Commons Sitting of 4 August 1879

MINUTES.
SUPPLY—considered in Committee War in South Africa (Vote of Credit); ARMY ESTIMATES.
Resolutions [August 1 and 2] reported.
PUBLIC BILLS—Ordered—First Reading—Prevention of Crime * [181].
Second Reading—Saint Giles Cathedral (Edinburgh) * [238]; Endowed Schools Acts Continuance * [272]; Metropolitan Board of Works (Money) [268]; Chartered Banks (Colonial) T278]; Expiring Laws Continuance * [279].
Committee—Report—Game Laws Amendment (Scotland) [143]; Regulation of Railways Acts Continuance * [270]; Civil Procedure Acts Repeal * [253–280]; Public Offices (Fees) * [266].
Third Reading—Mungrct Agricultural School, &c. * [213], and passed.

QUESTIONS.
  THE MAHARAJAH DHULEEP SINGH.

    QUESTIONS.
    MR. FAWCETTasked the Under Secretary of State for India, Whether, as in the "Estimated Account of the Receipts and Disbursements of the Home Treasury of the Government of India from the 1st April 1877 to the 31st March 1878" the allowance to Maharajah Dhuleep Singh was stated at £21,067 and in the similar Account of Receipts and Disbursements from the 1st April 1878 to the 31st March 1879 at £34,067, he can inform the House of the reason of this increase in the allowance?
    MR. ONSLOWasked the Under Secretary of State for India, If no papers regarding an increased allowance to Maharajah Dhuleep Singh can be laid upon the Table of the House during the present Session, he can state the reasons why the noble Lord the Secretary of State for India is prepared to reopen the question, considering the present allowance to his Highness was fixed after the fullest consideration by the Government of India and the Home Government?
    MR. E. STANHOPE: Sir, advances of £10,000 and £3,000 were sanctioned to the Maharajah Dhuleep Singh by the Secretary of State in Council on the 29th of August, 1878, and the 4th of March,
    44
    1879, respectively. Both were made subject to such conditions as to interest and eventual adjustment as may hereafter be determined upon, and were made pending the final settlement of the Maharajah's affairs. My hon. Friend the Member for Guildford asks why my noble Friend the Secretary of State has consented to re-open this question. The fact is that he has done nothing to reopen it. The state of affairs between the Maharajah and the Government of India is of a very complicated character, and concerns not only the pecuniary position of His Highness himself, but also the future welfare of his children. The desire of the Secretary of State in Council at the present moment is to effect a final settlement of all these matters. So far from re-opening the question, they are desirous of closing it once for all, and it is for this purpose that they have been in communication with the Government of India.
    MR. ONSLOW: Is it proposed to permanently increase the Maharajah's allowance?
    MR. E. STANHOPE: The whole subject of the relations between the Maharajah and the Government of India is under the consideration of the Secretary of State in Council.
    MR. FAWCETT: I should like to know, Whether, when the £13,000 of the people of India was advanced, any security was taken for its re-payment, and, if so, what was the nature of the security; also, whether the application to increase the allowance to the Maharajah was made subsequently to those advances?
    MR. E. STANHOPE: I am not quite sure that I understand the Question, but there certainly have been communications with the Maharajah since those advances; but the whole matter is subject to further consideration.
    MR. FAWCETT: The Under Secretary has not answered my first Question in reference to security for re-payment of the £13,000.
    MR. E. STANHOPE: These advances were made in connection with the general considerations of the Maharajah's position, and I do not doubt that when a general settlement is arrived at a satisfactory conclusion will be come to on that point.
    MR. FAWCETT: I think it my duty to press the Question, even if I have to conclude with a Motion. We were re-

    45
    minded only on Friday of the great importance of saving to India £9,000, and I again request the Under Secretary to give a distinct answer to this Question—When the £13,000 were advanced to the Maharajah Dhuleep Singh, was or was not any security taken in exchange by the Government?
    MR. E. STANHOPE: The answer is perfectly clear. The annual allowance made to the Maharajah is under the control of the Government of India, and it is perfectly open to them to increase or diminish" it. The £13,000 could, therefore, if the Government of India thought fit, be struck off the Maharajah's allowance.
    MR. FAWCETT: Is this £13,000 a temporary advance made by the Secretary of State to the Maharajah under security for its re-payment, or is it to be a permanent addition to His Highness's allowance?
    MR. E. STANHOPE: It is a temporary advance, made, as I have said, pending a general settlement of the whole affair. It is rather hard to press the matter here, seeing that the whole question is as present under consideration.
    MR. FAWCETT: I beg to give Notice that, in consequence of the answer I have received, I will certainly ask the House to express its opinion on the Motion, which stands in my name upon the Paper, with respect to the Maharajah Dhuleep Singh.

    ADMIRALTY CLERKS.—QUESTION.
    SIR CHARLES W. DILKEasked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether an Order of the 19th June of the present year places the clerks of the lower division in the Admiralty in an inferior position as regards sick leave to other clerks, and how this Order can be reconciled with his statement, made on the 12th July 1877, that—
    "The lower division of clerks are now on the same footing, as regards leave and other advantages, as any other members of the Civil Service?"
    THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: Sir, I must say that the practice which prevails in this House of having Questions continually put as to details of the arrangements within the clerical establishments of the different offices renders it exceedingly embar-
    46
    rassing to the Executive Government engaged in administering the Departments. With respect to this particular Question, I will refer, first, to an answer I gave to a Question put to me in July, 1677. I was then asked whether the writers were to be put on the same footing with the clerks of the lower division, and my answer was to the effect that it would be impossible to put all these writers on the same footing. I went on to say that, the clerks were now an established force of the Civil Service, and that they were on the same footing, as regarded leave of absence, as any other Department of that Service, but that the copiers were not on exactly the same footing. It was not my intention to imply that the clerks were to have precisely the same advantages. I said that to a considerable extent, the different Departments regulated these matters according to the circumstances of each case. In July last a question arose as to the allowance for sick leave to the clerks of the lower division of the Admiralty, and the answer was to the effect that a certain practice which then prevailed should be continued. That practice fixes a somewhat different rate for sick leave for the clerks of the lower division than the amount allowed for the other classes. I do not know that the matter is absolutely settled; but that is the present arrangement with regard to the Admiralty.

    TREATY OF BERLIN—THE PORTE— THE NOTE VERBALE.—QUESTION.
    SIR CHARLES W. DILKEasked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether any reply has been received to the Note Verbale addressed to the Porte on the 27th June; and, whether he can state to the House the general tenour of the Note handed to the Porte on the 19th of July last?
    MR. BOURKE: Sir, I cannot say that any formal reply has been received to the Note Verbale. At the same time, the Turkish Government have most solemnly assured our Ambassador to the Porte that they have no intention whatever of evading the responsibility which has been placed upon them by the Articles of the Treaty of Berlin. They have also assured our Ambassador that the delay in carrying out the portion of the Articles in question has arisen from

    47
    the fact that the réglements which apply to the various Provinces, and have to be framed on the Organic Statute of Roumelia, require some time for consideration. That Statute is one which contains about 900 clauses. The whole have to be considered by the Porte in order to see whether they will be applicable to the various Provinces. They have been discussed by the Porte; but the regléments have to be read over to the Council of Ministers. That will be done in a few days, and then, we are informed, they will be sent to the Provinces. The Papers referred to will be presented to Parliament; but I cannot say that it will be done this Session.

  INDUSTRIAL SCHOOLS (IRELAND).

    QUESTION.
    THE O'DONOGHUEasked the Chief Secretary for Ireland, Whether, under the provisions of the Industrial Schools Act (Ireland), it is lawful or competent for the managers of such schools to engage in the manufacture of goods or articles for sale other than the produce of work done by the inmates of such schools, and particularly if such managers are warranted in employing or engaging the work of tradesmen outside the institution, with the view to sale or profit or otherwise; and, whether it is within the duty of such managers and they are warranted by law in canvassing for work, such for instance as the making or providing of coffins and other articles, to the detriment and loss of the ordinary tradesman; and, in relation to this subject, if he will direct inquiries to be made as to the course of procedure in the Industrial School of St. Joseph's, Tralee?
    MR. J. LOWTHER: Sir, there is nothing contrary to law in carrying on productive occupations at industrial schools, and the practice, within reasonable bounds, appears to be a desirable one to adopt. I will, however, make inquiry into the case of the Industrial School of St. Joseph, in Tralee, in order to see whether there had been any cause for complaint.

  ACCOUNTS OF THE INDIA OFFICE AND THE WAR OFFICE.—QUESTION.
  MR. SEELYasked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether his atten-
  48
  tion has been called to the last Report of the Committee of Public Accounts, in which it is stated that India is indebted to the War Office in the sum of £788,000, for the three years ending 81st March 1878; whether this sum represents the capitalised value of the proportion of soldiers' pensions payable by India during the years mentioned; whether the debt has accrued in consequence of an agreement entered into between the Secretary of State for India and the Secretary of State for War, under which India undertakes to pay to the War Office the capitalised value of such pensions in lump sums from year to year, and the War Office undertakes the payment of these pensions as an annual charge; if so, whether he will lay a Copy of such agreement upon the Table of the House; whether he can inform the House what amount (if any) has been added to the £788,000 for the year ending 31st March 1879; whether he will endeavour to lay down a rule which will ensure that this House shall be kept informed of any large sums of money owing by one Department of State to another; and, whether he will direct that these sums of money, when they are paid by India, shall be handed over to the National Debt Commissioners, to be applied in the reduction of the National Debt?
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: Sir, I am aware that the Committee of Public Accounts has reported that £788,000 is due by India to the Imperial Exchequer on account of the noneffective charge of Her Majesty's regiments serving during the three years to March 31, 1878. Under present arrangements the share of military pensions due by India on account of service in India is capitalized; an Estimate is made before the commencement of each financial year of the amount of such capitalization which will become due within the year; but during these three years, owing to exceptional circumstances, the pensions falling due have largely exceeded the anticipation, and the sum of £788,000 represents the balance not provided for in the Estimate framed for each of those years. The hon. Gentleman asks whether the debt has accrued in consequence of an agreement between the Secretary of State for India and the Secretary of State for War, under which India undertakes to pay to the War Office the ca-

  49
  pitalized value of such pensions in lump sums from year to year, and the War Office undertakes these payments as annual charge. The hon. Member correctly describes the arrangement under which India pays down, once and for all, the capital value of the pensions for which she is liable. I will consider with the Secretary of State for War if there are Papers on the subject which he can lay upon the Table. The capitalized value of the pensions falling due in any year cannot be ascertained until some time after the close of the year in which they fall due, and I am not able to say what increase of the debt due by India may have accrued in the year to the 31st of March, 1879. The Public Accounts Committee have made a representation upon this point, which will have my best attention. I am not prepared at present to state the conclusion at which Her Majesty's Government will arrive as to the appropriation of the sums paid over by India. I have an arrangement with India under consideration to enable her to meet the excessive charge of this non-effective service during the past few years, and the decision at which we arrive with respect to that arrangement will be made known to the Committee of Public Accounts and, if necessary, to Parliament.

CYPRUS—REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE. —QUESTION.
MR. DODSONasked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether he can now present to the House complete Accounts or Estimates of the Revenue and Expenditure of Cyprus under British Administration; and, if not, whether he will at once lay upon the Table the Estimates made by Mr. Kelner?
MR. BOURKE, in reply, assured the right hon. Gentleman that Her Majesty's Government had been very anxious indeed to lay all the Estimates in their power with reference to the Revenue and Expenditure of Cyprus on the Table of the House. It was true that in March last he stated that such an Estimate had been received, and would be produced; but some of its statements proved not to be absolutely accurate. But, substantially, the statement he made in March as to the Revenue
50
and Expenditure of the Island would be found to be correct. They had received within the last few days a further Estimate, prepared in a short form. They had been waiting in order that they might put these matters before the House with much more accuracy and detail; but they had not received many of the necessary items. The Estimate would have been ready to-morrow, but for the fact that the day was a Bank Holiday; but it would be presented on Wednesday, or, at the latest, on Thursday. Mr. Kelner's Estimate was also in the hands of the printers, and would be presented to the House on Thursday.

SALMON POACHING (IRELAND)— CARLOW MAGISTRATES.

  QUESTION.
  MR. CALLANasked the Chief Secretary for Ireland, Whether his attention has been called to the sentence recently inflicted by a County Carlow Bench of Magistrates of a cumulative penalty of four pounds in each case, or two months' imprisonment, on a boy thirteen years of age for having killed, and aided and assisted his father to kill, a salmon—for which offences the father had also been sentenced to pay a like fine or undergo a similar period of imprisonment; and, whether it is a fact that on the occasion in question some of the occupants of the Bench were Slany River Conservators, at whose instance the prosecution had been taken, and who, therefore, were prosecutors in the case as well as judges?
  MR. J. LOWTHER: Sir, I have inquired into this matter, and as to the sentences passed they appear to me to have been quite proper ones under the circumstances. It must be borne in mind that large profits are made as the result of successful salmon poaching on the extensive scale upon which it appears to be conducted in that and some other neighbourhoods. With respect to the last part of the Question, if the circumstances were as indicated, I think the matter would certainly justify inquiry, as it is the general law of the land that persons cannot be both prosecutors and judges in their own cases. It seems, however, that by some means which I am unable to explain, a special exception to the operation of this gene-

  51
  ral rule was introduced into some of the Fishery Acts, and, as a consequence, considerable public scandal has been caused—not in Ireland, however—by Conservators combining the positions of prosecutors and judges in their own cases. At the same time, I have no fear that such instances of want of good taste and feeling would be likely to be frequent among gentlemen occupying the position of magistrates; and, in this instance, I am happy to find that the prosecutions in question were instituted by a proprietor in his private capacity, and that, although some members of the Bench were Conservators, they were in no way connected with, or parties to, the prosecution.

EGYPT—THE EX-KHEDIVE.

  QUESTIONS.
  MR. E. JENKINSasked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether the Government has received information that the ex-Khedive, I small Pasha, before leaving Egypt stripped the palaces and public buildings of articles estimated to be of the value of six millions sterling, and also compelled the Ministers to pay over to him all the funds in the Treasury available for the uses of the State, amounting to £240,000, and conveyed the whole of the property thus abstracted away with him; and, whether, as he was deposed by the action of Her Majesty's Government, with other Powers, the Government can exercise any influence to prevent any further sums of money from being paid out of Egypt to the ex-Khedive until he has returned the property thus abstracted from the resources of Egypt, or will be able to take any measures to assist its recovery to that State?
  MR. BOURKE: Sir, we have only heard officially that there is in Cairo a report that the ex-Khedive has caused a large portion of property to be conveyed on board his yacht; but we have not heard what the amount is. In fact, we have only heard a rumour that such a thing was done by the ex-Khedive. We do not know what the nature of the property was; and, therefore, neither Her Majesty's Government nor any other Power has taken any steps in the matter.
  MR. E. JENKINS: Has the Government no information whatever?
  MR. BOURKE: Nothing, beyond the report of the rumour that a large portion of property had been ordered by him to be removed on board the yacht. We have no official information that any was taken.

PUBLIC HEALTH (IRELAND)—TRIM.

  QUESTION.
  MR. PARNELLasked the Chief Secretary for Ireland, Whether, so long ago as the 19th of April, a petition was presented by the Town Commissioners of Trim to the Local Government Board of Ireland, praying that the town of Trim might be separated from the rural sanitary district of Trim Union, and be constituted an urban sanitary district; whether an affirmative reply to this petition was only returned by the Local Government Board on the 15th of July, or nearly two months after receipt of the petition, and whether this reply stated that it was now too late to obtain the necessary Parliamentary confirmation this Session of the Provisional Order; and, if so, whether he has caused inquiries to be made as to who is responsible for a delay which prevents the Town Commissioners of Trim from undertaking for another year important sanitary works necessary for the comfort and health of the inhabitants of that town?
  MR. J. LOWTHER: Sir, in order to enable the Standing Orders of the two Houses of Parliament to be complied with, it is important that the necessary steps should be set in motion at an early period of the Session by the promoters of Provisional Order schemes. It appears, in this case, that the Town Commissioners of Trim consumed some time in preliminary correspondence with parties locally interested; and it was not until April 19, as stated by the hon. Member, that their Petition was received by the Local Government Board. On the 3rd of May the Local Government Board applied to the Commissioners for some further information, and on May 17 and 24, notices were published in accordance with the Statute regulating these matters. On May 31 the Local Government Board instructed their solicitor to prepare the Provisional Order, which was approved on June 17, by which time it was too late to proceed with the matter during the present Session.

ARMY—HEAVY RIFLED ORDNANCE— THOMAS v. THE QUEEN.—QUESTION.
SIR HENRY HAVELOCKasked the Secretary of State for War, Whether, when the judges in appeal ordered judgment to be entered for the Crown in the case of Thomas against the Queen, they did not do so on grounds which had no relation whatever to the question of Mr. Lynall Thomas's claim to the origination of the System of heavy rifled ordnance, of which the 7-inch 7-ton gun was stated to be the standard gun?
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (Sir JOHN HOLKER): Sir, on behalf of the Secretary of State for War, I beg to say that, in the case of "Thomas v. the Queen," the verdict which was found for the plaintiff was based upon the assumption that a contract had been entered into by the War Office, on behalf of Her Majesty and Mr. Lynall Thomas, and that under such contract the latter was to receive reward and compensation in certain events. Upon an application, however, to the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court, the Court held that there was no evidence of any contract having been made, and ordered that judgment should be entered for the Crown. Against this decision Mr. Thomas might have appealed; but he did not do so. The question whether Mr. Lynall Thomas was or was not the originator of the system of heavy rifled ordnance was not involved in the decision of the Queen's Bench.

NAVY—FLOGGING IN THE NAVY— MEETING OF PETTY OFFICERS AND SEAMEN.—QUESTION.
MR. ANDERSONasked the First Lord of the Admiralty, If he will lay upon the Table the Memorandum issued by Admiral Fanshawe consequent on the meeting of Petty Officers at Portsmouth?
MR. A. F. EGERTON, in reply, said, there would be no objection to lay the Memorandum referred to on the Table of the House if the hon. Gentleman would be good enough to move for it.

PARLIAMENTARY FRANCHISE—SEPARATE OCCUPIERS.—QUESTION.
MR. CHAMBERLAINasked the Secretary of State for the Home Depart-
54
ment, Whether his attention has been called to a letter from Mr. Bompas, Q.C. in the "Echo" of Thursday 31st July, in which that gentleman states that the vestry clerks of the Metropolis have decided not to act upon the provision of 41 and 42 Vic. c. 26, s. 5, removing a doubt and enfranchising separate occupiers of parts of houses; and, if the statement is true, whether the local authorities will become liable to penalties for the omission of the names; and, whether he can take any steps to prevent many thousands of persons from failing to gain the franchise which Parliament intended them to possess?
MR. ASSHETON CROSS, in reply, said, his attention had not been called to this letter until the Notice of the hon. Gentleman's Question appeared upon the Paper. He had not yet had time to make inquiry of the vestry clerks; but he had directed inquiry to be made as to what the facts really were. As to the question of law, he would rather not express an opinion upon it until he had had an opportunity of consulting the Attorney General. He was afraid it was not in his power to take any such steps as were indicated by the hon. Gentleman at the end of his Question.

POOR LAW (IRELAND)—NORTH DUBLIN UNION.—QUESTION.
MR. GRAYasked the Chief Secretary for Ireland, as President of the Irish Local Government Board, Whether the seat on the Board of Guardians of the North Dublin Union, occupied by the chairman, Mr. M'Farlane, has been vacated by that gentleman's appointment as Local Government Board Inspector; if so, how long has it been vacant, and whether any intimation of the appointment or vacancy has been communicated to the Board of Guardians, who have been now for a considerable period without the services of Mr. M'Farlane?
MR. J. LOWTHER: Sir, Mr. M'Farlane was appointed an Inspector on the 15th of May last, from which date he ceased to be eligible to serve as a Guardian. It is not the practice to make any official communications to Boards of Guardians respecting the appointment of Inspectors or the acceptance of offices by members of these bodies. The North

55
Dublin Union have, I apprehend, power to proceed to the election of a new Chairman at their discretion.

POST OFFICE (IRELAND)—DUBLIN TELEGRAPH CLERKS.

  QUESTION.
  MR. GRAYasked the Postmaster General, Whether, referring to the memorial of the Dublin telegraph clerks which has now been under consideration for so many months, it is a fact that they discharge duties at least as onerous and responsible as those of the telegraph clerks in Liverpool and Manchester; and, if so, whether he will consider the propriety of giving them equal remuneration?
  LORD JOHN MANNERS: Sir, the ordinary telegraph work in Dublin is of the same kind as that in Liverpool and Manchester; and when there is an opportunity, which I hope shortly to find, I shall be prepared to recommend similar scales of pay for the lower classes of clerks. But the superintending officers in Dublin have neither such onerous nor responsible duties as those in Liverpool and Manchester, and this must be considered in fixing their pay.

REGISTRY OF DEEDS COMMISSION (DUBLIN).—QUESTION.
MR. M. BROOKSasked the Secretary to the Treasury, When the Report of the Registry of Deeds Commission (Dublin) will be laid upon the Table of the House?
SIR HENRY SELWIN-IBBETSON: Sir, the Report has not yet been presented to the Government. I understand, however, that it is ready for signature, and until it has been received it is impossible to say when it will be laid on the Table of the House, as the hon. Gentleman will see.

THE IRISH LAND ACT, 1870—THE CHURCH TEMPORALITIES COMMISSIONERS. —QUESTION.
MR. SHAW LEFEVREasked the Chief Secretary for Ireland, Whether, with a view to legislation next Session in extension of the facilities of the Irish Land Act, 1870, for the purchase by tenants of their holdings, he will authorise the Irish Church Temporalities
56
Commissioners to direct their valuator, who inspected and valued their property previous to sale, to visit during the Recess those properties which have been sold to tenants, and to report upon their present condition?
MR. J. LOWTHER: Sir, I agree in thinking it may be desirable to obtain information upon this subject; but I am disposed to doubt whether the particular mode of inquiry suggested by the hon. Gentleman would be advisable, as the gentleman alluded to is known to entertain very decided views in connection with the subject; and, therefore, it would probably be more agreeable to him, as well as more likely to serve the public interests, if some fresh authority was to appear upon the scene. I will, therefore, consider how this can best be carried out.

CRIMINAL LAW—THE DERBY MURDER.

  QUESTION.
  SIR WILFRID LAWSONasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether his attention has been called to the evidence given in the late Derby murder case, from which it appears that the murderer was made drunk at the Royal Hotel shortly before he committed the crime for which he is now under sentence of death; and, whether any steps are to be taken for proceeding against those who supplied him with the liquor?
  MR. ASSHETON CROSS: Sir, I have a telegram from the Chief Constable of Derby, stating that immediately the sentence was passed, proceedings were taken by him against the landlord of the Royal Hotel, that a summons had been granted, and that the case would be heard on Thursday next.

THE REVENUE—CUSTOMS AND EXCISE.

  QUESTION.
  SIR WILLIAM HARCOURTasked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether the falling off in the receipts of the Revenue under the head of Customs and Excise, amounting in the first four months of 1879 to one million, as compared with the similar period of 1878, is due merely to delay in collection, or is owing to a real decrease of consumption and consequent diminution of Revenue

  57
  beyond the amount estimated in the Budget?
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: The falling off to which the hon. and learned Member refers as having occurred in the last four months of 1879 is not really £1,000,000. The accounts up to last Saturday show a falling off of something less than £900,000. As regards the causes of the falling off, I have notes both from the Board of Inland Revenue and the Customs Office. Taking the Customs first, I have to say that the actual net receipt of duties in the year ending March 31, 1879, was £20,345,475. The Budget Estimate was fixed at £20,000,000, being a reduction of £345,475 on the year's receipt. The account under articles will not be ready until the evening of Tuesday next; but, according to the amount exchequered, the loss at the present date is, in round numbers, £270,000. If the exact proportion of estimated reduction were realized, the loss would now have been only £115,158; so that, in one sense, it may be said the reduction has travelled too fast by an amount of something like £155,000. But the position is explained by a reference to the heavy receipts of April, 1878, when the yield from tea and tobacco was in excess of the requirements of consumption. In the following months of that year the diminished receipts caused a natural adjustment of the Revenue. We have not yet advanced sufficiently in the financial year to show by comparison the relative strength of the two periods; but there is almost a certainty that we shall soon overtake the disparity; and, so far as present prospects are concerned, there is nothing to show that there will be a loss beyond that estimated—namely, £345,000. The actual falling off in the first four months of this financial year, as compared with the preceding year, under the head of Excise is £700,000. Of this sum the loss from deferred collection is £310,000, leaving a real loss of £390,000. The loss estimated in the Budget, chiefly from knowledge of malt charge, was £130,000, so that the excess beyond the estimated loss is £260,000. It will be observed that in stamps there is an increase of £217,000, and in Income Tax of £705,000,thoexcess over the Estimates under these heads being about equal to the falling off under the other heads.

ARMY—COURSE OF INSTRUCTION TO OFFICERS OF THE AUXILIARY FORCES—VOLUNTEER ARTILLERY.

  QUESTION.
  MR. GRANTasked the Secretary of State for War, Whether, in view of the difficulty experienced by many Officers of the Auxiliary Artillery engaged in business, and living at a distance from Woolwich, in Scotland and elsewhere, in giving an unbroken month to the first course of instruction at Woolwich, which is now insisted on, arrangements cannot be made for such Officers dividing the first month's course into two periods of a fortnight each, in the same manner as is already provided for Officers attending the second course?
  COLONEL STANLEY: Sir, I think it requires some consideration and some examination of the subject before we say whether the same instruction could be given in two separate periods of a fortnight each, which can now be given in the period of one consecutive month. I, therefore, am not able to give a distinct opinion upon that point. As regards the inconvenience referred to in the first part of the Question, I would call attention to a reply I gave a month ago, in which I said that we were endeavouring to find some place in Scotland, or in the Northern part of England, at which to form a suitable school of instruction for Volunteer officers, whereby a good deal of trouble and expense may be spared them.

EGYPT—DEPOSITION OF ISMAIL PASHA.—QUESTION.
SIR JULIAN GOLDSMIDasked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether, considering that on more than one occasion he has stated that he has been unable to inform the House of the action taken by Her Majesty's Government in Egypt, and the reasons for such action, because the Government had been working in concert with France, and had not the consent of the French Government to any such information being afforded, M. Waddington obtained the consent of the English Government before giving to the French Chamber on Thursday last, the important account of the circumstances connected with the deposition of Ismail Pasha; whether he can explain to the House the divergence of

59
views entertained by the two Governments, as shown by his own statement that it was not in the interests of any private persons or creditors that the Governments had acted, and that made by M. Waddington in the following words:—
"In the interests of such of our countrymen as have fortunes in Egypt, we were obliged to instruct our representative to invite the Khedive to abdicate;"
whether it is correct, as stated by M. Waddington—
"That the deposition of the Khedive has made no change in the privileges of Egypt, which is ruled by firmans bought at the cost of enormous sacrifices;"
and, if so, what is the reason why the new firman has not been published; whether it is true that at the present moment negotiations for the new firman are really not concluded because the Turkish Government wished to curtail the privileges enjoyed by the late Viceroy, and will only consent not so to curtail them, in return for a considerable additional tribute to be paid by the Egyptian Treasury; and, whether, considering that a public statement has now been made by M. Waddington, he will not, in accordance with the engagement understood by many Members to have been entered into, afford the House a very early opportunity of discussing the policy of the Government in their recent and present interference in Egyptian internal affairs?
THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: Sir, I cannot undertake, within the limits of an answer to a Question, to discuss the speech made by M. Waddington. But I would say that it is substantially correct that the deposition of the Khedive has made no change in the privileges of Egypt—that is to say, the last Firman which has been agreed to will leave the privileges of Egypt substantially as they were before. The terms of the Firman had, I believe, been settled; but the Firman has not yet been actually issued. There is no truth, so far as we are aware, in the statement that additional tribute was demanded in order to bring about the issue of the new Firman. As regards the other Egyptian Papers for which the hon. Baronet asks, I believe they will be out in the course of a couple of days, and there will then be an opportunity of discussing the subject.
SIR JULIAN GOLDSMIDgave Notice that he would bring the question before the House on the Motion to go into Committee of Supply.

ARMY—PROJECTILES—CLAIMS OF MR. PADWICK.—QUESTION.
COLONEL BERESFORDasked the Surveyor General of the Ordnance, Whether, in consideration of twenty-five years having elapsed without any person, other than Mr. Padwick, having claimed to be the inventor of the "Soft Stud System of Projectiles," he will refer Mr. Padwick's claim to three independent Members of this House to determine how far Mr. Padwick is justified in asserting his claim to the invention?
LORD EUSTACE CECIL: When my hon. and gallant Friend asked me a Question upon this subject 10 days ago, I stated then that the Select Ordnance Committee had reported, in 1865, that Mr. Padwick could not be looked upon as the inventor of "elongated projectiles with soft metal studs," as experiments were conducted in France with these projectiles four years before Mr. Padwick claimed to have invented them—namely, in 1850. This was approved by the then Secretary of State (Lord de Grey), and Mr. Padwick was so informed. The case was again taken up by the right hon. Member for Tamworth (Sir Robert Peel) and by Colonel Fane in 1866; but the then Secretary of State (General Peel) affirmed the former decision, which was affirmed again in 1870 by Lord Cardwell. Under these circumstances, with every desire to do justice as between the public and Mr. Padwick, my hon. and gallant Friend will see the impossibility of re-opening a question which has been repeatedly decided by successive Secretaries of States in a sense adverse to Mr. Padwick, by referring his claims to a tribunal for which there is no precedent whatever.

PARLIAMENTARY REPORTING—THE REPORTERS' GALLERY.—QUESTION.
MR. RYLANDSasked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, If it is the intention of the Government to propose a Supplementary Estimate to defray the charge for providing additional accommodation in the Reporters' Gallery, in accordance with the recommendations of the Select Committee on Parliamentary Reporting?
THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: Sir, as the matter referred to in the Question of the hon. Member will probably give rise to an interesting discussion, and as the Session is now wearing out, and some hon. Members who would wish to take part in the discussion might find it inconvenient to remain in town, it has been thought best to postpone dealing with the matter until the beginning of next Session.

THE NEW IRISH UNIVERSITY—THE SENATE.—QUESTION.
MR. HOLTasked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether he can now communicate to the House the names of the persons whom the Government will advise the Queen to place on the Senate of the proposed new University in Ireland?
THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: Sir, I am sorry to say that it is not in my power to do so. I think my hon. Friend will see that, before approaching any person to ask him to serve upon the Senate, it is necessary that we should know the precise form in which the House may approve of the Bill, and until that has taken place communications could not be opened. When they are opened I fear they will—as such communications always do—take some further time.

PRISONS (IRELAND)—CASE OF PATRICK GRIMES.—QUESTION.
MR. PARNELLasked the Chief Secretary for Ireland, Whether it is true that, on the inquest into the death of Patrick Grimes in Armagh Gaol, the prison medical officer deposed that on the 7th of June he had reported, for the information of the Lord Lieutenant, that he considered the life of Patrick Grimes, a prisoner then confined in that prison, to be in imminent danger by further confinement; whether any reply was made by the Prisons Board to this representation, or any action taken be them consequent thereon; and, whether the prison medical officer also deposed at the same inquest that the new scale of diet adopted by the Prisons Board is not sufficient for an ordinary man; and, if so, whether he will direct a full inquiry to be made into the death of Patrick Grimes by persons independent of the Government?
MR. J. LOWTHER: Sir, a Report was received by the Government from the medical officer on June 9, and was considered by the Lord Chancellor, acting as one of the Lords Justices. It was then referred, in accordance with the usual practice, to the Judge before whom the case had been tried, and his Report was received upon June 13, upon which day the prisoner died. I may, perhaps, as well mention that the medical officer's answers to the usual questions which had to be filled in by him were as follows:—
"Nature of disease?—Heart and kidney disease. Has the disease been caused by confinement in prison?—No. Has it been aggravated by confinement in prison?—No; not to any great extent. What benefit would the prisoner be likely to derive by being discharged?—Not much. Whether the prisoner would be likely to derive benefit by removal to an invalid establishment, in which the conditions of ordinary prison life would be changed?—He would not."
Under these circumstances, it appeared undesirable to depart from the usual practice followed in such cases, and, meanwhile, the man was in the prison hospital, where every attention was paid to his case.

ARMY—EXCHANGE INTO THE GUARDS.

  QUESTION.
  MR. ERRINGTONasked the Secretary of State for War, Whether the full Colonels of the Guards, in addition to their privilege of nominating for commissions, have, by Warrant or otherwise, the right to control and prevent exchanges into and from their regiments; whether his attention has been called to a case stated in the Army and Navy Gazette of the 26th instant as having recently occurred, in which an exchange between an officer of the Foot Guards and a Cavalry officer, though not objected to and even virtually sanctioned by the Horse Guards, was, to the serious inconvenience and loss of the officers concerned, prohibited by the full Colonel of the Guards regiment; whether the reasons on which the Colonel's decision was alleged to have been founded—viz., that the exchange would prejudice the rights of other officers in the regiment, can be maintained, and if admitted would not prevent all purchase officers in the Guards from being able to exchange; and, whether the Com-

  63
  mander in Chief has not some means of protecting these officers from the hardships which may be entailed upon them by the irresponsible exercise of these powers by the full Colonels of their regiments?
  COLONEL STANLEY, in reply, said, the full Colonels of the Guards had always had by custom, for all time, so far as he could trace—not by Warrant, he believed—the right to control admissions into their regiments, and to a certain extent that would also affect exchanges, inasmuch as the officer who exchanged into the regiment was to be looked upon as a first appointment in some respects. His attention had been called to the case stated in the Question, and he must correct the statement that the exchange was prohibited by the full Colonel of the Guards regiment. The exchange, which, like all others, was an indulgence to an officer, and not a right, was prohibited by the Commander-in-Chief and the military authorities, after consultation with the full Colonel of the regiment. With regard to the third part of the Question, the hon. Gentleman must excuse his answering it except so far as saying that he did not admit that any seeming right or hardship to any officer ought to stand in the way of that which would be for the benefit of the Service. There was no doubt the Commander-in-Chief had absolute power in those matters, though the exercise of that power against the wishes of the full Colonel of the regiment was, of course, somewhat a matter of discretion. These matters in their general aspect were at present under consideration, but not as regarded any particular case.

ARMY—DEFENCES OF THE CLYDE.

  QUESTION.
  MR. JAMES STEWARTasked the Secretary of State for War, If he has yet taken any action with reference to the defences of the Clyde; whether he has considered the statement in the Report of the Committee on the Volunteer Force, that "a School of Instruction for Officers of Artillery Volunteers is much wanted in Scotland or the North of England," and also the proposal for the formation on the Clyde and other places of Submarine Mining Companies; and, whether these three objects might not
  64
  advantageously be carried out in one scheme?
  COLONEL STANLEY, in reply, said, he had not been able to take action yet with reference to the defences of the Clyde, because it was his desire that the defences of the Clyde and other commercial ports should be inquired into by a Committee of experienced officers. Force of circumstances had hitherto prevented his obtaining the services of the officers he had fixed upon. Steps were being taken to inquire what place in Scotland or the North of England might be suitable for the establishment of a School of Instruction. With reference to the foundation of Submarine Mining Companies, he had not seen his way to make any proposal this year. There was no necessary connection between the three objects, and he did not think they could be considered as a whole in one scheme.

LOANS FOR PUBLIC WORKS.

  QUESTION.
  MR. JAMES STEWARTasked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether he has fully considered the serious inconvenience occasioned by the protracted inability of Government to meet their obligations in respect to Loans for Public Works?
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER, in reply, said, he was aware of the inconvenience. The sum at the disposal of the Public Works Loans Board was now reduced to £25; but he did not think, the Government could do anything till the Public Works Loan Pill was passed.

PRISONS (ENGLAND) ACT—PHOTOGRAPHING PRISONERS.

  QUESTION.
  MR. CALLANasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether his attention has been called to a complaint made at the Mansion House, on Wednesday July 30th, of certain proceedings on the previous day, of the Governor of Newgate, by a prisoner under remand, of the name of Ambrose Fortescue, when the Lord Mayor said—" He had no power in the matter—that the complaint should be addressed to the Home Secretary;" whether it is true, that, on Tuesday July 29th, the Governor

  65
  of Newgate wished to take the portrait of a prisoner under remand, who refused to have it taken on the grounds that he had not been convicted of any crime, despite which refusal the Governor called to the warders, and the prisoner was seized and forcibly held while he was photographed; and, whether he can state if it is the usual practice to photograph prisoners not convicted of any crime—nor even committed for trial; and, if so, under what authority, and by the provisions of what statute, the Governor of Newgate is empowered so to act?
  MR. ASSHETON CROSS: Sir, in the case in question the Governor of Newgate acted entirely against his instructions and without any authority. It had been decided that in the case of an unconvicted prisoner photographing was not to take place, and instructions had been given to the officials to that effect. The Prisons Commissioners have investigated this case, and entirely disapprove of the Governor's action in the matter.

AFGHANISTAN—MILITARY OPERATIONS. —QUESTION.
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: I wish to put a Question to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, of which I have given him Notice, to which it might be convenient that he should reply before he makes the Motion on the Paper in his name this day. I wish to ask him, Whether the despatch promised by the Government of India in a despatch dated June 2nd, on the subject of the recent military operations in Afghanistan, and generally upon the course of political events, has been received, and will be laid on the Table of the House; and, whether, and at what time, the Government intend to make any statement with regard to it?
THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: Sir, I am not quite sure that I referred to the despatch of the 2nd of June, to which the noble Lord directs my attention; but I am aware that Lord Cranbrook has quite recently received a very foil despatch from the Government of India, but he has not yet had time to communicate it to his Colleagues. I have seen it in his hand, and he expects in a few days to lay it on the Table of the House. As soon as that is done the Government will be perfectly prepared
66
to discuss the question—probably at the beginning of next week we shall be able to find an opportunity of doing so.

SOUTH AFRICA—THE ZULU WAR— CAPTAIN CAREY.—QUESTION.
MR. MILBANKsaid, he would like to ask the Secretary of State for War a Question of which he had not been able to give him Notice. It was—Whether the sentence of the court martial on Lieutenant Carey had been quashed owing to the illegality or irregularity of the proceedings; and, whether it was true that he was to be sent back to his regiment?
COLONEL STANLEY: Sir, I am afraid that is a Question which, at the present time, the public interest will not allow me to answer.

SOUTH AFRICA—THE ZULU WAR.

  QUESTIONS.
  MR. ANDERSON: I wish to ask the Secretary of State for the Colonies a Question without Notice. I wish to know—Whether his attention has been called to the following statement which appears in to-day's Pall Mall Gazette:—
  "Captain Macleod has been commissioned to stir up the Swazies to aggression on the Zulus, stimulated by the price of 5,000 cattle placed on Cetewayo's head. Leigh has been deputed to the Amatongas, to kindle among them a mercenary friendship and constitute them our king-catchers. Colonel George Villiers goes to Utrecht as political' agent with Oham, who is offered 5,000 cattle as a reward for his fraternal act of catching for us his brother?"
  The thing hardly sounds very credible; but the names of the three officers being given attaches a sort of credibility to it, and I wish to ask the right hon. Gentleman—Whether the Government know anything about the matter; and, whether it is the sort of warfare of which they approve? If not, I wish to know whether they will take any steps to ascertain the truth of the statement, and to put a stop to such a state of things?
  SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH: Sir, I know nothing of any commission that has been issued for any such purpose to Colonel Villiers; but with regard to Captain M'Leod and Lieutenant Leigh, Captain M'Leod has been for some time past stationed as a resident with the Swazies, and Lieutenant Leigh has visited the Amatongas;

  67
  but they have been employed, not in stirring up the people against the Zulus, but in doing their best to prevent those Tribes from joining the Zulus.
  MR. ANDERSON: Does the Government know anything about the 5,000 head of cattle offered for catching Cetewayo?
  SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH: I know nothing whatever about that.

SOUTH AFRICA—THE IMPRISONED GRIQUAS.—QUESTION:
MR. SULLIVANasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Whether any steps have been taken to secure the release of the prisoners who had been taken from East Griqualand and imprisoned at Cape Town?
SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH: Having considered the representations which have been made to me of the length of time for which the East Griquas had been detained as prisoners at Cape Town, I wrote on Thursday to Sir Bartle Frere, requesting him to bring the subject before his Ministers, and suggesting that they should consider whether the time might not now have arrived when these men, with the exception, perhaps, of the ringleaders, might be allowed to return to their homes. Of course, the matter is one for the decision of the Cape Government, who are much better acquainted than I am with the present condition of the district in question, in which the duty of maintaining order falls upon the Colonial Forces.

NAVY—REPORTED ORDERING OF THE FLEET TO BESIKA BAY.

  QUESTION.
  MR. E. JENKINSasked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether it is true that the Fleet has been ordered to Besika Bay; and, if so, for what purpose?
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: Will the hon. Gentleman please give Notice of the Question?

PARLIAMENT—ORDER OF BUSINESS.

  QUESTIONS.
  SIR JOSEPH M'KENNAasked, Whether the Banking Bill would be taken to-night?
  MR. DILLWYNsaid, he would like to know what Business would be taken to-morrow? At the same time, he suggested that the Paper might be cleared by the discharge of some more Orders.
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUERdid not think it was necessary to clear the Paper at present. As to the Banking Bill, he hoped the House would to-night let Mr. Speaker leave the Chair, and he would undertake not to proceed further. To-morrow they would take the Irish University Bill at the Morning Sitting, and, if necessary, also at the Evening Sitting. If time permitted, Supply would also be proceeded with.
  MR. SCLATER-BOOTHremarked, that he did not intend to proceed with the clauses in the Poor Law Amendment (No. 2) Bill, which related to the election of Guardians.
  MR. CHAMBERLAINasked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether, having regard to the lateness of the Session, he would not now consent to drop the portion of the Public Works Loans Bill which had given rise to so much opposition?
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUERsaid, that as soon as he could find time he proposed to proceed with the Public Works Loans Bill. He could not, he might add, consent to drop any portion of the Bill before the decision of the House had been taken upon it.

ORDERS OF THE DAY.
  AFGHAN WAR—VOTE OF THANKS TO THE VICEROY OF INDIA AND TO THE MILITARY FORCES.

    RESOLUTIONS.
    THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: Sir, I rise to move that the Thanks of the House be given to those distinguished persons and those gallant Forces who have been employed in the recent operations in Afghanistan. I must, at the outset, request permission to supply an accidental omission in the first Resolution as it stands on the Paper—an omission which would suggest itself to every person as an accidental one. I mean that the name of the gallant and distinguished Commander-in-Chief, General Sir Frederick Haines, has been omitted. I intend to move—

    69

    1. "That the Thanks of this House be given to the Eight Honourable Lord Lytton, Viceroy and Governor-General of India, and to General Sir Frederick Paul Haines, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., C.I.E., Commander-in-Chief in India, for the ability and judgment with which the resources of the British Empire in India have been applied to the support of the Military operations in Afghanistan.

    2. "That the Thanks of this House be given to—

    Lieutenant-General Sir Donald Martin Stewart, K.C.B.;

    Lieutenant-General Sir Samuel James Browne, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., V.C.;

    Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Francis Maude, K.C.B., V.C.;

    Major-General Sir Michael Anthony Shrapnell Biddulph, R.A., K.C.B.;

    Major-General Sir Frederick Sleigh Roberts, R.A., K.C.B., V.C.;

    and the other Officers of the Army, both European and Native, for the intrepidity, skill, and perseverance displayed by them in the Military operations in Afghanistan, and for their indefatigable zeal and exertions throughout the late Campaign:

    3. "That this House doth highly approve and acknowledge the valour and perseverance displayed by the Non-Commissioned Officers and Private Soldiers, both European and Native, employed in Afghanistan, and that the same be signified to them by the Commanders of the several Corps, who are desired to thank them for their gallant behaviour:

    4. "That the said Resolutions be transmitted by Mr. Speaker to the Viceroy and Governor General of India; and that his Lordship be requested to communicate the same to the several Officers referred to therein."

    MAJOR O'GORMAN: Mr. Speaker, I rise to Order. I wish to know whether the words inserted now by the Chancellor of the Exchequer are to be considered as an Amendment, or whether it is part of the original Motion?
    THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: I apprehend, Sir, I am in Order in making my proposition to the House. If not, you can put me in Order by correcting me. Now, Sir, I am sure I need say very few words to recommend this Motion to the House. Parliament has never been slow to acknowledge the services of those who have been employed in the field, and who have been employed in sustaining the honour of the British arms. And I may say, also, that the soldiers of England have never been slow on their side to show themselves worthy of the acknowledgment which Parliament has always been ready to make to them. I believe that there is but one spirit which animates all, whether they be Europeans or soldiers of
    70
    the Native Princes, who follow the standard of Her Majesty, and that is the spirit which arises from the conviction that the honour of the Empire is in a special sense committed to their hands, and that the eyes of this great country are upon them in the discharge of their duties and in the perils they have to encounter. And I venture to say there has never been any occasion in the military history of this country in which that spirit has been better or more truly shown than in the short campaign in Afghanistan. It has been short; but it has been a highly creditable campaign to all who have been concerned—from those who have organized the preparations which led to this complete and rapid success to those who have been ready to undergo all the hardships which were imposed upon them and to face any dangers which they might be called upon to encounter. I need not, I am sure, detain the House by giving any lengthened account of the operations of that campaign. They were followed by us all with an interest which never flagged from the beginning to the end. We all remember the first operations. We know that there were many who felt, or appeared to feel, that we were undertaking a work of great risk, and one which it would tax all the energies of this country to accomplish. I do not know that the risks which were then spoken of were at all exaggerated. The difficulties of the country, the difficulties of the season, the valour of the enemy; all these matters were put before us in a manner which, undoubtedly, was not exaggerated. The only thing which, perhaps, was not overrated, was the skill and the resolution and the perseverance which were shown by those to whom was committed the task of overcoming and subduing these difficulties. Perhaps it is the case that in enterprizes of this kind the task appears larger to those who are at a distance than to those who have to encounter it, and whose spirit rises to the task before them. Afterwards, perhaps, a contrary feeling comes on, and some of those at a distance begin to underrate the services which have been rendered, and which appear to be less because they have been rendered with such complete success, which is not altogether just to those who have been employed in the undertaking. I remember well, before we undertook

    71
    this campaign, there were some competent critics, not only in this country, but in other countries also, who thought it quite impossible for us, at so short a notice, and at such a season of the year, to accomplish the objects we had in view in a single campaign. It was thought we might make preparations, but that an actual advance must be delayed till the spring. But the Indian authorities felt, and felt rightly, that promptitude in the attack, and a complete and an immediate advance, was at least as important, perhaps, and even more important, than the ultimate success itself, and so perfect were the preparations made, and so complete were the plans, that on the very day when the time allowed to the Ameer for an answer to our demands expired, orders were sent to the three great divisions which were to attack the country from the three points converging on the capital; and at daybreak on the morning following those orders the three divisions of the Army entered the enemy's country. There was the division of Sir Samuel Browne, which advanced at once on the morning of the 21st November—advanced at once into the dreaded Khyber Pass and attacked the fortress of Ali Musjid. On the morning of the 22nd that fortress had been evacuated by its defenders and put in possession of Her Majesty's troops, and within three days more, on the morning of the 24th, Sir Samuel Browne and his troops were in possession of the Pass from end to end, and in occupation of the fortress of Dakka. The whole of that important work was done in three days, and the position carried, which placed the Khyber Pass, for once and for all, at the command of the British. On the same day another Force, under the command of that gallant officer, General Roberts, advanced and drove the enemy through the Kurrum Valley, and they retreated on the strong and well-defended position of the Peiwar Khotal. I think it was about the end of November when General Roberts prepared to attack the position of the Peiwar Khotal. We all remember the brilliant accounts we received of that action—the night marches of the gallant Highlanders, the Goorkhas emulating one another who should be first on the steep; how they gallantly scaled the stockades, and carried them at the point of the bayonet, after a gallant resistance; how
    72
    the mountain guns were served under Captain Kelso, who fell on that occasion; and how, under the command of General Roberts himself, at last the position was carried, and the British troops were in possession of that difficult and well-defended fortress. Within a few days afterwards—I think it was the 8th December—the Force advanced further, and General Roberts, with his Force, found himself on the top of the Shutargardan Pass, 11,000 feet above the level of the sea, and in complete command of the roads to the capital of Cabul. It is natural that our minds should be more excited by exploits of this kind than by the less exciting, but at the same time equally creditable, advance that was made by the third column, under General Biddulph and General Stewart. The advance by that Force, which had marched 500 miles encumbered with a large quantity of stores, which had to advance at an inclement period of the year and in a country very imperfectly known, and prepared at every moment to receive an attack of foes on front, flank, or rear, no matter from what quarter it might come—the advance of that Force so encumbered and so threatened, at such a time of the year, without any serious casualty, without any serious loss, is, I think, one of the most creditable of military acts, and it is to the completeness of the services rendered by this part of the Force, as by other parts, that the success of the campaign is owing. I ought also to mention those who took part subsequently in support of the advance. General Maude's was another portion of the Force who had to support the advance through the Shutargardan Pass, and rendered the greatest possible service in maintaining the communications in the Pass and in keeping quiet the Tribes in the disturbed district; and the effect of those operations have been that they have impressed on the people of the country in which the operations were carried on a sense of the power, of the firmness, of the readiness, and, at the same time, of the justice and good behaviour of the British troops who had been employed there. I ought not to pass from this subject without referring to one more class of men to whom the Thanks of the House must be given. I refer to all those Native officers and soldiers who took so distinguished a part

    73
    in the whole of the campaign, including not only those who are in the service of Her Majesty, but of others who had tendered their services to the Empire—namely, the independent Princes of India. One feeling animated them all. I believe that the fact of men like the Sikhs, the Goorkhas, and British troops serving together, will have a good effect for many years to come. I have already expressed my regret that the name of Sir Frederick Haines was omitted in the first draught of the Resolutions, and, undoubtedly, the Commander-in-Chief in India ought to have a full share of the acknowledgments to those who organized the campaign. I ought also to mention the Adjutant General and the Quartermaster General as those who have taken a great part in the preparations. I have very rapidly, very briefly, and, I know, very imperfectly, attempted to sketch to the House what appear to be the leading features in these operations. I feel it is impossible for anyone—certainly, it is impossible for me—to do justice to such a subject as the gallantry of our troops and the success of our expedition; but I feel sure that, simple as the account is which I have been able to give, it is one which will sufficiently justify the Vote which I am about to ask the House to pass. The very speediness, the very rapidity of the movements, have to some extent, perhaps, obscured and diminished the interest in the campaign; but, at the same time, we cannot, I think, too highly appreciate the value of that rapidity and of that speediness. It has had more than one advantage. Not only has it shown what the strength of the British Empire is in India, but the readiness with which we can put forth our strength. It has also had the effect of diminishing greatly the suffering and privation of our own troops; it has had the effect of diminishing the drain on our resources and the loss of life; and it has had an effect also, which I think we can hardly overrate, of diminishing also the sufferings of those against whom we were conducting our operations. This, at least, we shall be able to say—that we have carried through this campaign against those who were lately our enemies, but who are, we trust, now and henceforth our friends, in a manner which ought to leave the least possible sting behind it. We have done nothing
    74
    to humiliate the brave people against whom we fought. They have been overcome by a display of overwhelming power, and they have been overcome without any faltering on their part, and without any derogation of the high character for valour they have undoubtedly earned. They have been overcome by superior power, to which they can feel it no disgrace to have to submit; and I trust and believe that the feelings which will remain among the people of Afghanistan will be feelings such as will in no way interfere with their proper relations with the Government of India, and that neither we nor they shall have cause to regret the campaign. I beg, Sir, to move the first of the Resolutions which I have placed in your hands.
    Motion made, and Question proposed,
    "That the thanks of this House be given to the Eight Honourable Lord Lytton, Viceroy and Governor General of India, and to General Sir Frederick Paul Haines, G.G.B., G.C.S.I., C.I.E., Commander in Chief in India, for the ability and judgment with which the resources of the British Empire in India have been applied to the support of the Military operations in Afghanistan."—(Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer.)
    THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: Sir, there has been great difference amongst us in this House as to the policy which led to this war. It is probable there may yet be differences amongst us as to the results which have been obtained by the war, and even as to the manner in which, in some respects, the war has been conducted; but I am sure there will be no difference in any part of this House on at least one point—there will be no desire to grudge the officers and soldiers who have been engaged in the war the thanks which are due for the manner in which it has been conducted so far as they are concerned. The events of the war have been admirably and briefly described by the Chancellor of the Exchequer; and I may say we must all feel, if this has not been a war in which it has been possible for the Army to earn so much military honour as in some wars we can recall, yet, nevertheless, it has been one which has called forth some of the highest qualities which are required in the soldier—patience, perseverance, and endurance, even if it should have been the case that the enemy we have had to encounter has been less formidable than

    75
    was originally anticipated. But it appears to me there are two things which are essentially desirable on occasions of this kind. It is extremely desirable, in the first place, that there should be absolute unanimity on the part of the House; and it is desirable, in the next place, that there should be a substantial expression of the opinion of the House, and that it should not be reduced, or be liable to be reduced, in any way to a mere matter of form. I cannot but think that the mode in which this Vote is now proposed is not the best calculated to attain either of those ends. I am not going to blame the Government for the course they have taken on this subject; but I do think it would have been a proper subject of consideration whether the Indian precedents ought to be so strictly followed, and whether it was desirable, on a Motion of this kind, to mix up the Vote of Thanks to the officers and soldiers, which nobody can grudge, with a Vote of Thanks to the Governor General of India, which, to say the least of it, introduces more debatable and disputable matter. As far as I have been able to examine the precedents, none of the most recent are entirely satisfactory. In 1840, a Vote of Thanks was moved to the Army engaged in the first Afghan War, and the proposal was in precisely the same form as has been adopted on the present occasion. But, upon that occasion, Sir Robert Peel, who was then the Leader of the Opposition, said that—
    "No difference of political opinion could for a moment induce any political party to withhold the expression of their satisfaction at the success of the British Army and their admiration of the valour and perseverance by which that success had been achieved."
    Sir Robert Peel added that he reserved his opinion on the policy, on the conduct of the war, and on its results; he said he should like to see the Bill before he pronounced an opinion upon the advantages to be derived from it. But Sir Robert Peel had not expected that the Vote was to include Thanks to the Governor General, for he had grave doubts as to the policy of including civil officers, whatever their merits, in the expression of a gratitude which had reference to military operations alone. On the occasion of Thanks being voted to the Army at the close of the Indian Mutiny, in 1858, the risk of a difference
    76
    of opinion, in a case where there ought to have been, if possible, absolute unanimity, was still greater. Lord Palmerston proposed a Vote of Thanks in the same form in which it had been proposed in 1840; and, upon that occasion, Mr. Disraeli, the then Leader of the Opposition, having asked Lord Palmerston to postpone the first Resolution, which Lord Palmerston refused to do, actually moved the Previous Question upon the whole of the Resolutions. The Motion was not, it is true, pressed to a Division; but it led to a considerable debate, in the course of which a very severe—I may almost say a bitter—attack was made by Mr. Disraeli and other speakers upon Lord Canning, the then Governor General, and upon the policy of his Government. I am not going, on this occasion, to follow the example of Lord Beaconsfield, although he has been on so many occasions held up to our admiration as the very model of a patriotic Leader of Opposition. I do not intend to move the Previous Question on this Resolution, and I certainly do not intend to take this opportunity of making an attack on the policy of Lord Lytton; but I think that one or two observations of the Leader of the then Opposition may be appropriately quoted on the present occasion. Mr. Disraeli said—
    "When I am told, if I make any observation on the manner in which these Votes have been brought forward, that it is the usual form and the usual precedent to name in the same Votes persons whose actions are of far different degrees of excellence, I will say that we should beware that we do not make our votes mere votes of form, because, without honouring those who receive them undeserved, we shall destroy the distinction to those who have been prepared to give their lives in order to obtain it."—[3 Hansard, cxlviii. 883–4.]
    Further on, Mr. Disraeli said—
    "There are passages in the conduct of Lord Canning which require great explanation and a vindication which I have not yet heard. I am not prepared to say that a satisfactory explanation cannot he given, or that a triumphant defence may not be made; but I am prepared to say that we ought not to vote those thanks, and Lord Canning ought not to deign to accept them, until we have arrived at the clear conviction that his services are entitled to our approbation."—[Ibid. 884.]
    And, again, Mr. Disraeli said—
    "Do not let the mail go out and tell him—' Well, we have smuggled a Vote of Thanks to you through Parliament.' Will that reward him, and will that sustain him in his labours? Will that add to his moral influence in Calcutta?

    77
    No I There is not an hon. Gentleman in this House but must feel that a Vote of Thanks under these circumstances is worse than nothing. It excites the passions of party, and, instead of Lord Canning being held forth as a statesman who has deserved well of his country, an impression will go about that he is used as a stalking-horse, and that for factious purposes the Vote has been bestowed."—[Ibid. 888.]
    It may be said that this Vote of Thanks to Lord Lytton and the Government of India does not deal in any way with the question of the policy of the war. That is perfectly true. If it were otherwise, I should not feel justified in confining myself to these observations; but I should think it necessary to challenge the Vote. But I may say it is extremely desirable on this occasion that these Votes should be passed, not as a mere matter of form. I must call the attention of the House to the fact that we have not before us any information which would enable us to pass this Vote of Thanks to the Government of India otherwise than as a matter of form. Indeed, I think, as a matter of justice towards all those who have been in command of the troops, it would have been desirable that this Vote should have been postponed until the House was in possession of some fuller information than any before it respecting the actual character of the services rendered by the Governor General. The accounts we have had in the newspapers and the despatches published in The Gazette, coupled with the statement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, justify us in giving any thanks in our power to the Military Forces that have taken part in the campaign; but, from the same sources of information, we cannot help being aware that, as to the conduct of the campaign by the Indian Government, there has not been the same unanimity of opinion. I do not say whether things that have been said can be proved or not; probably, there may be a good defence; but it certainly was currently rumoured at the commencement of the war that Lord Lytton had been restrained by the strongest remonstrances on the part of the military authorities from precipitating military operations before adequate preparations had been made. We have been told, further, that the commissariat and transport arrangements have left a great deal to be desired, that the defects in transport have involved enormous loss, and that the cost of transport was
    78
    so enormous at one time as to all but render it necessary to suspend military operations. There may be an answer to all this; but, certainly, we have not in the official Papers any information which would justify us in agreeing to the Vote of Thanks. If we are asked to pass a Vote of Thanks to Lord Lytton and the Government of India for the way in which the resources of India have been applied to the furtherance of this war, we can only do it as a mere matter of form, and it will not be a Vote of Thanks which can convey any very substantial gratification to Lord Lytton. It is but a short time ago since we have heard of the arrangements made for the return of the troops, and those arrangements seem to have been far from perfect, and very unsatisfactory—some of them, it appears, had suffered very severely in their march across the plains in hot weather. Now, I cannot help thinking that some explanations ought to have been given to us upon this point, before we are called upon to assent to a Vote of Thanks to the Government of India. As regards the military authorities and the troops, I can subscribe heartily to any Vote of Thanks which may be proposed; but I must express my regret that matter of so debatable a character as the conduct of Lord Lytton should have been mixed up with it. I must, therefore, record my protest that, in passing a Vote in this shape, it is merely as a matter of form, and that we are not to be precluded in the slightest degree from calling attention, if. We should see fit, to the policy of the war itself, and to the manner in which it has been conducted. I trust, notwithstanding the unfortunate precedent, as I consider, that has been followed on the present occasion, this Vote may be carried unanimously. I am sure that, as far as the military authorities and the troops are concerned, it will be passed, not only unanimously, but very heartily, by every Member in this House.
    MAJOR O'GORMAN: Sir, I feel quite convinced that this Vote of Thanks would have been carried unanimously in this House if the name of Lord Lytton had been omitted. I am of opinion that Lord Lytton's conduct has been far from praiseworthy. Like Sir Bartle Frere, he has entered upon a most unnecessary, most sanguinary, and most pitiless war. He has mismanaged the resources of

    79
    India, and plunged that country and this country also into debt. I beg, therefore, to move, as an Amendment, that the words conveying the Thanks of this House to Lord Lytton, Governor General of India, be omitted from the Resolution.
    MR. O'DONNELL: Sir, I beg leave to second the Motion of the hon. and gallant Member for Waterford. It is quite true that much of what was contained in the speech of the noble Lord was of a nature to inspire some doubts as to the propriety of dividing against a Vote of this kind, and if I did not see that some further steps must be taken in order to prevent bad precedents being made I should have taken the advice of the noble Lord, and not have proceeded further against the Vote before the House; but I find that repeated protests, which in former years have been raised in the House to Votes of Thanks of this indiscriminate description, have been of no avail, and I see on these occasions that the protest has not been followed by a Division. Therefore, I think it will be necessary to take steps to mark the opinion of at least a section of the House, and show that the introduction of such a very debatable matter as the conduct of Lord Lytton in a Resolution of Thanks to our Military Forces in India is not unanimously viewed with favour. I believe that Lord Lytton did not act with judgment, and not with much ability, in respect to the war in Afghanistan. I believe he hurried on the war unnecessarily, and I believe he has concluded that war without honour or credit to this country, and without additional security to India. I will not say more on the point with regard to Lord Lytton than to express my conviction that the war has alienated from us the Border population, which ordinary calmness and honesty would have conciliated. I believe the policy of Lord Lytton has immensely increased the danger of our Indian Empire. I believe Lord Lytton is not the originator—it may be doubted whether he originated anything of importance during his administration of India—but he supported a policy of directly provoking and challenging the Russian Empire. I am convinced at this moment that the war in Afghanistan has caused Russia to take steps in the neighbourhood of our Indian Frontier, for which the House
    80
    of Commons, at no distant day, will have to note a heavy increase in the taxation of the country. I am satisfied you have made no friends in Afghanistan by your movement, and I doubt very much whether the war has been conducted according to the strict usages of civilized warfare. I believe, for every clansman we have gained over by a miserable system of subsidy and bribe, we have alienated tens of thousands. There is a piece of good advice, "Don't prophesy unless you know;" but the manner in which the Vote has been brought on and hastened forward prevents us from voting upon facts, except such as we can gather from the reliable but still unofficial accounts of the newspapers. If Her Majesty's Government had chosen to have the conduct of the authorities and troops decided by this House in full possession of the facts, they would not have brought on their Vote just previous to another important discussion upon another department of Government blundering and maladministration—the war in South Africa. I cannot speak with certainty of the motives of Her Majesty's Government; but I think the position the Ministry have taken up is highly calculated to provoke the suspicion that the Government wish to have the public attention occupied with the thought of the glory of the Afghan campaign, and the Vote of Thanks to our heroic soldiers will serve as a foil to cover the undisguisable blunders of the Government in South Africa. In conclusion, I have great pleasure in seconding the Amendment of the hon. and gallant Member for Waterford, which, as far as I am concerned, I will press to a Division.
    Amendment proposed,
    To leave out the words "to the Right Honourable Lord Lytton, Viceroy and Governor General of India, and."—(Major O'Gorman.)
    Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."
    SIR WILFRID LAWSONsaid, he was very much impressed with the speech of the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition. The noble Lord had made out a most convincing case against the desirability of passing this Resolution. He was still more impressed by the quotations the noble Lord had made, which were most apposite and

    81
    telling, especially the one showing that the present Prime Minister, on a similar occasion, moved the Previous Question rather than allow a similar Vote to be passed. The noble Lord was perfectly right when he said that, without unanimity, such a Vote would lose all its charms. On one point they were unanimous—namely, in thankfulness that this war was over; but, to say the least of it, the present Vote of Thanks was, in his opinion, premature. It had been brought forward so hastily that the Government had omitted from the Resolution the name of one of the most important actors in this war; and it was only on second thoughts that the Chancellor of the Exchequer put in the name of Sir Frederick Haines, the Commander-in-Chief in India. Then, as the noble Lord said, we had not yet received the most important despatch about the close of the war, telling how the thing was wound up; therefore, these were sufficient reasons for postponing the Vote. But he went further. This war was not like other wars in which Votes of Thanks had been passed by Parliament to those who carried them out. In the case of great wars, the nation was virtually unanimous in favour of them. It was so in the Crimean War, although a very small minority in the country was opposed to it, who were right, as minorities generally were. Since then we had had the Abyssinian War and the War on the Gold Coast. Though the policy of those wars was objected to by some, there was no organized opposition, and the wars might be said to have been carried on by the will of the nation. But that was not the case with respect to the Afghan War. Some months ago a great Division in the House of Commons was taken on that question; and though the Government were supported by a majority of 328, there was a large and influential minority, numbering 227, opposed to the policy of the war. It was not, therefore, a national war. What were the causes of the war? None of the reasons assigned in justification of the war had been satisfactory to him. The Prime Minister said it was undertaken to get a scientific Frontier. That was robbery of our neighbour. The reason given by the Chancellor of the Exchequer was because the Afghans refused to receive a Mission of friendship sent by England. That meant a war of revenge. A third
    82
    reason was given by his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Sunderland (Sir Henry Havelock), who, in a speech at Leeds, said that the war would be very useful in promoting Baptist Missions. His (Sir Wilfrid Lawson's) version was that the Government wanted to fight the Russians, but were afraid, so they went to fight the Afghans. If the question of policy had been distinctly raised by the Motion, he should have voted against it; but this might be considered invidious to the soldiers engaged, whose only duty was to obey—
    "Not theirs to reason why,
    Theirs but to do or die."
    They had done their duty gallantly, and I were in no way responsible for the injustice of the war itself. If the war were a crime against morality and justice, as he believed it to be, it was the House of Commons and not the soldiers who were to blame for it. The Chancellor of the Exchequer said they had all followed the Afghan campaign with the deepest interest. He was sure they did; and he himself had followed it with horror, week after week, reading of the burning of the villages of innocent people, and of the slaughter of men, who, as compared with English troops, were almost defenceless. He wanted to know why these special Votes of Thanks were given only to one class of the community—namely, the soldiers. He admitted that the soldiers did their duty; but did not other people do their duty who were not rewarded by the Thanks of Parliament? It was said that war, in which great armies were engaged, was intended to promote peace; but did not other people promote peace in a more humane and rational way? A year ago there was a Conference in Berlin which was attended by Lord Beaconsfield and Lord Salisbury. They exerted themselves greatly—it was said that they made superhuman efforts to bring about peace. Well, they came home to Charing Cross, which was well filled with people, as was also the square adjoining, and they brought home—"Peace with Honour." They were much praised by hon. Gentlemen opposite, and he was pleased that the country had not to fight. But why were not the Thanks of both Houses of Parliament proposed to Lord Beaconsfield and Lord Salisbury? Take another case. The Chancellor of the Exchequer took

    83
    one of the most honourable steps that he ever took during his laudable and distinguished career when he went to America to settle a quarrel, not by fighting, but by the Christian and rational method of arbitration. Had anyone moved a Vote of Thanks to the right hon. Gentleman? No one would have seconded it with greater pleasure than he would; but no such Vote was moved. For his part, he believed that no Vote of Thanks ought to be given except for distinguished services in the field; but he was informed by military men that no great skill had been displayed in those operations, and no great opportunity offered for the display of distinguished valour. That, he admitted, was not the fault of the soldiers, but rather of the circumstances; the soldiers would have shown their accustomed gallantry if the occasion offered. With regard to distinguished services in the field, he found that in what was described by an officer as "one of the most gallant episodes in cavalry warfare ever seen," in the fight at Mhoutan 20 bodies of the enemy were found dead, while our loss out of 2,000 men was two! When that was claimed as a glorious victory he could not help thinking that they were playing a little with the credulity of the public. The fights which took place were not great and glorious battles. They were nothing more nor less than massacres. Overwhelming numbers of trained soldiers were brought against Natives who might, in comparison with the equipment of our Forces, be said to be unarmed. That was not his idea of glory, if any fighting could be said to be glorious. It was, in fact, a second-class war, and it was not worthy of the House to pass a Vote of Thanks for such proceedings. He agreed with the noble Lord that it was a formal Vote; but it was dangerous to pass such formal Votes. If they passed Votes of Thanks in respect of those miserable wars, what were they to do in the case of really great wars? And if the present Government remained long enough in power they would, no doubt, fight Russia, and Prussia, and Austria, and all Europe, probably. Such Votes tended to lower the tone of public life, and he objected to them entirely. He would not, however, vote a negative, because that would seem to be invidious to the soldiers to whom he wished to do, and had done justice; but when the Amendment now before the House was disposed
    84
    of, he would, in order to show his opinion of these formal Votes for services too insignificant to justify the Thanks of Parliament, take the liberty of following the example of the Prime Minister on a former occasion by moving the Previous Question.
    MR. ONSLOWwas sure that every hon. Member who heard the speech of the hon. Baronet would agree with him that full justice ought to be done to the gallant soldiers who had fought the battles of their country. He could not but regret, however, that that speech had been made; because it would, he feared, create an impression in India which would not be conducive to the interests of that great Empire. He had hoped, notwithstanding the words which fell from the noble Lord opposite, that this Vote would not have been a merely formal Vote, but would have come from the bottom of their hearts to express their gratitude to the Viceroy, to the General Commanding-in-Chief, and to every officer and soldier who took part in the campaign. The noble Lord told the House that he did not wish to divide on the question, but that he would agree to the Vote as a matter of form. He thought that was a very poor reason indeed to give the House for such a step; and he believed that if the noble Lord had moved a direct negative to the question he would have met with a more crushing defeat than any he had yet sustained. That, he could not help thinking, was the reason the noble Lord had not moved a negative to the Motion. The conduct of Lord Lytton had been reviewed. Well, that was not the time to discuss the policy of the war, nor was that question involved in the Vote. They were only asked to thank Lord Lytton for the ability and judgment with which the resources of the British Empire in India had been applied for the military operations in Afghanistan. He regretted very much that the question of policy should have been introduced into the discussion. He held that the war was, in every respect, just and necessary; and, had it not been for that war, the belief that we were in fear of Russia would have grown to an enormous extent. The people of India now knew that, should the occasion arise, they need not fear Russia or any other country, and that we were determined to defend her against all comers. Allusion had been made to the conduct of

    85
    the men and officers of Her Majesty's Army, and he thought that they ought to congratulate the Native Army in India for the noble and admirable way in which they had acted with the English troops. He could not help admiring the noble way in which the Guide Corps had behaved, and the manner in which the Goorkhas and the Rifle Brigade had acted in concert. He believed that enormous good had been done fox India, by showing that when once the strength of this country came forward they had nothing to fear. He trusted that no Division would be taken upon the question before the House, as it would be a bad thing if it were to go forth to the people of India that any doubt was entertained of the use of a campaign which had been such a great and glorious success.
    SIR PATRICK O'BRIEN, in supporting the Amendment of the hon. and gallant Member for Waterford (Major O'Gorman), said, he had, on former occasions, supported the Government, because he believed they were determined to oppose Russian aggression in Europe. The Government, however, instead of doing that, had created this Afghan cloud, under which they might retreat from the tall language used to Russia in reference to the action of Russia in Europe. He was quite ready to acknowledge that the troops sent to Afghanistan had done their duty, and had behaved as every British soldier would have behaved under similar circumstances. The soldier had done his duty; but it was quite another thing to know how the Vote of Thanks would be received by the people of Afghanistan, No doubt, General Roberts had acted gallantly; but was there really anything for which a Vote of Thanks should be passed? If they gave thanks to those to whom thanks were due, they ought to have given them to Major Cavagnari for buying the Afridis in the Khyber Pass. Looking to our achievements in the past, he did not, while admiring the gallantry of our troops, think this war was of such a nature as to justify a step which ought only to be taken in great emergencies. However, as he did not desire for a moment to cast a reflection upon the British soldier, he would not oppose the Vote of Thanks if the Government thought it right. At the same time, he thought it would be a sorry compliment to pass such a Vote under
    86
    circumstances which did not indisputably warrant it.
    MR. JACOB BRIGHTpointed out that, altogether independent of the question of policy, the soldier must be regarded as a man who was not absolutely a free man. He was obliged to obey orders, and it might occur that those orders were of a character which compelled him to go to war in a cause which he could not conscientiously support. But when they came to the Governor General of India (Lord Lytton), a totally different condition of affairs was presented. The Viceroy was a voluntary agent, and he was not obliged to enter into this Afghan War. He could have taken any course he pleased to prevent it, and, believing that the war was indefensible, he could not join in a Vote of Thanks to Lord Lytton. He failed utterly to see why the campaign was started, and on what ground it could be supported. It was begun in the dark, and he did not think that any act of any Governor General in his recollection was ever more criminal than the act which commenced this war without the knowledge of Parliament and the country. They had no Papers; they were kept for months without information, and yet information was constantly demanded, and he suspected that Lord Lytton was in the conspiracy which led to the war. That had always been his feeling. Lord Lytton was a party to these dark transactions, and it was, therefore, impossible for him to join in this Vote. He should certainly vote for the Amendment of the hon. and gallant Member for Waterford (Major O'Gorman); and after that, if the hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) moved the Previous Question, he should go into the Lobby with him.
    MR. NEWDEGATEsaid, he did not see that any question of policy was involved in the Resolution, which was simply a Vote of Thanks for military services performed. When hon. Members spoke so lightly of a campaign in Afghanistan he must remind them that on one occasion, within the memory of many living men, a British Force was totally annihilated in the fields of these recent operations, and that this had been, in a great measure, the result of the Governor General, and his Council in India, of that day having undervalued the enmity and power of the Afghans. Their expeditionary Force was, in conse-

    87
    quence, utterly annihilated. He had no wish, however, to exaggerate the importance of the recent war, or enter upon a discussion of its policy; but this he would say—that if the House was to notice these minor wars in the manner now proposed, it was well to acknowledge the good service done and the success achieved in a field which had once witnessed the destruction of a British Army. With regard to Lord Lytton, the Resolution praised him for the preparations he had made, and for the arrangements he had carried out to support the Military Force which was to give effect to the verdict of this House. Although many hon. Members might have differed with regard to the policy of this war, they should bear in mind that it had been sanctioned by the House. Knowing, then, that our troops had done all that was required of them, that they had been adequately supported by the Civil Government, and that there had been no repetition of a disaster, which filled one of the darkest pages in Anglo-Indian history, he, for one, was prepared to support a Vote of Thanks to those who had carried out the decision of that House.
    MR. ANDERSONsaid, the Motion, as presented by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, fell flat upon the House. It had received but meagre signs of support from the Conservative side, and these were indications quite as much as the speech of the noble Lord the Member for the Radnor Boroughs (the Marquess of Hartington) that the Motion was most inappropriate. He quite agreed with the noble Lord, and he only regretted that the noble Lord, after such a speech, did not follow it up by the conclusion to which it naturally led. He ought to have followed the example of the Prime Minister on a previous occasion, and to have moved the Previous Question, and in that case the House would have had a decision upon what was the best line to take on the Motion. Now, what were the facts? The House were asked to vote the Thanks of Parliament for the wretched, miserable raid that was called a great war. If they did so, they would simply degrade the Thanks of Parliament, and take away the good of it for future great events. If they gave the Thanks of Parliament formally for every twopenny-halfpenny engagement, they would not only do a thing which was wrong in itself, but also which would
    88
    entail evil consequences hereafter. Our Armies would not care a farthing for the Thanks of Parliament if they were given under such circumstances as these. We gathered an enormous Force on the Frontier of Afghanistan with which we were at peace. We marched into that country, and we engaged in a greedy and aggressive war for no earthly reason except that we wanted to get a scientific Frontier by robbing that State. We found the Ruler of Afghanistan unprepared. He had no Armies and armaments to meet us. The consequence was that he fled and died in exile. Then his son became Ameer, and as he had no Army he was obliged to give in. There was the whole affair. We marched through the Khyber Pass; but how did we do it? We sent Major Cavagnari on beforehand to subsidize the Natives in order to prevent their fighting us; and so we got through the wretched business. Because we were angry with Russia and did not dare to fight her, we made a scapegoat of poor Afghanistan and demolished the wretched Ameer. He was told the war was not particularly well carried on either, and there were many mistakes made. The Chancellor of the Exchequer had given the House a sketch of what he called the leading features; but the right hon. Gentleman took care not to tell them of some other deeds of Major General Roberts. The right hon. Gentleman was most cautiously silent on that subject; and yet the House had in a Paper before them Major General Robert's admissions of having done actions which were altogether unworthy of a British soldier. He carried on his operations in the Khost Valley with the barbarism of an uncivilized people, and not according to the usages of modern warfare at all. He (Mr. Anderson) would pay General Roberts one compliment, fie had been straightforward and truthful in acknowledging all his misdeeds. He was charged by the correspondent of The Standard with having carried fire and sword into peaceful villages, and he admitted the truthfulness of the statement, and then attempted to justify his proceedings. He (Mr. Anderson) had read both the charge and the justification, and he must say that it did not impress him as being a justification at all. General Roberts said the charge against him was the giving up of unarmed villages to be looted and burnt, and that

    89
    was correct. He said the exact number of villages was 11, and that severe punishment was both deserved and necessary. His reason was as follows:—There were a large number of Mangals assembled. They did not belong to the Khost Valley at all, and they were harbouring in these villages. The fact was that the Mangals were armed, and the villagers could not help harbouring them; and yet General Roberts sent word that if his camp were attacked summary and severe retribution would be exacted from all who had given admittance to the Mangals or other persons. Then he received information that a considerable number of Mangals had gone into these villages, and then he considered it necessary to put into execution "my throat of summary and severe retribution." To use his own words—
    "The warning given on the previous evening had been completely disregarded. Camp followers had been murdered and camels carried off, and I therefore gave orders that certain villages, which had harboured Mangals, and from which hostile shots had been fired, should be plundered and burnt."
    He (Mr. Anderson) would not ask the House to go through the Papers, but just to consider those simple admissions. Suppose the German Army, when it was marching through France, had sent round to all the peaceable villages to say that any one of them where a French soldier was seen would be given up to fire and sword, what would have been said about it in this country? It would have aroused the execrations of all England, and Members of this House would not have been able to find words strong enough to denounce such conduct; and yet that was precisely the conduct of Major General Roberts towards the peaceful villages of Afghanistan, and which he adopted, too, after the Proclamation in which the Governor General announced to the people of Afghanistan that he had no quarrel whatever with them, and that his quarrel was solely with the Ruler of the country. The Ruler having been driven into exile, General Roberts set out to murder and slaughter the innocent people. Looking at these and other circumstances he could not even agree that the war had been carried on in a mode which deserved the Thanks of the country. Nor did he think the war was in itself of a character sufficiently great or important to warrant these Thanks; and if
    90
    the Thanks went in a divided way they lost all their grace, and the blame of that rested upon those who had introduced this Vote in so inappropriate a manner.
    GENERAL SHUTEdenied the statement of the hon. Member for Glasgow that there was no enthusiasm on that side of the House in reference to this Motion, and added that he was surprised to hear the bloodthirsty speeches which had been made by hon. Members opposite, many of whom were generally credited with a desire to promote peace at any price. Those hon. Members seemed to think the Army ought not to be thanked because there had not been a tremendous scene of butchery. He, on the other hand, thought they were pre-eminently worthy of praise, because, by their well-conceived strategy and brilliant tactics, they had brought about splendid military results with comparatively little loss of life on our side. His own opinion was that they would have been even more deserving of a Vote of Thanks if they had not lost a single man. The campaign had been carried on and completed without one misfortune, though war was a game that could rarely be played by even the best of players without occasional errors; and although no great action had been fought they had achieved great results with very little sacrifice of life, which well deserved the thanks of every Member of the House.
    MR. E. JENKINSobserved, that the hon. and gallant Member for Brighton (General Shute) had represented the complaint of the Opposition to be that there was no butcher's bill. What they complained of was that there was no butcher's bill on our side, whilst the butcher's bill on the other side was very considerable. He believed that whenever Englishmen found foemen worthy of their steel there was a butcher's bill on both sides. But our troops had swept through the Passes of Afghanistan without any considerable loss, except in fording rivers and from other avoidable causes which were owing to the incapacity of the Military Staff, and the whole of the proceedings were not worth the Thanks proposed to be given. Hon. Members were placed in a difficult position on the Vote, which had been proposed with no enthusiasm by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and was greeted with very few cheers by the House, whilst the speech of the noble Lord was

    91
    a most extraordinary mode of seconding a proposition of the Government. [An hon. MEMBER: He did not second it.] He was told the noble Lord did not second the Motion. Then, he would say that the noble Lord would have acted a more candid and more manly part, if he had proposed a direct Vote against it. What was the position in which the House was placed? What was the object of the Government? He ventured to say the object of the Government would not be attained by these proceedings. They were trying their old advertising dodge. Ever since an opportunity offered for histrionic purposes in Europe and Asia the Government had carefully gone in for an advertising business. It was a Governmental "Willing & Co." In every part of the world England was advertised as willing to fight anyone who liked to come on. But when it came to the push it was found that we dared to fight only the little ones. The hon. Baronet (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) was perfectly right, and there was not a shadow of doubt that the war was originated in India by Lord Lytton, who was the representative of a small Imperial clique, and who was sent there for the purpose of ending the mistake they had made in Europe, and the defeat they had suffered at the hands of Russian diplomacy; and now, after the war had been carried on, the House of Commons was asked to vote Thanks to those who had been the tools of the policy of the Government in this matter. He wanted to know what capacity had Lord Lytton shown? His Lordship had a brilliant imagination, and was ready to be the tool of this Imperial clique; but, even as far as the conduct of this war was concerned, he deserved no Thanks. At any rate, he did not deserve them from those who felt that the war was an infamous thing, and was simply undertaken by the Government for the purpose of hiding the confusion into which they were thrown by their European policy. He could not support the Government in proposing a Vote of Thanks to Lord Lytton, and he should certainly follow both hon. Members (Sir Wilfrid Lawson and Major O'Gorman) into the Lobby in support of their Amendments.
    MR. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSENsupported the Motion of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. He should not have done so if his taking that course could be regarded as implying approval on his
    92
    part of the policy of the war; but he did not see how it could be viewed in that light. And when hon. Gentlemen said they were going to vote against that Motion on account of the policy of the war, the effect could only be to give rise to a belief that the immense majority by which the Motion would be carried expressed approval of the policy against which they protested. For his own part, he separated entirely the policy of the war from the Vote of Thanks proposed by Her Majesty's Government. The House had not before it sufficient information, or Papers enough, to enable it to form a judgment on the conduct of Lord Lytton with respect to the Afghan War; but they must take it upon the authority of the Government that a certain policy having been determined upon, with regard to which they were not now called upon to pronounce an opinion, he had employed the resources of India vigorously to carry out that policy, and for this he was to be included in the Vote of Thanks. If, on the other hand, they refused so to include him, the position in which the House would be placed by a Division on that point would be that it would send out a qualified Vote of Thanks to those who had been engaged in the war. The hon. Member for Dundee (Mr. E. Jenkins) had said that it would have been more candid and manly for the noble Lord to have opposed the Motion. He (Mr. Knatchbull-Hugessen) was not there to defend his noble Friend; but it appeared to him that anyone who could accuse his noble Friend of acting otherwise than in a candid and manly way damaged his own reputation more than that of his noble Friend. His noble Friend had spoken as an English statesman and an English gentleman. His noble Friend made it plain, as he should have thought, even to the most limited capacity, that, as far as he and his Friends were concerned, the Vote to Lord Lytton must be regarded as a matter of form. But as to the soldier, he was a creature who had to obey; he was no judge of the policy of the war—he was not in arms for any particular policy—and the House was about to thank the soldiers, because they had done what British soldiers always had done and always would do—namely, gone straight forward and done their duty. It was easy for them to sit there and talk about butcher's bills; but he, for one, should blush to charge our soldiers with inhu-

    93
    manity. Wherever the British soldier went he acted with courage, and did not disgrace himself with acts of wanton and unnecessary cruelty. It did not follow, because there was no great bloodshed in this war, that the honour of British gallantry had not been maintained. He thought the great merit of this campaign was that it had been a comparatively bloodless campaign. He entirely disapproved of the policy of the Government by which this war was commenced. He had grave doubts as to whether the objects they believed to have been attained would really be found to have been so; but he hoped he was patriot enough to desire that this might be the case, and that those objects might be fully realized in the acquisition of a safer Frontier and a permanent peace. He most cordially supported the Vote of Thanks to the Army.
    SIR GEORGE CAMPBELLsaid, that the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition had expressed so completely the views he himself entertained that, after the speech, he had not intended to address the House; but since then some expressions had been made use of, in consequence of which he was obliged to add testimony and belief to this extent—that he believed the campaign was really a hard and arduous and a dangerous campaign, and that it had been gone through with great skill and with great merit. He should be very sorry if the House grudged Thanks simply because it had not been a very sanguinary campaign. With the reservations which had been expressed by his noble Friend the Member for the Radnor Boroughs he should support the Vote heartily.
    MR. CALLANsaid, he thought it was a mistake to place in the Vote for the officers and soldiers engaged in the Afghan War the name of Lord Lytton, and he was afraid that that course had been purposely pursued by Her Majesty's Government. At the outset, he did not intend to take part in the Division; and if he had done so, he should have recorded his vote in favour of the Motion of the hon. and gallant Member for Waterford. He should not have then voted in favour of the Vote of Thanks to Lord Lytton, because the Government had not given them sufficient information as to the war. Now, however, he should not refrain from voting in favour of the Government, because of the language used with regard to Irish, as well
    94
    as with regard to Scotch and English, soldiers by the hon. Member for Dundee (Mr. E. Jenkins), who had been very impartial in the distribution of his censure. He had spoken of the conduct of Her Majesty's Government in terms which were barely Parliamentary, and he had spoken of the conduct of the noble Lord the Member for the Radnor Boroughs, his Leader—["No, no!"]—in language no less strong. Perhaps, the hon. Member was only acting within his duty in talking of "the butcher's bill of that infamous war." But he was not aware that the hon. Member for Dundee had ever placed any Notice upon the Paper which justified his condemnation of the war in the terms he had used. He found, in the list of persons named in the Vote of Thanks, that of Major General Roberts, who was a Waterford man. ["No."] Well, then, he was sorry he was not an Irishman. ["He is."] Well, he was glad that he was an Irishman. He should vote, as he had stated, as a protest against the reflection which had been cast on our soldiers.
    MR. SULLIVANsaid, that he believed that the real question before the House was the omission of Lord Lytton's name. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Sandwich (Mr. Knatchbull-Hugessen) appeared to consider his position, as he put it before the House, one of a somewhat painful and embarrassing character, and had stated that he read all the papers, facts, and information necessary to enable him to pass judgment on Lord Lytton; but that, nevertheless, he intended to thank him first, and judge him afterwards. There could not be a question that that was a position which demanded their sympathy. There was no doubt that the spectacle which the House of Commons presented that evening was one that would hardly command the admiration of posterity. The British Parliament presented its Thanks to Lord Wellington when he defeated the Armies of France; the Thanks of Parliament were also presented to Nelson. He had no doubt that Bismarck would laugh to-morrow morning, and so would Moltke and Todleben. These eminent critics would laugh when they found this country engaged in thanking its officers for what had been described as a petty war in Afghanistan. The American Senate thanked General Grant after the suppression of the great Secessional Rebellion; but he had never heard

    95
    that a Vote of Thanks was proposed to the General who defeated Sitting Bull. It was not clear to him that the American General who defeated those Indians would not henceforth complain grievously if the American Senate did not follow the example set that evening. Hitherto, it had been thought that the Thanks of Parliament were something unusual—something that ought not to be passed, as a matter of course, upon the conclusion of every petty war. If they took from the rarity of the occurrence, they would cheapen it until it would lose all its historical importance and effect. If they were to thank every General and every Corps which did its duty, it would only be the Corps which turned its back upon the enemy—which he hoped no British Army would ever do—which would be deemed unworthy of thanks. They were, then, adopting the principle of thanking the leaders of every petty expedition, instead of reserving so grave a proceeding as the proposal of the Thanks of Parliament for the man who approached something nearer to the achievements of Wellington and Nelson. The men who served in the Army ought to be taught to do their duty without coming to Parliament for thanks for their actions. The reason they were asked to pass the Vote that night was to gratify the military element, and to offer some incense to Lord Lytton. Instead of thanking Lord Lytton, he should be glad to join in a Vote of Censure upon him. There was not a man in the country who did not feel that the country had got, happily, out of the miserable position into which Lord Lytton had led it. he did not desire to criticize the military proceedings, or whether there had been a large or small "butcher's bill;" but it could not be said that the troops over which our soldiers had been victorious were on equal footing with them. Could it be said that an Afghan Chief was worthy to stand against the Imperial power of this country? By giving a Vote of Thanks for such affairs as these, they would cheapen it until it became the laughing stock of Europe. The truth was, this was a mere proceeding at the dictation of the Jingo element out-of-doors. He should vote heartily against the proposal to thank Lord Lytton, who, he thought, if they had an opportunity of gauging, would be found more entitled to their censure of his administration.
    MR. E. STANHOPEsaid, the words of the Resolution put before the House by the Government implied the approval of the House to the support given by Lord Lytton to the military operations in Afghanistan; but it was not intended by that to give any approval to his civil policy and administration. The terms of the Resolution followed very much the precedent of 1858. His noble Friend the present Prime Minister made a speech upon that occasion, and, in answer to it, after he had moved the Previous Question, various explanations were given. A very excellent speech was made by his right hon. Friend the Member for the University of Cambridge (Mr. Walpole). He pointed out grave reasons for objecting to a Vote of Thanks to Lord Canning, although, in that case, there was a Memorial from a number of inhabitants of India against Lord Canning with respect to specific points, and as it was distinctly understood that the Vote of Thanks was to be given to those who had been engaged in the war, and was not to be taken as implying any approval of Lord Canning's policy, he urged upon the present Prime Minister to withdraw his Amendment. Mr. Disraeli—as he then was—did so, on the understanding that it did not imply such approval. Therefore, it was clear that, according to that precedent, the civil policy of Lord Lytton was not now in question. If it were, he need scarcely say that he was then prepared and ready to defend it—and in no less degree with regard to the policy of the Afghan War than on other occasions—and if occasion arose they would not shrink from the encounter; but that question was not now raised. He regretted very much the language used in some of the speeches which had been made on the Resolution now before the House, as tending to detract from the character of the operations in Afghanistan—operations which, as had been already said, were to be measured not by the amount of slaughter that had taken place, but by the great difficulties that had to be encountered and hardships that had to be endured. We were told very often in the course of the debates in both Houses in December last, as well as in speeches made out-of-doors, that the difficulties which lay in the way of our troops in entering upon this war were very great, and that the task was very onerous. We were told

    97
    that when our troops entered Afghanistan most dreadful things would happen—that if our posts were too weak they would be overpowered, whilst if they were too strong they would be a menace to the country; that if we put them on the hills they would be without water, and that if we put them in the valleys they would be commanded from the hills. What really did happen? Crossing the Frontier, the troops advanced almost without a hitch; so that, within three months from the time they entered Afghanistan, they had achieved the objects of the war. Could it be said, therefore, that Lord Lytton ought not to be thanked "for the ability and judgment with which the resources of the British Empire in India had been applied to the support of the Military operations in Afghanistan?" In these circumstances, he hoped the House would not hesitate to adopt the Resolution, thanking Lord Lytton, as well as the officers and men, who had brought the campaign to so speedy and successful a conclusion.
    SIR WILLIAM HARCOURTsaid, he concurred in everything that the Under Secretary of State for India had said with regard to the Army in India, and cordially gave his voice for the Vote to the Army for the manner in which they had conducted operations; but he did not think the Under Secretary had removed the difficulty in regard to the Thanks to the civil officers. There was no distinction between the Vote of 1858 and the Vote in this case, and no mere declaration or suggestion by anybody could alter the real character of the Vote. The House was asked to thank Lord Lytton for the ability and judgment with which the resources of the British Empire in India had been applied to the support of the military operations in Afghanistan. The Under Secretary had said that was not the passing of any opinion on his civil policy of course; but then it never was a civil policy at all. It never was intended to be a civil policy; it was never supposed to be anything but a military policy from the first. But the question he had to ask was, what was the meaning of a Vote of Parliament which thanked Lord Lytton for having applied the resources of India to military operations in Afghanistan? He had had an opportunity, when that policy was discussed previously, of saying what
    98
    he thought on the subject; and he could not, without stultifying himself, vote on that Resolution, because he had expressed the opinion that Lord Lytton ought not to have applied the resources of India to the military operations in Afghanistan. He held that opinion still, and thought it was an entire mistake to have applied the resources of India to military operations in Afghanistan; and the greater the ability and judgment which were shown in taking a wrong course the worse it became, in his opinion. For these reasons, while he should concur in thanking all concerned in the military operations, he should abstain from anything which had the appearance of endorsing the policy that had made them necessary.
    MR. PLUNKETsaid, that the hon. and learned Member for Oxford (Sir William Harcourt) knew that the grammatical construction of the proposed Vote, as well as every circumstance connected with it, had nothing whatever to do with the policy of Lord Lytton. It was not a Vote of Thanks to Lord Lytton for the manner in which he had applied the resources of India in the sense of his having commenced the war; but that war having been commenced, and, as everybody knew, sanctioned by Parliament, and he believed by the vast majority of the people of this country, he skilfully applied the resources at his command. That was the true meaning. If it was not an un-Parliamentary expression, he should say that it was mere quibbling to attempt to put Lord Lytton out of the Vote in the way indicated by the hon. and learned Member for Oxford. Nobody could believe that it was a Vote on foreign policy. It was a Vote simply on the manner in which the policy of Parliament had been carried out, and on the way in which Lord Lytton had applied the great resources of India to this purpose. The hon. and learned Member for Oxford had reduced himself to this absurd position—that Parliament having decided to carry on the war, Lord Lytton ought not to have applied the resources of India to the prosecution of it.
    SIR JOSEPH M'KENNAremarked that, although he had steadily voted against the policy of the Government in the Afghan War, he did not think he should run counter to the votes which he

    99
    had given on previous occasions if he now voted for the Resolution of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. But he admitted that Lord Lytton's policy was a perfectly open question. He would say, however, that the course of the war had tended, to a certain extent, to modify the judgment which he formed against it in its earlier stages. He thought, however, now that the war was over, that they would do very wrong if they were to look at the terms of the Resolution with too microscopic an eye. He looked upon the Vote, and coupling Lord Lytton's name with it, as a Parliamentary amenity. They could not pass a Vote in regard to the Army and, at the same time, pass over the Viceroy. Although he could not vote with his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Waterford (Major O'Gorman), yet he thought he had fairly stated the exception which he took, and that he had given grounds sufficiently strong for the distinction which he had drawn, yet not sufficient to warrant the rejection of this Resolution.
    SIR HENRY HAVELOCKwould have been glad to see the Vote divisible into two parts, so that he might have voted in support of the Thanks to the Army without upholding the policy of Lord Lytton. He thought the course of that noble Lord in relation to the war, both as regarded the civil and military policy, was a mistaken one; and, therefore, while he admitted his intention of voting with the Government, he did so wholly and solely on the supposition that in doing so he was according that due and proper and just meed of praise to the troops to which he thought they were entitled. This campaign had been neither small or insignificant; no less than 25,000 men had been engaged in it, very few lives had been lost, and the whole conduct of the operations had been managed in such a manner as to induce him to support the Motion for a Vote of Thanks to the troops.
    MR. RAMSAYwould be glad to vote for the Amendment and yet thank the officers and soldiers for their conduct in the war. He contended that the hon. and learned Member for Dublin University (Mr. Plunket) was putting a false issue before the House when he said that Parliament had been consulted on the Afghan War, because no consultation of Parliament ever took
    100
    place, and that was specially what they complained of.
    Question put.
    The House divided:—Ayes 148; Noes 33: Majority 115.—(Div. List, No. 205.)
    Original Question again proposed.
    SIR WILFRID LAWSONthought he was now justified in moving the Previous Question. He did not want to make a speech; but all he had heard that night had confirmed him as to the wisdom of the course he proposed, but especially the speech of the right hon. Member for Sandwich (Mr. Knatchbull-Hugessen). The right hon. Gentleman said he made it as a patriot. As a patriot, he (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) made this Motion.
    MR. O'DONNELL, in seconding the Amendment, said, he was compelled to support the principle that Votes of this kind ought not to be brought on until the House had a full opportunity of learning how the War, for which the Thanks were to be given, had been conducted. At this moment they had read the most fearful news of the manner in which the wounded Zulus had been treated at the battle of Ulundi. ["Question!"] It was strictly the question. For all they knew it was hypothetically possible that some of our more irregular troops in Afghanistan had committed fearful atrocities. They had no time to look into the question, and there were no facts before the House. They might yet be asked to give a Vote of Thanks to the Native Contingent in Zululand. The news from Ulundi was that after that battle the Zulus were refused permission to take their wounded from the field, and every wounded Zulu was murdered by our Native Contingent. That might, or might not, be true. But they knew that the murder of women and children had been admitted and proved in recent Blue Books. The story might, therefore, be true; and it was sent by Dr. Russell, of The Daily Telegraph, of high authority, and one not likely to lead this country willingly wrong. He wished to ask the Government when they intended to publish the Report which they promised three months ago, in reply to a Question by himself, respecting- the reported execution of seven Afghan priests, on the charge of having instigated the resistance of the Afghans? There were

    101
    other questions requiring to be answered. It was evident that this Vote of Thanks was not so much for the Army as for the public out-of-doors; and, as had been wittily observed, it was not so much a Vote for General Roberts or General Haines as for General Election. It was an evil precedent, fraught with the greatest danger. It was a mere formal Vote; and it could not have real weight and force unless it were postponed, in order that fuller information might be placed before the House.
    Motion made, and Question proposed, "That that Question be now put."—(Sir Wilfrid Lawson.)
    MR. KNIGHTinquired whether it was regular to move the Previous Question, except as an initial Amendment?
    MR. SPEAKERsaid, that the hon. Baronet was entitled to move the Previous Question.
    MR. PAPNELLsaid, he objected to thanking Lord Lytton, because he objected to the policy he had had to carry out. He looked upon that policy as a murderous policy, undertaken on account of the necessities, or supposed necessities, of this country. He could not but look on the act of the Government of this country in going to war against a friendly people in Afghanistan as an act of assassination against the people. He considered that every human being who had been killed in Afghanistan, whether on the side of the British, or on the side of Afghanistan, had been murdered. There was no other way of putting it. It was all very well to call it war; but he called it murder. They feared to go to war with Russia, and they were obliged to enter upon this diversion in Afghanistan in order to satisfy the instincts of a section of the people of this country, whom Lord Beaconsfield looked on as his chief supporters. He knew the power of the Government in bringing up a majority to vote Thanks to Lord Lytton; but he did not intend to be silent, or acquiesce in any of these Resolutions; and he intended, by way of protest, to divide against every one of them.
    Question put.
    The House divided:—Ayes 140; Noes 28: Majority 112.—(Div. List, No. 206.)
    Original Question put, and agreed to.
    1.Resolved, That the Thanks of this House be given to the Right Honourable Lord Lytton, Viceroy and Governor-General of India, and to General Sir Frederick Paul Haines, G.C.B., G.C.S.L, C.L.E., Commander-in-Chief in India, for the ability and judgment with which the resources of the British Empire in India have been applied to the support of the Military operations in Afghanistan.
    2. Resolved, That the Thanks of this House be given to,—

    Lieutenant-General Sir Donald Martin Stewart, K.C.B.;

    Lieutenant-General Sir Samuel James Browne, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., V.C.;

    Lieutenant- General Sir Frederick Francis Maude, K.C.B., V.C.;

    Major-General Sir Michael Anthony Shrapnell Biddulph, R.A., K.C.B.;

    Major-General Sir Frederick Sleigh Roberts, R.A., K.C.B., V.C.;

    and the other Officers of the Army, both European and Native, for the intrepidity, skill, and perseverance displayed by them in the Military operations in Afghanistan, and for their indefatigable zeal and exertions throughout the late Campaign:
    3. Resolved, That this House doth highly approve and acknowledge the valour and perseverance displayed by the Non-Commissioned Officers and Private Soldiers, both European and Native, employed in Afghanistan, and that the same be signified to them by the Commanders of the several Corps, who are desired to thank them for their gallant behaviour:
    4. Ordered, That the said Resolutions be transmitted by Mr. Speaker to the Viceroy and Governor General of India; and that his Lordship be requested to communicate the same to the several Officers referred to therein.

SUPPLY—COMMITTEE.
Order for Committee read.
Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."

SOUTH AFRICA (MILITARY EXPENDITURE) .—RESOLUTION.
MR. RYLANDS, in moving—
"That, in view of the large and increasing expenditure for military purposes in South Africa, this House is of opinion that the Colonies of the Cape of Good Hope and Natal ought to be required to contribute a due proportion of the military expenditure incurred in the interests of those Colonies, and which cannot, in justice, be made a Charge upon the British Exchequer,"
said: If hon. Gentlemen were to take the trouble to refer to the proceedings in Parliament 28 years ago, they will find that the House of Commons were engaged in very much the same sort of discussions as those which are occupying

103
our attention at the present moment. In 1851, the country was engaged in a protracted war at the Cape of Good Hope. It was the last of several wars in which we had been engaged, and in consequence of the great amount of expenditure, and also in consequence of the great uneasiness produced in the country by the succession of wars, the House of Commons seriously considered a Motion brought before it having reference to the circumstances which then existed. I think I may truly say that at that time the opinion of the highest authorities in this House was entirely to the effect that the wars in South Africa had been, for the most part, of a very unjust character; that they had been fomented by the Colonists, and had arisen, to a very great extent, from aggressions made by the Colonists upon the adjoining Tribes; and, at the same time, there was a feeling very strongly expressed in this House that the expenditure which was incurred in the interests of the South African Colony ought not to be borne by the taxpayers of this country, but that the South African Colonists themselves should provide the means for the protection of their own Frontier and for the support of their own interests. That which happened 28 years ago has again happened within our own recent experience. We have again wars in South Africa, wars which I hope, for the time, may be considered as happily concluded; but there is a very strong opinion on the part of many Members of this House, and I think it is an opinion which is also entertained in the country, that the origin of these wars—I am speaking-not merely of the Zulu War, but of the Transkei War as well—can hardly be justified, but that the wars might have been avoided, and that all the expenditure and all the anxiety which had arisen in consequence of these wars might have been saved to the country. I observe from the Report of the debates in the House of Commons in 1851 that Sir William Molesworth, in a speech which he made on the subject, stated the opinion, which our subsequent experience has proved to be correct, that so long as this country continued to pay for the maintenance of British Forces in the Colonies at the Cape of Good Hope, and so long as we led the Colonists to look to this country to furnish the military Forces to carry out the objects which the
104
Colonists had in view, we should continue to have wars, and each war would prove greater than its predecessor. That has been so, for every Kaffir war has been more formidable than its predecessor, requiring more troops and costing more money. That we found in the experience which we have gained in the war we have just had in South Africa. The Transkei War, according to the Estimate of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, has cost the country near £1,000,000—I think the exact figure is between £800,000 and £900,000—and we are now about to consider an additional Vote of Credit for the Zulu War amounting to £3,000,000. In the last year we passed a Vote of Credit for £1,500,000 on account of the same campaign. From the Statements, in fact, which have been laid on the Table of the House of Commons, we find that, in respect of the Zulu and Transkei Wars, we had already voted for extraordinary expenditure nearly £5,500,000. But I wish to point out that this sum by no means represents the whole expenditure which has been incurred for military purposes in South Africa. The right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in a speech he made a short time ago, in laying on the Table an Estimate for the Vote of Credit, spoke of the entire expenditure, which he estimated as the net cost of the war, beyond the sums already provided in the Army Estimates as being the amount which he proposed to raise by the Vote of Credit. Now, that sum already provided in the Army Estimates is a very large sum indeed. The amount which we pay under the ordinary Votes of this House on account of the Force which is now in South Africa is very large indeed, and the ordinary Estimates must be added to the total amount of extraordinary expenditure which we are incurring in South Africa. I am not quite sure whether I notice some dissent on the part of the Secretary of State for War; but I should be very glad to be corrected. I am quite satisfied, however, that at the present moment the amount of the Estimate which we have on the Table of the House for the Vote of Credit is simply a further expenditure which does not include the ordinary charges of the troops which are placed in the ordinary Estimates of the year. [Colonel STANLEY assented.] Now, the

105
right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Secretary of State for War agrees with me. If I am right, it means that, in addition to this large sum of £5,500,000, which is the amount of the extraordinary expenditure which has had to be met by this country during the last three or four years, for the purposes of the Transkei and Zulu Wars, we must place at least £1,000,000 more on account of the expenditure which appears in the Army Estimates. Well, if that be so, it comes to this—that on account of the Transkei and Zulu Wars we have up to the present time expended the sum of £6,000,000 or£7,000,000 for our Military and Naval Forces. That is the amount, if I take the Estimate as it has been laid on the Table by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. But I am bound to say that I believe that the Government themselves are in some doubt as to whether these Estimates may not be exceeded, judging from previous experience, and from the experience of the Abyssinian War, whore Estimates were laid on the Table of the House, carefully prepared by the Government, something like, in the first instance, the amount which the Government are asking on account of the South African War. They asked, first of all, £3,000,000, and then £4,500,000, and gradually it amounted to £9,000,000. But if we take the experience of former African Wars, I think we shall have very good reason to believe that the expenditure will mount up to very much more than the Government are at the present moment expecting. I know that the Government intend to check this expenditure as far as they can; but in the former wars, which were under discussion 28 years ago, I find that the War of 1846–7 cost £685,000 extraordinary expenditure, and that of 1853 cost £2,000,000 in extraordinary expenditure; and it was stated in the House by the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies of that day that no one in this country had a definite idea how the money was spent; and it was also stated, in one of the speeches which was made in the debate, that Sir Henry Pottinger told Lord Grey—
"That it was impossible to convey an adequate idea of the confusion in consequence of the unauthorized expenditure and the attendant peculations which prevailed during the war. Commissions of Audit were utterly incapable of auditing or checking the accounts."
106
He further stated that—
"Though he had offered the burghers liberal terms for serving in a force to protect their own property, they had deserted their duty and returned homo within a month.…Rations were served out to them after their desertion; and at one time it appeared that the whole population was receiving rations, and that, by some mistake, women received four ounces more meat than men."—[3 Hansard, cxvi. 250.]
I dare say the Chancellor of the Exchequer hopes that no abuses to that extent will prove to have existed in the Commissariat Department in the present war; but we must bear in mind that in South Africa we are placed in the midst of a population, every one of whom must have a direct interest in getting as much money out of us as he possibly can. There are the merchants at the Cape, who are importing—the merchants who are dealing in various commodities, a demand for which arises in connection with the war. There are traders in every district, and burghers, who have something to sell; and these tradesmen all derive such a great advantage from the war, and have such an opportunity to charge an enormous sum, that I must say I am not very sanguine in supposing that the Government will find that their labours are very successful efficiently to check these accounts. We hoard, the other day, from my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham (Mr. Chamberlain), a quotation from The Times newspaper, where it was said that some Colonists in Natal said that war paid better than sugar. And that is only repeating what occurred 28 years ago; for I find that in the debate on Sir Charles Adderley's Motion for a Committee of Inquiry into South African affairs Mr. Vernon Smith said—
"It was a notorious saying in the Colony that the war would last as long as the expenditure went on, and would begin to end when the expenditure declined, or, as the phrase was, 'when the price for the hire of waggons fell.'" [Ibid, 250.]
Well, Sir, we have that repeated in reference to the late war. I observe, in The Daily News correspondent's letter of 18th May, that the Transport and Commissariat difficulties—
"At that time were causing increased anxiety, and the movement of the troops was delayed in consequence. It is said that many are holding back waggons and oxen, with the view of forcing the Government to give them higher prices. The Committee are considering what

107
would be fair to both parties; this is at present unknown. Two to three pounds a-day is being given for the hire of a waggon and a span of oxen. When it is known that 1,600 waggons are employed, and that this is quite inadequate, the cost and the difficulties will be realized."
Well, Sir, the fact is that during the continuance of the war there was plundering in every direction. Those burghers, those traders, whose battle we were fighting, so far from showing any great disposition to aid us, determined to take every advantage to obtain out of the British Exchequer as much money as they possibly could; and the consequence has been that the war has been extremely popular at the Cape of Good Hope and throughout South Africa. I hold in my hand several extracts from the Cape newspapers, which will show how this spending of money actually made the war popular at the Cape. I observe in The Cape Argus, regarding the remarks at the meetings at the Cape expressing confidence in Sir Bartle Frere, and endorsing his policy, the writer says—
"None of the enthusiasts thought it expedient to inquire into the policy of Sir Bartle Frere, probably because the cost of the Zulu War will be paid for in English blood, and out of the taxes raised in the United Kingdom."
Then, another paper, The Standard and Mail, said—
"We are glad that England has resolved on putting things right, whatever it may cost her in men and money.'
The London Daily News made some very pertinent remarks. It published several special articles on the injustice that would arise if the English were called upon to pay for the cost of this war, which was being carried on for the benefit of the Colonies. Upon which, the Cape Times replied to the London Daily News in these words—
"The London Daily News says in truth that we are waging a war of policy, but that the policy is that of Sir Bartle Frere and the Cape Colonists; and it not unreasonably complains at our having all the advantages and they all the cost. John Bull has to pay for the mistakes of the past; and though he will growl at having to pay he has never yet shirked his duty. If everything were admitted that The Daily News asserts, then all the more grateful should we be to that statesman who, being sent here in England's name to govern this land, has come forward nobly in defence of the Colony."
Then there was an account in the same paper, as follows:—
108
"From the Boers' camp his Excellency's progress has been marked by the warmest outpourings of a people's gratitude, and Capetown, as it is her privilege and her place, will put the final seal on all that has been done; and at the meeting in the Commercial Exchange to-day it was decided that the demonstration should be worthy of the metropolis of this country."
Now, I wish to point out to the House that all this rejoicing at the Cape took place at the time when the war itself was languishing, and when we in this country were in a state of anxiety and alarm. At that period it seemed as though the whole military operations were paralyzed, mainly because of this want of Commissariat arrangements, and, to some extent, on account of the greed of the Colonists. At the very period when we were in this country feeling great interest and some despondency in relation to this war; at that time, when we were suffering from commercial depression, when the demand for our industries was declining, and when the revenue returns were also declining, and we had expectations of Budget deficits—at that very time, everything at the Cape was flourishing. We find that the Colonists were absolutely bathing in the stream of gold that was sent from this country. They were all in a state of the greatest satisfaction and perfect enjoyment. Now, the people of this country, when they saw this contrast of opinion between the Colonies and the Mother Country, were, no doubt, very much dissatisfied. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for the Colonies must have seen in the papers recently abundant evidence to assure him that the people of this country were thus dissatisfied; and I can only say that I think it would be the greatest injustice if, in the face of what I have just referred to, their labour were to be taxed in order to gratify what I would call Colonial rapacity. The Government, I know, have already taken steps with a view to obtain from the Cape Governments repayment of what they have to determine as a fair proportion of this expenditure. I quite recognize the course which the Government have taken in this matter. I am glad to bear testimony that for the last two or three years the Secretary of State for the Colonies has not lost sight of this; and in one despatch, dated June last, the right hon. Gentleman has brought under the notice

109
of Sir Bartle Frere, in very strong terms, what he believes to be the only just arrangement for the people of this country. But I am bound to say that while I acknowledge the course the Government has taken, we ought, as a House of Commons, to strengthen the hands of the Government by expressing very strongly, as it is our duty to our constituents to do, our opinion that we have a claim upon the Colonists in this connection. And we have great reason for our doing so, because of the difficulty in which the Government will be placed by the supineness of former Governments. The Cape Colonists have been told again and again that they would be required to pay for the outlay on their account. I have referred to several Blue Books in the Library on that subject, and I find that so early as 1848, in the despatches of the 21st of March and 21st of June, Lord Grey declared to the Colonists that it was not to be expected that this country should in future bear the expenses incurred by maintaining a Force to defend the Colony, and that it was incumbent on the Colonists to make a suitable provision for that purpose; and, subsequently, Lord John Russell, relying upon these despatches, said that the Colony was mainly responsible for meeting that expenditure. That was in 1848. In 1867, Lord Carnarvon sent a despatch to Sir Philip Wodehouse, giving notice—
"That payment must be made for British troops at the same rate as paid by the Australian Colonies—namely, £40 a-head for every Infantry soldier, and £70 for every Artilleryman. In default of these payments, Her Majesty's Government will be at liberty to withdraw the troops from the Colony either wholly or to such extent as they may deem expedient."
That, of course, was only part of the expense which would, no doubt, have amounted to £80 a-head for every Infantry soldier. I think I am within the mark in saying that. In replying to that despatch of Lord Carnarvon, the House of Assembly passed Resolutions which were communicated to the Home Government, and those Resolutions set forth a number of reasons—not of any strength, but still they were reasons—which the Colonial Government thought fit to put forward. The Duke of Buckingham, who had succeeded Lord Carnarvon in 1867, wrote to Sir Philip "Wodehouse—
110
"You request me to observe that in the Resolution of the House of Assembly no attempt is made to dispute the right of the Mother Country to make the stipulations insisted on; that the House simply pleads its regret that such a demand should be put forward, its sense that the peculiar position of the country gives it some claim to consideration, and its conclusion that the Colony is unable to pay the sum demanded for its military defence. I have to inform you, in reply, that Her Majesty's Government adhere to the general principles indicated in Lord Carnarvon's despatch, and to the propriety of requiring from the Colony of the Capo of Good Hope a substantial contribution towards the expenses of Her Majesty's troops."
On December 9, 1869, there had been a change of the Home Government. Lord Granville was then Secretary of State for the Colonies, and Lord Granville wrote a despatch to Sir Philip Wodehouse, in which he said—
"Her Majesty's Government have come to the conclusion that British troops cannot be retained in the Colony for Colonial purposes, and should be gradually withdrawn."
Upon that, there was a Memorial from the Cape Colonists, numerously signed, addressed to the noble Lord, praying Her Majesty that military protection might be continued to the Cape Colonists at the expense of Great Britain. Lord Granville, in replying in acknowledgment of that Memorial, said—
"I do not doubt that the effectual protection of life and property is essential to the protection of the Colony. I observe, however, that the memorialists estimate the White population at 200,000, and the cost of defence at £100,000, which, if the whole were paid by persons of European origin, would only amount to 10 s. per head, and declares this sum to be a strain on the finances of the Colony greater than it can bear. But this is scarcely a good reason for the shifting all further expense upon the inhabitants of Great Britain, who already pay 15 s. per head for their own defence independently of police."
I think that was a very sound position for Lord Granville to take up, and upon that despatch there was another Address to the Queen from the House of Assembly, praying that the withdrawal of troops might be postponed. Then Lord Granville, on May 23, 1870, wrote—
"It is impossible to hold out any hopes that Her Majesty's Government will sanction any further delay in the removal of the troops beyond that which has been already determined upon, and I, therefore, earnestly hope that the Cape Parliament will address themselves seriously to the task of placing the finances on a proper footing, and making further provision for the defence of the Colony."

111
Now, Sir, I think it is a matter of grave regret that, notwithstanding the position which Her Majesty's Government took on that occasion, there should not have been stops taken in accordance with these despatches. There was a diminution of troops; but there was no such step taken as was contemplated in the despatches, and we still retained something like 3,000 men in the Colony—3,000 men costing us at the rate of £100 per man, per year, all the charges taken into account, and we were paying all that large expenditure for the protection of the Colonies, while the Colonial Government were satisfied to pay to us the magnificent sum of £10,000 a-year. That, no doubt, is a difficulty which the Government will meet with arising from what I must call the laches of former Governments. I think it is most unfortunate that former Governments did not follow up the decisions which were communicated to the Cape Colony, and I believe that if they had been determined to carry out the policy which they had announced, and if they had insisted upon payment by the Colonists of the sum which they intimated that they should require them to pay; or if they had acted upon the alternative of withdrawing the troops, I have a very firm opinion indeed that the Colonists would have made ample arrangements for their own protection; and I have a very strong impression that the war which we are now unfortunately experiencing would never have happened. Well, I want to ask the Government what they intend to do in order to compel the Colonists to pay what is due from them? Of course, they will be met as former Governments have been met—by all sorts of flimsy excuses. I am perfectly aware that they will be met by the statement of the Colonists that they cannot pay. They will appeal to the Colonial Secretary that they cannot afford to pay. But I say they can afford a great deal better than we can afford it. It so happens that the very last mail, or one of the last, brought us a Budget speech which was made by the Finance Minister in the Cape of Good Hope Assembly. Now, that is a very important speech, and I have no doubt the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for the Colonies has noticed it in connection with this question. I quote the speech from The Times of one day last week—
112
"The Budget speech which was delivered yesterday by the Treasurer General (Mr. Stiller) was a very satisfactory one. It shows an increasing revenue and a prosperous condition of the country. For the financial year 1878–70, just expired, the Estimate, including the addition of amounts expected from the taxing measures passed last year, was £1,838,000, while the actual income will probably he about £2,067,888, giving an excess of £229,889. Duty from customs alone realized £909,387, being an excess of £152,387. The excise on brandy returned £50,000, and the house duty £80,000. The Government, after defraying all the ordinary expenditure, will, with their surplus, be able to meet all the war expenses without any increase of taxation, or of the public debt."
If our Chancellor of the Exchequer could produce such a Budget, he would be a very fortunate man—a much more fortunate man than he is at the present moment. I believe, however, there is an omission here, because the Cape Colony had borrowed £750,000 in the course of the year 1878–9. The authorised Debt now stands at £10,500,000, including an annual charge of £472,491 for interest, and £88,884 for Sinking Fund towards its gradual extinction, making, together, £581,375—an amount exceeding what was the total public income of the Colony 10 years ago. Well, if this Debt was a debt which had been incurred in some most wasteful way, if it had been thrown away by some extravagant body, it would, no doubt, be a very serious charge upon them; but, in point of fact, this Debt is all for works of a character which are returning very good interest indeed. They are public works which produce a very large income. The Treasurer General further stated that—
"Of the whole amount charged as public Debt, £9,816,858 has been raised for reproductive works, chiefly extended and nearly completed lines of railways. Although only portions of these lines have yet been opened up for traffic, the estimates of railway receipts for next year is about £600,000, and there is no doubt of its being realized. The telegraph system of the Colony was also extended last year by the erection of 263 miles of new lines bearing 421 miles of new wire. The war expenditure borne by the Colony has been about £1,250,000, including cost of the disturbances on the Northern Border of Basutoland. Up to the 30th of April, 1879, the actual payments reached a total of £1,087,361, and for May and June about £134,843, making a total on the 30th of Juno last of £1,222,704; including all advances and expenditure on account of these services, and, deducting the amount of the war loan, £750,000, leaves a balance of £472,704, which has been met from general revenue."
So that, in point of fact, they assume

113
that their war expenditure for the 12 months of 1878–9, amounted to £1,200,000, which, I believe, is a very excessive Estimate; and yet they say that the balance of expenditure over the loan—the balance amounting to £472,704—has been met out of the general Revenue without increased taxation. Then he goes to the Budget for the coming year; and this Budget, with regard to taxation, is altogether most satisfactory. The Finance Minister says he believes the income for 1879–80 will be £2,309,000, while the expenditure he estimates at £2,226,164; and this, he goes on to say, includes what he calls the large sum of £217,151 for military expenses. This is the total sum the Cape Government has put down in its Budget for purposes of defence. That does not look as if the Colony contemplated meeting the demands of the British Government to any large extent; but I wish to point out to the Government that, in this statement, which shows how flourishing is the Revenue of the Colony—which shows no Debt as a burden, because it has been incurred for productive works which produce a large income—which shows a light taxation, an increasing trade, and extension of resources at the Cape—with all this before us, any pretence that the Colony is not in a position to meet the just demands of our Government ought to be put aside as unworthy of consideration. No such excuse ought to be entertained for a moment; because, knowing what we do of the Cape of Good Hope, knowing how its Revenues have been increased by the extension of territory, as shown by the extent of good land advertised for sale after annexation of the Transkei—with all those resources, which have been so much increased by the expenditure we have incurred, they should be required to pay their due proportion of that expenditure. I have no doubt there will be an attempt made in another way to evade the demands of Her Majesty's Government. It will be said by the Colony—"The responsibility of these operations are not ours, they were forced upon us by the action of the High Commissioner, and the expenditure was incurred in carrying out the policy of Her Majesty's Government. It was the view which the High Commissioner came to carry out that landed us in the expenditure and this war, and,
114
therefore, we are not responsible." Now, I am bound to say, in the first instance, they have grounds in Capo Colony to make the assertion that Her Majesty's Government did send a Chief Commissioner to carry out a policy which, directly and indirectly, tended to foment these disturbances, which extended the area of the war and of the expenditure; but my position is this—whatever was the original responsibility of the Government, warned by the policy of their High Commissioner, the Colonists have since, by their own policy, by every Constitutional method, supported the Commissioner. Now, when the High Commissioner arrived at the Cape there was a Government in power, presided over by Mr. Molteno, a man of great Cape experience, and who, for years, had taken a leading-part in Cape politics. Mr. Molteno did not like the policy of the Government. I will not occupy the attention of the House on the point; but I will rather content myself with indicating what, if it were necessary and time allowed, I could show, by abundant reference to the Blue Book, that there was a decided divergence of opinion between the Chief Commissioner and Mr. Molteno. Mr. Molteno believed that he and his Government knew best how to manage Cape affairs, and that the trouble on their Frontier could be better managed than by the measures which the High Commissioner proposed. I am justified in maintaining that Mr. Molteno, who was Prime Minister, wished to carry out the policy supported by the leading statesmen of this country, of the Colonists managing their affairs upon their own responsibility, for, towards the end of the difference between the High Commismissioner and Mr. Molteno, we come to the main points upon which Sir Bartle Frere disagreed with the Ministers. Sir Bartle Frere, when he found that he could not induce Mr. Molteno to yield to his strong will—because it is quite evident that Sir Bartle Frere went to the Cape and was influenced throughout by a strong will, to which he was determined to make everybody yield in one way or another—when he found there was the difference of opinion between himself and Mr. Molteno—and they had had a conversation on the grounds of this difference—Sir Bartle Frere wrote a Memorandum, in which he jotted down the conversation which had just oc-

115
curred, and he left it with Mr. Molteno to say if it was correct. Mr. Molteno disliked this. It was an unusual proceeding, and he refused to accept the exact accuracy of the Memorandum in which Sir Bartle Frere stated Mr. Molteno's views; but, no doubt, they were his views, for Mr. Molteno stated them afterwards. The Memorandum gives the substance of Mr. Molteno's statement as follows:—
"There is a strong impression in the Colony that the conduct of military operations has been entrusted too exclusively to military men, and that the management of affairs has passed too much from the hands of the Colonial Ministry into those of officers of Her Majesty's Service, in whose ability to manage them economically and efficiently the Colony has far less confidence than it has in its Ministers."
MR. Molteno further said—
"That Ministers are quite competent themselves to do, with Colonial Forces, all that is now required to restore peace and order to the Colony," and that "the reinforcements of Her Majesty's troops, asked for by the Government, are not needed for any Colonial purpose in this Colony."
This was a very strong statement for Mr. Molteno to make in the conversation with the Commissioner; and he repeats it, I find, in a Memorandum of January 31st, 1878, in which he says the Government are prepared to undertake the responsibility of putting down the rebellion speedily and in the most effectual manner by Colonial Forces led by Colonists, and not encumbered by military impediments; and he urged that these measures ought to be under the control of the Colonial Government, who were prepared to accept the responsibility of preserving peace and maintaining the defence of the Colony. Now, what happened? I declare, when I read what occurred, it makes me indignant, when I read of the dictatorial manner in which Sir Bartle Frere dismissed the Prime Minister from Office simply because he would maintain what we believe is the right principle of Colonial government—that they should have the management who were asked to pay for it, and take the responsibility of defending their Frontier and maintaining peace within their own borders. But, no. Sir Bartle Frere, in that dictatorial spirit which he has assumed, so much to the disadvantage of the country, called into power a Government presided over by Mr. Sprigg; and here we come to the responsibility of the Colonial Govern-
116
ment. If the Colonists had supported the Molteno Government, they might have said this is an Imperial policy forced upon us and for which we should not pay; but when Mr. Sprigg came into power, anyone who reads his manifesto will see that he came into power with the determination of taking advantage of the British policy to get a large amount of plundering for South Africa. I have not formed a high opinion of Mr. Sprigg's capacity as a Prime Minister; but he knows what he is about. In Mr. Trollope's work on South Africa, written at the time of the Transkei War, he mentions having gone into the House of Assembly, and describes Mr. Molteno as Prime Minister, and Mr. Sprigg as leading the Opposition. He says of Mr. Molteno, he—
"Has been in Parliamentary life for many years, having held a seat since the creation of the first House of Assembly in 1854—has been a very useful public servant, and thoroughly understands the nature of the work required of him."
MR. Trollope continues—
"I attended one hot debate, and heard the Leaders of the Opposition attack the Prime Minister and his Colleagues in the proper Parliamentary manner. The question was one of defence against the Kaffirs, and it was made by the Opposition to appear that the object of the Premier was to rob the Colony of its money."
It is a curious thing' that a year before he came into Office Mr. Sprigg was opposing Mr. Molteno, because the latter wished to have the defence conducted out of Colonial funds. Well, this policy of Sir Bartle Frere was adopted by Mr. Sprigg's Government, and Mr. Sprigg's Government received the support of the Parliament then in existence. That Parliament was dissolved, and, so far as I have heard, the return to the new Parliament proved that Mr. Sprigg's Government was extremely popular. In Cape Town there were six candidates for four seats. Five of these candidates approved of the policy of the High Commissioner in the Zulu War, one attacked that policy and opposed Confederation. The one who opposed the policy of the Commissioner was a remarkable man—a gentleman of the name of Saul Solomon—a man who for some years occupied an independent but leading position in the Cape Legislature—a man on whose opinion all parties placed great reliance. Well, he opposed the policy, and he who had been a Member for a number of years was turned out.
SIR CHARLES W. DILKE: No; he came in on the Minority Vote.
MR. RYLANDS: At all events, he lost a large amount of support. What I wish to urge on the Government is this—that inasmuch as the Cape Legislature has adopted the policy of the Commissioner, and which has become immensely popular in the Cape, simply because a large expenditure upon the war arises out of it, I think that if Sir Bartle Frere is unable to obtain a satisfactory pecuniary arrangement with the Colony they ought to withdraw Sir Bartle Frere and send some Representative who would be determined to put more pressure on the Sprigg Government. It may possibly arise that when we know more about the secret transactions going on we shall find that some encouragement was given by Sir Bartle Frere to Mr. Sprigg to believe there would be large pecuniary assistance in carrying out their plans which induced Mr. Sprigg's Government to entirely endorse the policy which had been recommended to them. But it is quite clear that, so far as the Home Government is concerned, those on the Front Bench have never gone from their position of requiring the Colonies to pay their proper share; therefore, if there have been any transactions at the Cape which may have led to the supposition that Great Britain would not insist upon a share of the expenditure being borne by the Colony Her Majesty's Government are not at all compromised by that. The other day we were talking about the policy of the future, and, perhaps, I may say a few words upon that. It is clear that in the future, when all this war is over, we must decide on a policy with regard to the government of the Cape. We are quite aware that Lord Grey is a distinguished advocate of paternal government. He would withdraw responsible government from the Cape, and treat it like a Crown Colony, dealing with all Cape matters from Downing Street. He argues that it would be much better that all proposals in reference to national troubles, commercial interests, &c, should be decided by ourselves. But no one can seriously imagine that any such system would work; we should soon find that we could not control the Cape, or, from this country, manage Cape affairs with anything like efficiency. But there is another plan which, apparently, is almost as bad; that is a plan which
118
does not assume to be paternal government, but would continue a responsible government at the Cape, and still insist upon an interference to a certain extent, claiming for this country a controlling voice in the management of Cape affairs. A most absurd, untenable policy. We have followed it to some extent for 30 years; and I observe it is a policy which has high support in the person of my right hon. Friend the Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster). He referred to the idea, when he said on Friday—
"They had now a responsible self-governing community to deal with at the Cape. Whether it was a mistake to give self-government to the Cape was a grave question. For his own part, he did not think it was a mistake; at all events, they could not now take that self-government away. The problem of the Government was a fresh departure. They must ask themselves—'What terms shall we make with the Governments of the South African communities generally for the future?' That was to say—on what terms should they consent, in any case in the future, to assist the South African Colonists with our own troops? He thought the time had come when the Government ought to say, with the greatest possible determination, that the terms must be different from what they had been. They must say—' They shall he definite terms. You shall not find the policy, and we find the money and men to carry it out.' "—[3 Hansard, ccxlviii. 1891.]
Well, it seems to me, this is a kind of bargain you cannot make with the Cape. How can you say to them—"You shall not dictate the policy, and we find the men." Of course, if they have a House of Assembly, they naturally will dictate a policy; we cannot stop them. The right hon. Gentleman continues—
"However, he believed there was really one feeling in the House of Commons and the country on the question, which, was, that our relations with the Cape Colony must be put on a different footing—that we would not join in unjust wars."—[Ibid. 1893.]
But we know well enough that, where you have a responsible Government, a Colonial Power, it is not possible to say—I am assuming that you have a mutual agreement—"This is an unjust war you are engaging in, and we will have nothing to do with it." Why, if we could take that course, we should not have been drawn into the Zulu War, which we believed unjust; and the Transkei War, I believe, ought to have been avoided. Why, nearly every war we have had in the Colony has been an unjust war. It is quite clear, supposing we enter into such a bargain as that suggested by the

119
right hon. Member for Bradford, the only effect would be, we should still hold ourselves in readiness with our resources, and we should find it utterly impossible to raise the question whether a war was just or unjust; we should be entrapped into the unfortunate position in which we now find ourselves. It is no use trying to adopt this middle course; you have but a choice of two courses, unless you choose to go on as before; one, to go back upon what I look upon as impossible—of governing the Colony from Downing Street—and the other a policy of non-intervention. I believe the only safe plan is absolutely to withdraw from any part or parcel in their military arrangements. This is a policy for which I have high authority. Distinguished statesmen, Colonial Secretaries, have recognized the doctrine—Lord Cardwell, Lord Carnarvon, the Duke of Buckingham, Lord Granville—that it is the interest and duty of the Imperial Government to withdraw as much as possible from interference in the internal affairs of the Colonies, for their sakes as well as for our own; that the Colonies should support their own charges, both civil and military, for government and defence. That was an opinion expressed by high authorities in the debate of 1851, when, on April 10th, Sir William Molesworth moved his first Resolution—
"That it is the opinion of this 'House, that steps should be taken to relieve the country as speedily as possible from its present civil and military expenditure on account of the Colonies, with the exception of its expenditure on account of military stations or convict establishments."
I will not trouble the House with quotations from the speeches; but from several Members, distinguished on both sides of the House, who spoke in that debate of 1851, all declared that the only safe course was to withdraw from intermeddling with the Colonial Forces, trusting the control and their own defence to themselves. I will only give a short extract from the speech of a right hon. Gentleman—who will command respect at least on this side—the right hon. Member for Greenwich. On April 15th, 1851, he spoke of the
"Most mischievous and unsound system of managing the local affairs of the Colonies from home. He contended that these -wars on the Cape Frontier were altogether local affairs."—[3 Hansard, cxvi. 264.]
Then we have the Report of the Select
120
Committee on Colonial Military Expenditure, presided over by the hon. Member for Exeter, in 1861. That Committee reported—
"That with respect to the South African Colonies, and all those similarly circumstanced Dependencies which contain large European populations, their security against warlike tribes or domestic disturbances should be provided for, as far as possible, by means of local efforts and local organization; and that the main object of any system adopted by this country should be to encourage such efforts, not merely with a view to diminish Imperial expenditure, but for the still more important purpose of stimulating the spirit of self-reliance in Colonial communities."
I think I am justified, on these authorities, in asking the House to pass my Resolution; and I hope the expression of opinion may lead to a determination, on the part of the Government, to take steps to secure what I think would be a fair measure of justice to the taxpayers of this country.
SIR CHARLES W. DILKEseconded the Motion.
Amendment proposed,
To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "in view of the large and increasing expenditure for military purposes in South Africa, this House is of opinion that the Colonies of the Cape of Good Hope and Natal ought to be required to contribute a due proportion of the military expenditure incurred in the interests of those Colonies, and which cannot with justice be made a charge upon the British Exchequer,"—(Mr. Rylands,)
—instead thereof.
Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."
SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACHsaid, he was not about to enter into the topics which formed the latter part of the speech of the hon. Gentleman. Those questions were of very great importance, and were discussed at considerable length last week. He would not renew the discussion of last Friday; but there was one essential preliminary to throwing the Colonies on their own resources, and that was, that we should both induce and enable them to take such measures as would provide for their own defence when the occasion arose. As for what had been done by the Cape Colony in the emergency just passing away, he considered that the present Ministry, headed by Mr. Sprigg, had done far

121
more than its predecessors to effect the object the hon. Member for Burnley had in view, and the result of its action, promised well for the future. During the last Session measures had been passed for the raising of mounted police, militia, and other local forces; and these measures had been carried out to a large extent. There were two criticisms he might make on the speech of the hon. Member for Burnley. The one was, that in reference to the Zulu War he had rather mixed up the position of the Cape Colony and Natal. He did not think it was fair to charge the Cape Colony with having profited by the Transkei War; for, as the Papers showed, the Capo Colony incurred very heavy expenses in that war. The Forces engaged were to a great extent Volunteers and Colonial troops, and the hardships and the loss fell more largely upon them than upon Her Majesty's Forces. The Zulu War was, of course, a different affair. The cost in men and money had mainly fallen upon us, and the money expended by us had been laid out in the districts adjoining Zululand rather than in the Cape Colony. As to the remarks made by the hon. Gentleman on the course pursued by Sir Bartle Frere, he did not believe that if Mr. Molteno had remained in Office the Transkei War would have been brought to as satisfactory a termination as the hon. Member thought. When Mr. Molteno left Office the Transkei War seemed likely to spread, not only over a large part of the Cape Colony, but to Her Majesty's Dominions in other parts of South Africa. That was the reason which induced Sir Bartle Frere to take the Constitutional course of dismissing Ministers, and calling to the service of the Colony those who would carry on the war with vigour and bring it to a satisfactory end. With the exceptions he had taken, he did not wish to criticize the hon. Gentleman's remarks, for he could re-echo every word of the hon. Gentleman's Motion, and he begged to tender the hon. Gentleman his thanks and those of the Government for the manner in which he had brought the question before the House. In that way, the hon. Member had done not a little to strengthen the hands of the Government in the course they had adopted. He did not gather that the hon. Member had the least fault to find with any expres-
122
sions in his despatches. The course which the Government had pursued hitherto they would continue to pursue to the utmost of their power, and that not with regard to the Cape Colony alone. He had not been able to lay on the Table the despatches with respect to Natal, because the Correspondence was not in a state to be produced at present. But the same principles had guided the Government as they had followed in the case of the Cape Colony. They had done their best to insist that some of the expenditure should be fairly charged on the Colonial Treasury, and that there should be a clear understanding on all sides that a division of expenditure, when the amount of the expenditure was ascertained, should be made between the Mother Country and the Colony interested—of course, claiming from the Colony the utmost that it could reasonably be expected to bear, looking to the condition of its finances and population. He would only say, in conclusion, that what had fallen from the hon. Gentleman with regard to the ability of the Cape Colony to bear the charges he wished to see imposed on it was no slight testimony, so far as the ability of that Colony was concerned, to the justice of the expectations held out the other night by his right hon. Friend—that a considerable portion of the expenditure should be borne by that Colony.
Question put, and agreed to.
Main Question, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair," put, and agreed to.

SUPPLY—WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA (VOTE OF CREDIT).

  SUPPLY—considered in Committee.
  (In the Committee.)
  (1.) Motion made, and Question proposed,
  "That a sum, not exceeding £3,000,000, be granted to Her Majesty, beyond the ordinary Grants of Parliament, towards defraying the Expenditure which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1880, in consequence of the War in South Africa."
  MR. DODSONwould not question the calculations of the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer as to the estimated surplus revenue of £1,900,000 above the ordinary expenditure, and as to the estimated cost of the

  123
  Zulu War; but, at the same time, he could not but remember that in March last in his Budget speech the right hon. Gentleman was confident that the Zulu War would be wound up, and that Bonds to the amount of £600,000 for the same Zulu War incurred last year would be defrayed out of the so-called estimated surplus of £1,900,000. The right hon. Gentleman was then doubly confident that in any case the Zulu War would be wound up, even if the Bonds were not paid off out of that surplus. He observed that the right hon. Gentleman to-night spoke of winding up the Zulu War for £3,000,000 with less confidence than in March last for £1,900,000. He also observed that the Vote of Credit itself was a net estimate, after taking credit for the amount to be realized from the sale of horses and waggons and surplus stores, so that if by any accident that sum should be delayed, or fall short of the amount reckoned upon, his expectations would be frustrated. But he would now assume that the expectations of the right hon. Gentleman with regard to revenue would be realized; he would assume that the cost of the Zulu War in the present year would be met by the sum of £3,000,000 now asked for by a Vote of Credit, and he would also assume that he would not have in the present year any Supplementary Estimates beyond those upon the Table of the House, or, at all events, that if he had any Supplementary Estimates, they would not be greater than could be met out of the savings on the other Votes of the year. Now, at the end of the present financial year, if the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer realized his expectations, there would be a surplus on the year of £36,000; but there would be outstanding Exchequer Bonds amounting to £4,750,000 for the expenditure incurred in connection with the Russo-Turkish War; there would be Bonds outstanding to the amount of £600,000 for part cost of the Zulu War in the last financial year; there would be Bonds to the amount of £1,200,000 for the cost of the Zulu War within the present year, and there would be the Loan to India, without interest, of £2,000,000. On the whole, there would be outstanding charges to the amount of £8,550,000, and it would be remembered that already in connection with these matters we had in the last
  124
  two financial years paid out of the Revenue of the country £2,900,000, and that the right hon. Gentleman proposed to pay £1,800,000 more towards these same objects out of the Revenue of the present year. All this expenditure for military purposes came on the top of a normal increase of the Army expenditure under the present Government of £1,000,000 a-year, and of a normal increase of £1,500,000 for the Navy, which had been referred to by the Homo Secretary in a speech at Liverpool in October last, and justified on the ground that it was to make our Army and Navy ready for any cloud that might arise. He wished to examine a little more closely the position in which we should be at the end of the financial year, assuming that the Chancellor of the Exchequer's expectations were realized. We had, within the space of about two years, incurred an expenditure, on the part of this country and its Dependencies, for three wars, and a scare of war, which amounted to £16,000,000. Deducting from that amount £1,500,000, which he understood was expected to be paid by India in respect of the Afghan War, and £1,250,000, which it appeared by the last South African Blue Book was paid by the Cape towards the cost of the Transkei War and the Gaika rebellion, there remained £13,250,000 to be provided by the country. The right hon. Gentleman hoped to recover for this country from our Dependencies a considerable portion of that sum. He hoped to receive from India the return of the Loan of £2,000,000 without interest; the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for the Colonies hoped to recover from the Cape, according to the last Blue Book, a sum of about £350,000 for further incurred cost of the Transkei War, the Gaika rebellion, and the South African imbroglios generally; lastly, the right hon. Gentleman hoped to get back from the Colonies interested £1,200,000, the amount of the Bonds about to be issued. These sums, altogether, made £3,500,000, which he hoped to recover from our Dependencies in aid of the £13,250,000 provided or to be provided towards these wars and this alarm of a war. He did not know whether, in his heart of hearts, the Chancellor of the Exchequer felt very sanguine about the recovery of all that money; but the

  125
  finances of India were not now in a very flourishing condition, and we had been told that the Afghan War was caused, entered into, and carried out, for Imperial purposes. It was, therefore, not very unreasonable to suppose that a considerable portion of the £2,000,000 might ultimately remain as a gift from this country to India. But, at all events, whatever amount were repaid, no part of it would be got into the present financial year; even if the right hon. Gentleman did receive anything, it would be only one half-year's instalment of the whole amount, which had been spread over seven years. Again, it was admitted by the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for the Colonies that against any claim which he might be able to make upon the Colonies would have to be set a claim on the part of the Colonies for conveyance of Imperial troops by railway. Looking at the state of finances at the Cape, and the expenditure already incurred by the Colony, he asked whether the right hon. Gentleman felt very sanguine as to the recovery of any money from the Cape? He was only speaking of the difficulty of obtaining it within any period that would make it of material assistance to the finances in the present year. Then there remained the £1,200,000, the amount of the Bonds about to be raised this year for the Zulu War, and he could not think that the prospects of recovering that amount at an early date could be looked upon as particularly brilliant. He did not know what was the Revenue and Expenditure of Natal for the last year, or for the present year. The last year for which he had any account was 1877, and he observed that in that year, and in the three or four preceding years, the Revenue of Natal varied from £250,000 to a little over £270,000. It might have increased in 1878, and he thought the right hon. Gentleman had said that it had done so; but, at all events, it was not likely greatly to exceed £300,000. Then he observed, with regard to the expenditure of those four years, that in three of them it had been in excess of the Revenue, and that the Expenditure had exceeded the Revenue on the whole, taking the four years, 1874–5–6–7, together. In addition to that, he saw that Natal, which had a population of only about 25,000 White persons, had a Debt, in round numbers,
  126
  of £1,250,000. Again, if he looked to the Transvaal, he found by the accounts that the estimated Revenue in 1878 was £89,000, and that the estimated ordinary expenditure—a very ominous expression—was very nearly equal to the Revenue, and amounted to £87,000. At the same time, the Transvaal had an external Debt of £150,000, besides a local debt to bankers within its own boundaries. Looking, therefore, to the Revenue, Expenditure, Debt, and population of the two Colonies, the prospect of recovering from them the sum of £1,200,000 within a very short time was not promising. He endorsed the views expressed by the right hon. Gentleman and others that, in views of the almost exclusive share which those Colonies had in bringing about the present war, it was perfectly fair that they should be called upon to share its cost; but he was afraid that, after all, the main burden would fall upon this country. There was another matter to which he desired to call attention, and that related to the Vote of Credit for £3,000,000. Up to about three weeks ago, the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer had constantly spoken of presenting a Supplementary Estimate of the cost of the Zulu War; but, about a fortnight since, he had altered his expression, and began to speak of a Vote of Credit. That was the Vote which he had now presented to the House. He (Mr. Dodson) did not want to exaggerate matters, but, at the same time, there was a significant difference between an Estimate and a Vote of Credit. When a Minister, a contractor, or whoever it might be, gave an estimate for expenditure, he gave what was understood to be something in the nature of an undertaking that the expenditure would be defrayed out of the amount set down; at all events, there was reason to expect that it would be. But when a person asked for a credit it rather implied that he had before him an indefinite amount of expenditure, which he could not measure, and, therefore, asked for around sum to be placed at his disposal, on which he might draw for the purpose of carrying on the business. That was always understood to be the difference between an Estimate and a Vote of Credit. Now, there was one thing which he desired to urge, and he felt sure that the right hon. Gentleman would not complain of his doing

  127
  so, with respect to this Vote of Credit, and that was that the Treasury would be strictly vigilant in seeing that it was only applied to the Service for which it was granted. He did not know whether the right hon. Gentleman had had time to examine the second Report of the Committee of Public Accounts, which had been presented to the House; but, of course, he well knew the value of the labours of that Committee, and the great weight which attached to their Report. That Committee called attention to the statement of the Comptroller and Auditor General, that the Vote of Credit for the Russo-Turkish War had been applied to some rather doubtful estimates and expenses. For instance, the sum of £4,555 was applied out of it to the payment of part cost of a railway in Woolwich Dockyard. And, again, £47,386 was supplied out of the Vote of Credit for shields for the inner line of sea defence for fortifications. He did not know whether these shields were actually within the sanction of the Acts for the erection of fortifications by the Defence Loan Fund; but, at all events, Parliament had not been consulted about the matter, and, so far as he remembered, it had been given to understand that the idea of putting up these shields, if not abandoned, had been indefinitely postponed. It also appeared, from the Report of the Committee of Public Accounts, that of the Vote of Credit taken in 1878, the Government employed the sum of £228,600 to make good deficiencies on ordinary Votes, whereby they converted what would have been a deficit on the Army Accounts into a surplus, in round numbers, of £135,000. He would trouble the Committee by reading three or four lines from the Report of the Committee of Public Accounts, in which they point out the mischief which might arise from this lax proceeding. The Report said—
  "If a Vote of Credit is considered applicable to meet deficiencies in the ordinary Votes, the due control of Parliament over expenditure would "be at an end as soon as a Vote of Credit is granted."
  He trusted, therefore, that the Chancellor of the Exchequer would keep a tight hand over the spending Departments, and take care that no part of the Vote of Credit of £3,000,000 should be applied to any purpose other than that
  128
  for which it was asked by the Government and granted by Parliament.
  MR. COURTNEYsaid, the observations which he proposed to address to the Committee would be confined almost entirely to the policy which had resulted in this Vote of Credit being asked for. Her Majesty's Government had asked for a Credit for £3,000,000 for certain distinct purposes and to be used for certain definite ends; but, before the Committee gave this Vote of Credit, they ought to be assured whether those purposes were likely to be secured by the policy now being pursued by Her Majesty's Government, and whether those ends could be attained. It appeared to be thought that the war with respect to which these £3,000,000 was asked for was, practically, at an end. He did not wish to suggest any uneasy doubts as to that; but, he must confess, it did not appear to him to be so near an end as many hon. Members and the outside public seemed to think. But, putting that entirely aside, the next question raised by the demand for these £3,000,000 and referred to both by the right hon. Member for Chester (Mr. Dodson) and the Chancellor of the Exchequer was this—"What chance is there of getting back these £3,000,000 from the Dependencies for whose account the expenditure has been incurred?" The Chancellor of the Exchequer appeared to indulge in the hope that a certain portion would be recovered. He (Mr. Courtney) was not prepared to deny that a certain sum ought to be recovered, but he had a very clear opinion that no substantial amount would be; and he thought that there were very good reasons for believing that no part of the cost of the war would be recovered. In the first place, with regard to the Cape Colony, if any hon. Member would put himself in the position of a Capo Colonist, he thought he would repudiate the obligation of making any contribution towards this sum. This expenditure had been mainly, if not entirely, incurred in the Zulu War, and the interest of the Cape Colony in the Zulu War was, at least, distant. People, in speaking of Zululand and Cape Colony, did so from an English point of view, and supposed them to be in close contiguity; but, in fact, they were about 1,200 miles one from the other, and there was no appreciable danger, even supposing the Natal

  129
  anxiety to have been well-founded, of the Zulu War reaching Cape Colony. Therefore, if he were a Cape Colonist, he should repudiate any contribution to this sum, because it was incurred in a war in Zululand in which he had but a feeble interest. No doubt, the flames of war might gradually have spread down to Cape Colony; and, no doubt, some anxiety might be expressed on that account. But the anxiety lest the flames of war in Zululand should spread to Cape Colony was no more real than the anxiety of the people in this country lest the plague in Southern Russia should spread to England. Again, this expenditure had been incurred by a policy in which the Cape Colonists had no share. It was brought upon them in pursuance of directions which came from the Mother Country. It was Lord Carnarvon and Mr. Froude, and subsequently Sir Bartle Frere, who had brought that war upon South Africa, and if the Colonists had been left alone they would not have brought it about. It was perfectly true that certain of the Cape Ministers had supported Sir Bartle Frere in his policy, and, probably, they might be trusted to support him to the end with a comparatively small majority. But when the question came of contributing to the cost of the war; he thought there were many who would refuse altogether to acknowledge any obligation in that respect. For these reasons, he thought that the Cape Colonists would repudiate altogether any liability in the war. There was another reason which would have great weight with them, and serve as an excellent excuse for getting rid of their moral obligation. They would say—"Whatever we may have to do with this war in Zululand, it was finished in a way which we entirely disapproved; we were advocates of Sir Bartle Frere's thorough-going policy; but if you choose to send out another High Commissioner charged with the duty of bringing this war to an end, while we are left in an unsettled position, you will have to bear the expense of the war;" and that was the final reason why he thought the majority of the Cape Colonists would refuse altogether to contribute to the expenses of the war. As to Natal and the Transvaal, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Chester had, he thought, sufficiently shown, from an examination of their finances, that nothing was to be expected from them.
  130
  The financial position in the Transvaal was the most hopeless possible. No taxes were collected there except certain duties, and the ordinary Expenditure was not made up by the ordinary Revenue; and, in addition to that, there was a large debt remaining unpaid. Therefore, if one looked at the political situation of the Transvaal, it would be seen that it was hopeless to expect from it any useful contribution to the expenses of the war. It was possible that deficiencies might not continue for ever, and that there would be some recovery of trade and prosperity, and there might be a change in the financial situation, resulting in a surplus, where, for some years past, there has been a deficiency. But the real and important question was—"Are you, in relation to the South African Colonies, about to continue this policy, or do you intend to abandon it?" If the Government did not intend to abandon the course in which they had lately indulged, if they insisted upon a policy of supremacy, they would never get back any part of the £3,000,000, but would, on the contrary, year by year, add more millions to them. The Zulu War might be at an end; but, as he had before pointed out, that war was merely an episode in the affairs of the Cape. It was only a part of a series of events which must be gone on with one after another if the present policy was to be continued, of which the Zulu War was the expression. It was simply the result of the application of one particular principle of policy which, if it was continued to be applied, would raise other enemies not more easily subdued than Cetywayo. The Government had been asked what was to be their policy in the future; and they had laid upon the Table certain Papers which, however, did not contain a most important despatch that should have been given to the House as explaining what were their views with respect to South Africa. This despatch, which related to Confederation, had been sent by the Colonial Secretary to the Cape Government, and had been referred to as having been received by Sir Bartle Frere, and it had also been published in South Africa. The House, however, knew nothing of this despatch, and were, therefore, altogether in the dark as to what was the policy of Her Majesty's Government with respect to the funda-

  131
  mental question in South Africa. They knew that Her Majesty's Government were in some way or other committed to the policy of Confederation; but the Cape Colony did not think the time was ripe for promoting that principle. It was known that Her Majesty's Government favoured the idea from the express statement of the Colonial Minister, who said last Friday that they had not abandoned the idea of Confederation. This was a policy of active extension, because Confederation meant self-assertion and extension. We had inherited the fatal legacy which Lord Carnarvon left to the Government, and which he thought they might, without any dishonour, have repudiated on the first opportunity. They had, in spite of precedent and argument, retained that policy; they had not taken their stand upon the solid ground of throwing upon the Colonies the responsibility of behaving in a decent and just manner with its neighbours; they would not leave the Transvaal in the position of freedom which it once occupied; they insisted on maintaining the policy of extension. When the Cape Colonies were told that if they ran into war they must bear the consequences there were 25 years of peace, which had only been disturbed when this policy of vain ambition and folly was entered upon. It was true that the case of New Zealand had been referred to, where, by withdrawing the Imperial troops, and by throwing upon them the responsibility of conducting their own affairs, a certain period of peace had been secured. But he was told by the right hon. Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster) that the cases of the Cape and New Zealand were not parallel; and it would, he thought, be instructive to inquire why they were not so. They were not parallel, because in New Zealand the proportion of Englishmen to Natives was such that they could hold their own and assert their superiority. What did that mean but that in New Zealand Englishmen were big enough to domineer? In South Africa they were not numerous enough to do this. The right hon. Member said you could not leave Englishmen alone in South Africa altogether as you could in New Zealand; in other words, you must let Englishmen domineer there, and you must assist them. But if that was the policy of morality, he would like to hear the right hon. Member for Bradford
  132
  defend it upon that ground. If Englishmen dealt justly with their neighbours in South Africa, instead of making them slaves, then he held that there was no excuse whatever for not adopting the policy there which had been adopted in New Zealand. This was one of those subjects on which hon. Members went wrong, because they would not think out the question. If it was felt that Englishmen must be "cocks of the walk," and that they must be defended in assuming a position of superiority, whatever might be their position with regard to the neighbouring Tribes, then he repeated that that policy was absolutely immoral and productive of a continuous flow of money treasure and blood in any country where it was adopted. What he was saying had been said in so many words, without any circumlocution, by Sir Bartle Frere. Sir Bartle Frere was a man whose character had been very much elucidated by his position in South Africa. But they were bound to credit him with insisting that in South Africa there could be no settlement whatever unless the first principle was established of the unquestioned supremacy of Englishmen. In other words, this was Sir Bartle Frere's principle—and the principle which he (Mr. Courtney) believed was unconsciously entertained by many hon. Members—that we could have no neighbours. The people who were near us must be in a subordinate position to ourselves; neighbours and equals they could not be. Now, if you took that as your first principle of action in South Africa, was it not clear that you must go on and on in pursuit of that dream of abolishing neighbours until you lost yourselves in the middle of South Africa? You might get rid of the Zulus, and you then had the Swazies. You might get rid of them, and then there would be some other race to deal with, until at last you would be landed at the Zambesi, where there would be no necessity of persecuting neighbours any further. As long as we countenanced the Colonies in their notion that they must be supreme in their conduct with their neighbours, and as long as they felt that in all their difficulties we should come to their assistance, so long would they go on calling upon us to do so. He wished to point out, with reference to the state of affairs in South Africa, what was the position in which we were

  133
  now, and how impossible it was that we should go on with this policy. They had listened that evening to a very able speech from the hon. Member for Burnley (Mr. Rylands) on the necessity of requiring a contribution to the expenditure incurred in their behalf. And the other evening they had had a speech from the hon. Member for Birmingham (Mr. Chamberlain) in favour of sending out a Royal Commission to South Africa, in order to investigate the relations between our Colonies and the Native Tribes. But it would appear that both those hon. Members had failed adequately to grasp the meaning of the fact that we had given self-government to the Cape Colony. We had given the Colony self-government, and, in doing so, we had given them practical independence, which altogether forbade our intruding upon them if we went there with a Royal Commission, for example, to inquire into the relations between the Colony and the Native Tribes. We had given them self-government because we could not help it; for, as Lord Blachford had shown, the Cape Colony had resisted us to such a degree that self-government could no longer be withheld, and it was accordingly granted. But the gift entailed important consequences and placed the Colonial policy of the Cape beyond our control. Canada had acquired self-government, and she had taken advantage of the power thus obtained to adopt a tariff hostile to British trade, and to dismiss the local Governor of Quebec whom the Colonial Secretary would desire to keep in his position. But, having given self-control to Canada, you could not control the action of Canada with respect to the Tariff, nor in respect of the local Governor. In the same way, having given self-government to the Cape Colony, you could no longer control its action with respect to the Tribes annexed to it. You might affect to do so; but you had not the power. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford had argued that, as we must aid the Colonies in their need and contribute to the cost of their policy, we must have a share in controlling that policy. But he (Mr. Courtney) ventured to say that, as we could have no share in controlling their policy, we should refuse to contribute to the cost. The author of an able paper in The Quarterly Review had suggested that we might withdraw self-government from the
  134
  Colony; but everybody acquainted practically with politics would know that this was absolutely impossible. You could not retract what had been given in this way, and if you could not retract the power of disposition and control of Native policy, then it was in vain to say because we pay we must have a share in that policy. The alternative was, because we could have no share in that policy we would have no share in the payment. The hon. Member for Birmingham (Mr. Chamberlain) had laid before the House facts which appeared to be conclusive; he had given an illustration of the conduct of the Cape Colonists towards the Natives, and he had given an illustration of the way in which the Judges treated cases in which the rights of the Natives as against Englishmen were concerned. It was enough for him to say that it had been shown in that House that, in the Cape Colony, society was permeated with a different feeling and with a different morality to that which prevailed here. You could not, in a society with a different morality from your own, introduce your morality to make that society act contrary to its own morality. That appeared to him to be a self-evident proposition. There existed in the Cape Colony a different morality to ours with regard to the treatment of Natives; and it was idle to shut our eyes to this fact and its consequences. Besides this, there was another element in the question which could not be controlled and which was independent of our action—namely, the contest for land. The Colonial Secretary, he believed, denied the existence of this greed for land as an explanation of the difficulty in South Africa. He said that the whole thing was explained by the fact that Englishmen had a tendency to move towards the North and the Natives towards the South. But these two facts, which he would term the "Compass theory" of the right hon. Gentleman, were insufficient to explain the whole difficulty. Why was it that Englishmen moved towards the North, and that the Natives moved towards the South at the Cape? The answer was that the English were too numerous for comfortable living in the sea-side settlements, and were moving towards where they could get more space, and, in the same way, the Natives, who were getting more crowded in the North, were moving towards the South. It

  135
  was a question of the means of existence in both cases. We, in England, could not control the action of this struggle for existence in South Africa, and the only way to restrain it within decent limits was to throw on English Colonists the complete responsibility of their acts. In Natal and in the Transvaal the situation was even more serious than at Cape Colony. If we looked at the Transvaal, we should find a morality still more diverse than ours than that which prevailed in Cape Colony. There was, in the Cape Colony, a respectable minority whose views were analogous to those of Englishmen in this country, and had some influence on the conduct of affairs in the Cape. But in the Transvaal this was not so; and we could not, except by exercising force, make the policy of the Transvaal agree with our own. Again, we could not make the policy of the Transvaal agree with the policy of Cape Colony with respect to this question. The difference in the ideas and morality between these different States and Territories was such as, in the judgment of men who had given most attention to the subject, would render Confederation impossible. He had referred to an article in The Quarterly Review known to be written by a most distinguished historian, who went out to the Cape expressly for the purpose of promoting the scheme of Confederation. That writer said that Confederation was impossible, at least, during the life-time of the present generation. Lord Blachford had approached the question from a totally different point of view, but had agreed absolutely and entirely with the historian to whom he had referred that it was impossible to make these States confederate together, since their views, their ideas, and the policies which they pursued were different. With respect to the Transvaal, he would ask the Committee to allow him to go-into a few details, in order to show that there were insuperable difficulties in the way of the policy of Confederation to which the Government were pledged, and with respect to which they must add expense to expense. He trusted hon. Members would pardon the length to which his observations were extending; but it was of importance that with respect to the Transvaal the House should understand what was the attitude of the people in
  136
  the Transvaal towards ourselves; and in this matter he was sorry to say that we had not had that assistance from the public Press which was desirable. Last year he had expressed his regret that the Correspondence between the Colonial Secretary and the Delegates of the Transvaal had not been accurately reproduced in the newspapers, which resulted in the public getting one side of the story and not the other with reference to what had happened in the Transvaal. He had again to complain of the action of some of the newspapers. Sir Bartle Frere had sent home in the spring an important despatch, describing interviews which he had had with some of the Transvaal Boers at Bloemfontein. That despatch was telegraphed by the correspondent of The Standard at the Cape; but, as it was not known to be authenticated, it was not sufficiently published. Later it was known that the despatch was authentic, and still later it was laid upon the Table in a Blue Book; and in the analysis of those Papers which appeared in the most widely diffused newspapers of the day this despatch was entirely overlooked. He would very briefly show how impossible it was for this country to maintain in the Transvaal the first condition of Confederation. The Transvaal ought to be a member of any Confederation that might be formed in South Africa; but no sooner was the annexation of the Transvaal made than the Boers began to protest against it, and sent over a deputation to Lord Carnarvon. They were told that they did not represent the people; thereupon, a Memorial was drawn up, protesting against the annexation, and the Memorial was signed by about 6,000 adult males out of a population estimated at 8,000 adult males. That Memorial was brought before the Colonial Secretary, who said that the thing was done, and that it could not be looked to; he also refused to investigate the matter, or to take any notice of the remonstrances. What happened then? The Delegates went back, and told their story to the Boers; a meeting was held, and the result was such a demonstration of anger against the English Government as to produce a very considerable anxiety in Natal. The Boers met together, and Sir Bartle Frere met them. The whole Transvaal was then in a most anxious and critical

  137
  condition, and the English immigrants who were in the country were in a tolerable state of funk. They got into the town of Pretoria, and took precautions against surprise, and patrolled the streets in their anxiety lest the Boers should come from their camp and make themselves masters of the city. The Transvaal Boers were not likely to do that, because it would have embarrassed the English Government in the prosecution of the war in Zululand. They waited until Sir Bartle Frere came to them, and then they laid their remonstrances before him. What was their attitude, and what were their views on that occasion? He would read a few extracts from the Blue Books to show what were the characters and habits of the Transvaal people, whom they so perfectly ignored in their policy of Confederation. A document sent by a number of farmers at Wonderfontein began in words which were seldom heard in that Assembly, and, perhaps, it would be rash to repeat it there. It commenced—
  "In the presence of Almighty God, the searcher of all hearts, and prayerfully waiting on His gracious help and pity, we, burghers of the South African Republic, have solemnly agreed, as we do hereby agree, to make a holy covenant for us and for our children, which we confirm with a solemn oath. Fully 40 years ago our fathers fled from the Cape Colony in order to become a free and independent people. Those 40 years were 40 years of pain and suffering. We established Natal, the Orange Free State, and the South African Republic, and three times the English Government has trampled our liberty and dragged to the ground our flag, which our fathers had baptized with their blood and tears. As by a thief in the night has our Republic been stolen from us. We may nor can endure this. It is God's will, and it is required of us by the unity of our fathers and by love to our children that we should hand over intact to our children the legacy of the fathers. For that purpose it is that we here come together and give each other the right hand as men and brethren, solemnly promising to remain faithful to our country and our people, and with our eye fixed on God, to co-operate until death for the restoration of the freedom of our Republic. So help us Almighty God!"
  That was a message which the Boers of the Transvaal sent to this country, and it indicated the temper of the mind in which they assembled together. Sir Bartle Frere went to see these men. Before he got to them he thought that their importance was overrated, and that they were, in fact, only a small number of discontented, ignorant people to whom little attention ought to be paid. But when he got closer to them he found it
  138
  necessary to alter his opinion; and, before he came back, he admitted frankly that the gravity of the situation was unquestionable. The Boers had assembled in their camps to the number of 4,000, and, he believed, in a perfectly sober, orderly way, waiting for Sir Bartle Frere. They waited patiently, in their modest way, until Sir Bartle Frere came to them in order that they might put their views before him. What happened then was best seen by the despatch of Sir Bartle Frere of the 17th of April, one or two pages from which he would ask permission to read. He said—
  "They maintain that their independence was unjustly taken from them by the act of annexation, an act which they allege was grounded on incorrect representations of the state of the Transvaal and the feebleness of its Government. They desire that their independence may be freely and unreservedly restored to them. They desire nothing more in the shape of concession and they cannot be content with anything less. By 'independence' they understand the same entire freedom from all control in choosing their own form of government and their own administrative machinery as was guaranteeed to them by the Sand River Convention of 1852. In making this demand, they claim to represent the wishes of the very great majority of the Boer population of the Transvaal. They consider that the Boers now assembled represent the very great majority of that population. How far this is the case I have, of course, had no opportunity of judging personally; but there can be no doubt that I may say, as the result of my own observations in the camp and elsewhere, that it certainly is a very strong party that has kept up this movement to the present time; and, as a proof of their earnestness, I can confirm the fact that they have been in an open camp for four weeks waiting my arrival. And looking to the bearing and the temper of the members of the committee whom I met, who are men of position in the country and respected, and leaders who have since the earliest establishment of the Republic taken a prominent part in the government of the country, I think I may say that their representations are worthy of your earnest consideration."
  That was a letter which Sir Bartle Frere drew up and engaged to them to send home, and, later on, he sent another despatch to the Secretary of State for the Colonies couched in even stronger language. He said he felt assured that the majority of them considered themselves deeply wronged, and that only the highest motives restrained them from asserting their claims. Meanwhile, the taxes that ought to have been paid three months before remained uncollected, and the government of the country was virtually in abeyance outside the capital. He would ask hon. Members whether they sincerely thought that it was possible for this

  139
  country to maintain its rule over a population of that kind, where three-fourths of the people indignantly repudiated interference, and, in their solemn way, had expressed their determination to be free as their fathers had been? If this country were not going to thrust upon this people an unwilling dominion, what did it mean by promoting the Confederation which, for no other reason, would be impossible, by the absolute impossibility of maintaining any authority over those people? To the expense of the matter he would not refer; but would only say that, at the present time, the Transvaal did not pay its way. Was this country going to the expense of keeping an English soldier for every Boer in the Transvaal? Attacked, as they were, in purse, if not in conscience, it was plain they would have to abandon their policy. The principle of the Confederation, understood in the Cape Colony, meant—first of all, the inclusion of Natal and the Transvaal, and the subjugation of Zululand. Assuming the war to be finished, the £3,000,000 which they were then voting was only a very small part of the expense which would have to be incurred. Whatever might be said, he could not help thinking that the victory of which they had heard so much was one of the most moderate military transactions ever achieved. Certainly, that was the general opinion, and they would have expended £3,000,000 in securing that. But how far would that money go in accomplishing the policy which the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for the Colonies said was that of Her Majesty's Government, and which the right hon. Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster) approved of? What would he do if there were to be Residents placed here and there in Zululand? It was found difficult enough at present to govern Natal; but to govern Zululand would be still harder. Then they would have the Transvaal, with its invincible repugnance to their Sovereignty. They would have to retain a permanent military Force, and would find that £3,000,000 was a very small portion of the expense which would be incurred. If hon. Members did not approve of the policy which had been pursued in South Africa, then the Vote ought to be rejected altogether. In accepting that alternative, they would leave the Cape Colony to maintain itself as a self-governing community. They
  140
  would leave Natal to be, as hitherto, a settlement rather than a Colony—a settlement of Englishmen living peaceably and dealing honestly with the Natives among whom they lived. The doctrine that unless English Colonists were strong enough to domineer over their neighbours this country ought to assist them was opposed to the most elementary principles of morality. If the Government would not reject it as immoral, they would have to abandon it as too costly, for the £3,000,000 now asked for would be but a small instalment of the expenditure such a policy would involve.
  MR. DALRYMPLEsaid, that in the speech of the hon. Member for Liskeard (Mr. Courtney) a great point was made by him as to their desire to be "cocks of the walk." He would venture to say that there was no man in that House who, in reference to the war in South Africa, had any desire to be a "cock of the walk." It was impossible to feel any very great enthusiasm with reference to that war, and he thought that nothing was further from their minds than the policy which had been indicated. He could not but think that the pages of The Nineteenth Century, in which certain hon. Members—even eminent Members of Parliament—were in the habit of finding relief for their feelings, from time to time, in language stronger than they were in the habit of using in that House, would have been a more appropriate arena than the House for the speech of the hon. Member for Liskeard. He said that in no flippant spirit, for he was sure that it would be worth perusing. But the time and the occasion did not seem to him to be the most appropriate that could have been chosen for discussing lines of Colonial policy. The hon. Gentleman had referred to the speech of the right hon. Member for Bradford; but, for his part, he preferred the views of the right hon. Member to those of the hon. Member for Liskeard, for the right hon. Gentleman seemed desirous of maintaining their Colonial Empire, and all matters connected with Colonial populations excited his sympathy. As to the speech of the hon. Member for Burnley (Mr. Rylands), he would only remark that the hon. Member was somewhat unfortunate in choosing the occasion he had for suggesting reasons why the Colonists should not contribute towards defraying the cost of the war. He thought that very

  141
  few hon. Members were not of opinion that the Colonists should bear their share of the expenditure, and he hoped that they would be made to contribute their proportion. He, therefore, thought that the time was scarcely well chosen for suggesting reasons why they should not contribute. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Chester (Mr. Dodson) had an awkward habit of placing his finger upon weak points in an adversary's case, and when a speech from him was well over the Government might fairly be considered to have got out of a good deal of their difficulty. So far as he could make out, his speech was directed to the discussion of the mis-spent part of the £6,000,000 voted last year, and he considered that it was the duty of the Government to look very sharply after a certain £93,000 that had been referred to. He gathered from the criticisms of the right hon. Gentleman, and also from those of the hon. Member for Liskeard, that they had not much to say against the present Vote. He had no doubt but that the Committee were of opinion that the Vote was not an unreasonable one, and he was quite sure there must be a general feeling in the Committee that if that Vote represented the expenditure that had been necessary for the war they would have got out of it very cheaply. He had no reason to doubt that the calculations upon which the Vote had been based had been carefully framed; and, looking to the character of the war, and the circumstance that it was not a war provoked by Her Majesty's Government, and for which they were not responsible, he did not doubt that the Committee would agree to the Vote.
  SIR GEORGE CAMPBELLhad considerable misgivings as to whether the sum now asked for would suffice to meet all the expenses of the war, more especially when he found that the transport of troops to and from the seat of war was only put down at the sum of £450,000. He feared that during the Recess considerable expense might be incurred without the House having had any opportunity of expressing any opinion upon it. For the last four months the war had been carried on without the money being voted by Parliament. The right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer had explained the way in which that had been done. He wished to call the attention of the
  142
  House to the matter, for they had strong misgivings that they should find that very great expenditure had been incurred without the House having had the least opportunity of expressing any opinion one way or the other. They knew that for the last four months the money which had been spent had been taken from a mysterious source of supply which had been described as the Military Chest. Very few hon. Members understood what the Military Chest was, and the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer had been good enough to explain its nature. The explanation was that the Colonial authorities had carte blanche to spend what they liked by drawing long bills on this country. The right hon. Gentleman, however, told them that the bills drawn were long dated. The result, practically, was that the Colonial authorities had been allowed to borrow from the Colonial banks without any sanction from Parliament, and, so far as he knew, without the sanction of the Home Government. The long-dated bills were only one form of borrowing. What he very much wished to know was whether the system of long-dated bills was to be carried on while Parliament was not sitting, as, if so, the credit of the country might be pledged to the payment of £5,000,000 or £6,000,000 sterling, in addition to the Vote of Credit now sought for. He hoped that they would be clearly informed how that matter stood. As the matter stood at present, he thought it would be better for the Colonial authorities to borrow money upon their own credit rather than to have carte blanche to draw long-dated bills upon this country. With regard to the Transkei War, he had put several Questions during the Session. He had asked whether it was intended that Imperial funds should not only be devoted to the expenses of the Imperial troops, but that advances should be made from the Imperial Exchequer for the Colonial troops and for the forage and transport of the Colonial Force? Advances had been made from the Military Chest in respect of these matters. It was said that those advances had been made on the responsibility of the Government of the Cape; but he should like to know how that responsibility had been fixed and ascertained? They had heard nothing in the late Correspondence about the responsibility of the Cape Government for advances made for purely

  143
  Colonial purposes, and on purely Colonial accounts. A Blue Book had recently been presented to Parliament, and he had looked carefully through it to find any acknowledgment by the Cape authorities of their responsibility. He willingly admitted that the right hon. Baronet the Secretary of State for the Colonies had written a number of very admirable despatches setting forth what the responsibilities of the Cape Government were. But he had looked in vain in their replies for any recognition on the part of the Colonial authorities of those responsibilities—there had been hundreds of addresses sent home expressing confidence in the Government, but not a single despatch acknowledging the liability. It seemed to him that the system of allowing the Cape authorities carte blanche to draw long bills upon that country for expenditure, acknowledged to be Colonial expenditure, was a very dangerous and discouraging practice. He hoped that the Government would give an assurance that in future such a practice should not be carried on, and that they would not be drawn into another expenditure of £5,000,000 or £6,000,000 by the Colonial authorities spending that money without the consent or control of Parliament. Having said so much with regard to the responsibility of the Cape authorities for the money advanced for purely Colonial purposes, he must, on the other hand, say that it seemed to him that in that debate to-night, speaking generally, considerable injustice had been done to the Government of the Cape Colony. In justice to the Cape Colony, it should be remembered that a little while ago the minority in the Cape was a majority. They had some insufficient information concerning the Colonial administration; but he believed that the Cape Government, in its treatment of the Native Coloured population, had set an example which might be with great advantage followed in other countries. This example stood out in very favourable contrast to other Colonies, which had passed laws, which he was sorry to say had been sanctioned by Her Majesty's Government, of a very unfair character to the Chinese immigrants. In the Cape, on the other hand, the franchise had been extended to the Coloured population, and the Natives were treated by their White fellow-citizens as being on an entire equality with them. He thought, there-
  144
  fore, that the language used by the hon. Member for Liskeard upon this subject was not justified by the facts. The Cape Colony had been the first of all British Colonies which had granted the franchise to the Natives, and in that respect it deserved commendation. The hon. Gentleman had been very hard on the Dutch element in the Colony. He thought that it should be borne in mind that the Ministry now in power did not represent the Dutch element in the Colony, but the English. But they had been told of objectionable measures for which the present Ministers of Cape Colony were responsible. It was, however, but just to remember that the present Ministry, who were immediately responsible, had been imposed upon the Colony by a British Governor, and maintained in power by the support of British troops and money. With regard to the future, he was strongly of opinion that they might now reasonably call upon the Cape Colony to pay for such wars as should be carried on within the Colony itself. Now that the Transkei war was finished he agreed with the hon. Member for Liskeard that the Cape Colony ought to be self-supporting and to bear its own expenses absolutely and entirely. It should not be allowed to draw upon the Military Chest; but if it wished to raise money in the future it ought to do so upon its own credit and not upon that of this country. The Colony should be self-governing and self-supporting. Whatever, therefore, might be the case with regard to wars, he trusted that they might not again be called upon to pay for any war in the Cape Colony itself. His observations did not apply to any possible complications in Natal, but were limited to the Cape Colony. With regard to the subject of Confederation, he wished to express the opinion that it could not be brought about in a practical manner by means of the present Confederation Act. They had been told that it would be necessary for them to give military assistance to the Colonists and to control the Native policy. The means by which that could be effected had not, however, been yet discovered, and they had not yet solved the problem of combining military assistance from the Mother Country with a proper control over the Native policy. He did not think that there was any one instance in which they had succeeded in solving the problem. He sincerely hoped Her Majesty's

  145
  Government would succeed in doing so. Meanwhile, they ought to make the Cape Colonists feel that if they should again draw this country into war it would not be a conflict in which all the loss would be on the side of Great Britain and all the profit on theirs.
  MR. W. E. FORSTERdid not wish to detain the Committee at any length, but only to reply to some remarks that had fallen from the hon. Member for Liskeard (Mr. Courtney). The hon. Member seemed to think that he was of opinion that in New Zealand, where the Whites were strong, they should be left alone to commit any injustice they pleased; but at the Cape, where the contrary was the case, this country should interfere. Nothing could by any possibility be more contrary to his convictions than that idea. If the Natal Government were then stronger than the Natives, and were to commit any injustice upon them, and he was convinced that an act of injustice had been done, he could not say exactly what he would do; but he certainly would not be responsible for their acts. The hon. Member could not have any stronger feeling upon that point than he had; but the contrast between New Zealand and South Africa was very great. If they were to let New Zealand alone she would be well able to take care of herself; he believed they would be doing wrong to disavow the responsibility that belonged to them, but no harm would happen to the people of New Zealand, for they would be able to contend with the Natives. On the other hand, if they withdrew from their South African Colonies and all their possessions in South Africa the Natives were so numerous and so well armed that he thought they would be able to contend with the Whites. If the Blacks in South Africa got the upper hand atrocities would be committed upon the Whites which would be retaliated, and a general feud might take place. The Blacks in South Africa were very courageous, whatever else might be said concerning them, and from their contact with European nations they obtained such instruction in military matters that they would put the Whites in all parts of South Africa in very great danger, including Cape Colony and Natal. And if either the Zulus or some other Tribe were to put English Colonists in danger, was it likely that the English people
  146
  would not go to their rescue? This country could never stand by and see them murdered. That being the case, what were they to do? He regretted the wars that had hitherto been undertaken, and he believed that the last war was not only an unjust and unnecessary, but a wicked war. He hoped that they would have no such wars in future. Why were they going on with the war? It seemed to him they were bound to do so for two reasons. First, because there was always a feeling in South Africa, which they must expect to have to contend with, that wherever Whites were brought into contact with Blacks—the men of high civilization with the men of low civilization—the former would wish to domineer over the latter. That tendency ought to be checked by the Home Government, and he believed that the Government wished to contend against it; but he wished that they had done so with more vigour. A Governor and High Commissioner was sent out to contend against that feeling; but he had allowed himself to be led away by the War Party and to commit the country to what he (Mr. W. E. Forster) considered to be an unjust and unnecessary war. That war had cost them a large sum of money, and had only brought discredit on their arms. By the most recent appointment to the position of High Commissioner, the Government had placed over them a gentleman altogether opposed to the Native policy. They would, see what would be done for the future. The hon. Member for Liskeard proposed to sever the connection between the Mother Country and the Cape. He did not believe that the English people would assent to any such proposition. He would go further, and say that he did not think they ought to do so. They were, in his opinion, responsible for what happened at the Cape, and were bound to look to the safety of the Colonists. His hon. Friend had two lines of argument. In one part of his remarks he said that what was being done at the Cape was immoral and ought to be condemned. The answer to that was that this country was doing its best to put things in a proper state. Then the hon. Gentleman contended that the Colonists were free people, and ought to be left to themselves. With respect to the Transvaal, for every Boer there were 10 or 20 Blacks, and such a matter as

  147
  that should be taken into consideration. What was to be done under the circumstances? He entertained the strongest conviction that they ought not to break off their connection with the Cape. On the other hand, they were determined to do everything in their power to prevent the recurrence of another unnecessary, useless, and unjust war. They were necessary to the Colonists, who would be left in great difficulties without them. Whatever was said, yet the fact remained that if left to themselves the Colonists would be in very great difficulty, and would have no power to contend with the Natives of South Africa. But he thought they should take advantage of their position to make terms with the Colony. First, they should insist that they should do something for their own defence. A day or two ago the Secretary of State for the Colonies said that one thing which seemed to him to suggest that for the future the Government would insist upon the Colonies in South Africa organizing some defensive Forces. He thought that was the proper course to take, and that this country should say to the Colonists, that "if you accept our assistance we must have some voice in your policy; we must have some voice over your cost within your own Borders." On that point he fully agreed with the hon. Gentleman the Member for Kirkcaldy. They ought so to govern their Black subjects at the Cape, and the enormous multitude in Natal and the Transvaal, that at least there should be no wars or disturbances amongst them. He believed that was exceedingly difficult, and that it was one of the most difficult problems that ever came before any country to settle. He did not know, however, that there was any other policy they could take. They could not leave the Colony to shift for itself, and take the consequences of its own action. On the other hand, England was determined that it would not pay the expenses of such wars as this in the future. One thing we might do precisely opposite to what we had done, which was, that instead of sending out a Governor who made arrangements immediately after the annexation of the Transvaal, and who at once set to work with greater forces and power to carry out the policy which had brought the Transvaal Boers into misfortune, and so leading them into dis-
  148
  aster, they should send a man who, instead of getting up a war which was not wanted, and which was not necessary, and which was unjust, would use his very strong influence in preventing any such things. That was what the Government might very fairly do, and he had no doubt it was what the Government wished they had done. He hoped that this discussion would not cease without Government saying a little more of their intention with regard to their policy in the future than they had yet done. So far as he could tell, and he had watched these matters with some care and attention, the one practical measure suggested by the Government was that requiring the Colony to establish some defensive organization, and that he regarded as a very good measure. He thought a time had now come when, if the Government had a policy in regard to the Cape, and intended to meet this difficult problem, they ought to tell them what it was. He did not want to make an attack upon the Government, for he admitted their difficulties; but he must condemn, as he had always felt it his duty to condemn, the policy of Sir Bartle Frere. He felt also that Sir Bartle Frere had some right himself to complain. The Government ought to have known the very difficult problem they had to solve, and what sort of a man to solve it with. They ought to have known it—and if they did not know it before, it showed an amount of ignorance and want of foresight on their part that he could hardly suppose them guilty of—and if they did know it, they ought to have taken action with Sir Bartle Frere long before they did. They knew who he was, and what a remarkable combination he was of strength of will and of power of being misled by his own imagination—at the same time, of sincerity of purpose, and yet of a possibility of absolutely defying them in any instructions given to him. His letters and despatches, replying to the Colonial Secretary, showed pretty clearly what it was he meant to do. He could not but believe that the Government were in the same position as this. They thought—"Well, he may succeed in what he is going to do; we will leave him, and see what happens." Of course, it was very easy to judge after the event. That might be an easy thing to say now. Therefore, he made allow-

  149
  ances for the Government in that respect. Still, he thought they would themselves now regret very heartily that they did not act with more vigour and determination, and did not recall him or put him under instructions and restrictions from which he could not possibly have departed. Now, however, they had come to this point. They asked the Government to tell them fairly what was their line of policy? As regarded Federation, he thought they were right in making a Federation, if they would only tell them how they hoped to do it. If the Government would tell them the terms on which they would assist them, it would be an enormous advantage to deal with one body at the Cape. What was done several years ago was merely to give power to bind together the different States in the Federation. He had seen it stated sometimes that if the Divisions in the House on certain memorable occasions had succeeded in their object this war might have been avoided. But the South African Bill had nothing whatever to do with the war. Its sole object was to give the Colonists the opportunity of federating, if they pleased, and had no more to do with the war than any other possible thing that could have happened. When the Government trusted men like Sir Bartle Frere and Sir Garnet Wolesley, hoping that in some way or another they would solve this problem, they ought to give the House also some information of what their policy was to be.
  MR. ONSLOWobserved, that he had never said a word against Sir Bartle Frere; but he thought Her Majesty's Government ought to be very careful. He had worked with him many years ago, and he knew his character. The despatches he had written home were exactly in the same line as those he sent, when he was Governor of Bombay, to Lord Lawrence, then Viceroy; and it was now incumbent on Her Majesty's Government to tell Sir Bartle Frere, considering all that had happened, that he was not to take the government of the Colonies under his control without the previous sanction of Her Majesty's Government. For every action of his out there the Government were responsible, and as they knew the kind of man they had to deal with, and could see the great mischief he had already worked, they ought to take warning. As a humble
  150
  but very strong supporter of the Government, he would tell them that his policy had not met with the approval of the House or the approval of the country. The right hon. Gentleman had talked about Federation; but it was a most difficult thing to settle, as might be seen from the important despatches written by Sir Henry Bulwer on this subject. For his part, he hoped nothing would be done so long as Sir Bartle Frere was at the head of affairs. He should be sorry to say that of any man who had served his country; but having studied his character, and knowing his previous history, he thought, seeing that Sir Bartle Frere had not the confidence of the House or the country, he should not, perhaps, be recalled, but, at any rate, he should tender his resignation.
  SIR WILFRID LAWSONthought it a great pity that, entertaining the sentiments which he had just expressed, the hon. Member for Guildford (Mr. Onslow) did not vote with those who sat opposite to him on questions relating to our South African policy. But now that this question of Sir Bartle Frere had come up, and that they had had the pleasure of hearing the right hon. Gentleman's (Mr. W. E. Forster's) views of his character, and had heard him say that the Government ought to have known what manner of man he was, and ought to have looked rather sharply after him, he really thought he must come to the defence of the Government. A Friend of his had brought him a copy of Hansard, and he read with great interest in that volume the remarks made by the right hon. Gentleman on the 26th July, 1878. The Committee had heard the opinion of that right hon. Gentleman as to what the Government ought to have thought about Sir Bartle Frere. But what was his own opinion of him? He said—
  "We have certainly in the Governor of the principal Colony a man whom we can entirely trust for motive, for sense, and for ability in this most difficult matter. I entirely agree with what the right hon. Gentleman has said. I think we might search the whole of our Public Service and with difficulty find any man who has that combination of feelings of justice and firmness of character which fits him to deal with this most difficult question. I do not know that the Government can do more than strengthen his hand as much as possible."—[3 Hansard, ccxlii. 474.]
  Sir Bartle Frere seemed to him a representative of the result of this policy

  151
  which they were called upon to discuss that night. There had been some question earlier in the evening of the discussion of the policy of the Afghan War on the Vote of Thanks; but there was no doubt that when they came to vote money they were entitled to discuss the policy which rendered the money necessary. As the Prime Minister had said quite truly, "expenditure depends upon policy." Then it seemed to him a grievous thing, in the present state of the country—a state of dissatisfaction and suffering—that they should be called upon to vote this extra £3,000,000 for this war. He thought that night they had supped full of horrors. They had passed a Vote of Thanks to the Army for carrying on a war in Asia which half the House thought to be unjust. ["No, no!"] Well, then, he would say nearly one-half of the House, or, at any rate, one-third of the House. ["No, no!"] Well, hon. Gentlemen seemed very strictly accurate. He maintained that more than one-third of the House did not approve this war. ["Oh, oh!"] It was no use crying "Oh, oh!" because it did not alter the fact. Early in the evening they had passed a Vote of Thanks to the Army for successfully prosecuting a war which more than one-third of the House considered to be unjust, and now they were called upon to vote £3,000,000 for a war which the whole House believed to be unjust. ["No, no!"] In his opinion, this was a war which everybody thought to be unjust except the hon. and gallant Admiral (Sir William Edmonstone). They had the despatches of Her Majesty's Government, in which Sir Bartle Frere was condemned for beginning this war; and, therefore, he supposed he was justified in saying that the Government would not have said, if they had not thought it, that Sir Bartle Frere had acted wrongly and unjustly in this matter. In fact, Sir Bartle Frere seemed to him to have thought, not that he was the Governor, but that he was the Government, and could carry out any policy that he liked. And then an hon. Member went so far as to say that the Home Government was not responsible for the war. If a public servant begun war and was then condemned, that was, practically, condemning the policy he adopted. If they read English history, they would never find that we had
  152
  carried on before a war which was avowedly admitted to be unjust. He did not believe there was anything like it in our previous history. In every other war the people had been told it was for some noble purpose, or was to defend this or that interest; but here they were told by the Government themselves that it was unjust, and yet they were called upon to vote £3,000,000 for carrying it on. They had not gone much into the policy of the war that night, although his hon. Friend the Member for Liskeard (Mr. Courtney) had taken a wide sweep, and had discussed our whole Colonial policy. But what could be more wretched than the excuses put forward for this war; and could anything be more miserable? They were told that we made war with Cetywayo because he kept a large standing Army. Why, we in England worshipped a standing Army, and spent night after night in discussing it in all its details, and in providing for its perfection. They had 200 Members in that House more or less connected with the Army, who proved by their conduct that they believed that the country was made for the Army, and not the Army for the country. Then Sir Bartle Frere said war was made because Cetewayo did not allow his soldiers to marry till they were 40. Was there ever such a pretext as that? Why, we did exactly the same with our own Guardsmen. They had had a debate on this subject, and the hon. Member for Chelsea (Sir Charles W. Dilke) took them through the whole matter, and explained all the proceedings. Then they heard another reason. It was charged that two or three men had come over the Border and stolen a pipe and handkerchief. These were all mere pretexts, and nothing else. Then, another reason given to catch the superficial was that we wanted to put down the great cruelties which Cetywayo practised on his people. The noble Lord opposite (Lord Elcho) made a speech, in which he used very hard language about Cetywayo, and told some most extraordinary stories which horrified that House, although there was no evidence to show that they had any warrant, and no evidence had been brought forward since to prove them true. For his part, he believed these stories were merely the exaggerations of some disordered brain. They talked

  153
  about going to war to stop cruelties, as if Cetewayo was the only man who committed cruelties. He had heard of a man called Chefket Pasha, or some such name. Did England go to war to stop his cruelties? On the contrary, we raised £6,000,000 to keep him going on in the same practices. Then, after all these pretexts for war, we went to war. England might talk about Poles and Hungarians, and sympathize with them in their struggles for freedom and liberty; but he believed there never was a nobler struggle than that which these savages had made against us who had gone wickedly to war with them. They talked about the prestige of the country being restored. Future generations would say that we, with our perfect means of scientific slaughter, had found ourselves outwitted and defeated by these poor, half-naked savages. Now the end, he supposed, was come. About a fortnight ago news arrived that we had gained a great and glorious victory. We had shot down some 1,000 or 1,500 of these poor savages, losing 10 men ourselves. That we called a glorious victory. He maintained it was a crowning disgrace, and as unjust and wicked a war as ever this country entered into; and he believed that at some future day that night would be looked back on, not with pride, but with regret, by all those who had supported the policy which called upon the House to vote this large sum.
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: I do not know that it is possible for me to enter as fully as the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. W. E. Forster) seems to desire into the discussion of the prospective Colonial policy of the Government. We have a question before us which is of importance, though it is a comparatively narrow question—the question of the Vote which we now ask the Committee to agree to, the sum which appears to be necessary for the expenses of the war in which we are engaged. It is perfectly natural that the House of Commons, on being asked to make that Vote, should take an opportunity of expressing its opinion upon the war itself, and upon the general question of our policy in South Africa. I would remind the Committee, however, that the House has already, upon more than one occasion, discussed a good many parts of this
  154
  question. They have discussed, in former years, the general policy of the relations of the Colonies one to another in South Africa. They have discussed the question of Confederation; they have discussed the conduct and policy of Sir Bartle Frere, and the conduct which has led to the war now going on, and which, I trust, is now coming to a conclusion. Within a very few days we have also discussed some of the general questions which arise with regard to our future policy. The Government have not endeavoured to evade a discussion of this question. They have laid before the House, as candidly and fully as they were able, the views which they entertain with regard to the relations of the South African Colonies one to another; and the House is perfectly well aware what the general ground was upon which this was recommended some time ago, and to how great an extent the difference in the relations between European Settlements and the Native Forces was the cause of our desire to establish some system of relations between these different European races which might bring about a better state of relation with the great Native communities. It was not absolutely necessary that that arrangement should take the form of a Federation. That was the form suggested, and we agreed to recommend it to Parliament as the best thing which we could ask the States to entertain and agree to. Although that was one of the methods suggested, it was not the primary and cardinal object to arrive at a settlement in that particular way. What was really necessary for these varying communities of European descent and habits, living in immediate contiguity to a large and powerful class of barbaric nations, was that there should be that amount of understanding between them as might regulate their relations with these savage nations, and, as might prevent or obviate causes of quarrel, and, in the case of quarrels unfortunately arising, might enable the whole of the Powers which existed to be concentrated in order to prevent the series of difficulties which might happen from contention among them. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster) has, on more than one occasion, pointed out how very delicate is the question of the relations between the

  155
  White and the Black races in that part of the world. How difficult, and practically impossible, it is that we should leave those who are now planted in South Africa to entirely take care of themselves, and what lamentable consequences must follow from their being left, unassisted, to maintain a conflict such as he apprehends might take place between them and the great Native races by which they are surrounded. These are all points upon which we have been thinking for years—upon which there have been discussions for years, both in the House and in the despatches between the Mother Country and he Colonies. We are endeavouring, as far as we can, to arrive at a proper settlement with regard to the relations which ought to be established. I think my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Colonies has communicated, as far as is possible for him to do, what the general lines are upon which we are now discussing the questions that press for a solution. It is obvious that the very first thing we have to do is to settle the present difficulty—to finish the present war in which we are, unfortunately, engaged, very much against our will, and, as we are disposed to think, without absolute necessity. At the same time, I think it is unfair to the distinguished statesman who is our Representative at the Cape to represent this as if it were a pure piece of wantonness on his part. We have never attempted to say that we do not think he committed an error of judgment in what he did; but, at the same time, it is a little unfair to suppose it was a mere wanton act of aggression on his part, when he fairly tolls you in his despatches that he acted under the belief that unless he had done what he did there would have been an outbreak of the savages, and consequences which we cannot estimate. I am not going myself to defend his conduct; but it must be remembered, in justice to him, that he had what seemed to him the very strongest cause to justify his act. This is not a matter in which we ought to condemn Sir Bartle Frere, as if his action had been altogether without reason. We have to get rid of the difficulties in which we find ourselves placed. We have to judge of the steps we are to take to bring this war to a conclusion, and we are to consider the question of the expenses incurred in
  156
  connection with that war. Beyond that, we have to consider what is to be the future system which we should endeavour to establish in order to prevent the recurrence of similar misfortunes. In regard to the expenditure, only one course is at the present moment offered to Her Majesty's Government—namely, to ask Parliament for a Vote of money which will be sufficient for the present exigency, and for the payment of the bills actually incurred. We ask for this Vote in order that we may be enabled to meet the claims which we know will be made on the Treasury Chest on account of the expenditure already incurred, and also to meet such expenditure as is likely to be incurred between this time and the time when the troops will begin to return. In the Vote which we are asking, we are not only taking what we believe to be enough for the maintenance of the troops in South Africa up to the present time, and for some time longer, but we are also taking a sum of £500,000 for the Navy, the greater part of which will be devoted to expenses incurred in conveying the troops home. The next question is as to how the cost is to be apportioned between the Mother Country and the Colonies? We are all agreed, I think, that the Colonies ought to bear a proportion of the expense, and that every effort must be made to bring the Colonies to a conviction of their obligation in that respect, and to provide that they should take their proper share of the burden which has been incurred by us on their account much more than on our own. I cannot help regretting that the hon. Member for Liskeard (Mr. Courtney) should have taken this opportunity of putting into the mouths of the Colonists arguments to induce us to admit that they ought not to be called upon to pay. If such arguments are used hereafter, we shall have to thank the hon. Gentleman for having done what he could to prevent the Colonists taking upon themselves that share of the burden which everybody in the House agreed that they ought to take. We shall not venture into any discussion of the arguments of the hon. Gentleman. I believe there would be, on the part of the Colonists, a disposition to do what lies in their power. They will have their difficulties, but I do not know that those difficulties will be

  157
  insuperable; and, at all events, it will be the duty of Her Majesty's Government to arrive at such a settlement with the Colonists as will give us the best terms possible. It may be that the Colony of Natal has not a very large Revenue, but I believe it has a Revenue which will enable it to contribute a substantial amount to the expenses of the war; indeed, I am of opinion that means will be found to obtain from the Colonies a very substantial contribution towards this money which we are now asking Parliament to vote. What we desire to see in the future is that which we have desired to see for some time past. We desire to see established a system of arrangements which we believe will take the form of a Confederation between the States of South Africa organized on a proper footing, placed in proper relations with the Home Government, and having for its object the throwing, to a great extent, upon the Colonies in that part of the world of the responsibility of providing for their own defence and for their own Frontier policy. But, at the same time, that system must be adopted with a sufficient control—a sufficient influence on the part of the Mother Country to prevent mischiefs such as those which I have glanced at as being of a dangerous kind. If you have the establishing of such a system as that, and when you have to conduct your arrangements with a Colony which has the right of self-government, you are undertaking a task which is necessarily one of delicacy, and which will require some considerable amount of correspondence and communication. We cannot pretend, at the present moment, to lay down in detail what will be the regulations which we can hope to propose. My right hon. Friend is now in communication with the Colony of the Cape, the principal Colony, upon this subject; and I believe that he is at this moment expecting soon to receive a despatch from them, conveying their views upon that policy; and Sir Bartle Frere is, no doubt, exercising his influence—and it is a very considerable influence—in endeavouring to promote that settlement at the Cape. I think it would be premature to go, at the present stage of the negotiations, into a discussion in this House as to the particulars which we shall desire to insist upon in laying down our policy. My right hon.
  158
  Friend has said that one great object which we have in view is to induce the Colonies, in forming themselves into a Union or Confederation of this kind, to establish an organized system of self-defence. Her Majesty's Government think it a very important matter that their defence should not be left to mere irregular and chance Armies, but that there shall be something in the nature of a well-organized Colonial Force. We have no doubt that assistance may very properly be rendered, upon judicious conditions, by the Home Government, for the training, maintaining, and forming the nucleus of such a Force; and Her Majesty's Government are desirous that the relations between this country and the Colonies, both with regard to administration and legislation, and also to the important question of expenditure, should be put on a footing which, while it properly leaves them the due control of their own domestic concerns, will obviate, as far as possible, the danger of our being called upon, on Imperial grounds, and on grounds of humanity and of kinship, to save them from a fate which might be provoked by incautious and high-handed measures on their part, and will enable us to check and control their action as far as possible, before the mischief has arisen. I do not think it is possible, at the present moment, to go more fully than that into that question. We know quite well how difficult has been the problem of Colonial government. Reference has been made to the old and valuable debates; and, much as we have learned since Sir William Molesworth discussed that question and threw more light upon it than had, perhaps, up to that time existed, still the problem before us is one of great difficulty, and I only hope that the House of Commons will not force us to make either inconvenient or embarrassing declarations prematurely at a time when we are really not able to say anything that might be entirely conclusive and satisfactory.
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: Sir, I think the Committee must have observed a somewhat remarkable omission from the speech of the right hon. Gentleman who has just sat down. It would, perhaps, be unreasonable to-night to enter into the large question of the future of South Africa. And it would, perhaps, be equally unreasonable at

  159
  this period of the Session that the right hon. Gentleman should feel himself pledged to a particular course. I very much agree with what fell from him to the effect that the most urgent duty before us was to finish the Business in hand, and to put an end, as soon as possible, and upon the most satisfactory terms we can to the unnecessary war in which we are engaged. But what the right hon. Gentleman entirely omitted to notice was the terms on which this war can be put an end to, and this is what we are entitled to ask. The Committee, I think, has been placed by Her Majesty's Government in, perhaps, the most remarkable position that it was ever placed in, being left in total ignorance both as to the objects with which the war was commenced, and as to the terms upon which it is to be concluded. We are in this position—that we all unanimously in this House are agreed as to the inadequacy of the object for which this war was commenced by Sir Bartle Frere. But while the Government have repudiated all responsibility for bringing about the war, they have declined to recall Sir Bartle Frere, whose acts have led to it. To do Sir Bartle Frere justice, he has never, for a moment, wavered from the opinion that the war was a just one; and, probably, whatever may be said, he will not alter his view of the subject, while it is evident that, whatever may be the private opinion of Her Majesty's Government, they have determined to do their best to shield Sir Bartle Frere from blame. The result of this is that, although we have partially superseded him, this country has had to pay, altogether, £4,500,000 for a war as to which we are entirely agreed that the object for which it was entered into was insufficient. That is done and past recall. The war has been entered into, and must be paid for. But the terms upon which peace may be made are still, to a certain extent, within our control. We know very clearly what are the views of Sir Bartle Frere upon the subject of peace, for we have before us his Ultimatum in which they are contained; and those terms, I have no doubt, are the only terms on which Sir Bartle Frere would ever have consented to make peace. The Government laid before us a despatch containing a criticism upon the terms of that Ultimatum; but we do not know how far
  160
  Sir Bartle Frere was expected to think that he had their authority to proceed, or how far, in the opinion of the Government, the terms of the Ultimatum were to be departed from. When Sir Garnet Wolseley was sent out to supersede Sir Bartle Frere, endeavours were made to get some information as to the terms upon which he was authorized to make peace; but we received one excuse after another, until, finally, the Blue Book has appeared, and we find that no instructions have been given to him. I understand from the Secretary of State for the Colonies that Sir Garnet Wolseley had been made colloquially acquainted with the views of Her Majesty's Government, and that he was perfectly aware of the terms of peace which were to be required from Cetywayo. Why can we not now be placed in the same position as Sir Garnet Wolseley, even if the views of Her Majesty's Government are, as is very probable, incapable of being placed in an intelligible form upon paper? Why cannot we colloquially learn what are the terms of peace which Sir Garnet Wolseley is to demand? The Ultimatum has, very probably, disappeared; but that does not put an end to the difficulty. What security has been taken by the Government—even supposing that the power of Cetywayo, and the system established by him has disappeared—that another Cetywayo, with another military system, may not take his place? We have heard something about substituting a system of minor Chiefs, who are to divide amongst themselves the authority hitherto exercised by Cetywayo. But what position towards the British Government are these minor Chiefs to occupy? Are they to be independent, or under the control of this country? Does the Government accept the opinions put forward by Sir Bartle Frere in the latest despatch of his which we have before us, where he lays down the policy which, in his opinion, Sir Garnet Wolseley and the Government ought to follow. He says, in that despatch, that a Native policy uniform in its great principles is an essential preliminary to the establishment of a permanent peace in South Africa, and that such a policy must rest upon the fundamental principle that the supremacy of the British Government, as representing a civilized Power, should be

  161
  unquestionable in any Native State surrounded, as the Zulus are, by British subjects and their allies. In other words, a Zulu State, bordering on the Dominions of the British Crown, must, according to the doctrine of Sir Bartle Frere, acknowledge the supremacy of the British Power. It is extremely easy to say if this policy be adopted where it will lead us. It will lead us to practical annexation. The British settlers will, of course, colonize the territory, which would then only become an extension of the British Colony, and then we shall have new neighbours, amongst whom, according to Sir Bartle Frere, it would be necessary to assert the supremacy of the British Government. Where, as the hon. Member for Liskeard has asked, is this policy to stop? Are the Government aware of any limit within which they can rest and be thankful? Where can they expect to find no Tribes that may not possibly become enemies of the British Colonies? The House of Commons has a right to ask these questions. I have no intention of enforcing these at length; but I did think that the Government would have taken the opportunity to make some statement as to their views with regard to the terms of peace. The statement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer seems to me to be so manifestly inadequate in this respect that I could not omit to ask for some more information as to the terms upon which peace will be made.
  SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH: Sir, the noble Lord has said that the House has unanimously pronounced its opinion as to the insufficiency of the reasons for the present war. It appears to me, however, that the only opinion pronounced by the House was the rejection, several months ago, of the Motion of the hon. Baronet the Member for Chelsea; and that, if I may say so, we are wasting time in now discussing the causes of the war, and the policy which led up to it. I will venture to say that, whatever may be the views of the House as to the policy of the war, it has, at any rate, been unanimous in the opinion that it has necessary that the war, once begun, should be brought to a satisfactory clusion, and that is the object of the Vote for which the Committee are asked this evening. The noble Lord has asked for information as to the terms on which Sir Garnet Wolseley has been instructed
  162
  to make peace, and with that puestion he has mixed up a reference to the despatches of Sir Bartle Frere, which I should have thought to be quite unnecessary. Her Majesty's Government have sent out Sir Garnet Wolseley to South Africa, placing in his hands authority over certain parts of the country for reasons stated in despatches which have been laid upon the Table, and I would ask that we may be judged by reasons given by ourselves rather than by those attributed to us by the noble Lord. We have sent out Sir Garnet Wolseley in order to bring this war shortly, as we hope, to a satisfactory conclusion. The noble Lord has said that there has been delay and hesitation in publishing the instructions issued to Sir Garnet Wolseley; but I should like to know whether any instance can be given in which the particular instructions given to a General have been made public before the conclusion of a war? It appears to me that any such course would be calculated to defeat its own object. There have been given to the House the general instructions of Sir Garnet Wolseley, indicating the line of policy to be pursued. He is told in those general instructions that it is the desire of Her Majesty's Government that the present war should be brought to an end as soon as it can be done consistently with the honour of our arms and safety of the British Colonies; and that, in considering the conditions of peace, he is to bear in mind that the object of the Government is not to add to the extent of the British Possessions, but to relieve them from the danger to which they have been hitherto exposed, and that the best means of obtaining that object is to establish friendly relations with the Zulu people on a basis that might secure permanent peace. Yet the noble Lord charges us with the desire of extending our Dominions, and asks when we are are going to stop? That, I think, is scarcely a fair charge to make, after the direct and concise statement contained in the despatches before the House. I will remind the Committee of my despatch of the 28th March. That despatch pointed to the absolute necessity of breaking the military power of Cetywayo; it pointed to a system of British Resident Agents, fairly to represent British interests and protect British subjects in Zululand, and to that despatch Sir Garnet Wolseley

  163
  was referred. Finally, having had the advantage of constant communication with myself and other Members of the Government conversant with the details of this difficult question, Sir Garnet Wolseley was intrusted with complete power to carry out the general policy of the Government by such detailed arrangements as to him might appear advisable. Arrived on the spot, he found Cetywayo's Army dispersed, the King a fugitive, and the principal Chiefs submitting to us, and professing themselves tired of Cetywayo's rule. By the exercise of those diplomatic qualities with which Sir Garnet Wolseley is endowed, there appears to be an opportunity of bringing this matter to a satisfactory conclusion, which will secure permanent peace without the annexation of territory. I do not think it well to enter into the details of the plan by which this may be done. I can assure the noble Lord that Sir Garnet Wolseley's instructions are in accordance with the general principles contained in the despatches which I have laid before the House, and that we have full confidence that he will carry out those instructions in the manner and in the spirit in which they were given.
  MR. PARNELLsaid, that before the Vote was taken he wished to ask the Government what they proposed to do with regard to the revolution in Basutoland. At present there was a Chief there defending his stronghold from the attacks of the Colonial and Government Forces who were endeavouring to subdue him. He wished to know whether any favour able terms would be granted to that Chieftain? What terms did the Government propose to give him, or did they simply intend to hang or shoot him if they laid hands upon him? They had heard a most heartrending account of the way in which the Colonial troops had been acting. The Colonial troops would not have had power to attack the Basutos in the way they had done unless they had received help in another direction from the Govern-Forces. Before the Vote was taken, he thought it was right that they should understand from the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for the Colonies his ideas of the way in which the rebellion in Basutoland was to be terminated; whether he thought that the Colonial troops were to be allowed to go
  164
  on burning and killing women and children, and blowing them up with dynamite, or whether favourable terms of peace were to be given to those who surrendered? He did not call terms of peace favourable which treated them as guilty of treason and felony, and sent them to penal servitude for life or to perpetual imprisonment. He did think that they ought to have some more definite announcement of the intentions of the Government in this matter. Then, with regard to Cetywayo, an impression seemed to have got abroad that it was intended to deprive him of his Kingdom and of all power, and that his Kingdom was to be divided among other Chiefs. Did the Government intend to adopt that course, or would they make such terms of peace with Cetywayo as would give him power over the remainder of his people? If the Government had not decided what course they would take with regard to Cetywayo, he thought that the Vote ought to be postponed until the Government had made up its mind.
  SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACHsaid, that with regard to Cetywayo there was one point which had to be kept in view. Whatever steps might be taken with regard to him, of course they would include such measures as would preclude him from again attaining a menacing position towards the White population. There was no desire, however, to deal harshly with him if he fell into our power. The hon. Member had also asked him how they proposed to terminate the rebellion in Basutoland. He was happy to inform the hon. Member that, according to the latest telegrams, there seemed good reason to hope that the war in Basutoland had terminated, and that the rebels had submitted. But any further measures which it might be necessary to take in reference to it concerned the Colonial rather than the Home Government, inasmuch as Basutoland was within the limits of Cape Colony, which possessed a responsible Government, and the operations had been conducted by Colonial troops at the expense of the Colony. If there were anything in the conduct of the operations which appeared to the Government to require it, they would remonstrate with the Colonial Government. He knew very little of the way in which those operations had been conducted; and he

  165
  might add that he had asked Sir Bartle Frere to send him a Report thereon.
  MR. WHITWELLsaid, that the right hon. Gentleman the Colonial Secretary had not communicated to the House the instructions that had been given to Sir Garnet Wolseley. Those instructions, he had informed the House, were chiefly in despatches, and he thought that the House was entitled to know what they were. They had been told that many of those instructions were given in conversation only; but there must have been written instructions as well. As they had now heard, those instructions seemed to be of the most general and uncertain character, probably very much of the same character as those given to Sir Bartle Frere when he undertook the government of South Africa. What had been the result in that case? The result had been such as the Government had lamented as strongly as any of them. And they had now been told that Sir Garnet Wolseley had carte blanche to act as he chose. Sir Garnet Wolseley had been told to break the power of Cetywayo. That might mean that his Army was to be absolutely destroyed, for the military power of Cetywayo would not be broken while his Army could be got together again. So long as they left 20,000 men with arms in their hands they would not have broken the power of Cetywayo. There was another point. What was to be done with Cetywayo himself, and how was Sir Garnet Wolseley to act with regard to him? He objected to grant the Vote on an estimate of the expense that probably would not be anything like the sum that would be required. He would like to know a little more definitely and distinctly what instructions had been given, so that they might be enabled to judge whether the Vote was sufficient or not, or whether it was too much. Personally, he did not object to the Vote, because he felt perfectly sure that it would not be nearly enough for the war. He felt sure, by the despatches of the Government, and from the Correspondence that had been laid before the House, that the present Vote would not be one-third of the expense that would be incurred. But sufficient information had not been given to the House, and they would like more. He sincerely hoped that the sanguine expectations of the right hon. Gentleman the Colonial Secretary would be realized, and that
  166
  they had heard the last of the complications at the Cape.
  MR. CHILDERSsaid, that at that time of the evening he would be altogether wrong unnecessarily to prolong the debate. He would not do so; but he would like to hear some explanation from the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for the Colonies with reference to the inquiries that had been put to him from various parts of the House. There were also two questions upon which he thought it would be well for them to have a clear answer. The first question was with respect to the terms of the settlement that Sir Garnet Wolseley was empowered to make. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for the Colonies had stated that the terms of the settlement had been explained verbally to Sir Garnet Wolseley, and had reference to the communications addressed to Sir Bartle Frere so far back as March last. It was generally understood that information had come within the last day or two from the Cape that one of the probable arrangements for the settlement of Zululand was that Cetywayo being a fugitive, and his power broken, his country would be divided into a number of districts and each placed under a Chief, with a Resident, to be appointed by the Government, at the head-quarters of the district. He need not say that to support the Resident it would be necessary to have some kind of military force. That would virtually be annexation; and he wished to know, therefore, if such an arrangement was consistent with the instructions that had been given to Sir Garnet Wolseley? That was the first question he wished to ask. The other question was not one which he wished to ask by way of reflection upon the Government, but because he thought it would be well to obtain an answer before the present Vote finally closed the right hon. Gentlemen the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and especially the Chancellor of the Exchequer, had spoken as to the prospective arrangements in South Africa which might be presumed to have a tendency to prevent a recurrence of the heavy charge on the English public which the last and the present war had entailed. Now, the whole question of the cost of wars at the Cape was care-

  167
  fully considered by the Committee on Colonial Military Expenditure of 1861, of which he was one of the very few remaining Members. That Committee reported, in reference to South Africa, that there security against military aggression should be provided for by local effort, and that the main object of any system adopted by this country should be to encourage local effort, not only as its first object to diminish expenditure, but to stimulate self-reliance in the Colonists themselves. Having regard to the fact that, two Sessions ago, they passed an Act to enable the South African Colonies to confederate, remembering that while that Act was passing through the House they had never dreamt of this country being drawn into a policy from which an expenditure of £5,000,000 had ensued, and bearing in mind that the Confederation was spoken of as the last step in a series of steps which would place South Africa in a similar position as the Dominion of Canada, he wished to ask the Government whether they would not now, once for all, insist upon those Colonies adopting for the future such internal arrangements between each other as would, in the spirit of the Report to which he had alluded, and in the spirit of the Confederation Act, absolutely secure the recurrence of the present state of things? He thought that the Government ought to give some explicit assurance that they would not only, in form, call on the Colonies to do more for military defence against internal enemies, but that they would absolutely insist, as a condition of local self-government, on specific securities from those Colonies against the British public being required to provide for such defence; and he (Mr. Childers) would gladly support some concession to the Colonies in respect of the cost of the present wars, if we were made secure in this respect for the future. He did not ask these questions in any spirit of hostility against the Government.
  SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACHcould not go into questions of detail at so late an hour. He might, however, say, generally, that it was no part of the instructions given to Sir Garnet Wolseley that an Imperial Military Force should be permanently stationed in Zululand. With regard to the second question of the right hon. Gentleman,
  168
  he understood that he desired that an Imperial Military Force should no longer stay in South Africa.
  MR. CHILDERSsaid, that that was not his point. On the contrary, he left the question of the withdrawal of the Military Force now in South Africa entirely in the hands of the Government. What he said was, that after what had passed, and looking to the spirit of the Confederation Act, and on the lines of the Report of the Committee of 1861, he should like some assurance from the Government that the recurrence of exceptional charges similar to these would be obviated in the future by a binding agreement with the self-governing Colonies at the Cape.
  SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACHsaid, the Government had kept that object steadily in view in all the communications that had passed.
  Question put, and agreed to.

ARMY ESTIMATES.
(2.) Motion made, and Question proposed,
"That a sum, not exceeding £3,007,000, he granted to Her Majesty, to defray the Charge for Provisions, Forage, Fuel, Transport and other Services, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1880."
MAJOR O'BEIRNE MAJOR O'BEIRNE moved that the Chairman do report Progress. He did not think that they should go into the Army Estimates at that late hour. Several hon. Members were absent who would have been in their places had they thought that the Army Estimates would have been taken that night. Knowing that the Votes were of the greatest interest to them, he thought it unfair that they should be taken at that hour.
Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Chairman do report Progress, and ask leave to sit again."—(Major O'Beine.)
COLONEL STANLEYhoped that the Committee would bear in mind the time of the year at which they had arrived. If they were in the month of March or April it might be said that it would be fair to postpone the Estimate for another day. But the House could not adjourn until the Estimates had been disposed of, and it would not be convenient for hon. Members to be kept in town to a much

169
later period than usual. Under these circumstances, he thought that the Committee might fairly go on. If they came to any subject which was clearly provocative of discussion, then a question would arise as to whether they should report Progress or not.
MR. DILLWYNdid not think it right that they should go on at that time in the morning discussing the Estimates after the long debate that had taken place. Many hon. Members who wished to take part in the discussion of the Estimates were not present.
MAJOR O'BEIRNEsaid, that the Estimates could be taken perfectly well on Wednesday. They were of the greatest interest to several Irish Members who were not in their places and who had never expected that the Votes would be taken at that time. He should certainly persist in his Motion to report Progress.
MR. MONKinquired how many Votes it was proposed to take before they adjourned? There were 42 Orders upon the Paper, and if it were intended to go on with the other Government Business it was really no use proceeding with the Estimates.
MR. CHILDERSwished to make a suggestion to hon. Members on both sides of the House. If it were found that a serious difference of opinion arose on any Vote which it was proposed to take, then he did not think it should be taken, although they were in the month of August, after half-past 1 in the morning. If there was no great difference of opinion, then, considering that they were in the month of August, and that they wanted to get through the Business of Parliament, he would appeal to hon. Members not to move the adjournment.
COLONEL STANLEYwas quite willing to adopt the course which had been suggested by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Pontefract.
MR. RYLANDSventured also to appeal to the hon. and gallant Member for Leitrim to withdraw his Motion. It would be most inconvenient not to take the unopposed Votes then.
MAJOR O'BEIRNEsaid, that he would not object to Votes 5, 10, 11, and 12 being taken. He begged leave to withdraw his Motion.
MR. PAENELLthought that there were many points in the Votes which
170
required explanation from the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Secretary of State for War; and there ought to be a limit to the time during which they were kept there. Would the right hon. and gallant Gentleman tell them how long they were to be kept there?
COLONEL STANLEYsaid, that he could not give any such assurance as that asked for.
MR. PARNELLasked how many Votes the right hon. and gallant Gentleman wished to take.
Motion, by leave, withdrawn.
Original Question again proposed.
MR. PARNELL MR. PARNELL moved to report Progress, because he thought they ought to have some understanding on the point. So far as the Notice Paper went the Votes were absolutely unopposed; but it was quite impossible to get through them at that time in any reasonable manner. He thought that, at half-past 1 in the morning, they were entitled to ask the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Secretary of State for War to set some limit to the number of Votes he proposed to take.
Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Chairman do report Progress, and ask leave to sit again."—(Mr. Parnell.)
COLONEL STANLEYsaid, that at Vote 13 there were two substantial Amendments on the Paper, and he would not propose to go beyond that.
Question put, and negatived.
MR. PARNELLsaid, there was an item of £20,000 in this Vote for forage, of which he wished to have some explanation. On the other side of the account the amount was £30,000, so that there was a discrepancy of £10,000.
COLONEL STANLEYreplied, that the two items were the same, one being the gross amount and the other the net, some of the surplus stores having been sold.
MR. WHITWELLpointed out that the cost of transport abroad had largely increased.
COLONEL STANLEYadmitted that that was so; but it arose from exceptional causes.
Original Question put, and agreed to.
(3.) £801,600, Clothing Establishments, agreed to.
(4.) £34,400, Miscellaneous Effective Services.
MR. PARNELLsaid, this Vote included the cost of the medals for the Perak War, and they ought to have an opportunity of discussing that question. The Perak Expedition was not a war at all. Our Forces were only opposed to 200 Natives, and no European was killed. It was, in fact, nothing but a slight brush with a few robbers.
MR. MACDONALDhoped the Secretary of State for War would explain why these medals were given.
COLONEL STANLEYcould not state the whole of the circumstances that led to this war, which took place in the year 1875. The facts were these. The Resident was attacked by the Natives and murdered, and the escort, which was proceeding up the river to support the Resident, was fired upon. It was clearly a very sharp action while it lasted, and there were a considerable number of men killed and wounded. The troops were exposed to very considerable hardships, and it was the opinion of the Government that some medal should be given. The matter was pressed upon the Government by several hon. Members; and although his right hon. Friend who preceded him did not think a special medal should be granted for it, at the same time was of opinion that the action was one of some severity, and it was thought that a medal should be given for the Burmese War, with a special clasp for this action.
Vote agreed to.
Motion made, and Question proposed,
"That a sum, not exceeding £232,700, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the Charge for the Administration of the Army, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1880."
MAJOR O'BEIRNE MAJOR O'BEIRNE moved to report Progress, as this was a Vote that interested many hon. Members who were not present.
COLONEL STANLEY: I will postpone it then.
Motion, by leave, withdrawn.
Vote postponed.
Motion made, and Question proposed,
"That a sum, not exceeding £35,900, he granted to Her Majesty, to defray the Charge for Chelsea and Kilmainham Hospitals (In-
172
Pensions), which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1880."
MR. PARNELLthought this Vote ought to be postponed also, as it involved a very important question about which a Parliamentary Return had been moved for.
COLONEL STANLEY: If the hon. Member has any objection to the Vote he should say what the objection is.
MR. PARNELLsaid, that the Vote contained the salaries of certain chaplains, and there was a great disproportion between the salaries of the Roman, Catholic and the Protestant chaplains. He really must move to report Progress. The Secretary of State for War had given no explanation as to the chaplains, and was not treating hon. Members properly.
Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Chairman do report Progress, and ask leave to sit again."—(Mr. Parnell.)
MR. DILLWYNthought the Committee ought to have reported Progress long ago. The Business was being conducted in an irregular manner, and they were not doing justice to its importance. It was impossible to get through all the remaining Estimates at that Sitting, and the Votes ought not to be pushed on too fast.
MAJOR O'BEIRNEshould certainly support the hon. Member for Meath, because the hon. and gallant Member for Cork was interested in this Vote, and did not wish it to be taken in his absence.
Question put.
The Committee divided:—Ayes 11; Noes 88: Majority 77.—(Div. List, No. 207.)
MR. BIGGAR MR. BIGGAR moved that the Chairman do leave the Chair. It was now nearly 2 o'clock, and it would take a considerable time to get through the Orders of the Day, as Report on Supply would have to be taken. The principle of giving Protestant chaplains more than the Roman Catholic chaplains was an injustice which must not be allowed to continue. No explanation had been given.
Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Chairman do now leave the Chair."—(Mr. Biggar.)
SIR PATRICK O'BRIENsaid, this was not a question of obstruction; but it was time the Committee reported Progress. That day, at 2 o'clock, they were to have a most important discussion on the Irish University Bill, and he must ask the Government to allow them to adjourn the further discussion of Votes.
MR. PARNELLdid not see why this Vote should not be postponed. It was one which he and other hon. Members distinctly objected to. The chaplain at Chelsea Hospital received £400 a-year, while the allowance to the Roman Catholic chaplain was only £25. It would, no doubt, be said that there were more Protestants than Roman Catholics at the Chelsea Hospital; but that was not so at the Kilmainham Hospital, where the Protestant chaplain received £250 a-year, and the Roman Catholic chaplain only £75.
COLONEL STANLEYwas not aware that this Vote would be seriously opposed. This was a non-effective Vote, and he was willing to allow it to stand over and take those Votes which were not opposed.
Motion, by leave, withdrawn.
Original Motion, by leave, withdrawn.
(5.) £1,186,000, Out-Pensions, agreed to.
(6.) £178,600, Superannuation Allowances, agreed to.
(7.) £37,800, Militia, Yeomanry Cavalry, and Volunteer Corps.
SIR ARTHUR HAYTERsaid, that the retiring allowances to Volunteer officers had increased from £4,000 to £4,500. Was that on account of the increased number of old adjutants retiring?
COLONEL STANLEYreplied, that the increase was principally one day's pay for the extra day in Leap Year. This amount would vary occasionally.
SIR ARTHUR HAYTERsupposed that the recommendations of the Volunteer Committee with regard to the adjutants was still under the consideration of the Government, and whether the recommendations would be carried out would depend upon the Government.
Vote agreed to.
(8.) £1,100,000, Indian Home Charges.
COLONEL STANLEYremarked that this Vote was the Indian Home Charges connected with the Army, and was an old matter of account.
Vote agreed to.
House resumed.
Resolutions to be reported To-morrow;
Committee to sit again To-morrow.

BANKING AND JOINT STOCK COMPANIES (re-committed) BILL.

  QUESTION.
  MR. W. E. FORSTERasked if a day could be fixed for this Bill in Committee?
  SIR HENRY SELWIN-IBBETSON: We will take it to-morrow.

SUMMARY JURISDICTION BILL. [BILL 274.]
(Mr. Secretary Cross, Mr. Attorney General, Mr. Solicitor General, Sir Matthew Ridley.)
SUMMARY JURISDICTION BILL. [BILL 274.]

  CONSIDERATION OF LORDS' AMENDMENTS.
  MR. DILLWYNobjected to the Bill being taken then, as the Amendments had only been delivered to Members the previous morning.
  MR. ASSHETON CROSS: These Amendments are purely draft Amendments.
  MR. PARNELLsaid, it would be more satisfactory if they had a little longer time to consider these Amendments. There were a great many—in fact, six pages of Amendments—and supposing these were only verbal, still the House ought to have time to look at them.
  MR. ASSHETON CROSShad gone carefully through them himself, and they were simply draft Amendments which were necessary.
  Lords' Amendments considered and agreed to.

GAME LAWS AMENDMENT (SCOTLAND) BILL— [BILL 143.]
(The Lord Advocate, Mr. Secretary Cross.)
GAME LAWS AMENDMENT (SCOTLAND) BILL— [BILL 143.]

  COMMITTEE.
  Bill considered in Committee.
  (In the Committee.)
  Clauses agreed to.
  Preamble.
  THE LORD ADVOCATE (Mr. WATSON)wished to insert words to extend the operation of the Bill.
  THE CHAIRMANsaid, that an Instruction ought to have been given to the Committee, giving the Committee power to extend the Bill to England. The Amendment could not be taken now; but the Bill would have to be recommitted.
  Preamble agreed to.
  Bill reported; as amended, to be considered upon Thursday.

SUPPLY—REPORT.
Resolutions [2nd August] reported.
First Eleven Resolutions agreed to.
Twelfth Resolution read a second time.
COLONEL ARBUTHNOTsaid, that this was the only chance he should have this Session of raising a certain point, which was the inequality of pay to some classes of soldiers. He moved to reduce the Vote for the Army Service Corps by £500. Last year he called attention to this matter. The non-commissioned officers in the corps of artificers received 4s. 6d., while the same grade in the artillery service only received 1s. 9d. He would not press this matter, if it were not a real and a gross injustice. He would be satisfied if the Secretary of State for War would give him an assurance that this injustice would have his consideration, for it was not only unjust, but unwise, because such things increased the difficulty of getting good non-commissioned officers.
Amendment proposed, to leave out "£392,400," in order to insert "£391,900."—(Colonel Arbuthnot.)
Question proposed, "That '£392,400' stand part of the said Resolution."
COLONEL STANLEYhoped the hon. and gallant Member would not press this matter to a Division, because it was impossible for him to enter into the reconsideration of the Vote on Report. The matter was undoubtedly of importance, and last year he had informed the hon. and gallant Member that the question of the re-adjustment of the pay of non-commissioned officers would receive the consideration of the War Office. A Committee was sitting on the subject, and it was impossible to take the matter up now.
COLONEL ARBUTHNOTremarked, that he never had any intention of pressing his Amendment to a Division; but he would bring the matter again before the attention of his right hon. and gallant Friend in the shape of a Question. He begged to withdraw his Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Resolution agreed to.

METROPOLITAN BOARD OF WORKS (MONEY) BILL— [Bill 268.]
(Sir Henry Selwin-Ibbetson, Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer.)
METROPOLITAN BOARD OF WORKS (MONEY) BILL— [Bill 268.]

  SECOND READING.
  Order for Second Reading read.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Bill be now read a second time."—(Sir Henry Selwin-Ibbetson.)
  MR. MONKdid not think that the second reading of this Bill should be taken without some remark. The Bill was one which imposed taxes on the ratepayers to the amount of £2,500,000. He did not wish to oppose the progress of the Bill; but he rose for the purpose of asking for some explanation with regard to it from the Government. In the first place, it was a matter of very doubtful policy whether the Government ought to have brought in this 'Bill at all. It seemed to him that the Bill ought not to have been brought in by the Government, but by the Metropolitan Board itself. As he had said before, the Bill asked for £2,500,000 to be raised upon the ratepayers of the Metropolis. He wished to draw the particular attention of the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Treasury to Clause 10, by which it was provided that the powers of the Board should extend to a sum not exceeding £1,500,000, "or such other sum as the Treasury may approve." He did not know how those words had crept into the clause; but he should certainly oppose their introduction in Committee, unless some satisfactory explanation were given. The clause seemed to him rather loosely drawn, and he thought the whole of it should be left out after the words "one million five hundred thousand pounds," otherwise, the Metropolitan Board would have power to raise any further sum

  177
  without the sanction of Parliament, provided the Treasury should signify its approval. No doubt, there might be some difficulty in obtaining the sanction of the Treasury; but he did not think that those words should appear in a Bill of that nature. Clauses 26 and 28 also certainly required some explanation. He wished to know if the Metropolitan Board of Works had power to raise more than the £2,500,000 authorized by the Bill? These clauses seemed to him very objectionable; but, perhaps, some explanation could be given which would remove those obligations.
  SIR HENRY SELWIN-IBBETSONsaid, that he did not introduce the Bill with any remark, because it was simply a repetition of a Bill which the Treasury had used several times lately. The Bill was a safeguard to the House, because it really represented powers scattered over a number of Private Acts—some Management and some Private Acts. It would have required very considerable time for the Treasury to have brought them into one Act and to have submitted them annually to the purview of Parliament. The powers which were given by the Bill were those Contained in various Acts, and were now exercised by the Metropolitan Board without the know-lodge of the House at all The Treasury had insisted on all those powers being included in this Bill, and had thus brought the whole transactions of the Metropolitan Board under the eye of Parliament. With regard to the power given by Clause 40 to raise £1,500,000, to be increased if the Treasury should sanction it, that was really a similar power to that possessed by the Local Government Board in borrowing, sanctioned by that Office. He need hardly say that the Treasury would not exercise the power of permitting larger sums to be borrowed without very good cause, and he did not think there was any danger from its being placed in the Bill. It might be that a particular work might have required rather more than was contemplated and the Board had power to borrow; and then, perhaps, a case might be made out for the Treasury sanctioning their borrowing powers. He trusted to be able to make a more detailed explanation with regard to the Bill when they came to Committee and Report. He hoped that the House
  178
  would hesitate before it did away with what really brought under the knowledge of Parliament and under Parliamentary control, borrowing powers which had before been increased without the control or knowledge of Parliament.
  Motion agreed to.
  Bill read a second time, and committed for Thursday.

CHARTERED BANKS (COLONIAL) BILL.
(Sir Henry Selwin-Ibbetson, Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer.)
CHARTERED BANKS (COLONIAL) BILL.

  [BILL 278.] SECOND READING.
  Order for Second Reading read.
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER, in moving that the Bill be now read a second time, said, that it was for the purpose of meeting the case of certain banks in the Colonies which had hitherto existed under charters granted by the Crown. It had been thought better, now that the system of issuing Charters had become quite obsolete, to put these banks under a general Act similar to that by which Companies were regulated in this country—namely, the Companies Act. Power was given to the banks to increase their capital, and other alterations, subject to the conditions which were provided in the Act. There was a provision that nothing authorized any of the banks to make any issue of notes other than they at present possessed, except by the sanction of the Governors of the Colonies in which they were situate.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Bill be now read a second time."—(Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer.)
  MR. COURTNEYdid not wish to object to the Bill; but he trusted that the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer would allow two or three days to elapse before they went into Committee upon it, for it seemed to him that it required a great deal of consideration.
  Motion agreed to.
  Bill read a second time, and committed for Thursday.

MOTIONS.

  PREVENTION OF CRIME BILL.
  On Motion of Mr. Secretary Cross, Bill to reduce the minimum term of Penal Servitude in the case of a previous conviction; and to amend the Law with respect to the notifications and reports made under sections five and eight of "The Prevention of Crimes Act, 1871," ordered to be brought in by Mr. Secretary Cross and Sir MATTHEW RIDLEY.
  Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 281.]

  NAVY AND ARMY EXPENDITURE, 1877–8.
  Resolved, That this House will, upon Wednesday, resolve itself into a Committee to consider the Savings and Deficiencies upon the Grants for Navy and Army Services in the year ending on the 31st day of March 1878, and the temporary sanction obtained from the Treasury by the Navy and Army Departments to Expenditure not provided for in the Grants for that year.
  Ordered, That the Appropriation Accounts for the Navy and Army Departments, which were presented upon the 25th day of February last, and upon the 6th day of March last, be referred to the Committee.—(Sir Henry Selwin-Ibbetson.)
  House adjourned at a quarter before Three o'clock.