Commons Sitting of 16 May 1879

MINUTES.
Ways and Means—considered in Committee—Resolution [May 15] reported.
PRIVATE BILL (by Order)—Considered as amended—Belfast Water.
PUBLIC BILLS—Ordered—First Reading—Local Government (Highways) Provisional Orders (Dorset, &c.) *[186]; Local Government (Highways) Provisional Orders (Gloucester and Hereford) *[185]; Tramways Orders Confirmation*[187]; Consolidated Fund (No. 3) *.
First Reading—Salmon Fishery Law Amendment (No. 2) *[188].
Second Reading—Noxious Gases [123], debate adjourned; Local Government (Ireland) Provisional Orders (Colonel, &c.) *[166]; Local Government Provisional Orders (Artizans' and Labourers' Dwellings) *[159]; Licensing Laws Amendment [25].
Second Reading—Referred to Select Committee—Medical Act (1858) Amendment (No. 3) *[121]; Medical Act (1858) Amendment [2]; Medical Appointments Qualification *[62]; Medical Act (1858) Amendment (No. 2)*[86].
Select Committee—Wormwood Scrubs Regulation [96], other Members nominated.
Committee—Army Discipline and Regulation [88]—R.P.
Committee—Report—Parliamentary Burghs (Scotland) *[97]; Dispensaries (Ireland) [66]; Hares (Ireland) *[165].
The House met at Two of the clock.

PRIVATE BUSINESS.
  BELFAST WATER BILL (by Order).

    CONSIDERATION, AS AMENDED.
    Order for Consideration, as amended, read.
    MR. J. P. CORRY, who had given Notice of his intention to propose the

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    insertion of a clause, said, he had been informed that it was perfectly within his right to submit the clause, and that there were precedents for the course which he proposed to take. He certainly should not, however, have pursued that course if the promoters of the Bill had not raised technical objections against the Petitioners who represented the disfranchised classes of Belfast being heard before the Committee by whom the Bill had been considered upstairs. As he had already intimated, he believed that in taking this course he was perfectly within his right. At the same time, he was aware that if he were to move the clause of which he had given Notice it would give rise to considerable discussion in the House; and as the Government had fixed a Morning Sitting in order that the House might proceed with the consideration of a very important public measure, he felt that he would not be furthering the conduct of Public Business if he were to persist in moving the clause of which he had given Notice. In refraining from doing so, he desired to say that it was not because he did not feel that he should be able to convince the House that the proposition he wished to make was a reasonable and proper one, and also that he would have been supported by a large majority of the House. Under all the circumstances of the case, he did not intend to move the clause of which he had given Notice.
    Bill, as amended, considered; to be read the third time.

QUESTIONS.

  TREATY OF BERLIN—EXECUTION OF ARTICLES.—QUESTION.
  SIR WILLIAM HARCOURTasked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, referring to the Despatch of the Marquis of Salisbury, addressed to Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State from Berlin on 13th July 1878, which was presented to Parliament with the Treaty of Berlin, in order to set forth the principal alterations made at Berlin in the Treaty of San Stefano, and particularly to the following passages:—
  "The first and most important objections made in the Circular of Her Majesty's Government of April 1st to the Treaty of San Stefano "were amongst others that "the first working of
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  the institutions of the new Slav State of Bulgaria were to be commenced under the control of a Russian Army. It will be seen that all these objections have been removed by the Treaty of Berlin.… The influences under which the institutions of Bulgaria were to have been framed, and commenced their working, will no longer be especially Russian.… the retirement of the Russian Army from the province must take place before the period of the working of the new institutions is to begin.… And the first working of its institutions will therefore not be commenced under the control of a Russian Army;"
  and referring likewise to Article 7 of the Treaty of Berlin, which fixes the period at which the working of the new institutions is to begin, as one which "cannot be prolonged for more than nine months from the ratification of the Treaty;" whether he will state if, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government (the time fixed by this Article having elapsed and its conditions having been fulfilled), the declaration of Lord Salisbury has been made good—
  "That the retirement of the Russian Army from the Province must take place before the period at which the working of the new institutions of Bulgaria is to begin, so that the first working of its institutions may not commence under the control of a Russian Army; "
  and, if that is not so, whether such a departure from a capital term of the Treaty of Berlin has taken place with the concurrence of Her Majesty's Government?
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: Sir, the hon. and learned Gentleman's Question is certainly somewhat long; and I fear if I were to enter into the discussion which it seems to invite me to, my answer would be very much longer than is desirable, because it would be difficult for me to give a categorical answer to the Question without going into a much fuller discussion of what has taken place than would be convenient to the House or anyone else, I suppose, at the present moment. I endeavoured, as far as I could from the reading of the Question, to ascertain what was the point which the hon. and learned Gentleman particularly desired to ascertain; and in the still more extended form of the Question which stood on the Paper yesterday I thought I had discovered the point, because he referred to the suggestion that the Russian Army would not vacate Bulgaria until the 3rd of August, and I supposed that he wished to ascertain whether Her Ma-

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  jesty's Government had made any statement to the effect that the Russian Army was not to be bound to evacuate until the 3rd of August. I was prepared to say Her Majesty's Government had made no such statement; but as the matter now stands, with that struck out, I think the only answer I can give is this—that the Treaty of Berlin provided that the evacuation should take place nine months after the signing of the Treaty. The nine months have elapsed, and the evacuation is proceeding.

THE RAILWAY COMMISSION—PROLONGATION OF POWERS.

  QUESTION.
  MR. J. W. BARCLAYasked the President of the Board of Trade, Whether he will introduce the Bill for continuing the Railway Commission before Whitsuntide, in order that Chambers of Commerce and other bodies interested may have ample time to consider amendments of the existing Act?
  VISCOUNT SANDON: Sir, as I think I mentioned to the House before, I have prepared a Bill dealing not only with the prolongation of the powers of the Railway Commission—a matter to which both the Government and the community generally attach much importance—but also with other subjects of considerable interest connected with it. But until much greater progress has been made with various Bills of no ordinary length and importance—such as the Army Discipline and Regulation and the Criminal Code (Indictable Offences) Bills, upon which the House is already engaged—I feel that I should not be advancing the object we all have in view, and that it would be only wasting the time of Parliament, and of no advantage to the subject in question, if I invited the House to consider a general measure in connection with the Railway Commission,

OPEN SPACES (METROPOLIS).

  QUESTION.
  MR. W. H. JAMESasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, If his attention has been called to the observations of Dr. Hardwicke, at an inquest on the 8th of May upon a person of the name of Heron, in which he commented upon the absence of recreation grounds in London, where the children
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  had nowhere to play except the streets; and, if he will consider the expediency of making some inquiry as to whether there are not open spaces in the metropolis which might be made more available as playgrounds for the children of the poor than at present?
  MR. ASSHETON CROSS, in reply, said, he regretted as much as Dr. Hardwicke or anyone else that there were not more playgrounds in the Metropolis for children. A good deal had undoubtedly been accomplished of late years; but he was not aware that anything more could be done than had been done under the Open Spaces (Metropolis) Act, which was passed in 1877.

LLOYDS' PATRIOTIC FUND.

  QUESTION.
  SIR HENRY HAVELOCKasked the Vice President of the Council, Whether his attention has been drawn to a statement, which has appeared in several newspapers, that a sum of £51,000 was, during the Peninsular war, given by Lloyds' Patriotic Fund to be appropriated for the benefit of the families of deceased soldiers and sailors; that the accumulations of this fund now amount to £430,000, which is said to be under the administration of the Charity Commissioners; and, whether the facts are in any way as above represented; and, if so, whether this fund can be made available for the relief of the families of those soldiers lately killed in South Africa and Afghanistan?
  LORD GEORGE HAMILTON, in reply, said, he had communicated with the Charity Commissioners on the subject, and it appeared that this sum of not £430,000,but £74,600, in Reduced Three per Cent Annuities, stood in the names of "the Official Trustees of Charitable Funds" in trust for "Lloyds' Patriotic Fund," the dividends of which were to be administered in accordance with the provisions of the scheme established by order of the Board of Charity Commissioners for England and Wales, dated the 28th day of May, 1875. Those dividends, amounting to £1,119, were applicable, after certain other charges, in the discretion of the Trustees to the payment of annuities to the persons mentioned in section 17 of that scheme, the opening words of which provided that the income from the capital fund

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  should be applied by the Trustees in their discretion in granting annuities and other pecuniary assistance to soldiers, seamen, and marines, officers and men, and to their widows, orphans, and dependents, having especial regard to sufferings and losses in action. He thought, therefore, that the best course for the hon. and gallant Gentleman would be to open communications with the Charity Commissioners, and ascertain from them whether any of this money could be applied to the relief of the families of those soldiers lately killed in South Africa and Afghanistan.

ORDER OF THE DAY.

  ARMY DISCIPLINE AND REGULATION BILL— [BILL 88.]
  (Mr. Secretary Stanley, Mr. Secretary Cross, Mr. William Henry Smith, The Judge Advocate General.)
  COMMITTEE. [Progress 15th May.]
  Bill considered in Committee.
  (In the Committee.)
  Clause 37 (Ill-treating soldier), agreed to.
  Clause 38 (Duelling and attempting to commit suicide).
  Mr. PARNELL, in moving, as an Amendment, in page 16, line 7, after the word "suicide," to insert the words "while not undergoing a sentence of imprisonment," asked whether it would not be better to omit the 2nd sub-section from the clause? He thought that men convicted of breaches of military discipline should not be treated in the same way as felons and persons convicted of ordinary crimes, and he hoped that some guarantee would be taken under the Bill in order to secure this desirable result. They had a case the other day in which a sergeant of the 60th Rifles at Ginghilovo in South Africa, who merely committed an error of judgment in retiring a picket, had imposed upon him a sentence of five years' penal servitude. Common prison discipline in this country was neither more nor less than slavery; and he protested against the proposal to sentence a man already incarcerated to an additional term of imprisonment because, feeling that slavery, he attempted to commit suicide. There ought clearly to be some distinction between
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  the treatment of military prisoners—men who were simply convicted of breach of discipline—and the treatment of men convicted of criminal offences in the ordinary sense. There should, in his opinion, be separate prisons, separate rules, and a separate system of treatment altogether. It was manifestly highly unjust and improper that men who were found guilty and convicted of simple breaches of discipline should be compelled to herd with ordinary criminals. He earnestly desired to press this matter upon the attention of the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Secretary of State for War and the right hon. Gentleman the Home Secretary; and he hoped it would be carefully considered whether powers might not be given to the right hon. and gallant Gentleman to frame rules for the regulation and management of military prisons not only in England, but in other parts of the world. He simply moved his Amendment in order to put himself in Order. He did not intend to take a division upon the matter at present; but at a later stage of the measure he should be prepared, if necessary, to make a proposal embodying the views which he had indicated.
  COLONEL MUREwas inclined to think the hon. Member for Meath (Mr. Parnell) had very far stretched a point in assuming that the usual treatment of convicts induced suicide, and that the same thing could be said of the treatment of military prisoners. It was another assumption, also, that in the case of the sergeant at Ginghilovo the man only committed an error of judgment. As yet, they had no evidence on that subject at all; but his (Colonel Mure's) impression was the other way, and he did not believe for a moment that a man would have been sentenced to five years' penal servitude for that alone.
  COLONEL STANLEYsaid, with regard to the case of the sergeant referred to, he had only seen what had appeared in the public Press. He had not yet received any of the Papers, and, therefore, as he had already stated, he was utterly unable to form any opinion. It was also a pure assumption that because a noncommissioned officer was sent to penal servitude he would be likely to commit suicide. He was, however, quite ready to admit the contention of the hon. Member for Meath (Mr. Parnell), that

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  they must consider very carefully the circumstances under which military prisoners were confined in State gaols; and although he was not able in all cases to make separate rules for different classes of offenders, the point raised by the hon. Gentleman was one which had engaged, and would still receive, his own attention and the attention of his right hon. Friend the Home Secretary, with a view to its amendment to a certain extent.
  MR. E. JENKINSasked why, if the existing law were sufficiently strong to lay hold of offenders, and offences were defined in the Common Law, it should be necessary to make an attempt to commit suicide what might be termed a military offence? It could be well dealt with by the ordinary Criminal Courts. They had a punishment for the offence under the ordinary law, and why should not the offender be handed over to the civil power for trial? The certificate of the sentence would be enough to enable the military power to deal with the offender. He was not going to discuss the Ginghilovo affair either; but the time would come when the Government would have to answer for the strangeness of the fact that the offence of the General who lost an Army at Isandlana should be disregarded, while a sergeant—[Colonel STANLEY: I rise to Order]—was sentenced to penal servitude for retiring a picket.
  THE CHAIRMAN: The question before the Committee at the present time is the Amendment of the hon. Member for Meath (Mr. Parnell) as to the punishment to be inflicted on soldiers who attempted to commit suicide, and the hon. Member for Dundee must confine his observations to that Amendment.
  GENERAL SIR GEORGE BALFOURremarked that this was one of the many additions of novel crimes created by the present Bill, which he very much regretted. The new crime was not recognized by the old Mutiny Act, but only by the 104th Article of War, and which was in contravention of the rights granted to the Crown to make new crimes not provided for by the Acts of Parliament, and it was now legalized for the first time by being introduced into the proposed Act by the Secretary of State.
  SIR WILLIAM HARCOURTthought this a misapprehension of the law which would apply to many other cases. The
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  Articles of War were not illegal; but they were legal so long as they did not go beyond certain penalties. The recital stated that "no man can be forfeit of life or limb without the authority of the Act of Parliament."
  MR. O'DONNELLsaid, the question of unnecessary duplication of crimes and punishments was raised by this and by a good many other clauses of the Bill. Certain punishments and crimes were clearly laid down in the ordinary law of the land; and why, in the preparation of the present measure, should the principle not have been observed by simply declaring that all the crimes known to the general law were also crimes in the Army, and that the punishments fixed under the general law were applicable in the Army, except in cases where for military purposes it was advisable either to add to or take away from the list of ordinary crimes? This sort of way of imperfectly going over the ground traversed by the general Criminal Law seemed to him to perpetuate a good many of the worst evils of confusion which existed in the old Mutiny Act and in the old Articles of War, and which ought to be improved and amended, and rendered as nearly as possible perfect on the present occasion.
  MR. PARNELLsaid, that apart from the evils of the present system, his reason for directing the attention of the Government to the subject was this—that he thought the Home Secretary did not take power in his Prisons Act of 1867 to make rules with regard to military prisoners as distinct from any other class of persons undergoing sentence; and if the right hon. Gentleman now desired to make such rules, it would be necessary for him to take power under the Bill now before the House. He sincerely hoped that the attention of the Government would be given to the subject; and, if necessary, he should be prepared at a future stage to bring it on again.
  Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
  Clause agreed to.
  Clause 39 (Refusal to deliver to civil power officers and soldiers accused of civil offences).
  SIR ALEXANDER GORDON SIR ALEXANDER GORDON moved, as an Amendment, in page 16, line 14, to leave out the words "to deliver over

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  to the civil magistrate or to." For the first time there was introduced here an offence against which it would be very difficult for an officer to defend himself. The terms of the present Act provided that the person wanted must he "under his command." These important words were now omitted, and the clause now punished any person subject to Military Law who refused to deliver over "any officer or soldier accused of an offence punishable by a civil court." It was not to be necessary that the person called on to deliver up a person should have any connection with, or any power or command over, the person to be punished. The word "wilfully" was also now omitted. Formerly, both in the Mutiny Act and in the Articles of War, the person must "wilfully neglect or refuse;" but those words were now omitted, making the clause far more severe. The duty of the officer no w was to render such assistance to the civil authorities as might be in his power. When Lord Melbourne was Home Secretary, the question arose whether a commanding officer should or should not be compellable by law to deliver over any soldier under his command. The question was referred to the Law Officers, and their opinion was communicated, by the desire of Lord Melbourne, to the Army. That opinion was to the effect that, while a commanding officer was not compellable, either by the Mutiny Act or by the ordinary processes of the Courts of Justice, to deliver up a soldier to a constable who had a warrant to execute against him, yet, at the same time, such facilities ought to be granted to a constable as to enable him to take the person. It came to this—that while an officer was not compellable to give up the person, yet that it was wise to do so, in order to avoid unseemly and dangerous collisions between the civil and the military powers.
  COLONEL STANLEYquite agreed that the words in the old Mutiny Act were "under his command." But the Articles of War did not say anything about command, and ran thus—
  "Any officer or soldier who, on application being made to him for the purpose, shall wilfully neglect or refuse to deliver over to the civil magistrate, or to assist in the apprehension of any officer or soldier accused of any crime punishable by law."
  He apprehended, therefore, that so far
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  they were reproducing the old law; and he was anxious also, as far as possible, to avoid any chance of a conflict between the civil and military authorities. He thought the clause had better remain as it was, for he saw no reason to omit the words.
  GENERAL SIR GEORGE BALFOURreminded the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Secretary of State for War that any constable could not at the present time be allowed to walk into any barracks just as he chose, and take away a soldier legally in confinement under Military Law. No doubt the civil power was supreme, and was so recognized by every officer of the Army. The officers well knew that they must obey all demands made by the civil magistrate to give up military persons when regularly and lawfully demanded. He had known cases where a military person, when about to be flogged, was taken out of the square formed by the troops to witness the punishment, and not the slightest hesitation existed in giving up the body on the Judge's writ being presented to the officer in command. And as there had been no conflict up to the present between the two powers, civil and military, where was the need for these words, which might lead to serious strife by reason of a constable making a demand on a sentry or a corporal to yield up a military prisoner?
  MR. RYLANDSsaid, he was very sorry that he could not agree with his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for East Aberdeenshire (Sir Alexander Gordon). Clearly, if a soldier was guilty of any offence against the law an officer was bound by every consideration to deliver him up to the civil authorities. It would be most unfortunate if any doubt whatever were allowed to remain upon that point, and no encouragement should be given to commanding officers to refuse to assist the civil power in dealing with soldiers who had been guilty of criminal offences. But if his hon. and gallant Friend thought the clause, as it now stood, pressed upon commanding officers and regimental officers in a manner that was not already the case, he should have no objection to the word "wilfully" being inserted. That would, he thought, meet the objection that had been raised. If the Amendment were withdrawn, he trusted the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the

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  Secretary of State for War would consent to the insertion of the word "wilfully."
  GENERAL SHUTEobserved, that the clause only referred to commanding officers. He thought it would be far better if the few words to which objection had been taken were omitted.
  SIR WILLIAM HARCOURTsaid, that a commanding officer was, by the present law, bound to deliver over to the civil power any officer or soldier under his command, guilty of any act contrary to law, on proper application being made to him. So far as he could see, this clause practically reproduced Clause 76 of the old Mutiny Act, except, it might be, by the omission of the words "under his command." He thought that those words were properly omitted, in order to insure in every case the due execution of the law against any soldier. It was undesirable that an officer should not be bound in all cases to aid the civil power in the apprehension of military offenders.
  SIR ALEXANDER GORDONobserved, that by the clause, as it stood, an officer was to be punished if, on application being made to him, he neglected or refused to assist in the apprehension of any officer or soldier charged with any offence in any Civil Court. Those words went too far, and what he asked was that it should not be made penal for an officer not to have given into custody a soldier charged with any offence, when that officer might know nothing about it, except that the soldier was under his command.
  MR. E. JENKINSremarked, that the clause was in accordance with the existing law. The Mutiny Act, it was true, confined the offence to a commanding officer; but the 96th Article of War provided for any officer or soldier who, on application being made to him, should neglect or refuse to deliver over to the civil magistrate any officer or soldier accused of an offence punishable by a Civil Court. He did not think it could be said that the clause altered the existing law.
  Amendment negatived.
  Clause agreed to; and ordered to stand part of the Bill.
  Clause 40 (Conduct to prejudice of military discipline).
  SIR WILLIAM HARCOURTsaid, this was known in the Army as the
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  "Devil's Clause." On general principles, he should be inclined to think the clause objectionable, as the great object of all criminal legislation was that crime should be specifically defined. He should be very glad if such a provision could be done away with; but he did not think it was possible. It had been found necessary, for the maintenance of discipline, to have some such clause as that, which corresponded with regard to the soldier very much to the clause with reference to an officer making punishable conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman. As in the case of an officer it was necessary to provide generally for conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, so, in the case of a soldier, for any act, conduct, disorder, or neglect to the prejudice of good order and military discipline not otherwise specified in the Act. The evil, no doubt, was that this clause might be used by officers in courts martial to try soldiers for offences specified in other clauses. He desired that it should be made quite clear that that was not to be done. Evidence was given before the Select Committee to show that there was a disposition to use the clause for cases in which it was not intended to apply. To meet that objection he should, therefore, propose to put in words at the end of the clause declaring that it was not to be employed for purposes of punishment in matters for which a specific punishment was provided by the Act. He should now move, as an Amendment, in page 16, lines 25 and 26, to leave out the words "though not in this Act otherwise specified," and would move later on to insert the provision he had mentioned.
  COLONEL STANLEYsaid, that, on consideration, he agreed with the Amendment proposed by his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Oxford (Sir William Harcourt). There was a good deal to be said on both sides; but as it was in accordance with the general principle of the Act to specify crimes and punishments, it was certainly undesirable to leave it in doubt that this clause was only intended to apply to offences upon which the Act was silent.
  Amendment agreed to; words struck out accordingly.
  SIR ALEXANDER GORDON SIR ALEXANDER GORDON moved, as an Amendment, in page 16, line 27,

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  to leave out the words "on conviction by court martial," in order to insert "be tried by court martial, and on conviction shall." The 105th Article of War, referred to in the margin of the Bill as being that upon which the clause was founded, declared that offences to the prejudice of good order and military discipline should be taken cognizance of by a court martial. That provision had been in use for many years, and had worked well. Many hon. Members were most strongly opposed to the offences of officers and soldiers being tried by any other means than by court martial, and the object of the Amendment was to insure that course being taken. He sought to make it imperative upon the Secretary of State for War, when he took cognizance of any of these offences, to deal with them only by bringing the officers or soldiers charged therewith before a court martial.
  COLONEL STANLEYsaid, that, whatever might be the effect of the 105th Article of War, the hon. and gallant Member must see that the effect of the Amendment he proposed would be to render the clause which they were passing more stringent. Whatever act might be construed as prejudicial to good order and military discipline, however trivial, must, if the words were inserted, be tried by court martial, and lie did not think that that should be done. The alteration of the clause would really tend to increase the danger which the hon. and gallant Gentleman feared. Although the Article of War might be as he had stated, yet it was well known that it was not put in force, and that great discretion was exercised by the authorities.
  MR. E. JENKINSremarked, that the right hon. and gallant Gentleman admitted that the Article of War specifically stated that these offences should be taken cognizance of by a court martial; but he had gone on to observe that they were not always taken cognizance of. But the contention of his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for East Aberdeenshire (Sir Alexander Gordon) was that persons should not be treated as being guilty of these offences without being previously tried by a court martial. It was necessary to introduce the words he proposed to insure that being carried out. He wished to point out to
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  the Committee that the clause, as it stood, was more severe than the Article of War. Whereas the Article of War gave some sort of direction to a court martial that the crime or offence should be taken cognizance of according to its degree, yet, in this clause, those words were left out. No such direction was anywhere given to a court martial by this Bill, and anyone who knew anything about military men would see that when a man was tried before a court of officers for having shaken his fist at his commanding officer, or some little offence of that sort, the absence of any direction to the court martial to treat the offence according to its nature and degree would considerably prejudice the offender. In his opinion, that was a matter well worthy of attention. As courts martial were become more ordinary, it was more necessary than ever that clear and explicit directions should be given by the Bill to persons not instructed in law as to what they were to do. There was a great deal of force in the view of his hon. and gallant Friend that no man ought to be punished for crimes which came properly under this clause, unless he had been previously brought to trial before a court martial. That was a point upon which they had been endeavouring to insist throughout the Committee, and he should go into the Lobby with his hon. and gallant Friend if they went to a Division upon it.
  SIR WILLIAM HARCOURTdid not think it quite certain that the Amendment proposed would make the clause less severe. On the contrary, he thought it would make it more severe, for the clause covered every "act, conduct, disorder, or neglect," and no one could wish a man to be tried by court martial for a very trivial offence. For slight offences a commanding officer could award punishment to soldiers, and no one could insist that every one of these should be tried by court martial. If that were done, the clause would be made much more severe. The authorities avoided doing so now by putting a liberal interpretation upon the Article of War. The hon. and gallant Member for East Aberdeenshire (Sir Alexander Gordon) wished to insert his Amendment in order that everyone charged with these offences might be tried by court martial. What he (Sir William Harcourt) should

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  contend, on the other hand, was that if lighter penalties were provided, then the authority of the Statute was not needed; but if a court martial were required, then the words in the clause, "upon conviction by court martial," were sufficient to meet the case.
  MAJOR NOLANcould not support the Amendment. In his opinion, it would make the Act, already stringent enough, still more stringent. A commanding officer would be placed in a position in which he would have to say to an officer or soldier—"You have committed an act by which, under this clause, you must be dealt with by court martial." He thought it would be better if the words were not inserted.
  LORD ELCHOconsidered it necessary that the Army should be kept in thoroughly good order and discipline. But when he heard the hon. Member for Dundee (Mr. E. Jenkins) refer to a soldier's shaking his first in the face of his commanding officer as a very small offence, he thought it right to say that, in his opinion, expressions such as that should not be used in the course of that debate. What passed in that House was very fully reported, and when soldiers read in the newspapers that a distinguished Member of the House of Commons had stated that it was a trivial offence for a soldier to shake his fist in his commanding officer's face, it would have a very prejudicial effect.
  MR. E. JENKINSobserved, that the noble Lord opposite (Lord Elcho), being a Scotchman, seemed to have no sense of humour. But, perhaps, when he (Mr. E. Jenkins) made use of the words complained of, he did so unadvisedly. He would venture to point out that the clause, as it now stood, was very much more severe than the Article of War, because the Article of War took cognizance of the offence according to its degree, whereas the clause contained no such modification. No one would wish that every person who had committed any of these offences should be tried by court martial, only that they should be liable to be so. He thought that both officers and soldiers would prefer the 105th Article of War to the clause of the Bill.
  MR. GOLDNEYdid not think that the hon. Member for Dundee had read the Article of War correctly. In a compromise between the two, it seemed to
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  him (Mr. Goldney) that the clause was the more favourable to the persons coming under it.
  SIR ALEXANDER GORDONthought it obvious to every military man that his Amendment was not capable of the construction put upon it by the hon. and learned Member for Oxford (Sir William Harcourt). The Article of War had been in use about 100 years, and, never having been subjected to the hypercriticism of the hon. and learned Gentleman, it had never been construed in the way it was now put by him. It was never intended that everyone should be tried by court martial for every offence, and he should contend that that was not the proper construction of his Amendment. But the object of his Amendment was to prevent the system that had only been recently adopted and had come into practice, by which the Secretary of State for War overrode all law by pronouncing judgment himself upon officers and soldiers charged with offences. Such a system as that would never formerly have been thought of.
  MR. RYLANDSthought, after the very serious statement which had been made as to the conduct of the War Office in the matter of courts martial, some explanation should be given. The hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for East Aberdeenshire (Sir Alexander Gordon) had, in the most distinct manner, charged the Secretary of State for War with a very grave misdemeanour. He had stated that the right hon. and gallant Gentleman had been in the habit of making use unnecessarily of the power he possessed to deal with military offenders, and of not bringing offences under the cognizance of courts martial when they ought to have been. When hon. and gallant Gentlemen in the Army thought it necessary that some provision should be made against this sort of procedure, he was of opinion that the Committee ought to take some notice of the matter. He (Mr. Rylands) was very much influenced by the authority of the hon. and learned Member for Oxford (Sir William Harcourt) in other matters; but upon this clause he was not disposed to regard him as an exclusive authority. He thought that it was undesirable that for some trivial offence there should necessarily be a court martial; but he quite agreed that if there was any chance of the clause being made use of

  583
  to perpetrate any injustice upon the officers and soldiers of the Army, it was desirable by every means to prevent it. He did not, however, think that it had been satisfactorily shown that the effect of the Amendment proposed, which was designed to counteract a very pernicious practice, would be that imputed to it—of making a court martial necessary in the case of every trivial offence. He should, therefore, support the Amendment.
  SIR HENRY HAVELOCKsaid, he was of opinion that the effect of the Amendment of the hon. and gallant Member for East Aberdeenshire (Sir Alexander Gordon) would be that every person subject to military law committing any offence contrary to good order and military discipline must of necessity be tried by a court martial. He did not think that that was a result which was desirable, and that there should be no option but to try every man by court martial. Although he agreed with the desirability of offences being tried by court martial, yet, for the reasons he had alleged, he could not support the Amendment.
  MR. HOPWOODwas of the same opinion as the hon. and gallant Member for East Aberdeenshire (Sir Alexander Gordon) as to the propriety of making courts martial obligatory on the "War Office in lieu of secret procedure. But, still, he thought his Amendment open to the objection urged against it—that every offence, however small, would have to be tried by court martial. He would, therefore, venture to suggest that he should withdraw his Amendment, and that after the words "court martial" in the clause, should be inserted the words "and not otherwise." That would effect his object that no man should be sentenced to any of the penalties provided by the clause, except after conviction by courts martial, and would also meet the objection that had been raised to his Amendment.
  SIR ALEXANDER GORDONwas quite willing to adopt the course proposed by the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Stockport (Mr. Hopwood), and begged to withdraw his Amendment. Before he did so, however, he would ask the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Sunderland (Sir Henry Havelock) whether, in the whole course of his service, he had ever
  584
  interpreted the 105th Article of War in the same manner that he had done that day. He must have served on many courts martial; but he (Sir Alexander Gordon) would venture to say that it was impossible for him ever to have placed the same construction on the Article of War as he had now done.
  THE CHAIRMANinquired what course the hon. and gallant Member for East Aberdeenshire intended to pursue?
  SIR ALEXANDER GORDONstated that he would withdraw his Amendment.
  Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
  MR. HOPWOOD MR. HOPWOOD moved to insert, in page 16, line 27, after the words "court martial," the words "and not otherwise."
  SIR HENRY JAMESobserved, that those words would do nothing at all. It was only saying that that should be done which should be done.
  MR. HOPWOODdid not think there was anything extraordinary in inserting the words, which were very usual in the Acts of the Legislature. It was simply said that something should be done by court martial, and by that alone. If those words were not put in, the clause would be open to the construction that an officer might be cashiered for such offences as these, although not tried by court martial. He ventured to say that if the words "and not otherwise" were inserted, it would have the effect of the Legislature saying in no other way than by court martial ought an officer to be cashiered.
  SIR WILLIAM HARCOURTobserved, that that construction would destroy the power of the Crown to cashier officers. If an offence could not be cashiered except by court martial, as, according to the hon. and learned Member for Stockport, would be the case if his Amendment were adopted, it was a direct interference with the power of the Crown to cashier at its absolute discretion. That power would be indirectly taken away by his Amendment.
  MAJOR NOLANcontended that the words "on conviction by court martial" governed the word "soldier" lower down in the clause, and, under that provision, a commanding officer might give 21 days' imprisonment. It would be very serious, indeed, if the words proposed were put in the clause, because it would prevent

  585
  a commanding officer dealing with a soldier by inflicting on him some small punishment without sending him to a court martial.
  MR. MEREWETHERagreed that the Amendment would prevent a commanding officer, who found a man guilty of something to the prejudice of good order and military discipline, even reprimanding him, for he could not be dealt with otherwise than by court martial, reprimand being one of the penalties specified.
  MR. HOPWOODdid not wish to affect the Prerogative of the Crown to dismiss an officer; but the principle on which they insisted was, that whenever any person was charged with any such offence as was indicated in the clause, and was liable to be tried by court martial, he should be tried by court martial, and should be dealt with in no other way. Such a provision as that would not interfere with the Prerogative of the Crown to dimiss anyone for any or no reason whatever. So far as this clause was concerned, and so far as it laid down certain charges, then those matters ought to be decided upon by a proper tribunal.
  MR. MUNTZremarked, that a man could be dismissed without any court martial at all. He did not think that anyone would wish to interfere with the Prerogative of the Crown to dismiss an officer from the Service without assigning a reason.
  MR. E. JENKINSsaid, he should move to report Progress, as the Committee did not seem disposed to hear him on the matter.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Chairman do report Progress, and ask leave to sit again."—(Mr. E. Jenkins.)
  COLONEL STANLEYwas not aware that the hon. Gentleman had met with any interruption. Many of the comments upon some of those points were not shared in by the body of the Committee; but if they reported Progress whenever that was the case, they would be kept till the Whitsuntide Holidays considering the Bill. There had been no interruptions, and, on the contrary, the discussion had gone on most smoothly. His objection to the Amendment was that whereas the authorities now exer-
  586
  cised a discretion with regard to sending offences before a court martial, if it were adopted, when once they had taken cognizance of a case, there would be no option but to have it tried by court martial, and thus subject the offenders to much more severe punishment. Therefore, he wished [the clause to stand as it was, and he trusted that the Committee would proceed and give its decision upon what, after all, was a very small matter.
  SIR HENRY HAVELOCKobjected to the Amendment, both on the ground that it might be an interference with the Prerogative of the Crown, and that it would prevent offences, however small, being dealt with otherwise than by court martial. It was not desirable to interfere with the Prerogative of the Crown in an indirect manner; and sending cases to court martial instead of dealing with them summarily would, so far from being an alteration in the direction of leniency, be exactly the reverse.
  MR. E. JENKINSstated that he had no desire to stop the progress of the debate; but if the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Secretary of State for War would put some little restriction upon the tempestuous element behind him, he thought they would get on better. He had taken considerable pains to acquaint himself with the details of this measure, and thought that the Committee should pay some regard to the objections brought forward. He would advise his hon. and learned Friend (Mr. Hopwood) to withdraw his Amendment after the opinions that had been expressed as to its effect upon the Prerogative of the Crown. Undoubtedly it was the Prerogative of the Crown to dismiss without any reason given; and as regarded that Prerogative, it was not proposed for one moment to interfere with it. They proposed only to point out that if an officer were charged with the offences cognizable by military tribunals established in the Act, that then, in relation to those offences, he should be allowed the privilege of a trial by court martial before the Crown exercised its Prerogative. That might be an interference with the Prerogative of the Crown to some extent, as it asked the Crown, before it dismissed officers for particular offences, to restrain its Prerogative until they had been tried by courts martial under the Act. No

  587
  doubt, if the Crown were advised to relieve an officer of his trust or dismiss him from the Service upon a ground not made known to the general public, but which was supposed to be satisfactory, that could be done even if the Amendment were adopted. Much scandal would, however, arise from the practice being largely adopted. A bad effect was produced on the public mind by dismissing an officer who had been charged with a crime under the Act, because it was found inconvenient to the officers at the Horse Guards to try the matter by reason of someone else being mixed up in the affair. Whenever an offence was charged against an officer, he ought to be tried for it, in order that he should be either properly punished, or that he should have an opportunity of making his innocence clear to the whole world. The consequence of dismissal from the Service on the social status of the accused was very serious, and so grave, that it was a very harsh thing indeed to deprive a man of an opportunity of proving his innocence before a court martial. It was impossible for the Crown to ignore the fact that there was a Proviso in the Act for trial by court martial. He begged to withdraw his Motion to report Progress.
  Motion, by leave, withdrawn.
  MR. HOPWOODsaid, that as he did not find sufficient unanimity with regard to his proposal, he begged to withdraw his Amendment.
  Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
  SIR ARTHUR HAYTERsaid, that he had to move an Amendment with regard to punishment provided by this clause. It was extremely objectionable that different punishments should be inflicted, and he wished to move to leave out the words at the end of clause "or such less punishment as is in this Act mentioned." In Clause 44, punishments were detailed, and cashiering was placed in a lower place than imprisonment, although it was provided that an officer should be sentenced to be cashiered before being sentenced to penal servitude or imprisonment. He would also move that as imprisonment was made by this clause to follow cashiering, the words "should be liable to be cashiered" should also be struck out.
  Amendment proposed,
  In page 11, line 27, to leave out, after the word "liable," to the word "soldier," inclusive, in line 29.—(Sir Arthur Hayter.)
  Question proposed, "That the words 'if an officer' stand part of the Clause."
  SIR WILLIAM HARCOURTremarked, that this was a minor offence clause; but some act, infringing good order and discipline, might be very serious. He did not think that it would be well to limit the punishment in the way suggested by the hon. and gallant Member.
  MAJOR NOLANsaid, that the Amendment proposed would have the effect of increasing, rather than of lessening, the stringency of this "Devil's Clause." The clause had already got a bad name, and the tendency of the Amendment was to increase this stringency. He had been very anxious all through this Act to lessen its stringency, or to prevent its being increased, both as regarded officers and men. He thought it a mistake to put officers and men on the same footing. There had always been two classes—officers and men—and he thought it right that the men should be kept distinct, for if all were promoted to be officers, it would be impossible to do anything at all. This was a very sweeping clause, and as it took in nearly everything, he did not think that the punishments should be made too heavy. His opinion was that, in many cases, officers should be dismissed, instead of being cashiered. He had a similar Amendment to move with respect to the men—namely, to limit their imprisonment to 84 days. He thought that that term was quite long enough, and that it was desirable not to give too heavy punishments for undefined charges. Every act which could, by any possibility, be construed as prejudicial to military law and discipline was brought under this law, and if the clause was so very stringent, he thought it would fail in its object. He might observe that there was one very mischievous consequence of this clause which would be partially removed by the Amendment of which Notice had been given by the hon. and learned Member for Oxford. This clause had a very bad effect upon the Army, because it prevented officers studying military law. It had been found so easy to bring

  589
  in every crime under this clause that the other provisions of the Act were neglected. Numbers of cases were brought in under the 105th Article of War which might very well come under other provisions. He hoped that the Government would not adopt the Amendment which had been proposed, and that they would rather go in the direction of mitigating than increasing the punishments given under the clause.
  MAJOR O'BEIRNEreferred to a case which had happened in which a man had been given 68 days' imprisonment by a court martial. The entire procedure was afterwards quashed; but it was held that there was evidence under the clause. He thought that from its operation a constant miscarriage of justice occurred.
  COLONEL STANLEYthought it would be better to adhere to the wording of the clause as it stood. He agreed with the hon. and gallant Member for Galway (Major Nolan) in much that he had said; but he was, at the same time, of opinion that it would not be quite wise to introduce words into the clause limiting, as was proposed, the discretion of courts martial, because it was perfectly conceivable that cases might occur, though perhaps very rarely, in which it would be desirable and necessary that a very severe punishment should be inflicted. As to the punishment of imprisonment, the object throughout the Bill had, as a rule, been to confine it to such cases—cases in which there was something of violence, or something that was disgraceful in the nature of the offence committed. Cashiering was, no doubt, a very severe punishment, almost the severest that could be inflicted upon an officer, short of death; but there were some instances in which it would be felt to be a less severe punishment than imprisonment, which certainly could not, he thought, be fairly maintained to be regarded with the same sort of feeling by both officers and men.
  SIR ARTHUR HAYTERwas not convinced by the arguments which had been urged against the Amendment, which he felt it to be his duty to press to a Division, being of opinion that the clause conferred too large a power upon courts martial in the punishment of what, after all, might be very trivial offences.
  Question put.
  The Committee divided:—Ayes 157; Noes 73: Majority 84.—(Div. List, No. 97.)
  MAJOR NOLAN MAJOR NOLAN moved, as an Amendment, in page 16, line 28, the omission of the word "cashiered," with the view of substituting for it the word "dismissed." He contended that cashiering was too severe a punishment to inflict upon an officer for such offences as were contemplated under the operation of the clause, and that dismissal would quite as effectually answer the purpose of preventing conduct prejudicial to good order and military discipline. He also intended to propose a second Amendment, limiting the period of imprisonment which might be inflicted on a soldier under the clause to 84 days. If those Amendments were agreed to, the severity of the clause as regarded both officers and men would be considerably mitigated, and the powers which it conferred upon courts martial would be less liable to abuse.
  COLONEL STANLEYsaid, he was sorry he could not accept the Amendment. He might point out to the hon. and gallant Gentleman that so many offences wore specified in other clauses of the Bill that the clause under discussion would, in all probability, be reduced to a minimum in its operation. It was, at the same time, perfectly possible that there might be some very serious offence which would have to be tried under the clause for which the punishment of cashiering would be by no means too severe. On general principles it was, he thought, expedient to maintain that form of punishment in the ease of the officers; while it would also, in his opinion, be injurious to the Service to limit the term of imprisonment in the case of the men as was proposed. He would add that if a maximum punishment were fixed by the clause, it would in practice be very likely to become the minimum.
  COLONEL ALEXANDERpointed out that, under the operation of the clause, the punishment of cashiering would not necessarily be inflicted on an officer for an offence to the prejudice of good order and military discipline. He would merely be liable to it in those cases in which, in the opinion of a court martial, the offence of which he was guilty called for so severe a punishment,
  MAJOR NOLANsaid, the argument of the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Secretary of State for War, that if a maximum punishment were fixed, it would be likely to become the minimum, was not borne out by experience. The maximum penalty of two years' imprisonment was very rarely inflicted in practice, and was very frequently reduced by regimental courts martial to imprisonment for only two or three days.
  GENERAL SIR GEORGE BALFOURthought the discussion only seemed to furnish another illustration of how confused and confusing were the provisions of this Bill. For his own part, he regretted very much that, instead of making such a proposal as that embodied in the present clause, the Secretary of State for War had not adhered more closely to the Articles of War and the Regulations already in existence, which long experience had proved to have worked satisfactorily. The Bill ought simply to have been a consolidating Bill, and another Bill should have been introduced, providing for changes in the existing law and Articles of War. This was the command of the Statute Revision Committee. The second Bill, on being agreed to in Committee, might then have been amalgamated with the consolidated Bill. In this form the Military Law should have been passed, without raising the numerous difficult questions already discussed.
  MR. PARNELLexpressed his surprise that the Secretary of State for War should have refused to accept the Amendment. Of the two, he might add, the second Amendment of his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Galway (Major Nolan) seemed to him to be the more important. All it asked the Committee to affirm was that no punishment should be inflicted on a private soldier exceeding 84 days' imprisonment for the commission of any offence which it was found impossible to define in the Act itself. That, he confessed he could not help thinking, was a most reasonable proposal. There was no grave or serious offence which had not been abundantly defined in the Bill already; and it could, therefore, be only for some trifling offence that a soldier could be tried by a court martial and sentenced to imprisonment under the operation of the clause now under discussion.
  COLONEL COLTHURSThoped the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Secretary of State for War would reconsider his decision in the matter. There were, in his opinion, very few cases in which a court martial would think it necessary to sentence a man to a longer period of imprisonment than 84 days. If a man was sentenced to six or 12 months' imprisonment, the evil results were likely to be far greater than the punishment itself. As to the first part of the clause which related to officers, he did not think it would be worth while to interfere with it.
  COLONEL MUREsaid, he could not support the first Amendment of the hon. and gallant Member for Galway (Major Nolan). The second, however, was, he thought, entitled to the favourable consideration of the Committee. As had been observed in the course of the discussion, every serious offence had already been defined in the Bill; and there ought, in his opinion, to be some limitation imposed on the powers of courts martial in dealing with those trifling offences against good order and discipline which might arise under the operation of the clause. As a general rule, of course, great powers must be given to those who were intrusted with the administration of the affairs of the Army; but as there was great variety in the tone and temper of officers in the command of regiments, so was there great variety in the severity of the punishments which were inflicted on the men under them from time to time. That being so, it would, he thought, be very advisable to limit the power conferred by the clause, as the hon. and gallant Member for Galway proposed to do by his second Amendment. It was a limitation to which commanding officers themselves would, he believed, be far from objecting.
  MR. HOPWOODcontended that as the clause applied, and that only in general terms, to a number of small and trivial offences for which it had been found impossible to provide in the other clauses of the Bill, it would be only wise and fair for the Government, especially after the remarks which had fallen from hon. and gallant Members who were so well acquainted with the subject, to provide that the punishment to be inflicted for those offences should not exceed a maximum. He entirely

  593
  dissented from the view of the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Secretary of State for War that because the extent of the punishment was named in the clause it would invariably be adopted, and the maximum become the minimum. His experience of Courts of Law did not bear out this view, and he hoped the Amendment would be agreed to.
  SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT, while admitting that there were one or two points of some difficulty involved in the clause, said, its real object was to provide a means of dealing with unforeseen offences which, so far as he was aware, were not provided for under the Military Law as it stood. The Bill made definite provisions against all serious offences; but it was desirable, in his opinion, that the whole ground should be covered, and that there should be the means of inflicting adequate punishment for conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline in the Army whenever it occurred.
  SIR ALEXANDER GORDONwished to call the attention of the Committee to the opinion of the draftsman of the Bill, as having an important bearing on the subject under discussion. The draftsman, in giving his evidence before the Select Committee upstairs, said he did not believe the ingenuity of man could discover a crime which could not be tried under the operation of the first part of the Bill, and that if any gentleman present at the time, whether soldier or civilian, could tell him of any such crime, he would give the question up. That being the opinion of the draftsman, would it not be wise, he would ask, to accept the Amendment of the hon. and gallant Member for Galway (Major Nolan), limiting the period of imprisonment in the case of a soldier found guilty, under the present clause, to 84 days?
  SIR CHARLES RUSSELLsaid, he could not see why, if the punishment of cashiering, which was one of great severity, might be inflicted upon an officer under this clause, his hon. and gallant Friends opposite who supported the second Amendment of the hon. and gallant Member for Galway (Major Nolan) should suppose that an offence for which a soldier might be tried under it might not be one of considerable magnitude, also deserving of severe punishment.
  MR. MEREWETHERpointed out that an offence which was perfectly obvious the moment attention was called to it, that of injuring the Revenue by destroying Her Majesty's coinage, had been declared in the Courts of Law this year not to be an offence under the existing Acts by two learned Judges; while two others, including the framer of the original Code, held that it was. That fact, he thought, was sufficient to show that it was not easy to provide for every offence specifically in an Act of Parliament, and it was very probable that the counsel for a prisoner before a court martial would not be very long in finding out some serious offence which was not defined in the clauses so carefully framed by the draftsman of the present Bill.
  MR. RYLANDSwould remind the Committee that the Bill had been drafted with the greatest care by a gentleman whose experience extended over a long period of time, and that the utmost pains had been taken to include in it every known offence which was at all likely to be committed. To provide, however, for the possibility of there being some offence which was not contemplated by the framers of the Bill the words—
  "That is to say, is guilty of any act, conduct, disorder, or neglect, to the prejudice of good order and military discipline,"
  were embodied in the clause under discussion. That being so, and every serious offence being already provided for, it appeared to him, as it did to almost every hon. Member who had taken part in the discussion, that the punishment which might be inflicted under the clause should be limited as far as possible. If, therefore, his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Galway did not press his first Amendment, he would, he hoped, at all events, take a Division upon the second.
  MR. MORGAN LLOYDwas also of opinion that the words of the clause were so vague and uncertain, and allowed courts martial so great a latitude in the exercise of their discretion, that it was highly desirable the punishment which might be imposed under it should be limited. What, for instance, was an offence against good order? One commanding officer might think one thing amounted to an offence against good order, while another might be of the contrary opinion. Now, as every act which could amount

  595
  to a military crime was already comprehended within the provisions of some section of the Bill, it seemed to him that such a clause as that under discussion ought to be confined to offences of minor importance, and that latitude should not be given to tribunals acting under it to punish very severely acts which, in the estimation of one tribunal, might amount to offences, while another tribunal might be disposed to regard them as no offences at all. He hoped, therefore, the Government would accept the Amendment.
  GENERAL SHUTEsaid, every hon. and learned Gentleman, and, indeed, every brother magistrate, must be aware that in Civil Law it would be simply an absurdity to attempt to define in detail every crime that could possibly be committed. It would be still more absurd to attempt to do so with regard to the maintenance of military discipline; nor was it likely that commanding officers would differ as to what offences were to the prejudice of good order. It was also extremely improbable that too severe a punishment would be inflicted under the clause, especially seeing that the sentences passed by courts martial had to be confirmed by the confirming officer, and had to be submitted to the Judge Advocate General's Department. There was no fear, therefore, of there being any such inequality, as some hon. Members appeared to apprehend, in the punishments awarded; nor did he think that there was the least cause for the alarm that a greater punishment would be imposed than was desirable or expedient. Some atrocious crime might be committed, especially on field service, which was not at all contemplated by the framers of the Bill, and for that the present clause would provide.
  MAJOR NOLANsaid, that in consequence of what had fallen from some of his hon. Friends near him, he would withdraw his first Amendment, and take a Division only upon the second. He might be allowed to point out, in reply to the hon. and gallant Member for Brighton (General Shute), that if the offence committed were an atrocious one, it ought not to be tried under the present clause at all; and the ingenuity of the hon. and gallant Gentleman would, he felt satisfied, very soon bring it under the operation of some of the preceding clauses in which the penalties for grave crimes were set forth. One very good
  596
  reason, in his opinion, for limiting the clause was that it was likely to be put into operation where there were officers who knew little or nothing about Military Law. The punishment which might be inflicted under it ought, for that and other reasons, in his opinion, to be diminished and defined. It was most injudicious, he thought, to retain the clause in the Bill at all; but if it was to be retained by way of experiment, it should be restricted as much, as possible. He begged, however, to withdraw the Amendment before the Committee.
  Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
  MAJOR NOLAN MAJOR NOLAN moved the second Amendment, providing that in the case of a soldier the period of imprisonment should not exceed 84 days.
  Amendment proposed,
  In page 16, fine 29, after the word "imprisonment, to insert the words "for a term not exceeding eighty-four days.—(Major Nolan.)
  Question put, "That those words be there inserted."
  The Committee divided:—Ayes 68; Noes 198: Majority 130.—(Div. List, No. 98.)
  CAPTAIN MILNE HOMEbegged to move the Amendment standing in the name of his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for East Suffolk (Colonel Barne), subject, however, to a verbal alteration for which he himself was responsible—namely, in page 16, line 30, after "mentioned," to insert—
  "Where an officer has been convicted by a civil court of an indictable offence he shall cease from the date of such conviction to belong to Her Majesty's Army."
  He cordially agreed with the Amendment, and trusted that the right hon. and gallant Gentleman would accept it.
  SIR HENRY JAMESthought it impossible that the Proviso could be accepted, as under its terms an officer who had committed the most venial act would be bound to be dismissed from the Army.
  CAPTAIN MILNE HOMEsaid, he certainly had not been aware that such venial acts as instanced by the hon. and learned Member for Taunton were classed as indictable offences. He would not,

  597
  after such information from so great an authority, press the Amendment.
  Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
  SIR ALEXANDER GORDONalso wished to move an Amendment in the same terms as that of the hon. and gallant Member opposite (Colonel Barne), leaving out the words "or misdemean-our." He thought that an officer guilty of felony ought no longer to hold Her Majesty's commission, and was under the impression that in former years conviction of felony carried with it ipso facto dismissal of an officer.
  THE CHAIRMANpointed out that the clause did not contain the word "misdemeanour," and that, therefore, it could not be proposed to omit it from the clause.
  SIR ALEXANDER GORDONcomplained of the noise in the House, which prevented him hearing the words of the Chairman. He begged to move, as an Amendment, in page 16, line 30, after "mentioned," to insert—
  "Where an officer has been convicted by a civil court of felony he shall cease from the date of such conviction to belong to Her Majesty's Army."
  SIR HENRY JAMESremarked, that the Amendment, as amended, was one which the Committee ought to consider well before giving it their acceptance, because, by the clause, an officer convicted of felony, however wrongly, and even if that conviction should afterwards be set aside, would have to bear the penalty of dismissal from Her Majesty's Service.
  Amendment negatived.
  On the Motion of Sir WILLIAM HARCOURT, Amendment made in page 16, at end of Clause, by inserting—
  "Provided, That no person shall be charged under this section in respect of any offence for which special provision is made in any other part of this Act."
  Clause, as amended, agreed to, and ordered to stand part of the Bill.
  Offences punishable by ordinary Law.
  Clause 41 (Offences punishable by ordinary law).
  SIR HENRY JAMES SIR HENRY JAMES moved, as an Amendment, in page 16, line 35, to leave out the words "has committed,"
  598
  in order to insert the words "shall commit."
  Amendment agreed to; words substituted accordingly.
  MR. PARNELLwished to move an Amendment which stood in the name of the hon. and gallant Member for Galway (Major Nolan), who was absent. The clause, which was very long and involved, gave power to try by court martial the offences of treason, murder, manslaughter, treason-felony, or rape committed in any place within Her Majesty's Dominions other than Gibraltar—
  "Unless such place (whore the offence is committed) is, in the opinion of the officer who convenes the court martial (such opinion to be expressed in the order convening the court, and to be conclusive), more than 100 miles as measured in a straight line from any city or town in which the offender can, within a reasonable time, be tried for such offence by a competent civil court."
  He submitted to the Committee that the Proviso which he asked should be adopted was much more fitted to meet the requirements of cases contemplated by the Bill than the clause as it then stood. Within the United Kingdom it would, of course, always be possible to try an offender before a court of criminal judicature, so that no necessity existed for sending any person to be tried for a criminal offence by court martial. The case, however, would be different in India; but it would be met by the Proviso which he was about to ask the Committee to accept. The Saving Clause in the Bill gave great power and authority to the officer convening the court martial, which he (Mr. Parnell) submitted he should not possess. Practically, it gave him power to override the ordinary Civil Courts of the land by his own ipse dixit. The words of the clause he had already quoted made the officer judge both as to the distance and as to the time within which it was reasonable the offender should be tried. He did not think it right to leave such power in the hands of the officer convening the court martial, and therefore begged to move that, in page 17, line 1, after the words "courts martial" the words "if there is no possibility of trying the offender within a reasonable time before a competent civil court," be inserted.
  SIR HENRY JAMESthought that the hon. Member for Meath (Mr. Par-

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  nell) had selected an inconvenient part of the section on which to raise his point. He (Sir Henry James), himself, shared the wish of the hon. Member to raise the question as to time and distance, but considered it better that it should be deferred until they came to the restrictive part of the clause, at which point he should be happy to support the Amendment of the hon. Member. As the clause stood, no person could be tried by court martial for these offences in the United Kingdom, and the point raised only applied to places beyond it.
  COLONEL STANLEYagreed with the principle of the Amendment of the hon. Member for Meath (Mr. Parnell), but thought it advisable to retain the present wording, until some better limitation could be introduced, which he would be perfectly willing to consider and accept; and on this point he was in hope of receiving the assistance of the hon. and learned Member for Taunton (Sir Henry James). The object of the portion of the clause to which the Amendment applied was to prevent the jurisdiction of the court martial being void ab initio.
  MR. PARNELLwas willing to take the suggestion of the hon. and learned Member for Taunton (Sir Henry James), although he could not see how the question could be more suitably raised at that part of the clause to which he had referred. On the understanding that the hon. and learned Member would move a sufficient Amendment when that portion of the clause was reached, he (Mr. Parnell) was willing that the present Amendment should be withdrawn.
  Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
  MAJOR NOLANproposed to add words to the clause, the effect of which would be to prevent any officer holding a court martial for the trial of the offences named, out of India, unless a competent Civil Court was at a greater distance than 100 miles from the place where the offence was committed. He thought this would make the Act somewhat more stringent as against the convening officer, to insert after the word "is," in page 17, line 26, the following words:—
  "Situated in India or in any country in India under the protection of Her Majesty or in any place beyond the seas in which there is no civil judicature."
  MR. PARNELLhad a verbal Amendment to suggest in line 24—namely, after the word "manslaughter," to insert the words "treason-felony."
  COLONEL STANLEYcould hardly agree to the addition to the wording without some further consideration; but would make a note of the point, and bring it up on the Report.
  SIR HENRY JAMEStrusted that the Government would take into their serious consideration the question of trying by court martial the offence of treason - felony, which, of all others, was the most difficult to deal with, and admitted of great latitude of definition.
  Amendment (Mr. Parnell), by leave, withdrawn.
  MAJOR NOLAN MAJOR NOLAN moved the Amendment of which he had just given Notice
  COLONEL STANLEYsaid, it was very difficult to get at the exact sense of a verbal Amendment at a moment's notice. At first sight, it appeared to him wiser to allow the clause to remain as at present; but he was quite willing to take a note of the suggested alteration.
  MAJOR NOLANexplained that his Amendment would prevent military courts acting for the trial of offences named in the clause in any of the Colonies, even if they were 100 miles away from a town in which civil judicature was in force, but that it would, not prevent them from acting in India.
  SIR DAVID WEDDERBURNthought the words of the Amendment not well chosen, and to involve a repetition, unless the term "British India" was employed.
  COLONEL STANLEYsaid, unquestionably, no officer would desire to try the crimes named in the clause by court martial; but it was necessary to make provision for the trial of such offences under certain circumstances by court martial—that was to say, when the trial by civil process would have to take place at a distance of more than 100 miles from the place where the offence was committed. He did not think it would be wise to limit the clause in the way proposed by the hon. and gallant Member for Galway (Major Nolan), but would carefully consider the point raised. In the meantime, he asked the Com-

  601
  mittee to allow the wording to remain as at present, on the understanding that it should be looked into on Report.
  Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
  SIR HENRY JAMESsaid, in order to fulfil his promise to the hon. Member for Meath (Mr. Parnell), he would propose the Amendment standing in the name of the hon. and gallant Member for South Ayrshire (Colonel Alexander) which had not been moved. The offences named in the clause were not of a military, but of a civil character—primâ facie, therefore, they should be tried by a Civil Court. But the Proviso in the clause gave absolute discretion to the officer convening the court martial to say—first, whether there was a competent tribunal within 100 miles, and from the exercise of that discretion there was no appeal; secondly, it was left to his discretion to say whether the person could be tried within a reasonable time. He thought that considerable discussion was desirable before the Proviso was agreed upon in its present form. With relation to what was the term "reasonable time" used? One officer might say—"I wish this regiment to march; I cannot try you before the regiment marches." Therefore, the individual could be tried in a reasonable time with relation to the marching of the regiment. Another officer might say—"I cannot try you until the health of the regiment permits it;" in that ease, the term "reasonable time" would be used with relation to the health of the regiment. In this way, power was given to the officer to supersede the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts, and to say—"I think the offender cannot be tried within a reasonable time; therefore, he shall be tried by court martial;" and, of course, there were circumstances under which that power might be exercised. All this was to apply outside the United Kingdom, and was, in fact, an extension of the Mutiny Act to all the Dominions of the Crown. This great extension of power claimed for, and to be placed in the hands of, a military officer, to shut out the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts of the country, he felt bound to oppose, and should, therefore, do all in his power to strike out the Proviso. He moved that all the words from the word "in," in line 26, down to "conclusive," in line 28, be struck out,
  MAJOR O'BEIRNEthought that the time within which an officer should be tried ought to be accurately fixed. Twenty years ago, a case had occurred of an officer being kept under arrest for six months, although the authorities to whom his case was referred were only 300 miles from the station; but they did not care to interfere during the hot weather in India. Again, an officer had been kept four months under arrest in Dublin, pending the settlement of the question as to whether he should be brought before a court martial or not.
  MR. RYLANDSthought the Committee must have perceived that very serious matter had been introduced into the discussion. The Committee could not be expected to pass the clause in its present objectionable state; and he, therefore, appealed to the right hon. and gallant Gentleman to postpone it. He could not agree to allow the clause to pass out of the hands of the Committee until it had been put into proper shape. He did not doubt the intention of the Secretary of State for War to prepare another clause; but the Committee ought to see that it was entirely changed, and consider well the Amendment to be made before it was passed. He therefore suggested that the clause should be postponed, and that before the Committee met again the right hon. and gallant Gentleman should state the exact words which they were expected to adopt.
  COLONEL STANLEYhoped that the Committee would see that the Government were anxious to prevent any possible abuse under the clause, which, for some reasons, he should be glad to see amended. The best plan, in his opinion, would be to leave out all the words from the word "in," in line 26, down to "conclusive," and also to leave out the words "within a reasonable time," and he would bring up the words on the Report to make the meaning-more clear.
  GENERAL SIR GEORGE BALFOURsaid, that the law in India on this point was pretty well settled. It was the custom there from time immemorial to send at once for civil trial all cases where the offence had been committed within 120 miles from the Civil Court of the chief Presidency towns of Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay. The present Bill was pro-

  603
  posed to alter the distance from 120 to 100 miles. No reason was given for this trifling change. It had, however, the effect of changing a long-established course of action, and one that had been introduced after many difficulties. Beyond 120 miles the trials for offences which would within 120 miles be carried on before a Civil Court must be conducted by courts martial, and hitherto very fairly done. He trusted that the Secretary of State for War would consult those who were acquainted with the Indian practice in determining what the new clause should be.
  SIR HENRY JAMESpointed out, that if the Proviso were allowed to stand in its present form, it would, primâ facie, at once give military jurisdiction in cases of murder and treason, and he could not think that such was the intention of the Committee.
  MR. PARNELLsaid, the limit of 100 miles from the place of civil jurisdiction was a bad one, and it would, therefore, be better to leave that an open question also. He suggestsd that all the words after "Gibraltar," in line 26, should be left out, in order to insert the words—
  "Unless such place is so situated that there is no possibility of trying the offender before a competent civil court;"
  and the right hon. and gallant Gentleman could then amend that on Report, if necessary. The proposed alteration would get rid of the limit of distance, and the authority of the convening officer, as well as the objectionable sentence with regard to the "reasonable time" within which an offender could be tried, while any securities that were found to be required could be added on the Report.
  MR. HOPWOODthought the word "civil," as contrasted with "military," made use of in the clause, was not the fittest that could be chosen. This criticism was merely verbal; but it was right to use accurate language if it could be found.
  MR. STAVELEY HILLreplied, that by the Definition Clause the words "civil courts" applied to any court whatever.
  Amendment agreed to; words struck out accordingly.
  Clause, as amended, agreed to, and ordered to stand part of the Bill.
  Redress of Wrongs.
  Clause 42 (Mode of complaint by officers).
  SIR ALEXANDER GORDON SIR ALEXANDER GORDON moved, as an Amendment, in line 41, page 17, after the words "Commander-in-Chief," to insert the words "in order to obtain justice."
  Amendment agreed to; words inserted accordingly.
  SIR ALEXANDER GORDON SIR ALEXANDER GORDON moved, as an Amendment, in lines 41 and 42, to leave out the words "who shall cause his complaint to be inquired into," in order to insert the words "who is hereby required to examine into such complaint."
  Amendment agreed to; words substituted accordingly.
  SIR ALEXANDER GORDON SIR ALEXANDER GORDON moved, as an Amendment, in page 18, line 2, after the word "thereon," to add these words—
  "In India any such officer may complain to the Commander in Chief in India, who, if he is unable to give such officer the redress to which he may consider himself entitled, shall forward the complaint to the Commander in Chief to be disposed of as above directed."
  In some of the Presidencies of India, an officer was allowed to complain to the Commander-in-Chief; but in others, an officer would be obliged to complain to a civil authority. The object of the Amendment was that an officer who felt himself aggrieved should have the right to complain to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. This right was possessed by the officers in China, and was, indeed, acknowledged all over the world.
  COLONEL STANLEYthought that Subsection 3 of Clause 170, page 98, which ran thus—
  "Any officer belonging to Her Majesty's Indian Forces who thinks himself wronged by his commanding officer, and on duo application made to him does not receive the redress to which he may consider himself entitled, may complain to the Commander-in-Chief in the Presidency," &c.
  would carry out the principle desired by the hon. and gallant Member to be established.
  SIR ALEXANDER GORDONremarked, that this was a good illustration of the answers received in the

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  House of Commons, as well as of the way in which the Bill had been prepared. The clause referred to by the right hon. and gallant Gentleman applied to officers of the Indian Army alone.
  SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOTagreed with the proposal of the hon. and gallant Member for East Aberdeenshire (Sir Alexander Gordon), and hoped that the right hon. and gallant Gentleman would see his way to put the words into the Bill.
  GENERAL SIR GEORGE BALFOURhoped the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Secretary of State for War would take up the point, and see what could be done to settle the matter; at the same time, he trusted that the complaints of officers would not be allowed to come through the Council at home, because they would do all they could to prevent redress being given. The quotation of the right hon. and gallant Gentleman referred entirely to the Indian Forces; but the Committee had to deal with that portion of the English Army serving in India, and, in fact, subordinate to the Indian authorities.
  SIR JOHN HAYtrusted that the Amendment would be accepted by the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Secretary of State for War.
  MR. RYLANDSconsidered the Committee had reason to complain that the right hon. and gallant Gentleman had referred, in answer to the hon. and gallant Member for East Aberdeenshire (Sir Alexander Gordon), to a portion of the Bill which had no relation whatever to the point under discussion. The portion of the Bill referred to concerned the Indian Army alone, and the statement of the Secretary of State for War was, therefore, unintentionally, misleading. He (Mr. Rylands) was the more surprised at this, because at the side of the right hon. and gallant Gentleman sat the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Judge Advocate General, who, from his great knowledge of this subject, should have prevented his falling into that error.
  COLONEL STANLEYsaid, the question was, how to deal with the appeal of officers, as regarded the commanding officers in India? Either the officers were officers of the Indian Forces, or they were officers of Her Majesty's Forces serving in India. If they were
  606
  officers of Her Majesty's Forces serving in India, they had a right to appeal under the present clause—42; but if they belonged to Her Majesty's Indian Forces, then their appeal lay under Clause 170.
  GENERAL SIR GEORGE BALFOURreferred to the cases of officers in India whose complaints had lately been subjected to inquiry by a Select Committee, on which the hon. and gallant Baronet the Member for West Sussex (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) and the right hon. and gallant Baronet the Member for Stamford (Sir John Hay) and himself had served. It was there proved most conclusively that though the Commander-in-Chief at home had been made acquainted with the complaints of certain Indian and Royal Artillery officers, yet did not consider himself justified in interfering; and he (Sir George Balfour) considered it a very proper thing that he should not have directly interfered in a case of complaints which appertained to the Indian Government. The question as to the mode of appeal for officers in India was by no means clear, and he thought that it should be provided for at the present opportunity. The Bill did not, however, do so in a satisfactory form. The kinds of complaints that might be, indeed, the complaints that were under the consideration of the Select Committee were of a character far beyond the powers of any military officer to settle. They affected the Indian Government both in India and in England; and, therefore, the Bill ought to provide for all such cases.
  MR. PARNELLwished to understand the position. Had the Amendment of the hon. and gallant Gentleman (Sir Alexander Gordon) been agreed to by the Secretary of State for War?
  COLONEL STANLEYreplied, that he had not agreed to it, for the reason that he understood it to be already provided for by the Bill. The officers of the Army serving in India would not lose their right, under Clause 42, to appeal to the Commander-in-Chief. With regard to the officers of the Indian Forces, their mode of appeal was stated in Clause 170, as he had already pointed out; and their ultimate appeal lay to the Governor of the Presidency, who had power, if he thought it right, to forward the application to the highest quarter.
  MR. HOPWOODinquired to which Commander-in-Chief the appeal lay? It had been answered, to either of them; but that could not be. The Commander-in-Chief in India might have power to remedy the grievance of an officer; if so, that was only saying that the appeal should be made to him in the first instance; but if that was not the case, it was saying that the appeal should lie to the Commander-in-Chief in England. It was this appeal which was desired. It ought to lie in all cases from officers serving in the Queen's Forces in India to the Commander-in-Chief in England.
  GENERAL SIR GEORGE BALFOURreminded the Committee that in India, where the Government was supreme, no power which any Commander-in-Chief possessed, either in India or in England, could deal with. No military authority, however high, could go beyond that of the Viceroy, unless to thrust upon the Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief a right of interference with the Government of India far in excess of the functions confided to him under the Order in Council of 1870. It was, therefore, necessary to provide that the complaints of officers should in some way or other not only reach the Commander-in-Chief in England but also the two Secretaries of State for India and War. He therefore hoped that the Secretary of State for War would take proper means to redress the constantly-recurring grievances of officers serving in India by insuring a channel of communication through which the claims and complaints might be subjected to the Cabinet.
  SIR JOHN HAYsaid, according to Clause 42, an officer might complain to the Commander-in-Chief in India, who would send the complaint to the Secretary of State for India. The officer would then find himself in difficulty between the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Secretary of State for War, and the Secretary of State for India. What was wanted was that the Com-mader-in-Chief in India should receive the officer's complaint, and forward it to the Commander-in-Chief in England, who should take care that no disputes arose between the great Departments of State, owing to which the grievances of officers might remain unredressed. It was true that, under Clause 170, the
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  officers of the Indian Army had a right of appeal which was now sought for the officers of the English Army; and it was asked that such appeal should come home to the Commander-in-Chief here, and, eventually, that the Secretary of State for War should place it before Her Majesty.
  MR. MARTENpointed out that Clause 180 expressed the Commander-in-Chief to mean the Field Marshal or other officer commanding-in-chief Her Majesty's Forces for the time being. The present clause, therefore, would provide for the complaint going to the Commander-in-Chief—that was to say, under the present system, to the Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief Her Majesty's Forces for the time being.
  SIR ALEXANDER GORDONsaid, that the views of the hon. and learned Member for Cambridge (Mr. Marten) did not at all meet the case. The section, quoted from page 98, applied solely to the officers of the Indian Service, who had nothing whatever to do with the British Service, and whose complaints, therefore, it was proper should be settled by the Government under which they were serving. But the Queen's officers should be dealt with as they would be in China or in North America. He felt sure that if the settlement of the question was put off, the Committee would be told, when they reached the clause referred to, that it had nothing to do with the Queen's officers; moreover, he wished it to be understood that he had not put down this Amendment without well knowing the cases to which it would apply. Officers serving in India made complaints which went up to the Presidency, where they were dealt with as Government questions—the civilians disposing of military matters which ought to have gone to the Commander-in-Chief. That was the grievance of the Army. The officers desired to be protected in India as they were in other parts of the world. When these complaints came before the Secretary of State for War, the reply was that he could not interfere in matters relating to India; and when they came before the Secretary of State for India, his reply was that he knew nothing about them. The remedy desired, therefore, was that officers serving in India should have the opportunity of bringing their

  609
  grievances to the knowledge of the Commander-in-Chief in England, and he hoped the right hon. and gallant Gentleman would agree to the insertion of the words proposed.
  COLONEL STANLEYagreed with the principle that an officer, in making an appeal, should not be shuttle-cocked about; but, as it was laid down, officers serving in India came under Clause 42, and had their right of appeal accordingly, it mattered not whether their complaints went to the Commander-in-Chief or the General Officer commanding, both of which officers were but the channels through which the complaints were forwarded. If he found that his impression was wrong, and that the hon. and gallant Member for East Aberdeenshire was correct in the view he had taken, he would agree to the insertion of the words on Report.
  SIR ALEXANDER GORDONsaid, he was perfectly satisfied with the statement of the right hon. and gallant Gentleman; and, therefore, he should withdraw the Amendment.
  Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
  MR. PARNELLsaid, there appeared 'to be some confusion between the hon. and gallant Baronet the Member for East Aberdeenshire (Sir Alexander Gordon) and the Secretary of State for War. The argument of the hon. and gallant Baronet came to this—that although the officer in India—serving in India—nominally retained his status and right of appeal under Clause 42, yet, owing to the distance of England from India, it was impossible for him, practically speaking, to make this appeal within any reasonable time; and although there was a Commander-in-Chief in India, the Commander-in-Chief at home did not consider himself competent to interfere in the matter. Then came the question between the different Secretaries of State—the Secretary of State for India, and the Secretary of State for War. The Secretary of State for War did not consider himself properly qualified. This appeared to him (Mr. Parnell) to be the argument of the hon. and gallant Baronet. Of course, if he only desired to reserve the technical right of an officer in India to appeal, he would have gained his purpose by the promise made by the Secretary of State for War.
  MAJOR NOLANexpressed his regret that some of the clauses in the Bill were not dovetailed. The case was made much worse for the soldier than for the officer. But the Government had introduced into this clause great practical changes. They read very well; but he doubted whether they would work well. There was, for instance, the case of an officer making a complaint against another officer—affecting the character of another officer—or of a soldier making a complaint. What was in the mind of the draftsman of this Bill? Clearly, his object must have been to discourage complaints. The old Articles of War were in the other direction—they encouraged complaints, so as to leave a safety-valve. They gave an officer or a soldier full permission to bring complaints before their superior officer, if they felt themselves aggrieved. There was no penalty on an officer bringing a complaint and failing in it, though there was on the soldier; but there was this provision—that if he brought a complaint before the regimental court—if he appealed to a higher court—he might be punished, if the appeal was found to be frivolous and groundless. The same was the case exactly with regard to the soldier. He thought there was a very great change being introduced by this penal clause, thus adding to the old Articles of War. They now said to a man who made a complaint—"If you make a false statement, you are liable to be tried." At first sight, that seemed fair; but what about the working of it? The man complaining would differ in some matter of fact from his commanding officer; there was nearly always a difference as to a matter of fact, and if there was a difference, it might fairly be said to "affect the character" of somebody. It might, for instance, affect an officer's military character to say he lost his temper, or something of that sort; and in the majority of cases of serious complaint they would have some statement affecting the character of an officer. What he believed would happen under this new Act was this—and it was designed, he was satisfied, for the purpose—when an officer made a complaint, instead of pressing it against his commanding officer, he would be put on his trial, and the commanding officer would be told he must prove the charge against the junior officer, who would be told he

  611
  had made a false charge. The effect of this alteration, instead of assisting complaints, would land the junior officer in a trial in which he would be charged before a court martial for making a false statement. The superior officer would not know that he had made a false statement; but he would say we must investigate, in the same way, this fact; and in that way the junior officer would be placed on his trial. Perhaps, in the great majority of cases, the officer would not be tried; but if one was tried out of 50 who made complaints, it would be quite enough to establish the grievance which he had pointed out, and to stop the great bulk of complaints. It would stop the safety-valve which existed at present—the right of making fair and legitimate complaints of grievances. He thought the right hon. and gallant Gentleman ought to point out why this clause was being introduced. They were removing by this clause the soldier's only safeguard. No soldier under the clause could make a complaint without being made liable to punishment. They might reply—"Well, let him make no false statement." He believed, in the majority of cases, both sides were in the right, and that the facts were as they stated them; and the result would be that a man would be tried for making false statements when, in fact, he had told the truth. When they came to Clause 43, he would show how very much worse the soldier's case was made than it was at present. It behoved the Secretary of State for War to show to the Committee why he had departed from the old Act. He should, in page 18, line 2, move to leave out all the words after "thereon," to the end of the clause.
  MR. STAVELEY HILLsaid, the Committee upstairs had agreed unanimously to the clause. The object of the insertion of the words was clear. It was to prevent false charges. The Committee deemed it proper to make this a specific offence. Let him point out that the words were "knowingly making a false statement," and concealing any material fact. He asked whether "knowingly making a false statement" was not a matter which should be punished?
  MAJOR O'BEIRNE, in reply to the statement of the hon. and learned Gentleman opposite (Mr. Staveley Hill), wished to say that the Committee gave
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  hardly any time at all to the consideration of the clause. They were unanimous, for the simple reason that they were helpless, and the clause was hurried through from beginning to end, and was not discussed at all.
  MR. STAVELEY HILLsaid, that if the hon. and gallant Member for Ler-trim would look, he would find that the hon. and gallant Member for East Aberdeenshire (Sir Alexander Gordon) took a division on another part of the clause.
  MAJOR NOLANwished to point out that his hon. and gallant Friend (Major O'Beirne) and the hon. and learned Gentleman opposite (Mr. Staveley Hill) differed as to a matter of fact in the Committee of which they were Members. This was exactly a point on which an officer would be tried. If a junior officer put the statement in writing, he would probably be tried for making a false statement. The provision in the new Act was a dangerous one. Here they had two hon. Members differing as to a matter of fact; but under this Act the mode of investigation would be to try the complainant. This was the dangerous feature to which he most strongly objected.
  COLONEL MUREsaid, that hon. Gentlemen who complained of this clause were the same who complained of the "Devil's Clause." Offences of this kind must be punished; and if that were so, surely they ought to make the matter clear. He hoped the hon. and gallant Gentleman would give way.
  COLONEL STANLEYrose to explain that it was not a false statement as to fact, but false statements affecting the character or wilfully suppressing any material facts. As to matters of fact, no court in the world would convict a man for a statement, unless it was convinced of the intention of the person making the statement.
  MR. HOPWOODsaid, the Committee was discussing a very important point—the possibility of the accuser being brought to trial. He agreed, on the face of the thing, "knowingly making a false statement," and "wilfully suppressing facts," were strong terms; but, taken in connection with the words with which they were placed in juxtaposition, "by himself making complaint first," something like a menace was held out, or a

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  warning was given to the man not to make any complaint at all. He would put a case which frequently occurred at law. A man made a charge against another, and he was tried. The accuser failed to substantiate the charge. The party accused could retaliate; but how? He might indict the man for perjury; but the law said—"Oh, no! we cannot take merely your counter-statement against that of the accuser. You must have two witnesses as to the fact, proving his statement to be false and wilful. Your mere affirmation that the charge made against you is false is not sufficient to enable us to convict him of perjury. If you wish to show that the charge was the result of more vindictiveness, you must strengthen that by at least two witnesses, and we require two witnesses in support of your statement."
  SIR ALEXANDER GORDONsaid, he wished to support the objection taken by the hon. and gallant Gentleman (Major Nolan). They were, no doubt, re-enacting a clause which already existed; but they were putting a very important rider to it—a rider which said to the man bringing the charge—"Take care what you are about. You will be tried by court martial." That was a most serious thing to say, by Act of Parliament, to a man who had a grievance. He had often heard complaints of soldiers, and there was always a tendency on the part of commanding officers to prevent men making complaints. A commanding officer always disliked a man coming before him to make complaints, or before the general; but it was the duty of every general to see that every soldier had the right of complaint, and that he was not punished if he made it properly. He had ordered a man to be tried for making improper complaints, and he thought the case was already fully provided for. Therefore, he thought it would be better to omit the clause altogether, as it was useless.
  MAJOR NOLANsaid, there was one point to which he wished to allude, and that was with reference to the evidence given before the Committee on the Mutiny Act. He thought, if anyone looked at the list of witnesses there, he would see that the people who gave evidence were those who, in many cases, had frightful bothers with complaints. He did not think the Committee had one witness of the class of men who complained. The
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  Committee had been hearing one class of witnesses; and it was rather better, he thought, for the Committee of the Whole House to hear all sides of the story. The safe right of complaint was a safety-valve for discontent. Abolish, or nearly abolish, that right, and they would remove the safety-valve. The men would interpret the clause as meaning that, however true, the complaints were not wanted.
  MR. STAVELEY HILLwished to read a few lines from the evidence of the Commander-in-Chief. "I think it a great pity," said His Royal Highness, "that any restriction should be put upon the right of complaint." Now that it was supposed an attempt was made to interfere with that right, he wished to remind the Committee of the evidence given on that head by the Commander-in-Chief.
  MR. RYLANDSsaid, that it might be perfectly true this statement was made; but there was nothing to justify this extraordinary change in Military Law. Under the Articles of War, there was every encouragement given to complaints. The object had been not to sit on the safety-valve in dealing with the Army. The right of complaint—the free exercise of the right of complaint—was the safety-valve; and, instead of leaving it in the way in which the Articles of War placed it, they attached to this clause, which provided for the redress of grievances, a warning which no human being could doubt would be understood by junior officers and soldiers as meaning that if they brought complaints against their superior officers it would be at their own risk. He should resist the change as altogether unwise.
  MR. PARNELLsaid, as the proceedings of the Committee had been referred to, he, as a Member of that Committee, thought it right to say that they should not rely too much on them. They were very much hurried, and if hon. Members would study the Report of the Committee, he thought they would find that the Report was drawn up in such a manner that they ought not to attach any great importance to the conclusions arrived at. They had none except official witnesses, and very few of those. They were Horse Guards' witnesses. So far as he was concerned, he agreed to everything, because he saw there was no use pro-

  615
  posing. They were put to a task which could not be performed in two or three Sessions.
  MR. HOPWOODsaid, their opposition to the clause was so rooted taht he thought it would be well if the question were taken into consideration by the Secretary of State for War. At that hour (15 minutes to 7) the clause could not be disposed of. The clause proposed, in effect, to abolish a right which they were all anxious to secure to the men.
  SIR JOSEPH M'KENNAsaid, he thought this provision gave a complete discouragement to any man making a complaint. He had had a good deal to do in civil matters with receiving complaints, and he could assure the Committee it was very difficult to get men to make complaints, even where they were aggrieved; and where the discipline of the Service in which they were engaged was involved, the difficulty always was to get men to impeach authority, even when right. A man had a great deal to contend with before he made up his mind to bring a charge against a superior. If, in addition to the natural reluctance to accuse a superior, he had to labour under the reflection that, when lie did bring a charge, if he did not prove the charge, he would be liable to imprisonment in addition to the imputation that he brought a false charge, the proper exercise of the right of complaint would be seriously curtailed. He knew of one case where his own judgment went wrong. He thought a man brought a false charge; but after wards the charge proved to be true, and it would have involved a serious injustice if the man, immediately after bringing the charge, were tried for bringing it forward. A case occurred to him at the moment. A man made a charge against a respectable party placed over him in authority. It was apparently so absurd that he did not investigate it, especially as the party bringing the charge made a mistake in one very important point, which would seem to destroy his veracity. The charge, however, was true, for all that—and was the man's whole evidence to be discredited?
  And it being ten minutes before Seven of the clock, the Chairman reported Progress; Committee to sit again this day.
  And it being now Seven of the clock, House suspended its sitting.
  House resumed its sitting at a quarter after Nine of the clock.

ORDERS OF THE DAY.

  SUPPLY.—COMMITTEE.
  Order for Committee read.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."

  BREWERS' LICENCES.

    MOTION FOR A SELECT COMMITTEE.
    MR. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN, in rising to call attention to Brewers' Licences; and to move for a Select Committee to inquire into the nature and incidence of the Tax upon Brewers' Licences, said: Sir, although it may seem rather a paradoxical statement, I feel that the task which I have undertaken to-night is, at the same time, easy and difficult. It is easy, because I have a good cause and a strong case. It is difficult, because in these days, when public attention is concentrated upon foreign policy and Colonial difficulties, it is not without an effort that the mind of Parliament can be brought to turn itself to the more prosaic subject of the details of home taxation. Moreover, Sir, the difficulty is increased by the fact that no immediate remission can be expected, even if I prove to demonstration my case against the tax of which I complain to-night. No remission of taxation can be expected, under ordinary circumstances, without a surplus. To such a luxury the Chancellor of the Exchequer has long been a stranger; and I fear that, unless and until, happily for him, there should occur an interregnum of Liberal Government, it will be long indeed before he has another surplus to distribute. But, properly considered, this circumstance rather strengthens my position. If the Chancellor of the Exchequer possessed a surplus, he would be puzzled and embarrassed between the rival claimants upon his bounty. As it is, the prospect of such a state of things being remote, his mind, and the minds of other men, are in a state of calm impartiality, which renders the moment peculiarly opportune for a full and fair

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    inquiry into the case of any particular I interest which complains of undue taxation. And therefore, Sir, I ask for a Committee, to inquire into the nature and incidence of the tax upon brewers' licences. And here, Sir, I pause for a moment to sweep away, if I can, a prejudice by which I am encountered upon the very threshold of my argument. Brewers are popularly believed to be a wealthy class, well able to endure taxation. In fact, it is a common opinion that, in these bad times, the three b's—the brewers, the bankers, and the butchers—are the only bees who have any honey left in their hives; and the brewers have certainly not obtained much sympathy from the public. But I venture to say that this arises entirely from a want of knowledge of the true facts of the case. The truth is that when we in this House speak of brewers, our thoughts instinctively turn to my hon. Friend the Member for Derby (Mr. M. T. Bass). Well, Sir, if all brewers were in the position of my hon. Friend, they would probably be rather the objects of envy than of commiseration. By the exercise, from a very early period of life, of a skill, energy, and perseverance rarely equalled in the history of mercantile enterprize, my hon. Friend has, no doubt, acquired a high financial, as well as a high commercial, position, and this I am sure no one will grudge him who knows, as I know, the kindly qualities of his heart, and the sterling worth of his character. But you must not take my hon. Friend, nor must you take the half-dozen representatives of great brewing companies who sit in this House, as fair samples of the brewers upon whom falls the pressure of this tax. On the contrary, I put this forward in the very front of my argument, that the tendency and effect of this particular taxation is rather to create and foster a monopoly in the hands of a few great and prosperous houses, and to drive out of the trade their smaller competitors, who, in the interest of the public, should be allowed to exist. And if you point to my hon. Friend and say—look how flourishing he appears to be—is this the man whom you seek to relieve from taxation? I answer you with the fact that 12 years ago my hon. Friend was one of nearly 38,000 brewers in the United Kingdom, and that to-day he is one of less than 24,000; the fact
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    being that during the last 12 years more than 1,000 brewers per annum have been driven out of the trade, mainly owing to the injurious pressure of the exceptional taxation to which they are subjected. And let me respectfully remind the House that it is no answer to this statement to say, as was said by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the course of a former debate upon this subject, that before the imposition of this tax in 1862 the number of brewers throughout the country had been on the decline. That argument, if it is worth anything at all, may show that even before 1862 the disadvantages under which the trade laboured were already so great as to drive men out of it; but surely, to a logical mind, this can be no valid reason for greatly adding to those disadvantages. It is an indisputable fact, take it as you will, that since the establishment of the present system of brewers' licences, the number of brewers has decreased far more rapidly than was previously the case, and that, according to present appearances, things are working to this result—that in a few years the brewing trade will be a gigantic monopoly in the hands of a few great houses. There are those who know this well, and there are some persons connected with these great houses who know it so well, that they do not wish success to our movement against this tax, because, if successful, it will militate against the creation of a monopoly which will greatly benefit themselves. But I ask hon. Gentlemen who are the champions of free competition in this House, whether they are prepared to acquiesce in the present system, and thus to assist in creating a monopoly in one large trade; and I ask those who are the champions of temperance, whether they think that the cause of temperance will be promoted by giving to this branch of the drinking trade such enormous power for action upon the Legislature as would undoubtedly be given to it by its concentration in the hands of a few individuals? And let me here say one other word to the champions of temperance. I am as much an advocate of temperance as any man in the House, although I utterly decline to believe that the cause of temperance can be advanced by unnatural and galling restrictions. But I want to put this to my hon. Friends—that the

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    drinking of spirits is worse for man than the drinking of beer, and that if they desire men to abstain from the one, they should not look with disfavour upon the trade which supplies them with the other. You cannot abolish the trade of a brewer; if you wish to do so, and think you can succeed, make your proposal boldly. But if the trade of brewing is to continue a legitimate trade, you will gain none of your objects by supporting a tax which is gradually making it a monopoly. This trade has a right to be treated as justly and as fairly as any other trade; and to drive out of it all but the larger traders will not cause one pint of beer less to be drunk in the country, will not promote the cause of temperance in the smallest degree, but will simply deprive the public of the advantages which they obtain in all cases from free and fair trade competition. Let me prove this from the last Return presented to the House on the subject. The total number of brewers in 1877 was 24,747; in 1878, 23,626: decrease, 1,121. Of these, the number of brewers who brewed over 50,000 barrels was, in 1877, 72; 1878, 73: increase, 1. So that the larger brewers held their own. But the number of brewers who brewed less than 1,000 barrels was, in 1877, 19,682; 1878, 18,678: decrease, 1,004; clearly showing that the diminution in numbers comes from the small traders, and that it is continuously going on. [Laughter.] I see that the Chancellor of the Exchequer laughs at this statement; but, whatever be the cause of the declension in the number of small brewers, I cannot think it a subject to be treated with levity, or that it can be a salutary state of things which thus forces men to abandon a legitimate trade at the rate of over 1,000 barrels per annum. And now, Sir, as I am most desirous not to occupy the time of the House for one moment longer than I can help, I do not propose to enter upon any long and minute history of the tax upon brewers' licences, nor to show how the brewers are called upon to bear at once the old duty of 4d. per 1b. of hops, the new duty of an additional 1d., and the 5 per cent added in 1840 and never taken off. I will simply take up the question from the period of 1862, when the present system was established. And if I can show—first, that the arguments then
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    used to justify the imposition of this tax have all been contradicted by the experience of time; and secondly, which is more important still, if I can show that the tax in itself is vicious in principle, unjust, irritating, and contrary to every principle of sound and fair taxation, then, Sir, I think I shall have gone far to prove that there is good reason at least for the inquiry which I have to demand to-night. In order to prove my first proposition, I must refer to the Financial Statement of my right hon. Friend the Member for Greenwich, in which he dealt with this question and imposed this tax. My right hon. Friend was about to abolish the hop duty, and he proposed this tax on brewers' licences as a kind of substitute. I think he fell into some slight error in believing that the brewers had been the promoters of the agitation for the repeal of the hop duty. That was not so. The agitation was a bonâ fide, agitation on the part of the hop-growers, quorum pars parva fui, and the brewers had but little to do with it, although they may have sympathized to some extent with an object so thoroughly legitimate. But, be this as it may, after announcing his intended boon to the hop-growers, my right hon. Friend turned his attention to the anomalous state of the then existing scale of charges for brewers' licences. He said that—
    "The charge is arranged on an ascending scale … which, on the slightest inspection, will he seen to he eminently burdensome to the small tradesmen, and in favour, I must say, beyond all bounds of the larger."
    He pointed out that if a brewer brewed less than 20 barrels he paid 10s. 6d. for his licence, or 6¼d. per barrel; if he brewed 50 barrels, he paid £1 1s., or 5¼d. per barrel; if he brewed 1,000 barrels, he paid £2 2s., or ½d. per barrel; whereas, if he brewed 80,000 barrels, it worked out at ¼d. per barrel. And he said that this was "a state of things which in common justness and fairness warranted an alteration." Now, the proposal of my right hon. Friend was—
    "To re-adjust the scale of the brewers' licences on the principle of including in them generally an equivalent, or nearly an equivalent, to the charge in respect to the present hop duty from which they will he released."—[3 Hansard, clxvi. 479.]
    He said—
    "Threepence in the form of hop duty is the minimum which the brewer now pays as an ele-

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    ment in the price of his hops, and that minimum we propose to charge in the shape of licence duty."—[Ibid. 480.]
    This was his calculation—A duty of 3d. represented 2 1b s. of hops, and 2 lbs. of hops, used with 2 bushels of malt, represented a barrel of beer containing 36 gallons. The duty thus imposed, then, was 3d. per barrel, or equal to 1s. per quarter upon the malt used. But it unfortunately turns out that although it was estimated in 1862, and the Excise still estimate, that every quarter of malt will produce four barrels of beer, and exacts the tax in accordance with this estimate, experience proves the estimate to be wholly fallacious. Now, as one example is as good as 100 in a case such as this, I will quote one in order to show how erroneous this estimate was, and how the trade has suffered in consequence. A firm of brewers in London consumed last year 193,416 quarters of malt, which was estimated to produce 773,669 barrels of beer, and the duty paid was £9,671 5s.; but the quantity of liquor in reality made was only 613,310 barrels; so that a tax of 3d. per barrel was paid upon 160,357 barrels which wore never made, and the firm thus paid £2,004 9s. 3d. upon an article which was not produced. And in different amounts this has, of course, been the case throughout the whole Kingdom. Therefore, the main calculation, and one of the main arguments upon which my right hon. Friend founded his justification of this tax, has proved to be fallacious, and affords no justification at all. Again, my right hon. Friend stated as another reason why this tax would not press unfairly on the brewers that they would benefit by a lower price of hops. He said—
    "No doubt, the brewers will obtain, though not, perhaps, at the very moment, the whole further benefit of the reduction of the hop duty which we now propose."—[Ibid.]
    What has been the fact? I find from the books of one large brewing firm this record—that for the seven years from 1856 to 1862 inclusive, the average price which they paid for their hops was £5 10 s. 11¾d. per cwt; whilst for the 16 years which have elapsed since the repeal of the hop duties, the average price which they have paid has been £5 15 s. 5½d.—including last year, when the mould affected a large acreage of hops, and the price only averaged from£3 10 s.to£3 15 s.
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    —so that instead of the brewer recouping himself for the licence duty by the lower price which he has had to pay for his hops, it has been rather the other way, and the justification of this tax also falls to the ground. Therefore, I think I need not go further to prove my first point—namely, that the arguments by which the imposition of this tax was justified have been contradicted by the experience of time. Now, to summarize—1st, the estimate of the yield of the article upon which the tax was based has been shown to be erroneous; 2nd, instead of being an equivalent for the minimum of hop duty previously paid, it has been much more than an equivalent; 3rd, the brewers have not received the benefits prophesied for them at the time of the repeal of the hop duties in the shape of the lower price of hops. And I may further add that the intention of my right hon. Friend having evidently been to assist the smaller brewers in their competition with the great houses, that benevolent intention has been entirely frustrated, and the last state of those men has proved to be worse than the first. I acknowledge, indeed, that the Chancellor of the Exchequer did attempt to relieve them, in 1875, by the substitution of a 12 s. 6d. tax per 50 barrels in lieu of the former sliding scale; but the boon was small after all, and the £60,000 lost to the Revenue was not given to the small brewers only, but was shared by their larger brethren. But I have now to show what are the specific and grave objections to this tax as a tax, and what are the special grievances of those whom I represent. I have gone very carefully into this subject, and I find eight principal and separate objections which can be urged against this tax. The first of these is, that it is an exceptional tax to which no other trade is subject. Other licence taxes are entirely different. I will not use my own arguments here. I will take my powder out of the enemy's magazine, and quote the words of my hon. Friend the present Secretary to the Treasury upon this point, in 1873, when he had charge of this question. He said—
    "When the wine duty was reduced from 5s. 6d. to 1s., no equivalent duty was placed on the wine merchant. A wine merchant who desired to import or sell a cask of wine paid 10 guineas, and he paid no more whatever number of casks he sold or imported. A distiller, who was more akin to the brewer, paid a double duty

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    —namely, 10 guineas for his licence and 10 guineas for the privilege of rectifying. That was a fixed tax, and enabled him to deal with any quantity."—[3 Hansard, ccxv. 907–8.]
    I quote, moreover, the speech of my right hon. Friend the Member for Greenwich in that same debate, when, after saying that the peculiar hardship alleged in regard to this tax was that it was based on conditions "such as were imposed on no other trade or calling," he went on to say—
    "He admitted that there was no case analogous to the brewer's licence."—[Ibid. 911.]
    I go no further at this moment than to object to this tax as exceptional, and I say that this first objection cannot be denied, and is, of itself, condemnatory of the tax. The second objection is, that this tax is not what it pretends to be—a licence duty. It is, in reality, an additional 1s. upon the malt tax of 21 s. 8d. per quarter, which the brewer pays besides—a most exorbitant tax, indeed, when the price of his barley is 31 s. per quarter. This tax fulfils none of the usual conditions of a licence duty. A licence duty confers a monopoly of the sale of the article for the right of selling which the duty is paid. So, in the case of distilleries, no private stills are allowed; and, moreover, I may remark, the duty is only payable when the spirit is withdrawn for sale. But, in this instance, mark the difference—the public brewer, who brews to get his living, is taxed; the private brewer, who brews for his convenience, is untaxed. Put it in other words. The brewer who exchanges the article which he produces for money is taxed. the brewer who exchanges the article he produces for the labour of his servants, or who produces it to save himself the greater expense or trouble of buying it, is left untaxed. And who are the private brewers whom you thus favour in your taxation? Not poor men, but men possessed of wealth and owning large establishments; so that you have the rich lord brewing without being taxed, whilst the struggling brewer in his village is weighted with taxation. The injustice is so palpable that it was admitted by my right hon. Friend the Member for Greenwich in 1862, when he actually proposed a licence for private brewers—save such as were farmers or of the labouring class—which he had to withdraw in consequence of the opposi-
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    tion it encountered. I know it is said that the number of private brewers has not increased since 1862; if the contrary were the case, the hardship upon the brewing trade would, of course, be aggravated; but the fact does not remove the manifest injustice of the present system. The third objection to the tax is, that it is a second Income Tax, and one of a most unfair character, inasmuch as it is a tax upon the capital of the brewer before he begins his operations; and not only not a tax upon profits, but a tax totally irrespective of profits altogether. The brewers have to pay six months in advance, and if the brewing is spoiled, and is unsaleable, they have to pay just the same—or, rather, they have paid before they have got one sixpence of return for their outlay, and this totally irrespective of profit and loss. There is no deduction for bad debts; there is no consideration whatever of the result of the operation of brewing. An arbitary estimate of the quantity of liquor to be produced by the quantity of ingredients used is made—that estimate I have already shown to be fallacious, yet the tax is based thereupon—and the brewer has to pay this second Income Tax upon an income which he has not made, and which he often never makes. And then, as if this was not enough, the Income Tax collector comes, and he is assessed to the Income Tax upon the fallacious estimate of profits established by the Excise, and thus doubly robbed. Can anything be more iniquitous? The fourth objection is, that it is a most inconvenient tax, and imposes great restrictions upon a legitimate trade. The brewer has to give 24 hours' notice before brewing, and two hours' notice of ingredients intended to be used; neither of these notices can be altered. He has also to provide special rooms for sugar and malt. His mash tuns can only be filled at specified times, and emptied after Excise inspection. If, after giving his first notice, an order comes which requires a greater quantity of malt, he must give a fresh 24 hours' notice. If an order is countermanded, so that he requires less malt, he has still to pay the full duty on the quantity for which he had first given notice. Other notices are required, and, in a word, the brewer lives under the supervision of the Exciseman, and really works in fetters as no other tradesman does in this country.

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    And these inconveniences do not fall so much upon the great brewer who has a large staff of servants and brews constantly, as upon the small man who only brews occasionally, and who is worried to death and gradually driven out of the trade by the vexations and difficulties by which he is surrounded. It has been stated to me to-day that, in many cases, these restrictions are not now in practice enforced. But surely, if that is the truth, it strengthens my case for an inquiry whether rules which are found too oppressive to be put in force cannot be done away with altogether. The fifth objection is, that the tax is surrounded by penalties enough to frighten any honest trader out of his senses. The alteration of an entry by a careless or dishonest servant, a trifling accident, or the spite of an Exciseman, all expose the brewer to penalties which cannot but be oppressive and injurious. I hold in my hand a list of these penalties with which I will not trouble the House; but it will be easily seen that they are such as greatly to annoy the brewer and impede his trade. The present system, indeed, bristles with penalties with which a legitimate trade ought not to be hampered.
    Notice taken, that 40 Members were not present; House counted, and 40 Members being found present,
    MR. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN, continuing, said: This is a small interruption; let us hope we shall not have a "bigger" one. My next two objections are of a somewhat different character, and I do not urge them as being so certain and unanswerable as those which I have already urged. They are, however, objections which have been brought under my notice by persons acquainted with the trade, and I think it right to include them among the eight prominent objections to the tax. One of these, which I will take as the sixth objection, is that this tax directly clashes with the malt tax, because there is a temptation to evade the tax by reducing the quantity of malt used and substituting other ingredients. The duty being nearly 5 per cent addition to the malt tax, by reducing the strength of the beer 5 per cent, 5 per cent less malt is used, and 5 per cent less malt duty paid; in which case, the total amount of Revenue collected would not be increased, the amount of licence duty being practically
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    so much deducted from the amount of malt tax. It is much as if you were to put a tax upon all the gas consumed, and then to put a tax upon every gas-burner; surely the one tax would militate against the other. The seventh objection is the temptation which the tax offers the dishonest trader to adulterate and deteriorate the liquor. I touch upon this subject with great tenderness and delicacy, and I believe the great majority of brewers are too honest and too anxious to give good liquor to their customers to be tempted. Bat I am told, though I can scarcely credit it, that an eminent statesman once advised the brewers that, if this tax pressed heavily upon them, they could recoup themselves from the New River, and if this plan were adopted, an artificial fulness might probably be given to the beer by the use of other ingredients than malt. I make the objection for what it is worth, and I leave the House to follow out the suggestion and judge for themselves whether or no the temptation is not held out by the tax. The eighth objection is, undoubtedly, valid—namely, that the tax is unfair to the brewer in his competition with the lighter wines, with cider and with perry. Since 1862 there has been a great reduction in the duty on all kinds of wine; on champagne, for instance, I am told as much as 80 per cent. So the rich get their beverages much cheaper, whilst this tax is aimed at the beverage of the working classes. Is cider—is perry—more wholesome than beer? Why should both be untaxed and the national liquor be thus persecuted by taxation? The fact is, Sir, that this is a tax for general purposes imposed upon one particular class of the community. Why should it be so imposed? Is it because this class is supposed to be wealthy? Then why do you not attempt to tax bankers as well? Is it because you think it will check drinking? Then why not tax, in a similar manner, the wine merchant and the sellers of cider and perry? The Chancellor of the Exchequer is a Devonshire man; the taxation of cider would come home to him, and he sees the objection. Then let him sympathize with me, as a man of Kent, who objects to the taxation of beer, the national beverage of his county. The brewers claim no exceptional privilege, but they protest against an exceptional burden. They

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    supply the public with that which is really to many one of the necessaries of life. They supply the national beverage. It is for the interest of the people that this beverage should be pure and good, and that its supply should not be in the hands of a few persons only, but the fair subject of trade competition. Sir, I am not going into the question of whether this tax falls on the brewer only, or whether the consumer shares it; I am not going to overburden my case with other arguments, for I think I have said enough to condemn the tax against which I protest. I do not know what course the Chancellor of the Exchequer will take. He informed mo, indeed, the other day, that he should certainly oppose my Motion; but he is a Gentleman of an amiable, I had almost said of a pliant disposition, and I am not without hopes that he may have been convinced by the strength of the case, which even so poor an advocate as I am have been able to present to the House, and that he will be induced to grant the inquiry to which, at least, I think my clients are entitled. It would have been easy for mo to go into greater details as to the operation of this tax, in order to illustrate its unfair pressure upon those whom I represent to-night. But I have purposely abstained from doing so—first, because I have been anxious to avoid unnecessarily occupying the time of the House; and, secondly, because to investigate and criticize those details will be precisely the work of that Committee which I ask the House to appoint. My clients come before you to-night with a very humble request. They say—"We are a recognized and legitimate trade; if there are those who think we ought not to be so, let them come forward boldly and propose to Parliament that we shall be suppressed and our trade abolished. But if we are to continue to be legitimate and recognized, do not inflict upon us an unjust and exceptional burden to which no other trade is subjected. We ask you to inquire whether or no this is a fair description of the burden against which we protest. If we fail to prove that it is so before a Committee of the House of Commons, our agitation is ended, and we will for the future submit to your taxation without a murmur. But, if we can prove our case, then we only ask you to remember our claim to remission, whenever remission shall be
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    possible. For we are satisfied that when we shall have been allowed to show to Parliament and to the public, by unimpeachable evidence, the gravity of the injustice under which we labour, the removal of that injustice can only be a question of time, and that removal will at once commend itself to the fair and equitable spirit in which Parliament ever seeks to distribute the burden of taxation over the whole body of the taxpayers of the country, as well as to the general wisdom and justice of the House of Commons." To that wisdom and justice, Sir, I make my confident appeal, and I now beg to move for the Select Committee which I have given Notice.
    Amendment proposed,
    To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "a Select Committee be appointed to inquire into the nature and incidence of the Tax upon Brewers' Licences,"—(Mr. Knatchbull-Hugessen,)
    —instead thereof.
    Question proposed, "That the words proposed be left out stand part of the Question."
    THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUERsaid, it was impossible to deny the ability or the moderation of the speech to which they had just listened, and he was prepared to admit that there had been many points which his right hon. Friend (Mr. Knatchbull-Hugessen) had brought before the House which, although he could not say they were very new, had been exceedingly well stated. He had been a little disappointed, however, at finding that nothing had been advanced by his right hon. Friend which had not, in one form or another, been already brought to their notice on former occasions; and he must also say that he failed to see the close connection between the speech of his right hon. Friend and the conclusion to which he wished to bring the House. His right hon. Friend's argument was one which went directly to the abolition of the brewers' licence duty; but he did not ask the House to pledge itself to that conclusion. He asked for the appointment of a Committee to inquire into—it did not clearly appear what. There were one or two observations he wished to make upon the opening remarks of his right hon. Friend; and more especially was he anxious to asso-

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    ciate himself with him in some of the remarks which he had thought necessary to clear away all prejudice, which he was quite satisfied did not, and certainly ought not, to exist. His right hon. Friend began by saying that the difficulty, or one of the great difficulties, under which those who advocated the cause of the brewers laboured, was this—that the brewers were popularly supposed to be a wealthy class, and there was very little sympathy with them on that account. He would say now, what he had said before, that, in the first place, he did not believe the brewers, as a body, were a wealthy class. There were, no doubt, a certain number who were very wealthy men; but there was no doubt, also, that there was a large body of highly respectable men who were carrying on a business of an important character in a most thoroughly honourable way—men of small capital, who were in every way respectable, and who were struggling under considerable difficulties. He fully admitted the extent of those difficulties, and he sympathized with those who had to encounter them; but, at the same time, he must point out that this was not the first time that attention had been called to the fact that the number of small brewers was steadily decreasing. But he entirely disputed the assumption of Ids right hon. Friend, when he said that the reason why they were decreasing was on account of this burden. There was really not the slightest ground for that assumption; and when his right hon. Friend made that observation, he (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) could not refrain from expressing his amusement at it. He could assure the House that it was not because he treated it as a matter of levity that there should be a diminution in that class of persons, but because he thought the argument that it was the result of this licence tax was too transparently fallacious to be allowed to pass without challenge. There were one or two considerations which would show what a fallacy there was in these arguments. In the first place, the diminution in the number of the small brewers had been going on for years, and was not the result of the imposition of the licence tax in 1862. For 10 or 15 years before that tax was imposed, a very steady diminution had been going on in the number of brewers,
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    and, of course, in the number of the smaller brewers. But anybody who gave himself the trouble to think of the matter would see that as society advanced, and as capital was invested more and more in great businesses, and as the means of communication increased, the advantage in favour of the great capitalists, who sent their products all over the country, would become increasingly great. This was shown in many other businesses besides brewing. There was another, and an analogous business—that of the maltster. The maltster was not affected by the licence duty. It had nothing to do with him; but yet it had been the case that there had been a considerable diminution in the number of maltsters since 1862. In 1862 the number of maltsters was 6,500, and in 1878 it was 4,200. This was a very large decrease, and was, no doubt, clue to the same class of causes as those which had operated in the case of the smaller brewers. There was also this consideration, which must be borne in mind. The large brewer, spreading his profits over several years, could afford to stand one or two bad years and recoup himself in good years. The smaller brewer was not able to do that, and a single bad year had an effect upon him which it had not upon the larger brewer. Besides this, there had been legislative changes, to which no allusion had been made by his right hon. Friend, which had had some effect upon the small brewer. In former times, there were long malt credits, and long hop credits. They were of advantage to the small brewer; but they had now been abolished, and the case of the small brewer was worse in consequence of the legislation of recent years. Indeed, his right hon. Friend admitted that he (the Chancellor of the Exchequer), within the last year or two, had done what he could, to diminish the disadvantages in which the small brewers were placed, so far as legislation bore co-relatively on one or the other; and if any other particular could be pointed out in which the position of the small brewer could be improved, it would be his duty to advance still further in the direction of endeavouring to improve it. They were told that the small brewer was injured and driven out of the business by this peculiarly unjust tax, which was exacted from him, but which was not levied

    631
    upon the private brewer. As his right hon. Friend said, the tax was falsely called a licence duty, because it did not not fall upon the private brewer. In theory, there could be no doubt that the arrangement of taxation seemed to give an advantage to private brewers; but if that were actually the case in practice, he (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) supposed they must assume that if there were no causes in operation which reduced the number of small brewers except this tax, and if the private brewer was exempt from the tax, as he was, it would follow that the number of private brewers ought to increase. If the licence duty was so injurious, and if the private brewers were not subjected to it, they had an advantage, and one would suppose that they would increase. But, in point of fact, the number of private brewers had not increased. Everybody knew that, although there were still a certain number of great houses in which private brewing was maintained, and in which it would probably be maintained under any circumstances, yet, in point of fact, a large number of private families were now abandoning the habit of private brewing, and were going to the great brewers to supply them, and that was in accordance with the natural law which induced them to go where the practice and the large capital employed gave them advantage. Under all these circumstances, they might set aside, at all events, the argument that the effect of this tax was to destroy and to injure the small brewers to the advantage of the larger brewers. He did not believe that that was the case. It might be said that the small brewers, and the large brewers also, were subject to certain restrictions in connection with the tax, and that it would be a good thing for them to get rid of it. He did not for a moment deny that. Of course, it would be a good thing for anybody subject to the Income Tax and the restrictions connected with the Excise to get rid of such burdens altogether. But it was not possible to deal with taxes in that way. They could not take a single tax, and say that they would subject it to examination, and see if it imposed difficulties and inconveniences upon anybody, and if they found that it did, say then, "Let us get rid of that tax." If they did that, there would be no taxes left, for he would undertake to say that some-
    632
    thing might be said in regard to every one of them. His right hon. Friend certainly made a point, when he declared that it was not reasonable to call this a licensing tax, it being, in fact, a mere addition to the malt duty. Now, let them look at the matter in that point of view. What was the casein 1862? Up to 1862 it had been the policy of the Government to levy duties upon various intoxicating liquors. Duties were levied on spirits, on wine, and on beer, but in a different form. In old times, they used to have a duty upon beer itself. That was done away with, because it was found intolerably vexatious, and they were left with the malt tax and a tax upon hops. Those were two taxes which fell upon the materials from which beer was made. In 1862, the duty on hops was repealed; and, at the same time, an addition was made really and truly to the tax upon malt, but it was made in the form of a licence duty on the brewers who used and brewed the malt. Malt used for other purposes than brewing was not affected by that addition, and malt used by private houses in brewing was also exempt from it. Therefore, his right hon. Friend was right when he said it was something of a misnomer to call this a licence duty, because it was not imposed in connection with a privilege, but fell upon a certain class engaged in brewing. But what were they to do in order to get rid of this anomaly. If they were in the happy condition of being able to remit this taxation and sacrifice the duty, it would have to be considered in connection with other claims which would be made in other quarters; and, probably, when they came to deal with matters of that kind, a good many questions would arise as to the relative taxation upon various articles which came into competition with beer, and the taxes which fell upon other industries. That, however, was not a matter which at the present moment was before them. His right hon. Friend did not ask them to take off the tax now; but he took refuge in proposing a Committee, which Committee, so far as he (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) could see, had nothing whatever to inquire into, because all the facts were known; besides which, the Committee might lead to a certain amount of misconception and other inconveniences, and, after all, would not point out what

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    his right hon. Friend wished to bring the House to—namely, a means of getting rid of the tax. If they could not afford to get rid of the tax, could they see their way to commute it, so as to obtain the same amount of Revenue in a less inconvenient manner? In that respect, his right hon. Friend had not given them as much information as he (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) hoped they might have been furnished with. It was obvious that there were two ways open to them by which they might reduce the tax to a nominal amount without any sacrifice of Revenue. One of them would be by an addition to the malt duty. By adding something like 5 per cent to the duty on malt, without any sacrifice of Revenue, they would be able to obtain the same amount of Revenue and abolish the licence duty. His right hon. Friend did not say he would recommend that; but it was an important question on which they ought to have some information. If they were not to add to the malt tax, there was another way in which the difficulty might be met, and that was by getting rid of the licence duty, and probably the malt duty itself, and substituting for them a simple beer duty. Did his right hon. Friend recommend the adoption of that course, or was the Committee to go into the question whether it would be possible and desirable to substitute a beer duty? He (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) thought that would be a very large proposition; and if it were in the contemplation of his right hon. Friend that the Committee should go into such matters as that, he ought to enlarge the scope of his Order of Reference, and give the House some of his arguments on that subject. A beer duty was one of which, in former times, the country had some experience, and upon which a good deal of information could be obtained from the shelves of the Library. It would, therefore, be interesting to know whether the recommendation which his right hon. Friend wished the Committee to consider was the abolition of the malt tax and the substitution of a beer duty. But if he understood his right hon. Friend to ask the Government neither to sacrifice the Revenue, nor to make an addition to the malt tax, nor to consider the substitution of a beer tax for the malt tax, then, he would ask, what were the particular
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    objects his right hon. Friend proposed to gain by his inquiry? They had been told that the system of licences at present involved arrangements which were inconvenient to the trade; that there were too many notices required, and too many arrangements as to separate rooms; that the trade was subject to vexatious penalties; that a careless or malicious servant might expose his master to serious evils; and other matters of that kind. No doubt, it was most desirable that there should be frequent, or, at all events, occasional examinations of the manner in which the duties were raised, in order to see that no unnecessary vexation was imposed on the subject in reference to these duties. He felt very strongly that it was quite possible that, through the want of that periodical revision of obsolete rules which was really necessary for the convenience of the public, needless restrictions were sometimes forced upon those who were carrying on a business which was subject to the Excise. It seemed to be thought that if they got rid of this licence duty, they would get rid of the necessity of all these restrictions, and that they would hear nothing more about those interests of Excisemen, and other things necessary to prevent the evasion of the duty. He himself very much doubted whether that would be the case—whether, under any circumstances, they would be able to get rid of the inspections and the visits from the officers of the Excise which were now made the subject of complaint, because, unless they could abandon the idea of raising revenue from beer, it would be requisite to ascertain what the processes in the breweries were, in order to see that the brewer was not using improper substances. A certain amount of inspection would be necessary over those carrying on the business. He ventured to doubt whether, upon the whole, it would be very useful to submit questions of the sort to a Committee of the House of Commons. He did not know whether hon. Members thought it would be desirable that they should have all the proceedings and processes of manufacture the subject of a long inquiry, and every sort of investigation carried on in public before a Committee of the House. Many of these discussions were extremely inconvenient. They agitated the trade, caused expectations, and brought about

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    a good deal of confusion. He thought it would be far better that they should have, on the part of the Government a departmental inquiry into complaints which might then be brought before them with regard to the working of the present system. The proposal of the abolition of the duty was a matter which they could not for the present entertain. As to the remission of the malt tax, he thought they had not had any case made out that would justify them going in for such an alteration. But if it could be shown that the licence duty was unequally assessed; that the mode in which the quantities were fixed was not a proper mode; that the malt assumed to be used for a barrel of beer was not what it should be; or that there were restrictions which might be in any way disadvantageous, these points might be brought before them by practical members of the trade, and the Government would be most happy to examine them patiently. He did not think, however, in spite of the very able way in which his right hon. Friend had introduced the subject again to their notice, and the ingenious way in which he had put his arguments before them, that a case had been made out for the Motion he had brought before the House.
    MR. MITCHELL HENRYsaid, he had felt, during the argument of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that the Motion of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Sandwich (Mr. Knatchbull-Hugessen) would result in nothing practical. To that Motion of the right hon. Gentleman, who proposed—
    "That a Select Committee be appointed to inquire into the nature and incidence of the Tax upon Brewers' Licences,"
    he had intended, if the Forms of the House would have allowed, to move the addition of the words "and upon the best mode of supplying a substitute for it." It was, he thought, impossible to contemplate the abolition of this tax without also looking at another great tax—namely, the tax upon malt. The brewers' licence duty appeared to him (Mr. Mitchell Henry) to be wholly indefensible, and one of the worst taxes that could be imposed upon the industry of any country; indeed, there was hardly another example of a similar tax upon the manufacturer. He believed that the brewers' licence duty pressed with peculiar hardship upon deserving
    636
    and poor men, numbers of whom were being driven, as they believed, out of the trade in consequence; and although other causes might have contributed to this result, there could be no doubt that the tax was felt by them to be peculiarly hard and galling. The parallel drawn by the Chancellor of the Exchequer between the cases of the private brewer and the professional brewer, who made his livelihood by brewing, was, in his (Mr. Mitchell Henry's) opinion, inapplicable. The right hon. Gentleman had said that the private and small brewers were decreasing in number; and, therefore, that as one was taxed and the other was not taxed, the tax had no effect upon the professional brewer. But that was not so, for the reason why people had ceased to brew privately was that they got better ale by buying it from the large brewers, for with the private consumer the question was not trade but quality and convenience. The question, however, ought to be approached in a much broader spirit and on a larger scale. He believed that it was impossible for the Chancellor of the Exchequer to abolish the tax upon brewers' licences, as also the tax upon malt, which, in his (Mr. Mitchell Henry's) opinion, was quite as bad, unless a substitute were provided for them. Therefore, he asked permission of the House to propose a direct substitute for the two taxes in question. He would at once state that his proposal was to revert to the old practice of placing a direct tax upon the manufactured article of beer; and he believed it could be shown that this tax would not in the slightest degree interfere with the consumption of beer, or be felt seriously by the consumer. On the other hand, the tax would provide the Chancellor of the Exchequer with a very large Revenue, and enable him to abolish both the malt tax, and the tax upon brewers' licences. As the Chancellor of the Exchequer had mentioned, this tax did exist in former times; but in consequence of the inconvenience attending its collection, it had been abolished almost 50 years ago, and, eventually, a tax had been imposed upon the unmanufactured article of malt. He was not there to contend that it was possible to lay a differential tax upon the various descriptions of beer which wore brewed, of which there were at least seven or eight

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    kinds in ordinary consumption; but it could be shown, and he believed that it would be admitted by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, if he looked at the question from a practical point of view, that the imposition of the tax upon beer would neither raise the price of the article to any appreciable extent, nor be attended with any intolerable hardship to brewers. It was not his argument that evening to enter upon the question, which he had already raised once or twice, of equalizing the tax upon the alcohol contained in spirits, and the alcohol contained in beer. At the present time, they raised on alcohol—that was, upon beer, wine, and spirits, upon licence duty and upon the sugar used in brewing, no less than £33,000,000 a-year, and it was a circumstance of very considerable importance to know that they spent £155,000,000 annually in buying alcoholic liquors. He maintained that, by the adoption of the proposition which he was about to submit, there would not be the slightest difficulty in getting, in addition to the £9,000,000 taxes now practically levied upon beer, in the shape of the malt tax, brewers' licences, and sugar duty, the additional sum of £6,000,000, which would enable the Government to abolish every one of those Customs' duties which pressed so heavily upon the people who did not drink alcoholic liquors—that was to say, it would permit the abolition of the tea and coffee and other such duties. The brewers' licences produced £433,000 a-year, and the sugar used in brewing £526,000 a-year; while the sum derived from the malt tax amounted to very nearly £8,000,000. He did not think the country could do without that taxation, which amounted in all to £9,000,000 a-year; but however that tax was levied, whether upon the article of beer itself, or upon the material used in its manufacture—whether upon the meal or the malt—it was still a direct tax upon beer; and, for that reason, in suggesting some modification of the duties on beer, he was not proposing a new tax. The quantity of malt used in brewing was as nearly as possible 57,000,000 bushels, or about 8,000,000 quarters. Now, it had been assumed by the Excise authorities that one barrel of beer should be produced from two bushels of malt; but this had been considered as too high an
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    average, although he was prepared to assume that it was a reasonable one. But as he desired to be perfectly fair in his statement of the case, he would assume that it required 2½ bushels of malt to make 36 gallons, or one barrel, of beer; and on that basis he would found his calculation that 115 gallons of beer would be produced from every quarter of malt; and that, as there were 8,000,000 quarters used in the course of the year, the total quantity of beer which ought to be produced would be 920,000,000 gallons annually. There were several classes of beer; but he would deal first with such beers as Bass's and All sopp's ales, as examples of beers of the highest class, which contained from 8 per cent to 11A- per cent of proof spirit. Upon these beers, then, of the highest class, and containing from 8 to 11½ per cent of proof spirit, he proposed that there should be a tax in the shape of an Excise stamp duty of 9s. per half-barrel. How would that affect the producer and consumer? The beers in question, upon which, according to his calculation, about 4s. 6d. per half-barrel was already levied indirectly, were being sold at hotels, railway stations, and refreshment rooms, at the rate of 6d. the reputed pint, or 3d. a-glass. Upon these beers alone, representing about one-third of the total production which, as he had already pointed out, amounted to 920,000,000 gallons, would be raised, by the addition of the proposed duty of 9s. per half-barrel, £7,500,000 annually, and that by increasing the price to the consumer less than ½d. per glass. Indeed, he believed, from the competition which would ensue, if the trade were thrown open, that it would be found that this additional ½d. would never be added at all, and that the beer would continue to be sold to the public at 3d. per glass. But even if the price were raised by ½d. per glass, there was, in his opinion, no reason to believe that with regard to an article of such great popularity with the higher and middle classes as pale ale, the consumption would be in the slightest degree diminished. Besides the beers mentioned, there were in ordinary consumption four different classes of beer, containing from 5 to 8 per cent of proof spirit, which he proposed to take together, and tax at the rate of 4s. 6d. per half-barrel. How would that affect the

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    prices to the consumer? The class of beer which came next to Bass's, and the rest to which he had referred, was sold at 4d. a-pint, and its present cost was 48 s. per half-barrel of 18 gallons. The proposed tax of 4s. 6d. per half-barrel would not raise the price of this kind of beer to the consumer by more than ¼d. a-glass. The next class was sold at 3d. a-pint, and the cost was 36 s. per half-barrel; in the same way, the price of this beer to the consumer would be raised by less than ¼d. a-glass. The next class was sold at 2d. a-pint, or 30 s. per half-barrel, and upon this, and the rest of the beers, the increased price would be so small to the consumer as to render the calculation unnecessary. He had endeavoured to show that by a duty of 9s. per half-barrel upon the manufactured article of the first class the sum of £7,500,000 would be raised. A like sum would also be raised from the remaining classes of beer—namely, those which contained from 5 per cent of proof spirit and upwards; so that altogether, if his proposal were adopted, a total sum of £15,000,000 would be obtained annually. It was an important question to consider whether that amount could be raised in a manner which would not be intolerable to the brewers. At the present moment, the brewer was subject to a number of restrictions, to which the right hon. Gentleman who introduced this Motion had referred. All that would be necessary in the new tax would be a book of stamps like the delivery books given by railway companies. The Excise would keep the counter-part, and the stamps, which would be several inches wide, would be affixed by the brewer under the supervision of the officers of Excise. The stamps might be put over the bung-hole of the cask. ["Oh, oh!"] An hon. and gallant Member opposite seemed surprised at such an absurd notion; but was it more absurd than the present mode of settling the malt duty, or collecting the brewers' licences? The system could be carried out with the greatest ease. The brewers could purchase the books of stamps, taking out a nominal licence in proportion to the number of gallons of beer which they manufactured. There would be no difficulty in that respect, for already there was a Return which showed the quantity of beer produced by every brewer in
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    the United Kingdom. But what would be the other effects of carrying out his proposal? The country would lose £9,000,000 of taxes by the abolition of the brewers' licences, the tax upon sugar used in brewing, and the malt tax; but the brewers and agriculturists would very much appreciate the abolition of taxes which now fell upon them; while, on the other hand, £15,000,000 would be raised by the plan he proposed. From this would result a surplus of £6,000,000, which would enable the Chancellor of the Exchequer to abolish all the Customs duties, except those on tobacco—that was to say, the duties upon chicory, coffee, currants, figs, plums, prunes, &c, which amounted to something like £900,000 annually; and, in addition to these, the duty upon tea, which amounted to about £4,000,000 a-year. The Chancellor of the Exchequer would then have £1,000,000 remaining, which he could devote to any purpose that pleased him. He (Mr. Mitchell Henry) considered the suggestion which he had made well worthy of the attention of the right hon. Gentleman, who, it was to be hoped, having stated his willingness to appoint a Departmental Committee to inquire into the nature and incidence of the tax upon brewers' licences, would also allow the Committee to inquire earnestly; and seriously into the feasibility of imposing a tax upon the manufactured article of beer, in place of those duties now imposed upon the raw material used in brewing and upon the trade of those persons who were struggling to make a living' by this manufacture. He (Mr. Mitchell Henry) believed the figures quoted by him to be absolutely correct; and he had, moreover, the authority of hon. Members in the House, who were able to speak upon the subject with greater weight than he could pretend to, for saying that his proposal was perfectly feasible; and he, therefore, hoped that on the appointment of the Committee it would receive the serious consideration of the Chancellor of the Exchequer.
    SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOTsaid, that everyone knew that the whole incidence of the tax upon brewers' licences was before the Chancellor of the Exchequer; and, therefore, what was the use of an inquiry? If the necessity for such an inquiry was so im-

    641
    perative as the right bon. Gentleman the Member for Sandwich (Mr. Knatch-bull-Hugessen) assumed, why had be not drawn attention to the matter when he and his Friends were in Office, and when what he wished to have done in the matter might have been effected? In that case, however, he (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) thought that, supposing a duty were imposed on beer, the small brewers, as a class, would be annihilated. In spite of the depression in the country during the last few years, the brewers had been doing well; while, as to a remission of the tax, the present was no time for taking off a tax of the kind, which was not oppressive, though, perhaps, it was to some extent vexatious. He altogether denied that it was looked upon generally, oven by the brewers themselves, as an unjust tax, and he believed they would rather endure it ten times over than have a tax imposed on beer. He was of opinion that no case had been made out for a Select Committee; and, looking at the present consumption of liquors throughout the country, he thought this tax was one of the last that this House would think ought to be repealed.
    SIR WILFRID LAWSONthought his hon. and gallant Friend opposite (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) had been rather hard on the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Sandwich (Mr. Knatch-bull-Hugessen), in asking him why he had not moved in this matter when a Liberal Government was in Office. The fact, however, was that agitation of this kind was always very vigorous when a Liberal Government was in Office, but it generally relaxed when a Conservative Government came in. There was a French statesman who had been described as having spent his life in coming to the rescue of the strongest. This seemed the aim of the right hon. Gentleman in coming to the assistance of the brewers, that powerful body, who were alone prosperous in these hard times, and who were very well able to protect themselves. He knew the great and sincere interest his right hon. Friend took in anything connected with the liquor traffic. He remembered his attending a dinner of the Licensed Victuallers; there was the same idea of a Bill being brought in for their relief, and he said the proper way would be that the publicans should be consulted,
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    and, according to what they wanted, so the Bill should be drafted. His right hon. Friend had chosen a very curious time to make an appeal to the House on behalf of the brewers. The brewers had been doing very well; they always did well. The drink trade was always prosperous. At a Licensed Victuallers' dinner that took place at Burton, one of the speakers, speaking of the bad times, the great distress that prevailed, said Burton was the only green spot—the oasis in the desert. Coal and iron were depressed, but drink was bringing in lots of money still. But, although the brewers were so prosperous, they were always complaining—they complained of the Excise, of the magistrates and the police, the Good Templars, and the whole community. In fact, they represented themselves as a class of men whose sole object it was to benefit mankind, yet they were harassed by every one. The Association for the Repeal of the Brewers' Licences was formed in 1874. Shortly afterwards there was a grand deputation to the Chancellor of the Exchequer; 208 brewers and 58 Members of Parliament were present. Some conversation took place. The Chancellor of the Exchequer asked what effect the repeal of the duty would have on the price of beer? One of the deputation replied, none whatever; the consumer never paid the tax. Whereupon the Chancellor of the Exchequer said he would not detain the deputation any longer. When the present Government, which owed a good deal to the publicans, came into Office, they did something for the brewers, which ought to have satisfied them. Whatever the brewers or anybody else might say, he believed there was no doubt that the tax was paid by the consumer somehow or other. If, however, it was paid by the producer, he was the last person who should be relieved in a time of national distress; and if it was paid by the consumer, the House ought not to encourage him to drink more by making his drink cheaper. So that, whether the consumer or the producer paid, there was no case for alteration. The beer drinker bad been described by the hon. Gentleman below as a distressed man. [Mr. Mitchell Henry: The small brewer.] Well, was that any reason for encouraging the drinking of more beer? He would not give his own opinion. It was not well

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    to give the opinion of a fanatic. But he would quote the opinion of Sir Henry Thompson in a letter to the Archbishop of Canterbury—a letter from a man who had the care of our bodies to a man who had the care of our souls. Sir Henry Thompson said that the habitual use of fermented liquors, far short of what was necessary to produce drunkenness, and such as was quite common in all ranks of society, injured the body and diminished the mental powers to an extent which few people were aware of; and he believed there was no single habit in this country which so much tended to deteriorate the qualities of the race, and so much disqualified them for that endurance which was required in that struggle in which the prizes must fall to the best and the strongest. Yet they were asked, in the face of that dreadful state of things, to relieve the manufacturers of these liquors from taxation. If that was the only remedy which the right hon. Gentleman had to propose for the misery and destitution of the country, he (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) thanked God he was not a statesman, and was never likely to be one. There was no greater fallacy than to suppose, if you dosed people with weak alcohol, they would grow up strong. When the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich was Chancellor of the Exchequer, he brought in a Bill for supplying people with cheap wine, saying he did it for the purpose of promoting temperance in this country, and that if they drank this sour, nasty stuff, they would give up stronger liquors. There never was a greater delusion. The result had been—
    "That those then drank who never drank before, And those who always drank then drank the more."
    He, therefore, hoped the House would get rid of the superstitious idea that they would wean people from drinking one form of alcohol by encouraging them to drink another. We tried the same thing before in the case of cheap beer, but everyone knew there was never a greater evil, and those who supported the measure in a short time saw the greatness of their delusion. Dr. Richard-son said it was perfectly horrible that so much Revenue should be raised by the degradation of the nation. But, as it was the system to raise about one-third
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    of our Revenue by the sale and consumption of strong drink, let us have equality, and let not the man who drank one sort of liquor pay less than the man who drank another. He fully admitted the convincing force of the figures with which the future Chancellor of the Exchequer of the Home Rule Party (Mr. Mitchell-Henry) had sustained the proposal which he had just made to them to tax beer; and also the reasonableness of the complaint which the hon. Member for Dumbarton (Mr. Orr-Ewing) had more than once urged, as to the way in which spirits were taxed as compared with beer, and that alcohol in Scotch whisky was taxed much higher than alcohol in English beer. Let the English sot and the tippling Scot pay exactly the same. He would not, however, level down, but level up, and the simplest way would be to increase the malt duty; but as that proposal threatened to drive some hon. Gentlemen crazy, they might impose a duty on beer. Beer was taxed one-fifth of its price, or 20 per cent; spirits were taxed four-fifths of their price, or 80 per cent. That was not fair. There was no need for a Committee, the matter had been very well discussed, and might be very properly left in the hands of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. He hoped, therefore, every hon. Gentleman of common sense in the House would, on this occasion, vote against the Motion of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Sandwich, and give his hearty support to Her Majesty's Government.
    Question put.
    The House divided:—Ayes 115; Noes 53: Majority 62.—(Div. List, No. 99.)
    Main Question proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."
    Motion, by leave, withdrawn.
    Committee deferred till Monday next.

NOXIOUS GASES BILL.— [Bill 123.]
(Mr. Sclater-Booth, Viscount Sandon, Sir Henry Selwin-Ibbetson, Mr. Salt.)
NOXIOUS GASES BILL.— [Bill 123.]

  SECOND READING.
  Order for Second Beading read.
  MR. SCLATER-BOOTH, in moving that the Bill be now read a second time, said, that the measure was based on the recommendations of a Royal Commis-

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  sion. Its character was very comprehensive, as it sought to provide for the whole Kingdom, wherever a noxious trade was carried on, or noxious gas emanations injurious to the health of the public were produced, such a remedy as would be readily applicable without unduly interfering with the industry of the country. It was intended by the Bill to raise from the trades and manufacturers themselves a comparatively small sum of money which, with the amount already provided by Parliament, would be sufficient to supply an adequate machinery for giving effect to its object. In connection with the history of previous legislation with regard to the subject, he would remind the House that the original Alkali Act, passed in 1863, was designed to cure the mischief done to vegetation from the evolution of muriatic acid gas. It limited to a great extent the mischief done by isolated works; but the progress of trade had led to the establishment of a great aggregation of these manufactories in many districts, especially on the Tyne and Mersey, and the result was that vegetation was entirely destroyed in those neighbour-hoods. Accordingly, when he entered upon his present office, applications were made to him by gentlemen connected with the localities thus affected for an amendment and extension of the Act. That was affected by the Act of 1874, which required the owners of those factories so to conduct their operations as to allow only an almost imperceptible amount of muriatic acid gas to escape from the chimneys of their works at one time. Complaints, however, were still made that vegetation continued to wither from the effect of these gases, and the Government consented in 1875–6 to appoint a Royal Commission to inquire into the working of the Act and report on the whole subject of the injury to the public done by noxious vapours. Concurrently with the appointment of the Royal Commission an Inspector of the Local Government Board was engaged to examine factories and ascertain what means were available to diminish the mischief the caused by the evolution of gases; and he recommended that provisions analogous to those in the Alkali Acts should be applied to several trades. The first part of the Bill consolidated and re-enacted the main provision of the Alkali
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  Acts, and added new obligations with regard to sulphuric and other acids upon the manufacturers, in order that as little as possible might be emitted during the process of manufacturing. The second part was devoted to the trades that were placed for the first time under these obligations. The third part catalogued all the remaining trades that were to come under inspection, and that were to be liable to be called upon to adopt such preventive methods as were from time to time shown to be applicable. In this way, the inspection hitherto confined to alkali works would be extended for the benefit of the whole community. Existing works would be allowed a certain time for re-registration, without which no new works would be allowed. Licence fees would have to be paid and would reduce the cost of inspection, and a sanitary district, or a combination of two or more districts, might apply for the services of an Inspector, who would be paid by the Government, the district to guarantee a certain proportion of the salary. Complaint had been made of the supposed leniency of the Alkali Inspectors in instituting proceedings, but he doubted whether there was any ground for such complaint. The efficiency of inspection was not to be tested by the number of proceedings against works, for much good was done indirectly and without resort to legal measures. If the law with regard to nuisances arising from noxious gases were made uniform throughout the United Kingdom, he was satisfied that manufacturers would readily adopt any regulations on the subject which might be laid clown. In conclusion, he would move the second reading of the Bill.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Bill be now read a second time."—(Mr. Sclater-Booth).
  SIR HENEY JAMES SIR HENEY JAMES moved the adjournment of the debate, and his reasons for doing so he felt sure the House would accept. This was a very important Bill, in which many persons were strongly interested who were absent, and it seriously affected certain manufacturers in, for instance, the 29th clause. Therefore, when the Bill was discussed it ought to be discussed fully. Now, the right hon. Gentleman was asked on Thursday when he would take the Bill,

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  and he distinctly said he would take it on Monday.
  MR. SCLATER-BOOTHbegged to explain. The Bill stood for last evening. He was asked about it early in the day, and he said he was afraid from the opposition to it that it would be impossible to take it before Monday, but that he had not given up all hope of taking it that evening.
  SIR HENEY JAMESasked, whether the natural inference from those words was not that the Bill would not be taken this evening? He knew many Members, including his right hon. Friend the Member for Pontefract (Mr. Childers), who desired to speak on the Bill, had gone away, and if the second reading were pressed on, the only effect would be to create a feeling that a promise had been broken, and so to prevent its further progress.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Debate be now adjourned."—(Sir Henry James.)
  MR. SCLATER-BOOTHsaid, he could not resist the Motion, if it were pressed; but he believed the hon. and learned Gentleman was the only Member in the House who desired the adjournment. His answer was not reported, and as the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Pontefract (Mr. Childers) was not present when the answer was given, he could not be prejudiced.
  MR. WILBRAHAM EGERTONsaid, he was in the House at the time the answer was given; but, as he did not catch its purport, he spoke to the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Sclater-Booth) afterwards, and certainly understood from him that he would bring on the measure that (Friday) night, if he could. He thought it would be very inconvenient to delay the Bill, and to waste the time of hon. Members who had come down to support the second reading.
  MR. LOWTHIAN BELLcould not tell, of course, what took place between the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Local Government Board and the last speaker privately; but immediately after hearing the answer given on the previous evening, he went into the Lobby and told half-a-dozen gentlemen, manufacturers and others, that the Bill would not come on before Monday, and they consequently went away. As a whole, he liked the Bill, although its
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  promoters had been singularly unjust in certain clauses to the manufacturers.
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUERsaid, of course, where there was any misunderstanding as to an arrangement, it was far better to take an adjournment.
  Question put, and agreed to.
  Debate adjourned till Monday next.

WORMWOOD SCRUBS REGULATION BILL— [Bill 96.]
(Colonel Lindsay, Mr. Secretary Stanley, Lord Eustace Cecil.)
Order read, for resuming Adjourned Debate on Question [13th May], "That Mr. Shaw Lefevre be a Member of the Select Committee on the Wormwood Scrubs Regulation Bill."
Question again proposed.
Debate resumed.
Question put, and agreed to.
MR. GORDON, Colonel KINGSCOTE, and Colonel LOYD LINDSAY nominated other Members of the Committee.

MEDICAL ACT (1858) AMENDMENT BILL— [Bill 2.]
(Dr. Lash, Sir Trevor Lawrence, Sir Joseph M'Kenna.)
MEDICAL ACT (1858) AMENDMENT BILL— [Bill 2.]

  SECOND READING. ADJOURNED DEBATE.
  Order read, for resuming Adjourned Debate on Amendment proposed to Question [12th March], "That the Bill be now read a second time."
  And which Amendment was, to leave out the word "now," and at the end of the Question to add the words "upon this day six months."—(Mr. Serjeant Simon.)
  Question again proposed, "That the word 'now' stand part of the Question."
  Debate resumed.
  Question put, and agreed to.
  Bill read a second time, and committed to the Select Committee on Medical Act (1858) Amendment (No. 3) Bill [Lords].

  ARMY DISCIPLINE AND REGULATION BILL— [BILL 88.]
  (Mr. Secretary Stanley, Mr. Secretary Cross, Mr. William Henry Smith, The Judge Adoocate General.)

  COMMITTEE.
  Order for Committee read.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House will, upon Tuesday next, at Two of the clock, resolve itself into the said Committee."—(Colonel Stanley.)
  SIR CHARLES W. DILKEsaid, he had no intention of detaining the House, but it had always been the effort of the Opposition to keep the Government to an understanding as to when Morning Sittings should commence. The rule always had been that they should not commence regularly before the 10th or 12th of June, and for two years the first Morning Sitting was on the 19th of June. There had sometimes been exceptional Morning Sittings, one in March and one in April, but these were always regarded as purely exceptional. [Sir HENRY SELWIN-IBBETSON dissented.] His hon. Friend the Secretary to the Treasury, he saw, shook his head; but on the last occasion when this matter was discussed, his hon. Friend the Member for Rochester (Sir Julian Goldsmid) went very carefully into the figures, and prepared a tabulated statement which was reported in Hansard. The Government, he thought, would hardly deny that they were taking more Morning Sittings, and taking them oftener, than ever was the case before. That day made the third, another was fixed for Tuesday, and he was certain that was the earliest period at which they had ever got into them regularly. Previously, any Morning Sittings before June were always defended on the ground that they were exceptional. When the Chancellor of the Exchequer proposed a Morning Sitting some weeks ago, he told them it was exceptional; but he only missed one Tuesday, and they had had them ever since. If Government insisted, of course, it was useless to object; but he certainly should divide the House by way of protest.
  SIR HENRY SELWIN-IBBETSONsaid, he also wished formally to enter his protest against the idea that the
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  10th or the 11th of June was the time at which these Morning Sittings should begin. Within the last four or five years there were two years, in each of which there had certainly been either three or four Morning Sittings—-he could not pledge himself to the exact number—in either the months of April or May.
  Question put.
  The House divided:—Ayes 92; Noes 15: Majority 77.—(Div. List, No. 100.)

HYPOTHEC ABOLITION (SCOTLAND) BILL [Bill 119.]
(Mr. Vans Agnew, Mr. Baillie Hamilton, Sir George Douglas, Colonel Alexander.)
HYPOTHEC ABOLITION (SCOTLAND) BILL [Bill 119.]

  CONSIDERATION AS AMENDED.
  Order for Consideration, as amended, read.
  MR. VANS AGNEWsaid, he was anxious that the Bill should be considered that evening; but in the absence of the right hon. and learned Lord Advocate and most of the Scotch Members, he would defer it till Friday, the 23rd.
  Consideration, as amended, deferred till Friday next.

DISPENSARIES (IRELAND) BILL.
(Mr. Brum, Mr. Downing, Mr. Mulholland, Mr. Ward.)
DISPENSARIES (IRELAND) BILL.

  [BILL 66.] COMMITTEE.
  Order for Committee read.
  Bill considered in Committee.
  (In the Committee.)
  Clauses 1 to 5, inclusive, agreed to.
  Clause 6, (Loan to be repaid by annuity).
  MR. BRUEN, in moving, as an Amendment, in page 3, line 19, to leave out from beginning to "provided," in line 29, and insert—
  "Every loan made under the provisions of this Act shall bear interest at the rate of three and a half per centum per annum from the date of each advance to the fifth day of April or the tenth day of October which shall next happen after such advance, and shall be repaid by the payment to Her Majesty of an annual rent-charge of five pounds for every one hundred pounds of such loan from time to time advanced, and so in proportion for any lesser amount, to be pay-

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  able for the term of thirty-five years, to be computed from the first of the said days which shall next happen after the advance in respect of which the rent-charge shall be charged, such rent-charge to be paid by equal half-yearly payments on the fifth day of April and the tenth day of October in every year, the first of such payments to be made on the second of such days which shall happen next after the issue of any such advance in respect of which the rent-charge shall be charged;"
  and in page 3, line 30, after "annual," leave out "sum," and insert "rent-charge;" said, if his proposal were adopted it would bring the Bill into harmony with the Public Works Loans Bill.
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUERsaid, he had no objection to the insertion of the words, subject to the understanding that he reserved to himself the right to make the Public Works Loans Bill now before Parliament apply, if necessary, to this Bill.
  Amendment agreed to.
  Clause, as amended, agreed to.
  Clause 7 amended, and agreed to.
  Remaining clauses agreed to.
  Schedule amended, and agreed to.
  House resumed.
  Bill reported; as amended, to be considered upon Monday next.

LICENSING LAWS AMENDMENT BILL. [BILL 25.]
(Mr. Staveley Hill, Mr. Mundella, Mr. Rodwell.)
LICENSING LAWS AMENDMENT BILL. [BILL 25.]

  SECOND READING. ADJOURNED DEBATE.
  Order read, for resuming Adjourned Debate on Amendment proposed to Question [17th April], "That the Bill be now read a second time."
  And which Amendment was, to leave out the word "now," and at the end of the Question to add the words "upon this day six months."—(Sir Harcourt Johnstone.)
  Question again proposed, "That the word 'now' stand part of the Question."
  SIR CHARLES W. DILKEdrew attention to the fact that it was after half-past 12 o'clock, and contended that the Order, being opposed, could not be taken.
  Question put.
  The House divided:—Ayes 48; Noes 30: Majority 18.—(Div. List, No. 101.)
  Main Question put, and agreed to.
  Bill read a second time, and committed for Tuesday next.

  WAYS AND MEANS.
  Resolution [May 15] reported, and agreed to.
  Ordered, That a Bill be brought in upon the said Resolution; and that Mr. RAIKES, Mr. CHANCELLOR of the Exchequer, and Sir Henry SELWIN-IBBETSON do prepare and bring it in.
  Bill presented, and read the first time.

MOTIONS.

  SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE ACTS [SALARIES, &c.]
  Considered in Committee.
  (In the Committee.)
  Resolved, That it is expedient to authorise the extension of the provisions of the Supreme Court of Judicature Acts 1873, and 1875, relating to the salaries and pensions of puisne Judges of the High Court of Justice, and of the officers attached to their persons, to any additional Judge who may be appointed under the provisions of any Act of the present Session for amending the Supreme Court of Judicature Acts.
  Resolution to be reported upon Monday next.

  VOLUNTEER CORPS (IRELAND) [PAY AND ALLOWANCES, &C.]
  Considered in Committee.
  (In the Committee.)
  Resolved, That it is expedient to authorise the payment, out of moneys to be provided by Parliament, of Bay and Allowances, Half Bay, and Pensions to Members of the Volunteer Force, and of pensions to their widows; also of allowances to Clerks of general meetings of Lieutenancy in Ireland, which may become payable under the provisions of any Act of the present Session, to authorise the enrolment of Volunteer Corps in Ireland.
  Resolution to be reported upon Monday next.

  COURTS OF JUSTICE BUILDING ACT (1865) AMENDMENT [EXPENSES].
  Considered in Committee.
  (In the Committee.)
  Resolved, That it is expedient to authorise the payment, out of moneys to be provided by Parliament, of any Expenses which may be incurred in keeping order in, cleaning, and in the management and use of, the Royal Courts of Justice, under the provisions of any Act of the

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  present Session to amend "The Courts of Justice Building Act, 1865."
  Resolution to be reported upon Monday next.

  LOCAL GOVERNMENT (HIGHWAYS) PROVISIONAL ORDERS (DORSET, &C.) BILL.
  On Motion of Mr. Salt, Bill to confirm certain Provisional Orders of the Local Government Board under the provisions of "The Highways and Locomotives (Amendment) Act, 1878," relating to the Counties of Dorset, Montgomery, Northampton, Salop, Wilts, and York (East Riding), ordered to be brought in by Mr. Salt and Mr. Sclater-Booth.
  Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 186.]

  LOCAL GOVERNMENT HIGHWAYS PROVISIONAL ORDERS (GLOUCESTER AND HEREFORD) BILL.
  On Motion of Mr. Salt, Bill to confirm certain Provisional Orders of the Local Government Board under the provisions of "The Highways and Locomotives (Amendment) Act, 1878," relating to the Counties of Gloucester and Hereford, ordered to be brought in by Mr. Salt and Mr. Sclater-Booth.
  "Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 185.]

  TRAMWAYS ORDERS CONFIRMATION BILL.
  On Motion of Mr. JOHN G. Talbot, Bill for confirming certain Provisional Orders made by the Board of Trade under "The Tramways Act, 1870," relating to Bristol Tramways (Extensions), Briton Perry and Swansea Tramways, Burnley and District Tramways, Chesterfield, Brampton, and Whittington Tramways, Crewe and District Tramways, Derby Tramways, Dewsbury, Batlcy, and Birstal Tramways (Extension), Ipswich Tramways, Leamington and Warwick Tramways, Liverpool Corporation Tramways, Newcastle upon Tyno Tramways, North London Suburban Tramways, Oxford Tramways, Staffordshire Tramways, Stoke upon Trent, Fenton, Longton, and District Tramways, Sunderland Corporation Tramways, Sunderland Tramways (Extension), Swansea Tramways (Extension), Tynemouth and District Tramways, Wigan Tramways, York Tramways; and for empowering the Board of Trade to grant licences for the use for limited periods, by way of experiment, of steam or mechanical power upon Tramways in certain cases, ordered to be brought in by Mr. John G. Talbot and Viscount Sasdon.
  "Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 187.]
  House adjourned at a quarter before One o'clock till Monday next.