debate resumed.
  GENERAL SIR. GEORGE BALFOURsaid, he wished to say a few words on the subject of Indian finance, as one who had passed many years of his life in the service of India, and naturally felt great interest in India. There had been great alarm created in this country in consequence of the blunders in the Estimates and Charges of the War beyond the Frontiers, and arising from supposed defects in the mode of keeping account of the finances of India. Having been formerly employed in connection with the Military Accounts of India, as the head of the whole of the military finance, and having, in some degree, established a system of account in that country which had been maintained more or less accurately up to the present day, he thought it now his duty to state, unhesitatingly, that whatever defects might have been discovered in the amounts of the Estimates, or in the charges actually brought into the books of the year, he distinctly asserted that these errors were in the mode of performing the duties of supervision and not in the system itself. Twenty years ago the military finance of India was in great disorder owing to the Mutiny; the Estimates were loosely prepared, and the disbursements as well as vouchers greatly in arrear; but there was no serious difficulty in ascertaining the military expenditure of India, from the cash issued by the Civil Treasuries for the military pay and charges; and he, therefore, submitted that what was

  1333
  done 20 years ago might very well be done now. He was exceedingly sorry that the debate on the Indian Budget had been delayed so long, to within two days of the end of the Session, as that fact prevented his bringing the matter more fully under the consideration of the House. He felt so entirely the inconvenience of prolonging the present Saturday Sitting that, although he was most anxious to make a full statement on the subject of Indian finance, he, knowing that Members needed rest, would, of his own accord, at once conclude his observations.
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, he could assure his hon. and gallant Friend that he greatly regretted it was not possible to bring on this question earlier in the Session. He was deeply indebted to his hon. and gallant Friend for the important evidence he had given before the Committee now sitting at the India Office, and he would take care that although his statement had not been made in the House his views should receive the fullest consideration.
  Question put, and agreed to.
  Matter considered in Committee.
  (In the Committee.)
  Resolved, That it appears by the Accounts laid before this House that the Ordinary Revenue of India for the year ending the 31st day of March 1879 was £58,624,372; the Revenue from Productive Public Works, including the Net Traffic Receipts from Guaranteed Companies, was £6,575,230, making the total Revenue of India for that year £65,199,602; that the Ordinary Expenditure in India and in England, including Charges for the Collection of the Revenue, for Ordinary Public Works, and for Interest on Debt exclusive of that for Productive Public Works, was £54,990,433; the Expenditure on Productive Public Works (Working Expenses and Interest), including the payments to Guaranteed Companies for Interest and Surplus Profits, was £8,174,923, making a total Charge for that year of £63,165,356; that there was an excess of Income over Expenditure in that year amounting to £2,034,246; and that the Capital Expenditure on Productive Public Works in the same year was £4,381,898.
  House resumed.
  Resolution to be reported upon Tuesday next.

MOTION.

  ADJOURNMENT OF THE HOUSE.
  On the Motion of Lord RICHARD GROS-VENOR, it was resolved that the House at its rising do adjourn till Tuesday next, half-past 1 o'clock.
  House adjourned at half after Six o'clock till Tuesday next.